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DNA from the remains was analyzed by the University of North Texas Center for Human Identification and the victim is now being identified as a white female with a "large build.
The Macomb County Medical Examiner's Office previously confirmed the victim's race.
The DNA is now entered into a searchable database to be periodically checked for possible identification, Sterling Heights police say."I've been in law enforcement since 1976 and this ranks right up there with one of the strangest things I've been involved in," Sterling Heights Police Lt. Luke Riley said after the discovery in August.
The remains contained a tattoo, a photo of which police released in an attempt to identify the victim.
The Macomb County Medical Examiner determined, based on the level of decomposition, that the chunks of flesh hadn't been in the sewer very long.
"We're talking hours within 24 hours," Riley said.
The pieces were discovered by public works employees caught in a grate about 57 feet below road level in a gravity flow sewer that serves 24 communities and 833,000 customers in Oakland and Macomb counties, which "defies explanation," Sterling Heights Public Works Commissioner Anthony V. Marrocco said. "How the body parts got into the interceptor is another mystery."
Riley said the pieces contained underlying body fat and tissues and were not just skin.


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Through the mediation of Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz, France and Austria sign the Alliance of Versailles. This agreement, coupled with the Treaty of Westminster recently signed between Britain and Prussia, reverses the pattern of longstanding alliances which saw France and Prussia in opposition to Britain and Austria, and thus constitutes a Diplomatic Revolution. By the terms of the agreement, the Holy Roman Empire is to remain neutral in an Anglo-French war, but either party will aid the other if attacked by Prussia. In addition, France is to recognise the Austrian Netherlands and to aid Austria if the latter is attacked by Turkey.
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subset: commoncrawl


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The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of Historyby Philip Bobbitt
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"We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another state . . . This is no longer true, owing to advances in international telecommunications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. The change in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be as profound as any that the State has thus far undergone."
—from the Prologue
The Shield of Achilles is a classic inquiry into the nature of the State, its origin in war, and its drive for peace and legitimacy. Philip Bobbitt, a professor of constitutional law and a historian of nuclear strategy, has served in the White House, the Senate, the State Department, and the National Security Council in both Democratic and Republican administrations, and here he brings his formidable experience and analytical gifts to bear on our changing world. Many have observed that the nation-state is dying, yet others have noted that the power of the State has never been greater. Bobbitt reconciles this paradox and introduces the idea of the market-state, which is already replacing its predecessor. Along the way he treats such themes as the Long War (which began in 1914 and ended in 1990). He explains the relation of violence to legitimacy, and the role of key individuals in fates that are partially—but only partially—determined.
This book anticipates the coalitional war against terrorism and lays out alternative futures for the world. Bobbitt shows how nations might avoid the great power confrontations that have a potential for limitless destruction, and he traces the origin and evolution of the State to such wars and the peace conferences that forged their outcomes into law, from Augsburg to Westphalia to Utrecht to Vienna to Versailles.
The author paints a powerful portrait of the ever-changing interrelatedness of our world, and he uses his expertise in law and strategy to discern the paths that statehood will follow in the coming years and decades. Timely and perceptive, The Shield of Achilles will change the way we think about the world.
From the Hardcover edition.
Editorial Reviews
"I take my hat off to the author for the boldness of his enterprise, for his scholarship, and for his capacity to get the reader to think along new lines. The Shield of Achilles may well become a classic." —Paul Kennedy, The New York Review of Books
"Excellent . . . This book – with its masterly reappraisal of modern history and subtle elucidation of today's geopolitics – should be on every desk in the State Department." —National Review
"Philip Bobbit is to be saluted for undertaking an epic struggle to sort through an extraordinarily dynamic time in international affairs." —The Washington Post Book World
"Once in a great while, there comes a book so ambitious in scope and so original in its insights that it challenges our comfortable patterns of thought and provokes widespread discussion in academic and political circles . . . a rare and important book." —Fort Worth Star Telegram
"The Shield of Achilles should become required reading not only in the academy but for the military and civilian decision-makers of the industrialized world." —The Weekly Standard
"[The Shield of Achilles] will be one of the most important works in international relations published during the last fifty years." —Sir Michael Howard, author of War and the Liberal Conscience
"This is a bold book, a brave book, and a worthy primer for the essential study of where we go from here." —The Times (London)
[The Shield of Achilles] will be one of the most important works in international relations published during the last fifty years." –Sir Michael Howard, author of War and the Liberal Conscience
"This is a bold book, a brave book, and a worthy primer for the essential study of where we go from here." –The Times (London)
"We are all about to have our view of the world turned upside down by this superb book."–Chris Patten, The Guardian (UK)
"An extraordinarily sophisticated and comprehensive survey of war, peace, and nationhood. . . . Bobbitt has made a valuable contribution to wider understanding of how the world really works."–The Dallas Morning News
"Remarkable. . . An audacious, massively informed analysis of the nature of the modern state and of modern war."–Richard Overy, Literary Review
"A blockbuster on the history and future of the modern state. . . I defy you to read this and claim your understanding has not been enriched."–Adam Roberts, The Independent (UK)
"Awe-inspiring. An alarming glimpse of our future. . . argumentative, opinionated, brilliant. . . A triumph."–Evening Standard
"One of the key texts at the birth of the new century."–Philip Ziegler
"Wide-ranging, ambitiously conceived, and intelligently argued. . . . Bobbitt's future scenarios are based on an intelligent and cautiously realistic extrapolation of current security and political developments. We ignore them at our peril."–The Times Literary Supplement (UK)
"Remarkable. . . Breathtaking in its range of reference, forcefully written."–London Review of Books
"Fascinating. . . This book will certainly stimulate a needed discussion of America's foreign policy."–Christian Science Monitor
"Immensely and deliberately provocative. . . A passionate and worthy effort to make sense of what is clearly a brand new world."–New York Sun
"Detailed and provocative. . . . A valuable and intriguing look at where we have been and where we are going."–Booklist
"A brilliant, disquieting essay on geopolitics, warfare and the future of the state. . . . Few historical studies are as daring and engaging as this."–Kirkus Reviews
Product Details
- 9780307796905
- Publisher:
- Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group
- Publication date:
- 07/06/2011
- Sold by:
- Random House
- Format:
- NOOK Book
- Pages:
- 960
- Sales rank:
- 1,094,564
- File size:
Read an Excerpt
State of War
Paradise Lost
(Book III, lines 111—125)
. . . They therefore as to right belonged,
so were created, nor can justly accuse
their maker, or their making, or their fate,
as if predestination overruled
their will, disposed by absolute decree
or high foreknowledge: they themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
which had no less proved certain unforeknown.
So without least impulse or shadow of fate,
or aught by me immutably foreseen,
they trespass, authors to themselves in all
both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I formed them free, and free they must remain,
till they enthrall themselves . . .
--John Milton
Law, Strategy, and History
Law, Strategy, History--three ancient ideas whose interrelationship was perhaps far clearer to the ancients than it is to us, for we are inclined to treat these subjects as separate modern disciplines. Within each subject we expect economic or political or perhaps sociological causes to account for developments; we are unlikely to see any necessary relation among these three classical ideas. They do not appear to depend upon each other.
Of course we understand, from the point of view of any one of these three disciplines, how events in one can affect events in another. A war is won, and international law changes, as at the Nuremberg trials that followed World War II and called to account those who had obeyed orders they believed to be lawful. Or a war is lost, with the consequence that a new constitutional structure is imposed, as happened to Japan after World War II. Thus does strategy change law--and we call it history. Or the law of a state changes--as by the French Revolution, for example--and this change brings about the levée en masse that enables a Napoleon to conquer Europe through strategic genius; thus does law change strategy, and this too we call history. Or history itself brings new elements into play--a famine drives migration across a continent or technological innovation provides the stirrup--and an empire falls, and with its strategic collapse die also its laws. With all these examples we are familiar, but we understand this interrelationship as the by-product of cause and effect, the mere result of wars, famine, revolution, in which history is simply the record of events, organized according to the usual subject matters. We scarcely see that the perception of cause and effect itself--history--is the distinctive element in the ceaseless, restless dynamic by means of which strategy and law live out their necessary relationship to each other. For law and strategy are not merely made in history--a sequence of events and culminating effects--they are made of history. It is the self-portrayal of a society that enables it to know its own identity. (1) Without this knowledge a society cannot establish its rule by law because every system of laws depends upon the continuity of legitimacy, which is an attribute of identity. Furthermore, without such a self-portrayal, no society can pursue a rational strategy because it is the identity of the society that strategy seeks to promote, protect, and preserve. One might say that without its own history, its self-understanding, no society can have either law or strategy, because it cannot be constituted as an independent entity.
History, strategy, and law make possible legitimate governing institutions. For five centuries, the operation of these institutions has been synonymous with the presence of the modern state, and so we may be inclined to think of the subjects of these disciplines--history, strategic studies, jurisprudence--as mere manifestations of the State. Such a reaction is natural enough with respect to law: some writers, such as Kelsen (2) and Austin, (3) have held that there is no law without the State. And other writers, such as Machiavelli (4) and Bodin, (5) present strategy as an aspect of the State, for it is the State that sets the terms of engagement pursued by generals, that fields their armies and declares their wars or announces their capitulations. It is even plausible to regard history in this way: for this reason, Hegel wrote that history ended at the Battle of Jena, with the birth of the state-nation, for history ends with the creation of an institution that makes the Absolute attainable. (6) These reactions are understandable but they are misguided.
The State exists by virtue of its purposes, and among these are a drive for survival and freedom of action, which is strategy; for authority and legitimacy, which is law; for identity, which is history. To put it differently, there is no state without strategy, law, and history, and, to complicate matters, these three are not merely interrelated elements, they are elements each composed at least partly of the others. The precise nature of this composition defines a particular state and is the result of many choices. States may be militaristic, legalistic, and traditional to varying degrees, but every state is some combination of these elements and can be contrasted with every other state--and with its own predecessors--in these ways.
The legal and strategic choices a society confronts are often only recombinations of choices confronted and resolved in the past, now remade in a present condition of necessity and uncertainty. Law cannot come into being until the state achieves a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Similarly, a society must have a single legitimate government for its strategic designs to be laid; otherwise, the distinction between war and civil war collapses, and strategy degenerates into banditry. Until the governing institutions of a society can claim for themselves the sole right to determine the legitimate use of force at home and abroad, there can be no state. Without law, strategy cannot claim to be a legitimate act of state. Only if law prevails can it confer legitimacy on strategic choices and give them a purpose.* Yet the legitimacy necessary for law and for strategy derives from history, the understanding of past practices that characterizes a particular society.
Today, all major states confront the apparently bewildering task of determining a new set of rules for the use of military force. Commentators in many parts of the world have observed a curious vacillation and fecklessness on the part of the great powers at the very time those powers ought to be most united in their goals, for the Long War that divided them has now ended. Or perhaps it is the end of the Long War that accounts for such widespread confusion. Because the ideological confrontation that once clearly identified the threats to the states of either camp has evaporated, it has left these states uncertain as to how to configure, much less deploy, their armed forces. (7) What seems to characterize the present period is a confusion about how to count the costs and benefits of intervention, preparedness, and alliance. What does the calculus for the use of force yield us when we have done our sums? Only an unconvincing result that cannot silence the insistent question: "What are our forces for?" (8) Because no calculus can tell us that. We are at a moment when our understanding of the very purposes of the State is undergoing historic change. Neither strategy nor law will be unaffected. Until this change is appreciated, we will continue the dithering and the ad hockery, the affectations of cynicism and the placid deceit that so typifies the international behavior of the great powers in this period, a period that ought to be the hour of our greatest coherence and conviction. It is not that the United States did or did not decide to go into Somalia or Bosnia; it's that the United States has made numerous decisions, one after the other, in both directions. And the same thing may be said of the pronouncements of the other great powers regarding North Korea, Iraq, and Rwanda. "Ad hoc strategies" is almost a contradiction in terms, because the more states respond to the variations of the hour, the less they benefit from strategic planning.
The reason the traditional strategic calculus no longer functions is that it depends on certain assumptions about the relationship between the State and its objectives that the end of this long conflict has cast in doubt. That calculus was never intended to enable a state to choose between competing objectives: rather, that calculus depends upon the axiomatic requirement of the State to survive by putting its security objectives first. We are now entering a period, however, in which the survival of the State is paradoxically imperiled by such threat-based assumptions because the most powerful states do not face identifiable state-centered threats that in fact imperil their security. Having vanquished its ideological competitors, the democratic, capitalist, parliamentary state no longer faces great-power threats, threats that would enable it to configure its forces by providing a template inferred from the capabilities of the adversary state. Instead, the parliamentary state manifests vulnerabilities that arise from a weakening of its own legitimacy. This constitutional doubt is only exacerbated by the strategic confusion abroad for which it is chiefly responsible. So the alliance of parliamentary great powers,* having won their historic triumph, find themselves weaker than ever, constantly undermining their own authority at home by their inability to use their influence effectively abroad. With a loosening grip on their domestic orders, these powers are ever less inclined to devote themselves to maintaining a world order. The strategic thinking of states accustomed to war does not fit them for peace, which requires harmony and trust, nor can such thinking yet be abandoned without risking a collapse of legitimacy altogether because the State's role in guaranteeing security is the one responsibility that is not being challenged domestically and thus the one to which it clings. We have entered a period in which, however, states must include in the calculus of force the need to maintain world order. This is not the first such period; indeed, the last epoch of this kind was ended by the eruption of the conflict that has just closed, leaving us so disoriented. Accordingly, there is much to learn from the study of that conflict, and also from earlier eras that were marked by changes in the constitutional form and strategic practices of the State.
Preliminarily, there are a few widespread preconceptions that must be put to one side. In contrast to the prevalent view that war is the result of a decision made by an aggressor, I will assume that, as a general matter, it takes two states to go to war. The common picture many Americans and Europeans have of states at war is that they came into hostilities as a result of the aggression of one party. It is like a class bully in a schoolyard who provokes a fistfight in order to terrorize his classmates. But the move to war is an act of the State and not of boys. States that wish to aggrandize themselves, or to depredate others, may employ aggression, but they do not seek war. Rather it is the state against whom the aggression has been mounted, typically, that makes the move to war, which is a legal and strategic act, when that state determines it cannot acquiesce in the legal and strategic demands of the aggressor. So it was with Germany, Britain, and France in 1939. (9) So it was with Athens and Sparta in 431 b.c. A corollary to this idea is the perhaps counterintuitive notion that sometimes a state will make the move to war even when it judges it will lose the war that ensues. A state that decides it can no longer acquiesce in a deteriorating position must ask itself whether, if it chooses to resist, it will nevertheless be better off, even if it cannot ultimately prevail in the eventual conflict.
Many persons in the West believe that war occurs only because of miscalculation; sometimes this opinion is combined with the view that only aggressors make war. Persons holding these two views would have a hard time justifying the wisdom of Alliance resistance to Communism the last fifty years because it was usually the U.S. and her allies and not the Soviets who resolutely and studiedly escalated matters to crises threatening war. Besides the obvious cases involving Berlin in 1952, or Cuba in 1962, we might add the decisions to make the move to war in South Korea and in South Viet Nam, the nature and motivations of which decisions are underscored by the persistent refusals of the Americans and their allies to bomb China or invade North Viet Nam. That is, in both cases the allied forces fought to stop aggression by going to war and declined to employ decisive counteraggression.
Those persons who concede these facts and conclude that these decisions were wrong, and yet who applaud the victory of the democracies in the Cold War, are perhaps obliged to reconsider their views. For it was this peculiar combination of a willingness to make the move to war coupled with a benign nonaggression, even protectiveness, toward the other great powers that ultimately gave the Alliance victory. Sometimes this matter is confused in the debate over precisely how this victory was achieved. Was the Cold War won because U.S.-led forces militarily denied Communist forces those strategic successes that would have sustained a world revolution? Or was it won because northern-tier markets were able to build an international capitalist system that vastly outperformed the socialist system (and an international communications network that informed the world of this achievement)? Such a debate misses the point, perhaps because it is suffused with the assumptions about war and miscalculation to which I have referred. Neither military nor economic success alone could have ended the Cold War, because neither alone could deliver legitimacy to the winning state, or deny it to the loser. Moreover, neither military nor economic success was possible without the other: can one imagine a European Union having developed without Germany, or with a Germany strategically detached from the West? Even the ill-fated American mission in Viet Nam contributed to the ultimate Alliance victory: a collapse of military resistance in Indochina in 1964 would have had political effects on the very states of the region whose economies have since become so dynamic (analogous to those effects that would have been felt in Japan following a collapse of resistance in Korea in 1950). The political and economic, far from being decisive causal factors on their own, are really two faces of the same phenomenon. Only the coherent union of a constitutional order and a strategic vision could achieve the kind of results that ended, rather than merely interrupted, such an epochal war. We shall have to bear this in mind with regard to maintaining either success, political or economic, in the future.
Contemporary imagination, however, like so many aspects of contemporary life, is suffused with presentism. This is often commented on by those who lament the current lack of interest in the past, but it is equally manifest, ironically, in our projections about the future. This leads us to the third preconception that must be dismissed: namely, that future states of affairs must be evaluated in comparison with the present, rather than with the unknowable future. One encounters this often in daily life, in the adolescent's decision to quit school so "I can make more money" (because going to school pays less than working in a fast-food shop) or the columnist's claim that "if we balanced the budget, interest rates would drop and growth would increase" (because the government would not be adding to the demand for borrowed money). In those cases the speaker is making the mistake of comparing a future state of affairs with the present, and omitting to imagine what an alternative future state of affairs might be like (if he stayed in school and qualified for a better job; if the government steeply increased taxes in order to balance the budget), which would provide the proper comparison. If this seems altogether too obvious, let me give one famous example of this preconception.*
Many commentators believe that the turning point in the 1980 U.S. presidential elections came in the first debate between the candidates when Governor Reagan asked the American people to consider the question "Are you better off today than you were four years ago?" Indeed, this riposte was so successful that it was used in the 1984 debate by Reagan's opponent, Walter Mondale; and used again by George Bush against Michael Dukakis; and then used by Governor Clinton against President Bush.
Such a question, however, can scarcely be the measure of a presidential administration because the one thing we know is that things will never stay the same for the length of a presidential term, regardless of who is in power. Governor Reagan ought to have asked the public in 1980, "Are we better off now than we would have been if President Ford had held office these last four years?" This is the measure of the choice to be made, which might be phrased: "Will we be better off in four years, not 'than we are now' but 'because of the choice we are asked to make now'?"
The calculus employed by a state in order to determine when it is appropriate to make the move to war is, similarly, future-oriented. It asks: will the state be better or worse off, in the future, if in the present the state resorts to force to get its way? For half a millennium, the State has been an attractive institution for making political decisions precisely because it is potentially imperishable. The State, being highly future-oriented, can channel resources into the future and harness present energy for deferred gains. But this quality of futurism is also its vulnerability: the State is a clumsy instrument for persuading people to make sacrifices when objectives are in doubt, or to parry subtle long-term threats, because the interests of the people can easily be severed from those of the State when long-term objectives and goals are at issue. In the long term, as Keynes remarked, we are all dead. In periods in which the objectives to be pursued by the State are unclear, its very habits of orientation toward the future do not help to marshal the popular will, and thus the State is apt to be disabled from carrying out commitments that may be necessary for its ultimate security and the welfare of future generations to which it is, faute de mieux, committed. Threats such as the destruction of the ecology, the erosion of the capital base, potential threats to its critical infrastructure, and especially demographic developments all play on this vulnerability, for each such threat can call on a vocal domestic constituency that, out of reasonable motives but a present-minded orientation, can paralyze rational action. And, it should be noted, military power can quickly erode if a state does not accurately conceptualize the threats it actually faces, and thus neglects to adopt a strategy that meets those threats.
It is interesting to ask just what the United States, for example, at the end of the twentieth century took to be the objectives of its strategic calculus. According to a Pentagon White Paper at the time, there were three such objectives: deterrence, compellance, and reassurance. (10) It can be easily shown, however, that these three objectives were hangovers from the era just past, indeed that they were borrowed from theories about the objectives of nuclear strategy. What is less obvious is that, at the end of the war the Alliance had just won, objectives such as these were worse than useless because they tended to obscure the tasks that the United States had to undertake in order to redefine the goals of its national security policy. Let us look at each of the three purported objectives.
Deterrence is an extraordinarily limited theory that relies on a reasonable but extraordinarily broad assumption. That assumption is that the State will make decisions as a result of balancing the benefits to be achieved by a course of action against the costs incurred in pursuing those benefits by the particular means proposed. This assumption, in turn, depends on the commonsense observation that human beings can imagine pain greater than that they now endure, that they can imagine happiness greater than that in which they now delight, and that they will evaluate possible futures in terms of their mixtures of these two imaginary states. For instance, deterrence is a common means in criminal law, in the classroom, even in the family. "Don't even think of parking here" reads a familiar sign that reflects this approach.
As a strategy, deterrence makes most sense in the extreme case of nuclear deterrence, where the interest of the state in simple survival intersects the clarity of the danger of annihilation. Deterrence is more problematic, however, when the calculations on which it relies become more complex, or when these calculations are clouded by cultural differences and varying attitudes toward risk, or when the facts on which such calculations depend are uncertain or colored by wishful thinking. In other words, the idea of deterrence is itself so much a part of human nature that it can be applied only as it is affected by the various fallacies and shortcomings to which human nature is prey. Moreover, the strategic theory of deterrence is of a very limited application. It is scarcely deterrence, much less nuclear deterrence, that prevents the United States from invading Canada (or the other way around). Our political relations with Canada--an amalgam of our mutual history (including past wars against each other), our shared institutions, our intertwined economies, our alliances--are what render the idea of an attack by one on the other absurd enough to have been the basis for a popular satiric comedy. Rather, military deterrence is a concept that is useful within war or the approach to war, once political relations have become so strained that hostilities only await opportunity. It is only because we have lived for so long at war that we are inclined to miss this point, and that we have come to think of deterrence as a prominent feature of the international relations of a peacetime regime.
Drawing on work by the economist Jacob Viner, Bernard Brodie introduced into American strategic thinking the remarkable idea of nuclear deterrence. To see how revolutionary an innovation this was, we need only recall Brodie's famous conclusion. He wrote, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose." (11) This makes a great deal of sense when dealing with nuclear weapons. The destructiveness of such weapons and their possession by our adversaries required a revolution in thinking about the purposes of our military forces. The military managers and politicians of the 1950s who were inclined to treat nuclear weapons as though they were simply bigger bombs had to learn a new, eerie form of strategic calculation. Deterrence, as a general matter, however, is a poor mission statement for a state's armed forces. No state, even one as wealthy as the United States, can afford to maintain the forces that would successfully deter all other states acting independently or in combination. One can see from the Pentagon White Paper that this idea of Brodie's in the nuclear context--the use of armed forces to avert war--has now infiltrated the conventional, that is, the non-nuclear mission statement. Not only is it unrealistic to assert that the United States must maintain forces so vast as to be a matter of general, conventional deterrence. It also begs the one important question at the end of the Cold War: whom are we supposed to deter? Only when this question is answered can we so configure our forces as to realize such a policy. Deterrence does not come with its own specifications. If it takes two to war, then the idea of deterring wars without a specified adversary or threat is nonsense. The simple intuitive appeal of being so strong militarily that no one dares threaten you is an absurd idea for a state. Indeed, such an idea, however appealing, can actually weaken the state because the diversion of its resources into an undirected defense establishment undermines the economic and political strength the state will require should it find itself in a dangerous confrontation.
Advances in weapons technology make it possible for the leading states of the developed world to produce weapons of mass destruction that are so deadly relative to their size and cost that they can bypass even the most sophisticated attempts at defense by attrition. A corollary to this fact is that these weapons can be deployed clandestinely, so that the possibility of retaliation can be defied, and thus the strategy of deterrence rendered inoperable.
Compellance, too, is an idea that originated in the strategy of nuclear weapons and has been imported by the White Paper into the world of conventional forces. There is some considerable irony in this. Thomas Schelling introduced the neologism "compellance" as a complement to "deterrence" because this ancient concept of the use of force had become lost in the bizarre new world of nuclear strategy. (12) Schelling used "compellance" to describe the coercive use of nuclear weapons. This occurs when the threat of the use of such weapons seeks to compel an adversary state to actually do something it would otherwise not do, rather than merely refrain from doing something it would like to do (which is the purpose of deterrence). Compellance has been a purpose for armed force or, indeed, violence generally throughout the life of mankind. Yet it too is inappropriate as a mission statement for American forces. Only if we have a clear political objective can we determine what form of compellance is appropriate strategically. To say the mission of our forces is "compellance" is very like saying the mission of our minds is "thought." It is both a true and an empty sentence.
Compellance has had a good run lately. It was compellance that forced Saddam Hussein to evacuate Kuwait, once he had occupied and annexed it. It was compellance that forced Slobodan Milosevic to abandon Kosovo, a province he hitherto controlled utterly. These were worthy objectives, even if our execution of our war plans was not faultless. It would be good to have had a Bush Doctrine or a Clinton Doctrine, spelling out precisely for what reason and in what contexts the United States will compel other states by force, not only because the public in a democracy has a right to such an articulation of purpose, but also because without such limiting guidelines, compellance has a way of bringing forth countervailing force. When he was asked what the lesson of the Gulf War was, the Indian chief of staff is reported to have said, "Never fight the United States without nuclear weapons."
Interestingly, the third idea said to make up the mission of U.S. forces today is an idea also drawn from nuclear strategy. Sir Michael Howard is the father of the notion of "reassurance" in nuclear strategy. (13) In a series of essays and lectures he stressed reassurance as the key element in American nuclear strategy--an element not directed at our adversaries, but toward our allies. Much stronger forces are required, he concluded, to reassure a nervous ally who is dependent on U.S. nuclear protection than are actually required to deter a targeted enemy from attack. Like the contributions of Brodie and Schelling, this insight has been of crucial importance in the development and understanding of nuclear strategy. I doubt, however, that it can be of much use in the absence of a threat to the Atlantic Alliance, or to any of the states who have relied upon the American nuclear umbrella. Of what exactly are we to reassure our allies?
Reassurance as an idea in nuclear strategy depends on the crucial distinction between extended and central deterrence. The former term applies to the extension of American nuclear protection to Europe and Japan; the latter term refers to the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter attack on the American homeland. I have argued elsewhere that extended deterrence has driven U.S. nuclear strategy, not central deterrence. Reflecting on the evolution of nuclear strategy in Democracy and Deterrence, I concluded in 1983 that:
The fate of the world does not hang on whether the U.S. or the USSR reduce their weapons or on whether they freeze their technologies. Indeed it should be easy to see that were either goal pursued too single-mindedly, there would result a much more dangerous world as other powers entered the nuclear field, approaching parity with the superpowers. Rather, our situation will be determined by whether Euro-Japanese security is enhanced, from their perspective, by our strategies, military and diplomatic; whether the public can be made to understand and support such steps as do enhance the extended environment when it has been told more or less constantly that it is the number of weapons and the advance of technology that causes (or cures) the problem. . . . (14)
I still endorse this view, but such reassurance is now far less easy to achieve because it has largely ceased to be defined. Reassurance played a crucial role during the final phase of the Long War, from 1949 to 1990, because it prevented multipolarity--the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states such as Germany and Japan--and thereby made possible the quite stable deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reassurance, I will argue, has an equally vital role to play in the twenty-first century as our strategies move toward a greater emphasis on defense and deception. This will not be possible, however, if we continue to think and plan as though the stable relations that attended the possessors of weapons of mass destruction in the Cold War are somehow intrinsic to such weapons. Indeed, in my view the use of nuclear weapons is likelier in the first fifty years of the twenty-first century than at any time in the last fifty years of the twentieth century, but we are lulled into complacency about this because of the nuclear stability we experienced in that period. As one commentator has put it,
our current strategic thought tends to project this peculiar experience into the future. It assumes that the use of mass destruction weapons will either be deterred or be confined to localized disasters caused by strategically incompetent terrorists. Competent adversaries, this thinking implicitly assumes, will have to emulate the "revolutionary" military technology that we now possess, but at the same time adhere to our old, counterrevolutionary strategy, as worked out in our superpower rivalry with the former Soviet Union. But, unfortunately, our old strategy is not an immutable law of nature. A highly competent enemy might well emerge who will seek to destroy the United States by using mass destruction weapons in a truly revolutionary kind of warfare. (15)
Thus we won't be able to reassure our peer competitors because we will fail to appreciate the true threats they face. Instead, mesmerized by "rogue states" whose hostility to the United States is essentially a by-product of our global reach that frustrates their regional ambitions, we will find ourselves increasingly at odds with the other great powers. Until we know what will serve the function of maintaining the Alliance that has become a proto–world order, we know not what to assure our allies of (or insure them against). The problem for the United States has become to identify its interests and future threats so that it can use its power to strengthen the world order that it has fought, successfully, to achieve, and that can, if properly structured and maintained, re-enforce American security to a far greater degree than the United States could possibly do alone. This is essentially an intellectual problem, just as the solution devised by the United States and its allies to the universal vulnerability that attended the development of nuclear weapons was an intellectual solution. (16) But faced with the immense difficulties of anticipating a new strategic environment—both at the state level, where peer competitors may emerge as threats, and at the technological level, where weapons of mass destruction make nonsense out of our defense preparations—who is eager to take the bureaucratic and political risks inherent in accepting this challenge? (17) How much more likely it is that we will extrapolate from the world we know, with incompetent villains and heroic (and recent!) success stories.
Our present world, this "Indian summer"* as one writer puts it, not only presents a beguiling invitation to complacency reinforced by new technological possibilities. It also offers an opportunity to undertake some fundamental reassessments without the terrible pressure of war. Recent American successes in the Gulf War and in Yugoslavia, however, may tend to discourage any too-radical revisions.
Paul Bracken correctly concludes,
The focus on the immediate means that a larger, more important question is not being asked: should planners redesign the U.S. military for an entirely new operational environment, taking account of revolutionary changes in military technology and the possible appearance of entirely new kinds of competitors? (18)
And Fred Iklé adds that
. . . military planners, as well as most scholars, would shrug off these cosmic questions and instead nibble at the edges of the problem—worrying, say, about whether a tactical nuclear weapon could be stolen in Russia and sold to Iran, or whether Iraq might still be hiding some Second World War–type biological or chemical agents. (19)
A failure to take seriously the new strategic environment can have costly consequences in the domestic theatre as well. Should the use of a weapon of mass destruction occur, the state in which this happens will undergo a crisis in its constitutional order. How it prepares for this crisis will determine the fate of its society, not only its sheer survival, but the conditions of that survival. Some societies may become police states in an effort to protect themselves; some may disintegrate because they cannot agree on how to protect themselves.
The constitutional order of a state and its strategic posture toward other states together form the inner and outer membrane of a state. That membrane is secured by violence; without that security, a state ceases to exist. What is distinctive about the State is the requirement that the violence it deploys on its behalf must be legitimate; that is, it must be accepted within as a matter of law, and accepted without as an appropriate act of state sovereignty. Legitimacy must cloak the violence of the State, or the State ceases to be. Legitimacy, however, is a matter of history and thus is subject to change as new events emerge from the future and new understandings reinterpret the past. In the following chapters, we will see how the standards against which state legitimacy is measured have undergone profound change, animated by innovations in the strategic environment and transformations of the constitutional order of states.
It is often said today that the nation-state is defunct. (20) Recently, in a single year, two books were published with almost identical titles, The End of the Nation-State (21) and The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies. (22) To these can now be added Martin van Creveld's distinguished The Rise and Decline of the State. (23) There are skeptics, however, who point out that both nationalism and the State are thriving enterprises. Moreover, for all the transfer of functions to the private sector, we don't really want the State to fade away altogether. There are many things we want the State and not the private sector to do because we want our politics rather than the market to resolve certain kinds of difficult choices. And, it must be conceded, the market itself has need of the State to set the legal framework that permits the market to function.
What is wrong in this debate over the demise of the nation-state is the identification of the nation-state with the State itself. We usually date the origin of the nation-state to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years' War and recognized a constitutional system of states. In fact, however, the nation-state is relatively new—being little more than a century old—and has been preceded by other forms of the State, including forms that long antedated the Thirty Years' War. The nation-state is dying, but this only means that, as in the past, a new form is being born. This new form, the market-state, will ultimately be defined by its response to the strategic threats that have made the nation-state no longer viable. Different models of this form will contend. It is our task to devise means by which this competition can be maintained without its becoming fatal to the competitors.
*This is the true import of Clausewitz's celebrated remark that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."
*A great power is a state capable of initiating an epochal war, that is, a conflict that threatens the constitutional survival of the leaders of the society of states. Attacks by lesser states can be swiftly rebuffed (as Iraq learned in the Gulf War). Even a state whose forces can be decisive in a particular campaign—like North Viet Nam's—can neither initiate nor terminate an epochal war. Its attacks are insufficient to call the constitutional survival of its adversary into question or to settle such questions when they are posed by others.
*Even a thoughtful commentator can succumb to this fallacy, as when Michael Mandelbaum asserted that the NATO mission had failed because the people of the Balkans "emerged from the war considerably worse off than they had been before." James Steinberg, "A Perfect Polemic," Foreign Affairs (November/December 1999): 129.
*Written before September 11, 2001; see the epilogue.
NOTES: INTRODUCTION: Law, STRATEGY, AND HISTORY
1. Cf. La Pietra Report (2000), which affirms national histories, but of a very different kind. "Instead of assuming the nation to be the "natural" unit of historical analysis, it acknowledges a variety of relevant and interrelated geographical units of history. It urges not only the exploration of the different historical forces, including transnational ones, that made and sustained the nation and national identities but also the importance, always changing, of the nation in relation to other social units, from the town, to the transnational region, to solidarity with all peoples of color, to international corporations." Thomas Bender, "Writing National History in a Global Age," Correspondence: An International Review of Culture and Society, no. 7 (Winter 2000/2001): 14.
2. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945).
3. John Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [1832]).
4. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (University of Chicago Press, 1985).
5. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (B. Blackwell, 1955 [1606]).
6. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807), trans. A. V. Miller and J. N. Findlay (Oxford, 1979). Also see Roger Kimball, "The Difficulty with Hegel," New Criterion 19 (September 2000): 4.
7. William A. Owens, "The Wrong Argument about Readiness," New York Times (September 1, 2000): A27.
8. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, "It's Harder Now to Figure Out Compelling National Interests," New York Times (May 31, 1992): E5.
9. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Penguin, 1961) for a related argument.
10. U.S. Department of the Army, Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994). See also the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997, defenselink.mil.pubs/qdr/) and the Bottom-Up Review (October 1993, fas.org/man/docs/bur/).
11. Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 76.
12. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
13. Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War," Survival 36 (1994–1995): 165.
14. Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 286.
15. Fred Ikle, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare." The National Interest 47 (1997): 9.
16. Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence, 19–96.
17. But see Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999).
18. Paul Bracken, "The Military after Next," The Washington Quarterly 16 (1993): 157.
19. Fred Iklé, "The Next Lenin."
20. See also Robert D. Kaplan, "Fort Leavenworth and the Eclipse of Nationhood," Atlantic Monthly (September 1996), and Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (Free Press, 1991); see also van Creveld's The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
21. Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State (University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
22. Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1995).
23. Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge, U.K., 1999). See also Empire.
From the Hardcover edition.
Meet the Author
Philip Bobbitt teaches constitutional law at the University of Texas, where he holds the A. W. Walker Centennial Chair. He was formerly the Anderson Senior Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, where he was a member of the Modern History faculty. He was later the Marsh Christian Fellow in War Studies at King's College, London. He has served as associate counsel to the president for intelligence and international security, legal counsel to the Senate Select Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair, the counselor on international law at the Department of State, as well as director of intelligence, senior director for critical infrastructure, and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council. He has written several previous books on nuclear strategy, social choice, and constitutional law. He lives in Austin, Washington, and London.
From the Hardcover edition.
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Larry Moore tags along as Jenny Nelson, a freshman at William Jewell, picks out a perfect pumpkin for Halloween.
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Best route map between Jonesboro, AR and Nashville, TN. This route take about 282 Miles.
The distance and estimated time is placed on the right depending on the status of the road.
, 17:24
* You can see Jonesboro, AR and Nashville, TN photos above. We provide this photos from Google Panoramio service.
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"You think yours is bad," said the woman, a complete stranger, who stopped in the cash register line at Music Millennium on East Burnside on Monday night. "Look at this. I just had it taken. I even combed my hair."
She had obviously read my Monday column on how to get a better DMV photo. And yeah, her picture was bad. She looked like she had stumbled in from the parking lot after downing a fifth of Jack Daniels.
She's one of several strangers and friends who have approached me about the topic (certainly, some have shown me flattering photos that they carry as a small piece of photogenic pride in their pockets).
Meanwhile, a couple dozen readers have e-mailed and called with comments and questions.
Merna A. from Fairview called to say that the DMV's Jeremy Ting appeared to give me the happy face on the question of whether it's OK to smile. Ting told me that he wants all drivers to smile (in fact, that's the big secret to getting a stellar license photo).
Merna said she just renewed her license at the Gresham DMV office. "I gotta tell you," she said in a voice mail. "They won't let you smile. They told me they couldn't do that anymore. It was something illegal or some silly thing. Now I have this license where I look like I'm madder than heck."
Sorry, Merna. Sounds like you found yourself on the wrong end of a cranky state employee.
"You can smile," DMV spokesman David House confirmed this morning. "Perhaps we have a misinformed employee. But I don't know how that could be with all the training."
Or, like I said, the photographer was just having a bad day.
Jim Curtis of Hillsboro called to say he doesn't understand why motorists can't get a hard copy of their licenses at the counter any longer. "I asked why they mail it to us now," Curtis said, "and all I got was a shrug of the shoulders."
Actually, Mr. Curtis, it's to protect you, me and everyone else from identity thieves.
Last year, DMV began using new cameras with facial recognition software. The state needs to upload your new photo into a database with thousands of other pictures to make sure it matches your last license -- and it doesn't match someone trying to assume your identity.
"There's so much data to be crunched that it can only be done overnight," House said. "It can't be done over the counter."
If the software matches the photo to the facial features of Shady McShade of Mollala instead of Jim Curtis, then DMV passes the information to State Police, voids the license and notifies you.
The temporary paper license we have to carry for a week doesn't seem like such a big inconvenience when you consider the time that identity-theft victims have to spend getting their credit and names back.
Interestingly, if you smile too much, the software may reject your first photo and require a retake. "Of course, that also applies to someone who frowns too much," House said.
Speaking of frowning (and getting back to that grumpy-DMV-employees thing), several readers contacted me to share stories of what they're convinced where intentionally bad photos.
For example, Fred Albert wrote:
"I remember getting a photo for this some years ago. The DMV employee taking the photos told me to look down and stay behind the white line (the line of tape on the floor). I did so and at the exact moment I brought my head up he took the photo, that I was in no way expecting. He didn't say anything to get me ready and deliberately didn't give me any time to realize that he was about to take my picture. It was awful, and I was angry about it. I'm sure that he was either in a bad mood that day, or that he just had a negative disposition in general."
Yeah, that's rough.
Noting that DMV charges $25.50 each time a driver requests a retake, another reader smelled conspiracy. "Are they intentionally taking bad photos?" the anonymous caller said. "You bet. That way they can take advantage of our vanity and make extra revenue."
Some readers said Coscto and TriMet actually take worse pictures than DMV.
In fact, Joan Harvey, a colleague at The Oregonian, e-mailed to let me know that many downtown residents aren't pleased with the TriMet passes they're receiving now that Fareless Square is gone.
"It's a great deal, only $10 for two years," she wrote. "But the photographs they're taking are all squished up. Everyone I've talked to has the same problem. We look like we're in a fun house mirror. And to add insult to injury, the bus drivers don't know what they are and make a big deal when we try to flash it at them."
She wasn't interested in sharing her photo.
Actually, maybe I should stop complaining about my license photo. As some have noted, it's not all that bad -- considering.
Still, I'm convinced that DMV uses a special lens to accentuate chubby cheeks.
-- Joseph Rose, Twitter: pdxcommute


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A major bridge over Highway 45 will come down Friday night as part of prep work for the Zoo Interchange project.
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Show #2896
Medal of Honor Recipient Staff Sergeant Ty Michael Carter, Hayden Panettiere, and In The Valley Below.
PLUS: tennis grunts; Trump University; and a ferry fender-bender in the harbor.
" . . . and now, the magically delicious . . . . . . . David Letterman!"
-"The United States government says a conflict in Syria would last no more than two days . . . . which is code for 'a decade.'"
-"A ferry carrying visitors to the Statue of Liberty crashed into the island yesterday. They say the captain failed to heed warnings of large statues in the area."
The U.S. Open is underway and is being enjoyed by millions who do not subscribe to Time Warner Cable. For the real hard core tennis fans, they can always tune in and just follow the grunts. Over a black screen with "Just The Grunts" chyron, we hear the grunts of the players as they forehand and back.
The New York State Attorney General is suing Donald Trump for running a bogus and phone "Trump University." The claim is Mr. Trump is taking money from students without preparing them for success. Trump University has taken issue with this and rebuts the claim in this announcement.
ANNOUNCE: "The New York State Attorney General has called Trump University a fraud, claiming it failed to deliver on promises to make students rich. We here at Trump University take offense at these accusations, and can prove that many have found success . . . like Trump University graduate Eric Trump, who bought a yacht after making his first million; Ivanka Trump, who created her own successful line of shoes, jewelry and handbags; and Donald Trump Jr., who is one of the stars of the wildly popular television show, 'The Apprentice.'
Trump University: 'We Make Millionaires.'"
If I ruled the world, I would have slightly altered the tagline at the end, to:
"TRUMP UNIVERSITY – We Make Millionaires Out Of Billionaires."
The ferry accident earlier today at the Statue of Liberty Island resulted in no major injuries, thank goodness. There was only one minor injury. We take a look.
We see Ms. Liberty in a neck brace.
The American enters to a standing ovation.
Dave asks Staff Sgt. Carter how he learned he was to receive the Medal of Honor. The staff sergeant says he first received a "warning call." He was asked some questions to verify his identity. He was told that he would be receiving a phone call from a very high military official. Would he be available to take this call? Staff Sgt. Carter said, "No." He wouldn't be available. He would be on vacation with his family. After some more discussion, Carter offered to stop someplace between Oregon and Northern California at the designated time of the call and look for a place that got reception on his phone. That worked for both sides. Carter had inkling what this may be about but he's learned in the military that nothing happens until it happens. So off Carter and his wife go on vacation. They stop at a gas station and are told by the attendant that they couldn't park there. They look for another place where they could get a signal. Meanwhile, his wife is out front of the camper feeding the baby. The other kids were fighting typical children fights . . . . "You touched me!" . . . . and the dog was making dog noise. All Carter wanted was a few minutes of quiet so he can hear what the phone call was about. He gets the call and is asked, "Would you accept this phone call from the President of the United States." (What? The President was calling collect? This country is in more financial trouble than I thought!) Carter says the President got on the phone and sounded just like he sounds on TV. The President thanked Carter for his service and that he approved the Medal of Honor. Then they chatted about Carter's family and that the President looked forward to meeting them in Washington D.C. And that was it. Carter then told his wife that he just spoke on the phone with the President and that he was being awarded the Medal of Honor. You can imagine the thrill. He and his wife called family and friends to share the story, making them promise not to tell anyone. What a moment. Dave says if it was he, he would have gone back to the gas station attendant and say, "Oh, by the way, we can park here."
Dave has Staff Sgt. Carter tell of how he arrived in the Army. Carter was first a Marine. After fulfilling his obligation, he came home and did odd jobs here and there. But something was missing. He was at a loss. He needed to do something. He signed up for the Army, which offered stability and structure and a dependable income. He says a soldier's main focus is the mission at hand. They really don't spend much time, or have much time, to consider the dangers. It is the family at home who sits alone, worry, hoping that dreaded phone call or knock on the door ever comes. It is they who have the worry.
Staff Sgt. Carter then describes what happened on that day, October 3, 2009 at Camp Outpost Keating in Afghanistan. The Outpost was under constant observation and under constant fire. The full body armor was heavy and hot, but you wanted to wear it and you wore it everywhere you went in Outpost Keating. He admits to being unsure of the mission there but it turned into a mission of survival. Each morning pretty much started with a firefight. You sort of get used to it, but then Carter changes it to describing it as expecting it. You come to expect the firefight. On this day, instead of the fight lasting minutes or an hour, it lasted all day, 12 hours, from 7A to 7P. Carter describes the longest day in gripping detail.
Dave then has Carter describe the Post Traumatic Syndrome Disorder (PTSD). He says the hardest part is recognizing you have PTSD. You see the symptoms, but you think it's something else. Others noticed and got him the help he needed. Once you realize you have it and once you start talking about it and sharing it with others, you slowly begin the road back. Today, Carter places a high priority on helping those with PTSD and educating others about it and to help the Army better understand this.
Staff Sergeant Ty Michael Carter – thank you.
Into commercial, we see the names of those killed in the October 3, 2009 attack on Combat Outpost Keating:
Staff Sgt. Vernon W. Martin of Savannah, Georgia – 25 years old.
Staff Sgt. Justin T. Gallegos of Tucson, Arizona – 27 years old.
Sgt. Joshua M. Hardt of Applegate, California – 24 years old.
Sgt. Michael P. Scusa of Villas, New Jersey – 22 years old.
Spc. Christopher T. Griffin of Kincheloe, Michigan – 24 years old.
Spc. Stephan L. Mace of Lovettsville, Virginia – 21 years old.
Pfc. Kevin C. Thomson of Reno, Nevada – 22 years old.
HAYDEN PANETTIERE (panna-tee-AIR)
Haden is wearing a happy, summery dress. Dave says, "You look like summer vacation." She laughs, agrees, and adds she looks like a stained glass.
Hayden stars in the popular ABC series, "Nashville" and she is dating Wladimir Klitschko, a professional heavyweight boxer. She's 5'1". He's 6'6" and weighs 215 pounds. She's learned that it is not a very good idea to go jet-skiing with someone that size. She was in front, Wladimir on back. The jet-ski stood up on its hind legs and off they went. All she could see was the sky. We see a photo of Hayden and Wlad. The size difference is quite.
On the "Nashville," Hayden plays the new, country-singing, young, sexy Dolly Parton-ish flavor of the day who is pitted against the older established country crooner who is hoping to keep her career alive.
"Nashville" – the 2nd season premieres September 25th at 10 PM on the ABC.
ANNOUNCE: It's top-notch television tomorrow as Dave welcomes Bill Murray and Lenny Kravitz and Gladys Knight."
SFX: phone ringing.
ANNOUNCE: That's the Pope.
ANNOUNCE: I can't deal with him right now
Phone continues to ring.
IN THE VALLEY BELOW: Making their network television debut, from their EP, "Peaches," In The Valley Below performed "Peaches."
And that was our show for Wednesday, August 28, 2013
The Medal of Honor is awarded to a person who, while serving as a member of the Armed Forces, distinguishes himself or herself "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life, above and beyond the call of duty, in action involving actual conflict with an opposing armed force."
Staff Sgt. Ty Michael Carter . . . this is what I will remember most about his interview. When he tells his wife that he just spoke to the President . . . . he says, "That was the President of the United States, and we're getting the Medal of Honor." Did you get that? He said "WE'RE getting the Medal of Honor." WE! WE are getting the Medal of Honor. Whatta guy.
I'm working on a monologue joke about a band. Before getting into it, Dave will ask "Anyone here ever in a band?" After a smattering of applause from the audience, Dave will then look over to the CBS orchestra. The horn section will not have their hand raised.
My 17-yr-old twin daughters grew up watching Miley Cyrus and Amanda Bynes and Lindsay Lohan and Britney Spears. The only good role model from their early TV days is SpongeBob
I went to K-Mart this weekend to buy myself some non-plaid short-sleeved button shirts. Couldn't do it. Everything is plaid? Who made plaid so popular?
I like watching the "Jeopardy." I've been watching since the days of Art Fleming. I really like it when I get some answers/questions during Double Jeopardy. But a new angle I'm enjoying is the Final Jeopardy wagering. For some really smart people, their final wagers can be really stupid. Last week I saw all three contestants miss the Final and end up with $0. Granted, they were just teens but I've seen adults not use common sense when it comes to their final wager.
Person A has $18,000
Person B has $11,000
Person C has a mere $1,400.
How much should each contestant wager in the Final?
-Person A (18K) has to defend against Person B (11K). If Person B bets it all and gets it right, he will end up with 22K. Therefore, the leader with 18K has to bet enough to cover the 22K, meaning Person A should only bet $4,001.
-Person B can only win if Person A gets the Final Jeopardy question wrong. Knowing Person A has to bet at least $4,001, Person B should only bet enough to cover $13,999 (18k minus 4,001). Person B should only bet $3,000.
-Person C (1.4K) can only win if both A and B get it wrong. Hopefully, A and B bet everything. If C were closer to B, then B would have to wager enough to cover C if C bet everything.
There is some more mathematical figuring involved but you get the idea. Betting everything in Final Jeopardy is usually not a good idea. Instead of the contestants spending hours and hours reading trivia books leading up to their appearance, they should spend an hour figuring the best wager they should make in Final Jeopardy depending on how much they have and how much the others have.
During the commercial break leading up to Final Jeopardy, I like to guess the Final Jeopardy answer/question simply from learning the category. And then I liked to figure out how much each contestant should wager. My wife finds this all very annoying.
And now it's time for "This Date in Cameo Mention of a Wahoo Reader History"
8/23/03 – 10 YEARS AGO TODAY - From the Garden State of New Jersey, it's Shirlee DiBacco, known to Rupert Jee customers as the "Foxyscribe
This concludes another installment of "This Date in Cameo Mention of a Wahoo Reader History"
Be sure to watch Thursday's 20th anniversary show. Bill Murray rips up the place! And stay till the end for a montage of Late Show shots over the years. I'd hate to be Dave Yoder who will probably try to list them all.
From Kansas City, it's the ever-affable Brian Hall.
This concludes another installment of CAMEO MENTION OF A WAHOO READER
Michael Z. McIntee
Twitter: @WahooMike


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UNESCO's "On the Frontlines of Climate Change" Forum Continues Discussion on REDD
6 March 2009: "On the Frontlines of Climate Change," an internet forum launched by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in partnership with the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Secretariat of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has published an article on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).
The article, entitled "REDD: Fast Track to Benefits or to Conflicts?" launches a discussion with regard to the impacts of REDD. The forum poses questions related to: community experiences in REDD consultation processes; information dissemination to indigenous and rural populations; and ways to improve REDD consultation processes. [On the Frontlines of Climate Change]


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remove bios password
I wonder if anyone can answer my question. I have a HP pavilion xt183 laptop, have had it for a while and a while back I put a password on the BIOS so my kid will not mess things up. The problem is that I forgot what the password is, can anyone please tell me how to retset the password? I have tried to open the case and maybe remove the battery but I have only messed around with PC's. I would need instructions on how to open the case if I need to.
Re: remove bios password
Better go to the vendor and ask him to open ur la's case. And reset it. that is the safest way. Since u re messed around with PC's i dont want to give any other cracking thing.
|All times are GMT +5.5. The time now is 14:07.


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Westerville classes canceled until 2 p.m. due to a power outage.
Fantastic Fridays
Fantastic Fridays lets K-12 students work in real college-level science labs. Students get hands-on science training, and even get to solve murder mysteries!
Sessions are free to schools, and generally last from 9:30 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. Afterward, teachers and students are encouraged to stay and enjoy lunch in the campus cafeteria.
For more information, check out What's A Fantastic Friday Visit Like?
Here is a sampling of what you can learn at Fantastic Fridays:
Your Amazing Human Body: Anatomy and Physiology Programs
Chemistry Is Cool! Programs
Environmental Biology, Earth Science and Geology Programs
Forensic Science Programs
The Invisible Universe: Programs in Microbiology
Physics is Phenomenal
Taxonomy and Animal Behavior
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I am excited to be starting my year as President of OPA! I would like to thank the OPA Board members, central staff, and especially Dr. Jim Broyles and Mr. Michael Ranney, who have been essential in supporting and preparing me for the honor of acting as OPA President.
When I ran for OPA President, I hoped to make improving communication a main area of focus. Newsletters such as these, our recently revamped OPA website and the various OPA listservs are all ways we work toward communicating what OPA is doing for Ohio psychologists and connecting Ohio psychologists with important information from around the state. Social media is also an important new tool for psychologists in Ohio to communicate with each other and the public about psychology in Ohio. OPA is on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and other social media sites; if you haven't already joined in, you may be missing out!
OPA is also reaching out to the public to communicate about the value psychologists bring to healthcare through legislative efforts, insurance advocacy and public education. Our advocacy, insurance, public sector and social responsibility committees are strong and active voices for Ohio psychologists to legislature, insurance companies and consumers.
OPA also provides communication to its members on state-of-the-art practices and research through their continuing education opportunities. If you haven't already done so, strongly consider registering for the fall Convention, "Psychology's Role in Integrated Health Care." With leaders such as Drs. Katherine Nordal, Benjamin Miller and Barry Anton speaking, the Convention is sure to have essential insights about health care reform and the psychologist's role in the new health care world. I would like to thank the Education Committee and the central staff for putting together such a strong program. Convention is also a wonderful occasion to communicate with fellow psychologists around the state, generate new ideas and network.
Communication between members and OPA central staff has always been important to OPA's reputation as a leader among state psychological associations. The central staff members do much of their work behind the scenes, but are truly integral to the success of OPA. Few members realize the many hours of hard work that staff puts in with connecting with other organizations such as APA, mental health boards and state offices and legislature. In addition, the work that makes the website run smoothly or an OPA Convention appear seamless is almost entirely due to the staff. Please recognize their efforts in your courteous requests for help. My experience is that the staff is extremely responsive to member feedback.
Despite these avenues for communication, at times OPA members feel disconnected from what is happening around the state and at OPA. They may feel at times as if they have little voice in OPA leadership, direction, or decisions. In particular, the voice of members of marginalized groups can often seem to be lost in the communication process. OPA members have sometimes noted that they are not sure what the OPA Board does for them, or the function of different OPA committees. Even within leadership at OPA, at times the Executive Committee and the Board note difficulties with communication between each other or various committees. In part for this reason, Dr. Jim Broyles appointed a Governance Structure Task Force in 2012 to look at how possible changes in the OPA governance structure might help to enhance communication and engagement with members. OPA remains committed to hearing from all members about their needs whether early or late career, private practice or public sector, gender, race, religion, political affiliation, or sexual orientation.
As chair of the task force, I have had the pleasure of moderating four open forums with OPA members to receive feedback on possible changes to enhance communication. Possible recommendations have included optimizing technology better to connect psychologists across the state and considering town hall forums at events such as Convention on focused topics important to psychologists such as the internship crisis or insurance reimbursement. Another possible recommendation is to make all board seats elected by the membership to help increase their voice in leadership. Please be alert for more information on the process of restructuring, and be aware that no restructuring will take place without a membership vote. Your voice is important in this process.
I am interested in hearing your ideas as a member for how to improve communication and help OPA continue to support you as an Ohio psychologist. I look forward to talking personally with members at Convention, and would be happy to touch base by phone or email throughout the year.


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3 Phase Paleo: Transition Your Family in 3 Easy Steps
Details at the bottom of this post, or go to the 3 Phase Paleo page directly now for more information & purchase.
This year, 2014, will mark the fourth year that we, as a family have been paleo. And for four years we have been hearing the same question: How did you do it? How did you convert your whole family, kids and all to a paleo lifestyle? And for all that time we've never been able to offer anyone a direct, complete resource. Now, instead of reading all of our posts, listening to our podcasts, getting Eat Like a Dinosaur and figuring out your own plan after weeding through all that we finally have an answer!
Announcing our NEW eBook, 3 Phase Paleo!
Whether you've been paleo for years and struggling with how to heal, or perhaps you want to know how to get the littles on board, or maybe you are ready to start from the beginning and change your lifestyle from a sedentary, bread, pizza, and cookies existence to a full paleo one – 3 Phase Paleo will help guide you through the process, one step at a time.
We're not just the writers of this plan, we're users, too!
Nearly 4 years ago we set about the journey of transforming our health. Matt & Stacy lost over 200lbs and their 3 boys recovered from a myriad of health issues. It is for this reason that we've created this eBook to help other families transition to this healthy lifestyle, despite the societal challenges and daily struggles we each face.
It's not about perfectionism.
It's not about all or nothing.
It's about making the best choices you can.
It's about knowing that a bad choice doesn't make you a bad person.
It's about patience, consistency, and sticking to a plan.
Not only have we transitioned our own family, but for years we've been advising and helping thousands of other families on how to do the same. Over the years we've come to find that a consistent method can be applied to all families, no matter where they are in their journey. We have developed a three phase plan for anyone struggling with how to begin or move passed the rut they might be stuck in. This eBook will help you implement these 3 easy steps in your own life!
In the SWAP phase, we'll show you how to move away from the most problematic foods in a typical diet and change to foods and products that are better for you without significantly depriving you of those "comforts" that you're used to – setting you up for long-term success! With award-winning, delicious, easy recipes as well as our FOOD SWAP GUIDE and PRINTABLE GROCERY SHOPPING LISTS and THE GOING OUT GUIDE you'll be set up for long-term success!
Next, in the REMOVE phase, we'll teach you how to move away from all those typical food paradigms and eliminate unhealthy grains, sugars, legumes and processed oils from your diet permanently. It might seem overwhelming as you read the labels on all the foods in your pantry, but our detailed guide on HOW TO STOCK A PALEO PANTRY will help you learn our family-friendly short-cuts that have made this a sustainable life-long plan!
Finally, in the HEAL phase, we add in the most nutrient-dense and healing foods. Our 75+ recipes are tagged by phases, so you can focus on PHASE 3 RECIPES that will help you easily identify the best foods to include in your family's meal plans. But HEAL is more than just food: our FAMILY FUN GUIDE and other recommendations will help you focus on getting your body's hormones regulated so that you feel your absolute best!
Click each picture to see a larger image for the entire eBook's recipe catalog!
Award-Winning Recipes
Not only have we broken down the conversion process, but we've also included over 75 of our best recipes! These recipes are the very ones that we developed for ourselves to make our transition easy! Dishes like Frozen Waffles from Eat Like a Dinosaur or our Sweet Potato Drop Biscuits from Beyond Bacon. Not to mention our famed Bacon Chicken, Easy Peasy Pancakes, Pumpkin Pucks, and 50/50 Bacon Burgers – all in one single easy-to-read place!
Additionally, 3 Phase Paleo also includes NEVER BEFORE SEEN ON THE BLOG RECIPES that we know you're going to love!
- Pumpkin Waffles – NEW
- Bacon Jam – from Beyond Bacon
- Blueberry Bundt Cake – NEW
- How to build your own kid-friendly salads – NEW
- Make your own Coconut Milk & Almond Milk – NEW
We hope that cooking from this book will help the whole family realize that converting their lifestyle may take work, but it will definitely be delicious a long the way. Are you ready to get a taste of what it looks like?
You'll notice that each recipe includes, in addition to the recipe itself reference to the Phase(s) appropriate for the food as well as notations if the recipe can be found in either of our cookbooks, Eat Like a Dinosaur or Beyond Bacon.
We've used the same recipe writing you've come to know and trust from not only our popular blog, but also two bestselling cookbooks.
Bonus Material
We know that one of the most common issues for people living this lifestyle is other common food allergies that extend beyond living grain, legume and dairy-free. That's why we've also included SEVERAL RECIPE INDEXES, including a NUT-FREE INDEX and EGG-FREE INDEX. You'll also find a list of our RECIPES BY PHASE so that you can focus on the recipes we suggest for helping your family happily eat healthy, nutrient-dense, real, paleo foods.
Additionally we've included resource guides to the tools and people we trust. These are intended to help you find additional resources to continue your path to a healthy, happy family. These includes lists of the COMMUNITY WE TRUST, PRODUCTS WE LOVE and, TOOLS WE USE.
You're not in this all alone.
You don't need to feel abandoned in the sea of junk food our society has thrust upon us and our children. This book provides you resources, access to the community we used to start our healing journey, recipes to keep your entire family happy and healthy and you can e-mail us and ask questions along the way!
It's time you got all the information – all in one place. It's our goal to help people (people just like you) succeed on their path to a healthy, happy family.
3 Phase Paleo is the tool you've been asking us for.
3 Phase Paleo contains more than 110 pages of downloadable, FULLY DIGITAL information on HOW to practically transition your family to a paleo lifestyle that you will all thrive off of RIGHT NOW. Trust us, we're in better health than we could have ever imagined and this plan is how we got there! For just $22.95 3 Phase Paleo will be yours, immediately. AND, you receive lifetime updates to the guide!
3 Phase Paleo is an INSTANT DIGITAL DOWNLOAD. That means you can get started RIGHT NOW.
- Our 3 Phased approach on how to transitionally your family while keeping it simple and staying sane
- Phase 1, SWAP includes our FOOD SWAP GUIDE and PRINTABLE GROCERY SHOPPING LISTS and THE GOING OUT GUIDE
- Phase 2, REMOVE includes HOW TO STOCK A PALEO PANTRY in order to "go full paleo"
- Phase 3, HEAL adds in nutrient-dense foods with coded PHASE 3 RECIPES and provides a FAMILY FUN GUIDE
- Plus, over 75 delicious, simple, easy recipes to get you started on the right path – categorized by phase
- Resource guides to our RECOMMENDED EXPERTS, COMMUNITY, PRODUCTS WE LOVE and TOOLS WE USE
- RECIPE INDEX SORTED BY PHASE as well as EGG-FREE and NUT-FREE RECIPE INDEXES
Why an eBook?
This is digital answer to the question we get asked digitally nearly every day. And as a result, it means you get a family-friendly resource to use immediately. And, as new products emerge, we write new recipes we fall in love with and better ideas come to us you'll have the advantage of lifetime updates! You will ALWAYS have the most up-to-date information and recommendations.
Need help putting the 3 Phase Paleo PDF on your tablet, kindle or other device? We've got instructions HERE.
Don't like eBooks?
3 Phase Paleo is YOURS for $22.95. That's over 110 pages of interactive awesomesauce, including over 75 recipes to help your family succeed. But we know some of you don't like eBooks or will want something in hand. GREAT NEWS! We've formatted 3 Phase Paleo to be sized 8.5×11 so you can print it easily!
Questions before you buy?
We're happy to help! E-mail us!
P.S. We hope you love what we've put together. This has been a year in the making and represents the sweat and tears of not just our family but the Paleo Parents Team as well. Courtney has done an amazing job of taking our vision and the material on our site, blog and heads and turned it into an organized aesthetically pleasing tool we believe your family will find useful. We wish you health, happiness and a home filled with love – if only this little eBook could do all that!
♥ Stacy & Matt
If you'd like to become an affiliate for 3 Phase Paleo, review the instructions here (note this eBook will not be available for affiliate sales until 1/16/14).


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Three victims had their mouths, eyes and hands taped up during an Orlando home invasion Monday morning, police said.
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Wednesday, January 30, 2013
The Charleston County School District has not been notified of a strike among school bus drivers at this time, according to a statement provided by Erica Taylor, executive director of strategy and communications.
The situation could change at any time, though, Taylor noted.
Stay with the Moultrie News online, on Twitter and on Facebook for the latest updates.
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Four wanted in Palm Springs home invasion
Elderly woman attacked after intruders entered home through unlocked door
Police say four armed men stormed into an elderly woman's Palm Springs home and held her to the floor as they grabbed property.
The victim yelled for help Saturday night at her home in the 1100 block
of East Ramon Road, as the suspects ran off in different directions, the Palm
Springs Police Department reported.
Police later learned that the suspects had jumped over the home's rear patio and entered through an unlocked sliding door.
Police say the four robbers barged into the woman's bedroom, forced her onto the floor and ransacked her home as one of the suspects covered her mouth.
Police report two of the suspects are believed to have carried a handgun and knife.
Neighbors heard the woman yell and phoned for help at 7:47 p.m., then chased the suspects. Police officers set up a perimeter several blocks wide, but could not find the suspects.
The woman was treated at Desert Regional Medical Center for minor injuries.
The Palm Springs Police Department asked anyone with information about the home invasion robbery suspects to call at (760) 327-1441.
Copyright 2014 Gulf California Broadcasting. The Associated Press contributed to this report. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.


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When Performance Is Measured By Results
NOTE: I was invited to write the foreword for Christina Wodke's new book on OKR's, Radical Focus, and I am sharing the foreword here.
Devolving From Good To Bad
Lots of people have written about the challenges of managing growth. Especially about the importance of working hard to maintain staff quality as you scale the organization. There is little question that most organizations become worse in their ability to rapidly deliver consistent innovation as they grow, yet most people attribute this to staff quality and also process and communication issues of scale. Some believe that this is unavoidable.
Product For Legacy Companies
NOTE: This article is from the foreword to the new 2nd Edition of The Art of Scalability by Marty Abbott and Michael Fisher. I'm reprinting it here because quite a few people have written me asking how to get their old-style company to start behaving more like a modern technology-powered business.
Missionaries vs. Mercenaries
One of my all-time favorite quotes in our industry comes by way of the legendary VC, John Doerr, where he argues that "we need teams of missionaries, not teams of mercenaries." This point captures so much, and gets right to the heart of the most important trait of strong leaders, strong organizations, and strong product teams.
Innovation vs. Execution
In my last article I discussed how we need to simultaneously learn fast in product discovery, yet still release with confidence in product delivery. I got a very good response from this article, as well as many questions as to how teams can get better at one or both. This quickly gets into a very deep discussion of culture. You can think of this as the characteristics of a strong innovation culture, versus those of a strong execution culture.
Discovery vs. Delivery
Most of us are working on solving some pretty hard problems, and it usually ends up taking some fairly complex systems in order to power these solutions. As such, for most teams there are two very significant challenges to tackle:
Roadmap Alternative FAQ
In my prior article I discussed my favorite alternative to conventional product roadmaps. That article seemed to strike a chord in people, and I received quite a bit of very positive feedback. However, I also received more than a few questions. This didn't really surprise me because as I said in the article, this is not a minor topic. But in my back and forth with people, I realized that there were several common and often significant confusions, and sometimes, the discussions would expose a more serious misunderstanding about product and how product teams work.
The Alternative to Roadmaps
I have always loved the General George Patton quote: "Don't tell people what to do; tell them what you need accomplished, and you'll be amazed at the results."
The Role of Product at Apple
It pains me to write this article.
Leadership vs. Management
I would argue that two of the most importance competencies in building great product organizations, indeed nearly any significant organizational undertaking, are leadership and management. Yet so few people actually consider what each of these really means. Many people just lump the two together. Some think this is what's taught in MBA programs (it's not). And sadly there are many that have never experienced strong leaders or strong managers.


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.308 Recipe w/ 185gr Berger VLDs
Ammunition, Gear, and Firearm Help
Handloading and Reloading
> .308 Recipe w/ 185gr Berger VLDs
December 1, 2010, 01:42 AM
Anybody got any good ones? I just got my bullets in the mail and a fair amount of searching hasn't turned up anything.
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December 1, 2010, 06:12 AM
Here is a good starting place.
December 1, 2010, 07:29 AM
Contact Berger by email. I did a few months ago and Walt Berger himself replied with the information. It seems that this gentleman now is semi-retired and his (I believe) grandson-in-law manages the business on a day to day basis. Mr. Berger still is acting as technical support. Actually I had 2 very informative email replies from him. A true gentleman.
December 1, 2010, 07:30 AM
Heavy bullets in the .308 require special powders if you want any velocity out of them without high pressure. The best I've found is VihtaVouri N550. 47.0gr behind a 190SMK in Hornady Match brass nets me 2700fps.
December 1, 2010, 08:31 AM
Thanks for all the tips guys
December 1, 2010, 10:16 PM
Might also try Reloder 17. My 308 recipe for that & SMK 190s clocks around 2750 fps. Haven't tried the Bergers, though, I ended up going heavier.
December 1, 2010, 10:24 PM
Are you constrained to magazine-length?
If so, measure the longest round that will fit in the mag, and reduce the COL by 0.010"
All other specs start from there.
December 1, 2010, 11:54 PM
I don't think so but that is an excellent point. I hadn't even considered that. It looks like i'm gonna have to spend some more money and get some special powder, looks like Vihtavuori N550 or so. No one around here sells it either so I'm gonna have to spend $1,000,000 on hazmat shipping
December 2, 2010, 12:45 AM
You have to decide on what will be your COL.
Without that number, there is no point from which to begin.
After that, you must determine the capacity of your case.
This will be a fired case, trimmed to the desired length, but before resizing -- unless the rounds are fired in a semi-auto, in which case the fired casing will give you a false reading of case volume.
December 3, 2010, 01:05 AM
A co-worker of mine was messing around in QuickLoad and he put everything for a .308 win, 26" barrel, 185 Berger VLD and a powder charge of 42.5 grains BUT with Hodgden H4350 instead of Vihtavouri (the preferred powder for this combo) and the 4350 was about 2000psi less.
That means it would be safe to experiment with, right? That put's it around 2500fps. My current load, a 168gr SMK with IMR 4064, also 42.5grains, produces about 51000psi @ 2650fps. Less pressure is less dangerous, right?
December 3, 2010, 10:39 AM
During load development for heavy bullet .308 loads, I tried H4350. No problem using it (but use much more than 42.5gr), but velocities are low (~2500fps) because you simply cannot get enough H4350 in the case (too slow of a powder).
December 3, 2010, 05:17 PM
I had considered that. It's ok, there's a gun show here soon so I'll see if I can get some Vihtavuori for cheap
December 3, 2010, 11:38 PM
Powder burn-rate comparisons.
December 4, 2010, 09:58 AM
RL17 works very well for heavy bullets in .308.
I use IMR4064 for up to 178gr AMax but switched over to RL17 for the bigger bullets.
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Flu-ridden Fowler expects to be in Ducks' lineupJanuary 20th, 2013, 5:33 pm by Eric Stephens, Staff writer
CALGARY, Alberta -- Defenseman Cam Fowler took part in practice Sunday and said he's improved to the point where he'll be in the Ducks' lineup Monday against Calgary after sitting out the opener due to a stomach virus.
"I was sick the whole night before," Fowler said. "Wasn't really able to put much in. I tried getting up [Saturday] and went to the pre-game meal and everything. But I was only able to have soup.
"I was starting to feel better but then when I started warming up for the game, I got a little lightheaded and dizzy. As much as I want to be out there, it just wasn't healthy for me."
Fowler was able to eat more solid food Sunday. Jordan Hendry subbed in against the Canucks and delivered a solid 18 minutes, 24 seconds of ice time.
"He's an experienced guy," Ducks coach Bruce Boudreau said. "He's got a Stanley Cup ring. I expected him to be good."Read the rest of this entry »


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The Magnificent Morgan - Bray, MaynardLog of Mystic Seaport, Vol 26, No.1.(Spring, 1974): 2-16.
<< Previous Page 4 of 8 Next >>
sliding very slowly down the side of the trench and when digging was completed on December 5th she had shifted to port about one foot and her bow was 15" lower.
At this time morning tides were running highest as a full moon was making up, and although an exuberant but predictably unsuccessful attempt was made on Wednesday night, the morning of Thursday, December 6th, was really the first time there could be any assurance of success. A fresh southerly wind blew Wednesday night and a couple of us stayed with her, sleeping in the fo'c'sle - just in case. By 3:30 A.M. the wind had abated and, as scheduled, things started happening. The Holbrooks came to get up steam to run the lighter's winch. It was raining but the cameramen came just the same. "Charlie" Andersen's deck gang began to arrive. The tide looked good: 3.5' already and an hour to go until high. We pumped her dry (not much there anyhow) and took a strain. The masthead tackles were released, freeing her from the one remaining bank of sand under her starboard bow. The tide was above where she should have floated but as yet she didn't budge. It was too dark to check her with the transit but she must have lifted and be completely afloat. Why didn't she move? Knowing that the stern was free as was always the case, I called for a line run straight abeam from her port quarter, hoping that by pulling her stern into the trench her bow would follow. Mean-while, Holbrook was "working" his winch cable by alternately 'slacking and taking up, causing the Morgan to pitch noticeably.
Suddenly she began to move without resistance both astern and to port; and from then on, it was only a matter of tending lines. She was free! Shouts of joy arose from the faithful onlookers - most of whom were here for the sixth time. The tide stick read 3' 9", the clock 4:50 A.M.
* Funding for digitization provided by: Mystic Seaport


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10 top artists we'd love to hear duet with Michael Jackson
"Love Never Felt So Good," the first single from Michael Jackson's new album, "Xscape," out Tuesday (13), featuring Justin Timberlake and the King of Pop in a makeshift duet created years after Jackson's 2009 death. In fact, the whole album "contemporizes" eight previously unreleased Jackson tracks, reimagined by top producers including Timbaland and Stargate. So what if some of Jackson's biggest hits could be recreated with some of today's top artists? Here are our picks for a dream Michael Jackson duets album (Though it doesn't appear on "Xscape," Justin Bieber apparently recorded a version of "Slave to the Rhythm." We picked another song for him below). By the way, there's clearly a demand for new Jackson material: "Love Never Felt So Good" debuted at No. 20 on the Billboard Hot 100 this week.