text: Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy (Letter Report, 03/15/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-47). Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Army's plans to allocate its end strength to meet the force structure requirements of its combat and support forces, focusing on: (1) comparing the Army's 1996 and 1998 reviews to determine if there were changes in the Army's risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy; and (2) assessing the Army's potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing end strength. GAO noted that: (1) the Army did not assess risk in its 1998 force structure review, but GAO's analysis shows that the Army's risk in implementing the national military strategy increased since its 1996 review; (2) a comparison of both reviews shows that war-fighting requirements for two wars increased at the same time the Army's forces decreased, support force shortfalls are higher, and the number of support forces arriving late has increased; (3) further, risk is higher in a second war because few active forces are planned to be deployed in the second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the second war; (4) the Army's 1998 force structure review was based on the following best-case assumptions which are consistent with defense guidance--limited chemical use by the enemy, immediate access to ports and airfields, and immediate redeployment of forces involved in contingencies to a major theater war; (5) in contrast, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated that U.S. forces should be prepared to encounter adverse conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons; (6) support force shortfalls may be higher than Army data indicated because the Army's analysis did not include all the QDR reductions in reserve component end strength; (7) the 1998 analysis assumed that the National Guard will convert nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support forces; (8) shortfalls will be higher if the conversions do not occur as planned; (9) although the risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the strategy has increased, the full extent of the increase is unknown since the Army did not perform all the analyses needed to assess and quantify its risks; (10) the Army did perform sensitivity analyses in its 1996 review that concluded additional support forces would be needed if these best-case assumptions did not occur; (11) the Army's end strength exceeds its war-fighting requirements, yet the Army has allocated significant end strength to nonwar-fighting missions; (12) one option to mitigate risk is its plan to convert nonwar-fighting positions in two National Guard divisions to war-fighting support forces; (13) this would reduce shortfalls if implemented as planned; (14) another option is to analyze the extent to which nonwar-fighting missions may be performed by civilians or contractors rather than by military personnel; and (15) if the Army used civilians or contractors to perform more nonwar-fighting missions, it could then allocate a larger proportion of military positions to meet war-fighting support requirements. --------------------------- Indexing Terms ----------------------------- REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-47 TITLE: Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy DATE: 03/15/99 SUBJECT: Army personnel Mobilization Combat readiness Defense contingency planning Comparative analysis Warfare Armed forces reserves Human resources utilization Chemical warfare IDENTIFIER: DOD Quadrennial Defense Review DOD Bottom-Up Review Total Army Analysis Process DOD Future Years Defense Program Army National Guard Division Redesign Program Army Force XXI Initiative ****************************************************************** ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a ** ** GAO report. This text was extracted from a PDF file. ** ** Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, ** ** headings, and bullets have not been preserved, and in some ** ** cases heading text has been incorrectly merged into ** ** body text in the adjacent column. Graphic images have ** ** not been reproduced, but figure captions are included. ** ** Tables are included, but column deliniations have not been ** ** preserved. ** ** ** ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when ** ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed ** ** document's contents. ** ** ** ** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO ** ** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please ** ** send an e-mail message to: ** ** ** ** <[email protected]> ** ** ** ** with the message 'info' in the body. ** ****************************************************************** ns99047.book GAO United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees March 1999 FORCE STRUCTURE Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy GAO/NSIAD-99-47 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Lett er Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure GAO National Security and International Affairs Division Lett er B-281688 March 15, 1999 The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act requires us to annually assess, through 2001, the Army's plans to allocate its end strength to meet the force structure requirements of its combat and support forces. 1 This is the third in a series of reports to respond to this congressional mandate. 2 The Army's force structure requirements are based on the national military strategy to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. In 1996, the Army completed its biennial force structure review and concluded that it faced a moderate risk in carrying out the strategy because of significant shortfalls in support forces. 3 This report addresses the Army's risks after completing its 1998 force structure review. To respond to the act's requirement, we (1) compared the Army's 1996 and 1998 reviews to determine if there were changes in the Army's risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy and (2) assessed the Army's potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing end strength. To assess risk for the 1998 review, we considered factors that 1 End strength is the total number of positions authorized annually by Congress. Force structure is the Army's organization of its forces into units. 2 Our two previous reports were Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With Some Risk (GAO/NSIAD- 97-66, Feb. 28, 1997) and Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998). 3 Support forces deploy to sustain combat forces in wartime and include specialties such as chemical, engineering, quartermaster, and transportation. B-281688 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure the Army used to measure risk in its 1996 review, including support force shortfalls, the number of support forces not expected to arrive on time, and challenges expected if a second war were to occur. We also assessed the Army's underlying assumptions for determining its war- fighting requirements using available criteria such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Results in Brief The Army did not assess risk in its 1998 force structure review, but our analysis shows that the Army's risk in implementing the national military strategy increased since its 1996 review. A comparison of both reviews shows that war- fighting requirements for two wars increased at the same time the Army's forces decreased; support force shortfalls are higher; and the number of support forces arriving late has increased. Further, risk is higher in a second war because few active forces are planned to be deployed in the second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the second war. The Army's risk may be even higher than this comparative analysis indicates for two reasons. First, the Army's 1998 force structure review was based on the following best case assumptions which are consistent with defense guidance limited chemical use by the enemy; immediate access to ports and airfields; and immediate redeployment of forces involved in contingencies to a major theater war. In contrast, the (QDR) stated that U. S. forces should be prepared to encounter adverse conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons. Second, support force shortfalls may be higher than Army data indicates because the Army's analysis did not include all the QDR reductions in reserve component end strength. Finally, the 1998 analysis assumed that the National Guard will convert nonwar- fighting positions to war- fighting support forces. Shortfalls will be higher if the conversions do not occur as planned. Although the risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the strategy has increased, the full extent of the increase is unknown since the Army did not perform all the analyses needed to assess and quantify its risks. According to defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to conduct analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions. Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the risk involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army did perform sensitivity analyses in its 1996 review that concluded additional support forces would be needed if these best case assumptions did not occur. B-281688 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure The Army has several options to mitigate its risks. The Army's end strength exceeds its war- fighting requirements, yet the Army has allocated significant end strength to nonwar- fighting missions. One option to mitigate risk is its plan to convert nonwar- fighting positions in two National Guard divisions to war- fighting support forces. This would reduce shortfalls if implemented as planned. Another option is to analyze the extent to which nonwar- fighting missions may be performed by civilians or contractors rather than by military personnel. If the Army used civilians or contractors to perform more nonwar- fighting missions, it could then allocate a larger proportion of military positions to meet war- fighting support requirements. Lastly, if the Army had more current data on the type and availability of host nation support, it could use such resources to reduce shortfalls. Background The 1993 Bottom- Up Review and the 1997 QDR require that U. S. forces be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous theater wars. The QDR also determined that this strategy could be implemented with a smaller force at an acceptable level of risk and, for the Army, recommended reductions of 60, 000 military positions. Accordingly, the Army plans to eliminate 35, 000 positions by fiscal year 2000: 15, 000 active, 17,000 National Guard, and 3,000 Army Reserve positions. These reductions will bring the Army's end strength to 1,035, 000. The remaining 25,000 reductions will be allocated to the National Guard and Army Reserve as part of the Army's next force structure review, Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007, which will be completed in November 1999. The Army performs TAA every 2 years to determine the number and types of support forces needed by combat forces and to allocate end strength to these requirements. The TAA process focuses on support forces because combat forces are defined in defense guidance and allocated 100 percent of their end strength requirements. 4 The combat and support force structure is projected to be maintained within the resources available in the Department of Defense's (DOD) Future Years Defense Plan. The TAA force structure drives development of the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which is the Army's input into the Future Years Defense Plan. 4 The combat force is defined in defense and Army guidance and consists of 10 active Army divisions, 2 active cavalry regiments, and 15 National Guard enhanced brigades. B-281688 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure In its TAA, the Army uses a series of models to simulate the two nearly simultaneous major theater wars described in the national military strategy. The defense guidance describes the various phases of the campaign, including the buildup of support forces, launching the counteroffensive, and post- hostility stability. The models also include assumptions about campaign conditions (see app. I). The Army models project support force requirements based on the simulated campaigns and the defined combat force. The Army then matches existing force structure units to the requirements until the inventory is exhausted. Shortfalls occur when the requirements exceed the available inventory. The Army calls these shortfalls unresourced requirements. According to defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to conduct analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions. Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the risk involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army made the following "best case" assumptions which are consistent with defense guidance limited chemical use by the enemy; immediate access to ports and airfields; and immediate redeployment of forces involved in contingencies to a major theater war. In its 1996 force structure review, the Army performed various analyses that identified the effects on support force requirements if these assumptions changed. The Army completed its most recent TAA (TAA 2005) in March 1998 and projected total combat and support war- fighting requirements of 747,000 positions through fiscal year 2005 for a two- war scenario. The Army initially projected support force shortfalls of 91, 300 positions but reduced them to 72,500 because it plans to convert almost 19, 000 nonwar- fighting positions in National Guard divisions by 2005 to meet war- fighting support requirements. The Army plans to convert an additional 26,000 nonwar- fighting positions in National Guard divisions by the end of fiscal year 2009, for a total of 45,000 converted positions. The Army's Risk Has Increased The Army's risk in its ability to implement the national military strategy has increased since its force structure review in 1996, when the Army assessed its risk as moderate. Risk increased for the following reasons: Army war- fighting requirements increased at the same time that the QDR planned significant force reductions. B-281688 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Army requirements would have been even higher had the Army included requirements for all campaign phases and accounted for adverse conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons. Army support force shortfalls have increased since the 1996 review and may increase further if the conversion of National Guard nonwar- fighting positions to war- fighting support positions does not take place as planned. The number of support forces arriving late in the first 30 days of the first war has increased since the 1996 review. Further, risk is higher in a second nearly simultaneous war because fewer active forces are planned to be deployed in the second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the second theater. Despite these indicators, the full extent of the Army's risk is not known because the Army has not performed all the analyses needed to assess and quantify risk. A risk assessment should include analyses of adverse conditions to determine their effect on requirements and analyses of effects on war- fight timelines under more severe conditions than those identified in defense guidance. Requirements Increased as the Force Decreased The Army's war- fighting requirements increased by 75,000 positions from 672,000 in the 1996 analysis (TAA 2003) to 747,000 in TAA 2005. At the same time, the Army began implementing QDR reductions, which decreased its end strength by 35, 000. The growth in requirements is mostly attributable to defense guidance changes and increases in the Army's requirements to support other services. For TAA 2005, defense guidance directed the Army to include all the National Guard enhanced brigades, which added about 40,000 combat positions. In addition, Army requirements to support other services increased by about 25, 000 positions, including 13,000 positions to provide chemical decontamination for the Navy and the Air Force. In response to theater commander plans and defense guidance, the Army included four corps 5 in TAA 2005 compared with three in TAA 2003. Although some support decreased, 6 the net change 5 Some support forces are assigned to a corps that provides nondivisional support for two to five divisions. Each theater is assigned two corps. 6 Support requirements for medical, equipment use, and some classes of supply decreased but, overall, support requirements increased. B-281688 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure from TAA 2003 to TAA 2005 was an increase in combat and support requirements of 75,000 positions as shown in table 1. Table 1: Army War- Fighting Requirements Source: GAO analysis of Army data. In fiscal year 1998, the Army's congressionally authorized end strength was 1,070,000 and consisted of 495, 000 active, 367,000 National Guard, and 208,000 Army Reserve. In TAA 2005, the Army assumed an active end strength reduction of 15,000 and a decrease in reserve component end strength of 20, 000 by fiscal year 2000. Assuming Congress authorized an end strength consistent with the QDR recommendations to reduce Army end strength by a total of 60,000 positions, the Army will need to allocate an additional 25, 000 reduction to the reserve components. The QDR asserted that the Army would be able to implement these reductions because of more efficient support through the redesign of its heavy divisions and implementing "just in time" logistics. But until Army doctrine is revised and TAA models are updated to reflect the new concept of operations, no estimate can be made of future support force efficiencies. TAA 2005 modeling did not include redesigned divisions or corps as envisioned in Force XXI, 7 even though two divisions and one corps will be redesigned by 2005. The two digitized active divisions will save only about 2,500 active combat positions, but the active force will be reduced by 15, 000 positions by the end of fiscal year 1999. According to an Army official, the full effect of digitization on Army force structure may not be known until TAA 2011, since the Army will be in various stages of transition until then. TAA 2003 TAA 2005 Increase Combat 199,031 240, 006 40, 975 Support 440,850 449, 723 8, 873 Support to other services 32, 119 57, 447 25, 328 Total 672, 000 747,176 75, 176 7 Force XXI is the Army's reorganization of its divisions to incorporate new operational and organizational concepts. B-281688 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure TAA Assumptions Limited Support Force Requirements War- fighting support force requirements would have been higher had the Army included all the campaign phases of both theaters and accounted for adverse conditions. For example, the Army did not calculate or include additional support forces that would be required if opponents use chemical weapons. Also, the Army did not assess the effects on support force requirements of U. S. forces being denied immediate access to ports and airfields. Finally, the Army assumed that forces deployed in ongoing contingency operations would be available immediately for redeployment to a major theater war and did not assess the effects on support force requirements if this were not the case. The Army Did Not Include Requirements for Two Campaign Phases During TAA 2005, the Army modeled requirements for only three of five campaign phases. Army officials stated that defense guidance does not clearly require the Army to identify requirements for the last two campaign phases. Army officials believe the defense guidance is very vague on the fifth phase and that the extent of the Army's role and involvement in this phase is unclear. The Army therefore never attempted to identify requirements for the final phase. The Army did calculate 14, 000 support force requirements for the fourth phase but, consistent with its interpretation of the guidance, did not include them in the total requirement for 747, 000 war- fighting positions. By not incorporating requirements for all five campaign phases for both theaters, the Army does not know its total requirements and cannot fully assess its risks in implementing the strategy. Theater commanders, on the other hand, develop war- plans for the entire campaign. We found that one theater commander had identified requirements for nearly 30, 000 additional support positions needed in the last two phases. Most of these spaces were for the engineering, field artillery, medical, and transportation specialties. The Army Did Not Include Requirements for a Chemical Environment Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army included the additional forces required in a chemical environment. However, TAA 2005 assumed enemy forces would employ only limited use of chemical weapons in both theaters and thus did not increase war- fighting requirements. The Army later modeled more intense chemical use in one theater but did not identify or include additional support requirements in TAA 2005 results. According to Army officials, the chemical analysis was not completed until after the TAA requirements phase, and the Army did not accomplish all of the study goals. The Army B-281688 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure did not complete this analysis sooner because it redirected its resources toward performing QDR analyses. Even though the Army followed defense guidance, the QDR stated that U. S. forces must plan to fight and win theater wars in which adversaries use chemical or biological weapons because this is a likely condition of future warfare. The QDR also stressed the importance of increased investment in capabilities to prevent and defend against the use of chemical and biological weapons. The Army Did Not Include Requirements Needed if U. S. Forces Are Denied Immediate Access to Ports and Airfields In TAA 2005, the Army assumed that U. S. forces would have immediate and unobstructed access to ports and airfields in both theaters. The Army did not identify the effects on support force requirements if access were denied, although it initially planned to do so. Army officials said they did not have time to perform this analysis. As a result, TAA 2005 requirements do not include forces that may be needed if the U. S. does not have access to primary ports and airfields. In TAA 2003, the Army did assess the effects on support force requirements if U. S. forces were denied immediate access to primary ports and airfields in a one theater war. The results showed a requirement for additional positions above that needed for two nearly simultaneous wars. Ninety percent of the increase was in the transportation and quartermaster specialties. Officials at one theater command stated that their current war- plans are consistent with defense guidance the plans assume immediate access to primary ports and airfields. However, the officials recognized there could be significant effects if U. S. forces are denied access. In a 1997 memo, the theater commander stated that the use of weapons of mass destruction against airports or seaports would delay the buildup of forces and would severely impede the ability to blunt an initial attack. As a result, the command is planning analyses to identify the impact of such events on U. S. forces. Army Assumed Forces Can Be Redeployed Immediately From Contingency Operations In TAA 2005, the Army initially planned to analyze the effects that redeploying forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war would have on requirements, but, according to officials, the Army did not complete this analysis because it redirected its efforts to support the QDR. The assumption that forces involved in contingency operations can be immediately redeployed to a major theater war is consistent with defense guidance. However, we reported in 1997 that this assumption is risky B-281688 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure because the critical support forces needed in the early stages of a major theater war are needed to facilitate the redeployment of military forces from the contingency operation. 8 DOD agreed that the assumption used in TAA 2003 that made all units involved in contingencies immediately available for war- fighting is flawed and overly optimistic. One Army study on strategic risks assumed that 20,000 Army active component resources would be committed to one or more contingency operations and would not be available to participate in the two- war scenario. The Army does not know how many additional support forces would be required to extract forces from a contingency operation and redeploy them to a major theater war or how such a redeployment would affect war- fighting timelines, according to Army and theater command officials. The European Command Deputy for Operations has estimated that it would take 90 days to disengage forces from Bosnia and redeploy them to a major theater war. Further, the President's 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century and defense guidance state that U. S. forces must be prepared to withdraw from contingency operations to deploy to a major theater war. Support Force Shortfalls Increased but May Be Understated The Army's estimate of its support force shortfalls 9 increased by 14,000 to 72, 500 positions since TAA 2003 but may still be understated. The Army has accepted most of its risk in three support specialties transportation, quartermaster, and chemical which account for 75 percent of the shortfalls. 10 For example, TAA 2005 includes a requirement for nearly 13, 000 spaces for the Army to provide chemical support to other services. This resulted in a requirement for 110 chemical decontamination companies, but the Army allocated end strength to only 36 of these units. Therefore, the Army's overall chemical support requirement is significantly under resourced, with only about 12,300 of 23,600 required positions allocated end strength during TAA 2005. 8 Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With Some Risks (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997). 9 Shortfall refers to units that are not allocated any end strength and exist only on paper. 10 Appendix II shows the number of positions the Army requires in each specialty in a two- war scenario and the end strength allocated to each speciality. B-281688 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure TAA 2005 support force shortfalls of 72,500 positions may be understated for two reasons. The Army had initially estimated shortfalls of 91, 300 but then reduced the estimate because it plans to convert 19,000 nonwar- fighting positions in National Guard divisions to war- fighting support positions. However, similar conversion plans that were part of TAA 2003 (66,400 active and reserve positions were supposed to be converted to higher priority support units) were never implemented. Army officials said the conversions did not take place because the National Guard announced it would convert combat positions to support positions. If the conversions planned in TAA 2005 are delayed, shortfalls will increase. Second, the Army allocated end strength as of 2000, not 2005 when the Army expects it will have completed the QDR reductions. By not including the remaining 25,000 reductions in TAA 2005, the Army has allocated 25, 000 more positions than DOD plans to request in congressional end strength authorizations for fiscal year 2005. Implementing these reductions will increase support shortfalls if the cuts are allocated to the National Guard and Army Reserve war- fighting support force structure. In contrast, allocating the reductions to the reserve components' 228,000 position nonwar- fighting structure will not increase war- fighting support force shortfalls. If Congress chose not to reduce reserve force levels further, the Army would not necessarily have more support forces because it would still have to convert nonwar- fighting positions to war- fighting support positions. The Army relies heavily on reserve components for support force structure. As table 2 shows, over 70 percent of the resourced war- fighting support force requirement is met with reserve end strength allocations in the civil affairs, public affairs, quartermaster, transportation, chemical, ordnance, and engineering specialities. B-281688 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve Components Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Support Forces Required in the First 30 Days Arrive Late, Increasing Risk Defense and Army guidance stipulate that support units needed in the first 30 days of the first theater war should be predominately active forces. Army officials stated that they do not expect most reserve component units to be able to begin moving to the theater until about 30 days after they are mobilized because of the time needed to call up, train, and begin moving forces. The Army estimated in TAA 2005 that over 105, 000 support forces would not arrive in the first 30 days as required. This estimate is higher than the 79, 000 support forces that TAA 2003 estimated would arrive late. Furthermore, the requirements for several support specialties will probably not be met within the first 30 days because significant portions of these forces are in the reserve components. For example, about 71 percent of engineering forces, 58 percent of ordnance forces, 57 percent of quartermaster forces, and 54 percent of the transportation forces needed in the first 30 days are in the reserve components. We compared one theater commander's requirements to execute the first 30 days of the campaign, against the Army's TAA requirements for the same theater. The theater commander's requirements for the first 30 days were less than the TAA requirements and were met mostly with active forces. The commander's support force requirements were about 37,500 positions, of which 80 percent were active Army. In contrast, the TAA 2005 requirements for this theater, were about 177,000 positions of which only about 40 percent were active Army. Whereas TAA uses the doctrinally correct force flow the number, mix, and sequencing of forces needed to support combat forces the theater commander may stagger the flow of forces and plan to have some support forces arrive after the first 30 days. Active component Reserve components Specialty End strength allocation Percent End strength allocation Percent Civil Affairs 131 2. 49 5, 139 97. 51 Public Affairs 108 7. 61 1, 312 92. 39 Quartermaster 6, 757 16. 79 33, 482 83. 21 Transportation 12, 206 20. 91 46, 173 79. 09 Chemical 3, 356 27. 25 8, 961 72. 75 Ordnance 12,186 27.96 31, 405 72. 04 Engineering 20,764 28.90 51, 077 71. 10 B-281688 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Theater command officials stated that, given limitations in lift, the priority in the first 30 days is to move combat forces into the theater. However, both the TAA models and the theater commander's plans achieve sufficiency of support forces at about the same time. Risks in the Second Theater Are Higher Risks in implementing the national military strategy are higher in the second of two theaters because shortfalls are higher and the proportion of active support forces is significantly less in the second theater. TAA 2005 showed that support shortfalls are 11,500 spaces higher in the second theater than the first. Also, active forces comprise only 15 percent of the total required support forces in the second theater compared with 36 percent in the first. Fewer active forces in the second theater increases risk if the mobilization of reserve forces is delayed or if the second war occurs with little warning time. The significance of the second theater was highlighted by the QDR, which asserted that maintaining forces capable of winning two nearly simultaneous wars is essential to the credibility of the overall national security strategy. The QDR also stated that a one theater war capacity would undermine the deterrence and credibility of U. S. commitments. Another indication that risk in the second theater is higher came from one theater commander who estimated higher shortfalls if his forces are involved in the second of two wars. The theater commander stated that if his theater was second, he was concerned about the lack of support forces to sustain the fight and delays in execution that may be caused by support force shortfalls. Full Extent of Army's Risk Is Not Known The Army does not know the full extent of its risks in implementing the national military strategy because it did not perform a risk assessment in TAA 2005. Even though TAA 2005 used assumptions that were generally consistent with defense guidance, the guidance also encourages analyses to identify risks under conditions different from these best case assumptions. In TAA 2003, the Army performed sensitivity analyses that concluded additional support forces would be needed if (1) an adversary used chemical weapons, (2) access to ports and airfields was denied, and (3) forces deployed in a contingency operation were not immediately available. Officials at one theater command stated they routinely perform analyses to identify the effects of worst case conditions. The Army planned to perform some of these sensitivity analyses in TAA 2005 but, according to Army officials, did not do so because resources were shifted to support B-281688 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure QDR analyses. As a result, the Army does not know the full extent of its risk. We believe sensitivity analyses are essential in assessing risk. Without them, the Army cannot specify the additional support forces required under adverse conditions. For example, in TAA 2005, the Army did not run the transportation, campaign, and support models with the resourced force 11 to determine the impact of support force shortages on war- fighting timelines. The Army did run the transportation and support models with the TAA 2005 required forces and, according to Army officials, determined that there was no significant change in combat and support unit arrival dates and therefore, the Army did not re- run the campaign models. While this "relook" analysis is a positive change from TAA 2003, re- running the transportation model using the required force does not assess the effects on war- fighting timelines or identify risks resulting from support force shortfalls that could be assessed if the Army re- ran the campaign models with the resourced force. As many as 72, 500 support force positions are unresourced with many shortages falling in specialities such as transportation, quartermaster, and chemical. Re- running the models with the resourced force would identify any effects on war- fighting timelines because the models' transition to counteroffensive is based on the level of support forces in the theater. Also, re- running the campaign models with the resourced force would enable the Army to better assess risks of shortages in specific specialties such as transportation, quartermaster, and chemical. Army officials stated that the objective of TAA modeling is to identify the required forces. While the Army has modeled deployments with the resourced force on special requests from the theater commanders, it has not included such analyses in TAA. Army officials agreed, however, that re- running TAA models with the resourced force would improve the Army's ability to assess risk. Options to Mitigate Risk The Army has several opportunities to mitigate its risks in executing the national military strategy. The Army's total end strength exceeds its requirements to fight two wars, but the Army has allocated 417,000 end strength positions to force structure that does not have a war- fighting mission, such as for institutional or unique positions. In TAA 2005, the 11 The resourced force is that portion of the required force for which the Army allocated end strength. B-281688 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Army did not determine whether the military end strength allocated to institutional or unique force structure was essential. If this structure could be filled with civilians or contractors, then more military end strength would be available to meet war- fighting requirements. The Army could also reduce shortfalls by converting military positions that do not have a warfighting mission to war- fighting support positions. If implemented, the Army's National Guard Division Redesign Program will convert 45, 000 positions in two National Guard divisions to war- fighting support positions by 2009. But, the conversion program is not effectively managed. Finally, the Army could consider support from host nations to help meet its warfighting requirements, but theater commanders will need to provide more current data on how much support will be available and when. Significant Portion of End Strength Does Not Have War- Fighting Mission The Army's congressionally authorized end strength exceeds war- fighting requirements, yet the Army still has support force shortfalls because a significant portion of its end strength is allocated to nonwar- fighting missions. In TAA 2005, the Army projected its end strength in fiscal year 2000 would total 1,035,000, which exceeds the war- fighting requirement of 747,000. For purposes of TAA, the Army actually allocated 1,073,000 spaces, which includes additional spaces for the National Guard. But the Army has allocated about 417, 000 end strength spaces to nonwar- fighting structure, leaving 656, 000 spaces to allocate to war- fighting requirements. The nonwar- fighting structure includes institutional positions, National Guard divisions, trainees, transients, holdees, students, uniques, and uncommitted forces (see table 3). As a result, the Army initially projected 91,300 unresourced positions before accounting for the National Guard conversions. Table 4 shows how the Army allocated end strength in TAA 2005. B-281688 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar- Fighting Force Structure a The Institutional force is generally nondeployable and supports Army infrastructure activities such as training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. b TTHS = trainees, transients, holdees, and students. TTHS make up the portion of the active force in temporary status. c The uncommitted force structure, consisting primarily of engineering units, is not required for war- fighting. d Force structure that did not match war- fighting requirements but that the Army has retained to meet nonwar- fighting needs such as joint, DOD, and alliance commitments. Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Nonwar- fighting force structure Active National Guard Army Reserve Total Army Institutional a 115,000 36,000 63,000 214, 000 TTHS b 61, 000 0 0 61, 000 Guard divisions (strategic reserve) 0 112,517 0 112, 517 Subtotal 176,000 148,517 63,000 387, 517 Uncommitted c 0 2,719 0 2, 719 Uniques d 12, 932 10,853 3,103 26, 888 Total 188,932 162,089 66,103 417, 124 B-281688 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations a The Army assumed end strengths as of fiscal year 2000. However, in the case of the National Guard, the Army allocated 388,000 force structure Guard spaces rather than the 350,000 assumed end strength. b The Army has units that are under resourced, i. e., the units are not allocated all required positions. However, when mobilization occurs, the Army fills these vacancies using the Individual Ready Reserves or recruits. c These shortfalls should be reduced by converting positions in two National Guard divisions to warfighting support positions. Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Army Process for Allocating End Strength Is Not Consistent With Defense Guidance The Army's process for allocating 417,000 spaces to nonwar- fighting functions is not consistent with defense guidance. Defense guidance states that the services should reduce forces not required to support missions envisioned by the national military strategy and minimize the number of military personnel assigned to support organizations. The guidance further states that positions that do not meet military essential requirements will be eliminated or converted to civilian positions. The QDR also addressed this topic, stating that DOD should improve the efficiency of support activities and consider nonwar- fighting support functions as candidates for outsourcing. Army officials stated they did not assess, as part of the TAA 2005 process, whether civilians or contractors could perform the functions of institutional or unique military forces. Army institutional functions in particular have received increasing scrutiny in recent years because the Army has been unable to support requirements based on workload and ensure that these functions are carried out in the most efficient and cost- effective manner. As shown in table 3, 214,000 military positions are Active National Guard Army Reserve Total End strength (as of fiscal year 2000) 480,000 388,000 a 205,000 1,073, 000 Minus nonwar- fighting force structure 188,932 162, 089 66,103 417, 124 Force structure available for war- fighting requirements 291,068 225, 911 138,897 655, 876 Minus war- fighting requirements 747, 176 Initial support force shortfalls b 91, 300 c Minus National Guard conversions by 2005 18, 846 Remaining shortfalls 72, 454 B-281688 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure allocated to institutional functions. A previous GAO report found that the Army's efforts to establish workload- based requirements and redesign institutional functions had not been very successful. 12 If the Army reduced the number of military institutional forces, then more would be available to meet war- fighting requirements. The Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign Pamphlet 100- 1, published in March 1998, acknowledged the potential benefits of reducing military forces that perform institutional functions. The pamphlet states that many of the services currently being performed at all levels of the institutional force, "support military missions, but, are not uniquely military in nature." It states that privatization on an Army- wide basis, if done with proper analysis, could achieve the objective of greater cost savings for more efficient operations. Army Could Reduce Allocation of Military Positions to Nonwar- Fighting Unique Structure According to Army officials, there were nearly 27,000 unique force structure positions left after TAA 2005 matched the existing structure with war- fighting requirements (excluding the strategic reserve). The officials stated that much of the 27,000 unique structure is required to meet joint, DOD, and alliance commitments. However, they acknowledged that they have not assessed this structure to determine whether unique positions require military personnel or could be filled by civilians or contractors. The Army could reduce unfilled war- fighting support requirements by allocating unique force structure to war- fighting missions. Some of the unique structure is in the same specialty as unfilled war- fighting requirements, although it does not provide the same capability. For example, unique structure in the transportation specialty contains minimum equipment, and its units contract for port services. In contrast, some of the unresourced transportation requirements are for units with heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts. The Army has not identified the additional training or equipment modifications that would be needed in order to convert these units to fill war- fighting requirements. Table 5 shows Army unique force structure by component. 12 Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998). B-281688 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Potential Exists to Apply Nonwar- Fighting National Guard Division Assets to Meet War- Fighting Support Requirements The Army may be able to reduce its support shortfalls and thus its risk by using resources in the National Guard divisions to meet war- fighting requirements. In 1997, we recommended that the Army determine whether war- fighting support missions could be assigned to the National Guard division force structure. 13 As a result, in TAA 2005 the Army assigned war- fighting missions to a few units in National Guard divisions that did not previously have a war- fight mission. These units totaling about 3, 600 spaces consist of two National Guard division aviation companies, one attack helicopter battalion, seven chemical companies, and three field artillery battalions. In addition, the National Guard gave us a list of about 21, 800 Guard division spaces that are currently on theater commanders' deployment rosters. These represent the theater commanders' assessment of the units needed for war- fighting. We compared this list to the TAA 2005 unresourced requirements and found over 1,800 spaces in 11 aviation units that closely or exactly matched the 2,400 space aviation war- fighting shortfall. This illustrates the potential for the Army to further reduce its unresourced requirements by assigning war- fighting missions to units in National Guard divisions. National Guard Conversions Can Reduce Support Shortages, but Program Is Not Effectively Managed As part of the National Guard Division Redesign program the Army plans to convert about 45, 000 positions in two Guard divisions from nonwar- fighting missions to war- fighting support between 2000 and 2009. If the program is successful, it will halve the TAA 2005 support force shortfall from 91, 300 to Force structure Unique spaces Percentage of total Active 12, 932 48. 1 National Guard 10, 853 40. 4 Army Reserve 3, 103 11. 5 Total 26, 888 100.0 13 Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With Some Risks (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997). B-281688 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure 46, 300 spaces by the end of fiscal year 2009. 14 Even though about 68 percent of the spaces will convert to specialties with the largest number of unresourced requirements transportation, quartermaster, and chemical-- only 25 percent are planned to convert by 2003. Further, the program's success will depend on buying new equipment according to Army officials. In 1997, the Army estimated the program to cost about $5 billion, which does not include costs to upgrade facilities. However, only $1. 9 billion are programmed in the Army's fiscal year 2000- 05 POM, most of it (66 percent) is programmed for fiscal years 2004- 05. Army officials stated that they have not updated the program's costs since 1997 when they prepared the 1999- 2003 POM, and do not have a current estimate of how much money will be needed to convert all 45,000 positions. Most Spaces to Convert After 2003 About 75 percent (almost 34, 000) of the conversions are planned to take place in 2004 or later. Table 6 shows near- term and long- term planned conversions by support specialty. 14 In 1996, we reported that the National Guard combat divisions were not needed for the two- war strategy and recommended that some be converted to support roles or eliminated if the forces exceeded validated requirements. B-281688 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions a According to Army officials, the conversions planned for fiscal years 2006- 09 may change as a result of subsequent TAAs and POM programming decisions. Source: GAO analysis of Army data. The Army's fiscal year 2000- 05 POM shows the planned conversion of 18, 846 spaces from six brigades. However, as of December 1998, the Army had identified only three of the six brigades and only about half the spaces it budgeted to convert in the POM. Army officials stated that the next three brigades may be identified in February 1999. The Army Did Not Convert 66,000 Positions as Planned in TAA 2003 Prior Army efforts to reduce support force shortfalls have not been implemented as planned. In February 1997, when we reported on the results of TAA 2003, the Army had two major plans to significantly reduce unresourced requirements. The first was to shift 66, 000 active and reserve positions from support units excess to the war- fight to higher priority support units. Converting these positions was estimated to cost $2. 6 billion. The second plan was to convert 42,700 positions in National Guard divisions from combat to support. This plan was estimated to cost an additional $2.8 billion. In total, both plans would eliminate 108, 700 unresourced requirements and cost $5. 4 billion. We also reported in January 1997 that procurement for converting the 66, 000 spaces was to be fully funded before any of the National Guard redesign would be undertaken. However, Army officials stated that none of the 66,000 spaces have been converted and that the Army currently plans to implement only Specialty Fiscal years 2000- 03 Fiscal years 2004- 09 a Total Air Defense 406 4, 488 4,894 Army- level headquarters 32 0 32 Aviation 0 1, 448 1,448 Chemical 720 3,021 3,741 Engineer 92 1, 008 1,100 Field Artillery 0 1, 305 1,305 Military Police 647 0 647 Ordnance 965 1, 330 2,295 Quartermaster 3, 628 8, 810 12, 438 Signal 624 2, 131 2, 755 Transportation 4, 196 10,113 14, 309 Total 11,310 33, 654 44, 964 B-281688 Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure the National Guard division redesign. Table 7 shows the changes in the Army's plans. Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls a Total cost unknown. This amount does not include all equipment, training, and facilities costs expected during fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Total Cost for National Guard Redesign Program Is Unknown The total program cost is unknown because the Army's fiscal year 2000- 05 POM did not include an estimate for facilities costs, and Army officials said that procurement costs for fiscal years 2006- 09 have not been updated. However, the Secretary of the Army in August 1997 wrote that the Army was committed to the conversions and that meeting this objective would require about $586 million per year through 2007 to buy equipment. If funding is provided at this level, procurement costs would add $1.17 billion to the $1. 9 billion programmed in the POM. However, Army officials stated that the costs for the years beyond the POM can change depending on how the composition of unresourced requirements is changed by subsequent TAAs and which brigades are identified for conversion. For example, converting a unit to aviation (combat support) is much more expensive than converting a unit to quartermaster. Although the largest cost is for equipment procurement, the conversions will also require funding for training and facilities. But the Army's most recent POM did not include any funding for facilities. Military construction to upgrade facilities will be needed to support the change in units. For example, Army officials stated that an armor unit may not have the facilities or infrastructure needed to support an aviation or truck company. The National Guard has estimated that facilities costs for converting the first 3 brigades would total $130 million and that facilities costs for all 12 brigades could be as high as $590 million. However, National Guard officials cautioned that, because only the first three brigades have been identified, facilities cost estimates for the remaining nine brigades are very Plan as of TAA 2003 Plan as of TAA 2005 Difference Spaces to convert 108, 700 45, 000 63, 700 Conversion cost $5. 4 billion $1. 9 billion through fiscal year 2005 a $3. 5 billion Conversion timeline 1998- 2012 (15 years) 2000- 2009 (10 years) 5 years B-281688 Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure preliminary. Estimates can change depending on units selected and the type of units to which they are converting. The POM shows a total training cost estimate of $85.5 million, of which $76.7 million has been programmed. The Army estimates that training costs for fiscal years 2006- 09 will total $214 million, which means that the POM only funds 26 percent of the total estimated training cost. Redesign Program Not Effectively Managed It is difficult for the Army to monitor the program's progress because no office provides consolidated, periodic reporting on the program's status. For example, Army officials agreed that no office is responsible for monitoring or reporting periodically on all program costs, including for equipment, training, and facilities expected between 2000- 09; unfunded requirements; comparisons between planned converted units and unresourced requirements to show whether the most critical shortfalls are being addressed first; risk assessments if conversions are delayed; and comparisons between actual conversions and conversion plans to assess progress. The only current program oversight is provided by a Process Action Team, which has been tasked with identifying total resource requirements through 2009. 15 The Secretary of the Army approved the redesign program in May 1996, yet the team has only met three times since then and has not yet identified the total resource requirements. According to Army documents, the team agreed that it would be prudent to give visibility to the total program costs to avoid giving the impression that the POM will cover all the costs. However, because there is no separate budget line item or project code for the program, the program's costs can not be identified in the POM, according to Army officials. Further, fragmentation of program oversight among the many different offices that have representatives on the team creates ambiguity concerning who is responsible for program implementation issues such as ensuring that the most urgent conversions take place first. For example, only 8 percent of the total program spaces are in the chemical specialty, even though 48 percent of the chemical war- fighting requirement is unresourced. 15 An Army Headquarters office chairs the team, which consists of 32 members representing 10 different offices. B-281688 Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Host Nations Can Provide Some Support, Potentially Reducing Army Shortfalls Both Army and theater command officials agree that host nations can provide some types of war- fighting support, potentially helping to reduce Army support force shortfalls. According to Army guidance, the Army should consider the availability of host nation support to reduce unmet requirements. However, Army officials told us that theater commanders had not provided updated host nation support data for use in TAA 2005 because agreements were still being negotiated. As a result, the Army only matched 1, 300 spaces of host nation support against its war- fighting requirements, although Army "best estimates" suggest as many as 30,000 spaces of host nation support could potentially be available in the two theaters. According to Army officials, since the end of the Cold War, theater commanders have found it difficult to determine how much host nation support would be available in their theaters and when. For example, the Secretary of Defense has repeatedly told Congress that at least one theater commander has had significant problems with the host nation support program because the command has few assurances that host nation support will be available when or where it is needed. The theater commander has begun to review host nation capabilities, but command officials told us that validating available resources from host nations will be a long- term process. Conclusions The Army's risk in carrying out the national military strategy has increased since the Army's TAA 2003 force structure review because requirements have increased, optimistic assumptions about war- fighting conditions have limited requirements, and support force shortfalls have increased. In addition, a higher number of support forces would not be expected to arrive at a major theater war within the first 30 days as required, and few active support personnel would be available to deploy to the second war. The Army does not know the full extent of its risk because it did not perform the analyses needed to do so. For example, the Army did not re- run its models with the resourced force. Doing so would provide the Army information on how force structure decisions affect the war- fighting, including the availability of support forces and how the late arrival of support units affects war- fighting timelines. Another reason the Army does not know the full extent of its risk is because the Army did not include requirements for all campaign phases and did not identify what effects varying war- fighting conditions contained in defense guidance would have B-281688 Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure on requirements. For example, the Army did not identify requirements in cases where the adversary uses chemical weapons or for the redeployment of forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war, even though the guidance encourages such analyses. It is important to quantify the effects of including all phases and adverse conditions on support requirements since this data could influence Army force structure decisions and could be used to modify future defense guidance and modify force structure decisions to mitigate risk. Since the Army still has substantial forces in excess of its war- fighting requirements, it can mitigate risk by converting positions from nonwar- fighting to war- fighting structure without increasing the force. Converting the two National Guard divisions from nonwar- fighting structure to war- fighting support positions as planned is a sound concept that would increase the proportion of end strength performing war- fighting missions and help reduce shortfalls. However, the program requires careful management, and the Army has not yet identified the total cost. Also, the Army could further mitigate risk by assessing whether other nonwar- fighting structure such as institutional and unique must be filled by military personnel. If these positions were filled by civilians or contractors, more military structure could be used to reduce support force shortfalls. Lastly, as theater commanders develop more current data on the availability of host nation support, the Army could consider such support when filling war- fighting requirements, as called for in Army guidance. Recommendations To improve the Army's ability to accurately determine war- fighting requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense clarify guidance to require that the Army include all campaign phases in determining its war- fighting requirements. To determine the risks in implementing the national military strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army include the following as part of the next TAA: an analysis of the number of support forces needed under a range of conditions such as the small, medium, or large use of chemical agents by an adversary; a re- run of TAA models using the resourced force to assess the effects of end strength allocation decisions on war- fighting, including the late arrival of critical support forces; B-281688 Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure an assessment of the differences between TAA models and theater commanders' plans in support force requirements in the first 30 days of a conflict; and an analysis of the support forces required to extract forces from ongoing contingency operations and redeploy them to a major theater war and the effects of such redeployment on war- fighting timelines. To improve the Army's ability to effectively monitor the progress of its National Guard Division Redesign program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army require the Process Action Team to prepare a periodic report on the program that includes: (1) total program costs (including equipment, training, and facilities); (2) unfunded requirements; (3) a comparison of planned converted units with unresourced requirements to determine whether the most critical shortfalls are being addressed first; (4) an assessment of the risks arising from delays in conversion; (5) a comparison of actual conversions with plans; and (6) identification of obstacles. To allocate end strength to nonwar- fighting force structure consistent with defense guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army identify which nonwar- fighting positions could be filled by civilians or contractors, fill them with either civilians or contractors, and allocate the military positions saved to reduce war- fighting support force shortfalls. To more accurately identify support force requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army expedite the incorporation of Force XXI concepts into doctrine that would provide the necessary information to update TAA models. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report and indicated that the Army plans to incorporate several of our recommendations in the ongoing TAA 2007. Overall, DOD said it was confident that the Army's initiatives would yield the right mix of trained and fully equipped ground forces to support the national strategy. DOD's comments are reprinted in full in appendix IV. In response to our recommendations relating to TAA requirements determination and risk analysis, DOD stated that the Army plans to capture the projected land force requirements generated in all phases of both campaigns for inclusion in TAA 2007 requirements. DOD also stated that the Army would focus its efforts on the most likely weapons of mass B-281688 Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure destruction employment case in TAA 2007, based upon the best available intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities. We believe this will be an improvement over TAA 2005, but continue to recommend that the Army conduct additional analyses to better assess the risks of war- fighting conditions that are different than expectations. DOD also said the Army plans to implement our recommendation to rerun TAA models with the resourced force to assess the effects of available end strength on warfighting. The Army will also assess the differences between theater commanders' and Army support force requirements. In conducting this analysis, we encourage the Army to fully consider the theater commanders' war- plan troop lists to ensure, for example, that the Army is able to resource, with predominantly active forces, the theater commanders' requirements for early arriving support forces. Last, DOD noted that TAA 2007 will consider the forces required to disengage from on- going contingencies and redeploy forces to a major theater war. DOD also concurred with our recommendation to improve the Army's monitoring of the National Guard Division Redesign program and stated the program will be focused on determining the total costs and benefits of this effort. To ensure the conversion program is successful, we believe it is imperative that the Army implement our recommendation immediately, to include identifying total costs through fiscal year 2009, identifying unfunded requirements, and assessing risks if the program is delayed. DOD also noted that the Army is participating in a rigorous program to identify military positions for potential conversion to civilian or contractor positions. A successful conversion program could make more military personnel available to alleviate support force shortfalls; however, at the time of our review, the Army was unable to tell us how many military positions were candidates for conversion. With respect to updating Army models to reflect Force XXI concepts, DOD stated that the Army is continuing to develop doctrine and to design the force structure necessary to support the Force XXI digitized division and corps organizations and that this work is proceeding in a disciplined manner. We recognize that updating Army doctrine to incorporate Force XXI concepts is a challenging process but note that the intent of TAA is to focus on the Army's future force structure requirements (i. e., 2005) and any delays in incorporating Force XXI logistics or war- fighting concepts will result in a force structure that is linked more to past concepts than to the Army's future direction. DOD further noted that, according to the Joint Staff, theater commanders are responsible for assessing the availability and appropriate use of host nation support to offset a portion of the Army's requirement. We agree that B-281688 Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure theater commanders are responsible for validating host nation support and for assessing the potential risks of host nation support offsets to war- fighting. But as our report notes, neither theater commander has been able to provide the Army with current host nation support data for use in TAA and one theater commander has reported significant deficiencies in his host nation support program. According to TAA guidance, the Army should consider host nation support during its resourcing process, and the Army has attempted to do this to some extent in both TAA 2003 and TAA 2005, despite shortcomings in the data. Our scope and methodology are described in appendix III. We conducted our review from April to December 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are providing copies of this report to Senator Wayne Allard, Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senator Max Cleland, Senator Pete V. Domenici, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator Fred Thompson, and to Representative Neil Abercrombie, Representative Rod R. Blagojevich, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Stephen E. Buyer, Representative John R. Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis, Representative John P. Murtha, Representative David R. Obey, Representative Christopher Shays, Representative John M. Spratt, Jr., Representative Henry A. Waxman, Representative C. W. Bill Young in their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request. B-281688 Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact Gwendolyn Jaffe at (202) 512- 4691. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Key TAA 2005 Assumptions 31 Appendix II Army Requirements for Two Wars, Resourced and Unresourced 32 Appendix III Scope and Methodology 33 Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense 35 Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report 39 Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Tables Table 1: Army War- fighting Requirements 6 Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve Components 11 Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar- Fighting Force Structure 14 Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations 15 Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure 17 Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions 18 Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls 20 Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense QDR Quadrennial Defense Review POM Program Objective Memorandum TAA Total Army Analysis TTHS Transients, Trainees, Holdees, and Students Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix I Key TAA 2005 Assumptions Appendi x I TAA 2005 Assumption Army Rationale By fiscal year 2000, Army end strengths will be 480, 000 active, 205,000 Army Reserve, and 350,000 National Guard. These end strengths reflect QDR reductions of 15, 000 active and 20, 000 reserves. TAA 2005 did not include 25,000 reductions recommended by the QDR for reserve components because the Army had not decided how the reductions would be apportioned between the National Guard and Army Reserve. The Army will deploy all 10 of its active divisions and make available all enhanced brigades in the two- war scenario. Army force structure will also contain eight National Guard divisions as strategic reserve. Consistent with defense guidance, all 10 active divisions and all 15 enhanced brigades will flow into the two- war scenario. Previously, the Army only deployed those enhanced brigades that could arrive before cessation of hostilities. The National Guard divisions are a strategic reserve to respond to adverse situations. The Army will employ four corps-- two in each theater. Each corps will have a doctrinal war- fighting mission. The Army will source the 4th corps as much as possible in accordance with doctrine. Defense guidance lists four corps. Presidential Selected Reserve Callup occurs on the day of unambiguous warning of the first war. This is consistent with defense guidance. The Army will have immediate access to ports and airfields in the theaters of operation. This is consistent with defense guidance. There will be limited use of chemicals by adversaries consisting of both persistent/ nonpersistent agents which will have limited operational/ tactical effects. Defense guidance contains conflicting statements about the level of enemy chemical use U. S. forces can expect. Army interpretation of defense guidance was "limited use" which meant that no force structure was added to the 747, 000 war- fighting requirement. Army requirements will be based on the first three phases of the campaign. Army interpretation of defense guidance is not to add requirements for the last two phases of the theater campaign. Units due to arrive in the first 30 days of the first war will be composed predominately of active forces. This is consistent with defense and Army guidance. The Army determined that time delays associated with the mobilization of reserve forces generally preclude their arrival in the first 30 days. The Army will begin the counteroffensive of a major theater war when adequate support forces arrive in the theater. Army models and one theater commander's plans are consistent in their estimate of when adequate support forces would arrive. There will be no delays or degradation of capability resulting from the transfer of support forces from a contingency operation to a major theater war. Defense guidance assumes that U. S. forces assigned to a contingency operation are immediately available to redeploy to a major theater war. Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix II Army Requirements for Two Wars, Resourced and Unresourced Appendi x I I a Resourced units are those allocated end strength and the Army assumes in TAA that these units are at 100 percent of wartime strength. During peacetime, some support units are authorized fewer positions than required. In TAA 2005, these shortfalls totaled 17,843 positions. b These are positions in units that are not authorized end strength and exist only on paper. The shortages in this column assume successful conversion of 18,846 nonwar- fighting spaces in National Guard divisions between fiscal year 2000 and 2005. Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Specialty Required Resourced a Unresourced b Percent resourced Logistics 45,136 45, 136 0 100. 00 Public Affairs 1, 420 1,420 0 100. 00 Army Level Headquarters 4,538 4, 538 0 100. 00 Brigade & Division Headquarters 7,693 7, 693 0 100. 00 Civil Affairs 5,270 5, 270 0 100. 00 Psychological Operations 2,556 2, 556 0 100. 00 Armor 37,965 37, 965 0 100. 00 Infantry 71,116 71, 116 0 100. 00 Medical 39,352 39, 154 198 99. 50 Military Police 35,606 35, 425 181 99. 49 Personnel Service Support 17,617 17, 501 116 99. 34 Special Operations Forces 4,719 4, 677 42 99. 11 Field Artillery 69,337 68, 032 1, 305 98. 12 Military Intelligence 16,122 15, 704 418 97. 41 Engineering 75,104 71, 841 3, 263 95. 66 Aviation 41,551 39, 125 2, 426 94. 16 Signal 34,235 31, 840 2, 395 93. 00 Ordnance 46,932 43, 591 3, 341 92. 88 Air Defense 25,285 21, 203 4, 082 83. 86 Quartermaster 57,289 40, 239 17, 050 70. 24 Transportation 84,749 58, 379 26, 370 68. 88 Chemical 23,584 12, 317 11, 267 52. 23 Total 747,176 674, 722 72, 454 90. 30 Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix III Scope and Methodology Appendi x I I I To determine if there were changes in the Army's risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the national military strategy, we compared the Army's 1996 and 1998 force structure reviews. We obtained and reviewed the Army's documentation on its Total Army Analysis (TAA) processes, assumptions, and results at Department of Army Headquarters, Washington D. C.; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Army National Guard Bureau; and Office of the Chief of Army Reserve. To better understand how the requirements of the joint war- fighting commands are considered in the TAA process and how theater commands are affected by TAA results, we requested information from the Commanders in Chief of the U. S. Central Command and the U. S. Pacific Command. Our review of TAA 2005 included analyses of the risks associated with the number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to support war- fighting requirements including comparisons with TAA 2003 results and theater commander war- plans; the Army's assumptions compared with those in defense guidance, TAA 2003, theater commander war- plans, and more recent Department of Defense (DOD) assessments; and the major assumptions used in TAA and how they affect force structure outcomes (including measures of risk). We did not evaluate logistical data used in the TAA process, however, prior GAO recommendations to establish valid and consistent data have been implemented. We compared the Army's TAA 2005 reported results with automated data from the Army's MERLIN system. MERLIN is an analytical tool that allows programmed resources to be aligned against war- fighting requirements. The programmed resources are imported from the Army's official force structure data base (SAMAS). Based on our analysis, we were satisfied that the Army's automated data and reported results were in substantial agreement. We did not test the Army's management controls over its automated system. To assess the Army's potential for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing end strength, we obtained the Army's justification for its nonwar- fighting force structure, including institutional forces; transients, trainees, holdees, and students; and National Guard divisions (strategic reserve). We considered the Army's recently reported material weakness and corrective action plan to determine if the plan included steps to ensure that the Army's institutional force is efficiently organized and comprises the minimum number of personnel. We also reviewed Army Pamphlet 100- 1, which Appendix III Scope and Methodology Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure provides the redesign objectives for the institutional force. We also ascertained whether the Army determined that these institutional forces, as well as other support forces such as its unique force structure, are military essential. Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I V Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report Appendi x V National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D. C. Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant Director Irene A. Robertson, Senior Evaluator Kenneth W. Newell, Senior Evaluator Norfolk Field Office Brenda M. Waterfield, Evaluator- in- Charge Dawn R. Godfrey, Senior Evaluator (701140) Let t er Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary, VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 or visit: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U. S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512- 6000 or by using fax number (202) 512- 6061, or TDD (202) 512- 2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET, send an e- mail message with info in the body to: info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO's World Wide Web Home Page at: http:// www. gao. gov United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001 Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Correction Requested Bulk Rate Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00 *** End of document. ***


text:
If you fell in love with Skylar Astin right around the time THIS happened:
Then you're probably totally cool with your boyfriend's plan to go see 21 and Over this weekend. 'Cause he's so adorable, and no number of that movie's inevitable farty-fratty jokes can take that away. That much we know. But here's what you might not:
You probably heard he broke out on Broadway in Spring Awakening, but you might not have known how different he looked as Georg. (So young, and that hair!)
His full name is Skylar Astin Lipstein, but he adopted his middle name as his stage last-name.
He played Mark in a 2010 Hollywood Bowl version of Rent—opposite my Les Mis crush Aaron Tveit and Vanessa Hudgens.
He's rumored to already be in talks for a ](http://www.movieweb.com/news/exclusive-pitch-perfect-2-in-the-works-rebel-wilson-to-return)[Pitch Perfect sequel (hoo-ray!).
He went to the famous Stagedoor Manor theater camp in upstate New York. Natalie Portman went there, along with Zach Braff, Lea Michele, Mandy Moore, and scores of others.
In case you were too focused on Zosia's fantastic facial expressions to notice, he was the guy in THAT Shosh scene on Girls.
Tegan and Sara are big fans. This video makes my heart want to burst. And I'm not going to tell you outright who his first crush was because I want you to have to watch this to find out. I can be stingy that way.
Aw, Skylar! Right?

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Kukla's Korner Hockey
Will Ryan O'Reilly Sign Now?
by Paul on 01/29/13 at 01:46 PM ET
Comments (2)
from Allan Muir of Sports Illustrated,
In the wake of Monday night's P.K. Subban deal, the 21-year-old restricted free agent and erstwhile KHL star is now the last remaining big-name player without a contract for this season.
O'Reilly led the Avalanche in scoring last season — albeit with just 55 points – -and brings a package of heart and skill that the franchise wants to rebuild around. After making $900,000 on the last year of his entry-level deal, according to capgeek.com, all agree that he is due a hefty raise.
And he'll get one.
But if he held out any hope of swinging $5 million a year from the Avs, well, that grandiose dream died Monday night under the pitiless boot heel of Montreal Canadiens GM Marc Bergevin.
If we've learned anything during the last couple weeks from the signings of RFAs like Subban and Michael Del Zotto, it's that a certain sense of order has been restored in the wake of the new CBA.
Filed in: NHL Teams, Colorado Avalanche, | KK Hockey | Permalink
Tags: ryan+o'reilly
Yeah, the Avs are completely awful.
They've got him right where they want him!
Posted by J.J. from Kansas on 01/29/13 at 01:53 PM ET
Especially with Landeskog out with a concussion and Downey out for the season, O-O-O-O'Reilly will have to cave for dirt cheap now.
Posted by HockeytownOverhaul on 01/29/13 at 01:57 PM ET
Add a Comment
Please limit embedded image or media size to 575 pixels wide.
Add your own avatar by joining Kukla's Korner, or logging in and uploading one in your member control panel.
Captchas bug you? Join KK or log in and you won't have to bother.
Most Recent Blog Posts
Hockey Notes On A Late August Night
Jared Bednar Is The New-Look Coach In Colorado
Video- The Fighting Debate In "Ice Guardians"
The Buffalo Sabres Cap Season Ticket Sales
A Lot Of 'Dead' Money In Arizona
Time For Chicago's Prospects To Produce
Your New Captain Of The St. Louis Blues Is Alex Pietrangelo
Avalanche hire Jared Bednar as head coach
A possible free agent signing and a possible Avs coaching resolution
About Kukla's Korner Hockey
Paul Kukla founded Kukla's Korner in 2005 and the site has since become the must-read site on the 'net for all the latest happenings around the NHL.
From breaking news to in-depth stories around the league, KK Hockey is updated with fresh stories all day long and will bring you the latest news as quickly as possible.
Email Paul anytime at firstname.lastname@example.com


text:
Medical Support Update
Rotherham Titans are delighted to announce the addition of The Rotherham Physiotherapy Centre as part of the medical support staff at Clifton Lane.
Alex Codling, Titans Head Coach said, "We are delighted to announce that the Rotherham Physio Centre have agreed to provide medical support to the Rotherham Titans 1st XV squad for the remainder of the season.
"The injury list at the Titans this season has been well documented and it is great to have the experience and knowledge of the guys at the Rotherham Physio Centre to assist Head Sports Rehabilitation Specialist Lindsay Whitaker, who is doing a fantastic job and add to what is already an excellent medical support set up."
The Rotherham Physiotherapy Centre has been established since 1987.
It is run by Andrew Sweeney, M.C.S.P, M.M.A.C.P, Dip Bio Mech. He and the team of experienced clinicians aim to provide the highest quality of care in a relaxed professional, friendly environment.
Their aim is to "Treat you as an individual, to maximise your recovery, but also to help you reduce the risk of problems reoccurring"
To make an appointment email: email@example.com or call Rotherham 01709 368805 or Wickersley 01709 702111.
For further information visit: http://www.rotherhamphysiocentre.co.uk/


text:
Forgot Password? | Not a User? Sign up
Your browser does not support iframes.
Three local violinists performed as part of the violin section during the Campbellsville University Orchestra's performance on April 28. The concert was directed by Dr. Robert Gaddis and assistant director Wansoo Cho.
Pictured, from left, are Madeira Curry from Taylor County High School, Chloe Cheng of Adair County High School and Mary Tress Eastham who attends Green County Vocational School and is home schooled. Their violin teacher, Roger Noel Davis, is in back.
James Roberts
Despite significant cuts to state funding, no jobs will be slashed at Taylor County Schools.
While districts across the state are responding to funding cuts by handing out pink slips, Taylor County School Superintendent Roger Cook said jobs here will be spared by not replacing those who have retired.
And, despite a $230,000 state funding cut and a looming 10- to 20-percent cut to Title 1 funding, all employees will receive a 1 percent raise.
Campbellsville Independent
May 16-20
Monday - Barbecue pork rib, French fries, Rice Krispie treat, pears and milk. Choice - chuckwagon.
Tuesday - Election Day. No school.
Wednesday - Baked spaghetti, tossed salad, hash brown, pineapple tidbits, Texas toast and milk. Choice - pork chop.
Thursday - Turkey or pork roast, mashed potatoes, green beans, peach cups and milk. Choice - chicken fried steak.
Friday - Hot dog, tater tots, buttered corn, fruit juicee and milk. Choice - fish.
Kaitlyn Benningfield
Taylor County Schools
Some children dream of becoming movie stars while others dream of visiting another country, but Neal Upchurch Jr. only dreamed of more independence and mobility. He wasn't able to fulfill his dream until this spring when his mother's van was converted to hold his wheelchair.
Taylor County High School student Christa Thomas recently received first place for a drawing in the State Woman's Club Competition.
Caleb Harris
Campbellsville University
In response to the earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan in March, Japanese students at Campbellsville University united and formed their own relief team. A total of $2,420 was raised for the CU Japanese Relief Fund for the Kentucky Baptist Convention.
May 9-13
Monday - Fish, macaroni and cheese, pinto beans, peach cups and milk. Choice - chuckwagon.
Tuesday - Lasagna, tossed salad, diced pears, garlic bread and milk. Choice - corn dog.
Wednesday - Chicken nuggets, mashed potatoes, green beans, strawberry cups and milk. Choice - pork chop.
Thursday - Tacos with tortilla chips, lettuce, tomatoes and cheese, Spanish rice, mandarin oranges and milk. Choice - chicken fried steak.
Campbellsville Elementary School fourth-grade students who brought the most Box Tops to school were recently announced. King is Spencer Swafford and the Queen is Christa Riggs.
Other winners include Abbie Dicken, Sarah Ford, Reagan Knight, John Michael Netherland, Christa Riggs, Davon Cecil, Caleigh Bright, Tabitha Burress, Samuel Cox, Tristan Hovious, Selena Ritchie, Daesean Vancleave, Chloe Gupton, Tristan Johnson, Myles Murrell, Piper Rucker, Spencer Swafford, Haley Watson, Casey Hardin, Jeremiah Jackson, Josh Mahan and Jaylah Tucker.
Bonnie Webster
Taylor County Public Library
Do you have a little extra time to read with all these spring rain storms? Here are some popular reads at the Taylor County Public Library.
Elena Groholske
Campbellsville University is offering summer classes as a way for students to get ahead and avoid the higher cost of tuition.
"Attending summer school gives a student the opportunity to either catch up or get ahead toward their graduation goal," said Dave Walters, vice president for admissions and student services. "Taking two summer session classes for three summers would total 18 credit hours, which would be like an extra semester."
Copyright © 2016
The Central Kentucky News-Journal is your source for local news, sports, events, and information in Campbellsville, KY and the surrounding area.


text:
Reflections Dining Table
A unique design and minimalistic sensibilities make this Reflections Dining Table an ideal solution for bridging the gap between looks and utility. Sturdy, sleek and stylish, this glass and stainless steel table seats six with ease yet is sure to fit a smaller dining spaces as well. Now all you need to worry about is what�s on the menu!
- Distinctive, ultra-modern design adds function and elegance to your dining space
- Pedestal style base ensures reliable stability
- Sleek, stainless steel post and central base provides a sturdy stance
- 10mm thick, clear glass table top with gracefully curved edges creates a light, airy look
- All glass is tempered for strength and safety
- Rubberized feet for delicate floors
- Seats up to 6 guests
- Perfect addition to condo or apartment setting
Weight: 156 lbs
Height: 29"
Width: 51"
Depth: 31.5"
- (1) Reflections Dining Table
LTL Freight (Truck)
- Minimal Assembly Required; Instructions Included
One Year Warranty Against Manufacturer Defects
1-877-224-6663 or 973-276-0444
Copyright 2003-2015 by Evofurniture, LLC. All rights reserved.


text:
BURTON CONSTABLE FOUNDATION has been successful in obtaining a grant of £417,800 from the Heritage Lottery Fund. The money will be used to repair, conserve and restore the Grade I listed red brick stable block at Burton Constable Hall.
In the first phase of restoration, a selection of the many historic interiors will be restored including stalls and loose boxes, tack rooms, stable master's sitting room and grooms' quarters. The Great Barn will continue as home to the skeleton of the Burton Constable Sperm Whale with a new display.
The project, to begin later this year, will bring the exteriors and interiors of the derelict stable buildings back to life to provide greater public access and a wide range of learning and community activities. New volunteer facilities, community exhibition and workshop spaces will also be created along with a new visitor entrance. Public engagement will be encouraged through a series of open-access days during the restoration period.
Dr David Connell, Director of the Burton Constable Foundation said: "This award provides us with a fantastic opportunity to transform the experience of visitors to Burton Constable and continue with the renaissance of this great house and its surrounding parkland."
Graham Stuart MP was one of the first to offer his congratulations. In a press release issued yesterday, the MP said: "The Burton Constable Foundation do important work maintaining this historic Hall. It is great news that they have received this HLF funding so visitors to East Yorkshire will be able to see even more of this fantastic house and its grounds, and local tourism can be given a boost."
The project aims to increase visitor numbers and provide opportunities for volunteer and community participation and learning for all age groups.


text:
Sweden, 1977, 95 Minute Running Time
Additional Countries: Australia
Genre/Subjects: Comedy, Documentary, Mockumentary, MusicLanguage: English, Swedish
Plays Friday, March 25th at 10pm at the Denver FilmCenter/Colfax!
Special pre-show by musical wunderkind Ian Cooke, charming you with his delightful renditions of some of ABBA's biggest hits!
Click here to see the rest of the awesome films playing in The Watching Hour!
35mm presentation - Bumbling radio DJ Ashley Wallace (Robert Hughes) pursues Swedish pop sensations ABBA across Australia in the hopes of landing an exclusive interview in this 1977 cult classic, released in conjunction with the group's wildly successful "ABBA: The Album." Directed by future Oscar nominee Lasse Hallström, the film captures Anni-Frid, Benny, Björn and Agnetha performing "Waterloo," "Mamma Mia" and other hits as they tour the country.
DIRECTOR: Lasse Hallström
Principal Cast: ABBA, Anni-Frid Lyngstad, Benny Andersson, Bjorn Ulvaeus, Agnetha Faltskog, Robert Hughes, Tom Oliver, Bruce Barry, Stikkan Andersson, Calvin Cross, Ivar DahlbornUS Distributor: Warner Bros
CLICK IMAGE for the Member Newsletter
CLICK IMAGE to submit to the Denver Film Festival. Withoutabox logos are trademarks of Withoutabox, a DBA of IMDb.com Inc. or its affiliates.
CLICK IMAGE to Renew or JoinMembership Updates and Sign Up
CLICK IMAGE for Information
CLICK IMAGE for more information
Site powered by: Luminate


text:
"What are benzodiazepines, and how do they work?
Benzodiazepines are a class of drugs primarily used for treating anxiety, but they also are effective in treating several other conditions. The exact mechanism of action of benzodiazepines"...
Ativan Consumer (continued)
Remember that your doctor has prescribed this medication because he or she has judged that the benefit to you is greater than the risk of side effects. Many people using this medication do not have serious side effects.
Tell your doctor right away if you have any unlikely but serious side effects, including: mental/mood changes (such as hallucinations, depression, thoughts of suicide), slurred speech or difficulty talking, vision changes, unusual weakness, trouble walking, memory problems, signs of infection (such as fever, persistent sore throat), trouble breathing (especially during sleep).
Get medical help right away if you have any rare but very serious side effects, including: yellowing eyes or skin, seizures.
A very serious allergic reaction to this drug is rare. However, get medical help right away if you notice any symptoms of a serious allergic reaction, including: rash, itching/swelling (especially of the face/tongue/throat), severe dizziness, trouble breathing.
This is not a complete list of possible side effects. If you notice other effects not listed above, contact your doctor or pharmacist.
In the US -
Call your doctor for medical advice about side effects. You may report side effects to FDA at 1-800-FDA-1088.
In Canada - Call your doctor for medical advice about side effects. You may report side effects to Health Canada at 1-866-234-2345.
Read the Ativan (lorazepam) Side Effects Center for a complete guide to possible side effects
PRECAUTIONS: Before taking lorazepam, tell your doctor or pharmacist if you are allergic to it; or to other benzodiazepines (such as alprazolam, clonazepam, diazepam); or if you have any other allergies. This product may contain inactive ingredients, which can cause allergic reactions or other problems. Talk to your pharmacist for more details.
Before using this medication, tell your doctor or pharmacist your medical history, especially of: kidney disease, liver disease, glaucoma, lung/breathing problems (such as sleep apnea), mental/mood disorders (such as depression, psychosis), drug/alcohol abuse.
This drug may make you dizzy or drowsy or cause blurred vision. Do not drive, use machinery, or do any activity that requires alertness or clear vision until you are sure you can perform such activities safely. Avoid alcoholic beverages.
Before having surgery, tell your doctor or dentist about all the products you use (including prescription drugs, nonprescription drugs, and herbal products).
Older adults may be more sensitive to the side effects of this drug, especially loss of coordination and drowsiness. Also, the elderly may not experience relief of anxiety with lorazepam. It may have the opposite effect on the elderly, causing symptoms including mental/mood changes, sleeping problems, increase in sexual interest, or hallucinations. Loss of coordination, drowsiness, and sleeping problems may increase the risk of falling.
Children may not experience relief of anxiety with lorazepam. It may have the opposite effect on children, causing symptoms including agitation, shaking, or hallucinations.
This medication is not recommended for use during pregnancy. It may harm an unborn baby. Tell the doctor right away if you notice symptoms in your newborn baby such as slowed breathing, feeding problems, or constant crying. Consult your doctor for more details.
This drug passes into breast milk. Consult your doctor before breast-feeding.
Ativan Consumer Overview
Additional Ativan Information
Ativan - User Reviews
Ativan User Reviews
Now you can gain knowledge and insight about a drug treatment with Patient Discussions.
Here is a collection of user reviews for the medication Ativan sorted by most helpful.
Report Problems to the Food and Drug Administration
You are encouraged to report negative side effects of prescription drugs to the FDA. Visit the FDA MedWatch website or call 1-800-FDA-1088.
Emotional Wellness
Get tips on therapy and treatment.


text:
Microsoft's Global Warming Challenge to Gamers [1]
Kevin Grandia [2] | June 13, 2007
By Kevin Grandia [2] • Wednesday, June 13, 2007 - 10:03
Microsoft announced today [3] a new venture that will take advantage of the massive gaming industry to help raise global warming awareness. Budding game designers will be challenged to develop a video game on the subject and the top 3 will be considered for inclusion on the XBox Live gaming network that reaches about 6 million gamers worldwide.
It will be interesting to see what a global warming game will look like. Will it include holy paladins [4] installing solar panels or shape-shifting druids [5] protesting at G8 Summits? Or will it take a more mundane Second Life tone with players trading in Linden dollars [6] for carbon offsets?
Guess we'll see.


text:
Friends and family hold candlelight vigil in Plattsburgh FridayUPDATED 12:44 AM EDT Jun 28, 2014
Friends and family hold candlelight vigil in Plattsburgh FridayVideo Transcript
MEMORIES -- FRIDAY NIGHT -- A GATHERING AT PLATTSBURGH HIGH SCHOOL TO REMEMBER TWO YOUNG LIVES LOST FAR TOO SOON. 17 YEAR OLD TAOUFIK MAKNANI... HIS FRIENDS REMEMBERING A KIND HEARTED, FUN LOVING GUY... 2:31:06 - :15 he was just a good kid -- had his priorities straight. He loved his family, he loved his mom more than anything. 2:32:46 - 56 so toufik... Last memory 2:19:28 - :34 I know you were my little brother... hero HIS BROTHER -- COULDN'T MAKE IT THROUGH HIS SPEECH -- BUT HIS MOM HELPED... AND TOLD THE CROWD OF HUNDREDS -- THAT TOUFIK'S HEART WAS BIG, AND HE WANTED TO HELP EVERYONE. 2:21::02 TOUFIK LOVES EVERYBODY. HE LOVES EVERYBODY cries THOUGH POLICE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THE NAME OF THE SECOND VICTIM -- THE AUNT AND UNCLE OF THE TEENAGER TOLD US TONIGHT -- HIS NAME IS MIKE LAWSON. AND HE WILL BE SORELY MISSED. 2:06:52 - 57 -- we would like to thank support -- to bring michael home. 2:00:06 - if anything you take from this... Don't let a day go by ... ORANGE BALLOONS FILLED THE SKY -- AS A TRIBUTE TO THE TWO... AND THE FLAMES FLICKERED IN THE NIGHT, AS THEIR FRIENDS SHED TEARS -- BUT RECALLED HAPPIER TIMES... 2:14:06 you always made me smile -- I'll miss you man. Fly
More Video
CommentsThe views expressed are not those of this site, this station or its affiliated companies. By posting your comments you agree to accept our terms of use.blog comments powered by Disqus
Latest from WPTZ
AdvertisingBest Bets