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There were two principal reasons for the creation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. One was that the U.S. Mission in Saigon believed that a paramilitary force should be developed from the minority groups of South Vietnam in order to strengthen and broaden the counterinsurgency effort of the Vietnamese government. The other was that the Montagnards and other minority groups were prime targets for Communist propaganda, partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese government, and it was important to prevent the Viet Cong from recruiting them and taking complete control of their large and strategic land holdings.
One major study of the situation in Southeast Asia concluded that in 1961 the danger of Viet Cong domination of the entire highlands of South Vietnam was very real, that the efforts of the Vietnamese Army to secure the highlands against Viet Cong infiltration were ineffective, and that the natural buffer zone presented by the highland geography and Montagnard population was not being utilized properly to prevent Communist exploitation. The government was, in fact, failing to exercise any sovereignty over its highland frontiers or its remote lowland districts in the Mekong Delta where other ethnic and religious minority groups were established. This lack of control deprived the government of any early intelligence of enemy attacks and any real estimate of Viet Cong infiltration. The Communists, on the other hand, continued to exploit the buffer zone, and there was always the danger that the insurgents would use this territory as a springboard into the more heavily populated areas.
The Vietnamese had not only made no attempt to gain the support of the Montagnards and other minority groups but in the past had actually antagonized them. Before 1954 very few Vietnamese lived in the highlands. In that year some 80,000 refugees from North Vietnam were resettled in the Montagnard area, and
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inevitably friction developed. Dissatisfaction among the Montagnards reached a point where in 1958 one of the principal tribes, the Rhade, organized a passive march in protest. Vietnamese officials countered by confiscating the tribesmen's crossbows and spears, an act that further alienated the Montagnards.
The indifference of the Vietnamese to the needs and feelings of the tribesmen grew directly out of their attitude toward the Montagnards, whom the Vietnamese had traditionally regarded as an inferior people, calling them "moi," or savages, and begrudging them their tribal lands. This attitude on the part of the Vietnamese plagued the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program from the beginning. Not until 1966 did the Vietnamese, in their desire to bring the tribes under government control, begin to refer to the Montagnards as Dong Bao Throng, "compatriots of the highlands." Even so, the animosity between Montagnards and Vietnamese continued to be a major problem.
The Montagnard Culture
The Montagnards constitute one of the largest minority groups in Vietnam. The term Montagnard, loosely used, like the word Indian, applies to more than a hundred tribes of primitive mountain people, numbering from 600,000 to a million and spread over all of Indochina. In South Vietnam there are some twenty-nine tribes, all told more than 200,000 people. Even within the same tribe, cultural patterns and linguistic characteristics can vary considerably from village to village. In spite of their dissimilarities, however, the Montagnards have many common features that distinguish them from the Vietnamese who inhabit the lowlands. The Montagnard tribal society is centered on the village and the people depend largely on slash-and-burn agriculture for their livelihood. Montagnards have in common an ingrained hostility toward the Vietnamese and a desire to be independent.
Throughout the course of the French Indochina War, the Viet Minh worked to win the Montagnards to their side. Living in the highlands, these mountain people had been long isolated by both geographic and economic conditions from the developed areas of Vietnam, and they occupied territory of strategic value to an insurgent movement. The French also enlisted and trained Montagnards as soldiers, and many fought on their side.
Since the Rhade (Rah-day) tribe is fairly representative of the Montagnards, a description of the way of life of the villagers will serve as a good example of the environment in which the Special Forces worked in Vietnam. The Rhade were, furthermore,
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the first to be approached and to participate in the CIDG program. For many years, the Rhade have been considered the most influential and strategically located of the Montagnard tribes in the highlands of Vietnam. (Map 1) Mainly centered around the village of Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province, the Rhade are also found in Quang Due, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa Provinces. While there are no census records for these people, it has been estimated that the tribe numbers between 100,000 and 115,000, with 68,000 living in Ban Me Thuot.
The Rhade have lived on the high plateau for centuries, and their way of life has changed little in that time; whatever changes came were mainly the result of their contact with the "civilized" world through the French. They settle in places where their livelihood can be easily secured, locating their houses and rice fields near rivers and springs. Because they have no written history, not much was known about them until their contact with the French in the early nineteenth century. It is generally agreed that most of their ancestors migrated from greater China, while the remainder came from Tibet and Mongolia.
In order of descending importance, the social units of the Rhade are the family, the household, the kinsmen, and the village. The Rhade have a matrilineal system; the man is the breadwinner, but all property is owned by the wife. The oldest female owns the house and animals. The married man lives with his wife's family and is required to show great respect for his mother-in-law. If a man is rich enough he may have more than one wife, but women may have only one husband. Marriage is proposed by the woman, and the eldest daughter inherits her parents' property.
Building a house is a family enterprise. All members of families who wish to live together pitch in and build a longhouse in accordance with the size of the families. The house is made largely of woven bamboo and is long and narrow, sometimes 400 feet long, with entrances at each end. Both family and guests may use the front entrance, but only the resident families may use the rear. The house is built on posts with the main floor usually about four feet above the ground and is almost always constructed with a north-south orientation, following the axis of the valleys.
The tasks of the man and woman of the family are the traditional ones. The man cuts trees, clears land, weaves bamboo, fishes, hunts, builds houses, carries heavy objects, conducts business, makes coffins, buries the dead, stores rice, makes hand tools and weapons, strikes the ceremonial gongs—an important duty—and is responsible for preparing the rice wine. Authority in the Rhade
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family is maintained by the man—the father or the grandfather. It is he who makes the decisions, consulting with his wife in most cases, and he who is responsible for seeing that his decisions are carried out. The average Rhade man is between sixty-four and sixty-six inches tall, brown in complexion, and usually broadshouldered and very sturdy. The men have a great deal of endurance and manual dexterity and have the reputation of being excellent runners.
The woman draws water, collects firewood, cooks the food, cleans the house, mends and washes the clothes, weaves, makes the traditional red, black, yellow, and blue cotton cloth of the Rhade, and cares for the children. The women sit on the porch (the bhok-gah) of the longhouse to pound the rice with a long pole and a wooden mortar.
The life of the Rhade is governed by many taboos and customs. Outsiders are expected to honor these, and therefore delicacy was required of Special Forces troops who dealt with the Rhade and other tribes. Healing is the responsibility of the village shaman, or witch doctor, and the general state of health among the Rhade is
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poor. Religion is animistic—natural objects are thought to be inhabited by spirits—but the tribe also has a god (Ae Die) and a devil (Tang Lie).
The Rhade tend toward a migratory existence. Once they have used up the soil's vitality in one area, they move their village to a new place, seeking virgin soil or land that has not been used for half a century. At the beginning of the rainy season the people plant corn, squash, potatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, and bananas. Once these crops are in the ground, the rice is planted.
The Rhade proved to be enthusiastic participants in the CIDG program in the beginning because the early projects were, they felt, pleasing to the spirits and helpful to their villages. If these two requirements were satisfied (and in many instances they were not later on), the Rhade, and the Montagnards in general, were quite willing to work hard in the CIDG program.
The Montagnards were not, of course, the only minority group involved in the CIDC, program; other groups were Cambodians, Nung tribesmen from the highlands of North Vietnam, and ethnic Vietnamese from the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects.
The Buon Enao Experiment
With the permission of the Vietnamese government, the U.S. Mission in the fall of 1961 approached the Rhade tribal leaders with a proposition that offered them weapons and training if they would declare for the South Vietnamese government and participate in a village self-defense program. All programs that affected the Vietnamese and were advised and supported by the U.S. Mission were supposed to be accomplished in concert with the Vietnamese government. In the case of the Montagnard program, however, it was agreed that the project would at first be carried out separately instead of coming under the command and control of the Vietnamese Army and its advisers, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. There was no assurance that the experiment with the Rhade would work, especially in the light of the Vietnam government's failure to follow through on other promises to the Montagnards.
The village of Buon Enao, which had a population of approximately 400 Rhade, was visited in late October of 1961 by a representative of the U.S. Embassy and a Special Forces medical sergeant. During two weeks of daily meeting with village leaders to explain and discuss the program, several facts emerged. Because government forces had been unable to protect the villagers many of them supported the Viet Cong through fear. The tribesmen had
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previously aligned themselves with the government, but its promises of help had failed to materialize. The Rhade opposed the land development program because the resettlement took tracts of tribal lands and because most American and Vietnamese aid went to the Vietnamese villages. Finally, the discontinuance of the medical aid and educational projects by the Vietnamese government on account of the activities of the Viet Cong had created resentment against both the Viet Cong and the government.
The villagers agreed to take certain steps to show their support for the government and their willingness to co-operate. They would build a fence to enclose Buon Enao as a protection and as a visible sign to others that they had chosen to participate in the new program. They would also dig shelters within the village where women and children could take refuge in case of an attack; construct housing for a training center and for a dispensary to handle the promised medical aid; and establish an intelligence system to control movement into the village and provide early warning of attack.
In the second week of December when these tasks had been completed, the Buon Enao villagers, armed with crossbows and spears, publicly pledged that no Viet Cong would enter their village or receive assistance of any kind. At the same time fifty volunteers from a nearby village were brought in and began training as a local security or strike force to protect Buon Enao and the immediate area. With the security of Buon Enao established, permission was obtained from the Darlac Province chief to extend the program to forty other Rhade villages within a radius of ten to fifteen kilometers of Buon Enao. The chiefs and subchiefs of these villages went to Buon Enao for training in village defense. They too were told that they must build fences around their respective villages and declare their willingness to support the government of the Republic of Vietnam.
With the decision to expand the program, half of a Special Forces A detachment (seven members of Detachment A-35 of the 1st Special Forces Group) and ten members of the Vietnamese Special Forces (Rhade and Jarai), with a Vietnamese detachment commander, were introduced to assist in training village defenders and the full-time strike force. The composition of the Vietnamese Special Forces at Buon Enao fluctuated from time to time but was always at least 50 percent Montagnard. A program for the training of village medics and others to work in civil affairs projects intended to replace the discontinued government programs was also initiated.
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With the assistance of the U.S. Special Forces and Vietnamese Special Forces troops who had been introduced in December 1961, and a twelve-man U.S. Special Forces A detachment deployed in February 1962, all forty villages in the proposed expansion were incorporated into the program by the middle of April.
Recruits for both village defenders and the local security force were obtained through local village leaders. Before a village could be accepted as a part of the development program, the village chief was required.to affirm that everyone in the village would participate in the program and that a sufficient number of people would volunteer for training to provide adequate protection for the village. The program was so popular with the Rhade that they began recruiting among themselves. One of the seven members of Detachment A-35 had this to say about how the Rhade received the program initially: "Within the first week, they [the Rhade] were lining up at the front gate to get into the program. This kicked off the recruiting program, and we didn't have to do much recruiting. The word went pretty fast from village to village." Part of the project's popularity undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that the Montagnards could have their weapons back. In the late 1950s all weapons, including the crossbow, had been denied to them by the government as reprisal for Viet Cong depredations and only bamboo spears were allowed until the second week in December 1961, when the government finally gave permission to train and arm the village defenders and strike forces. The strike force would maintain itself in a camp, while the village defenders would return to their homes after receiving training and arms.
The American and Vietnamese officials were acutely aware of the opportunity for Viet Cong infiltration and developed control measures to be followed by each village before it could be accepted for the Village Self-Defense Program. The village chief had to certify that everyone in the village was loyal to the government and had to reveal any known Viet Cong agents or sympathizers. Recruits vouched for the people nearest them in line when they came for training. These methods exposed five or six Viet Cong agents in each village and these were turned over to the Vietnamese and Rhade leaders for rehabilitation.
Cadres of Rhade trained by the Vietnamese Special Forces were responsible for training both local security (strike) forces and village defenders, with Special Forces troops acting as advisers to the cadres but having no active role as instructors. Villagers were brought into the center and trained in village units with the
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weapons they were to use, M1 and M3 carbines. Emphasis was placed on marksmanship, patrolling, ambush, counterambush, and swift response to enemy attacks. While members of a village were being trained, their village was occupied and protected by local security troops. Since no official table of organization and equipment existed, these strike force units were developed in accordance with the manpower available and the estimated needs of the area. Their basic element was the squad of eight to fourteen men, capable of acting as a separate patrol.
Activities within the operational area established in co-ordination with the province chief and Vietnam Army units in the vicinity consisted of small local security patrols, ambushes, village defender patrols, local intelligence nets, and an alert system in which local men, women, and children reported suspicious movement in the area. In some cases, U.S. Special Forces troops accompanied strike force patrols, but both Vietnamese and American policy prohibited U.S. units or individual American soldiers from commanding any Vietnamese troops.
All villages were lightly fortified, with evacuation the primary defensive measure and some use of family shelters for women and children. Strike force troops remained on the alert in the base center at Buon Enao to serve as a reaction force, and the villages maintained a mutually supporting defensive system wherein village defenders rushed to each other's assistance. The system was not limited to Rhade villages in the area but included Vietnamese villages as well.
Logistical support was provided directly by the logistical agencies of the U.S. Mission outside Vietnamese and U.S. Army supply channels. U.S. Special Forces served as the vehicle for providing this support at village level, although U.S. participation was indirect in that distribution of weapons and pay of troops was accomplished through local leaders.
In the field of civic assistance, the Village Self-Defense Program provided community development along with military security. Two six-man Montagnard extension service teams were organized to give the villagers training in the use of simple tools, methods of planting, care of crops, and blacksmithing. Village defender and strike force medics conducted clinics, sometimes moving into new villages and thus expanding the project. The civic assistance program received strong popular support from the Rhade.
The establishment of village defense systems in the forty villages surrounding Buon Enao attracted wide attention in other
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Rhade settlements, and the program expanded rapidly into the rest of Darlac Province. New centers similar to Buon Enao were established at Buon Ho, Buon Krong, Ea Ana, Lac Tien, and Buon Tah. From these bases the program grew, and by August 1962 the area under development encompassed 200 villages. (Map 2) Additional U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces detachments were introduced. During the height of the expansion, five U.S. Special Forces A detachments, without counterpart Vietnamese detachments in some instances, were participating.
The Buon Enao program was considered a resounding success. Village defenders and strike forces accepted the training and weapons enthusiastically and became strongly motivated to oppose the Viet Cong, against whom they fought well. Largely because of the presence of these forces, the government toward the end of 1962 declared Darlac Province secure. At this time plans were being formulated to turn the program over to the Darlac Province chief and to extend the effort to other tribal groups, principally, the Jarai and the Mnong.
Command and Control During the Buon Enao Period
In the course of the Buon Enao experiment, the command and control structure of the U.S. Special Forces underwent a number of changes. The expansion of the Buon Enao project and the training of Vietnamese Special Forces in 1962 necessarily involved an increase in the number of Special Forces troops needed to do these jobs. This buildup of the U.S. Special Forces generated the need for a Special Forces headquarters in Vietnam, and, with the establishment of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in February 1962, made co-ordination necessary between the U.S. Mission, which was running the CIDG program and controlling the Special Forces involved in it, and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
In February 1962 there was one full U.S. Special Forces A detachment deployed in Darlac Province on the Buon Enao project. When the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was established, with General Paul D. Harkins commanding, a special warfare branch was included in the J-3 staff section. In May a joint agreement between the U.S. Mission and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was made to co-ordinate the CIDG program between them. The U.S. Mission initially retained complete responsibility for both the logistical and operational aspects of the program. The counterpart organization to the joint U.S. Mission and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, structure was the
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Vietnamese Special Forces under the control of the Vietnam government. In July the U.S. Department of Defense made the decision to transfer complete responsibility for Special Forces operations to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, thus making the Army responsible for U.S. support of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. The Department of Defense arranged for a colonel qualified in unconventional operations to assume command of the Special Forces in Vietnam and provided for flexibility with respect to supply procedures and the expenditure of funds so that the efficiency and effectiveness of the CIDG program could be maintained. The transfer of responsibility—codenamed Operation SWITCHBACK—was to be accomplished in phases and completed by 1 July 1963.
In September 1962 in accordance with Operation SWITCHBACK, Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, was activated in Vietnam under the Military Assistance Command. As of October 1962 there were twenty-four U.S. Special Forces detachments in Vietnam. (Map 3)
By November of 1962 the U.S. Special Forces organization in Vietnam consisted of one C detachment, three B detachments, and twenty-six A detachments. There was also a headquarters unit in Saigon. The C detachment did not exercise its usual function as an operational control detachment but rather provided augmentation for the headquarters. The normal Special Forces chain of command came into effect.
In the period December 1962 through February 1963, U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, assumed full operational control of the Special Forces A detachments in Vietnam. These A detachments had, at this point, established CIDG camps in every one of the four corps tactical zones. A control B detachment was located in each corps tactical zone to co-ordinate with the Vietnamese corps command structure and the senior adviser of the tactical zone and to exercise operational control over subordinate A detachments. Special Forces A detachments were placed on temporary duty in Vietnam from the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa and from the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. By December 1963 Special Forces detachments, working through counterpart Vietnamese Special Forces units, had trained and armed 18,000 men as strike force troops and 43,376 as hamlet militia, the new name for village defenders. Also in February 1963, the U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, headquarters was moved from Saigon to Nha Trang. The new location offered two advantages: first,
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since it was situated halfway between the 17th parallel and the southern tip of the country, it was more accessible to Special Forces detachments scattered throughout and, second, it afforded good facilities for unloading supply ships from Okinawa across the beach and also had available air, rail, and highway transportation.
In the beginning the program with the Rhade around Buon Enao was not officially called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, but was known at different times under various names, one of them area development. The troops were at one time called village defenders, at another time hamlet militia. The term CIDG actually became the official designation for the paramilitary counterinsurgency effort after Buon Enao, when the program began to expand.
The success of the Buon Enao experiment prompted a rapid and wide-ranging expansion of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program and an accompanying expansion of the Special Forces' role. The expansion period ran from August 1962, when the Buon Enao project was flourishing with a 200-village complex, to the spring of 1965, when substantial numbers of conventional U.S. combat units began to reach Vietnam.
Early Paramilitary Programs
During the period of the Buon Enao experiment with the Rhade, a number of other programs, often independent and unrelated, were initiated by the U.S. Mission in Saigon in an effort to extend government control into areas either lost to the government or under marginal control. All these programs, along with the area development program that extended out of Buon Enao in the spring of 1962 further into the Montagnard region and elsewhere, came to be designated officially as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. In these other programs the Special Forces, under the control of the U.S. Mission, conducted paramilitary training programs for the minority groups involved.
In December 1961 the second half of Detachment A-35 (the other half was at Buon Enao) arrived at the Hoa Cam Training Center in Da Nang, where it inaugurated a basic training program together with several specialized programs. Among the paramilitary units trained at Hoa Cam were the mountain commandos, later called mountain scouts. These men were used on long-range missions in remote jungle and mountain areas in order to provide a government presence in the areas and to gather intelligence for the military and civil authorities in their districts. An-
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other program in which the Special Forces functioned as training cadre was the trailwatchers program. The mission of the trailwatchers, later called border surveillance units, was to identify and report Viet Cong movements near the border in their area and to capture or destroy small Viet Cong units when possible. Montagnards living near the border of Vietnam with Cambodia and Laos who participated in the trailwatchers program were trained for eight weeks at Da Nang or at other area development centers. The trailwatchers program is significant in that it produced the border surveillance program, in which the concepts of area development and border surveillance were combined to form one of the most important facets of the CIDG program.
The Special Forces also helped train paramilitary forces in the "fighting fathers" program, wherein resistance to insurgent activity centered on Catholic parish priests and a number of priests under the program made the arming and training of their parishioners possible. The goal, again, was to secure an area for the government of South Vietnam. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group program emerged as an amalgamation of many little programs, all of which aimed at the protection of and development of minority groups against insurgency.
By the end of 1964 the Montagnard program was no longer an area development project in the original sense of the term.
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There was a shift in emphasis from expanding village defense systems to the primary use of area development camps or centers (CIDG camps) as bases for offensive strike force operations. At the time the principal task as seen by higher headquarters was to supplement the current government pacification program with intensified counterguerrilla warfare. Security and camp defense took precedence over civic action, and stress was laid on the role of CIDG strike forces as "VC hunters." A second major shift in mission that gave greater importance to border surveillance occurred in 1963 as area development projects were expanded toward the western borders of Vietnam and new CIDG camps were established in border areas. Although area development continued in other localities and was combined with border surveillance when feasible, border surveillance received greater emphasis in 1964.
With the expansion of the CIDG effort among the Montagnards, other tribal groups were drawn in and more Special Forces detachments became involved. New projects were not concentrated in a specific area but were dispersed and scattered throughout the country. The original Buon Enao complex expanded in Darlac Province. Projects were also initiated to recruit tribes in I Corps Tactical Zone and the northern regions of II Corps Tactical Zone (in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces). Support was given to the Catholic youth program in the Mekong Delta. All this expansion involved area assessment and the setting up of area development centers. (See Map 3.)
A CIDG area development center consisted essentially of a secure base of operations at which village defenders and strike forces recruited from nearby villages were trained. As at Buon Enao, the village defenders (later known as hamlet militia) volunteered to come to the base camp for training and to receive weapons while their villages were protected by the strike force. Supervised and assisted by strike forces, village defenders, after returning to their homes, were expected to patrol in defense of their villages and their immediate area. They received no pay except during their period of training. Each village development area was protected by paid, full-time strike force troops. Operating in units of platoon or company size, they conducted aggressive patrolling throughout the operational area, assisted villages under attack, set up ambushes, and checked village defense procedures. In most cases, strike force troops were paid in accordance with Vietnam Army pay scales, although in the early stages of the program higher pay was sometimes used as an incentive for enlistment.
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The general mission of an area development center or CIDG camp was to train strike forces and village defenders; bring the local populace under the influence of the South Vietnam government; employ paramilitary forces in combat operations to reinforce organized hamlets, carry out interdiction activities, and conduct joint operations with Vietnamese Army units when such operations furthered the CIDG effort; conduct psychological operations to develop popular support for the government; establish an area intelligence system including, but not limited to, reconnaissance patrols, observation posts, and agent informant networks; conduct a civic action program; and, where appropriate, establish a border screen in sectors along the Republic of Vietnam international border. During the development phase, all reasonable means were to be taken to improve the economic status of the local population by purchasing local materials and hiring local labor for the construction and operation of the camp. At this time, the CIDG area development camp plans called for eventual turnover and integration into the national strategic hamlet program after the area was "pacified." The overthrow of the Diem regime in 1963, however, altered those plans.
Throughout the period 1961-1963, the U.S. Special Forces units were conducting training programs, both in support of the Military Assistance Advisory Group—for example, Ranger training—and in support of the paramilitary programs. The major mission, however, of the U.S. Special Forces after Buon Enao was to establish base camps and conduct operations in support of the area development program under the U.S. Mission. At the camps the U.S. Special Forces advised their counterpart Vietnamese Special Forces detachments, provided operational assistance when required, and served as a channel for the logistical and financial support provided by the U.S. Mission.
Operation Switchback: November 1962-July 1963
In accordance with Operation SWITCHBACK, the Army began assuming responsibility for U.S. participation in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program in November 1962 by first taking over training and operations. By 30 June 1963 the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was fully responsible for logistics and funding and in July the administration of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program belonged to the command completely. There were, however, some paramilitary projects that had not yet been officially incorporated into the CIDG program and therefore did not come under Military Assistance Command con-
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trol. The most significant of these was the border surveillance program, which was not incorporated into the CIDG program until October 1963. At that time responsibility passed from the U.S. Mission to the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Border surveillance sites were then considered as CIDG projects with a subsidiary mission of border surveillance and were administered in accordance with the CIDG program.
The unusual logistic support system used by the Special Forces in the conduct of the CIDG program had a great deal to do with its successes. The U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, provided the normal supply support for U.S. Special Forces detachments. Through interagency agreements, the Army, incorporating many features of the U.S. Mission's logistical system, gave the U.S. Special Forces a direct overseas procurement capability, authorized local purchases from current operating funds at all U.S. Special Forces levels, allowed for informal justification for unusual items or quantities, dropped formal accountability for items on shipment to Vietnam, and devised what came to be known as "quick-reacting supply and procurement procedures." The Counterin-
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surgency Support Office was established in the G-4 section of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, on Okinawa, to control and expedite procurement and shipment of material supplied from outside Vietnam. During Operation SWITCHBACK, a monthly average of approximately 740 tons of equipment and supplies was airlifted from Saigon and Da Nang to Special Forces A detachments.
By the end of 1962, only one year after the initiation of the Buon Enao project, 6,000 strike force troops and 19,000 village defenders and hamlet militia had been trained. Other irregulars trained included 300 border surveillance troops, 2,700 mountain scouts, and approximately 5,300 Popular Forces troops. (Table 1)
The expansion of the CIDG program from 1 November 1962 to 1 July 1963, the end of Operation SWITCHBACK, was fairly rapid. Approximately forty CIDG camps were opened and eight closed. The rapidity of this expansion did not permit the kind of development that took place at Buon Enao, where a great deal of time was taken to prepare the area and the people for military activity in the CIDG program. This time the emphasis was on speed. The usual approach was to establish security first, undertake civic action later, and work through province and district chiefs instead of tribal leaders. In general these projects were not as successful as the Buon Enao experiment. In many areas Viet Cong control was stronger than at Buon Enao, making recruitment difficult. Often the tribal groups were not as advanced as the Rhade. Strike forces frequently had to be moved from their home areas in order to establish a new camp. It was also during this period that emphasis shifted from the establishment of mutually supporting village defense systems to carrying out offensive strike force operations in order to open up and then secure an area. Finally, increased emphasis was placed on selecting area development campsites near the borders so that strike forces could be assigned a border surveillance mission in addition to the task of clearing and securing the assigned operational area. (Map 4)
The primary U.S. Special Forces mission during Operation SWITCHBACK continued to be the training of strike force troops and hamlet militia. By June 1963 approximately 11,000 strike force and 40,000 hamlet militia from over 800 villages had undergone training that averaged about six weeks for strike force troops and two weeks for hamlet militia. The Special Forces also continued to conduct training for the border surveillance and mountain scout programs.
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Map 4--U.S. SPECIAL FORCES DEPLOYMENT, 1 JUNE 1963 (15.9 KB)
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Offensive actions conducted by CIDG strike forces during Operation SWITCHBACK included ambushes, reconnaissance patrols, and combat patrols within each camp's operational area. By June 1963 the CIDG camps in II Corps had completed the training of enough strike force troops to enable U.S. Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, to shift emphasis from training to operations against the Viet Cong. There were joint operations with Vietnam Army units and also combined operations using CIDG forces from different camps. In June, for example, four companies of strike forces from the camps at Dak To, Plei Mrong, and Polei Krong were combined for an operation. The role U.S. Special Forces men played in many of these operations was much more positive in terms of direction and control than their role as advisers would indicate; in many instances Vietnamese Special Forces troops were unable to carry out an operation and U.S. Special Forces men were obliged to take over command. Vietnamese Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers were not as well trained as their U.S. counterparts, and were, furthermore, often unwilling to carry out offensive operations with the civilian irregulars. This is not to say that they were afraid. Most had seen a great deal of fighting. They were just not interested in, or even remotely enthusiastic about, the CIDG program. From the point of view of the Vietnam Special Forces and the government the CIDG program was an American project. The failure of the turnover and conversion of camps grew largely out of this unenthusiastic attitude on the part of the Vietnamese. In any case, combat operations often placed an exceptional burden on U.S. Special Forces soldiers. A typical operation might involve a company of indigenous CIDG Montagnard strike force troops and one or two Special Forces men--an officer and a noncommissioned officer. If the Vietnamese Special Forces troops were along, then the Green Beret was an adviser. But in a firefight he often became the commander, and the men he had around him were not Americans. The Special Forces has more than a few decorations for acts of individual heroism under such circumstances. (See Appendix B.)
Viet Cong reaction to the expansion of the CIDG program in many instances took the form of mere harassment or occasional probing fire. During Operation SWITCHBACK, however, Viet Cong opposition increased. Every CIDG camp experienced some sort of enemy fire. The one instance of an attack in strength occurred on 3 January 1963 when two reinforced Viet Cong companies, with the assistance of at least thirty-three penetration agents in the strike force, attacked and overran the camp at Plei Mrong. The
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cumulative effect of these attacks was an increase in camp security; specifically, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in January 1963 issued a directive to all A detachments that called for a secondary defensive system inside the outer perimeter, along with other measures.
Finally, it was during Operation SWITCHBACK that the Special Forces began to receive augmentation. Two U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) technical assistance teams arrived in January on a six-month temporary duty basis and were employed extensively in airfield construction. Two U.S. Army five-man Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments also came in to assist the Special Forces in constructing roads, schools, drainage systems, and other civic action projects. Augmentation also included direct assistance in civil affairs and psychological operations. In June 1963, men specially trained in civil affairs and psychological operations were assigned to Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, and two-man teams were dispatched to Special Forces B detachments.
The Turnover of Buon Enao
The problems encountered in turning over the Buan Enao project to the Vietnamese proved to be the same problems which arose every time turnover was attempted in the CIDG program. A discussion of the Buon Enao experience, therefore, is illustrative of the broader turnover experience.
The so-called turnover of a CIDG camp consisted of nothing more than "turning over complete authority and responsibility for the camp" to the Vietnamese Special Forces. The CIDG forces present in the camp maintained their CIDG status. The opposite was true in a so-called conversion; civilian irregulars were converted into regular Vietnamese soldiers, Regional or Popular Forces or Vietnamese Army, and lost their CIDG status. Conversion was not very popular among the CIDG, although eventually most men did convert.
The concept of the CIDG program provided that when an area could be considered secure or became accessible to Vietnam Army units and government agencies, it would be turned over to provincial control. By the end of Operation SWITCHBACK, July 1963, the expanded CIDG program was still in the developmental stage--only the villages in the Buon Enao complex were considered secure and ready for turnover. Nevertheless, the turnover of Buon Enao was a failure. A 5th Special Forces Group synopsis of the CIDG program concluded: "By the end of 1963, the Buon
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Enao complex was disorganized and most of its effectiveness had been lost."
The turnover at Buon Enao gave the first indication of two major problems that would arise later in the transfer of men trained by Special Forces to the government of Vietnam. The first of these was the lack of preparation on the part of the government for taking over and continuing area development projects. The second was the reluctance of strike force troops to be integrated into conventional Vietnamese units. During Operation SWITCH-BACK some camps were closed out before the assigned mission was accomplished because of the lack of CIDG potential in the area, change of mission, or greater need elsewhere for the strike force personnel.
In September 1962 the Darlac Province chief agreed to accept thirty-two of the 214 villages in the Buon Enao complex. These villages were considered secure. It was planned to turn over an additional 107 villages at the end of March 1963 and the remain-ing villages by the end of June 1963.
The government arranged a very rigid schedule for the Buon Enao turnover. The province chief and the Vietnamese Special Forces were given orders to carry out the schedule to the letter. The U.S. Special Forces teams on the sites were therefore unable to alter the schedule, although there is evidence of their consider-able apprehension over the possible consequences of an unpre-pared turnover-apprehension that apparently was not shared by the government. Despite the formal co-ordination that took place, actual on-the-scene planning and execution of turnover was handled unilaterally by the Vietnamese. The commanding officer of U.S. Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, was not shown the turnover plan in advance.
By the end of 1962 the chief of Darlac Province had accepted the thirty-two villages, but since he was unable to support them financially or logistically the villages were turned over on paper only. The Special Forces had to continue to support the villages and pay the strike force and other costs. On 20 March 1963 the second lot of 107 villages was turned over with province support of the original thirty-two still not forthcoming. The last 139 villages were to be assimilated into the strategic hamlet program, but because these hamlets had not yet been approved for support by regular U.S. Vietnamese funds, U.S. Mission funds continued to support all 214 villages in the complex for the next few months.
In April 1963, 604 of the 900-man Buon Enao Strike Force were turned over to the province chief to be used for the CIDG pro-
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gram and border surveillance, and one company was sent to open a new camp at Bu Prang in Quang Duc Province. The day after the turnover, the province chief moved the 604 CIDG troops from Buon Enao to Ban Me Thuot for indoctrination, thus leaving the complex without a strike force during the hours of darkness. These actions were taken unilaterally by the Vietnamese and apparently without any indoctrination or psychological preparation of the strike force. Although the province chief had assumed responsibility for the pay of strike force troops on 30 April 1963, they were still unpaid by 26 July and seemed ready to desert, despite the prospect of higher pay scales at the Vietnam Army rate. Neither had the village health workers trained at Buon Enao been paid. A serious situation was narrowly averted when the Special Forces provided back pay to strike force troops and village health work-ers from CIDG funds.
Once the strike force troopers left Buon Enao for indoctrination, they did not return but were transferred to other parts of the province, and in the process their unit integrity was destroyed. The dependents of the strike force also started to leave; and there were other disturbing developments that added to the bewilderment and discontent of the Rhade, who had come to view Buon Enao as the source and symbol of the entire program. For example, the dispensary facilities at Buon Enao, which had played a major role in the initiation of the project, were dismantled and moved to Lao Tien and Buon Ho.
Concern in Saigon about the large number of weapons distributed to the Rhade resulted, in December 1962, in a government order to reduce the number of weapons by 4,000. Difficulty was encountered in collecting the weapons because the tribesmen had received no instructions to turn them in. The order to do so appeared to them to be inconsistent with what they had been told, namely, that the weapons given them were for the defense of their villages and families. At the time of the turnover, there were still 2,000 more weapons in the province than Saigon regulations permitted, and there were further collections. The Special Forces did not participate in the collection of weapons. Disillusionment following the turnover of Buon Enao may have contributed to the Montagnard uprising which took place in late September 1964.
The reasons for the failure of the Buon Enao turnover can be summarized as follows: mutual suspicion and hostility between the Rhade and Vietnamese province and district officials; overly generous distribution by U.S. agencies of weapons and ammunition to tribesmen whose reaction to government enforced repossession of
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some of the weapons was understandably hostile;.apparent disregard on the part of the Vietnam government for the interests, desires, and sensitivities of the Montagnards; inadequate Vietnamese government administrative and logistical support; and, finally, failure of U.S. authorities to anticipate these difficulties and avoid them.
Although the transfer of considerable assets took place during the early years, there were only rare instances of turnover where the mission of pacification had been accomplished and where troops were trained and ready to carry on without U.S. supervision. Of the eighty-two CIDG camps that were established prior to October 1964, more than forty were closed out or turned over by that date.
The higher priority given the border surveillance mission after July 1963 caused a shift of the principal CIDG effort from the interior to border sites and was the reason for the turnover or closeout of seventeen of the eighteen camps relinquished between August 1963 and March 1964. Inadequate initial area assessment led in some cases to the selection of unproductive sites that later had to be relocated. Some camps were situated on indefensible terrain or had limited CIDG potential. Other camps were moved or closed out altogether because of the discontent of the strike force, which had been recruited from a distant area because of the lack of local resources.


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Camilla Viator was on Brazos Valley this Morning Monday morning to talk about the 12th Annual Mushroom Festival.
It takes place October 12 in Downtown Madisonville.
For information visit texasmushroomfestival.com.
Click Here to access the online Public Inspection File
Viewers with disabilities can get assistance accessing this station's FCC Public Inspection File by contacting the station with the information listed below. Questions or concerns relating to the accessibility of the FCC's online public file system should be directed to the FCC at 888-225-5322, 888-835-5322 (TTY), or firstname.lastname@example.com.

subset: commoncrawl


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KENNEBUNKPORT — The results of an investigation into an accident that left a Kennebunkport police officer with serious injuries are now in the hands of the York County District Attorney's office.
Police Chief Craig Sanford said the investigation into the late July accident is complete. Kennebunkport Police Officer Marc Laflamme sustained serious injuries after crashing his motorcycle on Arundel Road in the early morning of Friday, July 26.
Laflamme has since been released from the hospital and is recovering from the injuries.
"The case is at the (district attorney's) office and we're waiting to hear from them," he said. "It's basically for them to look at and give us their opinion because they are our legal advisers."
The accident was reconstructed immediately by an investigator from the Sanford Police Department and a blood alcohol analysis was conducted. Sanford said both those findings are among the evidence turned over to be reviewed by the district attorney's office.
Laflamme joined the Kennebunkport Police Department as a full-time patrolman in October 2007 after working as a summer reserve officer since 2001. Laflamme is a longtime volunteer with the Kennebunkport Fire Department and Kennebunkport Emergency Medical Services.
— Jennifer Feals
Location, ST | website.com


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Home » Blogs » Padres Scorecard »
China, MLB and the Padres
Written by | Tom Krasovic | 10:32 a.m., Mar 13, 2008
Five years ago, I wrote a column for The Sporting News about why Major League Baseball should further its relationship with China. Little did I know that Padres owner John Moores would hire Sandy Alderson out of the commissioner's office in 2003, and that Alderson and Moores would help bring about a China venture. Tomorrow, the Padres and Dodgers are to play the first of two exhibitions in Beijing. Here's the column:The Sporting NewsJanuary 13, 2003Scaling the Great WallWithout appearing to jump more than a few inches, Yao Ming can thrust basketballs over giants and through rims. Now we'll see if he can roust Old Man Baseball merely by being Yao Ming. When the 7-5 Yao performed for the Rockets in a pedestrian NBA game, nearly 300 million of his Chinese countrymen viewed the telecast. Presumably a comparable number of Chinese ultimately would watch if one of their own pitched for the Mariners or batted for the Yankees. "China is really the big prize for professional and amateur sports," says Dan Okimoto, a Stanford University professor who is the school's director emeritus for the Asia Pacific Research Center and is a regular visitor to China. "Even if 25 percent of China's population were attracted to baseball, you'd have 300 million, which gives you a fan base bigger than the size of the United States."Unlike some of its neighbors, notably Japan, China never has caught baseball fever. With Yao's giant step forward onto the American pro sports landscape, however, perhaps Major League Baseball owners will begin the journey of far more than a thousand miles and cultivate the world's last great untapped market. Other tasks could be more appealing to Bud Selig's band of owners, who seem more interested in demonizing the Yankees and convincing fans the industry is losing money. But for those owners who aren't turned off by China's considerable human-rights abuses, now could be the time to embrace the world's most populous country, where per capita income is expected to double in the next eight years.In March, China will launch its first professional baseball league, designed to prepare a team that can qualify for the Beijing Olympics in 2008.Yao has created his own cultural revolution, and several Taiwanese baseball players in U.S. farm systems could inspire China to push for rapid baseball development. Taiwan is home to ethnic Chinese and is of keen interest to China. A player such as Taiwanese pitcher Chin-Hui Tsao, a Rockies prospect with star potential, could convince many Chinese boys to don baseball uniforms."If Tsao or some of those guys wind up in the big leagues, I'd almost bet my meager salary that it won't be long until it will motivate the Chinese to do some things they aren't doing now," says Padres international scouting supervisor Bill Clark. "They might not be that aware of American baseball, but the Chinese are very aware of those Taiwanese guys in baseball. You don't want to be outdone by your rogue state."Clark expects the well-connected Mariners to find and develop the first Chinese player to reach the big leagues. Last April, Seattle became the first major league club to sign a Chinese-born player, Chao Wang, a teenage pitcher from Beijing. He went 0-2 with a 5.14 ERA for Seattle's affiliate in the Arizona Rookie League.In Clark's mind, he sees Chinese boys who have Ichiro Suzuki's hand-eye coordination and Pedro Martinez's suppleness of arm and torso. In a dreamier state, he sees U.S. clubs opening academies in China and investing six-figure sums in Chinese clubs that presently do not exist."Not long ago, China wasn't all that good at women's weightlifting," says Clark, who attended a college-level base-ball tournament in Beijing five years ago. "But they made the effort to become a world leader, and they've dominated women's weightlifting ever since then. They did it simply by identification, and they trained them into being weight-lifters. ... The same thing would happen in baseball."There are probably several Ichiros in China," Clark says of the Japanese star who joined the Mariners. "It might take the second wave of signees before you come up with an Ichiro, but once you get into the country, you'd have your Ichiros."
Be relevant, respectful, honest, discreet and responsible. Commenting Rules


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Read more fashion & style at fdluxe.dallasnews.com
I may be Sunday's biggest fan. It is the one day a week I can stay in my pajamas, sans shame, for as long as I please. So imagine my glee when I discovered that The Joule commissioned Tenoversix — the Los Angeles-based boutique that is set to open at The Joule this spring — to design the hotel staff's uniforms, inspired by, indeed, pajamas.
Tenoversix co-owner and designer Brady Cunningham's effortless ensembles range from chic, bathrobe-like wrap dresses to slinky, ankle-length trousers paired with loose-fitting blouses that channel the most sophisticated sleepshirts. It is my fervent hope that a purchasable version of the collection will be available — so I can show up to work on Monday morning, fashionably, in my new pajamas.
— Christina Geyer, firstname.lastname@example.com


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My Article: A Day in Montreal
February 9th, 2011
(MONTREAL) I arrived at my hotel from offices of the Société des Alcools du Québec in Montréal, and I realized that I had left my tasting glasses there — or worse, in the taxi.
I am working on an interesting project with the SAQ — the stater-run wine and spirits distribution company and arguably the biggest wine merchant in the world — where I am blind-tasting many of its specially selected wines, and we share the tasting notes on our websites. There is no financial relationship. It's sharing information and contacts. Besides, I think Montréal is a really cool place. It reminds me of Paris in the 1980s. And it's a hell of a wine city. I will tell you more soon.
You may not know it, but I travel the world with my Riedel Sommeliers Chardonnay glasses in a small battered black leather case that I have had for probably 20 years. Those glasses are one of my most treasured objects that I own. They are part of my heart and soul as a wine taster.
I guess it's sort of like the favorite guitar of my buddy, jazz genius Anthony Wilson, or Alex Lifeson of Rush. You get the idea.
Maybe I am a little psycho, but I think that I taste better with my Riedels. I believe that I can taste more consistently if I review wines from the same glasses, even if I am away from the tasting room at my house in Tuscany or my office in Los Angeles. It just makes me feel better at the end of the day.
So I was really pissed off when I thought that I lost my case of tasting glasses in the taxi that let me off at the Downtown W Hotel. I was livid. I was shaking. Could I taste wines the same without them?
I called the SAQ and they didn't have them. My friend at the SAQ, Marie Eve, called the taxi company, and it didn't have them. The hotel didn't have them. I was really bummed out to say the least.
I called the taxi company and I told her in French that I had lost "mes verres." She said that she spoke English perfectly, and no glasses were found in the taxi. I said, "Mes verres pour la degustation." (My glasses for tasting.)
"Sir, I speak English, so please don't speak French. We have found no glasses, sir," she said in her thick Québécois-laced English. She seemed pissed off now. I even offered her 100 bucks reward, and I admit, she became much more friendly all of a sudden. But she sadly said she could not help.
Why in the world would someone want some tasting glasses from some long-haired dude from Los Angeles anyway? Did they think the case was full of drugs or money or something truly valuable?
I called Marie Eve again and asked her in English if she had seen my glasses. "No," she said. "I asked around the office. The receptionist even said he saw them on your head when you left the office!"
"On my head?" I thought to myself. "I don't remember balancing my case of wine glasses on my head when I left."
OMG! "Ils ne sont pas mes lunettes mais mes verres de vin!" I said. (They aren't my eyeglasses, they are my wine glasses!)
"Oh, those are right next to my desk," she said.
I had a huge smile over the phone. I felt like taking a taxi to the SAQ and giving Marie Eve a big kiss. My day was made. Not only did I taste with 200 passionate and fun wine shop heads from the SAQ, and speak to them about my life as a wine critic, but I found my tasting glasses.
"La vie est belle à Montréal," I thought. (Life is beautiful in Montréal.)Comments
You must be logged in to post comment.Subscribe
February 11, 2011
Thats hilarious James but as soon as you mentioned to them you lost your glasses, I knew that they thought "Spectacles" it's a Quebec French thing!
James Suckling
February 11, 2011
I thought it was too funny not to write a blog about it! Lost in the translation! The woman kept on saying that my French was bad and speak English! I am still laughing about it!
February 12, 2011
This story is great! I'm thrilled you had/are having a great time in Montreal. If you're still around, my friends and I would love to take you to one of the best BYOB's in the city - the food is awesome, and you get to bring your own cherished wines and not pay 3x retail prices If you're already gone, well then, as we say, "a la prochaine!"
February 17, 2011
Bien content que tout se soit bien terminé!
J'ai bien noté vos suggestions sur le site de la SAQ et bien hâte de goûter ces vins...Avec un cassoulet ou tout simplement avec un confit, quel vin choisisez-vous? Merci pour votre partage et votre modestie...))
Guy de Repentigny
February 17, 2011
Mais votre français est encore très bon! Je regardé vos videos sur SAQ et c'est excellent! ;-)))
February 17, 2011
Perhaps too much vino? No... just not possible! LOL


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Fire, CO detector
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Can anything be done to make the game recognise other keyboards in the chat window? I can get all the letters – and they're all on the right keys, so it's not simply reading it as qwerty. But I can only get a # when I mean an apostrophe, and can't get a question mark at all. Anyone else using different keyboards having this problem?
[Legacy of Heroes] Non-qwerty keyboards
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It is our general policy to restrict who can access Personal Information. Except as otherwise stated in this Privacy Statement, we do not trade, rent, or share the Personal Information that we collect with third-parties, unless You ask or authorize us to do so.
We may provide Your Personal Information to third-party service providers who work on behalf of or with us to provide some of the services and features of the Site or Services and to help us communicate with You. Examples of such services may include sending email, analyzing data, providing marketing assistance and processing payments (including credit card payments, if applicable). These third-parties are required not to disclose Your Personal Information and not to use Your Personal Information other than to provide the relevant services to us.
We may create Anonymous Information records from Personal Information by excluding information (such as Your name or email address) that makes the information personally identifiable to You. We may use Anonymous Information to analyze usage patterns so that we may enhance the Site or Services. We reserve the right to use and disclose Anonymous Information to third-parties in our discretion.
Parature may share Personal Information with our parent company, any subsidiaries, joint ventures, or other companies under a common control (collectively, "affiliates"), if you opt-in to such sharing. Parature may share some of all of Your Personal Information with these affiliates, in which case our affiliates will honor this Privacy Statement, including any opt-out options you may have.
In the event of a change in ownership, or a merger with, acquisition by, or sale of assets to, another entity, we reserve the right to transfer all of Your Personal Information to that entity. Parature will notify You (via a posting on this Site or email (in Parature's discretion) of such a transfer, and You may choose to modify Your registration information at that time. This means if You are concerned about Your Personal Information being transferred to a new owner, You can deactivate Your account.
We may share some or all of Your Anonymous Information or Personal Information with our third-party partners, other third-parties to whom You ask us to send Your information, or about whom You are otherwise notified and do not request to opt out of such sharing. This Privacy Statement does not cover the use of Your personally identifiable information by such third-parties. Parature does not maintain responsibility for the manner in which third-parties use or further disclose Your personally identifiable information collected from You in accordance with this Privacy Statement, after we have disclosed such information to those third-parties. If You do not want Parature to use or disclose Personal Information collected about You in the manners identified in this Privacy Statement, You may not use the Site or Services and must notify Parature by emailing email@example.com.
Parature reserves the right to disclose Your Personal Information if required by law or if Parature reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to (a) resolve disputes, investigate problems, or enforce our Terms of Use; (b) comply with relevant laws or to respond to requests from law enforcement or other government officials relating to investigations or alleged illegal activity, we can (and You authorize us to) disclose Personal Information without subpoenas or warrants served on us; or (c) protect and defend the rights or property of Parature, You, or third-parties. You hereby consent to Parature sharing Your Personal Information under the circumstances described herein.
If You provide feedback to us, we may use and disclose such feedback for any purpose, provided we do not associate such feedback with Your Personal Information. We will collect any information contained in such feedback and will treat the Personal Information in it in accordance with this Privacy Statement.
Third-Party Sites
The Site may contain links to other Web sites. Parature is not responsible for the privacy practices or the content of these other Web sites. This Privacy Statement applies solely to information collected by us through the Site or Services and does not apply to these third party Web sites. Users will need to check the privacy policies of these others Web sites to understand their policies. Users who access a linked site may be disclosing their Personal Information. You should always use caution and common sense when choosing to provide Personal Information on the Internet, particularly when it comes to information such as credit cards and other payment information. We encourage You to only disclose information about yourself that you are comfortable sharing with others. We do not recommend disclosing social security numbers (or the like, for example non U.S. national identification cards). It is the responsibility of the User to keep such information private and confidential. We encourage our Users to read the privacy statements of each and every Web site they visit. The ability to access information of third parties from the Site or Services, including, without limitation, through any Other Websites or Company Services, or links to other Web sites or locations, is for Your convenience and does not signify our endorsement of such third parties, their services, other Web sites, locations or their contents.
Privacy Policy for Advertising
As you browse the Public Pages, advertising cookies will be placed on your computer so that we can understand what you are interested in. Our display advertising partner, AdRoll, then enables us to present you with retargeting advertising on other sites based on your previous interaction with parature.com. The techniques our partners employ do not collect personal information such as your name, email address, postal address, or telephone number. You can visit this page to opt out of AdRoll's and their partners' targeted advertising.
Regarding Children
The Site is not directed to children and children are not eligible to use our Services. Protecting the privacy of children is very important to us. We do not collect or maintain Personal Information from people we actually know are under 13 years old, and no part of the Site or Services is designed to attract people under 13 years old. If we later obtain actual knowledge that a User is under 13 years old, we will take steps to remove that User's Personal Information from our databases.
We have put in place reasonable security measures to help protect against the loss, misuse, and alteration of Your Personal Information. When our Site is accessed using Internet Explorer version 6.0 or later, or Firefox version 2.0 or later, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology protects information using both server authentication and data encryption. Parature also implements an advanced security method based on dynamic data and encoded session identifications, and hosts the Site in a secure server environment that uses a firewall and other advanced technology to help prevent interference or access from outside intruders. Finally, Parature provides unique User names and passwords that must be entered each time a Customer logs on. These safeguards help prevent unauthorized access, and help to maintain data accuracy and appropriate use of Personal Information. Parature also offers enhanced security features within the Services that permit Customers to configure security settings to the level they deem necessary.
Despite such efforts, however, please note that no company, including Parature, can fully eliminate risks or guarantee the security of Your Personal Information; unauthorized entry or use, hardware or software failure, and other factors may compromise the security of information about You at any time, and we bear no liability for uses or disclosures of personal data or non-personal data arising in connection with the theft thereof.
Opt-Out Policy
Parature offers Users of its Site and Services a means to opt-out of receiving certain communications from us. If, at any time after registering for information or ordering Services, You change Your mind about being contacted by us, or certain information, You can opt-out of receiving such information, by sending Your request to firstname.lastname@example.com. In addition, Users can choose to opt out of newsletters and promotional emails, via the opt-out link included in each email. However, even if You opt-out of receiving such communications, during the term of our agreement with You, we retain the right to send You service-related communications in our sole discretion.
To opt-out from the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI Opt-Out), please click here.
Correcting & Updating Your Information
If clients need to update or change registration information they may so by editing the administrator record. To update a Client Profile, log on to Parature and select the Administrator Account Settings to add or update information. To update billing information please email email@example.com or call (703)564-7758. To discontinue the Service and to have data returned, email firstname.lastname@example.com or call (703) 564-7758. If You change and/or request changes to Your information, subsequent uses or disclosures of that information by us will reflect those changes, however, we do not have the ability to update any information previously disclosed to any third party. Certain information is necessary in order for us to provide the Site or Services; therefore, if You delete such necessary information You will not be able to use the Site or Services. If You wish to have Your Personal Information removed from our databases or to discontinue the Service You may contact us at firstname.lastname@example.com or call (703) 564-7758 and provide the name of the Service for which information was provided, Your full name, mailing address, telephone number and email address so that we may identify You in the opt-out process. Within a reasonable time period after we receive Your request, we will remove Your Personal Information. Please note that even though You may request the deletion of Your Personal Information by us, we may be required (by law or otherwise, such as to prevent fraud, resolve disputes, troubleshoot problems, or enforce our Services Agreement) to keep this information and not delete it (or to keep this information for a certain time) in which case we will comply with Your deletion request only after we have fulfilled such requirements). When we delete Personal Information, it will be deleted from the active database, but may remain in our archives. We will however, promptly correct any inaccuracies in any Personal Information that we have in our possession once notified of the requested change. We endeavor to process these requested changes as soon as is possible, but it may take up to thirty (30) days to make requested changes.
Notification of Changes
This Privacy Statement is a living document. We reserve the right to modify this Privacy Statement at any time. If we are going to use Your Personal Information that we have previously collected in a manner materially different from that stated at the time of collection, and You have provided us with Your current email address, we will notify You at that email address of such change. In the event You have provided us with an invalid or incomplete email address, or we do not have Your email address on file, a notice of any such changes will be posted to the Site. You will have a choice as to whether or not we use Your Personal Information in this materially different manner. Any such modifications become effective upon the earlier to occur of (i) Your acknowledgement of such modifications; (ii) Your continued access to and/or use of the Site or Services fifteen (15) days after we first provide You with email notification of such modifications; or (iii) if we have not provided You with an email notification of such modifications, Your continued access to and/or use of the Site or Services thirty (30) days after we have first posted such notice to the applicable Site(s).
In addition, if we make any material changes to our Privacy Statement that do not affect User information already stored in our database, we will post a prominent notice on our Site notifying Users of the change, and, at our discretion, email Users who have opted to receive communications from us, notifying them of the changes in our privacy practices. It is Your sole responsibility to check the Site from time to time to view any such changes to the terms of this Privacy Statement. If You do not agree to any changes, if and when such changes may be made to this Privacy Statement, You must cease access to the Site and use of the Services. You give us permission to email You for the purpose of notification as described in this Section.
Additional Information
Questions regarding this Privacy Statement or the practices of the Site or Services should be directed to Parature by e-mailing such questions to firstname.lastname@example.com.
Contact Information
If Users have any questions or suggestions regarding our Privacy Statement, please contact us:
Contact: Parature Privacy
Tel: (877) 467-2728
Email: firstname.lastname@example.com
Address: 12012 Sunset Hills Road, Reston, VA


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Who are we...
Restaurant & Bar Solutions are the Australian Importer of Sifa Bars & Counter Systems manufactured in Italy.
Restaurant & Bar Solutions pride ourselves on quality and service. We continue to supply our clients with quality equipment and professional service, which will now continue to flourish and provide great service second to none, with nearly 40 years combined industry experience from Manufacturing through to Design.
We specialize in importing Sifa Complete Furnishing Systems, which is designed and manufactured to order in Italy.
Sifa Bars & Counter Systems was founded in Italy in 1957, they were leaders as the first entrepreneurs in the sector of furnishings for bars and stores.
Today they are still leaders with their special furnishing systems that cater for Bars, Patisseries, Bakeries, Restaurants, Cafes and more.
Installed world wide including America, Europe and Asia, Sifa can be found in Paris, London, New York, Tokyo, Toronto... the list goes on and now right here in Australia.


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- Anywhere In The UK
- Location: Anywhere in the UK
Radius: ... miles
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Never miss another 'Chris Wood Trio' show
Chris Wood Trio
Comprising CHRIS WOOD, violin, vocals and guitar, CLARE SALAMAN, baroque music specialist, on violin, and NICK COOPER, a classical cellist, producing a colourful blend of traditional music with intuitive composition.
Chris Wood Trio tour dates
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Venue Facts
Venue: St George's Bristol
Website: stgeorgesbristol.co.uk
Phone: 0845 40 24 001
Disabled Bookings: 0845 40 24 001
Seating Plan: View the Seating Plan
→ Clifton Down 16 min walk


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$20.00$0.18 / ml
Offers & Perks
Florence is an alluring combination of Italian Bergamot and crushed Violet Petals.
Housed in a beautifully decorated metal tube, TOCCA's new Crema da Mano Luxe is a paraben-free rich hand cream. Paraben Free. Enriched with coconut oil, shea butter and aloe, these moisturizing, quick absorbing hand creams will leave your skin feeling soft, silky and delicately scented.
Gardenia combined with Blonde Wood evokes a sophisticated and feminine scent that's reminiscent of old-world Paris.
Key ingredients include:
Avocado Oil, Coconut Oil, Jojoba Seed Oil, Aloe, Chamomile, and Shea Butter.
Gardenia combined with Blonde Wood evokes a sophisticated and feminine scent that's reminiscent of old-world Paris.
Paraben Free.
|Aqua/Water/Eau, Cocos Nucifera (Coconut) Oil, Ethylhexyl Palmitate, Vegetable Oil, Cetearyl Alcohol, Ethylhexyl Isononanoate, Polysorbate 60, Parfum, Phenoxyethanol, Isocetyl Stearate, Steareth-2, Hydroxyethylcellulose, Carbomer, Ethylhexylglycerin, Sodium Hydroxide, Butyrospermum Parkii (Shea Butter), Disodium EDTA, Persea Gratissima (Avocado) Oil, Simmondsia Chinensis (Jojoba) Seed Oil, Linalool, BHT, Butylphenyl Methylpropional, Limonene, Sodium Hyaluronate, Hydroxycitronellal, Olea Europaea Leaf Extract, Tocopheryl Acetate, Eugenol, Citronellol, Geraniol, Glycerin, Farnesol, Citral, Aloe Barbadensis Leaf Juice, Chamomilla Recutita (Matricaria) Flower Extract, Punica Granatum Extract


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NATHU LA: At 14,500 feet above sea level, the slopes are green with new vegetation. Summer has come to Nathu La pass: the sky is grey and it's drizzling.
Despite the depressing weather, the Rajput regiment soldiers who man this border checkpost between India and China are upbeat. "We'll be out of here soon," says one, "when trade starts, the BSF, ITBP and Sikkim Police can take over."