text:
Holocaust Denial on Trial, Trial Transcripts, Day 24: Electronic Edition
Pages 1 - 192 of 192
1996 I. No. 113
2Royal Courts of Justice
3Strand, London
4 Wednesday, 23rd February 2000
10Claimant -and-
14The Claimant appeared in person
15MR RICHARD RAMPTON Q.C. (instructed by Messrs Davenport Lyons and Mishcon de Reya) appeared on behalf of the First and
16Second Defendants
17MISS HEATHER ROGERS (instructed by Davenport Lyons) appeared on behalf of the First Defendant Penguin Books Limited
18MR ANTHONY JULIUS (of Mishcon de Reya) appeared on behalf of
19the Second Defendant Deborah Lipstadt
21(Transcribed from the stenographic notes of Harry Counsell
&Company, Clifford's Inn, Fetter Lane, London EC4
22Telephone: 020-7242-9346)
23(This transcript is not to be reproduced without the written permission of Harry
Counsell &Company)
1 <Day 24.
2(10.30 a.m.)
3 MR RAMPTON: My Lord, before I call Dr Longerich, there are
4three things I think I would like to mention.
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I want to mention two things to you too.
6 MR RAMPTON: Then judge before counsel.
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: All right. One I think I have actually
8discovered the answer to, but can you just confirm that
9the statements which you rely on for saying that Mr Irving
10is a Holocaust denier, are they now collective in K3 and,
11if so, are they going to be refined down, as it were, any
12more or do I take it that K3 is the selection upon which
13you rely.
14 MR RAMPTON: My belief is there was an abstract rather like the
15anti-Semitic abstract. It is on Word disk.
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I actually heard that. If, in due course,
17Mr Irving and I can be supplied with a copy of it, that
18will help a great deal. The other thing is, looking ahead
19a little more, and this is for you, Mr Irving, as well is
20really looking ahead to final speeches, it seems obvious
21that you must both take matters in whatever order you
22think is appropriate, but it seemed to me in this
23particular case it would be quite helpful to have a
24discussion at some stage about a possibly agreed order of
25topics to be covered, because it would help me if I knew
26what you were moving to. If you were to take things in
1the same order, you do not have to obviously, but do you
2follow what I am getting at?
3 MR RAMPTON: I do.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: This is quite a difficult case in the sense
5of you cannot take it chronologically and it is quite
6difficult to interrelate some of the issues.
7 MR IRVING: Your Lordship is aware that I propose not
8addressing certain issues in my closing speech.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: That is a matter for you.
10 MR IRVING: But I certainly agree that there should be an
11agreed order.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think so. That makes it sound a bit more
13formal than I was really intending, but if we can set
14aside maybe half an hour some time early next week.
15 MR RAMPTON: May I say straightaway my present format is to do
16what I call historical falsification first, then because
17it goes with Holocaust denial, Auschwitz, and then what
18I call racism and then finally political associations.
19I will try to order the historical distortions as I did in
20cross-examination, and my witnesses have done more or less
21in the witness box, to do that chronologically.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: If I can just indicate the problem I have had
23is that the issue of Hitler's knowledge of what was going
24on is quite difficult to accommodate within the structure
25you have just outlined. That is, I think, the area that
26is quite difficult to slot in.
1 MR RAMPTON: Except to this extent, it does not find a place,
2or not a significant place, in my format because I do not
3believe that it has any relevance except in so far as it
4is on the back of that topic that most of the historical
5distortions ride.
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Quite, but if you limit -- I am sorry to go
7on about this point; it is quite important to thrash it
8out -- what one might call the historiographical
9criticisms of Mr Irving to the points that are made,
10effectively, by Professor Evans, you slightly miss the
11whole gamut of the continuum, to use a word we have been
12using, of the evidence in relation to that issue. So I
13will just mention that as being a possible difficulty.
14 MR RAMPTON: It will have a place in the file which -- your
15Lordship I hope now has, which we have finished, I am
16afraid -- that was the other thing I was going to say and
17apologise -- a bit late yesterday. It contains what we
18think are the core history documents and that, obviously,
19bears on the Hitler knowledge question.
20 There will be in what I have to say a certain
21amount relating to Hitler's knowledge, Hitler's authority,
22Hitler's orders, if you like, but only in so far as the
23evidence leads to the conclusion reached by Sir John
24Keegan, for example, that the idea that he did not know
25defies reason.
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: We will spend a bit more time on perhaps
1discussing that.
2 MR RAMPTON: One other thing: as to that Hitler knowledge
3question, what Miss Rogers has done is to prepare a
4reference, chronological reference document, for what are
5the most important -- it is not exhaustive -- Hitler
6statements, in our submission. Can I pass that up?
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Where do you want me to put it? Have you had
8this, Mr Irving?
9 MR IRVING: No, I have not.
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Is there a copy for Mr Irving?
11 MR RAMPTON: N1, I think it is. It is the new file anyway and
12it is ----
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is called N1, thank you.
14 MR RAMPTON: There is one other thing I should say. Your
15Lordship asked for a note on the admissibility of expert
16evidence in written form. I have done a note on that. It
17will be ready by 2 o'clock. It is being typed.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Obviously, Mr Irving should have a chance to
19look at it before we have any submissions there are going
20to be about it.
21 MR RAMPTON: I will attach to it, there are some pieces of
22paper showing what the statutes and the rules say.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Thank you very much. Mr Irving?
24 MR IRVING: My Lord, the only thing I would wish to add to that
25is a request that there should be one clear day before the
26submission of closing speeches.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: There will be more than that, I think.
2 MR RAMPTON: I need much more than one day.
3 MR IRVING: The words "at least" was in square brackets before
4"one clear".
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, I do not think we want to have too long
6because I am not sure that speeches are necessarily going
7to need to go through everything, as it were, in detail;
8it is more a question of references, I think, in a way.
9 MR RAMPTON: I thought what I would do is a shortish sort of
10summary to read out in court with a file, which I would
11not read in court, of where necessary detailed reasoning
12and references just for your Lordship and, of course,
13eventually the public too.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: My feeling is it will be three plus days.
15Does that sound sensible to you?
16 MR IRVING: That will suit my needs, yes.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: That is everything you want to say?
18 MR IRVING: I think so, yes, my Lord.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So it is Dr Longerich, gentlemen?
20Mr Rampton, I have just been told there is an interpreter
21as well which rather surprises me because I thought
22Dr Longerich was giving expert evidence about the
23translation of German words into English.
24 MR RAMPTON: Yes. His English is very good, but there are
25times when his thought processes on a sophisticated or
26difficult question are in German, and when he feels
1uncertain that he may get quite the right nuance or
2emphasis in English, and it is only for that. It is not
3going to be a continuous process.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Good,
5 (Interpreter sworn)
6< DR PETER LONGERICH, sworn.
7< Examined by MR RAMPTON, QC.
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Dr Longerich, do sit down if you would
10 MR RAMPTON: Dr Longerich, are your full names Heinz Peter
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Peter Longerich, yes.
13 Q. [Mr Rampton] Peter Longerich, sorry. Have you written a report in two
14parts for the purposes of this case?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Rampton] Are you satisfied, so far as can you be, that the
17statements of fact contained in those reports are true?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Rampton] And that, so far as those reports contain expressions of
20opinion, those opinions are fair and accurate?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is correct.
22 Q. [Mr Rampton] You speak quite softly. I am a long way away at least.
23Can you try to speak up?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I will do my best.
25 Q. [Mr Rampton] Thank you very much. Please remain there to be
1 < Cross-examined by MR IRVING.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Good morning, Dr Longerich.
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Good morning.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Just to clarify one matter. Should I address you as
5"Professor" or a "Doctor"?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Dr Longerich.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Thank you very much. My Lord, just by way of diversion,
8I provided your Lordship the two documents of which you
9asked translations. This is nothing to do with
10Dr Longerich, but you asked this and I should have drawn
11your attention to this. There is the translation of the
12Party court in 1939.
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I remember, the Bericht.
14 MR IRVING: It is the final paragraph which is in endless
15lawyer language. That is the official American
16translation of it.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I will tell you what, let us come back to
18this and then we will at the same time work out where to
19put these documents.
20 MR IRVING: Precisely, my Lord, and also there is a small
21bundle of documents which look like this beginning with
22some Gothic script on the front cover.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: With "ausrotten".
24 MR IRVING: With "ausrotten", yes.
25 My Lord, just so you know where we are going
26today, I will advise your Lordship that I intend to deal
1today largely, and certainly this morning, with this
2witness's statement on the meaning of words, this late
3arrival, which I thought would be a useful way to kick off
4and then we will turn to this formal reports.
5 Before we do that, I just want to address one or
6two matters concerning, through the witness, conduct of
7the case and his credentials. Professor Longerich ----
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Dr Longerich.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] --- Dr Longerich, I am sorry. You work for a number of
10years at the Institut fur Zeitgeschichte in Munich, did
11you not?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This is correct, yes.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] You have to say yes clearly. A nodding will not do. You
14have to say yes otherwise ----
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] --- the microphone does not hear it. How many years did
17you work at the Institute of History in Munich?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] From 1983 to 1989.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] 1983 to 1989. That was, what, five years then?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] About five years -- a little bit more.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] About five or six years. Did you have a special subject
22you were working on there?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I worked on a project called condition of the files of the
24Party Chancellory.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] The Martin Bormann files, the files of the Party
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes I edited the second part of this edition.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. The Party Chancellory files no longer existed and
3they were reconstituted, is that right?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is an attempt to reconstruct the lost files of the
5Party Chancellory, so I edited about 80,000 pages of these
7 Q. [Mr Irving] A spectacular task. So that gives you a very good
8overview over the whole of the domestic life of Nazi
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it gave me a good insight into the day to day
11operation of the bureaucracy in the Nazi State.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] And into the kind of language they used?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, of course.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] And into the hierarchy and the various rivalries and
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Exactly.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Was friction between the top Nazis a major element of the
18Third Reich?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Absolutely.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] [German] -- in other words ----
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] --- jealousies between the different ministries and
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In-fighting and these things, yes.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Would you, from your knowledge of other governments, think
26it was more or less than other governments around that
1time, British government or the American government, or
2was it something extraordinary, the degree of ----
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I made point in the book I wrote on the Party Chancellery
4that I think this exceeded the normal of in-fighting you
5find in all governments. It is a special case here.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. When you worked in the Institute of History, who was
7the director at that time? Was it still Martin Broszat?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] At this time it was Martin Broszat until his death in
10 Q. [Mr Irving] He had a very great reputation, did he not, and he is
11still greatly admired by German historians?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think so.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Were you familiar with all the collections of documents in
14the Institute files? Did you work in the archives at all?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Not all the files. I mean, the Institute has an enormous
16collection of files, but I know some of them.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Was Dr Hoff still there, Anton Hoff, the archivist?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I think he died in 1883.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] 1983?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] 1983, sorry.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Just before you came?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] It is a very friendly atmosphere there at the archives, at
24the institute?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think they were friendly to me. I do not know ----
26 Q. [Mr Irving] They are very co-operative, are they not? They do not
1hold things back very much apart from own private
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot make such a general statement.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] In fact, you probably had quite a lowly position there,
5did you not? You were a newcomer and you were working in
6the Institute?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have no difficulties in actually getting access to the
8collection but I cannot make a general statement on that.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Did you ever take the opportunity to look at what is now
10ED 100, the collection of my documents which is in the
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I have seen some of the ED 100 files, but I cannot
13say that I have a complete overview.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have seen some of them yes, but at the moment I cannot
16recall every document I have seen in the Institute.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] I am just going to give you a list of names of collections
18of diaries. I am sorry, you have a copy of this already.
19I ought to give a copy to his Lordship, perhaps. (Same
20handed) just on the back of that there is a blue column
21called Hitler's People. Do you have that if you turn it
22over? There is a list of names of diaries that I used
23when I wrote my book Hitler's War, which are now in the
24archives. I have added to those since then but I just
25pick out a few names. Canaris: Would that be a valuable
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] At the moment I cannot recall the Canaris diaries. I am
2not able to comment on every item, but I think some of
3them are of course important.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Some are more important and some are less important?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, I am not trying to trick you. I am just at
7this stage trying establish -- I will give a little
8warning if I am going to try and trick you.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, do I get anything more from than
10that -- is this the new edition that is coming out
12 MR IRVING: No, this is the second edition, my Lord, but I just
13wanted to comment on the fact I wondered whether he had
14taken the trouble to look at these very important
15collections of diaries that are in my collection, either
16for his own work or in the expert report.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can you put it as a single question rather
18than the whole lot?
19 MR IRVING: Yes. Did you use the diary of Walter Havel?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I looked at the transcripts. I think it is in England, is
21it not, the original? I looked at the transcripts at one
22stage but not for the Party Chancellery. I think I looked
23at the Bormann, it is more a calendar.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] The calendar?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] Which I have now provided to the Defendants. The Walter
1Havel diary does contain one of these episodes July 1941,
2does it not, where Hitler describes the Jews as a
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot recall this particular passage, I am afraid.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] When you drew up this glossary of meanings of words,
6which, I must say, I find very useful indeed, and this
7goes purely to the conduct of the case, when did you start
8writing that approximately?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it was in December last year.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] In December last year?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I tried to use the Christmas holiday to do it.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] When did you complete it?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it was actually in January think.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] You completed it in January?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, January I think.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. When were you asked to do it by the instructing
17solicitors in this case?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think they wrote me an e-mail. I think it was in
19November, but I could not start immediately to work on it
20because I had other obligations. So I am sure I started
21to work on it at the end of the Christmas holidays.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] You got a letter of instruction?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think, as far as I recall this, I got an e-mail.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. So you got an e-mail sometime in November, you began
25writing in December and you completed it in January?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, that is right.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] Any idea when in January you completed it?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it was more through the end of January, probably
3on the first days of February, I cannot recall.
4 MR RAMPTON: I can help, I think, because now it comes out of
5Dr Longerich's hands, as it were. It came in its first
6version in German, which, since I was the person who
7requested it, I think in November is right, maybe even
8October, and was useless to me. So it had to be
9translated. It came back and the translation was, to say
10the least, unsatisfactory. Then it had it go back again,
11and what we now have emerged in the course of the last few
13 MR IRVING: Yes.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving I am not unsympathetic to the fact
15that you are having to deal with this at pretty short
16notice because it came to you very, very late in the day.
17 MR IRVING: Of course I accept Mr Rampton's explanation but it
18was delivered to me on Friday evening and, if it turns out
19he completed it in January, I would have wanted to know
20what the reason for the delay was.
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: If you want to say you want Dr Longerich to
22come back at some later stage because you want to ask some
23further questions, you would be pushing at an open door.
24 MR IRVING: I fully accept Mr Rampton's explanation about
25translation difficulties.
26 During your professional career, Dr Longerich,
1as you say in your curriculum vitae on page 3 of your
2report, you have received research grants from the German
3Historical Institute in London, and from the Deutsche
4Forschungsgemeinschaft and also from Yad Vashem?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, that is true.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Are you still in debt to Yad Vashem in any way?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I started to work on the project. The project has not yet
8been completed. The relationship, there is no contract
9between us and in this sense, it is not a book contract or
10something like that, but I still have to complete this
11project we started a couple of years ago.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] I do not want to know any figures or quantum. Does this
13mean to say they paid you in advance for something and you
14are still working on it?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. They paid me for ten months actually. It enabled me
16to live in Israel for ten months.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] As you say in this ----
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: What will you be doing for them? What will
19you be researching?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We started to work on a project, a documentation about the
21deportation of the Jews from Germany to Minsk and Riga and
22I had a partner there. We started to collect the
23documents, but unfortunately the work has not been
24completed yet. It is actually a major project and has not
25been completed yet.
26 MR IRVING: The Eastern European archives have turned out to be
1particularly fruitful, is that right?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Absolutely, yes.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Is it to be regarded as a great tragedy they have only
4recently in the last ten or 15 years become available to
5historians? Is that right?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot comment whether it is a tragedy. It is a fact
7that it has become available in the last years.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] They were not available at the time I wrote my first
9edition of the Hitler biography in the 1960s?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] With some exceptions. It was always possible to get some
11of the documents out of the archives. For instance, there
12is a large collection of documents in the German Central
13Agency for the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes. They actually
14managed to get a large collection from this material in
15the 1960s. There is also a large collection in the
16Bundesarchives archive and individual researchers had the
17chance to see not the whole archives but some of the
19 Q. [Mr Irving] If I can just dwell briefly on the files in the
20Zentralestelle, which is presumably the ZST source?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Absolutely, yes.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] You did not identify that in your report, did you?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think there is a list of abbreviations and it should be
25 Q. [Mr Irving] The documents provided by the Eastern European archives to
26the German Zentralestelle, which is a prosecuting archive
1-- could I put it like that?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is the house archive of this agency. They have their
3own library and their own archival collection.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] At Ludwigsburg?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Is it specifically collected for the purpose of carrying
7out prosecutions of German and other citizens for war
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is the main purpose of the whole institution and of
10course mainly some historical background.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] They have very valuable collections of documents there, do
12they not?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] They have a very good collection, yes.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] That is where Dr Goldhart worked, for example?
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, do you think we should move on
16from the archives?
17 MR IRVING: I just want to ask one question which makes the
18point clear, my Lord. Is it apparent to you that, if an
19archive has been collected for the purposes of
20prosecution, it is less likely to include defence
21material, if I can put it like that?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, you can use this material in different ways. I do
23not say that they had a complete set of documents from the
24Russian archives. It is certainly a selection. I did not
25select it. I do not know who selected it and who made the
26decision about this, so I should be very careful to make a
1comment on that.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] You would always bear in mind using such archives that you
3are only seeing one side of the picture and not
4necessarily the other side?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it is difficult to say because they were
6interested. They did a lot of work in this Zentralestelle
7during the 1950s and 60s, and they actually had historical
8expertise there because they actually worked on the
9historical background. I would not say that they were
10only interested in this aspect of prosecution. I think
11they had to collect the historical expertise which was not
12available at this time and could not be provided by
13historians. So I would be cautious to make such a
14statement about this collection.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] I see on page 5 of your report that you are an expert, or
16you have written about the Wannsee conference?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I gave the annual lecture in 1998 at the Haus of the
18Wannsee conference and this published as a booklet.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] I do not want a lengthy answer at this time. I just want
20a brief overview. Is it right that opinions differ as to
21the importance of the Wannsee conference in the history of
22the Final Solution?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not think, generally speaking, the short answer,
24I would not say that there is so much difference about the
25significance of the Wannsee conference. It was basically
26a conference on the implementation of what is called the
1Final Solution. I think a statement like this could be
2accepted by most of the historians. Of course, if you go
3into the interpretation of the text, you will find
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Opinions differ?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Opinions differ among historians.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Yehuda Bauer has said one thing, Eberhard Jaeckel has said
8another, and so on?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would be very careful to make a general comment. One
10could look at the writings of Yehuda Bauer and Eberhard
11Jaeckel and then I am prepared to comment on it.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] My Lord, the next question is purely pre-emptive in case
13another matter comes up. This is still on that page,
14three paragraphs from the bottom. You edited something
15called "Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland", a book on German
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. That is a collection of documents. Actually
18I issued this in 1990 when this was actually called, as
19you see here, documents about the question of German unity
20so that, when the book came out, the question was solved.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Would you tell the court please, during the 1960s, 1970s,
22and 1980s, or certainly during the 1960s and 1970s, what
23was the official designation in west German circles of the
24Soviet zone or the German Democratic Republic?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The official name?
26 Q. [Mr Irving] The official name, Sprachledlung.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not think there was a Sprachledlung but I think in
2the 1950s the generally preferred term was Soviet zone of
3Occupation. This changed, then in the 1960s, at the end
4of the 1960s, when it became more common to speak of the
5German Democratic Republic, but I am certainly not an
6expert on, you know, on this issue ----
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Have you ever heard of the word Middle Deutschland.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, of course.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Was that also an official designation?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This was also common, yes.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] No kind of revanches sentiment was attached to that word?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would be very careful to make such a general statement.
13It is a complex issue.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Professor Longerich, I think I can say quite evidently
15that you harbour no personal dislike or animosity towards
16me at this stage?
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, I am sure not. Mr Irving, shall we move
18towards one of the substantive questions that you are
19going to have to ask about? Let us move on, in other
21 MR IRVING: On page 8, three paragraphs from the bottom, you
22lecture the German Historical Institute ----
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] --- on the policy of destruction, vernichtung?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, that is the title you prefer. I cannot recall the
26exact English title of this lecture.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] Politik der Vernichtung. Was I present in the audience on
2that occasion?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I remember you, yes.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Did you invite questions at the end of that function?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Director of the Institute invited question, yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Did I ask a question?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you asked a question.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] What did the Director of the Institute say?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Director said, "Dr Longerich does not want to answer
10your question".
11 Q. [Mr Irving] He said, "Dr Longerich has informed me in advance he will
12not answer any questions from Mr David Irving"?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is correct, yes.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Thank you very much. Was there any specific reason for
15your refusal?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think there was a discussion in the Institute whether
17you should be actually asked to leave the building, and,
18well, at this stage I actually know, I actually knew that
19I would be called into the witness stand here, and
20I thought it was better not to answer this question, not
21to have a kind rehearsal of this.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Sorry, you did or you did not know you were
23going to be a witness?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I was quite aware, I think, that I would be.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Oh, you were, even back in 1988?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
1 MR IRVING: Did you state that at the time?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Pardon?
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Did you state that to the Chairman at the time as the
4reason why?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. I did not give a reason.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] What was the question I asked? Do you remember? What
7document was I asking about?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think you were asking about the Schlegelberger, what you
9called the Schlegelberger document.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] I read out the Schlegelberger document and invited you to
11reconcile it with what you had said in your lecture?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think this was the moment when you called me a
13"coward"? Isn't this this incident?
14 Q. [Mr Irving] That is right, yes.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I can recall this, yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Just a brief answer this time, do you consider the
17Schlegelberger document to be a key document in the
18history of the Final Solution?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, absolutely not.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] Totally unimportant?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is unimportant, yes.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Have you mentioned it in any of your books?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not think so.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] A book, in other words, a document which says the Fuhrer
25has asked repeatedly for the solution of the Jewish
26problem postponed until the war is over, in your view, was
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, that is your interpretation of the document.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] I am saying what it says.
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, it is third-hand evidence. It is an undated
5document. We do not know who actually wrote the
6document. It is third-hand evidence. It is about Lammers
7who said that somewhere in the past Hitler had said
8something to him about the solution, not the Final
9Solution, of the Jewish question. I think we will come to
10the document later in more detail, but I think I could not
11see this and I cannot see this as a major document, let us
12say, for the interpretation of the Holocaust.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] What would have prevented you saying this to what was
14obviously a friendly audience at the German Institute
15on ----
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: He has given his answer. You may not accept
17it, but he felt inhibited by the fact he had been asked to
18give expert evidence.
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I should mention that I do not want to find myself on
20Mr Irving's website with my answer. I felt myself ten
21with the full comment, you know, of my behaviour and
22I know that Mr Irving was doing these things, and I do not
23want to get engaged in this kind of argument or debate, so
24I prefer to be silent.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] You prefer there not to be a debate, is that right?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Pardon?
1 Q. [Mr Irving] You prefer there not to be any debate on things like this?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not prefer to be involved in this kind of debate
3that you, you know, should be more specific, not to be
4with my comment. I do not want to find me on your web
5page which is what I said during this discussion or during
6this lecture. This was the second reason.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] We are now going to go to the meaning of words, Professor
8Longerich. Again this is perfectly straightforward
9questioning and answering. There are no concealed tricks
10involved here. Would you agree that a lot of the words
11that you have put in your list quite clearly show an
12intention, a homicidal intent, if I can put it like that?
13A lot of the euphemisms used by the Nazis?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think that is true.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] A lot of them are ambiguous?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] They are in the way they were used they are. They are
17sometimes ambiguous, yes.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] It is really a bit of a minefield, is it not?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think, I cannot speak about minefields. I think
20what an historian has to do, he has to look at each
21document and has to look at the context and then try to
22reconstruct from the context what actually the meaning of
23this, of this passage might be.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] But is not the danger there that you then come back using
25our pre-Ori methods, that you extrapolate backwards from
26your knowledge and assign a meaning to the word rather
1than using the word to help you itself?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is the problem with all interpretations. You have to
3come back. Of course, you cannot analyse the word
4completely, you know, outside. You have to look at the
5meaning of the word, but always in a historical context.
6I am not a linguist, so I prefer to actually, as I said,
7to look at the context and to ----
8 Q. [Mr Irving] You speak English very well, Dr Longerich, if I may say
9so, and I think we are all very impressed by that and I am
10certainly impressed by the arguments you have put forward
11in your glossary. Would you agree also that the same word
12can have different meanings when uttered by different
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. That is exactly why I think it is important always
15to look at the context because, as you rightly said, the
16same word could have different meanings in different
18 Q. [Mr Irving] The same word can also have a different meaning depending
19on when it is uttered?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Exactly.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Even by the same person?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Exactly.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Or in what circumstances it is uttered?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is what I call the context.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] The only two words I am really concerned with (but we will
26certainly look at the other words in your glossary) are
1the words "vernichtung" which is destruction or
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I said, I translate it as, I could accept this
4translation, but I also think in our context, I said
5probably the translation "extermination" is the better one
6or the more appropriate one.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, well, "extermination" is a possible one, but you will
8appreciate it is not always proper to go for the third or
9fourth meaning of a word?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know what you mean by "the third or fourth
11meaning". If you mean the use of dictionaries, I think
12that is a rather mechanical way, you know, at looking at
13dictionaries. Of course, a dictionary offers various
14meanings and you have to probably go to the third or
15fourth meaning if the context suggested that, the context
16in which the document stands. So I do not think a
17translator or an historian would always in a mechanical
18way take the first meaning in the dictionary.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Here is a 1935 dictionary that says -- I will just check
20it -- "vernichtung" has only two meanings and that is
21"annihilate; destroy"?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This looks rather small, your dictionary, if I may say so,
23and you find other dictionaries -- actually, I do not
24think that.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] I have any number of other dictionaries going back over
26the years.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We can go, if you want, to the dictionaries.
2 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think what the witness is saying is you can
3swap dictionary definitions until the cows come home and
4no-one is at the end of it any the wiser.
5 MR IRVING: The other word I want to look at is "ausrotten" and
6I am going to ask you very quickly, Dr Longerich, to take
7this little bundle of documents which is on the left-hand
8side there which I just gave you.
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I just see this for the first time, I have to say.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Is that the little bundle there?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. I have given it to you for the first time because
13perhaps I can ask an interim question. When you compiled
14your glossary, Dr Longerich, did you have before you a
15number of documents from a dossier on the word "ausrotten"
16that had been provided by the Defence solicitors?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sorry, a glossary of terms of what the word ----
18 Q. [Mr Irving] When you wrote your glossary ----
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] --- did you before you a number of documents provided to
21you by the Defence solicitors?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I cannot actually -- I cannot recall this. I wrote
23this in Munich but, of course, it was holidays and when
24I did this, I did not have anything in front of me.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Very well. The first page, page 1 -- I am looking at the
26big numbers at the bottom -- the ausrottung des Prostesten
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Your bundle, yes.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] It is my little bundle, yes. This is 1900 ----
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] -- published by some church body, and it is about the
6ausrotten des Prostesten tismus in Salzburg?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Obviously, they are not talking about liquidating all the
9Protestants, are they?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know, I mean, you know, in Germany in the 17th
11century, for instance, they had what they called religious
12wars and many people were actually ausgerot for religious
13reasons. So if you give me a chance to find out whether
14this is about the 30 year war.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It appears to be dated 1900. I do not know
16whether the Gothic script means it is older than that.
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is written 1900, but is it not historical subject?
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, if I may say so, I do not think we
19will get very much help out of that.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I see. It is about the church history of the 18th
22 Q. [Mr Irving] I am looking just at the use of the word, my Lord, and
23suggesting strongly that at this time they were not -- it
24is in close parallel to the phrase the ausrotten des
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. I follow the point you are making, but
1can one not put it this way? Do you accept or not, I do
2not know, Dr Longerich, that you can use "ausrotten" to
3mean "rooting out". It depends on the context?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am not sure about "rooting out". I think the meaning
5here of "ausrotten" is to wipe out, to get completely rid
7 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] All right, wipe out?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This applies not to -- I do not know, I mean, I am not
9familiar with the -- I mean, if you give me the time
10I will try to do my best to get familiar with the history
11of the churches, of a church in Salzburg in the 19th
12century, I am not sure whether they kill anybody or so.
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let us forget about ----
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think the term "ausrotten" applies to an organization
15which probably Protestentismus is here. It does not
16necessarily mean that everybody who belongs to this
17organization is going to be killed. You can also speak,
18I mean, today about "ausrotten" of criminality, for
19instance, if you mean, you know, that you get rid of this
20problem. But I think what is more important is that, you
21know, it is more tricky when it comes actually to the
22ausrotten of human beings, then I think the meaning is
23quite clear, as far I see it.
24 MR IRVING: Can we now go to page 2 which is a 1935 Nazi
25reference to it, one which you have not adduced in your
26glossary. This is a speech by Rudolf Hess on May 14th. My
1Lord, the translation is the final paragraph on that page.
2"National socialist legislation", the actual phrase which
3I am going to look at is "National Sozialische Deutschland
4des Judentums etwa richtiglos ausgerottet wurde".
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Where is that?
6 Q. [Mr Irving] So there is a specific reference here to ----
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Fourth line?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 MR IRVING: --- the fourth line of the German. Here you
10have: "National Socialist legislation has now introduced
11corrective measures against this overalienisation. I say
12'corrective' because the proof that the Jews are not
13being ruthlessly ausgerottet", which I say is rooted out,
14"in National Socialist Germany, is that in Prussian alone
1533,500 Jews were working in the manufacturing industry,
1689,800 are engaged...", and so on. So he is talking
17clearly there about rooting out, is he not, not about
18liquidating because this is 1935, no one is killing Jews
19at that time, are they?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I take your word that this is the authentical texts.
21I have not seen this document myself. I do not know the
22context. He is saying that the Judentum, which is
23probably the Jewry in this context, is not ausgerottet in
241935, which is perfectly true, I think. It is a
25preHolocaust document, I cannot see ----
26 Q. [Mr Irving] It is a Nuremberg document, is it not, if you look ----
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: But the point that is being put,
2Dr Longerich, is that "ausrotten" is being used there in a
3context which has nothing to do with extermination. That
4is the only point that is being put.
5 MR IRVING: By a Nazi, in connection with the Jews?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, so it is not the Jews, it is the Judentum, the term
7"Judentum" means here, let us say ----
8 MR IRVING: The Jewish community?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- the Jewish community, the alleged social position of
10the Jews in Germany, their property, their wealth and so
11on. So I think that, and so far the term means not only
12human beings, a collective, but it also means more than
13that, and in this sense the Judentum was not ausgerottet,
14so that is....
15 Q. [Mr Irving] The next page, Dr Longerich, on page 3 is the English
16translation, but you can look at the German, if you wish,
17which is on page 5. This is on item that you yourself
18have adduced. This is Adolf Hitler's use of the word
19"ausrottung" in 1936. He is not talking about Jews, but
20it is the same word. He is talking about the need for an
21economic four-year plan. On page 3 he puts in this
22sentence: "A victory of Bolshevism over Germany would not
23lead to a Versaille Treaty, but to a final destruction,
24indeed the ausrottung of the German nation", "volk". Is
25Hitler saying that if the Bolsheviks succeed in war
26against Germany, they are going to exterminate the German
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am sorry. Normally, I have more time to interpret
3documents than this one or two minutes.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] This is one referred that you yourself have referred to
5though, is it not, in your glossary?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] So I just have to look at it because I quoted it myself in
7my own document, he goes then on and says after you stop
8here, "And if the ausrottung", he tries to explain what
9"ausrotten" means. In English, it says here that:
10"After a Bolshevik victory, the European states,
11including Germany, would experience the most terrible
12catastrophe for its people since humanity was affected by
13the extinguishing of the states of classical antiquity".
14So I think if you say, "Well, this will be worse than the
15end of the Roman Empire", this statement involves clearly
16that this will be done in a very, that this ausrottung
17will be done in very cruel manner, it will cost a lot of
18lives. I think this is implicit here in Hitler's words.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] But "ausrottung" here cannot be equated to the word
20"extermination", can it? He is not saying, "If the
21Bolsheviks win in a future war, it will lead to the
22extermination of the German people", he is saying, "It
23will lead to the emasculation of the German people or the
24end of them as an important power in Europe"?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would not agree because when he makes this reference,
26"It is more terrible than the end of the Roman Empire,
1the states", he says.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Then it is quite something. I mean, this is not just, you
4the Versaille Treaty, as he said. It is not just the
5collapse of the German Empire; it is much, much more.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Hunger, starvation and pestilence.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In a way, I am trying not to speculate what Hitler thought
8in 1936 what is actually more terrible than the end of the
9Roman Empire. I think it is quite reasonable to assume
10that this kind of "ausrottung" would, as the end of the
11Roman Empire did, involve the killing of many, many
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can you just for my benefit translate
14quickly, if you would not mind, the immediately following
15words, where he talks about what a catastrophe that would
17 MR IRVING: "The extent of such a catastrophe cannot be really
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Next sentence?
20 MR IRVING: "How the densely populated west of Europe,
21including German, would survive after a Bolshevik
22collapse, it would experience probably the most awful
23national catastrophe since the extinction of the antique
24states -- since the" -- it is a complicated sentence.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is a complicated sentence, but,
26Dr Longerich, it is all pretty apocalyptic stuff, is it
1not, that he is ----
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Exactly, and I think I translate it a little bit
3more, I said, "The most terrible catastrophe",
4"grauenhaft", I think is the word "terror" in it, and so
5it is ----
6 MR IRVING: "Awesome"?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it is more than that.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Can I just ask you briefly about this document. This is,
9of course, a document dictated by Adolf Hitler to his
10private secretary, is it not? It is not a speech. He is
11choosing his words carefully.
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I do not know whether he dictated this to his
13private secretary. It is a document he provided for
14Goring. It is an instruction for Goring to carry on
15with ----
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Well, I know because Christa Schroeder told me he dictated
17it to her.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am trying to explain this to the court. It is the
19document which actually says that Germany should be able
20within four years to fight the next war. So it is an
21instruction for Goring. But I think if we go -- no,
22I cannot read more than that in this document.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: We have your answer about that document
25 MR IRVING: Yes. Page 6, again we are still in 1936, but
26collection of documents published obviously by anti-Nazis
1now about the expropriation, the humiliation and the
2vernichtung of the Jews in Germany ----
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] --- since the government of Adolf Hitler. This time it is
5the word "vernichtung".
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] 1936, of course, the Jews as such had not been vernichtet,
8had they, and yet this is a history of the destruction of
9the Jews?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have to make here a general observation. I just have to
11trust that this is all, you know, this is original.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] I have the original documents here.
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] And I always prefer to look at documents in the
14appropriate context, but, of course, it is possible that
15somebody in '36, and I think these are the Jews who
16emigrated from Germany, would use the term "vernichtung"
17in a sense that, you know, "vernichtung" there, you would
18use it in the sense that he would not refer to the actual
19killing of the Jews because the actual killing, as we
20know, did happen later on. So I do not think how this
21document can help us to interpret or to put the Nazi
22terminology into the historical context.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, I agree. It is a low grade document. It is outside
24Germany but there is the phrase "vernichtung der Juden" in
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, and who actually published it, do you know that?
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let us move on. It is a low grade document.
2 MR IRVING: The next one is high grade. It is page 7, Walter
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Walter Hewel was a diplomat on Hitler's staff. He was the
6liaison officer, von Ribbentrop, was he not?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] H-E-W-E-L?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] And he wrote a memorandum on the conference between Hitler
11and this Czech State president Hacha -- H-A-C-H-A -- on
12March 15th 1939, which is in the official published
13volumes, is it not, ADAP?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, again I cannot recall the document. I just trust
15that this is correct what you are saying. I do not have
16the ADAP with me and I do not have ----
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Well, if this is a fig quotation, no doubt, I will be shot
18down in due course by the Defence. The phrase in German
19is [German - document not provided] which I will translate
20as "If in the a autumn of the last year, 1938,
21Czechoslovakia had not given in, then the Czech volk would
22have been ausgerottet?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] What is Hitler saying there?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well...
26 Q. [Mr Irving] Is it important, do you think, this use of the word here?
1 MR RAMPTON: Do let him answer. One question at a time.
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know about Hitler's plan, you know, it is a
3hypothetical question. It is assuming that the Munich
4agreement would not have happened, and so I do not know
5what was going on in Hitler's mind about the future of the
6Czechoslovak people, you know, in the case that would have
7been in 1938. So I cannot answer this question outside
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Is Hitler telling the Czech State President, "Good thing
10you signed on the dotted line at midnight or 2 a.m.
11otherwise I would have liquidated your entire people", is
12that what he was saying?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Forgive me, I do not know to which text you are referring
15 Q. [Mr Irving] That is the context there. If the word "ausgerottet" used
16in Hitler's mouth talking about ----
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, we have another document from the conversation
18between Hacha and Hitler where actually Hacha himself
19says, "Well, actually our people felt that -- our people
20are quite relieved because they feel now because they were
21on the assumption that they were going to be vernichtet in
22the case that, you know, the Munich agreement would not
23have kept ----
24 Q. [Mr Irving] How many Czechs were there? About 10, 15, 20 million?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Are we talking about the Czech Republic?
26 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think 7, 8 million or something like that, yes.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] So Hitler is at this time, is this what you are saying,
3"I would have exterminated 7 million Czechs if you had
4not signed"?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] First of all, I do not know whether actually, but this is
6verbatim document, whether it implies some kind comment on
7Hitler, and then I am not sure -- it is a hypothetical
8question because what happened is that Czechoslovakia and
9the Western powers gave in and the Czechoslovak people
10were actually saved from a major catastrophe, may I say it
11like this, and I do not know what was going on in Hitler's
12mind in '38 about the future of the Czech people in case
13that, you know, he had not signed the Munich agreement.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, but ----
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] But ----
16 Q. [Mr Irving] --- you do get the drift of my question, that here is that
17word "ausgerottet" in connection with a volk and Hitler
18saying, "I would have done it to them if you had not
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] You know, it is a hypothetical. It is also, you know,
21Hitler sometimes uses, you know, he made threats and he
22threatened people and he made completely, you know,
23remarks which shows that he was out of control. So, you
24know, I do not know the context whether this is a kind of
25emotional reaction or anything like this.
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: What you are saying, it all depends on the
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is absolutely true.
3 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] And is it also right that sometimes politicians, or Hitler
4anyway, would use a term like "ausrottung" meaning "wipe
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
7 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] Which is not to be taken literally?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, that is what I would say.
9 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] That is why I am not really ----
10 MR IRVING: That is precisely the point I was going to ask.
11 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is all context, Mr Irving, is it not,
13 MR IRVING: The final question on that quotation, therefore,
14is, is it not likely that Adolf Hitler was just saying,
15"If you had not signed, I would have ended Czechoslovakia
16as a power"?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think that is much, much stronger than that,
18"ausrottung", and again from the conversation with Hacha
19I know that Hacha was under the impression that the
20Czechoslovakian people would be vernichtet.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] What did he mean by "vernichtet"? I know you used this in
22your glossary.
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think that people had ----
24 Q. [Mr Irving] Gas chambers for the entire Czechs?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, but I think that people had felt, that people in
26Czechoslovakia in '38, felt that probably their existence,
1probably their life was under danger. I think that is
2quite fair to say.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] The entire Czech nation or just a few left wingers
4and ----
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That people felt that their life was in danger.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Move on to the next passage, please? This is one you have
7quoted, is it not? This we do not have to argue whether
8he has been correctly reported or not because this is from
9a transcript of a speech that Hitler made to the Nazi
10editors on November 10th 1938.
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. This is actually the day, the day after
12Kristallnacht, so the day, during the night approximately
13I think 90 or more people were killed, so this gives you a
14kind of background. Now, the term here Hitler is
15hesitating in this speech. He says, "Well" -- may be
16I should go, I have to go to my ----
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is quite a complicated sentence. Can you
18translate it?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sorry, I have to go to my own text and I have to compare
20the two text. I am sorry about this.
21 MR IRVING: While you are doing that, can I set it in context?
22Is Hitler saying ----
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am sorry, I cannot do this and listening to you. I have
24to find my ----
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Just pause a moment, Mr Irving.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have to find my own text. I know that it is somewhere.
1 MR RAMPTON: On page 21, in paragraph 6.12.
2 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Rampton.
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Yes, and then the sentence -- you did not give the,
4you stop in the middle of the sentence and you did not
5include the last five words, and the last five words in
6German are "aber man brauch Sie leider", "but we need
7them, unfortunately". So the context is that he is going
8to say, "Well, actually, you know, I could when I look at
9the intellectual classes in Germany, you know, one could,
10I could come to the conclusion", and then he is hesitating
11and saying "ausrottung", and then he goes on and says,
12"Well, unfortunately, we need them". So he is saying
13this idea to ausrottung, to kill the intellectual classes
14is completely illusionary, and so he has to come back and
15says, "I cannot do it".
16 You see, I have difficulties with this kind of,
17you know ----
18 MR IRVING: My Lord, can I just translate the sentence for you?
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, do not interrupt.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- I have difficulties actually to with these kind of
21documents which come in the last minute and leave out an
22important passage of the sentence, of the German
23sentence. Please give me sometime always to find the
24original if I have not got it in my report, I actually
25would like to insist that the original is here because
26I think this is not the way one can do it.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Dr Longerich, I have some sympathy with that,
2particularly as you have pointed out that there is quite
3an important bit of that same sentence omitted in
4Mr Irving's piece of paper.
5 MR IRVING: Can I just read out the translation of that
6sentence to you, my Lord?
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, because it has just been read out.
8 MR IRVING: I do not think he has actually read out the
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, I have read it; I thought he did.
11 THE WITNESS: I can do it if you want to.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Do if you want to, but include the last words
13because they make quite a big difference, it seems to me.
14 MR IRVING: Not in my submission, but there we are. "I look at
15the intellectual classes amongst us, then, unfortunately,
16well, you need them, otherwise, I do not know, you could
17ausrotten them or something like that, but unfortunately
18you need them". I do not understand why you say I left
19out the words "man brauch Sie an"?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Because you stop the sentence here with the colon and, in
21fact, the sentence is not stopping. You give as reference
22[German - document not provided] and this is not a
23complete, a complete sentence. You stopped in the middle
24of the sentence and left out the last five words. You
25should have used -- I mean ----
26 MR IRVING: Which are the words that I left out?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If your interpretation differs, you should have used, you
2know, the normal, you know, these little dots one uses if
3one does not insert the complete sentence.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, which are the words you say that I left out?
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: He has said many times, "aber man brauch Sie
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] "So you cannot kill them because we need them".
8 MR IRVING: Are those words not on the fourth line of my
9quotation on page 7? "Man brauch Sie"?
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, they are, but they come in twice
11and don't let us spend too long on this.
12 MR IRVING: Precisely, my Lord, but the whole point I am
13looking at there is this is Adolf Hitler in 1938 when
14nobody is liquidating anybody ----
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Except the 90 people who just died the night before, and
16this is the little exception one has. I mean, you have to
17realize the context is that this is the most brutal
18killing which happened in Germany since, I think, the
19Middle Ages. There are more than 90 people, I would say
20several hundred people possibly were killed the last
21night, and in this atmosphere Hitler is giving a press
22conference and speaks about the ausrottung of
23intellectuals. I think one cannot, you know, one has to
24look again at the historical context because this is, you
25know, an atmosphere which is dominated by brutality and a
26kind of absence of public order and law. I think, you
1know, this has to be included here.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Your answer invites two questions, unfortunately. The
3first question is was Adolf Hitler, to your knowledge, at
4the time you made this speech on the afternoon of November
510th aware that 90 people had been killed during the
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know. I do not know that.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] The second question is, are you, therefore, suggesting
9that the verb "ausrotten" is not a mass extermination but
10a midget extermination, if I can put it like that, of just
1190 people? Is that the scale you put "ausrotten"?
12I thought that "ausrotten" meant extermination on a huge
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I am just saying that when he made this, he made the
15statement and the statement says, "I can't kill them, I
16would like to but I can't kill them", but one has to look
17at the atmosphere of this very day.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It always comes back to context?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is what I am trying to say.
20 MR IRVING: Precisely, but a perfectly reasonable
21interpretation of the word "ausrotten" there would be get
22rid of them, abolish the intellectual classes, abolish
23the ----
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The translation here ----
25 Q. [Mr Irving] --- upper classes?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sorry. I think the translation, the proper translation,
1is to kill them all, but, unfortunately, I cannot do it.
2I have said this now three times and I think it is-- I do
3not want to ----
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Adolf Hitler was telling the editors of the leading
5newspapers in Germany, "I just wish I could kill all the
6intellectuals" in 1938?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, "But I cannot do it, unfortunately". That is what it
8says in the text here.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. This is the image you now have of that kind of thing
1055 years later, but how would the editors have picked up
11at the time if that was the meaning of the word
12"ausrotten" in 1938? You appreciate that the meaning of
13words change over the years and when Adolf Hitler uses the
14word in 1938, the editors sit there thinking, "Yes, he
15wants to abolish them, he wants to get rid of the upper
16classes", just the same as Tony Blair gets rid of the
17House of Lords?
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, not the upper classes. I do not think
19that is right.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The intellectual classes -- well, then he could have said,
21"Well, actually I want" -- I said this here in my report,
22I said if he were just referring to a kind of, you know,
23social, you know, reform or reform of the educational
24system or some leveling of class, something like that, he
25could have said so. He could have said, "Actually I want,
26you know, to be more, Hitler jungen in the universities.
1I do not want to get -- I would like to get rid of the
2sons of academics, well-established people", but he says
3he used the term "ausrotten". I cannot help this-- it is
4here and ----
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Just one more question on that. Would it not be a
6parallel if Tony Blair said he wanted to rid of the House
7of Lords, wipe out the House of Lords, would he not say
8"ausrotten" there and would that mean that he wanted to
9stand them against a wall?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is a hypothetical question. How can I answer this
12 Q. [Mr Irving] But it is that kind of word and that kind of situation, is
13it not? "This is a body which is bothering me. I wish
14I could, "Out, out, damn spot"?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If you ask me as an historian, I should make a historical
16comparison, then you have to include in this picture that
17Tony Blair just killed 91 Conservative Member of
18Parliament. So this would give you a kind of -- and then
19if he would use at the same time, at the next day the term
20"ausrotten", I would look at it and say, "Well, a
21dangerous man".
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, let us move on because really this
23is not, I think, a very helpful exercise.
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is difficult for me to make such comparisons.
25 MR IRVING: I did not drag in the 90 deaths and I am going to
26have to ask a question. Did Hitler order the Jews killed
1that night?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Did Hitler?
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Or did Hitler order the Jews killed in
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I do not think that bears on the issue we are
6considering at the moment.
7 MR IRVING: It bears on the questions of intent behind the word
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think that Hitler played a centre role in the
10launching of the Kristallnacht.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] We know your views on that.
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Pardon?
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Can you now go to document No. 8, please?
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: You did ask the question, Mr Irving.
15 MR IRVING: He then answered a totally different question
16whether Hitler played a central role or not.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let us move on if we have to do this
18exercise, let us do it quite quickly.
19 MR IRVING: Page 8.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I could not complete my answer, sorry.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] This is a 1941 document, a book again in German [German -
22document not provided]
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] Was Hungary exterminating the ethnic minorities?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, you see, give me the chance, you know, to read the
26book. Maybe the book, it might be a pamphlet from
1somebody who said, well, actually the Hungarians are
2killing, literally killing, the minorities. I do not know
3the order. I do not know whether Paclisanu is a reliable
4author. I have not seen the book and I do not know
5whether the book says -- I do not know whether you have
6read the book -- if the book says that the Hungarians are
7killing the minorities. There might be somebody ----
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think that is a fair answer. Without that
9further information, I do not think that particular cover
10page really helps.
11 MR IRVING: Well, if this expert witness can answer the
12question whether Hungary was killing ethnic minorities,
13that would clarify what the title meant.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not -- that is in 41. I am a bit hesitating here
15because, well, they actually were quite rude with
16the minorities after that, but I cannot comment on that
17without actually looking at the content of the book.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, at this stage in our discussion, therefore,
19we can agree that the word "ausrotten" can mean just about
20whatever you want it to mean?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, clearly not. You have to look at the context and the
22context will help you to establish a meaning of the word,
23I think.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] If you turn the page now to page 9, this is my summary of
25a telegram which I found in the Roosevelt library.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I would suggest that I should comment not on your
1summary but on the original, given the experience we have
3 Q. [Mr Irving] That is one way out of answering the question, is it not?
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, Mr Irving, that is not fair. Do you
5refer to this yourself, Dr Longerich?
6 MR IRVING: No, he does not.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. Sorry for interrupting you.
8 MR IRVING: Are you suggesting, therefore, that I have
9deliberately copied faked quotations from a telegram from
10my own files?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, but I have the experience and that quite upset me that
12you left out here half a sentence of a sentence without
13actually ----
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Which repeated the precisely the same four words that were
15earlier in the sentence, right?
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: We have left that document. Let us look at
17this one.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am just saying, I am not just -- I am not happy, you
19know, just to comment on your summary of a report I have
20not seen in the original. I think it would be
21inappropriate for me, as an historian, to comment on
22that. I should see the original and I should not draw
23conclusions from your summary.
24 MR IRVING: Shall we try, unless his Lordship says that
25I should not ask the question about this?
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: This appears to be -- is it Swiss?
1 MR IRVING: It is an American diplomatic despatch in the
2Roosevelt Library.
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Commenting on whether a word in a report
4which we do not have has been correctly translated.
5 MR IRVING: It appears that this report may be based on
6mistranslation of the words ausrottung and entjudung. Is
7it possible therefore to mistranslate the words ausrottung
8and entjudung?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have to fully digest, just one second.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] It is a bit of problem if you always have to produce the
11whole document or the original report, you do appreciate
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] So your question is what, sorry?
14 Q. [Mr Irving] The question, if you are prepared to answer a question on
15this summary, or extracts from an American diplomatic
16despatch, is it possible to mistranslate the word
17ausrottung and entjudung in a way which might go one way
18or might go the other. Even in 1944, in other words,
19there is no firm and fixed definition or translation?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, somebody speculates about the issue whether the
21words ausrottung and entjudung were mistranslated.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] And how shall I comment on that?
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I find this frankly an absurd document
25because the report appears to refer to the extermination
26of European Jews at camps in Silesia?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
2 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] It refers to a cyanide process and to German executions
3and then Mr Harrison, whoever he may be, thinks that
4ausrottung has been mistranslated. It is an absolute
6 MR IRVING: I am only relying on the mistranslation, the fact
7that it is possible to mistranslate the word ausrottung.
8That is all I can do with that particular document.
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If you want me to comment on it, I should be able to know
10more about the facts than Mr Harrison did, shall I put it
11this way? At the moment I do not know what I should do
12with this document.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] The final sentence, of course, "I spoke yesterday with one
14of the men who planted the report with the newspaper
15agencies". Did this kind of thing go on during the war
16years, that documents were planted with newspaper
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] During the war documents were planted with newspaper
19agencies, yes. That happened.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] You always want to see original documents. If you turn
21the page to the next one which is unnumbered, is this the
22kind of document you are familiar with from Himmler's
23files? You may actually know it, in fact, because it is
24addressed to your subject Martin Bormann, is it not?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I became quite familiar with him, that is true.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] It is dated 21st February or thereabouts, 1944?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. It says that the misstande, what is misstande in
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Bad conditions?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes something like that.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Naff, as they say in America.
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Can I ask the interpreter something?
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, of course.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Things which are not right, things which need
9putting right.
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] So he is not referring to people. He is referring to
11things which are not going right. He is saying that these
12misstande, these things which are not right, will be
13ausgerotet, so of course the term ausgerotet, you could
14give me thousands of documents which would show me that
15misstande ausgerotet were meant, ausgerotet, everything,
16every possible context.
17 MR IRVING: It has been dictated by Himmler, has it not?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Himmler's use of the word ausrottung in a non homicidal
20sense, that is all I am relying on this document for.
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] You can prove from this document so far that Himmler used
22the term ausrottung once, not referring to human beings
23but to misstande in a non-homicidal sense, yes, that is
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, all I am trying to establish here in the
26beginning of the 21st century is that back in the 1940s
1the word ausrottung did not have necessarily the meaning
2that we now give it, with our knowledge of all the
3atrocities that happened. Do you accept that?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I myself in my report made a little reservation here and
5I said, well, not every time the word ausrotten means
6killing, but if it refers to people, or to a group of
7people, in the historical context of the Nazi period,
8I did not find a single document in which one would not
9translate the word ausrotten to kill in large numbers or
10to kill all as far as possible. This is my provisional
12 Q. [Mr Irving] Wipe out?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think wipe out is a possible translation. Exterminate
14is another one. Kill off, or extirpate, which is the one
15I preferred. But I think for the German living at this
16time the term from a leading Nazi or national socialist,
17the term ausrotten applying to people means quite clearly,
18I mean for the average German at this time means quite
19clearly to kill in large numbers. It is a very cruel
20expression and of course there is a lot of violence in
21this word.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Can you not put yourself back in the mind set of the
231940 when the word possibly had a different meaning?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think particularly at this time, because at this time
25people lived in the time when people were killed on a
26massive basis, they were quite aware that the use of this
1vocabulary by leading Nazis referred to mass killing. Why
2should I speculate in a general way? One could look at
3the individual documents and establish the meaning. It
4does not help us, I think, to look at documents which are
5outside the context.
6 MR IRVING: You have to have some kind of guiding star to look
7at, do we not?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is fine.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Go to the next page, page 11, which is a 1944 military
10dictionary. We are getting pretty close to the actual
11meaning of 1944 if we accept that the dictionary was
12probably printed a year or two earlier. No, it was
13actually printed in 1944. That is what page 10 shows us.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Military dictionary?
15 MR IRVING: Military dictionary, yes.
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Which is a dictionary produced just for the use of the
18armies. It contains all sorts of things, too. There you
19have the meaning of the word ausrotten given in the
20following sequence: Wipe out, crush, annihilate. Wipe
21out is probably right.
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I again am not a linguist but, if I look at the other
23terms on this page, it is obviously that this is a
24dictionary for military terminology, so it refers I think
25particularly to the military sphere. But again I am quite
26convinced that you can present more dictionaries which
1actually do not have the meaning of extermination.
2I could probably show you dictionaries which have the
3meaning of ----
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am really finding this all pretty
5unilluminating really, because in the end we have to look
6at the documents which actually do relate allegedly to
7extermination, and decide whether ausrotten in that
8context means extirpate.
9 MR IRVING: My Lord, it is an uphill task because we are
10looking backwards, down through the telescope so to speak,
11to the events of the 1940s and trying to work out what a
12word meant when in common usage at the time, when we find
13the common meaning of the word was quite different from
14the way every German, and every Englishman, now
15understands what you mean by it, because we know of the
16atrocities that happened.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: One has to make allowance for that fact, I
19 MR IRVING: The reason I am going through this, if I can put it
20like this, is that, if we are looking at what Adolf Hitler
21means when he says certain things or issued certain
22orders, we really need to know what the word meant in
23common usage at that time, and not what it now means at
24the beginning of the 21st century.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: We really have spent a very long time on
26ausrotten and I think we have the full rage of
1possibilities in mind.
2 MR IRVING: That is the bad news. The good news is frankly
3that I am going to accept without demur that most of the
4meanings he applies to the other words, like Umsiedlung
5and the rest.
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I have to say here that I last night found three
7mistakes in the translation. I think I should correct
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think you probably should.
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I know that I am responsible in the end -- I am not
11blaming the translator, I am responsible and for the
12text. It is in point 5.9 and it is on page 14. I think
13the term Juda must die should be translated not with
14Judaism must die, but simply with Juda must die, because
15it refers I think basically to the tribe of Juda and
16I think one cannot and should not translate the tribe of
17Juda with Judaism which has another meaning. The same
18would apply to 6.14. There is the same mistranslation.
19I apologise for that. In 6.7 actually the word nicht is
20not translated, so in 6.7 it says in the indented
21paragraph in the second sentence what does die and it
22should say what does not die. So this is unfortunately a
23mistake. I am sorry about that.
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Do not worry, that is fine. Shall we move
26 MR IRVING: We are now dealing with your glossary. I must say
1I take exception to the title of your glossary because
2this assumes a priori that there was such a programme to
3exterminate or murder. Really what we are looking at is a
4glossary of terms used by the Nazis in their programme of
5persecution of the Jews, is it not? It includes murder in
6some cases but it is all sorts of other things, is it not?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In connection with a murder.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. You say in your paragraph 1.1 of your introduction,
9that the Nazi regime avoided speaking of the murder of
10European Jews by name, in other words they did not like
11saying it.
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Do you not yourself say in your report, I think it is
14round about paragraph 4.3.1 that the Einsatzgruppen
15reported quite frequently in most glowing terms of the
16killings they were carrying out and they made no bones
17about what they were doing?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I said here generally, so the Einsatzgruppen, of course
19there are exceptions and the most known exceptions are the
20Einsatzgruppen reports. If you look into the history of
21the Holocaust, this is rather a rare example, I think.
22Historians of the events in Russia are quite happy to have
23this, if I may use this term here, this source, but
24generally you are looking at the whole system. They were
25quite reluctant to use openly this expression.
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes.
1 MR IRVING: Except that it is rather odd that you should argue
2on the one hand there is this colossal use of euphemisms
3everywhere, but on the other hand everyone is talking
4about killing.
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, not everybody is talking about killing. I made it
6quite specific. We have some exceptions and the
7Einsatzgruppen reports are the best example for that. Of
8course there are more exceptions, but generally, and this
9explains why we do not have more documents, we should
10imagine that an operation like this, the killing of about
116 million people, in the 20th century we should have more
12documents on that, because it was an operation on an
13unprecedented scale. But to explain that actually the
14number of documents is in a way limited, I am saying here
15generally they prefer not to speak about the killing.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] So in newspapers, for instance, and things like that they
18did not announce on the first page that we are killing the
19Jews today, 5,000 people got killed in Auschwitz. They
20tried to keep it as a state secret. Even in the
21bureaucracy you find the kind of hesitation. It was
22actually forbidden to use this terminology within the
23bureaucracy. Of course there were exceptions.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] You refer to the speech by Heinrich Himmler at Posnan on
25October 4th 1943 in your paragraph 1.2.
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: 43 or 44?
1 MR IRVING: It was actually 1943. I think that is mistake in
2the report, my Lord.
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] 1943, yes. That is a mistake.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] That is quite an ordinary speech, is it not?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Why is it extraordinary in the context of what we are
7talking about this morning?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, he is saying: I also want to talk to you quite
9frankly about a very grave matter, we can talk about it
10quite openly among ourselves, but nevertheless we can
11never speak of it publicly, just to underline my point,
12just as we did not hesitate on 13th June 1934 to do our
13duty as we were bidden and to stand comrades who had
14lapsed up against the wall and shoot them, so we have
15never spoken about it and will never speak of it. It was
16a natural assumption, an assumption which, thank God, is
17inherent in us, that we never discussed it among ourselves
18and never spoke of it. That is I think a remarkable
19passage. Then he is going on: "Most of you will know what
20it means to have 500 of a thousand corpses lying together
21before you. We have been through this and, disregarding
22exceptional cases of human weakness, to have remained
23decent. That is what has made has made us tough. This is
24a glorious page in our history, once that has never been
25written and can never be written". Of course, the last
26sentence is a kind of challenge for historians, I think.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] He is talking about the shootings on the Eastern Front, is
2he not? He is not talking about the western European
3Jews. He is talking about here about the killings, the
4machine gunnings into pits and so on?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am always quite cautious. He is talking about the
6killing of hundreds of people. I cannot see whether he
7refers to shootings, or whether he refers to extermination
8camps, or to labour camps, I have no idea.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] As you say yourself, he says, "most of you will know what
10it means to have 500 or a thousand corpses lying together
11before you". He is referring to the shootings on the
12Eastern Front is he not?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Not necessarily. He could also refer to extermination
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: This is a speech to SS officers, is it not,
16not to the generals or anything of that kind?
17 Q. [Mr Irving] To the SS Gruppenfuhrer.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] To the SS GruppenFuhrer, that is true.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] He had this speech recorded on disk, did he not?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is true.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Did that indicate that he was particularly concerned about
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think the procedure was, it was not uncommon that he had
24his speeches on disk. He would give the disks to his
25personal adjutant and Brandt, and Brandt would then write
26a good manuscript, what actually improved the wording and
1so on. So I think the disk was primarily meant to be used
2for internal purposes, just to record exactly the words of
3the speech and to take it as a basis for an extended and
4improved minute. I think it was not intended to broadcast
5the speech or something like that, definitely not.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] We had a discussion here about the script of that speech,
7the transcript that was made.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Are you aware that he required those who had not read it,
10or had not attended it rather, to sign a list saying that
11they had in the meantime read the speech?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It may be right. I cannot recall this, but I think you
13are right.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. It is in my discovery. It is a two or three page
15list of the names of all the SS Gruppenfuhrer and they had
16been required to confirm either that they have heard this
17speech or that they have since read it?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Would you like to speculate from your knowledge as an
20expert on this why Himmler would have wanted to make sure
21that they had all heard the politics of the Third Reich?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] One should not speculate, but it is a very long speech.
23I think it is probably more than 50 pages or something
24like that.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] He refers to the killing of the Jews. It might be that he
1wants them to share this secret with him, but it could
2also mean that he just thought it was an important speech
3and they should listen to him, and they should be aware,
4because he is speaking about the conduct of war and all
5other important issues. So I am not absolutely sure that
6this is particularly this issue, why he is doing that.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Let me put it like this. Are you aware of any other
8Himmler speeches where he required those who had not
9attended to read it like school children afterwards?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am not sure, I cannot say anything to that.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] Can you take it from me that I have never seen any other
12such list from any other Himmler speech?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. I am afraid I have to say it might be, but I cannot
14recall that.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Are you prepared to suggest that there is a link between
16the fact that he made this extraordinary expose in this
17speech with the fact that he required all the SS generals
18to sign that they had now taken cognisance of it?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If I should speculate on it in this sense, yes, it is
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Probably a link?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am not quite sure, Mr Irving, what the
24suggestion you are making is. What are you saying that
25the reason was?
26 MR IRVING: I was just about to try and elicit this. I think
1undoubtedly that Dr Longerich is an expert on these
2matters and I would be interested to hear his views.
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. You are perfectly entitled to ask, but
4I was not quite sure what the suggestion was.
5 MR IRVING: Is there some suggestion that Himmler is making
6them all into accomplices after the fact?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is a possible interpretation.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Of something that he has done. Is he trying to spread the
9guilt, do you think?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is a possible interpretation, yes.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] Am I right, if I can ask a general question here, in
12saying that we are very much in the dark when we get up to
13this rarified level of Heinrich Himmler, Adolf Hitler, we
14do not really know what happened between them? We are
15forced to speculate, depending on our own personal
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, to speculate. We are in a way informed speculators
18so I think we have some sources and we should always take
19those sources as a basis for our speculation. And of
20course it is the nature of the system, the genre of
21decision making. We know there is a record of the
22relationship between Himmler and Hitler before this time,
23so we are also allowed, I think, to draw a conclusion from
24this wider context.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: You have not told me what your conclusion is?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] My conclusion?
1 Q. [Mr Irving] The question really was, we do not know much about the
2relationship between Himmler and Hitler.
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We know something about the relationship between Himmler
4and Hitler.
5 MR IRVING: Specifically in this connection, am I right, my
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It was your question I was paraphrasing.
8 MR IRVING: I am sure it would interest your Lordship too to
9know, from your own personal knowledge as an expert
10particularly on the Party Chancellery files, for example,
11is there any hint in all that huge body of, as you say,
1250,000 documents which suggests that there were intimate
13discussions between Himmler and Hitler on the Final
14Solution with a homicidal intent, if I can put it like
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Not necessarily in the files of the Party Chancellery but,
17if I can expand on that, the sources we have relating to
18Hitler and Himmler, I would say, the most important
19document we have, is the entry in the Dienskalendar, the
2018th December 1941. This is of course an important
21document. We have the speeches, not only this speech, but
22also a couple of other speeches, a couple of speeches
23Hitler made to this issue. We have a number of other
24documents which I refer to in my report number 1.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] We will come to them.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] So we have documents from 42, where Himmler said, "the
1occupied Eastern territories have to be made free of Jews,
2this is a burden on my shoulders, it was laid as a burden
3on my shoulders". We have more documents like this, which
4gave us a kind of insight into the relationship. They
5actually were discussing the issue of the Holocaust among
7 MR IRVING: Is it not a danger you refer to the December 18th
81941 document. That of course only turned up two years
9ago. Does that mean to say that for 53 years people were
10really reaching these conclusion without such a document,
11finally like a drowning man they found a straw?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. The other documents are not known, and it added to
13our picture. As you suggested yourself, it is luck that
14we actually opened, that we have access now to Eastern
15European archives, but they were not in the dark before
16that. It adds to our knowledge.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Just so I am clear, you say that the informed
18speculator would draw the conclusion that Hitler and
19Himmler were discussing the Holocaust. By the Holocaust
20in that connection you do not just mean the shootings by
21the Einsatzgruppen?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I mean the systematic killing of European Jews.
23 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] By whatever means?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] By whatever means, yes.
25 MR IRVING: What would you say to the historian who says that
26such speculation is without foundation if one looks at it
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would reject this view.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Would you say that one's personal political
4viewpoint come into it, that the extreme right-winger
5would adopt one view and the cautious German historian,
6aware of the laws in Germany, would adopt a different
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know to which laws are you referring. I publish
9all my books in Germany. I never felt any restrictions on
10publishing books.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] I am sure.
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] As far as the own political viewpoint is concerned, the
13ideology, I think we have to rely on our professional
14work. So we have to just try to exclude this fact as far
15as it is possible. We have some rules how to interpret
16sources, how to deal with material, and I think what we do
17is, generally speaking, reliable. You can rely on that.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] Would you classify the great body of German historians as
19being diligent and applying themselves to the task?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Why did they wait for 25 years before looking at Heinrich
22Himmler's handwritten notes of his telephone conversations
23with Hitler?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Which ones are you referring to?
25 Q. [Mr Irving] The notes in Himmler's handwriting which were in the
26National Archives in America and available on microfilm
1since the 1950s and I was first person to use?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If you give me a specific reference to one quote, and you
3can go through the works of my colleagues and find out
4whether they left something out, I think that -- well,
5stop here.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Let me put the question this way round. I do not
7want to go too far down this avenue, but are you aware of
8any other German historian who, before 1975, made any use
9of Heinrich Himmler's handwritten notes on his telephone
10conversations or meetings with Hitler?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Before 1975?
12 Q. [Mr Irving] Approximately, when my book Hitler's War was published.
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Actually, I cannot recall that.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot actually answer this question because I cannot
16recall every word which was published before 1975. But,
17if you are making the point that you were one of the
18first, or probably the first, who was using the documents,
19I agree.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] That is not the point I am trying to make. I am
21suggesting that, if an historian has not shown proper
22diligence in turning up and using the sources, then how he
23cares to speculate is not worth the paper he writes his
24speculations on.
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am reluctant to make a general statement about the
26historians. If you talk about a certain person, a certain
1author, you can discuss his books, whether the sources are
2available or not, but I am really hesitant to make a
3general sweeping statement about all my colleagues in
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The answer you gave me just now about what
6the informed speculator would infer was based on all the
7now available evidence including the Himmler diaries?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] One would try to include these documents into one's own
9interpretation, yes.
10 MR IRVING: It is right that we are learning the whole time,
11are we not, that more and more documents become available,
12particularly from the Moscow archives and from your own
13work, for example, on the Martin Bormann papers? We are
14constantly adding to our information, so we are correcting
15misinterpretations, we are correcting even mistranslations
16sometimes, or misreadings?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. It is a research process, that is true.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] You rightly point out the fact that Muller in January 1942
19said the word liquidierung was not to be used?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Which is understandable. If you are familiar with my
22Goebbels biography, do you know that it was Dr Goebbels
23who first issued that order?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Sometime in November or December 1941, Goebbels issued a
26propaganda directive that the word liquidate is only going
1to be used in connection with the Soviet killings?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Interesting. I am not aware of that, no.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] But liquidierung is quite plain. We do not have to argue
4about the meaning of that word of course.
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, definitely not.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] But on paragraph 2 we now come to Umsiedlung and the
7various other words with this settlement route.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] It is correct to say that these words are used in both
10homicidal and non-homicidal senses throughout the
11documentation. Sometimes Umgesiedlung means they are
12going to be literally, as we saw in one document, in the
13same paragraph concerning Brestitovsk Jews in October
141942, we saw one document where at the beginning of the
15paragraph it referred to, I think, 15,000 Brestitovsk Jews
16had been Umgesiedelt, which is shot, and then at the end
17of the same paragraph it said, "The village of A, half the
18Jews had been shot and the rest had been Umgesiedelt to a
19neighbouring village", and that is a typical case of the
20problem facing us, is it not, with this particular word?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not have this document in front of me but in general
22I could agree.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Assume it is true because we have been
24through it more than once.
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That makes it so important to look at the context.
26 MR IRVING: Sometimes we just do not have the context to judge,
1is that right?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We try our best to establish the context.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Sometimes when the Jews were sent just to ghettoes, that
4is where the word "umgesiedelt" is used, is it not?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Give me please some kind of reference and I will comment
6on it, because it is a very difficult subject because the
7meaning, as you rightly said, changes and can change in
8the same document. So I should refer, I should in my
9answer refer to single documents.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, in paragraph 2.2, you refer to a Wehrmacht report.
11It is not even an SS report, is it?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] So the German Army was also involved in the camouflage.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] They replaced the word "shooting" with the handwritten
16word "resettlement"?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] Which is a rather pointless kind of change if it is
19possible for us years later to see both words written
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Obviously, this man was not very intelligent who did
23 Q. [Mr Irving] In paragraph 2.4 you quite clearly give an example here
24where "Umsiedlung" is unambiguously used in its homicidal
25sense: "There are two pits there and groups of 10 leaders
26and men working at each pit relieving each other every two
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, and ----
3 Q. [Mr Irving] So that is what you are talking about when you are talking
4about the context, in context like that there is
5undoubtedly no question?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, exactly.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] The clarity is beyond dispute, and it would take a lunatic
8to say or to continue to argue that the word "Umsiedlung"
9there does not mean that, it does not mean killing?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I agree.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] But in the case of the key documents that we are looking
12at with Adolf Hitler, which is all that interests me
13really, we do not have that degree of clarity, do we?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I would like to suggest we should look at the
15documents and then we could ---- I think I should not make
16these general statements, I think I should always refer to
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think particularly in the light of that
19question, if there is a document, and I do not have one in
20mind, where Hitler uses the word "umsiedeln" ----
21 MR IRVING: With that degree of clarity.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: --- Then it would be helpful to put it to the
23witness. I do not recollect if there is one or there is
25 MR IRVING: What I am suggesting is that there is no such
26document with that degree of clarity.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Is there a Hitler document using the word
3 MR IRVING: I do not believe there is, my Lord, in which case
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Then the point is academic.
6 MR IRVING: Your Lordship will know that I do not attach much
7important for my purposes. I attach more importance to
8the words "Vernichtung" and "Ausrottung".
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let us move on to Vernichtung; we have done
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] My list is not complete; it is just what I found.
12 MR IRVING: In paragraph 3, page 3, we are dealing with section
133 now, Evakuieren.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] You do incidentally accept that the word "Umsiedlung"
16referred equally sometimes to the westward movement of
17ethnic Germans?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] And similarly "Besiedlung" can be the resettlement, for
20example, we have a September 1942 document where Lublin is
21being besiedelt with Volksdeutschen?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I will always say that I would like to prefer to see the
23document and not to speculate about this, but you may be
25 Q. [Mr Irving] "Evakuierung" does not always mean the killing, does it?
26It does not always have homicidal context either, does it?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It always depends on the context.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. It usually means deportation under rough conditions
3or sometimes?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sometimes, yes, it also, you know, there was a scheme for,
5what is the expression, Luftkriegsevakuierung ----
6 THE INTERPRETER: The evacuation from air raids.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In the context of air war, this was also the official
8term. So it could be used in a different context.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think you are really agreed about
10Evakuierung, that ----
11 MR IRVING: On paragraph 3.2, we come to the 6th March 1942
12meeting where Eichmann is talking about the evacuation of
13the Jews to the East.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] The second and third line it says: "Further evacuation of
1655,000 Jews", and you conclude that they are being sent to
17Auschwitz, and they should, you quote a document there,
18the Reich's security.
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not conclude that these Jews on 26th were sent to
20Auschwitz. One should, to make it clear, it would have
21been better to start on 20th with a new paragraph. This
22is a completely different issue.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] On 20th February, the Reich's Security Head Office issued
24guidelines on implementation of the evacuation of Jews to
25the East, Auschwitz Concentration Camp.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] And from that, you conclude that the evacuation of the
2Jews to Auschwitz is a homicidal meaning, is it?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think this is quite clear from the document that the
4people were sent to Auschwitz and ordered to kill them
5there. So the term evacuation then, particularly
6after 1941, could just mean the deportation to a point but
7it also could mean the deportation to this point plus the
8killings of the people there. So, I think these two
9interpretations are possible after 1941.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. I will come to this later on, either today or
11tomorrow, are you familiar with the Ahnert document, the
12deportation from France?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] We will come to that when the time comes.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] But you are not saying that all the people deported to
17Auschwitz were killed. You accept that some were used for
18slave labour?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think we went through the history of the Auschwitz. It
20was a combination of a slave labour camp and extermination
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: But I do not think, Mr Irving, that you are
23suggesting that, when guidelines are issued on the
24evacuation of Jews to the East (Auschwitz concentration
25camp), you are not suggesting, are you, that evacuation
26has a wholly non-homicidal connotation there?
1 MR IRVING: It can be either, my Lord. Here is one typical
2example where the context does not really help us. I am
3trying to establish that, from what we know, we do not
4know whether they were killed on arrival or whether they
5were put to work as slave labour as very large numbers or
6what. So that document does not really help us.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] May I comment on that.
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, of course.
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think that we know, not from the document, but, of
10course, we have enough information about Auschwitz to
11establish that, because these are guidelines; the general
12picture of what happens to Jews who were deported to
13Auschwitz after February 1943. So I think we could
14establish the context if we want to do so, but the
15selections and about sending people to gas chambers
16I think we have this information, and from this, I would
17then take this information and say that actually this
18makes it, I think, almost clear that the term evacuation
19here could include the killing of the people.
20 MR IRVING: In fact, it means exactly what it says that has
21been evacuated to Auschwitz.
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think we could, in a way, extend our knowledge and go
23into this day of Auschwitz, and it is not that this is a
24dark area ----
25 Q. [Mr Irving] This is not the time or place for that.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] So, we could do research and I think that, in the end, we
1could come to the conclusion that this, in general, meant
2the extermination of the people in the camp at Auschwitz.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] If I refer to the previous sentence beginning: "A report
4of 26th December", in which the head of the police force
5Saliter reported in detail about his experiences
6accompanying and supervising the transport of 1,007 Jews
7from the Rheinland to Latvia, is an entire report on the
8of evacuation of Jews to Riga, is that right?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] In December 1941, what happened to these Jews who were
11deported to the Riga at that time?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] At this time, the Jews were actually sent to ghettoes or
13to camps.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] To the Jungfernhof camp?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] To the Jungfernhof camp or to the ----
16 Q. [Mr Irving] So they were not massacred on arrival, then?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Most of them were not massacred on arrival.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] What conclusion do you draw from the use of the word
19evacuation there, then?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Here, it says that the Jews -- I am trying to be cautious
21-- it says here that the Jews are going to be deported to
22Riga, and the document does not say that the Jews are
23exterminated on the spot. There is actually one reference
24in the Saliter report, where Saliter says that the
25collaborators, if I may call them so, in Latvia were quite
26astonished to see the Jews here because they said that you
1can Ausrotten them yourself in Germany. But I think they
2were probably a little bit ahead at this time and in this
3context, I could not say that the word evacuation would
4necessarily include the killing of the people who were
5sent to this place.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, we have actually seen a number of documents
7over the last weeks from this December 1941 period,
8indicating that these trainloads from the Reich to Germany
9carried provisions and equipment for their first weeks in
10there camp on arrival there. So the evacuation here,
11would you accept, does actually mean evacuation then and
12not necessarily anything more sinister?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This is what we call the second wave of deportations.
14This was about 21 trains to Riga and about, I think, seven
15or eight trains to Minsk which happened between November
161941 and February 1942, except the six trains where the
17people were shot on the spot in Kovno and in Riga, except
18these six trains where the majority of these people
19actually were not shot on the spot but they survived a
20couple of months, most of them, and they were provided
21with all kinds of things, with tools and so on, from the
22Jewish communities because they, some of them, maybe even
23the majority, I do not know, some of them may actually
24have thought that they were some sort of pioneers who were
25sent to the East. So I think this idea to provide them
26with tools and so on also includes a moment of an element
1of deception, giving them the idea that they actually can
2start a new life somewhere in the East.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Do you have any proof for that. This is an important
4point, I think. Do you have any proof that this was an
5element of deception in inviting them it take
6their appliances with them?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think that the fact that 6,000 people were shot on the
8spot gives you an idea there was a kind of, you know, a
9kind of juxtaposition between the provision of these
10trains and actually what happened to those people. If
11I can explain this.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] I do not want really get into the police decodes business
13here, my Lord, because I think we will stick to the
14meaning of the words.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The cross-examination is notionally to do
16with the translation of words.
17 MR IRVING: It is, entirely.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The trouble is you are chasing some of the
19uses. I understand why, Mr Irving; it is not a criticism
20of you, but the result is that it is a little bit
21scattered this cross-examination, and it is not a
23 MR IRVING: I have two ways of doing it. Either I can follow
24my own plan or I can follow his own very useful glossary
25which he has provided for us, and as we all have the
26glossary, I think it is more useful if I follow his
1paragraphing rather than introduce yet further confusion.
2But I am taking large leaps and bounds through it.
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. You have been confronted with the
4glossary and I suppose you have to really to deal with it.
5 MR IRVING: Well I hope that is not implied criticism of my
6dealing with it.
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is not a criticism at all of you, Mr
8Irving, no.
9 MR IRVING: But if the Defence does seek to rely on these
10meaning of these words, then I have to try to shoot them
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, I know. Well, take your own course.
13 MR IRVING: Paragraph 3.3, the evacuation to the Lodz ghetto
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Which was referred to in the Gestapo report of June 9th.
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] In fact, the stages of the evacuation make it quite plain
19that were not actually being evacuated to their death, so
20they were initially evacuated somewhere else.
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but it is ----
22 Q. [Mr Irving] They were transported to the special command.
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but it is clear from, if you look at the following
24document, it is clear that they were deported to the
25extermination camp Chelmno. The Sonderkommando is the
26Sonderkammandolange which actually was responsible for the
1Chelmno extermination camp and the gas used there.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Abschieben, which is No. 4, carries only the meaning of
3deport really, does it not, or does it ----?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This is the original meaning, I think.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Goebbels, for example, in his 27th March 1942 entry,
6talks about the Abgeschobene Juden, of whom 60 per cent
7would probably be liquidated.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Which implies that the Abschiebung, the deportation, was
10not the killing, that was just what they used what came
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] You might be right in this case, but it is clearly said in
13his document what happened, so I think one of the key
14documents as far as Holocaust is concerned.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] We are now on No. 5, which is Vernichtung.
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] In other words, abschieben is not a very important word in
18this particular argument, would you agree?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think that, in a kind of hierarchy, I would not put it
20on the top.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Vernichtung is, however, quite important, is it
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] You have quoted in 5.1, the Langenscheidt version of the
25word, as destroy, annihilate or exterminate, presumably in
26that order.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] It is really destroying a thing, is it not, or if you can
3regard a group of people as a thing, then it is destroying
4a group of people?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If you look at the group of people as a thing then, if you
6make this ----
7 Q. [Mr Irving] For example, Judentum is a body of Jews, a community of
8Jews, is it not?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Again, I think that we have enough examples to discuss it
10with reference to a document. We do not have to speculate
11about the possible ways the terminology was used.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I quite agree.
13 MR IRVING: You refer to Klausewitz?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] As defeating the enemy, you destroy the enemy?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. He is referring to, I think, an enemy army. So he
17is not referring just to people; he is referring, well, to
18an organization, and he is making it quite clear that the
19term "vernichtung" could mean, well, it could mean, as he
20said, annihilation of the enemy forces either by death or
21by injury or any other ways, either completely or merely
22to such an extent that the enemy no longer has the will to
23continue the fight. So I am trying to illustrate here
24that if the term "vernichtung" refers to an organization,
25it can have the meaning, you know, following Klausewitz,
26to kill all of them, to kill part of them, but basically
1to make sure that the organization, as such, is not able
2to exist any more as an organization.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] You could bankrupt somebody and he would be destroyed,
4could you not?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you can make all other kinds of connotations.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Take the army prisoner ----
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It all depends on the context.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you can make all kinds of combinations, but I think
9the most interesting, I mean if I may suggest that the
10most interesting case is of course when it refers to the
11vernichtung of people, not of an organization, of Judentum
12but of Jews, then I think it becomes clear what the term
13actually meant.
14 MR IRVING: You have referred to Adolf Hitler's speech of
15January 30th 1939 ----
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] --- in this context where he uses the word "vernichtung"?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, 5.6, footnote.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] We do not have the exact quotation.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Unfortunately not.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] But the sense is, he said: If international finance Jewry
22once more succeeds in launching a new world war, then it
23will end not with the destruction of the European people,
24but with the destruction of, is it Judentum?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I have the quote in the first report.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] 38. Shall I read this again?
2 MR IRVING: I think it is an important passage.
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, perhaps you should in that case.
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I will only read the second -- well, I should read the
5whole passage: "In my life I have often been a prophet and
6was generally laughed at. During my struggle for power it
7was mostly the Jewish people who laughed at my prophecies
8that I would some day assume the leadership of the state
9and thereby of the entire folk, and then among many other
10things achieve a solution of the Jewish problem.
11I believe that in the meantime the then resounding
12laughter of Jewry in Germany is now choking in their
13throats. Today I will be a prophet again. If
14international Jewry within Europe and abroad should
15succeed once more in plunging the people's into a world
16war, then the consequence will be not the Bolshevization
17of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the
18contrary the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe."
19 So "Jewry" is here in the German original
20Judentum, and the annihilation is the vernichtung,
21annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.
22 MR IRVING: Yes. The words "on the contrary" you just
23interpolated that. They are not in the original, are
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: "Sondern".
26 MR IRVING: Sondern, it just means "but"?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] But, yes.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] It is the word "but" that comes in after a negative, is it
3not, as in French? I am going to draw your attention to
4the fact that this speech is on January 30th 1939?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Had not a few days earlier Adolf Hitler through Hermann
7Goring as head of the four-year plan, appointed Reinhardt
8Heydrich to set up an agency to speed the emigration of
9the Jews from Germany?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. That is true, yes.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. That was just four our five days previously, was it
12not, or about two weeks previously, something like that?
13It was one of the consequences of the Kristallnacht?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Shall I explain the context?
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Was that genuine or was that camouflage?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sorry?
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Was the setting up of the Heydrich agency genuine or
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think this was at this stage genuine, but I think I have
20to explain the background, if you do not mind.
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes.
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] You know there were international negotiations going at
23this time between the so-called international government
24for refugees and the German Government represented by
25Hischaft. So the idea was that actually one could, you
26know, force world Jewry, as the Nazis perceived it, to pay
1for the emigration of the Jews from Germany. In my
2interpretation I think they really thought this was a
3serious idea, a serious plan, that one could actually let
4them pay for the emigration of 400,000 Jews from Germany.
5So I think we have to look at Kristallnacht in this
6context, because I think the policy of the Nazis was to
7start a policy of terror against the Jews, to terrify them
8to leave the country, but also to force the Western powers
9actually to give in and to support this emigration
10programme. I think the speech has to be seen in this
11context. It is a threat, it a very violent threat: Look,
12if you don't agree and if we are getting in a kind of
13dispute again and if this dispute again will lead to
14another world war, then of course the life of the Jews in
15Europe is threatened, we are threatening the life of
16them. So if you look at the context they were, on the one
17hand, planning and preparing a programme for emigration,
18but on the other hand they were looking at the
19consequences if this programme would fail and if they
20would be involved in a military conflict with the Western
21powers again.
22 So if you threaten somebody, you know, it is a
23possibility. The whole idea I think of, well, threatening
24people is that you, in a way, leave a kind of uncertainty
25what you actually will do with the people you are
1 MR IRVING: I am sorry, did you want to say anything else?
2No. Would you regard this speech by Adolf Hitler as being
3a further twist to the Jewish arm, saying: "Get out while
4you can"?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think the motive behind the speech, there are various
6motives behind the speech, and one motive is clearly to
7threaten German Jews to leave the country as soon as
8possible. This is one of the motives behind the speech.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: On what matters, which is what "vernichtung"
10means in that context ----
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
12 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] You say it does mean extermination or extirpation?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I actually said here in the text "annihilation". You
14know, historians are debating this question. Some of my
15colleagues would say this is clear, Hitler actually at
16this stage had a clear programme to kill European Jews.
17I am not sure. I think the motives behind the speech are,
18there were different motives between the speech. It is a
19violent threat. It includes the possibility to kill the
20Jews in Europe, but I am not sure whether, you know,
21actually one can interpret this as a kind of programme
22which was already there.
23 MR IRVING: What possible proof is there for the fact that
24Adolf Hitler had at this time, at the beginning of 1939, a
25programme or a plan or intent to liquidate the Jews of
26Europe or anywhere else?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The historians who would take this line would argue the
2events which followed to actually give us a kind of clue
3that Hitler probably had this plan at a very early stage.
4I do not agree with this view. I think he still, you
5know, was not sure whether he preferred emigration or
6whether he was going to the next step and actually
7envisaging, was actually trying to envisage what would
8happen in a case of a war. So I think it is a kind of a
9watershed here.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Is he effectively saying: "We will hold the Jews
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think this is the message. There are various motives
13behind the speech. The fact that he is referring here to
14a world war, not simply to a war, a war against Poland,
15let us say, but a world war, which implies the involvement
16of the Western powers. I think this is a threat against,
17the Western powers against Great Britain, in particular
18against the United States. But this speech is really open
19for interpretation. I cannot prove at this stage that
20Hitler had a programme, a blueprint to kill European Jews
21during the next years. I think it would go too far to
22draw this conclusion from this speech. It is definitely a
23very violent threat. It is three months after
24Kristallnacht, and actually I think one has to bear this
25in mind that, you know, it is saying we could actually
26repeat Kristallnacht on a much, much wider scale. I think
1something like is implied here.
2 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, I am conscious that time is
3passing and we are spending huge amounts of time on the
4meaning of these various words. In a way you have been
5rather pushed into doing it because of the form of the
6glossary, but it does not seem to me terribly helpful all
7this, because it all depends, and Dr Longerich's last
8answer reveals, that exploring what the context of a
9document is can be quite a complicated exercise.
10 MR IRVING: I agree, my Lord, but I hope I am gradually
11bringing it home to your Lordship that when Adolf Hitler
12is concerned, which is the person I am largely concerned
13with, we are all at sea and anyone can draw whatever
14conclusion they want.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: We are at sea in 1939. I am not so sure
16about 1941 and 1942.
17 MR IRVING: Which I hope we will reach in the course ----
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, let us move on.
19 MR IRVING: In that case I will not draw attention to what he
20said two days previously.
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, I think 41 and 42 is the time, when the
22shooting started on the Eastern Front, paragraph 5.7
24 MR IRVING: I was up to 5.8 already.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Good.
26 MR IRVING: At 5.8 you refer to the Goebbels diary entry, Adolf
1Hitler speech?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] To the Gauleiters on December 12th 1941?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Here the reference is, well, actually the reference is
6not, the "vernichtung" does not come in a speech; it comes
7in the second part, in the Hans Frank diary four days
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] According to the Goebbels diary he says "vernichtung" in
10this speech, and again the full reference is in, the
11translation is in the other report, in the first report
12which is in chronological order so we should find it.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. There is footnote 156, so if we look at the German
15text in the first report, page 61, then we have the
16translation I think in both.
17 MR IRVING: That is in fact harking back to precisely that
18speech, is it not.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is completely circular.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 MR IRVING: It is exactly the same.
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, he did this a lot of times. He always came back to
23this speech. I think he have five or six or more examples
24where Hitler is actually referring to this prophecy,
25particularly at this time. It is not only on 12th
26December; it is also on 1st January, 30th January and 24th
1February. He is always giving the same text. On 21st
2February he is actually replacing the word "vernichtung"
3by "ausrotten". So he is actually saying, he is
4indicating that things become actually more violent and
5more threatening.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] You then look at what Hans Frank said on December 16th?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. So we are back in the glossary?
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, back in the glossary, paragraph 5.8.
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Is it plain that the word "vernichtung" as used by Hans
11Frank is unambiguously referring to liquidation there?
12Immediately before the passage you quote, has not Frank
13told subordinates that a great Jewish emigration is about
14to begin, meaning the Jews of the German government are
15going to be deported and adopted by the Soviet Union?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, again I would prefer to see the text here. I do not
17know who has the full.
18 MR RAMPTON: I think we probably need the new file. That is
19much the best way of doing it.
20 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am just wondering where we get with this.
21This is Frank putting a gloss on Hitler had said in 1939.
22We have looked at what Hitler said in 1939.
23 MR RAMPTON: No, my Lord, I think the case is Frank is putting
24a gloss, if that be the right word, on what Hitler said on
2512th December 1941.
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Do we need to trouble with what Frank says?
1 MR RAMPTON: The witness makes the point, and indeed Mr Irving
2accepts, that the understanding which Frank had of what he
3had been told by Hitler in Berlin was quite unequivocal.
4It was about physical liquidation.
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. He came back from Berlin -- it is four days after
6Hitler's speech -- saying he had discussions in Berlin
7and he is referring to this discussion. I think it is
8fair to assume, because Frank was as Reichsleiter present
9at the Reichs and Gauleiter meeting, so it is fair to
10assume that he is referring to this speech and may be
11other discussions they had.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I thought he was referring back to 1939.
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but if you look at the ----
14 MR RAMPTON: I think, my Lord, it would honestly be helpful
15because what we have done in this file is to put in fact a
16long translation provided by Professor Browning against
17the German text. Would you turn to 172, first of all?
18That is the English of Professor Browning. .
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Where will I find that?
20 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is called N1. It is also in another file
21but this is probably the best place.
22 MR RAMPTON: Do not worry about the other file. N1 is the one
23you need. I hope this should be a long paragraph in
24English indented. My Lord, may I ask the witness whether
25that is what he has?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I have got that.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes.
2 MR RAMPTON: If one turns to page 6 in a bold crayon, 178, one
3finds a third of the way down the page the words "mit den
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 MR RAMPTON: That I think is the passage we are looking for.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
8 MR RAMPTON: I will leave it there.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Thank you very much, Mr Rampton.
10 MR RAMPTON: I should add that it goes over the page to the end
11of a paragraph, the next paragraph beginning "Die
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. Mr Irving, have you got N1? Were you
15able to follow all that?
16 MR IRVING: I am going with your Lordship's view that what Hans
17Frank's use of the word means is really not of much
18relevance, having gone to all that trouble.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The way it is put is, and just decide whether
20you want to ask a question, is that Frank had just come
21back from Berlin where he had heard Hitler speaking, so he
22is not harking back in all of what he says to 1939 but to
23four days before.
24 MR IRVING: Yes.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think the way it is put is that vernichtung
26is used fairly unambiguously in Frank's speech as a record
1of what he had been told in Berlin. It is really that one
2phrase, is it not, Dr Longerich? "In Berlin we were told
3why all this trouble, we cannot use them in the Ostland or
4the Reichskommissariat either, liquidate them yourselves"?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. That is I think the main paragraph, the main
7 Q. [Mr Irving] It may be that you do not want to cross-examine about
8that, Mr Irving?
9 MR IRVING: Not really, because it is not the word vernichtung
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is the words Juden vernichtung. That is in there, in
12the German text. (German spoken). The term vernichtung
13the term vernichtung is clearly in here. When he is not
14sure about the means how to vernichtung the people, he is
15saying we cannot liquidate, we cannot execute them, we
16cannot poison them, so what shall we do?
17 MR IRVING: That is the problem we have with that particular
18passage, of course, my Lord, is it not Frank says earlier,
19we cannot poison them, we cannot shoot them.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. We are looking -- this is on page bold 7, second
21paragraph. So they are looking for a kind of solution,
22how to vernichtung the people.
23 MR IRVING: Without shooting or poisoning them?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Poisoning could be a possible method. They are
25looking for a kind of solution to this problem and then it
26is explained here that we will have a meeting in Berlin,
1and this is obviously the Wannsee conference. Then it
2becomes clearer what would happen in the
4 Q. [Mr Irving] If you went back to the Klauserwitz example and somebody
5said to a German general, we have Eisenhower's armies in
6front of us, we cannot shoot them, we cannot poison them,
7how are we going to destroy them? The answer is, cut off
8their water supply, cut off the power, deprive them of the
9shipping lines, the oil. There are all sorts of ways of
10destroying an enemy.
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is why I am trying to explain how difficult it is to
12make comparisons because clearly von Klauserwitz is
13referring to an army, and in your example you refer to an
14army, but here it is about the Jews.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] An enemy?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] An enemy, but the Jews are the Jews. This is the people,
17the human beings, and if I destroy, vernichtung, human
18beings, and I discuss then the methods, whether I should
19liquidate them, execute them or whether I should poison
20them, I think then the context is pretty clear. There is
21not much room for interpretation, I think.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, it is even clearer than that because he
23says, we cannot shoot them and we cannot poison them.
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, because they have not been told from Berlin what
25method they should use. Then, if you into the Wannsee
26protocol, actually the suggestion comes from von Below,
1they had the Secretary of State, "We could like to deal
2with the Jews on the spot, we do not want to send them to
3the East, we would like to do it here". Then it goes on
4in the Wannsee protocol. The various methods were
5discussed how to solve the problem. Then they were
6discussing what to do, poisoning, gassing, probably
7executions. This is preWannsee. He was sure that they
8were going to vernichtung the Juden, because it came back
9from Berlin and heard the speech, but the method was
11 Q. [Mr Irving] You are not suggesting, although I am sure you quite
12accidentally gave the opposite impression, that in the
13Wannsee protocol there is any reference to killing at all,
14is there?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know whether we will go to the Wannsee conference
16in more detail.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The problem with all of this is that it is
18not Mr Irving's fault at all, because he has been
19confronted with this glossary and I can understand why he
20is going through it, but to me it is unhelpful, this whole
21exercise. We are coming across odd documents from 39 or
2235 or 43.
23 MR IRVING: Rather the same thing happened with the previous
24witness, my Lord. We came across topics that the witness
25urgently wanted to talk about and which no doubt will get
26raised later on.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think it is better to look at these words
2when we come across them in the context of examining the
3substantive issues rather than having a kind of linquistic
4sequence of questions.
5 MR IRVING: That would be the other way of slicing the same
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I know it would. I say again -- it is not
8intended critically of you at all -- that darting from
9one document to another is not I think particularly
11 MR IRVING: I am very rapidly going through the remaining part
12of the glossary to see if there are any important points
13to take. The fact that Robert Lie used a word a certain
14way does not mean to say necessarily that that was the
15standard meaning of the word?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am only referring to Lie. He was one of the top Nazis
17and he used the term in a quite open way. I find our
18discussion quite interesting but ----
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Very well. In that case that finishes the with the
20glossary I think. I may wish to come back to it. Dealing
21now with your first report, Dr Longerich, page 10, you say
22there in your opening sentence that there can be no doubt
23that Hitler's behaviour during his entire political career
24was characterised radical anti-Semitism.
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] Was he always an anti-Semite, in your view, or did it come
1upon him in his youth?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think this way of radical anti-Semitism, which means
3that he wants to basically remove the Jews from, let us
4say, German soil, I think this is a product of the First
5World War and appeared immediately after the First World
6War. Other historians would argue that actually he learnt
7this in Vienna, but I think one has more to emphasise.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] There have been all sorts of weird theories, have there
9not, about where it came from?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, there are all kinds of theories. I think we are on
11safer ground if we look at the period after the First
12World War.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Were all the top Nazi leadership equal in their
14anti-Semitism, or were some more anti-Semitic than
15others? Were some more motivated than others?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Quite clearly some more anti-Semitic than others.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Some were more homicidally anti-Semitic than others?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Obviously you have worked for 20 years now in the records
20so you must have gained some impression that you can tell
21us about, the kind of league table of anti-Semitism.
22Would Martin Bormann be high up the list of anti-Semitism
23as an active anti-Semite?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Absolutely, yes. Definitely.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Josef Goebbels, would he be more or less anti-Semitic
26than Bormann?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have never thought about a kind of hierarchy, but
2I think, if you look at the top Nazis, I think you can
3fairly say that radical anti-Semites, people who wanted to
4remove by any means the Jews from Germany, I think you
5would count among them Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Bormann,
6I think, and some others.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Hermann Goring, for example, was always getting in trouble
8because he had Jewish friends, did he not?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but the fact that one has Jewish friends does not
10necessarily exclude that one can be an anti-Semite or even
11a radical anti-Semite. I think probably Goring looked at
12this more from a kind of political or tactical point of
13view. I am not sure. I think the anti-Semitism of Goring
14and his role in the Final Solution has not been fully
15researched. That is all I can say to that.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Goebbels was the real mover and shaker, was he not? He
17was the propagandist, he was the little poison dwarf, the
18evil genius?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] He was definitely a radical anti-Semite, and he was trying
20to push forward anti-Semitic policy, this is right, but
21I would not make a kind of hierarchy where I would place
22Goebbels at the top.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] The reason why I am asking this is this. Goebbels, for
24example, would never have dreamed of employing a Jew on
25his staff or a half Jew on his staff, would he? I do not
26think he did.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot say anything about his dreams, but I think he did
2not, as far as I know.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] That is an English expression. Adolf Hitler of course did
4have some half Jews on his staff, did he not?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know. I cannot recall any names. Hitler?
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. His private chauffeur, Emile Morris. When it turned
7out that Emile Morris was Jewish, did not Hitler protect
8him and keep him on to the end?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot recall this.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Do you know Peter Hofmann, Professor Peter Hofmann?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] He is a well-known Canadian German historian, is he not?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Have you read his book, Hitler's Personal Security?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I know the book but I cannot recall this detail. I simply
16do not know.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Does it not strike you as odd that an anti-Semite like
18Hitler would not mind having a Jewish chauffeur, Emile
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I cannot comment on this story. I do not know whether it
21was an established fact that Morris was a Jew. I cannot
22comment on that. Again I would say, if you look into the
23history of anti-Semitism, the greatest anti-Semites had
24sometimes Jewish friends. They would say, well, this is
25my friend, he is an exception, he is not like others.
26This is a typical stereotype.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] You are damned if you do and damned if you do not,
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is a typical stereotype. I do not think one can draw
4major conclusions from the fact that somebody protected a
5Jew or had Jewish friends.
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Just pause a moment, Dr Longerich.
7 MR RAMPTON: Can I say something? I am not criticising
8Mr Irving in the very least for having gone through that
9glossary, and he did it really rather quickly, but I am a
10bit concerned now because Mr Irving conceded one question
11and answer to the effect, I think, that Hitler was from
121919 onwards a profound anti-Semite and that anti-Semitism
13was one of the important planks of Nazi ideology.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So, in the early years you say that this is
15really not an issue?
16 MR RAMPTON: I have made it specific. From 1919 onwards and
17that anti-Semitism became an important plank of Nazi
18ideology or policy call it what you like.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Adding the rider that, as far as Hitler
20personally was concerned, he had other things on his mind
21from about the invasion of Russia.
22 MR RAMPTON: He may have had other things on his mind. Being
23an anti-Semite is not exclusive of other things.
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, but I think Mr Irving's case, and he will
25correct me if I am wrong, is that anti-Semitism was not
26really something that was concerning Hitler from -- am
1I right about this -- about 1941 onwards, because he was
2fairly preoccupied.
3 MR RAMPTON: No. He said from the time he came to power. From
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: You tell me, Mr Irving. Have I misunderstood
6your case?
7 MR RAMPTON: I have misunderstood Mr Irving's concession, if
8that be right.
9 MR IRVING: My Lord, my general impression is that Adolf Hitler
10abandoned that particular plank once he came to power. It
11had been very useful for getting him into power but, once
12he was an absolute dictator, he did not need it any more
13and it bulked less large.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The point Mr Rampton makes is do we need to
15spend very long exploring anti-Semitism in the 30s, given
16that you accept that he was a radical anti-Semite over the
17entirety of that period?
18 MR IRVING: The question is whether he was a cynical
19anti-Semite and used it in the same way that an Enoch
20Powell might use immigration as a means of establishing a
21political position, or whether he was profoundly
22viscerally anti-Semitic.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Which option are you going for?
24 MR IRVING: I am going for the cynical version, my Lord.
25 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So he was not really an anti-Semite, it was
26just a political gambit?
1 MR IRVING: He was when it served his purpose. He was a beer
2table anti-Semite. He used it to whip up support, but in
3private, and this is what counts, his state of mind was
4slightly different, which is what I was trying to elicit
5from just one or two episodes of his own----
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I find that slightly difficult difficult to
7reconcile with your acceptance earlier on in this trial
8that he was without qualification a rabid anti-Semite, at
9any rate in the 30s.
10 MR IRVING: I would then say it is perfectly possible for him
11to have been like that originally and then drifted out
12when he no longer needed it, just as with Goebbels it was
13the other way round. Goebbels was originally viciously
14anti-anti-Semitic and wrote his letter to his girl
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Do not let us worry about Goebbels. Can you
17put this point that you are now making in a general way to
18Dr Longerich?
19 MR IRVING: Two more questions and then we will have it, I
20think. Adolf Hitler's dietary cook was also Jewish,
21Marlene Exener.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: That is not putting it in a general way.
23 MR IRVING: I was going to say -- well, is the answer do you
24know that or not?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] If somebody maintained people like that on his private
1staff, is it an indication that personally he had no
2real -- what is the word I am looking for -- distaste
3for Jews as individuals?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I made my point. I think, if you look into the
5history of anti-Semitism, you cannot draw conclusions from
6these personal relationships, because the anti-Semite
7would always argue, well, this is an exception, this is
8not a typical Jew, this person is different. I remember
9vaguely these rumours that one or the other person was
10Jewish, or what they called half Jewish, but I do not
11think one can actually write a kind of history of Hitler's
12anti-Jewish policy on this basis. This might be the case,
13but it does not -- it is a well-known stereotype in the
14history of anti-Semitism, as I said.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can I interrupt you rudely and just ask you
16the question which was the one I had in mind? Do you
17accept what Mr Irving is contending, that Hitler's
18anti-Semitism in the 1930s was not an expression of a
19genuine anti-Jewish feeling, but was simply a political
20gambit to enable him to achieve power?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not think so. I do not agree.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Pursue it, if you want to, Mr Irving, but that was the
23general question I had in mind.
24 MR IRVING: I would ask again the general question. If he was
25viscerally anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic, would he have
26tolerated Jewish members of his personal staff? Would he
1have tolerated Field Marshal Milsch, who was a well-known
2half Jew?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I made my point clear. As far as I see
4anti-Semitism -- my English runs out a little bit --
5there is no contrast, no juxtaposition. I think this does
6not actually disturb my view. It does not surprise me.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] OK. Just one final question to round off this context.
8In that little league table I was beginning to draw up of
9Himmler, Goebbels, Goring, Bormann, Lammers, Hitler, where
10would Hitler come on the anti-Semitism scale? Would he be
11above or below Dr Goebbels? Would he be more or less
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would just say that Hitler was a radical anti-Semite
14like Goebbels. The degree of percentage, I cannot make a
15judgment about that. I do not know how one measures
16radical anti-Semitism.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Which way did the anti-Semitic current flow? From
18Goebbels to Hitler, or Goebbels to Hitler?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] If you look at this group of people, I think I would
20describe it as a consensus. It was a general radical
21anti-Semitic consensus among them and it is impossible to
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think we understand the difficulty you are
24in and I think, Mr Irving, you must move on.
25 MR IRVING: If you had read the Goebbels diaries right through,
26would you be able to form an impression on who was making
1the suggestions to whom, or who was just listening?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Again, I would prefer to look then at certain
3passages. As a general view I think my interpretation is
4that there was a high degree of anti-Semitic consensus
5between Hitler and Goebbels, and of course Goebbels in his
6diaries, one of the motivations, motives, why Goebbels
7wrote the diaries is that he wanted to show, the diaries
8should present him as a very active energetic person. So
9of course, he is in a way the actor, and others actually
10are reacting to him. My general impression is that there
11was an anti-Semitic consensus among them.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes.
13 MR IRVING: Can we now go to page 12 of your report, paragraph
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] In general terms you are saying that, between the outbreak
17of war in summer 1939 and the middle of 1941, the Nazis
18were look for a territorial solution to the Jewish
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Is this commonly accepted or do most historians now accept
22that there was no homicidal plan?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This is accepted, but I made a little comment there at the
24end, and I said, well, actually, if you look at the
25so-called territorial solution, one should actually say,
26and this is my argument, that this increasingly offers a
1perspective of the physical end of the Jews in Europe. So
2I think the territorial solution, it was not meant that
3the Jews should actually come back from this reservation
4or whatever they planned, and they should stay there for
5300 years. I think, if you look seriously at this
6territorial solution, these plans had clearly a genocidal
7implication, but they were still plans. They were not
8carried out.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] So that, although they were talking in terms of geography
10and moving them out beyond the pale, even then you suspect
11that they would really like to kill them? They were
12thinking in terms of killing? You want to have it both
13ways, really?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would come back to this phrase there is obviously a
15strong genocidal element in those plans, so they were
16considering among themselves the question how and whether
17the Jews would survive or they would not survive.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] Are you talking about the European Jews here or the
19Russian Jews?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am talking about the European Jews.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] But there is no actual document which indicates a
22homicidal intent. It is just that your feeling is they
23were talking geography but thinking in terms of bullets?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I could expand on that. There are two arguments. First
25of all, if you look at the plans themselves, at the
26comments they made on the plans, I think you can come to
1the conclusion that these so-called reservations would not
2offer sufficient means for existence to the Jews. On the
3other hand, I collected quite a number of comments from
4top Nazis, which actually made quite clear from the
5context that what they envisaged was that the Jews, the
6Jewry, Judentung, the Jews would actually not survive in
7the end this deportation to reservations.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] They hoped they would perish in the process?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] They would perish and put to death by a combination of
10diseases, epidemics, simply insufficient means for
11survival, hard labour and things like that.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, you appreciate there is a difference in
13intent there, just saying, "I want them to get out and who
14cares what happens to them when they are out"?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] That is one thing, but that is not quite the same as
17saying a homicidal intent?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I think that is to say very short, that is the
19difference between the idea to let them perish out there
20and to immediately kill them by executions or gas and so
21on. That is the difference.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] I do not want to go right back to the 1920s, but you do
23rely in part on Mein Kampf, do you not?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, of course.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] I have a copy of Mein Kampf here, one of these little
26things you collect over the years, given to me. I hasten
1to add I have never read it. Am I right in saying that
2Adolf Hitler was not the only person whose hand is to be
3seen in Mein Kampf? In fact a number of other people
4wrote it with him, Rudolf Hess and others?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I should say I read the book. I think it is a very
6interesting book. One should read it. Hitler dictated it
7to Hess. It is unclear. Some historians would argue that
8actually he helped to improve in a way the text, but
9I think the fact that Hitler's name is on the book
10indicates that he is responsible for every word in the
11book. I think also one recognizes of course his thoughts
12in the text.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Do you see a direct line then between what Adolf Hitler
14put his name to in Mein Kampf in 1923 or 1924 and what
15subsequently happened 20 years later?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. I think the policy developed gradually, but we have
17to take the fact into account that Hitler made very
18radical anti-Semitic statements as soon as the mid 20s.
19We cannot overlook this fact.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] He made anti-Semitic statements in it?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, Mein Kampf. He spoke about putting 12 to 15,000 of
22these people to gas and so on.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] They could be held under gas?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. He did not say that he was intending to kill
25European Jews, but he made some very, very interesting
26statements concerning the fate of the Jews.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, this is only a suggestion. It
2seems me that the key phase really is when talk moved, as
3Dr Longerich says it did, from deportation to Madagascar
4or wherever else ----
5 MR IRVING: 1941 is the key year.
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, exactly. Do you think that is where
7your quarrel with Dr Longerich really starts, is it not?
8 MR IRVING: This is absolutely true and that is why your
9Lordship will see that I am rapidly leafing through the
10pages which are heavily annotated by me, the
11Reichskristallnacht and so on.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I know it is a temptation, but if you can
13resist the temptation.
14 MR IRVING: In the meantime we have dealt with the
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think you have.
17 MR IRVING: I do not know what the law is here. If I do not
18traverse these matters here in court ----
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I have said this already. I think in the
20context of this case, if you have already cross-examined
21another expert on a particular topic, and you have
22certainly cross-examined Professor Evans on Kristallnacht,
23that is quite sufficient, unless Mr Rampton wants to
24persuade me otherwise, by way of putting your case, and
25you certainly do not need top traverse the same ground
26again with Dr Longerich. Mr Rampton, you do not disagree
1with that?
2 MR RAMPTON: No, I do not. Reichskristallnacht is mentioned in
3passing only in the first part of Dr Longerich's report.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think the same applies really to the
5shooting by the Einsatzgruppen.
6 MR IRVING: To much else, which is not a matter of great
7contention between us.
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: That is true.
9 MR RAMPTON: I think it has gone really as an issue.
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So really I think we are looking towards the
1140s in terms of pagination.
12 MR IRVING: We are making rapid progress. For the remaining
13three minutes I will just have a quick look at page, 45
14please. On May 25th 1940 Himmler did put this document to
15Hitler on the plans for the East?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Was this again Plan Ost or was that another document?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This was the future of the Frentfurgischer, as it was
19called in the text, the alien people.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] Does not Himmler in this document say words to the effect
21that we cannot do what the Russians do, we cannot just
22liquidate them?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, the quote here is: "The Bolshevist methods of
24physically extirpation (Ausrottung) of a people because of
25inner conviction, as un-German and impossible". So he is
26distancing himself from ausrottung. In the same text he
1says: "I hope to see that by means of the possibility of a
2large emigration of all Jews to Africa or to some other
3colony - that the concept of Jew will be fully
4extinguished". So I think we have take these
5two sentences into account. Distinguished but not
7 Q. [Mr Irving] I just wanted to look at the fact that the word ausrottung
8in that document does not by itself mean killing, because
9Himmler had to add the word "physical" in font of it, did
10he not, so going to physically ausrottung them?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Of course that is a possible interpretation, but sometimes
12in a document you make your position very clear by
13actually repeating the same meaning and adjective.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] That is added emphasis, is it?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you have to have a subject but you also add an
17 Q. [Mr Irving] To make it unmistakable?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, exactly.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Because otherwise it could be mistook.
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, and also probably you want to strengthen your point.
21People tend to repeat themselves. That is quite a common
22experience. If in the same document you make the same
23point twice or three times, it does not always, I think
24one cannot -- well, I stop here. Sorry.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Just like Adolf Hitler in that November 10th 1938 speech
26using the phrase "we do not need them"? He says it twice
1in one sentence.
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] It does not add anything really?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, for example.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] I see a smile from his Lordship. That was not the point
6I was hoping to make there. I would hate to go down just
7on that one sentence. That is the reason. Page 46 just
8for one minute. The Madagascar plan was quite feasible,
9was it not?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In which sense feasible?
11 Q. [Mr Irving] It could have housed them. The island is big enough.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The relevant question is they thought it was
13feasible? Whether they were right or not may not be here
14or there.
15 MR IRVING: I was going to ask the witness. He is rather
16dismissive of the plan.
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In which sense feasible? You mean to provide a place
18where 4 million Jews could have a happy life? In this
19sense feasible?
20 Q. [Mr Irving] Happier life.
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Or feasible in the sense of an SS police state, so to say
22a big prison, with a high death rate? In this sense
23I would say, yes, it was feasible. We have contemporary
24examinations about this problem. For instance, the Polish
25Jewish Commission which was sent to Madagascar in 37, they
26came back with a recommendation that, as one member put
1it, Madagascar would offer a place for about 50 to 75,000
2people. The Jewish members of this Commission did not
3agree. They said 2,000 probably. So this is contemporary
4evidence we have. I would say clearly that I doubt that 4
5million Jews would have the chance to survive this, if
6I may say, excursion to Madagascar in 1940.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, one final question before the adjournment.
8Are you aware that the population in Madagascar has
9increased from about 2 million to 13 million over the
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I looked it up because this was always said. 4 million in
1230s to 30 million indeed in the 1990s, yes.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] So that kind of population could have been absorbed?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, within 50 years, with an infrastructure and so on, of
15course. Experience shows that.
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Two o'clock.
17 (Luncheon Adjournment)
18(2.00 p.m.)
19 MR RAMPTON: My Lord, can I hand in my little note on the
20inadmissibility of expert witness statements?
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Thank you very much -- yes, please.
22 MR RAMPTON: I say no more about it. Yes.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, Mr Irving?
24 MR IRVING: Thank you. (To the witness): Dr Longerich, we had
25reached the middle of 1941 roughly and I think I am right
26in summarizing that there is no evidence up to 1941, the
1middle of 1941, of any directives by Hitler to exterminate
2Jews, no order for a systematic extermination of the Jews
3that you are aware of by the middle of 1941?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, if it comes to the preparation of Barbarossa,
5I would not agree. Before that -- at the moment I cannot
6-- probably you are right, I cannot recall something like
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, shall we have a look at the directives issued in May
91941 now?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Well, by the way, no, I have to correct myself,
11there is no -- we do not have a written, a written
12statement by Hitler signed by Hitler, you know, that the
13Jews have to be killed. This is something we do not have.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] On page 55 of your report, 15.1, you begin by saying: "In
15the course of the preparations for the racist war of
16extermination against the Soviet Union", that is rather
17colourful language, is it not?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, this is actually a language which is commonly used
19by historians to describe the specific nature of this war.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. It is not really material here except that it goes
21to your state of mind, I suppose, but are you not aware
22that there is a body of historical opinion on the other
23side now which says that to a certain extent,
24notwithstanding that Hitler had always wanted to fight the
25Soviet Union, by June 1941 it also had a preventive
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not accept this thesis. I think it does not
2convince me at all. These historians have not produced,
3in my opinion, enough evidence to prove that Hitler was
4just, well, fighting a preventive war.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Preventive war?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] I did not say he was just fighting a preventive war
8because I said that there was certainly evidence that he
9had always wanted to fight the Soviet Union. I chapter 14
10of Mein Kampf goes that way, does it not? But Stalin's
11biographer, General Volkagonov, has presented documents
12from Stalin's own private archives indicating that the
13Russians were planning to attack Germany?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not think there is enough evidence now. I mean,
15I know that research is going on, and one actually can
16find more material in Soviet archives, but at the moment
17I do not think that the case is made that Hitler was just
18fighting a preventive war against the Soviet Union and
19that Stalin had decided to attack Hitler somewhere in the
20summer 1941.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Once again, I did not say he was just fighting a
22preventive war, but it had a preventive element?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not accept this. I think, from the German side, if
24you follow the preparations, I mean, I am, of course, more
25an expert -- expert on the Germans, not on the Soviets.
26I am just following the discussion, but on the German
1side, it is quite clear in the preparations, from my point
2of view, that Hitler actually is planning this war since
3the summer of 1940, and in the documentation that there is
4actually, as far as I am aware, almost no reference to the
5policy of behaviour of the other side. So I think it is
6the main reason for this was really, on the one hand, the
7ideological belief of Hitler that he has to destroy this
8so-called Bolshevik Empire and, on the other hand, he is
9trying to find a way out of the general, the war situation
10he found himself in in the summer of 1940 when Britain was
11not prepared to surrender. So I do not share this view,
12that it was to some extent a preventive war.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Or to any extent at all a preventive war?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, I do not share this view.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] I do not want to labour the point, but I am just drawing
16attention to the fact that in that first line you do
17appear to throw around words like "extermination" rather
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not think I throw around; I just say that, in my
20opinion, if you follow this documentation, I think it is
21fair to say that this was a racist war of extermination
22from, you know, as both, if you look at the preparation
23and planning and, on the other hand, if you then look at
24what happened after the 22nd June 1941.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] We are looking now at Hitler's instructions to the High
26Command Operations staff, March 3rd 1941. These are the
1guidelines which I believe I gave your Lordship in
2complete translation a few days ago, the English
3translation of the document.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, I think you did.
5 MR IRVING: Is there any indication in that document, apart
6from that quoted paragraph, that there is an intention
7when the Russian campaign begins to liquidate the Jews as
8such rather than just the leadership?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not have the full document in front of me, so
10I cannot answer this, but you could probably help me.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] But you would have quoted it if it was in the document?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I looked through the document and if I did make a
13mistake, it is nothing, there is not such a phrase in
15 Q. [Mr Irving] I think we can take it that Hitler himself is the author
16of this document, can we?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] When Hitler refers to the Jewish Bolshevik intelligentsia,
19der Judisch Bolschewikisch intelligentsia, he is referring
20to the people around Stalin and the leadership of the NKBD
21and the Commissarts, that kind of people?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think the top leadership but also the Party
23functioners, I think.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] Whether they were Jewish or not, he just put them all into
25one package?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Jewish Bolshevik intelligence, yes, Jews and non-Jews
2 Q. [Mr Irving] This was part of the Nazi party jargon, was it not? It
3was part and parcel -- it was a word they liked using a
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but it refers to the fact that they were convinced
6that Bolshevism or Marxism is a kind of sinister, you
7know, tool of the Jews, you know, in order to destroy the
8Aryan people. This is, I think, the background. It is
9just not, it is just not kind of jargon. It has a thing,
10it has a background.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] The further quotations that you put on that page from the
12papers of General Thomas ----
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] --- who I incidentally learned was the father-in-law of my
15private secretary after 20 years she worked for me, oddly
16enough. It is a small world. These are just references
17to destroying the Soviet leadership?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Or murdering them or killing them?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Would that be a legitimate military aim to discuss with
22the German High Command?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, it gives you a kind of insight about the nature of
24this war because they are not planning only to annihilate
25or exterminate the Russian Army, but also they are trying
26to crush the whole system, including killing, obviously,
1the leadership. So it is far more than a normal war when
2two armies fight against each other, and, yes, and ----
3 Q. [Mr Irving] So it is just one step up the ladder, shall we say, of
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] So it is not the whole way, but it is an interesting rung
7in the ladder?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] If we can put it like that? Turning to page 56, please,
10paragraph 15.4, you refer to Hitler's guidelines of 3rd
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. It is a mistake. 3rd March. Sorry about that.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] 3rd March.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] 15.4, first line, should have "March" instead of
16 Q. [Mr Irving] In this directive it says, this is the directive of March
1713th issued by General Alfred Jodl: "In the operation
18area of the Arm, Himmler is granted special
19responsibilities by order of Hitler for the preparation of
20the political administration."
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but it is also -- yes, sorry.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] It looks pretty sinister and it probably is pretty
23sinister, but is this not within the guidelines of
24military operations, securing the rear areas?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but it says if you take the full, if you look at the
26German terminology, "die sich aus dem endgultig
1auszutragenden Kampf zweier entgegengesetzter politischer
2Systeme ergeben", this is in English "These special
3responsibilities arise from the ultimate decisive struggle
4between two opposing political systems". So it is not
5about just two armies fighting against each other. It is
6actually two political systems and the idea here is to
7completely, well ----
8 Q. [Mr Irving] National socialism, on the one hand, and Bolshevism on the
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] I think somebody once said the child with most -isms is
12the -ists. So they are dealing here with the Bolsheviks
13or the Bolshevists and the National Socialists rather than
14the Jews as such?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, but from the context it becomes quite clear that in
16the views of the National Socialist, you cannot separate
17Bolshevism from Jewry, so it is a kind of, it is quite
18clear it is one of the main elements of the National
19Socialist ideology that Bolshevism is in a way a kind of
20invention of the Jews, of all Jewry, in order to conquer
21world dominion, I think. This is something that you
22cannot separate here from this.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Sure enough in the next paragraph it spells out what the
24special responsibilities are. They are going to be
25bumping of all the Bolshevik Chieftains and Commissarts?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] I agree with that. That is quite obviously contained in
2the documents. We now go on the following page to page 57
3to the massacres executed by the four Einsatzgruppen?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: But can I just be clear about that? Forgive
6me. The documents we have just been looking at, four of
7them, 3rd March onwards?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] Do you regard those as being preliminary to the setting up
10of the Einsatzgruppen?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think one has to bear in mind that this is, you
12know, this is preparation of a racist war of
13extermination. So the result of the speeches and of these
14instructions are certain guidelines which are given to the
15troops. This is the Commissart order, the order to kill
16all Communist Commissarts, and this is what was called
17here the guidelines for special areas. And then there is
18the jurisdiction decree which says, basically, that every
19German officer is entitled to take retaliation measures on
20the spot, and they are the guidelines for the conduct of
21the troops in Russia.
22 So the whole of it has to be seen as a whole set
23of regulations and guidelines, which I think can be
24described as a kind of package for the racist war of
25extermination and Hitler is intimately involved in the
26preparation of this.
1 MR IRVING: As a what for the racist war?
2 MR JUSTICE GRAY: "Package".
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] A kind of package of set of documents which actually ----
4 MR IRVING: You describe them as the prerequisites ----
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, exactly.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] --- which does not necessarily mean that the one flowed
7from the other. The racist war of extermination would not
8have been possible without these prerequisites, but that
9does not necessarily mean that this was anticipated or
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think it is quite clear from the documents that
12this war, you know, this racist war, is planned from at
13least March 1941 onwards and Hitler is playing an active
14role in the preparations of those guidelines.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, if you are going to put it like that, I
16think you ought to point us to the passage of the March
17documents on which you are relying.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Am I right, my Lord, that he should ----
20 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, you are, but I do not want to assume too
21much, but 3rd March refers to the establishment of
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, it is an instruction from Hitler to Jodl to actually
24rephrase the guidelines, to be more radical in those
25guidelines. So it gives him a kind of idea of what he
26wants, and he says, this is the key sentence, "The Jewish
1Bolshevik intelligentsia must be eliminated". Then they
2are going on and revising these guidelines, and in end it
3says in here that there is in the operational area of the
4Army, the Reichsfuhrer SS special duties, he has to carry
5out and these duties relates to the fight between
6Bolshevism and National socialism.
7 So there is a specific political racist, I would
8say, element in here. It is not just a preparation of,
9let us say, a normal war between nations or armies.
10 MR IRVING: Racist or ideological?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Both. You cannot separate that. You cannot separate
12anti-Semitism from the anti-Communism. This is one thing.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] But if I narrow it down, these actual documents before us
14refer only to the leadership, the intelligentsia.
15Everything beyond that is extrapolation by yourself, is it
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know what the "Sonderaufgaben im Auftrage des
18Fuhrers" are. There is no -- the document does not give
19us any explanation for that. It is not -- the documents
20refer to leaders and to special tasks "im Auftrage des
21Fuhrers", "on behalf of the Fuhrer", so I do not know what
22this actually, I mean, because I was not there and we do
23not have a document about this, I do not know what this
25 Q. [Mr Irving] This is the document of March 13th on page 56, is that
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. "Sonderaufgaben", special tasks on behalf of the, by
2order of the Fuhrer for the preparation, and so on, and so
3I do not know what this really, how far ----
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Is it likely that Himmler went to see Hitler a bit jealous
5because the Army and the Air Force and the Navy had been
6given all these great tasks for this great ideological
7campaign in the East and Himmler has been to see Hitler
8and said, "Mein Fuhrer, I want jobs too. What are you
9going to give me?" and Hitler says to him, "Well, you are
10going to do this and you are going to do that. Your job
11is in the rear area, mopping up the partisans, holding
12down the population, securing the transport routes"?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. What happens is that I think the initiative came from
14Hitler because he is the one who is revising, first of
15all, the instruction, the guidelines by giving Jodl this
16instruction. So he is the one who thinks that the Army is
17not radical enough about, the Army has not completely
18understood the task ahead of them.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] The ideological nature?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The ideological was, so he is giving this instruction.
21Then in the end it is ended in these guidelines where
22these special tasks are mentioned.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, you are interested in the special tasks, are
24you not? We do not know what they are, but can I remind
25you of the meeting after Barbarossa began on July 16th
261941 where Himmler is given special tasks, is he not?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, he is then -- what he gets then is special tasks.
2He gets ----
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Pacifying the rear areas?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, he wanted more. He wanted the overall political --
5he wanted a political -- he wanted the responsibility, the
6political responsibility, in a way to reorder the whole
7area. What he got there on 16th is the competence for the
8political -- for the security -- for securing.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Securing the rear area?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Securing the rear area. So it is the word "police" is the
11crucial word in this.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] "Police"?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] "Police".
14 Q. [Mr Irving] So did Hitler on that 16th July 1941 meeting effectively
15give Himmler carte blanche? I am anxious not to lead you
16in any way on this. If you disagree, then please say so.
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think the meeting is decisive and we can see after
18the meeting that actually Himmler sent more men to the
19East and the killings were radicalized and, you know, and
20the whole process escalated.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] And is it possible (and I put this as a hypothesis to you
22and it may militate against me or for me, I do not know)
23that Hitler may have said to Himmler, "Herr Reichsfuhrer,
24do what you see best, do whatever you think is right, but
25do not tell me what you are doing"? Would that be
26possible? "Just keep me out of it"?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is difficult for me to speculate about this.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] On the basis of their relationship, as we know?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It is really difficult for me to speculate about this
4question, what he actually said, because I do not have
5minutes or anything about that. I find it difficult
6to answer this question.
7 Q. [Mr Irving] But later on we do find in 1942 the documents where
8Himmler says: "The Fuhrer has ordered the Eastern
9territories to be rid of the Jews. He has placed this
10burden on my shoulders. Nobody can take it off me"?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] And that rather fits in with that kind of hypothesis?
13I only want to put it you if you think you are comfortable
14with it.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I find this difficult to answer. You can, of course,
16argue that, in general, how this system, the political
17system, worked, the decision-making worked, that Hitler
18would make a general statement, gave general guidelines,
19and then leave it to other people responsible for this
20area actually to fill this out, you know, with their own
21energy and their own ideas, but really I do not know about
22the exact content of this guidelines.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] If it repeatedly happened that somebody like Hans Lammers
24went to see Hitler to protest about this or that, and
25Hitler would answer, or Ribbentrop would go to Hitler, and
26Hitler would answer, "Keep me out of this. Take it up
1with Himmler. It is his pigeon, it is his business"?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think, if we want to, if we want to discuss it,
3I think we have to discuss these individual letters or
4pieces of documents.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] It is just a general impression I was asking you about
6from your knowledge of the papers. So what we differ on,
7Dr Longerich, is this, am I right in saying this, that the
8March 1941 documents, you think it was an ideological
9preparation for the ideological war in the East, that
10Himmler was being given orders for, and I say it was a
11typically military securing the rear areas kind of job he
12was being given?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, you cannot separate the Nazi ideas of warfare in the
14East from their ideological goals. I mean, for them it
15was not contradiction to speak about securing of areas and
16to speak of ideological goals. I do not think one can
17separate these two issues.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can I just ask you this, Dr Longerich. Do
19you regard it as legitimate in deciding what the objective
20was to look and see what actually happened?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, of course.
22 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] Because we know pretty precisely what happened?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, of course.
24 MR IRVING: I will come to that question as question B, but,
25first of all, I will ask question A, if I may, my Lord?
26Would you agree that the documents before us fit entirely
1with the notion of military securing of rear areas?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, because it says, if you just look at the documents and
3leave out what happened after that, it says here:
4"Special responsibilities by order of the Fuhrer for the
5preparation of the political administration. These
6special responsibilities arise from the ultimate decisive
7struggle between two opposing political systems". So it
8is not just about policing and security.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Would that include the murder and extermination of the
10political and military leaders on the other side, the
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think so.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Now, if we turn the page and now we come to the four
14Einsatzgruppen, page 57?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] I am only going to ask you one question about this because
17I think we accept what happened there, that killings
18began, but this is going to be now questions B to start
19with, the fact that the killings began, is there any
20indication that they began as a direct result of these
21orders and guidelines or did they just begin of their own
22accord like a spontaneous combustion?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. We have, I think, quite good documentation because we
24have Heydrich's order of 29th and Heydrich's letter to the
25highest SS police leader of ----
26 Q. [Mr Irving] I think the 2nd July.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- 2nd July which actually gives you a very clear idea
2what the task of the Einsatzgruppen was.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] The 2nd July one which, my Lord, I am afraid I still have
4not translated for your Lordship -- we are working on it
5-- this is 2nd July 1941 where Heydrich, am I correct,
6says to the people in the Baltic states: "If pogrom
7start, you are not to stop them and, in fact, you are to
8help them along"?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I ----
10 Q. [Mr Irving] "But don't let it be seen"?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I translated this in the second part of my
12report. This is at page 6, and if you look at the English
13translation, I have to say here that I have,
14unfortunately, made a mistake here which I have to correct
15because if you read this indented paragraph "To be
16executed are", you have to add the word "or" to the first
17line, "To be executed are all" and then it goes on
18"functionaries of the Comintern", and so on, so that the
19word "all" ----
20 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So all of the lot of them?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] "All" also relates to the last line, "All Jews in Party
22and State functions", so this is the way the original
23German document is arranged. So we know from this
24document that Heydrich ordered the Einsatzgruppen to
25execute all Jews and part -- all Jews in Party and State
26functions and the more, I think most interesting word in
1this "all" is the next line which you find on page 7 and
2"other, and all other radical elements including", the
3most important word is I think the "etc." in the end,
4which says, "Well, this is not a definite list of the
5people we are going to kill". You know, you actually, you
6know, can add to the list. You can add saboteurs,
7propagandists, snipers, assassins and agitators, others
8who fall into this category.
9 MR IRVING: But am I right in saying ----
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] My interpretation of this order is that this is a kind of
11open, very general order which appeals to the initiative
12of the men in the field. They can actually go and extend
13the killings if they find it appropriate, if it is
15 Q. [Mr Irving] An umbrella order?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sorry?
17 Q. [Mr Irving] It is a kind of umbrella order?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Also, there is no indication in this order who
19actually is to be spared. It does not say, for instance,
20it is not allowed to shoot women.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Why should it not be allowed to shoot women?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, it is not said in this order here.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] If there is a woman kommissar she was going to be spared,
24or a woman sniper?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Then would assume that this is a Jew in party or state
26function, or it is one of the propagandists, saboteurs
1snipers, and so on. So I think this is not ----
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, I really want to come to this July 2nd
3document tomorrow when we deal with your second report,
4but I do draw attention to your footnote there, the second
5line from the bottom, the only Jews who are actually
6included in that are the Jews in party and state positions
7who are on the shooting list.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, and the word "etc." in the end, I think in my
9interpretation ----
10 Q. [Mr Irving] That could mean anything. It could mean the milkmen and
11everybody else, could it not?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, everybody else, everybody Jew or non-Jew who was
13suspicious from the point of view of the Nazis, the
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Can I now take you back to page 57, where we are looking
16at the Einsatzgruppen?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] I take it from your footnote that you have not made any
19use of the police decodes that are in the Public Record
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have looked at the police decodes, both in the
22collection here and also at the collection in Washington.
23I have seen several hundred of them, not more.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] Since you wrote this report or before that?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I saw the Washington decodes about two years ago and the
26ones here after I finished the report, I think.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] Just a subsidiary question: How would you rate the
2decodes as a source? Are they really pure gold, untouched
3and unimpeachable integrity as a source?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In the sense that they are authentic?
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Authentic and likely to contain something approximating to
6the truth?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We have actually the chance in some cases to complete the
8deciphers with the German originals in this case.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Compare them?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Sorry, compare them, and in this case it is clear that
11they are authentic. The problem with the deciphers is
12that they are relating to the order police, which is one
13branch of the German police. A second problem is that the
14German would use, as far as I am aware, a different code
15for the highest class of classified documents. They would
16not use this code. The Einsatzgruppen would not send
17their messages through the order police system. It is
18clear from one of the deciphers from September that the
19Germans were aware of the danger that the codes could be
20broken and the Deluger sent an order to say what actually
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Keep the figures up or something?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Be quite cautious here what you are sending. Also, we do
24not know how comprehensive actually the work of the
25deciphers were. Is this everything they got? Is this the
26whole communication of the German police? So I think we
1will spend, as historians always spend, a lot of time
2actually to assessing this document and to find out to
3which extent it will help us to understand the killings
4better than we did before.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] I have to take up two points. First of all, you say that
6because it is the Ordnungs Polizei, the order police, it
7does not contain a high level of material, but we have
8seen in this courtroom messages from Himmler to Jeckeln,
9and that is of course at the very highest level, is it
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The high SS police leader would use the communication
12system of the order police. That is possible, yes.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Would you accept, having spent some time looking at these
14decodes, that they are a pretty random selection, that
15they are not methodologically skewed in any way? Although
16it is not 100 per cent, the volume of documents that has
17been left for us to look at is a random collection of many
18hundreds of thousands of items?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am not sure what the numbers -- what I am trying to say
20is, if you look at the deciphers, you cannot be sure that
21the deciphers contain the whole radio communication
22between, let us say, Himmler and Jeckeln, for instance.
23I have no way to find out how comprehensive and how
24representative this collection is. But of course it adds
25to our knowledge.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. You did not have those, just to make this quite
1plain, at your disposal when you wrote this report?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I looked into some of the Washington files.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] The Washington files are not as complete as the British
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, exactly.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I had the Washington files in front of me when I wrote the
8report, and I did not include them here because what I
9have seen in Washington for me -- for instance, I did not
10find in Washington the Himmler Jeckeln correspondence and
11I did not spend enough time probably on it, but there is
12nothing in it which actually I thought was valuable enough
13to include it into the report.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, could you put, really for my
15benefit as much as anybody else's, to Dr Longerich what it
16is you say about the decodes that is significant.
17 MR IRVING: I am just about to come to that very point, my
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Good.
20 MR IRVING: You say you were not at that time familiar with the
21Himmler and Jeckeln decodes?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Have you in the meantime had a chance to look at them?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] I am referring here to the decodes of November 30th, the
26telephone call from Himmler to Heydrich on November 30th,
1and principally I am going to ask you now about the deeds
2codes of December 1st 1941.
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] There are three?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] The first one is a message from Jeckeln to Himmler on the
7morning. My Lord, do you want to have the items in front
8of you?
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am trying to follow but the documents are
10now even more scattered about.
11 MR RAMPTON: No, they are not.
12 MR IRVING: They should now be ----
13 MR RAMPTON: They are now collected in here.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I know, but I had marked the previous
15versions of them, that is the problem, and these are all
16in German.
17 MR RAMPTON: No, they are not.
18 MR IRVING: I have translated them.
19 MR RAMPTON: Wherever possible the English has been put
20opposite the German.
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: 31st December?
22 MR IRVING: 1st December, my Lord.
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Page 142, if I am right on this, in this blue bundle.
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Thank you very much.
25 MR IRVING: There should be three altogether. The first one is
26page 141. This is 9.15 in the morning. This is from the
1senior SS police commander, north Russia, to Berlin,
2saying: "I need by next available air courier 10 Finnish
3military pistols with two drum magazines, each execution
4of Sonderaktionen". He requests a radio telegram reply.
5What inference do you draw from that?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know whether the term Sonderaktionen refers here
7to shootings, and I do not know whether these Finnish
8pistols were used.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Is it a reasonable inference if I say that this is
10probably a reference to the machine gunning of Jews into
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know. It says militairpistol. This is not a
13machine gun or short machine gun.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Execution of Sonderaktionen?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am not sure. I think it is reasonable to argue this
16line, but I do not know whether ever Finnish military
17pistols were used. They had their own weapons. I do not
18see a reason why they urgently needed for these executions
19Finnish weapons. It does not make sense for me. It might
20be right, but I do not know the background.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Might not there be reasons of camouflage? They wanted, if
22bodies were dug out, to have Finnish bullets found in the
23bodies rather than German bullets? This kind of thing
24might have been in it.
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We have enough expertise information that they use
26normally the standard Army pistol.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] Tommy gun?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The 9 millimetre pistol for these operations. Actually
3I have not found something like that.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Dr Longerich, the ones I really rely on are page 143, two
5messages that afternoon, or evening rather, 7.30 p.m.,
6both at the same time. One from Himmler's adjutant,
7Grotmann, and one from Himmler himself, to Jeckeln.
8Jeckeln was the chief villain, was he not? He was one of
9the biggest murderers in Riga.
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes he was the highest SS police leader.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] The chief SS police leader. The first one summons him to
12a conference with Himmler on 4th December?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] The second one, even more peremptorily, from Himmler
15himself says to him, "The Jews being outplaced to the
16Ostland are to be dealt with only in accordance with the
17guidelines laid down by myself and/or by the
18Reichssicherheitshauptamt on my orders. I would punish
19arbitrary and disobedient acts".
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] That looks like quite an important telegram or message?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think you will relate this to the telephone call of 13th
23November, and I think you are right to do so.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] I am anxious to hear your opinion about it because it
25appears to be significant.
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I think these are two significant and important
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. Let me float a hypothesis past you, Dr Longerich.
3Does this indicate to you that Jeckeln has acted outside
4the authority that he believed he had to kill Jews?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think this is a fair assumption. I think this is
6absolutely possible. Also, I find it quite striking, if
7this is right, if Jeckeln is actually responsible for the
8murder of 6,000 people, what is the consequence of that?
9Is he then court martialled? Or he is thrown out of the
10SS? No. He got a nasty letter.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] A rap across the knuckles?
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. That is all he got. Then he had dinner with Himmler
13on the 4th and that is it, obviously. It was probably a
14violation of the guidelines but it was not seen as a kind
15of severe disobedience, a lapse or something like that.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] These were just Jews, were they not? They were German
17Jews but just Jews?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is probably true, yes. That is definitely true.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] I think no one disputes the fact that this is a gangster
20state and these are gangsters amongst themselves are they
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Did the killings then stop for a while as far as German
24Jews were concerned?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] As far as we know, the killing on a large scale, mass
26executions, stopped in Riga until a couple of months,
1until they used gas vans at the beginning of 1942.
2 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Just in Riga or elsewhere as well?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, to make this quite clear, there were two waves of
4deportation, the first one to Lodz of 20,000 Jews in
5October, and the second one, they planned to deport 50,000
6people, 25,000 each to Riga and to Minsk. They managed to
7deport about 21,000 to Riga or 24,000, and 8,000 to
8Minsk. The general observation is that it was obviously,
9as far as I see it, not the policy to kill them all
10because we do not have mass executions at this time in
11Lodz concerning German Jews and in Riga concerning German
12Jews. We only have these six trains in Kovno and Riga,
13and this was stopped. It was obviously, as is said here,
14not in accordance with the guidelines given by the
15Reichssichherheitshauptamt .
16 MR IRVING: It is a strange little glimpse of history which you
17have come across now at the end of the 20th century, 55
18years or more after the events. Is this an indication to
19you of how history is constantly in flux?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. These two messages confirm what we actually knew
21before. Obviously these killings in Riga were obviously
22not in accordance with the guidelines of the
23Reichssicherheitshauptamt and now we have another
24confirmation by these two telegrams.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] Has it been very widely noised around among German
26historians that the orders came down from on high that
1these killings had to stop? I have never heard it
3 MR RAMPTON: That is a slightly tricky way of putting that
4question. What does Mr Irving mean by on high?
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think that is right. The problem is --
6I think this is what Mr Rampton is really saying -- that
7there are guidelines. We do not know quite what the
8guidelines say. That is the difficulty. We cannot assume
9that the guidelines say no killing, full stop.
10 MR IRVING: I was tempted to say from the Fuhrer's
11headquarters, but then Mr Rampton would certainly have
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: That is a separate point.
14 MR RAMPTON: No. Himmler was probably somewhere in that
15complex at the Wolfsschanze when the telephone call of
1630th November was made. That is as far as one can push at
17what one might call wishful thinking.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can I just ask the question? There obviously
19were guidelines knocking around somewhere?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
21 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] Do you take the view that the guidelines said no Jews,
22German Jews or any other Jews, to be killed ever?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No.
24 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] Or what?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have not seen these guidelines.
26 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] No. Nobody has.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think I should not speculate on the guidelines. As far
2as I see this, the Holocaust emerged in different phases.
3We have the Soviet Jews who were killed during the summer
4first, and then the killing was extended in the autumn of
541 to parts of Poland and to Serbia, then in the spring
6and summer of 42 to other areas. So the German Jews at
7this stage were deported into these ghettoes, and the
8majority of them survived until the spring of 1941. So it
9was not policy at this moment, I think, as far as I know,
10as far as I am able to reconstruct this, to kill
11systematically German Jews on arrival in the ghettoes in
12Minsk, Riga and Lodz. Here obviously Jeckeln, let me put
13it this way, made a mistake, which is quite difficult to
14say because it involved the death of 6,000 people. But it
15was obviously not the policy of the
16Reichssicherheitshauptamt to kill every German Jew who was
17deported in the East at this stage.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Was it the policy to kill some of them in so
19far as you can speculate?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] When this happened, as I said, there was no severe
21punishment for that. It was not seen as a major
22violation. It was seen as a minor incident.
23 MR IRVING: That is a different matter, whether it was
24punishable or not. Can I ask you to look back at page 122
25of that bundle of German documents, the same one? It is
26another decode.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Now this one you may also have seen in view of the fact
3that I found it in the PRO and brought it to the attention
4of the court. It concerns the shipment of train loads of
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Where are we?
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Page 122 of the bundle of documents. It concerns whether
8there was a homicidal intention already in store for the
9train loads of Jews being sent out of Germany. This is a
10train load of Jews. It is a telegram. I will ask you
11just to read it first and then I will ask you some
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This is the first train to Kovno. The people were all
14killed in Kovno.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Thank you for telling us. That is very interesting to
16know that. This is the train load on November 17th 1941,
176.25 p.m., the transport train number DO, presumably that
18is Deutschland Ost, 26th, has left Berlin for Kovno with
19944 Jews on board, details of what the transport escort
20is. Then it says the transport has been provided with
213,000 kilograms of bread, 27 hundred kilograms of flour,
22and various other things, which indicates that they were
23going to have enough food for the journey and some.
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] There is another telegram, I am not sure if it is in this
26bundle or not, Miss Rogers will know, which actually says
1they are going to be taking their Gerat with them.
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Tools.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Their tools or appliances?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Does that imply they anticipated the people sending them,
6anticipated they were going to be going to a new life, if
7I can put it that way?
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: We had this this morning, you got the answer
9you wanted. They were lured into thinking that they were
10going to a new life in the East.
11 MR IRVING: Very well, but am I right now, Dr Longerich, you
12said that this particular train load, which was referred
13to here, which I did not know, I have to confess, ended up
14being murdered?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The first five trains to Riga were diverted to Kovno and
16these are the trains where the people were killed, and the
17first train to Riga as well. If I am not completely
18mistaken, I am pretty sure the people on this train were
20 Q. [Mr Irving] So would this indicate a totally chaotic situation? The
21people in Germany who were sending them out, assume they
22are going to need tools and bread for a new life, whereas
23the people who received them, bumped them off as they
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Again, the tools and the food was provided by the Jewish
1 Q. [Mr Irving] That is neither here nor there, is it, really?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It was provided by the Jewish communities, so the Jewish
3communities were assuming that, as a kind of solidarity
4with the people who were deported, they had to provide
5them with enough food and tools to survive the first days
6and maybe to build up new homes. I cannot draw from the
7fact that these trains were provided with food and tools,
8I am not able to draw any conclusions as far as the
9motives and aims of the Gestapo was concerned. It refers
10to the Jewish communities in Germany, what they thought it
11was appropriate to do.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, but ----
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The SS or the police did not provide the trains with food
14from their own stocks.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. I now take you to page 124. That is the other
16message I was referring to, where they are being sent with
17the food and the money and the appliances.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] This is a message from the SS, is it not, in Bremen to the
20commander of the police in Riga, saying, we are sending
21all these people with this food and with these appliances?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Is a reasonable inference, reading that, that the people
24in Bremen assumed that they were not just carrying all
25this stuff as camouflage, because they were going to be
26bumped off when they got there? The people in Bremen had
1no idea they were going to their deaths?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Gestapo, you mean?
3 Q. [Mr Irving] The people who sent this message.
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know. I am really cautious to draw this
5conclusion from this document. They are just saying the
6Jews are coming and they are bringing money and tools and
7food with them. I have to see if it survives the internal
8correspondence of the Gestapo in Bremen. I would not
9simply agree.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Would not the least perverse interpretation to be put on
11this message be that it is an innocent message from the
12people in Bremen, saying we are sending a train load of a
13thousand people who are members of the chosen race, with
14all their food and appliances, and they are arriving at
15such and such a time, and so on? Any other interpretation
16is pure speculation.
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Every interpretation here is I think speculation. The
18money, for instance: Do you think this is money from the
19Gestapo in Bremen to buy food for the Jews in Riga?
20I would think the money is taken from the Jewish community
21and it goes into the pockets of the Gestapo. I see this
22document here and I cannot follow your line of
24 Q. [Mr Irving] I am not interpreting it. I am just reading what it says.
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. So it says that this train was sent to Riga and did
26they have money and food and tools on the trains? That is
1what I can read from the document.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. I think, unless your Lordship has another question
3to ask about these decodes, we can move on.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Not for me.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] We now move either onwards or backwards, whichever way you
6look at it, to the 16th July 1941 conference between
7Hitler and Rosenberg on the policing of the Eastern
8territories. Did you use the diary of Otto Brottigan?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I used part of it which is printed in a German edition.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Did you not look at my original diary which is in the
11Institute of History? I donated the entire diary to the
12Institute of History.
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I used the one which is printed and commented.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] I am not sure how much of it is printed but the
15handwritten diary describes the atmosphere of rivalry
16between Rosenberg and Hitler, and Rosenberg coming out
17full of glee because he had got all that he wanted.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] There is this typical jealous going on at the top level
20inside the hierarchy of Third Reich.
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] You agree that in that entire meeting of 16th July 1941
23the word "Jew" was not even mentioned? So it is not very
24important from our point of view, except for establishing
25the hierarchy in occupied Eastern Russia?
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Where is this in the report, or is it not?
1 MR IRVING: Page 57, paragraph 15.7.
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I am not sure at the moment whether in the entire text the
3name Jew is not mentioned, but I think for me the central
4passage here is this expression of Hitler.
5 MR IRVING: Anybody who looks askance?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] How would you translate it?
7 Q. [Mr Irving] Anybody who looks askance can be shot.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. I think this is a category which also would include
9Jews, without particularly referring to them.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. You do agree that "der nur schief schaut" does not
11actually refer to somebody looking odd? It is actually
12somebody who is looking out of the corner of his eyes at
13you, or something like that? Anybody suspect?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Anybody suspect, yes.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] You summarize in paragraph 15.8, rather dangerously and
16adventurously in my view: "With the beginning of the
17massive murder of the Soviet civilian population in the
18summer of 1941, a stage was reached in which these
19statements and similar ones by Hitler could no longer be
20understood as general threats of violence"?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
22 Q. [Mr Irving] So we are looking really between the lines, are we there?
23Again, we have nothing specific to point to.
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think, if you look back and look at Hitler's orders and
25his speeches in March 1941, and the fact that he demanded
26the annihilation or the extermination of the Jewish
1Bolshevik complex, if you look at the intelligentsia -- of
2course this involved the killing of at least 10,000,
3probably 100,000, people. Then I think one has to take
4this into account if one looks at the way Hitler actually
5used this terminology after these events. I do not know
6whether we have actually reached here the stage where
7I refer to the Einsatzgruppen and their reports back, and
8the fact that these reports were widely circulated, we
9have evidence that Hitler actually has seen them ----.
10 Q. [Mr Irving] I would be interested. Do you know off the top of your
11head or from your memory what is the evidence that Hitler
12actually read the Einsatzgruppen reports?
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let us find it in the report.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I should be cautious here. We have this document from the
151st August 1941.
16 MR IRVING: Muller document?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Muller document, which I erroneously dated 2nd August,
1841, in this report. I cannot find it for the moment.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] That document does not show he was shown any?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No, you are right.
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Take this a little bit more slowly. Lets
22find your reference to the Muller document. Is that in
23your second report?
24 MR RAMPTON: Yes.
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
26 MS ROGERS: Page 26 of 2.
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] You are right, one should be cautious. Is it 26?
2 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Are you sure it is page 26.
3 MR IRVING: It is in the bundle of documents.
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have it in the report 1, page 57, in the middle of 15.6.
5 MR IRVING: Page 50 of the bundle.
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I use the wrong date. It is definitely the 1st August.
7It says here: "Dem Fuhrer soll von hier aus lfd Berichte
8unber die Arbeit der Einsatzgruppen im Osten vorgelegt
9weren". In English, the Fuhrer should be presented with
10continuous reports on the work of the Einsatzgruppen in
11the East from here. So it is an intention, yes. But we
12have also other evidence that were not only the
13Eichnesmeldung, which were done on a daily basis, but
14there were also monthly and bimonthly reports about the
15activities of the Einsatzgruppen. We know that these
16reports were widely circulated. They had a distribution
17list with more than a hundred names or institutions on
18it. These monthly reports were widely circulated among
19the different ministries. For example, in the Foreign
20Ministry one of the monthly reports was shown to 22
21people. It is difficult, I think impossible, to argue
22that the result of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen
23could be hidden before anybody, because it was literally,
24I think hundreds of people actually in the official
25capacity have seen these reports. So I think that this is
26enough evidence to say that the intention that Hitler
1should see this, that this actually was carried out,
2because it could not be, it was impossible to hide it
3before. On the contrary, it is exactly what he himself
4demanded in these orders. It is about the destruction of
5the Bolshevik Judao empire. That is what he wanted to
6hear and that is why they presented him I think with these
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: You say he ordered it and it happened?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
10 MR IRVING: Now I have to ask supplementary questions on that
11of course. You say that these Einsatzgruppen reports had
12lengthy distribution lists. You mentioned 22 names on
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Was the adjutants officer, the Fuhrer, one of them?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I did not say that 22, the Einsatzgruppen reports, we do
17not have complete distribution lists for every report and
18they vary from report to report. So I do not know.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Well let me ask in general terms. On any of the
20distribution lists was there any of Adolf Hitler's
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We do not have a complete set of distribution lists.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. On even one report then?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have to look to the reports. I cannot say this.
25I found in report No. 128 the Party Chancellery, for
26instance, involved. If you want to argue that these
1operations of the Einsatzgruppen were hidden before Hitler
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Hidden from?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] From Hitler, sorry, then you must argue that Bormann was
5part of this conspiracy because he received a copy, and he
6would not be alarmed and go to Hitler.
7 MR RAMPTON: I am sorry. I do not interrupt in the middle of
8an answer -- at least I try not to. Again, I am a bit
9troubled by all of this. I had the transcript reference
10some days ago, weeks ago, I have not got it at the
11moment. My recollection is that Mr Irving accepted in
12cross-examination, first that there was systematic mass
13shootings in the East by the Einsatzgruppen and, secondly,
14that they were approved by Hitler. So where are we going
15I ask myself?
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can I just check that because that thought
17had gone through my mind? I was hesitant about it.
18 MR RAMPTON: It was early on in the case, almost probably the
19first week.
20 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think I will be able to tell you.
21 MR IRVING: I think the answer to that is that there are
22killings and there are killings.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am not sure that is the way it has been
25 MR RAMPTON: I am not going to swear to it, but I think my
26recollection is more or less right.
1 MR IRVING: I am going to come back to this question.
2 MR RAMPTON: I am trying to prevent Mr Irving coming back to
3these questions, because I think it is a waste of the
4court's time and my client's money, and this witness's
5time too.
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am not sure, doing the best I can from my
7own notes, that the latter part of what you have just said
8is right. But, if anybody can check on the transcript, it
9is quite an important point. I do not think if I may
10respectfully say, so on your say so I can stop this line
11of cross-examination. If you can pick up a reference?
12 MR RAMPTON: No, of course not.
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Your position now, Mr Irving, and I do not
14suggest it was different before, is that, yes, there were
15these mass shootings going on and there were documents
16floating around reporting them, but you do not accept that
17the reports ever got back to Hitler?
18 MR RAMPTON: What I am quite certain about, my Lord ----
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can I have an answer first? Is that right?
20 MR IRVING: That is correct, my Lord. That is the position.
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Although the one we do have for December 42
22says "vorgelegt", you still do not accept that Hitler saw
23it? That is what jogs my memory that I do not think it
24has ever been----
25 MR IRVING: December 29th, 1942 yes, but that is something
26different which we will come to in due course.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is the same thing. It is a report of
2shootings by the Einsatzgruppen.
3 MR IRVING: My Lord, if you feel I am wasting this witness's
4time, I do hope that your Lordship will tell me.
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: What Mr Rampton is anxious about is that you
6should not waste time by cross-examining on a point which
7you have already conceded.
8 MR IRVING: I am very unlikely to do that, my Lord. It is my
9time also.
10 MR RAMPTON: I do not agree with that. Certainly it was
11conceded that report No. 51 of 29th December was probably
12seen by Hitler. That is out of the way. That has gone.
13That is 363,000 plus Jewish deaths by shooting.
14 MR IRVING: I beg your pardon? That was conceded?
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I do not think that was conceded. We must
16get the references.
17 MR RAMPTON: It was conceded that Hitler probably saw it.
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No. That is not my recollection.
19 MR RAMPTON: I will have to check this and I have to do it
20quickly because otherwise we are going to be here----
21 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Interrupt, if you would, again when you have
22the reference, but I think it is the sort of thing that we
23must have a reference on. Carry on, if you would,
24Mr Irving, unless and until you are interrupted.
25 MR IRVING: Very briefly, from your knowledge, if you had seen
26an Einsatzgruppen report which had indicated in the
1distribution list that it had been shown to Hitler or to
2Hitler's staff, or to his Adjutants, then you would have
3mentioned it, would you not?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Can you just say geographically where was the Party
6chancellery situated?
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Party Chancellery, the main office, was in Munich, but
8they had of course a liaison office in Berlin, or wherever
9Hitler was. Bormann was, after he became secretary of the
10Fuhrer, almost constantly a member of Hitler's personal
11entourage. He also made sure that the Party Chancellery
12was always represented in Hitler's entourage if he was not
13able to be present there.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: You have seen documents where Bormann is on
15the distribution list for these anmeldung?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have found one. These distribution lists are not
17complete. In 128 it says among 55 copies there is one
18copy going to the Party Chancellery.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] Would that have been the Munich office?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it only said Party Chancellery, and it says Party
21Chancellery in the main well ....
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Let me ask another specific follow up. On all the copies
23that you have seen, are there any handwritten annotations
24like "has been submitted to the Fuhrer" or anything like
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] As far as I have seen, no, there is nothing like that.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] No. Again if you had noticed that, you would have brought
2it to our attention?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] It is not impossible they were shown to Hitler, but we
5have no evidence, is that right?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would phrase it much stronger. I would think it is
7inconceivable that Hitler was not informed about these
8reports because they were so widely circulated, and there
9was a specific order on 1st August actually that materials
10should be shown to him.
11 Q. [Mr Irving] What period are you talking about now? Before December
121941 or after December 1941?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] We are talking about what?
14 Q. [Mr Irving] The Einsatzgruppen reports where you say it is
15inconceivable that he was not shown them?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The reports started in June and ended in March '42, and
17I think this would apply to the whole period because this
18letter actually from Muller which says it should be shown
19to him is from the early stages, from 1st August 1941.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] The fact that the letter from Muller says that the Fuhrer
21wants to be shown them does not necessarily mean to say
22that it was acted upon?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I assume that this was acted upon because, in
24general, orders by Muller were carried out as a very
25efficient head of the secret police. I think ----
26 Q. [Mr Irving] One example is that I requested that I should be shown
1proof of where this document is and that has not been
2acted upon either?
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Mr Irving, I think we have gone through this
4enough. I hear what the witness says. He says it is
5inconceivable that Hitler would not have known.
6 MR IRVING: One further question on the Muller document. The
7subject of the Muller document is the provision of visual
8materials, is it not?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. Well, it says, in particular, visual material, it
10does not include -- it does not exclude, of course, other
11material. It says [German - document not provided] so
12they should be continuously informed and, in particular,
13he is interested in visual material.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] Will you read out what the topic line of the telegram is?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, the topic line is [German - document not provided].
16So the topic line is the visual material. But, of course,
17if you look into this, I mean, if you really look into the
18text here, [German - document not provided] So you can
19read it as it is an established fact that Hitler should be
20on a continuous basis provided with reports, and for this
21purpose he needs, in particular, with the material, so it
22could be that this refers to an older, to an older,
23earlier order, and this is kind of common practice,
24established practice.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] What were the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen that are
26referred to in this?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, the tasks were basically the same, I would say, like
2the [German]. So they were, in particular, I mean, they,
3of course, had the explicit orders to execute enemies or
4potential enemies of the Reichs, particularly including
5the Jews, but also they had other tasks, in general, one
6could say intelligence work, for instance, to trace
7documents from the Communist Party, for instance. But
8also you can see from the reports that they were dealing
9with all kind of matters; they were dealing with the
10situation of the churches in the Soviet Union and with the
11food situation, and so on.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] So these reports were sometimes, what, nine or 10
13paragraphs long of which only one paragraph concerned the
14killing of Jews?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] One is, I think, in general, they had a kind of scheme and
16there is one paragraph concerning the fate of Jews and the
17other paragraphs were concerning other issues.
18 Q. [Mr Irving] So from the Muller telegram of 1st August 1941, is it
19plain what Hitler asked to be shown?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Visual material.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Everything, visual -- would there have been visual
22material about the killings?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, it refers to posters. We know that there were
24posters, for instance, demanding the Jews had to -- my
25English is running out.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] "Concentrate"?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- concentrate somewhere a place. It refers to other
2documents; photographs, there were definitely photographs
3of mass executions. So from this, from this list of
4things, I would say, yes.
5 Q. [Mr Irving] Have you seen any photographs of mass executions in German
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I have not seen photographs of mass executions in German
8files like the Ministry or something like that.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Can I take you now to page 62 and we will move forwards
10from there? This is the Goebbels diary entry of December
1112th 1941. We keep coming back against it again. The
12first two and a half lines on page 62: "As concerns the
13Jewish question, the Fuhrer is determined to make a clean
14sweep. He had prophesied to the Jews that if they once
15again brought about a world war they would experience
16their own extermination". That is Goebbels reporting
17Adolf Hitler, is it not, what he said in the speech?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] "This was not just an empty phrase. The World War is
20there, the extermination of Jewry must be the necessary
21consequence. This question must be seen without
22sentimentality. We are not here in order to have sympathy
23with the Jews", and so on. The rest of that paragraph
24could be Hitler speaking, but it could equally well be
25Dr Goebbels' gloss on it, could it not?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think it is -- I read this as a summary of Hitler's
1speech. If you compare the words of Goebbels, the way he
2put it, if you compare it with the speech Frank gave four
3years, four days later in Krakau, you can see that they
4actually use the same words. They both refer to the fact
5that one should not have compassion with them, that they
6both refer to the prophecy. So I think this is a, I would
7interpret it as a summary of Hitler's speech which is
8quite detailed here.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] As you are a German, Dr Longerich, it is proper to put
10this question to you. Would not that second part of that
11paragraph be in the subjunctive if it was referring to
12Adolf Hitler?
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, if one would assume that Goebbels always used the
14subjunctive when he refers to Hitler's speeches, but if
15you look into the Goebbels' diaries, we know that there is
16a mixture of the subjunctive and the present tense. So he
17did not use this in a -- it was not...
18 Q. [Mr Irving] Consistent?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Consistent, exactly, yes.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] If it had been subjective, then that would have been a
21clear clue that he was quoting Hitler, would it not?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It would be a clue, yes.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] So we are not sure either way?
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: When you say subjunctive, you mean reported
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
1 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] Well, in German, for reported speech they use the
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Because we do not and that is why I was a bit
5 MR IRVING: They do in various other languages too, I think the
6Spanish also do and...
7 MR RAMPTON: Can I intervene? I have not all the references
8I want, but I suspect this may be sufficient. On day 4
9which is, because I think we can put a stop to all this
10now ----
11 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think, unfortunately, we have moved past
12it .
13 MR RAMPTON: I am so sorry.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: It is not your fault, but I asked for
16 MR RAMPTON: It is not my fault, no, because, as a matter of
17fact, I do not have time to read the transcripts in this
18case at the moment. I will have to do that in due course.
1917th January, page 95 -- this reflects and earlier
20concession which I have not presently found -- line 1,
21question by me: "The probability that Hitler saw that
22report", that is report No. 51, "and was, therefore,
23implicated in the murder of all these 363,000 Eastern Jews
24is confirmed, is it not, by a subsequent knowledge of this
25document, by which I mean the Himmler note of the 18th
26December of that year?" Answer by Mr Irving: "Yes, there
1is no contention between us on that point".
2 Then if one turns to page 106 on the same day,
3we find your Lordship asking some questions, and at line
419, Mr Irving says: "What authorized, my Lord? The
5killing of Jews, the partisans?" Question by your
6Lordship: "Yes, you accepted that, I thought, a few
7minutes ago". Answer: "The Jews to be liquidated as
8partisans, 16th December, the conversation, yes. If we
9can expand that very meagre note, that skimpy note, into
10that interpretation which I think is a legitimate
11expansion, certainly Hitler sanctioned the killing of the
12Jews on the Eastern Front, all the rest of the Jews, the
13non-German Jews, and that has never been a contention for
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, that looks fairly clear.
16 MR RAMPTON: It is fairly clear. The next day it becomes even
17clearer at page 10, day 5, again it is your Lordship, this
18is line 12 on page 10: "Let us just keep an eye on the
19reality. You did accept yesterday, as I understood it,
20the shooting of Jews and others on the Eastern Front was a
21programme which was systematic and co-ordinated by Berlin
22and Hitler was aware and approved of what was going on?"
23Mr Irving: "The shootings of Russian Jews, my Lord, yes".
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Russian Jews?
25 MR RAMPTON: Yes. That means everybody but the people who were
26coming from Germany. In other words, he is not conceding
1that the shooting of the Berlin Jews in Riga was
2authorized, but he is conceding that there was systematic
3mass shooting by the Einsatzgruppen of the Jews in the
4East which was authorized and approved by Hitler.
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, well again that does look to be fairly
6clear, Mr Irving. This is difficult for you because you
7are in the middle of your cross-examination, but I think
8you must pause and reflect about this because it seems to
9me that Mr Rampton is probably right in saying, although
10I recollect a lot of cross-examination going the other
11way ----
12 MR IRVING: My Lord, I have made a note of the ----
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: --- Mr Rampton may be right in saying you
14ultimately did concede it.
15 MR IRVING: I have made a note of the page number of the
16transcript and I shall certainly attend to it, but I do
17not think this is the time or place to do it. Certainly
18I cannot do it on the hoof like this.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, I think that is right. The problem, of
20course, is that we do not want a lot of cross-examination
21which strictly really is not really relevant because it is
22a point you have conceded, but I think you have really
23moved on beyond the issue of whether Hitler had these
24reports about the shootings on the Eastern Front, have you
26 MR IRVING: It is not a vitally important point.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, leave on one side whether it is
3 MR IRVING: But I am certainly entitled to ask this witness who
4has seen the reports whether he has seen any evidence that
5they were shown to Hitler in detail, and I would certainly
6have to look and see what I had said or m alleged to have
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes.
9 MR RAMPTON: I just read it out.
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: But, Mr Rampton, he is in the middle of
11cross-examining. I think it is difficult for him to ----
12 MR RAMPTON: I know that, but I am anxious to save time.
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So I am but ----
14 MR RAMPTON: I really am.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: --- I think and hope Mr Irving has moved
16beyond now whether Hitler knew through the reports of the
17shooting of Jews in the East.
18 MR RAMPTON: I just which I had been able to find this a bit
19more quickly and then I could have saved some time, but
20never mind.
21 MR IRVING: Then we would have missed out on some very
22important information which is that there is no evidence
23that Hitler saw the Einsatzgruppen report.
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, but you have to take the witness's
25answer that it is inconceivable that he did not know which
26would mean that if you did concede the point you were
1right to have conceded it.
2 MR IRVING: My Lord, with the utmost respect to both yourself
3and to the witness, the fact that something seems
4inconceivable is not evidence or proof. It is interesting
5and has to be put into the scale pans against which has to
6be set the fact that all the evidence is there, the
7documents are now in 55 years later and the evidence is
8still not there.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I know you have a lot of other things to do,
10but if you would be good enough to look at those passages
11overnight and perhaps indicate tomorrow morning what your
12considered stance is in relation to Hitler's
13knowledge ----
14 MR IRVING: I will make a little written statement on it.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: --- of the shootings by the Einsatzgruppen.
16 MR RAMPTON: I am a bit cautious about that, if I may say so,
17because what it involves, if Mr Irving should back track
18on what I have just read, or tried to back track,
19Professor Browning has now gone. I cannot bring him back
20without enormous expense and inconvenience from America to
21go through what he would have said if I had known that
22that position was challenged. It means that I have to
23rehearse my quite long cross-examination of Mr Irving on
24this question. I do not believe that in the interests of
25what one might call justice and proportionality that
26Mr Irving ought to be, if I am right about where I got him
1to in cross-examination. In the face of the documents and
2what I might call common sense, I do not believe it is
3right that he should be allowed to reconsider his
5 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let us wait and see what his position finally
6turns out to be, and then we can argue about it if needs
7be. But let me know, please, in the morning and now carry
8on with your cross-examination.
9 MR IRVING: I do not think it is an enormously vital point
10actually in the whole Holocaust denial issue one way or
11the other.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: If it is not a vital point, it may be you
13will keep with your concession.
14 MR IRVING: Mr Rampton is yelping before he is hurt actually.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Do not let's denigrate his motives.
16 MR IRVING: Yes. Page 62, if you look at footnote 157, please,
17you quoted there a document, a wartime document, in the
18last three lines of that footnote there, a very
19confidential information report: "The number of Jews in
20this entire area is estimated at 6 million and in the
21course of the coming year they are going to be brought
22across the Urals or otherwise got rid of"?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] Does that not also indicate that the primary German
25intention was the geographical movement, dumping them
26across the Urals?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, it says ----
2 Q. [Mr Irving] Chased across the Urals?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, it says two things. First of all, it is referring to
4the biological eradication of the entirety of Jewry in
5Europe -- sorry, I am confused now. Sorry, those are two
6different documents, yes. You are looking here at this
7confidential report which are the notes of the reporter,
8so this is from a press conference, from a press
9conference, and under the heading "strictly
10confidential". So somebody in the press conference said
11that, you know, a way to solve the problem is to bring
12this estimated 6 million across the Urals.
13 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. But does that not indicate that there were two
14things being spoken of at that time, the geographical
15chasing across the Urals, generally spoken of at that
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think it is quite ----
18 Q. [Mr Irving] "Failing which we are going to have to liquidate them"?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] This refers to -- yes, somebody in the press conference
20said in November '41, "It is still a feasible way of
21solving this problem to bring these people over the
22Urals". So that is all I can say.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] It is a press conference by Rosenberg, right?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
25 Q. [Mr Irving] It is not a vitally important point, but there does
26appear, even at that time, to have been a degree of
1uncertainty as to what was going to happen?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but one should then also, if one speaks about this
3press conference, one should not leave out the words, you
4know, Rosenberg's words, "biological eradication of the
5entirety of Jewry".
6 Q. [Mr Irving] They are both second-hand reporting, are they not? One is
7by the [German]?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Who is that? I forget who that was, Rosenberg, but,
10anyway, it is a second-hand report, is it not?
11 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] Over the page, of course, page 63, we have something that
13is very first-hand. This is the vital Heinrich Himmler
14note of 18th December 1941.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] You probably know what I am going to ask you, if you have
17the phrase Judenfrager als partisan and ausurotten, what
18does that mean? How would you translate that into
19English? Als partisan and ausurotten?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, to be extirpated as partisans.
21 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes. I think there is no question in this case that it
22has a homicidal meaning, does it not?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
24 Q. [Mr Irving] And what does one normally do with partisans in warfare?
25Are they shot?
26 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not know what one normally does, but from the -- the
1orders were here clear. I mean, I refer to this orders at
2the beginning. The orders here were clear that a civilian
3who would, you know, actually -- a civilian who ----
4 Q. [Mr Irving] "Who takes guns up"?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- who takes guns up, yes, would be shot on the spot.
6 Q. [Mr Irving] That is the basic laws of war, the Frank tireur(?) are
7shot. The Americans did it, we did it.
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I only can answer this question as far as the German
9Army and the war on the East is concerned. It was, you
10know ----
11 Q. [Mr Irving] If it had said the partisan and ausrottung, that would
12have been to be shot like partisans ----
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, it would be different.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] That would have been a totally different meaning, would it
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] It would be different, yes.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Does the meaning of that sentence as it stands imply that
18these were Jewish partisans who were to be shot as
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. "Juden to be extirpated as partisans". It does not
21mean that only Jews have recognized as partisans were
22shot, they are just Jews were shot as partisans.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: "As if they were partisans", that is what it
24comes to?
25 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
26 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] That is your evidence?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
2 MR IRVING: Although it does say "as partisans" and not "like
3partisans", if I can put it in English. I do not want to
4hang that on the big bell, as you say in German, but there
5is a difference between the two words "als" and "wie", is
6there not?
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, but I think the witness is not accepting
8your interpretation, Mr Irving.
9 MR IRVING: Well, the translation is specific, but he may not
10accept the interpretation of it, of course, the
11conclusions from it. Paragraph 17.7, you have Adolf
12Hitler, on the fifth line of that, on 30th January 1942,
13saying that it is clear the war can only end with either
14the Aryan peoples being extirpated or the Jews
15disappearing from Europe", "Das Judentum aus Europa
16verschwindet". That again implies a geographical
17solution, does it not? This is 10 days after the Wannsee
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, "das Judentum aus Europa verschwindet", I think that
20this expression, "aus Europa verschwindet", could be seen
21as a camouflage language that actually disappeared from
22the German, from the area under German control, by, you
23know, anyhow. There was actually no chance how, you know,
246 million Jews could disappear at this stage from the
25German, from the territory under German control.
26 Q. [Mr Irving] As you point out just three days earlier in one of the
1table talks, this is now the following page, the second
2indented paragraph: "The Jew must get out of Europe. The
3best would be if they went to Russia! I have no sympathy
4with the Jews. They will always remain an element which
5stir up the peoples against one another". Again he is
6talking of a geographical solution even in private, to his
7own private staff? So why would camouflage be necessary
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, when you refer to the so-called [German], the table
10talks, one has to take into account that the table talks,
11you know, there were various people present on the table,
12so you could not, you cannot just assume that this is what
13Hitler really thought, that this really, you know, you are
14getting deep insight into his real world. This is always
15addressed to all kinds of people who were just present
16there. So he would be very cautious to speak about his
17real intentions, as far as the Jews are concerned. So
18I would hesitate to draw this conclusion from that.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] He never had any outsiders at these table talks, did he?
20They were always members of his private staff.
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but the members of his private staff, I mean, for
22instance, his secretary and others were not to, you know,
23Hitler has very specific rules about keeping secrecies and
24they were not, you know, just because they were his
25coworkers, they were not allowed to share all the secrets
26with him.
1 Q. [Mr Irving] But on occasion in his table talks he speaks pretty
2tough. He talks pretty violent language, does he not, in
3the table talk?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, that is true, but I do not think that the table talks
5are the best, the ideal source to find out, you know, what
6was really going on in Hitler's mind because Hitler was
7very careful, particularly as far as the Holocaust is
8concerned, very careful what he was saying there.
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Well, the only justification for saying that kind of
10thing, of course, is if you have anything explicit
11anywhere else and there is not, is there? Is it not
12possible that he is just saying what is in the table talk
13and in Goebbels' diary and elsewhere is an accurate
14reflection of what Hitler really knew? Is that not a more
15logical explanation?
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think the Goebbels diaries are different from the
17table talks but I ----
18 Q. [Mr Irving] Can I take you to paragraph 18.7 which is two pages later,
19page 56? The last paragraph there, you do not quote it in
20full, but this is the paragraph, my Lord, that we were
21looking at yesterday which is ----
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, I remember.
23 MR IRVING: --- the deportation to Siberia.
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Central Africa too.
25 MR IRVING: Central Africa, yes. Is that also more camouflage
26and even with Dr Goebbels sitting there who knows very
1well what is going on or suspects what is going on?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you know, if we look at the situation what was going
3on in April '42, we know that probably three quarter of a
4million or one million Jews in the Soviet Union were
5shot. They had started to systematically kill Jewish
6women and children in Serbia. They had opened the -- if
7this is the right way to say it -- extermination camp in
8Chelmo in December, they had just opened the extermination
9camp in Belzec and were carrying out mass extermination
10there. So one has to take this into account.
11 Really, I have difficulties, I have to say, to
12find, you know, an easy answer to this document because, I
13mean, they are in the middle of mass extermination and
14Goebbels is quite aware of that, and they are still
15talking about the idea that they could force the Jews out
16of Europe. I find this really difficult to explain.
17 Q. [Mr Irving] Can you not see any possible explanation?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Possible explanation ----
19 Q. [Mr Irving] That Hitler did not know?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The possible explanation would be that they just used
21among themselves this kind of camouflage language because
22they did not, they did not -- I mean, I have no trace, no
23evidence, that they spoke among themselves really about,
24"We are going, we are about to kill 6 million people. We
25are going to kill men, women, children, everybody", so
26they would use this kind of, this kind of language among
1themselves, and, yes, that is the explanation which seems
2most plausible to me.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] They were in a state of denial then, they were doing these
4things but pretending they were not?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Among themselves, I think, you know, they were in a way or
6Hitler was in this way using double standards. He was,
7I think, I am convinced that he was quite aware what was
8happening ----
9 Q. [Mr Irving] You keep saying that.
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- but among one of his best friends, so among themselves
11they would use a different language, they would not speak
12about, they would not say, you know, "We are actually
13killing so many children per month". They would just ----
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: But if he knew, supposing, assuming that
15Hitler knew all about the death camps and all the rest of
16it, what puzzles me a little bit about this camouflage
17theory is I do not quite see why it was necessary to talk
18about the Jews at all. Would you not keep your mouth shut
19rather than have this pantomime going on?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, if you look into the conversation between, you know,
21Goebbels and Hitler, this was a constant, you know, a
22topic which was constantly raised among them. It was a
23kind of tour de raison. They would cover every
24interesting, evert aspect which looked interesting from
25their point of view. They would speak about the war, the
26conduct of war, they would speak about the -- the
1situation, the foreign policy, and they would cover this
2topic, the Jews, the Jewish question, and they would --
3this is my reading of this -- they would encourage
4themselves, "Yes, they are dangerous, we have to do
5something against them, we have to carry on with our
7 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] That does not really explain why you then talk about it in
8camouflage language at the table talk; why not keep your
9mouth shut?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I think, if you remember the speech Himmler gave on 4th
11October, he said, "Well, actually we do not speak among
12ourselves about this. It is a question of taste. We do
13not speak about this". It is a history which has not been
14written which will never be written, and I think they went
15so far that even among themselves they would, you know,
16hesitate at this wonderful day in spring 1942 actually to
17say, "Yes, actually we are killing them". So that is the
18best explanation I can offer. It is clear from the
19documents that it stood in clear contrast to what they
20were doing.
21 MR IRVING: Dr Longerich, in the Institute have you read the
22memorandum by Karl Wolf who was Himmler's adjutant and
23liaison officer to Himmler for sometime?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Which?
25 Q. [Mr Irving] There were several handwritten memoirs by him, SS General
26Karl Wolf. Can I put to you one passage from them which
1might help to explain this kind of conversation and ask
2you if you remember it?
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Where Karl Wolf says: "I am certain that Hitler did not
5know what was going on. I think it was kept from him. We
6had to keep the Messiah of the coming 2,000 years clean of
7this matter"?
8 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think one has to again ----
9 Q. [Mr Irving] Do you remember that passage?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- I have to look at the document. I do no think -- they
11are not published. I do not think they are accessible to
13 Q. [Mr Irving] I have seen them.
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but I think ----
15 Q. [Mr Irving] And they are in my discovery.
16 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] --- as far as I am aware of, this is not a source which is
17accessible to every historian. They are not in a public
18archive on a library. If we, I mean, I would be happy to
19see them, but I think I would have to be in front of ----
20 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think that is fair. It is very difficult
21to comment on an extract like that.
22 MR IRVING: But can I just put it this way? Is the suggestion
23that Karl Wolff or the SS were anxious to do the dirty
24deed without getting Hitler, the Messiah of the coming
252,000 years implicated himself, would that explain how
26this situation would arise?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Wolff was sentenced in, was it, 199 -- 1965 or something,
2I think he was sentenced to a 15-year prison sentence,
3I think, so, really, he was -- his main occupation after
4the war was, actually his main problem after the war was
5to distance himself from these murderous actions. He did
6not want to spend the rest of his life in prison, so I
7would be very, very cautious to take this as face value,
8to, you know, what he knew, what Hitler knew. The whole
9attitude of Wolf is to say, "I was just a military man.
10I had nothing to do with these things. This was even not
11mentioned in my presence".
12 So I am really, first of all, I have not seen
13the document, but really, in general, would be very, very
14hesitant to draw -- to follow him.
15 Q. [Mr Irving] Would that not explain Heinreich Himmler's later remark on
16October 4th 1943, that this is a matter about which we
17never talk, if they wanted to keep it away from Hitler,
18would that not be the explanation?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I do not think he said in the speech, "We kept it away
20from Hitler". He says, basically, "We do not mention
21it" ----
22 Q. [Mr Irving] Among others?
23 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] " --- among ourselves". If you go to the Himmler speech
24and if you do it in a more systematic way, you can see
25that actually he refers to higher orders which were given
26to him. So I think you can link this speech with Hitler.
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: That is the awful responsibility?
2 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, for instance.
3 MR IRVING: On page 66 near the end of that, five or six lines
4up, you say: "Even talking to his closest associates
5Hitler avoided speaking openly on mass killing". This is
6your kind of gloss you put on paragraphs like that, that
7you are trying to explain how it is that in the documents,
8contemporary documents there are these baffling passages,
9if I can use the word "baffling"?
10 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. I have only seen one, this is the one in 1985, and
11I think we do not have many examples of that.
12 Q. [Mr Irving] On 69 there is I think the one you were just referring to
13in paragraph 19.3, July 28th 1942, Himmler wrote to
14Gottlegberger, an SS General, saying: "The Fuhrer has
15placed on my shoulders the implementation of this very
16difficult order and the responsibility cannot be taken
17away from me in any case." What order was that?
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] That is left out in the translation unfortunately.
19One had to add the first sentence in German. The first
20sentence of this quotation is: "The occupied Eastern
21territories will be free of Jews", and then he goes on:
22"The Fuhrer placed on my shoulders the implementation of
23this very difficult order."
24 This is in July 1942. I think that quite
25clearly Hitler gave Himmler the order to kill every Jew in
26the occupied Eastern territories, and Himmler saw this a
1particularly unpleasant and difficult task, but he was of
2course, as obedient as he was, prepared to carry on. So
3this is my reading of the document.
4 Q. [Mr Irving] Of course the document does not reply to another letter
5referring to the killing of the Jews, does it?
6 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] No. It is mentioned in a letter to Berger, but I think
7this is one of the clearest statements we have.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] It is indeed very clear.
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] "The occupied Eastern territories will be free of Jews",
10it is, "The Fuhrer placed on my shoulders the
11implementation of this very difficult order, the
12responsibility cannot be taken away from me in any case".
13 MR JUSTICE GRAY: "Detesbefehl" must refer back, you would say,
14to making the Oskabitte free of Jews.
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I explain this just for the minute. In the
16translation I left unfortunately out the first sentence.
17 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] I follow that.
18 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] And the first sentence is: "The occupied Eastern
19territories will be free of Jews". It is in the German
20text but not in the English text.
21 MR RAMPTON: My Lord, the full text, in case anybody thinks it
22is important, which it may well be, is in the new bundle N
23whatever it is.
24 MR JUSTICE GRAY: You mean the words before the omitted words?
25 MR RAMPTON: Yes. There are two paragraphs and this is a
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think this is worth looking at.
2 MR RAMPTON: I think it might be important for this witness in
3particular. 261, my Lord, we have reproduced
4Dr Longerich's short English translation of two sentences,
5and, as he says, defective translation of two sentences.
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Not defective but deficient.
7 MR RAMPTON: No, but the whole of the German text is in a
8microfilm copy on the right-hand side.
9 MR IRVING: My Lord, just for the record, I have no objection
10to any of the extracts this witness has made. He has left
11nothing out of any importance.
12 MR JUSTICE GRAY: No, I accept that. Should we just have a
13look. Did you say 261, Mr Rampton?
14 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] 261, yes.
15 MR RAMPTON: 261 I think I was told to say.
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I see, it is paragraph 1.
17 MR RAMPTON: It is in paragraph 1. It is the second part of
18paragraph 1.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Can you just translate?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The whole thing?
21 Q. [Mr Justice Gray] The first sentence on paragraph 1.
22 MR IRVING: Yes: "I urgently ask you not to have any ordinance
23about the concept of the word "Jew" issued. With all
24these stupid determinations we are just tying our own
25hands. The occupied Eastern territories will be free of
26the Jews. The execution of this very difficult order has
1been placed on my shoulders by the Fuhrer. So nobody can
2take that responsibility from me."
3 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] I would agree.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So there has been some sort squabbling about
5what comes within the definition of a "Jew".
6 MR IRVING: Who is a Jew.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] He did not want them to issue a regulation about the
8definition of the Jew because it was not necessary any
9more, because the problem has ----
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: And Himmler is saying: "I have been ordered
11to sort the problem out by getting rid of the Jews and get
12on with it."
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
14 MR IRVING: Yes. So the question which arises from that,
15Dr Longerich, is does this not fit in with the scenario
16that I suggested, that Hitler had said to Himmler: "You do
17the job, keep me out of it, I will keep people off your
18back, just get on with it, but don't bother me with it"?
19 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, it says here, this is my reading, that Hitler has
20given Himmler the order that the occupied territories
21shall be free of Jews. So which way this happened I do
22not know, whether this was ----
23 Q. [Mr Irving] So, "I can do what I want and buzz off"?
24 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you can speculate about this, but I do not have the
25minutes of the conversation between Hitler and Himmler.
26It could be a very explicit order, a very clear order. It
1could also be something general. Why should I speculate
2about it? I do not have the text in front of me.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] Now let me take you ahead to page 72, please, the first
4indented paragraph, and we get a little bit closer to what
5I am asking for. This is the second closing speech on
6October 6th 1943.
7 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] "I ask you that which I say to you in this circle be
9really only heard and not ever discussed. We were faced
10with the question "What about the women and children?"
11I took the decision to find a very clear solution to this
12problem here too." "I took the decision". Now is Himmler
13saying Hitler took the decision or is Himmler saying "I,
14Himmler, took the decision"?
15 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, you answered the question yourself I think.
16 Q. [Mr Irving] Yes, and that is pretty clear, is it not?
17 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but he did not say in this, he does not say in this
18speech that he took the decision without having the
19consent of Hitler.
20 Q. [Mr Irving] Oh, yes, he has been given the overall blank cheque by
21Hitler, has he not?
22 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, I think it is fair to argue -- I think he is
23referring here to the extension of the shootings in the
24Soviet Union, the extension of the shootings to women and
25children, which happened between the end of July 1941, end
26of October 1941, where actually the various killing units
1extended their shootings to include in the mass executions
2also women and children, shot also women and children.
3I think, as far as I am concerned, as I tried to
4reconstruct as precisely as possible the decision-making
5process, that clearly there is some kind of initiative
6coming from Himmler, but I have no doubts that this was in
7full consent and that Himmler acted under the -- that
8Himmler was convinced, deeply convinced that he acted with
9full consent of Hitler. I have no doubt about that. Also
10in this he says for the organization which had to execute
11this task. I think also this organization, it could be
12read as a reference to a higher order, an order which was
13given from, well, somebody above Himmler.
14 Q. [Mr Irving] I strongly disagree, Dr Longerich. If he says, "I am the
15one who took the decision that the women and children had
16to be killed too", and that the people who had to do this
17job, it was very unpleasant for them, there can be no
18doubt at all what job he is talking about and who gave the
19order, he Himmler?
20 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Well, I think you can read this sentence, it also can be
21read as that the SS, a reference to a higher order, but
22I cannot dispute, I do not want to dispute, that Hitler is
23referring here to his own initiative, but I on the other
24hand, looking at the whole history in 1941, in the second
25half of 1941, I have no doubts that he came to this
26conclusion with the deep conviction that he acted
1according to the wishes of Hitler. I mean this idea to
2separate in a way Himmler from Hitler and to insinuate
3that Himmler would have carried out this operation behind
4Hitler's back, I really have to say that this looks quite
5absurd to me, because if you look at Himmler's
6personality, for instance, Himmler was obedient, he was as
7loyal as he could be to Hitler. He was an anxious
8person. I think the whole personality, Himmler can only
9be explained as somebody who, it is really a remarkable
10example of somebody who really did the utmost to carry out
11the wishes of Hitler. The whole died of idea that this
12whole operation, this enormous operation, killing
13operation of 6 million people could be started and could
14be carried out on a large scale with implications, you
15know, transportation, the building of extermination camps,
16the involvement of 10,000 people who had to carry out this
17programme and the ramifications as far as the foreign
18policy was concerned, the policy towards the German Allies
19was concerned, all this, that this could be carried out by
20Hitler not asking, not being sure that he actually acted,
21you know, on Hitler's, according to Hitler's wishes, this
22whole notion seems absolutely, I hate to say this in a
23very strong way, absurd. I think we cannot build this
24case on three or four documents you find in the archives.
25I think you have to look at the whole system. You have to
26look at the relationship between Hitler and Himmler. You
1have to look at the way this was carried out. I simply
2cannot follow this line of argumentation.
3 Q. [Mr Irving] So Himmler was a weak man?
4 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] In a way Himmler had -- in a way Himmler had some
5weaknesses. You are quite familiar, you wrote biographies
6about the leading Nazis, and you I think are quite aware
7of the fact where are his weakness.
8 Q. [Mr Irving] Himmler's brother Gebhardt told me that Heinreich was such
9a coward that he would never have done this without
10Hitler's orders. So he backs you. But the fact remains
11that we are faced with these baffling documents, are we
13 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes. The question is now whether these documents are
14really sufficient enough to prove the case that the
15Holocaust was carried out by Himmler behind Hitler's back,
16you know, without his knowledge, without his approval.
17Generally speaking, my impression is that it is impossible
18to prove this case.
19 Q. [Mr Irving] You mention the transportation, that this could not have
20been done without Hitler's orders?
21 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] All this, not only transportation but the whole magnitude
22of this operation.
23 Q. [Mr Irving] But Himmler referred specifically to the fact that this
24movement of the Jews from the West to East is going to
25proceed stage by stage, is the Fuhrer's orders, September
261942 I think is the document?
1 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes.
2 Q. [Mr Irving] So that was covered by Hitler's orders, the actual
3transportation movement. That was clearly covered by
4Hitler's orders?
5 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] Yes, but all the over -- I can accept that, but it is not
6only the transportation. It is the involvement of 10,000
7people in police units, in SS units.
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: The whole. You do not need to spell it out?
9 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The whole operation.
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: One can imagine how logistically complicated
11it was.
12 A. [Dr Heinz Peter Longerich] The Holocaust became known in 1942 to the Western world,
13and of course it was used in the Allied propaganda, for
14instance, they dropped leaflets on Germany, and so on. So
15the whole idea that this process could be kept as a secret
16when, you know, 22 officials in the Foreign Ministry alone
17read one of the activity reports of 1941 which quite
18clearly states that thousands of people are shot, and 22
19diplomats were officially allowed to read this. Then to
20argue that this was done behind Hitler's back, it seems to
21me it defies reason.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. I have your very clear and full answer
23on that. Mr Irving, I do not know whether you are going
24to move on now?
25 MR IRVING: I have now reached effectively my planning for the
26first report. I will conclude the cross-examination on
1the second report tomorrow, and then I shall be finished
2with Dr Longerich tomorrow, if I may.
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, you are really saying you would rather
4break off now?
5 MR IRVING: Quite simply because we did zip through the
6glossary. I think it does fall naturally in two stages.
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am not sure about that, but if you say you
8would like to break off now then I am perfectly happy with
9that. Can we just see where we are going from here.
10Mr Rampton, are we expecting to have any other witness on
11Thursday? I suppose that depends on Mr Irving.
12 MR RAMPTON: No. I can start re-cross-examination Mr Irving on
13Thursday, if we go short with Dr Longerich. If not I will
14do that on Monday. I am expecting Professor Funke to be
15here on Tuesday.
16 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Have you got a whole day's further
17cross-examination, do you think?
18 MR RAMPTON: Probably.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am not surprised.
20 MR RAMPTON: Probably, because I have not done the political
21association. Considering the volume of material there is,
22I am going to keep it short, but it is still bound to take
23a bit of time.
24 MR IRVING: My Lord, ought I to question this witness about the
25Schlegelberger document which he has not referred it in
26his report?
1 MR JUSTICE GRAY: He has not, you are quite right, and
2I personally think there is absolutely no need, because if
3there is one topic that has been investigated exhaustively
4it is certainly that one.
5 MR IRVING: I do not want to be criticised for not having done
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I will not criticise you and I do not think
8Mr Rampton will either.
9 MR IRVING: Your Lordship is aware I attach great importance to
11 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes, I realize you do.
12 MR RAMPTON: I would point out, therefore, that it is likely
13that I will place reliance on what Dr Longerich has
14already said about that, which is that, in effect, he
15thinks it is a document of no historical significance.
16 MR IRVING: Yes.
17 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. The trouble is you cannot nibble at
18these issues. I hope Mr Irving will not take that as an
19invitation to open the whole issue.
20 MR RAMPTON: No, but it is only fair that I should say that.
21I would use as corroboration for reliance on that what
22Professor Evans has said about it.
23 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Professor Evans?
24 MR RAMPTON: Yes.
25 MR IRVING: If Professor Evans wishes to have a chance to
26amplify the reason why he considers it to be insignificant
1or less significant than do I, then this would be the
3 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think the answer to that is that he will
4not want to.
5 MR RAMPTON: He is in Cambridge.
6 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I think you meant Dr Longerich, did you not?
7 MR IRVING: That was the correct inference, yes.
8 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I am sure he will not want to, but Mr Rampton
9is entitled to rely on his commentary about it. Since
10I know so clearly what the issues are each way on it,
11I really see very little benefit to be derived from going
12through all the points all over again.
13 MR IRVING: I have no desire to.
14 MR JUSTICE GRAY: If you want to I am not stopping you.
15 MR IRVING: But I thought it would only be fair in view of the
16fact that he did express that negative opinion on it, if
17he wished to have the opportunity to amplify on that that
18he should, but if he does not so ----
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Just so it is clear, I am not for a moment
20stopping you from cross-examining fully on your reasons
21for saying why the Schlegelberger memorandum is a very
22important document, but I will not hold it against you
23that you did not cross-examine if you do not. I want to
24be absolutely clear what my position on that is.
25 MR IRVING: If your Lordship will not then I shall not.
26 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Good. I think that is a sensible outcome,
1because otherwise it is just a waste of time.
2 MR RAMPTON: Can I give your Lordship two more references to
3close the day.
4 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes.
5 MR RAMPTON: Day 2, page 262, lines 11 to 17, I will read it
6out for Mr Irving's benefit so he knows exactly.
7 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Of what?
8 MR RAMPTON: Of my cross-examination in the transcript.
9 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Day 2?
10 MR RAMPTON: Yes, page 262. Again I am afraid for some reason
11best known, perhaps it is that I merely lay the ground and
12all the bright questions seem to be asked by your
13Lordship. Maybe your Lordship has a better facility for
14getting straight answers, I do not know. Anyway, page
15262, line 11, Mr Justice Gray asks Mr Irving:
16 "Do you accept that means," this is about report
17No. 51, "since it is addressed to the Fuhrer that it was
18shown to him?"
19 Answer: "On a high probability, yes, my Lord.
20I would have accepted that as being evidence that it had
21probably been shown to Hitler, but I would also draw
22attention to one, two or three details, if I may, since we
23are looking at the document."
24 Then bottom of page 264, which is on the same
25physical sheet of paper, line 23, again your Lordship is
26asking the question:
1 "To be asked what you think this would have
2conveyed to Hitler, which is I think what Mr Rampton was
4 Answer: "Firstly, I accept the document was in
5all probability shown to Hitler. Secondly, I think in all
6probability he paid no attention to it, the reason being
7the date, the height of the Stalingrad crisis".
8 If there is going to be a retreat from that
9position, it is going to have to have, in submission,
10quite a good reason.
11 MR IRVING: Well, my response is that I think documents are
12often shown to learned counsel which learned counsel
13sometimes pay no attention to. I think Mr Carmen is an
14example of that.
15 MR RAMPTON: I am not Mr Carmen for one thing, and I shall not
16say what I feel about that.
17 MR IRVING: Also your Lordship will remember ----
18 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Let Mr Rampton tell us more about it.
19 MR RAMPTON: For another thing, that is only to say that it
20seems that that concession, and I advisedly use that word,
21seems to remain in place.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Indeed it is fortified, because Mr Irving is
23there saying that, all right, it may have been shown to
24Hitler, but he paid no attention to it, well, that is
25almost the same as saying it was not shown to him. But he
26goes done in day 4 and 5 in the passages that you have
1referred to I think to accept that Hitler knew and
3 MR RAMPTON: Yes, knew about the systematic mass shootings in
4the East.
5 MR IRVING: Your Lordship remember that I produced evidence to
6you a day or two later showing that on precisely that day
7or the day before one document of exactly the same nature
8was shown to Hitler on two successive days, submitted to
9him and obviously not read by him.
10 MR JUSTICE GRAY: Yes. I suspect the position will emerge that
11you have slightly shifted your ground backwards and
12forwards in the course of your answers to Mr Rampton.
13 MR IRVING: It is highly possible that one learns as one goes
14along, and one would be incorrigible if one did not.
15 MR JUSTICE GRAY: I will not comment about that, but you have
16now put your case actually in considerable detail to
17Dr Longerich and we have now had his answers.
18 MR IRVING: Yes.
19 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So tell me what your final stance is, because
20I would like to know, but the evidence is all in now.
21 MR RAMPTON: I would like to know too.
22 MR JUSTICE GRAY: So 10.30 tomorrow morning.
23 < (The witness withdrew)
24(The court adjourned until the following day)