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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies
by MATTHEW J. VAN WAGENEN, MAJ, USA B.S., Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1991
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2004
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Matthew J. Van Wagenen Thesis Title: An Analysis of the Indian Government's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Jammu and Kashmir
Approved by:
, Thesis Committee Chair Harold S. Orenstein, Ph.D.
, Member LTC William R. L. Coleman, B.A.
, Member MAJ Scott R. Peters, M.S.
Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:
, Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR, by MAJ Matthew J. Van Wagenen, 91 pages. The Indian government is involved in the longest and most costly counterinsurgency campaign that is conducted by a nation state in modern history. The Kashmir conflict is complex and contains a conflict of interests with multiple players struggling for a variety of agendas that include independence of Kashmir by the separatists, preservation of a secular nation fought for by India, and unification of a Muslim state contested by Pakistan. This study analyzes in depth the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian governments and security forces response to these conditions. This paper focuses on the Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign strategy from 1989 to present and critiques the use of the instruments of national power in defeating the insurgency.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Dr. They taught me this past year that tactical and operational success in itself when conducting a counterinsurgency campaign does not guarantee strategic victory. Major Scott Peters and LTC Bobby Coleman for their time and patience educating me in the complexity of counterinsurgency. Harry Orenstein. iv .
....................................................................26 Step Five: Assessing the Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents..............7 1990s: India's Counterinsurgency Operations................................ x CHAPTER 1...................................3 British Rule and Partition ..................................30 Step Seven: the Indian Government's Response ......................................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT......5 The Second Indian-Pakistani War....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................32 Step One: Definition of the Type of Insurgency in Kashmir.................................12 Key Terms........................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................... LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................13 CHAPTER 2............................................ 1965 ............................................................................26 Step Three: Assessing the Environment of the Kashmiri Insurgents .....5 East Pakistan and the Third War Between Pakistan and India in 1971 ............................6 The 1980s: The Road to Insurgency..................................................32 v ............................................................................................................iv ACRONYMS ..........................11 Limitations of the Thesis ........................................................ INTRODUCTION ....................................24 Step One: Definition of the Type of Insurgency in Kashmir.........31 CHAPTER 4..................................9 2004: Possible Peace and SARRC...................................................................................TABLE OF CONTENTS Page MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .................................................................................................................................................................. viii ILLUSTRATIONS ..................................................................................................29 Step Six: Assessing Foreign and Pakistani External Support.................................1 Research Questions .............. 1947 to1949.......................................8 1999: Kargil War .......................................................................................3 The First Indian-Pakistani War.....................................................................15 CHAPTER 3........................................................................................................................................10 Importance of the Conflict...............................................................................................................11 Delimitations.............................................................. ANALYSIS ................................................................................. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................ix TABLES ...................................................................................24 Step Two: Assessing the Kashmiri Insurgents' Strategic Approach ..........................................................
............66 Political Support ..........................................................................................................49 Religious and Ethnic Composition of the Population............................................36 Limited Guerrilla Warfare ......................................................................65 Foreign Fighter Support.................................59 Scope....................66 Sanctuary ..........32 Kashmir's Traditionalists..........................48 Human Environment...............................................................................................................................................46 Climate in Kashmir..........................59 Complexity...................................................................................................................................................................................................53 Step Four: Assessing the Popular Support for the Insurgency .........................................................34 Goal Identification......................41 Urban Warfare Strategy..........Secessionist Insurgent Groups ........................................................................49 Ethnic Composition ............................................................................................48 and Utilities Infrastructure................................................................................................................................................................................................................51 Politics ..................... CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....39 Conspiratorial Strategy ........................ Telecommunications........................54 Passive Support.....................................................................................................................................34 Misleading Rhetoric and Information..........................................................................63 Moral Support..........................35 Goal Transformation of Kashmiri Insurgents ...............................................................................................................................................................62 The Quest for Unity.........................................................57 Techniques Kashmiri Insurgents Use to Gain Support.......................................46 The Physical Environment............................................................................................44 Step Three: The Human and Physical Environment of the Kashmiri Insurgents .......................................................................................................................61 Cohesion .....67 CHAPTER 5........................................................................................................................58 Step Five: Assessing the Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents.........................................................................................................................................63 Material Support .40 Political Strategy.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................62 Step Six: Assessing External Support Provided to the Kashmiri Insurgents...........................................................................................37 Step Two: Assessing the Kashmiri Insurgents' Strategic Approach .................50 Economic Situation............................................................................................................................................................................56 The Kashmiri People .........................................42 Rural Warfare Strategy .............................................................................................................................................................................................48 Kashmir's Transportation.....................................60 Parallel Hierarchy ............................................................................................................................................35 Goal Conflict among Kashmir's Insurgents Groups...............................................................................33 Barriers to Identification of the Kashmiri Insurgent Goals ..............................................................................................................................55 The Role of Intellectuals..............................37 Terrorism ..........................................................68 vi .....................................53 Kashmiri Active Support .........39 Protracted Popular War Strategy .......................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................80 vii .......................................................................................................68 Information ................................................................................................................................73 REFERENCE LIST......................................Diplomatic Efforts ...........79 CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .....................................................................................................................................70 Economic .................................................................75 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................72 Recommendations................................................................................................................................69 Military .........................................................71 Conclusions.............................................................................
ACRONYMS APHC AAC HUA HUM J&K ISI JKLF LoC SAARC All Parties Hurriyat Conference Awami Action Committee Harkat-Ul-Ansar Hizbul Mujahideen Jammu and Kashmir InterService Intelligence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front Line of Control South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation viii .
...................31 ix .........................ILLUSTRATIONS Page Figure 1. O'Neil Model Modified.....................2 Figure 2..................................................................................... Map of Kashmir ................................
.........................TABLES Page Table 1.................................. Overview of the Population and Religious Makeup in Jammu and Kashmir ..................... Table 2........52 x ............................................50 Reasons and motivations for Kashmiri's Joining the Insurgency..........................
and foreign fighters represents a war of insurgency that is being fought for many complex reasons. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the partition of India and Pakistan in 1948 by the British. The controversy arose when both India and Pakistan claimed J&K as part of their new counties). In human terms. and Kashmiris. 1 . and at least 40. Pakistan. current deployme nt of 600. Pakistani.000 displaced Kashmiri Hindu refugees.CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) dispute between India.000 Indian soldiers to Kashmir. Kashmir became a flashpoint between India. and India laid claim because Kashmir's ruling prince decided to join India after coming under attack from Pakistani military forces. A case study of this insurgency in Kashmir that started in 1989 can provide military scholars insight into which approaches are needed to conduct a successful counterinsurgency operation by analyzing the Indian government's attempts to use instruments of national power to win this conflict. Pakistan claimed Kashmir because they both have a majority Muslim population and share cultural ties. In 1989. Kashmiri separatists. this conflict took on a new dimension when the Kashmiris began a military insurgency in order to gain freedom from India. who all claim the region (see figure 1). the results of this insurgency equate to an estimated 400. at a minimum thirty active Kashmiri insurgent organizations. 285-289). As a result.000 killed on all sides since 1989 (Medhurst 2002.
html . available from http://www. On-line Library.Figure 1.lib. Map of Kashmir Source: The University of Texas. edu/maps/kashmir. accessed on 4 February 2004. 2 . Internet.utexas.
in a region that was over seventy percent Muslim. and thus oppressed the Muslim majority (Bose 2003. The perception of the majority of the Muslim Kashmiris during the rule of the Maharaja and his family can be characterized as one of unfairness and suppression by the ruler. whose political goal was to gain equal rights for the Muslim majority (Bose 2003. The problem with the British choice of Maharaja Singh as the ruler was. the J&K Muslim Conference. that they did not take into account the religion of the Maharaja and his government officials. when a Muslim named Mohammed Abdullah started a peaceful political movement. who were Hindu. controlled the education system and government. In 1846.Research Questions Primary Question: Is the Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir effective. The Muslim majority viewed the Maharaja and the Hindu minority as self-serving. 3 . which was demonstrated by the fact that a Hindu minority population and government owned most of the land. This inequality of the Muslim majority in J& K would become the building block for the secessionist movement that would first make its appearance in 1932. 16-19). why not? Secondary Question: Is the Indian government using the correct combination of the instruments of national power as a means to defeat the insurgency in Kashmir? British Rule and Partition To understand the war on insurgency in Kashmir. and if not. the history of J&K must be reviewed and examined. the British colonial rulers of India gave the Prince Maharaja Singh rule of the State of J&K. 16-19).
60-61). Initially. 61. the British government partitioned India and Pakistan into two states that best reflected the religious makeup of the former colony (Wirsing 1994. Lord Mountbatten. the British Colonial magistrate. Rebel forces then consolidated gains and attacked Srinagar. which includes the city of Muzaffarabad. Nevertheless. Lord Mountbatten. 7-9). In addition. started a revolt among the Muslim population (Asthana 2001. disguised as tribesmen. the Maharaja Hari Singh believed that an independent J&K was possible. 14-15). The idea of an independent J&K was destroyed during the first week of October 1947. thus directly threatening the J&K government. and India's new Prime Minister Nehru finally agreed that the Indian Army could deploy because of the rebellion 4 . believing he had the legal right to decide the fate of his state (National Public Radio 1999).With the end of the colonial rule in August 1947. 9-10). 8-9). and the new Indian government in New Delhi (Asthana 2001. the ruler of each new state would agree to the status of the partition (Ganguly 1997. which forced him to reach out for military assistance from the former colonial ruler. this uprising was successful and captured the territory that is presently considered occupied Pakistani Kashmir. These attacks resulted in atrocities committed against the Hindu minority throughout Kashmir and a direct threat to the Maharaja's rule. the summer capital of Kashmir. The British followed general guidelines that would ensure that former states with Hindu majorities would be part of India and that Muslim majority states would belong to Pakistan. since without an official request for accession into the new country of India that was ratified by the people of J&K. Ganguly 1997. when Muslim rebels from J&K and Pakistani regular army forces on leave. the Indian Army could not legally respond (Rajawat 2003. The new Indian government was hesitant to fulfill the Maharaja's request.
Indian paratroopers landed in Srinagar. fearing that the Muslim majority would vote to join Pakistan (Schofield 1996. repulsed the rebel army. splitting J&K into the regions of Indian-and Pakistani-occupied Kashmir depicted on today's maps. 1947 to1949 The result of the Indian and Pakistani intervention into Kashmir would be the first of three wars over the disputed region. 10). thereby splitting Kashmir in two. while at the same time India took its case to the United Nations to get a mandate for immediate Pakistani withdrawal. The armed conflict ended in 1949 when the United Nations mediated a ceasefire that drew a 500-mile border. Pakistan began Operation Gibraltar. and a vote from the Kashmiri people to decide to which country to accede. 24-25). neither side withdrew its forces from the region. an operation that used a small number of Pakistani soldiers who infiltrated Indian Kashmir in order to incite and lead the local Kashmiris to rise up against the Indian government (Ganguly 2001. This 5 . a minimization of Indian forces in J&K. "The Plebiscite is the 1948 United Nations resolution that called for internationally supervised process whereby the future status of the state of J & K shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people" (Bose 2003. The United Nations passed two resolutions that ordered a ceasefire. thus setting the stage for the longest dispute in the history of the United Nations. The First Indian-Pakistani War. withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kashmir. and reversed Pakistani gains. 43). 1965 In May 1965. As a consequence. known as a Plebiscite (Schofield 1996. In October 1947.in J&K. However. 24-27). 39). and that after the situation was secure the vote on accession into India or Pakistan would take place (Ganguly 1997. The Second Indian-Pakistani War. India refused to allow a free vote.
183). when India intervened on the Bangladeshi rebels' behalf. which renamed the ceasefire line in Kashmir to the Line of Control (LoC) and established an internationally recognized border. which would begin to manifest itself in the 1980s" (Singh 2001. East Pakistan and the Third War Between Pakistan and India in 1971 In 1971. India and Pakistan fought their third war but this one over Bangladesh. However. led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. demonstrated by not publicly advocating the Kashmiris' right to self-determination and not providing any significant external support to separatists (National Public Radio 1999). the Pakistani government. The results of this war led to the Simla Accord. secretly began the formulation of a strategy that sought to regain control of lost Kashmiri territory out of revenge for the loss of Bangladesh. which counterattacked across the Ceasefire Line (CFL). With the exception of the dispute about the Siachen glacier. assuming mass popular support existed in Kashmir and thus a popular uprising would quickly gain support and result in the overthrow of the Indian government (Ganguly 2001. which were fighting for independence from Pakistan (National Public Radio 2004a). this agreement has lasted until today. "However.offensive action against the Indian government drew an immediate response by the Indian Army. The next five months of fighting resulted in no territorial gains for both countries and another ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. few Kashmiris joined the ranks of the Pakistani Army and the popular uprising that Pakistan envisioned never occurred. 6 . 43-45). formally East Pakistan. Pakistan attacked Kashmir. This third war also caused Pakistan to lose interest in Kashmir for the next decade.
The culmination of these anti-secessionist efforts occurred in 1987. In addition. which caused the economic situation to worsen. This unfair election was the catalyst causing secessionists to turn to low-level violence to voice their discontent with New Delhi. 6869). 84-90). when the Indian government failed to conduct fair elections (National Public Radio 2004a). 84-90). the hope of the Kashmiris to resolve the dispute with India peacefully quickly began to fade with a drastic shift in New Delhi's politics. This resulted in a severe crackdown on Kashmir's self-determination by banning secessionist groups and controlling local elections in order to prevent autonomous movements from gaining power and to ensure that New Delhi would have centralized control over local politics (Ganguly 1997. growing protests. Gandhi feared that if more self-rule were given to any Indian Muslim State. and organized violence by the Kashmiri youth and secessionists (Akhtar 1991. The situation in Kashmir 7 . From 1988 to 1989. the police had to regularly put down strikes. The lawlessness of the region increased daily until 1990. with the kidnapping of the daughter of a local minister who was appointed by New Delhi. 48-49). This further fed the spiral of violence. laws such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act were put into effect to crack down on anti-Indian efforts and to afford local law enforcement the right to search and detain pro-secessionists arbitrarily (Ganguly 1997. causing many young Kashmiris to become militant (Akhtar 1991. 90-91). led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The final turning point occurred in December 1989. then other heavily populated Muslim states would demand the same and security and secularism would be at risk (Ganguly 2001.The 1980s: The Road to Insurgency During the 1980s.
with 300. which essentially put Kashmir under marshal law. In addition to local Kashmiri insurgents fighting the Indian government. and other Muslim countries from around the Middle East to assist the insurgents in their struggle against the Indian rule (Singh 2001. the Indian government's response to the 8 . Moreover. 184-185). relations with Pakistan became tenuous because of the external support given to the Kashmiri insurgents by Pakistani InterServices Intelligence (ISI). 107-108. foreign fighters began to arrive on the scene from Afghanistan. which was supported externally by Pakistan through training. 154-156). 87-89). for the first time in Kashmiri history. This resulted in the Kashmir Disturbed Act of 1990. and recruitment by the Pakistani Intelligence Service. Akhtar 1991. Pakistan. the loss of control of large parts of the Kashmir Valley to Muslim insurgents. material. 112). As a result. By early 1990.000 soldiers battling dozens of insurgency groups across J&K (Ganguly 1997. the insurgency in Kashmir was marked by the complete breakdown of civil authority. and the Indian military conducting full-scale counterinsurgency operations. National Public Radio 1999).quickly deteriorated and the Indian Army and the first insurgent organizations were involved in the first battles of the civil war. In addition. 122. Indian Army intelligence quickly realized that the situation in Kashmir was no longer just local terrorism. but rather a growing insurgency. thousands of Hindus began to flee Kashmir after becoming the target of ethnic violence (Ganguly 1997. intelligence. 1990s: India's Counterinsurgency Operations In the early 1990s. Indian Army and police forces were now free to conduct unrestrained counterinsurgency operations and to use any means necessary to regain control (Ganguly 1997. as well as infiltration of foreign fighters (Schofield 2003.
with most Kashmiris losing the will to continue the insurgency. By 1996. and the continued passive and active support given to the military and political insurgent groups operating in Kashmir. Second. New Delhi wanted to be known for being unbreakable on the issue of terrorism and insurgency in order to deter other problem states from following such violent attempts to achieve autonomy. 128-130). either through direct support by Pakistani paramilitary forces or by indirect support. Pakistan needed to show its determination and 9 . the Indian Army's successful counterinsurgency campaign did little to win the general popular support of the Kashmiris. 1999: Kargil War In spring 1999. However. Therefore. thus further shattering the secular Indian society (Ganguly 1997. First. the government feared that the intervention of Pakistan would worsen the situation. Pakistan feared that the insurgency was slowly dissipating over time. This was reflected in the continual resistance of the Kashmiri people. most of the Kashmiri insurgent guerrilla operations were soundly defeated across J&K. However. New Delhi provided the best of its military to the Kashmir crisis and gave it full power to conduct the war with few constraints.insurgency focused on a military solution for two primary reasons. an unrestrained Indian military had both positive and negative effects on the war throughout the 1990s. Therefore. India and Pakistan fought their third war over Kashmir after Pakistan attacked the LoC in the Kargil region of Kashmir with regular Pakistani troops and insurgents. such as training and supplies. boycotting all elections from 1996 on. With the defeat of the guerillas in Kashmir in 1996. clearly confirmed by Kashmiri insurgent tactics switching dramatically from regular direct attacks on the Indian Army to terrorism against the Kashmiri people.
both countries have been here before only losing the opportunity nationalism. 121-122). 121-122). The result of these factors is the continued Kashmir crisis with little hope for peace in the foreseeable future. January of 2004 brought dramatic new developments with Pakistan and Indian during the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation meeting in Islamabad. After fourteen years of fighting. Both countries agreed for the first time in years to build a map for peace over the conflict setting in motion a series of events that offers a possible solution for all parties involved. pride or terrorism which derailed possible peace efforts. 2004: Possible Peace and SARRC The Kashmir insurrection that started in 1989 can be traced back through a long complex history driven by demands of self-determination and a general perception of unfair treatment felt by Kashmiri people. Nevertheless. at least tacitly. In addition. Pakistan also continues to assist the insurgency.support to the Kashmiri insurgents who were still fighting and hoped to inspire passive Kashmiris to renew aspirations of self-determination (Ganguly 2001. through continuous moral and material support that provides the resources that fuel the militant aspect of the conflict. 10 . However. with many external support groups and Islamic governments beginning to believe the insurgency was lost (Ganguly 2001. the insurgency is still ongoing despite a massive Indian military counterinsurgency campaign and the continued control and influence on Kashmiri local affairs of state by the Indian Federal Government. the international pressure and support for the Kashmiris were losing energy.
which have been at war four times since their creation. because it is ultimately being fought and supported by two nuclear states.000 as refugees (Medhurst 2002.000 to 80. Kashmir may represent the most dangerous existing conflict. the loss of Kashmir is unacceptable because of domestic political reasons. both nuclear nation states. either by force or by détente. The importance of this conflict varies for the three involved players. 286-289). the Kashmir conflict to date has claimed the lives of an estimated 40. For India. For the rest of the world. but peace can only possibly come if the insurgency is stopped. Limitations of the Thesis This thesis will focus on the counterinsurgency campaign that has been conducted by the Indian government from 1989 to the present. but fought over between rival insurgent groups. government. 128-129). the general public. A common stance on the accession into Pakistan or independence from India is not only argued in Kashmir. Therefore. 128-130). This study will not address if the counterinsurgency operation is just or if the Indian occupation is legal under United Nations mandates of 1948. For India and Pakistan.000 people and left another 400. the Kashmir issue must be settled. This is an analysis of the effectiveness of the 11 . thus destroying a secular India (Ganguly 1997.Importance of the Conflict In human terms. Kashmir is an integral part of its secular nation state and it believes that the loss of Kashmir could result in other Muslim states demanding autonomy or independence. The Kashmiris themselves are divided on their vision of self-determination. who are unlikely to give it up as a national agenda (Ganguly 2001. Pakistan views Kashmir as the most important national political issue. and Islamic extremists. which evokes strong views from the military.
or descriptive statistics is precluded. The examination will focus only on the Indian government polices and its counterinsurgency strategy. This study will also not address the Chinese stance on Kashmir and the land it annexed in this region supported by Pakistan. the Pakistani-Indian nuclear stand off. document analysis. informational. The Kargil War of 1999 will not be analyzed. The final product will closely look like a case study that draws conclusions from other published works and documents on the subject of Kashmir. The study will be limited to defining a research question and concepts. The conclusions in this thesis will use the instruments of national power paradigm--diplomatic. the issue of human rights will not be 12 . Delimitations This thesis will not analyze events prior to 1989.counterinsurgency campaign which uses the Bard O'Neil model. or other South Asian issues that embroil these nuclear nation states. to define the elements of the Kashmir insurgency. A limited amount of time will be the major constraint in this study. Finally. proposing explanations and specifying units of analysis on which conclusions are based on. The Pakistani-Indian dispute over the Siachen glacier in Kashmir will not be addressed because of its location and the fact that it offers little strategic significance to the counterinsurgency campaign. due to its conventional nature and insignificance with regard to the counterinsurgency campaign. and economic--as the criteria to analyze the success of the Indian government's response. elite interviewing. outlined in his book Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Warfare. using a research design that would involve empirical observation. univariate data analysis. military. Therefore.
manipulated. altered. 177-188). military. Anatang to the southeast and Srinagar in the center. Line of Control: "The 740-kilometer dividing line between Indian J&K and Azad Jammu and Kashmir-Northern areas. and was renamed to the Line of Control by intergovernmental agreement in July of 1972" (Bose 2003. Insurgency: "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" (US Army 1997. information. 40). paramilitary. psychological. political. 13 . Kashmir Valley: "The Part of the state of J&K that lies in the valley of the Jhelum river and includes the towns and villages of Handwara. Instruments of National Power: "Instruments of National Power are the tools nation states use to influence the behavior of other nation states within the current international system. Baramulla. economic. was slightly altered during the December 1971 war. and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency" (US Army 1997. It originated in January 1949 as a ceasefire line at the end of the first Indian-Pakistani war. (National Public Radio 1994. 83). 295). and Sopore to the northwest. and economic" (Davis 2003. These instruments represent tangible resources that can be purposefully crafted. and balanced. Key Terms Counterinsurgency: "Those military.discussed because of the questionable accuracy of information distributed by all parties involved in the conflict. 3). These instruments are diplomatic.
19). religious. 154). 14 . 18-19). Traditionalist Insurgents: "Traditionalist insurgents seek to displace the political system and replace it with a political structure that is rooted in ancestral ties or religion. Traditionalists want to create political structures that were seen in the past that are characterized by low autonomy and power in the hands of an autocratic leader who is supported by the military and clergy " (O'Neil 1990.Secessionist Insurgents: "Secessionist insurgents renounce the political community of which they are apart and create a new independent political community" (O'Neil 1990. or theological" (US Army 1997. Terrorism: "The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear: intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political.
political. Bard O'Neil outlines the steps that are necessary for critically analyzing any insurgency by using a detailed approach in defining all aspects of an insurgency. such as insurgent type. goals. The military literature is used to gain insight into the tactical and operational aspects of the counterinsurgency operations that have occurred and are ongoing in Kashmir. The third area of literature is historical in nature and focuses on the causes of the conflict. These works focus on three primary areas and are characterized as military. and historical in nature. The book uses case studies to demonstrate the author's theory and highlights the fact that the different elements of national power must constantly be adjusted in response to a 15 . and the evolution of the insurgency. Brassey's. strategic approach. He states that the correct combination of instruments of national power can only be applied after the insurgency is defined and understood in detail. The second area of literature primarily focuses on the political atmosphere that has created or contributed to the conditions that exist in Kashmir and offer possible explanations for the current atmosphere. 1990 (Military). Incorporated. This reference is the foundation for understanding any insurgency and how to combat it.CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW This chapter of the thesis will give an overview of the periodicals and books covering the conflict in Kashmir that were used in the research. and support base. Bard O'Neil. O'Neil's hypothesis is that most nation states' answer to any insurgency is to react with a military solution and not to use any other instruments of national power to combat it. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare.
Mamta Rajawat. Retired Indian General Samay Ram has extensive experience in counterinsurgency operations in Sri Lanka. Most of this book is written from 16 . in that it uses O'Neil's model to analyze the current insurgency in Kashmir. Rajawat examines the conflict between India and Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists from its beginnings after the British partition until the time of the book's writing. 2002 (Military). Tackling Insurgency and Terrorism. Punjab. It is one of the few works that address in depth the need of the Indian national authorities to use all instruments of national power to defeat Kashmiri insurgents and how to stop the negative information campaigns about Indian counterinsurgency efforts in Kashmir. and J&K. This work is written from an Indian perspective and is a complete analysis of the politics and many underlying issues associated with the conflict. Thus. This book is written by an Indian-born journalist who analyzes the war from her own standpoint of having witnessed the war firsthand. are any changes that are needed for the Indian Army's strategic approach in combating insurgents. Samay Ram. The book also addresses India's current need to employ assertive economic and diplomatic tools in order to overcome the government's shortcomings in the past. Rajawat provides an empirical view on the war that most authors do not have. The book focuses on the conflict from a political standpoint.particular insurgency. He wrote the book more as primer for future counterinsurgency commanders than for scholars studying such conflicts. closely examining Kashmir's and New Delhi's politics and the role these politics play in the roots of the insurgency. Kashmir: Shadow of Terrorism. since the security situation precludes most scholars from observing the war firsthand. This book is the foundation of this research paper. 2003 (Military and Political). The only element not addressed in detail.
Surveys of Indian soldiers are used to demonstrate the effects of fighting a long-term counterinsurgency on the soldiers and leaders. N. Insurgencies and CounterInsurgency Operations. 2003 (Military).personal experience conducting counterinsurgency operations and explains the need for field commanders to understand the correct use of information on local populations as a key aspect to winning the moral battle as well as enemy propaganda techniques.C. Terrorism. The book may be the only unclassified work written on this subject that allows a researcher to gain a true estimate for the scope and complexity of the current insurgent organizations. Nirmal. 2001 (Military and Political). This is a lengthy book. Asthana and Anjali. K. considering the fact that it is written by an enemy of Kashmiri insurgents. This is a reference book that is mandatory for any research that is done on Kashmir. General Ram also depicts a current picture of ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir and the Indian subcontinent. size. It is written by a group of antiterrorism experts at India's Defense Studies and Analyses Institute and is the only book that identifies all current insurgency groups operating in Kashmir and supporting groups in Pakistan. Human rights abuses are also addressed and its negative effects on the soldiers' morale. written by a former Indian Army commander in Kashmir and a political scientist who both have 17 . Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir. and goals of all insurgency groups in Kashmir and offers key insight into the difficulty of identifying insurgent groups and their goals in Kashmir because of the continuously changing political environment in the region. Santhanam. It provides the name. key personal. The book is balanced. The value of the book for the scholar is its clear explanation of the constraints under which the army operates to fight against an insurgency.
The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War. but they also advocate possible diplomatic and political solutions after the insurgents are defeated militarily. The two books are written by one of the world's leading expert on Kashmir. The book outlines the tactics of insurgents at the strategic and tactical level and the countermeasures that are needed to defeat these tactics. 2001 (Historical and Political).empirical observation of the conflict. and explains why military approaches are usually the only option the Indian government is left with. who is a Professor at the University Of Indiana. Hopes of Peace. According to his 18 . This book is a thoroughly researched work that outlines the Kashmir conflict in detail and provides information about all ongoing counterinsurgency operations in India and how many of the insurgencies in India can be traced directly to Pan-Islamic fundamentalism. covering every element of terrorism and counterinsurgency. and both books offer essentially the same information on Kashmir. Sumit Ganguly. It is an important work to fully understand the difficulties India has been facing since its partition in 1947 in dealing with insurgencies. Both books outline the conflict. The authors address the Kashmir crisis and recognize the fact that major mistakes have been made militarily. These authors primarily focus on military approaches to defeating the insurgency in Kashmir and in parts of India. Conflict Unending. but write from an Indian perspective. but do explore different details of the conflict between Pakistan and India. Ganguly explores the Pakistani-Indian conflict and Kashmir war from a unique historical and human perspective and addresses the causes of the conflict from the aspect of what the author calls political mobilization. starting from the partition but ending with different time periods 1997 and 2001 respectively. 1997 and Sumit Ganguly. Asthana and Nirmal are insurgency experts.
Once these rights were revoked in the 1987 elections.theory. These references are essential in any research done on this phenomenon because they explore the most important cause for this insurgency. since his primary question is whether either country has a legal claim to Kashmir. the human factor. This recent work by Wirsing covers the latest events 19 . India. the reason the Kashmiri insurgents demand more self-determination is because they became more educated and were given the experience of free elections in the late 1970s to early 1980s. The only shortcoming with this particular work is that it is ten years old and only tracks developments until 1994. Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution. Robert Wirsing. the educated Kashmiris reverted to violence and insurgency out of desperation. Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age. This book is written by an American political scientist and college professor and focuses on the analysis of the Kashmir dispute and the precarious role Pakistan plays in it. 2003 (Historical and Political). Wirsing's approach to research and questions asked is probably the most unbiased and offers possible solutions for both countries to solve the conflict. 1994 (Historical and Political). His analysis is not likely to meet either India's or Pakistan's approval. It details the entire conflict and examines both India's and Pakistan's motivations since the conflict started fifty years ago until 1994. Robert Wirsing. The book covers the insurgency in detail on a strategic level and focuses on how to end this conflict. These works are a detailed account of the political and informational aspect of this phenomenon and fully accounts for the Pakistan's role and importance in this conflict. with the solution residing solely with the central governments of both India and Pakistan.
A clear link is established between the rise of foreign fighters entering the conflict in Kashmir and the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in 1989. but Margolis does outline the dangers that the insurgency brings to one of the most volatile regions in the world. Paths to Peace. Sumantra Bose. 2003 (Historical and Political). development. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan. 2002 (Historical and Political). Margolis also explores the roots of the Kashmir conflict and India's attempts to fight it. Eric Margolis is an American writer and traveler who offers a new approach to the conflict in Kashmir and other parts of wartorn regions of the Himalayas. This theory is backed up with numerous interviews of Mujahideen who fought in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. Eric S. Bose is a British University professor who outlines the origins. providing personal accounts of the motivations and methods to support the insurgents. Margolis. 20 . Wirsing also addresses the changes in the Kashmiri insurgents' goals and identity as Pakistan separates itself from the insurgents because of the United States' pressure in the post 11 September world. this time in Kashmir. Kashmir and Tibet. This book critically analyzes the roots of jihad when it first came to modern warfare in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation.and nuclearization of the subcontinent by India and Pakistan. Margolis's argument is that unemployed trained foreign fighters who were not allowed to return to their countries were left with no other choice but to find a new war. No solutions for the conflict in Kashmir are offered. This book is perhaps the most up-to-date resource on the current strategic setting in the region and is an essential asset to any research conducted on the topic. Kashmir: Roots of Conflict. This book looks at the conflict from an Indian and Mujahideen perspective and the complicated issues that surround this insurgency.
and current situation in Kashmir in a well-researched and unbiased manner. He is a consultant to the US State Department on issues about Kashmir. Schofield's final conclusion on the situation is that too often the conflict and any possible solution are derived from 21 . Final conclusions in this work emphasizes that the Kashmir conflict can only be solved with the participation of all parties involved. She begins with an in-depth history of the state and follows events through 2001. Bose's theory is that India's failed attempts to promote democracy in Kashmir and the radical Hindu government are the main causes of the conflict. Victoria Schofield. regularly offering strategic advice on key strategic issues on South Asia that are highlighted in this work. Hindus. This work is unique because of the interviews of all parties involved were used while writing it. including Buddhists. thus making it essential to the study of Kashmir conflict and its possible resolutions. The strength of this work is the thorough analysis of the historical religious and ethnic complexities that make up Kashmir which provide the foundation that fuels the conflict. and that the only solution is a severe diplomatic and political reform. The author allows the reader to identify with all sides of this conflict and outlines the hardships it has created for all involved parties including the situation of the Pakistanis and people of Pakistan controlled Azad Kashmir face which is a topic that is not covered in most works done on the subject. and Sikhs. Kashmir in Conflict. It is a reference book on all issues of Kashmir ranging from ethnic diversity to ongoing military operations. This book's focus is on the deep ethnic and cultural issues that divide J&K and identifies how these issues affect all parties involved. Victoria Schofield is an American author who provides a historical view of Kashmir combined with current accounts of the conflict. 2003 (Historical and Political).
Singh exposes the sharp differences he experienced with New Delhi about what the most 22 . the Border Security Force. he also spends a large portion of the book dedicated to his time serving as a commander of the largest paramilitary group in Kashmir. By using indepth research and interviews. 2001 (Military). while simultaneously fighting insurgents in the Kashmir valley. Prakash Singh is a retired career police officer from the Indian security forces. and provides a noncombatant perspective. The paper broadly covers numerous issues that include separatist movements. Kaia Leather.the Pakistani and Indian standpoint. This thesis is a fine work and contains a brief synopsis of large amounts of information and uses references from numerous sources. she makes it clear that the Kashmiris themselves must be included in any negotiation or peace will not be achieved. leaving out the Kashmiris themselves. the role of Pakistan and India. Although most of the book is focused on Assam and his battles with separatist activity in this Indian state. "Kashmiri Separatists. The author writes from first person experience and focuses on the limitations and difficulties he encountered attempting to secure the LoC. Prakash Singh. Although this is a short paper. The role of the United States in the conflict and its critical role in any future solution are addressed. His numerous years of experience fighting separatists in the Assam region and Kashmir are the empirical basis for writing this book." 2003 (Historical and Political). it contains the latest data on the major armed insurgent groups and the Hurriyat conference. Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail. Kaia Leather is an American researcher who captures the Kashmir war by focusing on all issues associated with the crisis.
Military authors often believe that the answer lies in a new doctrine or weapons. The current literature on the Kashmir conflict provides numerous well-researched insights into the conflict. strategies of insurgents. only look for answers in their profession.effective methods are to fight insurgents in Kashmir. Akhtar offers a different viewpoint for possible causes. Shaheen Akhtar. therefore. Singh views the Kashmir conflict as a battle for India's survival between secularism and fundamentalism. and economic instruments. but not a combination of all four. 1998 (Historical and Political). informational. Pakistani. This book is written by a Pakistani author and published by the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad. It traces the roots of the conflict and offers explanations for the current crisis from a distinctly Pakistani view. and political and social scientists see the answer in solving the human dimension of the conflict. diplomatic. and international sources. This brief book is a necessary reference when researching the subject to gain an appreciation of the Pakistani and Kashmiri motivations and aspirations that continue to play such an important role in this conflict. rather than analyzing this problem within the context of a combination of military. Uprising in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. the book is grounded in fact and uses references from Indian. that most authors write what is most familiar to them and. but none uses the instruments of national power to measure an effective Indian government response. Nevertheless. and possible outcomes of the conflict that is not written about in many books. The research gap that exists in dealing with the issue of counterinsurgency in Kashmir appears to be due to the fact. 23 . Most works offer their own solution to how to end the insurgency in Kashmir by looking for solutions using only one or two instruments of national power. Overall.
whose objectives are equality and an equal distribution of the central control. The model's framework. who seek to displace the political system and replace it with a primordial system. (4) pluralists. but provides basic guidelines that will assist scholars and politicians with the definition of the type of insurgency in order to understand its scope. beginning with the definition of the type of insurgency that is being fought and ending with the government's response to counter the insurgency by using the instruments of national power. The types of insurgents that O'Neil outlines are: (1) anarchists. with a foundation that is solidly grounded in history. will be used to analyze the Kashmir insurgency. such as an ancestral or religious system. outlined in the book Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. whose ultimate aim is to set up a new 24 . Step One: Definition of the Type of Insurgency in Kashmir The first step in the analysis of the Kashmir insurgency is to define what type of insurgency the Indian government is fighting. (3) traditionalists. who want to achieve individual freedom for everybody and set up a political system that supports this. The model is made up of seven steps. This framework will be applied to analyze the Indian government's effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir.CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Bard O'Neil's model. O'Neil emphasizes that this is not a cookie cutter solution to define insurgent wars. whose ultimate goal is to eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements. This chapter will outline O'Neil's model and describe how it will be applied to estimate the success of the counterinsurgency effort in Kashmir. is designed to analyze any insurgency. (2) egalitarians. (5) secessionists.
An assessment will be conducted on these barriers in Kashmir to determine if they are causing the Indian government to misunderstand the goals of the insurgents and thus use the wrong approach in planning it strategy. Goal ambiguity applies when numerous different Kashmiri insurgent splinter groups issue information about the insurgent goals. who seek to maintain the current political system. 17-21). An assessment will be conducted to determine the type of insurgency in Kashmir in order to determine if the Indian government has defined correctly the type of insurgency it is fighting. Misleading rhetoric occurs when Kashmiri insurgents release misleading information intentionally or by accident. but no faction is clearly in control of the insurgency (O'Neil 1990. 2123). and economic benefits without rejecting the political system currently in place. 21-23). social. but want to engage in violence against nonruling groups who are demanding more rights or benefits (O'Neil 1990. For the purpose of this thesis.political community. Goal transformation occurs when new leaders emerge as the Kashmir insurgency matures and change the overall goal of the insurgent organization. 25 . misleading rhetoric. who want more political. thereby causing confusion in the analysis of the ultimate goals of the insurgents by the Indian government. These barriers are outlined in the O'Neil model as goal transformation. (6) reformists. and goal ambiguity (O'Neil 1990. and (7) preservationists. Goal conflict takes place when Kashmiri insurgent groups disagree on whether the final goals of the insurgency should be accession into Pakistan or independence. there are four possible barriers that can make the identification of the type of insurgency with which the Indian government is dealing difficult and unclear. goal conflict.
telecommunications. The human environment is characterized as the economic. as well as the transportation. which. which uses political means. Step Two: Assessing the Kashmiri Insurgents' Strategic Approach The next step in the model is to determine which strategy the Kashmiri insurgents are using. It is essential that the strategy of Kashmiri insurgents is identified correctly. The last is the urban warfare strategy. The O'Neil-model outlines four types of strategies insurgents can use. concentrates on guerrilla or conventional warfare to conduct the campaign. and gradual escalation of violence. 31-36). so that the Indian government's counterstrategy can be assessed on the tactical and operational level. Once the type of insurgency and form of warfare being executed by the Kashmiris is defined. with military primacy.Finally. the form of warfare the Kashmiri insurgents are using must be identified. and utilities infrastructure (O'Neil 1990. which applies to small organizations attacking urban centers (O'Neil 1990. 24-27). The types of warfare that are available to Kashmiri insurgent organizations are terrorism. The third is the military-focused strategy. 53-59). conventional war. 26 . or a combination of these (O'Neil 1990. an analysis will be conducted to assess if the Indian government has come to the same conclusion. The second is a protracted popular war strategy. guerrilla war. Step Three: Assessing the Environment of the Kashmiri Insurgents The physical and human environment in which the insurgents operate affects the Indian government's strategy and radically dictates the campaign plan which the Indian government is executing. mass organization. The first is the conspiratorial strategy. in which a small elite organization uses a low level of violence. The physical environment is broadly defined as the terrain and climate.
In the analysis section of this thesis. these passive supporters are unwilling to provide material support due to fear of retribution from Indian forces or competing insurgent organizations. the role of leaders and masses. O'Neil's model divides this critical topic into three distinct categories: active and passive support. 59-67). in order to identify the size of the popular support and means the insurgents use to gain support in order analyze the Indian government's response. or intelligence support 27 .political. These physical and human conditions will directly affect the Kashmiri insurgents' ability to conduct lethal and nonlethal operations against the local populace and the Indian government and the ability of Indian counterinsurgency forces to interdict insurgent forces. and religious conditions that exist in the insurgents' area of operations (O'Neil 1990. Passive support is given by that portion of Kashmir's populace that identifies with the insurgents and gives moral support by not actively assisting Indian security forces and participating in civil disobedience. Step Four: Assessing the Popular Support of the Kashmiri People Gaining and maintaining popular support is the center of gravity for both opponents during any insurgency and therefore the efforts of both sides must be focused on this key task in order to have any hope of victory. Therefore. However. Active Kashmiri supporters are the foot soldiers who battle Indian forces or are covert forces that provide financial. the scope of the insurgency will be estimated at least in general terms. medical. 70-74). an assessment of the Kashmiri physical and human environment will assist to determine the effectiveness of current and future Indian counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. and the techniques insurgents use to gain this support (O'Neil 1990. ethnic.
which highlights the grievances of the masses. who are highly educated and nonviolent. (3) exoteric appeal. which is used to demonstrate the government's weakness or the insurgents' strength.to the foot solders. They are the key component of the insurgency and conduct day-to-day operations through direct action (O'Neil 1990. which is driven by intellectuals who appeal to the realities of economic or political conditions in which the masses suffer. 73-74). which is the insurgents' attempt to drive government forces to take reprisals against the masses for crimes and atrocities they commit and then to use the reprisals as 28 . provide leadership on the national and international scene in order to win international support for the insurgents' cause (O'Neil 1990. The masses are defined as the foot soldiers and fight for the insurgency at the operational and tactical level. The political leaders. The O'Neil model outlines how insurgents employ seven different methods. (5) provocation of government repression. or a combination of these. (2) esoteric appeal. which is the ability of the leaders to derive respect from the locals by being seen as superheroes or larger than life. 73-74). The second group is the operational leaders who use their intellectual ability to plan and conduct military operations against the Indian security forces. Both types of leaders are essential to Kashmir's insurgency campaign in building popular support against the Indian government and by using political and military means to defeat the Indian government. (4) terrorism. to which the masses comply with fear. The Kashmiri leadership can be divided into two groups characterized as the political and operational leaders. Active supporters are hard to distinguish from the passive supporters because they operate in secrecy among the Kashmiri civilian populace. to win the support of the local population: (1) charismatic attraction.
An analysis of the insurgents' means used to win the support of the Kashmiris is conducted to establish how difficult it is for the Indian government to counter the insurgents' efforts with its own campaign to win the support of the populace. and cohesion (O'Neil 1990. 9098). which is used to force the people to provide material support (O'Neil 1990. and cohesion of the Kashmiri insurgency is conducted in order to reveal if the Indian government has identified possible weaknesses of the insurgents which can be exploited. and (7) coercion. 90-91).propaganda to incite a conflict. and political cadres that comprise an insurgency organization over a period of time (O'Neil 1990. which is the insurgents' attempt to win support by helping the people through material support. such as education or economic means. These numbers in Kashmir have changed over time. 74-85). the scope of the Kashmir insurgency will be estimated in 29 . However. complexity. complexity. lack of cohesion in common purpose. Therefore. An analysis of the scope. When determined these dimensions reveal current threat the Kashmiri insurgents pose to the Indian government and security forces fighting in Kashmir and their progress. Step Five: Assessing the Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents The O'Neil model outlines three structural dimensions of the insurgent organization that must be examined: scope. Scope refers to the number of fighters. and lack of complexity when conducting basic functions. thus allowing key facets to be destroyed. the scope still directly affects the Indian government's responses to use military and political means and must be continually adjusted. leaders. such as membership base. due to the mature nature of this insurgency and ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the region. (6) demonstration of potency.
External support can take the form of moral.this study to determine the effectiveness the Indian counterinsurgency response and strategy. or sanctuary support (O'Neil 1990. Kashmir insurgents organize and conduct activities. when both fighting the insurgents and attempting to destroy their intelligence. 111-124). planning. such as training. 30 . The relationship of political and operational elements of the insurgency will also be examined to determine if their operations and goals support each other. and execution of operations. Once the type and provider of Kashmiri support is identified. An analysis will be conducted as to the nature of the external support the Kashmiri insurgents are receiving from Pakistan and other countries and whether India has used the appropriate means to stop this support. intelligence. Cohesion is the element of an insurgency that directly affects the ability of an organization to conduct large-scale operations over time (O'Neil 1990. 98). political. the Indian government must react by using the instruments of national power to stop the external support. Complexity refers to the ability of an insurgency to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the organization (O'Neil 1990. The cohesion of the Kashmiri insurgents will be examined to determine if they are a closely linked organization with a common purpose and conduct operations that are focused on achieving a common end. Step Six: Assessing Foreign and Pakistani External Support The detection and identification of external support are critical for the success of any counterinsurgency effort. and recruiting operations. finance. The complexity of these activities will be analyzed to gain an understanding of the level of difficulty the Indian Army is facing. 91-95). material.
Economic Step Six: Define Pakistani and Foreign Support Types of support (Moral. Traditionalist 4. Inc. This analysis will answer the following question. Military Focus 4. Sanctuary) Step Five: Define Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents 1. Terrorism 2. and informational criteria as the measures that will be used to determine if the Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir is effective. Material. Pluralist 5. Urban Warfare Step Three: Define Kashmir Environment Physical Environment 1. economic. Bard. diplomatic. Reformist 7. Secessionist 6. 1990. Preservationist Forms of Warfare used in Kashmir 1. Political/3. 31 . Conventional Step Seven: Define Indian Response • • • • DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION MILITARY ECONOMIC Step Two: Define Strategic Approach 1. Ethnic/2. the Indian response is assessed. Scope 3. This assessment uses military. Cohesion Step Four: Define Popular Support in Kashmir Passive + Active + Intellectuals and Masses =Techniques For Gaining Popular Support Figure 2. Complexity 2. Protected Popular 3. Egalitarian 3. O'Neil Model Modified Source: O'Neil. Climate Human Environment 1. Herndon. Insurgency and terrorism: Inside modern revolutionary warfare.Step Seven: the Indian Government's Response After an analysis of the Kashmiri insurgency is conducted using O'Neil's model to clearly identify and define its elements. Terrain 2. Political. Anarchist 2. Conspiratorial 2. Is the Indian government using the correct combination of the instruments of national power as a means to defeat the insurgency in Kashmir or is it conducting the counterinsurgency as a military campaign alone to achieve success? O'Neil's insurgency model as applied to the Kashmir conflict (see figure 2): Step One: Define Type Of Insurgency 1. Virginia: Brassey's. Guerrilla 3.
"This group is the most powerful secessionist organization. 132). Secessionist Insurgent Groups Kashmir's secessionists are broken into two opposing camps: those that want independence from India and to become part of Pakistan.CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS Step One: Definition of the Type of Insurgency in Kashmir This section of the thesis will outline the types of insurgency that currently exist in J&K and the methods of warfare the insurgents are using. whose headquarter is in Anatang and goal is independence from India without joining Pakistan (Pelton 2000. One of the most active of the secessionist insurgent groups is the Hizbul Mujahideen (HUM). which is headquartered in Srinagar and strongly supported by Pakistan. 117). whose goal is the secession of Kashmir by armed warfare in order to merge with Pakistan" (Santhanam 2003. It also focuses on the problems to identify the true goals of these groups due to goal transformation. 539). 32 . Currently. no accurate estimates exist to delineate the number and strength of secessionist groups that are pro-independence or pro-accession into Pakistan. "Most of the other secessionist organizations are splinter groups that drift in and out of favor and alliance with these two leading insurgent groups" (Wirsing 1994. and those that want to form an independent nation of Kashmir. The other major secessionist group is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). which has often occurred in many of the groups as the insurgency matured.
It is unclear which of the traditionalist insurgent groups has the largest membership. but instead these insurgents want total domination of the world under the power of the Koran. this insurgent group also attracts many followers outside the borders of India. "This and other traditionalist insurgent organizations believe in the concept of ummah. 101). 540). and North Africa. because of the element of extreme fundamentalism they bring to the insurgency as currently seen in Palestine and Iraq. but also in urban areas where Islamic fundamentalist schools. as recently seen in the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. which advocates Islamic supremacy of the world (Pelton 2002. 33 . Common enemies of these insurgents are all non-Muslims. but the current leader is the Harkat ul Ansar (HUA). but India. In addition. The followers of these insurgents are seen primarily in rural areas of Kashmir. 146). The traditionalist type of insurgency in Kashmir has low membership numbers compared with the secessionist group. as well as from major terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaida (Singh 2001.Kashmir's Traditionalists The traditionalist insurgents have the lowest numbers of active members and are perhaps the least known by both the Indian government and the international community. and Israel are considered the worst infidels (Santhanam 2003. but may present the largest danger to India in the future. the unification of holy warriors under the flag of the jihad" (Ram 2002. Kashmir traditionalists are bound in strong religious Muslim traditions and want the sharia law and other traditional systems. the United States. operate. who come from the Middle East. 196-197). known as Madarssas. Kashmir traditionalists' ambition for power is not restricted to the Indian state of Kashmir. former Soviet Republics.
131). 215-223). terrorist threats. Additionally. Misleading Rhetoric and Information Kashmiri insurgents' release of information is characterized as political messages. goal transformation. and propaganda. This information system is characteristic of a mature insurgency 34 . This chapter of the thesis will address barriers that complicated the identification of the goals of the insurgency since 1990. Pakistani media often publish news articles with the tacit permission of the Pakistani government or large Kashmiri insurgent groups who want to transmit a message to the Indian government on issues involving the conflict. both the Indian Army and Kashmiri insurgents have developed informal means to communicate by using the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to pass information as their political representative (Santhanam 2003. or terrorist threats that are generated locally in Kashmir by means of carriers or the local press. The reason for this is due to barriers of misleading rhetoric. since 1993.Barriers to Identification of the Kashmiri Insurgent Goals Kashmiri insurgents are characterized as highly fragmented and are fundamentally divided on the issue of independence or accession into Pakistan (Wirsing 1994. the Indian Army was challenged to sort out relevant from inaccurate or deliberately misleading information as the insurgents developed means to communicate with the Indian government. and goal conflict among the different insurgent groups. In the early days of the counterinsurgency campaign. However. to avoid misleading rhetoric. An example of common information exchange now are political messages that are generated by Pakistan. These methods allow the Indian government and Army and the Kashmiri insurgents to understand each other's rhetoric and true intentions.
which indicates that all parties understand how to inform each other of their intentions if needed. the Indian Army and government were challenged to conduct an accurate goal identification of the traditionalist and secessionist groups. This Pakistani cohesion also extended to the traditionalist insurgents by offering support to organizations such as the HUA. Goal Transformation of Kashmiri Insurgents Goal transformation is common in Kashmir among the numerous insurgent groups that operate throughout the region. today's insurgents' goals are well understood by all sides involved in this conflict. 125-127). At times. many organizations such as the JKLF. whose original goal was independence. received extensive pressure from Pakistan and other pro-accession insurgents to change its goal to accession into Pakistan or otherwise face loss of all external support (Bose 2003. influence. with the understanding that these traditionalist groups would not support a proindependence stance. but this was quickly overcome by both Indian intelligence and the use of mass media by the insurgents to proclaim their goals. For instance. and power 35 . As a result. The reason for this change is primarily the financial and material support provided by Pakistan. with little reason for any party to question what final outcome the insurgents are demanding. Goal Identification In the early days of the insurgency. It is most common for pro-independent movements to change their goals to a pro-accession stance. goal transformation by different Kashmiri insurgent groups has caused false impressions in the Indian Intelligence community about goals. which will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis.
143-144). 84-85). Second. First. Goal Conflict among Kashmir's Insurgents Groups With the evolution of the pro-accession movement by traditionalists. 2224). as many insurgent groups disappear or fold into other larger groups. Understanding the forms of warfare being used is essential because of the requirements and problems it causes for the Indian Army.of the numerous organizations operating in Kashmir (Asthana 2001. whose external support introduced two new elements into the Kashmir conflict. 36 . However. As a result. Pakistan introduced foreign fighters and Madarssas to the Kashmir insurgency. The inability to accurately identify changing goals of the insurgent groups was seen primarily in the early days of the insurgency and caused problems for the Indian Army in effectively combating its enemy." (Santhanam 2003. in 1993 the HUM became the dominant leader in the insurgency scene supported by Pakistan (Ganguly 1997. this issue still remains a minor challenge to the Indian Army today. Types of Warfare This section focuses on the forms of warfare that Kashmiri insurgents are currently using to fight the Indian government. thus changing their goals as well. but also various secessionist groups. goal conflict among the various insurgency groups has occurred continuously in Kashmir since 1993. which inspired some Kashmiri insurgents to abandon their secessionist stance and become traditionalists who advocate the new goal of "Jihadi. Pakistan lost patience with the JKLF due to its numerous defeats at the hands of the Indian Army during the early 1990s and its refusal to advocate accession as the group's main goal. The reason for this can be directly traced to Pakistan.
However. Limited Guerrilla Warfare In Kashmir. but the Indian government and most noted sources put the number between 4. while avoiding Indian Army forces. limited guerrilla warfare is conducted primarily in rural areas and is fought against by regular Indian Army forces and special police units that operate primarily in the Kashmir valley. The guerillas are primarily ethnic Kashmiris. many of the insurgent organizations in Kashmir have abandoned this form of warfare as too costly. and destroy shops. local government officials and their relatives. the primary insurgent organizations that use limited guerrilla warfare as means in Kashmir are the HUM and the HUA (Santhanam 2003. 117-130). and hotels of Kashmiri Hindus or pro-Indian government supporters. since they have lost most direct engagements. and ministers. Kashmiri guerrillas are known for targeting police forces. Guerrilla warfare in Kashmir is characterized by small insurgent units operating in small groups which use limited visibility and wooded terrain to move from safe havens to positions of advantage to execute hit and run tactics on soft targets.000 guerrillas (Ram 2002. Pakistani nationals. but are augmented by foreign fighters that include Afghan Taliban. Currently. and government buildings (Ram 2002. These 37 . and Arabs. Terrorism Kashmiri insurgents attack teachers.000 to 5. 94-114. police. 39-42). houses. and destroying infrastructure including buses. bridges. 141). the Indian Army's response is evaluated with regard to its effectiveness. The numbers of actual guerrillas in the Kashmir valley vary depending on different sources. after strong counter guerilla efforts by the Indian Army.Once the form of warfare is established.
In December 1999. These terrorist actions are not new to the Indian government and people. 288).831 shops destroyed by arson until 2002 (Medhurst 2002. 204-205). the insurgents attack such moderate family members to intimidate and to disseminate terror as a warning to all who deal with the Indian government. 38 . it ultimately led to the release of imprisoned insurgents. this hijacking was not the first by Kashmiri separatists. 198). 140-145). terrorism has become a cheap and efficient alternative for Kashmiri insurgents that are demonstrated daily against Kashmiris and the Indian government and military. the Indian Airline flight 814 was hijacked by Harkat-ul-Ansar. Terrorism is also being exported outside of J&K by attacking both the Indian central government in New Delhi and the Indian commercial airline industry. Another example of terrorism was the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. Because of the lack of success using guerrilla tactics. who demanded the release of several imprisoned Kashmiri insurgents (Singh 2001. These attacks are also conducted against Kashmiri Muslims who are considered moderates by the insurgents. Although. These objectives are legitimate in the insurgents' view and serve specific purposes. such as to erode the will of pro-Indian Kashmiris who continue to support the Indian government.terrorist attacks have amounted to over 8. As a result. destroy the morale of the Indian military in Kashmir. During this attack five Kashmiri insurgents from Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with automatic weapons and grenades in a suicide attack. since many Muslim moderates want to negotiate and find a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem. but are becoming bolder in nature.000 private dwellings and 4. and force Kashmiri Hindus to leave Kashmir (Ram 2002. killing eight staff members (Santhanam 2003.
by using their influence to impede all civil administration. When the strikes failed to completely collapse the local government the conspirators in the local government stayed on strike as insurgents murdered 170 loyal Indian government employees who continued to try to run local services (Asthana 2001. The Indian government's counterstrategy was to use the military as an interim government and to then bring in legislature from the Federal government or hire non-Muslims to fill most government jobs. These general strikes were led from within the local Kashmiri government. which resulted in large gaps in government services and legislature. However. which clearly has an overmatch capability to defeat a nonstate actor by using conventional tactics and weapons. Consequently. and led many Kashmiris to believe this strategy was working. 78).Step Two: Assessing the Kashmiri Insurgents' Strategic Approach The Kashmiri insurgent's strategic approach is analyzed to determine if it has any chance of success against the Indian Army. This chapter will discuss the approaches used by Kashmiri insurgents from 1989 to 2003 and how these strategies have changed with regard to the Indian government's responses over time. when Kashmiri government employees and transportation workers joined general strikes thereby shutting down the state government. the conspiratorial strategy had a short existence and was effectively countered by the end of 39 . The Indian government's response to this was slow and ineffective. This approach initially had some success and demonstrated a united front to the Indian government and international community. Conspiratorial Strategy The conspiratorial strategy was used in 1990. with the conspirators hoping to attain secession or maximum autonomy from India. the conspiratory approach lacked the military strength to back it.
1992 by use of marshal law and a replacement of the Kashmiri government by the federal government and military. Protracted Popular War Strategy From 1989 to 1996, Kashmiri insurgent groups conducted the protracted popular war strategy, which begins with terrorism, transitions to guerilla warfare, and finally evolves to a full conventional war. The event that initiated this strategy was the murder of four unarmed Air Force officers in Srinagar on 24 January 1990 by the JKLF, which signified a change in tactics to terrorism (Bose 2003, 111-112). The Indian government's response to the initiation of the strategy was to enter Kashmir with 150,000 security forces in order to attempt to regain control of the civil government and to reestablish general order (Schofield 1996, 40). These security forces were not trained in conducting counterinsurgency, but instead used tactics that focused on conventional warfare. This resulted in a campaign that targeted the entire population, thereby causing a large loss of innocent civilian life and property (Bose 2003, 112-114). The Indian government failed to correctly define the strategy of Kashmiri insurgents from 1989 to early 1992 and thus gave the insurgents the opportunity to enter the next phase of warfare. Thus in 1992 there was a transition to the next phase of protracted popular warfare throughout Kashmir, guerilla warfare. The leading insurgent organization, JKLF, actively battled Indian counterinsurgency forces both in rural and urban areas. In addition, numerous other splinter insurgent organizations began to appear armed, trained, and willing to fight. The key aspect that allowed the insurgents to begin more direct operations against Indian counterinsurgency forces were the lines of communications and supply that were firmly
put into place with the help of the ISI (Wirsing 1994, 119-121). This assistance gave Kashmiri insurgents the means to conduct very aggressive guerilla warfare. In 1996, the popular protracted war strategy was defeated during the guerilla phase for numerous reasons. First, the Indian Army conducted aggressive counterinsurgency operations, using an overhauled Indian intelligence service that finally identified most of the insurgents' organizations and their key leaders. As a result, the Indian Army and special counterinsurgency units were able to target and attack suspected insurgent strongholds. Furthermore, other situations drastically affected the insurgents' guerilla operations. The JKLF fought with other insurgent organizations over the issue that the original platform of a free Kashmir should be replaced with the new agenda to join Pakistan (Santhanam 2003, 167-170). This infighting, which already started in 1991, was instigated by the ISI to push the new platform of a united Pakistan and Kashmir and would only serve to derogate a united insurgency effort. The final factor that eliminated the protracted war strategy was the Indian government's successful attempt to hold an election in 1996, despite its low turn out of 46 percent of the population (Asthana 2001, 83). Finally, in 1996 the JKLF was defeated and most guerilla groups that had been formed in the stalemate phase disbanded. The HUM, the sole survivor that was still actively conducting limited guerilla operations, was being hunted by the Indian Army (Bose 2003, 136). Political Strategy With the rise of numerous insurgent organizations throughout Kashmir in 1993, a political arm of the insurgents, the APHC, was established in order to speak with one voice and gain international acceptability for the cause (Schofield 2003, 159-160). The 41
APHC came into existence during one of the most difficult periods of the Kashmiri insurgency for the Indian government. In 1993, insurgents took control of the Hazratal shrine in Srinagar and became involved in a month-long standoff with Indian security forces (Wirsing 1994, 134). This became a national issue due to this site being considered sacred to India's 140 million Muslims. However, the APHC negotiated a peaceful settlement with both sides and gained international respect as peace makers. The result was the national and international recognition of the political wing of the Kashmiri insurgents, which the Indian government has never been able to discredit. The existence of the APHC causes problems for both India and Pakistan, because the organization represents an independent organization that has little allegiance to Pakistan; at the same time, it has international recognition, so that India cannot ignore it. Although the group is unpopular to many Kashmiri insurgent organizations, it still commands authority, because it has open lines to the local Kashmiri government and New Delhi. Since its inception, the APHC has played a key role in all negotiations with New Delhi and will continue to do so because of its legitimization as a peacemaker in 1993 (Leather 2003, 18-20). As a consequence, the Kashmiri insurgents have a recognized voice for their cause that cannot be removed. Urban Warfare Strategy This strategy mainly takes place in the city of Srinagar, where terrorist attacks occur regularly, and focuses on the Indian Army and a dense and multiethnic population. Srinagar offers numerous targets that include Hindus, government workers, military, police, and the few tourists that still visit Kashmir. The purpose of this urban warfare strategy is to erode the support of the Kashmiri people for the Indian government by 42
a Special Operations Group. trigger happy troops. I see similar pall and fear and raw tension fall over other cites at war: Algiers. this counterstrategy is not effective. because of the large population of noncombatants and dense urban sprawl (Ram 2002. colorful city into a semi ghost town. 140). However. "Intifida has turned the streets of the once vibrant. Bogotá. Conducting counterinsurgency operations in Srinagar is a difficult task. and guarded unimportant intersections and government buildings. 112). Srinagar is clearly a city under siege" (Margolis 2002. These units are the most seasoned counterinsurgency units in the Indian military. These forces rely on federal law enforcement and intelligence units to gain information on insurgent meeting places and safe houses and then conduct raids to eliminate them. Insurgents have turned Srinagar into a city under siege. so that the insurgency gains momentum. which operate daily in and around Srinagar. and the Central Reserve Police Force. The tactical approach to fighting the insurgency is to patrol Srinagar dismounted and to use numerous stationary posts to secure critical sites. As I walked through the grim. which usually result in full scale battles that end up taking place between large numbers of Indian soldiers and small numbers of insurgents. police and paramilitary troops. and Kabul. manned by nervous. Sandbagged Indian checkpoints. as described in the book War on Top of the World by Eric Margolis. This environment has allowed the insurgents to tie up large numbers of Indian Army forces in Srinagar and thus expand their operations into the rural areas. Attacks in Srinagar still occur daily. deserted streets I met wary patrols of Indian army. The Indian Army and security forces in Srinagar consist of thirty-two battalions comprised of Border Security Forces. the Rashtriya Rifles Special Counterinsurgency Units. because most of the insurgent activity is conducted 43 .creating insecurity and mistrust of local police and government.
clandestinely and thus usually leaves Indian security forces in a reaction mode to such insurgent attacks as improvised explosive devices, ambushes, and suicide bombings. The urban warfare strategy that is primarily conducted in Srinagar is a successful insurgent strategy which is applied in a violent manner. The primary weakness in the government's counter strategy is the lack of the use of local police to fight the insurgents, but instead use primarily Indian security forces that are not from Kashmir. Thus, the violence is largely viewed by the residents as war between the Indian government and insurgents, and lacks the emotional effect of local Kashmiri police fighting against this terrorism and sustaining casualties. The local police must be used to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Srinagar. This would remove the violence from appearing be instigated by the Indian army. In addition the local police would have better access to intelligence allowing a more proactive approach to fighting this insurgent strategy. Nevertheless, urban warfare in the congested city of Srinagar using terrorism as it primary method of warfare is situation that untenable for any military response. Rural Warfare Strategy Although the rural warfare strategy is being attempted by the insurgents in Kashmir, scholars studying insurgency theory do not characterize this as a defined strategic approach. The characteristics of this approach in Kashmir include attacking public transportation, tourism, local police, and government in rural areas. However, the strategy avoids engaging regular army forces and mid to heavily secured installations and formations. This rural warfare takes place in all areas of Kashmir outside the general area of Srinagar and was adopted by default since 1996, after the defeat of large guerilla operations by successful Indian counterinsurgency operations. Although many rural areas 44
in Kashmir are under government control at certain times, this has not stopped either the movement of Kashmiri insurgents and supplies to and from the LoC or the continuous violence in what is commonly referred to as the Kashmir Valley and the region of Jammu (Asthana 2001, 83-84). The Indian Army's counterstrategy to fight insurgent rural warfare strategy is a massive deployment of 210 battalions consisting of an estimated 300,000 men, thus comprising the same array of forces as in Srinagar (Rikhye 2002). These forces are not mobile, but instead are fixed to an area of operations assigned to each unit. The primary tactics of these units is to conduct search and attack or cordon and search operations, both of which rely on surprise and involve encircling a target area and then combing the area for insurgents. These forces are mainly relegated to stationary guard to protect infrastructure and posts. This strategy is consuming hundreds of thousands of Indian soldiers, but appears to have stopped freedom of movement of insurgents and forced the insurgents to flee to the mountains from urban and village areas. The rural warfare strategy, however, appears to have only limited success for the insurgents because it is missing the key aspect of building popular support among the rural Kashmiris, which uses the local populace as leverage to increase the scope and intensity of operations against government forces. This lack of support occurred because the insurgents were forced to leave the villages and living areas due to the massive troop deployment and relentless counterinsurgency operations of the Indian Army. The lack of support is an interesting phenomenon, since the terrain and environment favor the insurgents. This is a success for the Indian counterinsurgency campaign since the terrain and environment actually favor the insurgents. 45
Step Three: The Human and Physical Environment of the Kashmiri Insurgents Kashmir's environment is diverse in all regards in relation to terrain, weather, infrastructure, ethnicity, religion, and economic dimensions. All of these facets are unique and some, such as the ethnic and religious make-up, are key elements that are directly attributed to the conflict in Kashmir. Other factors, such as terrain, weather, and economic conditions, are secondary conditions, but also assist in keeping the conflict ongoing in regards to the duration and scope. The Physical Environment The location of Kashmir and the physical environment are significant factors in why both India and Pakistan lay claim to the area and will not forfeit it for the sake of peace for both strategic and economic reasons. Kashmir borders Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and China. Whoever controls this area also controls the water sources of three rivers: the Jhelum, the Chenad, and the Indus, which are critical for both Pakistan and India (National Public Radio 2004a). In addition, the economic value of the terrain of Kashmir is unlike the rest of India and South Asia. "Kashmir itself lies in isolation from the rest of a dry and overpopulated India from which it is separated by the Himalayas and Karakoram mountains and is characterized by water, trees, and fertile plains" (Margolis 2001, 56-57). Thus, Pakistan and India have enormous economic and strategic stakes in the area due to the physical environment. Pakistani-controlled Kashmir is called Azad Kashmir and translates into "Free Kashmir." This area borders most of Indian-controlled J&K along the UN-demarcated LoC. The area of Azad Kashmir is 13,296 square kilometers and constitutes one-third of the original state of J&K before the partition of India by Great Britain in 1947 (Rajawat 46
The main geographic issue in Azad Kashmir for the Indian counterinsurgency campaign and the continuous military standoff between the Indian and Pakistani Armies is the LoC. the hill country. The Kashmir valley comprises all types of terrain and is also bisected by the Jhelum River and numerous other streams and lakes (J&K Government India 2003). In contrast. Jammu. The LoC is over 700 kilometers long and provides approximately 150 covered and concealed crossing points for Kashmiri insurgents to enter and exit Indian Kashmir (Asthana 2001. 83-87). and Ladakh (Bose 2003. which is between 300 meters and 3. and the control of this border effectively fixes 70. The Ladakh region is predominantly a high mountain area which covers the largest land mass of the entire state of J&K with glaciers and the Himalayan range (J&K Government India 47 .2003. and is made up of the three regions: Kashmir.000 meters in height. 8-11).000 meters. The territory constitutes two-thirds of the original state of J&K. is 139. The terrain is very diverse and is characterized by mountains over 3. Its hills and mountains contain large amounts of dense foliage with some undergrowth.000 square kilometers large. 94-97). The significance of the LoC and the role it plays in the Kashmir insurgency is arguable. and finally the valleys and plains (J&K Government India 2003). but it does offer some resupply routes and access to sanctuary to insurgents. 64). Indian controlled Kashmir more complex in size and terrain and borders Pakistan and China and has border disputes with both countries over the exact geographical boundaries of J&K and what India believes is an illegal occupation of the state of J&K by these two countries (Rajawat 2003.000 Indian troops to preclude its use. the Jammu region is primarily a valley and plain area with some hill country and mountain ranges that separate it from Kashmir and Ladakh.
and Srinagar. Anatang.5 millimeters. The area has four seasons. with most precipitation falling in the winter as snow (J&K Government India 2003). depending on the specific security situation of the general area. In the region of Jammu. with an estimate of one television per sixty-five residents (Ganguly 1997. Kashmir's Transportation. the winter capital of J&K.2003). Electric power exists in all cities and villages. power stations. The annual precipitation in Kashmir averages 650. and public transportation.000 meters. but some remote mountainous areas are without both electricity and telecommunications. such as telecommunications. Most Kashmiris have access to radio. Generally. with short falls and springs and longer winters and summers. In the winter months the snowline drops to 1. 35-37). the Indian government 48 . the infrastructure in Kashmir is developed similarly to other states in India. so that much of the day-to-day operations take place in the Kashmir valley and in Srinagar. while fewer residents have access to television. the main urban area is Jammu city. and Utilities Infrastructure Kashmir's infrastructure. However. is in various states of decay or development. the summer capital of Kashmir. Telecommunications. As a result. causing much of the valley to be snowbound from as early as October to as late as April. Climate in Kashmir The climate in Kashmir is extreme. during this time most infiltration and resupply conducted along the LoC is completely stopped because of the snow. The telecommunication system in Kashmir is developed well and even many small villages have pay phones. radio and television stations. with high temperatures in the summer months and extreme lows in the winter months. The main cities in Kashmir are Baramulla.
because of fear of advanced telecommunications being used by Kashmiri insurgents for command and control (Joshi 2002). Religious and Ethnic Composition of the Population The four main religions found in J&K are Muslim. with a Muslim and Sikh minority. These are 49 . Hindu. Human Environment Kashmir's human dimensions are complex and may be one of the primary causes of this conflict. an analysis is conducted on the religious. Public transportation in Kashmir is readily available. one-third is Hindu. whose followers vary in size and concentration depending on the region and population estimates. An improved road network is limited to the valleys. and Sikh. economic. and it is still the most overlooked dimension that must be dealt with if the insurgency is going to end. The complexity of this dimension was dismissed by the Indian government until after the violence started in 1989. The Indian government has spent numerous resources to develop J&K at the same rate with the rest of India.also has managed to delay mobile communications in J&K. The Indian national railways has still not connected Jammu with Srinagar and this restricts movement of products and people between Srinagar and Jammu city to road or air. and political composition of J&K. and that Ladakh is primarily Buddhist. Breaking down the data further by regions within J&K indicates that the Kashmir valley is overwhelmingly Muslim and that Jammu is mainly Hindu. ethnic. To understand the human environment in Kashmir. Breakdown of the religious make-up of J&K reveal that two-thirds are Muslim. with a bus network throughout J&K and a developed airport in Srinagar. due to the mountainous terrain and sensitive border area with Pakistan. Buddhist. but the Indian national highway crosses both J&K.
Overview of the Population and Religious Makeup in Jammu and Kashmir Population Muslim 96% 38% 49% Hindu <4% 65% <. available from http://kashmiristudygroup.05 <5% 1% Kashmir Jammu Ladakh 4.html.500.000 200. due to its remote location surrounded by mountain peaks. Kashmir's ethnic identity emerged with 50 .however. thus adding merit to secessionist and traditionalist claims that the Muslim majority deserves more rights due to ethnic and religious majorities (see table 1).000 Source: J&K Government India 2002.org/away forward/mapsexplan/population. Jammu and Kashmir population distribution 1981 and subsequent growth.700. From this time on. The reasons for this are twofold: the lack of security prevents the Indian government from conducting a census in the Kashmir valley. and it is reluctant to publish data that show a Muslim majority living in this region. when Muslim conquerors drove the Hindu rulers from Kashmir and converted the majority of the Kashmiris to Islam which remained until today (Margolis 2002. estimates since the last official census was conducted in 1981.000 4.05% Buddhist 0% <2% 51% Sikh <. Table 1. Kashmir's identity with India was limited throughout its history. It remained Hindu until the fourteenth century. which is primarily due to the geography of the region. The area was originally Buddhist and then converted to Hinduism. accessed on 22 November Ethnic Composition The ethnic identity of J&K is also as diverse as the religious make-up of the area. Internet. 64-67).
being fair complected. Numerous scholars attribute this economic discrimination as a factor contributing to the rise of the insurgency in 1989. but with a Hindu majority that follows the caste system of present day India (Bose 2003. 69-70). In the last area of J&K. Furthermore. the Kashmiris have their own language and even look different from the Indians. a theory which is widely accepted. Thus. with the Hindu and Sikh elite minority controlling most real estate and commerce. the dividend of these investments is long term and has not given Kashmir's economy the immediate boost it needs. and education. and share a close ethnic culture with Kashmiri Muslims (National Public Radio 1999). However. Ladakh is closely related to Tibet in language and culture. 811). calling themselves Kashmiri Pandits. known as Ladakh. Economic Situation Economic discrimination against the Muslim majority existed in Kashmir for years. ethnicity was also influenced by its remoteness and severe isolation from the rest of Kashmir and India.a religion and language that is very different from the rest of present day India. Kashmir's economic situation has vastly changed with the Indian government's mass investment in utilities. Jammu's ethnicity is linked closely to that of India. since the late 1990s. healthcare. In addition. which is multi-ethnic. because its shares an ethnicity that resembles India. but also has a small Sikh and large Shia Muslim population (Margolis 2002. Jammu is very different from Kashmir. Conversely. major expenditures amounting to as much as sixty percent of all local 51 . while Kashmir is distinctly homogenous in ethnic heritage and thus very different from other Indian Muslim states. Even the Hindus who continued to live and rule in Kashmir established their own identity. and have their own cultural and ethnic identity.
A survey that was conducted in J&K in 2002 reveled that ninety-three percent of those questioned believe that economic development would bring peace to the state (Mori. investment and economic development can only 52 . Consequently. much of the youth in the Kashmir valley is unemployed and thus easily recruited into Kashmiri insurgent organizations. which yield low economic return. Furthermore. The data in table 2 indicate that unemployment is a major factor in recruiting. with twentyfour percent of all Kashmiri insurgents being jobless when joining the insurgency (Medhurst 2002. 2002). handcrafts. and rugs.000 visitors per year in the 1980s (Pelton 2000. 1-3). However.com surveys. As a result. and also discourages any return of tourism. which once yielded as many as 700. Kashmir's economy is primarily based on farming.25% 8.75% 24% FORCE OR THREAT PEER/FAMILY PRESSURE GENTLE PERSUASION ATTRACTION RELIGION ENEMY AGENT OPPORTUNIST JOBLESS The lack of any external foreign investment in Kashmir can also be attributed to the poor security situation. Reasons and motivations for Kashmiri's Joining the Insurgency 15% 10% 12% 10% 20% 0. 162).government money are consumed by security and counterinsurgency costs (Ganguly 1997. no reconstruction or economic development committees have been established by the Indian government to plan and design such development in Kashmir. The Indian government will have to address this issue if the insurgency is going to be defeated in the long term. Table 2. 544).
Politics The politics of Kashmir are complicated and the subject of thousands of books and documentaries. or Kashmir's remaining in India as a province. An analysis 53 . on three continents over three decades. and unemployed. who are essentially farmers. and the Indian Army must be the organization that provides the safe environment to promote this issue. Kashmir's accession into Pakistan. 70). the role of the Kashmiri intellectual elite. Kashmiri political agendas revolve around four platforms: an independent Kashmir. the plebiscite issue is perhaps the most passionate for all parties involved. However. and numerous other actors represented by the Hurriyat conference. The security of the Kashmir valley is still debatable. the Kashmiri people. Step Four: Assessing the Popular Support for the Insurgency "Bernard Fall wrote in the book The Two Viet Nams that in his empirical study gathered from three guerilla battlefields. The popular support for the insurgency in Kashmir will be discussed in terms of active and passive support.occur in a secure area that has a good telecommunications and transportation network. 310). Nevertheless. a semiautonomous Kashmir that is still part of India. due to India's fears of other Muslim states within India demanding the same right (Rajawat 2003. but not manipulate or coerce it. and the representative Kashmiri citizens. any solution must be forged on diplomatic grounds. civilian support is the essential ingredient of a successful insurgency" (O'Neil 1990. A plebiscite on this issue has never occurred as stipulated by United Nations resolutions and probably never will. The key players in Kashmir's politics are the Indian and Pakistani governments. merchants.
The most effective active support for the insurgency may be the Kashmiris who are unafraid to conduct civil disobedience or demonstrate against the Indian government. Depending on different sources the numbers of active Kashmiri insurgents range from 12. and children who are either active foot soldiers or provide direct support to insurgents.000 sympathizers in just one organization. Although few of the members of the AAC are foot soldiers. where the insurgency never really took root from 1989 on. they are actively pursuing self-determination. women. or who assist in civil disobedience. and acting as messengers rather than participating in direct action such as bombings or attacks. which is located in the Kashmir valley (Santhanam 2003. However. such as logistics and intelligence. with few being involved in violence on a regular basis (Ram 2002. Kashmiri active supporters predominately participate in providing intelligence on Indian security force movements and patterns. 54 . the Awami Action Committee (AAC). hiding ammunition and weapons.is conducted on the scope of the popular support in Kashmir and the methods the insurgents use to gain and maintain support. such as strikes.000 to 100. The actual foot soldiers who conduct direct action may be as few as 4. 85). and understands the effects of its operations. this small army of Kashmiri insurgents is lethal and well armed. Kashmiri Active Support Kashmiri active support includes those men.000 to 5. or participation in funeral precessions of slain insurgent leaders. demonstrations. 141).000 soldiers. rendering safe housing for resting of wounded insurgents. The only region in which Kashmiri insurgent support has dissipated to nearly zero is Ladakh.
55 . 139-140). but give quiet approval to the insurgents by ignoring what they see around them. and finally eliminating financial channels. stopping future bombings and attacks. In fact the large presence of Indian Army soldiers in Kashmir and their aggressive behavior against the Kashmiris in the early days of the counterinsurgency has probably increased the support for the insurgency rather then stopped it. "The Kashmir valley is a constant reminder to the locals of the war and its aftermath is the hundreds martyrs' cemeteries that exist with most dates on the graves reading 1990 to 1994 during the guerilla struggle" (Bose 2003.000 people in Srinagar joined in the funeral procession of the prominent HUM insurgent commander Ghulam Rasool Dar. These passive supporters may not assist or even give insurgents moral support. who was killed by Indian security forces days earlier (J&K Government India 2004).This was recently seen in January 2004.000 to 80.000 dead on both sides combined. but they also provide no information on insurgent activities to the Indian Army and security forces. but the failure to break this support is not the lone responsibility of the Indian Army and security forces. Passive Support Passive support is exemplified by those who are not involved in the Kashmiri insurgency in any active way. Intelligence is the key factor that is necessary for Indian counterinsurgency units to act first in arresting insurgents. This demonstration is an indicator of the insurgency's active support that flourishes throughout the Kashmir valley. There is no lack of active support in the Kashmir valley. Kashmiri passive support exhibits itself in the general state of mistrust that is caused by fourteen years of violence between Indian forces and Kashmiris. when an estimated 4. it is also shared with the Indian government. which has inflicted an estimated 40.000 to 6.
and building the moral support of the masses to continue to resist the Indian government. The operational leaders are the intellectuals who lead insurgent organizations such as the HUM.In general. Kashmiris are tired of the war. planning future operations. Without these sources. The Role of Intellectuals The intellectual elite is essential to keeping the Kashmiri insurgency alive by providing a strategic vision. because Indian security forces cannot assimilate into the local culture. attaining such intelligence will be impossible. the intellectuals are also the insurgency's leadership and can be grouped into two categories: operational and political leaders. 117). In practical terms. As a result. at least a high level of anxiety is a constant factor among the Kashmiris. The political leaders are members of the Hurryat Conference. 56 . but still provide little or no intelligence to Indian security forces because of memories of the past and the present poor atmosphere between security forces and the locals. 117). The Kashmiris possess vital information on obvious insurgent activity. which only reinforces passive support. which include the cordon and search technique and mass arrest and detainment of locals without apparent justification. Thus. commanded by Syed Salahuddin. Indian Army and security forces will continue to have a very difficult time gathering operational intelligence in Kashmir if the local population is not embraced and some level of trust regained (Rajawat 2003. designing communication networks. The lack of intelligence still forces Indian Army and security forces to use what are termed "heavy handed" methods. subversive conversations in tea houses and mosques and other activity. such as movement of unfamiliar people. and use violence as their primary means to resist (Santhanam 2003.
The role of both leaderships and its importance to the Kashmir insurgency cannot be overstated. and Kashmiris continue to boycott the elections in an act of disobedience. Although New Delhi continues to claim a moral victory by proclaiming successful elections. First. the elections are a clear indicator that political insurgent leaders are able to execute a strategic plan. 230). The 2002 elections had mixed results. The intellectual leadership has created many barriers for both the Indian government and military. operational commanders understand the limitations of their organizations and therefore only escalate violence within the capabilities of their organizations by using an urban and rural warfare strategy. Although there was a high voter turnout in Ladakh and Jammu. These leaders have managed to continue to resist the Indian government's and military's efforts to destroy the Kashmiri insurgents. The general leadership of the insurgents has been highly successful in two facets. The support of the current insurgency predominantly comes from the five million Kashmiri Muslims who live in the Kashmir valley and the northern areas of 57 .who have no link to violence. the lack of success of the Indian-sponsored elections in Kashmir is a critical source of friction between the Indian government and the Kashmiri people. inspired and led by Kashmiri insurgent political leaders. Thus. The Kashmiri People The people of J&K certainly are not aligned on the issues that have faced this state since 1947. the voter turnout in Kashmir was nonexistent in Srinagar and low in the countryside. despite strong cohesion from the Indian government and military. Second. except where some Kashmiris came voluntarily or were forced by the Indian Army to go to the polling centers (Bose 2003. by adapting to evolving Indian government strategies to deal with the insurgency.
provocation of the Indian government to commit repression occurred in the early years of the war. Whether planned or not. This aspect is strong enough to continue the resistance against the Indian government's attempts to pacify and control the region. 118). As a result. But they are not united in their following of one insurgent leader or a particular stance on the future of Kashmir. and justice (Wirsing 1994. 63-65). Techniques Kashmiri Insurgents Use to Gain Support The first Kashmiri insurgent organization to turn to violence was the JKLF in 1988. such as provocation of government repression. Since 1989. the one uniting aspect is the common culture that joins the people of the Kashmir valley and demands an end to Indian intervention into local politics and Kashmir's destiny. This appeal was successful. killed government leaders. which quickly led to massive strikes and violence against the Indian government. 75). terrorism. However. economics. and coercion." is perhaps the most important factor in sustaining the popular support that the Indian government must overcome (Akhtar 1991. and engaged in ethnic violence against 58 . when insurgents bombed government infrastructure. since most Kashmiris lived in or perceived a situation of vast inequality. the intellectuals appear to have to do very little leading to keep the insurgency alive. The strong ethnic tradition that binds the Kashmiri people.Jammu. This exoteric appeal made by the JKLF and other insurgent groups were based on the need for self-determination and nationalism because of unequal treatment from the Indian government in the areas of politics. known as "Kashmiriyat. Kashmiri insurgent leaders turned to additional methods to gain and maintain support. which made exoteric appeals to the people of Kashmir to join the insurgency against the Indian government (Akhtar 1991.
which is not 59 . this assessment will be drawn from historical data and estimates. or the number of terrorist attacks over a particular period. 112). complexity. such as the Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and other actions that amounted to marshal law. However. complexity. Another method Kashmiri insurgent groups have used to gain support is terrorism against their own people as means to persuade noncooperation with the Indian government and security forces and other Kashmiri insurgent groups (see table 2). and unity of the Kashmiri insurgents is done to reveal if the Indian government has identified weaknesses of the insurgents. Scope Estimates on the scope of the insurgency can be misleading and must be examined against more meaningful data. such as the number of attacks against Indian forces over time. and cohesion in Kashmir or any insurgency is that insurgency is clandestine in nature (O'Neil 1990. parallel hierarchy. coercion is a method that is difficult to gauge. Therefore. 90-91). Finally. because the coerced rarely report the threats. resulting in numerous brutal acts against noncombatants (Ganguly 1997. Kashmiri independent newspapers are regularly threatened not to publish negative reports about Kashmiri insurgent organizations. However. the main problem with estimating scope. These extreme measures only acted to reinforce the beliefs of the Kashmiri people that they were in fact being governed unfairly and unequally. The Indian government's retaliation was seen in the numerous laws that were emplaced. cohesion. 156-157).Kashmiri Pandits (Schofield 2003. Step Five: Assessing the Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents An analysis of the current state of scope.
any data provided by the Indian government can also be considered tainted. Schofield 2003. 60 . the scope of the insurgency is practically impossible to estimate using statistics alone. This is due to the goal conflict of proindependence or pro-accession. Complexity The complexity of the insurgency refers to the relationship between the military wing of the Kashmiri insurgents and the political wing. or Indian Army casualties. The Indian government estimates that only 4. because the Indian government does not disclose such data. which indicates that the scope of the insurgency must be relatively large. In reality.available. 284. Moreover. since providing such facts could help insurgent leaders to assess their effectiveness. perhaps somewhat reliable means to estimate the scope of this insurgency comes from the free press of India and Kashmir. In general. They both consistently report that violence has been occurring daily since 1997. 192-193). the insurgency has not achieved any synchronization of efforts between the APHC and military wings. The result of this goal conflict has been devastating for the Kashmiri insurgency and has caused military and political efforts to be unfocused and at times destructive.000 to 8. lack of activity. and wrong conclusions can be drawn from such estimates as simple body counts. estimations about the scope of any insurgency are dangerous. for coordinating military operations and political actions to achieve maximum effects against the Indian government. which is the main issue that separates the political and military wing and also causes conflicts within each wing itself. the APHC. The only. Therefore.000 active insurgents remain in J&K and uses the large election turn-out in 2000 as the indicator to show that the scope is declining (Medhurst 2002.
As a result. This hierarchy is normally established to recruit fighters and to win financial support from international sources. as most recently seen at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The APHC may have been unable to earn a right to participate in these mediations due to the lack of a unified effort on the part of it and the military wing over the past years. Kashmir's insurgent organizations began to establish these structures early in the conflict by using a parallel logistics system in Kashmir and creating the political party of the APHC and the education system known as madarssas. and when the establishment of critical logistics and training facilities is set up in other countries or sanctuaries (O'Neil 1990. hospitals and a government in exile. However. Parallel Hierarchy Parallel hierarchy occurs when critical state functions are duplicated by the insurgents. the Indian government does not fear that the APHC is able to coordinate and use any military wing to force the Indian government to let the insurgents participate in any negotiation. All these parallel systems exist to prevent the Indian government from gaining firm control over the Kashmiri people.The Indian government has exploited this lack of synchronization. Pakistan and India finally agreed to discuss the Kashmir issue. After six years of no formal communications. 90). with huge concessions made by Pakistan to make such negotiations possible. The existing 61 . which are Islamic fundamentalist schools that teach theological studies focused on the premise of the jihad. such as schools. such as foreign governments and moral supporters (O'Neil 1990. This is strength of the insurgency that the Indian government has not been able to prevent or eliminate. the APHC was not even consulted to take part in any talks that may decide Kashmir's future. 90). held in Islamabad in January 2004.
as many as 150 insurgent organizations. Pakistan abandoned the organization and began to support numerous other Kashmiri insurgent organizations.Parallel hierarchy is the only area that the Indian government has not effectively dealt with and therefore the APHC. such as HUM. do not recognize the APHC as their legitimate 62 . Santhanam 2003. the effects of the lack of cohesion and no unified command element have undermined the efforts of all insurgent groups and ultimately led to the defeat of the popular protracted warfare strategy in 1996 and continue to weaken the insurgency. which could be controlled by Pakistan. when the JKLF ceased to be the leading insurgent organization due to its unwillingness to change its proindependence stance to a pro-accession stance. The problem is that many of the powerful military organizations. strong logistics systems. 138-143). Cohesion Kashmiri insurgents have not had a unified command since 1993. now estimated as thirty or fewer. including the United States' pressure to abandon support of terrorism following 11 September (Ganguly 2001." but it has lost this power for numerous reasons. and Madarssas continue to strengthen the insurgents' membership base. The intent of the ISI was to create multiple insurgent organizations that supported the accession of Kashmir into Pakistan. nor the numerous military wings of Kashmiri insurgents exercise central control over the insurgency in Kashmir. As a consequence. 7-8). For many years Pakistan did control military operations by "proxy. As a result. have operated simultaneously in Kashmir under no unified command (Asthana 2001. The Quest for Unity Neither the APHC. Nevertheless. at one time. 84.
This support has taken different forms. 200-203). Islamic fundamentalists throughout the Islamic world have voiced their approval and support of the Kashmiri insurgents' plight and goals. political. and have depicted the Kashmiri Muslims as a persecuted people dominated by a Hindu government (Asthana 2001. and sanctuary support. moral support is characterized as the support for the ultimate objectives of the Kashmiri insurgents. This support can be classified into the following areas: moral. Thus. worldwide support is 63 . material. This lack of cohesiveness and un-unified and uncoordinated approach is the strongest weakness of the insurgency and has been effectively exploited by the Indian government by causing infighting among the insurgents themselves. which has kept the insurgency weak and prevented it from gaining meaningful international support for the cause. rhetoric. and sympathies associated with the insurgents' causes. This infighting has prevented the emergence of a unified insurgent command structure. Moral Support In the Kashmir insurgency.representative because of the disagreement over pro-independence and pro-accession. but has manifested itself in three primary areas that are related to religion. The Indian Army and security forces have used the quest for unity as an opportunity to promote infighting among the insurgent organizations to make some rival insurgent groups appear to be cooperating with the Indian governme nt. and support from foreign fighters who provide their services. Step Six: Assessing External Support Provided to the Kashmiri Insurgents This section of the thesis will address the forms of assistance Kashmiri insurgents have received from Pakistan and other external supporters in the waging of the insurgency.
In addition. television. persecution of Muslims in India and a comparison of Kashmir with that of East Timor and Palestine" (Asthana 2003. this message of external moral support is reported by pilgrims returning from hajji. and radio to offset this external moral support. read on the internet. the Kashmiri's right to self determination. press. 217). Pakistani rhetoric and themes are well timed and directed not only at Kashmir. Information and propaganda operations also are being conducted by the Indian government using the internet. This religious support is closely associated with rhetoric and sympathies that are very forceful and are transmitted daily by Pakistan and Gulf States via radio. and the internet. such as the hajji. foreign fighters living among the Kashmiris are also a source of inspiration. and spread stories of worldwide Islamic support. but this information campaign by no doubt influences at a minimum the young and undereducated Kashmiri people. 64 . when prayers are offered for Kashmiri martyrs who have died for the jihad. but also at the international community to both provide moral support for Kashmiri insurgents and put India under strong moral pressure (Asthana 2001. and appears in the Islamic press. In Kashmir. and reinforces that the insurgency is receiving strong support from the outside world.gained by this rhetoric which is seen primarily in mosques and during religious festivals. "The issues routinely used for raucous harangues range from human rights violations in Kashmir. 217-218). The effects of this moral support are not measurable. television. but have been secondary to military and paramilitary operations because of the unquantifiable dividends of these information operations.
training. such as the Friends of Kashmir. the ISI facilitates the movement of some funds by using couriers. safe houses. 35). provide support by raising money. such as weapons. This money is moved into India by two primary methods that make it difficult for the Indian government to find and freeze assets. thus making the tracking virtually impossible (Santhanam 2003. a system of exchanging money in much of South Asia and the Middle East that involves the transfer of money by rich money brokers by verbal agreement only. First. 274). and money. bribes. and in the United States. intelligence. explosives. Furthermore. Pakistan is thought to provide twenty-five percent of this money. Funding is the most essential element of external support and provides weapons. such as the Kashmir American Council. This external assistance has been directly lobbied on the Kashmiris' behalf by Pakistan (Huntington 1997. but the majority of these funds are moved through Islamic charities. and the deep logistics network that delivers these tools of war to Kashmir through Pakistan or even India itself. In addition. The raising and funding of money for Kashmiri insurgent 65 . 35-36). Kashmiri exile organizations in Western Europe. with the most coming from worldwide contributions that are collected from Islamic charities (Santhanam 2003. other organizations that provide material support are Islamic fundamentalist groups with deep financial backing from Islamic charities and rich Persian Gulf States. The second method to move money into Kashmir is the use of the Hawala. The cost to fund this insurgency is estimated to be $125 million to $250 million per year and is provided mainly by Pakistan and other sources (Chalk 2001). food.Material Support Kashmiri insurgents have received material support in numerous forms. explosives.
reconnaissance. 89-90). Therefore. Pakistan allows new recruits to attend training in the fundamentals of insurgency. this group. whose strength is estimated at 1. Currently. without which it would be impossible to conduct an insurgency in Kashmir.800 in J&K at present. 89). such as finance. Foreign fighters from Afghanistan. 89-90). Foreign Fighter Support Another unique characteristic of active support is the large representation of foreign fighters. Sanctuary Azad Kashmir and Pakistan constitute a sanctuary for Kashmiri insurgents that provide two vital features. there are estimated to be ninety-one active insurgency training camps in Azad Kashmir 66 . Finally.organizations and the failure of the Indian government to stop this is a significant factor that has allowed Kashmiri insurgents to remain a threat against such overwhelming odds. they are usually Islamic extremists who believe in jihad and are not afraid of death. foreign fighters are usually well trained in terrorist organization and tactics. poses a real danger to the Indian Army and security forces (Asthana 2001. Such advanced training in weapons and explosives would be difficult to conduct in Kashmir with any degree of effectiveness due to the Indian Army's troop density and scope of counterinsurgency operations throughout Kashmir. First. First. Second. Pakistan. These active supporters appeared in the early 1990s and are still a strong variable that significantly increases the strength of the insurgency in Kashmir (Asthana 2001. and targeting. they are not afraid to attack targets that involve innocent Kashmiri loss of life as collateral damage. often having no home to return to making them very lethal (Asthana 2001. and the Middle East bring three primary strengths that are not prevalent in the local Kashmiris.
Second. To offset this Pakistani political internationalization of the Kashmir issue India has made a case directly to the United States that Kashmir is India's war on terrorism and that insurgents are not rebels but internationally supported terrorists. As a consequence. since the Indian Army has been not been able to completely close down the infiltration and exfiltration routes along the LoC. Pakistan has internationalized the issue. 67 . Political Support Pakistan provides the only official political support in the world by actively backing the goals of the Kashmiri insurgents. Pakistan openly advocates the ambitions of the Kashmiri people and supports these goals at the United Nations on an international front.that support the Kashmiri insurgents (Chalk 2001). Kashmiri insurgents continue to have safe haven. The effectiveness of this sanctuary in Azad Kashmir is a contributing factor that has not been solved in India's counterinsurgency campaign. so that other governments have been forced to become involved in order to avoid a conflict between the two South Asian nuclear powers.
until 2004 India had not reached a point in the Kashmir counterinsurgency campaign where it could use diplomatic means to reach a settlement with Pakistan and the insurgents because of the lack of international support for the Indian counterinsurgency campaign and the overall strength of the insurgency. the Indian government has been criticized as being relentless in its pursuit to destroy the separatist movement in Kashmir and openly defiant to all international efforts to try to mediate a solution. India has reciprocated with important moves by agreeing to meet with the APHC in New Delhi in the winter of 2004 thus acknowledging 68 . even if this is just to sign surrender terms when the insurgents have been defeated militarily. counterinsurgency campaigns must use meaningful diplomatic measures as an additional tool to bring the insurgents to the negotiation table. The SAARC of 2004 marked the turning point in the Kashmir conflict. This is largely to blame on Pakistan's open policy to support Kashmiri separatists with extensive material and moral resources. because Pakistan finally agreed to pursue a dialogue with India on the Kashmir issue. However. thus waging a war by proxy against India thus forcing India to respond militarily rather than with diplomatic tools. To successfully fight and end an insurgency.CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Diplomatic Efforts The Indian government's diplomatic efforts to solve the Kashmir conflict in the past fourteen years may be characterized as nonexistent. Nevertheless. by setting a timetable for future mediations and Pakistani President Musharraf's signaling to his Parliament that territorial claims on Kashmir and the support of the insurgency are a policy that needs to be abandoned.
Pakistan has finally been forced into a position to negotiate with India. the Islamic fundamentalists that Pakistan has supported in Kashmir are now beginning to threaten Pakistan's moderate Islamic existence by attempting to overthrow the government and force Muslim extremism on the moderates. after 11 September. Pakistan pursued a military-only approach and was as unyielding as India to negotiate. Finally. This is largely due to three factors that had not existed until after 11 September. Prior to this time. the Indian government has done an excellent job of keeping international media out of Kashmir and restricted external international monitoring agencies from observing counterinsurgency operations in order 69 . The Indian government used the events of 11 September to appeal to the international world to support their cause and used Kashmir as an example of the devastation of international terrorism. Pakistan financially cannot afford to anymore pursue its proxy war against a more powerful India and simultaneously develop its economy to compete with other South Asian economies. the United States declared a global war on terrorism and as a result Pakistan was forced to stop all open assistance for the separatists in Kashmir.a possible diplomatic solution and by opening the public transportation between Pakistan and India. India has reached the point where it must use diplomatic means and engage both Pakistan and the Kashmir separatists. Information India's information operations have focused on educating the Indian and international audience on the disastrous effects of terrorism that have been inflicted by the Kashmiri separatists. Current events are demonstrating that India understands the current opportunity and the need for diplomatic means to bring a solution to this conflict. First. In addition. Second.
leaving them no other means but to use terrorism as their primary method to fight the Indian government. First. From a military standpoint this is false. which needs to be monitored continually. This area is enormous and difficult to control even if the insurgents only number 3.000 square kilometers large and contains the 700-kilometer-long LoC. To win back the popular support in J&K will be a difficult task if it takes into account the fourteen years of continual violence that have marked the Kashmiri people. This information operation has been successful in gaining international and national support to bring condemnation against Pakistan. Critics use two primary indicators as measures of failure of the Indian military.to avoid condemnation for the violent nature of many of these operations. Critics use the size of the deployment to fight a small number of insurgents as a measure that the current strategy is not working. but now this campaign must be refocused towards the Kashmiris themselves in order to persuade them that being part of a secular India is the best option for all parties involved. This effort must begin with huge investments in education to counter the negative effects of the madarssas and Muslim extremism being injected in the Kashmiri society by media and the internet. 70 . By 1996. the huge deployment of 600. when the military's response was slow and inadequate. This criticism was only justified in the early days of the conflict. the military had adjusted to the insurgents' strategy and forced the Kashmiri insurgents to go underground.000 to 5. since the area of operations for the Indian Army is 122.000.000 soldiers is used as indicator of a failed strategy. Military The Indian military has been criticized by its own government and people for failure to bring an end to the war in Kashmir by destroying the insurgency.
Again. Therefore. and a establishing a feasible economic development plan. as discussed in the previous paragraph. This consistent pressure compounded with other variables that followed 11 September. the military strategy to pursue the insurgents should be continued and maximum military pressure applied to prevent traditionalists from derailing the APHC and negotiations with Pakistan. Although the Indian military's strategy has been costly in terms of human life and property. a large and continuous Indian deployment was in fact needed to adequately control this difficult terrain in order to effectively fight a small number of insurgents that are favored by the terrain and receive significant material and moral support. In fact. the Indian Army not only has to fight the separatists. it can be characterized as success by relegating the insurgents to terrorism and preventing a conventional war. and media. and infrastructure. Although India is trying to boost the Kashmiri economy by expanding healthcare. Economic India is rapidly developing into a global economy and this success must be shared with Kashmir by investing in education. this criticism is incorrect. transportation. the Indian military has been able to relentlessly keep the pressure on the insurgents and on Pakistan by deploying this large force over a long period. a high unemployment rate and lack of any existent economic development committee and strategy for the area will continue to 71 . but also to deter incursions by the Pakistani Army. to successfully bring the insurgency to a complete end. Finally. from a military standpoint. has been successful in bringing Pakistan and the APHC to the negotiating table. because.The second major criticism from military analysts uses the fourteen year duration of the insurgency as an indicator of strategy failure.
the popular support. Pakistan's external support is the lifeline for the Kashmiri separatist movement. However. the Indian government was given few choices 72 .feed the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism. Conclusions The Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir is effective largely due to the government's use of a massive military response during the last fourteen years. These economic efforts have taken a back seat to other tools to fight the insurgency. given the extent of the external support. Therefore. without which the separatists will be forced to negotiate a cease fire and peace settlement. This Indian military response was and is still necessary until Pakistan formally denounces and completely stops all material and moral support for the Kashmiri insurgents and as long Islamic extremists and nationalists continue to exist in Kashmir. The military has defeated the insurgents' attempts to transition to guerilla warfare and has forced the insurgency to use terrorism as its main means to gain support among the Kashmiris and the international world. a national economic recovery and reconstruction plan that focuses on encouraging tourism and international investment in order to reduce unemployment. Economic development is a vital key to the counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir and must be executed with the same vigor as the military strategy. The Indian government's mixture of instruments of national power that is used as a means to defeat the insurgency in Kashmir has been criticized by the international community for excessive use of the military in conducting the counterinsurgency in Kashmir. the recruiting base for insurgents. but now must be reinvigorated to capitalize on the military success. and the scope and complexity of the insurgency.
the recruiting base for insurgents. the sincerity and seriousness of India's use of diplomacy to find a final solution to the conflict can be judged. India could have submitted to the insurgents' demands under the threat of terrorism. It appears the time for diplomacy has arrived. Only then. the instruments of information and economic tools must be reinforced and the current military strategy must remain. Military: Expand the Kashmiri local police to take on a more prominent role in leading the fight against the insurgency and Islamic extremism. However. the government's response was to use a heavy military response. 73 . to increase the chances of success for diplomacy. 2. Recommendations 1. To prevent this situation. thus setting a precedent in its fragile secular country for other states to also withdraw from the republic. Economic: Establish a national economic recovery and reconstruction plan that focuses on encouraging tourism and international investment in order to reduce unemployment. which was supported by secondary efforts using information and economic instruments and to reserve diplomatic options until Pakistan would withdraw its support and claims for Kashmir. 3. and the final judgment on India's correct use of all instruments of national power will be reserved until the future.but to use the military as primary method to respond. Military: Continue the military strategy pursuing insurgents and applying maximum military pressure to force the traditionalist insurgents from derailing the APHC and Pakistani negotiations.
Diplomatic: Exercise maximum diplomatic moderation and go towards the Pakistani and Kashmiri political representatives by giving in on some issues of self autonomy. 6. 74 . Information: Develop an information campaign that focuses on reconciling the Kashmiri and Indian government in order to begin winning back popular support in J&K.4. Military and or Information: Continue to use the military and information as the primary instruments of national power to fight Islamic extremists and traditionalists who will continue to exist in Kashmir regardless of any peace deal with separatists. 5.
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Fort Leavenworth. Fort Leavenworth. Coleman DJMO USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Harold S. Orenstein CADD USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth. Fort Leavenworth. Suite 944 Fort Belvoir. KS 66027-1352 MAJ Scott R.INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST Combined Arms Research Library US Army Command and General Staff College 250 Gibbon Ave. VA 22060-6218 Dr. KS 66027-1352 79 . KS 66027-1352 LTC William R.. Peters CADD USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. KS 66027-2314 Defense Technical Information Center/OCA 825 John J. Kingman Rd.
6. you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL. Thesis Title : An Analysis of the Indian Governments Counterinsurgency Campaign in Jammu and Kashmir 4. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. Follow sample format shown below: EXAMPLE Limitation Justification Statement Direct Military Support (10) Critical Technology (3) Administrative Operational Use (7) / / / / Chapter/Section Chapter 3 Section 4 Chapter 2 / / / / Page(s) 12 31 13-32 Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below: Limitation Justification Statement / / / / / / Chapter/Section / / / / / / Page(s) 7. Van Wagenen 3. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: 80 . See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse. then list. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages.CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT 1. Thesis Author: MAJ Matthew J. Thesis Committee Members: Signatures: 5. Certification Date: 18 June 2004 2. below. then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below: A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified.
3. Protection of foreign information. Foreign Government Information. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware. distribution is unlimited.S. 6. Administrative/Operational Use.STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.S. 4. military advantage. 2. 8. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U. STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date). Currently most used reasons are 1. Protection of software documentation . 7. and 10. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). 3. or higher DoD authority.S. Currently most reasons are 1. Proprietary Information. Critical Technology. 9. 9. 2. and 9 above.S.S. DoD contractors only. 5. 3. 7. 5. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.1 -R. and 9 above.2. 8.release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930. STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U. 7. (REASON AND DATE). 81 . 7. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes. STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only. (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert). 10. Test and Evaluation. 4. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). 3.25. 8. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals). DoD 5200. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U. Government. STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U. STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U. 8. 6. Direct Military Support. Protection of information required by a specific authority. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination. (REASON AND DATE). STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U. Premature Dissemination. Specific Authority.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230. Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following: 1. Software Documentation. Currently most used reasons are 1.
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