text: Contracts - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/contracts/ 2016-07-23T18:55:56-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://justatic.com/v/20160720080532/shared/images/social-media/law.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2016/64349.html Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam 2016-07-21T09:34:09-08:00 2016-07-21T14:14:48-08:00 Sumona Islam entered into an agreement with her employer, Atlantis Casino Resort Spa (Atlantis), to refrain from employment or association with any other gaming establishment within 150 miles for one year following the end of her employment. After Islam resigned from Atlantis and began working as a casino host at Grand Sierra Resort (GSR), she entered altered and copied gaming customers' information from Atlantis' computer management system into GSR's computer management system. GSR used this and other information conveyed by Islam to market to those customers without knowing the information was wrongfully obtained. Atlantis filed a complaint against both Islam and GSR, alleging tort and contract claims. All three parties appealed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly found that the noncompete agreement was unreasonable and unenforceable; (2) properly denied Atlantis' conversion claim based on Islam's alteration of the electronic information; and (3) properly found that GSR did not misappropriate Atlantis's trade secrets. View "Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam" on Justia Law 2016-07-21 state Nevada Supreme Court of Nevada Michael L. Douglas 64349 64452 65497 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-5966/15-5966-2016-07-21.html Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod.Co. 2016-07-21T08:00:37-08:00 2016-07-21T11:06:30-08:00 In 2001, EQT sold or leased to Journey several oil- and natural-gas-producing properties in Kentucky. Both parties continued to conduct oil and natural-gas operations in the state, but Journey later concluded that EQT was operating on some of the lands that had been conveyed to Journey. Journey sought a declaration that it owned or controlled those properties and that EQT was liable for the oil and natural gas that EQT had removed from those properties. The district court concluded on summary judgment that the parties' 2001 contract had unambiguously conveyed the disputed properties to Journey. A jury found that EQT's trespasses on Journey's lands were not in good faith. The court subsequently required EQT to pay $14,288,432 in damages and transfer certain oil and natural-gas wells to Journey. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in construing the parties' contract, in excluding portions of EQT's proffered evidence, and in crafting the remedy for EQT's trespasses. EQT carried out its drilling despite obvious indicators that its ownership of the underlying property was doubtful, establishing an ample basis to conclude that EQT's trespasses were not in good faith. View "Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod.Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-21 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Ronald Lee Gilman 15-5966 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-3462/15-3462-2016-07-21.html Orchard Hill Master Fund v. SBAC Corp. 2016-07-21T06:30:05-08:00 2016-07-21T18:37:41-08:00 Plaintiffs owned two convertible notes issued by SBAC. After converting the notes into equity and/or cash, plaintiffs filed a breach of contract claim, alleging that SBAC failed to pay the interest owed on the underlying notes following the conversion. Plaintiffs assert two identical causes of action: a breach of contract claim for each set of notes. The district court dismissed the claim with prejudice, holding that there was no reasonable interpretation of the underlying contract that entitled plaintiffs to both the benefits of the conversion and the final interest payment. The court held that SBAC's refusal to pay plaintiffs the final interest payment did not constitute a failure to perform under the indentures. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Orchard Hill Master Fund v. SBAC Corp." on Justia Law 2016-07-21 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Peter W. Hall 15-3462 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2016/27521.html Kern v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co. 2016-07-21T05:03:51-08:00 2016-07-21T08:38:30-08:00 Kern was injured in a rear-end collision in which the other driver was at fault. Kern filed an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim with Progressive Northern Insurance Company, his insurance provider. Months of settlement negotiations ended in a stalemate. Thereafter, Kern brought an action against Progressive for bad faith, alleging that Progressive's settlement offers had been intentionally inadequate. Kern also sought unpaid UIM benefits. After a trial, the jury awarded Kern $18,650 in unpaid UIM damages and found that Progressive had not acted in bad faith. Kern appealed, alleging several errors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Kern's alleged errors required reversal and that the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to award attorney's fees. View "Kern v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-20 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court David Gilbertson 27521 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-1256/15-1256-2016-07-19.html CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos 2016-07-19T12:02:15-08:00 2016-07-19T13:15:32-08:00 CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltd. ("CEEG"), a Chinese company, agreed to sell solar energy products to LUMOS, LLC, a U.S. company. After receiving certain shipments, LUMOS filed a warranty claim alleging workmanship defects, and refused to remit the balance due. After two years of "fitful" negotiations, CEEG filed an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the parties' agreements. Although the parties had communicated exclusively in English to that point, CEEG served LUMOS with a Chinese-language notice of the proceedings, and LUMOS did not immediately realize what the notice was. After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, CEEG moved for the district court to confirm the award. LUMOS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Chinese-language notice caused it to miss the deadline to participate in appointing the arbitration panel. The district court granted the motion, finding that the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise LUMOS of the arbitration proceedings. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos" on Justia Law 2016-07-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Carlos F. Lucero 15-1256 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2016/55-map-2015.html A. Scott Enterprises v. City of Allentown 2016-07-19T11:33:23-08:00 2016-07-19T12:37:04-08:00 Appellant City of Allentown (City) contracted with appellee A. Scott Enterprises, Inc. (ASE), to construct a new public road. After arsenic-contaminated soil was discovered at the worksite, the City suspended work on the project. Following testing, it was determined construction could resume if precautions were taken. Accordingly, the City instructed ASE to obtain revised permits and proceed with the project. However, the existing contract did not include terms regarding the potential for contaminated soil, despite the fact the City was aware there might be contamination prior to entering into the contract, and ASE declined to proceed, explaining it would incur substantial additional costs due to the contaminated soil. The parties made several attempts to reach an agreement in which ASE would continue the construction, but to no avail. Consequently, ASE sued the City to recover its losses on the project, alleged breach of contract, and sought compensation under theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, as well as interest and a statutory penalty and fee award for violations of the prompt pay provisions of the Procurement Code. After a trial, a jury found the City breached its contract with ASE and also withheld payments in bad faith. In this discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an award of a statutory penalty and attorney fees under the prompt payment provisions of the Commonwealth's Procurement Code was mandatory upon a finding of bad faith, irrespective of the statute's permissive phrasing. The Court held such an award was not mandatory, and therefore reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "A. Scott Enterprises v. City of Allentown" on Justia Law 2016-07-19 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Doughtery 55 MAP 2015 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b258353.html Flintco Pacific v. TEC Mgmt. Consultants 2016-07-19T10:31:02-08:00 2016-07-19T10:48:32-08:00 After TEC, a subcontractor, submitted a written bid to Flintco, a general contractor, to perform glazing work on a project, Flintco used TEC's bid price in compiling its own bid to the owner of the project. Flintco was awarded the contract and sent TEC a letter of intent to enter into a subcontract and a standard-form subcontract, both of which documents differed materially from TEC's bid. TEC refused to enter into a subcontract. Flintco secured another subcontractor for that scope of work and sued TEC on a theory of promissory estoppel seeking the difference between TEC's bid and the amount Flintco was required to pay the replacement subcontractor. The trial court entered judgment for TEC. The court concluded that Flintco failed to demonstrate that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Flintco did not reasonably rely on TEC's bid price without considering the material conditions stated in TEC's bid, the proposed subcontract Flintco sent TEC constituted a counteroffer because it contained material variations from the conditions in TEC's bid, and the counteroffer gave TEC the right to withdraw its bid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Flintco Pacific v. TEC Mgmt. Consultants" on Justia Law 2016-07-19 state California California Court of Appeal Richard D. Aldrich B258353 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-1218/15-1218-2016-07-19.html KCOM, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. 2016-07-19T09:04:16-08:00 2016-07-19T11:06:38-08:00 In June 2012, a hailstorm damaged Plaintiff KCOM's motel. Soon a dispute arose between KCOM and its insurer, defendant Employers Mutual Casualty (EMC), over the extent of the damage. In October 2012, following receipt of an inspection report, KCOM submitted a proof of loss of $631,726.87. EMC admitted coverage but not the amount of loss. Dissatisfied, KCOM invoked the insurance contract's appraisal provision. KCOM claimed there were issues with the appraisal process, prompting it to ultimately file suit against EMC, alleging breach of contract, unreasonable delay and denial of benefits, and bad faith breach of the insurance contract. The threshold question presented for the Tenth Circuit's review in this state law diversity action was whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over the district court's non-final order denying confirmation of a property loss appraisal. The Court concluded it did not, and dismissed the appeal. View "KCOM, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Baldock 15-1218 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2459/15-2459-2016-07-19.html Capson Physicians Ins. Co. v. MMIC Ins. Inc. 2016-07-19T07:30:50-08:00 2016-07-19T12:36:54-08:00 Capson filed suit against MMIC seeking a declaration that MMIC was the primary professional liability insurer for Karl J. Hasik, M.D., and that Capson was the excess insurer. MMIC counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Hasik and others, seeking rescission of its insurance policy or, in the alternative, a declaration that MMIC had no obligation to defend or indemnify Dr. Hasik for two medical negligence cases that had been filed against him. The district court granted MMIC's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Dr. Hasik's and the hospital's nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit (a medical malpractice suit filed by a patient against Dr. Hasik) was the equivalent of a false assertion. Therefore, the court held that the elements of equitable rescission were satisfied in this case. Dr. Hasik's and the hospital's nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit was the equivalent of a material representation that was false. MMIC was entitled to rescind the prior-acts coverage it had agreed to provide. The court further held that Iowa law does not preclude a judgment of rescission in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Capson Physicians Ins. Co. v. MMIC Ins. Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Roger Leland Wollman 15-2459 15-2575 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1858/15-1858-2016-07-18.html Cornwell Ent., Inc. v. Anchin, Block & Anchin, LLP 2016-07-18T13:00:07-08:00 2016-07-18T19:23:48-08:00 Patricia Cornwell, a well-known crime novelist, and her spouse filed suit against their former business managers Anchin Block & Anchin and the company's principal, Evan Snapper, alleging New York state law claims of negligent performance of professional services, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on all three claims and awarded Plaintiffs $51 million in damages. Thereafter, the district court vacated the jury's decision, ruling that it had incorrectly instructed the jury and that Defendants' statements to the Department of Justice (DOJ) were protected by a qualified privilege and therefore should not have been considered by the jury. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly found that it incorrectly instructed the jury on New York's statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the DOJ issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cornwell Ent., Inc. v. Anchin, Block & Anchin, LLP" on Justia Law 2016-07-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit David J. Barron 15-1858 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-1682/15-1682-2016-07-18.html Sheet Metal Employers Indus. Promotion Fund v. Absolut Balancing Co., Inc. 2016-07-18T08:30:34-08:00 2016-07-18T09:09:41-08:00 Multi-employer funds established by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractor National Association and the Sheet Metal Worker's Union sought confirmation of arbitration awards granted against five employers. None of the employers had participated in the arbitration, which concerned contributions to the funds. The district court declined to confirm the award, concluding that there was an open question as to whether the employers were party to the CBA, and, therefore, bound to its arbitration procedures. After initially ruling that state law applied to the question of whether the employers were bound to arbitrate under the CBA, the court certified a question for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b): whether state or federal law will apply at trial to the question of whether the employers "are bound/signatory to" the CBA? The Sixth Circuit reversed. While state contract law may provide helpful guideposts to federal courts, it is well-established that in the field of labor relations, the technical rules of contract law do not determine the existence of a CBA. The law to be applied to the question of whether a party has assented to the terms of a CBA, including an arbitration provision, is ultimately federal. View "Sheet Metal Employers Indus. Promotion Fund v. Absolut Balancing Co., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Gibbons 15-1682 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3327/15-3327-2016-07-15.html Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hoffman 2016-07-15T09:04:15-08:00 2016-07-15T10:58:20-08:00 In 2009, Hoffman executed a $1.5 million tax‐increment finance (TIF) note for a development project by Fyre Lake Ventures, backed by a TIF bond, a mechanism for local governments to finance real estate development. Hoffman was not personally liable on the loan. In 2010, Fyre signed a $9 million loan, with the same lender; Hoffman acted as a co‐guarantor for $900,000. Separately, Hoffman borrowed $157,300 from the lender with his wife; the note was secured by mortgages on three lots in a Milan, Illinois housing development. By October 2011, all of the loans were in default. After negotiations, the FDIC (as receiver for the lender) and the Hoffmans signed a settlement agreement. In exchange for titles to the Milan lots, the Hoffmans were released of their obligations. Less than three months later, the FDIC sued Hoffman and other guarantors of the Fyre loan, $900,000 of which he personally guaranteed. The district judge found the settlement agreement ambiguous and concluded that parole evidence supported the bank's interpretation of the settlement: Hoffman was only released from his obligation on the $157,300 loan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, interpreting the agreement's general language in light of the specific language referring to the smaller loan. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hoffman" on Justia Law 2016-07-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Daniel Anthony Manion 15-3327 15-3326 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-3597/15-3597-2016-07-15.html Stewart, Jr. v. Nucor Corp. 2016-07-15T07:31:19-08:00 2016-07-15T07:43:27-08:00 Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Nucor after sustaining injuries while working at Nucor's steel mill. The district court granted summary judgment to Nucor, finding that the third-party waiver's (TPW) language and the circumstances of its execution met the standard for enforcement of exculpatory contracts under Arkansas law and that the agreement was not unconscionable. The court agreed with the district court that the TPW was enforceable where the parties stipulated that plaintiff had the opportunity to read the TPW, that he did not ask the trainer any questions concerning the meaning of the TPW, and that he had the ability to read and understand the contract. The court also concluded that the contract provision at issue is not unconscionable where there is no evidence rebutting Nucor's affidavit showing the availability of other work in the region at that time, plaintiff had the opportunity to read and understand the TPW, and there is no evidence of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or any other inequitable conduct on the part of Vesuvius or Nucor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stewart, Jr. v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law 2016-07-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Beam 15-3597 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/15-1291/15-1291-2016-07-15.html Laguna Constr. Co. v. Carter 2016-07-15T07:01:15-08:00 2016-07-15T07:32:20-08:00 In 2003, the government awarded Laguna a contract for Worldwide Environmental Remediation and Construction (WERC). Under the contract, Laguna received 16 cost-reimbursable task orders to perform work in Iraq, and awarded subcontracts to several subcontractors. The physical work under the contract was completed by 2010. Laguna sought reimbursement of past costs, a portion of which the government refused to pay after an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the government alleged that it was not liable because Laguna had committed a prior material breach by accepting subcontractor kickbacks (18 U.S.C. 371, 41 U.S.C. 53), excusing the government's nonperformance. Three of Laguna's officers were ultimately indicted for kickbacks. The Board granted the government summary judgment on that ground, The Federal Circuit affirmed. Laguna committed the first material breach by violating the contract's Allowable Cost and Payment clause because its vouchers were improperly inflated to include the payment, Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.216-7. View "Laguna Constr. Co. v. Carter" on Justia Law 2016-07-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Todd Michael Hughes 15-1291 http://law.justia.com/cases/michigan/supreme-court/2016/150591.html Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Liquid Manufacturing, LLC 2016-07-15T05:00:06-08:00 2016-07-15T09:53:36-08:00 In 2007, plaintiff Innovation Ventures, LLC engaged defendants Andrew Krause and K & L Development of Michigan (K & L Development) to design, manufacture, and install manufacturing and packaging equipment for the production of "5-Hour ENERGY" at Liquid Manufacturing's bottling plant. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether agreements between sophisticated businesses were void for failure of consideration and whether the noncompete provisions in these agreements were reasonable. Innovation Ventures alleged a variety of tort and breach of contract claims against Liquid Manufacturing, LLC, K & L Development of Michigan, LLC, Eternal Energy, LLC, LXR Biotech, LLC, Peter Paisley, and Andrew Krause based on the defendants' production of Eternal Energy and other energy drinks. Contrary to the determination of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties' Equipment Manufacturing and Installation Agreement (EMI) and Nondisclosure Agreement were not void for failure of consideration. The Court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants for the claims against Krause, because there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question whether Krause breached the EMI or the Nondisclosure Agreement. Likewise, there was no issue on the question whether K & L Development breached the EMI. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in failing to evaluate the noncompete provision in the parties' Termination Agreement for reasonableness. The Court therefore reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for consideration of those questions of fact remaining regarding whether K & L Development breached the Nondisclosure Agreement and whether Liquid Manufacturing breached the Termination Agreement with respect to its production of products other than Eternal Energy. View "Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Liquid Manufacturing, LLC" on Justia Law 2016-07-14 state Michigan Michigan Supreme Court Bridget Mary McCormack 150591 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2016/91932-1.html Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co. 2016-07-14T07:19:47-08:00 2016-07-14T11:17:55-08:00 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court: "Does a title company owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments?" This certified question arose out of a civil action for money damages. Plaintiffs Centurion Properties Ill LLC (CP Ill) and SMI Group XIV LLC (collectively Plaintiffs) asserted that defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company negligently breached its duty of care and caused damages when it recorded unauthorized liens on CP Ill's property. The Washington Supreme Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question "no," holding that title companies did not owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments. "Such a duty is contrary to Washington's policy and precedent, and other duty of care considerations." View "Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-14 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Charles Wiggins 91932-1 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-111.html Xpress Natural Gas, LLC v. Cate St. Capital, Inc. 2016-07-14T07:08:38-08:00 2016-07-14T09:45:48-08:00 In 2012, GNP Parent, LLC entered into a sales agreement to purchase compressed natural gas from Xpress Natural Gas, LLC as fuel for the Great Northern Paper Mill. Cate Street Capital, Inc., the corporate owner of GNP, guaranteed the amounts payable by GNP up to $1,500,000. GNP failed to make the required payments for natural gas, and an arbitrator found Cate Street liable to Xpress for $1,500,000 on the guarantee. Xpress applied to the superior court to confirm the arbitration award. Cate Street and GNP moved to vacate the award in part, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding Xpress $1,500,000 in damages on the guarantee of payments. The superior court entered a judgment confirming the award and denying the motion to vacate the award. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in this case because his interpretation was rationally derived from the sales agreement. View "Xpress Natural Gas, LLC v. Cate St. Capital, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-14 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Leigh Ingalls Saufley 2016 ME 111 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/a142217.html Baldwin v. AAA N. Cal. 2016-07-13T14:30:40-08:00 2016-07-13T18:32:10-08:00 Plaintiff's almost-new Toyota Tundra Pickup sustained structural damage, while parked, as a result of a collision between the vehicles of Hollandsworth and Sebastian. Plaintiff had an insurance policy through AAA covering collision-related damages.Hollandsworth also had an AAA insurance policy, covering property damage that he caused through negligence. AAA refused to consider the pickup a "total loss," had the vehicle repaired at a reported cost of $8,196.06, and provided a rental car during the interim. As a result of the collision and the repairs, the pickup's future resale value was decreased by more than $17,100. Plaintiff sued Hollandsworth and Sebastian for negligence and sued AAA for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial court dismissed the claims against AAA, finding that plaintiff essentially was seeking reimbursement for the lost market value of his pickup, a loss that specifically was excluded under his insurance policy. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the resale value exclusion violated public policy and was void. The court stated that, in the insurance context, courts are not at liberty to imply a covenant (of good faith) directly at odds with a contract's express grant of discretionary power, View "Baldwin v. AAA N. Cal." on Justia Law 2016-07-13 state California California Court of Appeal William R. McGuinness A142217 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2016/da-15-0641.html Low v. Reick 2016-07-12T14:32:20-08:00 2016-07-13T10:00:53-08:00 Plaintiffs and Defendants owned real property on a peninsula in Echo Lake. Defendants owned a parcel on the southern end of the peninsula, through which the sole vehicular road granting access to the northern lots owned by Plaintiffs ran. Defendants purchased their property subject to a long-term existing easement allowing Plaintiffs access to their properties. In 1992, the parties entered into a road maintenance agreement setting forth the responsibilities of the parties regarding maintenance of the access road. When a flood damaged the road, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that the maintenance agreement was valid and enforceable and alleging that Defendants breached the agreement. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred by concluding that the maintenance agreement was unenforceable against Defendants for lack of consideration, but the error was harmless; (2) did not err by ruling that Defendants did not breach the maintenance agreement; and (3) did not err by ordering Plaintiffs to pay Defendants' counterclaim-related attorney's fees and costs. View "Low v. Reick" on Justia Law 2016-07-12 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Patricia O. Cotter DA 15-0641 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-4352/15-4352-2016-07-11.html Constr. Contractors Employers Group, LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co. 2016-07-11T15:00:34-08:00 2016-07-11T18:10:44-08:00 Construction Contractors (CC), was formed to perform employment functions for regional construction employers, who would transfer funds into CC's accounts to cover gross payroll, taxes, benefits, and administrative costs. CC would disburse the funds to satisfy subscribers' obligations. In 2002, CC outsourced its daily operations to AlphaCare. In 2012, AlphaCare informed CC that there were insufficient assets to meet obligations, although the subscribers had paid enough money to fulfill their respective obligations. An AlphaCare manager (Moon) had been falsifying financial statements. CC terminated its agreement with AlphaCare. An investigation revealed that the IRS had started levying CC accounts in 2011. CC owed more than $1.25 million, plus penalties, in unpaid taxes dating back to 2005. AlphaCare had also failed to remit $715,000 in Ohio unemployment taxes for the first quarter of 2012.CC's CFO, VanDenBerghe, determined that Moon had committed wire fraud by transferring over $900,000 from CC's account to AlphaCare's account from 2009-2012. VanDenBerghe continued investigating; about $1 million was still missing. CC applied for a crime-coverage insurance policy, with coverage for employee theft, from Federal Insurance. After Federal executed the policy, CC determined that Moon had misappropriated the missing $1 million. Federal denied CC's claim for that loss. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Federal, concluding that any loss caused by one employee is considered a "single loss" under the policy and that CC had "discovered" the loss before the execution of the policy. View "Constr. Contractors Employers Group, LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-11 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Donald 15-4352 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/14-3447/14-3447-2016-07-11.html Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran 2016-07-11T06:30:06-08:00 2016-07-11T18:41:39-08:00 This case concerns a lease and a purported joint venture agreement entered into between defendant and his now-deceased father, the former president and majority shareholder of a real estate development corporation. The lease granted defendant control over a multi-million-dollar property for a period of 20 years in exchange for a payment of $20. AHC sought damages for defendant's use and occupancy of the property and a judgment declaring the lease and joint venture agreement void. Defendant counterclaimed. The district court granted AHC's motion for partial summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claims and denied defendant's requests for additional discovery. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's FRCP 56(d) motion seeking more discovery materials where none of the items defendant specifically requested is germane to the issues before the court; the court applied Pennsylvania law to its analysis of the joint‐venture dispute and New York law to the lease dispute; and the district court correctly concluded that the business judgment rule should not apply to the lease and thus the lease was void as a gift or act of corporate waste. As to the joint venture agreement, the court declined to certify the issue of parol evidence to the state court. The court concluded that the parol evidence rule applies in this case and that the integration clause in the lease retains its preclusive effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran" on Justia Law 2016-07-11 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Peter W. Hall 14-3447 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s15g1295.html Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank 2016-07-08T10:07:26-08:00 2016-07-09T04:32:32-08:00 A mandatory arbitration clause is contained in each deposit agreement for customers of appellee SunTrust Bank. The clause permits an individual depositor to reject the agreement's mandatory arbitration clause by giving written notice by a certain deadline. SunTrust claimed it drafted the arbitration clause in such a way that only an individual depositor may exercise this right to reject arbitration on his or her own behalf, thereby permitting that individual to file only an individual lawsuit against the bank. But SunTrust asserted that even if, as it has been determined here, the filing of a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the rejection of arbitration deadline operated to give notice of the individual plaintiff's rejection of arbitration, the complaint could not be brought as a class action because the filing of a class action could not serve to reject the arbitration clause on behalf of class members who have not individually given notice. Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., who was a SunTrust Bank depositor, filed a complaint against SunTrust on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated alleging the bank's overdraft fee constitutes the charging of usurious interest. At the time Bickerstaff opened his account (thereby agreeing to the terms of SunTrust's deposit agreement), that agreement included a mandatory arbitration provision. In response to the ruling of a federal court in an unrelated action finding the arbitration clause in SunTrust's deposit agreement was unconscionable at Georgia law, and after Bickerstaff's complaint had been filed, SunTrust amended the arbitration clause to permit a window of time in which a depositor could reject arbitration by sending SunTrust written notification that complied with certain requirements. SunTrust had not notified Bickerstaff or its other customers of this change in the arbitration clause of the deposit agreement at the time Bickerstaff filed his complaint, but the complaint, as well as the first amendment to the complaint, was filed prior to the amendment's deadline for giving SunTrust written notice of an election to reject arbitration. It was only after Bickerstaff's complaint was filed that SunTrust notified Bickerstaff and its other existing depositors, by language printed in monthly account statements distributed on August 24, 2010, that an updated version of the deposit agreement had been adopted, that a copy of the new agreement could be obtained at any branch office or on-line, and that all future transactions would be governed by the updated agreement. SunTrust appealed the order denying its motion to compel Bickerstaff to arbitrate his claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the information contained in the complaint filed by Bickerstaff's attorney substantially satisfied the notice required to reject arbitration. Bickerstaff appealed the order denying his motion for class certification, and in the same opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, holding in essence, that the contractual language in this case requiring individual notification of the decision to reject arbitration did not permit Bickerstaff to reject the deposit agreement's arbitration clause on behalf of other putative class members by virtue of the filing of his class action complaint. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the terms of the arbitration rejection provision of SunTrust's deposit agreement did not prevent Bickerstaff's class action complaint from tolling the contractual limitation for rejecting that provision on behalf of all putative class members until such time as the class may be certified and each member makes the election to opt out or remain in the class. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement of OCGA 9-11-23 (a) (1) for pursuing a class complaint was not defeated on this ground. View "Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law 2016-07-08 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Robert Benham S15G1295 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/d067687.html Magno v. The College Network, Inc. 2016-07-08T09:00:33-08:00 2016-07-08T09:06:08-08:00 The College Network, Inc. (TCN) appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of a consumer fraud and breach of contract action brought by Plaintiffs Bernadette Magno, Rosanna Garcia, and Sheree Rudio. TCN argued the arbitration provision in Plaintiffs' purchase agreements was valid and enforceable and contended the trial court erred when it ruled the provision unconscionable. Alternatively, TCN argued that if the forum selection clause was unconscionable, the court abused its discretion in voiding the arbitration provision altogether rather than severing the objectionable provisions and enforcing the remainder. After review of the provision at issue, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined the arbitration provision to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable and did not abuse its discretion in voiding it in its entirety. View "Magno v. The College Network, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-08 state California California Court of Appeal Judith McConnell D067687 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2016/20150319.html Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Co. 2016-07-07T10:04:13-08:00 2016-07-08T04:43:31-08:00 Constellation Development, LLC, appealed dismissal of its claims against Western Trust Company and its trustee, Gary Hoffman (collectively "Western"), for breach of contract and equitable and promissory estoppel, and against Dabbert Custom Homes, LLC, for tortious interference with a business contract. In 2013, Constellation agreed in writing to purchase about 24 acres of land in Cass County from Western, with the remaining balance to be paid on October 14, 2013. A check was tendered with the agreement, but was returned for insufficient funds. When Constellation tendered a cashier's check to cover the earlier check, Western refused it. In it s suit against Wester, Constellation claimed there had been an oral extension of the purchase agreement. The Supreme Court found the district court did not err in finding there was no breach of any agreement Western had with Constellation, it affirmed dismissal of Constellation's claims. View "Constellation Development, LLC v. Western Trust Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-07 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Dale V. Sandstrom 20150319 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-101.html Camden Nat'l Bank v. Weintraub 2016-07-07T07:02:43-08:00 2016-07-07T10:53:36-08:00 Camden National Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Ilene Weintraub. Weintraub brought several counterclaims against the bank, including violations of the Maine Consumer Credit Code, breach of contract, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she suffered injuries as a direct and proximate result of the abuse conduct of the Bank's collections department and an accusation of criminal conduct. The Bank filed a special motion to dismiss requesting dismissal of several claims based on Maine's anti-SLAPP statute, but failing to request dismissal of the breach of contract claim. The superior court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute prohibits selective dismissal of claims and that Weintraub met her burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of actual injury and causation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in holding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not allow for selective dismissal of some, but not all, of Weintraub's counterclaims, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not err in concluding that Weintraub met her burden of showing prima facie evidence of causation. View "Camden Nat'l Bank v. Weintraub" on Justia Law 2016-07-07 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Humphrey 2016 ME 101 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2294/15-2294-2016-07-06.html Symphony Diagnostic Serv. v. Greenbaum 2016-07-06T07:01:38-08:00 2016-07-06T11:02:59-08:00 After Ozark was sold to Mobilex, Mobilex filed suit against defendant to enforce the non-compete and confidentiality agreements defendants had signed with Ozark. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis that a personal services contract cannot be assigned to a subsequent employer under Missouri law without the employee's contemporaneous consent. The court adopted the majority rule and held that covenants not to compete can be assigned to a successor employer without contemporaneous consent. In this case, the non-compete agreements precluded only working in the field of medical diagnostics or soliciting business from certain clients within a specified geographical area. A reasonable jury, looking at the facts in the record, could find that defendants did not agree to the non-compete and confidentiality agreements because of Ozark's unique characteristics. Because the court found that the non-compete and confidentiality agreements at issue here were not personal services contracts and could be assigned without the consent of defendants, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symphony Diagnostic Serv. v. Greenbaum" on Justia Law 2016-07-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Jane Louise Kelly 15-2294 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3313/15-3313-2016-07-06.html Caudill v. Keller Williams Realty, Inc. 2016-07-06T07:01:13-08:00 2016-07-06T11:53:32-08:00 Caudill, the owner of a real estate brokerage, sued Keller Williams for breach of a 2001 franchise contract. Caudill's position as Regional Director of Keller Williams was terminated in 2010; her franchise was terminated in 2011. The suit settled with an agreement including a prohibition against disclosure of its terms, except to tax professionals, insurance carriers, and government agencies; those recipients had to promise to keep them in confidence. Any violation entitled the victim to damages of $10,000. Months later, Keller Williams issued an FDD (Franchise Disclosure Document) to about 2000 existing or potential franchisees and other parties, describing Caudill's lawsuit in detail. The FDD was not required by the Federal Trade Commission under 16 C.F.R. 436.2(a). Caudill sought $20 million (2000 x $10,000) in damages. The district judge rejected her claim, noting that under Texas law a liquidated damages clause is enforceable only if "the harm caused by the breach is incapable or difficult of estimation and … the [specified] amount of liquidated damages is a reasonable forecast of just compensation." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is unreasonable to suppose, without evidence, that the dissemination of the FDD caused Caudill a $20 million loss. Although the burden of proving that a liquidated damages clause is actually a penalty clause is on the defendant, Keller Williams established that there was no basis for the requested damages. View "Caudill v. Keller Williams Realty, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 15-3313 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-3769/15-3769-2016-07-06.html Tri County Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Labatt USA Operating Co. 2016-07-06T07:00:37-08:00 2016-07-06T07:55:53-08:00 Under Ohio Rev. Code 1333.85, suppliers manufacture or import alcoholic beverages and must sell their products to state-licensed distributors, who sell to retailers; supplier-distributor franchise agreements are protected from termination without just cause, except when a successor manufacturer acquires another manufacturer, the successor may terminate the franchise by repurchasing the distributor's inventory and compensating for the diminished value of the distributor's business that is directly related to the sale of the product terminated. NAB owned Labatt through nested holding companies. NAB's owners sold their interests to CCR. Months later, Ohio distributors of the Labatt brands received letters terminating their franchises, citing the section 1333.85(D) exception. In the distributors' suit, the court granted CCR summary judgment on a Takings Clause claim and a claim regarding the scope of section 1333.85(D), then determined the diminution of the values of the distributors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the constitutional claims. At common law, businesses may enter into contracts that allow for termination and contracting parties have a right to breach a contract that is no longer advantageous, in an "efficient breach." That common-law norm is abrogated by section 1333.85, with an exception. The state created and is free to take away that protection from termination. The court remanded the calculation of damages with instructions to deduct the distributors' projected profits for the time until the date when the franchise agreements are finally terminated View "Tri County Wholesale Distrib., Inc. v. Labatt USA Operating Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Danny Julian Boggs 15-3769 15-3710 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2016/27645.html Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc 2016-07-06T05:33:06-08:00 2016-07-06T12:08:13-08:00 In August 2005, D.R. Horton, Inc. completed construction of the Smiths' home, and the Smiths closed on the property and received the deed. Thereafter, the Smiths experienced a myriad of problems with the home that resulted in severe water damage to the property. D.R. Horton attempted to repair the alleged construction defects on "numerous occasions" during the next five years, but was ultimately unsuccessful. In 2010, the Smiths filed a construction defect case against D.R. Horton and seven subcontractors. In response, D.R. Horton filed a motion to compel arbitration. The Smiths opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The circuit court denied D.R. Horton's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. D.R. Horton appealed, but finding no error in the circuit court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc" on Justia Law 2016-07-06 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Jean H. Toal 27645 http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2016/2014ap000157.html Dufour v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co. 2016-07-06T04:33:43-08:00 2016-07-06T17:36:32-08:00 Plaintiff, the insured of Dairyland, sustained bodily injury and property damage while operating his motorcycle. After paying plaintiff all proceeds to which he was entitled under the Dairyland policy, and after plaintiff had settled with the tortfeasor's insurer, Dairyland sought and obtained subrogation from the tortfeasor's insurer for the property damages that it previously paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff then demanded Dairyland pay him the funds it obtained on its subrogation claim. When Dairyland refused, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith. The court concluded that the made whole doctrine does not apply to preclude Dairyland from retaining the funds it received from its subrogation claim because the equities favor Dairyland: (1) Dairyland fully paid plaintiff all he bargained for under his Dairyland policy, which included the policy's limits for bodily injury and 100% of plaintiff's property damage; (2) plaintiff had priority in settling with the tortfeasor's insurer; and (3) if Dairyland had not proceeded on its subrogation claim, plaintiff would have had no access to additional funds from the tortfeasor's insurer. The court also concluded that Dairyland did not act in bad faith. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals decision in all respects. View "Dufour v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-07-06 state Wisconsin Wisconsin Supreme Court Patience D. Roggensack 2014AP000157 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1827/15-1827-2016-07-05.html Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2016-07-05T09:00:04-08:00 2016-07-05T13:10:02-08:00 After seeking a mortgage modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program Plaintiff filed a complaint against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Homeward Residential Inc., claiming breach of contract, unfair debt collection under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and derivative equitable relief. A federal district court dismissed Plaintiff's action in its entirety. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged that Defendants failed to offer her a mortgage modification in a timely manner and that Plaintiff had sufficiently pled damages for her Chapter 93A claim. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's breach of contract and Chapter 93A claims failed, and therefore, her derivative claim for equitable relief failed as well. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law 2016-07-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Torruella 15-1827 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/h040508.html Popescu v. Apple Inc. 2016-07-01T14:30:36-08:00 2016-07-01T15:23:36-08:00 Popescu sued Apple for damages after he was fired by his employer, Constellium. He alleged that Apple took affirmative steps to convince Constellium to terminate him in retaliation for his resistance to Apple's alleged illegal anti-competitive conduct. The court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed with respect to claims for intentional interference with contractual relations and for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. An employee whose at-will employment contract is terminated as a result of a third party's interference need not allege that the defendant's conduct was independently wrongful to state a contract interference claim. Popescu was not required to allege that he was directly harmed by an independently wrongful act so long as he alleged (as he did) that Apple's wrongful act interfered with his economic relationship with Constellium. View "Popescu v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-01 state California California Court of Appeal Miguel Márquez H040508 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2016/14-0457.html RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins 2016-07-01T06:04:11-08:00 2016-07-02T20:54:44-08:00 RSL Funding, LLC had arbitration agreements with three individuals (collectively, Individuals) who owned annuity contracts they agreed to sell to RSL or its designee. Neither RSL nor the Individuals had arbitration agreements with the companies that wrote the annuity contracts (collectively, MetLife). After MetLife refused to honor contracts by which the Individuals sold their annuities, RSL sued MetLife and the Individuals in the County Court at Law (CCL) for a declaratory judgment. A district court suit was also initiated involving the same parties and subject matter. The Individuals initially joined forces with RSL but disputes subsequently arose. RSL initiated arbitration with the Individuals and moved to stay the CCL suit pending completion of arbitration. The CCL denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that RSL waived its right to arbitrate through its litigation conduct in the trial courts. The First Circuit affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by determining that RSL waived its right to arbitrate by litigation conduct; but (2) RSL did not challenge a separate ground on which the trial court court have denied RSL's motion to stay the litigation - that RSL failed to join its assignees in the arbitration. View "RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins" on Justia Law 2016-07-01 state Texas Supreme Court of Texas Per Curiam 14-0457 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2016/s-15-0236.html Felix Felicis, LLC v. Riva Ridge Owners Ass'n 2016-07-01T01:18:25-08:00 2016-07-01T14:39:35-08:00 Appellants, the owners of a tract of land in the Riva Ridge subdivision, submitted their plans to build a home and writer's studio to the Riva Ridge Owners Association's Site Committee. The Site Committee rejected the plans on the basis that some of Appellants' home would be visible from some locations in other homes. Appellants filed a complaint against the Association and others (collectively, Appellees) alleging several causes of action. Appellants filed a separate complaint requesting a determination of the term "principal residence site" in the covenants. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees on several issues. After a trial, the district court interpreted the phrase "principal residence site" in a way that required complete invisibility between the homes in the subdivision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in its interpretation of the phrase "principal residence," as the covenants only require that a principal residence be invisible only from a precise area of land on each tract; (2) erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants' breach of contract and bad faith claims; and (3) properly determined that Appellants must seek permission from the Site Committee before planting any trees on their tract. View "Felix Felicis, LLC v. Riva Ridge Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law 2016-06-30 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Kautz S-15-0236 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/150830.html Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc. 2016-06-30T07:22:15-08:00 2016-06-30T13:22:38-08:00 This case involved a royalty dispute over the use of nuclear technology. Areva NP, Inc. filed a complaint against Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) and affiliated companies (collectively, the B&W defendants), alleging breach of contract and violation of the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Areva on both claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to set aside the verdict and by entering judgment for the B&W defendants on Areva's royalty and trade secrets claims. Final judgment entered dismissing Areva's claims. View "Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Areva NP, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-30 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Kelsey 150830 http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2016/2014ap002484.html Water Well Solutions Serv. Group Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co. 2016-06-30T05:33:40-08:00 2016-06-30T14:01:45-08:00 Water Well, which was insured under a commercial general liability primary policy (CGL policy) with Consolidated Insurance Company, was sued by Argonaut Insurance Company. The complaint alleged that Water Well and its employees were negligent in the installation and reinstallation of a water pump and breached their contractual obligations. Water Well tendered its defense to its insurer. Consolidated denied Water Well's defense tender, stating that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Water Well under the CGL policy. After settling with Argonaut, Water Well filed suit against Consolidated, alleging that Consolidated breached its duty to defend Water Well in the action initiated by Argonaut. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Consolidated, concluding that "there is no covered claim and therefore there was no duty to defend." Applying the four-corners rule, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Water Well's request to craft a limited exception to the four-corners rule is rejected; and (2) Consolidated did not breach its duty to defend Water Well because certain exclusions in the CGL policy eliminated coverage. View "Water Well Solutions Serv. Group Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-30 state Wisconsin Wisconsin Supreme Court Ann Walsh Bradley 2014AP002484 2014AP002484 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2016/15-181.html Sisto v. America Condo. Ass'n, Inc. 2016-06-29T07:17:47-08:00 2016-06-29T12:47:41-08:00 Plaintiff filed an application with the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) seeking to expand his condominium unit. Defendants filed an objection to the proposal, asserting that Plaintiff did not own the property upon which he sought to expand his unit. CRMC denied the application. Plaintiff subsequently brought a complaint alleging slander of title and breach of contract and sought a declaratory judgment that he had the right to file his application with the CRMC. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute protected them from liability for questioning Plaintiff's ownership of the land in their communications with the CRMC. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendants then filed a motion seeking attorney fees incurred in defending the anti-SLAPP judgment on appeal. The hearing justice awarded Defendants $8,924 in attorney's fees in connection with the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, holding (1) the issue of attorney's fees was properly before the superior court; and (2) the superior court did not abuse his discretion in awarding attorney's fees. View "Sisto v. America Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-29 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Gilbert V. Indeglia 15-181 http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2016/2014ap000821.html Fontana Builders, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am. 2016-06-29T05:03:57-08:00 2016-06-29T13:26:02-08:00 The complex insurance coverage dispute arose out of a 2007 fire that destroyed portions of a home that was still under construction. Fontana Builders, Inc., the construction contractor, and James and Suzy Accola, the occupants/presumptive purchasers, had separate insurance policies. The Accolas settled with Chubb Insurance Co., the insurer that provided their homeowner's policy. Assurance Company of America, which had issued a builder's risk policy to Fontana, denied all coverage for the fire. Fontana commenced this action against Assurance alleging breach of the insurance contract and bad faith failure to pay under the policy. Fontana's lender, AnchorBank, FSB, eventually intervened. After a retrial, the jury found that the Assurance policy did not provide coverage for Fontana's fire loss, concluding that the Chubb policy "applied" to the underlying facts so as to terminate Fontana's builder's risk coverage. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the homeowner's policy issued by Chubb to the Accolas did not apply so as to terminate Fontana's builder's risk policy from Assurance. Remanded. View "Fontana Builders, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law 2016-06-29 state Wisconsin Wisconsin Supreme Court David T. Prosser, Jr. 2014AP000821 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2016/42690.html Kugler v. Nelson 2016-06-28T10:31:29-08:00 2016-06-28T14:45:15-08:00 John Kugler appealed the grant of summary judgment in his suit against Ron Nelson, David Powers, Steven Kenison, William Armstrong, and Powers Candy Co., Inc. (collectively "the Defendants"). Until mid-2010, Kugler, Nelson, Powers, Kenison, and Armstrong were all shareholders of H & M Distributing, Inc. (H & M), a wholesale distributor of beverages, cigarettes, and other miscellaneous items. In his complaint, Kugler alleged breach of various agreements and wrongful actions taken by the Defendants all in relation to Nelson's departure from H & M. The district court dismissed all of Kugler's claims because it found that the claims were derivative and Kugler failed to comply with derivative action requirements. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kugler v. Nelson" on Justia Law 2016-06-28 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Joel D. Horton 42690 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2016/43461.html Bryan Trucking v. Gier 2016-06-28T10:31:25-08:00 2016-06-28T11:42:00-08:00 Appellant Bryan Trucking, Inc., sued Respondent Terry Gier for fraud, based on statements and representations Gier allegedly made to Bryan Trucking that induced Bryan Trucking to purchase a used commercial truck from a third party. Gier was a member of Gier Jammer's Diesel Repair, LLC. Gier Jammer's serviced long-haul trucks for Bryan Trucking starting in 2009. In August 2012, Gier Jammer's overhauled the motor in a 2005 Kenworth truck owned by Niel Ring Trucking, Inc. ("Ring Trucking"). Niel Ring ("Ring") notified Gier that Ring Trucking wanted to sell the truck, and Gier arranged the deal. The district court dismissed the claim by stipulation of the parties. Bryan Trucking appealed the district court's subsequent award of costs and attorney fees to Gier. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bryan Trucking v. Gier" on Justia Law 2016-06-28 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Jim Jones 43461 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2016/14-184.html America Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mardo 2016-06-28T07:34:22-08:00 2016-06-28T12:10:12-08:00 Goat Island South Condominium (GIS) was comprised of three subcondominium residence areas - Harbor Houses Condominium (Harbor Houses), America Condominium (America), and Capella South Condominium (Capella). The Constellation Trust owned Unit 18 in Harbor Houses. Plaintiffs, America and Capella, filed an action against Defendants, the trustee of the Trust and Harbor Houses, seeking injunctive relief to bring a halt to the expansion of Unit 18 onto a limited common element. The trial justice concluded (1) Defendants were liable for breach of contract and for committing a common law trespass, (2) Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendants breached restrictive covenants contained in the GIS Second Amended and Restated Declaration of Condominium (GIS SAR) was moot, and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial justice erred in failing to award attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiffs based on the terms of the GIS SAR; and (2) the trial court did not otherwise err in its judgment. View "America Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mardo" on Justia Law 2016-06-28 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court William P. Robinson, III 14-184 14-185 14-186 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2070/15-2070-2016-06-28.html Cooper v. General American Life Ins. Co. 2016-06-28T07:01:10-08:00 2016-06-28T16:34:33-08:00 Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest and attorney's fees after General American notified plaintiff that the treasury warrant in the amount of his annuity transfer had never cleared. General American reversed the transaction. The court found that, under the terms of plaintiff's annuity, General American promised to make periodic payments to plaintiff at agreed upon dates; plaintiff does not allege that General American failed to make payments or otherwise failed to fulfill an obligation under the terms of the annuity; nor does this action arise from a declaratory judgment action or an effort by General American to cancel or lapse the policy. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff did not suffer a "loss" covered by Ark. Code Ann. Sections 23-79-208 and 23-79-209, and the district court was correct that neither a 12% penalty nor attorney's fees are owing by American General under these sections. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under section 16-22-308. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees in this case. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cooper v. General American Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Bobby E. Shepherd 15-2070 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2016/2015-0477.html Newell v. Markel Corporation 2016-06-28T05:02:51-08:00 2016-06-28T07:51:47-08:00 Defendants, Markel Corporation, Markel Services, Inc. (Markel Services), and Essex Insurance Company (Essex), appealed a superior court order denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff Michael Newell, in this insurance coverage action. Newell was allegedly injured in a slip and fall accident at a property owned by Brames, Inc. (Brames) in Laconia. Brames was insured under an Amusement Park General Liability Policy issued by Essex. Essex was a subsidiary of Markel Corporation and Markel Services was Markel Corporation's claims handling branch. Newell filed two personal injury actions arising from his slip and fall. The first action against Brames' co-owner and treasurer, was settled out-of-court. In the second lawsuit, Newell sued Ivy Banks, the person who allegedly cleaned the floor upon which Newell slipped and injured himself. Defendants received notice of the Banks action, but declined to defend Banks or intervene. Banks, although properly served, filed neither an appearance nor an answer and was defaulted. A default judgment was entered against Banks for $300,000, the full amount of damages sought by Newell. Newell brought suit against defendants to recover the amount of the default judgment, arguing he was a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract between Brames and Markel/Essex. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in determining that the language of the Policy was ambiguous and that Banks was a "volunteer worker" under the Policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Newell v. Markel Corporation" on Justia Law 2016-06-28 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Gary E. Hicks 2015-0477 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2016/scwc-13-0000531.html Arthur v. State, Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands 2016-06-27T15:31:37-08:00 2016-06-27T19:20:50-08:00 Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Kamehameha Investment Corporation (KIC), the developer of a hillside area, and Sato and Associates, Inc. and Daniel Miyasato (collectively, Sato), the civil engineer. KIC tendered defense against Plaintiffs' claims to Sato pursuant to a hold harmless clause in a project consultant agreement between Sato and KIC. KIC filed a cross-claim against Sato, alleging that Sato had agreed to defend and indemnify KIC against Plaintiffs' claims. The trial court granted KIC's motion for partial summary judgment against Sato. Relying on Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that Sato had a contractual duty to defend KIC in the wrongful death action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10-222 renders invalid any provision in a construction contract requiring the promisor to defend "the promisee against liability for bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of willful misconduct of the promisee, the promisee's agent or employees, or indemnitee"; (2) Pancakes does not apply to defense provisions in construction contracts; and (3) the scope of a promisor's duty to defend imposed by a construction contract is determined at the end of litigation. Remanded. View "Arthur v. State, Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands" on Justia Law 2016-06-27 state Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii Sabrina S. McKenna SCWC-13-0000531 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-5739/15-5739-2016-06-27.html Brown v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc. 2016-06-27T14:30:38-08:00 2016-06-27T16:20:19-08:00 Harrogate, a healthcare provider, participates in Blue Cross networks. Harrogate's patients sign an "Assignment of Benefits," allowing Harrogate to bill Blue Cross directly for services. The Provider Agreement allows Blue Cross to perform post-payment audits and recoup overpayments from Harrogate. Blue Cross paid Harrogate's claims for antigen leukocyte cellular antibody (ALCAT) tests, which purport to identify certain food allergies. Blue Cross claims that these tests have "little or no scientific rationale." Investigational treatments are not "covered, compensable services" under Blue Cross's Manual, which is incorporated by reference into the Provider Agreement. That Agreement also specifies that Harrogate may not "back-bill" patients for un-reimbursed, investigational treatments unless, before rendering such services, "the Provider has entered into a procedure-specific written agreement with the Member, which has advised the Member of his/her payment responsibilities." Blue Cross began recouping ALCAT payments. Harrogate filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The district court dismissed, holding that Harrogate did not meet the statutory definition of "beneficiary" and had not received a valid assignment for the purpose of conferring derivative standing to bring suit under ERISA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Harrogate had derivative standing through an assignment of benefits, its claim regarding recoupments falls outside the scope of that assignment. View "Brown v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Roth 15-5739 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1818/15-1818-2016-06-27.html Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC 2016-06-27T13:01:02-08:00 2016-06-27T15:44:05-08:00 In 2013, Panther, a marketing and brand management company, signed a contract with IndyCar, to purchase access to coveted space in the "Fan Village" at IndyCar racing events, an area where sponsors set up displays to attract fans. The Army National Guard had been Panther's team sponsor, 2008-2013. After it signed the 2013 contract, Panther learned that another team, RLL, intended to provide the Guard with Fan Village space. Believing that RLL had conspired with IndyCar and the Docupak agency to persuade the Guard to sponsor RLL instead of Panther, Panther brought suit in state court against RLL, Docupak, IndyCar, and active‐duty Guard member Metzler, who acted as the liaison between the Guard and Panther. The defendants removed the case to federal court, where the United States was substituted as a party for Metzler, 28 U.S.C. 2679(d); Panther filed an amended complaint that did not name either Metzler or the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint against RLL, IndyCar, and Docupak and found the United States's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction moot. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; the basis for federal jurisdiction disappeared when Panther amended its complaint. View "Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC" on Justia Law 2016-06-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane Pamela Wood 15-1818 http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc66.html Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc. 2016-06-27T07:30:52-08:00 2016-06-28T04:33:20-08:00 Petitioner John Van Rees, Sr. contracted with respondent Unleaded Software, Inc. to perform web-related services and to design additional websites. After Unleaded missed deadlines and failed to deliver the promised services, Van Rees sued, asserting multiple tort claims, a civil theft claim, three breach of contract claims, and a claim for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). The trial court granted Unleaded's 12(b)(5) motion, dismissing all but Van Rees' contract claims, on which a jury found in Van Rees' favor. Van Rees appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court had determined that the tort and civil theft claims were barred by the "economic loss rule" because they were related to promises memorialized in the contracts, and the CCPA claim failed to allege a significant public impact. The Supreme Court found the issue pertaining to the economic loss rule was not whether the tort claims related to a contract, but whether they stemmed from a duty independent of the contact. The Court found pre-contractural misrepresentations in this case distinct from the contract itself, and could have formed the basis of an independent tort claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed as to Van Rees' tort claims. With respect to civil theft, the court affirmed the court of appeals on the ground that the claim failed to adequately allege the "knowing deprivation of a thing of value." View "Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-27 state Colorado Colorado Supreme Court Allison H. Eid 14SC66 http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc176.html Warne v. Hall 2016-06-27T07:30:51-08:00 2016-06-28T04:32:46-08:00 Menda Warne appealed the court of appeals' judgment reversing dismissal of Bill Hall's complaint, which asserted a claim of intentional interference with contract. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted without addressing the applicable case law in its written order. The court of appeals expressly declined to apply more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence governing Fed. R. Vic. P. 12(b)(6), finding itself bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's existing precedent, which heavily relied on the federal Supreme Court's earlier opinion in "Conley v. Gibson," (355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding the complaint sufficient to state a claim. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the court of appeals too narrowly understood the Court's existing precedent. After review of the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Warne v. Hall" on Justia Law 2016-06-27 state Colorado Colorado Supreme Court Coats 14SC176 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3361/15-3361-2016-06-27.html Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. GSF Mortgage Corp. 2016-06-27T07:30:45-08:00 2016-06-27T12:35:51-08:00 NAMC, which buys, services, and sells residential mortgages, and GSF, a residential mortgage lender that also sells mortgages, entered into an Agreement whereby GSF would sell loans to NAMC. To use the Fannie Mae Desktop Originator System (DO), which evaluates potential mortgagors under Fannie Mae's eligibility standards, GSF needed a sponsoring lender. GSF had several sponsors from 2006 until 2011; one was NAMC. Every time GSF downloaded a report it paid Fannie Mae a $15 fee and the sponsoring lender had to pay Fannie Mae between $20 and $28. GSF was not aware that the sponsoring lender also had to pay a fee. In 2008 NAMC terminated its Agreement with GSF, but failed to notify GSF to stop using it as a sponsoring lender. NAMC was billed by Fannie Mae for almost $278,000 for GSF's use of the system, 2008-2011. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of GSF in a suit charging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. "NAMC is a sophisticated enterprise... its failure to cancel its sponsorship of GSF when it severed all its other relations to that company was an inexplicable blunder for which it has only itself to blame." View "Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. GSF Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law 2016-06-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 15-3361 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2016/1141422.html Ex parte Interstate Freight USA, Inc., et al. 2016-06-24T07:30:06-08:00 2016-06-24T17:44:59-08:00 Petitioners Interstate Freight USA, Inc., Interstate Specialized, Inc., Interstate Freight, Inc. (collectively referred to as "the Interstate companies"), Charles Browning, and Donald Raughton, Sr., filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the underlying action to the St. Clair Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The plaintiff in the underlying action, Kevin Vogler, was hired as a vice president/general manager for Interstate Specialized and Interstate Freight USA. Vogler sued, alleging that: in December 2013, he was working for another company and had become interested in acquiring the transportation branch of the Interstate companies; that he had entered into negotiations with Browning, the president of Interstate Freight USA and Interstate Specialized, and Raughton, a business consultant for the Interstate companies; that Browning and Raughton were acting on behalf of the Interstate companies; that the parties had agreed that "Vogler could acquire a minority interest in the trucking business over a two year period and, after two years of employment with the Interstate companies, would have the option of buying out the interest of Defendant Browning"; that Browning and Raughton had made representations to him regarding his salary and benefits; and that, based on those representations, Vogler left his previous employment and entered into separate employment contracts with Interstate Specialized and Interstate Freight USA. In early 2014, however, the businesses were shut down for "financial reasons," and Vogler's position was terminated. Petitioners moved to dismiss Vogler's complaint, or in the alternative, for a change of venue. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Baldwin County was the proper venue, but that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue on the "interest-of-justice" prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to transfer this case to the St. Clair Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Interstate Freight USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law 2016-06-24 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Alisa Kelli Wise 1141422 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2032/15-2032-2016-06-24.html Clarke Cnty. Dev. Corp. v. Affinity Gaming 2016-06-24T07:01:19-08:00 2016-06-24T07:36:59-08:00 CCDC filed suit against Affinity to enforce a memorandum of understanding that was signed after a mediation. The district court concluded that no contract existed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment for Affinity. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether board approval is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before the parties can enforce the memorandum of understanding. Whether board approval is a condition precedent thus cannot be resolved as a matter of law, and the case must be remanded for further proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Clarke Cnty. Dev. Corp. v. Affinity Gaming" on Justia Law 2016-06-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Steven M. Colloton 15-2032 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2016/15-0328.html In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am. 2016-06-24T06:04:39-08:00 2016-06-25T13:38:40-08:00 Brian Bresch entered into a contract with Nationwide Insurance Company that contained a forum-selection clause. The clause designated Franklin County, Ohio as the place to settle disputes arising from the agreement. Bresch later sued several Nationwide affiliates for, among other causes of action, breach of contract. Bresch filed the underlying lawsuit in Travis County, Texas. Nationwide sought to enforce the forum-selection clause by moving to dismiss the Texas litigation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Nationwide subsequently sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Nationwide's petition and directed the trial court to enforce the parties' forum-selection clause, holding that because Bresch failed to establish that the clause was waived or otherwise unenforceable, the trial court abused its discretion by not enforcing it. View "In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law 2016-06-24 state Texas Supreme Court of Texas John P. Devine 15-0328 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/14-13947/14-13947-2016-06-23.html Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vizcay 2016-06-23T11:03:02-08:00 2016-06-23T12:02:13-08:00 Allstate filed suit against multiple defendants, alleging claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Defendants are medical clinics that appointed Dr. Sara Vizcay as their medical director. Allstate's central allegation is that Dr. Vizcay failed to systematically review billings as required by Florida's Health Care Clinic Act, Fla. Stat. 400.990 et seq., which caused the clinics to submit unlawful or fraudulent insurance claims to Allstate. A jury found the clinics liable and awarded damages to Allstate. The clinics challenge the jury's verdict, and the district court's denial of their dispositive motions, on numerous grounds. The court held that, under Florida law, there is judicial remedy for a licensed clinic's violation of the Clinic Act; a licensed clinic can be held responsible for its medical director's failure to comply with the duties enumerated in the Clinic Act; the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Dr. Vizcay failed to substantially comply with those duties; Allstate's fraud claims are not barred by Florida's statute of limitations; and the district court did not err in denying defendants' motions to bifurcate the trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vizcay" on Justia Law 2016-06-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Edward Earl Carnes 14-13947 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/150930.html Commonwealth, Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Va. Ass'n of Counties Group Self Ins. Risk Pool 2016-06-23T08:34:20-08:00 2016-06-23T13:54:52-08:00 A pretrial detainee asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against guards and nurses at a regional jail. The jail authority had purchased a general liability insurance policy (the VaCorp Policy) from the Virginia Association of Counties Group Self Insurance Risk Pool (Risk Pool Association) and also elected to participate in a government-sponsored insurance program (the VaRISK Plan) managed by the Division of Risk Management (DRM). While the federal suit was pending, the detainee filed a declaratory judgment action against DRM and the Risk Pool Association seeking a determination of their respective liabilities for insuring the jail defendants. The Risk Pool Association and the DRM filed opposing third-party claims for declaratory relief. The detainee later settled with the jail defendants. The circuit court concluded (1) the VaRISK Plan was the sole primary coverage and that the DRM had the exclusive duty to defend the jail defendants, and (2) the Risk Pool Association had no duty to contribute toward the defense costs incurred by the jail defendants in the federal suit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the VaCorp Policy and VaRISK Plan provided co-primary liability coverage to the jail defendants; and (2) VaRISK Plan's $2 million coverage extension applicable to medical malpractice claims did not apply to the section 1983 civil rights claim alleging violations of federal constitutional law. Remanded. View "Commonwealth, Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Va. Ass'n of Counties Group Self Ins. Risk Pool" on Justia Law 2016-06-23 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Kelsey 150930 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2016/cv-15-944.html Integrated Direct Mktg. Inc. v. May 2016-06-23T08:30:53-08:00 2016-06-23T09:02:21-08:00 Drew May worked for Integrated Direct Marketing, LLC (IDM) as an executive vice president until his termination. May later began working for Merkle, Inc., a competitor of IDM. IDM filed a complaint against May and Markle alleging breach of contract and conversion, among other claims. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims except conversion. The court then certified to the Supreme Court the question whether, under Arkansas's tort of conversion, intangible property such as electronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that, under Arkansas law, intangible property such as electronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted "if the actions of the defendant are in denial of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner or person entitled to possession." View "Integrated Direct Mktg. Inc. v. May" on Justia Law 2016-06-23 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Wynne CV-15-944 http://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2016/20140137.html Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass'n v. Shakespeare 2016-06-23T08:04:07-08:00 2016-06-23T13:20:43-08:00 Gloria and Thomas Shakespeare, GLOCO, LC, and Atlas Tower, LLC (collectively, Shakespeares) applied for permission from the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association (Association) to construct a cell phone tower on a lot located along River Road in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park (industrial park). The Association denied the application. When the Shakespeares proceeded to construct the cell phone tower, the Association brought suit, alleging that the Shakespeares breached the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the industrial park. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Board did not have the right to limit the number of cell phone towers in the industrial park. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in strictly construing the CC&Rs in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property rather than applying neutral principles of contract construction; and (2) the Board had sufficient authority under the CC&Rs to deny the Shakespeares' application. View "Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass'n v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law 2016-06-22 state Utah Utah Supreme Court Himonas 20140137 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2016/15-22.html Tri-Town Constr. Co. v. Commerce Park Assocs. 12, LLC 2016-06-22T07:04:42-08:00 2016-06-22T18:06:33-08:00 Defendants defaulted on a loan. At the ensuing foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff purchased the property securing the loan. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants seeking to secure the resulting deficiency. Count 1 alleged breach of the promissory note against both defendants, and count 2 alleged a breach of guaranty against one defendant. Defendants counterclaimed. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and dismissed the counterclaims. The trial justice then awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the superior court's judgment, holding (1) the court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on claims of the breach of promissory note and breach of guaranty, as well as its dismissal of Defendants' counterclaims; but (2) the superior court erred in awarding Plaintiff attorney's fees without considering the testimony or affidavit of independent counsel. View "Tri-Town Constr. Co. v. Commerce Park Assocs. 12, LLC" on Justia Law 2016-06-22 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Francis X. Flaherty 15-22 15-146 http://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2016/112538.html Pizano v. Lacey & Assoc., LLC 2016-06-21T11:33:01-08:00 2016-06-22T06:13:57-08:00 In 2012, Lacey & Associates, LLC, contracted with Everest Homes, LLC, to purchase a commercial building. In addition, Lacey and Everest executed an escrow agreement for the release of additional funds to Everest if the roof was replaced after title had transferred to Lacey. After title passed to Lacey, Everest entered into a contract with the Williams Group, a contractor, to replace the roof. The Williams Group then hired Andrea Pizano to remove the old roof and HVAC units, which service she performed. In early 2013, Pizano sued alleging the Williams Group did not pay the contractual amount of $11,085, as agreed by the two parties. She filed a mechanic's lien on Lacey's building one day before she filed her petition. The lawsuit sought judgment against the Williams Group in the amount of $11,085, plus interest. The Williams Group never filed an answer. The trial court thereafter entered a default judgment against the Williams Group, awarding Pizano $11,085, an attorney's fee of $2,500.00 and court costs of $461.81. Pizano then sought to foreclose her lien against Lacey and be awarded court costs and attorney fees. She requested that the property be sold to satisfy the judgment. Lacey answered and included a "Cross-motion for Summary Judgment," contending that the new roof leaked so badly that large barrels had to be placed inside the building to catch the water. Therefore, no party was entitled to be paid for the roof. Lacey also asserted that Pizano's motion should be denied because Lacey had no contract with Pizano, and also that the plaintiff failed to file the required pre-lien notice. The trial court granted Pizano's summary judgment motion in part, and denied Lacey's counter-motion for summary judgment. Lacey appealed and Pizano counter-appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals held that Pizano successfully preserved her subcontractor's lien, but found that genuine disputes of fact remained as to the amount owed to Pizano and the enforceability of the lien. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature intended amounts less than $10,000 to be exempt from pre-lien notice. Having provided such an exception, the wording of the applicable statute persuaded the Court that "if a claimant filed a claim of $10,085 without a pre-claim notice, the claim would be enforceable up to $9,999. We do not believe that the claim would be completely unenforceable if it exceeded that legislatively-approved amount by a mere $86." The trial court's order entitling Pizano to a reduced judgment amount of $9,999.00 and an award of attorneys' fees and costs was affirmed. This case was remanded to the trial court to issue a judgment consistent with the law as expressed in the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Pizano v. Lacey & Assoc., LLC" on Justia Law 2016-06-21 state Oklahoma Oklahoma Supreme Court James R. Winchester 112538 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-2494/15-2494-2016-06-21.html Frangos v. Bank of America, N.A. 2016-06-21T10:00:11-08:00 2016-06-21T12:15:10-08:00 Thomas and Frances Frangos (Plaintiffs) secured a loan and pledged their home as collateral to secure a promissory note issued to the lender. Plaintiffs defaulted on the mortgage twice. A foreclosure sale was scheduled, but on the eve of the sale, Plaintiffs filed suit. Plaintiffs sought an injunction permanently barring Bank of America, N.A. and New Penn Financial, LLC (Defendants) from foreclosing, as well as damages premised on an alleged breached of a provision in the mortgage agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Frangos v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law 2016-06-21 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Stahl 15-2494 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2016/a-31-14.html Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute 2016-06-21T06:33:14-08:00 2016-06-21T07:07:49-08:00 In May 2013, plaintiffs Annemarie Morgan and Tiffany Dever filed suit against defendants Sanford Brown Institute, its parent company, Career Education Corporation, and Sanford Brown's chief executive officer, admission and financial aid officers, and clinical director. Sanford Brown was a private, for-profit educational institution with a campus in Trevose, Pennsylvania, that offered medical-related training programs. In the complaint, plaintiffs claimed that defendants misrepresented the value of the school's ultrasound technician program and the quality of its instructors, instructed students on outdated equipment and with inadequate teaching materials, provided insufficient career-service counseling, and conveyed inaccurate information about Sanford Brown's accreditation status. The complaint further alleged that Sanford Brown employed high-pressure and deceptive business tactics that resulted in plaintiffs financing their education with high-interest loans, passing up the study of ultrasound at a reputable college, and losing career advancement opportunities. The Sanford Brown enrollment agreement included payment terms for tuition and fees, disclaimers, and an arbitration provision. Without answering the complaint, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. The Appellate Division found the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed an arbitrator would determine issues of arbitrability and that plaintiffs failed to specifically attack the delegation clause. The panel therefore determined that arbitrability [was] for the arbitrator to decide. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Appellate Division and trial court did not have the benefit of "Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp.," (219 N.J. 430, 436 (2014), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2804, 192 L. Ed.2d 847 (2015)) at the time they rendered their decisions. The New Jersey Court held in "Atalese" that an arbitration provision in a consumer contract that fails to explain in some minimal way that arbitration is a substitute for a consumer s right to pursue relief in a court of law was unenforceable. This case was therefore remanded for further proceedings in light of Atalese. View "Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute" on Justia Law 2016-06-14 state New Jersey Supreme Court of New Jersey Barry T. Albin a-31-14 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3655/15-3655-2016-06-20.html Sirazi v. Gen. Mediterranean Holding, S.A. 2016-06-20T08:30:53-08:00 2016-06-20T10:59:23-08:00 Riverside, owned half by GMH and half by Heritage (Rezko's company), owned a valuable Chicago property. Sirazi had helped Rezko finance several investments, including guaranteeing a $5 million loan from Republic. The loan came due in 2006. Rezko was already in default on millions of dollars borrowed from Sirazi. Sirazi and Rezko signed a settlement agreement: Rezko gave Sirazi a security interest in all distributions from Heritage and committed to a priority order for paying off debts using Heritage proceeds. Rezko defaulted on another loan, triggering Sirazi's guaranty, so that Rezko then owed Sirazi $12.9 million. Meanwhile, Rezko had been indicted. GMH bought him out for $31.8 million. Rezko received $5 million, which paid for his criminal defense; the balance consisted of forgiveness of Rezko's debt to GMH. With the approval of Heritage's general counsel and GMH chairman Auchi, the agreement ignored Sirazi's interest. A jury awarded Sirazi compensatory damages of $12.9 million against GMH and Auchi and punitive damages of $5 million against each; the judge set aside the award against Auchi. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, in favor of Sirazi. Rezko breached the settlement by failing to pay Sirazi; the jury reasonably found GMH liable for tortious interference with contract. GMH was enriched unjustly. The award was reduced by $524,000 that Sirazi received in Rezko's bankruptcy and the award against Auchi was reinstated. View "Sirazi v. Gen. Mediterranean Holding, S.A." on Justia Law 2016-06-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 15-3655 15-3505 http://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2016/20140453.html Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. 2016-06-17T08:04:20-08:00 2016-06-17T11:37:54-08:00 Trans-Western filed an amended complaint in federal district court asserting claims against U.S. Gypsum for breach of an oil and gas lease and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The district court found that U.S. Gypsum had wrongfully rescinded the lease and that the rescission constituted a breach of contract and a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The court awarded nominal damages of one dollar to Trans-Western. The parties appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court the question of how to measure expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease. The Supreme Court answered (1) expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease are measured in much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract; (2) damages may include general and consequential damages; and (3) trial courts may allow the use of post-breach evidence to help establish and measure expectation damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-16 state Utah Utah Supreme Court Himonas 20140453 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3617/15-3617-2016-06-16.html C.G. Schmidt Inc. v. Permasteelisa N. Am. 2016-06-16T11:30:53-08:00 2016-06-16T11:43:26-08:00 Using a form provided by CGS, the general contractor for construction of an 18-story Milwaukee office building, PNA submitted a $12,675,421 bid to provide a glass curtainwall--a nonstructural outer covering for weatherproofing and aesthetics. The contract manual provided by CGS stated that "[t]he bidder must accept all terms of the [standard CGS] subcontract as a condition for submitting a bid." After CGS chose PNA's bid, PNA repeatedly expressed a need to review the finalized prime contract before it would execute a formal subcontract. CGS and PNA engaged in a "value engineering process" during which they refined the price and other terms of the subcontract. PNA regularly updated the proposed price and communicated the updates to CGS. Several times, PNA raised concerns about subcontract terms. CGS never indicated to PNA that, in CGS's view, there was already an agreement in place. The parties never entered into a formal subcontract. CGS had to use a different subcontractor at a higher price. CGS filed suit. The district court granted PNA summary judgment, finding that the parties did not intend to be bound until the execution of a formal subcontract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the parties never entered into a binding contract and that CGS's promissory estoppel claim fails as a matter of law. View "C.G. Schmidt Inc. v. Permasteelisa N. Am." on Justia Law 2016-06-16 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Joel Martin Flaum 15-3617 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2016/sjc-11943.html Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey 2016-06-16T06:02:52-08:00 2016-06-16T14:36:01-08:00 The United States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit certified two questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The questions arose in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, and concerned the power and effect of an affidavit of an attorney, executed pursuant to G.L. c. 183 section 5B, in relation to a mortgage containing a defective certificate of acknowledgement. The first question centered on whether, pursuant to the statute, a recorded mortgage omitting the name of the mortgagor, a material defect of that mortgage. The second question centered on whether the recording of that allegedly defective mortgages provides constructive notice of the mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, either independently or in combination with the mortgage. The Massachusetts Supreme Court answered both questions "yes." View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Casey" on Justia Law 2016-06-16 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Margot Botsford SJC-11943 http://law.justia.com/cases/kentucky/supreme-court/2016/2016-sc-000002-i.html Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway 2016-06-16T06:01:55-08:00 2016-06-16T08:39:54-08:00 Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. (KSF) and Brantley Dunaway entered into an employment agreement. Two years later, KSF terminated Dunaway's employment. When KSF informed Dunaway that he was not entitled to a bonus for the 2013 fiscal year, Dunaway filed an action for breach of contract. Nearly one year later, KSF filed a motion for partial summary judgment and declaratory relief, arguing that KSF's determination that Dunaway was not entitled to a bonus was a binding "arbitration award" issued by an independent accounting firm. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that the employment agreement did not contain an agreement to forgo litigation and arbitrate any bonus dispute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no arbitration agreement existed between KSF and Dunaway, and because no arbitration proceeding occurred, there was no arbitration award to be confirmed. View "Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway" on Justia Law 2016-06-16 state Kentucky Kentucky Supreme Court Daniel J. Venters 2016-SC-000002-I http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-14070/15-14070-2016-06-15.html Coker v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co. 2016-06-15T13:01:38-08:00 2016-06-15T16:42:03-08:00 Defendants, three excess liability insurers, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims. The district court concluded that Georgia's uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) statute imposed upon defendants an unconditional obligation to provide UM coverage to the insured as if they were primary insurers, and that defendants' failure to tender payment amounted to a breach of contract. The court held that Georgia's UM statute, Ga. Code Ann. 33-7-11, applies to defendants' excess liability policies; defendants' excess liability policies contain vertical exhaustion requirements; and section 33-7-11 does not supersede the vertical exhaustion requirements in defendants' excess liability policies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Coker v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Hull 15-14070 http://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2016/113105.html American Natural Resources, LLC v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P. 2016-06-14T08:03:23-08:00 2016-06-14T11:04:34-08:00 Parties to an agreement regarding an area of mutual interest for the purposes of oil and gas exploration sought to determine their respective rights under the agreement. The agreement gave the respondents in this case the right to participate in wells in futuro. The petitioners urged that the provision violated the rule against perpetuities. The district court agreed and granted judgment to the petitioners. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part remanded the matter for further proceedings. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a clause in an agreement giving a limited liability company the right to participate in all future wells on unleased property violated Article II, Section 32 of the Oklahoma Constitution prohibiting perpetuities, and whether a limited liability company was a "life in being." The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative, finding that the district court did not err in granting a motion to dismiss based on these two questions. View "American Natural Resources, LLC v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P." on Justia Law 2016-06-14 state Oklahoma Oklahoma Supreme Court Steven W. Taylor 113105 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2016/618-2015.html Enrique v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 2016-06-14T07:31:00-08:00 2016-06-14T11:08:23-08:00 Joann Enrique appealed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in an action she brought for bad faith denial of uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage stemming from a 2005 car accident. In 2005, an uninsured driver crashed into Enrique's car by improperly turning into her lane. Enrique suffered a fractured rib, trauma to the right knee requiring arthroscopic surgery, trauma to the left knee for which she was a candidate for arthroscopic surgery, abrasions, and soft tissue injuries. Throughout the settlement negotiations and the processing of Enrique's claim, State Farm personnel expressed concerns about whether Enrique's knee injuries were caused by pre-existing conditions. The record was unclear as to why there were large lapses in time during the settlement negotiations. While the parties were waiting for the Independent Medical Examiner report, in July 2008, Enrique filed suit against State Farm, seeking benefits up to the $100,000 policy limits, as well as punitive damages against State Farm for bad faith by refusing to pay up to those limits. In support of the bad faith claim, Enrique alleged that State Farm refused to compensate her up to the UM policy limits without any reasonable justification. In October 2008, the Superior Court severed and stayed the bad faith claim pending resolution of the UM damages claim. The parties then stipulated to a partial dismissal of the bad faith claim without prejudice. Due to the continuing impasse, in September 2008 State Farm decided to advance Enrique $25,000, as the parties both agreed the claim was worth at least that much. As trial approached, State Farm offered Enrique another $20,000 to settle the case, for a total of $45,000. Enrique also revised her demand, and as of January 2010, was willing to settle for an additional $65,000, representing a $90,000 demand. The parties could not bridge the gap, and the damages case went to trial in February 2010. The jury returned a $260,000 verdict. State Farm did not seek remittitur, but did appeal on an evidentiary issue. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, and State Farm paid the remaining $75,000 of their policy limits, costs and interests. Enrique then pursued her bad faith claim against State Farm, claiming as damages the unpaid $160,000 portion of the jury verdict, prejudgment interest, and punitive damages. The Superior Court granted State Farm summary judgment because Enrique failed to make a prima facie showing of bad faith. The court based its decision on causation issues arising from Enrique's pre-existing knee problems (which gave State Farm a reasonable basis for its actions), State Farm's multiple valuations of Enrique's claim that put it below policy limits, and her failure to offer facts showing State Farm exhibited reckless indifference in handling her claim. Finding no reversible error as to the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Enrique v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-14 state Delaware Delaware Supreme Court Seitz 618, 2015 http://law.justia.com/cases/michigan/supreme-court/2016/150656.html Altobelli v. Hartmann 2016-06-14T05:00:05-08:00 2016-06-14T11:07:35-08:00 In 1993, plaintiff Dean Altobelli began working as an attorney for Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. ("the Firm"). Upon joining the Firm, plaintiff signed the "Miller Canfield Operating Agreement" ("Operating Agreement"), a document governing the Firm's internal affairs. By January 2006, plaintiff had become a senior principal at the Firm. However, in late May or early June 2010, plaintiff decided he wanted to pursue a new opportunity as an assistant coach for the University of Alabama football team. Plaintiff proposed a 7- to 12-month leave of absence from the Firm to defendant Michael Hartmann, the Firm's CEO, and defendant Michael Coakley, who was the head of the Firm's litigation group but was not a managing director. Plaintiff suggested that the Firm permit him to maintain his ownership interest and return to the Firm as a senior principal any time before June 1, 2011. Plaintiff avers that Hartmann initially promised plaintiff that he could spend as much time at the University of Alabama as he wanted and still receive certain allocated income from his clients. Hartmann disputed this, claiming that plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the partnership. Plaintiff claimed he was improperly terminated, and that the Firm shorted plaintiff's income as a result. Plaintiff's attempt to resolve the matter through the direct settlement and mediation process, as outlined in the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement, was unsuccessful. In November 2011, plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration as provided for in the arbitration clause. Despite having made the demand for arbitration, he filed suit alleging that the seven individuals named as defendants were responsible for engaging in tortious conduct with regard to plaintiff's request for a leave of absence and retention of his equity ownership in the Firm. Defendants moved for summary judgment and a motion to compel arbitration as required by the arbitration clause. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment too. The circuit court denied defendants' motions and granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that plaintiff did not voluntarily withdraw from the Firm. Rather, the circuit court concluded that defendants had improperly terminated plaintiff's ownership interest without authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the part of the Court of Appeals' opinion regarding the motion to compel arbitration and instead held that this case was subject to binding arbitration under the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the lower courts should not have reached the merits of plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition, as the motion addressed substantive contractual matters that should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Altobelli v. Hartmann" on Justia Law 2016-06-13 state Michigan Michigan Supreme Court Bernstein 150656 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/14-0441.html Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer 2016-06-13T11:04:21-08:00 2016-06-13T13:14:29-08:00 Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff later brought suit against Defendant, claiming that there were defects in the house. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by ruling on questions of arbitrability despite the existence of a delegation provision in the arbitration agreement that vested the arbitrator with authority to determine issues of arbitrability relating to the dispute. The Supreme Court determined that the circuit court was within its rights not to enforce the delegation language because the language did not reflect the parties' clear and unmistakable intention to delegate issues about the validity, revocability, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator. The United States Supreme Court granted Defendant's requested writ of certiorari, vacated the Supreme Court's opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of their decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order, holding that because Plaintiffs never specifically challenged the delegation language before the circuit court or Supreme Court, Plaintiffs waived any right to challenge the delegation language. Remanded for arbitration. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law 2016-06-13 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Menis E. Ketchum, II 14-0441 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-1878/15-1878-2016-06-10.html Gateway Customer Solutions v. GC Services L.P. 2016-06-10T07:30:57-08:00 2016-06-10T18:03:42-08:00 In this contract dispute between the parties, the district court granted summary judgment for GC Services, concluding that Addendum A unambiguously provided that the 2014 Agreement was not a "renewal" of the 2011 Agreement. Here, the term "renewals" was defined in Addendum A. Addendum A - drafted by Gateway - provided that the period in which Gateway would be entitled to receive commissions would be defined in the future "awarded contract," a contract to which Gateway would not be a party. The court found that this may not have been a wise provision, from Gateway's perspective, but it is not ambiguous. Because the court agreed with the district court that the relevant contract provisions are not ambiguous, the court may not consider extrinsic evidence, nor does the doctrine of contra proferentum apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gateway Customer Solutions v. GC Services L.P." on Justia Law 2016-06-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 15-1878 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2016/13-0986.html Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry 2016-06-10T06:33:40-08:00 2016-06-12T13:08:20-08:00 Plaintiff, a reservoir engineer, purported to identify ten localized areas in oil-and-gas formations in East Texas that offered optimized production. Plaintiff sued Southwestern Energy Production Company (SEPCO), an oil and gas operator, alleging that SEPCO misused the proprietary information about the ten "sweet spots" acquired under a confidentiality agreement and profited from its use. After a trial, the jury awarded $11.445 as tort damages for misappropriate and contact damages for breach of the confidentiality agreement and $23.89 million in equitable disgorgement of past profits. The court of appeals affirmed the actual damages award for misappropriation but reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment on the disgorgement and breach-of-contract awards. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the breach-of-contract and misappropriation-of-trade-secret claims and remanded for a new trial, concluding that limitations was not conclusively established and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the entire jury award; and (2) the equitable disgorgement issue need not be addressed because the trial court must determine the issue anew on remand following a new trial. View "Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry" on Justia Law 2016-06-10 state Texas Supreme Court of Texas Helfand 13-0986 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2016/150334.html Bass v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc. 2016-06-10T05:31:38-08:00 2016-06-10T11:48:23-08:00 Plaintiff filed a class action petition against J.C. Penney asserting that the internet retailer unlawfully charged Iowa sales tax on shipping and handling charges. J.C. Penney forwarded the tax to the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) pursuant to the Iowa version of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act (SSUTA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of J.C. Penney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted J.C. Penney's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's statutory claims grounded in SSUTA, as the SSUTA does not create a private cause of action; (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims related to the alleged unlawful payment of taxes on the ground that the remedies under Iowa Code 423.45(3) and 423.47 are exclusive remedies barring other claims for relief for wrongful payment of taxes under SSUTA; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to recover on her claims alleging shipping and handling misrepresentations. View "Bass v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-10 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Brent R. Appel 150334 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2016/141274.html Nat'l Surety Corp. v. Westlake Invs., LLC 2016-06-10T05:31:37-08:00 2016-06-10T11:24:52-08:00 Developers and a general contractor of an apartment complex purchased a primary commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy from Arch Insurance Group and an excess CGL insurance policy from National Surety Corporation (NSC). Westlake Investments, LLC, which purchased the complex, sued the insureds for construction defects. Arch defended the suit on behalf of the insureds, and the parties eventually settled. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the insureds assigned their claims against NSC on the excess CGL policy to Westlake. Thereafter, NSC initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to pay any portion of the judgment awarded to Westlake. Westlake counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Westlake, concluding that property damage resulting from defective work performed by an insured's subcontractor may constitute an accident that qualifies as an occurrence covered by the Arch policy, and therefore, the NSC policy. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Westlake. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that defective workmanship by an insured's subcontractor may constitute an occurrence under the terms of the Arch policy incorporated by reference into the NSC policy. View "Nat'l Surety Corp. v. Westlake Invs., LLC" on Justia Law 2016-06-10 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court David S. Wiggins 141274 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2016/s213873.html Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. 2016-06-09T09:00:59-08:00 2016-06-09T11:59:07-08:00 After Plaintiff was injured, he sought benefits from Defendant-insurer under an indemnity benefit policy. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging that Defendant breached the insurance contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded Plaintiff $31,500 in unpaid policy benefits, $35,000 in damages for emotional distress, and $19 million in punitive damages. The parties stipulated that the amount of attorney fees to which Plaintiff was entitled under Brandt v. Superior Court was $12,500, and the court awarded that amount. Defendant moved for a new trial seeking a reduction in the punitive damages award on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court granted the motion and reduced the jury's award to a 10-to-1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. In so doing, the court considered only the $35,000 damages award but did not include the $12,500 in Brandt fees. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in determining whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive, Brandt fees may be included in the calculation of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, regardless of whether the fees are awarded by the trier of fact as part of its verdict or are determined after the verdict has been rendered. Remanded. View "Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-09 state California Supreme Court of California Kruger S213873 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2016/91777-9.html Lui v. Essex Insur. Co. 2016-06-09T07:19:47-08:00 2016-06-09T10:48:12-08:00 Kut Suen and May Far Lui (the Luis) owned a building that sustained water damage after a pipe burst while the building was vacant. The Luis' insurance policy for the building limited coverage for water damage based on vacancy: coverage was suspended if the building remained vacant for 60 consecutive days and, effective at the beginning of any vacancy, and there was no coverage for certain specified losses, including water damage. The Luis argued that the policy was ambiguous and should have been interpreted in the Luis' favor to mean that the exclusion of coverage for water damage would commence only after a 60-day vacancy. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Luis' arguments and found that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for water damage immediately upon vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's contrary holding and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lui v. Essex Insur. Co." on Justia Law 2016-06-09 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Charles Wiggins 91777-9 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-3554/14-3554-2016-06-08.html Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC 2016-06-08T07:01:22-08:00 2016-06-08T18:26:07-08:00 Following a jury verdict in favor of Lincoln, in this case involving a contract dispute between the parties, Firetrace appealed the denial of its motion for a new trial or remittitur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. The court concluded that Firetrace made its intent clear by filing its Amended Statement of Issues and Amended Designation of the Record on Appeal and that Lincoln will not be prejudiced. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Firetrace's motion for a new trial because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Firetrace's limited repair or replace remedy failed of its essential purpose; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Firetrace's motion for a new trial because it found there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Firetrace was on notice that Lincoln's terms and conditions existed and that Lincoln intended those terms and conditions to be binding on Firetrace; the court rejected Firetrace's claim that it was entitled to a new trial based on several errors regarding jury instructions; and the district court did not err by declining to grant Firetrace's motion for a remittitur or new trial on damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC" on Justia Law 2016-06-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Jane Louise Kelly 14-3554 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2016/27640.html Maybank v. BB&T 2016-06-07T12:25:55-08:00 2016-06-07T12:56:03-08:00 This appeal arose out of a $17 million verdict rendered in favor of Francis Maybank for claims sounding in contract, tort, and the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). Maybank brought this action alleging he received faulty investment advice from Branch Banking and Trust (BB&T - the Bank) through BB&T Wealth Management (Wealth Management) and BB&T Asset Management (Asset Management), all operating under the corporate umbrella of BB&T Corporation (collectively, Appellants). Appellants appealed on numerous grounds, and Maybank appealed the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest. After review, the Supreme Court reversed as to an award of punitive damages based on a limitation of liability clause. The Court affirmed on all other grounds. View "Maybank v. BB&T" on Justia Law 2016-06-03 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Kaye Gorenflo Hearn 27640 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-2190/15-2190-2016-06-06.html Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc. 2016-06-06T12:00:04-08:00 2016-06-06T12:44:46-08:00 Baskin-Robbins, a Delaware LLC, franchises ice cream stores. Alpenrose, a dairy products manufacturer incorporated in Oregon, is headquartered in Portland. In 1965, the two executed a territorial franchise agreement. Baskin-Robbins then had its principal place of business in California. Negotiations occurred in California. Between 1973 and 1985, the parties amended the Agreement three times; Baskin-Robbins remained in California. All material discussions concerning the amendments took place in Oregon. Around 1998 Baskin-Robbins' headquarters moved to Massachusetts. In 2001 and 2007, Alpenrose sent Baskin-Robbins, in Massachusetts, formal notice of its election to renew. In 2013, Alpenrose informed Baskin-Robbins that it did not intend to renew. The parties began negotiating Alpenrose's transition out of the arrangement. Negotiations stalled. Alpenrose wrote to Baskin-Robbins, stating that it wished to "revoke" its decision not to renew and requested another six-year extension, citing the Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code 19.100.180(2)(i). Baskin-Robbins rejected Alpenrose's demands for renewal or compensation, then sought a declaratory judgment in the District of Massachusetts. That court dismissed for want of in personam jurisdiction, stating that "nothing in [the parties'] history . . . suggests that Alpenrose intended to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business within Massachusetts." The First Circuit reversed, "the assertion of jurisdiction satisfies both the relatedness and purposeful availment criteria, and the Gestalt factors do not counsel otherwise." View "Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Selya 15-2190 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/14-1106.html Allegheny Country Farms, Inc. v. Huffman 2016-06-06T11:04:44-08:00 2016-06-06T11:39:48-08:00 Allegheny Country Farms entered into a contract to purchase a portion of Carper's 33-acre property. The agreement was intended to resolve a boundary dispute. Before the conveyance was made, however, Carper sold her property at auction to the Huffmans, by a contract wherein the Huffmans agreed to abide by the terms of the first contract. Allegheny sought specific performance. The court granted summary judgment to the Huffmans and dismissed, as moot, and action against Carper. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed: the Huffmans are contractually bound to convey a portion of their property to Allegheny. "The Huffmans entered into this contract, and its attending obligation to execute the Boundary Line Agreement, with their eyes wide open. They were clearly put on notice and assented to this requirement at the property auction." View "Allegheny Country Farms, Inc. v. Huffman" on Justia Law 2016-06-06 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Margaret L. Workman 14-1106 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0516.html Mays v. Southern Resources Consultants, Inc. 2016-06-06T04:01:27-08:00 2016-06-06T06:50:17-08:00 Southern Resources Consultants, Inc. ("SRC") was a Residential Service Provider ("RSP"), contracting with the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities ("DBHDD") and the Georgia Department of Community Health ("DCH") to operate group homes and provide care and oversight for Medicaid-funded individuals with developmental disabilities. Linda Mays ("Mays") contracted with SRC to be a Host Home Provider ("HHP") for one such woman, S.F., from approximately 2006 to 2014. S.F. became dissatisfied with SRC, and requested that her case manager, who was the Guardianship Case Manager for the Division of Aging Services of Georgia's Department of Human Services ("DHS") and S.F.'s legal guardian, change S.F.'s RSP. At the time of the request, DBHDD policy prohibited a HHP from terminating its contract with a RSP, such as SRC, and then continuing to serve the individual who had been in the care of the HHP. Consequently, at S.F.'s behest and believing it to be in S.F.'s best interests, the case manager requested a waiver of such policy from DBHDD so that S.F. could remain in Mays's host home despite the termination of Mays's relationship with SRC. DBHDD granted the waiver. S.F. then began to receive services from a new RSP, Southern International Living ("SIL"). SRC subsequently filed suit against Mays for breach of purported confidentiality3 and non-compete provisions in a "Work for Hire Agreement/ Contract/ Subcontract Agreement" ("Contract"), and for violation of the Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990 ("GTSA"), and subsequent unjust enrichment. This case reached the Georgia Supreme Court by way of an appeal of the superior court's grant of an interlocutory injunction and for interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief, damages, attorney fees, and costs. The parties conceded that Mays had returned certain SRC confidential information at issue in the interlocutory injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court as a nullity. Because the second and third provisions of the injunction were inextricably entwined and based upon a non-compete agreement that has since expired, these provisions were moot. Accordingly, the injunction was reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Mays v. Southern Resources Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-06 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia P. Harris Hines S16A0516 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2016/1141267.html Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Har-Mar Collisions, Inc. 2016-06-03T08:00:06-08:00 2016-06-03T09:03:37-08:00 Har-Mar Collisions, Inc. appealed a circuit court judgment after a jury verdict of $101,054.40 in favor of Har-Mar Collisions on its breach-of-contract claim against Scottsdale Insurance Company. The trial court offset the jury verdict by the amounts Har-Mar Collisions had recovered from a settlement agreement it had entered into with Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Owners Insurance Company and from a settlement agreement it had entered into with CRC Insurance Services, Inc. ("CRC"). Because the total amount Har-Mar Collisions recovered from those two settlement agreements exceeded the amount of the jury verdict, the trial court entered a judgment awarding Har-Mar Collisions $0. Har-Mar Collisions appeals, challenging the setoff. Scottsdale cross-appealed from the judgment against it. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment to the extent it applied a setoff against the jury verdict returned against Scottsdale and remanded the case for the trial court to enter a judgment reinstating the jury verdict of $101,054.40. The Court remanded for the trial court to reconsider Har-Mar Collisions' motion to tax costs. The trial court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Har-Mar Collisions, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-03 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Tommy Bryan 1141267 1141230 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2016/14-284.html Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc. 2016-06-03T07:16:20-08:00 2016-06-03T10:07:02-08:00 Cashman sued, alleging Cardi provided defective cofferdams for construction of the Sakonnet River Bridge. Cofferdams are temporary watertight enclosures that are pumped dry to expose the bottom of a body of water so that construction can occur. During discovery, Cashman sought, and Cardi refused to produce, computer models and draft reports that had been "considered by" its testifying engineering expert to determine "certain stress and loads that are going to be placed on certain points on this cofferdam," including models "that [the expert] created which [he] may not have relied on but certainly would've considered" and draft reports. Cardi argued that Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure does not allow discovery of materials "considered by" an expert in forming an expert opinion. The hearing justice concluded that he did not have the authority to compel production of the material. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, after considering interpretations of the corresponding Federal Rule. The state rule is "clear and unambiguous" and is confined to discovery through interrogatories or deposition. It does not provide for the disclosure of documents. View "Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-03 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court William P. Robinson, III 14-284 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2016/140632.html Des Moines Flying Service, Inc. v. Aerial Services, Inc. 2016-06-03T05:31:32-08:00 2016-06-03T08:58:00-08:00 An aviation company challenged the application of a statutory immunity provision to its claim of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability found in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) arising from an alleged defect in product design or manufacturing. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the immunity provision only applied in tort cases or if it also applied to contracts. The Court held the statutory immunity only applied in products liability cases involving personal injury or property damage, not in cases based solely on economic loss. View "Des Moines Flying Service, Inc. v. Aerial Services, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-03 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Mark S. Cady 140632 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2016/2014-ca-01748-sct.html Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church v. Alfa Insurance Corporation 2016-06-02T10:32:21-08:00 2016-06-02T10:56:40-08:00 Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church appealed a circuit court order denying its request for prejudgment interest against Alfa Insurance Company. This suit arose from a 2005 insurance claim Sweet Valley filed with Alfa Insurance Corporation ("Alfa"), following storm damage to its property caused by Hurricane Katrina. Sweet Valley had a commercial insurance policy with Alfa Insurance. Sweet Valley filed suit against Alfa for breach of contract and alleged that Alfa had undervalued its claim. Sweet Valley requested prejudgment interest in its complaint. It was determined that Sweet Valley was entitled to $462,761.89. Alfa remitted the full amount to Sweet Valley. Subsequently, Alfa filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that, since an appraisal had been conducted and it already had paid Sweet Valley $462,761.89, no genuine issues remained. The trial court granted Alfa's motion. Because there was no judgment in this instance upon which interest could accrue, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church v. Alfa Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law 2016-06-02 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Beam 2014-CA-01748-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/150528.html Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 2016-06-02T08:34:37-08:00 2016-06-02T17:39:24-08:00 In 2003, Dumville met with attorney Thorsen to prepare her will. Thorsen understood that Dumville wanted a will that would, upon her death, convey all of her property to her mother if her mother survived her, and, if her mother predeceased her, to the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Dumville was 43 and lived with three cats, which she desired to go to the RSPCA upon her death. Thorsen prepared, and Dumville executed, the will. She died in 2008, her mother having predeceased her. Thorsen, as co-executor of the estate, notified the RSPCA that it was the sole beneficiary of Dumville's estate. Thorsen was informed that, in the opinion of the title insurance company, the will left only the tangible estate, not real estate, to the RSPCA. Thorsen brought suit in a collateral proceeding to correct this "scrivener's error" based on Dumville's clear original intent. The court found the language unambiguously limited the RSPCA bequest to tangible personal property, while the intangible estate passed intestate to Dumville's heirs at law. The RSPCA received $72,015.60, but the bequest, less expenses, would have totaled $675,425.50 absent the error. RSPCA sued Thorsen for negligence, as a third-party beneficiary of his contract with Dumville. The court found for the RSPCA. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed: RSPCA was a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary. View "Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law 2016-06-02 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia LeRoy F. Millette, Jr. 150528 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2016/27449.html Tri-City Associates, LP v. Belmont, Inc. 2016-06-02T05:03:12-08:00 2016-06-02T11:22:16-08:00 Tri-City Associates, LP owned and operated the Northgate Shopping Center in Rapid City. It entered into a written lease agreement with Belmont, Inc. in April 2006 for unfinished commercial space. The unfinished commercial space required substantial initial construction work before the lease was to begin on August 1, 2006. The parties experienced considerable difficulties in completing the terms of the lease. Tri-City proposed to move the start date of the lease to January 15, 2007. Belmont did not respond to the requested modification. Ultimately, Tri- City did not deliver the premises to Belmont on August 1, 2006, in the condition required under the lease and did not complete its allocated initial construction work. After Belmont did not pay rent for the first few months of the lease, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice of default under the lease. A month later, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice to quit and vacate and, in April 2007, sued to evict Belmont. Belmont answered and asserted that Tri-City materially breached the lease, which Belmont asserted relieved it of its duty to pay rent. Then, in October 2007, Belmont counterclaimed for damages for Tri-City's failure to perform under the terms of the lease. Tri-City responded to Belmont's counterclaim that Belmont agreed to accept the premises "as is." Tri-City also argued that Belmont failed to provide Tri-City with written notice of Tri-City's alleged breach and did not give Tri-City an opportunity to cure as required by the notice-and-cure provision in the lease. In this second appeal, Tri-City argued that the circuit court erred when it entered a judgment in favor of Belmont, Inc. In "Tri-City I," the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to enter "findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont's failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure." On remand, the circuit court entered supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, interpreting the notice-and-cure provision of the lease at issue to allow for substantial compliance and found that Belmont substantially complied. It also found that Tri-City had actual notice of its material breaches and an opportunity to cure. Alternatively, the court concluded that, by bringing suit against Belmont, Tri-City repudiated any intention to perform its obligation under the lease and made futile the requirement that Belmont strictly comply with the notice-and-cure provision. It then entered a judgment in favor of Belmont. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tri-City Associates, LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-01 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Lori S. Wilbur 27449 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/15-0600.html Jeffrey N. Evans/Ameriprise Fin. Servs. v. Bayles 2016-06-01T11:03:45-08:00 2016-06-01T12:12:13-08:00 Bayles rolled over his 401(k) retirement account, signing an Ameriprise Brokerage Individual Retirement Account Application. Bayles later signed an Active Portfolios Application-IRA Account Application. The first page of each application states that a copy of the related Brokerage Agreement must be provided to the client; the IRA Application states: "You acknowledge that you have received and read the Ameriprise Brokerage Client Agreement and agree to abide by its terms….. This brokerage account is governed by a predispute arbitration clause which is found on Section 26.... You acknowledge receipt of the predispute arbitration clause." Similar language appears in the Portfolios Application. Bayles died in 2013. His wife thought she was the beneficiary, but decedent's children were the designated primary beneficiaries on both accounts. Mrs. Bayles challenged Ameriprise's payout of the proceeds. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found the absence of a signature on a brokerage agreement created an ambiguity that invalidated the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded. Decedent signed the IRA Application, expressly acknowledging the arbitration clause, but there are unresolved issues, including whether the arbitration clause is unconscionable and whether anyof Mrs. Bayles' claims "fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration agreement." View "Jeffrey N. Evans/Ameriprise Fin. Servs. v. Bayles" on Justia Law 2016-06-01 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Allen H. Loughry, II 15-0600 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1482/15-1482-2016-06-01.html Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc. 2016-06-01T10:00:43-08:00 2016-06-01T11:41:44-08:00 Trailer Transit contracts with shippers for the movement of cargo, then contracts with independent drivers, who provide the rigs that carry the cargo, promising those 71% "of the gross revenues derived from use of the equipment leased herein (less any insurance related surcharge and all items intended to reimburse [Trailer Transit] for special services, such as permits, escort service and other special administrative costs." In a class action, about 1,000 drivers claimed that Trailer Transit made a profit on its "special services" and owes 71% of that profit to the drivers. The district court rejected that argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining: "That just isn't what the contract says. Drivers are entitled to 71% of the gross charge for "use of the equipment" (the rigs), but the contract does not provide for a share of Trailer Transit's net profit on any other part of the bill." View "Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Hoover Easterbrook 15-1482 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2016/a14-1358.html Figgins vs. Wilcox 2016-06-01T07:32:33-08:00 2016-06-01T16:33:07-08:00 Appellant Patrick Figgins brought suit against respondent Grand Rapids State Bank (GRSB) and its CEO, respondent Noah Wilcox, claiming, among other things, that Wilcox and GRSB had made misrepresentations and breached an oral agreement regarding the due date of a payment on an outstanding loan. Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that Minn. Stat. 513.33 (2014) did not permit these claims. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Figgins, on appeal, argued that section 513.33 did not apply to his claims and, to the extent it did, his promissory estoppel claim should have survived because promissory estoppel was an exception to the statute. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Figgins vs. Wilcox" on Justia Law 2016-06-01 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court G. Barry Anderson A14-1358 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b264493.html Rand Resources LLC v. City of Carson 2016-05-31T12:30:45-08:00 2016-05-31T16:00:01-08:00 The trial court granted anti-SLAPP motions, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, against a city's exclusive agent in its action for breach of, and interference with, the agency contract and related causes of action. The court concluded that the alleged wrongful conduct in plaintiffs' tortious breach of contract cause of action is the City's violation of the terms of the Exclusive Agency Agreement (EAA) by allowing someone other than Rand Resources to act as its agent with respect to efforts to bring an NFL franchise to the City. Thus, the cause of action is not premised upon protected free speech or the right to petition for redress of grievances. The alleged wrongful conduct in plaintiffs' promissory fraud cause of action is the false representation regarding renewal of the EAA. Although the basis of the cause of action is a statement, the gravamen of the cause of action is the manner in which the City conducted itself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City's exercise of free speech or petitioning activity. The gravamen of the fourth cause of action with respect to the City is the City's violation of the terms of the EAA and the manner in which the City conducted itself in relation to the business transaction between it and Rand Resources, not the City's exercise of free speech or petitioning activity. The alleged wrongful conduct at the heart of plaintiffs' interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage causes of action is again the Bloom defendants' efforts to usurp Rand Resources's rights and role under the EAA. As addressed with respect to the fourth cause of action, this conduct arises from the Bloom defendants' private conduct of their own business, not their free speech or petitioning activities. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Rand Resources LLC v. City of Carson" on Justia Law 2016-05-31 state California California Court of Appeal Elwood G.H. Lui B264493 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/h040226.html People v. Bankers Ins. Co. 2016-05-31T11:30:46-08:00 2016-05-31T14:02:18-08:00 Moreno was arraigned for felony domestic violence and false imprisonment. The court issued a domestic violence protective order and set bail. Bankers issued a bail bond of $50,000 to secure Moreno"s release. Moreno appeared at two hearings. On February 22, Moreno appeared for a plea hearing. The prosecutor announced that she was filing an amended complaint, adding misdemeanor counts of violating a protective order and aggravated trespass, and sought an increase to the bail amount. After an unreported bench conference, the court did not increase bail and set the preliminary examination for April 5. Moreno did not appear; the court ordered the bail forfeited. The court subsequently granted Bankers"s request to extend the appearance period by 180 days to April 2013. In April 2013, Bankers moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond, arguing that the court had materially increased its risk when it permitted Moreno to remain free after the amended complaint was filed. The court noted that the bond stated that it applied to "duly authorized amendments" and entered judgment on the bond. The court of appeal affirmed. Although the amendment to the complaint was not duly authorized, it did not materially increase the risk and did not require the court to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. View "People v. Bankers Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-05-31 state California California Court of Appeal Nathan D. Mihara H040226 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2016/20150313.html Holverson v. Lundberg 2016-05-31T09:05:34-08:00 2016-05-31T10:30:59-08:00 Susan Lundberg, as Trustee of the Gabriel J. Brown Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in a tract of land to Greg Holverson, directing the Trust to convey the land to Holverson, and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims for rescission or for damages for breach of contract. In May 1980, Holverson owed a balance on a contract for deed. Robert Lundberg, as original Trustee, released 5.09 acres from the contract and deeded that land to Holverson. Holverson executed a mortgage on the 5.09 acres as additional security for the contract for deed and the single indebtedness of $39,018.40 under the same repayment terms as the contract for deed. Holverson made sporadic payments under the amended contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she wrote Holverson multiple times asking him to make required payments. In December 2012, the Trust initiated proceedings to cancel the contract for deed and served Holverson with a notice of default. Holverson agreed to pay the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she reviewed records at the Burleigh County Recorder's Office and learned Holverson had obtained and satisfied several other mortgages on the land while making sporadic payments to the Trust since 1978. Susan Lundberg claimed she discovered Holverson had executed five mortgages on the land and satisfied three of the mortgages between 1978 and 1997, and he had obtained six mortgages and satisfied seven mortgages after 1997. She claimed she also discovered Holverson's stated reason for amending the contract for deed and mortgage on November 10, 1997, was false, because the record in the recorder's office reflected he had obtained the Capital Credit Union mortgage several days before Holverson's contract for deed and mortgage with the Trust were amended on November 10, 1997. Holverson made a timely tender of a certified check for the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage, and the Trust refused to accept the check and execute a warranty deed for the land. Holverson sued the Trust to quiet title and determine ownership of the land. Holverson generally denied the Trust's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and affirmatively pled accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, payment, release, statute of limitations, and waiver. The district court granted Holverson's motion for summary judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Trust's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law 2016-05-31 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Gerald W. VandeWalle 20150313 http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc1.html Martinez v. Mintz 2016-05-31T08:30:49-08:00 2016-05-31T10:34:06-08:00 Plaintiff's initial attorneys were discharged for cause and replaced by successor counsel. Initial counsel had been hired on a contingency basis. When discharged, they asserted a lien against any settlement or judgment entered in the underlying action and in favor of the plaintiff. The underlying action was subsequently settled, and successor counsel filed a motion to void the lien. Initial counsel responded by moving to strike successor counsel's motion and to compel arbitration, based on an arbitration clause contained in initial counsel's contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff. The district court ultimately concluded that this dispute was between the lawyers, and thus, the arbitration clause contained in initial counsel's contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff did not apply. The court then determined that initial counsel was not entitled to fees because it had been discharged for cause, and under the express terms of the contingent fee agreement, it had forfeited the right to those fees. Initial counsel appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that successor counsel's motion to void the lien at issue was properly filed in the underlying action and that the underlying action was a "proper civil action." In light of this determination, the Supreme court further concluded that the lien dispute was between initial and successor counsel and that therefore, the matter: (1) was not subject to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in initial counsel's contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff; and (2) was properly before the district court. View "Martinez v. Mintz" on Justia Law 2016-05-31 state Colorado Colorado Supreme Court Gabriel 14SC1 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/15-40538/15-40538-2016-05-27.html Pirani v. Baharia 2016-05-27T09:31:40-08:00 2016-05-27T21:22:13-08:00 The adversary action comprises the claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses between two sides of a business scheme to buy, renovate, and operate a Days Inn. This appeal stems from the district court's order affirming a bankruptcy court judgment rendered after trial in the adversary action. Appellant and his brother formed the plan to buy the hotel, and appellees are the investors that the brothers convinced to buy a fifty-percent stake in the scheme and the company that the three investors formed to hold their membership interest. The court concluded that appellant's res judicata argument fails where the release claim at issue was filed in the original action while summary judgment was still interlocutory. Thus, the claim was properly preserved through the severance order for later adjudication, and res judicata does not bar it. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court judgment that appellant breached the settlement agreement. Further, the district court properly affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of appellant's breach-of-guaranty claim against the investors, but not as to the company. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for additional proceedings, including a determination of what percentage of the attorney's fees were attributable to the breach-of-contract claim. View "Pirani v. Baharia" on Justia Law 2016-05-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Stephen Andrew Higginson 15-40538 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2016/1141052.html Once Upon a Time, LLC v. Chappelle Properties, LLC 2016-05-27T07:30:07-08:00 2016-05-27T09:52:38-08:00 Once Upon a Time,LLC ("OUAT"), appealed by permission a circuit court decision denying OUAT's motion seeking a summary judgment on the third-party complaint filed against it by Chappelle Properties, LLC ("Chappelle"). Chappelle owned a building in Birmingham containing at least two commercial retail spaces. Chappelle and OUAT entered into a commercial lease agreement in which Chappelle agreed to lease one of the commercial retail spaces to OUAT. The agreement contained an indemnity clause. Deborah Anderson worked for OUAT as a sales clerk. In late 2011, the OUAT retail space was flooded with contaminated water. Certain items of OUAT's inventory were moved from the OUAT retail space to Chappelle's vacant commercial retail space. Although Anderson was not working on the day of the incident, in the days following she counted inventory that had been moved to the vacant retail space. In late 2013, Anderson filed a complaint alleging that she had suffered a bacterial infection caused by her handling the allegedly contaminated OUAT inventory stored in the vacant retail space following the flood of the OUAT-leased retail space. In 2014, Chappelle filed a third-party complaint against OUAT and its managers that sought, among other things, indemnification pursuant to the indemnity clause in the agreement. OUAT alleged that the indemnity clause in the agreement did not cover the claims asserted by Anderson in her complaint. After review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying OUAT's summary-judgment motion. The Court held that the indemnity clause should not have been interpreted to include incidents occurring in the vacant retail space. View "Once Upon a Time, LLC v. Chappelle Properties, LLC" on Justia Law 2016-05-27 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Tom Parker 1141052 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2016/1140578.html Gaddy v. SE Property Holdings, LLC 2016-05-27T07:30:05-08:00 2016-05-27T09:50:52-08:00 In 2005, Water's Edge, LLC purchased lots 62-69 of "Re-Subdivision A" in Baldwin County, commonly referred to as Gulf Shores Yacht Club and Marina ("the property"). Fairfield Financial Services, Inc. loaned Water's Edge $12.8 million of the $13 million needed to purchase the property. In 2006, Fairfield notified Water's Edge that it would not renew Water's Edge's loan. The members of Water's Edge authorized the managers to seek new financing. In December 2006, Vision Bank agreed to loan Water's Edge $14.5 million. Vision Bank later merged with SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"). Certain members of Water's Edge signed agreements guaranteeing all of Water's Edge's debt to SEPH. In October 2008, SEPH notified Water's Edge that the loans were in default. In October 2010, SEPH sued Water's Edge and 28 individuals, including the guarantors, based on the promissory notes and guaranty agreements pertaining to the various loans issued over the years. The trial took place in late 2014. The trial court did not submit the case to the jury, but instead discharged the jury and entered an order granting SEPH's motion for a JML. The trial court found the guarantors and the other defendants jointly and severally liable on continuing unlimited guaranty agreements. The trial court found each of them individually liable for differing amounts based on continuing limited guaranty agreements they had signed. A month later, the trial court revised its earlier order, taking into account settlements and declarations of bankruptcy that certain guarantors had declared. The guarantors timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied. The guarantors then appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial court's judgment was not final because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss SEPH's claims against one of the guarantors, and the trial court did not certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). "An order entered in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void as to the debtor, thus leaving the claims against [one of the guarantors] pending and rendering the judgment nonfinal. A nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal." View "Gaddy v. SE Property Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law 2016-05-27 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Michael F. Bolin 1140578 1140722 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2016/20150259.html 26th Street Hospitality v. Real Builders 2016-05-26T14:02:39-08:00 2016-05-28T04:22:39-08:00 26th Street Hospitality, LLP appealed a district court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration; order lifting a stay in the proceedings, confirming the arbitration award, and awarding post-judgment interest; and final judgment. The Partnership argued the district court erred in ordering arbitration because the court was required to determine the validity of the contract before arbitration could be ordered and not all of the claims and parties were subject to arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "26th Street Hospitality v. Real Builders" on Justia Law 2016-05-26 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Carol Ronning Kapsner 20150259 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-55484/14-55484-2016-05-24.html Rich v. Shrader 2016-05-24T09:03:19-08:00 2016-05-24T21:11:36-08:00 Plaintiff filed claims alleging breach of contract and claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., against BAH and others. Under California law, a breach of a written contract must be brought within four years of the date of the alleged breach, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 337. The court concluded that plaintiff's cause of action accrued in September 2003 and the filing of his complaint was untimely. Therefore, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is time barred. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff a third opportunity to amend his complaint. Finally, the court held that the employer's stock rights plan did not qualify as an employee pension benefit plan subject to ERISA under 29 U.S.C. 1002(2)(A) because its primary purpose was not to provide deferred compensation or other retirement benefits. Because, in this case, the stock rights plan was not designed or intended to provide retirement or deferred income, it is not covered by ERISA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rich v. Shrader" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Block 14-55484 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/15-5074/15-5074-2016-05-24.html Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States 2016-05-24T07:01:57-08:00 2016-05-24T08:02:30-08:00 In 2001, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awarded Northrop an order for network monitoring software produced by Oakley for one base year and three option years. A subsequent modification required ICE to use best efforts to secure funding for the option years. Without notifying ICE, Northrop entered into a private agreement with ESCgov, an IT services company, assigning all payments under the order to ESCgov. ESCgov paid more than $3,000,000. The agreement absolved Northrop from liability for failure of ICE to exercise a renewal option if Northrop "use[d] its best efforts to obtain the maximum recovery." ESCgov assigned its rights to Citizens, a financial institution. None of the parties provided notice, as required by the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. 3727(a)(2). ICE paid Northrop $900,000 for the base year, which it delivered to ESCgov. ICE did not use the software in any investigations, and sent Northrop notification of its decision not to exercise the first option year. ICE did not exercise any option year. A contracting officer declined a claim that ICE breached the contract by failing to use its best efforts. The Claims Court dismissed a lawsuit on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because Northrop failed to provide "adequate notice" of its claim by failing to disclose the assignments. The Federal Circuit affirmed a second dismissal, following remand, agreeing that Northrop "is unable to identify any way that it, as opposed to ESCgov or Citizens, was harmed." View "Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Jimmie V. Reyna 15-5074