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In the wake of the recent debate between Bill Nye and Ken Ham on creation, I have decided to write a series of articles articulating some of the most important debates concerning the relation of scientific investigation to worldviews that have taken place throughout the 20th century. One of the reasons I am doing this is because presuppositionalists are oftentimes accused of raising their objections to secular science as a desperate parlor trick to justify an otherwise unjustifiable belief in Christianity, when in fact, the issues that many presuppositionalists raise are perennial discussions in the philosophy of science that have troubled scientists of all religious persuasions, including those who completely reject the validity of religious belief. Indeed, many of the objections presuppositionalists raise are precisely those that have been raised and discussed by unbelieving philosophers of science and scientists. Various solutions have been offered at this time. Some of these questions, which I intend to discuss, include:
-What impact, if any, do our presuppositions about reality have on our scientific investigation?
-When faced with conflicting interpretations of the same data among scientists, how can we decide between interpretations? According to what standard are we able to make this determination?
-In light of the fact that scientific consensus is in continual, radical flux, can scientific investigation really produce any knowledge at all?
-Is the association of scientific investigation with atheism or agnosticism historically normative, or is it a relatively recent development?
-Is authentically scientific investigation compatible with Christianity?
-Can we ground scientific investigation in anything substantive and foundational, or is it necessarily a series of totally arbitrary methods and practices which cannot be demonstrated to be any more conducive to truth than any other set of methods and practices?
-How can scientific investigation reliably determine that it is such and such a variable that produces such and such an effect and not another? How can we avoid confounding variables? How can we demonstrate that the correlation is not an incidental one, but is a legitimate example of direct or immediate causation?
-What "is" science, anyway? In what way or ways, if any, does it differ from ordinary, commonsense induction and abduction? How ought scientific investigation proceed, according to what standard, if at all, can authentically scientific investigation be distinguished from pseudo-science, junk science, etc.?
-Is pragmatic and predictive success in scientific investigation really commensurate with knowledge acquisition? Is scientific 'discovery' really correlated with scientific 'justification'?
I intend to discuss the different main figures in 20th century philosophy of science, the questions they grappled with and the answers they attempted to provide. Finally, I will discuss how different Christian presuppositionalists have responded to such debates, and make a case for how I believe presuppositionalists ought to respond.
In the public square, scientific investigation tends to be associated with a specific set of metaphysical commitments that are not innate to it, and in fact historically have not necessarily been associated with the practice of scientific investigation at all. I refer in particularly to metaphysical materialism, according to which all of reality can be reduced to nothing but the behavior of matter, as well as atheism or religious agnosticism. I would like in this article to trace the genealogy of this tendency throughout the 19th and early 20th century, and demonstrate how the vast majority of later 20th century philosophers of science came to reject the attitude of unmitigated optimism towards science, according to which scientific investigation is regarded as the only legitimate form of knowledge acquisition.
What has come to be regarded as the attitude of "modern science" was arguably born in the 19th century, in the person of Hermann Lotze.
"Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) mediated the transition from the exuberance of German idealism, in the first half of the nineteenth century, to the sober, scholarly and scientific ethos that came to prevail in the second half. He adapted the notion of "chief" or defining problems in the philosophical sub-disciplines, inherited from Herbart, and brought opposing approaches to bear on them, in a quasi-systematic way, preparing the way for the modern textbook. A professor in a changing situation, moving toward bureaucratic centralization in an encompassing national state, he mostly restricted his attention to academic issues, appealing to his peers (but not the public) in the now rising professional journal (while maintaining a lively interest in things quotidian)"(Sullivan, 2010).
We see in the person of Hermann Lotze the rejection of the philosopher as a kind of Renaissance man, who speculates on a wide variety of topics and attempts to integrate them in a systematic manner in order to put forth a holistic worldview. Instead, we see the beginnig of distinct subject matters (biology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, etc.) occupied by specialists in that field, whose work is undertaken according to a systematic manner that is peculiar to that very field.
"In his reviews, criticisms, and polemical writings he is as dignified as Kant and Herbart had been; he is never impolite as Fichte and Schelling frequently were; nor does he fasten upon his opponents any stigma as Hegel frequently succeeded in doing; he is quite above that virulent and unmannerly invective by which Schopenhauer tries to crush, but never actually damages, the arguments of thinkers whom he chooses to regard as enemies. But the style of Lotze reflects one characteristic trait of modern thought. The confidence and self-assurance of Kant, Fichte, Hegel. Schopenhauer, and of the earlier Schelling have disappeared." (Merz, 1907–14, p. 493)(Sullivan, 2010)
In the absence of the cult of the romantic philosopher-genius, arorse the cult of the professional journal:
"The new model of the academic researcher demands the replacement of prominent personalities—i.e., romantic 'geniuses'—by the new exemplar of the sober scientist. Significant, as well, are the new material constraints on the practice of philosophy: not just the rise of the university professor—after Kant—as the most prominent representative figure, but the correlative emergence of the professional journal as the typical venue of presentation and publication. Of course, the atmosphere of political repression, following the failed revolutions of 1815 and 1848, surely played a crucial role in limiting the wider ambitions of philosophers and reinforcing the need for a more neutral tenor. Indeed, the same political pressures and bureaucratic demands associated with the state professor's status as "civil servant" began to figure prominently during the first half of the nineteenth century, harkening back to the Fichte's difficulties in the Atheismusstreit (1798/99) and leading up to, among other things, the dismissal of the "Göttingen Seven" (1837)—just to enumerate a few salient events from the German situation alone.
The efficient causes of this portentous change were not limited to the social-political sphere: in the numerous departments that came to make up the philosophical, or lower, faculty of the university, other important developments were also afoot. First, and foremost, there must be numbered the emergence of new, separate disciplines—such as geology, chemistry, biology and psychology—and the resulting squabbles over relative positions, proper boundaries, and the subsequent agon of "role purification" (see Kusch, 1995). In addition, the rapid advances in the scientific discovery had multiplied the previously manageable amounts of data and, hence, suggested to some that the task of philosophy was now to restrict itself to explaining "how the problems of speculation still connect themselves with the ever increasing mass of special knowledge that the labours of the new generation have accumulated" (Adamson, 1885b, p. 573). In this context, the cognate conceptions of philosophy as a synthesizing or supervisory endeavor began to gather adherents. Indeed, the "rehabilitation of philosophy" [Rehabilitierung der Philosophie] (see Schnädelbach, 1984, pp. 103ff) is perhaps the central foundational issue of the day and names "the attempt to allot to philosophy, in a scientific age, a domain of problems that would be independent of the special sciences" (ibid., p. 103). Here, as elsewhere, Lotze emulates Fichte: while science can surely explain what is, it can never elucidate the ultimate value or meaning of the phenomena it reveals—that alone is the task of philosophy (cf. ibid., p. 178)"(Sullivan, 2010).
It is difficult to overstate the importance and influence of Hermann Lotze. Although rarely discussed by name today, he exercised an important influence on many of the thinkers whom we will discuss:
"Oddly—despite his one-time preëminence[keeping in mind that in his day he was regarded as one of the world's philosophical greats]—Lotze founded no enduring school. However, his teaching directly influenced such prominent students as Windelband and Frege and his ideas were still being considered and debated as late as the 1920s by a numerous notables, including Heidegger and Carnap. Even in his own day, Lotze's reputation soon spread beyond the continent. As a result, he became a substantial force in the English-speaking world affecting, among others, Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet, in Britain, and Royce, James, and Santayana, in America. Indeed, it is principally by this latter means that he came to hold some sway with both the early Moore and the early Russell. Furthermore, because his influence extended through both Anglo-America and the Continent, some have postulated his unconscious but seminal presence in the emergence of analytic philosophy (cf. Sluga, 1980, Gabriel, 2002, Milkov, 2000); and, likewise, studies of Lotze by historians of phenomenology (Rollinger, 2001, Hauser, 2003) have also begun to emerge"(Sullivan, 2010)
Although he exerted a decidedly secularizing influence on the intellectual disciplines of the 20th century, he was difficult theologically to pin down with any precision:
"Finally, in this same moment, when philosophy was only beginning its (eventual and complete) confinement to the academy—and becoming simultaneously more specialized and less provincial—Lotze was (notably) the darling of numerous Protestant theologians and preachers: both conservatives who sought to popularize him as a fanatical opponent of mid-century materialism, and others, of a more liberal character, who fastened on to his "personalism" as the proper antidote to the dangerous heterodoxies of pantheism, rationalism, agnosticism and atheism (cf. Hall, 1912, pp. 94n-96n). While Lotze himself may not have endorsed these distortions, there was, nonetheless, something about his work that permitted such misuse. Santayana, a keen observer of this very phenomena, insisted on inserting an important cautionary note: he remarked dryly that one ought not to be misled by Lotze's continuous reference to "souls" or "God" as "a certain acceptance which Lotze has found in conservative circles is perhaps due to insufficient considerations of his meaning":
Lotze is inclined to give old names to new things; he is fond of a metaphysical nomenclature, and his terms are generally more mysterious and old-fashioned than his ideas. Thus he speaks of the soul, of substance, of free will, of efficient causation, of a personal God; but these phrases stand in his system for comparatively modest and legitimate conceptions. The words may please us in themselves; but we shall be disappointed if we welcome the things for love of the names they bear. (Santayana, 1971, p. 153)
If correct, this suggests that Lotze, once again, followed the lead of Fichte in using traditional language to mask more deeply naturalistic conceptions than the surface meaning of the ordinary wording might initially suggest. (This peculiar feature of the expression of his thought must be made continually present by the active reader.) In any event, Lotze's continuing influence in the twentieth century (ironically) came mostly through the theological curriculum of classical liberal Protestantism, still in evidence until the late-1960s (cf. Reardon, 1968)""(Sullivan 2010).
Our own interest is limited to the historical context in which Lotze was writing as well as its effects on later intellectuals. Lotze's work contributed to the discrediting of Hegelian idealism and its various offshoots as legitimate, serious philosophical thought, and also contributed to the sort of highly compartmentalized, reductionistic tendency of thought we know today as "scientism":
"After modernism, philosophy changed. But the change was slow in coming and, well before the full impact of high modernism, Hermann Lotze reigned as the single most influential philosopher in Germany, perhaps even the world. Although almost completely unread today, his substantial body of work exemplifies the new academic philosophy ("Kathederphilosophie") that flourished between the demise of the post-Kantian idealisms and the rise of scientific philosophy proper; he is usually credited with assisting "the rejection of Hegel and Absolute Idealism within the bounds of academic philosophy" (Schnädelbach, 1984, p. 169). Although the time period under discussion is sometimes denominated by the phrase "between idealism and positivism," it might be more accurate to describe it as a transitory stage between the various ideological groupings of the post-Enlightenment (romanticism, materialism, et al.) and those diverging philosophical movements that only emerged in modernism proper (logical analysis, phenomenology, etc.). Thus, as a prominent figure within an essentially transitional period, Lotze's long shadow was, perhaps, predestined to gradually fade from the scene"(Sullivan, 2010)
It was within the atmosphere of the emerging obsolescence of Hegelian idealism, the division of academic disciplines into distinct domains of specialization, and the rise of analytic philosophy, that the logical positivists found their home. The logical positivists attempted to construct a foundationalist philosophy of science. Although the movement had numerous philosophers, its essence, particularly for our purposes, can be summarized rather simply:
"The fundamental thesis of modern empiricism [i.e. logical positivism] consists in denying the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge" (H. Hahn, O. Neurath, R. Carnap, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, 1929).
Presupposed in the statement about synthetic a priori knowledge is a twofold distinction between a priori/a posteriori on the one hand, and synthetic/analytic statements on the other. A priori knowledge refers to purely non-empirical knowledge. Such knowledge is purely self-evident. A posteriori knowledge, on the other hand, is empirical knowledge. Likewise, synthetic knowledge is knoweldge whose predicate is not contained in the subject. An analytic statement, on the other hand, is a purely tautologous statement, whose predicate is contained in the subject. An example of the latter is A = A.
What the positivists thus denied is that there is any such thing as purely non-empirical knowledge. All utterances consist of either theh tautologies of logic, which are analytic and a priori, or the propositions of scientific inference, which are synthetic and a posteriori. There is no such thing as synthetic a priori knowledge. The significance of this belief for them is that it provided them with a means of rejecting metaphysical and religious statements as meaningless. Thus, for the logical positivists, scientific reasoning would be necessarily conceived as atheistic reasoning. They summarized this principle in what was referred to as the "verificationism." This is simply another way of saying that the only legitimate claims to knowledge are those whose content is empirically unverifiable. Propositions about morality, ethics and religion were thus out of the question, as they did not refer to empirically verifiable realities:
A.J. Ayer, for example, writes:
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. … If now I generalise my previous statement and say, "Stealing money is wrong," I produce a sentence that has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false. … I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.
It is worth noting at the outset that logical positivism has long since fallen out of fashion in academic philosophy. Indeed, its death knell was sounded in the early-to-mid 20th century. Nevertheless, it is puzzling that its influence is still very much felt in mainstream Western thought. Indeed, A.J. Ayer, one of the most important original advocates of the thought, as noticed this apparent paradox. He admitted of the majority of his philosophy of logical positivism that "nearly all of it was false" and in 1977, wrote:
"The verification principle is seldom mentioned and when it is mentioned it is usually scorned; it continues, however, to be put to work. The attitude of many philosophers reminds me of the relationship between Pip and Magwitch in Dickens's Great Expectations. They have lived on the money, but are ashamed to acknowledge its source"
Another important logical positivist, Moritz Schlick, wrote:
"When are we sure that the meaning of a question is clear? Obviously if and only if we are able to exactly describe the conditions in which it is possible to answer yes, or, respectively, the conditions in which it is necessary to answer with a no. The meaning of a question is thus defined only through the specification of those conditions...The definition of the circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly equivalent to the definition of its meaning."
... a statement has a meaning if and only if the fact that it is true makes a verifiable difference.
(M. Schlick, 'Positivismus und Realismus' in Erkenntnis, 3, 1932).
Thus, for the logical positivists:
"Metaphysical statements are not empirically verifiable and are thus forbidden: they are meaningless. The only role of philosophy is the clarification of the meaning of statements and their logical interrelationships. There is no distinct "philosophical knowledge" over and above the analytic knowledge provided by the formal disciplines of logic and mathematics and the empirical knowledge provided by the sciences" (Logical positivism)
Let us undertake an analysis of the thought of the logical empiricists in general. While the term "logical empiricism" is oftentimes used interchangeably with that of logical positivism, logical empiricism arguably refers broadly to the trends within empiricism common to both the Vienna Circle in Austria and the Berlin Circle in Germany (only members of the former self-identified as logical positivists). Hopefully, this will begin to provide the reader some insight into the historical and genealogical roots of the trend of thought that regards scientific reasoning as inherently materialistic, mechanistic and atheistic.
We will first look at the historical context of the emergence of the movement broadly denominated "logical empiricism" and then descend to what particular philosophers in the movement taught. Arguably the most important group of logical empiricists were those of the Vienna Circle, who are more properly denominated "logical positivists." This group was headed by Moritz Schlick and the Ernst Mach Society. The other primary influence were the philosophers of the "Berlin Circle", from t he Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy. Many of the latter disagreed vehemently with many of the doctrines of the former. The Berlin Circle oftentimes referred to those of the Vienna Circle as "positivists" with the intent of distancing their own teachings from them. The logical empiricists in general sported quite an impressive roster:
Another way of mapping the boundaries of logical empiricism is to list the specific philosophers who were centrally or peripherally part of it. Indeed, many of the most important philosophers of the mid-twentieth century were either members of the logical empiricist movement or associated with it in some way. Hans Hahn, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Otto Neurath were leaders of the Vienna Circle, and Kurt Gödel regularly attended its meetings. The list of its members, visitors, and interlocutors is staggering. To name only a few, these include A.J. Ayer, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Carl Hempel, Karl Menger, Richard von Mises, Ernest Nagel, Karl Popper, W.V. Quine, Frank Ramsay, Hans Reichenbach, Alfred Tarski, Friedrich Waismann, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Not all of these would admit to being part of the logical empiricist movement, of course, but a case can be made that all contributed to it. The Berlin Society for Empirical (or Scientific) Philosophy was, as stated, smaller but perhaps more influential. Led by Hans Reichenbach, it included, among others, Kurt Grelling, Walter Dubislav, Kurt Lewin, Richard von Mises, and Paul Oppenheim. Hempel took his doctorate in Berlin, working chiefly with Reichenbach until the latter was forced to leave in 1933. Hempel also spent time in Vienna and Prague as well. Of course, among the foremost associates of the Berlin Society was Albert Einstein, who was also in Berlin also until 1933 (Creath, 2013).
Because of the war in the 1930s, many of the important philosophers associated with these movements fled to America. The journal Erkenntnis, quoted above, originally one of the most important hubs of the philosophy, vanished in the 1940s. The exodus of the logical empiricists to America had quite an interesting philosophical and sociological effect:
Once in the U.S., these exiles were joined by the Americans Nelson Goodman, Charles Morris, W.V. Quine, Ernest Nagel, and, after the war, by Reichenbach's UCLA students Hilary Putnam and Wesley Salmon. Adolf Grünbaum can also be considered as clearly in the Reichenbach lineage. And Wilfrid Sellars was, in his early years, a close associate of Feigl. The American incarnation of the logical empiricist movement enjoyed generally good relations with the American pragmatists, not only because many of the logical empiricists had a strong pragmatist component to their philosophy, but also because the pragmatists and logical empiricists shared a common concern for empirical methodology in the service of social reform. Institutionally, the movement was represented in most major American universities, and such journals as Philosophy of Science (with Carnap and Feigl on the Editorial Board and Reichenbach and Schlick on the Advisory Board) and Philosophical Studies (founded and edited for many years by Feigl and Sellars) provided ample outlet for their publications. In addition, the Inter-Scientific Discussion Group was founded by Philipp Frank at Harvard. That grew into the Institute for the Unity of Science, called by some the Vienna Circle in exile. Meanwhile in Chicago the Encyclopedia of Unified Science was established with Neurath, Carnap, and Morris as its editors (Creath 2013).
By the 1960s, many of the original thinkers which had more or less identified with the movement had either recanted the beliefs associated with it, or simply abandoned it. By the next decade, the movement was more or less over. It is during the latter half of the 1970s that A.J. Ayer made the statements quoted above concerning its obsolescence.
One of the most important sociological elements of the context of the emergence of logical positivism, as we have noted before, was the emergence of hermenetically isolated scientific disciplines from philosophy (and indeed, all other disciplines); a process of specialization, which, as we have seen, had its roots in the thought of Hermann Lotze:
One long-term process with profound implications was the steady departure of the various sciences from philosophy to form autonomous disciplines. By early in the twentieth century mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and the social sciences were all pursued professionally and independently from philosophy. And psychology had just separated from philosophy or was in the process of doing so. Yes, there were polymaths who could and did pursue a science and philosophy professionally. Those were increasingly rare, but even single-discipline scientists did from time to time make philosophic-seeming pronouncements. But they did so from outside the field. This pattern of steady departures raised the pressing question: What sort of thing remained behind? Once mathematics and the empirical sciences all left, what was philosophy to be? (Creath 2013)
In light of this development, the role and nature of philosophy, particularly in relation to the hard sciences, was a peculiar preoccupation for the logical empiricists. Many philosophers of the period believed that philosophers had access to certain deeper truths than the hard sciences, and that it therefore had its own realm of investigation totally independent of scientific investigation. It was precisely this that the logical empiricists rejected. Carnap rejected such a conception of philosophy as "metaphysical," and therefore to be rejected.
The logical empiricists were eager to conceive of their enterprise as scientific and to engage in philosophy only insofar as it was also scientific. This science need not be an empirical one and it need not include all that was traditional in philosophy that had not been incorporated into the independent sciences. The decision to be scientific can hardly be the end of the story. It requires rather better and more detailed answers to questions about what scientific methods are, how the mathematical (and other apparently non-empirical sciences) fit together with the empirical ones, and what, more precisely, philosophy's role was (Creath 2013).
Logical positivists such as Schlick, Carnap and Hempel, who had started off as Neo-Kantians, had to grapple with developments in modern science which contradicted Kant's doctrines. Since Kant held that the world had to be represented as a Euclidean structure, the framework of which would constitute the bedrock of all future physics, positivists who had relied on Kant had to grapple with developments such as Einsteinian relativity and the co-ordinate development of non-Euclidean geometry, which would supplant the old. Geometry could no longer serve as the foundation according to which we would represent the empirical world, as Kant had desired (Creath 2013).
The demonstration that non-Euclidean pure geometrical structures were as consistent as Euclidean ones and that spaces can indeed be represented as a non-Euclidean manifolds were one half of the problem. The other half came when Einstein argued convincingly that physical space was best described as a non-Euclidean manifold of non-constant curvature. Plainly Euclidean geometry was not a feature of any future physics. Modern mathematical logic also posed a problem for other Kantian claims, but not in the same wrenching way(Creath 2013).
Under the scientific philosophy of the positivists lay a definite political motivation: The positivists, as good Enlightenment thinkers, held that the "evils" of the world were the result of bondage to 'metaphysical' patterns of thought. The irony, of course, is that the very notion of 'evil' requires the metaphysical category of ethics (which the positivists rejected as metaphysical and illegitimate), and so if the positivists were to be consistent, they would reject the very category which caused them to desire political reform in the first place.
Such ways of thinking might be exemplified in theology, in the racial hatreds of the day, in conceptions of property, and in traditional ideas about the "proper" roles of men and women in society. So to articulate a "scientific world conception" and to defend it against metaphysics was not just to express an academic position in the narrow sense. It was a political act as well; it was to strike a blow for the liberation of the mind. To articulate scientific methods and a scientific conception of philosophy was the essential first step in the reform of society and in the emancipation of humankind (Creath 2013).
In this respect, the logical positivists, as staunch modernists, were faithful heirs of the Enlightenment:
If all of this sounds like something out of the 18th century Enlightenment, the analogy was not lost on the logical empiricists themselves. André Carus has recently argued that this is exactly what Carnap had in mind in "explication" (Carus 2007). Neurath frequently drew parallels between the logical empiricists' anti-metaphysical program and the earlier Enlightenment ambitions. Certainly Kant had inveighed against the metaphysics of his time, and the anti-metaphysical tradition remained strong within the scientific community through the 19th century (Creath 2013).
The positivists, in wanting a strictly scientific conception of philosophy, found modern formal logic ready at hand. Departing from the Newtonian notion that scientific claims were those that could be inferred from experience, they drew on developments in the formal logic of their day in order to attempt to "specify the form of proper inferences, the form of an appropriate confirmation relation, and/or the structure of good reasons"(Creath 2013). The positivists had at their disposal the recently developed predicate calculus, thanks to logicians such as Gottlob Frege. Set theory and other forms of higher-order logic had recently become available as well. Russell had recently argued in "Our Knowledge of the External World" that logic was "the locus of scientific method in philosophy"(Creath 2013). Many positivists were likewise inspired by an interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, according to which "mathematics could be integrated into an overall empirical theory of the world. Wittgenstein also expressed a radical verificationism in the early 1930s in his conversations with Schlick, Waismann, and other members of the Vienna Circle"(Creath 2013). Creath outlines the central concerns of the positivists as:
1) The relations between "empiricism, verificationism, and anti-metaphysics" (Creath 2013)
2) "the logical empiricists' treatment of logic and mathematics as analytic" (Creath 2013)
3) "the united of science and reduction"(Creath 2013)
4) Questions surrounding probability.
First, we will deal with the relations between empiricism, verificationism and anti-metaphysics. One of the central concerns of the positivists had to do with the question of whether or not scientific investigation rested upon something other than experience. Before the positivists, it was generally agreed, and taken for granted by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, that logic and mathematics, as consisting entirely of purely analytic truths, did not rest on experience. The positivists were inspired by the verificationist position taken by the early Wittgenstein in particular, that logic and mathematics consisted of nothing but tautologies, and that sensible synthetic claims consisted only of those which could be confirmed by experience. According to such a strict verificationism, however, many notions ordinarily considered 'scientific' would have to be dispensed with, such as "laws" of nature. Some positivists, such as Moritz Schlick, simply admitted that propositions about 'laws' of nature did not refer to such at all, but were instead "principles of inference"(Creath 2013). Other positivists, unwilling to take what they considered an inordinately radical position, such as Han, Neurath, Carnap and Philipp Frank, modified their verificationism instead (Creath 2013). Indeed, Creath goes as far as denying that Carnap was in any meaningful sense a verificationist at all.
Positivists proposed numerous models of verification, each time succumbing to failure. Verificationists, Creath notes, attempted to link semantic meaningfulness with empirical confirmation. The positivists likewise attempted to develop philosophically sophisticated accounts of empirical confirmation. The accounts of verification developed by Ayer in 1936, and Carnap in 1956, remain the most well-known (Creath 2013). Ayer's emphasis was on synthetic sentences. For Ayer, "Confirmation is a feature that applies to sentences (or groups of them) and not to sub-sentential parts, and for an empiricist the content that a synthetic sentence has would be empirical content"(Creath 2013). For a sentence to have such empirical content, it must either imply an observational sentence "or add to the observational content of some other sentence...That is, the conjunction of A and B should imply some observation sentence not implied by B alone"(Creath 2013). Carnap argued that confirmation is not strictly a characteristic of whole sentences, but a characteristic of terms within those sentences.
Whatever the case may be, it is obvious that the positivist position is self-refuting. The positivists claimed that all sentences are either analytic or synthetic. The verification principle is clearly not an analytic statement. If it were, it would be true by virtue of its meaning and therefore trivial. It is not true by virtue of its meaning, because there are people who disagree with it. Furthermore, if it were true by virtue of its meaning, it would be a tautology, which it is clearly not. It is also not a sentence which is itself empirically verifiable. Therefore, by positivist standards, it is a nonsense statement which must be rejected. Positivism in general can therefore safely be rejected as metaphysical nonsense, as it ought to have been regarded by the positivists themselves (as it oftentimes was).
Carnap addresses the charge of self-refutation in his "Philosophy and Logical Syntax." He argues that the verifiability criterion of meaning occupies the realm of part of a meta-language, and that this standard is therefore not a component of the language itself. The verificationist criteria of meaning, therefore, is not self-refuting. Rather than seeking to defend positivism from the infinite regress to which such a position obviously leads (since the meta-language would require a meta-meta-language by which the meta-language is itself governed, and so on and so forth ad infinitum) Carnap took up a position astonishingly similar to that of some of the pragmatists, according to which there is no definitively "correct" logic.
Perhaps more precisely each of the various versions of empiricism (including some sort of verificationism) is best understood as a proposal for structuring the language of science. Before tolerance, both empiricism and verificationism are announced as if they are simply correct. Correspondingly, what Carnap called metaphysics is then treated as though it is, as a matter of brute fact, unintelligible. But what is announced thus dogmatically can be rejected equally dogmatically. Once tolerance is in place, alternative philosophic positions, including metaphysical ones, are construed as alternative proposals for structuring the language of science.
None of them is the uniquely correct one, and no theoretical argument or evidence can show that it is. Nor can theoretical arguments or evidence show that it is false. Neither proposals nor languages are the sort of thing to be true or false. Instead, proposals call for practical decisions and practical arguments rather than for theoretical reasons or evidence. Carnap believes that there are indeed very good practical reasons for adopting the proposal of verificationism, for choosing a language of science in which all substantive (synthetic) claims can, at least in principle, be brought before the court of public experience. The reason is that if we do not require this, the result is "wearisome controversies" that there is no hope of resolving. That, he thinks, is the sad history of attempts to get beyond science, and it is just too painful (Creath 2013).
Carnap's own preferred 'language' is one in which there are "no synthetic sentences that are both unverifiable and meaningful"(Creath 2013). He accepts that languages which dissent from such a view are no less legitimate than the one he has proposed. Adoption of this or that language is merely a matter of preference, and he prefers his own language because he believes it is the most pragmatically useful.
Thought of in this way the verifiability principle does not describe natural language, it is not intended to. It is intended to reform language to make it a more useful tool for the purposes of science. Carnap is under no illusion that natural languages are free from metaphysics. Nor is he under the illusion that defenders of the sort of metaphysics he targets will readily step up to the challenge of presenting precise rules of grammar and inference.
There is one other change that tolerance brings to Carnap's own vocabulary. Before tolerance, verificationism is stated in such a way that violations would count only as unintelligible gibberish. With tolerance in place, Carnap is prepared to imagine non-empiricist languages, though of course he thinks they are very unwise. So instead of saying that violations of these principles, that is, the sentences in non-empiricist languages, are meaningless he says that they are empirically meaningless which has a very different flavor. There is no weakening of his defense of empiricism, but it is put on a somewhat different footing (Creath 2013).
How unlike the common caricature of the logical positivists as inordinately tough-minded positivists by whose standards hardly anything can be admitted to the status of knowledge! Indeed, Carnap's "tolerance" was quite legendary, as he was known even for admitting the notorious continental philosophers as (at least potentially) legitimate interlocutors:
"Before a particular meeting got under way, a friend and I were chattering about metaphysics and, no doubt hoping to impress Carnap with our commitment to the tough-minded ideology he was noted for espousing, we expressed our utter derision for some claim by Heidegger. Carnap's response was immediate: "Tolerance, boys, tolerance." It stopped us in our tracks"(Aune, 1998).
Carnap's 'tolerance' of Heidegger here is quite important, both in its own right insofar as a philosophy of tolerance is self-defeating, and insofar as it is a concession to Heidegger's very own philosophy. Heidegger was more or less a presuppositionalist among non-Christians, and his philosophy requires that someone like Carnap cannot pretend to merely neutral presuppositions. But more on this later.
Let's look at what was taught by specific logical empiricists, as well as those who are oftentimes associated with the movement, but whose views do not necessarily strictly correspond with stereotypes about positivists.
Rudolf Carnap:
Carnap made numerous important contributions to philosophy of science and logic. He rejected metaphysical utterances as meaningless on the ground that they could not be justified through experience; in this respect, his beliefs correspond to what we have come to learn about positivists.
"He asserted that many philosophical problems are indeed pseudo-problems, the outcome of a misuse of language. Some of them can be resolved when we recognize that they are not expressing matters of facft, but rather concern the echoice between different linguistic frameworks. Thus the logical analysis of language becomes the principal instrument in resolving philosophical problems. Since ordinary language is ambiguous, Carnap asserted the necessity of studying philosophical issues in artificial languages, which are governedby the rules of logic and mathematics. In such languages, he dealt with the problems of the meaning of a dstatement, the different interpretations of probability, the nature of explanation and the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori, and necessary and contingent statements"(Murzi)
For Carnap, a scientific theory was an "axiomatic formal system"(Murzi) consisting of:
a formal language, including logical and non-logical terms;
a set of logical-mathematical axioms and rules of inference;
a set of non-logical axioms, expressing the empirical portion of the theory;
a set of meaning postulates stating the meaning of non-logical terms, which formalize the analytic truths of the theory;
a set of rules of correspondence, which give an empirical interpretation of the theory(Murzi)
For Carnap, one of the most important functions of philosophy was to demonstrate the differences between different kinds of sentences. A scientific theory, for Carnap, would consist of symbols as well as syntactical rules whose purpose was to ensure that the sequence of symbols which constituted the scientific theory would constitute a well-formed formula. A scientific theory which did not follow from the syntax would be a meaningless sentence or set of sentences. Important for Carnap was the distinction between logical and non-logical terms of the theory. Logical terms consist of the sort of terms we're used to in formal logic, such as connectives, quantifiers, etc. This also included mathematical symbols such as numbers and integrals.
On the other hand, non-logical symbols consist of two sorts:
1) Observational
2) Theoretical
These non-logical symbols refer to the actual empirical data which constitute the object of study. Furthermore, Carnap distinguished between 4 sorts of formulae:
1) Logical statements - these do not contain non-logical terms. They are purely analytic and a priori
2) Observational statements - these contain "observational terms but no theoretical terms"(Murzi)
3) Purely theoretical statements - these "contain theoretical terms but no observational terms"(Murzi)
4) Rules of correspondence - these contain "both observational and theoretical terms"(Murzi)
How exactly do we articulate the distinction between observational and theoretical terms? This distinction, it ought to be noted, was essential not only for Carnap's philosophy of science, but for positivism in general(Murzi). He articulates this distinction in
"Philosophical Foundations of Physics" in terms of the distinction between empirical laws and theoretical laws(Murzi). Empirical laws deal
"with objects or properties that can be observed or measured by means of simple procedures. This kind of law can be directly confirmed by empirical observations. It can explain and forecast facts and be thought of as an inductive generalization of such factual observations. Typically, an empirical law which deals with measurable physical quantities, can be established by means of measuring such quantities in suitable cases and then interpolating a simple curve between the measured values. For example, a physicist could measure the volume V, the temperature T and the pressure P of a gas in diverse experiments, and he could find the law PV=RT, for a suitable constant R"(Murzi).
So an empirical law, for Carnap, was a kind of inductive generalization about the behavior of observable objects or properties. A theoretical law, however, concernrs properties or objects which we can only infer rather than directly measure. We go from empirical laws, which constitute inductive generalizations about observable entities or properties, to theoretical laws, which are more like hypotheses (Murzi). "While an empirical law can explain and forecast facts, a theoretical law can explain and forecast empirical laws. The method of justifying a theoretical law is indirect: a scientist does not test the law itself but, rather, the empirical laws that are among its consequences."(Murzi).
The distinction seems intuitively plausible, so far as it goes. However,
Carnap admits...that the distinction is not always clear and the line of demarcation often arbitrary. In some ways the distinction between observational and theoretical terms is similar to that between macro-events, which are characterized by physical quantities that remain constant over a large portion of space and time, and micro-events, where physical quantities change rapidly in space or time(Murzi).
As noted before, Carnap advocated the principle for which logical positivism is perhaps most famous: the verifiability principle, . According to this principle, a synthetic statement is only meaningful if its content is verifiable. We have already dealt with this principle and will not deal with it in Carnap. Suffice it to say that it was not long after Carnap's acceptance of this principle that he argued for the position we mentioned before; namely, that "the significance of a term becomes a relative concept: a term is meaningful with respect to a given theory and a given language. The meaning of a concept thus depends on the theory in which that concept is used. This represents a significant modification in empiricism's theory of meaning"(Murzi). He thus ends up with a highly relativistic and pragmatistic conception of theoretical language hardly worthy of someone as preoccupied with a rigorously scientific conception of the world.
Herbert Feigl:
Feigl and Wilfred Sellars summarize their empiricism in Readings in Philosophical Analysis:
"The conception of philosophical analysis underlying our selections [they say] springs from two major traditions in recent thought, the Cambridge movement, deriving from Moore and Russell, and the Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle (Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap) together with the Scientific Empiricism of the Berlin group (led by Reichenbach). These, together with related developments in America stemming from Realism and Pragmatism and the relatively independent contributions of the Polish logicians, have increasingly merged to create an approach to philosophical problems which we frankly consider a decisive turn in the history of philosophy" (Quoted in Aune, 1998)
Though oftentimes associated with logical empiricism specifically, it is clear that Feigl was associated much more broadly with Anglo-American philosophical movements whose aim, to one degree or another, was to conceive of philosophy as a handmaiden to scientific investigation. Its purpose was not that of metaphysical speculation for its own sake, but a practical investigation into how things hang together, so to speak. This included, by this account, the early analytic philosophy of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, the logical empiricism of the Berlin Circle, and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, as well as the pragmatists and the Polish logicians (at least one of whom, namely, Alfred Tarski, exerted an important influence on logical empiricism, broadly construed to include both the positivists of Vienna and the empiricists of Berlin). Like Carnap, Feigl insisted that factual claims be tested according to a verifiability or confirmation criterion: No statement has any meaning unless its truth can be empirically confirmed.
Furthermore, like Carnap, he upheld the distinction between analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori statements, and considered these two kinds of sentences to be the only legitimate claims, rejecting as nonsensical and 'metaphysical' claims to synthetic a priori knowledge. So far as synthetic a posteriori justification was concerned, Feigl admitted only inductive inference and observation to the table. Though initially an ardent logical positivist, he later came to entertain a great deal of uncertainty about what he believed.
Otto Neurath:
Otto Neurath was another important figure in the history of logical empiricism. Over and against the foundationalism of Carnap's Aufbau, Neurath had a more pragmatic and coherentist understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific investigation was a unified endeavor in which numerous varied disciplines coordinated their efforts and the conclusions they had reached in their own scientific discipline into a unified whole. Neurath emphasized the interpersonal nature of language, prediction and justification. Language is never purely monological. It is developed within the intersubjective realm. The intersubjective nature of language is a more particular species of his pragmatic project broadly considered. That is, we do not merely interact with other humans, but with a definite world. For Neurath, the language of the intersubjective realm was one and the same with the language and interaction of the physical realm. It is for this reason that he termed his understanding of such language as "physicalist." His intersubjective understanding of the nature of language and rationality has drawn appropriate comparison with that of Wittgenstein:
Objectivity features prominently in the private language argument. Both Neurath's argument and Wittgenstein's earlier one are laid out for the case of an individual epistemic agent understanding himself before he needs to understand others (Uebel 1995b). For both, the constancy and consistency of language use is paramount. It can only be ensured by an intersubjective, that is, objective and social, language, namely the language of physicalism, about 'spatio-temporal structures'. For Wittgenstein, especially in the Philosophical Investigations, the social dimension of language guarantees its extrinsic character and therefore its proper justification, the normative condition of possibility and intelligibility of success, and likewise for the more general case of rule-following. The scope of Neurath's argument is more particularly directed to the case of scientific language in the scientific community.
The notion of private language argument is typically associated with the later argument by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations to the effect that a private language is logically impossible for an individual to use consistently and for others to understand. By private language, Wittgenstein means a language with words whose meaning is essentially dependent on the inner experience or individual consciousness of a subject. In a previous version from 1929, Wittgenstein refers to the primacy of our public everyday language about physical things over a language of immediate sensations. In the 1951 version the language is dependent on the public social institutions of language-games and their rules. A private language is, by contrast, impossible because to use it requires following its rules, which in turn requires a private modality of rule-following, and this, Wittgenstein claims, is incorrect(Cat, 2011).
In opposition to the notion of synthetic a priori knowledge, which as we have seen was incompatible with the philosophy of the positivists, was the notion that "revisable theoretical scientific statements should stand in appropriate logical relations to unrevisable statements about elementary observations (data), called 'control sentences' or 'protocol sentences'. Such relations would provide theoretical terms with cognitive meaning or sense, and theoretical statements with verification"(Cat, 2011).
It ought to be noted that in addition to the emphasis upon verifiability, experience and empiricism, among the positivists, was the emphasis on language. We have seen that one of Neurath's central concerns was not merely the conditions under which objective knowledge could be had, but the question of the intersubjective communicability of this objective knowledge.
The 'linguistic turn', as it is known, was adopted as a philosophical tool in order to explicate the rationality, and the objectivity—that is, inter-subjectivity—and communicability of thought. Lacking the transcendental dimension of Kant's metaphysical apparatus, attention to language extended to non-scientific cases such as ordinary language philosophy in Oxford and to literary texts in the Continent. In the context of logical empiricism, the formal dimension of knowledge was thought to be manifest particularly in the exactness of scientific statements. For Schlick, knowledge proper, whether of experience or transcendent reality, was such only by virtue of form or structure—'only structure is knowable'. For Carnap, in addition, the formal dimension possessed distinct methodological values: it served the purpose of logical analysis and rational reconstruction of knowledge and helped expose and circumvent 'pseudo-philosophical' problems around metaphysical questions about reality (his objections to Heidegger appealed to failures of proper logical formulation and not just empirical verification). In 1934 he proposed as the task of philosophy the metalinguistic analysis of logical and linguistic features of scientific method and knowledge (the 'thesis of metalogic'). For Neurath, this approach helped purge philosophy of deleterious metaphysical nonsense and dogmatism, and acknowledged the radically social nature of language and science (Cat, 2011).
Neurath's emphasis on the intersubjective element of knowledge is best understood in opposition to the arguments of Carnap's Aufbau, discussed earlier. In this work, Carnap had investigated the origin of intersubjective knowledge, beginning with the individual subject. For Carnap, knowledge is irreducibly private. It is individuals who possess knowledge, and so it follows that we would investigate the origin of this knowledge in the individual's experience.
In particular it was supposed to capture how experience is central to meaning and method; that is, how it is responsible for the intelligibility and acceptability of our beliefs. All we need is connecting-statements or rules that link any statement to experiential statements—translation rules, originally biconditional 'constitution sentences', and subsequently, in the late 1930s, weaker conditional 'reduction sentences' and 'semantic postulates', or 'bridge principles'. The inclusion of terms and statements in the system of science by this method excluded all nonsensical speculative statements. It provided a verification criterion not only of testing but also of cognitive significance, or meaning. Carnap stated in that vein that 'science is a system of statements based on direct experience' (1932/1934)(Cat, 2011).
To put it simply: knowledge begins in the individual's experience, and a faithfully scientific conception of philosophy provides a language for the communication and systematization of such knowledge. Such a position was understood immediately by fellow members of the Vienna Circle as having enormous philosophical implications:
In spite of the range of alternatives considered, the Aufbau's main focus on an empiricist, or phenomenological, model of knowledge in terms of the immediate experiential basis was quickly understood by fellow members of the Vienna Circle as manifesting three philosophical positions: reductionism, atomism and foundationalism. Reductionism took one set of terms to be fundamental or primitive; the rest would be logically connected to them. Atomism, especially in Neurath's reading, was manifest semantically and syntactically: semantically, in the analyzability of a term; syntactically or structurally, in the elementary structure of protocols in terms of a single experiential term—'red circle here now'—; it also appeared in the possibility of an individual testing relation of a theoretical statement to one of more experiential statements. (Cat 2011)
Of particular interest for us is Carnap's foundationalism. Cat notes the Cartesian historical roots of this element of Carnap's philosophy. For Descartes, as for Carnap, we ought to take as our starting point an infallible foundation (hence the term) which is itself properly basic and does not require external justification. It is from this basis that we then infer subsequent truths, which are deduced infallibly from this basis. Unless the beliefs we deduce can be inferred necessarily from this foundation, they cannot count as knowledge. Neurath likewise rejected Carnap's apparent subjectivism. Since knowledge is intersubjective, it can never be merely private. Indeed, it is because knowledge is public and intersubjective that communication is possible at all. "In order to use experience reports to test and verify even one individual's own beliefs over time, private instantaneous statements of the form 'red here now' will not do"(Cat 2011). In place of Carnap's phenomenalism, which Neurath believed would result in solipsism, was the latter's thesis of "physicalism", according to which "the unity, intelligibility and objectivity of science rests ons tatements in a language of public things, events and processes in space and time - including behavior and physiological events, hence not necessarily in the technical terms of physical theory"(Cat 2011). It ought to be kept in mind, however, that although Neurath referred to his own philosophy of intersubjective communication as 'physicalism', he is not using the term as synonymous with ontological materialism, as it is often used nowadays in philosophical discourse.
What was Neurath's motivation for this? His desire was to create an intersubjective language for a scientific conception of science that would be able to communicate with precision the sort of objective, mathematical and quantitative measurements so essential to scientific investigation. In this, he is at one with Carnap, who likewise believed that
"only the structural or formal features, in this case, of exact mathematical relations (manifested in the topological and metric characteristics of scales), can guarantee objectivity. After the Aufbau, now the unity of science rested on the universal possibility of the translation of any scientific statement into physical language - which in the long run might lead to the reduction of all scientific knowledge to the laws and concepts of physics"(Cat 2011)
For Neurath, in place of Carnap's subjectivistic and phenomenalistic doctrine of private knowledge was the doctrine of protocol statements. The purpose of the study of protocol statements, for Neurath, was to articulate what would count as scientific evidence within the context of an empiricist epistemology "by specifying conditions of acceptance of a statement as empirical scientific evidence"(Cat 2011). Neurath's intention in this was to avoid Carnap's foundationalism, subjectivism, atomism and reductionism (Cat 2011). Cat notes that Neurath's paradigmatic example of such a sentence was:
"Otto's protocol at 3:17 o'clock: [Otto's speech-thinking at 3:16 was: (at 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)]."
This has obvious advantages over Carnap's paradigmatic protocol statement, "I see a red circle here now." Neurath's specifies that the person perceiving the table is Otto. The implication is that Otto is distinct from other people who also exist. So we have an example of how Otto's protocol statement implicitly recognizes the public nature of knowledge. This is quite opposed to Carnap's subjectivistic, purely phenomenalistic, 1st person account. Cat notes that the time and spatial location explicitly enunciated in Neurath's sentence provides a helpful alternative to Carnap's overly simplistic sentence.
Neurath's articulation of a protocol sentence was part of an overall project to create a unified, intersubjective, agreed-upon language among scientists that was free of metaphysics. More interestingly yet, Neurath was opposed to the use of subjectivistic language such as "I", because the self, as Kant and Hume had ably and famously demonstrated, could not be proven to exist empirically. All we are conscious of is pure experience, never an indivisible, substantial 'self.'
Sullivan, David, "Hermann Lotze", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hermann-lotze/>.
Creath, Richard, "Logical Empiricism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/logical-empiricism/>.
Aune, Bruce. "Feigl and the Development of Analytic Philosophy at the University of Minnesota." Web. 1998. Retrieved from: https://www.umass.edu/philosophy/PDF/Aune/feigl.pdf
"Logical positivism." Retrieved from: http://www.loyno.edu/~folse/logpos.htm
Cat, Jordi, "Otto Neurath", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/neurath/>.
Murzi, Mauro. "Rudolf Carnap." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://www.iep.utm.edu/carnap/


text:
When talking to people over Mumble/Teamspeak/Ventrilo, I have a few who are broadcasting all of their audio output (e.g. music playing in the background, game sounds, etc.) whenever they are sending -- in addition to the microphone signal.
I don't have this problem myself, so it's hard for me to troubleshoot remotely, but I'm interested in collecting solutions for this problem for Windows XP, Vista and 7, so that I can link them to this question.
Links to other related SU questions are highly welcome as well, but I couldn't find any. Most people seem to try to either get microphone to feed back into the audio output or turn exactly that off, which is different from this problem. I'm talking about the opposite problem, the output being fed into the input.
I'll assume that it has been ruled out at that point that it's just the microphone picking up the actual audio waves from the speakers. The person is wearing headphones and probably using push-to-talk.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Help me prove (or disprove) a point
Had my first meeting in Oakland last night, and one of the, erm… discussions that came up had to do with writing attribute-less dialogue. Charlotte vigorously held that it cannot (or at least shouldn't) be done. I thought that done right, it can work.
So, here's what I want to know from you. Do you think a two-person dialogue is too hard to follow without attribution?
Here is a short story with two characters, with no dialogue tags. Does this work for you? Can you follow it?
That Ain't Write
"What's the matter, your dog die or something?"
"I don't have a dog."
"It's just an expression. So, really, what's wrong?"
"She's still givin' you grief about your writing?"
"Yeah. It's not like we're hurting for money, or anything."
"Well, it wouldn't be a bad thing if you sold something."
"Don't I know it."
"So, what was it this time?"
"My sweats."
"Pardon me?"
"OK, see, I don't really need to get dressed up to sit at my computer and write."
"So you wear your sweat suit all day, right?"
"Right. All except for my–"
"Yeah. Shoes. Did I tell you about that?"
"You might have mentioned it… oh, just about once a week for the last 5 years."
"Really? Well, it's true. I can't write if I don't put on my shoes."
"You know that's really weird, right?"
"You want to hear this, or not?"
"Yeah. Please. I've got nothing better to do than–"
"–I can go home."
"Nah. Sorry. What happened?"
"Well, she's on her way out the door. You know, shopping with her girlfriends, when she stops, comes over to me and tells me that I dress like a slob."
"You do. Everybody knows it. What was her point?"
"Right. So I ask her."
"Oh. Yeah. Well, she says that knowing me, I'll be sitting in front of the computer wearing the same dumb sweatshirt and pants when she comes back from shopping, and she's really bored with it all, and, hell, I don't know what else."
"You stopped listening?"
"I stopped listening. I mean I've heard it a million times. Gets old, you know?"
"Yeah. So, what's the point of this?"
"Right. Getting to it. So, she's out the door, slams it, actually, and I'm sitting at the computer and thinking. She's right."
"Good for you."
"Shut up. So, I'm thinking she's right. I want to do something about it. You know, surprise her."
"What did you do?"
"I put on a pair of jeans."
"Big whoop. That must have gone over well. Were they clean?"
"I don't know. I found 'em on the floor of my closet."
"Uh-huh. So what'd she say about that?"
"Nothing? You mean to say she didn't notice?"
"Nah. She didn't come home."
"She left you?"
"No! Cheeze, man. I mean she didn't come home from shopping right away."
"So you waited there at your computer, dressed to the nines in a sweatshirt and a pair of dirty jeans."
"Well, yeah. But you know, I got to thinking about it. I thought, what the hell? I found a shirt."
"Was IT clean?"
"Probably not. It was in the clothes hamper, but that's not the point. It wasn't a sweatshirt."
"Quite a push for you. So when she came in…"
"Well, she still hadn't come back yet. So, I'm working on the novel, see, when I notice what time it is. It's getting late, and I'm starting to worry a bit–"
"So you called her cell?"
"No! I don't do that. Makes her think I don't trust her, or something."
"All right, OK, so what did you do."
"Well, I got to thinking, I'm getting dressed up, anyway–"
"–old jeans and a dirty shirt, and you call that getting dress–"
"So, I'm thinking, since I'm getting dressed up anyway, why not really do it up. You know, surprise her."
"Not bad. Now you're movin' in the right direction. What did you do?"
"Went digging in my closet, and I found a white shirt."
"Aw, man, just when I thought you were getting it together. I don't think one of your "Firesign Theater" t-shirts would impress her. Did it?"
"Let me finish. I found a dress shirt, clean, and on a hanger."
"You're kidding me. I didn't know you even owned a dress shirt."
"Sorry. So, you put that on?"
"Yeah. Then I take a look at myself in the mirror, and I'm thinking, shirt looks nice, but slacks would be better than jeans, and–"
"You have slacks?"
"Do you want to hear what happened, or not?"
"Hey, I'm in. Talk away, maestro."
"OK, so, I find my slacks, and they're in pretty good condition, and I put 'em on. They fit, and everything. I dig around, I find a belt–"
"Man, goin' for the gold!"
"I find some dress socks, and I find my dress shoes. They're a little scuffed up, but I brush 'em up a little, and–"
"Who are you? And what have you done with my friend?"
"Cut it out, will you? Anyway, I find a tie, it's a skinny one, but hey, and I find a sports coat that I'd forgotten I owned."
"This is amazing. She must have been shocked."
"Wait. Not done yet. So, I'm looking at myself in the mirror, and I can hardly recognize myself. It's pretty remarkable, but there's something wrong. Then I get it, and go into the bathroom and comb my hair and shave."
"You did this while wearing a suit?"
"Yeah. Well, I took off the coat and loosened the tie, but yeah."
"I can't wait. She must have been amazed."
"Nope. She hadn't come home yet."
"Must have been frustrating."
"Yeah. So, anyway, I'm looking at myself in the mirror, all spiffied up, and I'm thinking I'll take her out to dinner. Really blow her mind. Then, all of a sudden, I remember the tux."
"You've got a tux?"
"Yeah, I know it's hard to believe. But back when I was working in an office, I got it for a Christmas party. It was all the thing, back then–"
"Don't tell me–"
"Yeah! I'm thinking, if me shaved and clean, and wearing a suit would start her fire, how would it be if she came home and found me waiting for her in my tuxedo?"
"So you put it on?"
"Well, I got it out, and it was in great condition. You know, the whole works. Bow tie, cummerbund, cuff links, ruffled front shirt, studs, I mean the nines."
"So you put it on?"
"Well, I started to. I was getting out of the suit when I had an idea for a story. See, it's about a guy who's lady doesn't get it about his writing, and is always complaining about how he dresses, and–"
"You're kidding me."
"No. So, I'm standing there in my underwear when the idea hits me full on, and I run back to the computer to start writing it, and then–"
"And THEN she walks in."
"Yeah. Go figure. So, she puts down her shopping bags, looks at me sitting at the computer in my underwear, and she says, 'Nice. Well, at least you shaved'."
That's it. Were you able to follow the story? Did it need dialogue tags?
Your help will be greatly appreciated.


text:
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text:
Lincoln Lawyer Movie Reviews
User reviews on Lincoln Lawyer
Best movie since Avatar. Good plot and acting. Bad guys got what they deserved. Still have dip-sticks playing with cellphones. They don't realize the show up like a fly in milk. Are you there to watch a movie or talk?
Wfe and I enjoyed the movie. Just enough twists to keep your interest. Matthew M was outstanding.
F*CK YEAH, MATTHEW McCONAUGHEY. THAT DUDES THE MOTHA f***ING MAN. HE'S THE CHAMP OF CHAMPS. THE GOD OF GODS. I. JUST. CAME.
I did not expect much of this film because it was starring Matthew McConaughey, who i consider to be a full of himself prick with no talent, but i was actually pleasantly surprised by this film and by Matthew's performance. Matthew was charming and it was the first time i was watching him in the film and he did not annoy me at all. Ryan Phillipe was great as well and i really think he did a very convincing portrayal of a rich boy who's morals are immensly corrupt. The film was exciting and suspenseful, even though it did feel like I was watching a TV drama from time to time. Overall, I think the film was pretty good and considering that I am not a fan of Matthew McConaughey, I think it is definitely worth seeing this film in the theaters.
Before I start this review I have to say that I absolutely hate Matthew McConaughey. I make it my business not to see any films with him because in my opinion the man can not act and he annoys the living hell out of me. My friend dragged me to see this film and I was prepared for the worst but it actually was not bad at all. Matthew McConaughey did pretty well and believe me it kills me to say that. I thought that the film was pretty interesting and entertaining, but I do have to say that the production value was poor. The camera work was not good and the colors seemed a little too bright. The story was pretty interesting but I do think that it is not worth seeing this film in the theaters, if I were you, i would wait until it releases on DVD.
For the last few years, Matthew McConaughey has made it his job to become the M. Night Shyamalan of actors. When you see his name in the credits, you can't help but laugh. Surfer, Dude anyone? So it's a pleasant surprise when you're lowered expectations are not only exceeded but destroyed by an actually good movie starring McConaughey, which the Lincoln Lawyer is.
Based on the Michael Connelly book, McConaughey plays Mick Haller, a slick lawyer running his practice out of the back of his car. He's always got the answers, until he gets a job defending a rich kid accused of rape and attempted murder. This case is way above our hero's head, and leads him to question not only past cases, but his new clients connection to them.
The filmmakers do a very good job of keep the action going and keeping all of the various characters connected, but it's really the actors that make this movie. Supporting roles (Ryan Philippe as the rich defendant and Marisa Tomei as Haller's ex-wife) are excellent overall. But it's really McConaughey that makes the movie. He seems more engaged than he has in a long time, using his cool to give depth to Haller as opposed to just trying to be cool. As much as I hate to admit it, it again shows why he became a movie star in the first place.
Finally! A good courtroom drama film. I haven't seen a good courtroom drama in such a long time. All of the movies that fall into this category have been boring and off-point. The Lincoln Lawyer delivers in this sense with a thought-provoking and interesting plot. Even Matthew McConaughey, the main star, is great in this movie. I haven't seen him step into a courtroom since A Time To Kill, which was an absolutely great movie. I'm glad he waited this long to get back in the courtroom because he absolutely killed this movie. His acting was great. I'm also glad that the writers and director didn't dumb down this movie like so many other courtroom dramas have been lately. This is a win for everybody involved, well done.
Matthew McConaughey stars in this courtroom drama, The Lincoln Lawyer. I must say right away that Matthew McConaughey is one of the actors that is so full of himself and I really dislike his performances. The only problem is that I actually enjoyed this movie! It's really hard to dislike the main star of the movie but still enjoy the movie, but that seemed to happen here. There are complex plot twists and the story moves very quickly, which is a welcomed change from the watered down courtroom dramas of the past decade. The Lincoln Lawyer also stars one of my favorite comedians-turned-actor John Leguizamo. He does a magnificent job in playing his character. I must give it to him, he has definitely become a great actor from starting as a comedian. This movie was interesting and fun to watch and I would suggest it to anyone.
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The Arduino Cookbook covers a wide range of Arduino-related topics in "recipe" format, i.e., stating a problem and providing at least one solution. As the author states in the introduction, this book is slightly different from most technical cookbooks, because it does not assume a base skill level on the part of the reader, given that Arduino has a wider audience than just engineers and programmers.
Recipes start with very basic "hello world" type tasks such as connecting the Arduino, making an LED blink, etc., then progress through basic programming tasks and into the more complex realms of physical output, wireless, audio-visual output, etc. Some reviewers have noted minor errors in code listings, which could be frustrating to the beginner, but an active errata listing is maintained on the publisher's product page, along with an updated code download archive of the recipes.
I found the recipes to be a useful collection and recognized some questions that had stumped me in my first exploits with Arduino. Margolis has a very direct writing style, which is complemented by uncluttered example code. Where illustrations are used, they are clear and relevant, at least in the PDF version of the book.
Overall a timesaver and reliable reference, definitely worth purchasing.


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Valentine's Day, that delicious Hallmark holiday, is just around the corner. Turns out, if you are single, ready to mingle and a straight lady, San Francisco is a good place to be. The city has been ranked the best place in the country to live for heterosexual ladies.
The fine folks at Nerd Wallet came to this conclusion by looking at the availability of singles, ease of meeting people and affordability of dating in cities across the country. San Francisco took the top spot due to the high numbers of unmarried men (although Nerd Wallet does not specify whether they did any research to determine if those single men are actually looking for straight women), our plethora of bars and the city's undeniable walkability. San Francisco is only one of two California cities to make the list.
Here is the top five list of cities where it is fabulous to be single, straight and a lady;
1) San Francisco, CA
2) Miami, FL
3) Minneapolis, MN
4) Seattle, WA
5) San Diego, CA
San Jose is one of the most romantic cities in the country
If this event looks like fun, be sure to subscribe! Just click the 'subscribe' button below the headline.


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About Our Program
Our program stresses both academics and clinical pediatrics. We are ACGME accredited, receiving a full 5 year accreditation on our most recent site review, and our program is competency based. We offer both a Pediatric Residency and an Internal Medicine/Pediatric Residency. We take 17 new pediatric residents and 3 medicine-pediatrics residents each year.
Hospital Information The Children's Hospital is located in downtown Oklahoma City, and is the only full-service, free-standing pediatric health care facility as well as the only level I pediatric trauma center in the state. The 258 bed inpatient facility averages 11,000 admissions, and ambulatory facilities see more than 80,000 children in outpatient clinics, and averages 35,000 visits to the Pediatric Emergency Department annually.
The faculty in the Department of Pediatrics is a very diverse one, spanning 14 sections and approximately 127 physicians. Faculty members are committed to house staff education and are very approchable; the real strength of the program is in the people. For information about residency see our residency brochure located on the left hand side of this webpage. If you are interested in gaining an excellent pediatric education in a friendly, engaging setting, we invite you to consider the Pediatric Residency Program at The Children's Hospital at OU Medical Center.
Contact Information For additional information not included in this website, please contact the
Department of Pediatrics
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center
1200 Children's Avenue, Suite 14000, Oklahoma City, OK 73104
Phone: Chief Resident's Office (405) 271-4417 (405) 271-4417 or (800) 831-9609 (800) 831-9609 FREE
Email: Ruth McCollough


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Track List
Album Notes
Personnel: Dorothy Ashby (harp); Winterton Garvey, Harris Goldman, Dorothy Wade, Carl LaMagna, Kenneth Yerke, Karen Jones , Marcia Van Dyke, Charles Veal, Jr., William Henderson , Arnold Belnick, Janice Gower, Haim Shtrum (violin); Paul Polivnick, Rollice Dale, David Campbell, Dennyse Buffum, Pamela Goldsmith (viola); Dennis Karmazyn, David H. Speltz, Ronald Cooper, Raymond J. Kelly (cello); Buddy Collette (flute, tenor saxophone); Bill Green (flute, bass saxophone); Ernest J. Watts (tenor saxophone); Bud Brisbois, Paul Hubinon, Charles Findley (trumpet, flugelhorn); Oscar Brashear (trumpet); Robert Watt, Barbara Korn, Alan Robinson , Vincent DeRosa (French horn); Garnett Brown, George Bohanon, Raymond Jackson (trombone); George Thatcher, Lew McCreary (bass trombone).
Audio Mixer: Barney Perkins.
Recording information: ABC Recording Studios, Los Angeles, CA (1977); Burbank, CA (1977); Los Angeles, CA (1977); Studio Masters (1977); The Burbank Studios, Burbank, CA (1977).
Photographers: Ken Marcus; Penny Wolin.
Arranger: Wade Marcus.
This two-fer CD combines the Sonny Criss 1976 album Warm and Sonny with Joy of Sax, released the following year. Originally these LPs were released separately on Impulse and are the last dates Criss released before passing away in 1977. Both albums find him playing with an electric rhythm section and the addition of strings and horns throughout. Most of the material is pleasant but forgettable, especially on the pop tunes of the era "The Way We Were," "You Are So Beautiful," "Don't You Worry Bout a Thing," and "You've Lost That Loving Feeling." With the exception of a few tracks, and the addition of trumpeter Blue Mitchell and tenor saxophonist Ernie Watts, these final albums aren't representative of Criss at his best. ~ Al Campbell


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More New and Used
from Private Sellers
Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.
When to Use What Research Design
ISBN13:by Vogt, W. Paul; Gardner, Dianne C.; Haeffele, Lynne M.
The Guilford Press
Questions About This Book?
What version or edition is this?
This is the 1st edition with a publication date of 2/21/2012.
What is included with this book?
- The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any CDs, lab manuals, study guides, etc.
- The eBook copy of this book is not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically only the book itself is included.
Systematic, practical, and accessible, this is the first book to focus on finding the most defensible design for a particular research question. Thoughtful guidelines are provided for weighing the advantages and disadvantages of various methods, including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods designs. The book can be read sequentially or readers can dip into chapters on specific stages of research (basic design choices, selecting and sampling participants, addressing ethical issues) or data collection methods (surveys, interviews, experiments, observations, archival studies, and combined methods). Many chapter headings and subheadings are written as questions, helping readers quickly find the answers they need to make informed choices that will affect the later analysis and interpretation of their data. Useful features include: easy-to-navigate part and chapter structure engaging research examples from a variety of fields end-of-chapter tables that summarize the main points covered detailed suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter integration of data collection, sampling, and research ethics in one volume comprehensive glossary.
Author Biography
W. Paul Vogt, PhD, is Emeritus Professor of Research Methods and Evaluation at Illinois State University, where he has won both teaching and research awards. Dr. Vogt\u2019s areas of specialization include research design and data analysis, with particular emphasis on combining qualitative, quantitative, and graphic approaches. Dianne C. Gardner, PhD, is Associate Professor of Educational Administration at Illinois State University. Dr. Gardner\u2019s research interests include assessment, organizational development, program evaluation, P20 systems, and qualitative research methodology. Lynne M. Haeffele, PhD, is Senior Research Associate in the Center for the Study of Education Policy at Illinois State University. Dr. Haeffele\u2019s research interests include combining research designs, applying research findings to policy and practice, program evaluation, and the topical areas of college readiness, organizational performance, and school–university partnerships.
Table of Contents
General Introduction: Design, Sampling, and Ethics I. Research Questions and Designs What Is the Role of Theory in Research Questions and Designs? 1. When to Use Survey Designs When Are Surveys Likely to Be a Wise Design Choice? When Should You Use Which Mode of Administering Your Survey? What Design Should You Use to Study Change over Time? What Question Formats Can You Use in a Survey Design? Conclusion on Survey Designs: So Many Questions, So Little Time 2. When to Use Interview Designs Comparing Interviews with Surveys Conclusion on Interview Designs in General Specific Interview Types, Approaches, and Procedures Conclusion 3. When to Use Experimental Designs What\u2019s Wrong with Gold-Standard Thinking? When Is an RCT a Good Option? When Is an Experimental Design a Good Option for Your Research? When Should You Use the Basic Types of Experimental Design? General Conclusion on When to Use Experimental Designs 4. When to Use Naturalistic and Participant Observational Designs Overview of Observational Designs When Is Observation a Good Design Choice? Further Distinguishing between Naturalistic and Participant Observational Designs When Should You Use a Naturalistic Observational Design? When Should You Use Participant Observational Designs? Conclusion: Characteristics of All Observational Designs 5. When to Use Archival Designs What Kinds of Archival Data Are Available for Researchers? When Should You Collect and Use Preexisting Data Rather Than Produce Your Own? Types of Archival Research Database Archives Organizational Records Textual Studies of Documents New Media, Including Internet Sources Conclusion 6. When to Use Combined Research Designs Simple versus Multipart Research Questions When to Combine Research Designs Types and Qualities of Combined Designs Logistical Considerations in Combined Research Designs Conclusion and Summary II. Sampling, Selection, and Recruitment 7. Sampling for Surveys Probability Samples Nonprobability Samples When Should You Try to Improve Response Rates? How Big Should Your Sample Be? Conclusion 8. Identifying and Recruiting People for Interviews How Interview Strategies Are Shaped by Research Questions Making Basic Decisions about Interview Sampling Conclusions on Selecting People to Interview 9. Sampling, Recruiting, and Assigning Participants for Experiments Randomized Controlled Trials Alternatives to RCTs Controlling for Covariates Conclusion: Sampling, Recruiting, and Assigning Cases in Experiments 10. Searching and Sampling for Observations Overview of Searching and Sampling Concerns in Observational Research Appropriateness and Relevance of the Sample Accessing Observation Sites Decisions Influenced by Resources and Other Practical Considerations Four Basic Sampling Decisions Sampling and the Five Types of Research Questions Conclusion and Summary 11. Sampling from Archival Sources When Do You Search and When Do You Sample? Sampling Research Literature to Build Upon and Synthesize It Database Archives Organizational Records Textual Studies of Documents New Media, Including Various Internet Sources Conclusion ze:10.0pt;"12. Sampling and Recruiting for Combined Research Designs When Should You Use Probability Samples in Your Combined Design Study? When Should You Use Purposive Samples in Your Combined Design Study? When Should You Use Both Probability and Purposive Samples in Your Study? Conclusion and Summary III. Research Ethics: The Responsible Conduct of Research Responsibilities toward the Persons Being Studied Responsibilities toward Other Researchers Responsibilities toward the Broader Society/Community 13. Ethics in Survey Research Consent: Informed Participants Willingly Joining the Research Project Harm: Preventing Injury to Respondents Privacy: Ensuring Respondents\u2019 Anonymity and/or Confidentiality Conclusion 14. Ethics in Interview Research Consent: Informed Participants Willingly Agreeing to Be Interviewed Harm: Preventing Injury to Interviewees during the Interview Privacy: Ensuring Interviewees\u2019 Confidentiality Conclusion 15. Ethics in Experimental Research Consent: Informed Participants Willingly Joining the Research Project Harm: Preventing Injury to Experimental Participants Privacy: Ensuring Participants\u2019 Anonymity and/or Confidentiality Conclusion 16. Ethics in Observational Research Seeking and Acquiring Informed Consent to Observe Avoiding and Minimizing Harm to Participants While Conducting the Study Ensuring Participant Privacy Conclusion 17. Ethical Issues in Archival Research Ethical Practice in Reviews of the Research Literature Ethical Practices in Employing Database Archives Ethical Obligations When Using Institutional Records Ethical Issues When Using Documents, Including Public Documents Ethical Issues When Using Blogs and Other Sources Published On-line When Might the Honest, Correct Reporting of Archival Research Cause Harm? Conclusion 18. Ethical Considerations in Combined Research Designs Consent Harm Privacy Conclusion: Culmination of Design, Sampling, and Ethics in Valid Data Coding When to Use Qualities or Quantities, Names or Numbers, Categories or Continua? What Methods to Use to Code Concepts with Reliability and Validity What Methods to Use to Improve Reliability What Methods to Use to Enhance Validity What to Use to Code Concepts Validly Coding Decisions Shape Analytic Options Glossary


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Tilley Endurables Inc
1050 Laurier O, Outremont, QC, H2V 2K8
These super resistant hats and clothes were created by a sailing fan who has so much confidence in the quality of the materials and work that it's guaranteed for life!
|Type de magasin |
|Accessoires, Mode masculine, Voyages, Mode féminine
|Paiement |
|Interac, MasterCard, American Express, Visa
|Quartier |
|Outremont, Plateau Mont-Royal
|Se rendre |
|Laurier Metro
|Intersection |
|Mon-Wed: 9AM-6PM Thurs-Fri: 9AM-9PM Sat: 9AM-5PM Sun: noon-5PM
Profil Dernière mise-à-jour: 13 décembre 2007
With the slogan "Tilley, the best travel hats and clothes in the world", it's not surprising that the company has complete confidence in the quality of its products. The proof is in the guarantees: if any item as a problem, whether a hole, tear or a defective zipper, the item will be repaired or replaced for free. Even the socks come with a three-year no-hole guarantee. The company also promises that the hats will never mould or shrink and that they'll resist any tough climate or trip.
Reviving the Market
The company was founded when Alex Tilley bought his sailboat and realized that no hat on the market was appropriate. It was in 1980 that he supervised the creation of his first model, comfortable and functional, adjustable to any head size, it floats and can be solidly secured for days of intense winds. These hats sold like fresh-baked cookies across North America. Then, Tilley designed a sailing short and a pair of travel pants with secret pockets for wallets and passports.
The Tilley shops feature a large selection of travel clothes for men and women. From blouses, vests, bathing suits, dresses, underwear, pyjamas, belts and skirts... all of these items are easily washable in the hotel sink and dry overnight without getting wrinkled. Tilley also sells different-sized bags that are light, solid and have many pockets that are pick-pocket safe. They also sell practical accessories like water bottles, rapid-drying towels, crystals that reduce body temperature, relaxation masks and reliable digital clocks.


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More About Our Company
Started by Dr Vanessa Lin, a Veterinary Surgeon with varied international experience (Australia, Malaysia and Singapore) experienced in diagnosing and treating animal illnesses, and performing surgery.Read More
Recent Blog Posts
April 25, 2014 |
Is your dog limping after playing?
"Dear Dr V, my Chihuahua has been playing outside, and recently I have observed her limping around...
April 25, 2014 |
Introducing a new dog to your household?
"Help! I have a miniature schnauzer that tends to be aggressive towards other dogs. I want to introduce a...
April 25, 2014 |
Puppy overeating and choking?
"Oh no! My mongrel puppy tends to gobble down his food whenever I place a bowl in front of him. Sometimes,...


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Jason Larue Gildon
Position: LB
Height: 6-4 Weight: 255 lbs.
Born: July 31, 1972 in Altus, OK
High School: Altus
College: Oklahoma St. (school history)
Drafted by the Pittsburgh Steelers in the 3rd round (88th overall) of the 1994 NFL Draft.
Weighted Career AV (100-95-...): 76 (430th overall since 1950)
3-time Pro Bowler & 1-time First-Team All-Pro (fine print)


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Wall Murals
Love my Poppy Mural. When you walk into the master bath, it makes you smile. I was very pleased with how fast I received the mural (w/in 10 days). I will order from Pixers in the future.
Added , by Lynn
Wall Murals
My wife and I easily applied our scenic mural on our wall. It shipped well protected with good instructions. Compliments from neighbors.
Added , by Daniel Nowotarski
Wall Murals
Backyard Garden of Beacon Hill....amazing is mild definition. This mural takes you right into the garden and each time, it's in a different part of the garden. i have it on a wall in senior housing where you can't paint and wake up each morning, in the garden :-) thanks so much. And you can take it with you!!!!! http://pixersize.com/wallmurals/beacon-hill-boston-98598961
Added , by Jacqueline Bell
Additional Information
"Color samples" - Sticker
Sticker Color samples will be a perfect horizontal decoration for your wall. We print all our stickers to size, so you will easily fit it to the size of the particular surface. On the illustration you will find some popular motives:
Sticker Color samples will look great, if you mix it with decorations with motives such us
If you are looking for other propositions in this style, take a look at our ideas from the category Piece of Fabric, specially the apparel-fabrics.
You can order selected sticker either with white background or cut along the contours – in this case order a wall decal of multiple use PIXERStick, which you can freely stick and unstick, and then transfer it wherever you want to.
This is a great sticker for kids, as it allows to play in decorating the kid's room. Additionally you can also change its look and get for example a sepia sticker or a sticker in black & white.


text: Hi, I was wondering WHY is the release date of above mentioned game keep getting postponed. It was supposed to be released in September, then it was delayed until the mid of November, end of November and to December 2, 2005. But today it says Q1 2006!!! The thing is, I will most likely forget about the game by the time it is actually released. I am hoping that somedy around here has some more info. So, please tell me. Before I plant a bomb under the publisher :)


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This is a discussion on What are you listening to? within the Off Topic & Humor Discussion forums, part of the The Back Porch category; ...
Nothing, the quiet is wonderful.
Lonnie Liston Smith & The Cosmic Echoes, Naima and a number of other tracks from the Cosmic Funk album.
Your best weapon is your brain. Don't leave home without it.
Thoughts: Justifiable self defense (A.O.J.).
Explain: How does disarming victims reduce the number of victims?
Reason over Force: Why the Gun is Civilization (Marko Kloos).
A leaky showerhead dripping in to the tub, I just dont have it in me to get up and fix it.
"The thing about quotes on the internet is that you can not confirm their validity."
-Abraham Lincoln
"A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky. dangerous animals."
-Agent K
Iron Butterfly--Inna Gadda Da Vida I, uh, love the lyrics.
Retired USAF E-8. Official forum curmudgeon.
Lighten up and enjoy life because:
Paranoia strikes deep, into your life it will creep. It starts when you're always afraid... Buffalo Springfield - For What It's Worth
Doing a paper for school.........The Ascent Part One - K2 Soundtrack - Hans Zimmer - YouTube
Great movie also.
Then I heard the voice of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send? And who will go for us?
And I said, Here am I. Send me!
Isaiah 6:8
The Black Keys or Kings of Leon are my usual in the office music mix.
Don"t let stupid be your skill set....
And Shepards we shall be, for Thee, my Lord, for Thee,
Power hath descended forth from Thy hand, So that our feet may swiftly carry out thy command,
And we shall flow a river forth to Thee, And teeming with souls shall it ever be,
Crickets farting...I don't have any music on
"Outside of the killings, Washington has one of the lowest crime rates in the country,"
--Mayor Marion Barry, Washington , DC .
I have been digging pink floyd and yoshimi battles the pink robots from the flaming lips.
Sent from my iPhone 4s using Tapatalk. Droid still sucks!
Ccccccc what? Ccccccccccc Hawks!
As I am typing this Lightning Hopkins "Mr. Charlie"...10 minutes ago George Jones "He stopped lovin' her today"
Really broad spectrum I know!
Right now, "Foolin'" and "Rocket" from Def Leppard "Vault" greatest hits CD.


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"Put your right hand in put your right hand out; put your right hand back in shake it all about…" The Hockey Pokey song is one of the many songs kindergarteners will sing to help them learn.
At the end of the semester year your kindergartener must know the below elements:
Day sequence: When you plan for the week with your child he should understand when you say the family will do this today, tomorrow or did it yesterday.
Left/right: It is at this age that your child should resolve whether or not he or she is a lefty or righty. It will be a natural process owing to the many classroom interactions. Some children are ambidextrous, they can use both right and left hand interchangeably.
Attention span: The classroom routine and assignments will strengthen your child's concentration and hence teach him to stay focus for 15 minutes or more.
Recognition: Your kindergartener should be able to identify all primary colors, the alphabet and their sound, as well as read simple sight word sentences.
Spell: At mid-semester your child should recognize and spell his first and last name. It should be a blocked letters and a bit slanted but legible. He should know his address and phone number. He should also be able to write 3 letter words such as "mat" and "cat".
Story time: Your kindergarten after you read a bed time story should be able to retell the story. His imagination is vast and unlimited.
Arithmetic: Promotion to 1st grade will be measured by your kindergartener's ability to count up to 100, add and subtract basic 2 digit numbers, and recognition of some shapes.
Opinionated: Along with a vivid imagination your kindergartener will be very talkative about school and household events. He should be able to express himself in drawing and writing form.
Look for these "should know" every day in your child's backpack and when he interactions within the family. If they are not there consult with your child's teacher as soon as possible.


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I was flipping through Milnor's "Topology from the Differentiable Viewpoint," and I came upon a sentence concerning the mod 2 degree of a function from M to N. It essentially says: "We may as well assume also that N is compact without boundary, for otherwise the deg mod 2 would necessarily be zero."
I understand why this is true for compactness. However, any ideas I have trying to prove the boundary part seem way to complex for a paranthetical aside. Any ideas are appreciated.
Edit: Also, M and N are smooth manifolds of the same dimension, f is smooth, and M is assumed to be compact and boundaryless (so the definition of mod 2 degree makes sense).