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Axelberg v. Comm'r of Pub. SafetyAnnotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary
After she was arrested for driving while impaired, Driver took a urine test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of twice the legal limit. Pursuant to the state's implied consent law, Driver's license was revoked. Driver sought judicial review, arguing that her license should not have been revoked because she acted out of necessity to protect herself from her violent husband. After an implied consent hearing, the district court upheld the revocation, concluding that necessity is not an affirmative defense that drivers may raise to challenge a civil license revocation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of Minn. Stat. 169A.53(3) does not permit a driver to raise the affirmative defense of necessity at an implied consent hearing.
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STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A12-1341 Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J. Dissenting, Lillehaug, Page, and Wright, JJ. Dissenting, Wright, Page, and Lillehaug, JJ. Dissenting, Page, Wright, and Lillehaug, JJ. Jennifer Marie Axelberg, Appellant, vs. Filed: May 21, 2014 Office of Appellate Courts Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent. ________________________ Ryan Pacyga, Ryan Pacyga Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant. Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent. Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsey Law Firm, PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice and Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. ________________________ SYLLABUS A person who challenges the revocation of his or her driver s license in an implied consent hearing held pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2012), may not raise the affirmative defense of necessity. Affirmed. 1 OPINION GILDEA, Chief Justice. The question presented in this case is whether a person who has had his or her driver s license revoked under Minnesota s implied consent law may raise the common law affirmative defense of necessity in a civil implied consent hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2012). Because we conclude that the plain language of the statute does not permit a person to raise the affirmative defense of necessity at an implied consent hearing, we affirm. This case arises out of a domestic assault incident that took place over Memorial Day weekend in 2011. Appellant Jennifer Marie Axelberg (Axelberg), her husband Jason Axelberg (Jason), and two of their friends were staying at a lake cabin in Mora. On Sunday night, Axelberg and Jason were drinking at the nearby Fish Lake Resort. After they returned to the cabin, Axelberg and Jason started to argue while they were outside the cabin. Jason pushed Axelberg and hit her twice on the head. Fearing for her safety, Axelberg got into her car and locked the doors. Axelberg retreated to the car because she felt that it was the only safe place available to her. Axelberg did not believe she could outrun her husband. And she could not go inside the cabin, because Jason was between her and the cabin. Finally, Axelberg could not call for help, because Jason had her cell phone. Even after Axelberg got into the car, Jason continued to yell at her and started hitting the car s windshield. Eventually, Jason climbed onto the car, started screaming, and broke the windshield with his fist. Axelberg then started the car. Jason was still on 2 top of the car, but he eventually climbed off as Axelberg started driving. Jason ran after Axelberg, yelling. Axelberg drove nine-tenths of a mile to Fish Lake Resort, the closest open business. Jason and one of the friends then walked to the resort, where Jason again confronted Axelberg in the parking lot. Someone at the resort called 911. Law enforcement arrived at the resort at around 2:28 a.m. and arrested Jason. An officer also arrested Axelberg for driving while impaired. Axelberg was asked to take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol, and she agreed to a urine test. The test revealed an alcohol concentration of .16, which is twice the legal limit. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 2(1) (2012). Pursuant to Minnesota s implied consent law, respondent, the Commissioner of Public Safety, revoked Axelberg s driver s license. Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2012). Axelberg sought judicial review of the revocation. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2 (2012). 1 At the implied consent hearing, Axelberg argued that she should not lose her license because she acted out of necessity to protect herself from her violent husband. The district court held that necessity is not an affirmative defense that drivers may raise to challenge a civil license revocation. A divided court of appeals affirmed. Axelberg v. Comm r of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. App. 2013). We granted Axelberg s petition for further review. 1 We have referred to the hearing held on the driver s petition for judicial review as the implied consent hearing. E.g., State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2009). We adopt the same terminology here. 3 I. On appeal, Axelberg argues that she may raise the necessity defense at the implied consent hearing held pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2012). 2 The Commissioner argues that the statute does not permit drivers to raise the necessity defense. The parties arguments present an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Minn. 2010). When a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012). We agree with the Commissioner that the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3, does not allow drivers to raise the necessity defense. Minnesota law requires the Commissioner to revoke a person s driver s license when the Commissioner receives a certification from a peace officer stating, in part, that the person submitted to a chemical test for the presence of alcohol and the test results indicated an alcohol concentration of .08 or higher. Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4. A person may seek judicial review of the license revocation by filing a petition for judicial review. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2. The statute requires that the district court hold 2 The common law necessity defense has been used to excuse criminal conduct in emergency situations where the peril is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no alternative but the conduct in question. State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 199, 183 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971). We have said that, in most criminal cases when the defense is recognized, the illegal act of the defendant was done for the preservation of life. Id. at 201, 183 N.W.2d at 544. We have also recognized that necessity is a defense in civil tort actions. Id. And while we have addressed an issue involving a jury instruction given on the necessity defense in the context of a criminal case for impaired driving, see State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. 1999), we have not addressed specifically whether the defense is available in the context presented here. 4 an implied consent hearing on the petition for review. Id., subd. 3. And the statute limits the scope of an implied consent hearing. Id. Specifically, under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), [t]he scope of the hearing is limited to the issues in clauses (1) to (10). None of the 10 issues listed involve the necessity defense. See id. 3 3 The issues are: (1) Did the peace officer have probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle or commercial motor vehicle in violation of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired)? (2) Was the person lawfully placed under arrest for violation of section 169A.20? (3) Was the person involved in a motor vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage, personal injury, or death? (4) Did the person refuse to take a screening test provided for by section 169A.41 (preliminary screening test)? (5) If the screening test was administered, did the test indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more? (6) At the time of the request for the test, did the peace officer inform the person of the person s rights and the consequences of taking or refusing the test as required by section 169A.51, subdivision 2? (7) Did the person refuse to permit the test? (8) If a test was taken by a person driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle, did the test results indicate at the time of testing: (i) an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more; or (ii) the presence of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols? (Footnote continued on next page.) 5 The Commissioner argues that because the necessity defense is not included in the list of issues to which the Legislature has limited the implied consent hearing, drivers may not raise that defense. We agree. The Legislature has directed that words in Minnesota statutes are construed according to their common and approved usage. Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2012). The word limited means [c]onfined or restricted within certain limits. The American Heritage Dictionary 1019 (5th ed. 2011). The use of the word limited in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3, then, means that the issues a driver may raise at an implied consent hearing are restricted to those that fall within the topics in clauses (1) through (10) of section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b). Because the necessity defense does not fall within one of those topics, the plain language of the statute compels us to hold that drivers may not raise the necessity defense at implied consent hearings. Notwithstanding the Legislature s use of the term limited in subdivision 3(b), Axelberg argues that the scope of the hearing should not be so strictly confined. After all, Axelberg notes, the Legislature has provided for an affirmative defense in subdivision 3(c). In this subdivision, the statute provides that [i]t is an affirmative defense for the petitioner to prove that, at the time of the refusal, the petitioner s refusal to permit the test (Footnote continued from previous page.) (9) If a test was taken by a person driving, operating, or in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle, did the test results indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at the time of testing? (10) Was the testing method used valid and reliable and were the test results accurately evaluated? Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b). 6 was based upon reasonable grounds. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c). The Legislature s inclusion of one specific affirmative defense does not lead us to conclude that the Legislature meant to also include other affirmative defenses, such as the necessity defense, nor does it create an ambiguity as to the Legislature s intent. An ambiguity might be created if the Legislature had provided for an affirmative defense that is not encompassed within the 10 issues that drivers may raise at the implied consent hearing. Inclusion of such a separate defense might call the meaning of the word limited into question and indicate that the word limited in subdivision 3(b) was not, in fact, meant to exclude the use of affirmative defenses. But that is not the case with respect to the affirmative defense that the Legislature specified in subdivision 3(c). The presence of the reasonable grounds to refuse affirmative defense does not open up the statute to additional affirmative defenses or create ambiguity as to the meaning of limited because the court could determine that whether the refusal was reasonable is within the scope of the issue listed in clause (7): whether the person refused to permit the test. 4 Id., subd. 3(b)(7). 4 The dissents of Justices Lillehaug and Wright argue that if the reasonablegrounds-to-refuse affirmative defense is relevant to clause (7), then the defense of necessity must also be relevant to some of the other issues to which the implied consent hearing is limited. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b). But the Legislature did not provide in the statute for the availability of the necessity affirmative defense as the Legislature did for the reasonable-grounds-to-refuse affirmative defense. Essentially, the dissents propose to add words to the statute that the Legislature did not supply. Our precedent does not permit us to do that. See Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012) ( We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted. ). The dissents also suggest that the necessity defense does not expand the scope of the issues to which the hearing is limited because necessity is (Footnote continued on next page.) 7 In addition, if we were to read an affirmative defense in subdivision 3(c) to allow for innumerable other affirmative defenses to be offered at implied consent hearings, we would be reading the word limited in subdivision 3(b) out of the statute entirely. The rules of statutory interpretation do not permit us to do that. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2012) ( [T]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. ). 5 (Footnote continued from previous page.) relevant to some of the issues listed in clauses (1) to (10). Justice Lillehaug argues that the affirmative defense of necessity is relevant to the issue of driving, operating, or . . . physical control of a motor vehicle, a topic he contends is included in clauses (1) and (8) of the statute. Justice Wright does not rely on clause (1), but contends necessity is relevant to clause (8). The dissents are mistaken. Clauses (1) and (8) focus on the government and its burden. Specifically, clause (1) asks whether the police officer had probable cause to believe the driver was intoxicated. Clause (8) asks about the results of the chemical tests administered by law enforcement. Neither clause invites an inquiry into why a person may have decided to drive under the influence. Accordingly, the reason for the driver s action is not relevant to the issues listed in clauses (1) or (8). Cf. Minn. R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable ). The affirmative defense of reasonable grounds to refuse, by contrast, addresses the driver s behavior and the driver s behavior (i.e. refused to permit a test) is the subject of the issue listed in clause (7). The Legislature s provision for the driver to prove that her refusal was based on reasonable grounds therefore does not create ambiguity as to the Legislature s limitation on the scope of the implied consent hearing. 5 In dissent, Justice Wright also argues that precluding the necessity defense leads to an unreasonable result, citing Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2012) ( [T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. ). The dissent argues that under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c), a person who refuses a chemical test for intoxication is permitted to assert the defense of necessity in arguing that the refusal was reasonable, and that it would be unreasonable for the Legislature then to not allow such a defense to a person who agreed to take the test and failed. We disagree. As an initial matter, Justice Wright builds her analysis on a premise that this case does not present. Specifically, Axelberg did not refuse the test. Whether Axelberg would have been able to claim necessity as a reasonable refusal, as Justice Wright s (Footnote continued on next page.) 8 Axelberg also argues that we should reject the interpretation that reasonable refusal, as specified in subdivision 3(c), is the only affirmative defense available because we do not presume that statutes derogate the common law unless they do so expressly or by necessary implication. Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 2004) ( We have long presumed that statutes are consistent with the common law, and if a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because there is no indication that the Legislature meant to restrict common law defenses in the Implied Consent Law, Axelberg argues, the common law defense of necessity must still be available. Axelberg s argument fails, though, because the canon of construction on which Axelberg relies does not apply to the Implied Consent Law, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.50-.53 (2012), and even if it did, application of the canon confirms that the Legislature intended to preclude drivers from raising the common law defense of necessity. As the Commissioner rightly points out, modern regulatory legislation, such as the implied consent administrative scheme, is generally regarded as a newly conceived (Footnote continued from previous page.) analysis presumes, therefore is simply not presented here. More importantly, the rule of construction that Justice Wright cites is not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute utterly confounds the clear legislative purpose of the statute. Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Minn. 2012). This is not that rare case. The legislative purpose of the implied-consent laws is to protect public safety on the highway. Goldsworthy v. State Dep t of Pub. Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Minn. 1978). The plain language of the statute serves this purpose; it does not confound it. 9 system of legal arrangements to deal with emergent problems in society. 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 61:3, at 364 (7th ed. 2008). Such legislation is not subject to the rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law because its genesis and conception are wholly outside and apart from any common-law frame of reference. Id.; see also Sec. Sav. & Loan Ass n v. Wauwatosa Colony, Inc., 237 N.W.2d 729, 731-32 (Wis. 1976) ( An exception to the rule of strict construction is customarily made in the case of a statute which purports to provide a complete system of law covering all aspects of the subject with which it deals, so as to supersede all prior law on the subject, whether common or statutory law. (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted)). The Implied Consent Law exists outside of the common law and in that statutory scheme, the Legislature has provided a complete system of law on the topic of administrative license revocation for impaired drivers. See Sec. Sav. & Loan Assn., 237 N.W.2d at 731-32. Accordingly, the canon of construction that we discussed in Brekke is not applicable here. 6 6 In his dissent, Justice Page argues that because we applied the canon of construction in Brekke we must similarly apply it here. Justice Page s dissent argues that the statute at issue in Brekke Minn. Stat. § 181.79 (2012) was unknown at common law, and he supports this conclusion with a citation to 48B Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations § 2818 (2005). In this section, the author writes that [t]he Fair Labor Standards Act . . . is designed to implement social and economic policy through remedies not only unknown to common law but often in derogation of it. The citation is not helpful to the dissent s point because Minn. Stat. § 181.79, the statute at issue in Brekke, is not part of the Fair Labor Standards Act or Minnesota s version of that federal law. See Minn. Stat. § 177.21 (2012) ( Sections 177.21 to 177.35 may be cited as the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act. ). More importantly, the statute at issue in Brekke restricts the ability of employers to make deductions from employees wages and provides employees with a private right of action for an employer s violation of the (Footnote continued on next page.) 10 Moreover, even if the canon of construction were applicable, as Justice Page contends in dissent, it would not support Axelberg s position that the necessity defense is available. Consistent with the canon, if the Legislature s words expressly or by necessary implication preclude application of the common law, the common law does not apply. Brekke, 683 N.W.2d at 776. The Legislature did not expressly state in the Implied Consent Law that it was abrogating the common law. But that is the necessary implication of the Legislature s decision to limit[] the scope of implied consent hearings to the 10 issues listed in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b). See Urban v. Am. Legion Dep t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 4-6 (Minn. 2006) (finding the Legislature had clearly stated that licensees were responsible under the Civil Damages Act thus impliedly did not intend for the common law doctrine of respondeat superior to apply to CDA liability). 7 (Footnote continued from previous page.) statute. This statute creates a new cause of action but it does not create an entire system of law in the way that the Implied Consent Law does. The dissent also relies on Neuberger v. Hennepin Cnty. Workhouse, 340 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1979). But the dissent s reliance on Neuberger is misplaced, because as the dissent notes, we did not even discuss, much less invoke, the canon asserted in the present case. 7 Axelberg argues that Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), does not limit the issues that may be raised in an implied consent hearing because we have allowed parties to raise constitutional issues that are not mentioned in the statute at such hearings. See Friedman v. Comm r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 1991) (addressing the Minnesota constitutional right to pre-testing counsel in an implied consent case). This case, however, does not involve a constitutional challenge to Axelberg s license revocation. In addition, while the Legislature is free to create a regulatory scheme that exists entirely outside of the common law, it is not free to create a regulatory scheme that violates the constitution. Thus, the fact that we have considered such constitutional challenges in an (Footnote continued on next page.) 11 Axelberg next argues that the common law defense of necessity should be available because we have referred to the implied consent law as quasi-criminal, and therefore, common law defenses available in criminal cases should likewise apply to implied consent cases. We have used the quasi-criminal label to describe the consequences of license revocation. See Friedman v. Comm r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 1991); Prideaux v. State Dep t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 411, 247 N.W.2d 385, 389 (1976). At the same time, however, we have also recognized that once a driver has made a decision regarding testing, the proceeding divide[s] clearly into its civil and criminal aspects. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 389. The criminal proceedings serve to punish the driver. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20-.285 (2012). The civil proceedings, however, protect public safety on the highway. Goldsworthy v. State Dep t of Pub. Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Minn. 1978). A driver s decision to challenge the Commissioner s administrative license revocation falls squarely on the civil side of the division. Id. Therefore, even if the necessity defense is available in the context of a criminal case for driving under the influence, that would not allow us to ignore the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), which limit[s] [t]he scope of implied consent hearings. 8 (Footnote continued from previous page.) implied consent case does not mean that a driver may raise any challenge whatsoever at an implied consent hearing. 8 As noted above, we have recognized the defense of necessity in civil tort cases. See supra n.2. Justice Page s dissent therefore is mistaken in contending that we (Footnote continued on next page.) 12 Finally, Axelberg and our dissenting colleagues argue that is it bad public policy to force victims of domestic abuse to choose between license revocation and personal safety. This public policy concern should be directed to the Legislature because we must read this state s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be. See In re Estate of Karger, 253 Minn. 542, 548, 93 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1958) ( What the law ought to be is for the legislature; what the law is, rests with the courts. ); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 ( [T]he letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. ). As sound as the public policy arguments may be, the only way to reach the conclusion that the common law affirmative defense of necessity is available here is through an act of pure judicial will. But as we recognized long ago, [w]e have no personal or judicial will to accomplish, and we have no power to judge acts of legislation [as] either good or bad. State ex rel. Benson v. Bd. of Comm rs, 186 Minn. 524, 528, 243 N.W. 851, 853 (1932). In essence, Axelberg s argument and the analysis of our dissenting colleagues prioritizes a policy that protects victims of domestic abuse over a policy that protects the public from impaired drivers. Axelberg contends that she was in fear for her life and that she made the only choice she could, given her husband s violent behavior. But it is also true that when she made that choice, and drove with an alcohol concentration that was more than twice the legal limit, Axelberg created a substantial risk to public safety. That (Footnote continued from previous page.) conclude that the necessity defense is unavailable because that defense only applies in criminal cases. 13 Axelberg did not harm anyone is fortunate, but that fact does not provide a basis for us to discount the public safety risk impaired drivers present. See Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 63 (Minn. 1983) ( [D]runken drivers pose a severe threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota. ). This case therefore could be cast in terms of competing policy considerations, with policies aimed at protecting victims of domestic abuse competing with policies aimed at protecting victims of impaired drivers. The statute in this case, however, addresses only the latter. See Goldsworthy, 268 N.W.2d at 49 ( The primary thrust of the implied consent law is remedial and intended to protect public safety on the highway. ). We decline Axelberg s and the dissents invitation to prioritize a policy goal that is not expressed in the statute at the expense of one that is the clear focus of the legislation. In short, if the Implied Consent Law needs revision in order to make it embody a more sound public policy, the Legislature, not the judiciary, must be the reviser. 9 Affirmed. 9 The parties raised a number of other statutory construction arguments, such as the argument that remedial statutes must be broadly construed in favor of public safety and against the private interests of the drivers involved. But such canons of construction operate only after we have concluded that a statute is ambiguous. Billion v. Comm r of Revenue, 827 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Minn. 2013). Because we find that Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), is unambiguous, we do not need to reach those arguments here. 14 DISSENT LILLEHAUG, J. (dissenting). Today the majority decides that Jennifer Axelberg must lose her right to drive, even if she drove impaired to save her life or escape serious injury. The majority asserts that this outcome is required because the Legislature has tied the judiciary s hands. In my view, the majority has manufactured and applied its own bindings. Because there is room for justice in this case, I respectfully dissent. I. The majority s statement of facts is accurate, but the key points bear retelling. During an argument, Jennifer Axelberg s spouse hit her twice in the head. He had her cell phone. She took refuge in their car. She would have stayed there, but her enraged attacker climbed onto the hood and broke the windshield. At 2 a.m. in the isolated woods, her only alternative was to start the car and drive away from him. Even then, her attacker pursued her on foot. Axelberg drove less than a mile to reach a place of relative safety. The incident ended there when law enforcement arrived. Axelberg was arrested for driving while impaired, and her husband was arrested for domestic assault and disorderly conduct. Axelberg was a victim of the crime of domestic violence. Although she drove while impaired, she has a strong defense that she acted only as necessary to avoid death D-1 or serious injury. And yet the Commissioner of Public Safety1 revoked Axelberg s license and pursued revocation upon judicial review. The Commissioner argues, and the majority agrees, that necessity the emergency avoidance of death or serious bodily injury is not even relevant to, much less a defense in, a judicial review hearing. I disagree. II. We start with the structure of what the Legislature labels the Implied Consent Law. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.50-.53 (2012). Section 169A.51 establishes implied consent for intoxication testing and outlines requirements for such testing. Section 169A.52 establishes civil consequences, including license revocation, for test refusal or failure. When the Commissioner revokes a license, section 169A.53 allows the driver to seek review. The driver may obtain administrative review under subdivision 1, judicial review under subdivisions 2 and 3, or both forms of review. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 1-3. This case arises out of Axelberg s petition for judicial review. Briefly, judicial review consists of a hearing in district court, conducted in most respects according to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subds. 2(d), 3(a). The hearing, while civil in nature, may be held at the same time as a 1 The Commissioner has statutory authority to pursue license revocation. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52 (2012). Among the Commissioner s other statutory responsibilities are promoting the highest attainable standards of . . . justice for crime victims, Minn. Stat. § 611A.74 (2012), including through the Crime Victims Services, advocating for the rights of victims of domestic violence, see Minn. Stat. §§ 518B.02, subd. 3, 611A.201, subd. 2(1) (2012). D-2 hearing on pretrial motions in a criminal case for driving while impaired. Id., subd. 3(a). The scope of the hearing is governed by subdivision 3(b). Subdivision 3(b) provides: The scope of the [judicial review] hearing is limited to the issues in clauses (1) to (10). Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) (emphasis added). Clauses (1) through (10) are phrased in the form of questions. To sustain a revocation based on test refusal or failure, the Commissioner must, by a preponderance of the evidence, persuade the court to answer yes to the relevant questions. See State v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 431, 181 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1970) (placing a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof on the Commissioner in an implied consent hearing). While subdivision 3(b) does not allow open-ended judicial review, neither does it provide that the hearing is restricted to answering questions. Significantly, subdivision 3(b) does not say that the scope of judicial review is limited to clauses (1) to (10), or limited to the questions in clauses (1) to (10). Instead, subdivision 3(b) provides that the scope is limited to the issues in clauses (1) to (10). (Emphasis added.) The majority and I agree that the word issues means topics. Thus, it follows that any and all of the topics in clauses (1) through (10) are within the scope of judicial review. These topics include probable cause; driving, operation, and physical control of the vehicle; the arrest; test taking or refusal; and test results. While the Commissioner has the burden to prevail on the relevant questions in subdivision 3(b), subdivision 3(c) puts a burden on the driver. Subdivision 3(c) provides: It is an affirmative defense for the petitioner to prove that, at the time of the refusal, the D-3 petitioner s refusal to permit the test was based upon reasonable grounds. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c). III. With the structure of the statute in mind, I turn to the issue of whether the judicial review hearing may include the affirmative defense of necessity. The defense of necessity is a narrow one, but it is deeply rooted in our legal system. As the majority acknowledges, necessity is a valid defense in both criminal cases and civil tort actions. State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 200-02, 183 N.W.2d 541, 544-45 (1971). Necessity is a defense only in emergency situations where the peril is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no alternative but the conduct in question. Id. at 199, 183 N.W.2d at 543. While we recognize the severe threat posed by drunken drivers, see Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 63 (Minn. 1983), we also recognize that a necessity instruction may be appropriate in circumstances such as Axelberg s, when an intoxicated victim s only means to escape domestic violence is by vehicle. See State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. 1999) (affirmative defense instruction given in criminal case when defendant asserted that she sought refuge in a car to flee from her abusive boyfriend). Moreover, the Legislature has excluded from the crime of reckless driving the emergency operation of any vehicle when avoiding imminent danger. Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 3(b)(2) (2012). I appreciate the majority s point that our system of license revocation and review is neither a criminal proceeding nor a civil tort action, but a statutory administrative and judicial scheme without a common-law counterpart. So I agree with the majority that this D-4 case is one of statutory interpretation in which we read the Legislature s words to decide whether it either: (a) banned all affirmative defenses except reasonable refusal; or (b) left room for the judiciary to recognize the defense of necessity. IV. Neither subdivision 3(b) nor 3(c) specifically references necessity. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)-(c). But mere silence on a particular topic does not mean that the statute is unclear or ambiguous unless the silence generates more than one reasonable interpretation. See Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010). The majority and I agree that the words of section 169A.53 are clear and unambiguous, but we come to precisely opposite conclusions about what they signify. In my view, the majority s reading, which would bar the judiciary from doing justice, is unreasonable. Tellingly, in subdivision 3(c), the Legislature chose the phrase an affirmative defense, employing the indefinite article an. The Legislature did not employ a definite article, such as the. State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 2012) (interpreting the plain meaning of a statute based on the use of the definite article the, which is a word of limitation that refers to a specific object ). So, as used here, the word an means one, as in: It is one affirmative defense. If the Legislature had meant to allow only a single affirmative defense and prohibit all others, it could have said so with ease. It could have used phrases such as the only affirmative defense, the one affirmative defense, or simply the affirmative defense. D-5 Also significant is that the affirmative defense the Legislature described incorporates the word reasonable. This signals that the Legislature did not intend judicial review to be a mechanical, answer-the-question-and-only-the-question process without regard to reason. Rather, judicial review is a place where justice can be done. Another strong statutory signal that the Legislature intended judicial review to be more than a mechanical answering of questions is the administrative review established by subdivision 1. If the Legislature truly wanted the judiciary to turn a blind eye to injustice, likely it would have blinded the administrative reviewer as well. To the contrary, the administrative reviewer may consider not just the evidence upon which the revocation was based, but any other material information for the purpose of determining whether sufficient cause exists for revocation. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 1. It is troubling that, under the majority s reading, the statute gives an administrative reviewer authority to do justice, while the judiciary cannot. But, says the majority, the judiciary is restrained because subdivision 3(c) uses the term limited to describe the scope of the hearing. Of course the hearing is limited, but limited to what? The hearing is limited to the issues, or topics, in clauses (1) through (10). The majority notes that the affirmative defense of reasonable test refusal is relevant to the issue of test refusal, the topic of clause (7). The affirmative defense of reasonable test refusal explains why the person did not take the test. In the same manner, the affirmative defense of necessity is relevant to the issue of driving, operating, or . . . physical control of a motor vehicle, a topic included in clauses (1) D-6 and (8). The affirmative defense of necessity explains why the person drove, operated, or was in physical control of the motor vehicle. The majority s stingy reading of the statute produces injustice, not only here but in other cases. If, as the majority holds, the statute prohibits all affirmative defenses but reasonable refusal, then any and all test failures would require license revocation, no matter the underlying facts. For example, it would be improper for a court to consider whether a driver had consumed alcohol after driving but before the test, and all such evidence would be irrelevant as a matter of law. In this regard, the majority s holding tacitly overrules a sensible, long-standing court of appeals precedent, Dutcher v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 406 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. App. 1987), which recognized an affirmative defense for post-driving alcohol consumption. As the Dutcher court recognized, post-driving consumption certainly is germane . . . [and a] contrary result could revoke the license of one entirely sober at the time of the accident who thereafter imbibed but did not drive. Id. at 336. Over the last quarter century, we have never had occasion to review the holding in Dutcher and the Legislature has never overridden it. In fact, the Legislature has codified the post-driving consumption defense in criminal proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 169A.46, subd. 1 (2012). Unlike the majority opinion today, Dutcher s holding represents good common sense. In summary, there is nothing in the statute whereby the Legislature tied the judiciary s hands to prevent us from recognizing an affirmative defense to avoid manifest injustice. The plain words of the statute are to the contrary. D-7 V. Because the words of the law are sufficiently explicit to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and their application to this situation is clear and free from all ambiguity, there is no need to turn to the canons of construction in Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012). If we did apply the canons, however, it is hard to imagine that the Legislature intended that the judiciary revoke the licenses of victims who drive only to escape domestic violence. A driver s license is an important property interest. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings, 816 N.W.2d 525, 540 n.16 (Minn. 2012); Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Minn. 1983). For anyone, loss of a driver s license can be devastating. Prideaux v. State Dep t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 410, 247 N.W.2d 385, 389 (1976). But the stakes are even higher for victims of domestic violence. Loss of a license may deprive them of financial independence, treatment and counseling services, transportation for their children, and the only reliable means of escape in the next emergency. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16(6) (stating that the consequences of a particular interpretation are relevant to determining legislative intent). In recent years the Legislature has taken the initiative to protect not penalize and stigmatize victims of domestic violence. For example, and of special relevance here, in 2006 the Legislature recognized that victims establish new addresses in order to prevent their assailants or probable assailants from finding them. Minn. Stat. § 5B.01 (2012). Under the Minnesota Secretary of State s Safe at Home program, Minn. R. Ch. 8290 (2013), victims may use a designated address in all public matters, including on driver s D-8 licenses and in court proceedings. Now, because of the majority s unwillingness to read the law to avoid manifest injustice, the Legislature may wish to consider further measures to protect the next Jennifer Axelberg. Finally, I am perplexed by the majority s contention that any reading of the statute that does not foreclose the necessity defense is somehow an act of pure judicial will that constitutes a legislative-style policy choice. To the contrary; each of the three dissents is grounded in a careful analysis of the statutory text. Moreover, the necessity defense is not a mere policy preference; it is a legal concept deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. That is why we recognized it in Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, another drunk driving case. If there is any pure judicial will being exercised in this case, it might be the majority s interpretation of this statute without regard to its application to an existing situation, Minn. Stat. § 645.16. Such judicial will sometimes operates under the guise of exercising judicial restraint, see Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Serv., 841 N.W.2d 147, 158 (Minn. 2014) (Wright, J., dissenting). Yes, we must never disregard the letter of the law . . . under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. Minn. Stat. § 645.16. But, likewise, we must never disregard the spirit of the law under the pretext of pursuing the letter. In this case, both the letter and the spirit of the law leave room for us to do justice. D-9 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I also join the dissents of Justice Wright and Justice Page. PAGE, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Lillehaug. WRIGHT, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Lillehaug. D-10 DISSENT WRIGHT, Justice (dissenting). Because I conclude that Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c) (2012), does not foreclose recognition of the affirmative defense of necessity in the context of implied consent proceedings, I respectfully dissent and join the dissents of Justice Page and Justice Lillehaug. If the Legislature had intended that reasonable test refusal be the only affirmative defense available in an implied consent hearing, it easily could have said so. It did not, and the majority need not read such a restriction into the statute. I write separately to address another reason why Axelberg should be permitted to raise the necessity defense in an implied consent hearing. Interpreting Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) (2012), to preclude the defense of necessity leads to an unreasonable result. This unreasonable result can be avoided, however, by recognizing that the affirmative defense of necessity is relevant to the inquiry in an implied consent hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(8). The implied consent law contemplates two bases for revocation of a person s driver s license: (1) refusing to submit to a chemical test for intoxication (test refusal) and (2) driving, operating, or controlling a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more or while under the influence of a controlled substance, as confirmed by a chemical test for intoxication (test failure). Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subds. 3, 4 (2012). In an implied consent hearing, the judge reviews whether the person engaged in prohibited conduct test refusal, Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(7), or test failure, Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(8) that would justify driver s license revocation. D-1 The majority s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), to preclude the defense of necessity produces an unreasonable result. Yet, we are obligated to avoid interpreting the language of a statute in a manner that yields an unreasonable result. See Wegener v. Comm r of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1993) (recognizing our obligation to go beyond the plain language of the statute if a literal interpretation leads to absurd results or unreasonable results which utterly depart from the purpose of the statute ); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2012) ( [T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. ). Under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(c), a person who refuses a chemical test for intoxication is permitted to assert the defense of necessity in arguing that the refusal was reasonable. But, under the majority s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), if the same person consents to the test and fails, that person is barred from asserting the defense of necessity. No discernable policy choice by the Legislature justifies the inconsistent treatment of test refusal and test failure cases that results from the majority s interpretation. Instead, this inconsistency invites well-informed (or well-counseled) drivers facing similar circumstances to refuse to submit to chemical tests for intoxication. The Legislature s decision to criminalize the refusal of a chemical test for intoxication clearly is intended to produce the opposite result to induce drivers to submit to such tests. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012) (making it a criminal offense to refuse to submit to a chemical test for intoxication). Permitting necessity to be invoked as a defense to test refusal but not as a defense to test failure is both unreasonable and contrary to the Legislature s intent. D-2 By contrast, such an unreasonable result easily is avoided by recognizing that the affirmative defense of necessity is relevant to the inquiry in an implied consent hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(8). Having acknowledged, as the majority does, that reasonable test refusal is relevant in an implied consent hearing under subdivision 3(b)(7), it is clear that necessity is similarly relevant under subdivision 3(b)(8). At the core of both affirmative defenses is an assertion that the unlawful conduct was justified under the circumstances, thereby eliminating any rationale for revoking the license. The doctrine of necessity arises from a judicial recognition that obedience to the law would have endangered some higher value. State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 201, 183 N.W.2d 541, 544 (1971) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) ( [T]he defense of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils. ). By its terms, the defense of necessity asks whether, under dire circumstances, violation of the law was the only reasonable alternative. It is, therefore, erroneous to conclude that the defense of necessity is not relevant to any of the topics enumerated in subdivision 3(b) as within the scope of an implied consent hearing. When correctly construed, the statute is not susceptible to the inconsistency of rendering necessity relevant in cases of test refusal but irrelevant in cases of test failure. Necessity is a narrow defense because it applies only in emergency situations where the peril is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no alternative but the conduct in question. Johnson, 289 Minn. at 199, 183 N.W.2d at 543. Accordingly, application of D-3 the doctrine of necessity requires close attention to the particular factual circumstances of a case. Here, Jennifer Axelberg was arrested for driving while impaired after she fled a violent assault at the hands of her husband. At 2 a.m. in a remote wooded area, he hit her twice in the head. With her violent husband standing between her and the house and her cell phone in his possession, Axelberg sought refuge in their car. Without a necessity defense, Axelberg violated the law simply by seeking refuge in the family car and, therefore, was subject to revocation of her driver s license. 1 Axelberg s husband then climbed on top of the car and broke the windshield with his bare fists. With no way to call for help and no other means of escape, Axelberg started the car and drove to the nearest open business. Any reasonable person would have feared for her safety, but given that Axelberg was acting against the backdrop of domestic violence, the danger she was facing is even more apparent. 2 The majority seeks to minimize my analysis as an improper attempt to prioritize a policy of protecting victims of domestic violence over a policy of discouraging impaired driving. To the contrary, my analysis reveals a flaw in the majority s interpretation 1 See State v. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010) ( [A] person is in physical control of a vehicle if he has the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle, and he is in close proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle. ). 2 The majority notes that the common law defense of necessity in criminal cases generally requires that the illegal act was done for the preservation of life. Johnson, 289 Minn. at 201, 183 N.W.2d at 544. Given that Axelberg s husband broke a windshield with his bare hands, there is little question that Axelberg s life was threatened. The question here, however, is not whether Axelberg has presented sufficient evidence to prove necessity as a defense, but whether she should even be permitted to present such evidence and argue in an implied consent hearing that her conduct was excused by necessity. D-4 of Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b). That the majority s unreasonably narrow interpretation inflicts injustice on victims of domestic violence makes its conclusion all the more unsound. Domestic violence is a widespread problem in Minnesota. An estimated 27 percent more than one quarter of Minnesota women have experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes. 3 This is consistent with estimates of the pervasiveness of domestic violence nationwide. 4 Too often, domestic assaults turn deadly. The Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women, which has been collecting and reporting data on domestic violence since 1989, reports that at least 25 women in Minnesota died from domestic violence in 2013. 5 At least 542 women have been murdered in domestic violence 3 Office of Justice Programs, Dep t of Pub. Safety, Domestic Violence: Results from the 2008 Minnesota Crime Victim Survey 1 (2009), available at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/forms-documents/Documents/!09%20Domestic%20 Violence%20Report.pdf. 4 Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Nat l Inst. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep t of Justice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey 9 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (reporting that 25 percent of women surveyed said they had been assaulted by an intimate partner in their lifetimes). 5 Minn. Coal. for Battered Women, 2013 Annual Femicide Report 3, available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/f4bdb8_35de63f40fa04f8e9a5328ace33045ed.pdf. The report notes that the actual numbers might be greater because the Coalition relies in part on media coverage, and violence against women in some communities is often unreported. Id. at 6. D-5 situations in Minnesota since the Coalition began collecting data. 6 Social isolation is often an accessory to domestic violence, making the victim feel increasingly helpless and dependent on the abuser. 7 By controlling what the victim does and with whom she interacts, the abuser can destroy the victim s support network and make her more physically vulnerable. 8 Victims of domestic violence in rural areas are further isolated by geography. 9 For women in rural Minnesota and even the suburbs, where public transportation is generally unavailable, cars can provide a degree of social and economic independence and sometimes, as this case illustrates, a safe haven. Without the freedom a driver s license affords, a victim of domestic violence is subject to even greater control by her abuser. 6 Id. at 2-3. 7 See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1107, 1116 (2009); Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 4, at 33 ( [R]esearch shows that wife assault is more common in families where power is concentrated in the hands of the husband or male partner and the husband makes most of the decisions regarding family finances and strictly controls when and where his wife or female partner goes. ). 8 Kerry Healey, et al., Nat l Inst. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep t of Justice, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal Justice Strategies 3-5 (1998), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/168638.pdf. 9 Adria Gallup-Black, Rural and Urban Trends in Family and Intimate Partner Homicide: 1980-1999, at 7 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants /208344.pdf. Some scholars have even argued that some abusive men choose to live in rural areas to facilitate the isolation that is conducive to their abusive behavior. See, e.g., Douglas A. Brownridge, A Comparison of Partner Violence Against Women in Rural and Urban Canada Prevalence, Correlates, Consequences, and Help-Seeking Behavior, in Intimate Partner Violence 11-1, 11-4 (Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett & Sarah M. Giacomoni eds., 2007). D-6 While the implied consent law limits the scope of an implied consent hearing, Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), the implied consent law does not mandate that we relinquish our good judgment when exercising our power of judicial review. The law need not be construed to require a person being subjected to an unprovoked, violent attack to choose between her immediate personal safety and the possibility of losing her driver s license and the independence that comes with it. By refusing to give Axelberg even the opportunity to present evidence of necessity in this case, the decision reached by the majority retreats to an overly narrow interpretation of the implied consent law and declines to grapple with the complexity and danger of domestic violence and the circumstances Axelberg was facing. For these reasons, I agree with Justice Page and Justice Lillehaug that statutory interpretation does not compel such a result in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. PAGE, J. (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Wright. LILLEHAUG, J. (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Wright. D-7 DISSENT PAGE, Justice (dissenting). Today the court, in essence, concludes that losing the privilege to drive is a small price to pay for saving your life. In reaching this conclusion, the court fails to adhere to our rules of statutory construction, our case law, and our constitutional mandate to do justice. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I. First, it is important to have a full understanding of the implications of the court s decision. The court s decision not only discourages victims of domestic abuse who happen to be intoxicated from fleeing their abusers when the only means to do so is in a motor vehicle and allows them to be punished if they do, it goes further. By its decision, the court also discourages domestic abuse victims from even seeking refuge in a motor vehicle. Based on our case law, today s decision deprives many victims of domestic violence 1 of the only available refuge. That is because an intoxicated person is guilty of violating our driving-while-impaired statute if the person drive[s], operate[s], or [is] in physical control of any motor vehicle. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2012) (emphasis added). We have held that a person is in physical control of a motor vehicle if the person has the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle, and he [or she] is in close 1 An estimated 36% of domestic violence victims have chemical dependency problems, often an unfortunate aftereffect of abuse. James J. Collins & Donna L. Spencer, Linkage of Domestic Violence and Substance Abuse Services 1, 9 (1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/194122.pdf. D-1 proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle. State v. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010). To illustrate, in Fleck, the defendant was found in his vehicle, outside of his apartment, with the keys in the center console. 777 N.W.2d at 235. Even though he had not recently driven the vehicle, we concluded that Fleck was in a position to exercise dominion or control over the vehicle and that he could, without too much difficulty, make the vehicle a source of danger. Id. at 237; see also State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn. 1992) (reinstating a defendant s conviction who was found stuck in a snowfilled ditch without the keys in the ignition); State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319-20 (Minn. 1981) (concluding that the motor of a vehicle need not be running to find that a defendant was in physical control of the vehicle). Certainly the same is true when, as here, the Commissioner need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner was in physical control of the vehicle. See State v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 431, 181 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1970). Thus, upon entering the vehicle, Axelberg, without having made any attempt to start or drive the vehicle, was in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20 and subject to the loss of her driving privileges simply because she attempted to shelter herself from her husband s abuse. The court asserts that the analysis of [the] dissenting [opinions] prioritizes a policy that protects victims of domestic abuse over a policy that protects the public from impaired drivers. That assertion suggests that the two policies are mutually exclusive. But in fact they are not mutually exclusive and can be harmonized in a way that protects D-2 the public from impaired drivers while at the same time not punishing the victim of domestic violence who seeks shelter from her abuser in a motor vehicle. This case provides an example of how the appropriate balance can be struck. Here, Axelberg drove only when she faced near certain bodily injury or death. The risk to the public was minimized because she drove at a time and on a road not likely to have traffic, either vehicular or pedestrian, and drove only as far as necessary to obtain protection from her husband and no farther. Indeed, it is the absence of other people that makes the necessity defense appropriate in this case. Thus, allowing the necessity defense in license revocation hearings under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2012), allows the district court to harmonize the interests of the general public with those of victims of physical or sexual violence. Finally, the necessary implication of the court s decision is that the necessity defense is unavailable not only in cases of domestic abuse, but also in cases in which a victim is seeking refuge from a violent physical or sexual assault or kidnaping, and the court s decision thus discourages those individuals from seeking shelter in a motor vehicle as well. II. In its slavish attempt to adhere to section 169A.53 s plain meaning, the court ignores the well-recognized rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of D-3 the common law are to be strictly construed. 2 In rejecting this approach, the court states that this rule does not apply because the implied consent law is part of our modern regulatory legislation. Because the law was unknown to the common law, the court reasons, the rule of strict construction is inapplicable. The court is wrong. We recently applied this rule to a civil wage-and-hour statute unknown to the common law in Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 2004). In Brekke, the plaintiff sued his employer for violating Minn. Stat. § 181.79 (2012). 683 N.W.2d at 772. Section 181.79 prohibits employers from deducting money an employee owes the company from the employee s wages. Minn. Stat. § 181.79, subd. 1. The employer argued that the employee was estopped from bringing his claim because he had breached contract and fiduciary duties during his employment. 683 N.W.2d at 775-77. We considered whether the common law defenses of waiver and estoppel were abrogated in light of exceptions contained within section 181.79 because none of these exceptions included waiver or estoppel. Id. at 775. We applied the canon of construction that statutes that abrogate the common law must do so expressly or by necessary implication. Id. at 776. Because section 181.79 did not clearly abrogate the common law defenses of waiver and estoppel, we concluded that the Legislature had not intended to abolish those defenses. Id.; cf. Neuberger v. Hennepin Cnty. Workhouse, 2 Because this canon of construction serves as a presumption, we typically do not first consider whether the statute is ambiguous. See, e.g., Dahlin v. Kroening, 796 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 2011) (considering whether a statute abrogates the common law without first deciding that it is ambiguous); Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377-78 (Minn. 1990) (same). D-4 340 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that despite the absence of an estoppel exception in the Workers Compensation Act, an employer was estopped from asserting the statutory time bar because it had erroneously told the employee that his disability benefits would last indefinitely). We applied this canon in Brekke even though wage-and-hour laws were unknown at common law, see 48B Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations § 2818 (2005), and are remedial in nature, A.H. Philips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). Under the majority s reasoning in this case, our rule of construction relating to abrogation of the common law should not have resulted in relief for Brekke. The court responds that the statute in Brekke did not create an entire system of law in the way that the Implied Consent Law does. But we essentially applied this rule to the Workers Compensation Act, see Neuberger, 340 N.W.2d at 332, which, as the treatise the majority cites notes, provide[s] a complete system of law, see 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 61:3, at 357 (7th ed. 2008). In Neuberger, the employer denied Neuberger s workers compensation claim and Neuberger went to discuss the denial with his supervisor. 340 N.W.2d at 331. The supervisor erroneously told Neuberger that he was equally well or better off on disability benefits and incorrectly indicated that disability benefits would last until he was 65. Id. Relying on these representations, Neuberger declined to file a workers compensation claim until 4 years later when, at age 55, his disability benefits expired. Id. at 330-31. His employer responded that the 3-year, statutory time bar precluded his claim. Id. at 331 (citing Minn. Stat. § 176.151, subd. 1 (1982) (current version at Minn. Stat. § 176.151(a) D-5 (2012))). We disagreed, holding that the employer was estopped from asserting the time bar because the supervisor s misrepresentations caused Neuberger to file his claim late. Id. at 332. We reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Workers Compensation Act is a complete system of law unknown to the common law and did not include an exception for estoppel, see Minn. Stat. § 176.151(c) (2012) (allowing claims after the statutory time bar when physical or mental incapacity prevent the employee from filing a claim). Although we did not expressly invoke the canon that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed, the effect was the same: we applied a common law exception to a complete statutory regime unknown at common law. The court concludes that section 169A.53 abrogates the common law by necessary implication because it limits the issues a petitioner may raise in an implied consent hearing. But in Brekke, the statute prohibiting wage deductions limited the defenses an employer could raise. 683 N.W.2d at 775. Despite these limits, we concluded that the Legislature had not intended to abrogate the common law defenses of estoppel and waiver. Id. at 775-76. Similarly, in Neuberger, we applied estoppel to a time bar despite the fact that estoppel was not one of the exceptions provided in the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 176.151(c); Neuberger, 340 N.W.2d at 332. In State v. Hage, a criminal case, we acknowledged that the necessity defense is available in criminal cases involving driving under the influence. 595 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1999). At the time, the statute at issue provided affirmative defenses for defendants who consumed alcohol after driving or were under the influence of prescribed drugs. Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 2(d) (1998). The statute did not mention the necessity defense. See Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1998). Under D-6 the court s reasoning today, the necessity defense should not have been available in Hage, yet we acknowledged that it was. Hage, 595 N.W.2d at 207. Unless the court is saying that Hage was wrongly decided and is reversing it sub silentio, the reasoning of Hage should lead to the conclusion that the necessity defense is available in driver s license revocation cases. III. The court also contends that the necessity defense is unavailable because that defense only applies in criminal cases. But we have effectively applied the necessity defense in civil tort cases. See, e.g., O Leary v. Wangensteen, 175 Minn. 368, 370-73, 221 N.W. 430, 431-32 (1928) (holding that the defendant was not liable for killing the plaintiff s dog because the dog was threatening the defendant s poultry); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 458, 124 N.W. 221, 221 (1910) (concluding that it was not negligent for the defendant to leave his boat attached to a dock when a severe storm made it imprudent to leave the dock). Moreover, we have said that implied consent hearings are quasi-criminal, and on that basis provided protections typically reserved for criminal defendants. Friedman v. Comm r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832, 835 (Minn. 1991) (holding that criminal defendants have a limited right to confer with counsel before deciding whether to submit to alcohol screening). D-7 In sum, the facts of this case require us to comply with our constitutional mandate to do justice and adhere to well-recognized principles of statutory construction. Because the court fails to do so, I respectfully dissent. 3 WRIGHT, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Page. LILLEHAUG, Justice (dissenting). I join in the dissent of Justice Page. 3 I join the dissent of Justice Wright and the dissent of Justice Lillehaug. D-8


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How many tracks off 4 will we hear before its June 28 release date? Not that we're complaining. Recently leaked "Party," the album's sole duet featuring an always welcome Andre 3000 (who once again teams up with a strong female after a guest appearance on Ke$ha's "Sleazy" remix earlier this year) features some retro beats and innate coolness, thanks to Consequence and Kanye West, who brilliantly instructs us to refer to swag sauce as "Swagu." "Party" follows "Best Thing I Never Had" as being more of typical, expected Beyoncé track, yet it's still not the definitive B number we've been waiting for. (And at this rate, that may never arrive. But maybe that's a good thing?)
Despite its high-energy suggestive title, "Party" has the subtle coolness of "Ego," sounding more suitable as the soundtrack to a nightcap rather than an adrenaline-pumping jam that brings people to the dance floor. Its direct, emotional lyrics ("I may be young but I'm ready / To give you all my love") make things sound like the soiree B is referencing is more a party for two than, say, an entire club a ("I told my girls you can get it"). '80s-sounding synths give it a throwback feel, further referenced by the time we get to Andre, who breezily reminisces about his mallrat days ("Man we were just in the food court eating our gyros"). The sampling of Slick Rick and Doug E. Fresh's definitive classic La Di Da Di" provides a syllable-enthused chorus, perfectly capable of being the "Umbrella" of summer 2011. The song should get some play at many a barbecue or block party this summer, making the simplistic sounds of "ey-ey-ey" even more inescapable.
[starreview tpl=16]

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News Contact:
COM Celebrates its 83rd Annual Commencement
Marin Community Foundation CEO will be Commencement Speaker
Kentfield, CA— May 25, 2010 —COM's 83rd Commencement will take place on Saturday, May 29, at 10 a.m. at the Athletics Complex, Baseball Field, behind the Diamond PE Center, on the Kentfield Campus (PLEASE NOTE: If fields are wet due to unseasonal rain, the ceremony will be held in the Diamond PE Center Gymnasium).
Of the approximately 276 students receiving degrees and certificates this year, about 100 students will participate in the formal ceremony. The youngest graduate is 15 and the oldest is 69 years old. The total number of associate in arts degrees conferred is 152, the total number of associate in science degrees is 95, and the total number of certificates is 57 (some students earned both a degree and a certificate.)
Frances L. White, Ph. D., Superintendent/President will welcome the graduating class. Nick Chang, vice president of student learning, will introduce the student speaker, Ghazaleh Vargha Najafabadi. Eva Long, Ph.D., president of the Board of Trustees, will introduce the commencement address speaker, Thomas Peters, Ph.D., president and CEO of the Marin Community Foundation. Chang will present the graduating class. Dr. White and Dr. Long will confer the degrees and certificates. Yolanda Bellisimo, Academic Senate president, will give the closing address.
Guests may arrive between 9 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. Seating is available on a first-come, first-serve basis. No tickets are required. For more information, contact Student Affairs at (415) 485-9376 or visit www.marin.edu/commencement/.
83rd Commencement Program
Musical Selections
College of Marin Music Department
Opening of Commencement
National Anthem
Introduction of Student Speaker
Student Address
Introduction of Keynote Speaker
Commencement Address
Presentation of the Graduates
Conferring of Associate Degrees, Certificates, & Certificates of Completion
Closing of Commencement


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photo credit: Paulo Brandão
Hi everyone! Here is my first in a series of "summer reads"! This list is from Oprah, but don't worry — this is the last Oprah list for a while…!
I have a great variety of summer lists to share! I've read a few of the following, so I included a link to my review whenever possible. Personally, I wouldn't consider Olive Kitteridge (which I loved) or The Women (which I liked) "beach reads?" So, I'm not sure what the criteria for this list was… On the other hand, The Help and Open House are great beach reads. And I'm waiting patiently for Dreaming in Hindi and thought The Castaways sounded pretty good when it was released a while ago… Haven't heard of the others — any comments?
- Appassionata by Eva Hoffman
- The Bible Salesman by Clyde Edgerton
- The Castaways by Elin Hilderbrand
- Dreaming in Hindi by Katherine Russell Rich
- The Help by Kathryn Stockett — my review of The Help
- The Piano Teacher by Janice Y.K. Lee
- Olive Kitteridge by Elizabeth Strout — my review of Olive Kitteridge
- Open House by Elizabeth Berg
- The Women by T.C. Boyle — my review of The Women


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ST. CLAIRSVILLE - There is a reason Eat'n Park restaurants are open 24 hours a day.
Whether your craving a hearty breakfast, a rib-sticking dinner or perhaps a late night meal to put the finishing touches on an evening out on the town, any hour is the perfect time to head to the family restaurant staple.
But sometimes, while you may be craving the food, you aren't craving having to sit down and eat amongst a restaurant full of like-minded customers. Maybe you wan't to eat at home but don't feel like cooking.
And maybe, just maybe, you don't feel like getting dressed up to go out.
Eat'n Park has the solution for you as its recently unveiled its pick-up window at its St. Clairsville location in the Ohio Valley Plaza.
The pickup window, like the restaurant, is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
To order takeout at the St. Clairsville location, guests should call (740) 695-5507. The order will then be prepared and available at the pickup window conveniently located on the side of the restaurant.
Should the sudden urge for a waffle smile or a shredded pot roast sandwhich strike you while out and about, simply place your order and wait in a properly marked take-out space while your food is prepared.
Eat'n Park's St. Clairsville location also features the award-winning original Superburger, an Eat'n Park classic since 1949; the original Breakfast Smile; and the Soup and Salad bar all available to go. Additionally, the restaurant offers a variety of Eat'n Smart menu items, including low-sodium and celiac-friendly options for guests.
"We wanted to provide a convenient option for our guests," said Kevin O'Connell, senior vice president, Eat'n Park Restaurants.
"The pickup window is the next generation of service and makes the takeout experience easier while still offering the full breadth of our menu 24 hours a day."
According to O'Connell, Eat'n Park team members have been specially trained to help fill orders accurately and quickly and help get guests on their way.
Each takeout order also will receive a free, hand-iced Smiley Cookie as a thank you.
Eat'n Park's St. Clairsville location employs more than 50 team members locally.
The company and its team members are proud supporters of the St. Clairsville Junior Sports League and other non-profit organizations, including the local chapters of the National Kidney Foundation, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and WVU Children's Hospital.
About Eat'n Park
Since 1949, Pittsburgh-based Eat'n Park Restaurants has been a family-owned restaurant chain, serving guests across Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia. At the heart of Eat'n Park are more than 8,000 team members committed to providing friendly, attentive service and supporting a growing number of community initiatives, including an annual fundraising campaign that has generated more than $7 million for children's hospitals. Eat'n Park also donates more than 200,000 Smiley Cookies the brand's iconic symbol every year to support community events and fundraisers. The company is the recipient of the National Restaurant Association's 2011 Restaurant Neighbor Award for community service.
Eat'n Park Hospitality Group is a portfolio of foodservice concepts focused on personalized dining. The restaurant division includes Eat'n Park Restaurants and Six Penn Kitchen, a neighborhood American bistro. Its contract foodservice division includes: Parkhurst Dining Services, a provider of contract dining services to businesses, higher education institutions and cultural centers; and Cura Hospitality; which enhances life around great food through contract dining and management services for regional hospitals and senior living facilities.
Hughes may be reached at firstname.lastname@example.com


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Jacquelyn Cara "Jackie" White
Published: Thursday, April 25, 2013 at 8:02 a.m.
Last Modified: Thursday, April 25, 2013 at 8:02 a.m.
SPARTANBURG, SC-- Jacquelyn Cara White, 23, died suddenly, Monday, April 22, 2013.
A funeral mass will be held today, Thursday, April 25th, 1pm at St. Paul the Apostle Catholic Church.
The family will receive friends immediately following the service in the Parish Life Center.
In lieu of flowers, memorials may be made to the American Cancer Society, P O Box 22718, Oklahoma City, OK 73123.
Condolences may be expressed to the family at www.JMDunbar.com.
Dunbar Funeral Home
& Crematory
Reader comments posted to this article may be published in our print edition. All rights reserved. This copyrighted material may not be re-published without permission. Links are encouraged.


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/ Local
The controversial debate between candidates standing for the Hayley Green and Cradley South election is going ahead this evening.
The debate was in danger of becoming a farce after a row between Councillor Hazel Turner and her Labour opponent over who would chair the debate.
Reverend Ernest Cruchley will chair the debate at the Lutley Community Centre tonight at 6pm despite complaints from Cllr Turner and her agent and husband Councillor Ken Turner about the clergyman being in the hotseat.
Labour candidate Ian Cooper, Cllr Turner and the BNP's Robert Weale have confirmed they will attend the debate but the Green Party's Colin Royale is unable to make the hustings, which is the only of its kind in Dudley borough this election.


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Get Your Kids Started Early with the Ducati Coloring Book
How does someone become a Ducastista? Many of us become converts later in life and feel we have missed out on lusting after Italian beauties for part of our lives. Don't let this happen to your children! The Ducati Coloring Book prepared by DucCutters is the ideal took to ensure that the future of Ducati is secure.
The 24 page PDF book contains a range of Ducatis to unleash your kids artistic talent on, so have at it and enjoy. Download the Ducati Coloring Book and check out the DucCutters site.
If you liked this post please consider becoming a Fan of Ducati News Today on Facebook.


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Test Propeller, No. 10/9, Langley
Transferred from the Smithsonian Institution to the United States National Museum.
Physical Description:
Overall: Laminated Wood; Hub plate: Brass; Hub and Shaft Hole Reinforcement: Steel; Coating: Original Varnish.
Small propeller used for aerodynamic testing only. Not used for flight trials on aircraft or models. Constructed from narrow wooden strips glued together similar to boat planking and then sanded to a smooth airfoil cross section. Tips reinforced with cloth. Hub reinforced with a 1/16 inch (0.2 cm) thick metal plate mounted with screws, on one side only. Shaft hole reinforced with metal tube.
- Country of Origin
- United States of America
- Manufacturer
- Smithsonian Institution
- Date
- 1887-1903
- Type
- PROPULSION-Propellers & Impellers
- Materials
- Unidentified wood, Brass, Steel
- Dimensions
- Rotor/Propeller: 60.3 x 10.8 x 17.2cm (23 3/4 in. x 4 1/4 in. x 6 3/4 in.)
- Storage: 26.35 x 14.61 x 66.04cm (10 3/8in. x 5 3/4in. x 2ft 2in.)


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|Past Profiles
* CrissyBuck
* MoniqueMejia
* Crystal James
* Jessica Stamp
* Natasha Watley
* Ashley Bowles
* Brandon Kay
* Tairia Mims
* Malika Leatham
* 2000-01 Profiles
Sports Questions:
How old were you when you first started playing your sport? 6 years old
Name your favorite former UCLA player and why: Kelly Inouye-Perez, because she's the best van driver ever!
What has been the highlight of your athletic career? Hitting a game-winning home run in the 1999 world series
Where was the toughest place you ever played? Arizona
Who was the best player you played against? Jennie Finch (Arizona) or Jocelyn Forest (California)
If you could be a professional athlete in any other sport except your own, who would you be and why? Beach volleyball because I would be tall and skinny with a nice athletic body.
Do you have any pre-game superstitions? I give my horseshoe necklace to my assistant coach (Kelly Inouye-Perez)
Who inspired you to play your sport? My brothers
What was your most embarrassing moment in a game? Leading off of first base and tripping on my own feet
What was your favorite sport other than your own? Basketball
If you could give advice to a young kid playing your sport, what would it be? Have fun and play hard
I chose my uniform number (#10) because: My middle brother was #10 so I wanted to be like him when I was little and the number just stuck.
What is the one movie you must have in your movie collection? Office Space
What is the TV show you can't miss? Friends
If you could be a character on any TV show, who would you be and why? Phoebe on Friends because she is just so unpredictable
What is your favorite genre of music? Classic Rock
What is the last CD you bought? Sheryl Crow
What is the most embarrassing CD in your collection? Brittney Spears SCHOOL QUESTIONS: What is your favorite place on campus? In front of Royce
Why did you come to UCLA? To play for the best softball program in the nation and to be a part of the tradition of this program.
What class at UCLA have you liked best? History of Mental Illness and its treatment
Who do you admire most in life and why? My dad because of his ability to strive to be the best at what he does.
If you could have superpowers, what would it be? To be able to take others pain away.
What is the one thing you would not do no matter how much money you were offered? Run around naked
If you could travel in time, where would you go? 1940s Germany during WWII
What is your nickname? Bucky
What is your favorite ice cream flavor? Ben & Jerrys mint cookie and cream
What would you never be caught dead wearing? Anything in Monique Mejia's wardrobe
What is your worst fear? To wake up late and miss a final exam
What is your worst habit? Biting my fingernails
What is your pet peeve? When people scratch their throat
What is your favorite childhood memory? Going on vacation to Myrtle Beach with my whole family
What is your favorite thing to do outside of sports? Sit and watch my favorite movies
What is your favorite color? Blue
What phrase or word do you use way too much? LIKE


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Please remember to follow the manual of style and code of conduct at all times.
Check BNN and Bulbanews for up-to-date Pokémon news and discuss it on the forums or in our IRC channel #bulbagarden on irc.systemnet.info.
Check BNN and Bulbanews for up-to-date Pokémon news and discuss it on the forums or in our IRC channel #bulbagarden on irc.systemnet.info.
New Pokédex (Neo Genesis 95)
From Bulbapedia, the community-driven Pokémon encyclopedia.
New Pokédex (Japanese: 新ポケモン図鑑HANDY808 New Pokémon Illustrated Encyclopedia HANDY808) is a Trainer card. It is part of the Neo Genesis expansion.
Card text
Release information
This card was first released in the Neo Genesis expansion, originating from the Japanese Gold, Silver, to a New World... expansion. In Japan, it was reprinted in the Pokémon Web expansion.
A Pokédex is an important piece of equipment in the Pokémon games. This model is the HANDY808, used in the Generation II games.
|This article is part of Project TCG, a Bulbapedia project that aims to report on every aspect of the Pokémon Trading Card Game.
Latest Pokemon News
- Mark McQuillan's Machamp to be distributed at Australian National Championships: Based on 2015 ...
- CD Media to become Nintendo distributor in Greece: Nintendo to return to Greece this October
- Pokémon Sun and Moon SteelBooks to be available in Europe, Russia: To be available on launch day
- Solgaleo and Lunala New 3DS XL to be available in Europe, Australia, New Zealand: To be ...
- Red Rescue Team, Blue Rescue Team, Explorers of Sky coming to North American Wii U Virtual ...


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Currently Joshua Grant spends his day off from Pacific Northwest Ballet practicing for Seattle Dance Project's Project 7. "My husband, Chris Montoya, dances with them and I was invited to do it this year. Since they rehearse on Sunday, it works," said Grant. "But I haven't had a free weekend for three months."
Grant sandwiched those rehearsals around rehearsals and performances in PNB's "Sleeping Beauty," PNB's "Director's Choice," and the company's current production of "Midsummer Night's Dream." In the latter, he dances both the Cavalier and Demetrius.
"And Laura Tisserand and I went to Louisiana to dance 'Sleeping Beauty' there (at Lafayette Ballet Theatre in March)," said Grant. "A different 'Sleeping Beauty,' so that was all new choreography."
Working on so many projects keeps him energized, said Grant. But, on some days, "if I start thinking about all these different things that I am supposed to be learning, my head would explode."
He will perform at Seattle Dance Project during the company's break after "Dream" closes. It's physically possible to keep up with his schedule, Grant said, because the style of PNB and the style of Seattle Dance Project are so different.
In "Midsummer Night's Dream," Grant is dancing George Balanchine's classical ballet choreography. At Seattle Dance Project, the movement doesn't make the same physical demands. "Seattle Dance Project is aimed at creating movement that looks good but doesn't require the physical feats of an 18-year-old," he said. "At the same time, you're working with different dancers, moving outside of your comfort zone, and I appreciate that."
Grant began dancing at the age of two, when his mother took him along to dance classes. "My grandmother had three daughters, and she wanted them to be dancers," he said. One aunt ended up running a ballet studio in North Carolina while Grant's mother kept up her lessons and performing in local shows.
"So she would take me along, and there I was, waving my arms and doing port de bras as a toddler," he recalled.
Dance stuck with the athletic Grant, who also tried out the full run of sports and other activities as a boy in school, enjoying them all but basketball. "I'm awful at it," said the 6-foot-4 dancer, "and of course people always asked me to play."
Grant began at PNB as a student and has known some of his fellow dancers since their teen years together. "[PNB soloist] Lindsi Dec and I met as 16-year-olds, going to the summer course together," he said.
Grant became an apprentice at PNB in 2001, joining the corps de ballet in 2002. In 2004, he left for the National Ballet of Canada, and later toured as a principal dancer in Les Ballets Trockadero de Monte Carlo.
In 2011, he rejoined PNB as a member of the corps.
"Those years [of travel] got me excited about ballet again," Grant said. "Now I want to keep dancing at PNB as long as possible."
At Seattle Dance Project, he also sees artists who "keep creating, keep growing." In Dance Project 7, the works include Wade Madsen's "Want," Amy O'Neal's "Dessa Suites," and Iyun Ashani Harrison's "Falling Into It."
"Midsummer Night's Dream" continues at McCaw Hall, 321 Mercer St, today (April 19). Grant dances the Cavalier at the 2 p.m. performance and Demetrius at the 7:30 p.m. performance. There will be no Sunday performance due to Easter.
Seattle Dance Project's Project 7 will be held at the Broadway Performance Hall, 1625 Broadway, on May 2 and 3 at 8 p.m. and May 4 at 5 p.m. Along with Grant, this year's dancers include Montoya, Ezra Dickinson, Alexandra Dickson, Betsy Cooper, Michele Curtis, Iyun Harrison, Gavin Larsen, Timothy Lynch, David Alewine, Jason Ohlberg, Brenna Monroe-Cook, Ellie Sandstrom, and new company member Karena Kirk.


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Next time, install SMSBrick with 1-click
Learn how MacUpdate Desktop can install apps on MacUpdate with the simple click of the icon. Plus, keep all your apps updated.
SMSBrick... Send SMS messages from your Dashboard. This widget supports "sipgate" and "sipgate team edition".
The current version works for sipgate germany (sipgate.de) only!
What's New
Version 1.2: Release notes were unavailable when this listing was updated.
RequirementsMac OS X 10.4.3 or later, sipgate account.
Similar SoftwareOpen Comparison
Suggest Other Similar Software


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Content strategy is not always UX
You're at a new restaurant and you've just ordered your meal. The decor looks fabulous, the host was friendly and warm, and the wait staff is attentive but not pushy. Your first course arrives and the presentation is superb. You take your first bite—and ugh! It's not what you expected at all. Maybe it's bland and tasteless or perhaps it's too heavily seasoned. The second course is even worse. You choose not to stay for dessert. What a disappointment. All the beautiful presentation and ambience couldn't make up for the lousy food.
And maybe we're not talking about restaurants—maybe we're talking about websites. You know the sites: beautifully designed, easy to navigate, but the content doesn't taste that good.
I'm guessing that most people go to restaurants to enjoy a good meal―the presentation and ambiance are important elements and help create a great experience, but ultimately you want some good eats. But if the food is gross, you probably wouldn't go there again. Worse, you'd probably strike the restaurant off your list and write up a bad review on OpenTable.com. Similarly, if the content on your website isn't relevant to your visitors or doesn't meet their needs, they're not going to come back―and they'll go to your competitor for the information.
So what happened? Was the website project an exercise in user experience (UX) or content strategy? Or did someone decide content strategy was UX? Before the UX pros among you start tweeting us a piece of your mind, hold on.
The complex interplay between UX and content strategy allows for many different scenarios, but one thing is clear to us: Most of the time, content strategy efforts should not fall under UX. UX professionals are expert in creating intuitive, clear paths within websites for visitors to consume all your audience-targeted content. Content strategists are expert at creating content that meets audience needs.
Or put it this way―"content" in "content strategy" is the creating of audience-targeted content (the reason why your visitors come to your site); "strategy" in "content strategy" is the user experience.
Content professionals and UX professionals can and should work hand-in-hand―optimizing the content experience is half the battle; the other half is developing content that is relevant, useful, and drives visitors to the next stage of the buying cycle. If you make content a check box on a list of considerations for UX professionals driving a site design, you are relegating content to data. As Tendo content strategy expert Christine Zender (also our VP, Content) says, "Content is the art; UX is the science."
So who should lead your content strategy? If you don't have a dedicated content team, perhaps the best answer is your marketing department. "The marketing department is focused on what the users want to do. Smart marketers will try to focus what customers want. Marketers are more prone to understand the possibilities of what content can do. UX is about the experience part of 'user experience,'" Zender says.
What are your thoughts on UX and content development in content strategies? Does your answer depend on how much weight you give to "content" vs. "strategy"? Should one lead the other, or are both equally important? Which function led your site design, and why?


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A personal account of how children can suffer from anxiety
This is a personal description of a young woman who has suffered from anxiety her whole life. I am hopefully others who read this will understand that anxiety is real and sometime even unmanageable as well as embarrassing. Many hours and money was spent going from one Doctor to the next and finally found a therapist that would work with her using play therapy. At the time she was only two years old and as she got older she transitioned into talk therapy. It seemed that the professionals always wanted to blame the parents and while sometimes that is true her parents were doing everything they knew to do.
From the time she was two years old we noticed that she would avoid men at all costs except for her daddy. For a year or so we just thought it was the terrible two's and maybe had some separation anxiety. If a man even came into the room where was she would literally climb up her mom or me.
Was she abused?
When we realized this was much more than a phase we got really concerned that maybe someone has tried to abuse her. We thought it may be time to get her back into therapy but after several sessions the therapist working with her concluded that she hadn't been abused but for some reason even at two years old she was suffering from anxiety and we may never know why. She explained that Sarah was not harmed and the therapist said she could have observed something that was totally normal but she may have perceived it as danger. We tried the suggestions the therapist gave us but nothing was working.
From the day she started school we were still dealing with her anxiety accept then she really started to struggle in school. She would study for tests but would fail all of them. We finally figured out that her anxiety was really taking its toll on her. All through High School she tried to deal with it but it was so consuming and overwhelming she couldn't even take tests. The doctor started her on medication but she didn't feel like it was helping very much.
Every day she would throwing up when she got overwhelmed and at this point she had a 504 plan in place with so many accommodations to help her but she just couldn't handle school. Finally the teachers began giving her tests to her verbally and she passed them with no problems.
Fight for your child
Each year her mom would have to go up to the school and once again fight to get her accommodations followed such as giving her tests verbally. Some thought she was using this and felt she was making up some of her anxiety symptoms. Her mom had to really push them to understand she truly had anxiety.
Finally she graduated and everyone was so relieved to say the least. Today, she is managing her anxiety with medication and is working full time and is doing great. She has some anxiety sometimes but she is learning to cope with it. My hope is that if you come across a child with anxiety you take it seriously. Children really need the support we can all give.


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D'Raymonds Send to Phone
OpenLunch Mon.-Fri., Dinner Mon.-Sat.
- Parking lot
- Dress code: Casual
- Full bar
- Reservations suggested
- Romantic setting
* Click here for rating key
Text data on D'Raymonds to your phone, or a friend's cell phone.
Sign up to receive the 2016 edition of GAYOT's Annual Restaurant Issue, which will feature the Top 40 Restaurants in the U.S. and more.


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Oct. 19, 2001
By JUSTIN EINHORN
AP MegaSports Writer
DeShaun Foster has never faced California. It might not take long for the Golden Bears to get tired of seeing UCLA's star tailback.
Foster, coming off arguably the greatest performance in school history, and the fourth-ranked Bruins, off their most impressive win of the season, play host to California on Saturday in a Pac-10 matchup.
This game seems to be quite a mismatch, considering UCLA (4-0, 2-0) has yet to lose and California (0-5, 0-3) is the only winless team in the Pac-10. However, the Golden Bears upset the Bruins in the last two meetings, winning 17-0 at the Rose Bowl in 1999 and 46-38 in triple-overtime last season at Berkeley.
Foster missed both of those games due to injury and also sat out UCLA's game against California in 1998, but he's looking plenty healthy this time around.
The 6-foot-1, 215-pound senior rushed for a school-record 301 yards on 31 carries and scored four touchdowns in Saturday's 35-13 victory over then-No. 10 Washington.
"I think DeShaun proved to everyone he's one of the great backs in the country, if not the best back," Bruins coach Bob Toledo said. "He ran with power, he ran with great vision, he ran with great speed. There's no question he put himself in position to be considered for the Heisman."
Foster leads the nation with 162.6 rushing yards per game, nearly 45 more than any other player in the Pac-10 and almost 100 better than Cal leading rusher Joe Igber.
Foster, who is averaging 5.7 yards per carry, is trying to join quarterback Gary Beban (1967) as the only Heisman Trophy winners in UCLA history.
"It's cool, it's good and stuff," Foster said about the Heisman hype. "I don't like to talk about it. I'm trying to stay focused, we've got Cal this week, just focus on Cal.
"It's just going to get harder every week. The higher you're ranked, the more people want to knock you off. I'm just going to try and keep rolling."
His team certainly is rolling, blowing out Oregon State and Washington after closing non-conference play by knocking Ohio State out of the rankings with a 13-6 victory.
The Bruins defense surrendered a total of 26 points in those three wins. They are giving up 12.0 points per game this season after allowing a school-record 368 points last year.
UCLA leads the Pac-10 in total defense, allowing 283.6 yards per game, while Cal is last in the conference at 467.0 per contest.
The Bears, off to the worst start in school history, have been torched for at least 30 points in all five of their losses. That includes Saturday's 48-7 loss to No. 5 Oregon.
Dropping this contest would clinch Cal's fifth straight losing season since Tom Holmoe became coach.