text: Criminal Law - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/criminal-law/ 2016-05-25T08:53:45-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://justatic.com/v/20160422a/shared/images/social-media/law.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2016/pd-1496-14-0.html Johnson v. Texas 2016-05-25T07:20:06-08:00 2016-05-25T08:39:15-08:00 Appellant Joe Johnson was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to life imprisonment on each count. On direct appeal, Johnson claimed that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior. Johnson argued: (1) that this evidence was relevant to his defense of fabrication; (2) that excluding this evidence violated his right of confrontation; and (3) that it was admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such evidence and affirmed Johnson's conviction. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the proffered cross-examination by Johnson's counsel should have been permitted. The case was remanded for a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). View "Johnson v. Texas" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state Texas Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Richardson PD-1496-14 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2016/pd-0077-15-0.html Cole v. Texas 2016-05-25T07:20:04-08:00 2016-05-25T08:39:14-08:00 Steven Cole moved to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw at his trial for intoxication-manslaughter. Holding that the record did not establish exigent circumstances, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the record established circumstances rendering obtaining a warrant impractical and that the warrantless search was justified under the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court accordingly reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals. View "Cole v. Texas" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state Texas Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Michael E. Keasler PD-0077-15 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2016/pd-0635-14.html Weems v. Texas 2016-05-25T07:19:59-08:00 2016-05-25T08:39:16-08:00 Daniel Weems moved to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw at his trial for felony driving-while-intoxicated. The request was denied, but the court of appeals reversed. The appellate court held, among other things, that the State failed to establish that Weems's warrantless blood draw was justified by exigent circumstances. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Weems v. Texas" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state Texas Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Michael E. Keasler PD-0635-14 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2016/sjc-11962.html Commonwealth v. Stevenson 2016-05-25T06:31:46-08:00 2016-05-25T07:34:28-08:00 Stevenson moved to dismiss indictments charging aggravated rape of a child with force, G. L. 265, 22B; and five counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14, G. L. 265, 13B.1, arguing that the Commonwealth offered only hearsay testimony from the investigating officer. The judge allowed the motion, reasoning that the Commonwealth's exclusive reliance on such testimony in this case constituted "extraordinary circumstances" and that "there was no good reason for [the complainant] not to testify." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the case does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting a variance from its general approval of indictments returned on the basis of hearsay testimony. Stevenson was provided with a detailed report of what the complainant told the officer, and of follow-up interviews with potential witnesses. A defendant has no right to require the Commonwealth to call witnesses to testify before the grand jury so that he might have transcripts of their testimony to use at trial. The grand jury heard all the information available to the police at the time; if the members had been uncertain about returning indictments based on the hearsay testimony regarding a 14-year-old case, they could have requested further evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Robert J. Cordy SJC-11962 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2016/sjc-11173.html Commonwealth v. Neves 2016-05-25T06:31:45-08:00 2016-05-25T06:59:42-08:00 The defendant was convicted on a theory of felony-murder in the 2008 shooting death of a Brockton taxicab driver. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before admitting to the shooting during a recorded interview. The defendant subsequently requested that the police stop talking to him, but any error in continuing the interview was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of other evidence. The court upheld the introduction of a witness's grand jury testimony after the witness claimed a loss of memory; the court's failure to strike, upon request, another witness's testimony after learning that he had violated a sequestration order; and the court's the failure to give a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Denying relief under G. L. 278, 33E, the court reasoned that some of the defendant's statements to police were not made voluntarily and should not have been admitted, but that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Neves" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Barbara A. Lenk SJC-11173 http://law.justia.com/cases/michigan/supreme-court/2016/151048.html Michigan v. Gloster 2016-05-25T05:00:06-08:00 2016-05-25T05:19:46-08:00 Defendant Antonio Gloster was convicted by jury of aiding and abetting armed robbery. Defendant had driven four men to a market in Hamtramck. While defendant stayed in the car, two of the men assaulted a woman and attempted to steal her necklace. Defendant then picked the men up and drove away. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a sentencing court could assess a defendant 15 points for "predatory conduct" under Offense Variable (OV) 10 (exploitation of a vulnerable victim), solely on the basis of the predatory conduct of a defendant's co-offenders. The Supreme Court concluded that it could not. "In direct contrast to other OVs, MCL 777.40 contains no language directing a court to assess a defendant the same number of points as his co-offenders in multiple-offender situations. We decline to import such language into OV 10, as it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that this Court will not read words into a statute that the Legislature has excluded." View "Michigan v. Gloster" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state Michigan Michigan Supreme Court Brian K. Zahra 151048 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-2528/15-2528-2016-05-24.html USA v. Joseph Phelps 2016-05-24T13:30:55-08:00 2016-05-24T14:37:22-08:00 Phelps was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and was sentenced to 120 months in prison, the statutory minimum. The Sentencing Guidelines range was 188–235 months. A year later the government moved for a sentence reduction as a reward for his substantial assistance. The court reduced the sentence to 60 months. Months later, Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 took effect, retroactively reducing Phelps's guideline range to 151–188 months. Phelps moved, under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), for a sentence reduction to 48 months. The judge calculated that a "reduction comparably less than" the amended range in Phelps's case would be 75 months, not 48 months, by comparing Phelps's 60-month sentence to the below-guideline sentence of 120 months that the court had originally imposed. The 60-month term was 50% of the original sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed. To calculate a sentence that is "comparably less than the amended guideline range," the Sentencing Commission instructs the court to compare the defendant's current below-guideline sentence to the original unamended guideline range, convert the difference to a percentage, and apply that percentage reduction to the amended range. This approach applies even where the government's substantial-assistance motion came after the court imposed a below-range sentence for some other reason. View "USA v. Joseph Phelps" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane S. Sykes 15-2528 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-3635/14-3635-2016-05-24.html United States v. Lewis 2016-05-24T13:30:52-08:00 2016-05-24T14:04:27-08:00 Lewis was convicted of five federal sex offenses. The district court sentenced Lewis, who is 66 years old and in poor health, to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 35 years in prison. The district judge, while recognizing that the chances Lewis will survive his prison sentence are low, also included in his sentence a life term of supervised release. Lewis raised no objections in the district court to any aspect of the supervised release term and conditions. Represented by new counsel on appeal, however, Lewis argued that the court's findings and explanations were not sufficient. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defense had ample advance notice of the terms of proposed release that were contemplated and ultimately imposed. Before sentence was actually imposed, the court expressly invited objections and requests for further findings or elaboration. The defense expressly declined the invitation. That was waiver. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HAMILTON 14-3635 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/e064010.html Jackson v. Superior Court 2016-05-24T13:05:33-08:00 2016-05-24T14:23:49-08:00 In 2008, real party in interest (the State) charged petitioner Patrick Jackson with a violation of section 288, subdivision (b), under case No. INF061963 based on conduct that allegedly occurred on May 3, 2008. On July 24, 2008, the trial court declared doubts as to petitioner's competency to stand trial. Two years later, the trial court found petitioner to be incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner was ordered committed to Patton State Hospital in 2012. In 2015, the trial court ordered petitioner released from custody, finding that he had reached the maximum time of commitment authorized by law. The State then secured an indictment and initiated case No. INF1500950 three days later. In case No. INF1500950, the trial court declared doubts regarding petitioner's competency to stand trial, however the record did not demonstrate that a determination regarding petitioner's competence to stand trial had been made in the later case. Arguing that he could no longer be confined because he had exceeded the maximum commitment period authorized by law, petitioner, just as he had done in case No. INF061963, moved for his release from custody in case No. INF01500950. The trial court denied that motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the record failed to support at least two assumptions central to petitioner's reasoning. View "Jackson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state California California Court of Appeal Manuel A. Ramirez E064010 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-2728/15-2728-2016-05-24.html United States v. Waters 2016-05-24T12:01:10-08:00 2016-05-24T12:49:16-08:00 Waters cooked methamphetamine at locations throughout southern Illinois and also taught others to do so. He eventually pled guilty to conspiring to manufacture a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). Waters had several prior convictions, including for enhanced domestic battery under Illinois law, which the probation office characterized as a crime of violence (U.S.S.G. 4B1.1a) in the presentence investigation report. The court overruled Waters's challenge to that characterization and sentenced him as a career offender. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent forecloses a defense argument that the Illinois statute prohibiting domestic battery does not include the use of physical force as an element of the offense and thus, is not a crime of violence. No intervening Supreme Court decision justifies a different result. View "United States v. Waters" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Joel Martin Flaum 15-2728 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-3059/14-3059-2016-05-24.html Blackmon v. Williams 2016-05-24T12:01:08-08:00 2016-05-24T12:36:38-08:00 On July 4, 2002, Cox was standing outside a Chicago restaurant when he was gunned down by two men. Two women driving cars near the scene saw the murder and the shooters' faces. Less than two months later, both women independently chose Blackmon's photograph out of arrays. They repeated those identifications at a live line-up and again at trial. Primarily on the strength of their testimony, Blackmon was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 60 years in prison. Blackmon petitioned the state courts for post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present eyewitness and alibi testimony, and in the alternative, that he was actually innocent. The state courts summarily denied relief. Blackmon then unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of habeas relief and remanded for determination of whether Blackmon "is actually 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" The record supported conclusions that Blackmon's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate alibi witnesses and that the state court's summary dismissal of the claim was unreasonable. Because of that summary dismissal, the alibi witnesses have not yet been tested in any adversary proceeding. View "Blackmon v. Williams" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HAMILTON 14-3059 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/15-4319/15-4319-2016-05-24.html United States v. Foster 2016-05-24T11:00:14-08:00 2016-05-24T15:04:48-08:00 Defendant conditionally plead guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, and then challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered after a stop-and-frisk. The court rejected defendant's version of the facts as well as his accompanying legal argument that he was seized before he reached for his pocket. The court also concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion based on a tip from a 911 call, defendant was found in the area in which the gunshot was reported in a high-crime area, defendant failed to respond or make eye contact with the officers, and defendant's performance of a security check gave credence to the anonymous tip and gave the officers reason to suspect that defendant was the man of whom they had been warned. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Albert Diaz 15-4319 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/h040942.html People v. Espino 2016-05-24T10:05:34-08:00 2016-05-24T13:49:56-08:00 Sergeant Deras stopped defendant for speeding, then determined there were no warrants outstanding, defendant's license was valid, and he was not on probation or parole. Defendant was registered as a sex offender. Deras testified that, days earlier, another officer gave him information that led Deras to infer that defendant might not actually live at his registered address. While Deras was trying to call that officer, Detective Richmond called and told Deras to "hang on" to defendant because of information from a "validated confidential informant" that defendant was selling narcotics and firearms. While Deras waited for backup, a civilian ride-along stated that he had seen defendant make what Deras believed was a "furtive move." Backup arrived. Defendant consented to a search of his pockets. Officers found an object consistent with the size and texture of crack cocaine. Officers placed defendant in handcuffs. After Deras determined the object was a diamond, defendant, still handcuffed, "took a moment" and consented to a car search. Officers found baggies, an electronic scale, and methamphetamine. They obtained a warrant for defendant's residence, where they found a gun and ammunition. The court of appeal reversed denial of a motion to suppress. Officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop, but defendant did not give valid consent for the car search; officer lacked probable cause to keep him under arrest when they requested his consent. View "People v. Espino" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state California California Court of Appeal Miguel Márquez H040942 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2016/sc95301.html Missouri ex rel. Ryan Amorine vs. Honorable Kelly Wayne Parker 2016-05-24T10:02:14-08:00 2016-05-24T12:13:53-08:00 Ryan Amorine sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from holding a probation revocation hearing after Amorine's term of probation expired. On May 4, 2011, Amorine pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and second-degree domestic assault. After accepting his guilty plea, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Amorine on supervised probation for five years. The trial court also imposed special conditions upon Amorine, which included community service and paying court costs. In 2013, a probation violation report was filed alleging that Amorine failed to pay his court costs or report any community service hours. Amorine admitted the violation in an attachment to the probation violation report. A second probation violation report was filed in 2014, again alleging Amorine failed to pay his court costs or perform his community service hours. The trial court suspended Amorine's probation and set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, Amorine admitted to the violation. The court extended Amorine's probation for an additional year. In early 2015, the Board of Probation and Parole filed a "Case Summary Report" and a "Field Violation Report." Both documents informed the court that Amorine had an earned discharge date of July 13, 2015, and with continued supervision compliance, an optimal discharge date of April 1, 2015. Both reports also indicated that the only violation of Amorine's probation was his failure to report any community service hours he performed and the failure to pay his court costs. However, the Field Violation Report recommended that the trial court revoke Amorine's probation, place him on a new term of suspended execution of sentence probation, direct him to pay his court costs, and perform community service work. In 2015, the court issued an order suspending Amorine's probation. The docket sheets reflected that the court continued and rescheduled the probation revocation hearing several times in 2015; both Amorine and the state appeared at every court date. By fall 2015, Amorine, his counsel, and the state all appeared for another probation revocation hearing, but the cause was passed again. The court continued to hold case reviews on December 15, 2015, and February 17, 2016, and scheduled the next case review for April 19, 2016. The Supreme Court concluded that the facts and circumstances in this case demonstrated "unequivocally" that it needed to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of prohibition to remedy an excess of authority. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded his authority in continuing Amorine's probation revocation hearing indefinitely after Amorine should have been discharged. Therefore, the preliminary writ of prohibition was made permanent, and the trial court was directed to discharge Amorine from probation. View "Missouri ex rel. Ryan Amorine vs. Honorable Kelly Wayne Parker" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri George W. Draper, III SC95301 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-35897/14-35897-2016-05-24.html Carillo-Carillo v. Coursey 2016-05-24T09:03:18-08:00 2016-05-24T21:11:32-08:00 Petitioner, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition with prejudice after concluding that petitioner had not fairly presented his claims to the Oregon state court first. The court concluded that petitioner fairly presented to the Oregon courts his claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by unduly pressuring him into accepting the no contest plea, and that his decision to enter the plea and waive his right to a jury trial was not knowingly and voluntarily made. In this case, petitioner attempted to present his claims in proper form by filing Section B of a Balfour brief and expressly incorporating his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition by reference under the heading "Argument." That petitioner may have done this under the wrong heading is surely less serious error than the one found excusable in Farmer v. Baldwin. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Carillo-Carillo v. Coursey" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Paul Jeffrey Watford 14-35897 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/e062858.html California v. Smith 2016-05-24T09:02:50-08:00 2016-05-24T12:09:34-08:00 Defendant Michael Smith appealed the summary denial of his Proposition 47 resentencing petition. Using the Superior Court's standard petitioning form, Smith sought to have two felony second degree commercial burglary convictions (counts 1, 2) designated as misdemeanor shoplifting because "[t]he value of the check or property does not exceed $950.00." The State responded, also using the standard form, by checking the box conceding Smith "is entitled to resentencing" and requesting a hearing to determine "[r]e-sentencing on Ct 2." The State did not contest the value of the loss in count 1, but did check the box requesting a hearing because the "People do not believe count one is eligible as [the victim] is not a commercial establishment," which is a required element of shoplifting. The superior court agreed the victim in count 1 was not a commercial establishment and denied relief, and also summarily denied Smith's petition as to count 2 without explanation. On appeal, Smith argued the victim check exchange business was a commercial establishment and there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the court's denial of his petition as to counts 1 and 2. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the superior court's ruling with directions to either summarily grant his petition or hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve any material factual issues revealed by the superior court's review of the record of conviction. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state California California Court of Appeal Slough E062858 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-75.html Maine v. Kimball 2016-05-24T07:01:56-08:00 2016-05-24T13:20:25-08:00 Brown, a 95-year-old resident of North Yarmouth, lives on his farm and keeps bees. Karen helped Brown and also raised her own bees and harvested honey there. Brown's family was concerned about Karen's influence over Brown and her inclusion in his will. Brown's grandson called Karen to tell her that "things were going to change." Karen became concerned about valuable harvested honey that she had stored at Brown's farm. Brown's family members and Karen and her husband, Merrill, met at the farm. Brown's daughter called 9-1-1. Merrill and Kelley, Brown's son-in-law, had a confrontation on the driveway. Merrill tried to push Kelley but stumbled backward, then pulled out a handgun and shot Kelley three times. Kelley died at the hospital from his wounds. Merrill was convicted of murder, 17-A M.R.S. 201(1)(A). The court sentenced Kimball to 25 years' imprisonment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in declining to give a jury instruction addressing the affirmative defense of adequate provocation; admitting evidence that Merrill had been drinking on the day at issue; and limiting evidence concerning the relationships between Kimball's family members and the victim's family members. View "Maine v. Kimball" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Andrew M. Mead Cum-15-294 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-14640/15-14640-2016-05-24.html United States v. Frazier 2016-05-24T07:01:23-08:00 2016-05-24T18:36:23-08:00 Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion because it complied with the two-part procedure for analyzing defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion by determining that he was eligible for a sentence reduction, but the reduction was not warranted based on its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court declined to reassign defendant's case to a different district court judge because there is no need for a remand and reassignment is unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Charles R. Wilson 15-14640 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-2799/15-2799-2016-05-24.html United States v. Maxwell 2016-05-24T07:00:50-08:00 2016-05-24T07:40:42-08:00 Maxwell, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of a substance containing a cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, but remanded twice for resentencing in light of recent Supreme Court opinions. On second remand, the court had acknowledged that Maxwell's prior Minnesota conviction for fleeing from an officer no longer constituted a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of the career offender enhancement. Maxwell also argued that his prior conviction for simple robbery was not a crime of violence. The court responded: "I didn't feel bound by the career offender guideline. I arrived at a sentence based on the factors of Section 3553(a) of Title 18 … . I did consider the career offender guidelines ... but I have not relied upon those guidelines in arriving at the sentence here. And so whether or not simple robbery is an appropriate consideration or not, I am comfortable with the sentence that has been imposed independent of those guidelines. The court again sentenced Maxwell to 120 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that even if the court had relied on the career offender guideline, the Minnesota statute for simple robbery is not broader than U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit William Joseph Bauer 15-2799 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2016/sjc-11938.html Commonwealth v. Beal 2016-05-24T06:01:50-08:00 2016-05-24T14:54:57-08:00 The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. 269, 10(a); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. 269, 10(h); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. 269, 10(n); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. 265, 15A; and two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 265, 15B(b), stemming from a shooting at a 2008 Dorchester, Boston cookout. The jury separately found that defendant previously had been convicted of two violent crimes and was subject to enhanced penalties under the armed career criminal act, G. L. 269, 10G (ACCA). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, expressing "serious doubt" whether the jury impermissibly based the convictions of the greater and lesser included offenses on the same act, and concluding that the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon must be vacated. the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The court also vacated the ACCA conviction, finding its residual clause invalid, that assault and battery is not categorically a "violent crime," and assault and battery upon a public employee does not qualify as a "violent crime" under the force clause. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Beal" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Fernande R.V. Duffly SJC-11938 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-13392/15-13392-2016-05-24.html Dolphy v. Warden, Central State Prison 2016-05-24T05:33:28-08:00 2016-05-24T18:36:17-08:00 Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas petition because it was time-barred. The district court concluded that the state habeas proceedings became complete once the Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause and the period for seeking reconsideration of that denial lapsed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The court held that, for purposes of section 2244(d)(2), when the Georgia Supreme Court denies a state habeas petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause, the petitioner's proceedings remain "pending" until the court issues the remittitur for the denial. Applying this holding to petitioner, his section 2254 petition was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dolphy v. Warden, Central State Prison" on Justia Law 2016-05-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Per Curiam 15-13392 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2016/81-15.html Stoddard v. State 2016-05-23T12:41:07-08:00 2016-05-23T15:13:04-08:00 In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant's conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court's review of an ALJ's findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Clayton Greene, Jr. 81/15 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2016/75-15.html Taylor v. State 2016-05-23T12:40:56-08:00 2016-05-23T14:32:57-08:00 Cambridge Police Officer Mothersell stopped petitioner at 1:00 a.m. after observing him speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign. Mothersell – the only witness at the suppression hearing – said that, when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected a minor odor of alcohol coming from petitioner's breath and person, even though petitioner was several feet away, in the driver's seat. Mothersell observed that petitioner's speech was slurred and hard to understand and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Petitioner said that he had been at the Point Break bar. Mothersell had petitioner exit the car so he could perform field sobriety tests, which petitioner did not complete successfully. Petitioner was placed under arrest. A backup officer arrived. Mothersell placed petitioner in the rear seat of his squad car to advise him of his rights, while the backup officer searched petitioner's car and found the cocaine inside the front seat center armrest. Mothersell said that the sole purpose for the search was to locate any "other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest." The court denied a motion to suppress; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ensuing conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. In this case there was an articulable basis for suspicion: the arresting officer's prior experiences of finding open containers inside the passenger compartment. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Wilner 75/15 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b249467.html People v. Aleman 2016-05-23T11:00:22-08:00 2016-05-23T12:42:19-08:00 Defendants Aleman and Medrano were convicted of first degree murder and other criminal offenses. The court rejected Medrano's contention that the prosecution, motivated by group bias, removed six prospective jurors by the improper exercise of peremptory challenges; the trial court did not err in admitting a letter referring to drug distribution where it was more probative than prejudicial; the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a person's character or trait under Evidence Code section 1101; the trial court's flight instruction was justified because it shows consciousness of guilt where defendants wanted to avoid observation or arrest; the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury to disregard that a witness was called to the witness stand, allowing her unjustified refusal to answer the prosecutor's questions to remain before the jury; the mere presence at a crime scene, without more, makes someone an eyewitness, not an accomplice; in any event, the failure to give an accomplice instruction was harmless; the court rejected Aleman's claims with respect to a police search of a storage unit which turned up a gun, ammunition, and Aleman's driver's license; the court rejected Aleman's contention that no credible evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a shooter in the Bentley incident; and the court rejected defendants' remaining contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Aleman" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state California California Court of Appeal Roger W. Boren B249467 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b258587.html People v. Cowan 2016-05-23T11:00:20-08:00 2016-05-23T12:42:16-08:00 A jury found defendant guilty of one count of sodomy of a person under age 10; two counts of oral copulation with a person under age 10; and two counts of lewd acts on a child. The jury also found true that both counts of lewd acts on a child involved substantial sexual conduct. During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the presumption of innocence applies only until the charges are read. The court concluded that when a prosecutor argues to a jury the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, she or he may not mislead jurors with an incorrect explanation that lightens the prosecution's burden. In this case, the overwhelming evidence against defendant and the trial court's instructions rendered the prosecutorial misconduct harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Cowan" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state California California Court of Appeal Arthur Gilbert B258587 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2016/s220247.html People v. Robinson 2016-05-23T09:00:27-08:00 2016-05-23T12:45:21-08:00 Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. At issue is whether misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser include offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. The court concluded that the trial court erred by holding that misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose, so that convictions of the greater offense could be reduced to the lesser. Here, the evidence failed to show that two of the victims' consent was negated by misrepresentation. That evidence was equally insufficient to establish lack of consent for purposes of misdemeanor sexual battery. Lack of consent may be shown in other ways to prove the misdemeanor offense, but the jury did not consider alternate grounds. Moreover, a charge of sexual battery under Penal Code section 243.4(c) does not notify the defendant of the need to contest the consent issue on any basis other than the alleged fraudulent representation. Therefore, misdemeanor sexual battery cannot be deemed a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. The court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state California Supreme Court of California Carol Corrigan S220247 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-1175/15-1175-2016-05-23.html United States v. House 2016-05-23T07:03:21-08:00 2016-05-23T07:15:27-08:00 Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress photographic identification evidence because the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the witness's identification of defendant in the photographic lineup where the mere fact that defendant is the only individual pictured with a ponytail does not render the photographic lineup unduly suggestive. In this case, the show-up with a witness to the incident was not unduly suggestive and there is no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Bobby E. Shepherd 15-1175 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-496/15-496-2016-05-23.html United States ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 2016-05-23T07:00:08-08:00 2016-05-23T11:51:42-08:00 Defendants were found liable under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1833a, for mail and wire fraud affecting a federally insured financial institution. The Government alleged that defendants violated the federal mail and wire fraud statutes by selling poor-quality mortgages to government-sponsored entities. Defendants argue that the evidence at trial shows at most an intentional breach of contract and is insufficient as a matter of law to find fraud. The court agreed with defendants that the trial evidence fails to demonstrate the contemporaneous fraudulent intent necessary to prove a scheme to defraud through contractual promises. Accordingly, the court reversed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of defendants. View "United States ex rel. O'Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-05-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Richard C. Wesley 15-496 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/578/14-8349/ Foster v. Chatman 2016-05-23T06:30:28-08:00 2016-05-23T07:09:59-08:00 During jury selection at Foster's trial, the state (Georgia) used peremptory challenges to strike all four qualified black prospective jurors. Foster was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The trial court rejected an argument that the strikes were racially motivated, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. While his state habeas petition was pending, Foster obtained copies of the prosecution's trial file, including the jury venire list with the names of each black prospective juror highlighted; an investigator's statement comparing black prospective jurors and concluding, "If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay"; notes with "N" (for "no") appearing next to the names of all black prospective jurors; a document with notes about a church, annotated "No. Black Church"; and questionnaires, on which each juror's response indicating race was circled. The state court denied relief. The Georgia Supreme Court denied a certificate of appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of a Certificate of Probable Cause; there was no indication that denial rested on state law "independent of the merits" of Foster's Batson claim. The lower court's application of res judicata depended on a federal constitutional ruling; its decision that Foster failed to show purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. Though the trial court accepted the prosecution's justifications for the strikes, "the record belies much of the prosecution's reasoning." That a prosecutor's reasons for striking a black prospective juror apply equally to an otherwise-similar nonblack prospective juror, who is allowed to serve, suggests purposeful discrimination. The Court noted "the prosecution's shifting explanations, misrepresentations of the record, and persistent focus on race." Because Batson was decided only months before Foster's trial, the state argued that the prosecution's file was an effort to maintain a detailed account should the prosecution need a defense against any suggestion that its reasons were pretextual. That argument, having never before been raised in the 30 years since Foster's trial, "reeks of afterthought." View "Foster v. Chatman" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 federal U.S. Supreme Court John G. Roberts, Jr. 14-8349 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0321.html Stanbury v. Georgia 2016-05-23T04:06:36-08:00 2016-05-23T12:21:19-08:00 Thaddius Stanbury was convicted by jury for the 2010 murder of Allen Blash, Jr., and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Stanbury contends that: (1) the trial court committed plain error by not providing a jury charge on the necessity of corroborating accomplice testimony; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury charge on accomplice corroboration; (3) the State presented insufficient corroborating evidence of Salik McKenzie's accomplice testimony; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to exclude McKenzie's accomplice testimony. "[I]f a conviction could be affirmed in spite of the trial court erroneously providing a witness testimony instruction wholly opposite to an accomplice corroboration charge, an accused would have no way of knowing whether the jury secured his conviction through permissible means. In effect, laws and jury charges requiring accomplice corroboration would be meaningless." The Georgia Supreme Court held that this error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings below." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stanbury v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Harold D. Melton S16A0321 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0270.html Blackwell v. Georgia 2016-05-23T04:06:35-08:00 2016-05-23T12:20:10-08:00 Prinson Blackwell appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. Blackwell entered a guilty plea to malice murder and several other offenses in connection with his role in the shooting death of Keniesha Carr and the aggravated assault of Derrick Carr. As part of his plea, Blackwell agreed to provide truthful testimony at the trial of his co-indictees, Kerwin Tate and Xavier Bradford. However, on the eve of his co-indictees' trial, Blackwell filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to OCGA 17-7-93 (b), because he had not yet been sentenced. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw, finding "[t]here is no Federal or State constitutional provision stating that a criminal defendant may withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right at any time prior to sentence being pronounced. Nor is there any express language in OCGA 17-7-93 (b) itself indicating that, although the right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentence is pronounced exists, the right cannot be waived." A review of the record revealed that Blackwell did in fact knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive this right, therefore the trial court did not err in denying Blackwell's motion. View "Blackwell v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Harold D. Melton S16A0270 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0256.html Giddens v. Georgia 2016-05-23T04:06:34-08:00 2016-05-23T10:46:10-08:00 Appellant Matdrick Giddens was found guilty of five crimes, including two counts of felony murder, in connection with the shooting death of Timothy Murray, Jr. After the trial court granted Giddens' motion for new trial based on two instructional errors, he filed a plea in bar seeking dismissal of the case based on his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the plea in bar, and Giddens appealed that ruling. He argued the evidence at his trial was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts and that collateral estoppel barred the State from retrying him for the crimes of which he was found guilty, because he was acquitted of the aggravated assault count that was a predicate element of all of those crimes. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts. As for the collateral estoppel issue, the Georgia Court noted that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide this very question, which divided the lower courts. The Georgia Court determined the U.S. Supreme Court's decision would be released after its two-term deadline for deciding this case, it worked through the constitutional question. After doing so, the Georgia Court joined the majority position and rejected Giddens' argument. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Giddens v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia David E. Nahmias S16A0256 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0071.html Darling v. McLaughlin 2016-05-23T04:06:34-08:00 2016-05-23T10:47:39-08:00 In 2011, Thomas Darling pled guilty to felony murder for having failed to promptly seek medical treatment for a minor child, and was sentenced to life in prison. In November 2013, Darling filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief challenging the voluntariness of his plea. At an evidentiary hearing in 2014, Darling's plea counsel (among other witnesses) testified. The habeas court granted the parties 60 days to file posthearing briefs, and Terry Marlowe entered an appearance as counsel for Darling. Marlowe filed on Darling's behalf a motion to dismiss Darling's pro se petition without prejudice, pursuant to OCGA 9-11-41 (a) (2), claiming that testimony at the evidentiary hearing revealed that plea counsel coerced Darling's plea by misrepresenting the date at which Darling would become parole eligible. In response to this motion, the Warden relied on OCGA 9-11-41 (a)(1), as did the habeas court. The court denied Darling's motion, finding that witnesses had been sworn and had provided testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and that the Warden had not agreed to dismissal. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Darling's application for a Certificate of Probable Cause to appeal to determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion by relying on OCGA 9-11-41(a) (1) to deny Darling's motion to dismiss when the motion to dismiss was made pursuant to OCGA 9-11-41(a) (2). The Supreme Court vacated the habeas court's order and remanded this case to the habeas court for consideration of Darling's motion to dismiss pursuant to the terms of OCGA 9-11-41 (a) (2). View "Darling v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Harold D. Melton S16A0071 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0064.html Hood v. Georgia 2016-05-23T04:06:33-08:00 2016-05-23T10:48:26-08:00 Appellant James Hood appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2011 stabbing death of Christopher Coon. Two of Hood's three claims on appeal raised issues under Georgia's new Evidence Code that the Georgia Supreme Court had not previously addressed. Concluding that the trial court committed no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hood v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia David E. Nahmias S16A0064 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s16a0003.html Cheley v. Georgia 2016-05-23T04:06:32-08:00 2016-05-23T10:43:37-08:00 Shanqulalandali Cheley was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the 2012 killing of Amber DeLoach. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Cheley appealed, contending that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements that he gave to law enforcement officers; (2) when it denied his motion to exclude or redact a trial exhibit; (3) when it limited his cross-examination of two jailhouse informants who testified for the prosecution; and (4) when it failed to rebuke the prosecuting attorney for an allegedly improper closing argument. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cheley v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Keith R. Blackwell S16A0003 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2016/s15g1610.html Olds v. Georgia 2016-05-23T04:06:31-08:00 2016-05-23T10:45:30-08:00 Vashon Olds was tried by jury and convicted of the false imprisonment and battery of a woman with whom he previously had a romantic relationship. At trial, the jury heard evidence of these crimes, as well as evidence of two incidents in which Olds had assaulted other women. The prosecution offered the evidence of these other incidents to show criminal intent, among other things, and the trial court admitted it. Olds appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the "other incident" evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the case law authority relied upon by the appellate court required clarification. In order to give the appellate court opportunity to reconsider in light of that clarification, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. View "Olds v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Keith R. Blackwell S15G1610 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/15-50176/15-50176-2016-05-20.html United States v. Valas 2016-05-20T15:30:32-08:00 2016-05-20T15:48:36-08:00 Defendant appealed his conviction for engaging in a commercial sex act with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591. The court concluded that the district court properly instructed the jury on section 1591's scienter requirements; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial because the court found no Brady violation; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alibi instruction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a spoliation instruction; the court rejected defendant's claims regarding the admissibility of rebuttal evidence and claims regarding government statements during closing arguments; and the court concluded that there is no cumulative error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Valas" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Stephen Andrew Higginson 15-50176 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/14-0919.html West Virginia v. Ervin 2016-05-20T11:03:53-08:00 2016-05-20T12:28:25-08:00 Ervin was charged with first degree murder; use of a firearm to commit murder; stalking; wanton endangerment involving the use of a firearm; and domestic assault, in connection with the 2012 death of Layman. Ervin did not deny he shot the victim, with whom he had previously had an intimate relationship, but argued self-defense. Following a seven-day trial, involving 25 witnesses, the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and first-degree murder using a firearm. . The jury did not recommend mercy with regard to the murder conviction. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder and to a five-year consecutive term for wanton endangerment. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in: not permitting the jury to visit the site of the alleged offenses; excluding testimony of one defense witness; allowing the jury to consider evidence not presented at trial; allowing the state to misrepresent evidence during closing argument; and not requiring the state to provide a bill of particulars regarding the alleged use of a firearm. The excluded testimony constituted hearsay, not subject to an exception; there was no evidence that the jury actually viewed a video that was not presented. View "West Virginia v. Ervin" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Allen H. Loughry, II 14-0919 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/d068595.html In re Ivan N. 2016-05-20T10:30:23-08:00 2016-05-20T19:35:25-08:00 In this case, the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing determined that Ivan N. (the minor), who had admitted to a felony sex offense, should have been placed out of his home for treatment in a community-based organization (CBO), which could include, if necessary, education at a juvenile court school. During further dispositional proceedings, the court denied the minor's motion for an additional hearing to consider whether he could be returned to his high school of origin after he received a short period of such treatment. On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion and he should be entitled to further hearings on his educational preferences (i.e., returning him to his school of origin), as a person who fits the definition of a "foster child" under Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a) by remaining "the subject of a petition filed under [section 602]." After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court was correct in determining that the Education Code provisions and related California rule of court relied upon by the minor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651) did not require it to grant a separate hearing on the request. "The procedures created by Education Code section 48853.5, subdivisions (a) through (g) were intended to be primarily directory toward state and local educators and their designated staff educational liaisons who act on behalf of foster children. Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (h) carves out an exception to those administrative procedures, and prevents interference with the discretion granted to a juvenile court that has made section 602 jurisdictional findings that a minor is a ward of the court, to make related placement orders giving the probation officer the authority to determine the appropriate placement for the ward. Once the true findings on the section 602 petition were made, the procedures of section 727 controlled the minor's dispositional proceedings. Based on the court's placement order under section 727, subdivision (a)(4), the probation officer could exercise authority without regard to the definitions of a "foster child" in Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a)." The Court affirmed the order and judgment. View "In re Ivan N." on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state California California Court of Appeal Richard D. Huffman D068595 http://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supreme-court/2016/112316.html Kansas v. Nguyen 2016-05-20T07:01:21-08:00 2016-05-20T07:24:48-08:00 Ebony Nguyen appealed the district court's denial of her motion for a downward durational departure of her life sentence for felony murder. Nguyen unwittingly received counterfeit money from Jordan Turner in exchange for her marijuana. Upon discovering the deception and with the assistance of three others, Nguyen retaliated by luring Turner to a secluded location where he was shot and killed. With kidnapping serving as the underlying felony, Nguyen pled no contest to one count of felony murder. The Kansas Supreme Court found that because the district court had no discretion to depart, it rejected Nguyen's arguments and affirmed. View "Kansas v. Nguyen" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Kansas Kansas Supreme Court Lawton R. Nuss 112316 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2016/2016-vt-58.html Vermont v. Kelley 2016-05-20T06:33:32-08:00 2016-05-20T07:24:53-08:00 Defendant Shawn Kelley argued that the Vermont Supreme Court should have vacated his domestic assault conviction because numerous reversible errors occurred during his jury trial. Specifically, he claimed that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted two pieces of hearsay evidence; (2) that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) that the State made prejudicial remarks during its closing statement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Kelley" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Marilyn S. Skoglund 2016 VT 58 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2016/sjc-11448.html Commonwealth v. Valentin 2016-05-20T06:32:01-08:00 2016-05-20T08:24:21-08:00 The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in two shooting deaths on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to introduction in evidence of weapons and related items that he lawfully owned and that were not alleged to have been used in the shooting; the denial of defendant's request that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of reasonable provocation; to the instruction that was given that the jury must "find" the defendant was intoxicated; and to portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in several respects. View "Commonwealth v. Valentin" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Fernande R.V. Duffly SJC-11448 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2016/s-15-612.html Adams v. State 2016-05-20T05:32:17-08:00 2016-05-20T12:03:55-08:00 The Nebraska Constitution confers on the Legislature the authority to define crimes and fix their punishment and on the Parole Board "power to grant paroles after conviction and judgment, under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, for any offenses committed against the criminal laws of this state except treason and cases of impeachment." A statute provides: Every committed offender shall be eligible for parole when the offender has served one-half the minimum term. Because it is impossible to determine when an offender has served one-half of a life sentence, the section has been interpreted to mean that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole until the Board of Pardons commutes the sentence to a term of years. Adams, an inmate serving two sentences of life imprisonment, challenged the statute as an unconstitutional usurpation of the Board's authority. The district court dismissed and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the commutation requirement was a "condition" prescribed by the Legislature within the meaning of the constitution's "conditions clause," which "reserves to the Legislature the ability to add to or subtract from the [Board's] power to grant paroles in all cases except in cases of treason or impeachment." View "Adams v. State" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court William B. Cassel S-15-612 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2016/s-15-396.html Shurigar v. Nebraska State Patrol 2016-05-20T05:32:16-08:00 2016-05-20T11:38:31-08:00 Shurigar submitted a "Nebraska Concealed Handgun Permit Application" and acknowledged that one year earlier, he had been found to be in possession of a loaded pistol in Oklahoma and had pled guilty to "Transporting Loaded Firearm in Motor Vehicle, Misdemeanor." Because of this prior conviction, the State Patrol denied Shurigar's application. The district court affirmed the denial, finding that Shurigar's conviction disqualified him from obtaining a permit under Section 69-2433(8): An applicant shall: Not have had a conviction of any law of this state relating to firearms, unlawful use of a weapon, or controlled substances or of any similar laws of another jurisdiction within the ten years preceding the date of application. Shurigar argued that his conviction was not similar to Neb. Rev. Stat. 37-522, which provides: "It shall be unlawful to have or carry, except as permitted by law, any shotgun having shells in either the chamber, receiver, or magazine in or on any vehicle on any highway." The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the Legislature deemed a person to be a risk for violating Section 37-522, which makes it unlawful to transport a loaded shotgun on a highway in Nebraska; there is no reason why a person violating another jurisdiction's law against transporting a loaded pistol on a highway would be less of a risk of committing future crimes than a person transporting a loaded shotgun. View "Shurigar v. Nebraska State Patrol" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Kelch S-15-396 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2016/s-15-327.html State v. Ash 2016-05-20T05:32:14-08:00 2016-05-20T08:41:05-08:00 In November, 2003, Guitron was reported missing. Guitron's remains were discovered in April 2010, under a woodpile on an abandoned farm in rural Kimball County. The cause of death was determined to be two gunshot wounds; a bullet recovered from Guitron's skull was fired from a pistol purchased by Ash's sister. Guitron's death was found to have occurred on October 15, 2003. In August 2003, Ash and his 15-year old girlfriend, whom Ash later married, began living with Guitron in Fort Collins, Colorado. The three were methamphetamine users. After several weeks, Ash and Meehan moved out and began living in a tent near Grover, Colorado. Ash was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded because the court erred in denying Ash's request for a continuance after the state disclosed, on the brink of trial, that a codefendant would be testifying pursuant to a plea agreement. Ash again was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, finding Ash's claim of insufficient evidence to support the verdict without merit; that none of Ash's claims of trial court error had merit; and that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was either affirmatively disproved by the record or not sufficiently presented for review. View "State v. Ash" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Stacy S-15-327 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2016/141623.html More v. Iowa 2016-05-20T05:31:12-08:00 2016-05-20T07:24:46-08:00 A jury convicted Glendale More Jr. of first-degree murder in connection with the death of his girlfriend, Wauneita Townsend. He applied for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because at his trial the State introduced expert witness testimony on Compositional Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA). According to More, recent scientific developments have discredited CBLA and that as a result of these new developments, he was entitled to a new trial. He also alleged that the use of CBLA testimony violated due process under both the State and Federal Constitutions by depriving him of a fair trial. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review and affirmed: "We certainly recognize that one of the roles of this court is to protect defendants from wrongful convictions when subsequently discovered evidence shows that an error has probably occurred. Yet after examination of the record in this case, we cannot conclude that More's trial, though flawed, was fundamentally unfair in light of the entire record, which points in the direction of More's guilt." View "More v. Iowa" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Brent R. Appel 141623 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-11618/15-11618-2016-05-20.html United States v. Parks 2016-05-20T05:30:58-08:00 2016-05-20T15:48:30-08:00 After defendant admitted to violating his conditions of supervised release, the district court sentenced defendant to the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months in prison. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2) applied to defendant's sentencing hearing and reviewed the claim de novo under the general United States v. Vandergrift rule. The court held that the district court failed to comply with section 3553(c)(2) because the district court failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for his non-guideline sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Higginbotham 15-11618 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2016/96-15-0.html State v. Rice, Nero, Miller; White & Goodson 2016-05-20T05:01:38-08:00 2016-05-20T06:01:14-08:00 On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray suffered an injury while in police custody; one week later, he died from those injuries. The state charged six Baltimore police officers in connection with Gray's death. Officer Porter's trial ended in a mistrial in December 2015. The state has indicated it will retry him and wants to compel him, before his retrial, to provide immunized testimony against the remaining officers. In two cases the trial court granted the motion to compel; in three cases it denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the state's compelling Officer Porter to testify in the trials of his fellow officers, under the grant of use and derivative use immunity, does not violate Porter's privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court lacks the discretion to deny a properly pled motion to compel immunized testimony. Denial of such a motion constitutes a final judgment from which the state can appeal immediately. Porter was the proper party to the appeal because he, not the defendants in the underlying trials, is the party interested in the subject matter of the motion to compel immunized testimony. View "State v. Rice, Nero, Miller; White & Goodson" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Barbera J. 96/15 http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2016/2013ap002433-cr.html Wisconsin v. LeMere 2016-05-20T04:36:23-08:00 2016-05-20T07:24:57-08:00 The charges of first-degree sexual assault against defendant-appellant Stephen LeMere arose out of events that occurred after a gathering in the Eau Claire on Friday evening, May 13, 2011, at the home of J.C. and his wife, A.C. LeMere was then 24. Also present that evening was C.R.C., J.C.'s 12-year-old sister. During the gathering, LeMere and another visitor drank the majority of two 30 packs of beer, in addition to other alcohol in the house. LeMere also took a narcotic pain killer. Although his memory of the evening became "fuzzy," LeMere recalled playing drinking games throughout the night. Early the next morning, LeMere sent text messages to C.R.C., and when she refused to have sex with her, he placed her in a choke hold, put a knife to her throat, fondled her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about what happened. C.R.C. did tell someone about it, and charges were later filed against him. In "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010)), the federal Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assessed "Padilla" in a different context: did the Sixth Amendment require defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, when the client entered a plea to a sexually violent offense? LeMere wanted to withdraw his plea, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the possibility of civil commitment following the confinement portion of his sentence under Chapter 980. The Wisconsin Court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient in this case, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Wisconsin v. LeMere" on Justia Law 2016-05-20 state Wisconsin Wisconsin Supreme Court David T. Prosser, Jr. 2013AP002433-CR http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-40219/13-40219-2016-05-19.html United States v. Romans 2016-05-19T15:30:33-08:00 2016-05-19T18:30:38-08:00 Defendants Romans, Moseby, Harden, and Booker were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. The court concluded that a rational finder of fact could have found that venue in the Eastern District of Texas was proven by a preponderance of the evidence; the Government presented significant evidence of concurring acts, actors, and events from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Booker was a member of the charged conspiracy; Harden has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by failing to appoint substitute counsel; Harden's decision to represent himself was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; Harden has not shown that the district court erred in balancing the sentencing factors or that the Guidelines sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion, nor has he rebutted the presumption of reasonableness that applies to his bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence; and, because Harden's sentence was not increased under the residual clause, the court need not determine whether, under Johnson v. United States, any part of USSG 4B1.1 is void. The court vacated Moseby's sentence and remanded for resentencing because the application of USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) was clearly erroneous. The court rejected defendants' remaining claims and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Romans" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit James L. Dennis 13-40219 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b264807.html People v. Arendtsz 2016-05-19T11:30:23-08:00 2016-05-19T17:22:39-08:00 Defendant appealed from the denial of his Penal Code section 1016.5 motion to vacate his nolo contendere plea for felony sexual battery. Prior to defendant's plea, former Deputy District Attorney Teresa Sullivan, twice advised him that his plea would result in adverse immigration consequences if he was not a United States citizen. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant was properly advised of the immigration consequences of his nolo contendere plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Arendtsz" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state California California Court of Appeal Paul Turner B264807 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-3141/14-3141-2016-05-19.html United States v. Cotton 2016-05-19T11:01:44-08:00 2016-05-19T16:04:29-08:00 Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The court concluded that both the government and the district court correctly recited some of the purposes for which evidence of prior convictions may be used, but the district court did not analyze the purpose for which the evidence was being offered in this case. Mere recitation of FRE 404(b) without an accompanying case-specific analysis risks couching criminal propensity in terms of knowledge, intent, or lack of mistake. Nonetheless, the court concluded that any error in admitting defendant's prior convictions was harmless. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion allowing defendant's post-arrest statement to be admitted for impeachment purposes; the statement was not offered as non-hearsay substantive evidence; and the statement was admitted under FRE 806 for the limited purpose of supporting the credibility of the declarant. Use of a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness who has been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement is appropriate when the statement contextualizes, clarifies, or amplifies the meaning of the witness's testimony or inconsistent statement. The district court's careful attention to the admission of the rehabilitation evidence presented supports the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting all of the proffered evidence for both parties regarding the credibility of the co-conspirator statements. Finally, there was no Brady violation associated with the government's failure to disclose the photograph at issue. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cotton" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Jane Louise Kelly 14-3141 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2016/2014-ka-01115-sct.html Quinn v. Mississippi 2016-05-19T10:31:51-08:00 2016-05-19T10:51:27-08:00 A jury convicted Archie Quinn of capital murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to life in prison, without the possibility of parole. Quinn appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) that the jury was incompletely instructed on the elements of the crime; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge properly instructed the jury and therefore affirmed on that issue. The Court also found that the record in this case did not "affirmatively show" ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, the Court affirmed Quinn's conviction, but dismissed his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to his right to raise it in a proper petition for post-conviction relief. View "Quinn v. Mississippi" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Ann Hannaford Lamar 2014-KA-01115-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2016/2014-ka-01778-sct-0.html Hale v. Mississippi 2016-05-19T10:31:51-08:00 2016-05-19T10:52:24-08:00 John Hale was convicted on four counts of sale or transfer of a controlled substance and was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve a total of sixteen years' imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Hale, represented by the Office of Indigent Appeals, argued that the trial court erred in denying his proffered jury instructions on the defenses of involuntary intoxication and entrapment. Hale also has filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he raised various other issues. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Hale's convictions and sentences. View "Hale v. Mississippi" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi William L. Waller, Jr. 2014-KA-01778-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/c078233.html California v. Silva 2016-05-19T09:31:04-08:00 2016-05-19T10:22:29-08:00 Defendant Allen Silva plead no contest to a number of felony offenses and one misdemeanor petty theft charged in connection with two separate events. The parties agreed to a maximum sentence of six years eight months. The trial court sentenced defendant to the negotiated term of six years eight months on the felonies, but added a consecutive sentence of 30 days on the misdemeanor petty theft, which the trial court subtracted from defendant's presentence custody credits. Defendant contended the trial court did not properly advise him he could withdraw his plea if the court was inclined to impose a higher sentence than the agreed maximum and contends the error required specific performance of the plea. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that neither the trial court nor the Judicial Council plea form used in this case properly advised defendant of his right to withdraw his plea as required by Penal Code section 1192.5. However, specific performance was not the appropriate remedy in this case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Silva" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state California California Court of Appeal William J. Murray, Jr. C078233 http://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/supreme-court/2016/cr-15-0303-pr.html State ex rel. Polk v. Hon. Campbell/Kraps 2016-05-19T08:00:10-08:00 2016-05-19T17:22:36-08:00 Francis Kraps was indicted on two counts of child prostitution in violation of A.R.S. 13-3212(B)(2). During a pre-trial hearing, the superior court advised Kraps that if he was convicted, the court was required to impose an enhanced sentence between seven and twenty-one years' imprisonment for each count without the possibility of early release, and that the sentences would be served consecutively. Kraps moved for reconsideration, asserting that because the "minors" involved were actually undercover police officers posing as sixteen-year-old girls, these sentencing provisions did not apply. The court held that "minor," as used in A.R.S. 13-3212(D) and (G) means a person who is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age, a peace officer posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years, or someone assisting a peace officer by posing as a minor aged fifteen to seventeen years. Accordingly, the court vacated and reversed. View "State ex rel. Polk v. Hon. Campbell/Kraps" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Arizona Arizona Supreme Court Ann Timmer CR-15-0303-PR http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2016/a-34-14.html New Jersey v. Perry 2016-05-19T07:32:42-08:00 2016-05-19T08:47:38-08:00 Defendant Bobby Perry was charged with sexually and physically assaulting a woman he had been casually dating. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion under the New Jersey Rape Shield Law to admit DNA evidence of an unidentified semen stain, which did not belong to defendant, found on the shorts that the victim was wearing on the night of the assault. Although it was never determined to whom the semen belonged or when it was left on the victim's shorts, defendant argued that the evidence supported his defense that the victim was still romantically involved with her ex-boyfriend, providing motive for the ex-boyfriend to assault the victim and for the victim to fabricate the charges. The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that the DNA evidence was irrelevant to defendant's theory of third-party guilt, precluded by the Rape Shield Law, and, in any event, inadmissible because the low probative value of the evidence [wa]s substantially outweighed by a danger of prejudice. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and third-degree aggravated assault. In a split decision, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the DNA evidence was relevant to prove defendant's theory that the victim s ex-boyfriend perpetrated the assault and was, therefore, admissible. The dissent, conversely, concluded that the trial court properly applied the Rape Shield Law to exclude [the DNA] evidence proffered by defendant that served only to establish that the victim engaged in sex with an unknown third party. After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the semen found on the victim's shorts constituted inadmissible evidence of sexual conduct within the meaning of the Rape Shield Law, and was not relevant to defendant's third-party guilt defense. The Court therefore, reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstated defendant's convictions. View "New Jersey v. Perry" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 state New Jersey Supreme Court of New Jersey Solomon a-34-14 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2016/91529-6.html Washington v. Budd 2016-05-19T07:17:00-08:00 2016-05-19T09:25:51-08:00 The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether police officers had to give resident-respondent Michael Budd "Ferrier" warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the resident's home in order to seize an item containing suspected contraband. In 2009, the Washington State Patrol received an anonymous cybertip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children alleging that respondent possessed child pornography on his computer, used Internet messaging services to communicate with minors, and bragged about molesting his nine-and-a-half-year-old daughter. After review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Ferrier warnings were required under such circumstances. Here, the trial court found that the officers did not give respondent the warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the home to seize his computer. Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent's consent was invalid. View "Washington v. Budd" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Charles Wiggins 91529-6 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2016/s-15-0169.html Lafferty v. Wyoming 2016-05-19T07:03:58-08:00 2016-05-19T08:40:45-08:00 Appellant Jeffery Lafferty was incarcerated awaiting trial for 811 days before pleading guilty to two counts of taking indecent liberties with his minor stepdaughter. After balancing the required factors, the district court concluded that the delay in bringing Lafferty to trial was reasonable and did not impair his right to a fair trial. On appeal, he argued his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. A review of the record revealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court that much of the delay was the result of appellant's own actions, "which in the aggregate caused his case to go on the circuitous journey it did." As such, the Court found no violation of appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial and affirmed his convictions. View "Lafferty v. Wyoming" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Michael K. Davis S-15-0169 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2016/cv-15-962.html Whiteside v. Ark. Parole Bd 2016-05-19T07:00:29-08:00 2016-05-19T10:25:26-08:00 Appellant Shawn Whiteside was an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Whiteside filed a petition for judicial review of a decision by the Arkansas Parole Board (Parole Board). Whiteside alleged that the Parole Board considered him for parole and made a final decision declining to grant a transfer to the Department of Community Correction (DCC). He attached a copy of a document in support of that claim, a "Record of Release Consideration," reflecting a hearing on May 24, 2015, and the denial of a request for reconsideration. Whiteside alleged deprivation of a conditional liberty interest in that the controlling statutes did not allow the ADC discretion in deferring a transfer for the offenses for which he was incarcerated. The circuit court dismissed the petition and counted it as a "strike" under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-68-607 (Repl. 2005). The court found that Whiteside failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted in that Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-15-212(a) did not allow actions by persons incarcerated in the ADC and Whiteside had failed to demonstrate the requisite liberty interest in order to raise a due-process exception. Whiteside appealed the order, contending he indeed established a liberty interest to support his claim. The Arkansas Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that there is no liberty interest in parole in Arkansas." State statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, but not every statute creates a liberty interest for due-process purposes. The Supreme Court found that even if Whiteside were correct in his claim that those inmates who meet the statute's criteria have a statutorily created liberty interest in transfer or parole, he did not state facts to demonstrate that he has satisfied the statute's criteria to be qualified for a mandatory transfer. Therefore, the Court affirmed dismissal of Whiteside's petition. View "Whiteside v. Ark. Parole Bd" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Per Curiam CV-15-962 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2016/cr-15-927.html Robinson v. Arkansas 2016-05-19T07:00:27-08:00 2016-05-19T10:25:21-08:00 Dion Robinson was charged by information with committing four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of felony theft of property, and one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Robinson was incarcerated following a guilty plea, and the circuit court sentenced Robinson to a twenty-year sentence. All of the sentences were set to run concurrently. Robinson appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the circuit court erred in not granting a hearing on his petition. Finding no error in the circuit court's summary denial of Robinson's petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Arkansas" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Josephine L. Hart CR-15-927 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2016/cr-15-819.html Reynolds v. Arkansas 2016-05-19T07:00:25-08:00 2016-05-19T10:25:17-08:00 Appellant Edward Reynolds appealed after a jury found him guilty of kidnapping and aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively. On appeal, Reynolds contended that the circuit court erred by: (1) denying his directed-verdict motions on both charges; (2) allowing the victim to testify about her injuries despite the prosecutor's failure to provide her medical records in discovery; and (3) overruling his objection to remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Arkansas" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Rhonda K. Wood CR-15-819 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2016/119162.html People v. Grant 2016-05-19T06:31:16-08:00 2016-05-19T08:44:40-08:00 The Johnson County circuit court appointed a psychiatric expert at the state's request, who testified at trial under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), 725 ILCS 205/0.01, that Grant had not recovered and was substantially likely to commit future sex offenses. A jury found that he was still a sexually dangerous person. The appellate court reversed, holding that the SDPA does not contemplate the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert for the state in a recovery proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; "when the legislature wants to grant the State the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation of a respondent, it knows how to do so." While the SDPA quite clearly allows a respondent in a sexually dangerous persons proceeding to retain a private expert witness, there is nothing in the plain language of the SDPA allowing the state to do so, and the SDPA must be strictly construed. View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Robert R. Thomas 119162 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2016/119006.html People v. Cotto 2016-05-19T06:31:15-08:00 2016-05-19T08:33:07-08:00 In 2008, defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced, as a habitual criminal, to natural life imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. In 2011, defendant, through privately retained counsel, filed a postconviction petition, claiming due process violations and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel on multiple grounds. The trial court advanced defendant's petition to second-stage proceedings. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition was not timely filed; that defendant failed to allege the untimely filing was not due to his culpable negligence; that defendant's substantive claims were barred by res judicata and waiver and consisted primarily of unsupported, conclusory allegations; and that none of the claims made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Defendant's postconviction counsel filed a response, arguing that the petition was untimely filed because trial counsel failed to inform defendant about the appellate court's June 3, 2009, decision. In support, defendant attached evidence that the notice of appeal was mailed to his mother, not to defendant. The court dismissed, finding that the record did not substantiate defendant's claim that his trial counsel suborned perjury and that counsel's decisions did not rise to the level of deprivation of a constitutional right. The court did not reference timeliness. On appeal, defendant unsuccessfully argued only that his privately retained postconviction counsel did not provide the requisite "reasonable level of assistance" during second-stage proceedings because counsel failed to contest the assertion that defendant's petition was untimely based on culpable negligence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating the reasonable level of assistance standard applies to both retained and appointed postconviction counsel and that counsel met the standard. View "People v. Cotto" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Thomas L. Kilbride 119006 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2016/118672.html People v. Hernandez 2016-05-19T06:31:14-08:00 2016-05-19T08:17:56-08:00 Hernandez,was convicted of armed robbery, a Class X felony under 720 ILCS 5/18-2, and was sentenced to an extended term of 40 years' imprisonment. Following an evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, during which he argued that the 40-year term imposed for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the circuit court granted a new sentencing hearing, finding the statute "facially unconstitutional" because it carried a harsher penalty than the penalty for "armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 5/33A-1. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the 40-year term of imprisonment. The definition of dangerous weapon for purposes of the armed robbery statute includes not only objects that are per se dangerous, but objects that are used or may be used in a dangerous manner. The common-law definition of "dangerous weapon" found in the armed robbery statute is broader than the definition of "dangerous weapon" in the armed violence statute. The elements of armed robbery, which require proof that defendant was "armed with a dangerous weapon" are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require proof that defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a Category III weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 33A-2. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Lloyd A. Karmeier 118672 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/578/14-1457/ Betterman v. Montana 2016-05-19T06:30:28-08:00 2016-05-19T06:44:52-08:00 Betterman pleaded guilty to bail jumping after failing to appear on domestic assault charges. He was then jailed for over 14 months awaiting sentence, in large part due to institutional delay. He was eventually sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, with four of the years suspended. The Montana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to post-conviction, presentencing delay. The Speedy Trial Clause right attaches upon a defendant's arrest or formal accusation, but detaches upon conviction. Before conviction, the accused is shielded by the presumption of innocence, which the Speedy Trial Clause implements by minimizing the likelihood of lengthy incarceration before trial, lessening the anxiety and concern associated with a public accusation, and limiting the effects of long delay on the accused's ability to mount a defense. The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right— dismissal of the charges—fits the preconviction focus of the Clause; it would be an unjustified windfall to remedy sentencing delay by vacating validly obtained convictions. View "Betterman v. Montana" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 federal U.S. Supreme Court Ruth Bader Ginsburg 14-1457 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/578/14-1096/ Luna Torres v. Lynch 2016-05-19T06:30:24-08:00 2016-05-19T07:56:59-08:00 Any alien convicted of an "aggravated felony" after entering the U.S. is deportable, ineligible for several forms of discretionary relief, and subject to expedited removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (3). An "aggravated felony" is defined as any of numerous offenses listed in Section 1101(a)(43), each of which is typically identified either as an offense "described in" a specific federal statute or by a generic label (e.g., murder); the penultimate sentence states that each enumerated crime is an aggravated felony irrespective of whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law. Luna, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in New York to attempted third-degree arson. An Immigration Judge determined that Luna's arson conviction was for an "aggravated felony" and that Luna was ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Second Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court affirmed. A state offense counts as a Section 1101(a)(43) "aggravated felony" when it has every element of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate or foreign commerce.; state crimes do not need a "jurisdictional hook." Congress meant the term "aggravated felony" to capture serious crimes regardless of whether they are made illegal by the federal government, a state, or a foreign country. It is implausible that Congress viewed the presence of an interstate commerce element as separating serious from nonserious conduct. View "Luna Torres v. Lynch" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 federal U.S. Supreme Court Elena Kagan 14-1096 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2016/27462.html South Dakota v. Janis 2016-05-19T05:02:36-08:00 2016-05-19T08:39:46-08:00 A jury convicted Cleve Janis, Jr. of third-degree rape in 2015. Janis appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred when it admitted undisclosed expert testimony. Janis also argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct through various statements during trial and that there was improper contact between a juror and a spectator. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Dakota v. Janis" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Glen A. Severson 27462 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2016/2015-1339.html Jury v. Miller 2016-05-19T05:02:08-08:00 2016-05-19T11:29:33-08:00 Appellant, convicted of kidnapping, felonious assault, and two counts of rape, challenged the dismissal of his petition for habeas relief, contending that he was not served with an arrest warrant or initial charging papers prior to his allegedly unlawful arrest and thus, that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence him. The court affirmed the judgment because a challenge to the sufficiency or validity of an indictment is not cognizable in habeas corpus. Furthermore, appellant was charged with the criminal offenses of which he was convicted by an indictment, and he had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge his convictions by raising the sufficiency of that indictment. View "Jury v. Miller" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Per Curiam 2015-1339 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2016/2012-1274.html State v. Adams 2016-05-19T05:02:07-08:00 2016-05-19T11:29:31-08:00 Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. A majority of this court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence. Before that decision was released, appellant filed an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen his direct appeal in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which was denied. Appellant then filed an appeal of right with this court. At issue is whether appellant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Based on State v. Maxwell, the court held that failure to challenge the state expert forensic pathologist's testimony or the autopsy report was not ineffective representation, because any such challenge would have failed as a matter of law. The court rejected the following six claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel: failure to object to the court's questioning of the state witnesses; failure to object to prejudicial comments made by a witness for the state; failure to make a record; failure to object to the removal of prospective juror Nos. 11 and 31; failure to present expert psychological testimony during the mitigation phase; and failure to object to the autopsy report or the testimony of the pathologist. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law 2016-05-19 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Per Curiam 2012-1274 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/15-40079/15-40079-2016-05-18.html Legate v. Livingston 2016-05-18T15:30:36-08:00 2016-05-18T16:40:18-08:00 Plaintiff, a Texas prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Executive Director of the TDCJ violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from the risk of contracting communicable diseases, including Hepatitis C. Plaintiff, a Native American inmate, claims to have contracted Hepatitis C while participating in a communal pipe-smoking ceremony at the TDCJ's Beeville, Texas, facility. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim without affording him discovery or an opportunity to amend his complaint. In this case, the TDCJ did not have a policy requiring plaintiff to participate in the communal pipe ceremony and plaintiff voluntarily participated in the pipe-smoking ceremony based on his personal religious tenets. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where plaintiff has not demonstrated that the district court erred in finding that a due-process claim would be futile, and amending the complaint to include unidentified TDCJ policymakers as defendants would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Legate v. Livingston" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Daniel P. Jordan, III 15-40079 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/15-30127/15-30127-2016-05-18.html United States v. Stanford 2016-05-18T15:30:34-08:00 2016-05-18T16:40:14-08:00 Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence stemming from his involvement in a synthetic marijuana distribution ring. Based on the intervening decision in McFadden v. United States, announced after defendant's trial, the court reversed the conviction of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance analogue (CSA) because the district court's error, in ruling that the government was not required to prove that defendant knew the synthetic marijuana compound distributed by the conspirators was a CSA, was not harmless, despite the decision to send the issue to the jury via a special interrogatory. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on all other counts and remanded. View "United States v. Stanford" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Jerry E. Smith 15-30127 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/d068831.html Elena S. v. Kroutik 2016-05-18T14:30:22-08:00 2016-05-19T09:25:32-08:00 Vladislav Kroutik appealed a domestic violence restraining order against him in favor of Elena S., contending that the order was void because he did not stipulate to a commissioner for adjudication of the matter. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding Kroutik's argument failed for two reasons: (1) he failed to demonstrate on the record he provided that the parties did not orally stipulate to the commissioner; and (2) by his participation in the hearing, he impliedly consented to the commissioner. View "Elena S. v. Kroutik" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state California California Court of Appeal Prager D068831 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3227/15-3227-2016-05-18.html United States v. Tate 2016-05-18T13:30:58-08:00 2016-05-18T14:23:27-08:00 Tate was convicted of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine (2013-2014) and of a single count of distribution stemming from a 2014 controlled buy. Tate's criminal history category was VI, regardless of the career offender Guideline. The court found that Tate's relevant conduct made him responsible for 400 grams of methamphetamine, yielding an adjusted offense level of 28 and that Tate qualified as a career offender, raising his adjusted offense level to 32, producing a range of 210-262 months. Tate's conviction for distribution of methamphetamine involved just 0.2 grams of methamphetamine, but at sentencing the district court considered the trial testimony of Tate's former girlfriend and another woman about his manufacturing activities. The judge rejected challenges to their credibility, acknowledging that the estimates were not exact. The court sentenced Tate to concurrent terms of 210 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding no error in the credibility determination, but holding that conviction under an Illinois law that prohibits attempted procurement of anhydrous ammonia with intent that it be used to manufacture methamphetamine does not qualify as a "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines' career offender provision, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HAMILTON 15-3227 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1537/15-1537-2016-05-18.html United States v. Wilkozek 2016-05-18T13:30:57-08:00 2016-05-18T13:44:06-08:00 In 2003 Wilkozek pleaded guilty mail fraud for participation in a mortgage-fraud scheme. Wilkozek drafted and submitted phony mortgage applications for buyers (participants in the scheme) to purchase properties from realtors (also participants) at artificially high prices. Mortgage lenders approved them and distributed the funds to the buyers, who divided the funds among the participants and abandoned the underwater properties. As Wilkozek expected, the original lenders quickly sold the mortgages to third-party lenders on the strength of the applications. By the time the third-party lenders uncovered the scheme, all they could do was foreclose and sell the properties. They suffered losses of more than $700,000. Wilkozek was ordered to pay restitution to the third-party lenders. The government asked the judge to order garnishment of Wilozek's wages. Wilkozek challenged the request by petition for coram nobis—an ancient writ used to collaterally attack a criminal judgment. Wilkozek claimed to have "new evidence," proving the third-party lenders were not actually victims entitled to restitution and that the government miscalculated the amount of unpaid restitution. The judge entered the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Misclassifying a lender as a victim is not a fundamental error remediable by coram nobis, and even if it were, Wilkozek was not close to proving misclassification. View "United States v. Wilkozek" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane S. Sykes 15-1537 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-2610/14-2610-2016-05-18.html Thomas v. Williams 2016-05-18T12:30:57-08:00 2016-05-18T12:37:57-08:00 Thomas was convicted of the 2001 murder of Shakir. In 2005, after his conviction was final, Thomas received a letter informing him that unidentified gang members told police that Thomas did not commit the murder and that the shooter was Pinkston, a drug dealer. Thomas filed an unsuccessful state court petition for post‐conviction relief, arguing that he was actually innocent in light of the newly discovered evidence. Thomas filed a second state court petition in 2007, this time alleging that the government withheld evidence that the officer was told that Pinkston was the shooter in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court held that the claim was defaulted; Thomas had not raised it in his first petition. The district court denied federal habeas corpus petition raising the Brady claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the questionable reliability of his alibi, it was not more likely than not that a jury would have acquitted Thomas based solely on evidence that unidentified gang members told someone who told someone that Thomas did not commit the murder. Thomas's gateway claim of actual innocence was, therefore, insufficient to excuse his procedural default. View "Thomas v. Williams" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit KANNE 14-2610 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/14-4533/14-4533-2016-05-18.html United States v. Gardner 2016-05-18T10:30:26-08:00 2016-05-18T16:07:10-08:00 Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced as an armed career criminal based on his three prior convictions for felony common law robbery in North Carolina. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the handgun found in defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop, and the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. The court concluded, however, that defendant's prior offense of North Carolina common law robbery is not categorically a violent felony. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in sentencing defendant as an armed career criminal. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Barbara Milano Keenan 14-4533 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-30231/14-30231-2016-05-18.html United States v. Tadios 2016-05-18T09:02:58-08:00 2016-05-18T16:07:12-08:00 Defendant, CEO of the Clinic, a federally funded health care facility located on the Tribe's Rocky Boy Reservation, was convicted of converting federal funds allocated to the Clinic for personal use, using federal funds for personal benefit, and misapplying Clinic funds. The district court sentenced defendant to one year and one day of prison, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered $15,000 in restitution to the Tribe. At issue on appeal is a question of first impression for the court: whether the district court committed clear error by including the salary loss in calculating the loss defendant inflicted on the Tribe under USSG 2B1.1. The court concluded that the public accountability principle underscores that time has value. It was thus not clear error for the district court to include the estimated value of the time that defendant should have reported as annual leave in calculating the total losses defendant inflicted on the Tribe. Defendant abused her status as an exempt employee by submitting fraudulent time sheets and falsely claiming to be working or traveling rather than taking annual leave when she visited her husband. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tadios" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit M. Margaret McKeown 14-30231 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2016/a15-0267.html State v. Onyelobi 2016-05-18T08:31:44-08:00 2016-05-18T12:40:47-08:00 After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder on an accomplice-liability theory. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of her arrest, as the arrest was supported by probable cause; (2) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's challenges to the State's peremptory strikes of certain jurors under Batson v. Kentucky; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when instructing the jury on accomplice liability; and (4) Defendant's pro se contentions lacked merit. View "State v. Onyelobi" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court Lorie Skjerven Gildea A15-0267 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2016/a14-1464.html State v. Horst 2016-05-18T08:31:36-08:00 2016-05-18T12:32:37-08:00 After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress statements from a police interview conducted shortly after the murder; (2) the warrantless seizure of Defendant's cellphone did not violate her constitutional rights; (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on her claim that defective search warrants violated her constitutional rights; (4) the district court did not err when it failed to give an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction; (5) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request to remove a juror for cause; and (6) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder. View "State v. Horst" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court David R. Stras A14-1464 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2016/a14-0584.html State v. Sanchez-Sanchez 2016-05-18T08:31:35-08:00 2016-05-18T12:25:19-08:00 Defendant entered a straight plea to the charge of conspiracy to commit a first-degree controlled substance crime. At the plea hearing, Defendant waived his right under Blakely v. Washington to have a jury determine whether aggravating factors existed to justify an upward durational department to his sentence. During Defendant's Blakely court trial to determine whether the alleged aggravating factors existed, the district court did not apply the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. After the trial, the district court concluded that the State proved all three of the aggravating sentencing factors. The court imposed a 240-month sentence, a greater than double upward durational departure from the presumptive sentencing range. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the rules of evidence do not apply during a Blakely court trial. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the rules of evidence apply in a Blakely court trial, but there was no objection and the error was not plain. View "State v. Sanchez-Sanchez" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court Hudson A14-0584 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-6106/15-6106-2016-05-18.html Shaw v. Patton 2016-05-18T08:01:08-08:00 2016-05-18T10:55:06-08:00 In 1998, Juston Shaw was convicted in Texas state court on a charge of sexual assault. Roughly ten years later, he moved to Oklahoma. When he did, his sexual-assault conviction triggered application of the Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act. Shaw challenged his registration obligation, arguing the Oklahoma Act constituted unconstitutional retroactive punishment. The district court disagreed, holding that the statute's retroactive application didn't amount to punishment. On appeal, the issue presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Shaw's restrictions on reporting, residency, and loitering constitute retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Responding in the negative, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Shaw v. Patton" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Robert Edwin Bacharach 15-6106 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/court-of-criminal-appeals/2016/pd-0480-15.html London v. Texas 2016-05-18T07:17:55-08:00 2016-05-18T07:43:54-08:00 Two days after appellant Joshua London's arrest for possession of a controlled substance, the trial court found him indigent and appointed counsel to represent him. London was convicted of possession of cocaine after pleading guilty without an agreed recommendation as to punishment. Appellant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The trial court included in the judgment an order to pay $329 in court costs. The judgment provided only the $329 amount and no break down of how those costs were calculated. Rather than challenge the constitutionality of the trial court's imposition of court costs through a hearing pursuant to Article 103.008 or a separate civil lawsuit, Appellant sought to raise, on direct appeal, an as-applied challenge to two provisions in Article 102.011 that imposed mandatory court costs upon conviction. The court of appeals, relying upon the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in "Curry v. Texas," held that Appellant failed to preserve error on this claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether Appellant could raise his as-applied challenge for the first time on appeal, and whether a formal bill of exceptions was necessary to provide a sufficient record for the court of appeals to properly evaluate the claim on direct appeal. Without considering the merits of the underlying claim, the Court held that Appellant was not required to raise his as-applied challenge in the trial court because his first opportunity to do so was on direct appeal. The Court also held that Appellant's as-applied challenge could be evaluated upon the record presented. Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the merits of Appellant's as-applied challenge. View "London v. Texas" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state Texas Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Newell PD-0480-15 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2016/27637.html South Carolina v. Jones 2016-05-18T06:03:08-08:00 2016-05-18T07:41:44-08:00 Whitlee Jones was indicted for the murder of her boyfriend after she fatally stabbed him at the home they shared. In a pretrial motion, Jones asserted immunity from prosecution under the "Protection of Persons and Property Act." The circuit court judge granted the motion, finding Jones established by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to immunity. The State appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in finding section 16-11-440(C) of the Act was inapplicable because the stabbing happened in Jones' house rather in "another place where [s]he ha[d] the right to be," or alternatively, Jones failed to establish she was acting in self-defense when she stabbed her boyfriend. Finding no error in the circuit court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Donald W. Beatty 27637 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2016/2015-0619.html In re Von 2016-05-18T05:02:54-08:00 2016-05-18T17:53:14-08:00 In 1997, Aaron Von was convicted in Colorado of sexual assault of a child and sexual assault in the third degree. In 2011, Von moved to Ohio and registered as a sex offender. Von later moved to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2950.15. The trial court denied Von's motion to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws because, at the time of his convictions, Megan's Law was in effect in Ohio, and it contained no provision to terminate one's status as a registered sex offender post-conviction. The court further concluded that later amendments were not retroactive. The appellate court reversed, concluding that offenders classified under Megan's Law may avail themselves of the privilege legislatively granted to Adam Walsh Act offenders to terminate their registration obligations. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the registration termination procedure delineated in section 2950.15 does not apply to sex offenders who committed their offenses prior to January 1, 2008; and (2) the appellate court properly remanded this matter for a determination of Von's sex offender classification pursuant to Megan's Law. Remanded. View "In re Von" on Justia Law 2016-05-18 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Terrence O'Donnell 2015-0619 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/a143344.html People v. Deegan 2016-05-17T14:30:19-08:00 2016-05-17T14:43:18-08:00 Deegan was convicted of three felony counts: assaulting a park ranger with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, assaulting a police officer with a deadly weapon, and forcibly resisting three police officers based on threats and violence. As to the forcible resistance, he was also found guilty of an enhancement based on his personal use of a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for six years. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument under Penal Code section 654, that the assault and forcible resistance charges with respect to the police officers were based on the same conduct and intent and that he may not be punished for both. There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's application of the multiple-victim exception to Deegan's sentencing and the trial court did not violate Deegan's Sixth Amendment rights by making findings of fact on that issue. View "People v. Deegan" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 state California California Court of Appeal Stewart A143344 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-2686/14-2686-2016-05-17.html United States v. Dessart 2016-05-17T13:31:03-08:00 2016-05-17T13:42:01-08:00 At his Reedsville, Wisconsin home, Dessart manufactured and sold products containing the active chemical ingredients in numerous prescription drugs, offering them for sale online with the disclaimer "for research only" to evade FDA oversight. After receiving an anonymous tip, investigating Dessart's website, and intercepting three packages connected to Dessart's operation, agents obtained a warrant, conducted a controlled delivery, and search Dessart's house. He was convicted of violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 331, with the intent to defraud or mislead the agency, which converted his violations from strict-liability misdemeanors into specific-intent felonies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the FDA's investigator lied in procuring a search warrant and the warrant otherwise lacked probable cause; the government's evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with deceptive intent; and the district court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of "prescription drug." The evidence of Dessart's intent to mislead the FDA was ample and easily sufficient to support the jury's verdict. View "United States v. Dessart" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane S. Sykes 14-2686 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3496/15-3496-2016-05-17.html United States v. Brown 2016-05-17T12:31:03-08:00 2016-05-17T12:36:41-08:00 In 2012 Brown pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison followed by 60 months of supervised release. Within months of being released from prison, Brown was arrested for violating the Illinois sex-offender registration law, 730 ILCS 150/3(a). He pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. Brown's federal probation officer then petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), citing Brown's state case and his failure to submit timely supervision reports on five occasions. Brown admitted the allegations. The district court revoked his supervised release, ordered him to serve an additional 12 months in prison (consecutive to his new state sentence) and imposed a 10-year term of supervised release. Brown filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserted that the appeal was frivolous and sought to withdraw under Anders v. California. The Seventh Circuit granted the Anders motion and dismissed. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding when the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HAMILTON 15-3496 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1366/15-1366-2016-05-17.html United States v. Johnson 2016-05-17T12:01:03-08:00 2016-05-17T12:18:30-08:00 Milwaukee police saw a car stopped within 15 feet of a crosswalk, which is unlawful unless the car is "actually engaged in loading or unloading or in receiving or discharging passengers". One police car drew up parallel to the stopped car, and another drew up behind. Shining lights through the car's windows (it was after sunset), police saw a passenger in the back seat try to hide a firearm. Johnson, the passenger, was prosecuted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress the gun, Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the statutory exception for receiving or discharging cargo or passengers means that the police could not have probable cause until they had observed the car long enough to know that it was not within the scope of the exception. The police would have discovered the same evidence without a seizure because any officer was free to walk up to the parked car, which lacking a driver, was not going anywhere. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Hoover Easterbrook 15-1366 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b264637.html People v. Vasquez 2016-05-17T11:30:22-08:00 2016-05-17T14:34:35-08:00 Petitioner seeks to have his 1995 felony conviction designated as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, Penal Code section 1170.18. The trial court granted the petition to redesignate petitioner's conviction, but denied his request to vacate the completed sentence. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1170.18 allows resentencing only for petitioners currently serving a sentence for a qualifying felony. In this case, because petitioner was not currently serving the sentence relating to his qualifying conviction, section 1170.18 did not give the trial court jurisdiction to vacate or otherwise change petitioner's completed sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 state California California Court of Appeal Audrey B. Collins B264637 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-50509/14-50509-2016-05-17.html United States v. Quintero-Levya 2016-05-17T09:03:20-08:00 2016-05-17T15:12:41-08:00 Defendant appealed the denial of a minor role reduction at sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b) after pleading guilty to importation of methamphetamine. About a year after defendant was sentenced, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 794, which amended the commentary to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. The court held that the Amendment resolves a circuit split and the language of the Amendment indicates that the Commission intended it to be a clarifying amendment. Therefore, the court held that the Amendment applied retroactively in direct appeals. Because the record is unclear as to whether the district court considered all the factors identified in Amendment 794, the court reversed and remanded with directions for the district court to resentence defendant under the newly amended section 3B1.2. On remand, the district court should consider the factors identified in Amendment 794. View "United States v. Quintero-Levya" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dorothy Wright Nelson 14-50509 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-5362/15-5362-2016-05-17.html United States v. Church 2016-05-17T08:30:58-08:00 2016-05-17T08:57:51-08:00 Nashville detectives went to Church's home to serve him with a warrant for violating probation. Church arrived, carrying food. The detectives placed Church under arrest, agreed to allow him to enter the house and call his girlfriend, then accompanied Church inside with his consent. They stated that they smelled burnt marijuana. Church admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana and displayed a marijuana blunt. Church called his girlfriend, who arrived and told police that Church regularly smoked marijuana at the house. Detective Moseley left to prepare a search-warrant affidavit while Bowling stayed with Church. In his affidavit, Moseley recounted the detectives' visit and conversations with Church and his girlfriend. The detectives executed a warrant for "controlled substances, [and] controlled substances paraphernalia" that afternoon. In a closet, they found 4.8 grams of marijuana and 8 dilaudid (hydromorphone) pills, plus a safe. Church refused to provide the code, so police used a prying ram to break in. The safe contained 800 dilaudid pills, a handgun, and ammunition. Church unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence, then pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute hydromorphone and to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 170 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavit established probable cause and the police did not break open the safe capriciously: they had probable cause to believe there might be drugs inside. View "United States v. Church" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Raymond M. Kethledge 15-5362 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-6003/15-6003-2016-05-17.html United States v. Mohammed-Ali 2016-05-17T08:30:57-08:00 2016-05-17T10:01:50-08:00 In 2010, Bail Bonds and Hamza jointly and severally secured a $75,000 appearance bond on behalf of Mohammed-Ali, an Ethiopian national (Hamza's cousin), charged with smuggling a controlled substance, (khat), into the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 545. One condition of the sureties' obligation was that Mohammed-Ali "comply with all conditions of release imposed by this court," which included that he wear a GPS ankle bracelet. But 15 months later—at Mohammed-Ali's request and without objection from the government—the court entered an order allowing him to remove the ankle bracelet. Neither counsel nor the court provided the sureties with notice of the motion or of the order. Mohammed-Ali fled to Ethiopia. The government sought judgment against the sureties. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that Bonds had constructive notice of the motion because it could have accessed the docket for Mohammed-Ali's case, using the court's electronic-filing system. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The risk the sureties agreed to accept was that Mohammed-Ali might flee notwithstanding his conditions of release, which included the ankle bracelet. That risk included the possibility that Mohammed-Ali might saw off bracelet and then flee. What the sureties did not accept was that the court would remove the bracelet for him. The purported "notice" was inadequate. View "United States v. Mohammed-Ali" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Raymond M. Kethledge 15-6003 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1946/15-1946-2016-05-17.html United States v. Koglin 2016-05-17T08:01:02-08:00 2016-05-17T08:27:31-08:00 Koglin was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1) and separately charged with engaging in a monetary transaction worth more than $10,000 involving property he knew to be derived from criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Koglin pleaded guilty to the conspiracy and the drug-money counts and agreed to assist the prosecution. Koglin's PSR began with a base level of 32 (for the amount of marijuana); a "mitigating role" adjustment dropped the level to 30. The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for possessing firearms in connection with drug-trafficking, a two-level "mitigating role" reduction. and a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility, yielding an offense level of 27 and a guidelines range of 70-87 months, but Koglin's conspiracy conviction carried a 10-year minimum sentence. The government successfully moved for a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect Koglin's substantial assistance, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). The judge sentenced Koglin to 57 months. Guidelines Amendment 782 subsequently reduced the base offense levels for most drug crimes. Koglin moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The government agreed that Koglin was eligible, but asked the judge to deny Koglin an "unjustified windfall" of a further sentence reduction. The judge denied Koglin's motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Koglin's guideline range would not have been lower had Amendment 782 been in place when he was originally sentenced. View "United States v. Koglin" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane S. Sykes 15-1946 15-1943 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2016/315-2015.html Fountain v. Delaware 2016-05-17T08:00:34-08:00 2016-05-17T12:53:40-08:00 Defendant-appellant Martin Fountain appealed a superior court judgment denying his motion for resentencing on grounds that the Amended Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively. With the help of amicus curiae, he argued that the Act vested a judge with the discretion to modify a consecutive sentence entered before the Act was effective July 9, 2014, and to reimpose concurrent prison terms. The State argued the judicial discretion provided for in the Act operated prospectively only, because there was no express statement in the amendment that made it retroactive. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that the Act applied prospectively. Therefore, the superior court's judgment was affirmed. View "Fountain v. Delaware" on Justia Law 2016-05-16 state Delaware Delaware Supreme Court Randy J. Holland 315, 2015 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2688/15-2688-2016-05-17.html United States v. Jefferson 2016-05-17T07:31:05-08:00 2016-05-17T15:12:33-08:00 Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and subsequently appealed his 188-month sentence. The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his felony drug-trafficking convictions in 2001, 2004, and 2008 from Illinois. The court held that the district court did not err in classifying defendant's 2001 Illinois drug conviction as a "serious drug offense," as he was convicted of an offense "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Per Curiam 15-2688 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-73.html State v. Dorweiler 2016-05-17T07:03:16-08:00 2016-05-17T09:01:41-08:00 After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the crime of escape from arrest. Defendant was sentenced to fourteen days in jail. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was "arrested" before she fled the custody of a police officer by climbing out the bedroom window of her boyfriend's home. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant committed the crime of escape from arrest because there was sufficient evidence to prove she was under arrest before she fled out the bedroom window. View "State v. Dorweiler" on Justia Law 2016-05-17 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Humphrey 2016 ME 73 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/f067666.html People v. McEntire 2016-05-16T11:30:19-08:00 2016-05-16T15:27:02-08:00 Defendants McEntire and Rodriquez were convicted of charges related to their illegal gang activities. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' conviction on count 8 for actively participating in a criminal street gang; there was sufficient evidence the crimes were committed for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang; and there was sufficient evidence to support the presence of nonparticipant during commission of the burglary. The court also concluded that the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding the violent felony enhancement, but the error was harmless; the trial court does not have a duty to define "present during the commission of a burglary" because it is a commonly understood phrase; the trial court did not err by failing to provide the jury with a clarifying instruction, sua sponte, on the meaning of the term "in association with a criminal street gang" pursuant to the gang enhancements; and the trial court did not err by refusing to bifurcate the gang enhancements from the remaining charges. Finally, the court agreed with the parties that defendants' sentence for illegal possession of ammunition must be stayed because they were already punished for possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, the court modified in that respect and affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. McEntire" on Justia Law 2016-05-16 state California California Court of Appeal Rosendo Peña, Jr. F067666 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b261842.html People v. Herrera 2016-05-16T11:00:23-08:00 2016-05-16T15:27:00-08:00 Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the jury found true an allegation that he personally used a weapon. The court agreed with defendant's contention that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a defense by improperly restricting the psychiatric testimony that he could introduce. In this case, the expert testimony explained how defendant's past history of trauma was likely to affect his mental state at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "People v. Herrera" on Justia Law 2016-05-16 state California California Court of Appeal Steven Z. Perren B261842 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/14-12558/14-12558-2016-05-16.html Daniel v. Commissioner, AL DOC 2016-05-16T09:32:03-08:00 2016-05-16T15:27:07-08:00 Petitioner, an Alabama death row inmate, challenged the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel was ineffective during petitioner's trial at both the penalty and guilt phase. The court concluded that petitioner's second amended Rule 32 petition pleaded more than sufficient specific facts about trial counsel's acts and omissions to show their penalty phase investigation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Here, trial counsel's failure to conduct any timely and meaningful mitigation interviews with petitioner and his family was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.The court vacated the district court's order denying petitioner's penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim and its order denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this claim; the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and remanded. View "Daniel v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law 2016-05-16 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Martin 14-12558