text: Antitrust & Trade Regulation - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/antitrust/ 2016-04-29T02:21:03-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://justatic.com/v/20160422a/shared/images/social-media/law.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/150522.html Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council 2016-04-28T06:04:14-08:00 2016-04-28T13:49:29-08:00 The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency sought a prime contractor to provide event-planning services. Plaintiffs offered their services as joint subcontractors to Navar, Inc. Plaintiffs and Navar entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and a Teaming Agreement, which provided that if Navar were awarded a prime contract then it would negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs. The Defense Agency awarded Navar a five-year prime contract, but Navar did not extend subcontracts to either Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sued Navar, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and trade secret misappropriation. A jury found (1) Navar had breached the NDA and Teaming Agreement, and (2) Navar misappropriated one plaintiff's trade secretes under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The trial court set aside the verdict on breach of the Teaming Agreement and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Navar could not be found liable for breach of contract because nothing in the Act or the NDA required Navar to use Plaintiffs as subcontractors; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding the Teaming Agreement was unenforceable as a binding contract. View "Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council" on Justia Law 2016-04-28 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Cleo E. Powell 150522 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/14-4043/14-4043-2016-04-14.html Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC 2016-04-14T09:00:05-08:00 2016-04-14T10:22:46-08:00 An Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) is a U.S. communication service between land and vessels in navigable waterways, existing on specific broadcast frequencies. Advances in technology have greatly expanded the potential uses of AMTSs. Under the original site-based system, small geographic regions were defined by location and the waterway served and the FCC provided licenses at no cost to the first applicant. In 2000, the FCC stopped issuing site-based licenses and began issuing licenses by competitive bidding; it divided the U.S. into 10 regions and, at public auctions, sold "geographic" licenses for two blocks of AMTS frequencies in each region. Although geographic licensees may generally place stations anywhere within their region, they may not interfere with the functioning of existing site-based stations, so the location of a site-based station creates a gap in a geographic licensee's coverage area. Plaintiffs obtained geographic licenses in areas overlaying pre-existing site-based licenses. Site-based operators refused to provide plaintiffs with the operating contours for their site-based locations within plaintiffs' geographic locations. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the Federal Communications Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the FCA claims and a determination that no antitrust conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs did not identify particular actions that were determined by the FCC to be unreasonable or unjust and, therefore, do not possess a private right of action. View "Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC" on Justia Law 2016-04-14 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 14-4043 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1571/15-1571-2016-04-04.html Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc. 2016-04-04T13:00:03-08:00 2016-04-04T19:53:14-08:00 Flovac, Inc. and Airvac, Inc. both fabricate vacuum sewer systems. Flovac filed suit against Airvac seeking relief under both federal and Puerto Rico antitrust laws and alleging that Airvac's conduct in marketing its vacuum sewer systems was anticompetitive. Flovac also brought claims of tortious interference with advantageous economic relations under Puerto Rico's general tort statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Airvac on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because the summary judgment record disclosed a relevant market much broader than Flovac claimed and a market where Defendant lacked market dominance, summary judgment was properly granted on Flovac's antitrust claims; and (2) Flovac's claim of tortious interference with advantageous economic relations was time-barred. View "Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-04-04 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Selya 15-1571 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2016/scwc-13-0000703.html Wong v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 2016-03-30T12:01:20-08:00 2016-03-30T13:45:02-08:00 Gene Wong was employed by Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (HAL) as a pilot until he retired. Upon retiring, Wong became eligible to receive medical insurance paid for by HAL. Wong claimed that, as a result of misinformation he received from the employee benefits director, he did not complete the necessary forms to enroll in Medicare Part B coverage for almost a decade. Wong filed suit against HAL, alleging negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair or deceptive practice (UDAP). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HAL, concluding that (1) Wong's negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims were preempted by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA) because any duty HAL owed would be derived from HAL's obligations to retired pilots under a collective bargaining agreement between HAL and the Airline Pilots Association, and (2) the UDAP claim failed because the deceptive act did not occur in the conduct of any trade or commerce. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the record in this case did not support federal preemption of Wong's negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims because these claims were not dependent on the Pilots Agreement; and (2) summary judgment was correctly granted on Wong's UDAP claim. View "Wong v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-03-30 state Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii Richard W. Pollack SCWC-13-0000703 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/14-4166/14-4166-2016-03-22.html Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys. 2016-03-22T08:30:49-08:00 2016-03-22T14:03:28-08:00 Plaintiff is a 26-bed, for-profit, physician-owned hospital that specializes in acute-care surgical services. Its Dayton-area competitors include the defendant hospitals (Premier Group), which have joint operating agreement for negotiating managed care insurance contracts and sharing revenues and losses through an agreed-upon formula, while maintaining separate asset ownership and filing separate tax returns and other corporate forms. Plaintiff sued, alleging violation of the Sherman Act, claiming that Premier was not a single entity, but a group of hospitals capable of concerted action to keep plaintiff from competing in the market. The court dismissed, concluding that Premier was a single entity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court's multi-factored test for determining whether a joint venture constitutes a "combination" under 15 U.S.C. 1: the condition of the business before and after the restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable; the reason for adopting the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be attained. The summary judgment record indicated that the purpose of Premier was to prevent plaintiff from entering the Dayton market; there was evidence of coercive conduct, threatening physicians and insurance companies with financial loss if they did business with plaintiff. There was also evidence of continued competition among the defendants, creating a genuine issue of material fact. View "Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys." on Justia Law 2016-03-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr. 14-4166 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-3933/13-3933-2016-03-18.html Concord Assoc., L.P. v. Entertainment Properties Trust 2016-03-18T06:00:07-08:00 2016-03-18T20:07:47-08:00 Plaintiffs, seven entities who are collectively attempting to develop a casino-resort complex in the Catskills, filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, alleging that defendants entered into an anti-competitive scheme to obstruct plaintiffs' resort development. At issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged a plausible relevant geographic market for their casino-related products and services. In this case, plaintiffs define the relevant market as the Racing/Gaming Market in the Catskills Region. The court held that plaintiffs' pleadings fail to define a plausible relevant geographic or product market for antitrust purposes, and that the district court properly dismissed their Sherman Act claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Concord Assoc., L.P. v. Entertainment Properties Trust" on Justia Law 2016-03-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Peter W. Hall 13-3933 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/15-1101.html State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hon. Jeffrey D. Cramer 2016-03-08T12:03:56-08:00 2016-03-08T19:44:41-08:00 William and Sarah Bassett, who were insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, alleged that State Farm engaged in unfair trade practices with regard to the Bassetts' assertion of unfair trade practices. The Bassetts based their claim on the assertion that State Farm never properly offered additional uninsured coverage, as State Farm was statutorily required to do. The circuit court granted the Bassetts' motion to compel answers to three interrogatories seeking the names, addresses and telephone numbers of State Farm insureds in West Virginia who may have experienced difficulties regarding their uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm filed this original proceeding in prohibition asking the Court to prohibit enforcement of its discovery order. The Supreme Court granted relief, as moulded, prohibiting enforcement of the order granting the Bassetts' motion to compel, concluding that the circuit court erred by failing to bar the disclosure of the names, addresses and telephone numbers of State Farm's other insureds. View "State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hon. Jeffrey D. Cramer" on Justia Law 2016-03-08 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Menis E. Ketchum, II 15-1101 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-57064/12-57064-2016-03-03.html FTC V. Commerce Planet, Inc. 2016-03-03T10:02:47-08:00 2016-03-03T22:37:20-08:00 The FTC filed suit against Commerce Planet in order to enjoin it's deceptive marketing of a product called "OnlineSupplier." The FTC alleged that Commerce Planet violated section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). Commerce Planet and two individual defendants settled. The remaining defendant, Charles Gugliuzza, was enjoined from engaging in similar misconduct and ordered to pay $18.2 million in restitution. In this opinion, the court addressed Gugliuzza's arguments contesting the validity of the restitution award. The court concluded that the district court had the authority to award restitution under section 13(b) of the FTC Act; the court saw no basis for holding that courts are categorically precluded from imposing joint and several liability in actions brought under section 13(b); because joint and several liability is permissible, restitution awards need not be limited to the funds each defendant personally received from the wrongful conduct; and, in this case, the judgment entered against Gugliuzza does not actually hold him jointly and severally liable for Commerce Planet's restitution obligations. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment. If on remand the district court decides, in the exercise of its discretion, to hold Gugliuzza jointly and severally liable with Commerce Planet, it may reinstate the $18.2 million restitution award. Otherwise, the award must be limited to the unjust gains Gugliuzza himself received. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly followed the two-step burden-shifting framework for calculating restitution awards under section 13(b) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the amount of the award in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "FTC V. Commerce Planet, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-03-03 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Paul Jeffrey Watford 12-57064 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-1531/13-1531-2016-02-25.html Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7 2016-02-25T14:00:03-08:00 2016-02-25T18:48:57-08:00 In 2004, five structural steel contractors filed a complaint against a local union - Labor Union No. 7 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers - alleging labor law violations under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), antitrust law violations under the Sherman Act, and other violations under state law. The First Circuit reviewed the matter and found elements pertaining to the federal claims undeveloped. Therefore, the Court remanded for further proceedings. After a trial, the case once again reached the First Circuit, with both parties appealing and cross-appealing various aspects of the final judgment. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions upholding the LMRA jury verdict and award of damages for Plaintiffs D.F.M. Industries, Inc. and Ajax Construction Company, Inc. and granting summary judgment for Defendant on the antitrust claims, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7" on Justia Law 2016-02-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Jeffrey R. Howard 13-1531 13-1665 13-1705 13-1714 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/14-1617/14-1617-2016-02-12.html Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc. 2016-02-12T08:02:05-08:00 2016-02-12T08:47:42-08:00 Lexmark makes and sells printer toner cartridges, for which it holds patents. Lexmark buyers may purchase a "Regular Cartridge" at full price, not subject to any terms restricting reuse or resale of the cartridge, or may purchase a "Return Program Cartridge" at a discount, subject to a single-use/no-resale restriction. Impression acquired restricted cartridges for resale in the U.S. after a third party physically modified them to enable re-use. Impression's actions infringe under 35 U.S.C. 271, unless Lexmark's initial sale of the cartridges constitutes the grant of authority that makes later resale and importation non-infringing under the doctrine of exhaustion. The Federal Circuit, en banc, held that a patentee, when selling a patented article subject to a single-use/no-resale restriction that is lawful and clearly communicated to the purchaser, does not thereby give the buyer, or downstream buyers, the resale/reuse authority that has been expressly denied. Such resale or reuse, when contrary to known, lawful limits on the authority conferred at the original sale, remains unauthorized, infringing conduct under section 271. Under Supreme Court precedent, a patentee may preserve its 271 rights through such restrictions when licensing others to make and sell patented articles; there is no basis for denying the same ability to the patentee that sells the articles itself. View "Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-02-12 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Richard Gary Taranto 14-1617 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/14-1646/14-1646-2016-02-10.html Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co. 2016-02-10T08:05:06-08:00 2016-02-10T09:16:26-08:00 3M and TransWeb manufacture respirator filters, consisting of "nonwoven fibrous webs." 3M sued Transweb for infringement of several patents. TransWeb sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement. A jury found the patents to be invalid based on TransWeb's prior public use of the patented method. In accordance with an advisory verdict from the jury, the district court found the patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. An inventor for the patents and a 3M in-house attorney acted with specific intent to deceive the patent office as to the TransWeb materials. The district court awarded approximately $26 million to TransWeb, including trebled attorney fees as antitrust damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient corroborating evidence to support the finding of prior public use by TransWeb, and that attorney fees are an appropriate basis for damages under the antitrust laws in this context. TransWeb's attorney fees appropriately flow from the unlawful aspect of 3M's antitrust violation and are an antitrust injury that can properly serve as the basis for antitrust damages. View "Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co." on Justia Law 2016-02-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Todd Michael Hughes 14-1646 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/15-1278/15-1278-2016-02-04.html It's My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc. 2016-02-04T12:00:40-08:00 2016-02-04T18:46:21-08:00 IMP filed suit against LN, alleging that LN violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., by engaging in monopolization, tying arrangements, and exclusive dealing in the music concert industry. IMP and LN both promote concert tours and operate concert venues, but they differ in geographic reach. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to LN, concluding that IMP failed to define the relevant markets or to demonstrate any anticompetitive conduct. View "It's My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-02-04 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit James Harvie Wilkinson, III 15-1278 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2016/14-1015.html Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc. 2016-01-08T07:04:36-08:00 2016-01-08T19:08:12-08:00 Plaintiff sued Defendants, attorneys Eric Turton and Oscar Gonzalez and the Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, alleging that they misappropriated $75,000 in trust funds that Turton received after settling a case on Plaintiff's behalf. The jury found that all three defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise and a joint venture with respect to Plaintiff's case and committed various torts in relation to Plaintiff. In response to a proportionate-responsibility question, the jury assigned forty percent to Turton, thirty percent to Gonzalez, and thirty percent to the Law Office. The trial court entered judgment holding all three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual damages, pre-judgment interest, additional Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act damages, and attorney's fees. Gonzalez and the Law Office appealed. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff could only recover for professional negligence, which amounted to $77,500 in actual damages. The court's opinion did not address the jury's proportionate-responsibility findings but nonetheless applied those findings in its judgment, ordering Gonzalez and the Law Firm to each pay Sloan $23,250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to address the sufficiency of the evidence of a joint enterprise or joint venture or the legal implications of those findings. Remanded. View "Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-01-08 state Texas Supreme Court of Texas Per Curiam 14-1015 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/15-1166/15-1166-2015-12-01.html United States v. Nitek Elecs., Inc. 2015-12-01T08:31:11-08:00 2015-12-01T12:55:28-08:00 Between 2001 and 2004, Nitek Electronics, Inc. entered thirty-six shipments of pipe fitting components used for gas meters into the United States from China. U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("Customs") claimed that the merchandise was misclassified and issued Nitek a final penalty claim stating that the tentative culpability was gross negligence. Customs then referred the matter to the United States Department of Justice ("Government") to bring a claim against Nitek in the Court of International Trade to enforce the penalty. The Government brought suit against Nitek to recover lost duties, antidumping duties, and a penalty based on negligence under 19 U.S.C. 1592. Nitek moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The court denied dismissal of the claims to recover lost duties and antidumping duties but did dismiss the Government's claim for a penalty based on negligence, concluding that the Government had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies under 19 U.S.C. 1592 by not having Customs demand a penalty based on negligence, instead of gross negligence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the statutory framework of section 1592 does not allow the Government to bring a penalty claim based on negligence in court because such a claim did not exist at the administrative level. View "United States v. Nitek Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law 2015-12-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Raymond Charles Clevenger, III 15-1166 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/14-1725/14-1725-2015-11-25.html Simens Energy, Inc. v. United States, Wind Tower Trade Coalition 2015-11-25T08:01:18-08:00 2015-11-25T12:25:56-08:00 The Department of Commerce determined that utility scale wind towers from the People's Republic of China and utility scale wind towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (together, the subject merchandise) were sold in the United States at less than fair value and that it received countervailable subsidies. The International Trade Commission made a final affirmative determination of material injury to the domestic industry. The determination was by divided vote of the six-member Commission. The Court of International Trade upheld the Commission's affirmative injury determination. Siemens Energy, Inc., an importer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the determination. The issues on appeal concerned the interpretation and effect of the divided vote. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Court of International Trade properly upheld the Commission's affirmative injury determination. View "Simens Energy, Inc. v. United States, Wind Tower Trade Coalition" on Justia Law 2015-11-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Pauline Newman 14-1725 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/h039519.html Richtek USA v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. 2015-11-24T14:00:30-08:00 2015-11-24T15:19:07-08:00 Appellants in this case were Richtek Technology Corporation, a Taiwan corporation, and Richtek USA, Inc., its California subsidiary. Respondents were James Chang, H.P. Huang and J.C. Chen, Taiwan residents and former employees of Richtek Technology, and uPI Semiconductor Corporation, a California company they formed. Appellants sued Respondents for trade secret misappropriation. uPI, Chang and Huang filed a demurrer on the ground that Appellants' claims were time-barred under Taiwan's statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation claims. Huang, Chang and Chen also filed a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in their employment agreements mandating a Taiwanese forum for Richtek Technology's trade secret claims. The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted Chen's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed the order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, holding that the trial court erred by using previous complaints filed in Taiwan to conclude that Appellants had knowledge of the misappropriation at issue in this lawsuit and the identity of the parties liable for damages; and (2) affirmed the order granting Chen's motion to dismiss, holding that the forum selection clause in the employment agreement between Chen and Richtek Technology was mandatory. View "Richtek USA v. uPI Semiconductor Corp." on Justia Law 2015-11-24 state California California Court of Appeal Conrad L. Rushing H039519 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/14-4183/14-4183-2015-11-12.html Hanover 3201 Realty LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc. 2015-11-12T10:00:06-08:00 2015-11-12T10:48:58-08:00 Hanover Realty contracted with Wegmans to develop a supermarket on its New Jersey property, requiring Hanover to secure necessary permits and approvals before breaking ground. ShopRite and its development subsidiary filed administrative and court challenges to Hanover's applications. Believing these filings were baseless and intended only to frustrate the entry of a competitor, Hanover sued for antitrust violations. The district court dismissed, holding that Hanover did not have standing because it was not a competitor, consumer, or participant in the restrained markets and did not sustain the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to the claim for attempted monopolization of the market for full-service supermarkets. Hanover can establish that its injury was "inextricably intertwined" with defendants' anti-competitive conduct. Hanover sufficiently alleged that the petitioning activity at issue was undertaken without regard to the merits of the claims and for the purpose of using the governmental process to restrain trade, so that defendants are not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity because their conduct falls within the exception for sham litigation. The court affirmed as to the claim for attempted monopolization of the rental space market; there was no standing because Hanover does not compete with defendants in that market. View "Hanover 3201 Realty LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-11-12 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Julio M. Fuentes 14-4183 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/a142156.html Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. 2015-11-10T17:00:27-08:00 2015-11-10T17:15:46-08:00 A class action complaint alleged that Honeywell engaged in uncompetitive and illegal conduct to increase its market share of round thermostats and to use its dominant market position to overcharge customers. In 2013, the parties reached a settlement and asked the trial court to preliminarily approve it. The court initially declined to do so because it had concerns about the notice proposed to be sent to class members. Those concerns were subsequently addressed to the court's satisfaction, and on February 4, 2014, the court preliminarily approved the settlement. The notice of settlement was subsequently published and distributed to class members. The long version was distributed and posted on a website, and the short version was published in various print publications. The trial court found that four objectors to the settlement failed to establish they had standing, but rejected one objection on timeliness grounds and rejected the other three on their merits. The court of appeal affirmed, except for the ruling on standing, finding that the court properly approved the distribution of residual settlement funds and awarded class counsel attorney fees that amounted to 37.5 percent of the settlement fund. View "Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-11-10 state California California Court of Appeal Jim Humes A142156 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/14-3563/14-3563-2015-11-03.html Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. Inc. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc. 2015-11-03T09:00:48-08:00 2015-11-03T10:06:30-08:00 Allied, founded in 1973 by Ramun, competes with Genesis in the field of industrial dismantling and scrap processing, including the design, development, and manufacture of related specialized equipment. From 1992-2001, Ramun's son Mark worked at Allied. By 1999, Allied developed innovative multi-use demolition machine attachments, called MT. Various sizes and types of jawsets, including a steel beam cutter and a concrete crusher, were available, allowing the MT operator to perform different tasks with just one tool. The jawset could be changed without removing the main pin, saving time and enhancing productivity. Mark had detailed information regarding the design and function of the attachment, which was highly confidential. In 2001 Mark left Allied, taking a laptop containing 15,000 pages of Allied documents, including detailed technical information about the MT. Mark joined Genesis in 2003. Genesis later released its own multiuse tool. Genesis brought trade secret claims, based on similarity to the MT. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Allied. The court awarded damages but refused to enter an injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a subsequent suit under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, alleging misappropriation after that verdict, citing issue preclusion. View "Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. Inc. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc." on Justia Law 2015-11-03 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Alan Eugene Norris 14-3563 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/13-15475/13-15475-2015-10-13.html Stanislaus Food Products v. USS-POSCO Indus. 2015-10-13T09:03:37-08:00 2015-10-13T18:01:58-08:00 Plaintiff, a tomato cannery, filed suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, alleging claims that it pays artificially high prices as the result of an illegal market allocation agreement among the nation's leading tin manufacturers who agreed to cede the tin mill products market in the western United States to UPI. The court concluded that U.S. Steel's participation in the alleged conspiracy is economically implausible. Further, the court concluded that the evidence does not tend to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators were acting independently and therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish specific facts supporting a market allocation conspiracy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Stanislaus Food Products v. USS-POSCO Indus." on Justia Law 2015-10-13 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit M. Margaret McKeown 13-15475 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-16601/14-16601-2015-09-30.html O'Bannon v. NCAA 2015-09-30T09:05:32-08:00 2015-09-30T18:25:33-08:00 Plaintiff O'Bannon filed suit against the NCAA and CLC, alleging that the NCAA's amateurism rules, insofar as they prevented student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs), were an illegal restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiff Keller filed suit against the NCAA, CLC, and EA, alleging that EA had impermissibly used student-athletes' NILs in its video games and that the NCAA and CLC had wrongfully turned a blind eye to EA's misappropriation of these NILs. Both cases were consolidated. The district court entered judgment for plaintiffs, concluding that the NCAA's rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their NILs violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court concluded that it was not precluded from reaching the merits of the appeal and found none of plaintiffs' claims persuasive. The court reaffirmed that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must be analyzed under the Rule of Reason; when those regulations truly serve procompetitive purposes, courts should not hesitate to uphold them; but the NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the Sherman Act's rules. In this case, the NCAA's rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports market. The court concluded that the Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their student athletes. The court concluded that it does not require more. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and permanent injunction insofar as they require the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation. The court affirmed otherwise. View "O'Bannon v. NCAA" on Justia Law 2015-09-30 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Jay S. Bybee 14-16601 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/d065165.html In re Tobacco Cases II 2015-09-28T11:00:26-08:00 2015-09-29T03:14:48-08:00 This action under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the False Advertising Law (FAL) arose from Philip Morris USA, Inc.'s use of terms such as "Lights" and "Lowered Tar and Nicotine" in advertising Marlboro Lights, to indicate they were less harmful to one's health than Marlboro Reds and other full-flavored cigarettes. The trial court determined Marlboro Lights were as dangerous than any other cigarettes, Philip Morris knew that, and its advertising was likely to deceive consumers. The court, however, denied plaintiffs' prayer for restitution on the ground they received value from Marlboro Lights apart from the deceptive advertising, and the evidence they submitted in an effort to show the difference between what they paid for Marlboro Lights and the value they actually received was incompetent and inadmissible. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the court erred as a matter of law by determining the only measure of restitution in a UCL products action was the measure set forth in "In re Vioxx Class of Cases," 180 Cal.App.4th 116 (2009)). Plaintiffs asserted value was immaterial, and they were not required to show any loss attributable to the deceptive advertising, because as an alternative measure the court had discretion to order Philip Morris to make a full refund of consumer expenditures, or its profits thereon, exclusively for the purpose of deterrence. Plaintiffs also contended the court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief on the ground of mootness. A federal court opinion affirmed in relevant part in "United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc." (566 F.3d 1095 (2009)), and federal legislation have already enjoined tobacco companies' use of the objectionable descriptors, plaintiffs asserted the matter was not moot because Philip Morris continued to market the cigarettes, called Marlboro Gold, in light-colored packs, which ostensibly signified they were less dangerous than Marlboro Reds or other cigarettes sold in dark-colored packs. Additionally, plaintiffs argued the court erred by denying them declaratory relief, awarding Philip Morris costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, and denying them sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for Philip Morris's failure to make admissions. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that all of plaintiffs' points were meritless and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Tobacco Cases II" on Justia Law 2015-09-28 state California California Court of Appeal Judith McConnell D065165 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2015/s-15270.html Alaskasland.com, LLC v. Cross 2015-09-25T09:00:14-08:00 2015-09-25T19:26:54-08:00 Using three photographs taken from a neighboring subdivision's marketing materials (including one portraying the subdivision's stylized entrance sign), a realtor group listed adjacent property for sale on a multiple listing service website. The listing also contained a property appraisal stating that: (1) based on plat-related information, existing legal access to the property might compromise the neighboring subdivision's gated community perimeter fencing; and (2) based on statements made to the appraiser by employees of the local electric association, the neighboring subdivision's electric service might be subject to legal issues. The subdivision's developer then sued the realtors for misappropriation of the photos, trade name infringement, and defamation. The superior court granted summary judgment to the realtors and awarded them enhanced attorney's fees; the developer appealed. Because there were no material factual disputes and the realtors were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the superior court's grant of attorney fees, and affirmed that decision too. View "Alaskasland.com, LLC v. Cross" on Justia Law 2015-09-25 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Daniel E. Winfree S-15270 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/14-40854/14-40854-2015-09-23.html Sanger Ins. Agency v. HUB Int'l 2015-09-23T09:31:54-08:00 2015-09-23T18:34:34-08:00 Sanger filed suit claiming that it was forced to abandon certain prospective business plans after coming up against the anticompetitive practices of HUB, a major player in the nationwide market for veterinary insurance. The district court granted summary judgment for HUB. The court concluded that Sanger has produced sufficient evidence of preparedness to survive the standing inquiry at the summary judgment stage, and the court reversed the district court's ruling to the contrary. The court also concluded that the alleged conduct does implicate allocation of risk in the insurance market and thus the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b), exemption. Therefore, the dismissal of the federal antitrust claims is affirmed, but the dismissal of the state antitrust and tortious interference claims is reversed. View "Sanger Ins. Agency v. HUB Int'l" on Justia Law 2015-09-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Costa 14-40854 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2015/sc19287.html Landmark Inv. Group, LLC v. CALCO Constr. & Dev. Co. 2015-09-22T05:00:27-08:00 2015-09-22T09:30:45-08:00 In 2005, Landmark Investment Group, LLC entered into a contract with Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC (Chung, LLC) to purchase certain property. Chung, LLC repudiated the contract after receiving a more attractive offer from CALCO Construction & Development Company (Calco) and John Senese, Calco's president and owner (together, Defendants). Landmark successfully sued for specific performance of the contract but was unable to purchase the property after it was sold at a foreclosure auction where a company controlled by Senese was the highest bidder. Landmark then filed suit against Defendants, alleging tortious interference with its contractual relations and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Landmark on both counts. The trial court, however, granted Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly granted Defendants' motion for JNOV because it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict; and (2) incorrectly concluded that Landmark presented insufficient evidence to support its claims. View "Landmark Inv. Group, LLC v. CALCO Constr. & Dev. Co." on Justia Law 2015-09-29 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Andrew J. McDonald SC19287 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/14-1746/14-1746-2015-09-15.html SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker 2015-09-15T11:00:13-08:00 2015-09-15T17:28:41-08:00 SawStop filed suit against two dozen saw manufacturers and affiliated entities under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, contending that several major table-saw manufacturers conspired to boycott SawStop's safety technology and corrupt a private safety-standard-setting process, all with the aim of keeping that technology off the market. The district court dismissed SawStop's amended complaint. The court concluded that SawStop's complaint does not plausibly allege any conspiracy to manipulate safety standards; the complaint also fails to allege any facts at all against several corporate parents and affiliates; and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal as to these claims. However, the court concluded that SawStop has alleged enough to suggest a plausible agreement to engage in a group boycott where the complaint offers enough to survive defendants' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal as to this claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker" on Justia Law 2015-09-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit G. Steven Agee 14-1746 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/14-2790/14-2790-2015-09-15.html In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig. 2015-09-15T08:30:06-08:00 2015-09-15T09:37:32-08:00 The U.S. chocolate market is dominated by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA (the Chocolate Manufacturers). A certified class of direct purchasers of chocolate products and a group of individual plaintiffs alleged that the Chocolate Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy products in the United States three times between 2002 and 2007. They offered evidence of a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in Canada. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Canadian conspiracy evidence was ambiguous and did not support an inference of a U.S. conspiracy because the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy; evidence that the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy was weak and, in any event, related only to Hershey. Other traditional conspiracy evidence was insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy. View "In re: Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law 2015-09-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit D. Michael Fisher 14-2790 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/13-56119/13-56119-2015-09-14.html Magnetar Techs. v. Intamin, Ltd. 2015-09-14T09:01:26-08:00 2015-09-14T20:44:13-08:00 Magnetar filed suit alleging that Intamin maliciously prosecuted a patent infringement action against it and claiming that Intamin prosecuted the action even though the '350 Patent was invalid pursuant to the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. 102 (on-sale bar). The district court granted summary judgment to Intamin. The court concluded that a reasonable attorney could have determined that the on-sale bar did not apply due to the genuine dispute concerning whether the magnetic braking system had been (1) offered for sale before the critical date; and (2) was ready for patenting before the critical date. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that Magnetar has not alleged sufficient facts to show a causal antitrust injury stemming from Intamin's actions. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly refused to sanction Magnetar for filing a frivolous action where Magnetar proceeded in good faith in not admitting facts related to the antitrust injury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "Magnetar Techs. v. Intamin, Ltd." on Justia Law 2015-09-14 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Milan D. Smith 13-56119 13-56333 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2015/da-14-0724.html Mont. Interventional & Diagnostic Radiology Specialists, PPLC v. St. Peter's Hosp. 2015-09-01T14:01:49-08:00 2015-09-01T19:18:37-08:00 Prior to July 2011, St. Peter's Hospital's Medical Staff granted privileges to qualified, non-employee radiologists, including the physicians of Montana Interventional and Diagnostic Radiology Specialists, PLLC (MIDRS), a professional limited liability company whose members are engaged in the practice of radiology. In July 2011, the Hospital closed its radiology department to all non-employee physicians regardless of qualification. MIDRS brought this action against the Hospital, alleging intentional interference with prospective advantage and unfair trade practices. The district court granted the Hospital's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint as untimely, concluding that MIDRS filed its complaint outside of the applicable statutes of limitation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the accrual of MIDRS' claims could not be determined from the pleadings alone and that further development of the record was necessary. View "Mont. Interventional & Diagnostic Radiology Specialists, PPLC v. St. Peter's Hosp." on Justia Law 2015-09-01 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Patricia O'Brien Cotter DA 14-0724 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-3239/14-3239-2015-09-01.html Indriolo Distribs., Inc. v. Schreiber Food, Inc. 2015-09-01T09:01:26-08:00 2015-09-01T10:38:33-08:00 A class action filed against Dairy Farmers of America (DFA), a dairy marketing cooperative, Keller's Creamery, a butter manufacturer, two DFA officers, and two Keller's officers, alleged a conspiracy to purchase cheese traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in order to help DFA and Keller's manipulate the price of Class III milk futures. The parties named in the initial complaint reached a settlement (DFA Settlement), which the district court approved in 2014. In 2012, plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint, adding Schreiber Foods as a defendant and alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the California Cartwright Act, the Commodity Exchange Act, and RICO. The district court dismissed the section 2 Sherman Act claims. In 2013, the court granted Schreiber summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court abused its discretion by limiting discovery to only "high-level" employees and prohibiting the depositions of several employees and in including Schreiber in the DFA Settlement. View "Indriolo Distribs., Inc. v. Schreiber Food, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-09-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit William Joseph Bauer 14-3239 http://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2015/20110261.html Innosys v. Mercer 2015-08-29T10:25:25-08:00 2015-08-31T18:12:21-08:00 Defendant worked for Plaintiff, a technology company, as an engineer. During and after her employment with Plaintiff, Defendant forwarded confidential emails to her private Gmail account, copied a confidential business plan to a thumb drive, and placed protected information on the record in an administrative proceeding. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Defendant had violated a non-disclosure agreement and misappropriated company trade secrets. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, determining that Plaintiff had failed to make an adequate showing of harm. The court further entered Utah R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against Plaintiff and awarded attorney fees to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence of threatened harm - or at least genuine issues of material fact concerning such harm - to defeat Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff prevailed on Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Defendant could not be entitled to sanctions or fees. View "Innosys v. Mercer" on Justia Law 2015-08-28 state Utah Utah Supreme Court Thomas R. Lee 20110261 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-4689/12-4689-2015-08-27.html Cash & Henderson Drugs v. Johnson & Johnson 2015-08-27T06:30:03-08:00 2015-08-27T14:56:50-08:00 Plaintiffs, a group of 28 retail pharmacies, filed suit against defendants, primarily pharmaceutical manufacturers, alleging claims for money damages and injunctive relief under subsections 2(a), 2(d), and 2(f) of the Robinson‐Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.13(a), 13(d), 13(f), and sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, 26. Plaintiffs' main contentions are that the lower prices offered by manufacturers violate the Robinson‐Patman Act by harming their ability to compete, and that favored purchasers violated the Act by using their drug formularies to extract the lower prices. Plaintiffs sought to prove that discounts caused them to lose customers to the favored purchasers, and that as a consequence they suffered injury under the antitrust laws. The district court concluded that plaintiffs could prove neither type of injury and granted defendants summary judgment. The court concluded that, given that an extended discovery process resulted in almost no evidence of diverted sales or other indicia of potential competitive injury, summary judgment was appropriate on the section 2(a) claims; plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to competitive injury and antitrust injury; injunctive relief is inappropriate where plaintiffs have offered no argument that future conditions will change in such a way as to make the injuries they claim to have suffered more pronounced than currently alleged; and since plaintiffs failed to show competitive or antitrust injury with regard to their section 2(a) claim, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to their claims under sections 2(d) and 2(f) as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cash & Henderson Drugs v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law 2015-08-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Barrington D. Parker 12-4689 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-56674/12-56674-2015-08-25.html Ramsey v. NAMM 2015-08-25T09:01:40-08:00 2015-08-25T18:41:38-08:00 Plaintiffs, a putative class, filed suit alleging that Guitar Center and the manufacturer defendants, as well as NAMM, conspired to implement and enforce minimum-advertised-price policies (MAP policies) that fixed the minimum price at which any retailer could advertise the manufacturers' guitars and guitar amplifiers. Plaintiffs claimed that these MAP policies tended to raise retail prices and restrain competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs allege that each manufacturer agreed with Guitar Center to adopt MAP policies and that the manufacturers agreed among themselves to adopt the MAP policies proposed by Guitar Center. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissed with prejudice. At issue was whether plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to provide a plausible basis from which the court can infer the alleged agreements' existence. Because plaintiffs lack direct evidence of horizontal agreements among the manufacturers, they plead that defendant manufacturers' parallel conduct in adopting MAP policies, in conjunction with several "plus factors," plausibly suggests the existence of horizontal agreements. The court concluded that plaintiffs have indeed provided a context for the manufacturers' adoption of MAP policies, but not one that plausibly suggests they entered into illegal horizontal agreements. Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to state a claim under section 1 and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ramsey v. NAMM" on Justia Law 2015-08-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Carlos T. Bea 12-56674 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-3286/14-3286-2015-08-25.html Alexander v. Fed. Trade Comm'n 2015-08-25T07:32:14-08:00 2015-08-25T14:17:29-08:00 In April 2014, two consumers filed a class action against BF Labs, asserting "deceptive and unconscionable business practices" in marketing and selling Bitcoin mining machines. Five months later, the Federal Trade Commission sued BF for unfair and deceptive acts, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). The court stayed pending suits and imposed a receivership. The stay was subsequently lifted. The two consumers were denied leave to intervene in the FTC action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the interests of the consumers' proposed class are subsumed within the public interest because the FTC, on behalf of consumers, sought relief for the same "deceptive and unconscionable business practices" alleged by the consumers. The consumers have not made the necessary "strong showing of inadequate representation." View "Alexander v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law 2015-08-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit William Duane Benton 14-3286 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-2561/14-2561-2015-08-13.html Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc. 2015-08-13T07:30:52-08:00 2015-08-13T14:31:38-08:00 Graco manufactures fast-set spray foam equipment (FSE) and sells it to distributors, who resell to consumers like Insulate. In 2005 and 2008 Graco purchased competing FSE manufacturers, ultimately raising its market share "to above 90%." In 2007, Graco sent a letter to its distributors citing the "best efforts" clause in its distributor agreements, stating: It is our opinion that taking on an additional competitive product line may significantly reduce the "best efforts" of a Graco distributor." In 2009, Foampak, a Graco distributor, considered carrying Gama products but chose not to after Graco threatened to end its distributorship. Graco sued Gama, alleging theft of trade secrets; Gama counterclaimed that Graco had unilaterally monopolized the FSE market (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2). In 2013, the FTC accused Graco of unlawfully acquiring its competitors (Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18). Graco and the FTC entered a consent agreement which confirmed Graco would not engage in any practice "that has the purpose or effect of achieving Exclusivity with any Distributor." The agreement did "not constitute an admission by [Graco] that the law ha[d] been violated." Insulate filed suit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal on the pleadings. Insulate did not adequately plead concerted action in the existence of written anticompetitive contracts or implied exclusivity agreements. View "Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law 2015-08-13 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit William Jay Riley 14-2561 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/14-11853/14-11853-2015-08-07.html Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. The Estee Lauder Co. 2015-08-07T11:01:25-08:00 2015-08-07T11:46:09-08:00 DFA filed suit against Estee Lauder after Estee Lauder refused to do business with DFA and communicated that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental space to DFA. DFW alleged three claims in its amended complaint: (1) attempted monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2; (2) contributory false advertising, in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); and (3) tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida law. The district court dismissed the suit based on failure to state a claim. The court concluded that DFW failed to allege basic facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face where DFW did not adequately allege that Estee Lauder engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct for its antitrust claims; DFA does not come close to establishing standing to seek injunctive relief from the requirements that Estée Lauder places on its competitors, inasmuch as DFA no longer does any business with Estée Lauder; DFA failed to plead sufficient facts from which a court could find that Estée Lauder made false statements, or, for that matter, was responsible for any such statements made by DFA's competitors in DFA's false advertising claim; and the complaint failed to allege any improper conduct sufficient to constitute tortious interference with a business relationship in violation of Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. The Estee Lauder Co." on Justia Law 2015-08-07 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Marcus 14-11853 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/14-3347/14-3347-2015-08-05.html Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc. 2015-08-05T07:30:46-08:00 2015-08-05T09:08:29-08:00 Best designs and markets exit signs and emergency lighting. Pace manufactured products to Best's specifications. Best's founder taught Pace how to manufacture the necessary tooling. There was no contract prohibiting Pace from competing with Best. By 2004, Best was aware that Pace was selling products identical to those it made for Best to Best's established customers. Several other problems arose between the companies. When they ended the relationship, Pace was in possession of all of the tooling used to manufacture Best's products and the cloned products, and Best owed Pace almost $900,000 for products delivered. Pace filed a breach of contract suit. Best requested a setoff of damages for breach of warranty and counterclaimed for breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and fraud. Pace claimed that Best had misappropriated Pace's trade secrets and had tortiously interfered with Pace's contracts. The district court found that Best had breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay, but that Pace was liable for breach of warranties, breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Pace is liable for breach of contract and tortious interference, but reversed or vacated as to the trade secrets, Lanham Act, conversion, and warranties claims. View "Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc." on Justia Law 2015-08-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Richard Allen Griffin 14-3347 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-7004/14-7004-2015-08-04.html Osborn v. Visa Inc. 2015-08-04T09:47:24-08:00 2015-08-04T17:38:11-08:00 Plaintiffs, users and operators of independent (non-bank) ATMs, filed related actions against Visa, MasterCard, and certain affiliated banks, alleging anticompetitive schemes for pricing ATM access fees. Plaintiffs alleged anticompetitive harm because Visa and MasterCard prevent an independent operator from charging less, and potentially earning more, when an ATM transaction is processed through a network unaffiliated with Visa and MasterCard. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to establish standing or the existence of a horizontal conspiracy to restrain trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Osborn v. Visa Inc." on Justia Law 2015-08-04 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Wilkins 14-7004 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/13-55553/13-55553-2015-07-31.html name.space, Inc. V. ICANN 2015-07-31T09:01:33-08:00 2015-08-01T20:39:10-08:00 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) creates and assigns top level domains (TLDs), such as ".com" and ".net." Plaintiff, a registry specializing in "expressive" TLDs, filed suit alleging that the 2012 Application Round for the creation of new TLDs violated federal and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because plaintiff failed to allege an anticompetitive agreement; the court rejected plaintiff's claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, because ICANN's authority was lawfully obtained through a contract with the DOC and did not unlawfully acquire or maintain its monopoly; the trademark and unfair competition claims were not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not alleged that ICANN has delegated or intends to delegate any of the TLDs that plaintiff uses; and the complaint failed to allege a claim for tortious interference or unfair business practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "name.space, Inc. V. ICANN" on Justia Law 2015-07-31 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Andrew David Hurwitz 13-55553 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-1435/14-1435-2015-07-27.html Robbins v. Becker, 2015-07-27T07:01:49-08:00 2015-07-27T09:32:36-08:00 The Robbinses provide towing and wrecker services along the I-44 corridor in eastern Missouri. State Highway Patrol (MSHP) Troops C and I, pursuant to MSHP policy, used a "rotation list" of approved towing and wrecking companies to determine which company to call to the scene of a disabled vehicle if the vehicle owner had no preference. The Robbinses were on both lists until they were removed, reportedly because Robbins had been charged with shooting at a competitor's truck in 1999. The Robbinses alleged the criminal charge resulted from a "sham investigation" and that their competitor used a friendship with an MSHP officer, with whom Robbins had had a confrontation, to harm the Robbinses' business. A jury acquitted Robbins, but they were never reinstated to either list. In 2005, the Robbinses sued the MSHP. The state court determined the MSHP lacked statutory authority to create a rotation list. In 2010, the Robbinses sued officers in their individual capacities, alleging due process and equal protection violations and conspiracy to violate those rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, claiming that the officers conspired to deny them work and disparaged their business. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Robbins v. Becker," on Justia Law 2015-07-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 14-1435 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2015/sc19219.html Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 2015-07-14T05:00:25-08:00 2015-07-14T13:27:12-08:00 Plaintiffs, automobile body shops and an auto body association, brought this class action against Defendant, The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, on behalf of more than 1,000 independent auto body repair shops in Connecticut, claiming that Defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) by requiring its staff motor vehicle physical damage appraisers to use, when appraising auto body damage sustained by Defendant's insureds, the hourly labor rates agreed on by Defendant and the plaintiff auto body shops instead of rates that more accurately reflect the actual value of those services. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Defendant's hourly rate practices constituted an unfair trade practice because they offended the public policy found in section 38a-790-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court incorrectly concluded that section 38a-790-8 supports Plaintiffs' CUTPA claim alleging unfair labor rate practices. View "Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2015-07-21 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Richard N. Palmer SC19219 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2015/sc19209.html Joseph Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Couto 2015-07-14T05:00:24-08:00 2015-07-14T11:04:42-08:00 John and Jane Couto entered into a contract with Joseph General Contracting, Inc. for the purchase and construction of a home and carriage house. The trial court found that the contract existed also between the Coutos and Anthony Silvestri, the owner and president of Joseph General. After disputes arose regarding the construction of the dwellings, Joseph General sued the Coutos for, inter alia, breach of contract. The Coutos counterclaimed against Joseph General, Silvestri and Landel Realty, LLC. The trial court held Joseph General, Landel and Silvestri each jointly and severally liable for breach of contract and implied warranty, trespass and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Silvestri appealed the propriety of these adverse rulings with respect to his personal liability. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment pertaining to Silvestri in an individual capacity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the claims of breach and contract and implied warranty against Silvestri in his individual capacity and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in determining that Silvestri had incurred contractual obligations to the Coutos in his individual capacity; and (2) properly determined that Silvestri could be held individually liable for alleged violations of CUTPA. View "Joseph Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Couto" on Justia Law 2015-07-21 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Dennis G. Eveleigh SC19209 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-3741/13-3741-2015-06-30.html United States v. Apple, Inc. 2015-06-30T06:30:04-08:00 2015-06-30T08:33:44-08:00 The Justice Department and 33 states and territories filed suit alleging that Apple, in launching the iBookstore, had conspired with the Publisher Defendants to raise prices across the nascent ebook market, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., and state antitrust laws. All five Publisher Defendants settled and signed consent decrees, which prohibited them, for a period, from restricting ebook retailers' ability to set prices. The district court found that the agreement constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act and, in the alternative, unreasonably restrained trade under the rule of reason. The district court issued an injunctive order that, inter alia, prevents Apple from entering into agreements with the Publisher Defendants that restrict its ability to set, alter, or reduce the price of ebooks, and requires Apple to apply the same terms and conditions to ebook applications sold on its devices as it does to other applications. The court concluded that the district court's decision that Apple orchestrated a horizontal conspiracy among the Publisher Defendants to raise ebook prices is amply supported and well‐reasoned, and that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court also concluded that the district court's injunction is lawful and consistent with preventing future anticompetitive harms. The court rejected Macmillan and Simon & Schuster's argument that the portion of the injunction related to Apple's pricing authority either unlawfully modifies their consent decrees or should be judicially estopped. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-06-30 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Debra Ann Livingston 13-3741 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-17805/12-17805-2015-06-29.html Ward v. Apple, Inc. 2015-06-29T09:00:53-08:00 2015-06-29T10:39:34-08:00 Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging that Apple conspired with ATTM to violate federal antitrust laws by entering into an exclusivity agreement in which ATTM would be the exclusive provider of voice and data services for Apple's iPhone. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under F.R.C.P. 19 for failure to join ATTM as a defendant. As a preliminary matter, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because this is an appeal from a final decision of the district court. On the merits, the court concluded that ATTM's role as an antitrust co-conspirator is not alone dispositive of whether it had interests that warrant protection under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i). In this case, the district court erred by failing to specify the interests ATTM claimed or to address how those interests might be impaired if the action were resolved in its absence. The court concluded that Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM has a legally protected interest in this action where Apple has not demonstrated that the risk of regulatory scrutiny gives ATTM a legally protected interest in this action; ATTM's reputational interests in this action are not legally protected under Rule 19; and Apple has not demonstrated that ATTM currently has any substantial contract rights that may be impaired by resolution of this action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ward v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-06-29 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Wallace 12-17805 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/14-1243/14-1243-2015-06-26.html King Drug Co of Florence Inc, v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. 2015-06-26T09:00:05-08:00 2015-06-26T09:29:12-08:00 In earlier litigation, Teva challenged the validity and enforceability of GSK's patents on lamotrigine, Lamictal's active ingredient. Teva was first to file an FDA application, alleging invalidity or nonenforceability, and seeking approval to produce generic lamotrigine tablets and chewable tablets for markets alleged to be annually worth $2 billion and $50 million,. If the patent suit resulted in a determination of invalidity or nonenforceability—or a settlement incorporating such terms—Teva would be statutorily entitled to a 180- day period of market exclusivity, during which time only it and GSK could produce generic lamotrigine tablets. After the judge ruled the patent's main claim invalid, the companies settled; Teva would end its patent challenge in exchange for early entry into the chewables market and GSK's commitment not to produce its own, "authorized generic" Lamictal tablets. Plaintiffs, direct purchasers of Lamictal, sued under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 & 2, claiming that the agreement was a "reverse payment" intended to induce Teva to abandon the patent fight and eliminate the risk of competition in the lamotrigine tablet market for longer than the patent would otherwise permit. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, citing Supreme Court precedent, holding that unexplained large payments from the holder of a drug patent to an alleged infringer to settle litigation of the patent's validity or infringement (reverse payment) can violate antitrust laws. View "King Drug Co of Florence Inc, v. Smithkline Beecham Corp." on Justia Law 2015-06-26 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Scirica 14-1243 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2015/131525.html Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs., Inc. 2015-06-26T06:01:15-08:00 2015-06-26T09:59:55-08:00 In this battle between two domestic producers of chondroitin sulfate, Plaintiffs filed suit claiming trade-secrets violations against Defendants. Before the Supreme Court was an interlocutory appeal on a discovery issue. The district court entered a protective order requiring the redesignation of Plaintiffs' standard operating procedures from "attorneys' eyes only" to "confidential," which would allow these materials to be disclosed to the defendants themselves. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while removing the "attorneys' eyes only" designation may have been appropriate, the district court's rationale for ordering redesignation was insufficient. Remanded for further consideration. View "Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs., Inc." on Justia Law 2015-06-26 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Thomas D. Waterman 131525 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-5182/14-5182-2015-06-09.html Pharmaceutical Research v. FTC 2015-06-09T07:01:02-08:00 2015-06-09T19:40:57-08:00 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 18a, added section 7A to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq., to establish notification and waiting requirements for large acquisitions and mergers. The principal purpose of the Act is to facilitate Government identification of mergers and acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws before the proposed deals are consummated. In 2013, the FTC modified its reportable asset acquisition regulations to clarify that, even if patent holders retain limited manufacturing rights or co-rights, transfers of patent rights within the pharmaceutical industry constitute reportable asset acquisitions if all commercially significant rights are transferred. PhRMA filed suit challenging the FTC's Rule and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FTC. The court concluded that the Rule does not violate the plain terms of the Act; the court owes deference to the FTC because the contested rule embodies a permissible construction of the Act; and the Commission's action also survives review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Because the FTC's action is supported by reasoned decisionmaking and PhRMA's claims are without merit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pharmaceutical Research v. FTC" on Justia Law 2015-06-09 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Harry Thomas Edwards 14-5182 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2015/da-14-0523.html Amour v. Collection Prof'ls, Inc. 2015-06-02T13:09:27-08:00 2015-06-02T17:27:06-08:00 During Plaintiff's marriage dissolution proceedings, Nancy Smith served as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff's children. After Plaintiff stopped paying bills to Smith, Smith assigned the unpaid bills to Collection Professionals, Inc. (CPI). CPI filed a complaint to collect the debt. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action alleging, among other claims, that Collection Professionals, Inc. (CPI) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by attempting to collect a false debt. CPI counterclaimed for the amount owed for Smith's services. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of CPI and Smith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly awarded summary judgment to CPI on Plaintiff's FDCPA claim because the FDCPA did not apply under the circumstances of this case; (2) correctly awarded summary judgment to Smith; and (3) correctly awarded CPI $7,408 in damages plus interest. View "Amour v. Collection Prof'ls, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-06-02 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 14-0523 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/14-60/14-60-2015-05-28.html United States v. Apple Inc. 2015-05-28T07:00:05-08:00 2015-05-28T09:07:53-08:00 The district court found Apple in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because Apple facilitated and executed a conspiracy where five of the six largest e-book publishers in the country entered into a horizontal conspiracy to eliminate retail price competition in order to raise e-book prices. The district court issued an external compliance monitor through a permanent injunction. At issue on appeal is the district court's denial of the motion to disqualify the appointed monitor, and modifications of the injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disqualify the monitor based on the record before the district court. The court also concluded that, in light of the court's intervening interpretation of the injunction, the terms of the injunction are not currently affected by modifications (if any) made by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the district court without prejudice. The court ordered the letter at issue disclosing the fee schedule unsealed and directed the Clerk of the Court to make that letter publicly available on the docket. View "United States v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law 2015-05-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Dennis G. Jacobs 14-60 14-61 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2015/14-0171.html In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys. 2015-05-22T06:03:27-08:00 2015-05-25T09:40:12-08:00 Plaintiff was a cardiothoracic surgeon who practiced at Memorial Hermann Memorial City Medical Center until 2012. When Plaintiff agreed to practice at Methodist West, Defendants - Memorial Hermann and certain healthcare practitioners - began conducting a "whisper campaign" against Plaintiff to cast doubt on Plaintiff's heart surgery procedures. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting claims for business disparagement, defamation, tortious interference with prospective business relationship, and improper restraint of trade. When Plaintiff moved to compel the production of certain documents, Memorial Hermann asserted the documents were protected from discovery under the medical committee privilege and the medical peer review committee privilege. The trial court ordered Defendants to produce the documents. After the court of appeals denied Defendants' petition for writ of mandamus, Defendants sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief as to some of the documents that the Court determined were protected but denied relief as to the remainder of the documents, holding that they were not confidential under either the medical committee privilege or the medical peer review committee privilege. View "In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys." on Justia Law 2015-05-22 state Texas Supreme Court of Texas Don R. Willett 14-0171 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2015/da-13-0644.html Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co. 2015-05-20T11:01:58-08:00 2015-05-20T17:18:35-08:00 Central United Life Insurance Co. (CULI) purchased Judith Gleason's cancer benefit insurance policy prior to Gleason's death from breast cancer. Gleason's Estate submitted notice of potential claims under the policy to CULI. CULI paid certain claims but denied payment for claims submitted outside the policy limit. The Estate contested the denial of the untimely-filed claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that CULI owed payment for the untimely-filed claims, provided it was not prejudiced by the late notice. After a trial, the jury found that CULI had violated the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) but did not award damages and therefore did not consider whether CULI acted with malice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the notice-prejudice rule; and (2) when an insurer is found to have violated the UTPA, a jury is not required to find compensatory damages beyond those for breach of the insurance contract before considering malice and punitive damages under the UTPA, and therefore, a new trial must be held on the issue of malice and punitive damages. View "Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2015-05-20 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Michael E. Wheat DA 13-0644 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2015/da-14-0380.html Gazelka v. St. Peter's Hosp. 2015-05-12T13:09:26-08:00 2015-05-12T17:32:48-08:00 After receiving treatment from St. Peter's Hospital, Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Hospital violated Montana anti-trust laws and the Montana Constitution by discriminating against her based on her lack of health insurance. After concluding that Plaintiff had standing, the district court awarded summary judgment to the Hospital, determining that uninsured persons are not a protected class under the Montana Constitution. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's standing determination; but (2) reversed the court's entry of summary judgment on the merits, holding that the determinations that the district court made in its summary judgment order did not resolve all of Plaintiff's claims. Remanded. View "Gazelka v. St. Peter's Hosp." on Justia Law 2015-05-12 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 14-0380 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2015/s15a0362.html McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth-Toccoa, LLC 2015-05-11T04:01:05-08:00 2015-05-12T02:27:35-08:00 McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, a Mississippi-based law firm, ran a full-page advertisement in a Northeast Georgia local newspaper, noting that Heritage Healthcare of Toccoa, a Stephens County nursing home owned by PruittHealth, had been cited by the government for deficiencies in the care of its residents and inviting those suspecting abuse or neglect of a loved one at the facility to call the law firm. On the following day, PruittHealth filed a verified complaint for temporary and permanent injunctive relief under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and petitioned ex parte for a temporary restraining order. That same day, the Stephens County Superior Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining McHugh Fuller from publishing, in any newspaper or other media, advertisements regarding PruittHealth utilizing the language of the ad. At the hearing, PruittHealth presented testimony that the government citation referenced in the ad arose from an old report, that the cited deficiencies had been resolved immediately, and the ad had caused severe damage to the facility's reputation. McHugh Fuller presented testimony to substantiate and justify the specific language used in the ad. The trial court found the ad to be deceptive and thus in violation of the UDTPA. Thereafter, the trial court signed an order enjoining McHugh Fuller "from publishing or causing the offending advertisement to be published in the future" and requiring McHugh Fuller remove postings of the ad. McHugh Fuller filed a verified answer and a motion to amend and/or for reconsideration of the court's order. The Supreme Court consolidated both parties' appeals of the trial court's rulings.. In case S15A0362, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by granting permanent injunctive relief at the conclusion of the interlocutory hearing without giving McHugh Fuller clear notice at the time that it was doing so. In case S15A0641, the Court found the trial court erred in its conclusion that that the appellate record in McHugh Fuller's initial appeal should not have included any filings in the trial court submitted after the entry of the permanent injunction on June 2, 2014. View "McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth-Toccoa, LLC" on Justia Law 2015-05-11 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Carol W. Hunstein S15A0362 S15A0641 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2015/s198616.html In re Cipro Cases I & II 2015-05-07T09:00:27-08:00 2015-05-07T14:01:20-08:00 Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (collectively, Bayer) marketed Cipro, an antibiotic. In 1987, Bayer was issued a United States patent on the active ingredient in Cipro. Twelve years before the expiration of the patent, Barr Laboratories, Inc. filed an application to market a generic version of Cipro. Bayer responded with a patent infringement suit, and Barr counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid. In 1997, Bayer and Barr entered into a settlement agreement under which Bayer agreed to make a "reverse payment" to Barr in exchange for Barr dropping its patent challenge and consenting to stay out of the market. The settlement produced numerous state and federal antitrust suits. This case arose from nine such coordinated class action suits brought by indirect purchasers of Cipro in California. The complaint alleged that the Bayer-Barr reverse payment settlement violated the Cartwright Act, unfair competition law, an common law prohibition against monopolies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bayer and Barr. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that parties illegally restrain trade when they privately agree to substitute consensual monopoly in place of potential competition that would have followed a finding of invalidity or noninfringement. View "In re Cipro Cases I & II" on Justia Law 2015-05-07 state California Supreme Court of California Kathryn Werdegar S198616 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/14-1205/14-1205-2015-05-04.html Sukumar v. Nautilus, Inc. 2015-05-04T07:32:10-08:00 2015-05-04T08:35:23-08:00 In 1994, Sukumar began caring for his aging father and noticed that rehabilitation fitness machines used by his father did not adequately suit frail seniors. To learn more about rehabilitation for seniors, he attended trade shows where he met Nautilus representatives. In 1998-1999, Sukumar ordered Nautilus machines and asked for modifications to meet elderly users' needs. When Nautilus delivered the custom fitness machines, Sukumar was dissatisfied and filed a breach of contract action. In 2004, Sukumar founded Southern California Stroke Rehabilitation Associates (SCSRA) to operate senior rehabilitation facilities in which Sukumar would use modified Nautilus fitness machines. SCSRA has acquired over 100 Nautilus fitness machines and, according to Sukumar, has twice attempted to negotiate a patent license from Nautilus. As of 2010, when Sukumar filed a false marking claim, 35 U.S.C. 292(b), SCSRA had no business plan, no employees, no office space, and no prototype designs. The district court found that many of the patents marked on six Nautilus machines did not cover the machines, but concluded that Sukumar had not suffered "competitive injury" necessary to have standing to assert a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Sukumar had not taken sufficient action to enter the market for fitness machines. View "Sukumar v. Nautilus, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-05-04 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Sharon Prost 14-1205 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/14-11363/14-11363-2015-04-15.html McWane, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission 2015-04-22T11:01:50-08:00 2015-04-23T13:07:43-08:00 The issue in this case arose from alleged anticompetitive conduct in the ductile iron pipe fittings ("DIPF") market by McWane, Inc., a family-run company headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama. In 2009, following the passage of federal legislation that provided a large infusion of money for waterworks projects that required domestic pipe fittings, Star Pipe Products entered the domestic fittings market. In response, McWane, the dominant producer of domestic pipe fittings, announced to its distributors that (with limited exceptions) unless they bought all of their domestic fittings from McWane, they would lose their rebates and be cut off from purchases for 12 weeks. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") investigated and brought an enforcement action under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 45. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and a divided Commission, found that McWane's actions constituted an illegal exclusive dealing policy used to maintain McWane's monopoly power in the domestic fittings market. The Commission issued an order directing McWane to stop requiring exclusivity from distributors. McWane appealed, challenging nearly every aspect of the Commission's ruling. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit found the Commission's factual and economic conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission's ruling. View "McWane, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law 2015-04-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Marcus 14-11363 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-4466/13-4466-2015-04-22.html Superior Prod. P'shp v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co. 2015-04-22T07:00:46-08:00 2015-04-22T10:28:00-08:00 Gordon Auto Body Parts, a Taiwanese company, was one of several early entrants into the U.S. market for replacement truck hoods. PBSI eventually entered the market for certain replacement hoods but found that it could not match the prices of Gordon and other Taiwanese firms, with which Gordon had participated in joint ventures. Believing that Gordon and the other firms were conspiring to drive it out of business with predatory prices, PBSI brought antitrust claims against Gordon. The district court granted Gordon summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that PBSI failed to make any showing that Gordon's prices were below an appropriate measure of cost. View "Superior Prod. P'shp v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co." on Justia Law 2015-04-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Gibbons 13-4466 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/575/13-271/ Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. 2015-04-21T06:30:18-08:00 2015-04-21T07:12:15-08:00 Institutions that buy natural gas directly from interstate pipelines sued, claiming that the pipelines had violated state antitrust laws: that they reported false information to the natural-gas indices on which natural-gas contracts were based. The indices affected both retail and wholesale natural-gas prices. The pipelines sought summary judgment, arguing that the Natural Gas Act pre-empted state-law claims. That Act gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to determine whether rates charged by natural-gas companies or practices affecting such rates are unreasonable, 15 U.S.C. 717d(a). It limits FERC's jurisdiction to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale, and natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, leaving regulation of other portions of the industry, such as retail sales, to the states. The district court granted the motion. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Acknowledging that the pipelines' index manipulation increased wholesale prices, it held that the state-law claims were not pre-empted because they were aimed at obtaining damages only for excessively high retail prices. The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing the importance of considering the target at which the state-law claims aim. Here, the claims are aimed at practices affecting retail prices, a matter "firmly on the States' side of [the] dividing line." State antitrust laws are not aimed at natural-gas companies in particular, but rather all businesses and states have long provided "common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices." The industries did not identify a specific FERC determination that state antitrust claims are pre-empted by the Act. View "Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-04-21 federal U.S. Supreme Court Stephen G. Breyer 13-271 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-17596/12-17596-2015-04-10.html Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. 2015-04-10T09:01:14-08:00 2015-04-10T12:09:00-08:00 In this putative nationwide class action Plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into purchasing Defendants' "natural" cosmetics, which contained allegedly synthetic and artificial ingredients. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California's unfair competition and false advertising laws, and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract. The district court dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so that the parties could seek expert guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not expressly preempt California's state law causes of action that create consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels; (2) although the district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than staying proceedings while the parties sought guidance from the FDA; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of or superfluous to Plaintiffs' other claims. View "Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-04-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit M. Margaret McKeown 12-17596 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-2301/14-2301-2015-04-09.html Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless 2015-04-09T09:00:58-08:00 2015-04-09T11:41:11-08:00 A class action antitrust suit on behalf of text messaging customers, claimed conspiracy by providers, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, to increase price per use. On remand, after three years of discovery, the district judge granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that it is difficult to prove illegal collusion without witnesses to an agreement. Competing firms can be expected to keep close track of each other's pricing and other market behavior and often to imitate that behavior rather than try to undermine it. The plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence consistent with an inference of collusion, but that evidence was equally consistent with independent parallel behavior. Tacit collusion, also known as conscious parallelism, does not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Collusion is illegal only when based on agreement. Agreement can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but the plaintiffs failed to find sufficient evidence of express collusion to make a prima facie case. View "Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless" on Justia Law 2015-04-09 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 14-2301 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-4067/12-4067-2015-04-08.html In re: Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig. 2015-04-08T08:30:11-08:00 2015-04-08T09:24:07-08:00 Plaintiffs are direct purchasers of traditional blood reagents, used to test blood compatibility between donors and recipients, from Immucor and OrthoClinical (defendants). By 1999, the entire domestic supply of that product was under defendants' control. In 2000, defendants' executives attended a trade meeting at which plaintiffs assert the conspiracy began. Defendants soon began rapidly increasing prices. By 2009, many prices had risen more than 2000%. Following a Department of Justice probe, private suits were filed, transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and consolidated. Plaintiffs sought damages under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, for alleged horizontal price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. After preliminary approval of plaintiffs' settlement with Immucor, the court certified plaintiffs' class of "[a]ll individuals and entities who purchased traditional blood reagents in the United States directly from Defendants ... at any time from January 1, 2000 through the present." Plaintiffs relied in part on expert testimony to produce their antitrust impact analyses and damages models, which Ortho challenged. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Comcast v. Behrend, which reversed Behrend v. Comcast, on which the district court relied in granting class certification. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the court had no opportunity to consider the implications of Comcast; a court must resolve any Daubert challenges to expert testimony offered to demonstrate conformity with Rule 23 View "In re: Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law 2015-04-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Scirica 12-4067 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2015/da-14-0152.html Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund 2015-03-17T15:01:41-08:00 2015-03-18T12:10:37-08:00 Plaintiff, a Montana corporation, sells workers' compensation insurance to employers without the use of insurance agencies. Defendant Montana State Fund sells workers' compensation insurance through in-house and out-of-house agents. The remaining defendants also sell workers' compensation insurance, including State Fund policies. In 2011, Plaintiff brought this of action against Defendants, alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff's UTPA claim on the grounds that the UTPA does not create a private right of action by one insurance company against another; and (2) granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to interference with prospective economic advantage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's inability to establish damages was fatal to its intentional interference claim and would be fatal as well to any UTPA-related claim. View "Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law 2015-03-17 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Patricia O'Brien Cotter DA 14-0152 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-56726/12-56726-2015-03-13.html Reid v. Johnson & Johnson 2015-03-13T09:01:06-08:00 2015-03-13T12:55:26-08:00 Plaintiff filed a false advertising lawsuit against Johnson & Johnson and McNeil Nutritionals, LLC (collectively, McNeil) challenging several of McNeil's assertions about its product, Benecol, a vegetable oil-based spread. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that McNeil's claims about its product were not authorized under the FDA's regulations and were false. Plaintiff asserted claims for relief on behalf of a putative class of Benecol purchasers under California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The district court granted McNeil's motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to plead reasonable reliance on any misrepresentations and that Plaintiff's claims for relief were preempted under federal law. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to challenge McNeil's statements; (2) Plaintiff's claims for relief were not preempted to the extent they were predicated on McNeil's statements about trans fat, and a certain FDA letter was not entitled to preemptive effect; and (3) Plaintiff's action was not barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Remanded. View "Reid v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law 2015-03-13 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Consuelo Maria Callahan 12-56726 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/b257222.html People v. Cahuenga's The Spot 2015-03-09T14:00:20-08:00 2015-03-09T14:08:58-08:00 In 2011 and 2012, the government brought enforcement actions against more than 80 facilities alleged to be selling and distributing marijuana for medicinal purposes in violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code for public nuisance, the Narcotics Abatement Law, Health & Safety Code section 11570, and the state unfair competition law, Business & Professions Code section 17200. The complaints sought permanent injunctions, abatement of the nuisances and civil penalties. The trial court denied the government's omnibus motion for summary judgment, reasoning that claims for penalties made under each of the statutory plans are elements of the causes of action alleged. The court of appeal vacated, holding that the penalties being sought are among the remedies available rather than elements of the causes of action alleged in the several complaints. View "People v. Cahuenga's The Spot" on Justia Law 2015-03-09 state California California Court of Appeal Goodman B257222 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-15705/12-15705-2015-02-27.html Frank v. Netflix, Inc. 2015-02-27T10:00:58-08:00 2015-02-27T12:13:41-08:00 A class of Netflix DVD subscribers filed a consolidated amended class action against Netflix and Walmart, claiming that a promotion agreement whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart's DVD sales business was anti-competitive. The district court approved of a settlement between Walmart and the class of Netflix subscribers whereby Walmart agreed to pay a total amount of $27,250,000. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) approving the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) certifying the settlement class; and (3) awarding attorneys' fees of twenty-five percent of the overall settlement fund. View "Frank v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-02-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Sidney Runyan Thomas 12-15705 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-18034/11-18034-2015-02-27.html Resnick v. Netflix, Inc. 2015-02-27T10:00:57-08:00 2015-02-27T11:51:51-08:00 Plaintiffs, individuals representing a class of Netflix subscribers, contended that a promotion agreement whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart's DVD sales business violated the Sherman Act by illegally allocating and monopolizing the online DVD rental market. The district court granted summary judgment for Netflix and awarded Netflix $710,194 in costs. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they suffered antitrust in-jury-in-fact on a theory that they paid supracompetitive prices for their DVD-rental subscriptions because Netflix would have reduced its subscription price but for its allegedly anticompetitive product; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part the award of costs, holding that certain charges for "data upload" and "keywording" were not recoverable as costs for making copies under 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). Remanded for consideration of whether costs were properly awarded for "professional services." View "Resnick v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-02-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Sidney Runyan Thomas 11-18034 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2015/131872.html Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc. 2015-02-27T07:00:51-08:00 2015-02-27T12:47:45-08:00 Wellmark, Inc., an Iowa-based health insurer that belongs to the national Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) network, contracted with health care providers in Iowa to provide services at certain reimbursement rates. Wellmark agreed to make those rates available both to self-insured Iowa plans that it administers and to out-of-state BCBS affiliates when those entities provide coverage for services provided in Iowa. Plaintiffs, a number of Iowa chiropractors, sued Wellmark, claiming that Wellmark had abused monopoly power in violation of the Iowa Competition Law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of some of the chiropractors' antitrust claims and remanded on Plaintiffs' remaining claims. On remand, Plaintiffs stipulated that their remaining antitrust claims regarding the agreements between Wellmark and both the self-insuring employers and the out-of-state BCBS affiliates were being asserted on a per se theory. The district court rejected Plaintiffs' per se theories and entered summary judgment for Wellmark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wellmark's arrangements with the self-insured employers and out-of-state BCBS licensees did not amount to per se violations of Iowa antitrust law. View "Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc." on Justia Law 2015-02-27 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Edward M. Mansfield 131872 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2015/cv-14-193.html Philip Morris Cos., Inc. v. Miner 2015-02-26T11:00:31-08:00 2015-02-26T15:21:30-08:00 Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Philip Morris Companies Inc. and Philip Morris Inc., alleging that Philip Morris violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) by falsely advertising that its Marlboro Lights cigarettes were safer and contained less tar and nicotine than other cigarettes. The circuit court certified Plaintiffs' class action, concluding that common issues among all class members predominated over any individual issues and that a class action was a superior method of resolving the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order certifying the class, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, as common issues predominated, a class action was a superior method of adjudication, and the class was ascertainable. View "Philip Morris Cos., Inc. v. Miner" on Justia Law 2015-02-26 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Rhonda K. Wood CV-14-193 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2015/27502.html South Carolina v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals 2015-02-25T08:02:03-08:00 2015-02-26T04:30:20-08:00 Appellant Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals (Janssen) manufactured the antipsychotic drug Risperdal. The Attorney General of South Carolina believed that Janssen had violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) by engaging in unfair methods of competition by willfully failing to disclose known risks and side effects associated with Risperdal. In 2007, the State and Janssen entered into a tolling agreement concerning the statute of limitations. The State filed its Complaint on April 23, 2007: the first claim arose from the content of the written material furnished by Janssen since 1994 with each Risperdal prescription (the "labeling claim"); the second claim centered on alleged false information contained in a November 2003 Janssen-generated letter sent to the South Carolina community of prescribing physicians (the "Dear Doctor Letter"). Because both claims arose more than three years prior to January 24, 2007, Janssen pled the statute of limitations as a bar to the Complaint. The matter proceeded to trial. A jury rendered a liability verdict against Janssen on both claims. The trial court rejected Janssen's defenses, including the statute of limitations, finding that both claims were timely. Janssen appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the liability judgment on the labeling claim but modify the judgment to limit the imposition of civil penalties to a period of three years from the date of the tolling agreement, which was coextensive with the three-year statute of limitations, subject to an additional three months by virtue of the time period between the January 24, 2007, tolling agreement and the filing of the Complaint on April 23, 2007. The Court affirmed the liability judgment on the doctor letter claim, but remitted the amount of penalties associated with that claim. View "South Carolina v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law 2015-02-25 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court John W. Kittredge 27502 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/574/13-534/ North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC 2015-02-25T07:30:17-08:00 2015-02-25T11:34:56-08:00 North Carolina's Dental Practice Act does not specify that teeth whitening is "the practice of dentistry." After dentists complained, the Board of Dental Examiners issued cease-and-desist letters to nondentist teeth whitening service providers and product manufacturers, warning that the unlicensed practice of dentistry is a crime. The FTC filed an administrative complaint, alleging that the Board's concerted action to exclude nondentists from the market for teeth whitening services constituted an anticompetitive and unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. An ALJ rejected a claim of state-action immunity and ruled against the Board. The FTC, the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Because a controlling number of the Board's decision-makers are active market participants in the occupation being regulated, the Board could invoke immunity only if the challenged restraint was clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, actively supervised by the state. That requirement was not met. The need for supervision turns not on the formal designation given by states to regulators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue private interests in restraining trade. States may provide for the defense and indemnification of agency members in the event of litigation, and can ensure immunity by adopting clear policies to displace competition and providing active supervision. Regardless of whether the Board exceeded its powers under North Carolina law, there is no evidence of any decision by the state to initiate or concur with the Board's actions against the nondentists. View "North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law 2015-02-25 federal U.S. Supreme Court Anthony M. Kennedy 13-534 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-5393/12-5393-2015-02-20.html FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. 2015-02-20T07:31:13-08:00 2015-02-20T09:25:40-08:00 The FTC initiated an enforcement proceeding against Boehringer after the pharmaceutical company failed to comply with an administrative subpoena seeking various documents related to a settlement agreement between the company and Barr, a generic drug manufacturer. Boeringer subsequently certified compliance with the subpoena but withheld hundreds of responsive documents under the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Te court rejected the FTC's assertion that the district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that settlement documents pertaining to a co-promotion agreement between Boehringer and Barr were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The court held that a settlement term may have independent economic value and still be considered part of a settlement for purposes of work product protection. The court also found that the district court reasonably concluded that the bulk of the contested co-promotion materials were prepared in anticipation of the Boehringer-Barr litigation, with a single exception pertaining to post-settlement documents. Therefore, the court generally affirmed the district court's finding on this issue but remanded for further consideration with respect to post-settlement documents. The court agreed with the FTC that the district court misapprehended the proper distinction between fact and opinion work product and reversed and remanded on this issue. View "FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm." on Justia Law 2015-02-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Wilkins 12-5393 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-35173/14-35173-2015-02-10.html St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke's Health Sys. 2015-02-10T10:00:57-08:00 2015-02-10T19:38:32-08:00 The FTC and the State filed suit alleging that the 2012 merger of two health care providers in Nampa, Idaho violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, and state law. The district court found that the merger violated section 7 and ordered divestiture. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court's determination that Nampa was the relevant geographic market was supported by the record; the district court did not clearly err in holding that plaintiffs established a prima facie case that the merger will probably lead to anticompetitive effects in the market; and defendant failed to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that efficiencies resulting from the merger would have a positive effect on competition. Therefore, in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing divestiture. View "St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke's Health Sys." on Justia Law 2015-02-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Andrew David Hurwitz 14-35173 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1060/13-1060-2015-01-30.html POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC 2015-01-30T07:31:15-08:00 2015-01-30T13:36:02-08:00 After the FTC voted to hold POM and the associated parties liable for violating the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) and 52(a), and ordered them to cease and desist from making misleading and inadequately supported claims about the health benefits of POM products, POM petitioned for review. The court denied most of petitioners' challenges; the court saw no basis to set aside the Commission's conclusion that many of POM's ads made misleading or false claims about POM products; and the Commission had no obligation to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Further, the court held that the Commission's order is valid to the extent it requires disease claims to be substantiated by at least one randomized and controlled human clinical trial (RCT); the order fails Central Hudson scrutiny because it categorically requires two RCTs for all disease-related claims; the Commission has failed to adequately justify an across-the-board two-RCT requirement for all disease claims by petitioners; and, therefore, Part I of the Commission's order will be modified to require petitioners to possess at least one RCT. The court denied the petition for review in all other respects. View "POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC" on Justia Law 2015-01-30 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Srikanth Srinivasan 13-1060 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/14-30410/14-30410-2015-01-27.html Felder's Collision Parts v. All Star Advertising 2015-01-28T05:05:52-08:00 2015-01-28T16:59:36-08:00 Felder's filed an antitrust suit against All Star and GM, alleging that GM's "Bump the Competition" program, which lowers the consumer price for GM-manufactured parts below the prices of equivalent "generic" auto parts manufactured by others, is an unlawful predatory pricing scheme. GM lowers the price by providing rebates to dealers like All Star that sell GM-manufactured parts for the reduced prices. The court concluded that the effect of this rebate in deciding whether Felder's can meet one of the essential elements of a predatory pricing claim - that defendant is selling its products at a price below average variable cost - should be considered. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the antitrust claims based on Felder's failure to adequately define the relevant geographic market and its earlier finding that Felder's did not allege below-cost pricing. View "Felder's Collision Parts v. All Star Advertising" on Justia Law 2015-01-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Costa 14-30410 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/14-1521/14-1521-2015-01-22.html In re Nexium Antitrust Litig. 2015-01-22T07:30:06-08:00 2015-01-22T16:12:39-08:00 AstraZeneca, which sells a heartburn drug called Nexium, and three generic drug companies ("generic defendants") that sought to market generic forms of Nexium, entered into settlement agreements in which the generic defendants agreed not to challenge the validity of the Nexium patents and to delay the launch of their generic products. Certain union health and welfare funds that reimburse plan members for prescription drugs (the named plaintiffs) alleged that the settlement agreements constituted unlawful agreements between Nexium and the generic defendants not to compete. Plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of third-party payors, such as the named plaintiffs, and individual consumers. The district court certified a class. Relevant to this appeal, the class included individual consumers who would have continued to purchase branded Nexium for the same price after generic entry. The First Circuit affirmed the class certification, holding (1) class certification is permissible even if the class includes a de minimis number of uninjured parties; (2) the number of uninjured class members in this case was not significant enough to justify denial of certification; and (3) only injured class members will recover. View "In re Nexium Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law 2015-01-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dyk 14-1521 14-1522 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-15139/14-15139-2015-01-15.html City of San Jose v. Comm'r of Baseball 2015-01-15T10:00:55-08:00 2015-01-15T12:14:10-08:00 This case arose when the Oakland Athletics wanted to move to the City of San Jose, but the City falls within the exclusive operating territory of the San Francisco Giants. The City, seeking approval of the move, filed suit against MLB, alleging violations of state and federal antitrust laws, of California's consumer protection statute, and of California tort law. The district court granted MLB's motion to dismiss on all but the tort claims and the City appealed. The City argues that the baseball industry's historic exemption from the antitrust laws does not apply to antitrust claims relating to franchise relocation. The court held, however, that antitrust claims against MLB's franchise relocation policies are precluded by Flood v. Kuhn, and, under Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v Kuhn, the court rejected any antitrust claim that was wholly unrelated to the reserve clause. Therefore, the City's claims under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7 and 15 U.S.C. 12-27, must be dismissed. Further, the City's antitrust claims necessarily fall with its federal claims where the City can point to no case that has ever held that state antitrust claims continue to be viable after federal antitrust claims have been dismissed under the baseball exemption. An independent claim under California's unfair competition law is also barred so long as MLB's activities are lawful under the antitrust laws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of San Jose v. Comm'r of Baseball" on Justia Law 2015-01-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Alex Kozinski 14-15139 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-11043/13-11043-2015-01-14.html Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. American Quarter Horse Assoc. 2015-01-15T05:01:01-08:00 2015-01-15T13:18:00-08:00 Plaintiffs filed suit against AQHA, alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and Texas antitrust law. Plaintiffs' allegations stemmed from votes by the Stud Book and Registration Committee of the AQHA, which had blocked AQHA registration of horses created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT or cloning). On appeal, AQHA challenged the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). The court concluded that reasonable jurors could not draw any inference of conspiracy from the evidence presented, because it neither tends to exclude the possibility of independent action nor does it suggest the existence of any conspiracy at all. Therefore, the court concluded that the JMOL motion should have been granted in the absence of substantial evidence on the issue of an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade under Section 1 of the Act. Further, the Section 2 claim failed as a matter of law because AQHA is not a competitor in the allegedly relevant market for elite Quarter Horses. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for AQHA. View "Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. American Quarter Horse Assoc." on Justia Law 2015-01-14 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Edith H. Jones 13-11043 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2181/13-2181-2014-12-29.html McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks 2014-12-29T14:30:08-08:00 2014-12-29T21:08:36-08:00 When Appellant, a resident of the Pondview Condominiums, did not pay his condominium fees on time, the condominium trustees hired law firm Marcus, Errico, Emmer and Brooks, P.C. ("MEEB") to collect Appellant's debt. MEEB filed nine collection actions in Massachusetts state court against Appellant and prevailed in two of them. Displeased with MEEB's collection activities, Appellant sued MEEB in federal district court, alleging violations of federal and state law. The magistrate judge concluded that MEEB committed numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and that the FDCPA violations constituted "per se" violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge reversed in part, finding MEEB not liable under Chapter 93A. The First Circuit reversed the magistrate judge's determination that MEEB was not liable under Chapter 93A, holding that MEEB's violations of the FDCPA constituted per se Chapter 93A violations by virtue of the unambiguous statutory language in the FDCPA and the Federal Trade Commission Act. View "McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks" on Justia Law 2014-12-29 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson 13-2181 http://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-0351.html Orca Commc'ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder 2014-11-19T09:00:31-08:00 2014-11-19T12:06:54-08:00 Orca Communications Unlimited, LLC filed this action against Ann Noder, its former president, and the competing company Noder started after she left Orca, asserting common law tort clams based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Orca's common law claims were preempted by Arizona's Uniform Trade Secrets Act (AUTSA), which creates an exclusive cause of action - and displaces conflicting causes of action - for claims based on the misappropriation of trade secrets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AUTSA does not displace common-law claims based on alleged misappropriation of confidential information that is not a trade secret; and (2) therefore, AUTSA did not displace Orca's unfair competition claim. View "Orca Commc'ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder" on Justia Law 2014-11-19 state Arizona Arizona Supreme Court John Pelander CV-13-0351 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-5947/12-5947-2014-11-13.html Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc. 2014-11-13T08:30:34-08:00 2014-11-13T09:48:06-08:00 Class representatives sued Kentucky real estate firms, alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by participating in a horizontal conspiracy to fix commissions charged in Kentucky real estate transactions at an anti-competitive rate. The certified class consists of people who sold residential real estate in Kentucky from 2001 to 2005, and used the services of defendants. Several defendants settled. The district court entered summary judgment for remaining defendants, excluding the opinions of plaintiffs' experts with respect to whether collusion among the defendants was the likely economic explanation of the pricing of commissions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that although the plaintiffs produced a good deal of circumstantial evidence that would support a theory of collusion, the conduct at issue was also consistent with permissible competition. View "Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-11-13 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Alan Eugene Norris 12-5947 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2173/13-2173-2014-11-12.html Baker v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. 2014-11-12T13:30:05-08:00 2014-11-12T18:22:48-08:00 Dragon Systems, Inc. (Dragon), a voice recognition software company that faced a deteriorating financial situation, hired Goldman Sachs (Goldman) to provide financial advice and assistance in connection with a possible merger. In 2000, Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V. (Lernout & Hauspie) acquired Dragon. When it was discovered that Lernout & Hauspie had fraudulently overstated its earnings, the merged company filed for bankruptcy, and the Dragon name and technology were sold from the estate. Plaintiffs, two groups of Dragon shareholders, filed suit against Goldman, alleging negligent and intentional misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. A jury found in favor of Goldman on Plaintiffs' common law claims, and district court found that Goldman had not violated chapter 93A. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly articulated the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs' chapter 93A claims and correctly applied that standard to its factual findings; and (2) Plaintiffs' arguments that they were entitled to a new trial on their common law claims because of evidentiary errors and erroneous jury instructions were without merit. View "Baker v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law 2014-11-12 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Sandra Lea Lynch 13-2173 13-2208 http://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supreme-court/2014/105245.html Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson 2014-10-24T07:01:59-08:00 2014-10-24T13:34:12-08:00 Dick McClary submitted an application for health insurance to Golden Rule Insurance Company that failed to disclose proposed insured Patti Denney's preexisting condition. Golden Rule issued a policy covering Denney, but later denied coverage for a proposed surgery based on the fact that the conditions documented in Denney's medical records were not disclosed in her insurance application. The Kansas Insurance Department imposed sanctions on Golden Rule for unfair claim settlement practices, concluding that Golden Rule had wrongfully denied Denney coverage for a medically necessary procedure. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McClary was not acting as Golden Rule's soliciting agent when he submitted Denney's health insurance application. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' decision on the agency question, as substantial evidence supported the conclusion that McClary had the actual authority to solicit and submit applications directly to Golden Rule; and (2) reversed the Department and the district court on their ruling that Golden Rule violated Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-2404(9)(f) but affirmed the finding of a violation of subsection (d); and (3) affirmed the Department's remedy. View "Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state Kansas Kansas Supreme Court Carol A. Beier 105245 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/13-3215/13-3215-2014-09-29.html In re: Urethane AntiTrust Litigation 2014-09-29T11:44:11-08:00 2014-10-01T15:37:01-08:00 This antitrust class action stemmed from an allegation that Dow Chemical Company conspired with its competitors to fix prices for polyurethane chemical products. Over Dow's objection, the district court certified a plaintiff class including all industrial purchasers of polyurethane products during the alleged conspiracy period. The action went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict against Dow. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, denying Dow's motions for decertification of the class and judgment as a matter of law. Dow raised four issues on appeal, all of which the Tenth Circuit rejected. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "In re: Urethane AntiTrust Litigation" on Justia Law 2014-09-29 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Robert Edwin Bacharach 13-3215 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/g047661a.html Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Super. Ct. 2014-09-22T15:00:50-08:00 2014-10-01T15:35:19-08:00 The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether federal law preempted the effort by a district attorney to recover civil penalties under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on an employer's alleged violation of workplace safety standards. Petitioners Solus Industrial Innovations, Emerson Power Transmission Corp., and Emerson Electric Co. (collectively Solus) argued the trial court erred by overruling their demurrer to two causes of action filed against them by Respondent, the Orange County District Attorney, alleging a right to recover such penalties. Solus argued that federal workplace safety law (Fed/OSHA) preempted any state law workplace safety enforcement mechanism which has not been specifically incorporated into the state workplace safety plan approved by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. The district attorney argued that once a state workplace safety plan has been approved by the Secretary of Labor, the state retains significant discretion to determine how it will enforce the safety standards incorporated therein, and thus the state may empower prosecutors to enforce those standards through whatever legal mechanism is available when such a case is referred to them. The trial court agreed with the district attorney and overruled Solus's demurrer. But the court also certified this issue as presenting a controlling issue of law suitable for early appellate review under Code of Civil Procedure section 166.1. Solus then filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to review the trial court's ruling. After the Court summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause. In the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that the UCL was not even in effect when California's plan was approved. The California Supreme Court then granted review, and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the matter in light of former Civil Code section 3370.1 repealed by stats. 1977, ch. 299, sec. 3, p. 1204. Having done so, the Court of Appeal again concluded that the district attorney's reliance on the UCL to address workplace safety violations was preempted. View "Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law 2014-09-22 state California California Court of Appeal Rylaarsdam G047661A http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-995.html Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow 2014-09-18T08:01:01-08:00 2014-10-01T15:33:39-08:00 Appellee, Peter Rosenow, brought a class-action complaint individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons against Appellants, Alltel Corporation and Alltel Communications, Inc. (collectively, Alltel), alleging violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and unjust enrichment arising from Alltel's imposition of an early termination fee on its cellular-phone customers. Alltel filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in its "Terms and Conditions." The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Alltel's arbitration provision lacked mutuality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that a lack of mutuality rendered the instant arbitration agreement invalid. View "Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow" on Justia Law 2014-09-18 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Paul Danielson CV-13-995 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11545.html Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc. 2014-09-15T06:16:29-08:00 2014-10-01T15:32:50-08:00 Plaintiffs, two motor vehicle dealers and an organization that represents the interests of new automobile and truck franchised dealerships in the state, filed this action against Tesla Motors, Inc., an automobile manufacturer, and Tesla Motors MA, Inc., its Massachusetts subsidiary, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B and conspiracy to violate chapter 93B. The superior court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action because they were not affiliated dealers of Tesla or Tesla MA. At issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the 2002 amendments to chapter 93B broadened the scope of standing under the statute since the Court's 1985 decision in Beard Motors, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distribs., Inc. such that Massachusetts motor vehicle dealers now have standing to maintain an action for an alleged violation of the statute against unaffiliated motor vehicle manufacturers or distributors. The Court affirmed, holding that chapter 93B does not confer standing on a motor vehicle dealer to maintain an action for violation of the statute against a manufacturer with which the dealer is not affiliated. View "Mass. State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-09-15 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Margot Botsford SJC-11545 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-4169/13-4169-2014-09-08.html Fed. Trade Comm'n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc. 2014-09-08T08:31:00-08:00 2014-10-01T15:30:49-08:00 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint alleging that Defendants fraudulently marketed and sold debt-related services, failed to provide those services, and retained money as upfront fees in violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a); the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310; and the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule, 12 C.F.R. 1015. The FTC also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, and provided more than 1,000 pages of exhibits. Defendants sought to stay proceedings, asserting that a criminal investigation had been launched into their business activities, as evidenced by a raid conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that resulted in seizure of records they claim were necessary to defend against the FTC's allegations. The district court denied the motion; the FTC and Defendants entered into a stipulated preliminary injunction. Defendants later renewed the motion for a stay, claiming that they were unable to access critical records. Without explanation, the district court denied the motion and later granted the FTC's motion for summary judgment, ordering Defendants to jointly pay restitution in the amount of $5,706,135.48 to injured consumers. The Sixth circuit affirmed, finding clear evidence of the violations. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-09-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Eric L. Clay 13-4169 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-3305/13-3305-2014-09-04.html Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster 2014-09-04T08:30:06-08:00 2014-10-01T15:30:00-08:00 Fair Wind owns sailing schools, including one in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. In 2007 Fair Wind hired Bouffard as a captain and instructor, under a contract precluding Bouffard from joining a competitor within 20 miles of the St. Thomas school for two years after the end of his employment. In 2010, relying on Bouffard View "Fair Wind Sailing Inc v. Dempster" on Justia Law 2014-09-04 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Julio M. Fuentes 13-3305 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-2290/13-2290-2014-08-26.html Ferring Pharm. Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc. 2014-08-26T08:30:10-08:00 2014-10-01T15:26:51-08:00 Ferring and Watson market competing prescription progesterone products. Progesterone plays a key role in helping women become pregnant and maintain pregnancies by preparing and maintaining the uterine lining to support the embryo during early pregnancy. Historically, women have received progesterone through intramuscular shots, which are not FDA-approved and which patients consider painful. Both companies manufacture a product that administers progesterone to women through vaginal inserts rather than shots. Ferring's product, Endometrin, is delivered in capsule form. Watson's product, Crinone, is a gel delivered via applicator. Ferring unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act, based on two presentations made by Watson in 2012 to healthcare professionals concerning Crinone. Watson's consultant, Dr. Silverberg made statements concerning a "Black Box" warning on Endometrin's package insert; a patient preference survey comparing the products; and Endometrin's effectiveness in women over the age 35. Silverberg was alerted to the inaccuracy of his statement about a Black Box warning after the first webcast and certified to Ferring and to the court that he would not repeat the statement. The district court held that Ferring failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court holdings that a party bringing a claim under the Lanham Act is not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction and must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely. View "Ferring Pharm. Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law 2014-08-26 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Michael A. Chagares 13-2290 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2256/12-2256-2014-08-21.html M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala 2014-08-21T13:30:59-08:00 2014-10-01T15:25:35-08:00 After leaving Gensler, an architectural firm with projects throughout the world, where he had been a Design Director, Strabala opened his own firm, 2Define Architecture. Strabala stated online that he had designed five projects for which Gensler is the architect of record. Gensler contends that Strabala's statements, a form of "reverse passing off," violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.1125(a). The district court dismissed, ruling that, because Strabala did not say that he built or sold these structures, he could not have violated section 43(a), reading the Supreme Court decision Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox (2003), to limit section 43(a) to false designations of goods' origin. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that Gensler maintains that Strabala falsely claims to have been the creator of intellectual property. View "M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala" on Justia Law 2014-08-21 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Hoover Easterbrook 12-2256 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-18023/11-18023-2014-08-15.html FTC v. Kimoto 2014-08-15T09:09:38-08:00 2014-10-01T15:23:29-08:00 Defendant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FTC and its order permanently enjoining defendant from engaging in a variety of marketing tactics, and ordering him to pay restitution. The court concluded that the district court properly held defendant personally liable for both injunctive relief and the requirement to pay restitution with respect to all of the marketing schemes at issue, with the exception of the Acai Total Burn scheme; individual liability for corporate malfeasance is available for violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1693, because such violations are also deemed to be violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 41-58, and that defendant is liable for Vertek's, defendant's wholly controlled company, violations of the EFTA because of his personal involvement in concocting and carrying out the several schemes that violated the EFTA; and defendant's challenges to the scope of the district court's injunction are unavailing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FTC in part, and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FTC with respect to the Acai Total Burn scheme. The court remanded so that the district court could modify its permanent injunction and the amount of restitution. View "FTC v. Kimoto" on Justia Law 2014-08-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Milan Dale Smith, Jr. 11-18023 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/13-12709/13-12709-2014-08-15.html Lakeland Regional Medical Center v. Astellas US, LLC, et al. 2014-08-15T07:11:30-08:00 2014-10-01T15:23:07-08:00 Astellas holds patents on a cardiac test and sells its unpatented pharmaceutical product, Adenoscan, for using during that test. The Medical Center, which conducts cardiac tests, filed suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, alleging that Astellas is able to overcharge the Medical Center for the Adenoscan product by unlawfully tying the patented right to perform the patented cardiac test to the purchase of the unpatented Adenoscan. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the Medical Center's request to certify a class seeking damages against Astellas for unlawful tying because the direct purchaser rule precludes the Medical Center's own treble damages claim. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify the class for purposes of seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lakeland Regional Medical Center v. Astellas US, LLC, et al." on Justia Law 2014-08-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Ebel 13-12709 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/13-1307/13-1307-2014-08-05.html Lenox MacLaren Surgical v. Medtronic, et al 2014-08-05T11:31:20-08:00 2014-10-01T15:19:26-08:00 Lenox MacLaren Surgical began to sell some of its bone mills (a device it manufactured for use in spinal surgery) through a Medtronic entity, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA. The arrangement ended badly: Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA initiated a recall of Lenox's bone mills, and another Medtronic entity began to manufacture and sell its own bone mill. The result, according to Lenox, was that four Medtronic entities acquired an unfair competitive advantage; thus, Lenox sued these entities for monopolization and attempted monopolization from 2007 to 2010. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both claims, and Lenox appealed. Upon review of the claims and the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding market definition, monopoly power, exclusionary conduct, and harm to competition. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Medtronic on the claims involving monopolization and attempted monopolization, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lenox MacLaren Surgical v. Medtronic, et al" on Justia Law 2014-08-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Robert Edwin Bacharach 13-1307 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/12-761/ POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. 2014-07-15T01:07:48-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:50-08:00 POM, which produces and sells a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend, filed a Lanham Act suit (15 U.S.C. 1125) against Coca-Cola, alleging that the name, label, marketing, and advertising of a Coca-Cola juice blend mislead consumers into believing the product consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it actually consists of less expensive apple and grape juices, and that the confusion causes POM to lose sales. The district court granted Coca-Cola partial summary judgment, ruling that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 321(f), 331, and its regulations preclude Lanham Act challenges to the name and label of the juice blend. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that competitors may bring Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA. The Court noted that the issue was preclusion, not pre-emption. Even if the Court's task is to reconcile or harmonize the statutes instead of to determine whether one is an implied repeal in part of another, the best way to do that does not require barring POM's Lanham Act claim. Neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA expressly forbids or limits Lanham Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. The laws complement each other in major respects: both touch on food and beverage labeling, but the Lanham Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while the FDCA protects public health and safety. The FDCA's enforcement is largely committed to the FDA, while the Lanham Act allows private parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a case-by¬case basis. Allowing Lanham Act suits takes advantage of synergies among multiple methods of regulation. Because the FDA does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures regarding all objectionable labels, preclusion of Lanham Act claims could leave commercial interests, and indirectly the general public, with less effective protection in the food and beverage labeling realm than in other less regulated industries. Neither the statutory structure nor the empirical evidence indicates there will be any difficulty in fully enforcing each statute. View "POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co." on Justia Law 2014-06-12 federal U.S. Supreme Court Anthony M. Kennedy 12-761 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/572/12-873/ Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 2014-07-15T01:06:53-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:46-08:00 Lexmark sells the only type of toner cartridges that work with its laser printers; remanufacturers acquire and refurbish used Lexmark cartridges to sell in competition with Lexmark's new and refurbished cartridges. Lexmark's "Prebate" program gives customers a discount on new cartridges if they agree to return empty cartridges to the company. Every Prebate cartridge has a microchip that disables the empty cartridge unless Lexmark replaces the chip. Static Control makes and sells components for cartridge remanufacture and developed a microchip that mimicked Lexmark's. Lexmark sued for copyright infringement. Static Control counterclaimed that Lexmark engaged in false or misleading advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and caused Static Control lost sales and damage to its business reputation. The district court held that Static Control lacked "prudential standing," applying a multifactor balancing test. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying a "reasonable interest" test. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated that the issue was not "prudential standing." Whether a plaintiff comes within a statute's zone of interests requires traditional statutory interpretation. The Lanham Act includes in its statement of purposes, "protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the control of Congress] against unfair competition." "Unfair competition" is concerned with injuries to business reputation and sales. A section 1125(a) plaintiff must show that its injury flows directly from the deception caused by the defendant's advertising; that occurs when deception causes consumers to withhold trade from the plaintiff. The zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement identify who may sue under section 1125(a) and provide better guidance than the multi-factor balancing test, the direct-competitor test, or the reasonable-interest test. Static Control comes within the class of plaintiffs authorized to sue under section 1125(a). Its alleged injuries fall within the zone of interests protected by the Act, and it sufficiently alleged that its injuries were proximately caused by Lexmark's misrepresentations. View "Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-03-25 federal U.S. Supreme Court Antonin Scalia 12-873 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12-133/ Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 2014-07-15T01:05:35-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:38-08:00 An agreement between American Express and merchants who accept American Express cards, requires that all of their disputes be resolved by arbitration and provides that there "shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis." The merchants filed a class action, claiming that American Express violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class action waiver was unenforceable and that arbitration could not proceed because of prohibitive costs. The Circuit upheld its reversal on remand in light of a Supreme Court holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. The Supreme Court reversed. The FAA reflects an overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. Courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements even for claims alleging violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA mandate has been overridden by a contrary congressional command. No contrary congressional command requires rejection of this waiver. Federal antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim or indicate an intention to preclude waiver of class-action procedures. The fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. View "Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest." on Justia Law 2013-06-20 federal U.S. Supreme Court Antonin Scalia 12-133 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12-416/ Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc. 2014-07-15T01:05:24-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:38-08:00 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) established procedures for identifying and resolving patent disputes between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. One procedure requires a prospective generic manufacturer to certify to the FDA that any listed, relevant patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug (paragraph IV). Generic manufacturers filed paragraph IV applications for generic drugs modeled after Solvay's FDA-approved, patented drug AndroGel. Solvay claimed patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). The FDA approved the generic product, but the generic companies entered into "reverse payment" settlements, agreeing not to bring the generic to market for a number of years and to promote AndroGel to doctors in exchange for millions of dollars. The FTC sued, alleging violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by agreeing to abandon patent challenges, to refrain from launching low-cost generic drugs, and to share in Solvay's monopoly profits. The district court dismissed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, calling for application of a "rule of reason" approach rather than a "quick look." Although the anti-competitive effects of the reverse settlement might fall within the exclusionary potential of Solvay's patent, the agreement is not immune from antitrust attack. It would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by looking only at patent law policy, and not at antitrust policies. The Court noted the Hatch-Waxman Act's general pro-competitive thrust, facilitating challenges to a patent's validity and requiring parties to a paragraph IV dispute to report settlement terms to antitrust regulators. Payment for staying out of the market keeps prices at patentee-set levels and divides the benefit between the patentee and the challenger, while the consumer loses. That a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent parties from settling their lawsuits; they may settle in other ways, e.g., by allowing the generic to enter the market before the patent expires without payment to stay out prior to that point. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-06-17 federal U.S. Supreme Court Stephen G. Breyer 12-416 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/11-864/ Comcast Corp. v. Behrend 2014-07-15T01:04:31-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:32-08:00 Comcast and its subsidiaries allegedly "cluster" cable television operations within a region by swapping their systems outside the region for competitor systems inside the region. Plaintiffs filed a class-action antitrust suit, claiming that Comcast's strategy lessens competition and leads to supra-competitive prices. The district court required them to show that the antitrust impact of the violation could be proved at trial through evidence common to the class and that damages were measurable on a classwide basis through a "common methodology." The court accepted only one of four proposed theories of antitrust impact: that Comcast's actions lessened competition from "overbuilders," i.e., companies that build competing networks in areas where an incumbent cable company already operates. It certified the class, finding that the damages from overbuilder deterrence could be calculated on a classwide basis, even though plaintiffs' expert acknowledged that his regression model did not isolate damages resulting from any one of the theories. In affirming, the Third Circuit refused to consider Comcast's argument that the model failed to attribute damages to overbuilder deterrence because doing so would require reaching the merits of claims at the class certification stage. The Supreme Court reversed: the class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The Third Circuit deviated from precedent in refusing to entertain arguments against a damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification. Under the proper standard for evaluating certification, plaintiffs' model falls far short of establishing that damages can be measured classwide. The figure plaintiffs' expert used was calculated assuming the validity of all four theories of antitrust impact initially advanced. Because the model cannot bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra¬competitive prices attributable to overbuilder deterrence, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class. View "Comcast Corp. v. Behrend" on Justia Law 2013-03-27 federal U.S. Supreme Court Antonin Scalia 11-864 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/568/11-1160/ Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc. 2014-07-15T01:03:51-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:29-08:00 Under Georgia's Hospital Authorities Law, Ga. Code 31-7-75, political subdivisions may create special-purpose hospital authorities to exercise public and essential governmental functions, including acquiring public health facilities. The Albany-Dougherty County Authority owns Memorial, one of two hospitals in the county, and formed private nonprofit corporations (PPHS AND PPMH)to manage it. After the Authority decided to purchase the county's other hospital and lease it to a PPHS subsidiary, the Federal Trade Commission issued an administrative complaint alleging that the transaction would violate the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The FTC and Georgia sought an injunction. The district court dismissed, citing the state-action doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Authority, as a local governmental entity, was entitled to immunity because the challenged anti-competitive conduct was a foreseeable result of the Law. The Supreme Court reversed. Georgia has not clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy allowing hospital authorities to make acquisitions that substantially lessen competition, so state-action immunity does not apply. State-action immunity is disfavored and applies only when it is clear that the challenged conduct is undertaken pursuant to the state's own regulatory scheme. There is no evidence Georgia affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership. The Authority's powers, including acquisition and leasing powers, simply mirror general powers routinely conferred by states on private corporations; a reasonable legislature's ability to anticipate the possibility of anti-competitive use of those powers falls short of clearly articulating an affirmative state policy to displace competition. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law 2013-02-19 federal U.S. Supreme Court Sonia Sotomayor 11-1160 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/568/11-982/ Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. 2014-07-15T01:03:47-08:00 2014-07-15T01:56:28-08:00 Nike alleged that Already's athletic shoes violated Nike's Air Force 1 trademark; Already challenged the trademark. While the suit was pending, Nike agreed not to raise any trademark or unfair competition claims against Already or any affiliated entity based on Already's existing footwear designs, or any future designs that constituted a "colorable imitation" of Already's current products. Nike moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice and to dismiss Already's counterclaim without prejudice. Already opposed dismissal of its counterclaim, indicating that Already planned to introduce new versions of its lines, that potential investors would not consider investing until Nike's trademark was invalidated, and that Nike had intimidated retailers into refusing to carry Already's shoes. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the case moot. The breadth of the covenant suffices to meet the burden imposed by the "voluntary cessation doctrine." The covenant is unconditional and irrevocable. Already did not establish that it engages in or has concrete plans to engage in activities that would arguably infringe Nike's trademark yet not be covered by the covenant. The fact that some individuals may base decisions on hypothetical speculation does not give rise to the sort of injury necessary to establish standing. The Court rejected the "sweeping argument" that, as one of Nike's competitors, Already inherently has standing because no covenant can eradicate the effects of a registered but invalid trademark. View "Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-01-09 federal U.S. Supreme Court Owen Josephus Roberts 11-982