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Zaynab Khadr
|Zaynab Khadr
Zaynab Khadr (?) in 2008
|1979 (age 35–36)
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
|Home town
|Toronto, Ontario & Peshawar, Pakistan
|1)Khalid Abdullah, m. 1997-divorced 1998;
2)Yacoub al-Bahr, m. 1999-divorced 2002;
3) Joshua Boyle, m. 2009-divorced 2010
|Safia Khadr
|Ahmed Khadr
Maha el-Samnah
Zaynab Khadr (in Arabic زينب خضر) (born 1979) is the eldest daughter and first child of Ahmed Khadr, a prominent Egyptian-Canadian citizen noted for charitable work among Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and suspected of being a terrorist and al-Qaeda member. Two of her younger brothers, Abduramhan and Omar, were held by the United States as enemy combatants in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp after being captured in Afghanistan in 2002.
With her family, she grew up in Pakistan and Canada, as they frequently traveled back and forth. Following a severe 1992 injury that left her father disabled, Zaynab became a "second mother" to the younger children of the family.[1] She was married and divorced three times, and has a daughter from her second marriage.
She and her widowed mother returned to Canada in February 2005. Khadr has since fought for the family members' legal rights to remain there. She has also worked for justice for her brothers. Abdullah Khadr was detained in Pakistan and resisted extradition to the United States; he finally returned to Canada in 2005. Abdurahman Khadr was also detained, but he had claimed to have been working for the United States CIA when he was held as a detainee in Guantanamo Bay detention camp, 2002-2003. In October 2010 her youngest brother Omar Khadr pleaded guilty to charges in a plea agreement, and was repatriated to Canada in 2012 to serve the rest of his eight-year sentence.
Early life and education[edit]
Zaynab Khadr was born in Ottawa, Ontario[1] in 1979, the eldest daughter and first child of Maha el-Samnah and Ahmed Khadr, Egyptian-Canadian citizens. Her father was in graduate school.[1]
The family moved to Pakistan in 1985, where her father worked for charities assisting Afghan refugees after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The children went to school there and were also home schooled by their mother. Zaynab has five younger brothers: Abdullah, Abdurahman, Abdulkareem (known as Kareem), Ismail (died), and Omar, and a younger sister.
In July 1995, her father arranged for the 15-year-old Zaynab to marry Khalid Abdullah, an Egyptian, in December. Her mother began preparing an apartment for the couple in the family's house in Pakistan.[1]
On November 19, 1995 Ayman al-Zawahiri bombed the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. Named as one of the conspirators, Zaynab's fiancé Abdullah went into hiding.[1] When police arrived eight days later to arrest her father on suspicion of involvement, Zaynab grabbed his rifle and screamed at them, while her mother barricaded the door.[1]
Zaynab later recalled having celebrated the engagement of her friend Umayma al-Zawahiri at the girl's family house in an all-day party. Umayma's father, al-Zawahiri, had knocked at Umayma's door to ask the two girls to keep their singing and partying quiet as it was nighttime.[2]
Marriage and family[edit]
In October 1997, Abdullah re-surfaced in Tehran and contacted the Khadr family to re-schedule the wedding. Khadr agreed to take his family on a long vacation, which they ended in Iran. They said farewell to Zaynab, by then reluctant, as she started a new life with Abdullah.[1] Six months after the couple began living in a rented Tehran apartment, Abdullah phoned his father-in-law to report that Zaynab was inconsolable at being separated from her family. The marriage was not working out, and Zaynab returned to live with her family.[1]
In 1999, Zaynab was introduced to Yacoub al-Bahr, a Yemeni who had fought in Bosnia. He was better-known as a wedding singer in Kabul, Afghanistan. Her father asked the boys of the family to vote on whether he should give his consent to the marriage, and did so after Abdurahman and Kareem voiced their enthusiasm; the younger Abdullah and Omar abstained.[1] The wedding was in Kabul. Both al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden attended. Zaynab later explained that nobody was individually invited, and that word of mouth informed interested parties about the open invitation to their upcoming wedding.[3] The couple moved into a separate wing of the Khadr household.[1]
The following year, Zaynab and her mother returned to Canada for several months late in her pregnancy, where she gave birth to a daughter, named Safia.[1] After returning to Afghanistan and introducing her new child to Rabiyah Hutchinson, Zaynab was advised to take her daughter to a doctor. Safia was diagnosed with hydrocephalus and required surgery, which Zaynab decided would be better performed at a Canadian hospital. Her husband disagreed, and insisted that a hospital in Lahore would be just as effective. When Zaynab insisted on taking her daughter to Canada, al-Bahr separated from her and left the household permanently.[1]
In late 2001, Ahmed Khadr encountered al-Bahr in Kabul; he advised him that he should either return to his wife and daughter, or consent to a divorce. After receiving written reassurance from Zaynab that she would not seek any form of restitution, al-Bahr agreed to a formal divorce.[1]
Life in post-invasion Afghanistan[edit]
In January 2002, Zaynab took Safia and Abdulkareem to Lahore for a stay at the hospital, where her daughter needed medical attention. Her brother Abdullah later joined them, since he required surgery to remove cartilage from his nose.[1]
He disappeared later that year, as did their younger brother Omar, not yet 16; she learned later that they were both being detained by the United States as enemy combatants at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.
In 2003, Zaynab, her daughter and her mother stayed at a house in Birmal, Pakistan for two days, before their hosts grew wary of American jets overhead. They moved further into the mountains of Waziristan.[4] Her father was killed in October 2003. Zaynab moved to Islamabad, where she lived for some time in a rented apartment with her daughter and younger sister.
In her book Wanted Women Deborah Scroggins describes meeting Zaynab while she was a house-guest of Khalid Khawaja, in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2004.[5]According to Scroggins, Zaynab told her that the time she lived under the Taliban were "the best five years of my life."[page needed]
Permanent return to Canada[edit]
Although her passport had been revoked by the Canadian High Commission in Pakistan after her father was alleged to be a terrorist, Khadr returned to Canada on February 17, 2005 to be with her mother, and help the legal defence teams of her brothers Abdullah and Omar.[3][6] Zaynab and her widowed mother Maha are both on passport "control" lists, meaning they will no longer be issued Canadian passports. This is due to the frequency with which they have reported losing their passports since 1999.[7]
When Zaynab returned to Canada, security officials, including Konrad Shourie, met her at the airport bearing a search warrant. It was based on the statement that she "has willingly participated and contributed both directly and indirectly towards enhancing the ability of Al Qaeda." They seized her laptop, DVDs, audiocassettes, diary and other files.[8][9] The security officials said that, through the computer files, they were able to determine the present locations of multiple al-Qaeda veterans, though they had no evidence to charge her. Zaynab said she had purchased the computer second-hand seven months before her trip.[10] After the expiry of the three-month limit on holding the items, the court granted the RCMP a one-year extension on June 18.[11][12][13]
On October 5, 2009, Isabel Teotonio, writing in the Toronto Star, reported on the extradition hearing for Zaynab's brother Abdullah Khadr. She wrote that Canadian officials had seized a hard drive from Zaynab that had belonged to her father.[9] Although Zaynab has indicated a desire to one day return to Pakistan, her Canadian passport remains withheld, rendering her unable to leave the country.
In 2004, Zaynab appeared in a PBS Frontline documentary entitled Son of al Qaeda, during which she said concerning the September 11th attacks:
"We don't like seeing people killed...[a]t the same time, when you're seeing your people being killed and killed and killed, everyday, everyday, everyday, and then you see whoever is doing this...being killed, you don't want to feel happy. But you just sort of think, "They deserve it. They've been doing it for such a long time, why shouldn't they feel it once in a while?"[14]
Most news stories reported only that she had supported the attacks, mobilizing public sentiment against the family.[15] Zaynab has worked to arrange legal support for other Canadians accused of militant actions in the war on terror, notably attending the bail hearings and preliminaries for the men and youths arrested in Toronto in 2006. Her presence has caused a stir in the media, while she maintains that many of the accused were friends of the family.[6]
In July 2008 clips from secret surveillance recordings at Guantanamo of Omar's first visit from Canadian officials were made public.[16] The clips stirred controversy, as they showed Omar being pleased, when he thought he was finally going to get help from Canadian officials; and they showed him weeping uncontrollably when he realized these Canadian officials were security officials, interested only in helping the CIA exploit him as an intelligence source. Global TV interviewed Zaynab and her mother who described being "devastated" by Omar's distress.
In October 2008, Zaynab began an 18-day hunger strike on Parliament Hill, where she hoped to draw attention to the government's inaction in bringing her brother Abdurahman back to face trial in Canada.[17]
Her brother Omar Khadr was released to Canadian custody at the end of 2012. In 2014 he was moved to a medium-security prison.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Shephard, Michelle (2008). Guantanamo's Child. John Wiley & Sons.
- ^ Wright, Lawrence, The Looming Tower, 2006
- ^ a b "Daughter of alleged terrorist returns: RCMP meets her with search warrant", February 27, 2005 Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; name "cageprisoners" defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ McGirk, Jan. The Independent, "The lonely world of al-Qaeda's wives", April 4
- ^ Deborah Scroggins (2012). Wanted Women -- Faith, Lies & the War on Terror: The Lives of Ayaan Hirsi Ali & Aaafia Siddiqui. Harper Collins. pp. 303, 304, 305–306, 428. ISBN 9780062097958. Retrieved 2013-06-16.
- ^ a b "Accused terrorists' families supply drama", Toronto Star, July 7, 2006
- ^ Shephard, Michelle and Tonda MacCharles. Toronto Star, "Shadow of CSIS will follow Khadr", December 3, 2003
- ^ "Khadr laptop seized at Toronto airport: report". CTV News. March 3, 2005. Retrieved 2008-01-13.
- ^ a b Isabel Teotonio (2009-10-05). "'A grenade launcher in every house': Fighting extradition to the U.S., Canadian Abdullah Khadr testifies that when you go fishing in Afghanistan, you do it with a bomb". Toronto Star. Retrieved 2009-10-05.
- ^ "Canada Discovers AQ Information Trove", Ed Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, June 15, 2005
- ^ "RCMP can hold items of Khadr family member, judge rules" , CBC, June 18, 2005
- ^ "Mounties uncover 'Al Qaeda' cache: Plans, tapes diaries seized at Pearson. Zaynab Khadr denies they belong to her", Toronto Star, June 14, 2005
- ^ Toronto hearing a window on terror probe, Toronto Star, June 18, 2005
- ^ [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/ Son of Al Qaeda, PBS documentary on Abdurahman Khadr
- ^ Shephard, Michelle. Toronto Star, "Khadr family views won't help Omar, lawyer says", September 9, 2008
- ^ Paula Simons, Jodie Sinnema (2008-07-15). "Khadr's mom, sister devastated". Global TV. Archived from the original on 2008-08-20.
"It is upsetting, it's very upsetting to us," said Zaynab Khadr, Omar's sister. "Especially the part where he was crying out. Out of the whole eight minutes, those were the two minutes that affected me the most. I felt it was very heartbreaking."
- ^ Michelle Shephard (2008-10-08). "Omar Khadr's sister stages hunger strike". Toronto Star. Retrieved 2008-10-19. mirror


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Search results for x chromosome
We've found 35 lyrics, 0 artists, and 0 albums matching x chromosome:
Mission incredible undercover convoy Full-tilt chromosome cowboy X-ray search and destroy Smoke stack black top Novocaine boy Got so low your mom
Mission incredible undercover convoy Full-tilt chromosome cowboy X-ray search and destroy Smoke stack black top Novocaine boy Got so low your mom
origami Organically grown, never give orgasms to organisms with X chromosomes Taking her home, good thing about her, She don't know her power to eat
never home alone, And only keep friends with 2-X chromosomes, So I command all these rappers: "Put the mic down!", Throw a grenade in your mouth
lacht wie andere Frauen sind Mich untern Tisch trinkt und auf mich drauf springt Ich will ein böses Mädchen, eine Amazone Sie hat zwei Y und fünf X
embalmin [We pros] I decompose, any rapper to the bone Down to they X and why chromosome So SEE MY NAME tagged in bold or italics [Bow, bitch] 'cause I'll be
of make believe Cream of cream of DNA She went to work on the seventh day Garden robbed by Adam's rib Her action started women's lib The chromosomes
Take me home take me home Have you ever even tried to use a comb I think you might be missing a chromosome Cause you keep comin back for more
What if I died in your arms tonight? Yeah, what if I, what if I, what if I Stay out the wonderment with them X's and the why's and the chromosomes Real
Stretch your legs in time and space [Incomprehensible] a passage through the vacuum Let me feel the stars burnin' on my face Ten for the gravity,
a hundred But you only ever found a fitty Three fingers in the honeycomb You ring just like a xylophone Devoted to the chromosome The day that you left
My Daddy was a man of letters My Mama was a head of state And when they got their chromosomes together They gave me all of their recessive traits
Spreading virus and Primate Camp! [x4] (Primate Camp) [x2] Dr. Zaus the physician And Zera pose a question With a chromosome a missing Can he reason, think,
chromosomes Experimental aircraft chemtrails across the sky Rain disease down on suburbia burning lungs stinging eyes Micro-cellular breakdown 'cause
warrior XY chromosome, sat heavy on the throne Touched something for you Ya stupid fail niggas fucked up Because bitches is talking They living, I'm
on the microphone Throwin' your chromosomes like a cyclone And commercial raps get the gun claps A wack on the ground of the head with my ill skill raps I'm a kill me
first pilots 52 white keys 51 jeans 50 gates of 49 nights of meditation 48 pairs of shoes 47 wines 46 human chromosomes 45 summer rise 44
Waited far too long For this day to dawn Marked position with an x and kept floating on Now I stretch and yawn All impostors gone Once again
these chromosomes hell Still these guns blaze on a ten hour swing shift Who I had thoroughly wanted to rip shit Grab the rags and towels
like Betty Y Minus that fatal chromosome Her hair is like the wine dark sea On which sailors come home I say "hey baby, I say, hey Betty X (I lean
chromosome All alone, I think about you night and day The sex, the skin, yeah yeah You make me want to stay All day don't walk away I'm inside you
science of death, MC design Let it be the main line in a text from vein to mind Let the chromosomes attack, simulate your fate Ship-shape in the matrix,
One two buckle that fool, He's fucking with me, if he's fucking with you Hillwood to my bones, to my chromosomes Got 2 44's so I'm not home alone
One two buckle that fool, He's fucking with me, if he's fucking with you Hillwood to my bones, to my chromosomes Got 2 44's so I'm not home alone
and doo-doo is brown Life is uphill but, not when you get down [Aceyalone] Sticks and stones, flesh and bones +Organic Electricity+ chromosomes I'm home alone,

subset: commoncrawl


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Friday, June 28, 2013
Tenth Circuit Recognizes For-Profit Corporations as Having Religious Freedom and Free Exercise Rights
In the contentious and closely-watched case of Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit has rendered its opinion concluding that a for-profit corporation has free exercise of religion rights under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment.
Hobby Lobby challenges the constitutionality of the so-called "contraception mandate" under the Affordable Care Act that require health insurance plans to provide contraception coverage to employees. We've previously discussed the issue and the circuit split here.
The federal district judge had rejected Hobby Lobby's claim, noting that it was a for-profit completely secular company - - - it is a corporation operating 514 arts and crafts stores in 41 states. The federal district judge also denied the injunction as to the for-profit corporation Mardel, a Christian supply and bookstore chain, and to the family owning both the corporations through a management trust. Hobby Lobby sought extraordinary relief from the United States Supreme Court after a Tenth Circuit panel declined to issue a stay; Justice Sotomayor in her role as Tenth Circuit Justice then rejected the claim, ruling that the privately held corporations did not "satisfy the demanding standard for the extraordinary relief they seek."
The Tenth Circuit granted the request for initial en banc review - - - thus, there is no Tenth Circuit panel opinion - - - and issued a lengthy set of opinions from the eight judges, one judge being recused. The majority opinion on pages 8-9 details the rationales of the individual judges. But the essential division is 5-3 over the issue of whether a corporation, even a for-profit secular corporation, has a right to free exercise of religion under RFRA and the First Amendment. The majority concluded there was such a right and that the corporations demonstrated a likelihood of success for prevailing on the merits.
Judge Timothy Tymkovich's more than 65 page opinion for the majority concluded that
Hobby Lobby and Mardel are entitled to bring claims under RFRA, have established a likelihood of success that their rights under this statute are substantially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and have established an irreparable harm. But we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on two of the remaining factors governing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.
Only a plurality of judges would have resolved the other two preliminary injunction factors - - - balance of equities and public interest - - - in Hobby Lobby and Mardel's favor, thus the remand.
The majority, however, held
as a matter of statutory interpretation that Congress did not exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA's protections. Such corporations can be "persons" exercising religion for purposes of the statute. Second, as a matter of constitutional law, Free Exercise rights may extend to some for-profit organizations.
(emphasis added). The opinion often conflates RFRA (which recall, is only applicable as to federal laws) and First Amendment. However, in specifically considering First Amendment doctrine, the majority's argument derived from two strands. First, it noted that individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and keep their Free Exercise rights - - - such as churches, citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993) (holding that a "not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law" prevailed on its Free Exercise claim). Second, it then noted that "unincorporated individuals may pursue profit while keeping their Free Exercise rights," citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (considering a Free Exercise claim of an Amish employer); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion) (considering a Free Exercise claim by Jewish merchants operating for-profit).
It then characterized the government's argument as being that these "Free Exercise rights somehow disappear" when "individuals incorporate and fail to satisfy Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3)." The majority found this distinction to be one that cannot be supported by First Amendment doctrine. It did, however, implicitly limit the facts under which for-profit corporations could be found to have free exercise rights:
The government nonetheless raises the specter of future cases in which, for example, a large publicly traded corporation tries to assert religious rights under RFRA. That would certainly seem to raise difficult questions of how to determine the corporation's sincerity of belief. But that is not an issue here. Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not publicly traded corporations; they are closely held family businesses with an explicit Christian mission as defined in their governing principles. The Greens, moreover, have associated through Hobby Lobby and Mardel with the intent to provide goods and services while adhering to Christian standards as they see them, and they have made business decisions according to those standards. And the Greens are unanimous in their belief that the contraceptive-coverage requirement violates the religious values they attempt to follow in operating Hobby Lobby and Mardel. It is hard to compare them to a large, publicly traded corporation, and the difference seems obvious.
Thus, the majority stated that it did not share any concerns that its holding would prevent courts from distinguishing businesses that are not eligible for RFRA's - - - and presumably the First Amendment's - - - protections.
While the analysis of substantial burden that follows is important, it is the holding that a secular for-profit corporation has a sincerely held religious belief that entitles it to assert a free exercise claim is the centerpiece of the controversy.
Indeed, Chief Judge Briscoe, joined by Judge Lucero, call the majority's opinion on this point
nothing short of a radical revision of First Amendment law, as well as the law of corporations. But whatever one might think of the majority's views, the fact remains that they are wholly unsupported by the language of the Free Exercise Clause or the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, and are thus, at best, "considerations for the legislative choice."
The ability of for-profit corporations to have Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment - - - along with their Free Speech rights as articulated in the still-controversial Citizens United v. FEC, decided in 2010 and liberally cited in Hobby Lobby - - - is highly contested. This may certainly be going (back) to the United States Supreme Court.
[image via]
June 28, 2013 in Campaign Finance, Congressional Authority, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Gender, Opinion Analysis, Privacy, Religion, Reproductive Rights, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Sunday, June 23, 2013
Ninth Circuit Affirms Injunction Against Judicial Endorsement, Expenditure Ban
The Ninth Circuit this week upheld in part a lower court permanent injunction against the enforcement of a Montana statute making it a criminal offense for any political party to "endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure to support or oppose a judicial candidate" in a nonpartisan judicial election.
The ruling in Sanders County Republican Central Committee v. Fox is no surprise, after the Ninth Circuit ruled last fall that Montana's ban, at Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 13-35-231, insofar as it restricted endorsements and expenditures, violated the First Amendment.
But the court also reversed the lower court's injunction against enforcing the ban on contributions. It ruled that the earlier case didn't address the constitutionality of the state's ban on contributions and that the contribution ban wasn't before the court here.
This week's ruling means that Montana cannot enforce its ban against political parties endorsing or spending money in support of or in opposition to a judicial candidate in a nonpartisan judicial election. But the state can enforce its ban against political parties making contributions to those judicial candidates.
June 23, 2013 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
Common Cause Takes Filibuster Challenge to D.C. Circuit
Common Cause this week pursued its case against the Senate filibuster at the D.C. Circuit when it filed its appellate brief, arguing that Judge Emmett G. Sullivan (D.D.C.) was wrong to dismiss the case last December and pressing its argument that the filibuster is unconstitutional. Common Cause's press release is here; the brief is here. We posted on Judge Sullivan's decision here.
Recall that Judge Sullivan dismissed the case, Common Cause v. Biden, for lack of standing and for raising a political question. In its brief, Common Cause takes on Judge Sullivan's ruling and argues that the filibuster is unconstitutional.
As to standing, Common Cause argues that House-member-plaintiffs have standing to challenge Senate Rule XXII, the cloture rule that allows a filibuster if the majority can't muster 60 votes to close debate, because the Rule allowed a minority in the Senate to effectively nullify their votes in favor of the DISCLOSE and DREAM Acts. Common Cause relies on language from Raines v. Byrd (1997), which says that "legislators whose votes . . . would have been sufficient to . . . enact a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action . . . does not go into effect on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" by a procedural violation of the Constitution. (In Raines, the Court held that Senator Byrd lacked standing when he mounted a facial challenge to the Line-Item Veto Act but failed to show that his vote on any specific appropriation bill had been nullified by the Act.)
Common Cause also argues that it has standing in its own right, because the filibuster of the DISCLOSE Act frustrated its core mission of campaign reform. It argues that it has standing based on its members, because they cannot learn the identities of certain campaign contributors. And it argues that the "dreamer"-plaintiffs have standing, because the filibuster of the DREAM Act denied them the benefits of that Act.
As to political question, Common Cause says that rules of Congress are justiciable, that they must be constitutional, and that "[t]here is nothing in the record of the Federal Convention indicating that the Framers intended to delegate to either house the authority to depart from the principle of majority rule . . . ." Brief at 15-16.
Finally, on the merits, Common Cause says,
Rule XXII's supermajority vote requirement is inconsistent with the rules of parliamentary practice that preceeded the adoption of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers as reflected in The Federalist Papers, the text of the Quorum and the Presentment Clauses, the exclusive list of exceptions to the principle of majority rule in the Constitution which specify when a supermajority vote is required, the provision of Article I, Sec. 3, cl. 4 that gives the Vice President the power to cast the tie-breaking majority vote when the Senate is "equally divided," and the first rules adopted by the Senate and the House immediately after ratification.
Brief at 56.
June 19, 2013 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, May 6, 2013
Daily Read: New Book "The Price of Justice" Discusses the Caperton Case
The 2009 sharply divided Supreme Court opinion in Caperton v. Massey Coal is the centerpiece of the new book, The Price of Justice: A True Story of Greed and Corruption by Laurence Leamer. Recall that the Court in Caperton ruled that due process required judicial recusal of a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals judge, Justice Brent Benjamin, in a case involving Massey Coal because of the contributions by Massey Coal to Justice Benjamin's campaign.
The starred review from Publisher's Weekly describes the book as
the riveting and compulsively readable tale of the epic battle between Don Blankenship, the man who essentially ran the West Virginia coal industry through his company Massey Energy, and two seemingly ordinary attorneys: Bruce Stanley and David Fawcett. The centerpiece of the story is a West Virginia mine owner whom Blankenship purposefully bankrupted, and on whose behalf Stanley and Fawcett won (in 2002) a $50 million dollar verdict that is still unpaid. In hopes of having the ruling overturned by the West Virginia Supreme Court, Blankenship sought to "buy" a seat on the court by contributing over $3 million to the successful campaign of a conservative judicial candidate. However, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually found that Blankenship's contributions were too much to allow the new West Virginia justice to hear the case. Leamer has produced a Shakespearean tale of greed, corporate irresponsibility, and personal hubris on the one hand, and idealism, commitment to justice, and personal sacrifice on the other. Blankenship is a villain for all time, and Stanley and Fawcett are lawyers who bring honor to their profession.
A good addition to that summer reading list for anyone interested in constitutional law and anyone who might like a reminder that lawyers can, indeed, be heroic.
May 6, 2013 in Books, Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Elections and Voting, Fourteenth Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Friday, April 26, 2013
Campaign Finance and DOMA
In an interesting advisory opinion from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the ability of same-sex couples married under state law to make political contributions similar to opposite-sex married couples is thwarted by the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Recall that the United States Supreme Court is currently considering the constitutionality of DOMA in United States v. Windsor, argued last month.
The advisory opinion explained the underlying regulatory scheme:
Notwithstanding the prohibition on contributions in the name of another, a Commission regulation governing "[c]ontributions by spouses" provides that "limitations on contributions . . . shall apply separately to contributions made by each spouse even if only one spouse has income." 11 C.F.R. 110.1(i). Thus, under Section 110.1(i), a spouse with no separate income may make a contribution in his or her own name "through the checking account of the other spouse."
It concluded that "so long as the relevant provisions of DOMA remain in effect, the Committee may not apply 11 C.F.R. 110.1(i) to contributions from same-sex couples married under state law," although the Commission recognized that DOMA was currently under review.
In a separately issued concurring statement, FEC Chair Ellen Weintraub (pictured) emphasized that her "vote today was in no way intended to endorse the discriminatory, irrational burden that DOMA places on political participation by individuals in same sex."
If DOMA is not declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on the basis of equal protection, the FEC's opinion might be fertile ground on which to grow a First Amendment challenge.
[image of Ellen Weintraub via]
April 26, 2013 in Campaign Finance, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Family, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Sexual Orientation | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, April 16, 2013
Daily Read: Albany Law Review Symposium on Free Speech
Now in print is the Fall 2012 Albany Law Review Symposium "What Are We Saying? Violence, Vulgarity, Lies . . . And The Importance Of 21st Century Free Speech."
Here's the TOC of the issue with links to pdfs of the articles, essay, and discussions:
-- Ronald K.L. Collins......Foreword: Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism
-- Robert M. O'Neil........Hate Speech, Fighting Words, and Beyond--Why American Law is Unique
-- Rodney A. Smolla........Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez
-- Jeffery C. Barnum.........Encouraging Congress to Encourage Speech: Reflections on United States v. Alvarez
-- Marjorie Heins..........The Supreme Court and Political Speech in the 21st Century: The Implications of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
-- R. George Wright.........Are There First Amendment "Vacuums?": The Case of the Free Speech Challenge to Tobacco Package Labeling Requirement
-- Robert D. Richards & David J. Weinert.........Punting in the First Amendment's Red Zone: The Supreme Court's "Indecision" on the FCC's Indecency Regulations Leaves Broadcasters Still Searching For Answers
-- Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican.........Media Diversity and Online Advertising
-- Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey.........Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression
-- Owen Fiss........The Democratic Mission of the University
-- Welcome & Opening Remarks.......Benjamin P. Pomerance
-- Debate on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.......Floyd Abrams and Alan B. Morrison, moderated by Ronald K.L. Collins
-- Panel Discussion on Recent U.S. Supreme Court Free Speech Cases and Their Implications......Adam Liptak (moderator), Ronald K.L. Collins, Susan N. Herman, Alan B. Morrison, Robert M. O'Neil, Robert D. Richards
April 16, 2013 in Campaign Finance, First Amendment, Scholarship, Speech | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, March 12, 2013
Zimmer on Inequality and Money in Politics
We don't talk about economic inequality much these days in constitutional law--at least not as much as we should. And we certainly haven't heard enough about poverty, its causes, and its solutions in politics. ConLawProf Mike Zimmer (Loyola, Chicago) is out to do something about that in his excellent piece Inequality, Individualized Risk, and Insecurity, recently posted on SSRN and based on his Thomas E. Fairchild Lecture at the University of Wisconsin Law School last April.
Zimmer's core argument connects the dots between inequality in today's economy, government policy, and money in politics--in a way that we don't often hear, even in discussions about campaign finance reform. (Sure, there's plenty of talk about the vast amounts of money in politics, but we don't often connect that to poverty and economic inequality.) Here's Zimmer:
The thesis of this paper is that our extreme inequality in part results from government policy, that much government policy is the result of the undue influence of money in politics, and that, before any reform is likely, the dominance of money in politics must be substantially reduced. An important question is how that dominance can be reduced; however, the ansewr to that question is far from clear.
Zimmer takes us through the current state of economic inequality and connects that to government policy. He limits his focus to labor policy, but still he manages a wide-ranging discussion, tying federal labor policy to Supreme Court rulings (in Ricci v. DeStefano, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, and even Ashcroft v. Iqbal) to show how the Court has aided and abetted Congress in tamping down labor rights at every turn. Again, Zimmer:
In sum, putting these decisions together, employers with collective bargaining agreements have a strong incentive to require an arbitration clause shifting all statutory claims to arbitration but at the same time precluding jury trials and class actions. That same incentive exists for employers without a union representing its workers.
If, somehow, an employee with a federal statutory claim is able to avoid having it shunted into arbitration, the Supreme Court has erected formidable procedural barriers to it reaching trial. Until recently, employment discrimination cases were not likely to be dismissed before the summary judgment stage, which was typically triggered once discovery was complete. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court moved up the possibility of dismissal to the earlier pleading stage before any discovery typically takes place.
Zimmer then persuasively ties federal policies that create inequalities to money in politics, again examining the Supreme Court's complicity (in Citizens United). He calls for campaign finance reform, but, recognizing that "the prospects . . . are not good," he alternatively suggests an economic equality social movement. Zimmer says the Occupy Movement is a start; so is popular culture (with, e.g., Steven Colbert's efforts to highlight the problems with super-PACs).
Zimmer's piece, with its tying-together of everything from poverty and extreme inequality to labor policy to campaign finance to social movements, is a joy to read. Highly recommended.
[Image: Vincent Van Gogh, The Potato Eaters, Google Art Project]
March 12, 2013 in Campaign Finance, News, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, February 19, 2013
Court to Test Individual Campaign Contribution Limits
The Supreme Court today said it would take up McCutcheon v. FEC, a case testing federal biennial limits on contributions to candidates, PACs, parties, and committees. (The jurisdictional statement is here.) While the case directly challenges biennial limits under the Buckley framework, the petitioner also preserved the issue whether Buckley's contribution-expenditure scrutiny distinction violates free speech.
It's not clear how much the case could matter to the sheer amount of money in politics. That's because contributors already have ample and growing opportunities to contribute to proliferating super-PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations. But if the Court takes on Buckley's contribution-expenditure distinction, the ruling could be quite significant both for First Amendment doctrine and money in politics. (That distinction means that the government can regulate contributions to prevent political corruption, but expenditures get full First Amendment protection.) It could be the next step after Citizens United in further opening the money spigot.
The case directly attacks federal biennial expenditure limits under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. BCRA limits an individual's contribution to a candidate, a national party, a local party, and a PAC in each calendar year. These are called "base limits." But BCRA also limits an individual's total contributions to all federal candidates, party committees, and PACs every two years. These are the "biennial limits."
McCutcheon argues that the biennial limits restrict his ability to contribute to as many candidates and parties as he'd like, thus restricting his First Amendment rights. In particular, he says that the biennial limits under BCRA have no justification and therefore must be struck.
To see why, start with the old biennial limit upheld by the Court in Buckley. Back then, there were no base limits for contributions to PACs or national or local parties. (There was a base limit on contributions to candidates, though--$1,000 per.) McClutcheon argues that the Court in Buckley upheld the biennial limit because it was designed to prevent a contributor from circumventing the base limit on candidates. How? By contributing massive amounts through political committees that would simply funnel the money to the candidate.
McClutcheon says that BCRA--with its base limits and biennial limits on candidates, committees, PACs, and parties--can't be designed to prevent circumvention in the same way. This is because BCRA's base limits themselves restrict circumvention. (BCRA's base limit on a party, e.g., prevents a contributor from funneling massive amounts of money through the party to the candidate). McClutcheon says that the only effects of BCRA's biennial limits are to restrict the total amount of cash he can spend and, with the base limits, to restrict the number of candidates, committees, PACs, and parties that he can spend on--thus violating his First Amendment rights. (E.g.: He would've liked to give $25,000 each to the RNC, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican Congressional Committee before the 2012 election, but that would have exceeded the biennial limit.) McClutcheon says his case against the biennial limit on contributions to candidates is even stronger, because even Buckley didn't hold that there's an anti-circumvention interest in that limit. He claims that that limit serves only to prevent him from contributing to as many people as he'd like.
McClutcheon also argues that the biennial limits are too low.
The Court could rule on the narrow issue whether the biennial limits violate Buckley's anti-circumvention interest (which supported the old biennial limit). This kind of ruling (if, as expected, it overturns the biennial limits) could give contributors another way to spend more money in politics, but it would retain Buckley's contribution-expenditure scrutiny distinction. Alternatively, the Court could take on BCRA's biennial limits and Buckley's contribution-expenditure distinction. This could fundamentally change how we approach campaign finance restrictions under the First Amendment (even if it's not obvious that it would necessarily result in a ton more money in politics).
February 19, 2013 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, First Amendment, Fundamental Rights, News, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Thursday, February 14, 2013
Daily Read: Dworkin on Winn and Bennett (and more)
Writing in The New York Review of Books in 2011, the late Ronald Dworkin described two recently rendered United States Supreme Court cases as "embarrassingly bad." The cases were Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and the then-pending Arizona Free Enterprise Club PAC v. Bennett.
Both were 5-4 decisions and both continue to be controversial, although the Bennett is overshadowed by Citizens United.
Dworkin's article is worth a (re)read.
For those in a more reflective mood, the New York Review of Books has highlighted his 2011 essay "What is a Good Life?" Dworkin wrote:
We are charged to live well by the bare fact of our existence as self-conscious creatures with lives to lead. We are charged in the way we are charged by the value of anything entrusted to our care. It is important that we live well; not important just to us or to anyone else, but just important.
And for those interested in the Court's current docket, Dworkin's post-oral argument analysis of Fisher v. UT is a must-read.
Dworkin's voice will be missed.
February 14, 2013 in Affirmative Action, Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Current Affairs, First Amendment, Religion, Speech, Standing, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Daily Read: Elizabeth Warren on Federalism and Administrative Constitutionalism
With the election of Elizabeth Warren to the United States Senate, today might a good time to reread her article Unsafe at Any Rate, published in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas in 2007.
Warren was arguing for the creation of a new federal agency, the Financial Product Safety Commission. In doing so, she not only argued in favor of regulation (using an originalist argument among others), but also argued that federal regulation was appropriate:
The credit industry is not without regulation; credit transactions have been regulated by statute or common law since the founding of the Republic. Traditionally, states bore the primary responsibility for protecting their citizens from unscrupulous lenders, imposing usury caps and other credit regulations on all companies doing business locally. While states still play some role, particularly in the regulation of real-estate transactions, their primary tool–interest rate regulation–has been effectively destroyed by federal legislation. Today, any lender that gets a federal bank charter can locate its operations in a state with high usury rates (e.g., South Dakota or Delaware), then export that states' interest rate caps (or no caps at all) to customers located all over the country. As a result, and with no public debate, interest rates have been effectively deregulated across the country, leaving the states powerless to act. In April of this year, the Supreme Court took another step in the same direction in Watters v. Wachovia, giving federal regulators the power to shut down state efforts to regulate mortgage lenders without providing effective federal regulation to replace it.
Recall that in Watters, the Court found no merit in the Supremacy Clause (preemption) and Tenth Amendment arguments.
Warren also argued that a federal agency could intervene more successfully than Congress because "the financial services industry is routinely one of the top three contributors to national political campaigns, giving $133 million over the past five years" and thus "the likelihood of quick action to respond to specific problems and to engage in meaningful oversight is vanishingly slim."
Although Congress eventually passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, with a FPSC agency, Elizabeth Warren was not named as its head given strong opposition to her by the Senate - the legislative body she will now be joining.
[image: Elizabeth Warren via]
November 7, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Commerce Clause, Current Affairs, Federalism, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, November 5, 2012
Frontline on Montana Campaign Finance
PBS's Frontline released a documentary last week on campaign finance in Montana that's well worth a look. The documentary provides background on American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, the case challenging Montana's restriction on independent campaign expenditures. The Supreme Court summarily reversed a lower court ruling in that case upholding the restriction.
We covered the Supreme Court's recent rejection of an application to vacate the Ninth Circuit's stay of a lower court ruling that Montana's campaign contribution limits violated the First Amendment.
November 5, 2012 in Campaign Finance, First Amendment, News, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
Supreme Court Rejects Application to Vacate Montana Campaign Finance Ruling
The Supreme Court today rejected an application to vacate the Ninth Circuit's stay of District Judge Lovell's earlier decision that Montana's low campaign contribution limits violated the First Amendment. (Thanks to Emily Phelps over at the Constitutional Accountability Center's Text and History Blog for the tip.) This latest ruling in Lair v. Bullock means that Montana's contribution limits will remain in place pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit and, in particular, through the election. All signs now point to a Ninth Circuit reversal of Judge Lovell's ruling that the contribution limits violated the First Amendment.
Our most recent post on the case, with links to earlier decisions and background, is here. Phelps's post at CAC's Text and History blog, with more on the political context of the case, is here.
October 23, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
Ninth Circuit Stays Lower Court, Retains Montana Contribution Limits Pending Appeal
A three-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit in Lair v. Bullock granted Montana's motion to stay District Judge Lovell's earlier decision that Montana's low campaign contribution limits violated the First Amendment. (Recall that the panel previously granted a temporary stay. Here's some background.) The ruling means that Montana's campaign contribution limits remain in place pending appeal and sends a strong signal that the Ninth Circuit will reverse Judge Lovell's decision and uphold the limits.
The panel reaffirmed its own ruling in Montana Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman (upholding Montana's low campaign contribution limits against a First Amendment challenge) and rejected any notion that the Supreme Court's ruling in Randall v. Sorrell (overturning Vermont's low campaign contribution limits) abrogated Eddleman. Here's what the Ninth Circuit panel said:
We conclude that the State of Montana has made a strong showing that a merits panel of this Court will likely conclude that, absent en banc proceedings or an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, we remain bound by our decision in Eddleman. We also conclude that a merits panel is likely to hold that the analytical framework of the Supreme Court's decision in Randall does not alter the analysis of Buckley or Shrink Missouri in a way that affects our decision in Eddleman, for three reasons. First, there is no opinion of the Court in Randall. Second, even if we thought that Justice Breyer's plurality opinioin represented the narrowest view of a majority of the Court, it did not depart from the principles of Buckley and Shrink Missouri that we applied in Eddleman. Third, even if we applied Randall to [the Montana limits], we cannot find, on the basis of the district court's findings, reason to disagree with, much less overturn, Eddleman. In light of Montana's interest in regulating campaign contributions, the lack of evidence that other parties will be substantially injured, and the public's substantial interest in the stability of its electoral system in the final weeks leading to an election, we will stay the order pending the state's appeal.
Op. at 3-4.
October 17, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, October 15, 2012
Developments in Montana Campaign Contribution Case
Recall that District Judge Charles C. Lovell (Montana) ruled earlier this month in Lair v. Murry that Montana's low campaign contribution limits for individuals and political parties violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing those limits. Judge Lovell wrote that he'd issue more detailed findings and conclusions soon. (He did; see below.)
But late last week, before Judge Lovell issued his follow-up, the Ninth Circuit issued a temporary stay of Judge Lovell's ruling, putting the limits back into place pending further action by the Ninth Circuit. The three-judge panel wrote that Judge Lovell's original ruling contained no findings and conclusions, and thus "the court is severely constrained in its consideration of the underlying issues raised in the emergency motion [for a temporary stay], including whether, in light of Randall v. Sorrell . . . our decision in Montana Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman . . . must be revisited."
A little background. The Ninth Circuit previously upheld Montana's low limits against a First Amendment challenge in Montana Right to Life Ass'n in 2003. The Ninth Circuit in Montana Right to Life Ass'n relied on the Supreme Court's Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (2000), which rejected a claimed constitutional minimum on campaign contributions and instead said the test was whether Missouri's contribution limit was so low as to impede the ability of the candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy. But since 2003, the Supreme Court overturned Vermont's ultra-low contribution limits in Randall v. Sorrell (2006). Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel wondered whether Judge Lovell thought that Randall v. Sorrell abrogated circuit law in Montana Right to Life Ass'n.
Judge Lovell answered that question later last week, when he issued his promised findings and conclusions. He wrote,
The Randall opinion is directly on point here. The Randall decision undeniably paints a new gloss on the law and provides important insight into the lower bound for contribution limits. Randall is intervening law that obviates Montana Right to Life's precedential value, particularly in light of the Randall plurality's expressed suspicion of Montana's contribution limits.
Op. at 28.
The case is now in the Ninth Circuit's court. While its temporary stay is still in effect, the court may revoke it in light of Judge Lovell's findings, or it may not. Whatever the court does with its temporary stay, it looks like the appeal will move forward. The Ninth Circuit established a page for the case here.
October 15, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Thursday, October 4, 2012
District Court Rules Montana Campaign Contribution Limits Unconstitutional
District Judge Charles C. Lovell (Montana) ruled in Lair v. Murry that Montana's low campaign contribution limits for individuals and political parties violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing those limits.
The State says that it will seek an emergency stay in the Ninth Circuit. Barring a stay, however, or a quick appeal, the ruling means that Montana's limits on individual and political party contributions are unenforceable--this election cycle, and maybe beyond.
This is the second recent significant defeat for Montana in the area of campaign finance restrictions. Recall that the Supreme Court summarily reversed a Montana Supreme Court ruling upholding the state's restrictions on corporate electioneering expenditures. (The Montana court ruled that Montana's unique history of political corruption justified the restriction, even under Citizens United. The Supreme Court disagreed.)
The restrictions at issue cap individual and political party contributions to candidates at very low levels. For example, Montana Code Section 13-37-216(1)(a) caps contributions at $500 for candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, $250 for candidates for all other state-wide offices, and $130 for candidates to all other offices.
The plaintiffs argued that these limits violated the First Amendment. Judge Lovell agreed. In a very short order, he wrote that "[t]he contribution limits prevent candidates from 'amassing the resources necessary for effective campaign advocacy.'" (Quoting Randall v. Sorrell (2006) (overturning Vermont's low limits on campaign contributions)).
Judge Lovell wrote that he'd later issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of his order.
October 4, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Sunday, September 16, 2012
Seventh Circuit Upholds State Campaign Finance Disclosure Requirements
A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled last week in Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan that Illinois's campaign finance disclosure requirements, which require registration and disclosure even of groups whose "major purpose" is not influencing electoral campaigns, were not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
The ruling means that Illinois state law stands, even as to those groups whose "major purpose" is not influencing electoral campaigns--the 504(c)(4) groups who famously escape disclosure requirements under federal campaign finance disclosure laws. It means that even those groups--which are often designed with the purpose of shielding their donors from disclosure--have to report under state law. The ruling also deepens a circuit split on this point, with a Tenth Circuit case, New Mexico Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669 (2010), invalidating a state disclosure law as applied to an organization because it did not "satisfy the 'major purpose' test," which "sets the lower bounds for when regulation as a political committee is constitutionally permissible," and a Fourth Circuit case, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (2008), concluding that before Citizens United state disclosure law violated the First Amendment because "an entity must have 'the major purpose' of supporting or opposing a candidate to be designated a political committee."
Illinois law requires groups and individuals that accept "contributions," make "expenditures," or sponsor "electioneering communication" in excess of $3,000 to make regular financial disclosures to the State Board of Elections. The plaintiff, a 501(c)(4) organization, challenged Illinois's disclosure law, arguing that five of its definitions--"electioneering communications," "political committee," "contribution," "expenditure," and "independent expenditure"--were facially vague and overbroad.
Illinois disclosure law tracked federal law, with three key differences: (1) Illinois disclosure requirements cover election activity relating to ballot initiatives (which have no federal analog); (2) Illinois law does not exempt from regulation those groups that lack the "major purpose" of influencing electoral campaigns; and (3) Illinois disclosure requirements cover campaign-related advertisements that appear on the Internet. Recall that the Supreme Court upheld federal disclosure requirements in Citizens United, so the court here only analyzed whether these three distinctions were unconstitutional.
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that these three provisions make the law unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. As to the second difference--the one that sweeps in 501(c)(4) organizations that so famously hide their contributors under federal disclosure requirements--the court rejected CIF's argument that the "major purpose" test is a constitutional test, so that those organizations that do not have as a "major purpose" the election of a candidate must be exempt from disclosure. The court gave four reasons. First, it said that when Buckley v. Valeo came down--and first ruled on the "major purpose" question, interpreting language in the FECA (and not the Constitution)--political committees faced much greater disclosure burdens under FECA than they do today under Illinois's disclosure requirements. Next, Illinois law defines political committee more narrowly than FECA by covering only groups that accept contributions or make expenditures "on behalf of or in opposition to" a candidate or ballot initiative. Third, application of a "major purpose" test could yield the perverse result that a small group dedicated to electing a state representing and that spends $3,000 could be required to register and disclose, while a major organization that spends millions could dodge registration requirements because its "major purpose" isn't electing a candidate. Finally, groups covered under a "major purpose" test could easily dodge disclosure requirements by dilluting its own message by broadening it beyond electioneering activities.
Judge Posner dissented, arguing that a handful of provisions in the Illinois law are vague.
September 16, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
West Virginia Supreme Court Strikes Public Campaign Finance Law
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ruled in State of West Virginia ex rel Loughry v. Tennant that the matching funds provision in the state's public campaign finance law violated the First Amendment. The ruling follows the Supreme Court's decision in 2011 in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett striking a similar Arizona law.
West Virginia's law, enacted in 2010, before Arizona Free Enterprise came down, provided a lump-sum initial payment to any participating candidate in a state election for the state Supreme Court of Appeals. It then provided matching funds for a participating candidate when a privately-financed opposing candidate spent the amount equivalent to the lump-sum payment plus twenty percent. In short, this meant that a participating candidate would receive matching funds from the state above the initial lump-sum payment whenever his or her privately-funded opponent spent more than the initial lump-sum payment plus twenty percent. Thus West Virginia's scheme forced the same kind of speech-restricting choice on a non-participating candidate that the Supreme Court said was foisted on a non-participating candidate in Arizona Free Enterprise: spend more (i.e., speak more) and trigger matching funds for your opponent, or don't spend/speak more.
West Virginia's law only applied to judicial candidates for the state Supreme Court of Appeals, though. This was by design: the legislature was concerned about the reputation of the judiciary in light of the problems that gave rise to Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., among others. The petitioner here argued that West Virginia's law was distinguishable from Arizona's for that reason--that judicial elections raise especial concerns that exempt them from the analysis in Arizona Free Enterprise.
The court rejected that argument and ruled that Arizona Free Enterprise applied with full force to all elections,including judicial elections. It went on to say that the matching fund scheme wasn't narrowly tailored: the state could have adopted a less speech-restrictive means to achieving its interest by simply increasing the amount of the initial lump-sum payment; and the matching fund scheme didn't advance the state's interest in protecting the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary in an election where three of the four candidates were self-financed.
The court allowed the petitioner to keep his initial lump-sum payment, however, saying that there was no constitutional problem with that.
The case means that the petitioner, a participating candidate who sought matching funds by way of mandamus after the state itself concluded that the matching fund scheme was unconstitutional and declined to pay, will not get matching funds for his election. And because the court ruled the scheme unconstitutional, neither will anybody else.
September 12, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
Nebraska Court Overturns Campaign Finance Law, Stretches Doctrine
The Nebraska Supreme Court last week in State of Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. Gale ruled that Nebraska's public campaign finance law violated the First Amendment.
The ruling extends and stretches the Supreme Court's rulings in Davis v. FEC and Arizona Free Enterprise Fund v. Bennett. (We also posted on Bennett here.) It also forecloses yet one more policy option for encouraging participation in a public campaign finance system and to reduce the dramatic disparaties in spending in certain elections.
Nebraska's law, the Campaign Finance Limitation Act (CFLA), provides public financing for participating candidates in exchange for those candidates' agreement to limit their spending in a particular election. But the CFLA doesn't start with a state block grant for participating candidates. Instead, the CFLA requires participating candidates to raise 25% of the spending cap on their own before the public financing system kicks in. Then, after a participating candidate raises 25% of the spending cap, that participating candidate receives a state grant in the amount of the difference between the spending cap and their non-participating opponent's estimated or actual expenditures.
An example: If the public financing spending cap for an election for a particular office is $100,000.00, a participating candidate has to raise $25,000.00 on his or her own. Now suppose that candidate's non-participating opponent either estimates or actually spends $120,000.00. The participating candidate receives $20,000.00 from the state (the difference between the spending cap and the estimated or actual expenditures of the non-participating opponent). That leaves the participating candidate with $45,000.00 total. The participating candidate can continue to raise money up to $100,000.00--that is, another $55,000.00--on his or her own. Thus the CFLA provided only $20,000.00 to the participating candidate--an amount determined by the estimated or actual expenditures of the non-participating candidate, to be sure, but not an amount that equalizes expenditures in any meaningful sense or provides the participating candidate with much of a tail wind.
One more feature of the Act: The candidates have to determine whether to participate within 10 days after they form a candidate committee. This means that a non-participating candidate has to indicate his or her intention to exceed the CFLA cap (that is, not to participate) before he or she knows whether an opponent will participate.
The court ruled that the scheme violated the First Amendment. Following Bennett, the court said that the state's interests in ensuring elections free of corruption or the appearance of corruption, providing the electorate with information, and gathering data to detect violations of the CFLA were not compelling. And the court said that the Act wasn't narrowly tailored (largely because there wasn't a compelling interest).
The court also ruled that the provision at issue (described above) was entwined enough with other provisions of the CFRA that the whole Act failed--that is, that the provision at issue was not severable.
But the court's ruling misses a threshold issue: whether the CFRA impinges on non-participating candidates' speech in the first instance. There's a key difference between the CFRA and the scheme in Bennett and Davis (upon which Bennett relies): under the CFRA, the non-participating candidate's level of speech is determined independently of the participating candidate's speech.
In Bennett, the Supreme Court ruled that Arizona's scheme infringed on a non-participating candidate's free speech, because that scheme provided a dollar-for-dollar match from the public fisc for a participating candidate when a non-participating candidate exceeded the statutory cap on spending. Bennett relied on Davis for this result. In Davis, the Court ruled that the "Millionaire's Amendment" infringed on an independently-financed candidate's speech, because that speech triggered asymmetrical contribution limits (allowing a non-independently-financed candidate to raise more in individual contributions) when it exceeded a certain level.
The free speech threshold in both Bennett and Davis was that a non-participating candidate's additional speech triggered an asymmetrical system to the benefit of the participating candidate. In other words, the non-participating candidate--at the time he or she decided to spend that additional dollar that put his or her campaign over the statutory limit--had to decide to speak more (and thus trigger the asymmetrical benefit to his or her opponent), or not. The Court in Bennett and Davis said that this decision infringed on free speech.
But that's not at all how the CFRA operates. The CFRA, by the Nebraska court's own reckoning, requires a candidate to elect to exceed the cap before he or she knows whether his or her opponent will participate. This is not the same kind of infringement on free speech that concerned the Court in Bennett and Davis. Indeed, this is no infringement on free speech at all: the non-participating candidate makes the decision completely independently of his or her opponent's decision.
The Nebraska court skates right by this distinction. It said only that under the CFRA, "public funds are disbursed to abiding candidates in response to the political speech of privately financed candidates." This is true, of course, but it misses the core reason why the Supreme Court said that the schemes in Bennett and Davis involved free speech in the first place--because the non-participating candidate had to choose between marginally more speech (and providing a benefit to his or her opponent), or not.
More: The CFRA plainly does not equalize the spending and contribution playing fields the way that the schemes in Bennett and Davis sought to do. As illustrated above, the CFRA likely provides just a fraction of additional funding to a participating candidate, and requires the participating candidate to come up with the 25% in the first place (rather than starting with a state grant, as other public financing schemes do). The court skates right by this, too, focusing instead on the fact that the participating candidate's award from the state is keyed (in any way) to the non-participating candidate's expenditures. Again, this ignores the reason why the Supreme Court said that the schemes in Bennett and Davis impinged on speech.
The ruling stretches the logic of Bennett and Davis well beyond its breaking point. In so doing, it also limits yet one more way that public financing systems can seek to address the gross disparities in spending in certain elections--at least in Nebraska.
So for now, the lesson in Nebraska (and any court following its lead) is this: The First Amendment prohibits a public campaign finance scheme from keying the state grant to a non-participating opponent's expenditures in any way.
August 7, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, August 6, 2012
Sixth Circuit Overturns Ban on Medicaid Provider Campaign Contributions
A three-juge panel of the Sixth Circuit ruled in Lavin v. Husted that Ohio's law making it a crime for state Attorney-General or county-prosecutor candidates to accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers violated the First Amendment. The court held that the law wasn't "closely drawn" to meet a "sufficiently important interest," Buckley v. Valeo, because the state didn't sufficiently support its stated interest in preventing corruption and because the law swept too broadly.
The case only says that there are some teeth in the First Amendment jurisprudence involving campaign contributions--the case says nothing about restrictions on expenditures--and that a government seeking to restrict contributions has to do some homework in tailoring its law. Still, the case leaves plenty of room for the government to regulate contributions, just so long as the government demonstrates its problem with corruption and appropriately tailors its law to meet that problem.
Ohio Revised Code Section 3599.45 prohibits a candidate for the office of attorney general or county prosecutor from knowingly accepting any contribution from a Medicaid provider or any person with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider. The state justified the ban based on its interest in preventing corruption--that is, preventing an attorney general or county prosecutor from using a campaign contribution as a factor in deciding whether to prosecute for Medicaid fraud.
The Sixth Circuit ruled that Ohio didn't sufficiently support its interest in preventing corruption, and that the ban swept too broadly. As to the former, the court ruled that Ohio simply recited its interest in preventing corruption, but failed to demonstrate its interest, as required by Buckley. (In fact, the balance of the evidence in the case only suggested the opposite--that Ohio had no problem of selective prosecution for Medicaid fraud based on campaign contributions.) The court contrasted Ohio's ban with Connecticut's ban on contributions by state contractors to candidates for state offices--a ban that the Second Circuit upheld in Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, based on Connecticut's demonstrated history of bribes and kick-backs involving state contractors.
As to the latter, the court said that the ban applied to all Medicaid providers and persons with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider, even though only .003% of them were implicated in Medicaid fraud in a recent year. The court wrote that "[i]t is not hard to imagine what a less restrictive ban might look like" and held that this sweeping ban was not sufficiently tailored to meet Ohio's stated (but, as above, not sufficiently demonstrated) interest in preventing corruption.
August 6, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
D.C. Circuit Denies Emergency Stay in Van Hollen Suit Against FEC
The D.C. Circuit yesterday denied motions for an emergency stay pending appeal of the district court's ruling in Van Hollen v. FEC. That case involved Representative Chris Van Hollen's (D-Md) suit challenging the FEC's regulation on corporate disclosure of contributors in the wake of Citizens United. The district court ruled for Van Hollen, effectively requiring corporations to disclose all their contributors (and not just contributors who contributed for electioneering communication), or to establish a separate fund for electioneering communication (even though Citizens United held that such a fund is not required). The court's denial yesterday means that the district court ruling remains in effect pending the appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
The court's ruling yesterday, and the district court's ruling before, are both victories for Van Hollen and for greater disclosure of those who contribute to corporations and labor unions (which then use those contributions for electioneering communication). As it stands under BCRA, corporations and labor unions that engage in electioneering communication can now either (1) disclose all contributors (whether for electioneering communication or not), including anyone who gives a corporation money for any purpose, or (2) establish a segregated fund for contributions for electioneering communication and disclose only contributors to that fund. This may give corporations and labor unions an incentive to establish a segregated fund. (It's either that or disclose the names and addresses of anyone who paid more than $1,000 for any purpose. This could indeed create a hassle for corporations and labor unions, and it's not clear exactly how useful this kind of undifferentiated disclosure of any and all contributors would be.) But here's the twist: Citizens United held that corporations and labor unions can't be required to use a segregated fund for electioneering communication.
Still, nothing in the rulings in Van Hollen's case challenges Citizens United. Indeed, the rulings are in harmony with it and underscore the value of transparency. The rulings only mean that BCRA requires disclosure--even of all contributors, when a corporation or labor union declines to establish a segregated fund.
But this is certainly not the end of the case. The appeals court only ruled that the appellants hadn't established the stringent requirements for an emergency stay; it did not rule finally and definitively on the merits (even if it gave strong clues in favor of Van Hollen).
Here's some background:
Van Hollen sued the FEC over its December 26, 2007, disclosure regulation, which required disclosure of corporate and labor union contributors as follows:
If the disbursements were made by a corporation or labor organization pursuant to 11 CFR Sec. 114.15, the name and address of each person who made a donation aggregating $1,000 or more to the corporation or labor organization, aggregating since the first day of the preceding calendar year, which was made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communication.
11 CFR Sec. 104.20(c)(9). The problem, according to Van Hollen, was that the italicized limit on the disclosure requirement violated the plain language of the BCRA, which says:
(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a segregated bank account which consists of funds contributed . . . directly to this account for electioneering communications, the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to that account . . . .; or
(F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds not described in subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the disbursement during the period beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date.
2 USC Sec. 434(f)(2). The problem was that Citizens United said that corporations and labor unions didn't have to use a segregated fund for electioneering communications--telling corporations and labor unions that they didn't have to use subsection (E). But without (E)--that is, without a segregated fund--corporations and labor unions apparently had to disclose all contributors (for electioneering purposes or not) under subsection (F). Yet the FEC regs--the italicized part above--requires disclosure of only those contributors who contributed for electioneering purposes.
The district court ruled that the FEC reg violated the BCRA.
The appeals court yesterday denied motions for an emergency stay of this ruling, writing that appellants hadn't satisfied the stringent requirements. The court was untroubled by the fact that the district court's ruling means that corporations must disclose all contributors (and not just those who contribute for electioneering communication): the appellants failed to show that they'd be silenced by such an interpretation. The court also said that corporations and labor unions could still establish a segregated fund under subsection (E), above, even though that's not required, and thus disclose only those contributors who contribute for electioneering communication. Finally, the court said that Van Hollen would be harmed by granting a stay, because he wouldn't be able to respond to electioneering communication funded by anonymous, non-disclosed sources.
May 15, 2012 in Campaign Finance, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)


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Corinna Schumacher, the wife of seven-time Formula 1 World Champion Michael Schumacher, is reportedly building a £10 million ($16.6 million) medical suite at the couple's home.
Schumacher has been in an artificially induced coma since his skiing accident three months ago. With experts saying it is unlikely he will ever wake up, an Intensive Care Unit is now being built at the couples' home by Lake Geneva, Switzerland.
Every day since his accident, Schumacher's family has performed a 150 mile round-trip to be by his side. The Daily Mail reports that pressure for bed space may soon build at the Grenble University Hospital in France, leading Schumacher's family to make preparations to bring him home.
"Miracles happen, of course," says a 25-year friend of the family, "and as a wealthy man he has the best care money can buy.
"But all the money in the world cannot fix what has happened to him. The family are making arrangements for a future of permanent immobility."Formula 1, Michael Schumacher


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At least a third of the abortion clinics in Texas were expected to cease providing abortions Friday after an appeals court lifted an injunction blocking controversial new rules.
All but five of the sprawling state's 42 clinics could be forced out of business if a second set of restrictions is goes forward next year.
Abortion is a hot-button issue in US politics. In recent years, opponents have imposed restrictions aimed at deterring women from ending pregnancies and making it harder for clinics to operate.
A Texas law requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital was overturned by a federal judge on Monday, only for the injunction halting the closures to be lifted by another court on Thursday.
Judge Lee Yeakel had ruled that the requirement ?does not bear a rational relationship to the legitimate right of the State in preserving and promoting fetal life or a woman's health and, in any event, places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus and is thus an undue burden to her.?
Similar restrictions imposed in Alabama, Mississippi and Wisconsin have been overturned by federal courts.
Many hospitals ban physicians from performing abortions and will not grant providers admission privileges because their low-risk practices do not result in a high enough volume of admissions, Yeakel noted in a 26-page opinion.
A federal appeals court disagreed and lifted the injunction late Thursday after determining that the state of Texas ?has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed" in its appeal.
It noted that while the Supreme Court has ruled that states may not place ?undue burdens? on women seeking to terminate pregnancies, a law need not be invalidated simply because it ?has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion.?
It also ruled that even if more 90 percent of the state's women did not live within 100 miles (160 kilometers) of an abortion clinic ?this does not constitute an undue burden.?
Texas Governor Rick Perry hailed the ruling as an affirmation of ?our right to protect both the unborn and the health of the women of Texas.?
?We will continue doing everything we can to protect a culture of life in our state,? he said in a statement.
But opponents vowed to challenge the ruling and work to overturn other portions of the bill, which also bans all abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy, limits the use of the abortion pill RU486 and imposes expensive new building codes on clinics.
?This fight is far from over,? Cecile Richards, President of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, which operates a number of clinics in Texas.
?If Texans showed America one thing during the historic protests against this law this summer, we demonstrated that Texans value women's health ? and that is why we will take every step we can to protect the health of Texas women in the wake of this ruling.?
A third of Texas abortion clinics to close on court ruling
At least a third of the abortion clinics in Texas were expected to cease providing abortions Friday after an appeals court lifted an injunction blocking controversial new rules.


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Apparently the Register actually called and talked to Ditka. Let's get creative and talk up some left field crazy possible coaches and see if the Register will call them too!
Until you find something worth dying for, you're not really living.
I read somewhere on this site that Will Ferrell was being considered. He has good ties to California and with Ditka...anyone else seen Kicking and Screaming? Who wouldn't want to play for an intense coach like that who also customizes his own clothes and has a cappuccino-maker with him on the sideline?
Anyone hear about the Colin Powell rumor? I hear he's looking for a job, and has an impressive resume in government operations. Seems like he'd be an obvious choice to me.
Go Sssssssssyclones!
To think that we'd actually get Ditka to coach at ISU, you had to have ate paint chips as a kid to think we had any chance in hell to have that happen. Watch for Witosky to have a followup soon... :)
I know Mike Singletary is still coaching. Why not him?
"The bass, the rock,
The mic, the treble,
I like my coffee black,
Just like my metal."
I heard that Lombardi was kryogenically frozen and just got thawed out and is looking to coach again.
The most recent rumor i've heard is actually Denzell Washington is looking to coach and JP is very interested in him. Denzell says "Coaching in the movie Remember the Titans wasn't that hard so how bad could college football be?" JP was very impressed with his confidence. Who wouldn't want to play for a movie star with such an impressive record? Remember Denzell was 13-0 while coaching for the Titans. He's never actually lost a game in his coaching career. Look for something to happen as soon as Monday reguarding Denzell!
Originally Posted by avery_larry
Apparently the Register actually called and talked to Ditka. Let's get creative and talk up some left field crazy possible coaches and see if the Register will call them too!
Seriously, I'd like for the DMR or some other local media entity to call the Big 12 office and take them to task for that idiotic "apology" issued to Coach Pinkel. However, that would require journalistic fortitude, and somebody in the media would actually have to care about ISU...
My sources have confirmed Larry Coker has accepted the head coaching position
I heard that Chuck Norris called JP up about the job
I heard that Chuck Norris called JP up about the job
F'n Chuck Norris! Iowa State will litterally kick the living crap out of every single opponent if he is actually coach. Can you imagine instead of Parker sacking the QB next year he just decides to give him a nice drop kick to the head. One thing if for sure if this is indeed true this will be the most aggressive and physical ISU team anybody has ever seen!
Gene Hackman! He did a nice job coaching in The Replacements! Or Billy Bob Thorton from Friday Night Lights or the guy that plays the coach on the TV series for that now. :)
I heard that Bill Parcells is fanatical about fresh corn and was looking to move to Iowa to better satisfy his corn cravings.
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William Edward Griggs III
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Height: 6-3 Weight: 230 lbs.
Born: August 4, 1962 in Camden, NJ
High School: Pennsauken
College: Virginia (school history) (Griggs college stats)
Drafted by the New York Jets in the 8th round (203rd overall) of the 1984 NFL Draft.
Weighted Career AV (100-95-...): 2 (11379th overall since 1950)
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New video shows Takfiris beheading Syrian man
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A new disturbing video has emerged showing al-Qaeda-linked militants in the central province of Homs in Syria beheading a man believed to have been a Shia supporter of the government. The so-called Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which posted the video, says the beheading was conducted by militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The identity of the victim is still unclear. A three-minute remainder of the video shows the crowd laughing and taking photographs of the scene. Several children are also among the crowd. Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria in March 2011, many similar videos have emerged, depicting horrendous crimes, including decapitation and cannibalism, committed by the foreign-backed militants against the people in Syria. A video footage posted online on January 26, showed several mutilated bodies in the western suburb of Aleppo that reportedly belong to the civilians who were executed by ISIL militants. Another video posted online on May 12, 2013, showed Takfiri militant, Khalid al Hamad, known by his nom de guerre, Abu Sakkar, eating an organ of a dead Syrian soldier. In an interview with the state-run BBC in July 2013, Abu Sakkar threatened to commit more gruesome murders if foreign-backed terrorists in Syria do not receive more military aid from abroad. Reports show that the Western powers and their regional allies - especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are supporting the militants operating inside Syria.


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November 30, 2015
KNOXVILLE, Tenn. (AP) - The Tennessee Valley Authority is studying the value of electricity produced from small, dispersed sites, such as solar, wind or small gas turbine installations.
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