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Dispatch Japan http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/ News and Views on the US, Japan, and US-Japan Relations en-US 2015-08-09T19:25:49-04:00 Yukio Okamoto: 'POWs, Chinese laborers subjected to inhuman conditions' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/08/yukio-okamoto-pows-chinese-laborers-subjected-to-inhuman-conditions.html On July 19, Mitsubishi Materials Corp. took the landmark step of issuing a formal apology to American ex-Prisoners of War (POWs) forced to work under "inhumane" conditions in copper mines run by the company's predecessor – Mitsubishi Mining – during World War II. The apology was a first by a...
On July 19, Mitsubishi Materials Corp. took the landmark step of issuing a formal apology to American ex-Prisoners of War (POWs) forced to work under "inhumane" conditions in copper mines run by the company's predecessor – Mitsubishi Mining – during World War II. The apology was a first by a major Japanese firm. An estimated 12,000 US POWs were forced to work by Japanese government and private companies during the war. The apology was delivered by Hikaru Kimura, a senior executive of Mitsubishi Materials, at a ceremony held at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. Kimura expressed a "most remorseful apology" to the estimated 900 POWs who were forced to work in conditions of "harsh, severe hardships."

Also present was Yukio Okamoto, a Mitsubishi outside director, and former POW James Murphy of California, who accepted the apology.

Okamoto said he "entered the room with a heavy heart, seeking forgiveness," adding that "we also have to apologize for not apologizing earlier." (See interview, below.) Okamoto, a former diplomat and advisor to then-prime ministers Ryutaro Hashimoto, Junichiro  Koizumi, and Yasuo Fukuda, is also a member of the 16-member Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and World Order in the 21st Century," which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe established to counsel him on a statement to be issued around August 15 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.

It's unclear if Mitsubishi's actions, or the advisory panel, will have any influence  on the content of Abe's statement, but the prime minister may be bending to considerable pressure to emulate his predecessors Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi and acknowledge Japan's "aggression" and "colonial rule" in the first half of the 20th century.

The Japanese government has officially apologized to ex-American POWs on several occasions, but long stood firm against providing any compensation on the grounds that the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 had settled all claims stemming from World War II. In recent times, the ex-POWs have dropped their demand for compensation, but have continued their anguished search for an apology from Japanese firms that exploited them as forced labor in what Okamoto termed "inhumane conditions."

In the past, some prominent Japanese firms have quietly considered issuing apologies, and perhaps even compensation, to ex-POWs, only to encounter deep resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which cited the San Francisco Treaty. But Okamoto says the MOFA has inaudibly shifted its stance. "The MOFA is no longer saying that the issue was settled by the Peace Treaty, and that we have to be mindful of legal stability. They are no longer holding on to that position." Mitsubishi Materials's actions could now spur other Japanese firms to follow suit.

The most poignant aspect of Mitsubishi's action was not the apology itself, but the genuineness conveyed by words used to reinforce the apology. In a talk before the Foreign Correspondent's Club (FCCJ) in Tokyo on July 22, just days after the Los Angeles event, Okamoto said that Mitsubishi is prepared to extend the same apology to former British, Dutch, and Australian POWs. "Ours is one of the companies who tortured POWs most, so we have to apologize," he said.

    COMPENSATION FOR FORCED CHINESE LABORERS: Meanwhile, in what could have widespread repercussions in Northeast Asia, Mitsubishi Materials officials have privately revealed that they are close to announcing an agreement with close to 4,000 Chinese citizens (or bereaved family of) who were used as forced labor during World War II. The company will acknowledge "a historical fact that the company violated human rights during World War II," and will express its "heartfelt regret" and "deep apology," for its actions.

From 1944-1945, upwards of 37,000 Chinese were brought to Japan due to severe labor shortages in the war-ravaged country. An estimated 6,830 died while working under harsh conditions. Mitsubishi Mining exploited close to 4,000, of whom about 1,500 have been found and identified.

Each of the roughly 4,000 victims (or their respective families) will receive about $16,140 in compensation.

Mitsubishi acted even though Japan's Supreme Court had previously dismissed in 1997 a lawsuit filed on behalf of the Chinese laborers. The Court ruled that all claims had been settled by the 1972 communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan.  The Supreme Court ruling was in line with the stance of the Japanese government.

Much as former forced laborers from Korea had done in Seoul, the Chinese victims had begun to file suit in Chinese courts. In Korea, the high court ruled in 2013 that former Korean forced laborers were entitled to compensation, even though the Korean government at the time agreed with Tokyo that the 1965 Treaty between Japan and Korea had settled all claims stemming from World War II.

China has never officially demanded compensation from Japanese companies, arguing that Japan's political leadership was responsible for war crimes, not the Japanese people, thereby absolving private Japanese firms of responsibility.

Negotiations between Mitsubishi and representatives of Chinese forced laborers began in early 2014. Mitsubishi officials were anxious to have the issue resolved by this year, prior to the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Mitsubishi, which is looking to expand business in China, also did not want the forced labor issue tarnishing its image.

     KOREA NOT INCLUDED: Thousands of Koreans were also forced to work in Japan during the war, but thus far Mitsubishi has not reached out to the 6,489 who toiled for its various group companies, including 4,150 for Mitsubishi Mining.

Okamoto says the legal circumstances differ between Chinese and Korea laborers exploited in Japan. Korea came under Japanese colonial rule in 1910, so Koreans were technically Japanese citizens ordered to work, as were all Japanese, under the 1938 mobilization law. Korean laborers were paid the same amount as Japanese nationals, though the currency in which they were paid became useless at the end of the war. The 2013 Korean court ruling says that the Korean workers were, for all practical purposes, never paid for their labor.

But Okamoto is quick to add that, legality aside, "the fundamental sin was the annexation of Korea, obliterating their national identities. We did not allow Koreans to use their own name, use their language. We even forced Shintoism on them to create second-class Japanese citizens."

     THE ABE STATEMENT: Coincidentally or not, the actions by Mitsubishi came just as the panel appointed by Abe to advise him on his 70th anniversary statement was about to make public its report.

For weeks, authoritative "leaks" circulated that indicated the panel was trying to corner a reluctant Abe into using the words "aggression" and "colonial rule," while softening the explicit apology issued by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995, and Prime Minister Juniichi Koizumi in 2005.

Prime Minister Abe is known to harbor a strict ideological aversion to use of those words.

Sure enough, on August 6, the advisory committee issued a report that criticized Japan's "aggression" and "colonial rule" in the first half of the 20th century in what amounted to a "reckless war." The report also thoroughly repudiated the notion popular among "revisionists" that Japan's intention in the 1930s-1945 was to "liberate" the rest of Asia from Western colonial rule.

At this point, the proverbial diplomatic ball is in Shinzo Abe's court. What will he say in his upcoming statement marking the 70th anniversary of the close of World War II? Abe deeply clings to the romantic illusion that annexation of Korea in 1910 was "legal," and that the militarist rampage through China and Southeast Asia during the 1931-1945 period was somehow guided by noble intentions. It's not surprising that Abe's hero is his grandfather, the late Nobusuke Kishi, who was a key architect of Japan's wartime policies.

Until recently, Abe seemed very unlikely to use the words "aggression" or "colonial rule," terms he has never come close to uttering with respect to Japan's calamitous wartime actions. Moreover, he seemed unlikely to communicate the genuineness of  Yukio Okamoto's apologies to ex-POWs, to exploited Chinese laborers, and for the annexation of Korea, or to capture to earnestness of his own advisory committee's rejection of the revisionist notion that Japan was out to "liberate" the rest of Asia.

A lot is riding on Abe's upcoming statement. Failure to heed the advice of his own advisory committee would likely lead to another round of icy diplomatic relations in Northeast Asia. And the United States, after having rolled out a red carpet for Abe during his late-April visit to Washington, would be in a weak position to disentangle itself from the regional political damage Abe could very well cause.

Okamoto: 'Annexation of Korea Japan's fundamental sin'

 Yukio Okamoto is president of Okamoto Associates, Inc., providing strategic political and economic advice to major corporations. From 1968 to 1991 he was a career diplomat in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including postings in Paris and Washington, and responsibility for helping manage the day-to-day operations of the US-Japan security relationship.

Mr. Okamoto serves as a board member for several Japanese multinational firms, including Mitsubishi Materials. Well-versed in economic and government policy debates, he is a familiar figure both in Japan and within the United States government. He is currently the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Mr. Okamoto has also served as a special advisor to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, Special Advisor on Iraq to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and chairman of Koizumi's task force on foreign relations. In addition, he was a member of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's Study Group on Diplomacy.

Mr. Okamoto also served on the 16-person committee appointed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to advise him on the statement he will issue in August commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How did Mitsubishi Materials come to the decision to apologize to US POWs, and to compensate Chinese forced laborers? What were the discussions inside the company like?

OKAMOTO: Mitsubishi Materials was sued by American POWs some years back [1999]. We had to take up the issue quite seriously. Within the company, we conducted an extensive examination. We were sympathetic to the cause of the POWs, and we decided that we had to be very sincere, and not hide behind the official government position that all claims against the Japanese government or private companies had been settled by San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.

We tried to communicate with the POWs, working through American intermediaries, in the hope of reaching an amicable settlement, including an apology.

But there were many elements to be considered. Many outsiders said many things, so our goal did not materialize. I can't say much more about this, except that we consulted outsiders. The time was simply not mature enough for us to go ahead. These were not, of course, formal consultations, but they advised us.

Then, early last year, there was another approach, by a volunteer -- who was apparently working with the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. She is Kinue Tokudome, director of the US-Japan Dialogue on POWs. We knew from our previous consideration and examination of the issue that we had to face it with sincerity. So this time, we decided to comply with the request to express an apology.

It took a while to arrange the meeting that occurred recently in Los Angeles.

DISPATCH JAPAN: When did Mitsubishi make the decision to extend this approach to Chinese laborers who were forced to work for Japanese companies?

OKAMOTO: There has been an ongoing lawsuit with Chinese forced laborers. The issue is not the same as that with the American POWs. But there was a prevailing feeling that Mitsubishi as a private company used these laborers, and therefore had to apologize in the same manner. The difference is that the American POWs were no longer demanding financial compensation; they just wanted an apology. By contrast, the Chinese argue that our response is  in essence an extension of the law suit, so we have been talking about the amount of reparation as well.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What was the response from the big business federation Keidanren, or individual Japanese companies? Have you received criticism? Or is there sentiment in favor of the actions you are taking?

OKAMOTO: We have not contacted Keidanren, or other companies. We have been doing this on our own. There is no official contact. All I know is through my friends, who work for a wide variety of companies, and they have been supportive.

DISPATCH JAPAN: But this could have major implications for other companies, right?

OKAMOTO: I don't know. I have not spoken with executives from other companies that actually used POWs as forced laborers. The people to whom I have spoken represent a kind of Japanese common sense. But I do not know what the other firms who used POWs as laborers are going to decide. We should remember that Mitsubishi Materials succeeded Mitsubishi Mining, and is a different corporate entity. Nonetheless, we assumed what we thought was our responsibility. We remain a big company. On the other hand, a good number of the coal mining companies that used forced laborers are now quite small, as a result of the virtual death of coal mining in Japan. I don't know what those firms will decide.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there any thought about creating a compensation fund for forced laborers involving the business community as a whole?

OKAMOTO: Not that I know of. I have not spoken with Keidanren. And we are not in a position to preach to other companies about steps they might take.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded? As you indicated, providing compensation to forced laborers is contrary to the longstanding government position that all claims against Japanese public and private entities were settled by the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

OKAMOTO: I think officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are sympathetic to us as a private firm having made the decision to apologize to American POWs. The MOFA is no longer saying that the issue was settled by the Peace Treaty, and that we have to be mindful of legal stability. They are no longer holding on to that position. They used to say that if a private company apologizes and pays compensation, it might rock the legal settlement reached at the official level. This was the position as of the Foreign Ministry until several years ago.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this your perception through informal communication with Foreign Ministry officials, or do you regard this as a change in the official position?

OKAMOTO: I'll have to check about the actual official MOFA stance. But I have many friends there,  and I have informally been telling them about our plans. They perfectly understood, and they said that the government, of course, would not stand in our way.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about the Chinese government? Have you been communicating with officials in Beijing? Does this have broader diplomatic implications for Japan-China relations?

OKAMOTO: The company has been communicating with the Japanese foreign ministry. I would be surprised if they are not doing anything. I think they are at least consulting with their Chinese counterparts. But I do not know the content of the discussions at the government level.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about Korea? Are there discussions with Korean forced laborers, or is that more complicated because of their legal status as Japanese 'citizens' during the colonial period?

OKAMOTO: There are not any talks with Koreans. The Korean case is quite different. Koreans were mobilized as laborers, just as Japanese were mobilized. This was, of course, a very wrong policy on the part of the Japanese government of that time. It is Japan's historical sin to have annexed Korea in 1910. But in a formal sense, they were technically 'Japanese,' so when the national mobilization law took effect in 1938, they were mobilized along with Japanese nationals, and put to work. They were given a choice: be conscripted into the armed forces to fight as a soldier, or, to work at a factory. There were many Koreans taken to factories. They were placed under the same labor conditions as Japanese. I do not assume the working conditions were not as harsh and cruel as those to which Chinese and POWS were subjected. But Korean workers were paid.  Of course, whether they were paid in cash, or in the form of military money, it all amounted to trash after the war.

It amounted, in effect, to zero compensation. But all of the Japanese mobilized in a similar fashion had to accept that fate. But Korean nationals, of course, were not satisfied. This is essentially an issue of unpaid labor and abuse. Japan has to deal with this issue sincerely of course, but the legal nature is different.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you foresee any scenario for getting around that problem?

OKAMOTO: In the case of Korea, in addition to the substantial difference in the labor issue, the legal status is also completely different. Japan concluded with Korea the renunciation of the right-to-compensation treaty in 1965. The Koreans clearly and unambiguously settled the issue. So there is resentment within the Japanese government. The treaty binds the entire nation of Korea – not only the administrative branch, but the judicial branch as well – yet the Korean Supreme Court has ruled against the treaty. The Korean case is quite difficult, and at this point I certainly do not see how this will evolve.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You don't have any ideas about how deadlock might be broken?

OKAMOTO: I don't even know personally if we [Mitsubishi Materials] used Korean laborers. If they were used, it means they were placed under the same conditions as Japanese nationals. I feel sympathetic to POWs and Chinese laborers, since we have ample evidence that these people were subjected to inhuman conditions. But in the Korean case, I do not know to what extent, if any, we shoulder some blame.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The Mitsubishi Materials announcement comes shortly before Prime Minister Abe's expected statement commemorating the August 15 end of the Pacific War 70 years ago. I don't know if this is just coincidental. Does Mitsubishi's decision concerning POWs and Chinese laborers have any implications for the prime minister's statement?

OKAMOTO: I don't know. You would have to ask Prime Minister Abe himself. The committee appointed by the prime minister to advise him on the statement has released its report. But the prime minister's statement will be issued separate from our report. It is the 70th  anniversary, and I do not deny that the sequence of events leading to a new reconciliation has been influencing Japanese society. Mr. Abe spoke to the US Congress, and referred to Bataan and Corregidor in the Philippines [where Japanese forces terribly mistreated American POWs], expressing deep repentance.

In other words, Prime Minister Abe officially apologized to American nationals. Of course, that made our decision as a private company much easier. American POWs used by Mitsubishi were virtually all seized at Bataan and Corregidor. So, I think our apology and the prime minister's statement are related.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Perhaps I am asking for your personal opinion. You referred to the annexation of Korea in 1910 as Japan's "historical sin." I am not sure Prime Minister Abe agrees with that.

OKAMOTO: I don't think the prime minister defends the annexation of Korea. There is a national consensus that the annexation was wrong.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Really? A national consensus? I hear some politicians, writers, and even some historians regularly defend the annexation as "legal."

OKAMOTO: You are not listening to honest people.

DISPATCH JAPAN: If there is a national consensus that annexation of Korea was wrong, why has Abe always avoided the word "colonization" with respect to Japan's actions in Korea?

OKAMOTO: The prime minister has no specific resentment to using the four "key words" that journalists are calling for: colonialism, aggression, apology, and repentance. But he thinks we have done enough, in the past, using those words, having issued apologies more than 10 times via written statements by prime ministers. Rather than continue to be shackled by those terminologies, we will, by substance, aim for a new vision that will serve the interests of the nation. The tone will be forward-looking.

Whether or not those 'key words' are used is not the result of historical interpretation as to the rightness or wrongness of Japan's past actions.

I teach at a university, and students often ask me for just how long Japan will have to keep apologizing. Certainly, for my generation, Japan's mistaken policies were decisions made by our fathers and grandfathers, so we still are besieged by the sense of guilt. But my students are two generations younger, and the wartime policies were carried out by their great, or great-great grandfathers. These students bear no responsibility for our dark past. We have a moral obligation to keep apologizing to the victims of our past. But we also have a responsibility not to make these students immersed in pessimism.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will you be comfortable with a 70th anniversary statement from Prime Minister Abe that does not include the words "aggression" and "colonialism"?

OKAMOTO: I will simply say that those are not crucial points. I will make my judgment based on the overall tone of the prime minister's statement.

 China historical revisionism Japan-China relations Japan-ROK relations Murayama Statement Shinzo Abe South Korea US-Japan relations Peter Ennis 2015-08-09T19:25:49-04:00 Governor Onaga to Prime Minster Abe: 'Stop abusing Okinawa' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/07/governor-onaga-to-prime-minster-abe-stop-abusing-okinawa.html Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continues to struggle with widespread public opposition to his push to overhaul Japan's pacifist, "self-defense only" security policy. But that is not Abe's only headache on defense issues. Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga is escalating his fierce resistance to a US-Japan plan to build a new US...
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continues to struggle with widespread public opposition to his push to overhaul Japan's pacifist, "self-defense only" security policy. But that is not Abe's only headache on defense issues.

Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga is escalating his fierce resistance to a US-Japan plan to build a new US Marine facility in Japan's southern-most, and poorest, prefecture. (See interview, below.)

A stalemate causing long construction delays would be a severe embarrassment for Abe, who has pledged to swiftly implement the plan. Abe was warmly welcomed in Washington in late April in part because of the widespread belief that he can deliver on that promise.

But Washington is sufficiently concerned that, following an early-June visit to the US capital by Onaga, US officials inquired as to whether there would be significant constructions delays on the new facility, planned for the coastal district of Henoko, part of Nago city. Japanese officials reassured their American counterparts that the project would proceed as scheduled. But the reassurances had a hollow ring.

Onaga was swept into office last November on a wave of anger over the 2013 decision by his predecessor, Hirokazu Nakaima, to approve a massive landfill project necessary for construction of the new base. The Henoko facility is supposed to replace the existing Marine Air Station Futenma, which the US and Japan agreed to close almost twenty years ago – contingent upon construction of an alternative base. Futenma is dangerously located in the center of the city of Ginowan, and has long been seen as a disaster waiting to happen.

Onaga insists that a prospective 'Futenma Replacement Facility' (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa, as the prefecture already makes available over 70 percent of the land in Japan utilized by US military facilities. Okinawa prefecture makes up less than one percent of all of Japan's territory. Tokyo and Washington over the years have outwardly acknowledged the huge imbalance in the burden of hosting of US bases in Japan, but little has changed on the ground. US and Japanese officials insist there is "no viable alternative" to placing the FRF in Henoko, but Onaga says this is just a continuation of long-standing exploitation of Okinawa.

Onaga is a conservative at heart, and a strong supporter of the US-Japan security alliance. He used to head up the Okinawa chapter of Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and was the campaign manager for Nakaima's successful 2010 reelection campaign, during which Nakaima pledged to keep the FRF out of Okinawa. Onaga was furious when Nakaima broke his pledge, and has been campaigning against the Henoko project ever since.

Shortly after taking office in December of last year, Onaga pledged to look for legal flaws in Nakaima's approval of the landfill project, as a means to cancel the permit, as part of his commitment to use every means available to stop the project. He subsequently established a 6-person panel to investigate Nakaima's decision-making process. The panel initially said it would issue its report at the end of June, but the release will likely not take place until the end of this month.

Numerous media reports indicate the 6-person panel has already decided to state in its review that Nakaima failed to sufficiently consider, and put into to place to counter, likely environmental problems associated with the Henoko project. The framework of the decision is reportedly already in place, and the panel is now working on the final language. At the time of his decision, Nakaima said that concerns about the environment were fully taken into account, but officials from the Okinawa environment and life department say that Onaga's predecessor ignored their remaining concerns.

Based on the panel's likely finding, Onaga could withdraw the landfill permit, putting a major obstacle in front of Abe's commitment to Washington. Indeed, numerous Japanese media organs report that Onaga has already decided to withdraw the permit, but his office will not confirm that.

Legal specialists say that Onaga has  authority over at least 10 areas related to the Henoko project, including: rescinding of the landfill decision; cancel permits to crush coral reefs that now lie below areas where an envisioned V-shaped runway will jut out into Henoko Bay; rescind permits to alter roads leading to the construction site.

By contrast, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, whom Abe has put in charge of pushing the Henoko project forward, insists that Nakaima's decision-making process was "flawless."

     ONAGA TO WASHINGTON: Onaga, along with a large delegation of Okinawa Prefectural Assembly members, brought their case to Washington, hoping to meet influential Americans who might press the Obama administration and Congress for a change in policy. The Obama administration only made available two mid-level officials from the State and Defense departments. The State Department issued a statement reiterating US policy that there was "no viable alternative" to the Henoko project. Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee was the most senior member of Congress to agree to meet Onaga. His office issued a statement echoing that of the State Department. In the past, McCain had seemed to be a skeptic of the Henoko project, but that was largely motivated by his concerns about the costs of related  US plans to relocate upwards of 8,000 Marines to Guam.

Former Senator Jim Webb, a decorated former Marine and former secretary of the Navy, told Dispatch Japan that he reluctantly turned down a request from Onaga for a meeting. Webb has declared his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination. While in the Senate, Webb worked hard to stop the Henoko project, and devise a new deployment strategy for the Marines in East Asia.

Subsequent to the visit, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly adopted an ordinance that would virtually block the importation of soil from outside of Okinawa for use in the landfill project that must precede construction of the facility itself.

Overall, Onaga demonstrated an unusually pugnacious, if polite, willingness to speak directly to US officials. He denied at a June 3 press conference that the trip had been a failure, saying he never expected the US government to easily change its view. Onaga has established an official prefectural office in Washington to continue lobbying Congress and the administration.

     ONAGA-SUGA TALKS: Meanwhile, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, whom Abe has charged with resolving the Henoko stalemate, met with Onaga for two hours over dinner at the Okura Hotel on July 4th.  Onaga deeply dislikes Suga, whom he humorously derides in talks with reporters.

Onaga told reporters upon leaving the meeting that Suga had agreed to engage in "serious" talks on the Hekono issue. Suga is scheduled to visit Okinawa at the end of this month. The dinner did include talk of the national budget for FY2016, which starts next April, with an eye on the amount of aid to be provided to Okinawa.

At least part of the dinner was taken up with Suga apologizing for the June 25th proceedings of an LDP Diet member study group consisting mostly of young, haughty nationalists who rode Abe's coattails into office. The study group hosted ultra-nationalist novelist Naoki Hyakuta, a friend of Abe, who urged that Okinawa's two leading newspapers – both oppose the Henoko project – be punished for their respective stances, and ultimately shut down. Hyakuta is one of Japan's most vitriolic deniers of the Nanjing Massacre. Several Diet members echoed views on Okinawa, with one saying that public opinion in Okinawa is "contorted."

In questioning before the Diet, Abe initially declined to apologize to Okinawans, but recanted and issued an apology, saying the  remarks were "thoughtless."

Suga has reminded Abe that it works against the Abe administration to unnecessarily antagonize Okinawans, and let the Henoko issue fester, with no sign of any effort to accommodate Okinawan concerns. Abe and Suga both felt that danger on June 23, at an annual solemn commemoration marking the end of the 3-month Battle of Okinawa in 1945. It's customary for the prime minister to attend. Abe was met with heckles and jeers, in a public display of disdain that is highly unusual in Japan.

Abe desperately wants to avoid a showdown that would require the use of force to dislodge protesters to enable construction to proceed. Onaga knows this, and is using it to his advantage.

At the same time, Onaga knows that in the long-run, he cannot win a legal or violent showdown with a Tokyo determined to proceed. Onaga's plan is to demonstrate so much opposition among Okinawans to the Henoko project that Washington and Tokyo will be shamed into devising a new plan.

INTERVIEW

Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga

'Henoko project would damage US-Japan relations'

DISPATCH JAPAN: The conflict between Okinawa and the central government has become so intense that it raises the question: do you think of yourself primarily as Okinawan or Japanese?

ONAGA: Fundamentally, I believe I am Japanese. However, sometimes, when I consider our historical development and the status quo, I have some doubts about this. But, fundamentally, I am Japanese.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you harbor any desire for Okinawa to break away from Japan?

ONAGA: I have no intention of trying to achieve independence of Okinawa from Japan. However, looking at the status quo, it is clear that Okinawa bears an excessive burden of the US military base presence in Japan. Okinawa accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's national territory, but US facilities in Okinawa are located on land that amounts to 73.8 percent of all land in Japan utilized by US facilities in all of Japan. Seventy years ago, at the time of the grand battle in Okinawa, more than 200,000 people died, including at least 100,000 Okinawan people. At the San Francisco peace treaty conference, Okinawa was separated from Japan. That means that when I was growing up, I was neither a Japanese citizen nor an American citizen. This fact remains in the back of my mind. But I feel responsible to play my role as a Japanese person.

Meanwhile, the issue of US military bases in Okinawa remains. The central government continues to impose the heavy burden on Okinawa to host such a big portion of US military facilities. It is unfair. The dignity and human rights of Okinawans have not been defended.

In last year's elections, all four candidates for the national Diet endorsed by the Liberal Democrats (LDP) were defeated. And the LDP candidates for mayor of Nago City, for the Nago assembly, and for the governor of Okinawa prefecture were all rejected by voters. Candidates who opposed the Henoko base construction plan were elected. But the central government ignored these results. It is not Okinawa that tries to distinguish itself from the rest of Japan. It is the central government that treats Okinawa as if it were not part of Japan.

DISPATCH JAPAN: From the Okinawa point of view, which is more complicated: relations with Tokyo, or relations with the US Marines?

ONAGA: Both are difficult. But if I have to identify the bigger problem, I would say it is the central government in Tokyo. It is the responsibility of the central government to protect the Japanese people. I understand that the US military suffered many casualties on Okinawa toward the end of the Pacific War, and established bases on Okinawa in preparation of possible future conflicts. And I understand that both Japan and the US are democratic nations working together to deal with common concerns, such as the rise of China. But I think the US military has to pay more attention to the burden imposed on Okinawa by the heavy US base presence. To not do so could pose a risk to the whole bilateral security arrangement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Despite the conflict over the Henoko project, do you remain a supporter of the US-Japan alliance?

ONAGA: I have served as a politician for over 30 years, and I have consistently supported the US-Japan security arrangement. However, the burden of hosting so much of the US military presence is simply excessive. With regard to the Futenma air station, our land was expropriated by the US forces, and our people were forced into concentration camp conditions. With regard to other US bases, the US used bulldozers to destroy our houses, expropriate our land, and build new bases. The people of Okinawa have never voluntarily offered our land for base construction. And now, the US acknowledges that the Futenma air station is the most dangerous airport in the world. But the US says that if Okinawans oppose construction of the new Henoko facility, it is Okinawa that must come up with an alternative plan.

The Japanese government often makes similar comments, and asks us: "Are you Okinawans really thinking about the security of Japan?" This is remarkable. Okinawa was separated from Japan by the San Francisco Treaty, and hosted most of the US bases, which in turn allowed Japan proper to focus on high-level economic development. Okinawa has suffered a lot, which is a situation that cannot endure.

I fully accept the US-Japan security arrangement, assuming it is fair. The US-Japan security arrangement has to be dignified, and protect freedom, democracy, and human rights. This is very helpful to Asia, and the rest of the world. But, at this point, the security arrangement does not extend these values to the Okinawan people. Under these circumstances, the alliance is groundless.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Privately, some US officials say that the Yokosuka naval facility, and the Kadena air base are the top strategic priorities, and that everything else should be negotiable. Do you agree with the idea that Yokosuka and Kadena are crucial?

ONAGA: In the past, many reformists in Okinawa were opposed to all US bases in the prefecture. But I have spoken extensively with the reformists, and the consensus now is that if the Henoko plan is abandoned, the rest of the bases would be tolerable. I understand your question, but I can't really comment on whether other individual bases are critical or not.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The fuel tankers that used to be based at Futenma have already moved to Iwakuni. So the issue is: where to base the 24 Osprey the Marines want to place in Okinawa. Couldn't the Osprey be placed inside Camp Schwab, or inside the Kadena air base? In other words, why do the Marines need a new runway at Henoko? Top officials from the Ministry of Defense have told me that they have asked the same question, and have not heard a good answer from the US about the need for a new runway.

ONAGA: It is not clear to me why the Marines want a new runway at Henoko. But my suspicion is that in 30-40 years, Japan's Self-Defense Forces will utilize the new facility. The former defense minister, Satoshi Morimoto, has written that the Henoko facility is designed to eventually host more than 100 Osprey. Morimoto wrote in his last book that 12 Osprey would be deployed to Okinawa in 2012, and another 12 in 2013. At the time, the MOD denied any knowledge of such a plan. But it turned out to be true. So the real question is: how many Osprey do the Marines plan to deploy in Okinawa? We don't know.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How is your personal relationship with Prime Minister Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga?

ONAGA: Looking back over his personal history, Suga has tried to cozy up with people in power so as to promote himself. That is at the root of Suga's relationship with Abe.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you expect from Prime Minister Abe's upcoming statement commemorating the end of World War II 70 years ago?

ONAGA: I would like to hear Abe repeat the words of former prime ministers Murayama and Koizumi.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe on occasion has questioned the validity of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

ONAGA: Two years ago, Prime Minister Abe sponsored a ceremony celebrating the signing of the treaty, as it marked the return of sovereignty to Japan. But Okinawans were shocked, because Okinawa was separated from the rest of Japan, and kept under US occupation. Abe was not thinking about Okinawa.  This indicated to me that Japan's sense of responsibility to other countries is weak. In this sense, I think Abe has inherited the ideas of his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke. Abe has often said that he wants Japan to emerge from under the postwar regime, and restore pride in Japan. But I wonder whether Abe includes Okinawa in his thinking, because with regards to Okinawa, Abe is desperately defending the postwar regime.

DISPATCH JAPAN: With regards to Henoko, have you already made your decision to reverse the landfill approval of former governor Nakaima that allows construction at Henoko to proceed?

ONAGA: Several years ago I served as campaign manager for then-governor Nakaima. I spent many hours with him, and we agreed on the campaign pledge to move a Futenma replacement facility outside of Okinawa. But later, without any consultation with me, he approved the landfill application, which was very damaging to the pride of Okinawans. People on the mainland said that Nakaima made his decision in exchange for economic aid from Tokyo. This was very hurtful. I decided to run for governor to help restore the damaged pride of Okinawans. I have a very strong determination to oppose the Henoko project, perhaps by reversing Nakaima's decision.

But I am also aware of the US-Japan security situation, so my administration is trying to engage in talks with the US and Tokyo to find a solution.

If Japan and the US try to push ahead with the Henoko project, which they justify in part as a response to the rise of China, then the image of the US will be very damaged. That is why I think the new facility will actually not be built.

 Futenma Futenma Replacement Facility Henoko Hirokazu Nakaima Jim Webb Murayama Statement Nago City Okinawa Shinzo Abe Takeshi Onaga US Marines Yoshihide Suga Peter Ennis 2015-07-15T00:08:27-04:00 For Governor Takeshi Onaga of Okinawa, determination grows to stop construction of a new US Marine facility http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/05/for-governor-takeshi-onaga-of-okinawa-determination-grows-to-stop-construction-of-a-new-us-marine-fa.html The May 17 demonstration in Okinawa in opposition to the Henoko project brought out 35,000 people, which was the largest gathering of opponents since Governor Takeshi Onaga defeated incumbent Hirokazu Nakaima last November. There have been larger demonstrations in recent years, with 90,000 having gathered in 2010 to protest the...
The May 17 demonstration in Okinawa in opposition to the Henoko project brought out 35,000 people, which was the largest gathering of opponents since Governor Takeshi Onaga defeated incumbent Hirokazu Nakaima last November.

There have been larger demonstrations in recent years, with 90,000 having gathered in 2010 to protest the prospect of building a new facility in Henoko Bay, off the coast of Marine Camp Schwab, to replace the Marine Air Station Futenma, dangerously located in the center of Ginowan City. In 2012, somewhere between 50,000 – 100,000 gathered in a park in Ginowan to protest the then-planned deployment of the hybrid Osprey aircraft to the Futenma base.

While relatively small, the demonstration last Sunday marked an important turning point, with average Okinawans seeming to gain faith that Governor Onaga will fulfill his campaign promise to give his all to stop construction of the new Henoko facility.

Even though voters swept Onaga into office last November, and voted down all four parliamentary candidates in Okinawa backed by the Abe administration and the LDP, they remained skeptical that Onaga would be willing and able to follow through on his unambiguous campaign promise.

Many Okinawans felt betrayed by Nakaima, who had seemed to promise to block construction of the Henoko facility, only to give his approval for necessary landfills in December 2013. Nakaima, with what came across as a verbal sleight of hand, claimed he had never promised to block the Henoko facility, but only to close the Funtema facility as soon as possible. The reaction against Nakaima was swift; his vain attempt at reelection ended in humiliating defeat.

But, while Onaga was welcomed as a sincere alternative to the chameleon-like Nakaima, the mood in Okinawa turned decidedly dour, with many voters and civic activists doubtful that Onaga would ultimately stand up to Tokyo. For many, it seemed inevitable that the Henoko project would be built, and the third-class status that many Okinawans feel is their plight would continue unabated.

Demonstrators have consistently shown up at the planned construction site for the new facility, but the numbers have been small, with a wait-and-see attitude toward Onaga prevailing among the somewhat fatalistic Okinawan population.

But now it's Onaga's determination that appears unabated, and average Okinawans have taken notice.

Onaga has put Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and his top aide, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, on the defense, suggesting meetings to discuss the impasse, only to put Abe and Suga in the embarrassing position of refusing to meet. Suga, whom Abe put in charge of the Okinawa problem, eventually gave in, and has met with Onaga several times. On April 5, Suga flew down to  Okinawa, and repeated the oft-heard contention that there is "no alternative" to a new facility at Henoko as a replacement for the obsolete Futenma facility. Onaga, who has become known for his comedic-sarcastic mimicking of Suga's predictable comments, responded with a brief history of postwar Okinawa. After the brutal Battle of Okinawa in April-June 1945, the US constructed what turned out to be permanent bases on what is Japan's southern-most prefecture.

While the post-war US occupation of Japan ended in 1952, returning full sovereignty to Japan, the US maintained control of Okinawa for another 20 years. For Okinawans, this amounted to abandonment, and solidified a feeling of alienation from mainland Japan that continues to this day. Onaga told Suga that, with regard to US bases, "all of the land for those bases, including Futenma, was expropriated." Onaga went on to say that Tokyo does not treat Okinawa, and Okinawans, as a full-fledged part of Japan.

Onaga cannot easily be dismissed as an ideological opponent to the US-Japan security alliance. He formerly headed up the Okinawa chapter of Abe's Liberal Democratic Party, and broke with the central government with great reluctance. He is now the leader of a new political reality in Okinawa: a broad coalition of leftists, liberals, and conservatives alike who believe the time has come for Okinawa to no longer bear the overwhelming burden of US forces deployed in Japan.

Following Suga's ill-fated visit to Okinawa, Prime Minister Abe gave it his best shot by finally agreeing to meet Onaga in Tokyo on April 17, prior to the prime minister's late April visit to Washington. The result was the same. Abe acknowledged that the Futenma facility is dangerous, and must be closed – a common US-Japan understanding for the past 20 years – but insisted that the planned Henoko facility is the only viable replacement. Onaga later told reporters about his response to Abe: "I said that I will never allow a new base in Henoko."

Onaga has crossed the Rubicon; there is no going back for him, and the recognition of that fact is gradually easing the sense of demoralization among many Okinawans that followed former governor Nakaima's decision to allow the Henoko project to move forward.

     ONAGA: RELUCTANT ACTIVIST: Can Onaga really stop the Henoko project? The governor knows that if the issue comes down to brute force, there is little he can do to stop a determined central government. But will Tokyo, backed by the US, really want to engage in the brutal police tactics that would likely be required to push past determined demonstrators backed by the governor of Okinawa?

Several sources close to Onaga report that the governor has commented in private that Tokyo too easily forgets the pleas from Okinawa, so "it might be better to throw rocks because no one forgets pain." Indeed, Onaga wants his 'private' comments public, as his office has provided the information to numerous journalists.

Onaga is not a professional, anti-American rabble-rouser. This comes from a governor who is conservative at heart, moderate in temperament, and reluctant to be an activist, but who is fed up with what he truly believes is mistreatment of Okinawa by both the United States and Japan's central government.

    ONAGA'S STRATEGY: Governor Onaga also knows that if the impasse over the Henoko project boils down to a battle in the courts, Okinawa will almost surely lose. He has been pursuing a  four-part strategy that ultimately rests on mobilizing large demonstrations of public opposition that might force Washington and Tokyo to reconsider: 1) Slow down the construction process as much as possible, until he can put together an air-tight legal argument to overturn former governor Nakaima's approval of the landfill procedures needed for construction of the envisioned new facility. Construction was supposed to begin this summer, but all involved unofficially acknowledge that the project won't get underway until Autumn, at the earliest. Onaga intends to delay construction in part by rejecting what would normally be routine requests for modifications to the existing building plans. Each rejection will likely require court intervention, pushing construction further behind schedule;  2) Produce a report, now scheduled for late June or early July, by a panel of experts appointed by Onaga that will poke huge holes in the decision-making process and conclusions that led to Nakaima's controversial decision, and use the report as the legal basis for reversing and withdrawing Nakamia's approval; 3) Use the expected panel report to demand a stop to all work on the Henoko project, throwing the issue into the uncharted territory of Japan's court system. Never before has Japan's court system had to take up such a big case involving a local governor objecting to central government construction plans;. 4) Use the court delays to build public opposition to the Henoko project, such that the central government and the US government cannot avoid revisiting the entire issue.

That's the plan. Onaga recently set up a special unit within his office charged specifically to investigate and pursue every possible means to shutter the Henoko project.

The next big events to watch are Onaga's planned trip to Washington starting May 30, the June 23 celebration of Memorial Day on Okinawa, a holiday in the prefecture that commemorates the end of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, and the mayoral election in Ginowan City in  January 2016.

The Obama administration will be under pressure to find a balance between according Onaga the respect  deserved by a sitting governor of such an important prefecture, while not giving Onaga any reason to believe the US will alter its plans for the Henoko facility. The aggressive Okinawa media will be ready to pounce on any perceived snub of Onaga. The upcoming visit will follow the recent opening of a prefectural office in Washington designed to press Okinawa's case directly to US policy makers.

Meanwhile, Memorial Day on Okinawa will put Prime Minister Abe in a bind. The sitting prime minister traditionally attends the day's festivities. For Abe to not attend would further inflame anger among Okinawans. But should he attend, Abe will be under pressure to address and defend the Henoko project, which will also raise the ire of island residents.

Further out, political insiders in Okinawa will be watching the January 2016 race for mayor of Ginowan City, where the controversial Marine Air Station Futenma dominates the landscape. Incumbent mayor Atsushi Sakima, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party and close to Prime Minister Abe, insists that all Marine operations at Futenma cease within the next 4-5 years.

But Sakima has not taken a stand on the Henoko replacement facility, arguing that his responsibility to his supporters is to close Futenma, not to figure out a new location for the bases's ongoing operations. The US says it will keep Futenma open until a replacement facility is up and running. Abe, in line with his predecessors, says the Henoko facility must be built so that Futenma can be closed. A large majority of Okinawans, who backed Onaga in his race against Nakaima last year, want the Futenma base closed, and oppose construction of a new facility at Henoko.  It is not clear who will run against Sakima next January. But should a candidate who openly opposes both the Futenma base and the Henoko plan knock him out of office, pressure will intensify for the US and Japan to revisit the issue.

 Futenma Henoko Hirokazu Nakaima Okinawa Shinzo Abe Takeshi Onaga US Marines Yoshihide Suga Peter Ennis 2015-05-22T09:38:03-04:00 Anatomy of an Open Letter: How 187 Japan scholars came together to push Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on history issues http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/05/anatomy-of-an-open-letter-how-187-japan-scholars-came-together-to-push-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-on-.html On Tuesday, May 5, 187 Japan scholars mostly from English-speaking countries came together in an Open Letter to warn against what they see as a worrisome trend of intolerance in Japan toward journalists and scholars who express disagreement with the Abe government's view of history issues, particularly "comfort women." Since...
On Tuesday, May 5, 187 Japan scholars mostly from English-speaking countries came together in an Open Letter to warn against what they see as a worrisome trend of intolerance in Japan toward journalists and scholars who express disagreement with the Abe government's view of history issues, particularly "comfort women."

Since publication of the Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan, the number of signatories has ballooned to close to 350, with the expanded list to be made public next week.

The co-coordinators of the Letter were Professor Alexis Dudden of the University of Connecticut, and Professor Jordan Sand of Georgetown University. Both argue that the purpose of the Letter was to encourage a renewed effort to resolve the comfort women issue, and for Japan to redouble efforts for reconciliation with China and South Korea. Both deny that their intent, and that of the other signatories, was to criticize Prime Minister Abe, but they acknowledge that those who interpret the Letter as a rebuke are "not incorrect."

 We sat down with Professors Sand and Dudden for a joint interview, during which they described in detail the process that led to the writing and publication of the Open Letter with such a large list of signatories.

Jordan Sand is Professor of Japanese History at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. He teaches modern Japanese history and other topics in East Asian history, as well as urban history and the world history of food. He has a doctorate in history from Columbia University and an MA in architecture history from the University of Tokyo. His research and writing has focused on architecture, urbanism, material culture and the history of everyday life. From 2009 through 2011, he served as Chair of Georgetown's Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures. During academic year 2012-13, he was a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo Graduate School for Interdisciplinary Information Studies, where he taught a seminar on approaches to the modern city.

Alexis Dudden is professor of history at the University of Connecticut, specializing in modern Japan, modern Korea, and international history. She has a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and a BA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University. She is perhaps best known for her book Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States.

DISPATCH JAPAN: I am hoping to explore with you both the substance of the Open Letter, and how the Letter came about, and then look a little bit at some criticisms that have emerged in the few days since the publication. I'll direct a question to one of you, and the other can then respond. Professor Sand, let me put this question to you. The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times both characterized the Open Letter as a "rebuke" of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Is that an accurate description of the spirit of the Letter, and does it capture your intention?

SAND: The Letter addresses our colleagues in Japan, the public, the media, and the government. We expressed hopes for action from the government on the issue of "comfort women." I believe, and I think most of the signatories believe, that there is a lot the prime minister could do. But I did not participate in order to rebuke the prime minister. I don't think that's our role. It is not mistaken to read it as a rebuke, but that does not capture the intent of the Letter.

DUDDEN:  I agree. The headlines on those stories, using the work "rebuke," were not incorrect. But that is not why 187 historians and scholars became involved. The Letter is a collective reflection on a new environment in Japan that is often inhospitable to objective historical inquiry on certain topics. This is quite different from even the recent past. The signers of the letter have all made Japan the center of their professional lives. Something new has emerged in Japan in the last year or two to the extent that putting together a common reflection on this trend by such a divergent group of people turned out to be remarkably easy.

SAND: You could even say the Letter was intended more as an encouragement than a rebuke. The Letter is a collective expression of opinion, not a set of demands to the government. Japan is a democratic society, and the prime minister is an elected official. He can answer his own constituents. We didn't presume to tell the prime minister what he "must" or "must not" do. But the government bears some responsibility for the climate in Japan around the "comfort women" issue. The Letter is a comment on this worrisome climate. The government has the power to change that.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Professor Sand, would you elaborate a bit on the "climate" you refer to?

SAND: Let me be specific. The timing of the release of the Letter gave the appearance that it was somehow responding to the prime minister's recent visit to the US. But I started talking with colleagues about putting together some kind of statement last year. At the time, I had no idea Abe would be making a visit to the US. Many scholars here were disturbed by reports of intimidation of journalists, and we found colleagues of ours in Japan saying that because of receipt of government funding, they would not be able to work on certain issues. In the political sphere, it was becoming common to hear callous statements about the surviving victims of the comfort women system passing as everyday political speech. It struck me, and many others, as a strange turn in discourse. It felt like it was time to comment, as friends and colleagues. I should also say that I've found many friends in Japan who are not academics who are tired from so-called "apology fatigue." These are good friends of mine. They just want the whole issue to go away. And I thought it was important to step back, and say that the issue has not gone away because it remains unresolved.

Those were my sentiments. So a few of us decided we would get a group together to discuss this at the March meeting in Chicago of the Association of Asian Studies annual conference. A few weeks before the conference, I visited Japan, still thinking about how to address these concerns at the AAS meeting. In Japan, I was astonished once again at the degree to which important and intelligent mainstream people were saying off-base things, such as: "This generation of American scholars are anti-Japan," and ridiculing serious scholars and newspapers. And I thought: "Wow, Japan has become a hot-house for this kind of thinking." Now, Japan is a very cosmopolitan place. So this deepened my conviction that we should try to blow some fresh air in from the outside, even if this ran the risk of appearing to be patronizing.

DUDDEN: We got 187 scholars with wildly divergent specializations to come together based on each of us noticing a troubling atmosphere. A lot of the recent presentation of the comfort women issue has been quite constricted. It is not full-on censorship from the highest level. Rather, there seems to be a narrowing of what is considered permissible speech. So a lot of people are losing sight of the fact that it is not all the fault of the "other side" – Team China, or Team Korea. The notion that Japan has "done enough" becomes pervasive, such that even the mildest of critiques of current Japanese policy defines one as "pro-China" or "pro-Korea." And within the world of Japanese politics, those who want to really reach out to China and Korea, while still on the scene, are far from the councils setting the country's policy agenda. That is a recent development, and it undercuts the notion of Japan being a regional leader. Much of the region looks to Japan as the open society. When the confines of "permissible" discussion in Japan become more narrow, Japan's aspirations for regional leadership become more difficult to realize. Still, we tried to operate as quietly as possible.

DISPATCH JAPAN: When you arrived in Chicago for the March AAS meeting, were there already discussions underway to initiate the writing of a Letter?

SAND: There were multiple conversations already underway. The issue of Foreign Ministry pressure on McGraw-Hill had sparked some conversations. There were conversations about the bashing of the Asahi Shimbun over articles that had long ago been retracted. The whole environment in Japan seemed to have taken a turn toward intolerance. By last December I concluded that some kind of statement would be appropriate, or at least possible. By February, Alexis and I were in email contact with old friends, and we discussed reserving a room in Chicago where those who shared our concerns and were attending the AAS meeting could get together for a discussion.

DUDDEN: We are not an organization of any kind, so we did not have a room of our own automatically available at the AAS meeting. We had to reserve one ourselves. The annual AAS meeting is really the only time that a good number of Japan specialists gather in one spot, so we were cognizant of the fact that if we were going to have momentum for the issuance of a Letter, we would have to have our act together going into the Chicago meeting.

SAND: I reserved a room for 11:30 pm, because that was the only time everyone was free. I was thinking that we would discuss whether as a group we could come up with a statement, what we have the right to say, and whether a statement would be constructive. The conversation was very constructive, but at that point still pretty inconclusive. Lots of good ideas were shared, but we did not resolve what exactly we wanted to say, and what would be the best way to say it. And to whom?

After the AAS meeting, Alexis and I played the role of on-line switchboard. About 30 people were present at the late-night meeting in Chicago, and they wanted to stay in the loop. They talked with other people, some of whom came on board. Drafts of a Letter started to circulate. It was all quite messy; organic. At a certain point, the content coalesced, and enough people had seen a draft that they thought was at least close to right.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Was there one person who wrote the initial draft?

DUDDEN: Nice try! 187 people wrote it!

SAND: I would call myself the secretary. I sketched out the main points of the first meeting and circulated them. Over a month-and-a-half, I kept putting in new commas, and taking out old semicolons, until everyone saw a final document that a large number of us could live with. At that point, the draft had circulated to so many people that we worried a bit that it might be released unfinished and we felt pressure to finalize the whole process. We gave everyone 24 hours to look at both the English and Japanese final versions, to recuse themselves if they decided the final version did not reflect their own opinion, and to otherwise make sure their respective names were spelled correctly.

We had to battle to keep the Letter from being too long. Every time someone suggested an addition, the Letter got longer and longer.

DUDDEN: Some people wanted footnotes. From the other side, there was a group from the Midwest that wanted to keep the Letter to 500 words, or they would not sign. It says a lot about the strong sentiments on the issues we raised that 187 academics were willing and able to come together behind the Letter.

DISPATCH JAPAN: There were roughly 30 people in this core group that collectively put the Letter together?

DUDDEN: There is an exact list of 29 people who made up the core. And there were 5-6 people who were deeply involved in the drafting of the Letter, throwing back at Jordan every adjective, comma, and semicolon they did or didn't like.

SAND: The whole process took over a month even though I think the Letter consists of rather common sense prose.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How did you go from the core of 30, to 187 signatories?

SAND: The final version was circulated by the original 30.

DUDDEN: To people they knew.

SAND: That's right. This was meant as a statement from scholars of Japan based outside of Japan, so we circulated to colleagues in North America, Europe, and Australia. Some colleagues in Japan saw it, but we wanted this to be a message that came from outside of Japan.

DUDDEN: We are cognizant that the Letter might come across as a bunch of westerners telling Asians what to do. But we were influenced by the statement issued late last year by the Historical Science Society of Japan (Rekishigaku kenkyukai) that was sharply critical of the Abe administration's stance toward the comfort women issue.

SAND: Many people read the Rekishigaku kenkyukai statement, and it really resonated. But we are not an organization of any kind. The Letter was issued by a group of people who were persuaded that "this much we can all agree on, this much we believe is common sense." There are people involved in this who have never had their names printed on the same page, anywhere. Some of them may not be willing to appear in the same room with each other. But we all shared the statement.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did you deliberately issue the Letter after Prime Minister Abe's visit to the US?

SAND:  Yes. We had a draft that many people saw before the prime minister arrived. A number of people commented that we couldn't very well issue the Letter until we've heard what he has to say. I felt that the Letter was not all about addressing Prime Minister Abe, but the point came through to me. We owed Abe the respect to let him come, address American audiences, and see what he says on the issues we raise. And the final version made reference to the more inspiring comments the prime minister made in his address to Congress. We did not want to rush the Letter out to have it somehow tied to the visit. It just so happened that the draft had already circulated far and wide so it was time to finalize.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about the paragraph on nationalism? I initially took it to mean that some people in the drafting process thought it would be important to reference nationalism in Korea and China so that the Letter not appear to be ganging up on Japan.

SAND: Everyone accepted that passage, though there were a few people who raised concerns that in some ways it is ahistorical. The roots of nationalism are profoundly different in different places, and of course in this case we are talking about the country of the perpetrator and the countries of the victims. To paint the nationalism we've seen in China, Korea, and Japan regarding comfort women with a single brush might appear to be very facile. But everyone agreed that at the present moment, on this issue, you can't ignore that nationalism is a problem far from unique to Japan. The comfort women issue is made even more complicated than it already is by the nationalism surrounding the issue in all three countries.

DUDDEN:  Many of us who have published writings specifically on the comfort women issues have stated up front that nationalism in all three countries is an obstacle to resolution. The Letter, however, tries to return to what we do in the classroom, which is to focus on the substance of what happened: the brutality of this particular history. People who throw history around as a weapon tend to forget what actually happened on the ground, which transcends national boundaries.

SAND: The whole statement is about the ethics of doing history, and the responsibility of governments to protect and respect the work of historians.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe has already said that he does not plan to use the key language from the Murayama Statement when he issues his own statement on World War II in August. Are you concerned that the upcoming statement will not bring Japan and its neighbors any closer to reconciliation, and might even worsen relations?

SAND: Alexis and I come at this from different specialties, so the question is best put to her. The politics of war memory and apology is a central research issue for her and a topic about which she writes. For my part, I of course believe the Japanese government has the power to make changes toward reconciliation. But I am less engaged in the diplomatic issues. I wanted to play the role of "switchboard" in the compilation of the Letter partly because I am not heavily involved in the issue, and felt I could channel the common sense of colleagues and bring opinion together.

DUDDEN: In my view, the current government in Japan seems determined to play with words, to divert attention from what really happened, and what needs to be said to move forward. It is disheartening that in this very important anniversary year, a nation that has acted in peace and with respect for human rights over the past 70 years sees its top leaders objecting to rather common sense assessments of what occurred in Asia in World War II.

DISPATCH JAPAN: In his Statement in 1995, Prime Minister Murayama stated that "Japan must eliminate "self-righteous nationalism."

SAND: We were in touch with some very prominent political scientists who have influence in Japan. For the most part, they said they are working through other channels, and chose not to sign. But several said: "I hope you will convey to the Japanese government how bad it is for Japan that this type of nationalism is still kicking around." It seems so obvious.

DISPATCH JAPAN: At least one critic in Japan has gotten considerable attention by claiming there is a split between you two, with Professor Dudden interpreting the Letter with a decidedly anti-Japan twist, and Professor Sand remaining more objective.

DUDDEN: There is no division between us. Whoever says there is a split has a gross misunderstanding.

SAND: Alexis and I were the two people who sent out the final version, which raised the question: what should we call ourselves? I suggested that we were two co-coordinators. We got the room at the AAS, we carried the whole thing forward on-line with the group of 30 or so. We decided on the deadline, and gave everyone involved their final say. And then we sent it out. But all of that is different from being the representatives, or spokespeople for the 187 signatories. Alexis has been on the public record on this topic many times. Her email inbox was filled with messages, many of them quite nasty. In many respects the Japanese language version of the Letter has turned out to be the more important one, because I expect more people are reading it. It was co-translated by me and Asano Toyomi of Waseda University. He is very devoted to the document, and he turned it into beautiful Japanese.

The Letter went all over the media. Sometimes it has been misrepresented in the media, and sometimes fairly represented. Lots of media have printed the whole document.

DUDDEN: We sent the Letter to the Cabinet Office, in both languages, out  of respect. We offered the Letter to Yomiuri Shimbun on an exclusive basis, but we never heard back from the paper. Then we gave the Letter to about 10 people for whom I had meishi on my desk. Most of them were Japanese reporters. I sent it to the New York Times and the Washington Post, and then to Bloomberg and the Korean news agency Yonhap. I had worked with a Yonhap reporter the week before at a conference. Subsequently, this turned into me being "pro-Korea," and me "manipulating" Jordan. Frankly, it is absurd. Some critics in Japan cited a Yonhap dispatch that I asserted I was the leader of the push for the Letter. I never said that; the Yonhap reporter wrote that. As we explained, I was one of the leaders, but one among many. Somehow the notion emerged that I led the push for the Letter in an effort to damage Japan. But this plays into something that has been going on inside Japan for over a year. I've been labeled as "anti-Japan," which of course I am not. But that label is very difficult to defend yourself against.

The Letter is not about me, or Jordan, or any other individual. This is 187 scholars, some of them very big names, who share a concern about a worrisome trend in Japan on history issues, in this case comfort women. That is a big deal.

Japan is an open society. We'd like to add to the debate in a productive manner. Unless there is discussion inside Japan, nothing else will matter.

SAND: We haven't gotten caught up in any of the commentary. We know we live in the age of the 24-hour, second-by-second media world. And we issued the Letter during Golden Week, so a lot of people we sent it to were probably not paying attention. I expect this week could be 'smear week.' Kobayashi Yoshinori has already started in.

We wrote a statement that we all feel strongly about.  We are historians. We know that we can stand back, and it will either speak to people on its own terms, or it won't. Any negative comments said around it are just part of that day's news cycle.

 Asahi comfort women historical revisionism Kono Statement Murayama Statement Shinzo Abe Peter Ennis 2015-05-16T00:18:16-04:00 Nye: 'The US rebalance to Asia is real' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/05/nye-the-us-rebalance-to-asia-is-real.html Joseph S. Nye Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. His latest book,...
Joseph S. Nye Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. His latest book, Is the American Century Over?, is now available in paperback. On Monday, April 27, Professor Nye helped host Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan during a forum held at Harvard.

With Prime Minister Abe having recently been in Washington, with the US and Japan announcing new "guidelines" for the bilateral defense relationship, we turned to Nye to discuss Japan policy, the US "rebalance" toward Asia, and a range of other foreign policy issues. Starting in 1994, while serving as a senior Pentagon official, Nye led an initiative to upgrade the US-Japan defense relationship, culminating in the 1997 bilateral guidelines forged in large part to ensure a smooth US-Japan reaction to any potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The new guidelines announced last week are the first since those of 1997.

Professor Nye was an advisor to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign, and remains an influential foreign policy voice within the Democratic Party.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You argue in your new book that the US will remain the world's main power for quite some time, but that the diffusion of power will make the US relatively less-able to control others.

NYE: Yes. Entropy may prove a greater challenge to the American role than China. This means there will be times when the US will actually have to work with China to get things done. For example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is not the kind of thing we should oppose. We should be encouraged that China will pick up some of the role of providing global public goods. And having other countries participate in the AIIB means that instead of it becoming a Chinese political slush fund, it will have to have transparency and organization.

The AIIB case is an example of the type of decision the US will have to make. The US will remain the dominant power, but we will have to learn to work more with others, and not just China. It is not possible to solve global climate change with just two countries. You can't have international monetary stability with just two countries.  We have to think of Europe, Japan, and others.

This requires an attitude about foreign policy that gets away from the kind of zero-sum way we have often approached it.

DISPATCH JAPAN: As you wrote the book, were you thinking to encourage Americans to think in a new way about foreign policy, or were you trying to reassure our allies and potential adversaries that America is not a declining nation?

NYE: Both. I try to write in an academically-respectable way, with footnotes and suggested additional readings. I addressed this book to people who are concerned about America's role in the world, whether they are in the United States or abroad.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the general trend in American foreign policy? The Bush administration was quite interventionist, and the Obama administration seems to have retrenched.

NYE: There are periods in American foreign policy in which we are "maximalist," and others during which we retrench. But retrenchment is not the same things as "isolationism." Retrenchment is an adjustment of strategic goals and means. Dwight Eisenhower followed a retrenchment policy, and Obama is in the tradition of Eisenhower. By contrast, George W. Bush was a maximalist. I argue that maximalists often get us into worse trouble than retrenchment. But too much retrenchment can be a problem, and I do worry about that.

For example, look at the role of Congress in not ratifying the Law of the Sea Treaty. Congress has refused to go forward with agreements reached to raise the quota for emerging countries in the International Monetary Fund. These are foolish decisions, and they hurt our position in the world.

In addition to this overview, it is important to look at specific regions. It would be foolish for the US to retrench in Asia or Europe, or even Latin America and Africa. But in the Middle East, we are going to see a period of revolutions of different types. Some will challenge state borders, as we are seeing now in the so-called Ottoman Provinces. We will also see increasing religious divisions. There will be popular discontent about delayed modernization, which occurred in the Arab Spring. These types of revolutions are not going to end quickly. It's a bit like the French Revolution, which began in 1789, and it was not until 1815 – 25 years later – that the Congress of Vienna restored some semblance of stability to Europe. In circumstances like that, trying to control events through external intervention often makes the situation worse, not better. Prussia, Austria, and Britain found that out when they tried to control events in France.

In the Middle East, we are going to have to learn how to use shifting partners, try to nudge things when we can, but accept that controlling these revolutions will be beyond our capacity, or the capacity of any external actor.

In the Middle East, we will have to think of policy in terms of containment of the effects of these revolutions.

In East Asia, in contrast, there needs to be a major American presence, which is what the "rebalance" policy is all about. We are welcome in East Asia: Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, India, Australia. These countries want us there to help manage the rise of Chinese power.

This is not containment. It is to ensure that as China's power increases there is a natural balance of power.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Some critics argue that President Obama looks weak.

NYE: In East Asia, the rebalance policy is correct. The administration has been challenged by so many problems that keep arising in the Middle East. So if you simply look at the travelogue of administration officials, you don't seem to see much rebalancing. This is a case of the urgent driving out the important. In Europe, I think President Obama has been right to ensure that Vladimir Putin cannot divide the US from Europe, which has been a major Russian objective. Obama has been very smart to keep a close relationship of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Meanwhile, the opening to Cuba in Latin America was a good move. With Iran, we still do not know what is going to happen with the nuclear negotiations until next June. These are all steps in the right direction.

Overall, I would say President Obama is headed in the right direction.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Let's look a bit more at the rebalance in East Asia.

NYE: One of the important questions is whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will get through. One can complain about the details of trade agreements, and I am not a trade expert. But if TPP fails, it will be seen as a major American setback for rebalance policy. There are indications that US and Japanese negotiators are getting close to an agreement, but it is not done until it is done.

We are also going to have to find ways to work with China on the key issues. Obama has tried. The statement on climate change reached while he was in China late last year was useful; not earth-shaking, but useful. We are going to have to think about a more subtle approach to the AIIB.

And the US-Japan defense relationship is the better than I have seen in years. When I was in the Pentagon 20 years ago, people were talking about the security treaty with Japan being a relic of the Cold War. People don't think that anymore.

American relations with India have moved in a healthy direction. So the overall direction of the rebalance is good, but it is occurring at a slower pace than I would like to see.

DISPATCH JAPAN:  How do you evaluate Prime Minister Abe, especially on history issues?

NYE: It really is time to put the history issues behind us. The 70th anniversary of the end of World War II should be a time to now turn to the 21st Century, and not get stuck in the details of the 20th Century. At times, Prime Minister Abe has been pragmatic on the issues. I hope that pragmatic side will continue to come through. Abe is Kishi's grandson, and that does have effect on how he thinks back over history. The visit to Yasukuni Shrine in late-2013 not only irritated Japan's neighbors but also disappointed Washington. I hope he will see that those kinds of steps are more costly than they are worth.  He wants to create a legacy, including TPP, the upgraded defense guidelines, and repairing relations with South Korea so as to be prepared if something were to erupt with North Korea. These are the things to think about, not history.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Okinawa continues to be a source of unease. What do you think the US should do about the Futenma Replacement Facility project?

NYE: If there is enough political support on Okinawa to build the replacement facility at Henoko, I think we should carry it out. But I am not sure that is going to be possible. We'll have to see. The more important issue is to think over a ten year period. How do we want to see American troops deployed? I have suggested that we ought to consider having US troops co-located on Japanese bases throughout the islands, which reduces their vulnerability, but also makes clear that these are Japanese bases, with Japanese flags, with the American presence rotating around these bases. Misawa Air base would be a case in point. If we think ahead 10 years and ask how we are going to ensure a continuing alliance, a continuing strong American presence, with US and Japanese forces capable of operating together, then we really have to get away from the idea of large, fixed bases on Okinawa as a long-term solution. We should be planning for that decade-long process, rather than letting everything sink or swim on the issue of relocating the Futenma operations to a new facility at Henoko.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this you forward-thinking, or are you aware of this approach being on anyone's radar screen in Washington?

NYE: This is my personal view, but I have raised it with friends in Washington. I participate in the US-Japan commission coordinated by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and there is also an annual conference held jointly by CSIS and Nihon Keizai Shimbun. I have floated these ideas in these forums. But I am not a stalking horse for any Pentagon consideration of new approaches to Okinawa. To the contrary; a lot of people would say I am out on a limb.
 AIIB China collective self-defense comfort women historical revisionism Japan-China relations Japan-ROK relations Joseph Nye Kono Statement Murayama Statement Okinawa Shinzo Abe TPP US Marines US-China relations US-Japan relations Yasukuni Shrine Peter Ennis 2015-05-05T18:07:04-04:00 Abe's 'Canberra Strategy' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/04/abes-canberra-strategy.html Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan will speak to a...
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan will speak to a joint meeting of the US Congress on April 29, marking the first time Japan's top political leader will address the full US national legislature. The speech will carry enormous symbolism; Abe will speak from the rostrum of the House of Representatives, from which Franklin Roosevelt declared war on Japan in 1941 in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of that year. The US and Japan have long been reconciled, of course, with a post-war bilateral security alliance that continues to form the bedrock of stability in East Asia. But Abe has a testy relationship with his leadership counterparts in China and South Korea, and both countries will be listening carefully to hear if and how he addresses lingering animosities about Japan's historical role in the region.

Many analysts in Washington expect (and some have recommended) that Abe will model his upcoming address to Congress on the talk he delivered to the Australian parliament in capital-city Canberra in July of last year. Abe effectively referenced two incidents of severe mistreatment of Australian prisoners-of-war during World War II that had long been thorns-in-the-side of Japan-Australia relations. The Bataan 'Death March' of 1942, in which hundreds of American POWs died in Japan-occupied Philippines, conjures up similar emotions in the United States. In 2009, Japan officially apologized for that mistreatment of captured American soldiers. Japan's prime minister at that time, Taro Aso, was under some pressure in part because his family's lucrative coal mining business used US POWs as forced-laborers during World War II. (Aso is now Japan's finance minister.)

Whether Abe really apologized to Australians on behalf of Japan, or merely commiserated about a shared bitter experience, remains a matter of contention. And his Canberra comments made no reference to China, Korea, or any other country in East Asia, leaving unanswered whether he really agrees with his predecessors Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi, who stated unambiguously in 1995 and 2005 respectively that Japan adopted a "mistaken national policy" that resulted in "aggression" and "colonial rule" in the first half of last century.

While stating that he agrees with his predecessors "on the whole," Abe himself has never used the most important operative words from those past apologies that Chinese and Korean officials consider a litmus test of his views and intentions.

Unresolved history issues between Japan and Korea – key US allies – continue to complicate American diplomacy in East Asia, making Prime Minister Abe's upcoming address to Congress, and his planned statement in August marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, particularly important.

To discuss Abe's 'Canberra Strategy,' we turned to Tessa Morris-Suzuki, one of Australia's top specialists on Japan. Morris-Suzuki is professor of Japanese history at Australian National University, and author of East Asia Beyond the History Wars. She is past president of the Asian Studies Association of Australia.

Morris-Suzuki: 'Prime Minister Abe

 is deliberately ambiguous about apologies'

DISPATCH JAPAN: Was Prime Minister Abe's "Canberra" speech last year well-received in Australia?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: The prime minister's speech made headline news and attracted some media debate at the time, but its long- term impact on Australian views of Japan appears to have been quite small. It is difficult to say whether this impact was positive or negative. A number of media, business, and political commentators praised Abe's words of condolence for the Australian servicemen killed in World War II, but much of the discussion in letters-to-the-editor of major newspapers was critical. The event also attracted public criticism from Australia's main veterans' organization, the Returned and Services League. An interesting note is that much of the criticism focused on Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who replied by praising the skill and sense of honor shown by Japanese troops during the war. This was widely criticized by veterans and others, who argued that Japan's wartime treatment of prisoners of war was not honorable.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe referred specifically to the Sandakan wartime events on Borneo, and the Kokoda events in Papua New Guinea. Remind readers why Sandakan and Kokoda resonate with Australians.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Abe began his speech by referring to Sandakan and Kokoda. Sandakan in Borneo is the site of a death march during which some 1,000 Australian soldiers were killed or died of starvation, disease, and exhaustion. The Kokoda track over the mountains of Papua New Guinea was the site of crucial and fierce battles between Australian and Japanese forces, in which some 600 Australian soldiers were killed.

It is worth noting that although Abe mentioned the place name Sandakan, he did not use the term "death march". These two sites, and particularly Kokoda, have become key symbols of the sufferings of Australian soldiers during the Pacific War. Monuments to the Kokoda track exist in many parts of Australia, and some Australians still visit the track to reenact the march over its rugged terrain.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did Australians receive Abe's comments as an apology? He seemed to speak somewhat in the passive tense – "regretting" that terrible things happened, but not acknowledging responsibility on the part of Japan.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Most commentators noted that Abe expressed condolences but not apology. In fact, Abe's speech presented the war, not as an event for which Japan should apologize, but rather as a part of history which Australia and Japan share. He spoke of "our fathers and grandfathers" -- both Japanese and Australian -- experiencing the events of Sandakan and Kokoda, and went on to speak of the Japanese naval officers killed in an attempted midget submarine attack on Sydney harbor. He recalled how Australia had invited the mother of one of the dead to visit Sydney for a memorial ceremony, and then quoted the words of former Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies: "Hostility to Japan must go. It is better to hope than always to remember." The clear message was, "We all suffered similarly during the war. We should let bygones be bygones."

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe seemed perhaps more ready to reconcile with Australia than with China or Korea?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I look at this in strategic terms. Abe wishes as far as possible to avoid making any direct apologies or acknowledgments of wrongs committed by the Japanese military during the war. But at the same time his strategy is to deepen the military alliance with the United States and forge new and deep military and intelligence alliances with countries like Australia. In order to combine these two aims, he and his advisers choose words very carefully to try to smooth over concerns about memories of the war without directly addressing or apologizing for the events of the past.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe says he upholds the Murayama and Kono statements "as a whole." To you, what does that mean?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: This is a phrase devised to confuse and blur the meaning of Abe's stance on the issues of war responsibility and apology. It is a deliberately ambiguous phrase which enables him to avoid saying whether he accepts words such as "aggression" and "apology" contained in the Murayama statement, and to avoid reconfirming the Kono statement's acknowledgment that "comfort women" were recruited by coercion.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you anticipate the prime minister will say in his August 15 statement, marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I think it likely that he will use two verbal strategies in an effort to appease international (particularly US) opinion, while at the same time avoiding making a direct statement of apology about the war. First, he will express a personal sense of pain at the memory of the war. In many recent statements, including his Canberra speech, Abe has spoken of his sadness and heartache at this memory. These words present the prime minister to the world as being a compassionate and caring person, but at the same time avoid any notion of historical responsibility. The second strategy is to use the word "反省" [hansei - best translated as "reconsideration" or "self-questioning"] in his statement in Japanese, but to translate this into English as "remorse". The word "remorse" in English has a much stronger meaning than "反省" in Japanese (and would most commonly be rendered in Japanese as 後悔 [kōkai]or 自責の念 [jiseki no nen]). In the Murayama and Koizumi statements, the word "反省" was also translated into English as "remorse", but was followed by the words お詫びの気持ち[owabi no kimochi - a feeling of apology].  If Abe uses the word 反省 (translated as remorse) but not the word お詫び (apology), he will convey to English speaking audiences the impression that he is apologizing, but will make it clear to those who read his statement in Japanese, Korean or Chinese is that he is merely expressing 反省 and not お詫び.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How will Korea react if PM Abe omits the wording of the Murayama Statement – "aggression," "colonial rule," and "mistaken national policy"?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I am deeply concerned about the likely impact of Abe's 70th anniversary statement. If he uses the verbal strategies I have mentioned, these will not only fail to ease the painful memories of many people in Korea, China and elsewhere, but also deepen misunderstandings between East Asian countries and the English-speaking world. Many Americans and others, hearing the word "remorse", will think that Abe has issued an apology, and fail to understand why Chinese and Koreans are still dissatisfied. In short, I am concerned that Abe and his advisors may be planning to use verbal games to send one message to the English speaking world and another to East Asian countries, including Japan itself. The terrible events of the Pacific War should be recalled with sincerity, honesty and directness, not with word games.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you think Abe a transformational figure, leading and reflecting fundamental changes in Japan?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: The Abe administration has already changed Japan in important ways through alterations to military strategy, state control of information, educational guidelines, trade and energy policy and other matters. In this sense Abe is a transformational figure; but it still too early to say whether he will succeed in carrying out the further and even more fundamental transformations, including changes to the constitution, which remain on his policy agenda.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why does the Abe Cabinet receive high marks in public opinion polls, but low marks for its major policies?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Public opinion is still reacting to the sense of crisis and absence of leadership which followed the triple disaster of March, 2011. Many people in Japan feel a profound sense of insecurity because of the ongoing aftermath of the disaster, the continuing weakness of the Japanese economy and the rise of China. In this situation, Abe's large and simple statements about Japan's revival and national pride are reassuring. Many people also still pin hopes on the future effects of Abenomics, even though, after two-and-a-half years, no significant positive impact on economic fundamentals or on the lives of ordinary Japanese people has yet been seen.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a thought-out, realistic national strategy underlying "revisionism," or is it more of a romantic whim about Japan.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I believe that this is driven by emotion and ideology, not by political realism. A more realistic political strategy would positively and creatively address the concerns of China, Korea, and other Asian neighbors, since Japan's long-term economic and security future rely on good relations with its neighbors. Revisionism is also creating deepening divisions within Japanese society itself. At a grassroots popular level, Japan has a fine history of efforts to seek reconciliation with neighboring countries and address problems of war responsibility. A more realistic national policy would build on these grassroots achievements, rather than ostracizing and marginalizing ordinary Japanese people who have worked so hard for reconciliation.

 Canberra statement comfort women historical revisionism Kono Statement Murayama Statement US-Japan relations Peter Ennis 2015-04-20T09:39:38-04:00 Cronin: 'Next year might have been a better time for Prime Minister Abe to address Congress' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/04/cronin-next-year-might-have-been-a-better-time-for-prime-minister-abe-to-address-congress.html Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe will arrive in Washington two weeks from now, with the highlight of his visit to be an address to a joint meeting of the US Congress. The key issues on the agenda include an upgrade of the US-Japan security relationship, and the ongoing efforts to...
Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe will arrive in Washington two weeks from now, with the highlight of his visit to be an address to a joint meeting of the US Congress. The key issues on the agenda include an upgrade of the US-Japan security relationship, and the ongoing efforts to conclude an Asia-wide trade deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But Abe, Japan's most politically-stable prime minister in years, is a polarizing figure in Northeast Asia, and could wind up receiving as much or more attention himself than the important issues at play.

Patrick Cronin directs the Asia program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), one of Washington's more influential think tanks on defense and national security issues. He has been involved with US-Japan policy for over 20 years, going back to the "Nye Initiative" of the early 1990s, which resulted in the upgrade of bilateral defense "guidelines" in 1997. When the Liberal Democrats (LDP) temporarily lost power in 2009, Cronin was one of the few specialists in Washington who had good contact with the LDP, the defense bureaucracy, and the then-newcomers of the Democratic Party (DPJ). Cronin has held senior positions at the National Defense University, London's IISS, and CSIS in Washington, and served several years as the third-ranking official at the US Agency for International Development (AID).

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Before we get into Prime Minister Abe's upcoming visit to Washington, let's set some context. The US Congress is now considering the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). You've suggested to members of Congress that they view TPP as critical to US national security, that it would rebrand the US as more than a military power in the region.

CRONIN: That's right. The Asia-Pacific region is driven mostly by trade and economics, and economic strategy. The United States has lost a lot of credibility; we used to be the dominant economic power, and the dominant trade power.

For the past few years, the US has pushed TPP as the leading framework for region.

My point to US policy makers is the intrinsic importance of reminding the region that the US is a great market power, interested first and foremost in open access to trade, and the global commons more broadly.

For better or worse, the US has made TPP the end-all and be-all of our whole approach to the region. So, without TPP, and without the trade promotion authority (TPA) that is a necessary precursor for TPP, the United States would be pushed onto our back feet for a number of years – well into the next administration. That is how long it would take to put together any new initiative that would have any hope of winning broad appeal, not just in the region, but with our Congress.

It is quite ironic that the US Trade Representative initially opposed bringing Japan into the TPP, on the theory that Japan would drag out an endless dialogue and negotiation. But now, in the 11th hour of trying to bring the TPP negotiations to a successful conclusion, it doesn't seem to be Prime Minister Abe who is dragging his heels. It is the US that can't get its act together.

For Japan, TPP is clearly a vital strategic interest. Abe seems anxious to prevent Japan from slipping down the ladder of great power nations. He is trying to preserve Japan's strong stature, especially as China rises so quickly. Abe's third arrow of structural reform has been waiting for something like TPP, and if it is not forthcoming, then it will be a serious wound to Japan's hopes of preserving its stature.

DISPATCH JAPAN: You think Japan – the Abe government – sees TPP in such strategic terms?

CRONIN: Japan has been pushing to tighten our alliance, even while it has been seeking economic revival, including with the TPP. But Japan is not reassured. Look at the lack of reassurance that Japan apparently feels over the Senkaku Islands. Because of the growing contest with China in the South China Sea, Japan is very wary over whether the United States will be fully committed to Japan. Every ally worries about this kind of thing to some degree. But there are plenty of signs of deep concerns in Japan about this, which led President Obama last year to state very publicly that Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty we have with Japan would apply to the Senkakus. It showed that Japan is in need of greater reassurance today than ever before.

DISPATCH JAPAN:  You have similar concerns about Australia.

CRONIN: Yes. The Australians want to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) proposed by China. I think the AIIB is a natural thing for the region to do. The US should have a clear message in support of any principled approach to multinational development programs. The British, the Germans, the Italians apparently want to join. The AIIB will likely be congruent with World Bank-type rules. Having Australia, Korea, and other allies inside the institution would be a welcome development.

Think back just two governments ago in Australia, to the Howard government, at the time of the financial crisis in the US in 2008. Australia was worried that by 2030 the US would no longer be the dominant power. China looked ascendant.  Other Australian leaders are on record saying that Australia needs a more balanced approach between China and the US.

Australia, like other powers, keep trying to balance their security interests with the United States on the one hand, and their trade interests with China.

That is both the real danger, and real opportunity for the US. If we rebrand ourselves as a balanced power, one that brings trade, and not simply security guarantees, we will be more palatable to all of our partners and other powers in the region, including new partners in Southeast Asia. If we just have a security agenda in the region, we'll be thwarted because of a lack of political will when tensions rise with China. Even a strong China will be much more compelled by a strong, balanced US to modify the rules it would like to perpetuate, such as labor, property rights, and state enterprises. China might like to push its own rules in these and other areas, but will have to adjust if they are forced to comply with a high-standards trade agreement of the sort we are talking about with TPP. China will have to compromise. That is the aim: to negotiate the rules for the Asia-Pacific region, to which China would have to comply.

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Just to clarify: US trade negotiators initially did not want Japan included in TPP?

CRONIN:  Lawyers inside USTR made it very clear that they did not want Japan an initial stakeholder, on the grounds that it would protract the negotiations, and potentially thwart a successful conclusion. The alternative idea was to have a smaller group in the initial round, and then invite Japan to join in the second round.

Things have changed with Prime Minister Abe, though Prime Minister Kan was also open to joining the TPP negotiating process as a lever to promote necessary domestic reforms in Japan.

But there certainly was a time when US officials harbored major doubts that Tokyo would be serious about the economic reforms needed for Japan to comply with TPP.

The irony now is that it does not appear to be Japan that is foot-dragging.

Systemically, it is the US Congress's inability to come to grips with Trade Promotion Authority that makes the United States appear as the dysfunctional party.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you think the Obama Administration is really committed to TPA, and TPP?

CRONIN: The US faces a presidential race in 2016, and whichever party wins, the new president will start with either a huge gain, or a huge deficit, depending on whether TPP has been adopted.

TPP is not the end-all or be-all of civilization. But the US Government has made it our singular trade liberalization initiative. We won't be able to get to our European initiative if we don't succeed with TPP.

As a result, a lot rides on the success of TPP passing; for the US Government broadly, not just the Obama Administration's legacy.

Without TPP, the US strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will look very hollow.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why?

CRONIN: Thus far, the US military presence in the region has adjusted only on the margins of what we had before. If TPP were to fail, our diplomacy in the region will largely be forgotten, or dismissed. The US will look like a declining, one-dimensional power; big guns, but little sway or influence in the very important local disputes in the region.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the Obama administration doing enough?

CRONIN: The Obama administration is definitely mobilizing. But when I was up on Capitol Hill recently, it was obvious that the White House needs to do more. Congressional staffers are still asking: When will the White House really reach out to us?

In fairness: The mood in Congress is not exactly open and friendly to the White House. But the White House needs to do a lot more.

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Such as?

CRONIN: It really needs to be bipartisan. I think the White House should reach out to someone like Jon Huntsman, who may be the only Republican of note not running for president, and suggest that they work together to sell TPA and TPP to Congress. Huntsman knows the issues, and the politics. There needs to be some compromise, starting with the president.

There is a moral hazard for the president. He has become a very polarizing figure, and that will only increase as the 2016 presidential race heats up. If President Obama is the sole major advocate for TPP, that could make it even more difficult to pass. So the president has to be surrounded by strong bipartisan voices. Paul Ryan is another important Republican who could play that role very well, and there are other sitting members of Congress who could do it effectively.

The president should be looking to share the success of TPA and TPP because passage would only be the beginning of a new round of fierce competition and additional negotiations.

The US will have to follow through with new initiatives. But we can't even think about that until we get to the finish line of TPA and TPP.

DISPATCH JAPAN: In the context of the Obama administration's initiative to rebalance our global policies toward East Asia, how is it that Washington so poorly managed the diplomacy surrounding China's proposal for a regional infrastructure bank?

CRONIN:   For better or worse, the United States has been heavily focused on major security initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq. We created an economy that went into a downward spiral and deep recession. We are now trying to be restrained in our international security policy which, in general, was a prudent move, but did provide others with opportunities to try to fill the gaps. We have been cutting defense spending, especially with sequestration in place, and we have been cutting back on foreign assistance.

So, in a declining budgetary and economic environment, we were failing to initiate more comprehensive moves that could appeal to the Asia-Pacific region.

We put ourselves in the unwise position of telling Asian allies and friends to turn down money very much needed for infrastructure, unless the money came from us. And we said this even though we had no money to give them.

The US has to be on the side of progress, of problem-solving, and of rules that everyone can live by.  But other than TPP, which is a very important initiative, we have been failing to promote additional trade, investment, and development programs. We could have been working in a bipartisan fashion to rework the Bretton Woods institutions, such as reworking the distribution of voting rights in the Asian Development Bank. The existing institutions need to be more innovative and creative in tackling development issues in the region. And even if we had been doing those things, there would still have been a shortage of capital in Asia because the area is so dynamic economically.

So China's capital is going to be important. We should have been trying to steer China's initiative in a direction that is consistent with global rules that have worked so well in the region over the past 70 years. We certainly should not have been trying to block our friends and allies from joining the AIIB. In fact, the US ought to join. We should want a voice in the rules that will govern infrastructure investments. We would be in a position to help shape rules and regulations on labor, the environment, and other issues that are critical for the region.

Instead, the perception regarding China's bank proposal is that the US is being defensive, and is trying to stop China. In fact, China's track record on infrastructure investments is not very good. We should be on the inside, having influence.

That brings us back to the broader point that we have put all of our policy eggs in the TPP basket, which is why it is so important that Congress pass it.

DISPATCH JAPAN: But who in the Administration dropped the ball on China's AIIB idea?

CRONIN: Ultimately the White House is responsible. There are some excellent people who are trying to convey reasonable messages that then have to be implemented by various departments. But the messaging from this administration has at times been abysmal. That is not me being critical of the administration. This is what I hear from the region. Even if the administration wants to hedge on the AIIB more than I would, we should at least have had a clear message to deliver. For example, we could have been saying: "There are lots of questions about the AIIB. We don't oppose it, and we won't stand in the way of any of our friends and allies in the region from joining, but we hope they will raise the serious questions that need to be raised." That would have been a reasonable position. But it is the kind of message that has to be made consistently, over time. Our principles only matter if it doesn't appear that we are changing them from moment to moment. Right now, our friends find us unpredictable. We've put ourselves in a very unhealthy position.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Relations with Korea seem to be particularly up and down these days, with differences over the THAAD missile defense system, and the AIIB. How much are the Koreans hedging because of the troubles with Washington that you describe?

CRONIN: Every government has its domestic challenges. President Park certainly is facing a slew of them. She has seen a lot of opportunities in improving relations with China. There are economic incentives. Better ties with Beijing also give Seoul some leverage over North Korea. And finally, President Park is hedging against the US-Japan relationship. She wants to gain some leverage with Washington, to get the US to put pressure on Japan, both to atone for history, and to not move in a direction on defense issues that makes Seoul uncomfortable.

Our alliance with South Korea is strong, but our relationship with Seoul has certainly been better than it is right now. We do not have the kind of high-level, deep trust with Seoul that we should. This is partly attributable to President Park's governing style of reliance on a very small inner circle, though Washington certainly shares part of the blame.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What explains Seoul's reluctance about THAAD?

CRONIN: Missile defense is something that is very much in the national security interests of Korea, and in the interest of protecting US forces in Korea. It is an important factor in deterring North Korea, as Pyongyang grows its missile, and potentially nuclear weapons stockpile. We need missile defense systems. And as North Korea's missile capabilities expand in both range and quantity, we need multi-layered missile defense. Ultimately that means something like the THAAD system, to provide defense at a higher altitude over a larger area than a system like the Patriot 3 batteries. This does not threaten China in any way, though Chinese perceptions may be a different matter. We need to consistently, vociferously, and relentlessly make the case that THAAD has nothing to do with China. The issue is deterring North Korea's ability to threaten the South, to threaten US forces in the region, and to perhaps even threaten US territory.

As a matter of political reality, President Park, having moved closer to China for the reasons I mentioned, probably will not accept US deployment of THAAD until the next crisis. We have once again run into a messaging problem. We probably have been talking with the South Koreans about THAAD, but we then seek plausible deniability by saying that it has not formally been on the bilateral agenda so it has really not been talked about. The point of that is to have a guise to hide behind so we don't have to acknowledge talking about a system that is so politically sensitive in South Korea. It is sensitive for President Park, because she doesn't want to have to explain the situation every time she talks with Chinese officials.

The reality is that we ought to be preparing THAAD as a response to a serious North Korean provocation in the future, such as a fourth nuclear test, or more missile launches, including mobile missiles that would be very hard for us to strike. [North Korea fired some short-range missiles last week, shortly before US defense secretary Ashton Carter arrived in Seoul for scheduled consultations.]

All of this would justify the need for further beefing up of the missile defense network that we already have, beyond the Korean missile defense system that Seoul is committed to.

We could concentrate on interoperability, rather than an integrated regional system. That would be a bit of finesse, as it would help enable the Koreans to tell the Chinese that the system is not part of a larger, regional system aimed at China.

But it would mean that American, Korean, and Japanese forces, in a crisis, could start to network in response to an impending North Korean missile launch.

The whole issue has not been handled well. The Koreans don't want to talk about it, and even want to deny that they are thinking about THAAD. The issue is very cumbersome to talk about.

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Meanwhile, it doesn't seem very surprising that Seoul showed interest in the AIIB from the beginning.

CRONIN: The Koreans have criticized the US on this in much the same way the Australians and British did. They all perceived mixed or confused messages from Washington, and thus were put in the difficult position of having to consider whether their involvement in this important initiative would risk tension with the US. The message from us should have been an emphatic "sure, go ahead." Of course, we still hope they will press for the kinds of institutional rules that have helped them grow into prosperous G20 economies.

DISPATCH JAPAN: In the context of rocky ties right now with Seoul, what are the "pros" and "cons" of the invitation extended to Prime Minister Abe to address the Congress?

CRONIN: I think it is correct to invite the prime minister to address Congress, at the right time. Japan is our most important ally in the region. We could not have the kind of force presence that we do have in the region without Japan. Japan is a democracy, and the world's third-largest economy. Prime Minister Abe is committed to making a contribution to peace, the way Japan has done over the past seven decades, not like the decades before that.

So an invitation to the prime minister is the right thing to do. The question is: Is this the right time? I think a case can be made that we should have waited until we have the Trans-Pacific Partnership in place. And it may not be the best idea to excessively highlight the announcement of the new US-Japan defense guidelines during the prime minister's visit, since defense is not necessarily the message we want underscore at the time of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.

Next year might have been the ideal time for Prime Minister Abe to address Congress.

During this year's visit, we could have showered the prime minister with all sorts of attention, while putting pressure on Congress to pass TPA, followed by TPP. And we could have unveiled the new defense guidelines as the new framework for thinking through new roles and missions for this critical bilateral alliance.

In this way, we could have gotten past the May and August anniversaries of the end of the War. Remember, Prime Minister Abe will be back in Washington, probably repeatedly during his time in office. We could have ensured an arrangement for him to address Congress next year, hopefully with TPP having been adopted, and with the new defense guidelines operational.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do you expect the prime minister to deal with history issues?

CRONIN: Nobody knows for sure, except Prime Minister Abe himself. I think he is his own counsel on this matter. But clearly people like Professor Shinichi Kitaoka, who is acting chairman of the commission that is supposed to advise the prime minister on this, is fully aware of the sensitivity of the issue. I was in Japan recently, and Professor Kitaoka agreed with the three points I raised. First, the prime minister has to make sure that he atones with deep respect and remorse for the past. This wouldn't have to be an endless part of a speech or statement, but the prime minister will have to be sincere and believable. Secondly, he could then go on and talk with quiet pride – but plenty of pride – about the contributions Japan has made to order and stability in the international system over the past 70 years. And third, I think he needs to put forth something that would be a positive, rules-based vision for all, for the future.  Sincere atonement for the past, quiet pride for Japan's seven decades of contribution to international order, and a positive, inclusive vision for the future.

Those are the three ingredients I think are key, and I think Kitaoka Sensei understands this, and would recommend it.

I also think the prime minister understands this, but until he actually says these things, no one knows what political calculations may come into play, and change the perception of what he says.

DISPATCH JAPAN: To be effective, do you think Prime Minister Abe would do best to use the precise language from the Murayama and Koizumi statements?

CRONIN: I don't necessarily think there is only one way to convey sincerity and believability. But including the language from those earlier statements is the clearest way to signal continuity, and not to raise concerns. Conversely, deviating from the earlier statements does not gain Japan anything, but could cause lots of trouble. That would be the surest path to invite criticism at a time when Japan should be applauded for the contributions the country has made over the past 70 years.

 AIIB Ashton Carter China China-North Korea relations collective self-defense comfort women historical revisionism Japan-China relations Japan-ROK relations Kono Statement Murayama Statement North Korea Park Geun-hye Patrick Cronin THAAD TPP US-China relations US-Japan relations Peter Ennis 2015-04-13T14:27:12-04:00 US, Japan to release new defense guidelines before implementing legislation reaches the Diet http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/04/us-japan-to-release-new-defense-guidelines-before-implementing-legislation-reaches-the-diet.html The United States and Japan will release new bilateral defense guidelines in late April, according to Japanese officials who briefed reporters on the plan. The timing is politically awkward, as new and revised legislation to authorize new roles and missions for Japan's Self-Defense Forces envisioned in the new guidelines will...
The United States and Japan will release new bilateral defense guidelines in late April, according to Japanese officials who briefed reporters on the plan. The timing is politically awkward, as new and revised legislation to authorize new roles and missions for Japan's Self-Defense Forces envisioned in the new guidelines will not even be introduced in the Diet until May, and will likely be the subject of intense debate. But the US and Japan are anxious to release the new guidelines during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Washington later this month. Abe's Liberal Democratic Party, together with coalition junior partner Komeito, holds a commanding majority in the Lower House, and the prime minister's advisors are confident the implementing legislation will pass with ease. The pacifist Komeito has major reservations about many of the defense policies spearheaded by Abe, but has been unwilling to resign in protest from the ruling coalition. US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter is currently in Tokyo for consultations prior to the Abe visit.

Dispatch Japan continues to chronicle the evolution of Japan's defense and security policies, and the implications of those changes for the US-Japan security alliance.

Jim Przystup is a senior fellow and research professor at the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Previously, he was Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, a staff member on the US House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, a staff member in the State Department's office of policy planning, and director for Regional Security Strategies on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He worked in the private sector at Itochu and IBM. Dr. Przystup graduated from the University of Detroit and holds an M.A. in International Relations and a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History from the University of Chicago. The views expressed below are those of Mr. Przystup alone.  They do not represent the views or policies of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Przystup:  "Collective Self-Defense makes

 Japan a more attractive alliance partner"

DISPATCH JAPAN: The public supported Prime Minister Abe's handling of the recent hostage crisis, including opposition to ransom payment. But the public also seemed to be wary of any military-related response, or to see any policy implications much beyond renewed diplomatic efforts. Any surprise there?

PRZYSTUP: Not really, either in terms of public support for Abe's handling of the crisis, or the government's opposition to ransom payments.  Within Japan's political leadership, there has been, and continues to be some discussion of a role for the Self-Defense Forces in a future hostage crisis. But there does not appear to be broad public support for an expanded SDF role.

The recent hostage crisis was definitely not a 9/11 "tipping point" for Japan with respect to security policy. However, over time and in the likely event of another incident, I would expect questions to be asked as to how the government, in the words of the 2013 National Security Strategy, will "ensure the safety of life, person and properties of its nationals."

DISPATCH JAPAN: Let's look at the ongoing review of the bilateral US-Japan defense guidelines. Why was Japan anxious for the review?

PRZYSTUP: For several reasons, the Abe government wanted to anchor the US in the alliance, and in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan faces growing threats from North Korea, and faces increasing assertive Chinese conduct in the East and South China Seas.  At the same time, many in Japan were uncertain of the Obama administration's commitment to back up words with actions. In particular, the disappearing "red lines" over Syria raised international eyebrows, and Japan was no different.

Meanwhile, there has been growing recognition in Japan that if the country is to be able to count on the US, Japan would have to assume a larger role within the alliance, given financial and deployment strains on US forces.

The Japanese government's reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense last July was in part aimed at making Japan a more attractive alliance partner.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why was the US initially reluctant to update the guidelines?

PRZYSTUP: The initial US reluctance stemmed from concerns of being drawn into a potential conflict with China over the Senkaku islands.  Since China's late leader Deng Xiaoping opened the country to the world's market economy, US policy toward Asia has run along  two tracks: one, to move China, in (former World Bank President) Bob Zoellick's words, toward becoming a "Responsible Stakeholder"; the second has been to manage alliance relationships.

Over the past three decades, this has been a diplomatic and security policy success story.  But, China's recent assertiveness in both the South China Sea and toward the Senkakus raised questions across the region with respect to US policy. What is the US going to do in response to China?   Even as Washington continued to issue a series of diplomatic statements, Chinese actions have continued to change facts on the grounds.

For the US, it has been increasingly difficult to manage a policy that straddles engagement with China and enhancement of alliance and security relationships with other countries in the region.

In January 2014, the Director of National Intelligence submitted his annual report to Congress that made two points with respect to China. First, China is engaged in advancing the notion of a New Major Power Relationship with the US, to smooth out bilateral ties with the US, and to create a win-win situation for the two countries. The second point was that China is actively engaged in undercutting US credibility with our allies and partners.

The confluence of these forces led to the October 2013 decision to review the US-Japan defense guidelines, and to President Obama's affirmation in April of last year that Article V of the Security Treaty extends to the Senkakus.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What roles and capabilities is Japan likely to enhance?

PRZYSTUP: Japan's National Security Strategy has identified several priorities: law enforcement capabilities via the Coast Guard; so-called C4ISR, which means "command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; and maritime surveillance and amphibious capabilities.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do the guidelines review and the collective self-defense issue overlap? Will authorization of collective self-defense most affect Japan's potential out-of-area roles, such as mine-sweeping in the Persian Gulf, or will the impact be greater on contingencies in areas around Japan?

PRZYSTUP: Concerning potential SDF deployments beyond the Asia-Pacific region, the most talked-about contingency involves minesweeping in the Persian Gulf.

The existing 1997 defense guidelines limit US-Japan security cooperation to rear area support in non-combat situations in "Areas Surrounding Japan" (SIASJ).  SIASJ is largely understood to relate to a Korean contingency.

Japan's logistical support for US-led coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (in Afghanistan), starting in 2001, required Diet passage of a Special Measures Law.

Whether the SIASJ language will be retained in the guidelines now under review will shape the contours of future security cooperation.  Certainly in the event of a Korean contingency, the US will have access to UN-designated bases in Japan and rear area support under the 1997 defense guidelines.  But ROK political leaders have made it unmistakably clear that Japanese "boots on the ground" would not be welcomed in a Korean contingency.

As for future instances in which Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defense, the two reports of the Advisory Panel on the Legal Basis for National Security (the Yanai panel) presented a broad overview. The ruling coalition made up of the Liberal Democrats and Komeito are now debating legislation that will implement the July 2014 Cabinet decision on the exercise of collective self-defense. Legislation is likely to be introduced in the current Diet session.

DISPATCH JAPAN: On a practical level, how will the new policy on collective self-defense most affect the US-Japan alliance?

PRZYSTUP: For the US and Japanese forces to operate effectively together, it will be crucial for them to integrate their respective C4ISR capabilities. This will be a major challenge. Joint planning, joint training, and joint use of bases will all serve to more closely integrate operations, strengthening both deterrence and defense.

DISPATCH JAPAN: A US-Japan unified command seems far-fetched, but do you foresee collective self-defense paving the way for joint US-Japan task forces?

PRZYSTUP:  I agree that a unified command structure is somewhere over the rainbow, but over time, collective self-defense could result in a joint US-Japan task force.  For now, the next step is to see where the implementing legislation will take security cooperation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What are the strategic factors underlying the recent revisions in Japan's defense export policy?

PRZYSTUP: Shrinking defense budgets, economies of scale, access to a broader range of technologies and markets, and the importance of preserving a defense industry combined to produce the decision to relax the arms export ban.  In the UK and France, defense ministry officials and defense industry leaders welcomed Japan's decision, and said they look forward to defense industry cooperation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Notwithstanding these changes in Japan's defense policies, strategic relations with South Korea remain troubled.

PRZYSTUP: Security in Northeast Asia would benefit immensely from improved relations between Japan and South Korea. Defense officials in both countries are, by and large, positive. The disconnect occurs at the political levels in Seoul and Tokyo. Intelligence sharing is now agreed to, but is limited to  North Korea's nuclear and WMD programs. Further intelligence sharing will enhance the Northeast Asia security environment.

This would also be true of cooperation on THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense).  China is opposed to the US and the ROK cooperating on THAAD. But the fact is that THAAD, despite Chinese representations to the contrary, is focused on the threat to the ROK posed by North Korea's missiles. I find it hypocritical for Beijing to argue that Seoul should not enhance its self-defense through the use of THADD, while Beijing continues to prop up the North Korean economy. By providing economic assistance, China is allowing Pyongyang to continue to develop its WMD and missile programs.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any prospect for improved Japan-ROK ties?

PRZYSTUP: In my view, the key to moving ahead in ROK-Japan relations is for leaders in both countries to get back to the October 1998, Kim Dae Jung-Obuchi Keizo agreement, known as A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century. (Kim "accepted with sincerity" Obuchi's acknowledgement as "a fact of history" that Japan caused "tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule.")

This will require real political leadership and statesmanship in both countries.  But, as demonstrated by the Kim-Obuchi agreement, it is not impossible.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Under these circumstances do you think it was a good idea for House Speaker John Boehner to invite Prime Minister Abe to address a joint session of Congress?

PRZYSTUP: Yes. Abe is the leader of our major ally in Asia. This is a no-brainer. President Park has twice addressed a joint session of the Congress.

 Ashton Carter collective self-defense comfort women historical revisionism hostage crisis Japan-China relations Japan-ROK relations Park Geun-hye Shinzo Abe South Korea US-Japan relations Peter Ennis 2015-04-07T22:02:56-04:00 Japan and 'collective self-defense' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/04/japan-and-collective-self-defense.html Japan is continuing to formulate a new legal framework that will govern the country's security policy. Last summer, the Cabinet led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe issued a new interpretation of the country's famed "peace clause" enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution, which bars the country from maintaining armed...
Japan is continuing to formulate a new legal framework that will govern the country's security policy. Last summer, the Cabinet led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe issued a new interpretation of the country's famed "peace clause" enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution, which bars the country from maintaining armed forces that could be used to wage war or to settle international disputes by use of force.  The new interpretation, with a few important details still being debated by the country's two ruling coalition parties, will expand the definition of "self-defense," and allow for new roles and missions for the country's Self-Defense Forces. But the ongoing discussion, while further along more quickly than many had anticipated, remains contentious on a number of fronts, as the dominant Liberal Democrats (LDP), especially Prime Minister Abe, favor a much more robust military for the country, while the coaltion's junior partner, Komeito, is more in tune with the more liberal leanings of the general public, which is wary of the country wandering far from the core principle of Article 9. Today we continue with the latest in a series of interviews discussing the ongoing evolution of Japan's security policy.

Tatsumi: 'Japan is becoming serious

about defense responsibilites'

Yuki Tatsumi is a specialist in Japanese security policy, and US-Japan relations, at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. She joined Stimson's East Asia program in 2004 as a research fellow, and was appointed a senior fellow in 2008. Before joining Stimson, Ms. Tatsumi worked as a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and as the special assistant for political affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington. Among her numerous writings is Japan's New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities and Implications. A native of Tokyo, Ms. Tatsumi holds a B.A. in liberal arts from the International Christian University, Tokyo, and an M.A. in international economics and Asian studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington.

DISPATCH JAPAN: After the recent  hostage crisis, and the murder of Kenji Goto, approval ratings for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went up, but support for diplomacy over any kind of military response has remained strong. Any surprise there?

TATSUMI: No surprise. On the one hand, the Japanese public is realistic that Japan playing a bigger role internationally does come with some risk, and it is important that Japan stand for certain principles. Abe said that Japan would not cave in to terrorist pressures. He refused to pay a ransom. The public supported Abe for taking a firm stance.

At the same time, by and large, the public remains very cautious about using the Self-Defense Forces abroad, including for hostage rescue operations.

DISPATCH JAPAN: We saw a rash of stories in the Western media arguing or implying that the hostage crisis had brought Japan to a "tipping point," with the country perhaps on the verge of turning against Article 9 of the Constitution. Do you believe there is any foundation for that kind of analysis?

TATSUMI: No. The hostage crisis has not brought Japan to a "tipping point," in either direction. Japan is not going to accelerate, or be propelled, in a direction toward much greater involvement of the SDF abroad. Similarly, the crisis is not going to drag Japan back to the point of perhaps 10 years ago, when we tended to avoid any sense of responsibility for international security. Back then, policies like collective self-defense were far removed from serious official consideration, but now they are not.

The crisis will likely induce public demand for greater transparency and accountability from the government about how prospective changes to the country's security legislation will actually affect SDF deployments. Prime Minister Abe has explained what he hopes to change in a broad policy sense. But even he has not clearly articulated to the public how the likely proposed legislative changes will translate concretely into what the SDF can, or cannot, do. The LDP and Komeito, as the ruling coalition parties, seem close to finishing their debate, and with their strong majority in the Diet, they should be able to get new legislation past, as well as changes to existing laws.

But there is a problem. Neither the general public, nor many people considered well-informed, have been able to digest and internalize the real implications of the legislative changes the government is on the verge of implementing.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The Democratic Party (DPJ) and others have tried to argue that the prime minister may have unnecessarily gone too far in his January speech in Cairo, when he strongly aligned Japan with anti-ISIL efforts, knowing that ISIL was holding two Japanese hostages. Polls show the public does not blame Abe personally for the hostage murders. But does the criticism of his Cairo speech resonate at all with the public?

TATSUMI: I was a bit disappointed by some of the DPJ commentary. After having run the government for 3 years, some in the DPJ's current leadership still seem too naïve in thinking that one speech in Cairo would trigger such a crisis. The DPJ completely overlooked preceding incidents, starting from last autumn, when American and British journalists were executed in a very public manner. Seen in this broader context, it is clear that ISIL was happy to exploit and manipulate anything available. It just happened to be Abe's speech.

So the criticisms by some in the DPJ that blamed Abe's Cairo speech were short-sighted. Such reaction probably backfired because the public was disappointed with  the DPJ's reaction, further dragging down  the public's confidence in the party that had been already pretty low.

It is clear from the Cairo speech that Abe was offering humanitarian assistance to people affected by the violence in the region. I don't think the public buys the argument that the speech somehow provoked the crisis, or that Abe delivered the speech and played-up the speech with too much fanfare. The speech was really just an extension of what Japan has been doing in the Middle East for many years, assisting the Palestinians and others in the region at the grassroots level.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see much support for cultivating in Japan the capability for a military response to a hostage crisis, such as a hostage rescue force?

TATSUMI: I don't see anything like that. A hostage rescue capability is highly-specialized, requiring other combined capabilities, such as intelligence gathering and evaluation, which Japan does not currently have. And even with modestly increasing defense budgets, there won't be the resources available to develop that kind of overall capability.

DISPATCH JAPAN: So what will be the practical policy fallout in Japan from the hostage crisis, with respect to either diplomacy or defense?

TATSUMI: I see two scenarios. One: the crisis could be a catalyst to raise greater awareness among the Japanese public that the country really needs greater intelligence and other relevant capacities to deal with various security crises, including responding to hostage situations. That would require detailed study of the resources that would be required, and how the resources would be pulled together. There has been some talk, for example, of creating a Japanese version of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There could be increased support for the notion – though perhaps not yet proactive pursuit – of those types of greater security capabilities. The idea would be that in these uncertain times, Japan as an independent nation needs to invest more in these areas.

The other scenario is for Japanese to say that the hostage crisis, and the growing uncertainty of the times, is precisely why Japan needs to be very careful about any kind of talk of dispatching the SDF overseas. In this scenario, the public would side with even greater caution, and intensify defensive measures such as early closure of embassies at signs of trouble, and attempts at stricter enforcement of travel warnings.

It is too early to tell how this will play out.

We will get a good indication from the upcoming Diet debates over security legislation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you think will be the main points of contention surrounding the security legislation?

TATSUMI: The Cabinet last July endorsed the exercise of collective self-defense in a limited way. Generally speaking, the debates will revolve around how to define "limited." And the debate will not be so much between Abe's Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition DPJ. The debate will be inside the ruling coalition, between the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito. What kinds of SDF deployments will Komeito be comfortable with?

Some people mistakenly believe that with the  coalition's two-thirds majority in the Lower House, the LDP can simply run over the Komeito. But the coalition does not work that way. Many LDP members of the Diet are dependent on Komeito's electoral support for their seats in the Diet. There is a point at which the Komeito can and will weigh-in on the collective self-defense issue. Komeito already stretched itself very far in first supporting Abe to pass the Secrecy Law in December 2013, and then supporting  the Cabinet decision of last July about collective self-defense. Abe and his team are going to have to spend a lot of time, trying to reach out to the Komeito leadership even further, if they hope to get what they apparently want.

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Where will Komeito and the LDP likely disagree the most?

TATSUMI: Right now the main sticking point seems to be that the LDP wants broad latitude for the SDF to act in what are called "gray zones," which would require changes to specific laws authorizing new types of SDF operations.

Generally speaking, gray zones are areas of potential belligerence that had yet to take the form of a state-organized attack on Japan by another nation with military force. There are not precise definitions of gray zones, or what would trigger authorized SDF actions, and what those actions would be.

It seems pretty clear that the government mostly has in mind a scenario involving increased tensions around the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea. Realistically, the escalation from relative peace, to a gray zone of growing hostility, and then to a real, live contingency, would likely occur quite rapidly.

The LDP and Komeito are likely to struggle to define SDF operations that would be allowable to deter a potential adversary from escalating a gray zone contingency, while making sure to not authorize excessive use of force by the SDF that would inadvertently escalate the hostilities. What kinds of SDF operations would make China think twice before escalating, while stopping short of full-scale SDF operations? And, how would this be managed in real time?

Keep in mind that it is not only the Chinese who would be watching Japan in these gray zone scenarios. The US, as Japan's security ally, would have a great interest as well, which raises very complicated questions about how much information exchange, contingency planning, and coordinated operations between US and Japanese forces would be authorized under the new policy of limited exercising of the right of collective self-defense.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about mine-sweeping operations in the Persian Gulf, which the prime minister clearly states he wants authorized? Komeito is still reluctant.

TATSUMI:  When I first heard about mine-sweeping, I thought the prime minister had in mind the type of mine-sweeping that Japan engaged in after the first Gulf War in the early 1990s. All the fighting had stopped, but the mines still had to be cleared.  But apparently, this is a different case.

This is a very important question, because this goes to the heart of the matter of what kind of situation allows Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense in a "limited" manner. The case like this is still triggering strong negative reaction from the opponents of the Prime Minister's policy because to them, this would be a classic example of the government trying to expand the scope of SDF activities to areas that are distant from Japan's vicinity.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How does the security legislation debate overlap the US-Japan rewriting of bilateral defense guidelines?

TATSUMI: It all adds up to a lot for the alliance to absorb. In the beginning, I felt that Washington was reluctant to take up revisions to the guidelines, because American officials were not sure if Japan was really willing to take on bigger roles and responsibilities. Japan initiated the process, out of concern that the existing guidelines were not reflective of China's rising capabilities and activities. But the US was not going to enter the talks just to make Tokyo happy. Washington took time to gauge the level of seriousness in Japan. There has to be something in this for the US, something more than the US assuring Japan of backing in the event of a conflict surrounding the Senkakus.

The US eventually became convinced that Japan was serious about pursuing legislative changes allowing for a broader scope and range of SDF operations, including limited exercising of the right of collective self-defense.  Of course, the escalation of Chinese activities not only in the  East China Sea but also in the South China Sea motivated Washington as well.

The revision of the guidelines was supposed to have been wrapped up by the end of last year. But Japan suggested a delay until after the envisioned legislative changes are enacted, so that the revised guidelines can incorporate the expanded legal scope of SDF activities.

So much depends on the final legislative details. The US could wind up either pleasantly surprised, or disappointed.

Keep in mind that the Japanese government's position on the new guidelines also has to be coordinated with Komeito. They have made progress, but disagreements remain.

DISPATCH JAPAN: My sense is that the US, more than anything else, wants an integrated flow of battlefield information between the US and Japan, mostly involving North Korea. That means everything from missiles, to planes, to naval vessels, especially submarines that could pose a threat to US aircraft carriers and other battle ships.

TATSUMI: From the US perspective, the real end-game for a long time has been a combined operational command, which would break down the walls between US and Japanese forces by legally supplanting the existing interpretation of self-defense. But a combined command is now pretty far-fetched, so the fallback is integration in specific scenarios, such as missile defense. In the case of gray zones, such as a scenario around the Senkakus Islands, Japan cannot realistically expect the US to fully commit if Japan has to go through an enormously complex series of legal procedures for operational authorization every step of the way.

The US does not expect Japan's SDF to be involved in front-line combat in war in distant places. But the US does think it should be able to expect Japan to provide the full range of rear area logistical support, and information flows, without getting bogged down in separate legal authorizations.

Ideally, this is where a combined command would come into play. But since that ideal is not even on the horizon, a more realistic idea is for a range of parallel US-Japan joint task forces suited to likely scenarios, including ballistic missile defense.

In the wake of the 3-11 triple disaster, the US and Japan established three bilateral coordination action teams (BCAT)—one in Ichigaya, one in Yokota, and one in Sendai—to work together on nuclear issues and humanitarian relief. This might offer the most realistic model for future planning and operational coordination between the two militaries.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe has been invited to speak to a joint session of Congress later this month. Given the tensions with South Korea, but the improving defense ties with the US,what are the "pros" and "cons" of the invitation?

 TATSUMI: If Abe can deliver a speech to a joint session of the US Congress with the consent of the White House, the biggest "pro" will be that it symbolizes the reconciliation between Japan and the United States.  It sends a clear message that the US government, both the executive and legislative branches, is supportive of Abe and his agenda, both in economic and security policy.  On the other side, it could remind many of the recent fallout between Speaker Boehner and the White House over Speaker Boehner's invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu. Abe will want to make sure that Boehner's invitation is extended to him with the consent of the White House.  The current US administration has been frustrated with some of Prime Minister Abe's "advisors," who openly talk about how the US-Japan relationship would be in a better place had it been the Republications in charge of the White House. Mr. Abe has accepted the invitation from Mr. Boehner, but I think he would be smart to not want to aggravate such frustration by accepting an invitation from a Republican Speaker of the House extended without the consent of the White House.

 China China-North Korea relations Chinese military collective self-defense comfort women Diet DPJ historical revisionism hostage crisis Japan-China relations Japan-ROK relations Japanese politics Park Geun-hye Senkaku Islands Shinzo Abe South China Sea South Korea Takeshi Onaga TPP US-Japan relations Peter Ennis 2015-04-02T00:08:48-04:00 The US, Japan, and 'collective self-defense' http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2015/03/the-us-japan-and-collective-self-defense.html Japan's ruling coalition parties – the dominant Liberal Democrats (LDP) and junior partner Komeito – have hammered out a framework for legislation to implement the Abe Cabinet's decision last year to reinterpret the nation's pacifist Constitution. The new interpretation and emerging legal framework broaden the range of roles and missions...
Japan's ruling coalition parties – the dominant Liberal Democrats (LDP) and junior partner Komeito – have hammered out a framework for legislation to implement the Abe Cabinet's decision last year to reinterpret the nation's pacifist Constitution. The new interpretation and emerging legal framework broaden the range of roles and missions for the country's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) deemed necessary and allowable to ensure national security, while seeking to abide by the public's enduring Constitutional commitment to eschew war-making capabilities and the settlement of international disputes by force.

It's a fine line to traverse, fraught with political and legal controversy. But the policy changes have proceeded pretty smoothly, considering the stakes involved. Various factors are at play. The changes have occurred incrementally, in a process begun long before last July's Cabinet decision, including during the 3 years the opposition Democratic Party (DPJ) was in power. The LDP-Komeito coalition holds a commanding two-thirds majority in the Lower House of the Diet, meaning it faces few legislative hurdles in its path, as long as the ideologically divergent parties manage to remain allied. And polls consistently show that the public, while open to modest expansion of the SDF roles and missions, remains very wary of straying from the core principle enshrined in the Article 9 'peace clause' of the Constitution, which greatly inhibits the impulse of many in the LDP, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for more robust, semiautonomous military capabilities for Japan. In the back rooms of complicated coalition politics, the more liberal Komeito has tended to reflect the public's cautious sentiments about collective self-defense.

In effect, a fledging, uneasy policy equilibrium is settling in, providing Abe and his supporters with anxious anticipation of further change, giving traditional liberals some confidence that Article 9 has withstood a powerful, frontal assault, and leaving liberal and conservative realists fairly satisfied that increased deterrence against a rising China is taking shape.

Among other things, the impending new security legislation will allow for more active SDF involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and allow for Japan to provide logistical and other support for the militaries of other nations involved in international peace efforts. The definition of "self-defense" could also expand to areas far beyond Japan, to include for example mine-sweeping in the Persian Gulf in times of conflict, to ensure a steady flow of oil supplies from the region. (Komeito still has reservations on this front that have yet to be worked out.)

But the biggest changes will probably come in the day-to-day functioning of the US-Japan security relationship, which many analysts for years have warned is largely an alliance on paper alone, woefully unprepared for a crisis because almost all vital integrated functions are either severely lacking or are non-existent. The traditional interpretation of Article 9 barred excessive "integration" with the armed forces of another nation, including treaty-ally America, out of concern that Japan might inadvertently contribute to US use of force in ways that had nothing to do with the defense of Japan. In practice, this has meant lack of clarity on even the most basic of issues, including which facilities in Japan would be available to the huge influx of US forces that would occur in Japan in the event of a crisis, such as hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.  One US official said recently: "Japan doesn't have a clue about the extent of our buildup in Japan that would occur in a Korean contingency." Another insider commented: "Up to now, we haven't tried to pin these things down, for fear of narrow, legalistic answers far below our needs."

Now, with the new interpretation of the Constitution about to take legislative form, the US and Japan can proceed to finish an ongoing upgrade of bilateral defense guidelines that will allow for more joint contingency planning, sharing of intelligence and other information flows, and division of actual military roles and missions in the event of a crisis in or around Japan.

To further explore the emerging Japanese security policy, and the implications for the US-Japan security relationship, we turn to three Washington-based specialists: Gregg Rubinstein, a former State and Defense department official with three decades of experience in the US-Japan security relations; Yuki Tatsumi, a security specialist at the Stimson Center; and, Jim Przystup of the National Defense University. First up is Mr. Rubinstein.

Rubinstein:

 'Collective self-defense opens door to real US-Japan alliance'

Gregg A. Rubinstein is director of GAR Associates, a Washington-based advisory firm specializing in US-Japan security matters, particularly defense technology cooperation, and for 30 years has been known as one of Washington's top experts in this field. Mr. Rubinstein spent 12 years in the State and Defense departments working on US-Japan defense issues, including 7 years in the US Embassy in Tokyo. Since 1993 he has been an advisor on Japan Programs to the under-secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics. He has degrees from the University of Chicago and Columbia University, and also studied at Sophia University, Tokyo.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The public supported Prime Minister Abe's handling of the recent hostage crisis, including opposition to ransom payment. But the public also seemed to be wary of any military-related response, or to see any policy implications much beyond renewed diplomatic efforts. Any surprise there?

RUBINSTEIN: No. The illusion persists among many in Japan that if the country were just to tread softly, no one would have reason to harm Japan.  Even as Japan has moved toward more capable defense forces, the use of force remains illegitimate in popular perceptions. Some Japanese still blame the hostages for having created a meiwaku (annoyance).

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any policy fallout from the murder of the hostages?

RUBINSTEIN: There probably will not be much impact on visible policies. Quiet but more substantive coordination with international intelligence and security networks is more likely. There could be more attention on special forces/hostage rescue capabilities, but probably not using the Self-Defense Forces; more likely something akin to Germany's GSG-9 (a unit of the federal police formed in the wake of the Munich Massacre at the 1972 Summer Olympics).

DISPATCH JAPAN: Does the hostage crisis represent a "9-11" for Japan?

RUBINSTEIN: That seems overwrought.  No doubt this incident has influenced views of security concerns. But the impact in Japan will be more incremental, and low profile.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Let's look at the ongoing review of the bilateral US-Japan defense guidelines. Why was Japan anxious for the review?

RUBINSTEIN: Many in Japan came to the realization that they face a genuine threat from China – in contrast to North Korea, where threats seem largely hypothetical and manageable, as in the development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities.  By contrast, posturing by China around Japan's southwest flank poses a far more tangible challenge.

Along with the realization of the genuine threat facing Japan came a recognition that neither Japan's defense capabilities nor the  arrangements to work with US forces were sufficient to be truly effective.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What motivated the US to fully engage in the guidelines review?

RUBINSTEIN: Since the Bush-Koizumi era (2001-2006), the US and Japan have engaged in Roles, Missions, and Capabilities (RMC) dialogue to define an appropriate division of responsibilities for both 'defense of Japan' and regional security contingencies.  RMC concerns cover a spectrum of issues, from threat perceptions and security strategies, to defense planning and acquisition of relevant capabilities.  Progress in RMC talks would, in effect, 'operationalize' what has until now been a largely passive security relationship, in which the US provides a security umbrella and Japan provides bases, but for the most part the two sides really don't interact on operational matters.

Until recently, progress on RMC dialogue has been halting and incremental, reflecting policy and political constraints in Japan, as well as lack of a perceived threat that would compel action to address them.  China has provided an incentive for such action.  It is in this sense that the US welcomed the Japanese government's interest in revisiting the guidelines, whose provisions will form an essential framework for implementing RMC policy measures – so much so that RMC dialogue is now folded into guidelines review.

Each side's goals for guidelines revision may not always intersect.  As always, the US wants to focus on the most direct/immediate threat -- hostilities in Korea. Japanese officials have sought more explicit guarantees of support in the event of future confrontations over the Senkaku islands and elsewhere on Japan's southwest flank.  Nonetheless, the common interest in deepening substantive alliance cooperation certainly outweighs such differences in emphasis.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How significant is the difference in threat perception between the US and Japan with respect to China and North Korea?

RUBINSTEIN: Differences here seem more a matter of degree than kind.  Japanese government and public perceptions tend to take a more narrow view of the threat from North Korea, seeing it as relatively contained – and something that will recede with the inevitable unraveling of the Kim regime.

On the other hand, US concerns with Korea cover a wider spectrum of issues, from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and war on the Korean Peninsula, to dealings with China – in all cases without a clear vision on how to manage them.

Both the US and Japan want China to fit into a rules-based international system. Both want regional stability, as well as to fend off Chinese challenges to Japanese sovereignty.

But the order of those priorities probably differs, with Japan naturally focused on aggressive Chinese posturing in the area, and relatively less concerned with an agenda to foster 'China as a constructive stakeholder.'

DISPATCH JAPAN: What new or expanded roles do you expect Japan to commit to?

RUBINSTEIN: The first part has to do with finally making fully operational existing provisions for US access to Japanese facilities and resources in a crisis. For the most part, those access provisions are in the 1997 defense guidelines, but have not been actualized.

The second part has to do with expanded Self-Defense Force operations in coordination with US activities in such priority areas as surveillance, maritime patrol, and more integrated air and missile defense.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do Japan's capabilities fall short in any key areas?

RUBINSTEIN: Where don't they fall short?  Japan has accumulated an impressive inventory of defense hardware, but decades of security policy has emphasized deterrence and development of the country's industrial and technology capabilities.  There was little concern with real-world operations – "war-fighting" as we are wont to phrase it.

The result is all too evident. Across-the-board, Japan suffers from shortfalls in equipment performance, logistics support, training, and interoperability among the SDF services, as well as with US forces. Despite relatively high acquisition budgets, Japan has notoriously inefficient procurement practices that waste much of this funding, and exacerbate operational shortcomings.

This situation is starting to change, in recognition of the need for true operational capabilities. We can see this in Japan's recently announced National Security Strategy, as well as in the Defense Ministry's new procurement and industrial/technology base strategy.

But it is never easy to change ingrained practices and attitudes, especially in an environment as insulated as that which has surrounded Japan's defense community.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do the guidelines review and the collective self-defense issue overlap?

RUBINSTEIN: Exercising the right of collective self-defense (CSD) is an essential enabler of the envisioned new guidelines. Under the long-standing interpretation of the Constitution, which barred the exercising of collective self-defense, there could be no real degree of interoperability between the SDF and US forces in planning, exercises, or development of mutually-reinforcing capabilities.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will authorization of collective self-defense most affect Japan's potential out-of-area roles, such as mine-sweeping in the Persian Gulf, or will the impact be greater on contingencies in areas around Japan?

RUBINSTEIN: A more realistic approach to CSD will impact US-Japan interaction on everything.

Look at contingencies in or around Japan. In the real world, it is simply not possible to distinguish between threats targeted only at Japan or Japanese forces, and those of friends and allies in the immediate area.

The constraints imposed by the traditional ban on CSD would almost certainly undercut any US effort to fulfill its Treaty obligations to the defense of Japan.

Consider the much-touted US-Japan collaboration on ballistic missile defense. Under the pressures of a real-world emergency, how could anyone expect an effort to distinguish what missile is going where? That would be absurd. But as long as the traditional ban on CSD was in effect, neither American nor Japanese officials could have serious expectations of SDF operational involvement, so there was no reason to openly challenge such absurdity.

The same applies to overseas contingencies.  Political and bureaucratic interests in security policy have differing views on how the new approach to CSD should be applied overseas.  In practice, out-of-region SDF deployments will likely remain limited to peace-keeping and humanitarian relief efforts.

I do not see the US pressuring Japan to exceed this general limit on CSD-authorized operations.  US concerns would more likely focus on more realistic rules of engagement.  Can anyone imagine a repeat of the Iraq War scenario, when Ground Self-Defense Force engineers had to be protected by other allied forces -- and could not come to their defense -- because rules of engagement precluded their use of weapons?  Whatever overseas operations SDF units may undertake, they must do as full participants with international partners – as assets, not liabilities.

DISPATCH JAPAN: On a practical level, how will the new policy on collective self-defense most affect the US-Japan alliance?

RUBINSTEIN: For more than five decades the US and Japan have had a mutual security relationship that both sides call an alliance.  However, in defense terms, that word implies a degree of collaboration in planning and operational interaction that, with only rare and narrow exceptions, has not existed.

The authorization of collective self-defense will remove a major barrier to real collaboration, allowing the US and Japan (and third country allies/partners) to not just coexist, but interact.

DISPATCH JAPAN: It seems that planning, command communications, and intelligence sharing would be particularly affected.

RUBINSTEIN: This will likely be true at first, but these planning and support functions are not an end in themselves; they will also enable operational cooperation.

DISPATCH JAPAN: I specifically meant enhanced battlefield situational awareness, from missile defense to monitoring of North Korea jets or submarines in a contingency.

RUBINSTEIN: Yes, that would naturally flow. Intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities – known as ISR in military jargon – are crucial in all these areas, and more. As things stand now, there are major gaps in both deployed US and Japanese ISR resources, which would be priority matters for any planning dialogue.

DISPATCH JAPAN: A US-Japan unified command seems far-fetched, but do you foresee collective self-defense paving the way for joint US-Japan task forces?

RUBINSTEIN: A unified command structure is unlikely. It is not necessary from an operational standpoint, and would be fraught with political complications. But joint task forces are another matter. The beginnings of such arrangements are already evident in the joint missile command center at Yokota Air Base.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What are the strategic factors underlying the recent revisions in Japan's defense export policy?

RUBINSTEIN: It is a significant, but carefully controlled change. The previous "Three Principles" (3Ps) policy on arms exports was interpreted as a ban on almost all such activity.  The new 3Ps language on "defense exports" recognizes such transfers as a legitimate instrument of policy, but will still be subject to extensive conditions and controls.

US officials have welcomed the new 3Ps as support for closer collaboration on defense acquisitions.  This does not mean that, as sometimes suggested, this new policy is meant as a gesture to the alliance. Nor is it a response to industry lobbying in Japan.  The new 3Ps policy is an instrument to implement Japan's National Security Strategy. In this case, the goal is more effective defense acquisition, and a rescue of what is now a crumbling defense industrial base.

As such, the new 3Ps policy complements the Defense Ministry's new industrial/technology base strategy by emphasizing increased international collaboration in defense acquisition programs.  The new 3Ps and the MOD's industrial strategy are two sides of the same coin.

DISPATCH JAPAN: So economics is a factor.

RUBINSTEIN: The issue is not promotion of defense exports as an end in itself. The goal is increased access to resources in the international defense community. It is also an acknowledgment that earlier efforts to maximize autonomy in defense production and procurement have proven unrealistic.

In addition, the Japanese government's interest in defense-related trade focuses not only on traditional defense contractors. Equally important is the effort to engage a broader sector of Japanese industry that can offer defense-applicable commercial products.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will this increase Japan's foreign policy influence?

RUBINSTEIN: Defense exports are a powerful instrument of foreign and security policies, widely used to strengthen political and defense ties, as well as to promote trade.  But, as all significant players in this game know, defense exports can become a double-edged sword.  Entanglements in arms programs inherently open the way to abuse and corruption, pose risks of unintended proliferation, and can become dangerous when one-time friendship and/or partnership relations sour.

All arms exporting nations face these issues. Even perennial 'good guy' Sweden, which in many ways serves as a model for emerging Japanese defense industrial and export policies, has run afoul of serious controversies in India and the Persian Gulf.  In this sense, the Government of Japan is well advised to approach future defense transfers in an incremental manner that establishes solid and transparent precedents.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Notwithstanding these changes in Japan's defense policies, strategic relations with South Korea remain troubled.

RUBINSTEIN: From an operational standpoint, more constructive Japan-ROK engagement would benefit trilateral US-Japan-ROK collaboration in such critical areas as contingency planning, ISR, and missile defense.  NK would be better contained, and China given more pause before trying to disrupt US cooperation with both countries.

How much progress can we make here given bloody-minded attitudes evident on both sides? Trying to work such issues now must be very frustrating for the officials involved.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Under these circumstances do you expect Prime Minister Abe to be invited to address a joint session of Congress?

RUBINSTEIN: No doubt that Abe wants the recognition – for Japan and himself – that such an event would bring.  But three serious concerns stand in the way.  One is a real breakthrough on Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations; Abe needs to be seen as having overcome powerful protectionist interests like Zen-no (Japan Federation of Agricultural Associations) to deliver meaningful concessions.  The second is controversy over Japan's wartime legacy – history revision and comfort women in particular. The third would be inevitable reaction from China and Korea to any perceived glorification of Abe.

Even if posturing by China and Korea are put aside, TPP and wartime legacy concerns have stirred real controversy in the media as well as Congress.  Unless Abe is prepared to make real gestures in both areas, efforts to arrange an appearance before Congress could prove embarrassing to him personally as well as a setback for bilateral relations.

 collective self-defense Diet DPJ hostage crisis Japan-China relations Japan-ROK relations North Korea Senkaku Islands Shinzo Abe South China Sea South Korea TPP US-Japan relations Peter Ennis 2015-03-25T01:57:26-04:00