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Oct 19 - Nov 17, 2012
Industry Night Nov 5
Mother Courage
Her Children
By Bertolt Brecht
Translated by Tony Kushner
Directed by John Steinkamp
Original music by Joey Appel
Widely considered one of the greatest dramatic creations of the modern stage, Mother Courage and Her Children is Bertolt Brecht's most passionate and profound statement against war. Set in the seventeenth century, the play follows Mother Courage, an itinerant trader, as she pulls her wagon of wares and her children through the blood and carnage of Europe's religious wars. In this exciting new translation by Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Tony Kushner, Brecht's epic drama is given a new life for twenty-first century audiences. ". . . brings Brecht up to date and exposes the illusion of achieving small economic victories in a world hell-bent on destruction."- The Guardian
Mother Courage... Paige Jones
Eilif... Mario Calcagno*
Swiss Cheese... Robert Wylie*
Kattrin... Brooke Fletcher*
Chaplin... Matt Kerrigan
Cook... Jason Glick
Yvette/Farmer's Wives... Karen Wennstrom*
Recruiter/Eye Patch/Farmer/Soldier... Tyler Ryan*
Sergeant/Soldier... Tom Mounsey*
Old Colonel/Ensemble... Robert Projansky
General/Ensemble... Alan Hakim
Quartermaster/Ensemble... Hans Eleveld
Young Soldier/Ensemble... Collin Lawson
Scenic Designer... Ryan Nicolai
Lighting Designer... JD Sandifer
Costume Designer... Jim Crino
Composer/Music Director... Joey Appel
Sound Designer/Engineer... Richard Moore
Props Designer... Kaye Blankenship
Stage Manager... Amber Peoples
Production Manager... Anna Crandall
Artistic Supervisor... Joel Harmon*
John Steinkamp made his directorial debut in 2011 with John Kolvenbach's Love Song at Lunacy Stageworks. As an actor, John's involvement in Portland theatre dates back to 1977 and includes performances at Storefront Actor's Theatre, Portland Civic Theatre, New Rose Theatre, Artist's Repertory Theatre, Oregon Shakespeare Festival (Portland), The Haven Project, CoHo Productions, and Portland Center Stage. Regionally John has acted at Chicago's Steppenwolf Theatre. From 2005 to 2011, John was a member of Third Rail Repertory Theatre, where he appeared in their productions of The Wonderful World of Dissocia, The Lying Kind, Dead Funny (Drammy Award for Supporting Actor), Nobody Here But Us Chickens, A Lesson from Aloes, The Lonesome West, and Recent Tragic Events. John received his training at New York University and the Stella Adler Studio of Acting.
* Member of Theatre Vertigo


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WILKES-BARRE — The man accused of shooting one person to death outside a bar in Luzerne County and leaving another paralyzed is headed to trial.
William Allabaugh said nothing as he left district court in Nanticoke, where five people testified about the shooting that police said Allabaugh started at a bar in Plymouth.
Witnesses testified Allabaugh shot Stephen Hollman inside the bar and then opened fire on Main Street in Plymouth. That's where police said Allabaugh shot and killed Scott "Scooter" Luzetsky.
Assistant District Attorney Jarrett Ferentino said the shooting could have been even worse.
"He was headed back to the bar. You heard that he did reload the gun and there is concern that of course he would have headed back into the bar and injured other people as well," said Ferentino.
It was another customer in the bar who shot Allabaugh to stop the shooting. This customer had a permit for the gun and was never charged. However, Allabaugh's lawyer said there's still a lot of evidence that has to be looked at in this case.
"We have to look at all the ballistics yet. We haven't gotten any discovery obviously," said Allabaugh's attorney Bill Rizzo.
Bob Soha was at the bar that night and testified in court. He said he saw the gun in allabaugh's pocket and heard the first gunshot that started the chaos.
"Most of the people, a lot of women were hysterical. The women that were in the bar. So you know. Which was normal," said Soha.
Stephen Hollman, the man shot inside the bar, is still in critical condition. A trooper testified today that he's paralyzed and not able to speak. Allabaugh's homicide and attempted homicide charges will move forward in county court.

subset: commoncrawl


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An inclusion complex is disclosed of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3, 3-diphenyl-propylamine or its hydrochloride complexed with a cyclodextrin as well as a process for the preparation thereof and pharmaceutical compositions containing same. The new inclusion complexes have coronary dilatory activity and have greater water soluble than simple N-(1-phenylethyl)-3, 3-diphenyl-propyl amine or the hydrochloride thereof.
1. A process for the preparation of inclusion complexes of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine or its hydrochloride with cyclodextrin, which comprises reacting N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine base or hydrochloride thereof with cyclodextrin in an amount of 1 to 3 mmoles of the cyclodextrin per mmole of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine or its hydrochloride, under stirring at 4� to 60� C. in aqueous or ethanolic medium.
2. A process as claimed in claim 1 which comprises using N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine and cyclodextrin at a molar ratio of 1:3.
3. A process as claimed in claim 1 which comprises using N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine and cyclodextrin at a molar ratio of 1:1.
4. A process as claimed in claim 1 which comprises using N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine-hydrochloride and cyclodextrin at a molar ratio of 1:1.
5. A process as defined in claim 1 which comprises performing the reaction in aqueous medium in the presence of 1-20 ml. of water to 1 mmole of cyclodextrin.
6. A process as defined in claim 1 which comprises conducting the reaction in 5-32% by volume of aqueous-ethanolic medium.
7. A process as claimed in claim 1, which comprises reacting N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine with cyclodextrin.
8. A process as claimed in claim 1, which comprises reacting N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine hydrochloride with cyclodextrin.
9. A process as claimed in claim 1, which comprises using hydrochloride of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine formed in situ in the complex formation.
10. A process as claimed in claim 1, which comprises using α-cyclodextrin as cyclodextrin.
11. A process as claimed in claim 1, which comprises using β-cyclodextrin as cyclodextrin.
12. A process as claimed in claim 1, which comprises using γ-cyclodextrin as cyclodextrin.
13. Coronary dilatator calcium antagonist pharmaceutical compositions containing as active ingredient a pharmaceutically effective amount of either N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine-hydrochloride cyclodextrin complex or N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine-cyclodextrin complex admixed with a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.
14. N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine-α-cyclodextrin complex as defined in claim 1.
15. N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine-β-cyclodextrin complex as defined in claim 1.
16. N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine-γ-cyclodextrin complex as defined in claim 1.
17. N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine hydrochloride β-cyclodextrin complex as defined in claim 1.
18. An inclusion complex of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine or its hydrochloride complexed with a cyclodextrin selected from the group which consists of a α-cyclodextrin, β-cyclodextrin and γ-cyclodextrin.
19. A coronary dilatative calcium antagonist method of treatment which comprises administering to a susceptible subject an effective amount of a composition consisting essentially of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine or its hydrochloride complexed with at least one cyclodextrin selected from the group which consists of α-cyclodextrin, β-cyclodextrin and γ-cyclodextrin.
The invention relates to the preparation of an inclusion complex of N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenyl-propylamine or the hydrochloride thereof with cyclodextrin.
The inclusion complex can be prepared by reacting N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine base or the hydrochloride thereof with cyclodextrin under stirring at 4�-60� C. in an aqueous and/or ethanolic medium and optionally treating the obtained complex of the base with hydrochloric acid.
N-(1-phenylethyl)-3,3-diphenylpropylamine (referred to hereinafter as phendiline), is a coronary dilator calcium antagonist (see Hungarian Pat. No. 150 534). The substance is an oily liquid and its hydrochloride salt is used as an active ingredient of a pharmaceutical composition known under the trade name Sensit. A solid pharmaceutical composition can be prepared only from the hydrochloride. However, phendiline hydrochloride is an extremely hydrophobic substance. Thus the rate and extent of the resorption of phendiline are not satisfactory.
The object of the invention is to provide a process by which phendiline or its hydrochloride can be prepared in a form which is more soluble and thus its in vivo resorption can be accelarated and increased.
We have now found that if phendiline or its hydrochloride is converted to a cyclodextrin inclusion complex the obtained complex is much more soluble at a pH and temperature corresponding to these of gastric acid than is the original molecule. The rate and extent of the dissolution are increased.
Cyclodextrin molecules are known to have a cylindric structure, the inner surface of which is apolar and thus they are capable of binding hydrophobic molecules in the form of an inclusion complex. Such hydrophobic molecules may in the present case be phendiline or its hydrochloride, the solubility of which in water is very poor. Our experiments have shown that when reacting phendiline with cyclodextrins, two molecules of cyclodextrin form an inclusion complex with each molecule of phendiline, which surprisingly loses one of its cyclodextrin molecules in an aqueous hydrochloric acid solution corresponding to the pH of gastric acid and the complex is readily converted to a molecularly dispersed state. The solubility is thus increased and a better biological activity can be observed. When stirring cyclodextrins vigorously with phendiline in an aqueous and/or ethanolic medium, the phendiline molecule displaces the water molecules in the hollow of the cyclodextrin and due to the formed apolar-apolar interaction an inclusion complex is formed.
This intensive dissolution process for the product of molecular encapsulation by cyclodextrins, combined with salt formation and partial release of cyclodextrin is new. The essence of the process is that the host molecule is ionized in the cyclodextrin inclusion complex of the non-ionic molecule, and due to the formation of the ionic bond the appearing intensive charge and the accompanying intensive hydrated state casts off part of the cyclodextrin casing of the host molecule. If an inclusion complex of a non-ionic host molecule which is not well soluble in water and which has a crystalline grid structure is thus converted to the ionic state, then the crystal granule disintegrates explosively and the entire amount of substance is transformed to molecularly dispersed state, i.e. to a solution.
The resulting, molecular structure is relatively highly soluble as its one end is hydrated due to the ionized state and its other end--which is apolar to a great extent and causes thus a poor solubility of the molecule--is covered from the outside by a hydrophilic cyclodextrin ring.
Phendiline is not soluble in water, but even the solubility of its hydrochloride is extremely poor. If the free base is treated with hydrochloric acid, then the hydrophobic hydrochloride on the surface of the oil drops of the base not only inhibits the dissolution but further salt formation as well. If one molecule of phendiline forms an inclusion complex with two molecules of cyclodextrin, a crystalline product is obtained which itself is relatively not highly soluble in water.
If, however this inclusion complex is introduced into an acidic medium, such as gastric acid, then the nitrogen atom of the phendiline takes up a proton and becomes ionic, breaking off the cyclodextrin ring close to the nitrogen atom. As a result a structure is formed in which the ionic phenylethylamino part of the phendiline is free, predominantly hydrated, and the apolar diphenylpropyl group remains in a complex with one molecule of cyclodextrin. A 2:1 complex is thus converted to a 1:1 complex in in acidic medium, when the phendiline cyclodextrin complex is mixed with an acid, and the product is transformed into a molecularly dispersed state, i.e. is dissolved.
Both the phendiline hydrochloride monocyclodextrin complex and the phendiline monocyclodextrin complex are highly soluble in water. Thus both the 2:1 molar complex of the basis form (active ingredient content about 11%), and the 1:1 molar complex of the hydrochloride (active ingredient content on an average 21%) show an increased solubility compared to that of phendiline hydrochloride and because of the biological activity these complexes are suitable for the preparation of pharmaceutical compositions.
FIGS. 1 and 2 are graphs illustrating the specific examples.
In order to demonstrate biological activity we examined the effect of the inclusion of the active ingredient into an inclusion complex with cyclodextrin upon the dissolution and resorption of phendiline and phendiline hydrochloride under in vitro circumstances. The in vitro tests were justified by the fact that the measurements are much more reproducible than by carrying out the tests in vivo.
The dissolution and the resorption are subsequent processes which depend greatly on each other. Under physiological conditions resorption is partially influenced by the pH relations at the place of the resorption and partially by the time spent by the pharmaceutical at the place of the resorption.
The average spent time in each segment of the gastro-intestinal system and the pH values are as follows:
______________________________________in the stomach 0-30 min pH = 1.2at the beginning of the 30-60 min pH = 5-6small intestine 60-360 min pH = 6-7in the further segmentof the small intestine______________________________________
The tests were carried out accordingly.
The resorption tests were performed on a Sartorius SM 16750 Resorption model, the membranes used were suitable for modelling the resorption from the stomach and from the intestine. On the basis of the test results the diffusion (Kd) and the resorption rate constant (Ki) were calculated for the test substances. The results are summarized in the following table.
______________________________________ Kd [cm2 min-1 ] Ki [min-1 ]Substance from the intestine______________________________________Phendiline 6.9 � 10-4 5.1 � 10-3Phendiline-β-cyclo- 1.42 � 10-3 1.24 � 10-2dextrin-complexPhendiline-hydrochloride 6.7 � 10-4 4.9 � 10-3Phendiline-hydrochloride- 1.71 � 10-3 1.52 � 10-2β-cyclodextrin-complex______________________________________
Both Kd and Ki are more than 100% higher in case of resorption from the intestine as a consequence of the complex formation.
The determination of the dissolved (MG) and the resorbed (Mi) active ingredient was performed on a Sartorius SM 16751 type Lose model [H. Stricker: Pharm. Ind. 33, 157 (1971); H. Sticker: Drugs in Germany 14, 93 (1971)].
FIG. 1 shows the dissolution of phendiline and phendiline cyclodextrine complex in some segments of the gastro-intestinal system over a time period where F stands for the dissolution of phendiline and F-CD stands for the dissolution of the phendiline-cyclodextrin complex.
In the 100. minute 75 mg. phendiline base were dissolved whereas the amount of the dissolved phendiline-CD-complex amounted to 150 mg.
The amount of the resorbed phendiline, phendiline-CD-complex as well as phendiline hydrochloride and phendiline-hydrochloride-CD-complex from the gastro-intestinal tract is shown in FIG. 2 where F stands for the resorbed amount of phendiline, F-CD stands for the resorbed amount of phendiline-cyclodextrine-complex, FHCl stands for the resorbed amount of phendiline-hydrochloride and FHCl-CD stands for the resorbed amount of phendiline-hydrochloride-cyclodextrine-complex.
Similarly to the increased dissolution values obtained both in the case of the base and the salt, the amount of the resorbed active ingredient from the intestinal tract doubled as a result of the complex formation. Thus the same activity can be achieved by only a half dosage.
In the toxicological tests we examined the acute toxicity of phendiline, phendiline-cyclodextrine-complex, and phendiline-hydrochloride and phendiline-hydrochloride-cyclodextrine-complex in mice intraperitoneally. The test substances were administered to 10 male and 10 female animals in each group by means of 5% Tween 80. The doses were calculated in the case of the complexes on the basis of the amount of phendiline active ingredient. The test results are summarized in the following table.
______________________________________ Observation time (hours) LD50 (mg./kg.)______________________________________Intraperitoneal administrationphendiline 24 47.54phendiline-cyclo- 24 157.47dextrine-complexphendiline-hydrochloride 1 81.14phendiline-hydrochloride- 1 160.55CD-complexPer os administrationphendiline 72 512.41phendiline-CD-complex 72 624.65phendiline-hydrochloride 24 522.24phendiline-hydrochloride- 24 954.88CD-complex______________________________________
The phendiline cyclodextrin complexes according to the invention are white powdery microcrystalline substances, which can be utilized in the form of pharmaceutical compositions. The pharmaceutical compositions contain an effective amount of the cyclodextrinphendiline inclusion complex optionally admixed with pharmaceutically acceptable organic or inorganic carriers. The most suitable forms may be tablets, dragees, capsules, syrups. These compositions contain the active ingredient admixed with diluents, such as lactose, dextrose, sucrose, glycine and/or lubricants, such as siliceous, earth, talc, stearic acid and salts thereof, polyethylene glycol, binding agents, filling agents, dyes, flavoring agents. The compositions may contain further biologically active components. The compositions may be prepared by methods known per se, such as mixing, granulating, preparing dragees by coating. The active ingredient content of the compositions may vary from 10 to 40%. The dosage depends on various factors, such as the route of administration, the state and age of the patient, etc.
The details of the invention are further demonstrated in the following Examples which merely serve for illustration and not for limitation.
10 g. (7.5 mmoles) of β-cyclodextrin containing 15% water are suspended in 40 ml. of water at room temperature whereafter 0.96 g. (3 mmoles) of phendiline in 2 ml. of 96% by volume are added dropwise under vigorous stirring. The suspension is then stirred for another 5 hours, filtered and dried. 9.2 g. of air-dried phendiline-β-cyclodextrin complex are obtained. Phendiline content: 9.7% by weight. The product is a white powder without a characteristic melting point. Determination of the phendiline content of the complex: 0.05 g. of the product is dissolved in 25 ml. of 50% by volume of ethanol and it is subjected to photometry at wavelength 258 nm against 50% by volume ethanol. The phendiline content is determined by means of a calibration curve.
26.8 g. (20 mmoles) of β-cyclodextrin containing 15% water are dissolved in a mixture of 350 ml. of water and 50 ml. of ethanol of 96 β by volume at 60� C. and a mixture of 3.15 g. (10 mmoles) of phendiline and 40 ml. of 96% by volume of ethanol are added within 30 minutes under vigorous stirring. The mixture is cooled to room temperature within 6 hours and allowed to stand overnight at +4� C. The precipitated crystals are filtered, and air dried. Thus 28.4 g. of phendiline β-cyclodextrin complex are obtained, phendiline content: 10.7% by weight.
13.3 g of β-cyclodextrine (10 mmoles) containing 15% humidity are suspended in 10 ml. of distilled water in a mortar. A solution of 1.55 g. (5 mmoles) of phendiline in 5 ml. 96% by volume of ethanol is added. A diluted suspension is obtained which is homogenized under steady trituration. After about thirty minutes the suspension becomes ointment like and the obtained substance is placed to an exsiccator and dried above phosphorous pentoxide for 24 hours. The solid complex which is free of solvent and water traces is pulverized. 12.5 g. of phendiline β-cyclodextrin complex are obtained, phendiline content: 11.8%.
2.1 g. (1.4 mmole) of γ-cyclodextrin containing 15% of water are dissolved in 15 ml. of water at 40� C. A mixture of 0.158 g. (0.5 mmole) of phendiline and 1 ml. of 96% by volume ethanol is added dropwise under stirring. The crystals start to precipitate during the addition. The suspension is cooled to room temperature within 2 hours and stored at +4� C. overnight. After filtration and air drying 0.66 g. of phendiline-γ-cyclodextrin complex is obtained, phendiline content: 11.3% by weight.
1.0 g. (1.0 mmole) of α-cyclodextrin is dissolved at 40� C. in 7 ml. of distilled water. A mixture of 0.158 g. (0.5 mmole) phendiline in 1 ml. of 96% by volume ethanol is added dropwise under stirring. The crystals start to precipitate during the addition. The suspension is cooled to room temperature within 2 hours, stored overnight at +4� C., filtered and dried. 0.5 g. of phendiline-α-cyclodextrin complex is obtained, containing 12.2% by weight of phendiline.
1.8 g. of a cyclodextrin mixture containing 11% water (dry substance content according to high pressure liquid chromatography: 70% β-cyclodextrin, 20% γ-cyclodextrin, 104% α-cyclodextrin, average molecular weight: 1151, mmoles: 1.4) are dissolved in a mixture of 20 ml. of distilled water and 3 ml. of 96% by volume of ethanol at 60� C. A mixture of 0.22 g. (0.7 mmole) of phendiline and 2 ml. of 96% by volume of ethanol are added dropwise under vigorous stirring. The mixture is cooled to room temperature within 3 hours and allowed to stand at +4� C. overnight. The precipitated crystalline product is filtered and air-dried. 1.3 g. of product are obtained, phendiline content: 11% by weight.
4 g. of β-cyclodextrin (3 mmoles) containing 15% of water are dissolved in 35 ml. of water at 60� C. A solution of 1.05 g. (3 mmoles) of phendiline hydrochloride in 8 ml. of 96% by volume ethanol is added dropwise. The mixture is cooled to room temperature within 5 hours, and allowed to stand overnight at +4� C. The precipitated white crystalline product is filtered and dried. The air-dried phendiline-β-cyclodextrin complex amounts to 3.8 g., containing 22.2% by weight of phendiline hydrochloride.
13.4 g. (10 mmoles) of β-cyclodextrin containing 15% water are dissolved in a mixture of 160 ml. of water and 10 ml. of 1N hydrochloric acid at 50� C. A solution of 3.15 g. (10 mmoles) of phendiline in 30 ml. of 96% by volume ethanol is added. The mixture is cooled to room temperature within 4 hours and allowed to stand overnight at +4� C. The precipitated crystalline substance is filtered and dried. 11.2 g. of phendiline-hydrochloride-β-cyclodextrin complex are obtained. Phendiline-hydrochloride content: 20.5% by weight.
5.0 g. of phendiline-β-cyclodextrin complex prepared according to Example 2 (phendiline content: 10.7% by weight) are dissolved in a mixture of 35 ml. of water and 2 ml. of 1N hydrochloric acid at 37� C. The solution is allowed to stand for 24 hours at room temperature and the precipitated crystalline substance is filtered. 2.0 g. of air-dried phendiline hydrochloride β-cyclodextrin are obtained, phendiline content: 21.2% by weight.
Roentgen diffraction assay to prove that according to Example 1 a complex was obtained.
The roentgen diffraction powder diagrams of β-cyclodextrin and phendiline-β-cyclodextrin complex show that the characteristic reflexion peaks appear at significantly different 20� angle values proving the different crystal structures. As the molecule enclosed to complex is liquid the different crystal structures proves the complex formation.
Thermoanalytical assay of the product according to Example 1.
The thermoanalytical assay shows characteristic differences between the phendiline-β-cyclodextrin complex and the physical mixture of phendiline and β-cyclodextrin complex. Phendiline starts to evaporate respectively to decompose at 150� C. and 98% mass change can be observed up to 250� C.
Cyclodextrin decomposes at 270� C. and at 300� C. β-cyclodextrin melts with decomposition.
The physical mixture looses its cyclodextrin water content at 100� C., and at 150� C. to 250� C. its phendiline content. The active ingredient is released from the complex only when the cyclodextrin decomposes i.e. at 270� to 300� C.
The thermoanalytical assay also shows that phendiline and β-cyclodextrin form a complex at a molar ratio of 1:2. In case of phendiline excess the excess phendiline behaves like in a physical mixture, i.e. the decomposition starts already at 150� to 250� C.
Assay of solubility of phendiline hydrochloride β-cyclodextrin complex prepared according to Example 7.
Phendiline hydrochloride β-cyclodextrin complex corresponding to 200 mg. phendiline active ingredient are dissolved at 37� C. and stirred by a magnetic stirrer at 150 rot./min. The active ingredient content of the samples is determined by spectrophotometry.
The following table summarizes the results of the dissolution rate assay:
______________________________________ phendiline hydrochloride β-cyclodextrinTime complexminutes phendiline conc. mg./ml.______________________________________ 1 13.3 5 12.715 12.930 12.860 13.3120 14.6______________________________________
0.22 g. (0.6 mmole) of phendiline hydrochloride is stirred at 37� C. for 3 hours in 3 ml. of water and in β-cyclodextrin solutions of various concentration by a magnetic stirrer at 150 rot./min rate. The concentration of the dissolved phendiline hydrochloride is determined by spectrophotometry and expressed in phendiline equivalents. The test results are summarized as follows:
______________________________________β-cyclodextrin phendiline β-cyclodextrinconcentration concentration mmolemg./ml. mmole/l. mg./ml. mmole/l. phendiline mmole______________________________________15 13.2 4.39 13.9 0.9520 17.6 5.95 18.6 0.9525 22.0 6.94 22.0 1.0030 26.4 7.51 23.8 1.10______________________________________
The molar ratio values of β-cyclodextrin mole/phendiline mole in the last column of the table shows that phendiline hydrochloride forms substantially an 1:1 complex with β-cyclodextrin.
Preparation of tablets containing phendiline β-cyclodextrin complex according to Example 3.
______________________________________phendiline-3-cyclodextrin complex 398 g.magnesium stearate 5 g.colloidal silicic acid 7 g.microcrystalline cellulose (Avicel PH 102) 90 g.______________________________________
The above substances are mixed together, homogenized and tablets of an average weight of 500 mg. and diameter of 13 mm. are compressed from the powder mixture. The tablets contain on an average about 45 mg. of phendiline corresponding to 50 mg. of phendiline hydrochloride. This tablet contains an equivalent amount of active ingredient to a tablet containing 50 mg. of phendiline hydrochloride.
Preparation of a suspension syrup from phendiline-β-cyclodextrin according to Example 3.
______________________________________phendiline-3-cyclodextrin complex 5 g.methyl-p-oxy-benzoate 0.1 g.aroma 0.5 g.carboxymethyl cellulose sodium 0.9 g.microcrystalline cellulose (Avicel RC) 1.1 g.sorbitol 35 g.distilled water ad 100 ml.______________________________________
Carboxymethyl cellulose sodium is dissolved in about a half volume of water, the microcrystalline cellulose is dissolved in the solution and after swelling of the cellulose the phendiline β-cyclodextrin complex is admixed to the solution. Methyl-p-oxybenzoate, the aroma and sorbitol are dissolved in the remaining water and the obtained solution is added to the suspension prepared above. The volume of the suspension is filled up to 100 ml. and homogenized.
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Crowds doubled for birthday celebrations of Muhammad
Posted: January 29, 2013|
THIS year's birthday celebration parade for the Prophet Muhammad in Derby was attended by double the usual number of people.
About 4,000 Muslim men marched around Normanton for the celebration, which has been likened to Christmas Day in the Christian calendar.
Organiser Dr Allah Detta, who also headed the parade, said: "Last year it snowed but about 2,000 people still turned out.
"So we knew that on a sunny day like we had there would be more people.
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"After initial estimates, we now know there were about 4,000 people marching, which is magnificent and wonderful for the 32nd annual parade."
The celebration procession started at the Darbar-Ali Ghamkol Sharif mosque in Dairyhouse Road at noon and, 90 minutes later, the green and white-clad figures reached the Jamia Mosque in Rosehill Street.
The crowd was also swelled by a number of people lining the streets along the parade route, with a number of roads closed to traffic while it was taking place.
The Prophet Muhammad is thought to have been born in about 570 AD in the Arabian city of Mecca.
At the age of 40, he received his first revelation from the angel Gabriel and, three years later, he started preaching these revelations publicly across the region.


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Physics at Messiah College
As a physics major at Messiah College, you'll thrive in an environment known for its intellectually challenging atmosphere.
With a strong theoretical and applied core of courses offered in our program, you'll be ready for a career in industry, education, government, or for graduate school where you'll be well prepared to specialize in a variety of fields.
During the summer you even may be able to participate in summer research funded by the National Science Foundation. Our Bachelor of Arts in physics provides you with a rigorous, multi-faceted educational experience combined with a solid introduction into computer science and statistics — all in a Christian context.
Physics major distinctives
As a physics major at Messiah College, you'll be able to:
- Choose from a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree
- Take challenging courses such as Classical and Analytical Mechanics; Electricity and Magnetism; and Quantum Mechanics.
- Secure an internship in nearby Harrisburg, Pennsylvania's capital.
- Participate in cosmic ray detection research with the support of NASA and the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory.
- Study with professors whose scholarly interests include cosmic ray detection and thin film physics.
- Work alongside other students in projects related to communications technology, assistance for disabled persons, sustainable energy, transportation technologies, and water resources.
- Choose a second major in mathematics, engineering, and/or computer science.
- Present your work professionally, on campus at our annual SEH Symposium, or regionally and/or nationally at professional meetings attended by students and faculty.
- Potentially attend graduate school fully funded if you are a strong college graduate in the sciences.
- Earn a minor in statistics, a strong add-on to a physics major and a distinctive program that is unique among Christian colleges & universities.
Career options for physics majors
As a graduate of the physics program, students are equipped to secure positions in areas such as:
- Business
- Industry
- Secondary education
- Higher education
- Graduate studies
Internship, research and teaching opportunities for physics majors
Messiah's nationally recognized internship program places students in a variety of physics internships. A few examples include:
- A variety of internship opportunities are available in the Harrisburg region.
- Faculty and student research in cosmic ray detection with the support of NASA and the Fermi National Accelerator Lab
- All majors completing the physics teaching certification complete sophomore and junior field experience semester in their second and third year, as well as a full-time professional semester (student-teaching) in their fourth year.
Learn more about the Department of Information and Mathematical Sciences
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The Kardashians
Kim Kardashian: Expert on Middle East Crisis?
After causing an uproar last week with her well-intentioned tweets about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kim Kardashian is reportedly determined to educate herself on the Middle East crisis — all while promoting milkshakes in the politically turbulent region!
The reality star will be jetting off to Kuwait and Bahrain for a series of in-store appearances at several new Millions of Milkshakes shops opening in both countries, and a source tells TMZ that she's keen on learning everything she can about the political and religious issues of the Middle East.
The insider added that Kim wants to "use her celebrity to help those in need and raise awareness about important issues in the area." In fact, she reportedly has meetings set up in both Kuwait and Bahrain with local leaders during her visit.
We've never seen such a serious side to Kim!
Source: TMZ
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text:
SUN SHIP, INC. v. PENNSYLVANIA
- 1970-1979
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Argument of Jeffery C. Hayes
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: We'll hear arguments next in Sun Ship Company against Pennsylvania.
Mr. Hayes, you may proceed whenever you're ready.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court.
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania which affirmed awards to claimant appellees for facial disfigurement under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.
The question presented to this Court today is whether Pennsylvania may constitutionally award benefits under its state workmen's compensation law for injuries to maritime workers covered by the Longshoremen's Act as amended in 1972.
The central facts necessary to the resolution of the question are not in dispute in this Court.
Sun Ship is an employer within the meaning of the Longshoremen's Act.
It is engaged in shipbuilding and ship repair activities at its facilities adjoining the Delaware River, a navigable water of the United States.
Each of the claimants, at the time of his injury, was employed by Sun Ship, and was engaged in maritime employment, either shipbuilding or ship repair, and as an employee within the meaning of the Longshoremen's Act.
In addition, each of the appellees were injured upon the navigable waters of the United States as that term has been defined in both Sections 3 (a) of the amended Longshoremen's Act, its covering provisions, and in Section 24 which defines employer.
It is further undisputed that the injuries involved here fall within the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act.
Every administrative tribunal below and the court below so found and it has never been in question here and indeed it's conceded by appellees in this Court.
We submit that the judgment of the court below must be reversed because upon analysis of the amended Longshoremen's Act, the legislative history to the 1972 amendments and consideration of the State's purposes and objectives, it is evident that the Congress intended to preempt the application of state workmen's compensation laws when enacted the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act as those laws might apply to maritime workers injured upon the navigable waters of the United States.
In addition to the extent that a review of the Longshoremen's Act and the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act reveals both a general and in the very instance of this case, specific conflicts with the regulatory scheme determined to apply by Congress, the Pennsylvania Act must yield.
Justice Potter Stewart: You have told us that in this case, it's conceded that the -- that the respondents were within the coverage of the federal statute.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes sir.
Justice Potter Stewart: Because of the location of their injuries as well as their status.
There might be questions under -- in some situations, might there not, as to whether or not the federal statute did cover?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes, sir.
On question -- yes, Mr. Justice Stewart, there is no question that there are questions about the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act --
Justice Potter Stewart: About -- that it's covered.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: -- at the edges of federal coverage.
Justice Potter Stewart: And therefore, wherever the line may be under -- there -- there's going to be a twilight zone, I suppose.
Isn't there?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well Your Honor it -- it's certainly possible.
The concept that there is going to be an edge of the federal jurisdiction and there maybe cases which fall close to that line which may give occasion to courts to consider on which side of the line and a -- a Davis kind of resolution of those conflicts might result.
But of course, in the course of amending the Longshoremen's Act, Congress substantially removed those problems at least in the context of shipbuilding and ship repair operations because it moved the line away from the water's edge which had been the most troublesome line of all.
Justice Potter Stewart: But there still is a line.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes, sir.
There is still a line.
There is no question --
Justice Potter Stewart: And -- and it's not -- it won't always be a clear line.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: It will not always be a clear line.
Justice Potter Stewart: And therefore, if -- if you should be correct and if an injured workman or the survivors of a deceased workman that was killed honestly believe that they're under the coverage of the federal statute.
And if you're -- if we decide this case in your favor and say the federal statute is exclusive and then the federal administrative agency upheld by the Court said, "Sorry, you're not covered."
Will the -- will the statute of limitations have run so far as the state workmen's compensation goes?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Your Honor, I think that that is a question that would have to be addressed to the States, many of which have equitable tolling principles that operate in other contexts and I think that the --
Justice Potter Stewart: I think they do, but I gather some don't.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Some may not, Your Honor.
Justice Potter Stewart: (Inaudible) the nature of your answer.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: And I think that the statutes may well be tolled or ought to be tolled under any number of principles because plainly, the purpose to be served by a statute of limitations would not be met because the employer of course would be on notice of the claim and would realize that it's a jurisdictional dispute.
And indeed, there's no reason to think the States would adopt any other rule than what the Benefits Review Board has adopted for the federal courts and what the -- Courts of Appeals have adopted as an application of the statute of limitations principles under the Longshoremen's Act.
Justice Byron R. White: Have the maritime -- do all the maritime states purport to extend coverage that is clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Your Honor, in fact I would -- I think it's clear from some of the decisions that are cited in the various briefs that Florida for example is a state that plainly does not purport to extend its remedy to --
Justice Byron R. White: Pennsylvania does.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: -- least claims within the Longshoremen's Act.
Justice Byron R. White: Pennsylvania does.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Pennsylvania statute is a statute of general application applying to all employers injured within the common law.
Justice Byron R. White: Isn't that the general rule?
Isn't it the general rule?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well, Your Honor --
Justice Byron R. White: I mean is that the general situation not to rule?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well, I think Florida as I -- as I've already indicated, expressly limits the Longshoremen's Act -- I'm sorry, limits its statute and it doesn't apply where the Longshoremen's Act does apply and there are other such statutes in other maritime states which -- which work in a similar way.
Pennsylvania's does not.
Justice Potter Stewart: Of course the Constitution continues, I suppose, to impose a limit upon the exertion of state power over -- over accidents or deaths that occur at sea.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes sir, I believe it does and I think that the --
Justice Potter Stewart: Or -- or navigable waters.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: And -- and it plainly --
Justice Potter Stewart: I mean the Jensen case has not been overruled ever as --
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: As a -- no, I don't believe it has, Your Honor.
I mean expressly it has not been overruled and I think that in addition, you have operating not only the pure admiralty principle which Johnson -- Jensen represents uniformity, but you have a kind of supremacy notion, if you will, that operates in tandem with the Admiralty Clause where the those cases recognizing uniformity principle have always found that where Congress moves into the admiralty area, uniformity is the rule and in addition, the Supremacy Clause analysis itself compels the result that if Congress has occupied the field that the States are not free to interfere.
Justice Potter Stewart: Well, quite powerful whether or not Congress has moved in the States, there's a constitutional limit upon the exercise of state jurisdiction over navigable waters, isn't there?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes sir.
There is and I think that that is why the -- the problem of the line that -- that you raise with me initially is important here because a system of concurrent jurisdiction necessarily creates two lines.
It creates the constitutional line, the Jensen line, if you will, over which the state remedy cannot extend and secondly, you have the edge of federal coverage somewhere to the landward side of the sea line.
Justice Potter Stewart: The Jensen line.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: And I think that there you have two kinds of jurisdictional disputes that you might have to answer, perhaps not in any individual case, but certainly over the course of the whole series of cases that are presented to the Court.
Justice John Paul Stevens: Mr. Hayes, the Pennsylvania statute, I suppose, purports to extend three miles out from shore, doesn't it?
It says any place within the common law.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice John Paul Stevens: And it --
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: And it purports indeed to extend to injuries that might arise out of contracts of hire entered into in -- in Pennsylvania.
It is the McCartin type statute, if you will.
The -- it is the post 1972 Longshoremen's Act which is the central focus of the analysis of course.
And there is really little reason to be overly concerned with the decisions of this Court and other federal courts which struggle with the very difficult questions presented by Congress when it enacted the 1927 Act and the meaning of the phrases which were read variously to extend or limit federal or state jurisdiction.
First of all, it's clear from the totality of circumstances shown by the language of the statute and the legislative history.
The Congress has totally occupied the field of compensation to maritime workers and expressly so to the exclusion of state law.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Well, there was some suggestion that in some cases, there will be a twilight zone or a gray zone.
There's no question in this case about federal coverage, is there?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: No Your Honor, there is no question.
This is not a twilight zone or a borderline case.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: No.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun: What you're -- you're really here because of the financial aspects of the case, wholly apart from all the theory.
If the Pennsylvania compensation was less than the federal, you wouldn't be here.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Your Honor, in this specific case, the statement is correct that the state remedy would have made it possible for these claimants to receive more money than they could under the Pennsylvania Act.
However, that statement does not extend to other provisions of the Act.
The Pennsylvania Act in other respects and perhaps in the respect that Congress was most concerned about in 1972, namely, the problem presented by permanently disabled maritime workers, the Pennsylvania remedy is less.
That point is established when one realizes that the federal maximum level set by the Director of the Office of Workmen's Compensation Programs is $426, whereas, under Pennsylvania, it's $244.
So --
Justice Harry A. Blackmun: You don't believe you can live with concurrency.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Your Honor?
Justice Harry A. Blackmun: I take it you feel that your client can't live with concurrency.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: That is correct, Your Honor.
The --
Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Why not?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: It introduces a level of uncertainty into the administration of a longshoreman -- I'm sorry, a shipbuilding type of operation which is what Sun Ship has.
The certainty of application of the Federal Act is going to operate in such a way here as to benefit not only Sun Ship but to benefit claimants, because it is going to put both of -- both claimants and Sun Ship in the position of having an interest in resolving the disputes under the informal mechanisms provided under the Longshoremen's Act.
But you're not necessarily available under the Pennsylvania Act.
Whereas, if we are -- if Sun Ship in particular is going to be in a situation of always having to concern itself with the availability of a second remedy, we're going to be much less inclined to resolve those disputes until a jurisdictional issue is resolved specifically and clearly.
Because it is clear I believe under the prior decisions of this Court and the lower federal courts, that if the federal Act applies, Section 5, by its terms, makes that remedy exclusive.
Justice Byron R. White: So if they were a claim from permanent disability under the federal Act and it was denied -- if there was concurrency, you could try it over again in the state system.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: He might, yes, Your Honor I -- I suppose that's true, although, he might be able to try it again in the state system if the State had a tolling kind of principle of its statute of limitations, recognizing if the federal decision --
Justice Byron R. White: Well, he might've filed at both places at the same time.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: He might file in both places.
That would --
Justice Byron R. White: And that if he loses in a -- in a higher level of jurisdiction, he tries it out in the other.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: He may, Your Honor, although I think that that introduces a whole set of difficult problems also.
Justice Byron R. White: Well, I -- I understand that --
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: If -- if you assume that -- that --
Justice Byron R. White: That that would follow from concurrency.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: That would follow from concurrency and it would follow -- the problems would be introduced in any situation where the decision by the federal tribunal that there was no federal jurisdiction if the denial of the claim was based on anything other than a lack of jurisdiction, you have difficult problems of res judicata and collateral estoppel introduced into the state system at that point just as you do in the federal system which the cases already point to.
In 1972, the Longshoremen's Act was no longer a gap filler.
It became an affirmative exercise of jurisdiction both in admiralty tort jurisdiction which was tied to the situs and to admiralty contract jurisdiction because Congress expressly brought within its coverage new categories of employees, and with it, their employment relationship with an employer covered by the Act whose business affects traditional maritime matters.
And this exercise comes in an area imbued with a dominant federal interest and where uniformity of the maritime law is the normal rule.
That has never been seriously disputed in this case.
Congress' intent to preempt state law in the area of compensation to maritime workers is clearly stated in the Act.
We've already had reference to Section 5 which when combined with Section 4, which makes the employers' obligation to pay compensation and secure payment of compensation mandatory, plainly indicates that the federal scheme operates exclusively.
That is to say in place of any other.
In contrast, the Act contains no language which indicates an intention to permit state law to operate and thus, the situation posed here is directly opposite to that presented to the Court in Askew here.
Indeed --
Justice William H. Rehnquist: But -- hasn't our rule been generally that it requires an affirmative showing by Congress to -- to preempt state of actions rather than just lack of a negative showing?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Mr. Justice Rehnquist, I don't that has been the test and I think the Court specifically, in City of Burbank versus Lockheed, made it clear that there is not a requirement that there'd be an expressed statement of congressional intent to preempt.
And in any event, (Voice Overlap) we would rely on --
Justice Byron R. White: (Inaudible) frustration, the federal objective, an -- an actual conflict or a frustration of some federal objective.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well, Yes Your Honor in the sense that the federal --
Justice Byron R. White: Does not either -- either, there hasn't have to be a -- some affirmative statement but --
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: That does not have to mean affirmative statement that the states are asked for, that's correct.
Justice Byron R. White: And -- but --
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: But Section 5 will provide that.
Justice Byron R. White: But just the -- just -- just the general existence of a federal law doesn't preempt the state law in the same area, does it?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well, Honor, that's what I meant to --
Justice Byron R. White: Unless there's a conflict or a frustration of the federal --
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: In the admiralty area, there may well be an absolute preemption of the States where Congress comes in as it has done here with a comprehensive and complete remedy.
Justice Byron R. White: What remedy -- what -- what congressional authority did Congress purport to be exercising in the 1972 amendments.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Its -- its authority -- its -- I think the legislative history, Mr. Justice White, is unclear.
I think it could be read either as the commerce power or as its admiralty power both comprised of --
Justice Byron R. White: Well, certainly in the commerce power, you don't have any automatic preemption.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: No, but you may -- but under the commerce power as you do in the case of the Federal Employers Liability Act if as in -- pursuant to an exercise of the commerce power, Congress moves into an area and defines a complete remedy and provides a -- an -- a solution to a problem which is complete and total in and of itself as -- as it did in the case of the Federal Employers Liability Act and there is no expressed preemption there and there is no statement that that Act is exclusive nonetheless this Court held that state efforts to provide a remedy for injured railway workers was preempted by the fact that Congress had acted affirmatively under the FELA.
Justice Byron R. White: They found an intent to -- to preempt the field.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: That's correct and I think that that attempt --
Justice Byron R. White: But -- but that isn't -- that just doesn't automatically follow from the passage of a law.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: No, sir.
It does not automatically follow.
That -- that is correct.
Justice Byron R. White: Well, what -- where do you find that kind of intent here?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: I think, Your Honor, we find that the Act has -- has changed substantially in 1972 where you have Congress exercising its full admiralty powers in both maritime and in contract.
You find that evidence because What Congress has done is it has not limited the remedy as it have been limited prior to 1972 to injures -- injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States.
That is a situs-oriented task.
In addition, Congress in Section 5 said both before and after 1972 that the remedy is exclusive.
And significantly, in 1972, Congress eliminated the only language that had ever existed in the Longshoremen's Act that seem to permit the States to operate by ruling the --
Justice Byron R. White: Well, Gilmore -- Gilmore and Black used the elimination of that language or just the opposite to prove just exactly the opposite.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes sir.
I understand that they do and I -- I understand that the -- the proviso however, I think and the -- the -- I believe the United States reads it differently in this case as well.
The proposition though I think is equally consistent.
The elimination of the proviso is equally consistent with the notion that Congress intended to preempt state law because if the proviso remains --
Justice Byron R. White: That's a considerable -- that's a considerable retreat from saying that it proves it.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Yes, sir.
I'm simply responding to -- to the -- to the point that you ascribe to Professors Gilmore and Black and would simply say that I think that it is more likely and it is a better reading of the elimination of the proviso to say that what that indicates is, that Congress is now coming on land with the Longshoremen's remedy in 1972.
And if it leaves the proviso only in place, it is coming on land with the remedy where the States, under this Court's decision in Nacirema and -- and many decisions before had been viewed as competent to operate.
So if it comes on land with the proviso, I think it's plainly creating a concurrent remedy, but it doesn't come on land with the proviso.
It eliminates the proviso and at the same time, it expands the coverage of the Act in such a way to indicate that it is exercising both its admiralty power and tort and in contract, and it's doing it in an area where uniformity is the law and I think that the congressional intent to preempt the field is demonstrated by the statutory language alone.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Well, if Congress intended that, can you suggest any reason why they didn't say it more clearly or say it at all?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well, Your Honor, I think that they were probably relying upon the decisions of this Court which had previously held Section 5 to be exclusive in a situation where the remedy applies and it acts against that background just as the Court found in Parker, that Congress in enacting the statute of 1927, was acting against the background of the Jensen line without examining the validity of the Jensen line as such.
Similarly here, even in Davis, which is the very case upon which appellees rely to create the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, you have this Court saying that of course if federal coverage were clear, the federal remedy would be exclusive.
And I think that in -- in that context, Section 5 and the elimination of the State law proviso along with the affirmative expansion of jurisdiction which this Court has already recognized in both Northeast Terminals and in Pfeiffer manifest the congressional intent to occupy the field.
Justice John Paul Stevens: And this is the -- the reasoning in -- is it Davis that -- that if jurisdiction -- federal jurisdiction were clear, remedy would be exclusive, did that rely on the notion that -- as in Jensen that where you got admiralty jurisdiction, it's got to be federal remedy or did it rely on the notion that Congress intended it to be exclusive.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Your Honor it's not -- it's not clear.
They rely -- they simply cite the Section 5 but I think either -- either reasoning is passed.
Justice John Paul Stevens: Well that this is going to be idea of it that after the Calbeck decision, you certainly have Section 5 still reading or then reading as it still reads and it was then assumed, there was an area of overlap.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Well, Your Honor, I -- I don't think -- I -- I agree that it was assumed that there was but I don't think either Calbeck or Davis compelled that result.
First of all, Calbeck's -- by its own terms says it wasn't addressing the question of Section 5.
It had no need to because you're having a claiming of the federal remedy.
Secondly, Calbeck, to the extent that it is read as creating concurrent jurisdiction depends upon the proviso and the continued viability of the maritime -- the local exception which prior to Calbeck had been -- had been read as being embodied within the proviso.
In 1972, the proviso goes and I submit with it any notion that Calbeck supports concurrent jurisdiction.
In addition, Calbeck was modified in another way in 1972 because the holding in Calbeck was that if you're injured upon the navigable waters of the United States that you have a federal remedy.
In 1972, Congress I think has made it plain that that even is not necessarily true because you have to also be engaged in maritime activity or meet the status test.
Now, I appreciate that at some point, you may run into the kind of situation where the States aroused it and if it's not maritime act -- it -- it's not maritime activity that this Court may have to resolve that question, but it is surely not presented here.
So Calbeck itself was substantially modified in 1972 both as to its affirmative ground and as to the questions that it left answered.
Justice John Paul Stevens: Thank you.
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: We think that the totality of the circumstances evidenced in the language of the statute in addition to the legislative history, manifest congressional intent to adopt a uniform system which a system of concurrent jurisdiction simply is not and cannot be.
Indeed, a system of concurrent jurisdiction would create the very kind of problem that Congress addressed here because as we've already noted, there is some limit to the ability of the States to provide the remedy.
Thus, if we take a law -- a shipbuilder who spends part of his time in the shops upon the ways, upon the land, if you will, at Sun Ship, and part of his day working in a dry dock or in a vessel floating in the navigable waters of the United States, if he is injured, seaward of the Jensen line, concurrent jurisdiction is plainly not available to him.
Only the employee injured on land has two remedies.
We submit that there was no concurrent jurisdiction really before 1972 and thus, in order to say that the -- that the shipbuilder or the ship repairman who moves both on to and off of the navigable waters, if by force -- fortuitous circumstances he's injured on land, now has two remedies, that that also runs counter to the congressional intent to provide a uniform remedy because he provides a disparate remedy and there is absolutely no indication in the legislative history or the statute that Congress intended to leave the employee injured upon land in a better situation than the maritime worker injured upon the water.
In addition, the other anomaly that might result if we were to find -- if this Court were to hold that a system of concurrent jurisdiction exists is that a worker who received an award under a state statute which makes a state remedy exclusive of every other remedy, for example, taxes which is the statute that this Court dealt with in Magnolia Power, maybe barred by operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 28 U.S.C. 1738 from recovering his longshoremen's remedy.
And if the taxes remedy as Justice Keith so plainly pointed out in his dissent in the Johnson case is a remedy that is a lesser remedy, it does not provide the claimant with the kind of recovery that -- that Congress provided under the Longshoremen's Act, that was all, thus plainly anomalous, and contrary the congressional purpose.
There can be no doubt that the congressional remedy is complete.
It covers every aspect of the relationship between the employer and the employee once an injury triggers its application.
The terms and body of legislative judgment concerning the rights and liabilities of employers and it was -- that judgment which Congress has made and the States under the circumstances are not free to modify, interfere with, even compliment or adjust the congressional judgment as to those rights and liabilities.
This actually makes a great deal of sense when you think about the problems that the two legislatures, the Pennsylvania legislature and the Congress are facing.
Pennsylvania's Act is a statute of general application and applies to all employment situations in the commonwealth while the Longshoremen's Act as a special statute dealing with special occupations and embodying Congress's judgment about how such injury should be compensated.
And this is an area in which Congress has been found particularly competent to operate and where it does affirmatively operate, uniform effect is given to its statutory enactments.
Pennsylvania on the other hand, it's interest here in compensating maritime workers is no different than its interest in compensating employees generally.
It has no special interest in this case.
And indeed, the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, advised this Court through its clerk when asked whether it wanted to submit a motion to affirm or dismiss under Rule 16 that Pennsylvania had no interest adverse to that of the appellant, no interest adverse to that of Sun Ship.
So this is not a situation where you have a state here claiming some special interest or right which again distinguishes the situation from Askew.
Finally, the Acts when put together and as you look at them from provision to provision, there are plain conflicts because a workmen's compensation statute is and represents an entire balancing of the rights and remedies and liabilities and obligation to the parties, you cannot really effectively start to look only at a specific conflict and say, "Well, because of that specific conflict, Pennsylvania is ousted here, but the rest of its remedy is available provided there's no specific conflict."
There's a specific conflict right here in the disfigurements that are at issue here.
Pennsylvania applies different standards for recovery.
Pennsylvania provides a remedy for disfigurement to different parts of the body.
Now, admittedly, Pennsylvania's Act might have provided a higher recovery.
None of the claimants here of course received more than the remedy provided under the federal statute which has but a single standard for recovery.
And moreover, the Pennsylvania awards here were reduced by counsel fees.
That is not the way the Longshoremen's Act work.
In contested cases, the counsel fee is an add-on, an additional payment by the employer.
So in summary, we have a total occupation to the field and we think an express intent that that federal remedy will operate exclusively.
It is a complete remedy and it actually conflicts in many respects not just in the area of disfigurement, maximum compensation, treatment of occupational disease, definition to the injury, scheduled losses, limitation periods, the notice of injury provisions, they're all different.
And in that situation, we think that the Court should give full effect to the congressional mandate and the congressional remedy by holding that Pennsylvania may not provide a remedy to injured maritime workers whose claims fall under the Longshoremen's Act.
Argument of Joseph Lurie
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Mr. Chief --
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Mr. Lurie.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court.
The Workmen's Compensation Act is not administered by any state.
It's not administered by the Federal Government, the Longshoreman Harbor Worker's compensation.
Ever State's Workmen's Compensation Act perhaps except Ohio which they have a state system, as well as the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act is administered by the employer.
The man is -- person is hurt, the employer has a duty to file notice of injury under Pennsylvania, under the federal law and starts to make payments.
It's the employer indeed at the outset -- at the outset who makes that election.
A fraction -- I think the National Safety Council and U.S. Department of Labors -- Bureau of Labor Standards reports there are some two million timeless accident cases reported each year in the United States and a fraction of them result in contested workmen's compensation claims.
Most of the claims are paid as a matter of course because the employer recognizes if there's an injury and are paid, very few are in dispute.
The significance of this of course is that the injured worker makes -- makes -- unless he consults a lawyer, unless something happens to him claim, unless he doesn't get compensation, unless compensation payments stop, does not consult a lawyer and therefore he himself exercises no choice.
This case is a matter of fact where Sun Ship comes in and tells what a beneficent employer they are.
When these five men were injured, Sun Ship never reported this is a -- as a work-related injury.
They say that under federal law, these men are covered, but Sun Ship never reported any of these five cases to the Deputy Commissioner's Office, so the Deputy Commissioner could advise people of their rights and start the federal law working.
The men in this case when consulted an attorney in our office, and we filed claims under the state law.
We filed claims under the state law because (1) state law in Pennsylvania on a disfigurement case takes about 68 weeks for an adjudication.
State -- under federal, it's between 18 months and two years because we go through the informal proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner determines if the case is settled, and if it's not settled, it then goes to administrative law judge and we wait for a -- with a full hearing and findings of fact and conclusions of law, lots of testimony are taken and the average has been somewhere between 18 months and two years for hearing.
And of course, in these cases, the awards where somewhere between 500 and $1500 per man but conceptually, because Pennsylvania has a higher limit in disfigurement cases, a -- a small type of disfigurement is going to warrant more money than under federal law, we have $3,500 as a maximum.
Now, it seems to me that this Court is bound by Davis, is bound by Calbeck.
In Davis, the exact issue was presented.
Davis was a person who was conceivably working on a barge in a navigable water in the State of -- of Washington.
He was -- as a result of industrial injury, he -- he fell into the -- the river, the navigable water and died.
He was paid benefits under the -- when he applied for benefits under the -- the State of Washington law, the -- the defense of the Federal Act was raised and there, the Court in Davis recognizing the strong policy arguments and the strong policy argument of course said, "No, there is concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction" and the strong policy arguments there which are the strong policy arguments in Calbeck and a strong policy arguments here as if the Act is to be construed liberally to protect injured workers.
And unless you have concurrent jurisdiction, you're going to have the injured worker being adversely affected by uncertainty as to where he should go.
You're going to have an adversely being affected by long delay in getting his benefits and you're going to have him adversely be affected by the expense in long court proceedings to determine what law applies.
And I say this because of the fact that if we make either state law exclusive or federal law exclusive.
What that means is that when a case suggests exclusivity of either state law or federal law, the employer is going to raise that as a defense.
And this is extremely crucial especially in view of the 1972 amendments which expanded coverage of the Longshoremen Harbor Workers Act.
So we're going to have tangential situations where state law -- state courts of the maritime states, and I guess Mississippi Valley States and the States which affect navigable waters are going to be decided -- be deciding federal coverage of the Longshoremen's Harbor Workers' Act because if the -- the question on the exclusive -- if this Court holds that the federal law is exclusive, then a state claim would be barred.
The way it stands under concurrent jurisdiction, the States rule on their law, the federal government rules on -- on its law if a claimant decides to go both ways which is of course a remote situation.
But assuming a claimant decides, takes a federal benefit and feel it's State's benefit is more -- is better for him or vice versa, takes a state benefit and then comes in to the -- to the federal court.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: But in this particular case, if he had come to you, where would you have gone?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: State.
From -- from the --
Justice Thurgood Marshall: So that's the only problem, he didn't come to a lawyer.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: No, they did come to a lawyer.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: But he didn't come to you.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: He sure did.
Oh, which -- which one?
The five claimants came to me, Judge.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: Yes.
But he came to you after, didn't they?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: No, sir.
What happened -- let me explain.
When these men were injured, Sun Ship figured that because they had a facial scar and were unaware of the law that they would never file claim and then it would fade and it would go away.
Therefore, Sun Ship which was the administrator of the Longshoremen Harbor Workers' Act as far as the claimants are concerned, were silent.
They did not file the notice of compensation payable or -- or the notice of injury with -- with the Deputy Commissioner's Office.
Now, just to backtrack a little of what happens when an employer is duty-bound under the Act to file a notice of injury with the Deputy Commissioner's Office whose charged with Congress to administer the Longshoremen Harbor Workers' Act.
When they filed that notice in the Deputy Commissioner's Office sends a letter to the injured person telling them that they have a right under the Longshoremen Harbor Workers' Act and contact us, establish a relationship with our office and we'll tell you how to get your rights.
Now, that didn't happen in this case.
Sun Ship did not file this notice.
Later, when these men had these scars, they contacted our office and said, "Can I get paid for this facial disfigurement?"
As a lawyer, I felt they could get paid under the federal Act or the state Act and since there was concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction and we proceeded under the State law because it was easier to get the benefits.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: And then what did the federal side do?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Absolutely nothing because no proceeding has ever been instituted by the shipyard in the federal court to pay them -- in the federal administration to pay them benefits.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: They didn't get any benefit --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: They got absolutely not one cent as a result of their industrial injury from this employer.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: Until today.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Even as of today, [Attempt to Laughter] haven't, no.
So that's why were here because what -- what Sun Ship is saying and this is the -- this isn't money quite frankly.
I think the Justice --
Justice Thurgood Marshall: If it's not money, what is it?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I think what we're talking about is -- is its -- its -- in a short range, it's money.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: Oh, I know.
In principle, you --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: But in the long range, it's -- it's rather the principle that there's going to be substantial delays and uncertainty if jurisdiction is exclusive.
The Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply -- for example, they raise the -- the -- the McCartin doctrine of full and complete concurrent jurisdiction.
Now, that's not involved in my case because in this case here, these men have not accepted any benefits under -- under federal law.
But most certainly, workmen's compensation law is not a final judgment.
For example, if -- if an order is made by a -- administrative law judge in a federal workmen's compensation case, that -- that judgment could be modified under Section 22 or that order could be modified up to a year later.
Justice William H. Rehnquist: But until it is under Magnolia -- under Magnolia, it is a final judgment, isn't it?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I don't think it really were -- should work like that because for example, conversely, that the -- the modification order under -- under Pennsylvania could come 10 years after the decision.
That is the --
Justice William H. Rehnquist: Even though under federal Act, the modification could come only within one year.
You say Pennsylvania could allow it to come 10 years later.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Right.
That -- that is, the compensation benefits might be suspended and no benefits are paid but the man has 10 years in which to reopen the claim so -- so he could come in with new facts etcetera to review anywhere from three to 10 years after the -- the judgment is final.
Justice William H. Rehnquist: Well, that would be a flat overruling of Magnolia Petroleum, wouldn't it?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I don't think the -- what we're talking about is the way -- that may very well be but that's the way the workmen's compensation law works.
It -- we're not talking about final judgments, we're talking about the day-to-day workings of a work -- state work -- state and federal workmen's compensation law.
Justice William H. Rehnquist: But Magnolia Petroleum held that a workmen's compensation judgment was a final judgment for purposes of full full payment of benefits.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I think in Calbeck the -- the Court sort of just ignored it.
For example, in -- if you -- if you read the last page of Calbeck --
Justice William H. Rehnquist: What page are you referring to?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Page 131, where they're talking about binding elections.
They cite with approval at the bottom of page 131 and 132 where the Court cites with approval, three federal Circuit Court cases which held that Full Faith and Credit does not apply to orders of the workmen's compensation --
Justice William H. Rehnquist: I thought Magnolia is a case from this Court, not from a Court of Appeals.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I'm suggesting by inference, sir, that in Calbeck, this Court has -- has sort of ignored Magnolia and said, "We don't think" -- for example, one of the people in Calbeck did receive state benefits under an order.
So consequently, what this Court has done is say with approval, the -- the four -- three Circuit Court cases which appear there where the Circuit Courts ruled that obtaining that final -- obtaining a state order does not bar federal coverage.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Well --
Justice Byron R. White: Would you think you could proceed under both acts for the same injury at the same time?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well --
Justice Byron R. White: What about -- could you -- could you get your award under the State -- under the -- under -- say, could you get your award here in Pennsylvania and get attorney's fees under the federal Act?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: I -- I think as a practical matter.
I agree but cannot -- I agree that you should.
I think that a claimant, if -- if there's a more liberal act that this man has given up his -- his health and his life for his employer and he should be able to take advantage of the most liberal act.
Justice Byron R. White: So the Pennsyl --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: And as long as there are set offs, I think he should go whichever way he goes and that he shouldn't be hooked with the uncertainties there of going to a lawyer who did advise him of the -- what were the correct benefits or choosing himself to proceed on benefits without having competent counsel.
So I -- I think, yes.
Justice Byron R. White: So if the -- suppose he applies under the Pennsylvania law and he's paid.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Right.
Justice Byron R. White: And he finds out when he's getting paid that his attorney's fees come out of it.
Now, can he go -- can he file another federal Act and just --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: No.
He couldn't get it --
Justice Byron R. White: -- might -- how do I put it.
Well, why not -- why not?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, because under federal -- federal law that -- the cases have held that attorney's fees could not be paid for issues of law, would simply file -- involve attorney's fees.
The Benefits Review Board has held that if the only issue is an attorney fee, we're not going to pay attorney's fees if that's the only issue.
I think for example, I see nothing wrong if this man made $1000 a week for example and was stuck with -- in Pennsylvania, say, or some other State pays less than the $300 and some odd dollars which is the State maximum, for example, Pennsylvania pays 242 and then realized that if he went to federal, he could get -- what, $376 I think is the maximum or somewhere thereabout.
And then -- and then was indeed covered by under Calbeck and Davis, then I think that most certainly, he should be entitled to -- to go collect that under federal and also perhaps collect counsel fees in that case, yes.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: But not -- but only through one.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, only -- he only gets one -- paid from one person anyway i.e. his employer.
That is, that the Federal Government does not pay benefits, the State of Pennsylvania doesn't pay benefits.
So he gets the benefits from his employer and he's not getting paid twice.
Justice Thurgood Marshall: What's -- the -- the employer has the (Voice Overlap)
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, not usually because -- because what I'm saying is, is that if this Court is -- comes down to weigh in this decision the way we hope it will, the employer will certainly get the message that since there is full concurrent jurisdiction and since he's been paid under State, they put him involuntarily under State and if there is full concurrent jurisdiction --
Justice Byron R. White: Well --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: -- then the employers don't want to litigate twice.
He's going to say, well, since there were -- or in – or an honest and a intelligent employer is going to say, "Since there is full concurrent jurisdiction, my injured worker should get the maximum benefit under which -- whichever jurisdiction applies."
Because otherwise, you're going to have the employer saying, "Well, put this guy into Pennsylvania because the State -- the -- the maximum is less than the federal."
And as I -- as I think the -- every one would agree that the -- that the Workmen's Compensation Acts are indeed administered by the employer.
There can't be any other way when you have two million people sustaining time laws injuries in United States everyday -- every -- every year.
I just like to address myself to -- to a couple of points.
They argue -- Sun Ship argues change of the 197 -- by the 1972 law.
And the only change that we could find of any significance is the deletion in -- in Section 3 (a) of -- of that provision that says, "If recovery may not validly be provided by state law."
And the five states which have -- which have considered this issue plus the four circuit, have agreed with the interpretation that this Court in Calbeck in eliminating that language.
And by eliminating that language -- perhaps it wasn't as clear what the Court meant.
The dissenting opinion said that Calbeck eliminated this -- this problem of concurrence -- this problem to excluclusifi -- exclusiveness -- well, the exclusiveness of the law because what it did, it says, if there's an area -- there's a -- there's a solid wall here and if a state law applies, then you can't have a federal right.
And what Calbeck did is -- just had the overlap concept out of Davis and said, "Well, if there is a federal law, if there is a state law, then we have concurrent jurisdiction."
Now, the Congress, it did -- did what Calbeck did.
It eliminated this and I don't see how the -- the appellee could argue -- the appellant could argue that by eliminating this, it made jurisdiction exclusive because the only area in the law where we could or would deal with -- with this question of jurisdiction is under the situs provision of Section 3 (a).
And in that, what they did was, they -- Congress agreed with Calbeck.
Now, Mr. Hayes says well, the Court didn't say what they really said in Calbeck.
Well, sometimes it's hard to -- to read opinions of -- of the Supreme Court but most certainly the dissent said that it -- that it did it, it took it out.
Larson said it took out.
Gilmore and Black said it took it out.
So, to the extent that -- that the Congressmen may not have read the actual decision, they've read what others said about it and what others said about it was that we have full concurrent jurisdiction because we've eliminated the state -- the state and federal barriers and that's what I think had happened.
The -- they argue that Section 5 pre -- is exclusive and therefore, precludes a workman's compensation remedy other than the federal remedy, or all States have this Section 5.
And Section 5 was the price that the injured worker paid for workmen's compensation, thus, he gave up his common law action against his employer to receive benefits.
As a matter of fact, these five men could have brought common law actions against Sun Ship if they wanted to because if we read the exclusivity part of -- of Section 5 (a), it says -- it's exclusive, they tell us but they say except if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, which Sun Ship did in this case.
An injured employee or his legal representative in case the -- death results from the injury may elect a claim compensation under this chapter or what are we -- what are they giving us, what are they giving the injured worker, they took away or to maintain an action at law or an admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death.
So that's what they -- they -- Congress has taken away by the exclusivity.
That is that right to maintain that action in law or the action on admiralty.
They made no -- they made no thought or mention of -- of state workmen's compensation law, and that's why in Davis, the Court said, "It doesn't apply, 5 (a) doesn't apply."
And indeed, it does not apply.
The issue is framed by the appellant in its brief as it appears on page 6, is a very simple issue which this Court amply answered in the Askew case.
Askew was a unanimous opinion by the Court and starting on page 37 and continuing, is that extremely eloquent and intelligent discussion deciding the issue in this case.
And the defendant -- the Sun Ship says, "The issue is whether the plain -- the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act is repugnant to the Supremacy Clause of the Admiralty Clause in is it -- when it's applied to permit the exercise of jurisdiction by Pennsylvania over an area within coverage of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act" and this was the exact issue in Askew.
In Askew, the issue was whether a state constitutionally may exercise its -- and I'm reading from page 337 -- may exercise its police power respecting maritime activities concurrently with the federal government.
And -- and here's a resounding answer, yes it may and -- and I -- I pray that -- that you will answer the question in the same way.
Thank You.
Justice Byron R. White: The very first compensation for injury wasn't involved there, was it?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: The -- the same exact issues were involved.
What it --
Justice Byron R. White: How do you distinguish this case from -- how would you argue -- why is this different from the employer's liability cases on -- on -- covering the railroads, workmen's compensation laws don't apply to railroad.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, that's -- you have the -- goes to different act entirely.
Justice Byron R. White: Well, of course, it's a different act but what's in it that's different than this?
It's just to comprehend all this -- the Court said was, that was a comprehensive scheme to cover railroad injuries.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Exactly.
Justice Byron R. White: Well --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, they're not saying that here.
Justice Byron R. White: Well, that -- the -- the question.
That's the question here --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, what they do is (Voice Overlap) they say that --
Justice Byron R. White: -- is that what Congress.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: We're -- we're --
Justice Byron R. White: Is that what Congress intended to do?
They didn't -- certainly didn't -- so much different here than they did in the Employers Liability Act.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: No, I think they did.
They -- they said for example that you have -- here is your -- here is your -- your right, your remedy.
At that time, there was no -- there was not -- workmen's compensation was -- was unheard of and they wanted to get --
Justice Byron R. White: At that time -- when?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: This is when --
Justice Byron R. White: Employer's liability?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Yes.
Federal -- determined in 19th century.
I think --
Justice Byron R. White: Well, they're going to get up here to get settled --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well --
Justice Byron R. White: -- in the Winfield case.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, that -- that may very well be but what the Court did there is saying you're going to -- that the legislature said, "You're going to apply federal law.
We don't care if you go to the state courts or the federal courts, but I think the -- the law seem to indicate and Court's interpretation is, is that we're talking only about federal law.
Justice Byron R. White: Well, that's right.
They said the -- the congressional statute providing comprehensive scheme for -- for compensating work-related injuries was covered by the federal law, now, that -- that was just -- that's the exclusive remedy.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Right.
Well, I don't think this Court have said that and where is their congressional intent that the -- that the same applies in this case.
Justice Byron R. White: I know that's -- I know that's your position but that's the question in the -- here whether -- you still haven't indicated to me why any evidence that --
Mr. Joseph Lurie: No.
Justice Byron R. White: And the reason to -- to distinguish this case from the Winfield case.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I would suggest that the -- that the history of the -- of Section 3 (a) under the 1972 Act which I've just mentioned is -- is -- you could -- you could get no other interpretation that Congress in 1972 realized what Davis said, what Calbeck said and therefore, eliminated from the Act language that would give state courts exclusive remedy where you have a -- an injury which occurred within the twilight zone.
Justice Byron R. White: But Longshoremen's Act originally was just a gap-filler wasn't it?
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, I don't it was a -- I don't think -- I - -I know that the word -- I -- I don't think it was -- it -- it was supposed to cover injuries which occurred --
Justice Byron R. White: It's supposed to cover injuries that state compensation systems been (Voice Overlap).
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Right, exactly, exactly.
Justice Byron R. White: Well, certainly, there was more of an intent than that in this case.
I mean in this -- under this statute, this statute wasn't motivated solely of any such intent.
It couldn't have been.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: No, the -- the intent was the quid pro quo was to give up the common law action that Zurichi in return for which, the jurisdictional limits of the Act were to be opened.
There was --
Justice Byron R. White: But for the first time, in 1972, they departed for the first time from -- form the notion that the Longshoremen's Act applies only when a state act may not.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: They -- who, the Congress?
Justice Byron R. White: Yes.
Mr. Joseph Lurie: Well, let me -- I would suggest that in 1962, this Court came down with -- with Calbeck and Congress took no action from 1962 to 1972 to say, "Wait a minute, Supreme Court, you were wrong in Calbeck."
And certainly, since 1972, state courts -- Supreme Courts have been coming down since 1976 interpreting Calbeck and 1972 amendments to mean what the appellees say they mean in this case and Congress has again remained silent.
Thank you.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Very well, do you have anything further, Mr. Hayes?
You have just one minute left.
Rebuttal of Jeffery C. Hayes
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: Thank you, Your Honor.
I just like to respond very briefly to what I think are irrelevant facts, but nonetheless, wholly and accurately stated by counsel for appellee.
The fact to the matter is that three of the claimants in this case, Messers Field, (Inaudible) and Moore filed claims for compensation under the Longshoremen's Act.
In point of fact, the records of the U.S. Department of Labor will reveal that Sun Ship, then the Sun Ship Building and Dry Dock Company filed first reports of injury in the case of Mr. Fields and in the case of Mr. Moore -- and in the case of Mr. Moore long before he filed his federal claim and all of the federal claims --
Justice Thurgood Marshall: Mr. Hayes, is that in this record?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: No, Your Honor.
I'm sorry it is not in this record but I -- I don't think the facts are relevant in either event but I -- I could not let the statements go uncorrected.
Secondly, with respect to the elimination of the proviso, whatever Calbeck meant or didn't mean, Congress was absolutely clear in 1972 because it adverted specifically to the deletion of the proviso and whatever it thought it meant and that is in the section by section review of the bill's amendment.
Thank you.
Justice Potter Stewart: Mr. Hayes, just one question.
Mr. Lurie stated that your client had failed to secure payments of compensation as required by the federal law and that therefore, his clients could've had their option if sued you at common law or an admiralty law.
Is that correct, factually?
Mr. Jeffery C. Hayes: No, Your Honor, I do not agree with that statement.
Securing of payment simply means making provision for payment of awards if compensation is payable.
No compensation was payable under this Act either voluntarily or pursuant to an award.
Sun Ship has secured pay -- has secured payment for all compensation claims through it's self insurance system and that's what the Section 5 reference means.
Justice Potter Stewart: I see.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: Thank you, gentlemen.
The case is submitted.


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Food and Beverage
In our hotel offer breakfast and dinner service with special attention to the vegetarian diet and farming products.
Enjoy the products of our land. Healthy meals and healthy to feel in harmony with the environment in which you will find the Hotel Rural La Correa.
Top quality products for the most demanding palates. Fresh fruits and vegetables daily to be authentic delicacies for our guests.


text:
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Product Information:
Get your blood moving with the SKINS Men's A100 Long Sleeve Compression Shirt. Engineered gradient compression technology will enhance circulation to decrease lactic acid build-up. Not only does this compression top enhance blood flow but it also keeps your body cool and comfortable. The warp-knit construction dramatically stabilizes your muscles to reduce muscle strains and tears while delivering oxygen rich blood to key muscles in the torso.
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text:
Astronomer Jim Geach at McGill in Canada put his coding skills to excellent use to create word clouds from the author lists of the top 500 astronomy papers (by citation counts) from ADS. He created clouds for each 15-year interval since 1905, I've shown the most recent 2 below. See his webpage for more info on how the images were created, and please complain to him if the size of your name looks smaller than your
ego academic prowess.
The cloud for the last 15 years shows how the subject, or rather the citation counts, are dominated by extragalactic science. Also, not surprisingly, by men – high fives to the Drs. Kauffmann, Dunkley, Freedman, Faber, Ferrarese et al for heading up the women in the field in the last 15 years.


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Study: Hispanics Are Largest Ethnic Group In Federal Prisons
Lecturer in Law Lucas Guttentag is quoted in The New York Times in a story about the results of a study conducted by the Pew Research Center that show Latinos "represent the largest ethnic population in the federal prison system, accounting for 40 percent of those convicted of federal crimes." The New York Times Writes:
Latinos made up only 13 percent of the U.S. adult population in 2007, but they accounted for one-third of federal prison inmates that year, a result the study attributed to the sharp rise in illegal immigration and tougher enforcement of immigration laws.Nearly half of Latino offenders, or about 48 percent, were convicted of immigration crimes, while drug offenses were the second-most-prevalent charge, according to the report.
Of Latino federal offenders, 72 percent are not U.S. citizens and most were sentenced in courts from one of the four states that border Mexico. Federal prisoners who are illegal immigrants are usually deported to their home countries after serving their sentences.
"The immigration system has essentially become criminalized at a huge cost to the criminal justice system, to courts, to judges, to prisons and prosecutors," said Lucas Guttentag, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union. "And the government has diverted the resources of the criminal justice system from violent crimes, financial skullduggery and other areas that have been the traditional area of the Justice Department."


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