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An object-based security framework provides for intra-process security boundaries. An application developer can define security settings declaratively at the object, interface, and method level using a graphical interface. When the application is deployed, the settings are placed into a central store and can be modified at a later time. At runtime, logic outside the application objects enforces the security boundaries, relieving the developer of having to incorporate security logic into the application. Changes to the security can be implemented by changing the settings without having to change the application objects. In addition to checking for identity, the security framework supports roles and enforces specified authentication levels. The integrity of an application's security scheme is retained when the application is combined with another application in the framework.
1. A method for providing security services to a secured object residing in a process and called from a calling object residing in the process, the method comprising:
interposing security logic between the secured object and the calling object to monitor calls directed to the secured object;
responsive to a call directed to the secured object by the calling object, wherein an identity is associated with the call, automatically executing the security logic to evaluate the associated identity; and
selectively blocking the call as a result of evaluating the associated identity with the security logic to enforce a security boundary between the calling object and the secured object.
2. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps of
3. The method of
determining an authentication level of the call, wherein the authentication level is indicative of confidence in the accuracy of the associated identity; and
during the executing step, evaluating the authentication level with the security logic.
4. The method of
5. The method of
6. The method of
7. The method of
8. The method of
9. In a computer system executing a program in a process, wherein calls from the program are associated with an identity, a method of enforcing a security boundary within the process comprising:
maintaining a security settings store comprising security settings for a secured object executing in the process, the security settings indicative of which identities are authorized to access the secured object;
before allowing access to the secured object by the program, consulting the store with logic outside the secured object and outside the program to determine if the associated identity is authorized to access the secured object; and
blocking access to the object with the logic if the store does not indicate the associated identity is authorized to access the object.
10. A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the steps of
11. The method of
at development time of the application, defining access to methods of the object in terms of logical classes of users;
at deployment time of the application, binding the logical classes of users to identities recognized by the host computer system to generate at least some of the security settings in the security settings store.
12. The method of
the store indicates a minimum acceptable authentication level for the secured object;
a call to the secured object has an associated authentication level; and
the blocking step blocks access to the secured object whenever the associated authentication level is insufficient to satisfy the minimum acceptable authentication level.
13. The method of
the program accesses the secured object through an invoked interface to the object,
the store comprises settings indicative of which identities are authorized to access particular interfaces to the secured object; and
the blocking step blocks access to the object as a result of determining the store indicates the associated identity is not authorized to access the invoked interface to the object.
14. The method of
the client program accesses the secured object through a called method of an interface to the object,
the store comprises settings indicative of which identities are authorized to access particular methods of the secured object; and
the blocking step blocks access to the object as a result of determining the store indicates the associated identity is not authorized to access the called method of the interface to the object.
15. The method of
placing a wrapper between the client program and the secured object to redirect calls to the secured object to the wrapper, wherein the blocking step is performed by the wrapper.
16. The method of
collecting at least some of the security settings in the store through a graphical interface depicting the secured object.
17. A method of enforcing a per-method security boundary within a process in a computer system, the method comprising:
maintaining at the computer system a central security settings store comprising security settings for a first secured object having a plurality of methods, the security settings indicative of which user identities are permitted to access the methods, wherein a first method of the methods has different security settings than a second method of the methods and at least some of the security settings in the security settings store are configurable using a graphical user interface depicting the first object and the first object's methods;
creating the first object in the process;
creating a second object in the process;
interposing a wrapper between the first object and the second object to redirect a second object's call to the first object to the wrapper, wherein the call is associated with a user identity;
upon receiving the call to the first object, invoking a security policy with the wrapper to perform a security check upon receiving the call, wherein the security check comprises consulting the security settings; store to determine if the user identity associated with the second object is permitted to access the first object; and
as a result of the security check choosing between forwarding the call to the first object if the security settings store indicates the user identity is permitted to access the first object and blocking the call if the security settings store indicates the user identity is not permitted to access the first object.
18. An object-based security framework for providing a security boundary between a secured object executing in a process and a program calling the secured object, wherein the program is executing in the process and calls from the program are associated with an identity, the security framework comprising:
a store for maintaining security settings indicative of an authorized set of identities authorized to call the secured object;
a wrapper operative to selectively forward calls to the secured object and further operative to invoke logic for monitoring calls to the secured object to enforce an intra-process security boundary between the secured object and the program by consulting the store to block calls to the secured object from the calling program if the associated identity is not in the authorized set of identities authorized to call the secured object;
an activator operative to execute responsive to a request to create the secured object and interpose the wrapper between the program and the secured object to redirect calls to the secured object to the wrapper.
19. The framework of
20. The framework of
calls to the secured object have an associated authentication level indicative of confidence in the identity's accuracy;
the central store comprises a minimum acceptable authentication level for the secured object; and
the security policy blocks calls to the secured object from the calling program if the associated authentication level does not satisfy the minimum acceptable authentication level.
21. The framework of
22. The framework of
23. The framework of
24. A method of providing a requesting client program with a reference to an object of a requested class to enforce a security boundary between the client program and the object transparently to the client program and the object, wherein a call from the client program is associated with an identity, the method comprising:
instantiating an instance of an object of the requested class in a same process as the client program;
acquiring an interface to the instance of the object; and
interposing a security policy between the client program and the interface of the object by providing the client program with a reference to a wrapper operative to invoke the security policy transparently to the client program, wherein the wrapper automatically invokes the security policy to selectively block calls to the interface based on the identity associated with the client program.
The present invention relates to an application-programming model using software objects, and more particularly relates to maintaining security in object-based applications.
In many information processing applications, a server application running on a host or server computer in a distributed network provides processing services or functions for client applications running on terminal or workstation computers of the network which are operated by a multitude of users. Common examples of such server applications include software for processing class registrations at a university, travel reservations, money transfers and other services at a bank, and sales at a business. In these examples, the processing services provided by the server application may update databases of class schedules, hotel reservations, account balances, order shipments, payments, or inventory for actions initiated by the individual users at their respective stations.
In a server application that is used by a large number of people, it is often useful to discriminate between what different users and groups of users are able to do with the server application. For example, in an on-line bookstore server application that provides processing services for entering book orders, order cancellations, and book returns, it may serve a useful business purpose to allow any user (e.g., sales clerk or customers) to access book order entry processing services, but only some users to access order cancellation processing services (e.g., a bookstore manager) or book return processing services (e.g., returns department staff).
Network operating systems on which server applications are typically run provide sophisticated security features, such as for controlling which users can logon to use a computer system, or have permission to access particular resources of the computer system (e.g., files, system services, devices, etc.) In the Microsoft Windows NT operating system, for example, each user is assigned a user id, which has an associated password. A system administrator also can assign sets of users to user groups, and designate which users and user groups are permitted access to system objects that represent computer resources, such as files, folders, and devices. During a logon procedure, the user is required to enter the user id along with its associated password to gain access to the computer system. When the user launches a program, the Windows NT operating system associates the user id with the process in which the program is run (along with the process' threads). When a thread executing on the user's behalf then accesses a system resource, the Windows NT operating system performs an authorization check to verify that the user id associated with the thread has permission to access the resource. (See, Custer, Inside Windows NT 22, 55-57, 74-81 and 321-326 (Microsoft Press 1993).)
A thread is the basic entity to which the operating system allocates processing time on the computer's central processing unit. A thread can execute any part of an application's code, including a part currently being executed by another thread. All threads of a process share the virtual address space, global variables, and operating-system resources of the process. (See, e.g., Tucker Jr., Allen B. (editor), The Computer Science and Engineering Handbook 1662-1665 (CRC Press 1997).)
The Windows NT operating system supports an application execution environment called Microsoft Transaction Server, a product separate from Windows NT which allows developers to define access control to processing services of an application independently of deployment during development using roles. Roles are logical groups of users that can be assigned at development time, and independent of a specific operating system security configuration until deployment. Subsequently, at deployment time, an administrator can bind the roles to particular users or user groups, resulting in a mapping of roles to users.
At execution time, Microsoft Transaction Server monitors cross process calls at the object and interface level to determine if the caller is a member of a role permitted to make the call. If the caller is not permitted access, the call is blocked, preventing access to the object's functionality by unauthorized users.
However, a problem can arise if two objects with different security requirements execute in the same process. For example, a first object might allow access by anyone, and a second object in the same process might allow access only by a select group. Since Microsoft Transaction Server checks only inter-process (i.e., cross-process) calls, a call could enter a process through the first object legitimately granting access to the caller. While doing work for the caller, the first object might call the second object for which the caller does not have access rights. Nevertheless, since security checks are made only for inter-process calls, the call could effectively circumvent the security services, having obtained unauthorized access to the functionality of the second object.
One way to prevent callers from circumventing the security system is to place each object in a separate process, ensuring that a security check is made for all calls between objects. However, each additional process consumes additional system resources, and cross process calls require invocation of additional logic consuming even more system resources. Therefore, placing every object in a separate process is expensive in terms of computing resources.
Another way to prevent callers from circumventing the security system is to place logic in the object to verify role membership before allowing calls to certain other objects. A disadvantage to such an approach is that object developers are burdened with incorporating security logic into their objects, and changing the logic requires rewriting and recompiling the application objects.
The present invention includes a security framework for controlling access to objects providing processing services in a server application. The security framework provides for intra-process access checks on calls to objects, thereby avoiding the need to place objects in different processes to enforce security boundaries. Access checks are done transparently to the application objects, freeing the application developer from having to incorporate security logic into the application objects.
In one aspect of the invention, a developer can declaratively define security requirements such as authorized users for calls to objects and a minimum acceptable authentication level for an application. The security framework tracks and enforces the requirements transparently to the objects, again freeing the application developer from including security-enforcing logic in the object.
A further aspect of the invention supports method-level security, allowing developers to declaratively define authorized users and authentication levels for particular methods, interfaces, or objects. Again, the developer is freed from having to incorporate logic in the object (i.e., in a particular method) to check security.
In yet another aspect of the invention, an application developer can declaratively define the security scheme using a graphical user interface depicting application objects, interfaces, and methods. The security settings defining the security scheme reside in a central store outside the application objects.
Another aspect of the invention supports role-based security in combination with intra-process security boundaries. Role-based security allows user identities to be defined independently of specific users during development of the application.
In another aspect of the invention, a security boundary is placed between objects of different applications, facilitating integration of multiple applications.
Additional features and advantages of the invention will be made apparent from the following detailed description of illustrated embodiments, which proceeds with reference to the accompanying drawings.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a computer system that may be used to implement a method and apparatus embodying the invention for implementing the described security framework for programming objects.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an object conforming to the Component Object Model specification of Microsoft Corporation.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a wrapper arrangement for providing security services transparently to a calling and called object.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an intra-process security boundary implemented using the wrapper arrangement of FIG. 3.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a per-method security scheme implemented using the wrapper arrangement of FIG. 3.
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of a security scheme in which objects of different applications are placed in different object contexts.
FIG. 7 is a view of a graphical user interface of an administration utility called the COM+ Object Explorer, for declaring various security requirements for objects.
FIG. 8 is a view of a feature of the COM+ Object Explorer interface for enabling authorization checking for a particular object in an application.
FIG. 9 is a view of a feature of the COM+ Object Explorer interface for limiting access to a particular method to specified particular roles.
FIG. 10 is a view of a feature of the COM+ Object Explorer interface for adding users and groups to a role when an application is deployed on a host system.
FIG. 11A is a block diagram showing a portion of a store called a catalog for defining access to methods.
FIG. 11B is a block diagram showing a portion of the catalog defining role membership.
FIG. 11C is a block diagram showing a portion of the catalog related to applications.
FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating object instantiation and method invocation in an environment supporting object contexts.
FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating a lightweight wrapper arrangement for supporting object contexts within a process.
FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary intra-process security framework using object contexts.
FIG. 15 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary intra-process security boundary.
The present invention is directed toward a method and system for providing an object execution environment with a security framework providing automatic security services. In one embodiment illustrated herein, the invention is incorporated into an object services component entitled "COM+" of an operating system entitled "Microsoft Windows NT Server 5.0," both marketed by Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash. Briefly described, this software is a scaleable, high-performance network and computer operating system supporting distributed client/server computing, and providing an object execution environment for object applications conforming to COM. The COM+ component incorporates object services from prior object systems, including Microsoft Component Object Model (COM), Microsoft Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), and Microsoft Transaction Server (MTS).
FIG. 1 and the following discussion are intended to provide a brief, general description of a suitable computing environment in which the invention may be implemented. While the invention will be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions of a computer program that runs on a computer, those skilled in the art will recognize that the invention also may be implemented in combination with other program modules. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, objects (also called components), data structures, etc. that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. Moreover, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention may be practiced with other computer system configurations, including single- or multiprocessor computer systems, minicomputers, mainframe computers, as well as personal computers, hand-held computing devices, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, and the like. The illustrated embodiment of the invention also is practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network. But, some embodiments of the invention can be practiced on stand-alone computers. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and remote memory storage devices.
With reference to FIG. 1, an exemplary system for implementing the invention includes a conventional computer 20, including a processing unit 21, a system memory 22, and a system bus 23 that couples various system components including the system memory to the processing unit 21. The processing unit may be any of various commercially available processors, including Intel x86, Pentium and compatible microprocessors from Intel and others, including Cyrix, AMD and Nexgen; Alpha from Digital; MIPS from MIPS Technology, NEC, IDT, Siemens, and others; and the PowerPC from IBM and Motorola. Dual microprocessors and other multi-processor architectures also can be used as the processing unit 21.
The system bus may be any of several types of bus structure including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of conventional bus architectures such as PCI, VESA, Microchannel, ISA and EISA, to name a few. The system memory includes read only memory (ROM) 24 and random access memory (RAM) 25. A basic input/output system (BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within the computer 20, such as during start-up, is stored in ROM 24.
The computer 20 further includes a hard disk drive 27, a magnetic disk drive 28, e.g., to read from or write to a removable disk 29, and an optical disk drive 30, e.g., for reading a CD-ROM disk 31 or to read from or write to other optical media. The hard disk drive 27, magnetic disk drive 28, and optical disk drive 30 are connected to the system bus 23 by a hard disk drive interface 32, a magnetic disk drive interface 33, and an optical drive interface 34, respectively. The drives and their associated computer-readable media provide nonvolatile storage of data, data structures, computer-executable instructions, etc. for the computer 20. Although the description of computer-readable media above refers to a hard disk, a removable magnetic disk and a CD, it should be appreciate d by those skilled in the art that other types of media which are readable by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, digital video disks, Bernoulli cartridges, and the like, may also be used in the exemplary operating environment.
A number of program modules may be stored in the drives and RAM 25, including an operating system 35, one or more application programs 36, other program modules 37, and program data 38. The operating system 35 in the illustrated computer is the Microsoft Windows NT Server operating system, together with the before mentioned Microsoft Transaction Server.
A user may enter commands and information into the computer 20 through a keyboard 40 and pointing device, such as a mouse 42. Other input devices (not shown) may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processing unit 21 through a serial port interface 46 that is coupled to the system bus, but may be connected by other interfaces, such as a parallel port, game port or a universal serial bus (USB). A monitor 47 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 23 via an interface, such as a video adapter 48. In addition to the monitor, computers typically include other peripheral output devices (not shown), such as speakers and printers.
The computer 20 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote client computer 49. The remote computer 49 may be a workstation, a server computer, a router, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described relative to the computer 20, although only a memory storage device 50 has been illustrated in FIG. 1. The logical connections depicted in FIG. 1 include a local area network (LAN) 51 and a wide area network (WAN) 52. Such networking environments are commonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets and the Internet.
When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 20 is connected to the local network 51 through a network interface or adapter 53. When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 20 typically includes a modem 54, or is connected to a communications server on the LAN, or has other means for establishing communications over the wide area network 52, such as the Internet. The modem 54, which may be internal or external, is connected to the system bus 23 via the serial port interface 46. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer 20, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used.
In accordance with the practices of persons skilled in the art of computer programming, the present invention is described below with reference to acts and symbolic representations of operations that are performed by the computer 20, unless indicated otherwise. Such acts and operations are sometimes referred to as being computer-executed. It will be appreciated that the acts and symbolically represented operations include the manipulation by the processing unit 21 of electrical signals representing data bits which causes a resulting transformation or reduction of the electrical signal representation, and the maintenance of data bits at memory locations in the memory system (including the system memory 22, hard drive 27, floppy disks 29, and CD-ROM 31) to thereby reconfigure or otherwise alter the computer system's operation, as well as other processing of signals. The memory locations where data bits are maintained are physical locations that have particular electrical, magnetic, or optical properties corresponding to the data bits.
FIG. 2 and the following discussion are intended to provide an overview of programming objects, using the Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) as an exemplary object model. In the illustrated embodiments, the security framework is implemented in an extension to the Microsoft COM Environment termed "COM+." COM is a model for accommodating programming objects and can be implemented on a variety of platforms, such as the Microsoft Windows NT operating system. In the illustrated embodiments of the invention, the application objects conform to the Microsoft Component Object Model ("COM") specification (i.e., are implemented as a "COM Object" 72) and are executed using the COM+ services of the Microsoft Windows NT Server 5.0 operating system, but alternatively may be implemented according to other object standards (including the CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) specification of the Object Management Group) and executed under object services of another operating system. The COM specification defines binary standards for objects and their interfaces which facilitate the integration of software objects into applications. (For a detailed discussion of COM and OLE, see Kraig Brockschmidt, Inside OLE, Second Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, Wash. (1995)).
Application developers build an application by designing a set of application objects (also called "application components") to implement the business logic of the application using a set of application objects, each of which contains program code for a portion of the application's work. For example, a banking application may comprise a transfer object, a debit account object, and a credit account object which perform parts of the work of a money transfer operation in the application.
With reference now to FIG. 2, in accordance with COM, the application object 76 is represented in the computer system 20 (FIG. 1) by an instance data structure 102, a virtual function table 104, and member functions 106-108. The instance data structure 102 contains a pointer 110 to the virtual function table 104 and data 112 (also referred to as data members, or properties of the object). A pointer is a data value that holds the address of an item in memory. The virtual function table 104 contains entries 116-118 for the member functions 106-108. Each of the entries 116-118 contains a reference to the code 106-108 that implements the corresponding member function.
The pointer 110, the virtual function table 104, and the member functions 106-108 implement an interface of the application object 76. By convention, the interfaces of a COM object are illustrated graphically as a plug-in jack as shown for the application object 206 in FIG. 3. Also, interfaces conventionally are given names beginning with a capital "I." In accordance with COM, the application object 76 can include multiple interfaces which are implemented with one or more virtual function tables. The member function of an interface is denoted as "IInterfaceName::FunctionName."
The virtual function table 104 and member functions 106-108 of the application object 76 are provided by an application program 120 (hereafter "server application DLL") which is stored in the computer on which the object is installed as a dynamic link library file (denoted with a ".dll" file name extension). In accordance with COM, the application DLL 120 includes code for the virtual function table 104 and member functions 106-108 of the classes that it supports, and also includes a class factory 122 that generates the instance data structure 102 for an object of the class.
In the illustrated embodiments, a security framework provides various security services to objects, relieving application developers from having to incorporate security logic in application objects. The following is a broad overview of the framework's features; the framework is described in more detail in later sections.
FIG. 3 shows two objects, 206 and 208. In the illustrated arrangement, the objects are sometimes referred to as a client object 206 and a server object 208, since the object 206 accesses functionality of the object 208. In some cases, the client object 206 might be a calling program (termed a "base client") instead of an object as shown. To indicate who is using the objects, an identity is associated with calls from the client object 206 (e.g., the identity of a logged on user or an identity indicating a computer system) as described in more detail below.
When the client object 206 attempts to access the functionality of the server object 208 it acquires a pointer to an interface of the server object 208 and issues a method call through the interface. As shown in FIG. 3, one of the features of the invention is to interpose a wrapper 210 between the objects, through which calls to the server object 208 pass. The wrapper 210 can invoke various security function calls to the operating system (e.g., to determine: the identity of a user) and accesses a catalog 220 to enforce security settings therein before relaying the call to the server object 208, if appropriate. One advantage of the illustrated arrangement is the security settings can be changed by modifying the catalog 220 without modifying or recompiling the objects. Also, the security framework can be modified to incorporate new technologies or improvements without having to modify legacy objects. Finally, developers of the business logic of the objects can avoid becoming familiar with abstruse security logic, speeding and simplifying application development.
The wrapper 210 can be interposed between the objects in a variety of ways (e.g., by an object creation service when the server object 208 is instantiated, or by unmarshaling code when a reference to 208 is unmarshaled) as described in more detail below. Also, the catalog 220 can be created in a variety of ways, such as by a graphical user interface or with reference to declarations in source code. The result of the arrangement shown in FIG. 3 is objects execute without regard to the design of the security framework; in other words, the security framework is transparent to the objects.
Another feature of the framework, intra-process security boundaries, is shown in FIG. 4. The framework, using the wrapper arrangement described above, supports an inter-process security boundary 258 between an object 256 executing in a first process 254 and an object 264 executing in a second process 260; both processes reside on a computer 252. Although a call from the object 264 to another object 262 may take place without a security check, the framework provides for an intra-process security boundary 266 between the object 264 and another object 268. FIG. 4 also shows an object 294 executing in a process 292 on a different computer 290. The framework also supports a security boundary 280 between objects 268 and 294 executing on different computers. The ability to enforce a security boundary between two objects in the same process avoids having to create an additional process to enforce a security boundary. Since creation of additional processes consumes additional computing resources, the illustrated arrangement conserves resources compared to a framework not supporting intra-process security boundaries. The illustrated security boundaries 258, 266, and 280 can perform any variety of functions, such as identity checks and authentication level checks.
The security framework also supports method-level access checks as shown in FIG. 5. In the illustration, an object 306 is associated with a user identity and accesses the functionality of another object 308 through an interface ISample with two methods, method1 and method2. A security boundary 312 (e.g., one provided by the wrapper arrangement of FIG. 3) between the objects selectively prevents calls to the methods based on security settings (e.g., user identities or groups stored in a catalog) that differ from method to method. For example, one method may allow access by all user identities and another may restrict access to a select group of user identities. Method level security can be enforced in an intra-process call; in FIG. 5, both objects execute in the same process 304 on a computer 302. However, method level security can also be enforced between processes or between computers.
An exemplary use of the framework to achieve security boundaries is shown in FIG. 6, wherein objects are shown as residing in object contexts. Object contexts are an environment extensibility mechanism described at length in Thatte et al., "Environment Extensibility and Automatic Services For Component Applications Using Contexts, Policies And Activators," U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/135,397, filed Aug. 17, 1998, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.
In summary, an object context is defined by its object context properties (e.g., a machine property, a process property, and an application property). If an object is in an object context having different object context properties from another object, the objects are said to be in different object contexts. A wrapper is automatically placed between references to objects residing in different object contexts by the object instantiation service of the operating system; the wrapper is provided with references to various policies as described below. The policies perform logic to establish an environment appropriate for the object context in light of the cross-context call. In the example, objects are associated with a unique application identifier indicating to which application an object belongs. The application identifier is incorporated into the object's object context as one of the object context properties. Accordingly, objects in different applications are placed into different object contexts and a wrapper is interposed between them. Associated policies perform logic (e.g., security checking) appropriate for a cross-application call.
With reference now to FIG. 6, various objects execute in a process 360 on a computer 354. The objects 370, 372, and 374 are members of one application and are accordingly placed in object context A; the objects 390 and 392 are members of another application and accordingly are placed in object context B. When an object in one application attempts to access the functionality of an object in the other application, a wrapper is automatically interposed between the objects (e.g., the call 380 is directed to a wrapper; the call 382 is not). The wrapper is provided with a reference to a security policy, which performs the various functions described above, such as enforcing an intra-process security boundary and enforcing method level security.
Although the example in FIG. 6 incorporates an object's application identifier as one of the object context properties to place:objects in an appropriate object context, the framework supports other arrangements. For example, a developer or vendor identifier could be used. Information indicating the objects' object context properties is acquired from a central database of object properties (e.g., a registry or catalog) and can also be collected at runtime (e.g., the machine on which an object is running can be included as an object context property).
An example of an implementation of the security framework in the Windows NT operating system follows. The framework accesses various security services of the Windows NT operating system to implement a security scheme. For a more detailed description of the Windows NT security services, see Richard Grimes, "Professional DCOM Programming," pages 319-389 (Chapter 7, Security) 1997.
In summary, users and groups in Windows NT are identified by unique identifiers called security IDs (SIDs). A collection of SIDs for the identity of a user, the groups to which the user belongs, and other related information, such as an impersonation level, is assembled into a single structure called a token.
A token is kept as part of a process's information to indicate the user initiating the process. By default, calls originating from the process are identified by the operating system as associated with the process's token. Alternatively, an identity can be kept as part of a thread's information (e.g., to facilitate impersonation of a remote user). For example, the thread on which the client object 206 (FIG. 3) is executing may be associated with a token. If so, calls on the thread are identified by the operating system as associated with the thread's token.
A network connection between two machines (e.g., over a LAN or the Internet) can provide a certain degree of confidence about identities reported over the connection. Whenever a caller's identity is provided over a network connection, the degree of certainty about the caller's identity is represented as a particular authentication level. An authentication service includes authentication level information for identities reported over a network connection. When the authentication service creates a token, the authentication level is not placed into the token, but the authentication level is available from Windows NT's security services.
Authentication levels supported by Windows NT include none, connect level authentication, call level authentication, packet level authentication, packet integrity level authentication and encrypted packet authentication. A low authentication level (e.g., none), indicates no steps have been taken to authenticate the user's identity. At the authentication level "none," the user's identity is not available to the server. A higher authentication level (e.g., per-packet), indicates that some steps (i.e., each packet has been authenticated) have been taken to authenticate the user's identity. For example, the connect level indicates the user's identity was authenticated when the connection is first made (e.g., using a challenge/response scheme). The following table illustrates various authentication levels defined for Windows NT:
In the security framework, the identity of a user as reported by the system is associated with the authentication level used to authenticate the identity. In this way, both the reported identity and confidence in the reported identity can be evaluated when performing security checks.
Application developers and deployers can use the illustrated security framework to enforce various security requirements in a COM+ environment. For example, a developer can specify that particular users or groups of users are permitted to access a particular object's method and further require calls to an application be associated with at least a specified authentication level.
An interface presented to developers and deployers of applications using the security framework is illustrated as an enhanced version of the Object Explorer provided in the Microsoft Transaction Server, marketed by Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Washington; the illustrated enhanced version is called the COM+ Object Explorer. The COM+ Object Explorer allows manipulation of various application object attributes. To facilitate application development and deployment, Microsoft Transaction Server supports logical classes of users called "roles" (e.g., a manager role and a teller role). When the application is deployed on a host computer, the roles are bound to actual users or groups of users at the host computer (e.g., the manager role binds to the group called "group4" and a user called "user2" at deployment time).
The COM+ Object Explorer allows manipulation of objects conforming to the COM+ standard and can also accommodate objects developed under the COM standard. Among the operations supported by the COM+ Object Explorer are declaring security for particular objects, interfaces, and methods. A screen shot of the COM+ Object Explorer is shown in FIG. 7. A user (e.g., an application developer) is presented with a window 400 with a pane 404 showing a highlighted label 414 for the application "bank." The window 406 allows the user to enable automatic security by checking the appropriate checkbox. The user can also specify a default authentication level for calls to objects in the application.
The various settings selected during operation of the COM+ Object Explorer are kept in a central store called the catalog. Subsequently, when a developer wishes to prepare a particular application for distribution, the developer selects an export option, which allows the developer to export either a client version (to be run remotely from a server) or a server version (to accommodate remote client versions) of the application. These versions are also sometimes called "packages." The export option generates a catalog appropriate for the package; at deployment time, the catalog is imported into the computer onto which the package is deployed.
For example, selecting the automatic security checkbox as shown in FIG. 7 results in a catalog entry indicating automatic security for the component. Subsequently, when an instance of the component is instantiated, the operating system consults the catalog and places a security activator in the activation chain based on the automatic security setting as described in more detail below.
With reference now to FIG. 8, a window 450 shows roles having access to a particular method in the bank application for an object "account." The "permitted roles" label 464 is highlighted in the pane 454, and the roles permitted to call the "withdraw" method of the "account" object are shown in the pane 460 (currently no roles). To add roles, the user activates the "Add Roles . . . " button in the window 456, resulting in the view of FIG. 9.
In FIG. 9, the "permitted roles" label 514 for the method "withdraw" is highlighted, so the pane 506 in window 500 shows roles having access to the "withdraw" method of the "account" object. The window 518 shows the various roles 512 from which the user can select to add to the permitted roles. In FIG. 9, the "managers" and "tellers" roles are permitted to call the method.
In the illustrated embodiment, a single authentication level is associated for roles in an application; however, an alternative embodiment could allow a user to specify a different authentication level for each role. Although the example shows controlling access at the method level, a user can also control access at the application, object, and interface level by selecting an appropriate line in the interface. Roles specified at a higher (e.g., the application) level apply to lower (e.g., interface and method) levels unless explicitly specified otherwise.
An alternative way to declaratively define security in the framework is to put various declaration lines in the object's source code. The declarations are scanned at compile time to assemble access control settings instead of or in addition to using the COM+ Object Explorer. Subsequent changes can be made and rescanned without having to recompile the objects. An example of such declaration lines follows:
When the application is deployed, the deploying user is presented with an interface as shown in FIG. 10. The window 550 includes a pane 554, which has a highlighted line for the managers role 556. The pane 558 shows the current users and groups to be bound to the role "managers" are group4 and user2. The deploying user can add various users and groups to the role by selecting from those shown in the window 568. When the deploying user has completed selecting various groups and users for the roles, the roles are bound to the selected groups and users by storing role information in the catalog, as shown in more detail below. The various role settings can be modified after deployment by another user, such as a system administrator with an appropriate password.
FIG. 11A shows a security-related portion of a catalog generated for a deployed application. Although various arrangements are possible, the illustrated catalog organizes the permitted role settings by class, interface, and method. The entries in the catalog show the permitted roles for various methods. Objects are denoted by their class identifier (CLSID), a globally unique identifier (GUID) identifying the object's class. An interface identifier (IID) identifies the interface, and a dispatch identifier (DISPID) identifies the method. Methods are commonly assigned a particular DISPID according to the position (e.g., 2) the method has in the interface declaration. Roles is a list of those roles permitted to access the particular method. For sake of example, the second entry in the table might represent the second method "deposit" of the first interface "IAccount" to a particular class "Account" of objects. Calls to the method "deposit" are allowed by the roles "managers" and "tellers."
FIG. 11B shows another portion of the catalog indicating which users and groups are in what roles. The users and groups are represented by the security identifiers (SIDs) in the catalog. In the example shown, the "managers" role is filled by members of "group2" and the user "user1."
FIG. 11C shows a third portion of the catalog listing the application identifier (APPID) of each application, the authentication level for calls to the application, and a list of class identifiers (CLSIDS) belonging to the application. In the example shown, Appld1 requires a minimum authentication level of RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT and consists of the objects represented by CLSID1 and CLSID2.
A hashing algorithm is used to quickly find an entry in the catalog for a particular method of an interface to a class of objects. The entries could alternatively be stored in a central configuration database in Windows NT called the registry.
The following description details an implementation of the security framework in a COM+ environment supporting object contexts and related services. An example of object instantiation in an environment 702 supporting object contexts is shown in FIG. 12.
In the example, the two objects 744 and 784 are members of different applications. When the object 744 (also called a client object) wishes to access the functionality of the object 784 (also called a server object), it does so by requesting an interface to an instantiated instance of the object 784. The reference is acquired by supplying the class identifier of the server object 784 to an enhanced version of the "CoCreateInstance( )" object creation API, which employs a chain of activators associated with the server object 784. The activators may be specific to the requested object class, the location (e.g., machine activators 704), and other object context properties. In the illustrated example, automatic security has been set for the server object 784, and the catalog so indicates; so the security activator 754 is included in the activation chain when objects of the server object's class are instantiated. As shown, the arrangement could be extended by including an optional security activator 714 on the client side. However, security could be implemented solely on either side (e.g., only on the server side). An alternative implementation uses a standard activator to determine whether automatic security is set for the object and sets an appropriate object context property indicating automatic security.
In some cases, traversal of the activation chain results in the server object 784 being created in the same object context as the client object 744 that requested its creation (i.e., the client object context 742). In other cases, the traversal results in the object 784 being created in another object context (i.e., a separate server object context 782). If the resulting object context does not yet exist, the activation chain creates the server object context 782 (i.e., by assembling appropriate object context property objects 760). In still other cases, the activation chain can terminate activation of the object (e.g., if security so requires), or defer activation.
In the illustrated example, the activation chain begins with an initial delegation to an activator (termed the "immediate activator") by the "CoCreateInstance( )" or other object creation API. This initial delegation by the "CoCreateInstance( )" API is to a class-specific activator (i.e., specific to the server object's class) if any is designated for the class. The class-specific activator can implement specific processing for the class during instantiation, such as setting particular object context properties (e.g., automatic security) when objects of the class are instantiated. Otherwise, if no class-specific activator is designated for the class, the "CoCreateInstance( )" API delegates to a default activator of the client object context 742. The default client object context activator can implement activation processing specific to a particular type of object context. For example, object contexts that incorporate particular domain-specific behaviors (e.g., automatic security) can provide a default activator to set object context properties specific to the behaviors (such as to screen inter-application calls). Finally, if the client object context 742 does not provide a default activator, the "CoCreateInstance( )" API initially delegates to a default object context activator.
The activators in the activation chain determine in which object context an object will reside by assembling a set of object context properties (e.g., the process in which an object resides and the application to which an object belongs). The object context properties are embodied in object context property objects, which can have a variety of interfaces. In the illustrated example, one of the object context property objects embodies an application identifier indicating to which application an object belongs.
After assembling the object context properties 730 and 760 of the object, the object context property objects having a policy maker interface (i.e., IPolicyMaker) are consulted and may contribute policies to the policy set. The policy set may be assembled at instantiation time, or alternatively be deferred until the reference to the server object 784 is first used (e.g., at unmarshaling time). The various policy set references 734 are available to the proxy 732, and the policy set references 764 are available to stub 762 on the server side. As a result, the proxy/stub arrangement functions as a wrapper between the client object 744 and the server object 784. Subsequently, when a cross-context object reference is used to access the interface to the server object 784, logic contained in the policies contributed to the object's policy set is executed automatically and transparently.
In the illustrated example, an object context property object for representing the application to which the server object belongs has a policy maker interface and contributes a security policy 736 to the policy set because the server object 784 is of a different application than the client object 744. If a call is made to the server object 784, the security policy 736 is automatically executed transparently to the caller and the called object; thus, security requirements for an object can be enforced even though the object itself contains no security logic.
Similarly, on the server side of the arrangement, a stub 762 has access to a security policy 768, which is placed in the policy set references 764. The machine activators 704 can also provide other functions related to security, such as reporting the authentication level at which a remote identity is provided. After instantiation is complete, the client object 744 is provided a reference to the proxy 732 in place of a direct reference to the server object 784. The proxy 732 then marshals the parameters and relays a call to the server object 784 to the stub 762, which unmarshals the parameters and relays the call to the server object 784. The proxy and stub automatically invoke the policies in the policy set at various stages during the call to the server object 784. Each policy has an interface (i.e., IPolicy) to which four events are sent: call, enter, leave, and return. Upon receiving the event, the policy executes logic particular to the event, if any. A method call to the server object 784 results in the following sequence of events:
Calls to the policies can result in termination of the steps listed above, thus effectively terminating the call. For example, a security policy called in step 4 could indicate a calling client object does not have access privileges, causing step 5 to be skipped (steps 6-9 would still execute, but they would be notified the call failed due to lack of access privileges).
In addition, the various policies can communicate via a buffer transfer mechanism. The example of FIG. 12 shows a cross-process call; however, object contexts can be implemented in a single process, as described below and shown in FIG. 13.
FIG. 13 shows an exemplary arrangement employing a security policy in an intra-process call. Calls from the client object 804 to a server object 834 are first directed to a wrapper 862, which consults the policy set references 864, including a reference to a security policy 872 and another policy 874. A single security policy 872 can contain logic for call, enter, leave, and return events. The illustrated 20 wrapper 862 is a lightweight replacement for a proxy-stub combination and does not marshal the parameters passed to the server object 834, except for interface pointers.
The wrapper 862 executes the security policy transparently to the objects 804 and 834. Another way of describing the arrangement of FIG. 13 is to assert the client object 804 is in an object context 802 and the server object 834 is in a different object context 832. Calls between the object contexts are automatically intercepted by the wrapper 862, providing a security boundary between the object contexts.
An exemplary arrangement for providing a security framework in accordance with the invention is shown in FIG. 14. In the example, a client object 906 of one application accesses the functionality of a server object 908 of another application through a lightweight wrapper 910 transparently interposed between the two objects during instantiation of the server object 908 as described above. The wrapper 910 accesses policy set references 920, including a reference to the security policy (CSecurity) 922 automatically included in the policy set because the two objects are of different applications (i.e., they have different object context properties and reside in different object contexts). The interface presented by the wrapper 910 appears to the client object 906 to be the interface presented by the server object 908. When the security policy 922 is created, it receives the class identifier of the server object 908.
When the client object 906 attempts to access a method of the server object 908, the wrapper 910 automatically sends a call event to the security policy 922. Upon receiving the call event, the security policy 922 uses the CoGetCallContext( ) COM+ API to acquire a reference 936 to a collection of information about the call termed the "call context." The call context is stored in the security call context object 932 and includes a reference to a token 940 associated with the call. As described above, the COM+ component of the operating system provides either the token associated with the calling object's process or the token associated with the calling object's thread, if any.
The security call context object 932 implements an interface ITrustable to provide the following information related to the call: the class identifier (CLSID) of called object, the interface identifier (IID) called, the method called, the dispatch identifier (DISPID) of the method called, and the security identifier (SID) of the caller. The token 940 indicates the caller's identity, and group membership, if any. Authentication information is also provided by the call context object 932 and is collected from the COM+ component of the operating system.
Subsequently, an enter event is issued to the security policy 922. Upon receiving the enter event, the policy 922 provides the pointer 936 to the trust manager 934, which determines whether to allow the call based on information in the catalog 942 and the security call context object 932. The catalog 942 is a central information store for the computer on which the objects 906 and 908 execute and contains information indicating security settings configured by the application developer at development time and possibly modified at deployment time, including information about roles, as described above.
Specifically, the trust manager 934 consults the security call context object 932 to determine whether the token 940 associated with the user of the client object 906 contains appropriate identity information to allow access as indicated in the catalog 942. If the call is rejected, a response indicative of rejection is returned to the security policy 922, which provides an appropriate response to the client object 906 (e.g., a response indicating the call failed because security requirements were not met). If the call is allowed, the response supplied to the security policy 922 results in the wrapper 910 forwarding the method call to the server object 908, obtaining any results, and relaying the results back to the client object 906.
For sake of example, assume the catalog indicates users in group2 authenticated by a minimum authentication level of packet (RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT) are permitted to call the method being invoked. If the token 940 indicates the user of the client object 906 is a member of group2, and the security call context object 932 indicates the client was authenticated by the level packet (RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT), the call would be forwarded to the indicated method of the server object 908. If, however, the token 940 indicates that the user is not a member of group2 or if the user was not authenticated, the call would be rejected. In this way, a method-level intra-process security boundary is enforced by logic outside the calling and called objects. The catalog 940 can be changed to change characteristics of the security boundary without modifying the objects 906 or 908. To improve performance, the trust manager 934 can be configured to maintain a cache of catalog entries.
An alternative implementation stores the reference 936 in a different way. Upon receiving the call event, the security policy 922 associates the security call context object 932 with the current logical thread in a mapping table. The mapping table maintained by the security policy 922 associates logical threads (also known as causality identifiers) with a stack of security call context objects. The mapping table facilitates use of the object by multiple logical; threads and allows caching of the security call context. Stacks are used to support the possibility of reentering a process on the same logical thread of execution. The call event results in a push to the stack for the logical thread. Upon receiving the enter event, the policy 922 supplies the trust manager 934 with the appropriate reference from the stack based on the current logical thread in the mapping table. A leave event results in a pop from the stack.
Another alternative implementation stores the call context information pointer on thread-local storage, which follows the thread. Another alternative to storing the call context is to simply call CoGetCallContext( ) to retrieve information about the current call context when needed (e.g., in the trust manager, in the security policy, or in the wrapper before the user is checked) instead of acquiring and relaying a pointer at different stages.
Some calls may cross machine or process boundaries. Such calls employ a server-side and client-side policy set, and the policy sets communicate via a buffer mechanism. In this way, information about the call context is marshaled from the proxy at the client object to the stub at the server object. In such a case, the call event is a callfillbuffer event which fills the buffer with the call context at the client side, and the enter event is an enterwithbuffer event which reads the buffer for the call context at the server side.
FIG. 15 illustrates an exemplary use of,the security framework to implement an intra-process security boundary. In the example, objects in different applications are placed in different object contexts, and a wrapper is automatically interposed between inter-application calls as well as between inter-computer calls. A security policy checks method calls between applications.
Two objects 956 and 958 are defined in the catalog as part of a first application (e.g., a network browser) from a first developer. The first developer has set security for the first application to require authentication of callers at some level above none (e.g, RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_CONNECT). The object 962 is defined in the catalog as part of a second application (e.g., a browser plug in) from a second developer; the minimum authentication level for the second application has been set to none (i.e., RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_NONE). In the example, the link between the two computers provides no level of authentication.
In the example, the catalog is configured to allow the two objects 956 and 958 to be called by a set of predefined users (i;e., a role or roles). The catalog further indicates that calls by any user are permitted to the other object 962. The object 962 provides additional functionality by calling a remote object 980 on a remote computer over the Internet to exchange information. Another catalog on the computer at which the object 980 resides indicates any user is permitted to call the object and indicates no authentication is required.
When invoked, the object 962 calls the object 980, providing it with a reference back to itself 962 (i.e., a callback). Even though the inter-computer connection provides no authentication, the call is allowed because the catalog requires no authentication. Upon finishing its processing, the remote object 980 then calls back to the object 962 over the Internet. Since the connection provides no authentication, no identity information is available about the calling user (i.e., the user is anonymous). Nevertheless, the call is allowed because calls with no authentication are permitted to the object 962.
If the object 962 then attempts to access some other object 958 in the same process on behalf of the remote object 980 (i.e., by impersonating the anonymous user by using its token), the call will fail. The token indicates an identity not accepted by the object 958, and the authentication level associated with the call by the anonymous user is too low.
In the example, the security framework checks the authentication level before checking role membership, so the call fails because the authentication level is too low. Alternatively, the role membership could be checked before checking the authentication level. In such a case, the call fails because the user is not a member of the roles permitted to access the object. In either case, access to the object 958 is not allowed. In this way, an intra-process security boundary 960 is provided around a group of objects (the object 962 in the example) within a process.
Grouping the objects into object contexts according to application is a useful strategy because it helps facilitate application composability. For example, a developer of a first application exercises control over the development process for the application; so the developer can tailor the objects in the application to respect a particular coherent security scheme. However, when the first application is subsequently merged with a second application into a single overall application (a process also called "composing applications"), the objects of the second application may operate without respecting the wishes of the first developer.
The ability to place a security boundary at cross-application intra-process calls enables the developer of the first application to maintain a coherent security scheme when the application is composed with another application from another developer. Further, the illustrated declarative security mechanism allows a developer to easily implement and modify a security scheme without modifying the logic inside the objects. Finally, since the boundary can be maintained without regard to whether the objects are in the same process, objects from two different applications can share a process while maintaining a coherent security scheme, saving computing resources.
Having described and illustrated the principles of our invention with reference to illustrated embodiments, it will be recognized that the illustrated embodiments can be modified in arrangement and detail without departing from such principles. It should be understood that the programs, processes, or methods described herein are not related or limited to any particular type of computer apparatus, unless indicated otherwise. Various types of general purpose or specialized computer apparatus may be used with or perform operations in accordance with the teachings described herein. Elements of the illustrated embodiment shown in software may be implemented in hardware and vice versa. In view of the many possible embodiments to which the principles of our invention may be applied, it should be recognized that the detailed embodiments are illustrative only and should not be taken as limiting the scope of our invention. Rather, we claim as our invention all such embodiments as may come within the scope and spirit of the following claims and equivalents thereto:
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Since there is no sound figure i would post a few songs to listen too while you watch.
Golden eye elevator musicTue Oct 19 2010 11:35AM Report
is this video taken from a caveman computer or what ?....learn to use videogame capture software mate.....Tue Oct 19 2010 2:17PM Report
I have seen better video's, and the absence of sound is irritating meTue Oct 19 2010 2:45PM Report
Wow, seriously? You guys are trying too hard for GW2. I mean it sounds awesome and all but going to the point to capture a video from the craziest angle that it didn't gave me any pleasure to watch at all for that reason alone. Which is of course after a long article of what class a writer is going to be in the game *cough* necro *cough*, while there have been only 4 classes released and the game is probably several months before its release. I think it's time to calm down a little bit.Tue Oct 19 2010 3:20PM Report
wth is this crap? no sound and a 45 degree angle? thanks for trying, I guess...Tue Oct 19 2010 3:58PM Report
ok, I am excited to no end about this game, and I am reading every single article but this just feels like a waste of my time. First off, if you want to provide your readers with a chance to see it, then take the recording facing the screen directly while the person playing it sits slightly angled. And lets have some sound. I don't know what you call a good time but for me it's sure not thirty nine minutes of watching someone else silently play a video game.
Thanks for trying.Tue Oct 19 2010 5:12PM Report
You have done no justice to the game. Did you seriously have THIS much of a "I don't give a crap" attitude when recording this video? And an even more of a IDGAC attitude to bother posting it? The worst part is the quality is fantastic.Tue Oct 19 2010 5:42PM Report
Anyone else find themself MST3K'n this? Just me huh? Whatever!Tue Oct 19 2010 8:17PM Report
Would have loved to have watched this at a better angle, but thank you for the video.Tue Oct 19 2010 8:34PM Report
It was this or no video at all. I told you guys I would try to get you video when I got my hands on the game and this is the best I could do. There wasn't sufficient space to set it up any better than the way it was setup with my FlipHD. I didn't walk in there with major camera equipment. :)
The video is silent because the sound is being piped in through headphones, which my camera obviously can't grab.
I don't have to grab video of the stuff I do as part of my assignments, I do it out of consideration for you guys, so it's not always going to be perfect. The last time I did this people complained about the camera shake (since I was holding the camera for an hour!), at least I had the decency to get a little tripod this time. ;)Tue Oct 19 2010 8:58PM Report
im drooling and waiting for the release date. But the only thing that is missing and im already hating the lack of it is the same thing ANet hates to give us...... extra skill bars on screen... ANet what have we done to deserve no extra action bars? " extra free to use/move" acton bars, not this kind of locked bars and stuff. As i can see in this video, there is plenty of space onscree to put more skill bars >.< damn.Tue Oct 19 2010 10:35PM Report
You did good, I mean, its not the best angle xD
But you shows us some small things that others videos didn't.
Like looting, achvs, bags...There is a ton of videos with better quality, but yours shows some more details. Its always fun to watch new things :D
Ty for the vid,
Mmm...I'm really excited for this game too but I have to agree this video doesn't do it justice. I see the effort that went into it though, and I appreciate it. But the lack of sound and the uninteresting angle only hurt perceptions of the game, not help. Unless that was the point.
In any case, is it me or does it look like there's 5 characters at that selection screen? If so, it looks like the 5th class to be revealed will be the second warrior...Tue Oct 19 2010 11:07PM Report
i concur, with the choices being this or nothing, i'd take this any day & the light, though it was apparent it was there, didn't capture my attention as much as the character creation process...i mean some of that i don't even remember reading about! changing clothes due to what kind of living conditions you have? wow fro indepth gaming that puts in this level of customization & still have yet to see what i'm assuming is Oblivion level character model cuztomization! &, while i would've liked to have seen any race other than human, i guess that allowed me to focuz more on the environment & other aspects i'd read up on...so far so good i'd say as far as talkin the talk, way to go ANET...please don't mess up XP hahaWed Oct 20 2010 2:46AM Report
After watching this hands on, i must say i'm underwhelmed to say the least. Not to be to harsh, but man, this looks like a bad version of LOTR.
40 minutes is surely not enough time to get a full grip on the whole game, but that looked pretty boring as hell. the environments were blah, the world looked small and linear, the quest's were more of the same and even the dynamic event looked liked nothing special.
I know this game is hyped to the high heavens but atleast for me at this moment, doesn't look like much.Wed Oct 20 2010 9:27AM Report
If you're serious about your comment (which I doubt), then it's kinda lame to say something like that based on THIS video since there is a ton of better quality gameplay vids on the net. This thing is even worse than the first gameplay leakage and it even has no sound. Hell even the colors are all weird..
Although I appreciate the upload, I agree with others. It doesn't give the game justice and i don't know why this video was needed.Thu Oct 21 2010 10:56AM Report
@ everyone complaining about the video being at a crazy angle...or the fact that it wasnt done with video capture software.
Let me ask you this. would you rather have a video that laggs like hell because the video capture software cuts the frame rate of this beautifully rendered game. Or would you rather have this video. You have to consider that Anet is showing this off live. Theres always the possiblity that the video capping software could interfere with the demo. They need to appear as professional as possible. TBH you should be happy this video even exists. They couldve done nothing at all and just gave you a write up about the conference(which about 9 out of 13211423 of us would read) and no videos at all.Fri Oct 22 2010 11:02AM Report
I just wanted to add my comment even though this is considered old news by now. Anyway...
I thought the video was fine. I think too many people payed attention to real world nitpicking aspects about the shooting of the video.
The character animations I thought were very smooth and well done especially the running and scaling things and how he seemed to stumble a few times. I also liked the fact there were stairs but many times he just scaled the hill instead. I enjoy not being locked into one way of doing things.
The enviroment looked very stunning and diverse to most of the flat areas with other MMOs. I liked the shadows and movement how everything seemed to have life.
The ecounters with NPCs I enjoyed how they took on a kind of story book feel with the painted back drops and pull you from the surroundings. Instead of looking around at other things while some character talks to you. You are actually pulled into their conversation and not I felt as distracted by other players.
My only draw back was the grabbin pigs for the pen or whatever that was, rabbits or whatever. Thats kind of an irritating aspect for me in MMOs where you do tasks for farmers or other supposedly salt of the Earth characters that are too lazy to do it themselves. I understand if they are under full attack to defend them, but I should not have to do their work for them. =P
I do hope there won't be many quests within that aspect of forage or gather as far as lazy merchants, farmers, aristocrats, or dock workers. So on and so forth. =)
Thankyou for the video either way.Mon Nov 08 2010 12:53AM Report
No file.
ALSO @ the person who mentioned the NPC with the torch, it was already mentioned the NPCs in GW2 are NOT like GW1. In GW1, all npcs were a kind of class that was available in the game. In GW2, NPCs will have their own unique skills and abilities, so you can't assume because the NPC can do one thing, you'll be able to as well. Not that I'd mind that kind of class, but it seems unlikely given the lore of the GW universe, which they are sticking closely to.Thu Nov 25 2010 1:14PM Report
Still no file, see that the last post is from nov 26, not going to be fixed ? :(Fri Jan 14 2011 2:07PM Report

subset: commoncrawl


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Want to know, long engagements. Does a guy want a beautifull girl more if she refuses to give it away till marriage?
Does that usually mean he will marry her without much delay? If the girl gives it to him before marriage does that mean he will not be in much of a hurry to marry her?
heavensmissinanangel 26-30, F 4 Answers 0 Jan 6, 2014 in Dating & Relationships
Save yourself for someone who is willing to wait.
Best Answer
If he really loves you than he will wait. Most don't even wait to have an engagement ring before they give in. How your relationship is before marriage is how it will be after. Pretty much.
Best Answer
No, I would want her the same. It's just a choice.
Best Answer
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Guys how do you know when you've found the right girl? Girls how do you know when you've found the right guy?Claudia1994 18-21, F 9 Answers 1 Jul 1, 2013 in Romance & True Love


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With an increasing base of support for a number of file systems (including HFS+ in v184.108.40.206) and formatting types, ProDiscover is quickly finding its way into the toolkits of many digital investigators. ProDiscover IR 126.96.36.199 is built on a highly successful platform that has a marked history in forensic analysis. This success is attributed to many imaging, analysis and reporting features packed into the software - most notably, its ability to image remotely (with a stealth option) through a twofish-encrypted TCP/IP connection using globally unique identifiers without interrupting a live system.
The common thread for all past ProDiscover IR reviews in SC Magazine has been ease of use and flexibility, and this review is no exception. From installation to testing, we experienced few problems. The software was easy to use and the graphical user interface (GUI) was easy to navigate. With a basic understanding of forensics, one can accomplish many things with this tool. For testing, we followed all instructions in the provided manual - even though many were no-brainers owing to the intuitive nature of the GUI. ProDiscover IR was able to image and preview all advertised file systems without issue, either fixed or remotely. "Stealth mode" held true to its name as the agent was installed undetected in the target system's directory without visibility on the program bar or tray area. We also enjoyed the customizable report generator, which further added to the efficiency of this program.
The only instance where we encountered a challenge was during analysis. We experienced multiple freezes and crashes when navigating around the project tree, all of which were properly documented in crash dump files. These could have been related to the size of the memory on our test computer. In the case of our test machines, we were running Windows XP in a 32-bit configuration.
ProDiscover's ProScript highlighted this software's true potential. The ProScript Perl engine changed to Strawberry Perl in v22.214.171.124, which made it easier to use on Windows machines through the MinGW (Minimalist GNU for Windows). Technology Pathways provides basic tutorials for ProScript, which helpfully supplements and supports users who may not be so familiar with Perl. All in all, we found its operations ran parallel to its advertised functionality, albeit it was a little touchy with crashes.
Documentation that came with this product was satisfactory. Everything was easy to read and understand. The section headers and content were logically placed, direct and helpful. Support has not changed markedly from past reviews: no-cost 30-day warranty with an optional fee-based "annual software maintenance" (including software updates and telephone/email assistance) at $1,619.10. Aside from this option, the website provides an extensive knowledge base, complete with advanced tips and essential ProScript code snippets. Given the flexibility, utility and range of tools, $8,995 is reasonable for any mid- to large-sized company.
Copyright © SC Magazine, US edition
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Quickies: Get off my lawn!
• The Inquirer goes all Hey, you kids, get off my lawn! Oh, and skateboarding is "antisocial behavior." And newspapers wonder why nobody under the age of 21 reads. [Inky]
• Sorry, Ben: Franklin Field is too "narrow" to host Olympic track and field. That track has nine lanes. How much bigger could it be? [Bucks County Courier Times]
• Drugs in the water have turned male bass into female bass in the Potomac. See, that transgender teacher in South Jersey didn't need to get a sex change operation — she just needed to go for a swim in the Schuylkill. [Inky]
• Metro interviews an author with a big Internet following, and runs the following quote: "I was like, 'Holy f-king sh-t!'" You know, if you're going to censor his quote like that you might as just well run the fucking curse words. [Metro]


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A Short Course in the History of the United Church of Christ tells our story beginning with our origins in the small community who followed Jesus 20 centuries ago and continuing to the present. Learn about the Reformation—a protest movement against the abuse of authority by church leaders; the rediscovery by Luther and Calvin of the Bible's teaching that salvation is not earned, but is a gift; the epic journey of the Pilgrims from England to the shores of North America; the waves of emigration by German and Hungarian Protestants seeking spiritual and political freedom; the beginning of the first Christian anti-slavery movement in history; the 20th-century movement to reunite the divided branches of Christ's church, and, as a result of that movement, the union of several traditions of Protestant Christianity into the United Church of Christ in 1957.
We invite you to use the Short Course for your personal study or as a resource for confirmation and new-member classes in your congregation. On every page, you'll find links to related resources on this website, links to other resources on the Internet, and ideas about books for further study. Also recommended: Hidden Histories of the United Church of Christ.
Full Version in PDFThe Early ChurchOur Reformation RootsGerman Evangelical MovementReformation in EnglandCongregationalismGerman Reformed ChurchEducation and MissionThe Christian ChurchesGerman Evangelical SynodAn Ecumenical AgeEvangelical and ReformedCongregational ChristianThe UCC Comes of Age
Ms. Kimberly WhitneyExecutive Associate to the Collegium700 Prospect Ave.Cleveland, Ohio firstname.lastname@example.com


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Misawa starts New Year double booked
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U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Nathan Jake Legaspi Perez, back, and Airman Basic Jeremy Franklin, 13th Aircraft Maintenance Unit crew chiefs, stand by while an F-16 Fighting Falcon is being inspected for their real-world trip to Guam at Misawa Air Base, Japan, Jan. 11, 2013. During the base-wide initial readiness response exercise, maintainers were generating jets for a simulated wartime scenario and a real-world training exercise. (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Kenna Jackson)
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U.S. Air Force Capt. Jason Holmes, 13th Fighter Squadron assistant chief of standardization and evaluation, inspects an F-16 Fighting Falcon during an initial readiness response exercise at Misawa Air Base, Japan, 11, 2013. During the inspection, Holmes looked for anything that is missing or improperly installed on the missile. The base is preparing for a real-world training exercise in conjunction with the IRRE. (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Kenna Jackson)
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Misawa starts New Year double booked
Posted 1/11/2013 Updated 1/11/2013
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by Airman 1st Class Kenna Jackson
35th Fighter Wing Public Affairs
1/11/2013 -
MISAWA AIR BASE, Japan
-- As the 35th Fighter Wing conducts its Initial Readiness Response Exercise Jan. 10 to Jan. 12 at Misawa Air Base, Japan, it is hard to ignore the busy nature of the flightline.
Despite the fact the flightline plays an integral role during an IRRE, which tests the wing's ability to generate aircraft and deploy combat power, this time it seems to be busier. This is because they are not only simulating going to war, but also preparing for an aviation training relocation exercise next week.
Next week, the 13th Fighter Squadron will deploy to Guam, honing their combat skills and practicing live-munitions drops, which is something they can't do at Misawa.
"We don't have a range here where we can drop live bombs," said Lt. Col. John McDaniel, 13th Fighter Squadron commander. "At our local range, we can only drop inert munitions with a small explosive radius."
However in Guam, the 13 FS will be able to use a range capable of handling much larger explosives, added McDaniel.
Not only will pilots and maintainers gain more experience with their craft, but they will also get out of the bitter cold in Misawa during the winter season.
"When training in a tropical climate, not only are we warm, but we don't have to deal with being delayed during take-off due to snow and the jets have less malfunctions" said Capt. Jason Holmes, 13 FS assistant chief of standardization and evaluation.
Although the two exercises are essentially back-to-back, McDaniel said they aren't having any difficulties completing their tasks. Part of that reason is the 13 FS, 35th Maintenance Group and 35th Logistics Readiness Squadron lead coordinators have developed a way to effectively balance the multiple tasks needed to be mission ready.
"The way things are set up, we have some of the jets and crews getting ready for this simulated combat exercise. The rest are preparing for the training exercise scheduled for next week," said McDaniel.
According to Holmes, this seemingly daunting task is made easier because of the similarities between getting aircraft and people to a simulated war time exercise and an ATR exercise.
"It's true that the exercises are different," said Holmes. "In one scenario we are preparing our pilots and aircraft for a simulated war time setting, while on the other hand we're getting ready for an aviation training exercise. However, despite the differences between the two scenarios, the process of getting our pilots ready for their mission, out-processing procedures and having our maintainers re-configuring the jets for the mission are the similar."
McDaniel added that prioritizing and making sure everything was moving smoothly with the IRRE preparations helped to keep confusion and disorder from occurring within their ranks.
"Although there are times when the lines get a little blurred, we're doing our best to keep the two exercises separated," said McDaniel. "The primary mission, as of right now, is the IRRE and ensuring the 35th Fighter Wing is ready for contingency operations."
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What attraction do you wish would come back all restored and refurbished with a remastered and restored soundtrack,modern animatronics and effects,and what do you think of the replacement that's there now?
I myself miss Journey into Imagination at Disney's EPCOT Center. The ride used to fit so well with the Imagination Pavilion and all the guests loved it. There was no reason to get rid of it. It's a classic. It's like the It's a Small World or The Haunted Mansion to EPCOT Center. You don't mess with the classics. Unfortunately some idiot at Disney Imagineering decided to change it into a cheap,awful abomination that is nothing like the original at all. They obviously didn't think twice on this awful idea of an attraction. The guests were all pissed that try changed it including Michael Eisner. So he ordered to add in Figment. Unfortunatly this didn't work well either. It's basically the same attraction with Figment added in. Fans to this day still complain about it including me. I honestly think the original needs to come back soon. Well, my time's up? What attraction would you like back and what do you think of it's replacement?


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I am looking for suggestions on what classes near Pima College east I can take to begin my plein aire painting quest. Private or otherwise would be welcome. I work full time but have always wanted to begin this type of painting. I am an avid nature lover and want to paint landscapes particularly of redrock / slickrock of southern Utah and maybe Sedona.
I teach plein air painting workshops around the state of Arizona. I am doing on at the North Rim of the Grand Canyon and Sedona. To learn more visit http://kevinmccainstudios.com
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You need time to manage this recipe but it is rather easy to make ...
Step 1: First part : the pastry
Ingredients :
- 4.40oz (125) of butter
- 8.80oz (250g) of flour
- 1.75oz (50g) of sugar
- 1egg
- 2 salt pinches
1. Cut the butter into the flour by mixing and rolling it out with your fingers, so that the dough is crumbly.
2. Add the salt, the sugar and the egg and mix them quickly with the dough.
3. You have to mix the dough with your hands, don't knead it. And be careful, this dough is very fragile. Roll it up into a ball and refrigerate it at least 2 or 3 hours.
Step 2: Second part : the lemon custard
Ingredients :
- 7 lemons
- 3 eggs
- 8.45oz (240g) of sugar
- 1 vanilla sugar sachet (0.35oz)
- 8.80oz (250g) of heavy cream
- 2.80oz (80g) of butter
- 1 agar-agar sachet (0.15oz)
- 0.70oz (20g) of almond powder
1. Wash carefully and brush the lemons. Squeeze them all and grate one of them zest.
2. Mix the lemon zest with the sugar (vanilla sugar too), the eggs and the cream. Cook gently the mixture in a saucepan until it thickens stirring constantly. Add the butter, the almond powder, the agar-agar and then the lemon juice - mix it. Take this lemon custard off the heat and let it cool.
3. Heat the oven at 370F° (190C°). Line the tart pan and bake the pastry for about 25-30 minutes.
4. Pour the custard on the pastry and bake it again for 15minutes.


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Year of publication
- 2002 (1) (remove)
- chemical (1)
- chiral SU(3) model (1)
- heavy-ion collisions (1)
- thermal (1)
- Particle ratios at RHIC : effective hadron masses and chemical freeze-out (2002)
- The measured particle ratios in central heavy-ion collisions at RHIC-BNL are investigated within a chemical and thermal equilibrium chiral SU(3) theta - omega approach. The commonly adopted noninteracting gas calculations yield temperatures close to or above the critical temperature for the chiral phase transition, but without taking into account any interactions. Contrary, the chiral SU(3) model predicts temperature and density dependent e ective hadron masses and e ective chemical potentials in the medium and a transition to a chirally restored phase at high temperatures or chemical potentials. Three di erent parametrizations of the model, which show di erent types of phase transition behaviour, are investigated. We show that if a chiral phase transition occured in those collisions, freezing of the relative hadron abundances in the symmetric phase is excluded by the data. Therefore, either very rapid chemical equilibration must occur in the broken phase, or the measured hadron ratios are the outcome of the dynamical symmetry breaking. Furthermore, the extracted chemical freeze-out parameters di er considerably from those obtained in simple noninteracting gas calculations. In particular, the three models yield up to 35 MeV lower temperatures than the free gas approximation. The in-medium masses turn out di er up to 150 MeV from their vacuum values.


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Topic: England Premiership 26/1
Here are my picks for Premiership on Saturday
Aston Villa - Blackburn Rovers
Aston Villa have very good form and have 3-3-0 on their last six matches. 2-1-0 on their last three home matches. Blackburn Rovers have also pretty good form with 2-1-0 on their last three away matches. Aston Villa win.
Good luck


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Experience the Sandhills Premier Chorus!
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MCCS, a 100+ voice society of volunteer singers, presents two major choral concerts each year in December and April. We welcome new singers each season. Auditions are not required. Last season, singers from five counties joined MCCS. Singers range from high school age to adults. Student memberships are graciously underwritten by society members.
If you would like to become a member of the chorus and experience a sense of cultural and artistic community we invite you to attend one of our Open Registrations. The next registration period, for our 40th annual Holiday Concert, will be held on Tuesday, September 2, 2014 and Tuesday, September 9, 2014 at 6:30 p.m. Rehearsal will follow at 7:30 p.m
Rehearsals are held on Tuesday evenings from 7:30 - 9:30 in the Fellowship Hall of Brownson Memorial Presbyterian Church on South May Street in Southern Pines, NC.
For more information; please call (910) 281-2029 or email firstname.lastname@example.com
MOORE COUNTY CHORAL SOCIETY P.O. BOX 785 Southern Pines, NC 28388 Phone (910) 281-2029