text:
The present invention relates to systems and methods for staging transactions and facilitating payments by consumers to a lender or merchant to consummate a financial transaction and/or to maintain a financial relationship. In one embodiment, a method for accepting payments from a consumer includes receiving a promise-to-pay record from a lender (210), receiving a payment from the consumer (220), associating the payment with the promise-to-pay record (230), and sending a notice to the lender (240), with the notice having an indicator that the payment has been received.
1. A method for accepting a payment from a consumer for monies owed by the consumer to a lender pursuant to a financial relationship between the consumer and the lender, the method comprising:
receiving a promise-to-pay record from a lender system operated by the lender at a payment service provider system operated by a payment service provider distinct from the lender, the record comprising a set of identifiers forming a database, the database comprising existing promise-to-pay accounts, the set of identifiers being formatted into a consumer database, the consumer database being operated by the payment service provider, the promise-to-pay record identifying at least a payment amount and including a transaction identifier of the set of identifiers;
receiving, at the payment service provider system, a record of receipt of a cash payment from the consumer to the payment service provider, the record of receipt identifying a paid amount and including a purported identifier provided by the consumer wherein the consumer is physically present at a payment service provider location when making the payment;
associating the record of receipt of the cash payment with the promise-to-pay record at the payment service provider system, wherein associating the record of the cash payment with the promise-to-pay record comprises matching the purported transaction identifier provided by the consumer with the transaction identifier included in the promise-to-pay record;
sending a notice from the payment service provider system to the lender system, the notice comprising an indicator that the cash payment has been received, the indicator identifying the paid amount; and
initiating, with the payment service provider system, an electronic funds transfer of at least a portion of the paid amount to control of the lender in response to receipt of the cash payment by the payment service provider.
2. The method as in
3. The method as in
4. The method as in
5. The method as in
6. The method as in
the promise-to-pay record includes information that identifies the customer; and
associating the record of receipt of the cash payment with the promise-to-pay record comprises verifying a consumer identity through a comparison with the information that identifies the customer in the promise-to-pay record.
7. A method for staging a transaction involving a payment from a customer for monies owed by the customer to a lender pursuant to a financial relationship between the customer and the lender, the method comprising:
receiving, at a lender system operated by the lender, a promise-to-pay a specified payment amount from the customer;
creating a promise-to-pay record with the lender system, the promise-to-pay record including the specified payment amount and an expiration time;
transmitting the promise-to-pay record to a payment service provider system operated by payment service provider distinct from the lender, the record comprising at least one identifier forming a database, the database comprising existing promise-to-pay accounts associated with a set of identifiers, the identifiers being formatted into a consumer database, the consumer database being operated by the payment service provider, the promise-to-pay record identifying a payment amount and a transaction identifier of the set of identifiers;
receiving, at the payment service provider system, a record of receipt of a cash payment from the consumer to the payment service provider, the record of receipt identifying a paid amount and including a purported identifier provided by the consumer wherein the consumer is physically present at a payment service provider location when making the payment;
receiving a notice of payment at the lender system from the payment service provider system if the payment service provider received from the customer a cash payment that equals or exceeds the payment amount prior to the expiration time; and
electronically receiving with the lender system a transfer of at least a portion of the payment amount pursuant to an electronic funds transfer initiated by the payment service provider system in response to receipt of the cash payment by the payment service provider.
8. The method as in
9. The method as in
receiving at the lender system a notice of non-effective payment from the payment service provider system; and
updating, with the lender system, the promise-to-pay record to include the notice of non-effective payment.
10. The method as in
11. The method as in
12. The method as in
13. The method as in
14. The method as in
This application is a continuation-in-part application and claims the benefit of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/444,111, filed May 21, 2003, entitled "Staged Transactions Systems and Methods," the complete disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference. The aforementioned application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Ser. No. 10/112,258, filed Mar. 29, 2002, entitled "Electronic Identifier Payment Systems and Methods, which in turn is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Ser. No. 10/007,701, filed Dec. 10, 2001, which in turn is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/823,697, filed Mar. 31, 2001, and U.S. application Ser. No. 09/990,702, filed Nov. 9, 2001, the complete disclosures of which are also incorporated herein by reference.
The present invention relates generally to financial transaction systems and methodologies, and in particular to systems and methods for staging transactions and facilitating payments by consumers to a lender or merchant to consummate a financial transaction and/or to maintain a financial relationship.
A wide variety of payment methods are available to purchasers of goods and services, or borrowers of money. Consumers may make purchases with currency, checks, money orders, debit cards, credit cards, and the like. Consumers may authorize the transfer of funds electronically from a customer account to a merchant or lender to satisfy an obligation. The success of each of these payment methods, however, is dependent on an actual transfer of funds. If the consumer account has insufficient funds to honor a check or to transfer electronically, the consumer will in all likelihood be notified by the merchant or lender that an additional payment attempt must be made. In some cases, the second or subsequent payment attempt must be tendered immediately or within a short period of time to avoid termination of the transaction, repossession of the purchased property, or the like. Thus, it would be desirable to have systems and methods in place so that the consumer can rapidly send payment, backed by sufficient funds, to a merchant or lender.
The present invention relates generally to financial transaction systems and methodologies, and in particular to systems and methods for staging transactions and facilitating payments by consumers to a lender or merchant to consummate a financial transaction and/or to maintain a financial relationship.
In one embodiment, a method for accepting payments from a consumer according to the present invention includes receiving a promise-to-pay record from a lender, receiving a payment from the consumer, associating the payment with the promise-to-pay record, and sending a notice to the lender, with the notice having an indicator that the payment has been received. In some aspects, the record of the payment is stored in a database, and at least a portion of the payment is electronically sent to the lender.
In some aspects, a transaction identifier is used to help associate the payment with the promise-to-pay record. The promise-to-pay record may include a time limit by which the consumer must effect payment. In one aspect, the promise-to-pay record is received electronically and the payment is received physically (e.g., cash, cashier's check, or the like)
In another embodiment of the present invention, a method for staging a transaction involving a payment from a customer to a lender includes receiving a promise-to-pay from the customer and creating a promise-to-pay record. The promise-to-pay record, which includes a payment amount and an expiration, is transmitted to a payment service provider. The payment service provider is adapted to accept a cash payment from the customer if the customer attempts payment prior to the expiration. The method further includes receiving a notice of payment from the payment service provider if the latter received a payment from the customer that equals or exceeds the payment amount.
In one aspect, the promise-to-pay record is updated with the notice of payment. In some aspects, the method includes receiving a notice of non-effective payment from the payment service provider, with the notice of non-effective payment used in updating the promise-to-pay record. In some aspects, the payment made includes a delinquent amount owed by the borrower.
The summary provides only a general outline of the embodiments according to the present invention. Many other objects, features and advantages of the present invention will become more fully apparent from the following detailed description, the appended claims and the accompanying drawings.
Various detailed embodiments of the present invention are disclosed herein, however, it is to be understood that the disclosed embodiments are merely exemplary of the invention which may be embodied in various forms. Therefore, specific structural and functional details disclosed herein are not to be interpreted as limiting, but merely as a representative basis for teaching one skilled in the art to employ the present invention in a variety of manners.
Consumers have the ability to purchase a wide range of goods or services from a variety of merchants. The terms "consumer," "customer," "borrower," and the like are used interchangeable in some cases herein. In this context, "merchant" may be an individual, group of individuals, company, association, or other entity that offers or has provided goods and/or services to consumers. If the consumer is intending to purchase a home, automobile, or another expensive piece of real or personal property, the consumer may opt to borrow money from a lender. In some cases the merchant is the lender, and in other cases the lender is a third party. The borrowed monies typically are paid back to the lender, or a designated third party, over a period of time, typically within a designated term. As compensation for lending money, the lender typically charges the consumer interest on the unpaid loan principal at an agreed-to interest rate. The borrower repays the loan, plus interest, in a series of payments (e.g., monthly, quarterly, or the like). Typically, a portion of each payment is applied against the interest on the loan, and a portion is applied towards reducing the loan principal. For each payment, particularly early in the repayment schedule, the amount that goes towards reducing the principal can be relatively small.
As an example, a common scenario involves a consumer purchasing a home using at least some money borrowed from a lender. The lender places a mortgage on the home. The consumer, as mortgagee, pays off the mortgage on the home, usually over a period of years. Common mortgage terms extend for ten (10) years, fifteen (15) years, twenty (20) years, thirty (30) years, and the like. In its most basic form, repayment of the loan may involve the consumer mailing monthly checks to the mortgagor or mortgage company. The monthly payment typically is made at approximately the same time each month, with a grace period of a few days to weeks possibly available. The mortgage company, lender, or designated third party maintains a record of the mortgage and monitors repayment of the loan. The lender typically tracks the payment record of the consumer, including, whether the consumer has missed any payments and, if so, how many.
The consumer also may set up an electronic funds transfer (EFT) to automatically make the monthly payment. With direct payment or EFT, consumers can preauthorize electronic debits of a desired amount (e.g., the mortgage payment, the mortgage payment plus additional principal, and the like). The debit is authorized to be made to the consumer's credit account, checking account, brokerage account, or other designated consumer account. To initiate direct payment, the consumer provides written or other authorization to the lender. Authorizations may be cancelled at the discretion of the consumer according to procedures outlined in the authorization. Cancellation of the direct EFT payment, however, does not relieve the consumer of the underlying financial obligation. With appropriate authorization the lender, in the mortgage example, originates a computer file containing payment information. The lender transmits the debit through an automatic clearing house (ACH) network to the financial institution maintaining the consumer's designated account. The proper amount is debited from the customer's designated account, and forwarded to the lender or credited to a lender account. In such a manner, the monthly payment occurs automatically, and the consumer does not need to remember when the mortgage payment needs to be paid.
As noted above, in one embodiment the payment is sent to the merchant/lender through an ACH network. The ACH network operates to clear debits and credits electronically, rather than through the physical movement of checks. The ACH system uses batch processing, store and forward operations, and does not typically process payments individually. Originating depository financial institutions (ODFI) submit ACH payment files to the ACH operators. The ACH operators accumulate these files, sort them by destination, and transmit them to receiving depository financial institutions (RFDI) for application to customer accounts at predetermined times throughout the business day. The ACH system provides significant economies of scale compared to individual wire transfers, and is faster and more accurate than paper-check processing, and thus is an efficient electronic payment alternative to checks and wire transfers. The ACH-network delivers electronic payments quickly, safely, reliably, and conveniently to financial institutions for their customers.
While the ACH network is used for consumer transactions such as direct deposit and direct payment, and for business-to-business transactions, it also may be the settlement calculator for home-banking payments, credit card clearings, point-of-sale and Internet purchases, electronic check transmissions, and automated teller machine (ATM) transactions. The ACH system provides the basic infrastructure for a wide variety of electronic payment applications. The ACH network transfers payments and related data through computer and high-speed communications technology, e.g., the Internet.
In addition to establishing an EFT repayment scheme as noted above, a variety of other programs exist to provide for automated or semi-automated repayment of loans such as mortgages. One such example includes the Equity Accelerator� program provided by First Data Corporation of Englewood, Colo. In one embodiment, instead of having a single debit each month to the consumer's account, a debit equal to one-half of the monthly amount is made every two weeks. As a result, over the course of a fifty-two (52) week year, twenty-six (26) one-half payments are debited from the customer's account, resulting in the equivalent of one extra monthly payment paid to the lender. In this manner, the debt is repaid more quickly and/or equity in the mortgaged property increases more rapidly.
Each of the above-noted manual or automatic repayment scheme works well provided the consumer continues to repay the loan on the requested repayment schedule. The success of the repayment schemes, however, depends on the customer's designated account having sufficient funds on the date the debit is made. Problems can arise, with manual or automated repayment systems, in the event that the consumer's designated account does not have sufficient funds (NSF). This may occur, for example, when the consumer sends a check to the mortgage company that is drawn on an account having insufficient funds to pay the amount of the check when the check is presented to the consumer's financial institution. In this event, the lender and/or the consumer's financial institution will notify the consumer that the payment was not effectuated, and the check "bounces." A consumer's payment attempt also is ineffective if the consumer's designated account has insufficient funds for an EFT debit on the date the debit is to be made.
In some circumstances, the lender may permit a second or more attempt(s) at payment by the consumer, with additional penalties, late fees or other charges possibly included. The lender may have guidelines or firm rules which permit the consumer to make a late or delinquent payment. However, at some point the lender may seek return of the mortgaged property or merchandise to satisfy the outstanding debt. The lender may initiate foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property in an attempt to recoup the balance of the unpaid loan. In one embodiment, this may occur if the consumer has missed several payments in a row, or several payments over a designated period of time.
Prior to foreclosure, the lender may offer the consumer one final opportunity to render payment in a specified period of time. The lender likely will require the payment be made by cash since the consumer has not attempted payment on the appropriate payment schedule or has had payment attempts rejected because the consumer's designated account had insufficient funds (NSF). In one embodiment, the present invention facilitates this payment in a just-in-time manner to avoid foreclosure on the mortgaged property.
With reference to
The lender/merchant has a financial relationship with a consumer, borrower, or customer, as previously noted, to whom they have sold goods or services, lent money, or the like. Payments from the customer to the lender/merchant may occur, for example, by check. Payments also may be made by telephone or other communication device authorizing a debit to a customer account 110, and a subsequent electronic transfer of funds from account 110 to lender/merchant control 120 as further detailed above. In the event the lender/merchant requires a cash payment from customer 110, in one embodiment the lender/merchant directs the customer to a payment service provider 150. Lender/merchant or lender/merchant control 120 then stages a transaction within system 100 as further detailed below, so that the customer can make a payment to payment service provider 150 to satisfy the debt or obligation owed to the lender/merchant.
In one embodiment, the lender/merchant or lender/merchant control 120 stages the transaction in system 100 by transferring a customer's "promise to pay" to an account servicing platform 130. A promise-to-pay record is created and forwarded to payment service provider 150. The promise-to-pay record may contain all customer related information in lender/merchant control 120, or some subset thereof. In one embodiment, the promise-to-pay record further includes the amount and possible methods of payment (e.g., cash only), the time the payment is due, additional fees, taxes, discounts, and the like. In one embodiment the promise-to-pay record may further include instructions regarding whether a late payment would be accepted, and additional options such as whether amounts other than the requested amount would be accepted, whether multiple payments are accepted towards the requested amount, and the like. The promise-to-pay record can be manually created, such as by a representative of the lender/merchant. Alternatively, the promise-to-pay record is created automatically by mapping the appropriate consumer data from lender/merchant 120 records, such as those stored in database 122, to a promise-to-pay record form created for or associated with the consumer. The lender/merchant, in one embodiment, verifies the data accuracy and, if needed, corrects or updates data in the promise-to-pay record before forwarding to payment service provider 150. In another embodiment account servicing platform 130 maps the appropriate consumer data to create the promise-to-pay record, and forwards some or all of the promise-to-pay record to payment service provider 150.
In one embodiment, the promise-to-pay record is maintained on a database 152 associated with payment service provider 150. The consumer then tenders payment to payment service provider 150, which matches the consumer payment to the promise-to-pay record. The matching of the customer's payment to the promise-to-pay record may occur in several ways. For example, in one embodiment the customer provides proof of their identity and payment service provider 150 uses a customer name, address, telephone number, social security number, or the like to match the payment attempt to the proper promise-to-pay record. In another embodiment, the staging of the transaction by lender/merchant 120 may include providing the customer with a transaction identifier. The customer then provides the transaction identifier to payment service provider 150 so that payment service provider 150 can match the customer payment to the appropriate lender/merchant 120. Payment service provider 150 or an operator thereof will verify the appropriate information, payment amount, transaction identifier, and the like. If the staged transaction has a deadline, payment service provider 150 will verify compliance.
In one embodiment the transaction identifier includes an alphanumeric string of characters unique to the customer and/or unique to the transaction. In some cases, the transaction identifier may comprise several items of the customers'information including the customer's name, address, telephone number, social security number, account number, or the like. In one embodiment, merchant control 120 creates the transaction identifier. In other embodiments, the transaction identifier is created by account servicing platform 130 or payment service provider 150.
Payment from the consumer to payment service provider 150 may then occur. In one embodiment, the customer tenders a cash payment to payment service provider 150. Upon receipt of the payment, a record of the payment is transferred to account servicing platform 130, and in one embodiment, a receipt is provided to the customer. The funds and updated account record also are transferred to lender/merchant control 120. In an alternative embodiment, the customer may tender payment using a debit card. In some embodiments, the promise-to-pay record contains a list of acceptable payment methods for a particular consumer, or all consumers.
In some embodiments, the consumer interacts with a point of service (POS) device 160 to facilitate payment to the lender/merchant. This may include having a third party receive the cash from the customer and input an authorization or transaction identifier into POS device 160 for transmission to payment service provider 150. POS device 160 communicates with payment service provider 150 in order to facilitate the transaction. For example, POS device 160 may present a screen with the transaction identifier and the amount of payment required by lender/merchant 120. Upon receipt of the payment from the customer, POS device 160 preferably provides a receipt to the customer indicating such payment has been made, and transfers a record of the payment to payment service provider 150.
POS device 160 can be any device disposed at the point-of-sale, or at some other location removed from a payment service provider 150 location. Thus, POS device 160 can be one such as is described in U.S. application Ser. No. 09/634,901, entitled "Point of Sale Payment System," filed Aug. 9, 2000, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/147,899, entitled "Integrated Point of Sale Device," filed Aug. 9, 1999, the complete disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. POS device 160 also may be similar to those described in U.S. application Ser. No. 10/116,689, entitled "Systems and Methods for Performing Transactions at a Point-of-Sale," filed Apr. 3, 2002, the complete disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.
Based on the description provided herein, one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize other devices capable of operating as POS device 160. For example, POS device 160 can be a personal computer (PC), a personal digital assistant (PDA), other wired devices, and the like. POS device 160 also may be a mobile device, such as a wireless device, hand-held device, or the like.
At the time of payment, other funds may also be collected. For example, payment service provider 150, lender/merchant 120, or other third parties may charge and collect a fee for its services.
Upon or after receipt of the consumer's payment, an electronic record of the payment along with the transaction identifier is sent to payment service provider 150 and/or is stored in database 152. In one embodiment, the payment information is transmitted to account servicing platform 130, where it may be stored in database 132. Further, the transaction information is forwarded to lender/merchant 120, where it may be stored in database 122. The funds may be transferred conveniently by the automated clearing house (ACH) system, or other means.
Any or all of these communications may pass through one or more networks 140 as schematically depicted in
With reference to
Further, in one embodiment a transaction identifier is captured from lender/merchant 120, to be used for the staged transaction. In another embodiment, account servicing platform 130 identifies or creates a transaction identifier for the transaction. Again, the transaction identifier may be a string of alpha-numeric characters, or may include additional information that will permit payment service provider 150 and/or account servicing platform 130 to identify the particular transaction.
The customer is directed to one or more payment service provider 150 locations. This may include locations where the customer directly interacts with payment service provider 150 or an agent thereof. Alternatively, the customer is directed to a third party location that facilitates payment collection through a POS device 160. In another embodiment, the customer is matched to a mobile POS device 160. This may occur, for example, by having the customer meet an operator of the mobile POS device 160 at a designated location, at the customer's residence or place of employment, or the like.
In some embodiments, the customer is required to tender payment in a designated period of time, after which the ability to consummate the transaction will expire. In one embodiment, the expiration time or other conditions are included in the information maintained or received by account servicing platform 130. For example, the lender/merchant may indicate to the customer that they have a certain number of minutes, hours, or days to tender payment to payment service provider 150, either directly or through POS device 160.
When the customer attempts payment to payment service provider 150, payment service provider 150 or the operator thereof pulls or receives the account record from account servicing platform 130. This may include reviewing the promise-to-pay record. The operator or payment service provider 150 validates all relevant data prior to proceeding to ensure that the record is complete. Account servicing platform 130 provides the payment service provider 150 with relevant data so that payment service provider 150 can associate the customer and their payment to the particular transaction or promise-to-pay record. (Block 230). In some embodiments, the data transferred to payment service provider 150 includes time limits for receipt of payment, the transaction identifier, any or all of the above noted customer information, notes or comments identifying key legal or operational elements, that may further include a requirement that the customer provide identification prior to submission of payment.
In one embodiment, the transmission of the customer information from lender/merchant control 120, the staging of a transaction by the lender/merchant, lender/merchant control 120 or account servicing platform 130, and the transmission of relevant data to payment service provider 150 occurs in a sufficiently short period of time such that the transaction record is available at payment service provider 150 when the customer attempts to tender payment. The data or promise-to-pay record transferred need not contain the same information from customer to customer. Further, the record transferred to account servicing platform 130 may differ from the record transferred to payment service provider 150, which in turn may be different than the record maintained by lender/merchant control 120. In one embodiment, the records transferred will have at least one common reference or piece of data (e.g., the transaction identifier, customer name, or the like) to ensure the customer payment is correctly matched to the appropriate promise to pay record.
The customer then tenders cash payment to payment service provider 150 directly, or via POS device 160 (Block 220). In one embodiment, the customer is permitted to use a debit card to tender payment. Other payment mechanisms also may be used within the scope of the present invention. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the processes of Block 220 and Block 230 may occur in a different order than shown in
Once the customer is successfully matched or associated to a particular transaction and payment service provider 150 has received payment, a notice that the payment has been received is sent back from payment service provider 150 to account servicing platform 130 and/or to lender/merchant control 120 (Block 240 and Block 340). The notification may include a wide range of detail, including, the customer name, transaction identifier, the time and date the payment was received, the form of payment, the amount of payment, and the like. In one embodiment, the lender/merchant may submit queries to payment service provider 150 or account servicing platform 130 so that the lender/merchant is made aware of whether a customer has attempted or made payment.
The lender/merchant also may be sent a non-effective payment notice. This may occur if, for example, the customer fails to attempt payment within the required time period, attempts payment with an incorrect payment amount, attempts to pay using a payment means not approved for the transaction, fails to provide proper identification, fails to provide the transaction identifier, and a wide range of other actions or inactions. In one embodiment, the non-effective payment notice comprises or consists of a request for further instructions. For example, if a customer attempts payment after the time period has expired, payment service provider 150 may transmit a request for instructions to the lender/merchant, to account service platform 130, and/or to lender/merchant control 120. The request sent by payment service provider 150 may inquire as to whether it should accept the late payment attempt as tendered, charge a late fee, or the like. The request may contain further information to identify the customer or transaction, such as customer information, a transaction identifier, or the like. Payment service provider 150 then may await a response to the request for instructions prior to accepting payment from the customer, prior to issuing a receipt to the customer, or the like. In one embodiment, a response is sent to payment service provider 150 by lender/merchant control 120 or by account service platform 130. The response may or may not be sent by the recipient of the request. The response may include an instruction specific to the request for instructions (e.g., accept the late payment), or general instructions. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that additional instruction requests, and corresponding responses, also fall within the scope of the present invention.
The invention has now been described in detail for purposes of clarity and understanding. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the examples described herein comprise a small subset of the possible uses of the methods in accordance with the present invention. It also will be appreciated that certain changes and modifications to the systems and methods of the present invention may be practiced within the scope of the appended claims. For example, a number of forms of system 100 may be implemented in accordance with the present invention. More particularly, system 100 can include any number of POS devices 160, account servicing platforms 130, payment service providers 150, and/or lender/merchant controls 120. Further, system 100 can be configured exclusively as an enrollment system as further detailed in U.S. application Ser. No. 10/444,111, previously incorporated herein by reference. System 100 also may operate exclusively as a payment system, or as some combination of payment and enrollment system. Further, the functions of the systems and methods of using such are merely exemplary. Accordingly, it should be recognized that many other systems, functions, methods, and combinations thereof are possible in accordance with the present invention. Thus, although the invention is described with reference to specific embodiments and figures thereof, the embodiments and figures are merely illustrative, and not limiting of the invention. Rather, the scope of the invention is to be determined solely by the appended claims.
Patent Citations
Non-Patent Citations
Referenced by
Legal Events
Original Image


text:
Weekend Baking Project: Bocaditos de Corn Flakes y Leche Condensada (Corn Flake Clusters)
President's Day Weekend comes on the tail of Valentine's Day and Mardi Gras, two days when we definitely indulged in the making and eating of sweets. That's why we want something low key for our long-weekend plane or bus ride, something irresistible to snack on that won't take too much time or effort to put together. Enter these Corn Flake Clusters. More

subset: commoncrawl


text:
I am most pleased to serve as the principal of St. Thomas School. After thirty-one years of teaching, moving into the principal's position has been quite a change. The staff has been supportive and patient with me as I begin this new phase of my professional life. I am most grateful for the kind words or support and prayers. My leadership style of one of collaboration. Together, we can do much more than by ourselves.
It is through clear communication and collaboration we can build a strong, vibrant school community.
Through the years, as a teacher at St. Thomas, I have witnessed the dedication of our staff, families and parish to the school. Many wonderful things have taken place because of the personal generous sharing by so many of time, talent and treasure. The interest and prayers have been most gratifying. It is my plan that we continue to build on our proud tradition and create new experiences for our students as we journey together. Our faculty participates in a variety of professional development experiences as they continue to refine their teaching skills. We strive for continuous improvement of our program.
The School Board, Parent Teacher Organization and Development Council provide strong support for the school.
Often, I meet parents of former students or the students themselves and they share with me how valuable their education at St. Thomas was to them. They speak of the faith experiences, values learned and the work ethic they developed. Our school is beginning its 38th year as
part of the long standing tradition of quality, faith based education in our community.
Our mission is to teach the Catholic faith. Our students range from Pre-K (age 4) to grade 6. We begin the school day as a community in prayer and by pledging allegiance to the flag. Our students are parish and non-parish.
They come from Sanford/Springvale and the surrounding communities.
St. Thomas is certified by the state of Maine. More so, it is accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges. Accreditation means that St. Thomas has met standards for a quality program in mission, academics, extra-curricular programs and a safe environment. We are dedicated to working in partnership with the
family to help each child reach his/her highest personal potential.
I invite you to come and visit St. Thomas School to learn more about what we can offer your child.
We want to help you find the best place for your child to grow.
What sort of education do you want for your child? What sort of future do you want?
It isn't easy to answer those questions, but the answers really matter. And the
school you choose can make a real difference.
We invite you to take some time to see what we believe in, see what we believe is
important, and visit our school.
"We are about to send our third child to St. Thomas and couldn't be happier with the school. We think of St.
Thomas as family where our children have friends in every grade, mostly due to the "Book Buddy" program.
Respect, the importance of education, a strong sense of community, and the presence of God in our lives are all promoted
throughout the school and in the classrooms. The experience and education our children gain, while attending St.
Thomas School, will always stay with them."
Julie K.
Saint Thomas School - 69 North Avenue, Sanford, ME 04073 - (207) 324-5832


text:
- New
- Kids Toys
- Kids Furniture
- Home & Garden
- Deals
My Account Customer Buzz Birthday Club Retailer Exclusives
Order by Phone 866-429-5200
For transportation stations sold from December 2008 through June 2010
Models: 790300, 7903TA
The light blue plastic wheels on the train cars can detach. The detached wheels could pose a choking hazard if a child puts one in his or her mouth. Affected train cars have light blue wheels. Train cars with grey wheels are not included in this recall.
Please inspect the train cars (see pictures to the left). If the train cars have light blue wheels, immediately stop using the toy train and destroy it.
Fill out the form below to receive a replacement toy train, or call Step2 toll free at (866) 860-1887 between 8 am and 5 pm EST Monday through Friday.


text:
Coach Bill O'Brien Press Conference
Big Ten Coach of the Year Bill O'Brien meets with the media to wrap-up 2012 and look toward 2013 season.
Penn State-Wisconsin Game Notes
Nittany Lions Host Senior Day on Saturday Versus Badgers
Coach O'Brien Media Day Transcript
Michigan @ Penn State
Michigan @ Penn State
Moving from safety to wide receiver during the 2013 season gave Jake Kiley the opportunity to bolster the depth at wide receiver. With two-time Big Ten Receiver-of-the-Year Allen Robinson and Brandon Felder moving on from the receiving corps, experience and finding playmakers will be key this season. Kiley is looking forward to using his skills, speed and instincts to challenge for playing time in the rotation this fall. Coached by his father, Edward, at New Hampton School in New Hampshire, Kiley was a strong contributor on the scout team defense in 2012 during his redshirt season before making the switch to the offense last fall. He is among the growing number of Nittany Lions from New England, joining D.J. Crook, Malik Golden and freshman Johnathan Thomas, all of whom have arrived on campus since 2012.
2013 (Sophomore Season)
2012 (Freshman Season)
High School


text:
You can continue watching this video later.
Just Create a profile and we'll remember where you stopped.
Don't show me this message again.
When the witness in a jewelry store robbery-homicide fails to appear in court, McCoy suspects foul play until he discovers that the man is a fugitive in a 20-year-old murder case.


text:
COON RAPIDS, Minn.--The Coon Rapids Potbelly Sandwich Shop hosts its seventh birthday party and the kick off of the Potbelly's toy drive to support Sharing and Caring Hands on Saturday, November 23. The party begins at 11:00 a.m. and goes through 2:00 p.m.
Potbelly's and Sharing and Caring Hands are teaming up for a toy drive taking place from now until Christmas. You can stop by any Potbelly store from now until Christmas and drop off a new toy.
If you come out to the Coon Rapid's Potbelly on November 23 you can enjoy live music, free birthday cake and the Potbelly Prize Wheel. If you bring a new toy you will be entered in a drawing for a $100 Potbelly's Gift Card.
(Copyright 2013 by KARE. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.)


text:
I mean GIMME A BREAK
I mean GIMME A BREAK
Question: if you were an executive or manager, would you shut the ride down until the eye is fixed or wait till the park closes to put the eyeball back in?
I'm not taking sides, but I would consider this bad show if it was like this for more than a day.
come on.. that thread is an informative joke.... think of it like the Maliboomer seen from tomorrowland thread.... except temporary... unless it goes for more than a day... Remember things can break...
Things can break alright but for those of us who visit WDW often enough, we can tell you that Splash Mountain is one of the rides with the most technical problems around. Broken props that go unfixed for days is almost the norm there. 3 out of 4 times I have ridden, Brer Rabbit does not hop at all in the hopping scene or he is missing from the set altogether. A few weeks ago, chewing gum sat uncleaned and stuck to the wall in the cave area of the queue for days, and I saw the same piece of chewing gum stuck to one of the sets two times I rode in 3 days...which I presume was the doings of prom night attendees, since the problem became very apparent during the Grad Nights week. Also dirty and mildewy looking and smelling log veihicles are the norm at WDW's Splash. Otownguy is only showing us one of the many problems we local APers see often on Spalsh Mountain.
Let's not make excuses for WDW's management lack of respect for the product's and show's quality. Things break, but they can also be fixed overnight, but that is obviously NOT happening.
Disneyland, June 97, June 01
WDW Aug 98 (Honeymoon), Aug 03, May 04, Aug 05, Dec 05, Mar 06, Dec 06, June 07, Dec 07.
DVC Member (AKV)
I personally saw and noticed that his eye was missing. I was LMAO. But yes, it is very bad show.
Other current problems in Splash Mt. :
-Jumping Fountains in Laughing Place still do not work.
-A fountain in Laughing Place has gone insane and now shoots at guests.
-The eye is missing. (as mentioned)
-The Brer Fox shadow in the upper tunnel is not active.
-Various water cannons outside are not working properly.
-A patch is showing in the riverboat scene.
-Some speakers are down.
-There is still some gum in the hallway.
-They re-routed everyone through the giftshop.
Any other problems you see? LOL
Splash Mountain is a pathetic joke when it comes to upkeep. Phil Holmes should be forced to clean those filthy logs himself ...
From what I was told, the eye was in place the day after the incident occurred.
I did get an email however saying that Country Bear Jamboree was in HORRIBLE shape (some of the fur was falling off of the bears) the other day.
This is getting pathetic.
You can sure blame Disney for malfunctioning audio-animatronics, but it´s not fair to say the chewing gum is Disneys fault. I mean VISITORS stick their gum on the ride, not the CM´s. You should not only complain about bad maintenance, but also about the attitude problem of many visitors!
- Milo
You know, it's a shame there hasn't been a management house cleaning like there was at Disneyland.
Disneyland, June 97, June 01
WDW Aug 98 (Honeymoon), Aug 03, May 04, Aug 05, Dec 05, Mar 06, Dec 06, June 07, Dec 07.
DVC Member (AKV)


text:
New York's Crisis-and Washington's
Only a few months ago—on July 1, precisely—New York's city government was able to announce that it had almost $1 billion in the bank after having paid off the last of its seasonal borrowings from the United States Treasury. This good news had been preceded by the passage, but not yet the implementation, of a new and more generous federal-aid bill which would ultimately guarantee long-term city bonds expected to encourage a total of $4.5 billion in new financing. Further, economic soothsayers, gazing into the murky depths of their statistics on employment and trade, were reporting signs of an upward turn in the ability of the city's people to produce wealth. Flushed with these happy auguries, President Carter journeyed to New York to sign the new federal-aid bill on the steps of City Hall, and to celebrate with Mayor Koch the end of the fiscal crisis.
For the occasion, a desk once used by George Washington was trundled out onto the steps. There, in front of Governor Carey and a goodly company, Koch and Carter, the heads of two governments very different in size but similar in their inability to balance their budgets, conducted their ceremony. It marked the triumph and culmination of an effort to persuade Congress to take the unprecedented step of guaranteeing a municipality's general obligations. And the two principals generously paid tribute to the ingenious and tireless people who had devised schemes enabling an all but bankrupt city to refund $5 billion in short-term notes without having to run for the sheltering arms of federal judges.
Ultimately the sun went down; the crowd dispersed; Washington's desk disappeared inside the building. The media people folded their notebooks and tripods. And yet if the celebration was over, the crisis whose end it had been called to mark most assuredly was not; and soon it was making its persistence known.
In September, the city comptroller was talking about difficulty in meeting the end-of-the-month payroll. Ultimately it was met in part from real-estate taxes, paid ahead of schedule by large real-estate owners who were given a substantial discount in compensation. More ominous, but less noticed, were signs that the city's budget balance for the year that began on July I was slipping rather badly. The four-year financial plan that the city had prepared to go with its federal-aid program acknowledged that each of its last three years would result in a deficit which it proposed to cover from a list of possible actions to be chosen later. But if the balanced budget for the first year were to go askew, all the subsequent deficits would become larger and harder to manage. The current slippage resulted from factors over which the city had little or no control: a reduction in the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) grants, through which the federal government had been paying for a number of municipal services throughout the country; the reluctance of Congress to renew its "contracyclical" assistance to cities in trouble, presaging a loss this year of about $105 million to New York; and a rise in the calculated cost of the 1978 labor settlement, so intricate and complex in its application that experts disagreed over the dollars involved.
These developments—unlike those related to bridging the embarrassing time gap between the city's need for cash and the arrival of tax money and other revenues—go to the heart of New York's problem. If New York cannot balance its budget, it will not be able to cover its debt payments; if it cannot cover them, the federal government will have to make good on the limited guarantees it has just authorized. But after that there will be no more special help for New York. This was a principle firmly emphasized by members of Congress during consideration of the aid bill, and just as firmly promised by the spokesmen for New York. Thus we come back to the question of whether New York can continue to sustain a government providing the services now provided, and if not, what the consequences will be.
To many serious observers, however, news of the budget slippage, though disconcerting, was by no means the last word on the city's vitality. They pointed out that municipal tax revenues, as well as expenses, depend on the state of the city's economy, and that for the first time in years New York's economy was beginning to breathe easier. These observers noted that in Manhattan, the city's crucial central business district, the renting of expensive space on the most desirable thoroughfares had picked up dramatically. Prices were far higher than would have seemed possible only two years ago. Strong demand had developed, too, for luxury housing in Manhattan. The purchase prices of cooperative apartments were soaring. Wealthy foreigners to whom, allegedly, New York's streets seem as safe as Disneyland's, swelled the ranks of would-be buyers. Another phalanx of invaders, armed with checkbooks and local bank credit, had come marching over the bridges from Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx.
In addition to all this, the optimists could point to a demand for housing which had stimulated the conversion of raggedy, largely unusable factory buildings in Manhattan's obscure industrial sections into useful and safe apartments, initially for artists, but now open to anyone who could pay. That city residents could find use for obsolete structures promised a solidification of New York's real-property tax base; that the city could retain within its borders households with the money to move elsewhere presaged well for its economy. So too with the phenomenon of young couples, primarily with professional backgrounds, investing in the purchase and rehabilitation of older one-family homes for their own use.
Other signs of economic revival: the State Labor Department reported 7,000 more payroll jobs in the city in June 1978 than there had been in June 1977, a gain of 2/10 of 1 per cent. (True, the city had been losing jobs for ten years at an annual rate of 2 per cent, ten times greater than the last year's rate of gain, but at least the loss had not grown.) In the same period, too, unemployment dipped from more than 9 to 8 per cent. Retail sales in the city increased by about $60 million between April and June of this year, outpacing the increase in the consumer price index. The Broadway season was spectacularly successful during the winter of 1977-78, a good sign for the city's tourism. Hotels were full, and more were being built or remodeled at great expense. Most encouraging of all, the Department of Social Services reported that in September 1978 the welfare rolls contained only 900,000 names, the lowest total in ten years.
These statistical indices of a healthier economy can be confirmed visually, particularly by those whose prospect of New York City is limited to central Manhattan, and especially its East Side. The midtown streets are jammed; plazas that abut new office buildings are thronged with young people at lunch time; they seem able—ingeniously or miraculously—to afford a share of Manhattan's sophisticated and expensive bounties, though in payment they lunch on hot dogs in the open air, weather permitting. And, at a glance, they represent, in fair proportion, all of New York's racial groups and sexes. On every hand, new restaurants are opening, new boutiques appear, and Rollses and Mercedeses are as numerous as bicycles.
Unfortunately, there are two major troubles with the happy picture. The first is that this good news, even if it were to continue, would be far too slow in producing income for the city government. The budget deficits for the next four years (including the one which started July 1, 1978) could not possibly be closed by a projection of these improving trends over the same period. A 5 percent decline in welfare would reduce the city's present $1 billion-a-year expenditure by only $50 million a year; not peanuts, surely, but not nearly enough to eliminate the estimated gaps, even if the drop could in confidence be expected to continue. New York's past concern with social values leads to the prediction that as the number of welfare recipients declines, the pressure to increase benefits for those remaining will grow. And the connection between the other improving trends and municipal revenues is even less close—indeed, much of the new construction to which the optimists point has been stimulated by immense local tax concessions.
The second major trouble with optimism on the basis of these observations is that they tend only to support the hope that a thriving headquarters / cultural-center / tourism / professional-service city is rising in the center of what is now New York. Perhaps it will continue to rise. But such a city will not be able to employ a population equivalent to those who once worked in New York's industrial areas and on its piers, docks, and freight railroads. The headquarters city—to shorten the prolix description—will of course require a small army of service workers who need not demonstrate office or professional skills. But it appears unlikely that the wealth produced by the headquarters industries could yield enough government revenue to support, with present services and benefits, the larger number of people now living in New York boundaries who will not be usable in headquarters jobs. Thus, for some years to come, the emerging headquarters city will have to be relieved of many of the present burdens of New York's past. Otherwise, the national government will have to assume the costs of carrying those burdens on an even greater scale than it already has.
Such, at least, are the arguments of those who are persuaded that just as the present population of New York exceeds its ability to create wealth, so the present upward trends in its economy cannot be matched to its need for funds.
Sanguine observers look to the heartening bustle of central Manhattan for visible support of their theory; so gloomier analysts look to other parts of Manhattan, and to the other boroughs, for confirmation of their pessimism. The Lower East Side of Manhattan, dotted now with burned-out and abandoned buildings, is far less crowded than it was fifty or a hundred years ago, but even shabbier. Its land, furthermore, is generally worth fewer dollars today (perhaps no more than one-quarter as many) than it was worth in the 1870's, when immigrants poured into the city. Conditions are hardly better in Harlem, many of whose middle-class citizens are now leaving, resettling in outlying single-family-home neighborhoods or in the suburbs. Large sections of the Bronx have been almost entirely burned out, though some families continue to hang on in even the most depressing-looking sections. Formerly prosperous neighborhoods like the Grand Concourse are, in fact, rotting from the inside out; rent control discouraged the owners of apartment houses from putting new capital in the buildings, and while the resulting low rents encouraged their tenants to stay on amid the deterioration, the time inevitably came when personal danger seemed more decisive than a modest rent.
Pessimists also find their attitude confirmed by what they see beneath the physical structures on the land. Below the Grand Concourse, for example, runs a subway line, built on the supposition that it would carry garment workers from their Bronx apartments to their Seventh Avenue jobs. The jobs have gone; as a result, the subway system as a whole has lost a million riders a day. Operating costs have soared. The city remains obligated to pay the interest on debts incurred in the course of buying or building the lines, maintaining them, and replacing their rolling stock. Although fewer trains are provided now on some subway lines because of the revenue crunch, any saving is lost in the morass of fixed charges.
Alongside the subway, sewer and water pipes represent a precious but wasting asset in which millions were originally invested: maintenance schedules have been stretched to the point of absurdity (a 199-year cycle for some pipe systems and the roads above them) because the city government chose to spend money on other projects that more immediately affect the lives of people in need. But in the long run, neglect of the city's physical plant—the roads and water-transportation systems, the bridges and subways—menaces human welfare just as certainly.
Making choices between "hard" assets—to strengthen and secure money that has already been spent on structures and "things"—and investment in "soft" assets—people, their comfort and training—is not easy. The city has opted for "soft" programs, but the debts incurred to build its "hard" structures remain to be paid. And the city's new financial plan must include large additional sums to keep these neglected hard structures from collapse.
Finally, the pessimist glimpses the city's immense staff, now protected in its tenure by civil-service law and union contract. Perhaps even more significant is the political protection of public resistance to service cuts, even while the same public decries waste and extravagance. A headquarters city with a smaller working population than that of the New York which had 600,000 more manufacturing jobs would surely be able to support only a smaller municipal staff. But it is very difficult to see how the force can be reduced below the present 300,000 level. Substantial cuts, amounting to about 60,000, have been made since the onset of the fiscal crisis, but further cuts have been opposed vigorously by the same labor unions whose pension-fund trustees must authorize loans to the city if the financial plan for the next four years is to be followed. The unions object less strenuously to a reduction by attrition, but their meekness on this subject is perhaps traceable to their belief that attrition cannot work. They reason—probably correctly—that since attrition depends on voluntary departure from the work force—people leaving city employment for their own reasons—some of these will inevitably have to be replaced to keep the rest going at reasonable efficiency.
So the city of New York, having persuaded the administration and Congress that it should be supported by the new loan guarantees, appears to face great problems in adjusting to the future. Even optimistic forecasts of the city's central business economy leave it short of putting its present population to work. Cutbacks in its physical facilities will not lighten the heavy burden of debt incurred in building them. Its maintenance programs require immense new investment. Its web of public services cannot be reduced without major changes in its way of life. Cutting its present employment levels will be extremely difficult.
To all of this, the optimists have a simple rebuttal: things were bad in the past as well and yet New York managed to thrive, and its response to the sudden crisis that hit it three years ago has shown that the city can thrive again.
There was, however, nothing really sudden about the onset of New York's fiscal crisis in 1975, nor anything truly mysterious about how the city thrived before. Up to 1930 it thrived because it provided limited services, using employees who were paid wages that were lower than the comparable standards in private employment. It survived the postwar decline in industrial activity, expansion of services, and higher wages for employees by concealing, even from itself, that its budget was never truly balanced.
It is possible to pore over the annual report issued by the comptroller of the city for each year since the end of World War II without learning until the 1974 report that the city's income had never covered its expenses. Each year's report, solemnly signed by the elected comptroller, and kept in full conformity with the laws, shows income and expenses to be almost precisely balanced. Fiscal authorities—including the present comptroller—who have studied the city's accounts since the crisis started, have now concluded that New York's cumulative deficit stood at $5.1 billion on June 30, 1975. The figure is in a sense arbitrary; its precision makes it appear that the examiners are all-wise in determining the difference between a capital investment and an operating cost, or can determine the real value of a mortgage—of which the city owns hundreds—covering the costs of constructing or rehabilitating an apartment house. In any case, using consistent rules, the accountants have decided that the city's deficit increased by another $3 billion between then and July 1, 1977.
In simple terms, New York got into trouble as Mr. Micawber said anyone might: it spent more than it earned. It thrived for years by borrowing the difference from the banks, the public, and the pension funds of its employees. In every one but three years between 1960 and 1975, its bonded debt was greater at the end of the year than at the beginning. After the world came to recognize the city's budgetary imbalance in 1975, it survived by borrowing still more. Uncounted in the chronicle of its deficits is about $3 billion which represents the money it, in a sense, has borrowed from the pension funds without their knowing if by paying in less money than it should to put those funds on an actuarially sound basis.
The next question, of course, is how, with a series of balanced budgets, the city could pile up a deficit of $8 billion (not counting the pension underfunding, but taking into account a two-year lag in even the present level of pension payments). There are two answers. The city (unintentionally) overestimated its income. It also underestimated its expenditures by calling them investments.
Overestimating income was easy. Each year's budget must be based on a projection of taxes the city expects to receive, but in the 1970's, unanticipated delinquencies in real-estate taxes rose sharply. Similarly, it was—and remains—easy for the city to overestimate the revenues it is entitled to receive from Albany and Washington. Only a relatively small part of the money contributed by the state and national governments to the city can be precisely determined in advance; the rest of the money is conditional on the performance of certain acts, or the accomplishment of certain qualifying payments by the city in support of the joint aims which the programs are intended to foster: public assistance, education, health care, manpower training—the list is very long. Frequently, the city in good faith believes it will qualify for intergovernmental payments which, later on, it finds disapproved by the governments involved. Or there is a dispute between the city and other governments over the meaning of a law. Or auditors going over the books refuse to accept the documentation of the city's expenditures.
The city also imprudently overestimated the proceeds of future bond sales. Once again, the basic notion of selling short-term notes to finance the construction of a building or a road is intelligent: it prevents the borrower from overselling long-term bonds to raise money for a capital investment which may, in the end, cost less than anticipated. These bond-anticipation notes were particularly attractive to city officials for use in the Mitchell-Lama middle-income housing program because, on top of everything else, they minimized the debt service which the tenants of such projects had to pay to the city. Many Mitchell-Lama projects were financed with bond-anticipation notes in the expectation that when the time was right, permanent long-term bonds would be sold and the proceeds used to repay the temporary financing. When the crisis came in 1975, and no one would buy city bonds, the city was stuck with nearly $1.4 billion in housing bond-anticipation notes, due within a few months, that could not possibly be replaced with city long-term bonds, or extended on any terms whatsoever.
The city's underestimating of its expenditures involves a more sophisticated and complex form of reasoning. In ordinary corporate accounting, a difference is drawn between operating expenses and capital investments. If an electric utility company buys coal, and burns it to create steam that generates electricity, it charges the cost of the coal actually burned in any year against the revenues it receives from its customers. If, however, in the same year it builds a power station, it charges against its income only the amount that its accountants believe (and the regulatory commissions accept) to be the depreciation of the plant's value due to its aging one year. Of course the purpose of making the investment in the plant is to increase the ability of the utility company to produce electricity for which its customers must pay.
The national government, in its basic accounting, does not make this same distinction between operating expenses and capital investments. If the navy buys an atomic-powered aircraft carrier, the cost is charged to the year or years in which the money is appropriated to pay for it. But big-city government, lacking the credit rating and the money-creating powers of the federal government, could scarcely afford to build any major capital improvements if it had to pay for them completely out of tax revenues in the years of their construction. New York State recognizes this in its constitution and permits cities to borrow for their capital expenses, paying the cost out over the long-term use of the improvement. New York City is allowed to borrow up to 10 per cent of the adjusted value of its real estate for capital improvements, and there are certain categories for which the city can borrow without limit—for example, sewage-treatment plants and self-liquidating projects in general.
This is not unreasonable but it overlooks two basic facts. First, the interest on the repayment of these bonds become annual expenses of the city government, but the improvements rarely contribute, as does a new power plant in the case of a utility, to the ability of the city to earn revenue. Indeed, most capital investments—like schools, parks, swimming pools—increase the municipality's operating costs because they require staff to run them. Second, as a city ages, its physical plant tends to deteriorate, just as an industrial plant does. But no political credit generally attaches to a city official for maintaining an old building well; his pay-off—in political kudos—comes from new construction with his name on the billboard in front of it. Thus, the capital-budget system, which sets forth how much the city can spend for major, long-term improvements, tends to be heavy on new structures, light on necessary reconstruction of existing facilities.
But since the capital budget merely limits the total indebtedness that can be outstanding, and does not precisely define what is considered a capital improvement, New York's mayors have found capitalizing expenses and taking them out of the expense budget an easy way to lower the apparent expenses of government during a specific fiscal year. Mayor Robert Wagner did this with operating expenses which were connected with capital structures—painting government buildings, for example. His successors expanded the practice until, in 1975, at least a billion dollars in operating costs were classified as one-time capital investments and removed from the annual budget. That budget, of course, already contained a provision for the debt service on all the earlier borrowings that paid for recurring operating expenses misclassified as capital investments.
Such a system of overestimating revenues and underestimating costs could go on, but not forever. Nothing the city did in the first two months of 1975 was grossly worse than what it had done previously, but the numbers were growing like weeds. In 1964 the city's temporary debt at year's end was only $316 million. At the end of fiscal 1975 it stood at $4.54 billion, a 1300 percent increase. Of course, inflation of incomes had increased the number of investors in the nation who wanted tax-exempt notes; New York was their biggest supplier. If the temper of the times had remained propitious, New York's refinancing of a steadily increasing load of temporary debt might have continued for years. But in 1974 interest rates reached unheard-of levels, recession was at hand, there was a temporary default on the notes of the New York State Urban Development Corporation, and when the city tried to sell some of its own notes in March, its own bond counsel refused to certify the accuracy of its accounting information. Nobody would buy the notes. With $4.5 billion in such notes due in the next twelve months or less, the city faced default and an inevitable bankruptcy, an eventuality for which no political leader had prepared the electorate.
Claiming that the city's general assets were adequate to pay the notes but were badly frozen, city officials called the crisis a "cash-flow" problem. All the principal participants in the crisis—city and state officials, bankers, union leaders, and the members of Congress—had a natural interest in propagating this narrow definition of the city's position. The bankers would not be asked why they had sold questionable obligations to their customers. Government officials would be spared the career-blighting ignominy of presiding over the bankruptcy of the nation's largest city, after having issued no warning of its imminence. For the labor leaders, defining the crisis as a cash-flow problem protected the wage levels of their members and defended them against catastrophic firings. Men of conscience, who by no means exclude the other categories, were terrified of a bankruptcy involving so large a government, one that provides health and welfare services, transportation, education, police and fire protection for a population of over 7 million, services which cannot be interrupted without immense risk, and for which bankruptcy procedures would be most difficult to work out.
The state government therefore had to find a way to segregate enough of New York's revenues to protect those who would lend it $4.5 billion in long-term money, with which the temporary notes could be paid off. It established the Municipal Assistance Corporation and ultimately assigned to it the city's sales and other business taxes. This stream of tax revenue was enough to support a large public borrowing while the city's employee pension funds were persuaded to buy both city bonds and the corporation's long-term securities. The state loaned the city $800 million, secured by a lien on the aid payments that it would make in the year following, and then made another loan against the security—far below face value—of the city's mortgages on its Mitchell-Lama housing projects.
By now it was perfectly clear that the financing would be needed not only to cover the maturing temporary notes, but the additional operating deficits which the city would inevitably run up until it could get its budget balanced. As we have noted, this came to an additional $3 billion. The state passed a law which permitted the city to phase out its capitalized operating expenses over a long period of years—these cash deficits would presumably be covered by selling the city's own paper when that became marketable. Mayor Koch had announced his plan to end this practice sooner. But the total of all these devices was too small to give the city the money it needed, and the federal government was then persuaded to make its two-and-a-half year arrangement for seasonal borrowings.
The sole purpose of all these ingenious arrangements—grossly simplified in this summary—was to permit the city to come to a time when it could maintain a balanced budget over the years. No one seems ready to admit that, from this perspective, the effort has failed. Even if it is possible to restore the balance of the current year's budget under the terms of state law, it remains at least $690 million in deficit under generally accepted accounting rules. Next year's budget is projected with a deficit under those same rules—and with the highly dubious assumption that the city's other than personal expenses will not go up, and that wages and salaries will be fixed at their present level—of $882 million ($472 million under state law).
Furthermore, Deputy Comptroller Sidney Schwartz has officially called attention to uncertainties in other city assumptions that, he says, may increase the gaps still further. At the end of September, he estimated the "possible" deficit for fiscal 1982—the final year of the federal aid program—as $1.2 billion, without taking into account a general wage increase for city workers whose contracts expire before then.
If one overlooks the comptroller's cautionary words, one can content oneself with the city's own guess of a $l-billion deficit in fiscal 1982, and search for ways in which it might be closed. The city forecasts a 4 percent attrition rate in its employees which, cumulatively after three years, would save $500 million in that year. A 4 percent attrition of the city's work force is about one-half of the natural rate of voluntary separations. It may not sound unreasonable to make do with such a loss each year, but the special circumstances of city government have to be considered.
The attrition of employees whose wages are paid partly or wholly by the state and federal governments does less good or no good at all, as the case may be. Large parts of the city work force—including the Department of Social Services (welfare)—fall into these categories. If a welfare caseworker quits his job, and is not replaced, the salary saved is offset by a corresponding drop in the aid payable by state or federal government or both. If the city pays one-quarter of the salary of a welfare caseworker, it must count on a 16 percent attrition rate in order to make a 4 percent payroll saving by attrition. Sixteen per cent is an unheard-of attrition rate; if it occurred, no department could function after three years.
If extraordinarily high rates were not achieved in welfare, then departments supported entirely by city tax levy or unrestricted government grants would have to allow their forces to be cut by more than 4 per cent to reach the target average rate. But the tax-supported departments are those concerned with public safety—fire, police, sanitation. They are protected in some cases by state law; and by the force of public fear.
As an alternative to attrition, the city could try to brave union wrath by cutting en bloc services which the city now provides. But which ones? Clearly not the public-safety services. Shall the blow fall then on departments of less generally accepted essentiality?
Thus, for example, the city might close down the housing-inspection agency, firing all the inspectors who mark clown violations of the housing laws. Unfortunately, this would offend the powerful constituencies of tenants and public-interest advocates who do not agree with a blanket condemnation of the inspection process. And similar constituencies spring up on behalf of every "soft" service: public libraries, the city university, day-care centers, old-age centers, manpower training. Largely supported by federal grants—sometimes categorically restricted, sometimes not—they are so small in their impact on a $1-billion deficit that a mayor who thinks of cutting them cannot really be blamed for quailing at the prospect of so much rage with so little saving.
If attrition or en bloc payroll cuts do not make it possible to balance the budget, a reduction in welfare benefits or a vast increase in federal assumption of welfare costs must be considered. The city's share of welfare costs cannot be cut because the much greater sums distributed by the federal and state governments would disappear. But there could be an assumption by the federal government of a larger share of the welfare load. Nothing would give New York City more temporary relief than this. Such a shift could be justified on the grounds that welfare is a problem of national economic and demographic trends, and that it is unfair for New York City to carry so heavy a load. Justification does not constitute political acceptance, however. The problems in the way of national welfare reform seem insuperable; welfare reform is opposed just as vigorously by those who claim it will do too little for the poor as by those who claim it will do too much.
We are left, then, with only one strategy that might bring New York's expenses into conformity with its present resources: a strategy of reductionism. New York City was laid out to serve a population of at least 7.8 million. Its total population may not much exceed 6 million today—a 25 percent reduction, greater than the reduction achieved in the city's work force, approximately 320,000 today, down from about 360,000 at its peak.
In the very nature of human settlement, it is easier to expand than contract, and no one should expect that the number of public servants can be reduced in direct proportion to the number of inhabitants. A city which refuses to reconstruct the neighborhoods its citizens have largely abandoned might be able to reduce the ratio of present employees and present citizens more effectivly than a city which refuses to recognize both the geographic and economic results of population loss. Unfortunately, President Carter's vow to rebuild housing in an abandoned section of the Bronx moves in the latter direction.
But even if the city concentrated its management efforts on reducing its manpower and purchase (electricity, for example) in depopulated sections, a major hole would remain in the bottom of its pocket; it is committed to paying interest and amortization on the money it borrowed to create the larger city of the past. The present city will be unable to continue the operations it requires today while paying for obligations it contracted during its years of growth.
If the budget cannot be balanced, the city will ultimately take refuge in bankruptcy no matter what promises are made to the contrary. A federal judge would then determine how the city should treat all the classes of people and institutions to which it owes money. The judge's job would be unprecedented. Public safety, public health, education, transportation in the city depend not only on the continuing service of the city's employees, but also on the supplies and services provided by thousands of independent vendors and contractors, all of whom would, in the event of bankruptcy, be terrified that they would never receive payment of their bills past and future. In order to keep the people of the city alive, a federal /?/ would surely give precedence to necessary da day functions, but the administrative complexity of achieving this goal would be staggering. Probably the judge would ultimately approve a plan for stretching out the debt-service payments on the city's obligations. Such a plan might also include scaled-down payments to unsecured creditors who had sold to and billed the city before the bankruptcy petition. The effect of their losses on the city's economy would be immense, as would a debt stretchout affecting the commercial banks which hold city obligations, the employee pension funds that have also purchased them, and the general investing public. Because more of these obligations are outstanding now than in 1975, the pains would be even more pervasive than they might have been then.
The city expects to pay more than $2 billion on its debts this year, a sum almost twice as large as the projected budget gap for the fiscal year beginning in 1981. If one-quarter of the debt service could be eliminated by interest reduction, long-term postponement, or outright cancellation, the budget gap would be reduced to $500 or $600 million, subject to the uncertainties listed by the deputy state comptroller for New York City. This much smaller gap might be closed with additional federal money and attrition of the work force at a practical rate. Obviously, such a proposal would be greeted with screams of anguish from the banks, the pension-fund trustees, and other holders of the city's obligations, for all of whom it would mean voluntarily settling for less than they were entitled to. Yet if they do not accept a settlement like this voluntarily, they may very well be forced to accept a similar one by a bankruptcy court. Indeed, if the whole fiscal crisis had not been misdiagnosed as a matter of cash flow, an accommodation of this kind might have been worked out three years ago. Possibly.
Several theories have attained wide circulation in the effort to explain what happened to the "richest city in the world." Jack Newfield and Paul Dubrul have ascribed New York's troubles to a cabal of bankers, real-estate interests, and politicians who, they say, conspired to sell bonds which they then rendered worthless and dumped on an unwitting public. It is surely correct to say that politicians and some real-estate people (in company with union members and many New Yorkers) urged development policies on the city which resulted in the issuance of bonds. It is also true that the bankers who were the major underwriters of the city's debt obligations made money selling these bonds, and purchased them long after they should have stopped. It is probably also true that they sold New York securities after they became suspicious of them. Yet it is hard to formulate a motive which would have impelled the banks to make the securities /?/ worthless, or how they (or the real-estate developers) benefitted from a financial crisis which they, in this theory, fomented.
Another theory is that New York is different from the rest of the country, less "American," and therefore more corrupt and dissolute. Its troubles, by this account, spring from gross malfeasance by the municipal government, graft on an immense scale, and huge programs intended to accomplish social goals which actually accomplished the enrichment of a few leaders at the very top of the government. Now, New York's government is indeed swollen, and supervision of the details of its operations from any central point is difficult, perhaps impossible. But the remedy often proposed—the decentralization of more of its operations—produces the even worse difficulty of finding local people able to execute programs faithfully without using them to feather their nests or promote their political ambitions or both. In any event, it has not been proved that a greater degree of corruption or incompetence accounts for New York's shakier position as compared with other of the nation's older cities.
The charge of differentness, or exoticism, carries with it a whiff of nativist prejudice. Yet the magnitude of New York's financial difficulties derives precisely from a widespread optimism about the American future which most Americans share; in this sense, New York is more rather than less American than the rest of the country. The difference is that in New York, optimism was not off-set by the restraining influences that affected most other local governments in the nation. Most New Yorkers, being tenants rather than home-owners like the majorities in every other large American city, did not fight real-estate tax increases. Moreover, the immense proliferation of New York's professional activities—the lawyering, doctoring, teaching, architecting—meant that a large part of its leadership was not so immediately in contact with payrolls and cost evaluation as the business people who provide leadership in other American cities. As for New York's business people themselves, they tended, as manufacturing activities in the city declined, to be at a high pinnacle of business life, the board room, where the subject is policies not payrolls.
In the expansive mood of the war's end in 1945, New York's political leadership responded to the visions of the greater postwar America that was expected to emerge as the altarpiece of the "American Century." In pre-war days a major issue before the city had been the municipalization of the subway system that had been built and owned by private interests. The city's purchase had taken years to effectuate, and was closely linked to the vital question of the 5-cent subway fare. In the greater vistas of the postwar world, city government gradually came to see that much bigger programs could be financed, and that when the state of New York was reluctant to undertake them, the city could. The city built up its own university system, greatly expanding the chain of four senior colleges that had existed before the war, and adding a community-college chain to it. It rebuilt and extended the municipal-hospital system. It built new schools to accommodate a population that was on the move. It perpetuated a wartime rent-control system, that, at the very least, tended to keep down the taxable value of its existing residential real estate, and then it provided tax exemptions to encourage the construction of new housing, adding its own mortgages, covering 90-95 per cent of cost, as a further incentive to private builders.
Bowing to state law, without serious protest, it undertook to pay one-quarter of the highest welfare stipends to which the federal government contributed anywhere in the United States, and half of the welfare assistance to employable people without other means of support, the Home Relief program, to which the federal government did not contribute. It took advantage of the federal government's low-rent housing program on a scale disproportionately larger than that of any other big city. Its urban-renewal program disavowed any intent to raise the taxable value of the land cleared of blight; social policies dedicated the land to low-rent and middle-income housing, and to cultural and educational institutions free of taxes. It spent its money on manpower-training programs when black unemployment became its most serious socioeconomic problem; it added 8,000 men to its police force to fight crime. It established day-care centers, paying all the bills when other governments did not contribute, and old-age centers, also supported with municipal funds.
This is not to say that these programs were successful; nor does it mean that they were undertaken entirely for reasons of social benefaction. Every bit of school construction was supported not only by the contractors, building trades-union members, and building-materials dealers, but also by the unions of teachers and supervisory personnel, and by parent, good-government, and neighborhood groups. All the programs undertaken by the city increased somebody's income; all represented the consensus of disparately motivated people essential to any but the most autocratic system of government.
The remarkable thing about the New York consensus was not that a majority supported it, but that in effect no minority effectively opposed it. To be sure, local groups opposed specific low-income housing projects which they considered threatening to their neighborhoods and their way of life. Fringe right-wing groups, by no means supported by business leadership in the city, cautioned about taxes, but no one consistently asked how the city government would discharge the debts incurred in bringing these noble schemes to fruition. If borrowing to build hospitals, schools, or colleges fell within the constitutional debt limit of the city, all discussion of the wisdom of such proposals ended before it began. If the debt limit did not permit a proposal, the discussion did not end: a way would be sought to stretch the limit or set up a class of projects outside it. The most useful purpose of the debt limit was to give the mayor, whoever he might be, an opportunity to avoid building a proposal to which he had objections.
Every year the mayor of New York City delivers a message to the city council setting forth his budget for the following fiscal year. During practically the entire thirty years between 1945 and 1975, mayors talked about the difficulty of providing the money to do all the things the city wanted or had to do; but no word appears in any of the budget messages to suggest that municipal government's income depends not only on the imposition of taxes, but also on the production of wealth sufficient to pay the taxes. The final security for the bills New York was running up in the pursuit of its goals—the city's continued ability to produce wealth—was taken for granted.
The inescapable fact is that New York's policies—based on the theory that the richest can afford anything—coincided precisely with the policies of the national government as both came to a climax in the Lyndon Johnson years. The richest nation in the world could simultaneously engage the North Vietnamese in war, rally its allies in Europe, send economic assistance to the Third World, build a "Great Society," redress the wrongs inflicted on black Americans for over three hundred years, improve the quality of life, rescue the physical environment from desecration, rebuild the cities, and enrich the humanities. If those were the major American imperatives in the 1960's, then it must be said that New York's policies in its own spheres were essentially American in their matching hubris.
Today, both governments are paying the price of their inability to admit that the limit on their capacities to spend is set by their capacities to produce; both have neglected the fundamental priority of their own economic health and productivity. In precisely the same way that foreign interests have proclaimed their doubts of the nation's political wisdom by fleeing from its currency, so have interests outside New York City fled from its obligations. Thus, the problem is not so much whether the federal government will "save" New York City from its continuing crisis as whether the example of New York City will save the federal government from a similar crisis of its own.


text:
It's attracting an incredible amount of attention, even from people who have never heard of Guild Wars before. While we may laugh at funny mistakes made by those who are unfamiliar with the world of Tyria, it's exciting that these people who passed over the original game are interested in this one. The more people become interested, the better it is for all of us.
But what's generating all this attention? What is ArenaNet doing that's so groundbreaking? Any fan of Guild Wars 2 could easily give you 20 reasons why the game is turning out to be so great, but almost all of them will focus on two things: the developers are intensely focused on making this game for the fans, and they don't show anything unless it's polished to a high gloss.
Fan involvement
"I stood in line for two hours on Saturday to play the game. Every demo station had two computers side by side and one ArenaNet employee. So the whole time you were waiting in line to play there was a developer you could talk about the game with. It was crazy. I am just some random guy and I got at least 40 minutes of face time with a Guild Wars 2 dev. And if that was not cool enough, once I was done talking with them I still got to play the game for 40 minutes."
This reader comment summed up the PAX experience so well that I had to borrow it. I also heard a few comments from people who were of the opinion that the mass of developers would be better off back in the studio working on the game. What I don't think those people understand is that the developers at PAX were working on the game.
Those developers weren't just hanging out chatting because they didn't feel like going to work that day; they were essentially collecting data. Granted, all of those employees probably enjoyed themselves immensely -- can you imagine the fun of finally being able to show off this project you've had under wraps for so long? However, talking one on one with the players as they waited in line and played Guild Wars 2 is the best source of player feedback that a team could hope for. I don't know how many people went through those lines in those three days, but I know it was a pretty big number, and I imagine every single one of them had something to say to a developer.
Think of it like a closed beta test in which you get to give your report face-to-face. What a valuable resource for ArenaNet!
The company took things a big step further with the Designing Dynamic Events panel. The panel not only was a ton of fun for attendees and developers alike, but brought a really personal touch to the game. As you might recall, ArenaNet did something very similar almost a year ago for heart transplant patient Emily. The devs seem to be saying, "This is your game. Tell us and show us what you want," and if it keeps working as well as it has until now, ArenaNet is going to have something pretty spectacular on its hands at launch time.
You might be sick of hearing that phrase, but you have to admit that it seems to be working well so far. I've seen so many people clamoring for new information on a regular and frequent basis, threatening to lose interest if the developers don't get a move on, but ArenaNet's not working like that.
We're so used to the status quo of game development: We see games earlier and earlier these days, all the way from their alpha stages. We start playing and testing them when they're broken, buggy, and completely unplayable in some cases. We weather the crashes, the quests that can't be completed, and all the frustrating things that come with a game that's not ready.
ArenaNet seems to have completely broken out of that mold, and if past experience is any indicator, you're not going to see any part of the game until it's launch-ready, so to speak. If you played the demo in Cologne or Seattle, you know that what the team has shown us is completely polished and ready to go. I may be well off the mark here -- I certainly don't know what the devs are plotting in those offices -- but the demo was nearly flawless in every aspect: combat, animation, events, and graphics. I had nearly two hours of hands-on time and watched at least two hours more from the sidelines, and I saw exactly one issue. In my home instance, an exterior plant was clipping through a wall into an interior room.
How many MMOs can boast that level of completion when they've not even reached the stage at which they're discussing beta testing? I know that there are many parts of Guild Wars 2 that we've not seen yet that still need to be developed, and I understand the frustration of waiting through the silence. This time a year ago I was pretty frustrated and negative myself, half-convinced that ArenaNet was shooting itself in the foot by being so coy and silent.
I think I get it now. The developers are breaking the mold of the public side of the development cycle, and they're not willing to present their fans something broken and half-baked. We deserve better, and we're getting it.
"When it's ready" is the motto for every step of development, and when you see something from Anet, you can be assured that you're seeing an honest-to-goodness finished product, rather than something that may or may not be in the game and only works part of the time.
It's an unusual approach that requires patience on our part, and some of us (me) have had a harder time learning that than others, but now that the demo is out there I think you'll all agree it's a lesson well-learned in this case.
I can't wait to see the next thing that's ready.


text:
Cyber Monday is the first Monday after 'Black Friday'. Historically 'Black Friday', the Friday after Thanksgiving, is one of the top-3 shopping days of the year. This is because retail stores offers outstanding doorbuster deals on this day. Fortunately for shoppers who don't find what they want on Black Friday, retailers have turned it into a weekend long event finishing off with hot online sales on the following Monday, which has become known as Cyber Monday.
Black Friday is traditionally the day when basically all retailers see profits for the year. In part this is because the traditional first quarter for companies begins in August or September. Because of this, Christmas season sales typically offset annual expenses and result in profits. Black Friday and Cyber Monday have become one of the biggest Christmas shopping days and these sales put companies 'in the black' which means profitable months and quarters. The term Cyber Monday was coined after the 2004 holiday shopping season. On the heels of weaker than normal Black Friday sales, shoppers seemed to take advantage of high-speed Internet connections at work and place orders for items they could not find at a price they liked in stores.
Since 2005 this term, Cyber Monday has referred to the Monday immediately following Black Friday. This has not consistently been as large a sales day for online retailers as Black Friday has been for brick and mortar stores, however online stores have made use of the date to introduce numerous sales the same way traditional retailers have on Black Friday and so Cyber Monday continues to gain in popularity.
The Black Friday/ Cyber Monday shopping season has been proven to so successful for both online and offline retailers that its changed the dynamics of the whole Christmas gifts shopping season. While high volume Internet sales days have varied between early and late December, November is definitely a month more and more companies are paying attention to.
Regardless of what day or month online shoppers conduct the most sales on/in, one thing is clear, Cyber Monday is here to stay for some time, which translate to more great deals and sales for everyone!