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Monday, July 6, 2015
Judge Posner Explains Why Contraception Mandate Accommodation Doesn't Violate RFRA (Again)
Judge Posner explained (yet again) last week why HHS's contraception mandate under the Affordable Care Act doesn't violate religious freedom, in particular, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. His previous explanation in the Notre Dame case is perhaps the best statement why the accommodation to the mandate doesn't violate religious freedom; his ruling in the continuing, and up-and-down, Wheaton College case is next best.
Wheaton College, a nondenominational evangelical college in Wheaton, Illinois, challenged HHS's accommodation to its requirement that colleges provide contraception as part of their health-insurance policies. Wheaton College doesn't object to all the contraception required under the mandate, only those that it considers abortifacients.Still, the College apparently wasn't satisfied with the Supreme Court's instruction to simply inform the government of its objections (at which point the government would tell the insurers to provide the contraception to Wheaton students and employees free of charge, reimbursed by the government)--a religious accommodation. The College argued that this accommodation itself meant that the government would take over its insurance plan, interfere with its contractual relationship with its insurer, and force it to be complicit in its insurer's provision of contraception. The College sought a preliminary injunction. But the Seventh Circuit rejected the motion.
Judge Posner explained why the accommodation (the requirement to tell the government of its religious objections to contraception) didn't violate RFRA:
Wheaton's antipathy is to having any contractual relations with insurers who provide emergency contraception to members of the Wheaton College community. Because they are "its" insurers, someone not in the know might think it "complicit" in the insurers' provision of a type of coverage that offends Wheaton's religious views. But where's the complicity?
In any event, termination of the [insurance] contracts would give Wheaton only temporary relief, since the government would notify any new insurers hired by Wheaton of their legal obligation to provide emergency-contraceptive coverage.
In short: It's the government, not Wheaton College, that mandates contraception coverage; and the accommodation only requires Wheaton to inform the government of its objection. How can you get an accommodation if you can't inform the government of your objection?
July 6, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Free Exercise Clause, News, Opinion Analysis, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)
Rule of Law Rankings Put U.S. at 19
The World Justice Institute recently issued its Rule of Law Index for 2015. We posted on last year's Index here.
The Index ranks 102 countries on various measures related to rule of law, around these four "universal principles":
1. The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under the law.
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.
4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.
The U.S. ranked 19 overall (out of 102), 19 out of 31 in our income class, and 13 out of 24 in the Americas. Low points include "no discrimination" in the criminal justice system and accessibility and affordability in the civil justice system. High points include lack of corruption and effective checks on the judiciary.
July 6, 2015 in Courts and Judging, News | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, July 2, 2015
Obergefell, Federalism, and Religion: Constitutional Issues Raised in Alabama and Texas
After the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges on June 26 declaring that states are required by the Fourteenth Amendment to issue same-sex marriage licenses, a few state officials have not only voiced objections to the decision, but have voiced resistance to complying with the Court's declaration.
The situations in Alabama and Texas have been the most contentious.
ALABAMA: Recall that earlier this year when federal District Judge Callie V.S. Granade entered an injunction against the enforcement of the state's constitutional amendment and statutes banning same-sex marriage, the reaction of Alabama Supreme Court's controversial Chief Judge Roy Moore was an unusual letter to the Governor objecting to the federal judge's opinion on the basis that federal courts have no power in this Biblical area. This was followed by an opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court ordering judges not to issue same-sex marriage licenses. The Eleventh Circuit, and then the United States Supreme Court denied a stay of the district judge's opinion.
When the Court took certiorari in Obergefell, however, Judge Granade stayed her order.
However, after the Court decided Obergefell, the Alabama Supreme Court's "corrected order" stated that because the US Supreme Court rules allow parties 25 days to file a petition for rehearing, the parties in the case - - - including two conservative Alabama organizations - - - were invited to submit briefs on the effect of Obergefell. Federal District Judge Callie Granade issued a one-page Order on July 1, referenced her earlier stay and then stated:
The United States Supreme Court issued its ruling on June 26, 2015. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ____ (2015). Accordingly, by the language set forth in the [previous] order, the preliminary injunction is now in effect and binding on all members of the Defendant Class.
Thus, the officials of Alabama are subject to a direct order by a federal judge.
TEXAS: The Attorney General of Texas, Ken Paxton, who is reportedly facing criminal charges on unrelated matters, issued a six page opinion letter a few days after Obergefell which stressed the individual religious rights of county clerks and their employees, as well as justices of the peace and clergy, regarding their participation in same-sex marriages. Paxton's opinion was widely reported and concluded that county clerks retain religious freedoms that "may allow" accommodations depending "on the particular facts of each case." Paxton relied on the First Amendment as well as Texas's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), essentially similar to the federal RFRA at issue in the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. This is not unique: the possibility of claims by individual public employees in clerk's offices was also raised after New York passed its Marriage Equality Act in 2011 and as that act made clear - - - as is generally understood - - - that religious officers have complete discretion in agreeing or refusing to solemnize marriages.
The Fifth Circuit issued a very brief opinion on July 1, noting that "both sides now agree" that the the injunction appealed from, originally issued in early 2014 by federal district judge Orlando Garcia in DeLeon v. Perry [now Abbott], "is correct in light of Obergefell," the Fifth Circuit ruled that the preliminary injunction is affirmed.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion makes clear - - - seemingly with state agreement - - - that Texas is bound by Obergefell, but does not mention individual religious accommodations.
In both the Alabama and Texas situations, there are echoes of resistance to the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education; The Supremacy Clause and the Court's opinion in Cooper v. Aaron seem to answer the question of whether state officials simply may disagree with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. This is true despite the dissenting opinions in Obergefell itself which argued that the Court should leave the resolution of same-sex marriage to individual states. The question of religious accommodations may be a closer one, but what seems clear is that if there is indeed an individual right to be accommodated - - - again, that itself is unclear - - - it cannot be a right of a government entity. While Hobby Lobby may have held that corporations have religious freedoms, it is hard to conceive of government entities having free exercise rights in a manner that does not violate the Establishment Clause.
July 2, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, News, Recent Cases, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Religion, Sexual Orientation, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, July 1, 2015
Anti-Masking Laws, the Ku Klux Klan, and the First Amendment
Reports that Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members are considering a rally in Columbia, South Carolina to support the controversial display of the confederate battle flag evokes images of hooded persons in traditional KKK garb.
However, South Carolina, like many states, has an anti-masking statute, S.C. 16-7-110, which provides:
No person over sixteen years of age shall appear or enter upon any lane, walk, alley, street, road, public way or highway of this State or upon the public property of the State or of any municipality or county in this State while wearing a mask or other device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such person demand entrance or admission to or enter upon the premises or into the enclosure or house of any other person while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such person, while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity, participate in any meeting or demonstration upon the private property of another unless he shall have first obtained the written permission of the owner and the occupant of such property.
As I've discussed in Dressing Constitutionally, such statutes, sometimes known as anti-KKK statutes, have been upheld against First Amendment challenges.
For example, the similar Georgia statute, passed in 1951 and still in force, makes it a misdemeanor for any person who "wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer" and is either on public property or private property without permission. In 1990, the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 674, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (1990) upheld the statute against a First Amendment challenge by Shade Miller, who was arrested for appearing in KKK regalia alone near the courthouse in Gwinnet County, purportedly to protest the anti-mask statute itself. In addressing Miller's argument that the statute was overbroad, the court interpreted the statute narrowly, but not so narrowly as to exclude the KKK. Instead, the court required the mask-wearer to have intent to conceal his identity and further that the statute would "apply only to mask-wearing conduct when the mask-wearer knows or reasonably should know that the conduct provokes a reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats or violence."
New York's anti-masking statute, which was not originally prompted by KKK activities but by land revolts before the Civil War, was also upheld against a challenge by the KKK. In 2004, the Second Circuit panel - - - including now United States Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor - - -decided Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004). The KKK group had sought an injunction against the statute to allow a demonstration while wearing masks. Rejecting the First Amendment claim, the court agreed that the KKK regalia - - - the robe, hood, and mask - - - met the threshold requirement for expressive speech, but nevertheless separated the mask in its analysis. In the court's view, the mask was "redundant" and did "not convey a message independently of the robe and hood." Moreover, the court opined that mask-wearing was not integral to the expression, but optional even amongst KKK members. Thus, while the KKK members had a First Amendment right to march, they did not have a First Amendment right to do so wearing their masks.
Should KKK members attempt to demonstrate while wearing their "regalia" that includes hoods that obscures their faces, the South Carolina masking statute - - - and its constitutionality - - - are sure to be in play.
July 1, 2015 in Association, Criminal Procedure, Current Affairs, Federalism, First Amendment, Fundamental Rights, History, Interpretation, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Speech, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, June 30, 2015
Oklahoma Supreme Court Declares Ten Commandments Monument at State Capitol Unconstitutional Under State Constitution
In a relatively brief opinion today in Prescott v. Oklahoma Capitol Preservation Commission, Oklahoma's highest court found that a Ten Commandments monument on the Oklahoma Capitol grounds violated the state constitution, Article 2, Section 5, which provides:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.
While the monument was a gift and no public funds were expended to acquire the monument, the court agreed that its placement on the Capitol grounds constituted the use of public property for the benefit of religion, emphasizing that the constitutional provision included the words "directly or indirectly."
The court noted that the Legislature and Governor authorized the monument relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision Van Orden v. Perry (2005), but noted that Van Orden was decided under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted the broader and more precise language of the Oklahoma state constitution. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion contained the requisite language insulating it from United States Supreme Court review under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine so important to federalism:
"Our opinion rests solely on the Oklahoma Constitution with no regard for federal jurisprudence. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)."
Two justices dissented, without opinion.
June 30, 2015 in Establishment Clause, Federalism, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Religion, State Constitutional Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Court Puts Union Fair Share on the Chopping Block
The Supreme Court today agreed to hear Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Association, and certified the first question as "Should Abood be overruled?" The case is just the latest foray into the First Amendment challenges to union fair share dues requirements. The Court has been chipping away at this in its last few rulings. This case will likely mean the end of union fair share requirements under the First Amendment.
We've posted a lot on this issue (search the blog for "Abood"), most recently here.
June 30, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News | Permalink | Comments (0)
Daily Read: Corey Robin on Dignity (and Whitney Houston)
Over at his eponymous blog, CUNY-Brooklyn Political Science professor Corey Robin has an interesting take on the controversial passage from Justice Thomas's dissent in Obergefell criticizing the "dignity" rationale of Kennedy's opinion for the Court by stating in part that slaves" did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved. "
Robins's post, "From Whitney Houston to Obergefell: Clarence Thomas on Human Dignity," is worth a read, and even worth a listen if you are so inclined.
June 30, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Fundamental Rights, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Thirteenth Amendment, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, June 29, 2015
Court Hands Victory to the People in Redistricting
The Supreme Court ruled in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission that federal law and the Elections Clause permit the people of Arizona to create, by referendum, an independent redistricting commission and vest it with authority to redraw congressional districts.
Arizona voters designed the Commission to take redistricting authority away from the state legislature and put it in the hands of an independent authority. In validating the Commission, the Court handed a significant victory to the voters--the People themselves--as against the state legislature and its partisan gerrymandering. The ruling means that Arizona's independent commission stays in place and can continue its work redrawing congressional districts.
Here's our oral argument review.
The key dispute between the majority and dissent is how to cast the exercise of redistricting power through referendum: the majority says that the people themselves hold government power, and therefore hold "legislative" power under the Elections Clause to create an independent redistricting commission; the dissent says that only the legislature holds redistricting power under the Elections Clause.
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. She wrote that 2 U.S.C. Sec. 2a(c)--which provides that "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment," it must follow federally prescribed redistricting procedures--permits redistricting by an independent commission created by voter referendum. She also wrote that the Elections Clause permits this. "The history and purpose of the Clause weigh heavily against [preclusion of the right of the people to create an independent redistricting commission], as does the animating principle of our Constitution that the people themselves are the originating source of all the powers of government."
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. He wrote that the text, structure, and history of the Elections Clause say that only "the legislature" can prescribe "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives."
Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote their own dissents, each joined by the other.
June 29, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Elections and Voting, Federalism, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (1)
Court Rejects Challenge to OK Lethal Injection
The Supreme Court in Glossip v. Gross rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to Oklahoma's three-drug lethal injection cocktail. The ruling deals a blow to opponents of the death penalty and leaves in place a protocol that's resulted in a spate of gruesome and botched executions. It also means that the plaintiffs' executions will move forward under Oklahoma's protocol.
The case was important, because victory for the challengers would have left states with few, if any, viable and sustainable options for administering lethal injection--and may have marked the de facto beginning of the end of the death penalty. (That's why some states have explored other methods of execution recently.) But there was no victory for the challengers, so the ruling allows states to move forward with a popular, but deeply flawed, cocktail.
If the past is any indicator, opponents of the death penalty will now work outside the courts to get suppliers of Oklahoma's new drug to stop providing it to states that use it for lethal injections--the same strategy they used to force Oklahoma to turn to a new protocol in the first place. And if the past is any indicator, they'll be successful, which might, in turn, lead to the next protocol and the next challenge.
We posted on the oral arguments here.
Challengers argued that Oklahoma's use of the sedative midazolam as the first drug did not reliably induce and maintain a deep, coma-like unconsciousness that would render a person insensate to the excruciating pain caused by the second and third drugs (which paralyze and cause cardiac arrest, respectively). Oklahoma turned to midazolam after suppliers for the state's previous first drugs dried up.
Justice Alito wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Alito wrote that the challengers didn't show that the state's use of midazolam created a demonstrated risk of severe pain, substantial compared to alternatives, and that they didn't identify a viable alternative. Justice Alito credited the district court's factual findings as to midazolam's ability to stop pain, and wrote that the district court didn't clearly err in finding that alternative drugs (the state's old drugs) were unavailable.
Justice Sotomayor wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. She argued that the district court erred in crediting the state's expert and in putting the burden on the challengers to identify a viable alternative to the state's use of midazolam.
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg, and argued that the Court should entirely reevaluate the constitutionality of the death penalty. Justices Scalia and Thomas each wrote concurrences addressing Justice Breyer's points.
June 29, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (1)
Court Grants Certiorari in Fisher v. UT Austin (Redux)
The Court has granted certiorari in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, which means the affirmative action in university admissions will be making its second trip to the United States Supreme Court. Justice Kagan is recused.
Recall that in June 2013, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's finding in favor of the University (affirming the district judge). The Court remanded the case for a "further judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation." The opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy - - - with only Justice Ginsburg dissenting and Justice Kagan recused - - -specified that the "University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal" of diversity and the University should receive no judicial deference on that point.
On remand, recall that by a divided opinion, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the university met its burden of demonstrating the narrowing tailoring necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's grant of certiorari might mean that the Court - - - or at least 4 of its members - - - disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's application of narrowly tailored. Justice Kagan's recusal could be an important factor in any decision.
Fisher graduated from another university in 2012, but the courts have rejected arguments regarding mootness.
June 29, 2015 in Affirmative Action, Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Federalism, Race, Recent Cases, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, June 26, 2015
Court Decides Fourteenth Amendment Requires States to License Same-Sex Marriage
In a closely-divided opinion, with the majority written by Justice Kennedy, the Court has decided that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license same-sex marriages in Obergefell v. Hodges. The opinion rests on both due process and equal protection grounds. The majority opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan - - - there are no concurring opinions - - - is less than 30 pages, plus 2 appendices including the citations of same-sex marriage opinions. Each of the four dissenting Justices - - - Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito - - - wrote a separate dissenting opinion, with some joinders by other Justices.
The decision that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license same-sex marriages renders the second certified question regarding recognition irrelevant, as the discussion during oral arguments made clear.
Recall that the consolidated cases of Obergefell v. Hodges on certiorari from the Sixth Circuit opinion which had created a split in the circuits on the issue of the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. There have been a record number of amicus briefs filed in the cases highlighting the interest in the case.
[image Donkey Hotey]
On the due process issue, Kennedy's opinion for the Court concludes that the right to marry is fundamental because:
- the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy, relying on Loving and Lawrence;
- it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals, relying on Grsiwold, Rurner v. Safely, and Lawrence;
- to safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education, relying on Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Windsor;
- Court's cases and the Nation's traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation's social order, relying on Maynard v. Hill (1888).
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same- sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.
June 26, 2015 in Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1)
Thursday, June 25, 2015
Court Rebuffs Attack on Obamacare Subsidies
The Supreme Court ruled today that the Affordable Care Act means exactly what Congress thought it meant in the first place: everybody should get--and be able to get--health insurance.
The Court ruled in King v. Burwell that the ACA authorizes federal tax subsidies for qualified purchasers of health insurance on federally-subsidized exchanges. The ruling means that qualified purchasers will continue to receive federal tax subsidies for their health insurance, that they won't go without insurance (at least not for a lack of subsidies), and that Obamacare remains intact.
Opponents attacked the subsidies, arguing that the ACA authorized subsidies only for purchasers on state exchanges, not federally-facilitated exchanges, and that the IRS had to stop extending subsidies to purchasers on federally-facilitated exchanges. Their argument turned on a single phrase in the Act, that subsidies extend to "an Exchange established by the State," despite the overwhelming evidence that the Act, as a whole, was designed to provide universal coverage. Our oral argument preview is here.
The Court today rejected the opponents' arguments. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He wrote that the phrase "an Exchange established by the State" was ambiguous, given the way the rest of the Act hung together, and that the Court therefore should give the phrase a reading that harmonizes with the rest of the Act, including the Act's clear purpose to provide universal coverage. That reading, he wrote, meant that tax subsidies extend to purchasers on both state-created and federally-facilitated exchanges.
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion is notable for its recognition of the several key components of Obamacare (guaranteed issue, community rating, individual mandate, and tax subsidies) and how they are designed to operate together to ensure universal (or close to universal) coverage. The majority opinion also discussed in some detail how these components evolved and ended up in the ACA and the health-care and health-insurance problems they were designed to solve (including the death spiral).
But Chief Justice Roberts also took the opportunity make a dig on process--how the legislative road to the ACA was hurried and lacked transparency.
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. The dissent was predictably colorful, but comes down to this:
The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says "Exchange established by the State" it means "Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government." This is of course quite absurd, and the Court's 21 pages of explanation make it no less so.
June 25, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Executive Authority, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers | Permalink | Comments (1)
The Constitutional Concerns in the Supreme Court's Fair Housing Act Case
The Court's closely divided opinion in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., centers on the issue of whether the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. §3601 et seq., authorizes disparate impact (as distinguished from disparate treatment) claims. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy held that it does. Kennedy's statutory construction largely rests on interpretations of two precursor discriminatory statutes: Title VII (regarding employment) and the ADEA (prohibiting age discrimination). It also rests on Congress's 1988 amendments to the FHA which seemingly ratified the availability of disparate-impact liability.
Dissenting, Justice Thomas argued that the recognition of disparate-impact in Title VII by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power (1971), was incorrect then and that error should not be repeated. In the primary dissent, by Justice Alito, and joined by Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts, the Court's opinion in Griggs is less disparaged. Instead, Alito argues that Griggs does not support the disparate impact interpretation of FHA, and that nothing in the FHA itself supports such an interpretation. Moreover, the dissent argues that disparate impact liability will have "unfortunate consequences" of increasing liability, echoing the dissent's graphic opening "No one wants to live in a rat's nest."
While a statutory interpretation question, Kennedy's opinion for the Court contains two important constitutional law matters.
First, the Court states that disparate-impact liability "has always been properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity." Statistics are insufficient because there may be valid interests being served by the housing developers "analogous to the business necessity standard under Title VII" and thus "a defense against disparate-impact liability." Additionally, there must be a "robust causality requirement": "racial imbalance" without a specific link to the defendant's policy or policies causing the disparity cannot be sufficient. These "safeguards" are necessary lest FHA enforcement "set our Nation back in its quest to reduce the salience of race in our social and economic system."
Second, should a court find a disparate-impact violation of FHA, the remedies a court can order must be constitutional:
Remedial orders in disparate-impact cases should concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice that "arbitrar[ily] . . . operate[s] invidiously to discriminate on the basis of rac[e]." Ibid. If additional measures are adopted, courts should strive to design them to eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral means. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he city has at its disposal a whole array of race- neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races"). Remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise more difficult constitutional questions.
While the automatic or pervasive injection of race into public and private transactions covered by the FHA has special dangers, it is also true that race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion. Cf. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 789 (2007) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; [and] drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods"). Just as this Court has not "question[ed] an employer's affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the [promotion] process," Ricci, 557 U. S., at 585, it likewise does not impugn housing authorities' race-neutral efforts to encourage revitalization of communities that have long suffered the harsh consequences of segregated housing patterns. When setting their larger goals, local housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools, and mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at the outset.
[ellipses in original].
Thus, Kennedy for the Court reiterates the so-called "affirmative action" cases that would be used to measure any remedies ordered for a finding of racial discrimination. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, who joined Kennedy's opinion here, might not subscribe entirely to those views given their other opinions on race and equal protection.
[image: Fair Housing Protest, Seattle 1964, via]
June 25, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Opinion Analysis, Race | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, June 22, 2015
Supreme Court Decides Raisin USDA Program is an Unconstitutional Taking
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Horne v. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
decisively declares the USDA's "California Raisin Marketing Order," under which a percentage of a grower's crop must be "put in reserve" is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
This regulatory program, under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) of 1937, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., regarding raisins, is similar to other USDA programs and thus could have wide application.
By resisting the program on behalf of "farmers," the Hornes have become "outlaws" or heroes of sorts. This is the second time that the Hornes have been to the Supreme Court: Recall that in a brief opinion in June 2013, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the Hornes did state a claim for a taking.
Today, again reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that a taking did occur and that the Hornes were entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Only Justice Sotomayor dissented from this conclusion, but Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan did not join Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court regarding the determination of "just compensation."
Relying on a Magna Carta provision regarding corn as well as on colonial history, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause applies with equal force to personal property as to real property. Any distinction between real and personal property might be relevant in a regulatory takings case, but the Court stressed that this is a "clear physical taking": "Actual raisins are transferred from the growers to the Government." (Whether this happens in a physical seizure was debated in the contentious oral argument and made another appearance in a to-and-fro between the Court's opinion and Sotomayor's dissent). For the Court, growers thus lose "the entire 'bundle' of property rights in the appropriated raisins." Dissenting, Justice Sotomayor disagrees that it is the entire bundle and thus disputes this conclusion. Given this physicality, it is irrelevant for the Court that the USDA could achieve the same ends through a regulatory taking (such as prohibiting the sale):
A physical taking of raisins and a regulatory limit on production may have the same economic impact on a grower. The Constitution, however, is concerned with means as well as ends. The Government has broad powers, but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be "consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).
The Court also rejected the notion that because the USDA program reserved a contingent interest in the raisins for the growers that this relieved the government duty to pay just compensation.
The Court also found that the USDA mandate to reserve raisins as a "condition" for engaging in interstate commerce effected a per se taking. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's observation that the growers could grow other crops or use the grapes differently - - -
"Let them sell wine" is probably not much more comforting to the raisin growers than similar retorts have been to others throughout history.
The Court also reached this conclusion by distinguishing other takings cases and other products. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984) is inapplicable because "raisins are not dangerous pesticides; they are a healthy snack." Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392 (1929) is likewise inapposite because "Raisins are not like oysters: they are private property— the fruit of the growers' labor—not "public things" such as oysters that belonged to the state under state law.
The majority [corrected] of the Court determined that the "just compensation" owed to the Hornes is the fair market value of the raisins, the subject of the fine imposed by the USDA: $483,843.53. Justice Breyer (and Ginsburg and Kagan), disagreeing with this conclusion, would remand the matter for a determination. It is not that Justice Breyer disagrees that this was the amount of the fine, but that he disputes that this is the actual fair market value absent the taking. In other words, the raisin reserve program operated to increase the cost of raisins. Thus, without the program benefit, the raisins in reserve may have been worth much less that the amount fined, or even, Justice Breyer suggests, nothing at all. He contends that the question of evaluation was not properly briefed before the Court. For the Chief Justice, however, "This case, in litigation for more than a decade, has gone on long enough."
[image: 1916 California Sun Maid Raisin Recipe Book via]
June 22, 2015 in Fifth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Supreme Court (US), Taxing Clause | Permalink | Comments (2)
Court Strikes Warrantless Hotel Registry Searches
The Supreme Court today struck a Los Angeles city ordinance that required hotels to make available their guest records "to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Department for inspection . . . ." But at the same time the ruling specifically allows the city to require hotel owners to keep and retain a guest registry and says that officers can search it if they only get a warrant (even just an ex parte administrative warrant), or satisfy an established exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
In short, the ruling in Los Angeles v. Patel only requires officers to jump through a hoop--an important hoop, to be sure, but perhaps only a minimally challenging hoop--before reviewing hotel records.
Still, the sharply divided ruling is a clear victory for Fourth Amendment enthusiasts for two reasons. For one, the ruling requires precompliance review of some sort in the ordinary case. This means that in most cases a neutral decisionmaker would review an officer's request to search the records before the search. For another the ruling underscores the fact that challengers can bring a facial case under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor wrote that the LA ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment on its face. In particular, she said that ordinance authorized an extra-judicial administrative search (with no prior judicial approval and no probable cause requirement), and that kind of search requires the subject to "be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker." The Court explained why that's important:
Absent an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests.
Although the Court recognized that it never really defined "precompliance review," the ordinance allowed no review and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment on its face. The Court said that the ordinance has to provide a hotel owner at least an opportunity for precompliance review; but because it didn't, it violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Court emphasized "the narrow nature of our holding," saying that nothing in today's ruling prevents the city from requiring hotel owners from maintaining a guest registry with certain information, or authorizing the police to access that registry with appropriate Fourth Amendment protections, or under established Fourth Amendment exceptions.
Justice Scalia wrote the principal dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Justice Scalia argued that a warrantless hotel records search was not unreasonable in every application (as required for a facial challenge), because hotels are closely regulated and therefore the government has more leeway in conducting warrantless administrative searches under New York v. Burger.
Justice Alito also dissented, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Alito argued that the Court overreached with its facial ruling, that there are (at least) five applications of the ordinance that satisfy the Fourth Amendment, and that the Court's ruling means that LA can never enforce its "116-year-old requirement that hotels make their registers available to police officers."
June 22, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Fourth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)
Court Sets Objective Standard for Pretrial Detainee Civil Rights Action
The Supreme Court ruled today in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that a pretrial detainee need only show that an officer's use of force was objectively unreasonable--and not subjectively unreasonable, a higher standard--in order to prevail on an excessive force claim. The ruling reverses the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed a trial judge's jury instruction that set the bar at the higher subjective standard, and remands the case for an application of the lower objective standard.
The ruling means that a pretrial detainee's burden in an excessive force claim is lower than the standard upheld by the Seventh Circuit. That's good news for pretrial detainees who bring civil rights claims. But the Court was quick to say that a detainee still has other hurdles to jump--including qualified immunity.
Justice Breyer wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Breyer wrote that the trial court's jury instruction based on a subjective standard--that "[e]xcessive force means force applied recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances [and] [d]efendants knew that using force presented a risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly disregarded plaintiff's safety . . . ."--should have been been based on an objective standard--that "the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable."
Justice Scalia wrote the principal dissent for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas. Justice Alito also dissented, arguing that the case should be dismissed as improvidently granted.
June 22, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, June 18, 2015
Sign Ordinance Violates First Amendment: Court Decides Reed v. Town of Gilbert
A unanimous Court, albeit with separate opinions, concluded that the extensive municipal signage regulations violated the First Amendment in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.
Recall from oral arguments that the town's regulations generally required a permit to erect a sign, with nineteen different exemptions including "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to Qualifying Event." The exemption for these temporary directional signs further specifies that such signs "shall be no greater than 6 feet in height and 6 square feet in area,"and "shall only be displayed up to 12 hours before, during and 1 hour after the qualifying event ends." Although the challenge involves a church sign, this was largely irrelevant. Instead the content at issue is the sign's directional nature, if indeed "directions" is a matter of content. In a divided opinion the Ninth Circuit upheld the town regulation as content neutral.
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, concluded that the Sign Code was content-based and did not survive strict scrutiny. The Sign Code provision is content-based because, simply put, to determine if a sign is a "Temporary Directional Sign" one must determine whether the sign "conveys the message of directing the public" to an event. It does not matter, Thomas writes for the Court, that the content may seem neutral:
A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of "animus toward the ideas contained" in the regulated speech. *** In other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content- based law into one that is content neutral.
Once the Court decided there the regulation was subject to strict scrutiny, there was little doubt that the town would not be able to satisfy the standard. Thomas assumed that the proffered governments interests of aesthetics and traffic safety were compelling, but quickly determined that that the manner in which they were being served was far from narrowly tailored. Instead, the regulations were "hopelessly underinclusive."
The concurring opinions take on the issue raised in oral argument about the constitutionality of any town's attempt to regulate signage. Justice Kagan's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg and by Breyer (who also has a separate concurring opinion) - - - but not by Justice Alito, who has his own brief concurrence, joined by Kennedy and Sotomayor (who also join the Thomas's opinion for the Court)- - - argues that strict scrutiny is not appropriate for all sign ordinances. Kagan states:
Although the majority insists that applying strict scrutiny to all such ordinances is "essential" to protecting First Amendment freedoms, I find it challenging to understand why that is so. This Court's decisions articulate two important and related reasons for subjecting content-based speech regulations to the most exacting standard of review. The first is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." McCullen v. Coakley. The second is to ensure that the government has not regulated speech "based on hostility—or favoritism— towards the underlying message expressed." R. A. V. v. St. Paul (1992). Yet the subject-matter exemptions included in many sign ordinances do not implicate those concerns. Allowing residents, say, to install a light bulb over "name and address" signs but no others does not distort the marketplace of ideas. Nor does that different treatment give rise to an inference of impermissible government motive.
She instead argues that the "we may do well to relax our guard so that 'entirely reasonable' laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive." But it was evident that even the concurring Justices did not view the Town of Gilbert's signage regulations as entirely reasonable.
June 18, 2015 in First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Court Decides Specialty License Plate is Government Speech in Sons of Confederate Veterans License Plate
In a closely - - - and interestingly - - - divided opinion today in Walker v. Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans, the Court's majority decided that Texas's specialty license plate program is government speech and therefore rejected the First Amendment challenge to the denial of a specialty license plate requested by the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans.
Justice Breyer delivered the Court's opinion, joined by four Justices, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and - - - Thomas. The dissenting opinion by Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy. And while Justice Breyer has become known for his appendices, this opinion has a simple one: the image of the rejected Sons of Confederate Veterans plate. Meanwhile, Alito's dissenting opinion has a more extensive appendix; it includes the images of 58 specialty plates that Texas has approved.
As was evident in the oral arguments, and is frequently the case in First Amendment speech controversies, there was a definite choice of doctrine at stake. Recall that the Fifth Circuit's divided opinion, reversing the district judge, found that the denial violated the First Amendment as impermissible viewpoint and content discrimination. The Court today not only rejected that view, but it rejected the applicability of any forum analysis. Instead, the Court applied the doctrine of government speech articulated in the Court's unanimous Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009) finding that there is no meaningful distinction between the privately placed monuments in Summum and the license plates in Texas. This was raised at numerous points in the oral arguments and echoes the opinion of Judge Jerry Smith who had dissented in the Fifth Circuit's divided opinion. Breyer did note that there were some aspects of Summum that were not exactly parallel, such as the permanence of the monuments in Summun, the opinion states that this was important because the public parks in Summun are traditional public forums, which is not the case for license plates.
And as for that other and most famous license plate case, Wooley v. Maynard (1977), the Court's majority opinion distinguished Walker because "compelled private speech is not at issue." And indeed, if there is any compulsion of conveying ideological messages to be protected against here, it is that of the state being compelled to "include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates."
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion has at its base a common-sense disagreement. Noting the proliferation of specialty plates, supported by his Appendix, he asks:
As you sat there watching these plates speed by, would you really think that the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars? If a car with a plate that says "Rather Be Golfing" passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: "This is the official policy of the State—better to golf than to work?" If you did your viewing at the start of the college football season and you saw Texas plates with the names of the University of Texas's out-of-state competitors in upcoming games— Notre Dame, Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas State, Iowa State—would you assume that the State of Texas was officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns' opponents? And when a car zipped by with a plate that reads "NASCAR – 24 Jeff Gordon," would you think that Gordon (born in California, raised in Indiana, resides in North Carolina) is the official favorite of the State government?
Thus, he argues that what Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to create a "limited public forum."
Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans could have wide-ranging effect. Does it give unfettered discretion to governments to decide license plate matters given that it is now government speech? Consider that the Fourth Circuit recently held that North Carolina's provision of a "Choose Life" specialty license plate violated the First Amendment; that the New Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated a vanity license plate regulation requiring "good taste"; and that a Michigan federal district judge similarly invalidated a refusal of specific letters on a vanity plate; and on remand from the Tenth Circuit, the design of the Oklahoma standard license plate was upheld.
Additionally, recent controversies about advertising on public transport, as in New York, the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit, could be reconceptualized after Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans.
June 18, 2015 in Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (2)
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
Second Circuit Gives Detainee Case Against Ashcroft, Mueller the Go-Ahead
The Second Circuit ruled today that a civil rights case by former alien detainees against former AG John Ashcroft, former FBI Director Robert Mueller, former INS Commissioner James Zigler, and officials at the Metropolitan Detention Center can move forward.
The ruling is not a decision on the merits, but instead says that the bulk of the plaintiffs' case against the officials is not dismissed and can proceed to discovery.
Still, the ruling is significant, to say the least. It means that officials at the highest level of the DOJ will have to answer in court for their actions that led directly to the wrongful detention and mistreatment of aliens who were mistakenly swept up in the 9/11 investigation, even though, as the court said, "they were unquestionably never involved in terrorist activity."
The case, Turkmen v. Ashcroft, over thirteen years old, challenges the defendants' moves that resulted in the detention and mistreatment of aliens in the post-9/11 investigation, even though they had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks or terrorist activities. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that they were detained between three and eight months, without individualized suspicion and because of their race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin, and subjected to various forms of mistreatment.
The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ defendants took certain actions that resulted in their detention and unlawful treatment, with knowledge that the plaintiffs were wrongfully detained and mistreated. They also alleged that the MDC defendants took official actions that led to their abuse and knew about certain "unofficial abuse."
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on qualified immunity grounds, and, for some claims, that Bivens did not extend a cause of action. The district court dismissed all claims against the DOJ defendants and some claims against the MDC defendants.
The Second Circuit (mostly) reversed and allowed the case to move forward. The court said that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded their constitutional claims (and met the Iqbal pleading standard) that the DOJ and MDC defendants acted directly to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Key to the ruling was the plaintiffs' carefully pleaded complaint, which incorporated most of two reports of the DOJ's Office of Inspector General, helping plaintiffs to meet the plausibility test. Also key was the plaintiffs' allegations that the DOJ defendants received regular information on the post-9/11 investigation, including detainees, and that they ordered and implemented certain policies and took certain actions that resulted directly in the plaintiffs' wrongful detention.
Along the way, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had Bivens claims (except for their free exercise claim), even though the DOJ defendants didn't argue Bivens on appeal. The court also ruled that the defendants weren't entitled to qualified immunity, because the law on pretrial detention and mistreatment was clear at the time.
The court concluded:
The suffering endured by those who were imprisoned merely because they were caught up in the hysteria of the days immediately following 9/11 is not without a remedy.
Holding individuals in solitary confinement twenty-three hours a day with regular strip searches because their perceived faith or race placed them in the group targeted for recruitment by al Qaeda violated the detainees' constitutional rights. To use such a broad and general basis for such severe confinement without any further particularization of a reason to suspect an individual's connection to terrorist activities requires certain assumptions about the "targeted group" not offered by Defendants nor supported in the record. It assumes that members of the group were already allied with or would be easily converted to the terrorist cause, until proven otherwise. Why else would no further particularization of a connection to terrorism be required? Perceived membership in the "targeted group" was seemingly enough to justify extended confinement in the most restrictive conditions available.
Judge Reena Raggi dissented.
June 17, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Fifth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, June 15, 2015
Does Immigration Marriage Case Foreshadow Same-Sex Marriage Case?
In United States Supreme Court's fragmented and closely divided decision in Kerry v. Din, the majority rejected the procedural due process argument of a naturalized American citizen to an explanation of the reasons supporting a denial of a visa to her noncitizen husband. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality and joined by Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that she had no cognizable liberty interest attributable to her marriage. Justice Kennedy, joined by Alito, would not reach the liberty interest issue because the process here was all that was due. Justice Breyer, dissenting, and joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, would affirm the Ninth Circuit and find that she had a cognizable liberty interest and that more process was due in the form of a more precise and factual explanation.
So what might this mean for Obergefell? Most obviously, the dissenting opinion by Breyer, and joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, articulates an expansive liberty interest in marriage under the Due Process Clause that could be easily imported into Obergefell. On Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Alito, the clear signal is that Justice Scalia's refusal to recognize a liberty interest in marriage is not one to which they are subscribing - - - in this case. Given that Justice Kennedy, as author of the Court's opinions Windsor, Lawrence, and Romer v. Evans, is being closely watched as potential author of an opinion in favor of Obergefell, there is nothing in Din that would mitigate that judgment. As for the plurality, Justice Scalia's derogation of substantive due process has a familiar ring that might be echoed in his opinion in Obergefell, with an emphasis on history. While Justice Thomas is widely expected to agree with Scalia's position, does the Chief Justice's joining of Scalia's opinion in Kerry v. Din signal a disapproval of recognizing any liberty interest in marriage? Perhaps. But perhaps not. Consider this:
Unlike the States in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), the Federal Government here has not attempted to forbid a marriage. Although Din and the dissent borrow language from those cases invoking a fundamental right to marriage, they both implicitly concede that no such right has been infringed in this case. Din relies on the "associational interests in marriage that necessarily are protected by the right to marry," and that are "presuppose[d]" by later cases establishing a right to marital privacy.
Indeed, under this view, as the Court made clear in Zablocki, there must be a "direct and substantial" interference with marriage in order for there to be a liberty interest. The Court in Zablocki distinguished Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) - - - which the Court in Din does not cite - - - which found no constitutional infirmity with altering social security benefits upon marriage. In short, the marriage was not "forbidden," it was simply subject to certain regulations in another the complex social security scheme, not unlike the complex immigration scheme.
So for those who might attempt to predict the various positions of the Justices in Obergefell based on Kerry v. Din, there is certainly much "play."
June 15, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Family, Gender, Recent Cases, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)


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Trustworthy reviews are our priority. Businesses can't pay to change or remove reviews.
I had the president of Electra Entertainment (Josh Lavine) come out and do my Deejaying on my wedding day, and every single one of my guest enjoyed the music and had a wonderful time! The best thing about Electra Entertainment is the personal face to face you get with your DJ. Josh was available for any questions either by e-mail or phone any time, and it was so comforting to know I had that!
I would recommend Electra Entertainment to every bride to be or any event needing a DJ!
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I would just like to say that Jack was our DJ and he did a fantastic job. We asked for an upbeat, fun, dance all night long DJ and that is what we got. He kept our guest on the dance floor having a great time. We have not stopped getting coments about how much fun everyone had and how nice and easy going the DJ was. He was very polite to all our guest and played the requests that they asked for with no hesitation. I would absoulutly recommend this DJ company to anyone.
Josh was a FANTASTIC DJ-- He set a fabulous tone and atmosphere for our wedding reception. We couldnt have asked for better!
We used Electra Entertainment for our wedding at the Elkridge Furnace Inn and I would highly recommend them. The day of our wedding there was a terrible storm and Josh the DJ made sure that the music would still sound good throughout the venue over the thunder. We also had a few timing gliches but Josh improvised and no one ever knew that we were off schedule. Josh was wonderful at announcing the wedding party and never mispronounced any of our tough names. Josh and his staff were very professional and helped us with music selections and never played any songs that were on our 'do not play list'. Everyone had a blast at our wedding - lots of great dancing photos thanks to Josh.
This was a unique experience because it took place all online. The entertainment group after contacting them pointed us to their website to fill in a standard template on the dances and what music should be played and when. They were extremely flexible and extremely receptive. DJ Joe was great. I would certainly use them again.
Working with Josh at Electra was a great experience, he had an extensive library of music and allowed me to go through his library and pick out our favorite songs. The entrance for the entire bridal party and family was personalized and a hit with all of our guests. Josh and his assistant had my guests on their feet from start to finish. I still get compliments on the music, and would recommend Electra to any potential bride. Affordable and stress-free! What more could you ask for?
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we were so nervous about the dj for our wedding. the music is what makes a wedding fun and memorable. Three months later we are still hearing how wonderful and fun our wedding was we want to have one every month and have Brandon as our DJ !
Loved how flexible they were, felt like I didn't have a ton of contact ahead of the reception, but still was able to use their online tools for planning (huge plus!!) We had asked that nothing too risky would be played, there was one song that as a little bit but other than that he did a fantastic job!
Electra Deejay did an excellent job at my wedding with both music and lighting and I wouldn't hesitate to recommend them!
In planning, Josh Levine of Electra was knowledgeable and offered a military discount. Electra's website to set up the schedule and song requests is excellent and has a huge inventory. Josh also sent MP3s of a couple of ceremony songs so I could see if I liked them. He met me at the venue one month out and brought different color lighting so we could test it out and considered carefully how to deal with the venue's acoustics and also called the week of to confirm everything. It did tend to take him longer to get back to me than I would have liked; I'd often have to remind him to respond to an email a week later.
He set up very early. The lighting looked fantastic. He and I arranged cues in the music for the ceremony and it went perfectly. And he played awesome music for the cocktail hour and dinner and did a great job as the emcee. As one guest said, "I wish the DJ could narrate my life, he makes everything sound so good." He even did a couple of unusual requests for me that were inside jokes.
Just two complaints. 1) Dinner started 25 minutes late. I think he should have cut the music to signal it was time to come in (and even gone outside where people couldn't hear him as there were no speakers there). Due to the acoustics, it was hard to hear him announcing dinner over the music and talking. 2) He knew I spent hours selecting 50 songs I liked and we only had time for ~25. When he played 4 songs not on the list, I was unhappy. He said people weren't on the dance floor so he was getting them back. Among 30 other songs, I know there were more than 4 that would have gotten the crowd going including one played at a wedding I went to the next weekend! If someone takes the time to choose 50 songs, find 30 songs from that list that work!
Complaints aside, my wedding was so much fun and I attribute a large part of that to Electra Entertainment!
Wonderful DJ at a competitive price. Our DJ kept everyone dancing the whole night and even gave us a CD of our wedding songs. Highly recommended.
Josh at Electra Entertainment was delightful to work with. He was prompt with responses to my music questions and requests, super-professional in handling a few awkward moments that arose during our reception (no champagne for the toasts, an unexpected toast...), and even let the groom come up to the balcony to karaoke his favorite song. All of our guests enjoyed the evening immensely and Doug and I got to dance the night away!

subset: commoncrawl


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Arizona Wildcats
'A Night With Janis Joplin' heads to Broadway
NEW YORK (AP) - The boozy, bluesy, hot-mama howl of Janis Joplin is heading to Broadway.
Producers said Wednesday that the musical "A Night With Janis Joplin" starring Mary Bridget Davies as the iconic singer will start previews at the Lyceum Theatre on Sept. 20.
The show, written and directed by Randy Johnson, has a live onstage band and features Joplin hits and classic songs such as "Piece of My Heart," "Mercedes Benz," "Me and Bobby McGee," "Ball and Chain" and "Summertime."
The show has already been staged at Portland Center Stage in Oregon; the Cleveland Play House; Arena Stage in Washington, D.C.; the Pasadena Playhouse in California; and the Milwaukee Repertory Theater.
Davies, who was raised in Cleveland, first won the role in 2005 after beating 150 actresses. She has appeared in the musical revue "It Ain't Nothin' But the Blues" and another Joplin musical, "Love, Janis." She has toured with Joplin's band, Big Brother & the Holding Company and has released the album "Wanna Feel Somethin.'"
Joplin rose to fame during San Francisco's 1967 "Summer of Love," gaining acclaim when she performed her version of blues singer Big Mama Thornton's "Ball and Chain" at the Monterey International Pop Festival. She died of a heroin overdose in Hollywood in 1970.
Online: http:// www.anightwithjanisjoplin.com
(Copyright 2013 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.)
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OWS - Model CS Series - Oily Water Separatorsby Victor Marine Ltd based in West Thurrock,, UNITED KINGDOM
The CS series Oily Water Separator is a compact design using the same technology as the VM series for use in smaller restricted engine rooms with a capacity range of 0.25m³/hr to 5.0m³/hr the CS series can handle heavy fuel oil, diesels and emulsified oils and achieves below 5ppm when tested by IMO.
ZCL - Gravity Oil/Water Separatorsby ZCL Composites Inc. based in Edmonton, ALBERTA (CANADA)
The compact distribution baffle makes efficient use of the separator's full volume and length. The baffle guides the flow of influent, reducing turbulence and introducing the flow evenly across the section of the vessel. An emergency shut off valve is standard on all ZCL gravity oil/water separators, allowing discharge from the separator to ...
Model AHP-55 - Liquid Phase Oil Water Separatorsby Ecologix Environmental Systems, LLC based in Alpharetta, GEORGIA (US) (USA)
AHP-55 Series Liquid Phase Vessels will not bulge, leak or rust apart. The top is made of heavy gauge domed steel and powder coated for durability. The interior has dual liners and a heavy domed internal bottom. Each has a built in 30 psi pressure relief valve with a 3/4 inch NPT connection, influent and effluent sample and pressure ports. Inlet ...
FREYLIT - Mobile Oil Separators for Oil Spill on Lakes / Riversby FREYLIT Umwelttechnik GmbH based in Klosterneuburg, AUSTRIA
The FREYLIT modular plate-pack system the perfect solution for oil separation in large scale industrial oil sperarators. In many industries process waters are contaminated with oil which needs to be removed before returning the water into the process cycle for example in steel mills. Coalescent plate pack seperators are the most economic method of ...
Hopper Oil Water Separatorsby Ecologix Environmental Systems, LLC based in Alpharetta, GEORGIA (US) (USA)
Oil water separators are systems used as an efficient method to separate oils and some solids from a variety of wastewater discharges. They are typically installed in industrial and maintenance areas and receive oily wastewater. The effluent from oil/water separators is typically discharged to either a sanitary sewer system or a storm sewer. ...


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Guest Reviews
Each review and rating that we receive is verified to ensure that we only display information provided by guests who have actually stayed in the hotel.
Recommend This Property
Overall Experience
Recommend This Property
Place to Stay
July 01, 2015
The hotel is nice but definitely not in walking distance to Disneyland. ART has a decent system for getting to and from the parks but did not keep the tickets in the kiosk or hotel available. Evening social was a good break from the parks. As a Platinum Elite member requested an upgrade to a bigger room but was told nothing was available for entire stay, would have been fine with at least part of the stay being upgraded but wasn't even offered as an option. Will stay closer to the parks next time.
Posted byHotelStaff
July 03, 2015
Hello electricelt, Thank you for taking the time to review our property. As we are sold out on many occasions, unfortunately we cannot guarantee an upgrade each trip. We are glad you enjoyed the hotel even though you would like to be a little closer to Disneyland next time. We hope to see you again. Jimmy Raynor Front Office Manager
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Great place for volleyball tournament guests
June 30, 2015
loved the 2 room suites - we travel with our volleyball club and these accommodations make it easy to have multiple groups stay at affordable rates...
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Shuttle Service
June 30, 2015
The hotel should consider providing their own shuttle service to the Disneyland park. The shuttle service that is provided for a fee was regularly late and the driver at times was rude. This reflects on the the quality of stay at the resort, even though those people are not under the resorts control.
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great place to stay with a family
June 28, 2015
My family of 6 enjoyed staying in the two room suite. Having two bathrooms and two bedrooms with a large family is important. The beds and pillows are very comfortable. My only complaint was that there was hair in the master suites tub - it was like the shower was not cleaned before we go there. Other than that, everything else was great. I like the breakfasts because of the variety that it offers.
Posted byHotelStaff
June 29, 2015
Hello jenni41, We are so very happy to find that you feel our hotel is great for families. We are really glad to offer a great family atmosphere with room to have fun. It does concern me that you had a service issue. We pride ourselves on customer service and thank you for giving us the chance to make it right. Thank you for taking the time to review our property. Jimmy Raynor Front Office Manager
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Live Presentation
An xRM1 Business Solution presentation tailor-made to your requirements
The Challenge with Evaluating Software
You would like to evaluate one of the xRM1 Business Solutions, but you don't have enough time.
You've taken a look at the website www.xRM1.com, found that our solution is of interest to you and that it meets your requirements.
You need more security that our solution will meet your needs optimally and that you're making the right decision?
Live Presentation – The Next Step
We will be pleased to present you our xRM1 Business Solutions, live and online.
We tailor-make every presentation based on your individual requirements.
We ask that you provide us up to 5 top requirements; we will use them as a basis to create a custom presentation for you.
During the presentation, we'll address approaches for your requirements and discuss best practices live.
Our experience has shown that you can validate the benefits of the solution better for your company after the meeting.
5-Step Process
- Your requirements are necessary to prepare the presentation. We gather these from you either by phone or by e-mail. Up to 5 requirements can be included in the 90-minutes meeting.
- We will prepare a presentation tailor-made to your requirements.
- Parallely, you resolve the availability of the appropriate participants from therelevant departments, IT and management.
- The presentation will then be based on the following agenda:
- An introduction to xRM1 Business Solutions (5 min)
- Cross-checking your requirements (5 min)
- Presentation of solutions to your requirements (60 min)
- Licensing, pricing and next steps (20 min)
- Lastly, we'll send you the presentation document, which includes feedback. In addition, we will organize the previously discussed next steps.
How does a Live Presentation benefit you?
- You'll get a firm understanding of the solutions
- You have experienced yourself how your requirements can be achieved
- You'll gain confidence in your decision
- You'll achieve your evaluation goal more quickly through the experience of xRM1
All relevant roles involved in the provided scenarios should take part in the Live Presentation.
Each role has an individual view about the processes which have to be supported and has to evaluate if the own requirements can be met well with the intended xRM1 Business Solution.
Next Step
Feel free to contact us at any time, we're happy to answer your questions.


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Home :: Wedding Bands :: Diamond Wedding Bands :: Designer White Gold :: Men's Diamond Band
14K White Gold
0.50 cts.
Product Selection
Excellent Customer Service
We want to express the highest compliment on how we were treated. From the beginning of the ordering process, the verbal contact and then the lightning...
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I have to say how happy we were to receive the rings, they were just the right size and what we wanted. thank you so much, they are BEAUTIFUL
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Original recipe yields 4 servings
Amount per serving ({{servings}} total)
Based on a 2,000 calorie diet
Ready In
Wow! Great way to perk up a regular 'ol burger! My husband is a huge fan of bacon and I adore blue cheese so this combination for a burger topper was a must try and it definitely didn't disappoi...
Most definitely a 5+ star. The first time I made this I did so 3 different ways. We had company and I'm the only one who eats Bleu Cheese. I made 1 full batch with Bleu Cheese, I made another...
Yummo! I didn't have any blue cheese on hand but I did have feta and it turned out great! Thanks for the recipe :-)


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Tel: (860)688-4110
We are a non-profit, non-sectarian Nursery School program located at the Poquonock Community Church.
We provide early education for three and four-year-olds.
Poquonock Playschool has been in service to the community since 1982.
We are licensed by the State of Connecticut, and our facility is inspected and approved annually by Windsor Fire and Health Department officials.
The program at Poquonock Playschool is designed to encourage each child's creativity and interests within a structured framework.
School Overview
|School Type
|Early Childhood / Day Care
|Religious Affiliation
|Grades Offered
|Grades Kindergarten - 1
Student Body
|Total Students
|59 students
|Student Body Type
|% Students of Color
State avg.: 24%
|Students by Grade
Academics and Faculty
|Total Classroom Teachers
|5 teachers
|Student : Teacher Ratio
National avg.: 13:1
Nearby Schools:
All Schools | High Schools | Elementary Schools | Preschools | Public Schools
Show me:
- School Location Miles Students Grades
Windsor LocksNew England Preschool Academy
1 Foxwood Dr
Windsor Locks, CT 06096
(860)627-9770Daycare / Preschool2 mi | 83 students | Gr. PK-KG
WindsorBright Horizons Family Solutio
1045 Day Hill Rd
Windsor, CT 06095
(860)688-6681Daycare / Preschool (Non-sectarian)2.2 mi | 46 students | Gr. PK-K
East GranbyKindercare Learning Center
17 Connecticut South Dr
East Granby, CT 06026
(203)452-5837Daycare / Preschool2.5 mi | 24 students | Gr. PK-K
WindsorBuilding Blocks Of Windsor
842 Marshall Phelps Road
Windsor, CT 06095
(860)683-2229Daycare / Preschool (Non-sectarian)2.7 mi | 58 students | Gr. PK-KG
WindsorMadina Academy
519 Palisado Avenue
Windsor, CT 06095
(860)524-9700(Islamic)3.5 mi | 150 students | Gr. K-11
School Reviews
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Recent Articles
Updated June 28, 2015
When it comes to choosing a private school, there are so many choices to consider that the project can be a huge challenge to most of us. We offer some help and advice to help you get started.
Sending your child to a foreign language school makes good sense when you have been posted to this country from abroad and in other circumstances as well.
Do you need financial aid? Not sure? Confused by how financial aid works? Here are some answers.
More ArticlesPre_elementary, Paying For It, High School Issues, Choosing a Private School, Opinion


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• Until recent years, archival film storage had been associated, at least in the public mind, with museums, government agencies, libraries, or other institutions concerned with the preservation of photographic records; however, other users of photographic film, such as commercial photographers, printing houses, publishers, and schools, have long been concerned with how best to ensure permanence of their irreplaceable photography.
• A sophisticated generation of amateur photographers who observed how time, humidity and casual storage damaged valuable slides and prints, nowadays, have converted to using archival storage techniques. They, too, appreciate that a picture good enough to keep is good enough to keep forever.
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The Print File G Archival Photo is commonly used for Archive and more.The Print File G Archival Photo is popular because customers like the following qualities of the Print File G Archival Photo: Easy to load photos and Strong construction
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Great way to organize photos in a binder!
Transferring 20-30 years of photos to new albums. These oages hold 8 4x6 photos per page rather then the typical 6 so I use less pages. Print File is a known quality and the photos look good in the pages and they save the photos from damage. My adult chidren spend hours going through them when they are home for a holiday or family event. Lots of laughs and memories.
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Great way to store photos and as stated in headline great replacement for discontinued [...] procuct
Easy to insert photos and combined with oversize 3-ring album binder make nice presentation of photos


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Container for subsystem's signal data logs
For new models, use the
Simulink® software creates instances of this class to contain
logs for signals belonging to a subsystem (see Export Signal Data Using Signal Logging). Objects
of this class have a variable number of properties. The first property,
Name, is the name of the subsystem whose
log data this object contains. The remaining properties are signal
log or signal log container objects containing the data logged for
the subsystem specified by this object's
Name property.
Consider, for example, the following model.
After simulation of this model, the MATLAB® workspace contains
Simulink.ModelDataLogs object, named
that contains a
Simulink.SubsysDataLogs object,
Gain, that contains the log data for signals
a and
m in
the subsystem named Gain.
>> logsout.Gain ans = Simulink.SubsysDataLogs (Gain): Name elements Simulink Class a 1 Timeseries m 2 TsArray
You can use either fully qualified log names or the
unpack command to access the signal
logs contained by a
SubsysDataLogs object. For
example, to access the amplitudes logged for signal
a in
the preceding example, you could enter the following at the MATLAB command
>> data = logsout.Gain.a.Data;
>> logsout.unpack('all'); data = a.Data;


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Blueberry Yum Yum
22 Jun 2009
|Cream cheese
|1 Cup (16 tbs)
|1⁄4 Cup (4 tbs)
|Graham cracker crumbs
|3 Cup (48 tbs)
|Comstock pie
|2 Can (20 oz)
|1⁄2 Cup (8 tbs)
Cream together cream cheese and sugar.
Add to already prepared Dream Whip.
Mix melted butter and graham cracker crumbs.
Use half of graham cracker crumb mixture and pat down on bottom of a large glass pyrex pan.
Use half of Dream Whip mixture, half of pie filling (blueberry or whatever desired).
Then layer the other half of Dream Whip, pie filling and the rest of the graham cracker crumbs on top.
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Blueberry Yum Yum Recipe