text:
The Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate is a dispute over what, if any, advance knowledge American officials had of Japan's December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.
Ever since the Japanese attack there has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught off guard, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans for an attack.
Several writers, including journalist Robert Stinnett and former United States Navy Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, have argued that various parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force America into war via the "back door." Evidence supporting this view is taken from quotations and source documents from the time and the release of newer materials.
Examination of information released since the War has revealed there was considerable intelligence information available to US and other nations' officials. Rather than attribute the lack of preparedness at the base to failure to process, it has been argued that the U.S. must have had some degree of advanced knowledge of the attack.
All ten reported incompetence, underestimation and misapprehension of Japanese capabilities & intentions, problems resulting from excessive secrecy about crypto, and lack of adequate manpower for intelligence (analysis, collection, processing, ...).
It is important to note that investigators prior to Clausen did not have the security clearance necessary to receive the most sensitive information, and some of those questioned were put in a difficult spot of having to lie (even under oath) to protect secrets they were charged with. Clausen reported that even though he had a letter from Secretary Stimson informing witnesses he had the necessary clearances to require their cooperation, he was repeatedly lied to until he produced copies of top secret decrypts, thus proving he indeed had the proper clearance.
The Stimson report to Congress (based on Clausen's work) was limited due to secrecy concerns (largely about crypto); a more complete account was not publicly available until the mid-1980s and not published until 1992, with Clausen's own account of the investigation. Reaction to the 1991 publication has varied; some regard it as a valuable addition to understanding, others note that (a) he didn't speak to General Walter Short, Army commander at Pearl Harbor during the attack, and (somewhat prematurely) (b) his investigation was "notoriously unreliable" in several aspects.
Nevertheless, U.S. cryptanalytic work continued after Stimson's action in two separate efforts: the Army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) crypto group, OP-20-G. Cryptanalytic work was kept secret to such an extent, however, commands such as the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor were prohibited from working on codebreaking by Admiral Kelly Turner as a consequence of the bureaucratic infighting in Washington.
By late 1941, those organizations had broken several Japanese ciphers, such as J19 and PA-K2, called Tsu and Oite respectively by the Japanese. The highest security diplomatic code, dubbed PURPLE by the U.S., had been broken, but American cryptanalysts had made little progress against the IJN's current D code (called JN-25 by the U.S.)
In addition, there was a perennial shortage of manpower, thanks to penury on one hand and the perception of intelligence as a low-value career path on the other. Translators were over-worked, cryptanalysts in short supply, staff generally stressed. Furthermore, there were difficulties retaining good intelligence officers and trained linguists; most did not remain on the job for the extended periods necessary to become truly professional. For career reasons, nearly all wanted to return to more standard assignments. However, concerning the manning levels, "... just prior to World War II, we had some 700 people engaged in the effort and we were, in fact, obviously having some successes. Of these, 85% were tasked to decryption and 50% to translation efforts against IJN codes. The nature and degree of these successes has led to great confusion among non-specialists. Furthermore, OP-20-GY "analysts relied as much on summary reports as on the actual intercepted messages.
The U.S. was also given decrypted messages by Dutch (NEI) intelligence, who like the others in the British-Dutch-U.S. agreement to share the cryptographic load, shared information with allies. The U.S. refused to do likewise. This was, at least in part, due to fears of compromise; sharing even between Navy and Army was restricted.
In any case, the eventual flow of intercepted and decrypted information was tightly and capriciously controlled to the point at times even President Roosevelt did not receive information from code-breaking activities. (This was in part due to fears of compromise as a result of poor security, after a memo dealing with MAGIC was tossed in the wastebasket of Brigadier General Edwin M. (Pa) Watson, the President's military aide.)
Most unfortunately, to date not all PURPLE messages have been released. This was noted as long ago as the Joint Congressional Hearings during the "Magic" testimony. This known fact is often missed, as well as other curious items, for example, the Hearing's questions regarding the missing 25 pages from the Roberts Commission report. Blanket or un-qualified statements on what decoded "Magic" messages revealed are, therefore, pre-mature.
Superenciphered codes of this sort were widely used and were the state of the art in practical cryptography of the time. JN-25 was very similar in principle to the British "Naval Cypher No. 3", known to have been broken by Germany during WWII.
Once it was realized what sort of cryptosystem JN-25 was, the cryptanalytic approach was known. Stinnett, in fact, notes the existence of a USN handbook for attacks on such a system, produced by OP-20-G. Even so, breaking it was not easy in actual practice. It took much effort and time, not least in accumulating sufficient depth in intercepted messages prior to the outbreak of hostilities when IJN radio traffic increased abruptly and substantially; prior to December 7, 1941 IJN radio traffic was limited, since the IJN played only a minor role in the war against China and therefore was only rarely required to send radio messages in their highest level crypto system. (As well, interception of IJN traffic off China would have been at best spotty.) Rather oddly however, the official history of GYP-1 shows nearly 45,000 IJN messages intercepted during the period from 1 June 1941 until 4 December 1941. Thus, most Japanese encrypted broadcast military radio traffic was Army traffic associated with the land operations in China.
Breaking a superencrypted cipher like JN-25 was a three-step process: (a) determining the "indicator" method to establish the starting point within the additive cipher, (b) stripping away the superencryption to expose the bare code, and then (c) breaking the code itself. When JN-25 was first detected and recognized, such intercepted messages as were interceptable were collected (at assorted intercept stations around the Pacific by the Navy) in an attempt to accumulate sufficient depth to attempt to strip away the superencryption. Success at doing so was termed by the cryptographers a 'break' into the system. Such a break did not produce a cleartext version of the intercepted message. Only after breaking the underlying code (another difficult process) would the message be available, and even then its meaning — in an intelligence sense — might be less than fully clear.
When a new edition was released, the cryptographers were forced to start again. The original JN-25A system replaced the 'Blue' code (as Americans called it), and used five-digit numbers, each divisible by three (and so usable as a quick, and somewhat reliable, error check, as well as something of a 'crib' to cryptanalysts), giving a total of 33,334 legal code values. To make it harder to crack a code value, meaningless additives (from a large table or book of five-digit numbers) were added arithmetically to each five-digit cipher. JN-25B superseded the first release of JN-25 at the start of December 1940. JN-25B had 55,000 valid words, and while it initially used the same additive list, this was soon changed and the cryptanalysts found themselves entirely blacked out again.
Over the years, various claims have been made as to the progress made decrypting this system, and arguments made over when it was readable (in whole or part). Lt. "Honest John" Leitweiler, Commander of Station CAST, the Philippines, stated in November 1941 that his staff could "walk right across" the number columns of the coded messages. He is frequently quoted in support of claims JN-25 was then mostly readable. This comment, however, refers not to the message itself but to the superenciphering additives and referred to the ease of attacking the code using a new method for discovery of additive values.
The 16 November 1941 letter to L.W. Parks (OP-20-GY) sent by Leitweiler states, "We have stopped work on the period 1 February to 31 July as we have all we can do to keep up with the current period. We are reading enough current traffic to keep two translators very busy." Another document, Exhibit No. 151 from the Hewitt Inquiry has a copy of the US Navy message OPNAV-242239 'Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941' which has in part: '1. Reference (a) advised that Com 16 intercepts were considered most reliable and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on Japanese naval movements and send dispatch to OPNAV, info CINCPAC. Com 16's estimates were more reliable than Com 14's, not only because of better radio interception, but because Com 16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System ("5-number code" or "JN25") and was exchanging technical information and translations with the British C. I. Unit at Singapore. Arthur McCollum knew this and gave it due consideration when he drafted the McCollum memo. Duane L. Whitlock, (traffic analyst at CAST), was not aware before the attack that IJN movement traffic code was being read. "Reading" in this context means being able to see the underlying code groups, not breaking out the messages into plaintext. The Hewitt Inquiry document also states, "The "5 numeral system" (JN-25B) yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of the Pearl Harbor raid, either before or afterward."
The claim that no pre-attack IJN message expressly mentioned Pearl Harbor is perhaps true. Similarly are the claims no PURPLE traffic likewise pointed to Pearl Harbor. To note, however, in both instances neither all traffic (IJN nor PURPLE) from these pre-attack intercepts have been declassified and released to the public domain. Hence, any such claims are now indeterminate, pending a fuller accounting.
Additionally, no decrypts have come to light of JN-25B traffic, and importantly identified as such, with any intelligence value prior to Pearl Harbor. Such breaks as recorded by authors W.J. Holmes and Clay Blair, Jr., were into the additive tables, which was a required first step of two. The first 100 JN-25 decrypts from all sources in date/time order of translation have been released, and are available in the National Archives. The first JN-25B decrypt was in fact by HYPO (Hawaii) on 8 January 1942 (numbered #1 up JN-25B RG38 CNSG Library, Box 22, 3222/82 NA CP). The first 25 decrypts were very short messages or partial decrypts of marginal intelligence value. As Duane Whitlock stated, "The reason that not one single JN-25 decrypt made prior to Pearl Harbor has ever been found or declassified is not due to any insidious cover-up...it is due quite simply to the fact that no such decrypt ever existed. It simply was not within the realm of our combined cryptologic capability to produce a usable decrypt at that particular juncture."
Detailed month by month progress reports have shown no reason to believe any JN-25B messages were fully decrypted before the start of the war. Tallied results for September, October, and November reveal roughly 3,800 code groups (out of 55,000, about 7%) had been recovered by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
According to a 1942 Japanese after action report "In order to keep strict radio silence, through steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strict radio silence was perfectly carried out.... The Kido Butai used the radio instruments for the first time on the day of the attack since they had been fixed at the base approximately twenty days before and proved they worked well. Paper flaps had been inserted between key points of some transmitters on board Akagi to keep the strictest radio silence..." Commander Genda, who helped plan the attack stated, "We kept absolute Radio Silence". For about two weeks before the attack, 31 ships "used flag and light signals" (semaphore and blinker), perfectly usable with task force ships remaining in line of sight. Kazuiyoshi Koichi, the Communications Officer for Hiei, dismantled vital transmitter parts and kept them in a box that he used as a pillow to prevent Hiei from making any radio transmissions until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced. Former Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshoka, communications officer aboard the flagship, Akagi, said he did not recall any ship dispatching a radio message before the attack. Furthermore, Captain Kijiro, in charge of the three Kido Butai submarines, stated nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters. Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka stated, "It is needless to say that the strictest radio silence was ordered to be maintained in every ship of the Task Force. To keep radio silence was easy to say, but not so easy to maintain." There is nothing in the Japanese logs or after action report that shows that radio silence was broken until after the attack. Which Kusaka worried about when briefly broken on the way home.
An often debated subject is also the appendix to the war-initiating operational order. The message of 25 November 41 from CinCCombined sent to All Flagships from Admiral Yamamoto stated, "Ships of the Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedure as follows: 1. Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating. 2. Other forces are at the discretion of their respective commanders. 3. Supply ships, repair ships, hospital ships, etc., will report directly to parties concerned." Furthermore, "In accordance with this Imperial Operational Order, the CinC of the Combined Fleet issued his operational order, ... The Task Force then drew up its own operational order, which was given for the first time to the whole force at Hitokappu Bay. ..." However also stated is under the appendix to that document, paragraph four where the especially secret Strike Force was specifically directed to "maintain strict radio silence from the time of their departure from the Inland Sea. Their communications will be handled entirely on the general broadcast communications net."
Since to disobey the radio silence orders would mean the location of the entire attack force would have been exposed, the personnel reports fit well with the requirements of the objective. Unfortunately, the current whereabouts of either Lurline's log, or the reports delivered to the Navy or Coast Guard by Lurline's radio operator Leslie Grogan in Hawaii, are not known, so contemporaneously written evidence of what was recorded aboard Lurline is not now available - the original logs Lurline, surrendered to Lt. Cmdr. George W. Pease, 14th Naval District in Honolulu, have disappeared. Grogan commented on a signal source "moving" eastward in the North Pacific over several days as shown via "relative bearings" which then "bunched up" and stopped moving.Generally, however, the directions given by Grogan in a recreation of the logbook for the Matson Line are consistent with locations used for radio deception by the Japanese (from the homeland) at the time. A recently discovered missing report by Grogan, dated 10 December 1941 and titled "Record for Posterity", also does not support claims of Kido Butai broadcasting.
Another technique confirmed to be used by the Japanese was the practice of radio deception. Susumu Ishiguru, intelligence and communications officer for Carrier Division Two, stated, "Every day false communications emanated from Kyushu at the same time and same wavelength as during the training period." This gave Rochefort the idea First Air Fleet remained in Home Waters for routine training. The ships left their own regular wireless operators to carry on "routine" radio traffic. Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka stated, "The main force in the Inland Sea and the land-based air units carried out deceptive communications to indicate the carriers were training in the Kyushu area." The main Japanese naval bases (Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo) all engaged in considerable radio deception. By analyzing DF bearings (when such bearings were obtained) from Navy directional finder stations, claimed breaks of radio silence can be accounted for, and by plotting the bearings directions, they match up with the various locations previously mentioned, instead of the actual locations of those ships on the relevant dates.
Rochefort claims there were no dummy messages used anytime throughout 1941 and that there was no effort by the Japanese to use serious deception. He also stated, when asked after the attack just how he knew where Akagi was, he recognized her "same ham-fisted" radio operators. However, the critical DF tracked radio transmissions have clearly shown bearings that could have not come from the strike force. Emissions monitored from CAST or CAST's report Akagi was off Okinawa on 8 December 1941, are examples, though some transmissions continue to be debated.
One suggested example of a Kido Butai transmission is the November 30, 1941 COMSUM14 report in which Commander Joseph Rochefort, commanding HYPO, mentioned a "tactical" circuit heard calling "marus". (a term often used for commercial vessels or non-combat units). Further, the perspective of U.S. naval intelligence at the time was, "... The significance of the term, 'tactical circuit' is that the vessel itself, that is AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a maru.
Another "eye witness viewpoint" akin to Beatty's is provided by Roosevelt's administrative assistant at the time of Pearl Harbor, Jonathan Daniels; it is the telling comment about FDR's reaction to the attack - "The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be. ... But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price. ..."
"Ten days before the Attack on Pearl Harbor", Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of War at the time "entered in his diary the famous and much-argued statement - that he had met with President Roosevelt to discuss the evidence of impending hostilities with Japan, and the question was 'how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.'" "
Mark Parillo, in his essay The United States in the Pacific, wrote that "[t]hese theories tend to founder on the logic of the situation. Had Roosevelt and other members of his administration known of the attack in advance, they would have been foolish to sacrifice one of the major instruments needed to win the war just to get the United States into it.
One quote is often used to add legitimacy to the notion the British Government knew in advance the attack was coming. Oliver Lyttelton, the British Minister of War Production, said, "... Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history ever to say that America was forced into the war. Everyone knows where American sympathies were. It is incorrect to say that America was truly neutral even before America came into the war on an all-out basis. If Britain, did, indeed know and chose to conceal, "withholding this vital intelligence only ran the risk of losing American trust", and with it any further American aid, which would be reduced after the attack in any event.
When considering information like this as a point for or against, the reader must keep in mind questions such as: was this official privy to information about the U.S. government? Did he have communications with high-level administration figures such as President Roosevelt or Ambassador Joseph Grew? Is this just a strongly held personal opinion? Or were there measures justifying this view?
Lend-Lease, enacted in March 1941, informally declared the end of American neutrality in favor of the Allies by agreeing to supply Allied nations with war materials. The signing of the bill into existence, because the materials would be used to combat the Axis powers, made the United States a de facto hostile and opened her to future attack.
In addition, Roosevelt authorized U.S. destroyers to report U-boats, then later authorized "shoot on sight". Neither is the act of a disinterested neutral.
Furthermore, one position discussed in author Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit suggests a memorandum prepared by Office of Naval Intelligence Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum was central to U.S. policy in the immediate pre-war period. The memo suggests only a direct attack on U.S. interests would sway the American public (or Congress) to favor direct involvement in the European war, specifically in support of the British. An attack by Japan would not, could not, do that, as history would prove.
Although the memo was passed to Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, two of Roosevelt's military advisors, on October 7, 1940, there is no evidence available to suggest Roosevelt ever saw it, nor any he did not. Moreover, although Anderson and Knox offered eight specific plans to aggrieve the Japanese Empire and added, "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better," of the eight "plans" (actions to be taken) offered in the memo only one was ever implemented in any fashion, and there is considerable doubt the memo was the inspiration. Nonetheless, as shown in Day of Deceit Stinnett claims all action items were implemented.
ONI is further said to have been aware of Japanese carrier movements. First publicly reported in John Toland's Infamy was a Dutch Rear Admiral's claim to have been present at ONI not long before the 7th. According to Toland, entries in J.E. Meijer Ranneft's diary made on December 2nd and on December 6th, show that ONI informed Ranneft about two Japanese carriers. Toland claims the diary places these ships northwest of Honolulu. Later, Toland claims the diary states the ships were north. However the diary clearly states beW meaning "Westerly" of Honolulu, Hawaii. So the documentary evidence cuts Toland's own ground from under him. Also none of the witnesses present on those dates support Ranneft's claims, clouding their actual significance considerably. David Kahn's review of Toland's book (The NY Review of Books May 27, 1982) and Zimmerman (IaNS Vol. 17, No 2) suggested the diary could have been reference to carriers near the Marshall Islands. Toland has also made other conflicting and incorrect claims about the diary as well during lectures at IHR.
The diary states at 02:00 (6-12-41) Turner fears a sudden Japanese attack on Manila. At 14:00 the diary states "Everyone present on O.N.I. I speak to Director Admiral Wilkinson, Captain MacCollum, Lt. Cdr. Kramer...They show me – on my request – the place of the 2 carriers (see 2–12–41) West of Honolulu. I ask what the idea is of these carriers on that place. The answer was: 'perhaps in connection with Japanese rapports [sic] on eventual American actions'. There is not one of ours who speaks about a possible air attack on Honolulu. I myself did not think of it because I believed everyone on Honolulu to be 100% on the alert, as everyone here on O.N.I. There prevails a tense state of mind at O.N.I." These diary entries are provided (in Dutch) in the photo section in George Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable.
Main article : McCollum memo
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, which details eight actions which might have the effect of provoking Japan into attacking the United States. The memo remained classified until 1994. Sections 9 and 10 of the memo are cited as the "Smoking Gun", and a primary thesis of an influential book (Stinnett's, see further reading) suggests that it was central to the high level conspiracy to lure the Japanese into an attack. Evidence that the memo or derivative works actually reached President Roosevelt, senior administration officials, or the highest levels of US Navy command, is largely conjectural.
From section 10 of the memo:
If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war. -- A. H. McCollum
Japanese intelligence (espionage) efforts against Pearl Harbor included at least two Abwehr agents. One of them, Otto Kuhn, was a sleeper agent living in Hawaii with his family; he and they were essentially incompetent. The other, Dusko Popov, a Yugoslavian businessman, was thought quite effective by Abwehr, but was actually a double agent whose loyalty was to the British. He worked for the XX Committee of MI5. In August 1941, he was tasked by Abwehr with specific questions about Pearl (Masterman's The Double-Cross System and Prange's Verdict both reproduce it), but the FBI seems to have evaluated the effort as of negligible importance. There has been no report its existence, or even Popov's availability as a double agent, was passed on to U.S. military intelligence or to civilian policy officials. J. Edgar Hoover dismissed Popov's importance, noting (without basis) his British codename, Tricycle, was connected with his sexual tastes. In any case, he was not allowed to continue to Hawaii and to develop more intelligence for the UK and U.S. Regardless, Prange demonstrates Popov's claim to have provided warning is overblown, and makes a case the notorious questionnaire was a product of Abwehr thoroughness.
More to the point, the Japanese did not need Abwehr assistance, having an active consulate in Hawaii which eventually included on its staff an undercover IJN intelligence officer, Takeo Yoshikawa. The consulate had been making reports to IJN Intelligence for years, and Yoshikawa increased the rate of reports after his arrival from Japan. (Sometimes called a "master spy", he was in fact quite young, and his reports not infrequently contained errors.) Pearl Harbor base security was so lax that Yoshikawa, indeed anyone, had no difficulty obtaining access to it, even taking the Navy's own harbor tourboat. (Even had he not, hills overlooking the Harbor were perfect for observation or photography, and were not off-limits.) Gossip with taxi drivers is supposed to have been one of his sources. Some of his information, and presumably other material from the Consulate, was hand-delivered to IJN intelligence officers aboard Japanese commercial vessels calling at Hawaii prior to the War; at least one is known to have been deliberately routed to Hawaii for this purpose during the summer. Most, however, seem to have been transmitted to Tokyo, almost certainly via cable (the usual communication method to/from Tokyo). Many of those messages were intercepted and decrypted by the U.S.; most were evaluated as the sort of intelligence gathering all nations routinely do about potential opponents, and not as evidence of an active attack plan. None of those currently known, including those decrypted after the attack when there was finally time to return to those remaining undecrypted, explicitly stated anything about an attack on Pearl; the only exception was a message sent from the Hawaiian Consulate on 6 December, which was not decrypted until after the 7th and was thus moot with regard to questions of U.S. foreknowledge. No cable traffic was intercepted in Hawaii until after David Sarnoff of RCA agreed to assist during a visit to Hawaii immediately before the 7th; such interception was illegal under U.S. law, though it had been going on sub rosa in New York for some time. Farago's postscript offers a viewpoint from RCA personnel. In the final analysis, illegal co-operation of American cable companies likely changed little or nothing, since radio intercept stations were picking up some of the consular traffic anyway, and American intelligence failed to make optimum use of their information in any case.
Locally, Naval Intelligence in Hawaii had been tapping telephones at the Japanese Consulate before the 7th, and, among much routine traffic, overheard a most peculiar discussion of flowers in a call to Tokyo (the significance of which is still publicly opaque and which was discounted in Hawaii at the time), but the Navy's tap was discovered and was disconnected in the first week of December. The local FBI field office was informed of neither the tap nor its removal; the local FBI Agent in Charge later claimed he would have had installed one of his own, had he known the Navy's had been disconnected.
Throughout 1941, the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands collected a considerable range of evidence suggesting Japan was planning some additional military adventure. The Japanese attack on the U.S. in December was essentially a side operation to the main Japanese thrust to the South against Malaya and the Philippines—many more resources, especially Imperial Army resources, were devoted to these attacks as compared to Pearl Harbor. Many in the Japanese military (both Army and Navy) had disagreed with Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's idea of attacking the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor when it was first proposed in early 1941, and remained reluctant after the Navy approved planning and training for an attack beginning in spring 1941, and through the highest level Imperial Conferences in September and November which first approved it as policy (allocation of resources, preparation for execution), and then authorized the attack. The Japanese focus on South-East Asia was quite accurately reflected in U.S. intelligence assessments; there were warnings of attacks against Thailand (the Kra Peninsula), Malaya, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies (Davao-Weigo Line), the Philippines, even Russia. Pearl Harbor was not mentioned.
The U.S. Navy was aware of the traditional planning of the Imperial Japanese Navy for a war with the U.S., as maintained throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. The Japanese made no secret of it, and in the 1930s American radio intelligence gave U.S. war planners considerable insight in Japanese naval exercises. These plans presumed there would be a large decisive battle between Japanese and U.S. battleships, but this would be fought near Japan, after the numerical superiority of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (assured by the Washington Naval Treaty, and still taken as given) was whittled down by primarily night attacks by light forces, such as destroyers and submarines. This strategy expected the Japanese fleet to take a defensive posture, awaiting US attack, and it was confirmed by the Japanese Navy staff only three weeks before Pearl Harbour . In the 1920s, the decisive battle was supposed to happen near the Ryukyu islands; in 1940 it was expected to occur in the central Pacific, near the Marshall islands. War Plan Orange reflected this in its own planning for an advance across the Pacific. Yamamoto's decision to shift the focus of the confrontation with the U.S. as far east as Pearl Harbour, and to use his aircraft carriers to cripple the American battleships, was a radical enough departure from previous doctrine to leave analysts in the dark.
There had been a specific claim of a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor from the Peruvian Ambassador to Japan in early 1941. (The source for this bit of intelligence has been traced to the Ambassador's Chinese cook. It was treated with skepticism, and properly so, given the now known nascent state of planning for the attack at the time.) Since Yamamoto had not yet then decided to even argue for an attack on Pearl Harbor, discounting US Ambassador Grew's report to Washington in early 1941, was quite sensible. Later reports from a Korean labor organization also seem to have been regarded as unlikely, though they may have had better grounding in actual IJN events. There has been uncovered no record of a serious belief or conviction by anyone in US or UK military intelligence (in Hawaii or DC or elsewhere), or among US civilian policy officials, prior to the attack, that Pearl Harbor or the US West Coast was on a target list.
There are two problems with this evaluation. First, there is Admiral King's endorsement of the Navy Court of Inquiry, page 344, reading in part, " ... (3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates some lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization. ..." Second, there exists more documentation for the "Winds Execute which relates an account of interception of the "Winds Execute", passing the message to ONI, and later, his direct order from Captain Harper not to testify in support of Safford at one of the Pearl Harbor hearings. Also see RG457 SRH-255 Archives II College Park MD where Ogg's statements during an interview by Captain Irwin G. Newman were considerably different from Toland's attributions and amplified by authors Stinnett and Wilford, and where neither Ogg or Newman ever mention the Winds code topic.
Since the Army was officially responsible for the security of the Pearl Harbor facilities and Hawaiian defense generally, and so of the Navy's ships while in port, Army actions are of particular interest. Short reported to Washington he had increased his alert level (but his earlier change in meaning for those levels was not understood in Washington and led to misunderstanding there about what he was really doing). In addition, Short's main concern was sabotage from fifth columnists, which accounts for his orders that Army Air Corps planes be parked close together near the center of the airfields. There seems to have been no increased Army urgency about getting its existing radar equipment properly integrated with the local command and control in the year it had been available and operational in Hawaii before the Attack. Leisurely radar training continued and the recently organized early warning center was left minimally staffed. Anti-aircraft guns remained in a state of low readiness, with ammunition in secured lockers. Neither Army long range bombers nor Navy PBYs were used effectively, remaining on a peacetime maintenance and use schedule. In Short's defense, it should be noted he had training responsibilities to meet, and the best patrol aircraft, B-17s and B-24s, were in demand in the Philippines and Britain, both of which had higher priority.
The mistakes made by both Hawaii and Washington meant little was done to prepare for air attack. Inter-service rivalries between Kimmel and Short did not improve the situation. Particularly, most intelligence information was sent to Kimmel, assuming he would relay it to Short, and vice versa; this assumption was honored mostly in the breach. Hawaii did not have a PURPLE cipher machine (although, by agreement at the highest levels between US and UK cryptographic establishments, four had been delivered to the British by October 1941), so Hawaii remained dependent on Washington for intelligence from that (militarily limited) source. However, since Short had no liaison with Kimmel's intelligence staff, he was usually left out of the loop. Henry Clausen reported the war warnings could not be more precise because Washington could not risk Japan guessing the U.S. was reading important parts of their traffic (i.e., most importantly PURPLE, despite the fact there was no known tactical or strategic info in that traffic).
Additionally, Clausen claims military men of Kimmel and Short's seniority and background should have understood the significance of the warnings, and should have been more vigilant than they were, as for instance in scouting plane flights from Hawaii, which were partial at best in the period just before the attack. All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures for their situations.
Like most commentators, Clausen ignores what the "war warnings" (and their context) explicitly warn, though indistinctly, against. Washington, with more complete intelligence than any field command, expected an attack anywhere on a list of possible locations (Pearl Harbor not among them), and since the Japanese were already committed to Thailand, it seems to have been expected another major operation by them was impossible. Clausen, like most, also ignores what actions Kimmel, Short, and Admiral Claude C. Bloch (Commander, Fourteenth Naval District, responsible for Naval facilities in Hawaii) actually took. They took precautions against sabotage, widely expected as a precursor to war, and reported their preparations. The Hawaiian commanders did not anticipate an air attack, despite good reason to have done so; no one did so explicitly.
One major point often omitted from the debate (though Costello covers it thoroughly) is the Philippines where MacArthur, unlike Kimmel or Short, had complete access to decrypted PURPLE traffic (indeed, Stinnet quotes Whitlock to that effect), and was nonetheless caught unprepared and with all planes on the ground nevertheless, nine hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. Caidin and Blair also raise the issue.
Although it has been argued that there was sufficient intelligence at the time to give commanders at Pearl Harbor a greater level of alert, some factors may take on unambiguous meaning not clear at the time, lost in what Roberta Wohlstetter in her masterful examination of the situation called "noise", "scattered amid the dross of many thousands of other intelligence bits, some of which just as convincingly pointed to a Japanese attack on the Panama Canal.
Not all in the US Navy shared this opinion. A mock air attack on Pearl Harbor during war games in the 1930s was judged to have been a success. Shortly after taking office, Navy Secretary Knox wrote an overview memo which specifically noted the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor. Neither observation led to formal policy recommendations to forestall such an attack, however.
The British proved torpedoes, modified for shallow water, could be effective in their attack on the Regia Marina at Taranto on November 11, 1940. The US Navy discussed this new development as can be seen in a June 1941 memo, as Taranto was about deep and Pearl less than 40. It was not considered the British attack method was relevant to a torpedo attack at Pearl.
The Royal Navy had used Swordfish torpedo planes, and their low speed was part of the reason the Taranto attack succeeded. The Imperial Japanese Navy no longer had any similar planes, so they had to develop other methods, both hardware and delivery technique. They independently developed shallow water torpedo modifications (called "Thunder Fish") during the planning and training for the attack in 1941. Wooden fins were added to the tail and anti-roll "flippers" kept the torpedo upright once in the water. The fins kept the torpedo's nose level in the air and broke off on entering the water. The flatter "flight" trajectory helped keep them from diving so deeply as to encounter bottom mud (but, despite these modifications, some Japanese torpedoes did indeed reach the bottom and several remain unaccounted for). These simple modifications were not anticipated by the USN, and Admiral Bloch (commander of the Pearl Harbor Naval District) didn't push to install torpedo nets or baffles at Pearl. Nor, it seems, did anyone else. Practical considerations also were an influence. Due to the shallow anchorage (which continues to require regular dredging), installation of torpedo nets would have severely restricted the mobility of vessels entering, leaving, and maneuvering in the harbor.
Kimmel and his staff testified regarding torpedo nets, booms, ...: "(m) Fact XV ... The decision not to install baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department.. That is, in Washington, DC, rather than in Hawaii.
In fact, the two carriers then operating with the Pacific Fleet, Enterprise and Lexington, were on missions to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands, which were intended in part to protect the route used by planes (including B-17s) bound for the Philippines. (The third, Saratoga, was in routine refit in Puget Sound, at the Bremerton shipyard.) At the time of the attack, Enterprise was about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, heading back. In fact, Enterprise had been scheduled to be back on December 6th, but was delayed by weather. A new arrival estimate, put her arrival at Pearl around 7:00AM, almost an hour before the attack, but she was also unable to make this schedule.
Furthermore, at the time, aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable. They were not capital ships. The most important vessels in naval planning even as late as Pearl Harbor were battleships (per the Mahan doctrine followed by both the U.S. and Japanese navies at the time). However, as the only major strike power remaining available in the Pacific fleet, carriers became the Navy's most important ships only following the attack.
One question to consider here is that, at the time, naval establishments all over the world regarded battleships, not carriers, as the most powerful and significant elements naval power. So, had the US wanted to preserve its key assets from an invited attack, it would almost certainly have focused on protecting battleships, not carriers.
After the attack, the search for the attack force was concentrated south of Pearl Harbor, continuing the confusion and ineffectiveness of the American response.
Theorists challenging the traditional view that Pearl Harbor was a surprise repeatedly note Roosevelt wanted (though did not say so officially) the United States to intervene in the war against Germany. A basic understanding of the political situation of 1941 precludes such an understanding as reasonable evidence Roosevelt knew of, allowed, or even invited, the Pearl Harbor attack.
First, no attack by Japan on the U.S. was a guarantee the U.S. would declare war on Germany. In such a case, American public anger would be directed at Japan, not Germany, just as happened. The Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) called for each to aid another in case of attack; Japan could not reasonably claim America had attacked Japan if it attacked first. For instance, Germany had been at war with the UK since 1939, and with the U.S.S.R. since June 1941 without Japanese assistance. There was a serious, if low-level, naval war going on in the Atlantic between Germany and the U.S. Navy in the summer of 1941, in any case. Nevertheless, it was only Hitler's declaration of war, unforced by the Axis treaty, several days after the Pearl Harbor attack, that brought the U.S. into the European war.
Clausen and Lee's Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement contains some interesting information on the intelligence available to Roosevelt and Churchill prior to the Attack. On page 367 in the Appendix is a PURPLE message, dated 29 November 1941, from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo. A closing paragraph reads, " ... He (Ribbentrop) also said that if Japan were to go to war with America, Germany would, of course, join in immediately, and Hitler's intention was that there should be absolutely no question of Germany making a separate peace with England. ..." According to David Irving, Churchill (having full access to PURPLE traffic) was well aware of this message, noting it in red ink. While theorists challenging the conventional view that the Attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise treat this as a guarantee to join after Japan's attack, it can as easily be taken as a guarantee to come to Japan's aid, as Germany had done for Italy in Libya.
Conflicting stories regarding FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests for the source materials used, e.g., Sheet Number 94644, or materials available at the National Archives are also common among the debate. However, much information has been said to have been automatically destroyed under a destruction of classified information policy during the war itself. Note various authors have nevertheless continued to bring classified Pearl Harbor materials to light via FOIA.
For instance, Sheet No. 94644 derives from its reference in the FOIA-released Japanese Navy Movement Reports of Station H in November 1941. Entries for 28 November 1941 have several more items of interest, each being a "movement code" message (indicating ship movements or movement orders), with specific details given by associated Sheet Numbers. Examples are: Sheet No. 94069 has information on "KASUGA MARU" - this being hand-written (Kasuga Maru was later converted to CVE Taiyo); Sheet No. 94630 is associated with IJN oiler Shiriya; and finally for Sheet No. 94644 there is another hand-written remark "FAF using Akagi xtmr" (First Air Fleet using Akagi's transmitter). It is known the movement reports were largely readable at the time.
These three documents (Sheet Numbers 94069, 94630, and 94644) are examples of materials which yet, even after decades and numerous specific FOIA requests, have not been declassified fully and made available to the public. Sheet Number 94644, for example, noted as coming from Akagi's transmitter and as being a "movement code" report, would have likely contained a reported position.
Another issue in the debate is the fact neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short ever faced court martial. It is alleged this was to avoid disclosing information showing the U.S. had advanced knowledge of the attack. When asked, "Will historians know more later?", Kimmel replied, "' ... I'll tell you what I believe. I think that most of the incriminating records have been destroyed. ... I doubt if the truth will ever emerge.' ... It is equally, probably more, likely this was done to avoid disclosing the fact Japanese codes were being read, given there was a war on.


text:
Total Items: 0 Current Total: $0.00
View Larger Image
Email this product to a friend
Greek Horseman Muscle Armour is unusual with its very widened form. It was designed to make it possible for a soldier to ride a horse without being obstructed by the lower edge of a standard breastplate. Made in brass with brass hinges, fits up to a 48" chest. Wearable. New Low Price! Was $610
Copyright © 1995 - 2015 By The Sword All rights reserved
Contact Us: email@example.com

subset: commoncrawl


text:
The Tavern of Fine Arts aims to provide a relaxed and comfortable wine bar and café. We feature fine wines, select liquors, craft cocktails, specialty beers and a full food menu available six nights per week in either the performance room or the barroom.
We are dedicated to providing an environment that encourages and fosters the patronage and presentation of musical, visual, and literary fine arts. Our space displays the work of local artists. The exhibits will change periodically and with each change we will host an opening party. We are also a venue for the performance of chamber music by the wealth of talented classical musicians in the St. Louis area.
The Tavern is a perfect place for friends and neighbors to come together for dinner and share a bottle of wine amidst beautiful art and music, or simply sit and read. We look forward to meeting you!


text:
your dmc files should be in program files x86 Daz 3D studio 3, 4 whatever plugins mimic configuration files, depending on what flavours of Daz studio you have installed, also in mimic, I have all my dmc files in a new folder seperate with my music files actually where I can find them!
and my pz2 files!
I have made a seperate runtime folder there with the lot!
On XP it's C:\Program Files\DAZ 3D\DAZStudio4\plugins\dzmimic\Configuration_Files
So I guess those come with the plugin included in Daz…
I wonder why the pro installer wasn't updated with all the dmc's, as well?
What about Poser users? (If DS4P were to stop being free, would DS4-basic have the mimic plugin?)
i've got DS4Pro, which i foolishly bought before they decided to give it away for free. in the plugins folder i'm only seeing .dlls for all my plugins plus a "PowerPose" and "Reality" folder (i normally use Reality for rendering). no mimic folder at all


text:
Latest People News
Squire's people get on their bikes for charity 7-Jul-2015
Staff from Squire's Long Ditton, Surrey garden centre took on a static bike challenge to raise money for the Momentum charity.
Squire's helps build careers in horticulture 6-Jul-2015
Squire's Garden Centres has selected two new people selected to take part in its "Grow Our Own" apprenticeship scheme.
New manager will introduce Suki hardware and tools to UK 6-Jul-2015
Known throughout Europe, German hardware and hand tools company Suki.international is bringing its extensive product ranges and merchandising solutions to the UK, with the appointment of Chris Cullen as UK country manager.
WD-40 winner is off to Wales Rally GB 1-Jul-2015
London-based mechanic Wayne Brooks has been crowned the winner of the WD-40 Be My Mechanic competition, following a live final which took place at this year's Goodwood Festival of Speed.
Bolsius sales manager John Barthorpe dies 29-Jun-2015
Bolsius UK sales manager for UK & Ireland John Barthorpe has died after a period of illness.
Second time around at Spear & Jackson 29-Jun-2015
Spear & Jackson has recruited Duncan Horton as its regional sales manager for Europe and Africa.
New plant buyer for Squire's Garden Centres 29-Jun-2015
Squire's Garden Centres has announced the appointment of Jeremy Hall as group plant buyer.
New digital role at Fetim Group 29-Jun-2015
Chet Singh has been appointed to the newly-created role of head of digital at Fetim Group.
Bathrooms.com newcomer will head up SEO 29-Jun-2015
Bathrooms.com has named Ovidiu Suciu as its new technical search engine optimisation (SEO) and analytics manager.
Poplar Tree Garden Centre appoints new manager 16-Jun-2015
Paul Barker has been appointed as general manager of the Poplar Tree Garden Centre, located in Shincliffe Village on the outskirts of Durham.
View older people news items


text:
« Coco sugar a hit at trade fair | Home | Lanao farmers train on coco sugar production »
Medicinal Plant: Kakawate – Cacao (Gliricidia sepium)
|By pinoyfarmer | March 14, 2011
Gen info
Name "gliricidia" derives from the Lain 'glis' (dormouse) and caedere (to kill). The Spanish name "mata-raton" refers to the tree's rodenticial properties.
As the tree pods hang-dry in the sun, they curl and explode, making a popping cracking sound. A cluster of trees with their pods snapping and popping and falling to the ground, in unison, make a fascinating afternoon of nature's concoction of sound.
Smooth, deciduous tree, 3 to 10 meters high.
Leavesw are opposite, oblong-ovate, 4-6 cm long with a pointed tip and rounded base.
Flowers are pink, 2 cm long, with a truncate calyx.
The pods are narrow, oblong to oblanceolate, 10 t 14 cm longs, 2 cm wide, containing 6 to 8 seeds.
The tree is common in the southern Tagalog areas, shedding leaves around December and flowering February and March. In some areas, the blooming of its pink flowers is so profuse to deserve a comparison with the cherry blossoms.
Parts utilized
Leaves, bark, roots.
Constituents and properties
Phytochemical studies have yielded:
• Aformosin (an isoflavan, reportedly with anti-tumor capacity), formononetin (isoflavan), gliricidin-6a, gliricidol-9A, medicarpin (pterocarpan, reportedly antifungal), 7,4′-dihydroxy-3′-methoxyisoflavin, 2′O-methylsepiol, tannin and a trihydroxyflavonone.
• Tannins are considered potentially antidiarrheal, antidysenteric, antimutagenic, antioxidant, bactericidal, hepatoprotective, pesticidal and viricidal.
• From the heartwood were isolated stigmastanol glucoside and 3′,4′-dihydroxy-trans-cinnamic acid octacosylester 2 along with three other known constituents.
Dermatitis, skin itching: Apply juice or decoction of leaves, bark or roots on the skin as antipruritic.
Fresh leaves applied to the skin as insect repellant.
As counterirritant: Crush leaves and apply as poultice for rheumatic pains, sprains and closed fractures.
Sap of bark, leaves and roots have been used for wound healing.
Treatment of scabies.
In Guatemala, the bark and leaves are used to treat skin diseases.
In many folkloric regimens of other countries, used for headache, bruises, burns, colds, cough, fever, fatigue, gangrene, gonorrhea, skin itches and sores; as antidote, insecticide, insect repellent.
Wood is hard and durable used for small housing needs, posts, implement handles and firewood.
Leaves have a fetid smell; crushed, used to rid dogs of fleas and ticks and cattle, of ticks.
The juice from leaves is applied to daily for one week to areas affected by external parasites,
Insect repellent: In Latin American, used by farmers to repel insects. Leaves are ground up, mixed with water, and the resulting paste use to bathe animals, and repeated every 7 to 14 days, decreasing the infections from tropical warble fly.
• Anti-Pseudomonas: Potential as anti-pseudomonas drug: Crude extract of Gliricidium sepium showed potential antipseudomonas drug potential with an in vitro study showing a minimum inhibitory concentration at 1%.
• Anti-Scabies: Clinical Trail on the Effectiveness of Gliricidia sepium (kakawati) in Treating Patients with Scabies: The study concluded that the "kakawati" preparation is as effective as sulfur lotion in the treatment of scabies.
• Antimicrobial: (1) Study of 10 medicinal plants in Colombian folk medicine, including G sepium, was done screening for antimicrobial activity. The ethanol extracts were all active against S aureus except for J secunda. (2) A possible alternative in the treatment of non-nosocomial infections: G. sepium was one of ten medicinal plants screened for antimicrobial activity, all of which were found effective against three or more pathogenic microorganisms, corroborating their use in folkloric medicine.
• Saponins: Study yielded three new hederagenin-based acetylated saponins from the fruits of Gliricidia sepium.
• Insecticidal / Nematicidal / Antibacterial: Study showed nematicidal activity against Meloidogyne incognita nematode with 60% mortalilty; mosquito repellent activity against Aedes aegypti with maximum 78% repellency; and antibacterial activity agaiinst E. coli, S aureus, Pseudomonas spp, S typhi and Klebsiella spp with best results against E Coli.
• Antimicrobial: Study on the antimicrobial activity on the bark of five tree species showed G sepium to have antimicrobial effects against S epidermis, S aureus, P aeruginosa, B pumillus and V cholerae.
Preparation for scabies treatment
Courtesy of: Dr. Joel Bañez, Section of Dermatology, UERMMH
1. White candelsticks (4)
2. Coconut oil or any cooking oil: 500 cc
3. Kakawati leaves 250 g
1. Clean kakawati leaves thoroughly
2. Chop leaves finely
3. Add 250 g (approximately 1 glass) of finely chopped leaves into 2 glasses of coconut oil.
4. Mix while boiling.
5. Gather leaves on the surface of the oil, then drain using a strainer.
6. Get 4 white candles ('esperma") and chop finely.
7. Add to the boiled preparation and mix until all chopped candles are melted.
8. Again, using a strainer, drain and transfer mixture into a clean glass container. Let it cool.
• Tannins: In South America, in times of scarcity, the forage is fed to livestock. Although goats can consume large quantities of plants with tannins, some animals, like cattle and sheep may not tolerate it due to a salivary protein binding factor that biinds the tannins.
Philippine Medicinal Plants
Topics: Medicinal Plants (Halamang Gamot) | No Comments »


text:
Fire damages Westside residence
A blaze of unknown origin heavily damaged the home of Thuy Bui at 825 Hill St. Monday afternoon.
Batesville Fire Department Capt. Cam Russell said Bui was home when the 911 fire call was made at 4:45 p.m.
"No one was injured; she was standing across the street on the school ground when we arrived," Russell said.
In flames when the department arrived, firefighters had to use a chain saw to cut into the end of the house, and later the roof, to get to hot spots in the attic of the home while water was being sprayed inside to control the blaze.
Lyon breaks through in Mississippi
BLUE MOUNTAIN, Miss. — It stopped at nine in Mississippi.
The Lyon College men's basketball team defeated the Blue Mountain Toppers 62-58 here Monday night, ending their loss string at nine games and collecting their first TranSouth Athletic Conference victory of the season.
Basketball in town tonight!
Forrest City Lady Mustangs (2-4, 5A-East District; 5-14, overall) vs. Batesville Lady Pioneers (1-5, 3-14), Pioneer Gym, 6 p.m.
The Lady Mustangs will try to finish off the first turn through the district schedule with two straight wins. They trimmed the Blytheville Lady Chickasaws on Friday night. "We have been playing better," Forrest City Coach Bobby Harris said. "Keyma Thompson, Mary Burks and Nikima Chatters have been playing pretty well."
Batesville juniors finish home slate with three wins
In their last appearance at home, Batesville's junior high basketball teams recorded a sweep in 5A-East District play.
In the varsity opener, the Junior Lady Pioneers clobbered the Wynne Lady Bees 42-12. The Junior Pioneers followed with a 39-29, come-from-behind decision over the Bees.
Batesville's girls shut out the visitors in the first quarter. Batesville led 11-0, 19-5 and 27-8 at the quarter breaks.
Sarah Hayes led the winners with 12 points. Kassie Blake and Katie Baxter chipped in 11 and eight points, respectively.
Cedar Ridge T-wolves roll on to 27-0 record
JUDSONIA — The Cedar Ridge Timberwolves hammered the White County Central Bears 82-39 in a 2A-2 District contest, improving their record to 27-0 overall and 10-0 district.
Jordan Steele led the T-wolves with 19 points, hitting five 3-pointers. Jacob Ardrey added 18 points, scoring four 3-pointers. Spencer Reaves provided 15 points.
The Cedar Ridge senior girls won 51-20. Haley Hix and Tosha Lovell both scored 12 points.
The Cedar Ridge junior girls won 35-11. Shannon Butler led with 15 points.
'Topping-out' ceremony scheduled for campus center
Lyon College will hold a "topping-out" ceremony for its new campus center at 11:30 a.m. Thursday at the construction site on College Avenue.
A topping-out ceremony commemorates the placement of the last beam at the top of a building. Lyon President Don Weatherman will speak briefly and the top beam will be signed before it is lifted into place.
The beam also will be available for signing Wednesday morning. It will be located outside the fence area on the north side of the site.
Library board meets Thursday
The Independence County Library Board will meet at 4 p.m. Thursday in the Citizens Bank Annex building. Meetings are open to the public.
Agency helps with utilities, fire departments, more
Editor's note: In addition to this program, USDA also has programs that help provide cities and towns with water, local fire departments with equipment, home loans and new roofs, windows, heating and air for homeowners.
• Donnie Fulbright has served as the mayor of Mount Pleasant for the past 22 years.
Fulbright said the agency has assisted with funding to help upgrade the fire department, helped with the cost of the community center/fire station and a water system that encompassed three counties.
Teen girls accused in break-in
MOUNTAIN HOME — Two teenage girls were taken into custody for breaking into a Baxter County convenience store, Sheriff John F. Montgomery said.
The 911 call center received a report at 12:10 a.m. Sunday from someone who saw a vehicle pull up at the Frost-Eez at 859 Cannie Baker Road, then drive away. A short time later, the caller saw flashlights inside the building and made the call to 911. Frost-Eez has been out of business for some time, Montgomery said.
Accused child rapist arrested trying to escape
MELBOURNE — A man accused of raping a child was arrested in Izard County after officers captured him trying to escape through a window, Sheriff Tate Lawrence said.
The Izard County Sheriff's Department assisted the U.S. Marshals Service Friday morning in the arrest of William Charles Langley Jr., 40, of Louisiana.
The arrest warrant from Acadia Parish in Louisiana accuses Langley of aggravated rape of a 7-year-old. Lawrence said the warrant did not specify if the child was male or female.
Winter Gala a success
The Batesville community turned out in numbers Sunday night to support Main Street Batesville's Winter Gala event held at Elizabeth's Restaurant Sunday night.
"We had about 75 people come out and enjoy the great food and entertainment and help us raise $4,000," Main Street Director Paula Grimes said Monday afternoon.
Both silent and live auctions were held during the event with over 60 items offered, ranging from beauty/personal care items to shop tools, home decor, jewelry and much more.
Meeting set over FSA closure
MELBOURNE — A public meeting to discuss the future of the Izard County Farm Service Agency office in Melbourne is scheduled for 2:30 p.m. Friday in the Izard County Courtroom, said Linda Newkirk, executive director of the state FSA.
The courthouse is at 80 E. Main St. in Melbourne.
This will be the only public meeting to take comments on the United States Department of Agriculture's proposed office consolidation plan in which Izard County's FSA office is being considered for consolidation (closure).


text:
Walmart sold AMT kits from around 2000 to 2005 all in the $5.00 range.
Model car builders mindset list 2013
Posted 12 March 2013 - 08:33 AM
Posted 12 March 2013 - 08:54 AM
Walmart sold AMT kits from around 2000 to 2005 all in the $5.00 range.
That must have been "nice" (I put that in quotes considering what overall damage was done with those checkerboard boxed kits to AMT/RC2), they were $8.98 around these parts.
Posted 12 March 2013 - 10:26 AM
26. ( One for the old guys ) Screwbottoms and wire axles are bad.
Posted 12 March 2013 - 01:24 PM
then what would hold the grilles and glass in?
Posted 21 March 2013 - 06:42 PM
Kinda sounds like you guys have something strongly against video games. I have a PS3 and a Wii and play them fairly often. I also build model car kits. Does this mean I have ripped a hole in the space time continuum?
if you have, then you are not alone
Posted 21 March 2013 - 06:51 PM
I graduated H.S. in 1995, now these kids are going to college? *sigh* Guess that explains why the music I listened to then is filtering into classic rock...
As part of the Gen X set of modelers here, I had video games growing up on the original Nintendo (Atari before that) and watched the internet be born (and had a Commodore 128 before that), and yet I and a slew of other people ate all still here, still building, and most if us are proudly still playing video games of one sort our another. I don't understand why some people feel the two "pastimes" are mutual exclusive of one another.
Agreed; many of my builds are inspired by video games. I rarely play anything other than racing games so for me the two kind of go together. Before Gran Turismo originally came out, a Skyline was a restaurant in Cincinnati. Forza 4 is my current favorite and I am in the process of building a few cars from my "garage" so I personally think that model cars and video games CAN cohabitate.


text:
Hotels in 30149 - Mount Berry GA
Only hotels in 30149 zip code are listed below. Search for cheap and discount hotel rates in Mount Berry, GA for your upcoming leisure or conference / group travel. We list the best 30149 hotels and motels so you can review the Mount Berry hotel list below to find the perfect lodging. Hotels in Floyd county and area code 706 are also listed.
30149 Hotels & Accommodations
Next: Show All Available 30149 Hotels with Pricing >


text:
Our Executive Director is Embezzling
It's the phone call no board member wants or ever expects to get: word that the organization's executive director is being investigated by the police for embezzlement. In this First Person Nonprofit article, Vernon Waldren, board member of the Nonprofit Association of the Midlands in Omaha, Nebraska, talks candidly about how the story unfolded:
We got a call from someone at a different nonprofit letting us know that our executive director was probably going to be arrested for embezzlement at their organization, where he was on the board. Our [board] president got that call on a Monday morning, and she called a meeting of the executive committee at 5:00 that evening.
What we learned was that this other organization was working with the police to determine whether there was enough evidence for an arrest, and that there probably would be an arrest. My first reaction was disbelief. I didn't know if he was guilty or innocent, but still you're surprised, you think, "okay," and then you're disappointed, and then you think, "If it's true, why would somebody do that?"
We had a three-hour meeting that night, and we knew we needed to do something appropriate for the membership and for the donors. We went through all the scenarios. Whether or not there was an arrest, there was enough corroboration that we needed to do something.
One thing that made a big difference was that we had great people on the board. We had a good mix of backgrounds, and every person had a connection to at least one other nonprofit, so we knew what we were about. The board chair was an executive director of a nonprofit for kids; the board treasurer was a banker; we had a nonprofit computer expert on the board, an assistant university dean, etc. At the time I was the president-elect; now I'm the president.
Before the meeting there had been some follow-up confirming the information we had gotten in the first call. During the meeting we talked with an attorney that one of us knew, who had done a lot of pro bono work with nonprofits, and later we reached out to a public relations firm that had also done a lot of pro bono work.
Fast action
We decided -- we took a vote -- that evening to suspend the executive director with pay. He had not been arrested, but we had enough credible reports to cause us concern. We did not want to impugn his reputation. He was still an employee until we knew for sure all the facts of the matter. We didn't think there was any malfeasance related to his work at NAM, but we didn't want to take any chances. Our concern was to safeguard our organization and its reputation.
The first thing the next morning we secured the bank accounts. The treasurer was on the signature card so he called the bank and told them not to let anything through without two signatures, including one from a board member. He also put a stop on the credit card.
The board president and the treasurer got to the office early and were there when the executive director arrived. They told him what had been decided, and he was very professional, didn't argue, gave them his keys, and thanked them for their support.
When the other staff came in, they were told that the board had closed the office for the day, and they should go home, and that they would get paid for the day, and would be informed later what would happen next. Meanwhile the computer person on our board went in and secured the computer; we wanted to be sure that we had all financial records intact in case we needed to look more closely at them.
That same day, we on the Executive Committee called each of the board members to announce a special meeting of the full board, and also advising them not to speculate, don't answer questions from anyone, refer questions to the board president.
Two days later
Two days later our ED was arrested, and he resigned. By the time it got to the press he was therefore NAM's "former executive director." As a result we were just a minor part of the news story.
We called all the donors and funders, and every one of the members. I remember calling eBay Foundation, telling them that our ED was under investigation at a different entity, that we had suspended him, and that there was no indication of malfeasance at our organization; she was glad I had filled her in so quickly. Imagine the difference if our members, donors and others had first learned of the leadership change by reading it in the paper!
What are you proud of?
Before this happened he [the executive director] had strong positive support from the board. Several of the board members were good friends with him. But that didn't change their being completely professional about how to handle the situation. We handled it professionally. We didn't get into the issue of guilt or not guilt. We focused on what we needed to do for the organization. We didn't go beyond what we should have done, but we did what we needed to do.
A few years before when our ED had been in the hospital, we adopted an emergency succession plan. So we knew what to do. The board president became the main contact for the organization, and the board would appoint an interim executive director. As it turns out, one of our board members was just leaving her job; we knew her capabilities and she stepped into the ED job.
Why are we telling our story? One of the philosophies of the board is that we want to exemplify good practices, and we think we handled this correctly, and we wanted to let other people see how one nonprofit effectively handled a crisis situation.
And now?
We emerged stronger and better in terms of community relations, financial management, and board leadership. We lost no members or donors.
The executive director pled guilty to taking more than $100,000 from the other organization. He's paying restitution and is on probation. The board member who became the interim director eventually became the permanent CEO -- Anne Hindery Camp -- and she's doing a terrific job.
Vernon Waldren is board president of Nonprofit Association of the Midlands, an Omaha-based organization supporting nonprofits through workshops, joint purchasing, public policy work, a jobs board, and other services. Vernon is also Extension Educator at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln. As part of his job he works with 4H, where as a youngster he was an active participant both in the livestock program ("hogs and all that") and in their leadership development program. He wants you to know that 4H is the largest youth organization in the world, and that it teaches life skills through many more programs than its traditional farm programs.
See also:
- Sample Emergency Succession Plan from CompassPoint Nonprofit Services
- Succession Planning for Organizations of All Sizes
- Embezzlement: More Common and More Preventable Than You Think
- Five Internal Controls for the Very Small Organization
Do you have a First Person Nonprofit story to share with Blue Avocado readers? Let us know about it by writing to editor at blueavocado.org.> Read more
I'd like to know more about what was happening/going on with staff at this time. Was no one actually working for the organization able to step into the ED role (was it too small)? I get the idea of a bewildered staff watching as board members take full control of the organization, from the computer, to the financial matters, to the leadership. Is this part of the story missing? I'd love to hear a perspective from an employee - perhaps the number two person or others. Luckily for them, the organization retained its reputation and integrity, thanks to the work of the board, but it seems they were relegated to the sidelines during the events described.
Sounds like NAM handled this well. The article does not say if NAM undertook an investigation of possible fraud at their own organization, but I believe they should have. People who embezzle from one organization are likely to embezzle from another given the opportunity. Funders and donors would likely question if that is the case. A fraud examiner can be brought in to investigate and determine if fraud has occured.
I would be interested in knowing how the act of embezzelment was committed by a member of the Board of Directors (of the non-profit that was embezzled). What position on the board was he holding during this time, that allowed him an opportunity to embezzel the organization?
I am having a big issue with the blatant conflict of interest of the hiring of a Board member to take over as Executive Director after the crisis. Meaning no disrespect to that person as an individual, of course. I was ok with how this was handled up to that point. I am currently out of a job along with ALL of my co-workers from an organization who allowed it's Board to run the organization and then punish the staff when things went south. I feel that the two entities of an organization should be clear and seperate. NEVER have a Board member try and run an organization for any reason. Give the staff the information and tools they need, support them and keep an open door, have a dialogue, be informed of each other but let each person shine where they should. There must have been some by-law changes allowed in order for a Board member to become Executive Director. Hope it all works for you. It killed our 60 year old organization which is now closed.
Thanks. Good Luck.
My organization is a member of NAM and I didn't recieve any communication from a Board member regarding this situation. Please don't generalize about "members being notified", Mr. Waldren. I find that insulting, or perhaps its yet one more example of little NAM cares about its non-Omaha based members.
A couple of clarifications on the article:
- This situation occurred two years ago, January, 2008.
- The staff of NAM at that time was 2.25 FTE (3 people); the current ED was the only full FTE person.
- The staff did a great job in the transition. And were invited to apply for the position. The board member who stepped in to serve as Interim Director immediately resigned from the board.
- NAM did have a multiyear audit conducted; no funds were misappropriated.
- The misuse of monies by the ED was from another organization where he served as treasurer.
- I apologize to the one member who commented about not being contacted. Efforts were made to contact NAM members as well as donors. This was a fast moving situation and every effort was made to notify folks.
Vernon Waldren
Oftentimes when I read the Blue Avocado I find that the articles present an unbalanced view that favors the board rather than valuing staff or the exec.dir. as equally important to an organization. This article was one of those times. Clearly, there was a problem with the exec. dir., but the board seemed to take charge without including any management staff who could have been key in getting through this. Then they hired a board member to run the organization to boot! I'm sure this can work, but I have rarely seen it provide more benefit than damage to an organization. The roles are too hard to keep clear and the staff are relegated to minor roles.
A situation where someone who is currently your boss (board) can at some point be doing your job (exec. dir) is a lousy way to set an organizational structure! Maybe it works in an instance where the ex leaves first, but it can create a board that offers a fertile ground for employment and an ex. dir. job that is nightmarish.
According to Mr. Waldren's comments, the ED was the only manager; the other two employees were part time. Had it been a larger organization with an assistant ED, it would have made sense to have that person handle interim duties. The other two might not have been willing and/or capable of handling either temporary or permanent ED duties.
I am investigating a situation where at least the executive committee of a nonprofit knew about embezzlement, and let the exec repay the money and keep his job. What can be done when the board is clearly complicit with wrong-doing? How can changes be forced/made to ensure the longevity and reputation of the organization (or can it be ensured at all?)? Any thoughts out there on this twist to this scenario?
What's your relationship to the nonprofit? Without knowing that, it's pretty hard to think about solutions to the situation you're outlining.
I wonder what the NAM Board might have done had the Executive Director not resigned, but protested his innocence and gone trial with a plea of not guilty?
Would you have had to keep him on the payroll until he was convicted? After all, he had not stolen any money from NAM. At what point is it appropriate to inform other people of the reasons for the suspension?
What if the other organization had handled the matter internally?
That's an interesting question -- for an ED or another staff person. Do you need to have a policy? Is it enough to be employed at will and have the organization decide that indictment for a non-business related offense is enough to terminate someone ? What if the offense were not embezzlement of another nonprofit (which "feels" related to the employing organization)? What if it were for burglary or domestic violence?
Too bad more info like this didnt come sooner. I worked for a non-profit 3 yrs ago where the ED in my opinion was not handling the organizations money appropiatley when I approached the Board Pres about it she immediatley wanted to further investigate but as soon as she apporached the otehr board members they all ganged up on her because they were the ED's friend for many years and so they were verbally abusive toward her and they went to the ED about it. Of course the ED was suggesting removing her from the board or have her resign. This Board Pres. brought in others who questioned where this foundation money went if not used on the project she denied it and the otehr board members began attacking her. We called several state and City for help but no one knew what to do, I was told to turn it in to the IRS. She had hired an accountant who also helped her cover up the books and verbally told the board that the way the money situation is was wrong explaining to them that you cant take money from one grant and move it over to another etc. etc. nothing ever came about it the Board President resigned after the ED called an emergancy board meeting and excluded the Board Pres. they left a threatening voice mail demanding her resignation. SAD But very True and not only for this non profit that was dearly loved but this ED is also a State Democrat Representative. I seen illegal things happen and when I cried out along with the board we were shot down.
Jeff Russell: Unfortunately there are so many simple things that can be done to prevent fraud that are consistently not employed at many NPs. Fraud is a result of perceived need, justification, and opportunity. NPs can attack all three of these with different tactics and help prevent much - but not all - fraud.
Check out my blog inspired by this topic. http://youreasyoffice.com/_blog/Easy_Office_Blog/post/Fraud_and_Nonprofi...
While the embezzling ED is clearly in the wrong, it is the responsiblity of the board to call for regular audits and to establish checks and balances to make sure this doesn't happen.
I am an ED of an organization with ~1.2 million on the balance sheet and 200K going through the books annually. When I started, the board wanted me to receive invoices, write checks, sign checks, balance the check book, and make the budget reports. They didn't want to pay for a bookkeeper or an audit. I was extremely uncomfortable with the situation and said so periodically. The reporting practices were set up by the treasurer who was a CPA--my background is not accounting so I deferred to the treasurer.
A new board president took over who did not like me (for reasons having nothing to do with work.) We get paid biweekly. He noticed payroll was bigger for certain months (months with three pay periods, not two) and during a board meeting, he announced he didn't think I should sign payroll checks as payroll was larger than usual for x y z months! It was easily explained, but it was incredibly embarrassing.
Because the BOD president was certain I was mishandling funds, he called for a review of our accounts by an accountant. The accountant found no discrepencies. However, she found that the board treasurer (the CPA) had set up very 'unusual' reporting practices for me to follow; she privately suggested I watch the accounts very closely!! I shared this information with a few board members in confidence--they voted in a new treasurer. It took a new BOD president until the board agreed to pay for an audit. The audit confirmed we needed to adjust our reporting practices (the ones set up by the previous treasurer were inappropriate), create a whistle-blower policy and hire a book-keeper. Done done and done.
I don't know if the treasurer was setting me up, incompetant or just lazy--but clearly, if anything had happened, I would have taken the blame.


text:
WEST CHAZY - Jim Garrant isn't embarrassed to wear pink. In fact, he's proud to.
Garrant is president of the newly formed Northern New York chapter of the Guardians of the Ribbon - a nonprofit organization working to raise money and awareness for cancer in women and children.
The group is made up mostly of law enforcement agents and firefighters, of which Garrant has been for the last 32 years. However, it wasn't just because he was a fire fighter Garrant became interested in the Guardians.
"My wife is a breast cancer survivor," he explained. "And, I've lost a couple of aunts to cancer and an uncle."
A couple months ago, Garrant's son, Jeremy, noticed a Youtube clip about the Guardians, featuring a pink fire truck. Immedietly Garrant contacted founder Dave immediately and began the 14th chapter of the Guardians of the Ribbon in the U.S., and the first in New York.
In just two short months, the local chapter already has 14 members.
"Right now, I've got three or four in my department, just from word of mouth," he explained, referring to the West Chazy Volunteer Fire Department.
Other members are from fire departments in Beekmantown and South Plattsburgh.
One of the current goals of the chapter is to get enough donations to purchase a pink fire truck, which Garrant expects to cost about $10,000.
"Once we get started, we'll be traveling all around New York," he said. "I've got people wanting us already to go to Syracuse for an event out there."
Getting the pink fire truck is important to the organization, because it not only raises awareness, but spirits as well.
Garrant explained Graybill's fire trucks are covered with autographs and messages from people across the country who have seen the truck. Something Garrant plans to do with the local chapter as well.
(Continued on Next Page)
Prev Next
More like this story
Use the comment form below to begin a discussion about this content.


text: Publications Search Results Users may wish to consult What's Included in the Bibliography. Results 1 - 1 Results per page: 25 50 100 Sort by: Pub Date (newest) Title Recent Additions Author Clear All Pub. Year Citation 2009 Branum, Amy M., Lukacs, Susan L. Food allergy among children in the United States. Pediatrics. 124, (6), 1549-1555. Full Text Options: DOI Worldcat Google Scholar Export Options: RIS EndNote XML [1]


text:
17/11/2013 18:56
ENDOWING steps up to beat the big guns in the G2 LONGINES Jockey Club Cup
ENDOWING continued his upward curve to land the biggest win of his career in a barnstorming finish to the G2 LONGINES Jockey Club Cup (2000m) at Sha Tin racecourse on Sunday, 17 November.
John Size's charge lined up for this premier lead-up to next month's G1 LONGINES Hong Kong Cup aiming to prove his merit against the big guns – a solid win two weeks earlier in the HKG3 Sa Sa Ladies' Purse (1800m) had hinted that he was on the cusp. And in taking the day's feature by a diminishing head, the four-year-old exacted revenge on runner-up AKEED MOFEED, his half-length conqueror in last season's HKG1 BMW Hong Kong Derby (2000m).
"He hasn't been winning by big margins but his wins have been quite convincing, he's held the horses off," said Size. "Today again off the rail alley, which he's been fortunate enough to draw a few times in his career, he was afforded the run of the race and he was given a split to win the race at the top of the straight, and he went on with it."
Tye Angland enjoyed an armchair ride from the one gate as he settled ENDOWING fifth on the fence, just inside MILITARY ATTACK and within striking distance of the front-running Liberator. But Angland's comfort vanished at the top of the stretch as, with his mount about to exert his superiority, the Australian dropped his whip.
"I didn't have to do much work once I got out, he was coming into the race so strong – I saw MILITARY ATTACK was off the bridle and I was going a lot better than him," he said. "I got the run between LIBERATOR and SAME WORLD and dashed really quick. I actually dropped my whip when I went to go for him, so the panic button was hit and I went from looking pretty to kicking him and slapping him and doing my best to get him across the line! I think I would have won a lot easier if I'd had a whip to ask him to hit the line."
With AKEED MOFEED storming home late and wide from the tail under Douglas Whyte, ENDOWING held on to clock 2m 00.60s, a new class record for the distance, while Horse of the Year MILITARY ATTACK kept on to finish a length and a half further back in third. Last year's winner CALIFORNIA MEMORY was a staying-on fourth.
"It's a very good sign that he can go up in company and meet those ratings of the better horses," said Size of the gelding, who went into the race rated 108. "AKEED MOFEED is 118, so he has to go to that to beat him – he can't do any more than win and we just have to remain optimistic for further improvement."
Richard Gibson was heartened by the performance of AKEED MOFEED. The classy colt ran his best race of the season after two unplaced efforts, to suggest he is on track for a big show at the LONGINES Hong Kong International Races in three weeks.
"We're very pleased, I thought it was a brilliant ride from Douglas, he rode him very patiently and the horse showed that impressive turn-of-foot he showed last term, so it's great to have him back."
The G1 LONGINES Hong Kong Cup is part of the LONGINES Hong Kong International Races held at Sha Tin on Sunday, 8 December
|Derby Runners Shine in International Races
|2013 LONGINES HKIR delivers a great occasion of international sport
|Whyte back in the good books in LONGINES Hong Kong Cup
|GLORIOUS DAYS mows down opposition in the LONGINES Hong Kong Mile
|LONGINES Hong Kong Cup post-race quotes