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A method and apparatus for providing authentication among a dynamically selected group of users in a communication system with a dynamically changing network topology. With this invention, freshness information and alleged identity information are transmitted from each of the users in the group using available paths in the network. A group key is then generated, and coded information, derived from the group key and the above transmitted information, is sent to each of the users. Each unit of coded information is accompanied by an identifying tag so as to identify which of the users is to use the appropriate unit of coded information. Each alleged user will then extract the group key from a corresponding coded information unit only if it shares an appropriate secret with a server. Without knowledge of the group key, a user cannot be authenticated.
1. A method of providing secure communications between terminals of a communications network, said method comprising:
(a) storing in a server of said network an initial user key for each of said terminals, each corresponding said user key being known only to said server and a corresponding one of said terminals;
(b) transmitting, upon the event of a group of said terminals indicating a desire to communicate with each other, corresponding alleged identity and corresponding freshness information from each terminal of said group of terminals, said freshness information indicating the happening of said event and the time elapsed since said event occurred and being associated with said group and said event, each said alleged identity information and each said freshness information being transmitted to said server, each said alleged identity and freshness information being dynamically routed to said server on current available paths of said network;
(c) generating a group key which is held in a secure fashion and is usable only by said group of terminals for only a predetermined time interval following said event;
(d) computing coded information for each terminal of said group of terminals, said coded information being dependent upon said group key, corresponding said freshness information, corresponding said user key, and upon an alleged identification of a user;
(e) transmitting to each of said terminals of said group corresponding said coded information along with an attached clear text tag representing said each terminal on said current available paths of said network; and
(f) extracting said group key, by each of said terminals, based upon corresponding said coded information, by employing said user key of said each terminal, said corresponding coded information being identified by a corresponding said attached tag,
said extracting in step (f) being successful only if an alleged user is actually the user it alleges to be in step (b), said users communicating securely with each other using said group key,
repeating steps (b) through (f) when another group of said terminals indicate that they desire to communicate with each other, wherein a new group key is generated.
2. A method as recited in claim 1, wherein said alleged identity information and said corresponding freshness information transmitted from said users is collected by one of said terminals of said group and then transmitted from said one terminal to said server, said one terminal being selected only if there is an available path from said one terminal to said server.
3. A method as recited in claim 1 wherein units of said freshness information and said alleged identity information are transmitted starting from an initiating terminal A of said group to/from an ordered sequence B1, B2, . . . , BN, B of said group, where said freshness information and said alleged identity information are collected at terminal B and transmitted directly to said server without passing through any other of said group, said sequence being established based upon available paths in said system.
4. An apparatus for providing secure communications between terminals of a communications network, said method comprising:
(a) means for in a server of said network an initial user key for each of said terminals, each corresponding said user key being known only to said server and a corresponding one of said terminals;
(b) means for transmitting, upon the event of a group of said terminals indicating a desire to communicate with each other, corresponding alleged identity and corresponding freshness information from each terminal of said group of terminals, said freshness information indicating the happening of said event and the time elapsed since said event occurred and being associated with said group and said event, each said alleged identity information and each said freshness information being transmitted to said server, each said alleged identity and freshness information being dynamically routed to said server on current available paths of said network;
(c) means for generating a group key which is held in a secure fashion and is usable only by said group of terminals for only a predetermined time interval following said event;
(d) means for computing coded information for each terminal of said group of terminals, said coded information being dependent upon said group key, corresponding said freshness information, corresponding said user key, and upon an alleged identification of a user;
(e) means for transmitting to each of said terminals of said group corresponding said coded information along with an attached clear text tag representing said each terminal on said current available paths of said network; and
(f) means for extracting said group key, by each of said terminals, based upon corresponding said coded information, by employing said user key of said each terminal, said corresponding coded information being identified by a corresponding said attached tag,
said extracting in step (f) being successful only if an alleged user is actually the user it alleges to be in step (b), said users communicating securely with each other using said group key,
repeating steps (b) through (f) when another group of said terminals indicate that they desire to communicate with each other.
5. In a communications network having N interconnected terminals, a method of authenticating any selected group of n of said N terminals to each other, said method comprising:
(a) storing an initial user key Ki for each of said N terminals, where i≦1≦N, where Ki is a secret shared only between terminal Ui and a server;
(b) transmitting, upon the event of a group of said terminals indicating a desire to communicate with each other, freshness information Ni from each of said selected terminals of said group Ui to said server terminals, said group key Kg being held in a secure fashion and being usable only by said group of terminals for only a predetermined time following said event off;
(c) generating a group key Kg by said server for said selected group of n, said freshness information indicating the happening of said event and the time elapsed since said event occurred and being associated with said group and said event;
(d) transmitting a unit of coded information Ci from said server to each terminal Ui of said group of n terminals, each coded information Ci being information Fi exclusively OR'd with said group key and identified by a clear text tag Ti corresponding to terminal Ui, said Ci 's being transmitted in an arbitrary order, where said Cis can be dynamically routed on current available paths of said network; and
(e) extracting said group key by each user Ui from said corresponding unit of coded information Ci by exclusive-OR-ing Ci with information Ii where Ii can only be determined with knowledge of Ki,
each terminal Ui authenticating itself to other users of said selected group of n users by encryption of information with said group key Kg,
repeating steps (b) through (f) when another group of said terminals indicate that they desire to communicate with each other.
6. In a communications network having N interconnected terminals, a method of authenticating any selected group of n of said N terminals to each other, said method comprising:
(a) means for storing an initial user key Ki for each of said N terminals, where i≦1≦N, where Ki is a secret shared only between terminal Ui and a server;
(b) means for transmitting, upon the event of a group of said terminals indicating a desire to communicate with each other, freshness information Ni from each of said selected terminals of said group Ui to said server terminals, said group key Kg being held in a secure fashion and being usable only by said group of terminals for only a predetermined time following said event off;
(c) means for generating a group key Kg by said server for said selected group of n, said freshness information indicating the happening of said event and the time elapsed since said event occurred and being associated with said group and said event;
(d) means for transmitting a unit of coded information Ci from said server to each terminal Ui of said group of n terminals, each coded information Ci being information Fi exclusively OR'd with said group key and identified by a clear text tag Ti corresponding to terminal Ui, said Ci 's being transmitted in an arbitrary order, where said Ci 's can be dynamically routed on current available paths of said network; and
(e) means for extracting said group key by each user Ui from said corresponding unit of coded information Ci by exclusive-OR-ing Ci with information Ii where Ii can only be determined with knowledge of Ki,
each terminal Ui authenticating itself to other users of said selected group of n users by encryption of information with said group key Kg,
repeating steps (b) through (f) when another group of said terminals indicate that they desire to communicate with each other.
1. Technical Field
This invention relates to communications between users of a computer network. More specifically, this invention provides a method and apparatus for providing secure communications between users of the network even as the network changes topology.
2. Description of the Prior Art
Many specific protocols for two party authentication and secure message exist, they already assume the members of the group (usually two parties) share a secret key. The disadvantage of the method is that if the number of subgroup is large, many keys are needed per user and in total in the system. U.S. Pat. No. 4,649,233 to Bass et al shows how to generate based on initial key (stored in a cryptographic facility at each node) a new session at each session/conference, thus adding a commutative key generation among the parties, based on initially shared key. This adds security, but relies on initial shared key.
The current mechanisms for distribution of keys is limited in many ways. With these mechanisms, access to the server is fixed. Thus, with these mechanisms, there is no way of dynamically deciding which user is to contact the server and which path is to be used. These mechanisms are described in the work of Needham and Schroeder [1 and 2], Burrows [3], and Kerberos [3].
The existing mechanisms are also limited to give one user access to the server, see for example, Kerberos [4] and the ANSI Standard [5]. Thus, these existing mechanisms will not work connectively in a dynamic network such as a radio network.
A two party protocol is also described in a pending patent application filed by the same assignee as the current application. See Ser. No. 07/672,226 filed Mar. 20, 1991, hereinafter referred to as Bird which is hereby incorporated by reference. This application teaches the concept of using a shared secret between the users and transmitting challenges between the users. patent application Ser. No. 07/678,474 filed Apr. 1, 1991 by the same assignee of the current patent application teaches sending projections derived from polynomials from a server to the users of the system desiring to communicate with each other. The users then use these polynomials to authenticate themselves to each other. The server, in the case, gives the polynomial projection to users based on their true identity. This distribution relies on real off line identification of the users. For example, one comes into an office and identifies himself. Distribution is not based on alleged identity.
There is, therefore, a need to provide an adaptive authentication mechanism which can dynamically adapt to changes in the group of users desiring to communicate with each other, and to changes in network topology, such as changes in network connectivity. These needs are particularly important in the mobile user environment, especially wireless networks.
The need for dynamic environment (like radio network) and dynamic group of users (like tele-conferencing groups) to handle secure communication is increasing in existing networks. Static Mechanisms in existence for distribution of keys from a server do not provide the needs served and the properties obtained by our mechanism. To demonstrate the needed flexibility consider, for example, a network of three users A, B, and C who may be all connected to a server S. In one execution of the mechanism using the protocol for key distribution, A may start the procedure, notify B who notifies C and information from C then goes back to B, B in turn passes this piece of information from B and C's piece of information to A. A then sends the pieces of all three users to the server S. In a later execution A starts the execution, but has now no connection to S (due to network connectivity changes), thus it passes its information to B which passes A's information to C together with B's information. C then transfers to the server S the three pieces of information from all users (A, B, and C). The mechanism needs such a flexibility to cope with changes of network connectivity.
[1] R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder, "Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Computers", CACM, Vol. 21, No. 12, December 1978.
[2] R. M. Reedham and M. D. Schroeder, "Authentication Revisited", Operating Systems Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 1987. [3] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, R. Needham, "A Logic of Authentication", DEC System Research Center, February 1989.
[4] J. G. Steiner, et al, "Kerberos: an authentication server for open network systems", Proc. Usenix Conf. (Winter 1988).
[5] "Wholesale Key Management", International Standard ISO 8732, ANSI Standard X9.17, 1985.
Accordingly, this invention provides an adaptive authentication mechanism which can adapt, on-line, to changes in user groups, that is the group of users desiring to communicate securely with each other, and to changes in network topology, such as network connectivity. More specifically, with this invention, a group key is generated dynamically, that is upon demand. Further, with this invention, the decision as to which member of the communicating group of users is to contact the server directly is made on-line in response to changes in network topology. The flexibility provided by this invention is a result of the fact that the mechanism of this invention is insensitive to the order of communication inside the group of users communicating with each other. Basically, tags are used so that a particular user can know which particular piece of information he is to use in a stream of data so as to determine the group key, which is sent in coded form from a server.
Accordingly, this invention provides a method of providing secure communications between users in a communication system. First, an initial user key for each of the users is stored in the server. Each user key is known only to the server and a corresponding one of the users. Second, alleged identity and corresponding freshness information is transmitted from each of the users to the server using a route based upon current available paths of the system. Third, a group key, which is held in a secure fashion and meant only to be used by a selected group of users, is generated. Fourth, coded information is computed for each user, and each coded information unit is dependent upon the group key, corresponding freshness information, a corresponding user key and upon the alleged identify of a user. Fifth, corresponding coded information, along with attached tags representing users are transmitted to the users on current available paths.
Finally, each user extracts the group key based upon corresponding coded information by employing a corresponding initial user key. The extraction in the last step will only be successful if an alleged user is actually the user it alleges to be. An unauthorized user would not be able to extract the group key to communicate with the server or other users of the group.
FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a typical communication systems (like SNA, APPN networks), with users existing in the computers connected by links.
FIG. 2 is a table of user key which is installed initially in the server and users.
FIG. 3 presents a protocol for two party authentication known in the art, arrows represents transmission of messages and from top to bottom, this gives the ordered execution of the protocol.
FIG. 4 presents schematically dynamic communication scenarios when the network topology changes.
FIG. 5 presents a three-party protocol (two users A,B, A is the initiator and server AS), where arrows are transmission of messages ordered from top to bottom. In this variant the non-initiator party (B) communicates directly with the server AS.
FIG. 6 presents a three-party protocol (two users A,B, A is the initiator and a server AS), where arrows are transmission of messages ordered from top to bottom. In this variant the initiator communicates directly with the server AS.
FIG. 7 presents the two protocols for three parties, one in which the initiator communicates directly with the server and one in which the non-initiator does so. It shows the similarity in the flow of messages.
FIG. 8 presents a decision tree diagram which is the logic of the initiator in the three-party protocols of FIG. 7.
FIG. 9 presents a decision tree diagram which is the logic of the responder (non-initiator) in the three-party protocols of FIG. 7.
A typical communication system (See FIG. 1.) has users communicating with each other. Users (A,B,C,D,E) or (U1, U2, . . . Un) reside in various locations which are computers/ terminals/ local area networks, which are interconnected by a set of links (20-1 to 20-10). In one (or more) of these locations a server for security and key distribution AS (21) may be residing to provide services to the set of users.
A common method is that the server stores a table of user-keys which are stored in safe storage at the server. See FIG. 2. Ka is the key shared by the server and a user whose identity is A. Similarly, Kb is the key shared with B, and so on. The user (A) also has the user's key (Ka) stored in its safe storage device (encrypted file, special hardware, a smart card, etc.).
Modern communication systems may be networks in which users change their location, or links may fail (break) and then rejoin. An example is links which are radio connection with a user device where the user actually moves around. The connectivity structure of the system changes. A link between two computers provides direct connectivity between users in these locations (computers). In FIG. 2 all links (20-1 to 20-10) are up and active. If link 20-3 is broken then the direct connectivity between AS and B is lost. If 2-3 which is the link between the location of user B and the server AS breaks we say that the topology (or connectivity structure of the network) changes.
In a modern communication system with a dynamically changing connectivity structure (also called dynamic topology network), the routing function among the users has to change dynamically. There are known methods in the art, such as topology information update (See Bertsekas-Gallager: Data Networks, Prentice-Hall, 1987, section 5.3), which is incorporated herein by reference for updating the network structure in every location. This enables the continuation of routing, broadcasting, and multicasting (sending a message to a sub-set of users along a path or a set of paths) in the presence of changes.
On the other hand, secure communication procedures in the prior art are designed for fixed connectivity structure. It is not enough to augment the existing procedures with a dynamic routing function, as routing layer information is separated in network design from the layer which gets the information concerning security, and the security mechanism itself has to cope with changes while maintaining security, and be able to perform its function while dynamic changes and different routing procedures take place. Our mechanism provides a solution which can be implemented as part of the security layer, and provides for a secure communication to any group of users in a system with dynamic connectivity (changes of topology). Another issue is performance, having a party with a connection to the server be the connection of the group reduces overhead. cms For example if there are many (1000) users at terminals who are in session with only a few (10) users (application) as peers on a mainframe computer, then letting the 10 users on the mainframe access the security server is much more economical then letting each terminal user go to the security server. If on the other hand each user on a terminal may access the security server, and all users are connecting to one resource (which is a user as well) who gives services and is in secure session with each of the terminal users. It may be advisable in this case, to let each terminal user go to the security server rather the highly busy resource. So performance optimization may become possible if a flexibility of who access the server is given.
Two more advantages of our scheme. First, our server-based procedure unlike most of the procedures in the art is not limited to a two party group of users. Second, our procedure is based on a minimal encryption-only functions (no one can invert), while known server based methods used encryption/decryption functions (which are a stronger cryptographic tool--not always available).
Let us give a physical analogy to the communication mechanism of this invention. This may ease the explanation of what we achieve.
Assume each of a group of people we call users shares a physical key to a corresponding lock with a distributor (which we call a server). Each user keeps his key safely, and the server keeps all locks and keys safely, and further it writes the user name on each pair of key and lock.
Now, a group (subset of size n) of these users want to exchange secrets. To do this, they have to rely on collaboration with the server in the following procedure.
The users send boxes, a box per user with the user's name on top of the box.
The boxes go to the server, collected by the users along any path among them.
The collected boxes are given to the server.
The server produces n copies of a common physical key and a corresponding lock.
The server puts a common physical key in each box and locks it with the lock corresponding to the user's shared key, e.g., the box of user A is locked such that the key that A shares with the server opens it, and no other key can do it.
The boxes are distributed back to the group.
Each user takes the box which he identifies by his name written on it (which he originally wrote on the box's top and sent) and forwards the remaining boxes to the next user by some path connecting the users.
If the user is indeed the user he claims to be by the writing on the box, he has the key to open the box and obtain the new key and lock which was put in it. If the user is impersonating the user with the name he claimed by writing a name on the box, he will not have a key, and will not be able to obtain the new key.
Notice that the order by which the boxes are collected and distributed back does not affect the procedure as long as there is a path among the users and the server (so that the boxes can reach their destination). Only the real users in the groups can now use the identical newly distributed keys and locks to send information among the group members (by sealing boxes with the new lock, and sending the box around in the group or to members of the group). The impersonators will not be able to open the boxes as they do not have new keys. It is important that the names of users are written on the box itself and not just on an envelope inside which the box is put. This is important so that the user when getting a number of boxes, can identify his own box (which it can open), and forward the rest of the boxes to others.
Let us now describe the actual mechanism in a communication system where by cryptographic means and exchange of information only, a task analogous to the above can be completed.
The mechanism of this invention is constructed using basic encryption operations used in the two-party protocol explained above. The mechanism uses a basic communication pattern which is a challenge by a freshness information (nonce) which is then encrypted by the other party. This interaction is basic in the set of protocols for multi-party secure session/conference. Thus we start by explaining the terminology of the encryption mechanism in the context of this basic protocol in FIG. 3 The protocol, called 2 PP, is described in Bird. See above.
The following notation is used for the definition of the 2-party protocol, see FIG. 3 (and later when we describe our mechanism):
A, B: identities of the authenticating parties (users); when used in any protocol message, these are, for example, 64-bit values obtained either by directly coding the identities or by applying a hash function to reduce the original coding of the name into a 64-bit field (when in an encryption expression). A message coming from a party alleged to be party A (say), will always include this party's alleged identity as a tag.
Ka: the key shared between A and a server Kab the key shared by the user group comprising of A and B
Eab(M): encryption of the 64-bit cleartext message M using a symmetrical algorithm like DES and the pair-wise secret key Kab (shared by A and B)
+: exclusive-or on 64-bit numbers
N1, N2 (or N1,N2 : nonces, 64-bit random numbers used only once. Each of the nonces can also be considered as freshness information.
f(x,y,z), g(x,y,z): functions yielding a 64-bit result using 64-bit arguments. f and g are public, i.e. unlike the encryption operation, every one can compute them. f and g may depend on all or only some of their arguments. In Bird et al. specific f and g are given.
We remark that the documents describing the two-party protocol (Bird) defines the exact forms of functions f and g that provide a perfectly secure two-party protocol. (We can ignore them in the current description). We further note that the operation of exclusive-or bit by bit in a string is denoted by +, x-or, ex-or, or exclusive-or interchangeably in this document. In this operation if the bits at the location in both strings are identical the result in this location is 0, otherwise it is 1.
The two party authentication (2 PP) is an example of a use of a shared key between two members of a group of users for secure communication, in this example it is party authentication, the key can be used for message encryption, message integrity and so on.
In the protocol of this invention there is an initiator denoted by A, who starts the communication. It is assumed that the group is determined so that A knows who takes part in it. It is also assumed that the routing function for moving information around is determined and based on current update information.
We present a combination of two variants of the mechanism: one, in which the initiator communicates directly with the server. The other in which some member of the group communicates directly with the server. These two variants are typical and are both necessary. In FIG. 4 we describe two possible scenarios of a communication path from a group of users to the server and later explain the advantage of the combination according to the networking scenario. In the first scenario of FIG. 4 (a), the connectivity is as in FIG. 2, so a protocol with users A,B, and C and server AS can start with A and may go through link 41 to C and continue on link 42 to B who can then via link 43 contact the server (so it is an A-B-AS variant). Later on as in FIG. 4 (b), the link 53 between B and the server may break, and a group session of A,B,C may start by A, going to C via link 51, and to B using link 52 and since B recognizes that link 53 is broken the messages will go back from B via C to A to execute the AS-A-B variant (since B does not connect anymore to the server). Thus, A contacts the server via link 54. Notice that the links 41 and 51 are the same link (called 20-1 in FIG. 2), links 42 and 32 are the same link (called 20-2 in FIG. 2) link 43 and 53 are the same (called 2-3), and links 44 and 54 are the same (called 20-4).
The protocols of this invention include responses to freshness information (Ni). These protocols have additional two important mechanisms. One is coded information from the server to each user which contains a group-key information (coded information); this is a mechanism which effectively securely transfer the distributed new key to the party with alleged identity (analogous to the sealed box with the physical key inside in the physical analogy). The second, is that information from a user is tagged by its name, so that it is associated with the alleged user identity so that the user can identify its coded information (analogous to the user's name written on top of the physical box). The coded information enables each party to decoded and get the new piece of information (Kab or Kg in our examples) which is a key to be shared by the group.
For simplicity and clarity of exposition, we start by describing a group of two users and a server later we explain how this is extended to a larger group of user, the extension is straightforward. The protocol starts by an initiator A (or some user Ui) who first identifies the other parties (users) in the sub-group (typically the initiator knows the communication paths among them but this is not necessary, and it knows the path to the server or just to the other member(s) of the group). There are known ways in the prior art (implemented in current networks) of checking the current network topology and determining communication paths between users, as we mention above. Once the paths are determined, a linear number of messages among the parties collects information of alleged identity and freshness information (nonces). The collected information is shipped to the server AS. The basic two protocols of this invention enable either the initiator of the conference of the sub-group (denoted A) or some other member in the group (the last to collect all users' information, denoted B) to communicate directly with the server. In one of the protocols, we call A-B-AS, the initiator of (A) the authentication never communicates with the AS whereas the other party (the last party to collect all information from all parties) B directly exchanges messages with AS. Conversely, in the other of the two protocols the AS-A-B protocol, the initiator A is the only party that communicates with the AS, leaving the other parties unaware of any communication with the AS.
Note: This setting is the preferred method. It is easy to relax this assumption and make all parties send some messages to the server directly. That is, the party which communicates with the server through messages to the other party (which forwards these messages) may answer the server directly. This, however, adds messages and makes the protocol less elegant. In a large group the number of messages increases from linear to quadratic (which is prohibitively large). This also requires too much connectivity among the parties Which limits very much the applicability in dynamically changing environments.
We start with the two basic variants for only two users A the initiator of the session and B.
In what follows AS is the server. Users attach a tag to their data which is their claimed identity (A,B). The freshness information (nonce) is usually denoted Na if originated by alleged A, etc. K usually denotes a key with subscripts for users (Kab is a key to a group containing user A and B, Ka is A's key shared with the server AS, and so on).
The A-B-AS protocol is presented in FIG. 5 in step (1) of the A-B-AS protocol, the initiating party A starts a protocol with its peer B by sending the nonce (freshness information) Na which is tagged with A's name. NA could also be referred to as a unit of freshness information. Since neither A nor B have any pre-defined key Kab to authenticate one another, they need the assistance of the common trusted third party AS to acquire such a key. B thus now starts a communication with AS, by sending in flow (a) its own nonce, Nb, and the one it received from A, Na. Each nonce (freshness information is tagged by the identity of the issuing party). The tag might also be used as a unit of alleged identity information.
In step (b), the AS replies to B with a reply which includes:
1. Two pieces of cryptographically coded information terms Ca(Kab) and Cb(Kab)
2. Each term (Ca(Kab) or Cb(Kab)) is encrypted under the user key shared initially with a corresponding party in the group (Ka for A and Kb for B), and each term include a partnet information (identity). Each term includes additionally an XOR operation grafting the newly generated Kab which is the new group key being distributed to the group of users (A and B). (The actual calculation of the coded information is given in the figure). The XOR operation (exclusive-OR) shall also be referred to as "X-OR'd" or "X-OR-ing."
3. The coded pieces of information are tagged with the names of the corresponding receiving party, so each party can recognize the term intended for itself.
At that point, B having received Ns (which is the server's freshness information (nonce), which gives a security advantage if is included in the calculation), can compute Eb(f(Nb,Ns,A)+Eb(Nb,Ns,A) given its initial user key and the knowledge of its partner A. Then, exclusive-or it with Cb(Kab) to recover the new group key Kab. If B is a fake it cannot extract the group key. It then proceeds with step (2b) by answering A's first message in (1) based on A's freshness information, B's own freshness information and identity, all encrypted under the new group key, the result of encrypting Eab(f(Na,Nb,B)+Eab(g(Na,Nb,A) and Nb its own nonce. However, it must in addition send the Ca(Kab) and the nonce it received from the AS because A needs them to figure out the new piece of information Kab. Note that Ca(Kab) indicates to A that his partner is indeed B (as B's identity is inside the expression).
Upon reception of this information, A extracts the group key. A fake user cannot extract the key without knowledge of A's user key Ka. A completes step (3) by computing the challenge sent by B (using the group key), and if this matches the computation of Eab(f(Na,Nb,B)+Eab(g(Na,Nb,B))) given Nb, A accepts the authenticity of B and computes and sends back Eab(g(Na,Nb,B)). In addition A computes cms Ea(g(Na,Ns,B)), which is meant as an indirect reply to the AS (via B). A will relay this information to AS, so that AS can register that the new piece of information was received by A. B itself cannot check the validity of the last encryption, as it does not know Ka. This response is by using the initial user's key. Upon reception of Eab(g(Na,Nb,A)) that reply, B is assured of the identity of A, since only A can extract the common key and answer with the encryption Eab(g(Na,Nb,A)) using the group key. In order that the AS be sure that A got Kab and is effectively talking to B, the AS must receive the Ea(g(Na,Ns,B)) relayed and the Eb(g(Na,Ns,B)) computed by B (and which only B can produce).
This last step makes AS sure of the receipt of the new piece of information by the parties and is useful for logging purposes so that server maintains the information that a sub-group key was delivered to the parties. This last step is optional. In the multi-party version of three users or more, the server collects all responses and is sure that all parties have received the key.
The AS-A-B protocol in FIG. 6 is very similar but requires additional information to the one in the A-B-AS one.
In step 1, the initiating party A starts by sending B a nonce Na (freshness information). NA could also be referred to as a unit of freshness information.
B proceeds in step (2a) replying to A with the cryptographic expression which is similar to the response of the two party protocol in the second arrow of FIG. 3, except for the fact that neither A nor B know the common group key Kab yet, so that B must construct the expression using its own user key (which is the key shared with AS) rather than Kab. Thus, the expression is Eb(f(Na,Nb,Q)+Eb(g(Na,Nb,Q)))
A then starts communicating with AS in step (a) by sending two tagged nonces as in the A-B-AS case. However, since A does not have B's user key Kb, it cannot check the validity of the cryptographic expression received in (2a). It must, then, also relay that expression along for AS to check.
In step (b), the server AS replies with the same cryptographic expressions as in the A-B-AS case. The coded information for A and B, and its nonce NS, in addition it must add the expression Ea(g(Na,Ns,B))+Kab as a confirmation to A that the cryptographic expression it received from B did check correctly. In fact, if this additional expression were not sent by the AS to A,A would be vulnerable to a collaboration attack in which both by the AS to A,A would be faked (impersonated) by intruders who would send A pure garbage instead of the cryptographic fields sent in (2a) and in (b), and A could by no means tell this garbage apart from valid messages. The syntax of this additional expression was selected simply on the ground that it must be cryptographically secure but does not require any additional encryption operation.
After the information in step (b) is sent, A still has not authenticated B to make sure that B is not an intruder. A cannot verify B's message encrypted under B's initial unit of information Kb in (2a). Also, AS cannot authenticate B since AS could not verify the freshness of the expression which was generated by B, sent in (2a), and relayed in (a), because of the absence of any nonce generated by the AS in that expression. However, the combination of the partial certitudes obtained by A and the AS is sufficient for A to verify B's identity. In fact, the reply of AS in step (b) guarantees to A that, if Na is fresh then the partner who sent the expression in (a) can be authenticated as B. On the other hand, A knows that Na is fresh because he generated it, hence A can be assured of B's identity.
A then completes the authentication with B, first, by recovering the new piece of information Kab from the coded information Ca(Kab) it received from the AS, and second, by using Kab to encipher Nb in the expression Eab(g(Na,Nb,A)) which it sends to B along with Cb(Kab) and Ns. At that point B has authenticated A.
The AS-A-B protocol is not as economical as the A-B-AS one because of the last cryptographic operation Eab(g(Na,Nb,A)), which is different from the Eb(g(Na,Nb,A)) term found in step (2a), where the initial unit Kb is used instead of the new piece of information Kab thus costing an extra cryptographic operation to be computed by the parties.
The AS-A-B scheme needs two more flows in case registration is required at the server AS. Registering would be done easily if we require that after step (3) of FIG. 6, B send A Eb(g(Nb,Ns,A,Kab)), and then A send the AS Ea(g(Na,Ns,B,Kab)) and relay Eb(g(Nb,Ns,A,Kab)) which comes from B in two extra flows of information. It should be noted here that authentication of A and B by the AS is not required for the mutual authentication between A and B. AS would need to authenticate A and B only for logging and audit purposes if desired, in which case the extra flows are executed. AS-A-B and A-B-AS Combination.
Because they are closely related and together are needed to enable flexibility in accessing the server, both protocols are represented side-by-side in FIG. 7 for comparison between and understanding of the variants. The flows in the two leftmost columns (below the titles A, B, and AS) describe the so-called A-B-AS protocol, while the flows in the two right most columns (below the titles AS, A, B) describe the so-called AS-A-B protocol.
Both A-B-AS and AS-A-B are based on using a basic three-way exchange twice, once between A and B, and once between the AS and whichever party contacts it. The two instances of three way exchange are noted (1)-(2)-(3) and (a)-(b)-(c) respectively in FIG. 7. Notice that (c) flow is missing in AS-A-B. As previously explained, two flows representing it can be added).
It can be noted from this presentation of the protocols that the interactions between A and B and the interactions between the AS and A or B are quite similar in the A-B-AS and the AS-A-B scheme. More importantly, the initiator of the communication (A) starts always with the same flow (1) which simplifies the logic. Also the decision of who contacts the server can be done by B (or more generally by the other members of the group who know how to contact a server). Thus, the choice of the right protocol instance being made only on the fly, during the execution of the protocol.
Once a party is assigned the role of the initiator (A) or the role of the responder (B) it can always determine what the next step of the protocol will be following a simple logic procedure. An entity that wants to start the protocol with another one is designated as the initiator (A) and an entity that receives the first protocol message (Na) from another entity is designated as the responder (B).
The extension of the logic to a more than two participants (not only A and B, but rather, A,C,D,F,B for example) is immediate (as flows among A and B are repeated and information gathering from various users is done and added to the flows). We will explain it in more details below.
The logic diagram that defines the behavior of the initiator is presented in FIG. 8. As shown in that diagram, an initiator can deterministically execute the protocol steps that match the responder's behavior and the network connectivity with the AS. The logic procedure aborts the protocol execution only in the case when neither the initiator nor the responder have a connection with the AS, or in the case that a shared key Kab initiated or obtained from a previous execution of the multi-party protocol is still valid (in which case the parties can use the previous key).
In dynamic environment the logical decision of whether the server is accessible, is done by the party (in our case B) by starting a search procedure in the network to locate the server. Such activation of a search procedure may be added to the computation of the protocol. The result of such a search is either the location (path, say) to the server, or a negative answer.
FIG. 9 presents the behavior of the responder. The responder can also deterministically choose the protocol steps that match the initiator's behavior and the network connectivity with the AS following that logic. We assume the responder goes to the server when possible (other variants are also possible).
A many user (three or more) needs small extensions to the protocols presented so far. What is needed, is:
A "group identifier" GI which is the ordered (by names) list of the identities of the members to identify the group on every message.
The path information (which can be initially determined by the initiator, or dynamically). It includes the indication of a path order in a list, and a second list indicating where the current message information has already visited. The second list may be unnecessary if the order of message relay is given by the path order.
In addition, each group has a "group name" GN which is a secure hash function of the group identifier list to 64 bit value to be used in computations of the pieces of coded information which carry the group's new key from the server to the various users. For a way to implement a safe hash function see R. R. Jueneman, "A high speed manipulation detection code", in Advances in Cryptology, Crypto86 proceedings, Ed. A. M. Odlyzko, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 263, Springer-Verlag, 1987 pages 327-346.
Also, we keep a list of the freshness information collected, denoted by Na,Nb1,Nb2,Nb, and its 64-bit hash value FN (freshness name).
When A executes the protocols with many users, it adds a group identifier to its message which is then flows to all members. Assume the members are called A, B, and B1,B2. Via a path the protocols described can be performed by the group. In this description we show a linear path which goes from A to B1 to B2 and to B, linear path is the simplest to implement. The path now can be described as going from A to B as before, but have intermediate actions performed by the intermediate users B1 and B2, and from B to A with intermediate actions by intermediate users B2 and B1 (in this order) as well. The intermediate members perform operations and relay information. The operation done by the intermediate users are straight-forward. On flows from A to B via B1 and B2, B1 repeats A's computation on a nonce of its choice using its own initial unit of information Kb1 (in cases when A uses Ka), tags it and forward all messages to B2, B2 acts similarly, using Kb2, and forwards the result to A. When a flow goes from B back to A, B2 repeats B's action using its own choices and key forwards to B1 who follows similar actions and relays to A. The users also add path information, to indicate where the message passed through. The nonce to be used in replies as the nonce of the group is FN, composed of hashing the entire pieces of freshness information. Note that as before each user tags its message with its identifier. The tagging as before is important to identify the ownership of fields in a messages relayed. At the end of an execution, the group of users gets a new group key. Using the key the members can identify each other, and send secure authenticated information to each other.
What is important to note again is that the path can be determined by the connectivity of the network and other availability and performance issues. The order of the parties along the path is not important as each user can access the information intended to it by recognizing the right tag.
We now present the protocol variants in details, assuming A,B1,B2, and B are the group (it is assumed that this is the order and the path along which information is sent is linear in that order). We start with A-B-AS variant group identifier, GI=A,B1,B2,B, group name is the hash value of GI which can be computed by all members, called GN, pieces of freshness information will be Na, Nb1, and so on. The steps taken are as follows:
A sends to B1: A,Na and GI
B1 sends to B2: A,Na, B1,Nb1 and GI
B2 sends to B: A,Na, B1,Nb1 B2,Nb2 and GI
B sends to AS: A,Na, B1,Nb1 B2,Nb2, B,Nb and GI. At this point, everyone who get the nonces, can compute FN.
AS Computes coded information to send back a group key Kgr. It computes Ca(Kgr)=Ea(f(Na,Ns,GN)+Ea(g(Na,Ns,GN)))+Kgr and similarly Cb(Kgr)=Ea(f(Nb,Ns,GN)+Ea(g(Nb,Ns,GN)))+Kgr, Cb1(Kgr)=Ea(f(Na,Ns,GN)+Ea(g(Na,Ns,GN)))+Kgr, Cb2(Kgr)=Ea(f(Na,Ns,GN)+Ea(g(Na,Ns,GN)))+Kgr, and sends: A,Ca(Kgr) B,Cb(Kgr) B2,Cb2(Kgr) B1,Cb1(Kgr), AS,NS, and (to certify freshness) FN, Egr(FN) to B.
B computes Kgr from Cb(Kgr). and sends: A,Ca(Kgr) B2,Cb2(Kgr) B1,Cb1(Kgr), AS,NS,FN, Egr(FN) and B, EBf=Egr(f(FN,Nb,B)+Egr(g(FN,Nb,B))), to B2.
B2 computes Kgr from Cb2(Kgr). and sends: A,Ca(Kgr) B1,Cb1(Kgr), AS,NS,FN, Egr(FN) and B2, EB2f=Egr(f(FN,Nb2,B2)+Egr(g(FN,Nb2,B2))), to B1.
B1 computes Kgr from Cb1(Kgr). and sends: A,Ca(Kgr), AS,NS,FN, Egr(FN) and B1, EB1f=Egr(f(FN,Nb1,B1)+Egr(g(FN,Nb1,B1))), to A.
A computes Kgr from Ca(Kgr) and sends A, Egr(g(FN,Nb1,B1) (for B1 check) A,EAg=Ea(g(Na,Ns,A)) (for AS check) to B1
B1 checks EAg, and sends B1, Egr(g(FN,Nb2,B2) (for B2 to check) B1,EB1g=Eb1(g(Nb1,Ns,B1)) (for server check) and A,EAg=Ea(g(Na,Ns,A)) to B2
B2 checks EB1g, and sends B2, Egr(g(FN,Nb2,B) (for B to check) B2,EB2g=Eb1(g(Nb2,Ns,B2)) (for server check) B1,EB1g=Eb1(g(Nb1,Ns,B1)) and A,EAg=Ea(g(Na,Ns,A)) to B
B checks EB2g, and sends B, EBg=Eb(g(Nb,Ns,B)) (for server check) B2,EB2g=Eb1(g(Nb2,Ns,B2)) B1,EB1g=Eb1(g(Nb1,Ns,B1)) and A,EAg=Ea(g(Na,Ns,A)) to AS
AS checks the correctness of the values of EAg,EBg,EB1g,EB2g, and registers that the group GI got key Kgr.
We may add another flow from AS to the group (via B, B2, B1, up to A) with certification: AS sends A,Ea(g(Ns,GN,Kgr)), B,Eb(g(Ns,GN,Kgr)), B1,Eb1(g(Ns,GN,Kgr)), B2,Eb2(g(Ns,GN,Kgr)) to all users, and each user checks the validity of this certification. This concludes the protocol.
Similarly, a many-user version of AS-A-B is possible with A, B1, B2, B as users.
A sends to B1: A,Na and GI
B1 sends to B2: A,Na, B1,Nb1 and GI
B2 sends to B: A,Na, B1,Nb1 B2,Nb2 and GI. At this point, B chooses Nb and can compute FN.
B sends to B2 GI B, Eb(f(FN,Nb,B)+Eb(g(FN,Nb,B))),Nb (to be checked by the server)
B2 sends to B1 B, Eb(f(FN,Nb,B)+Eb(g(FN,Nb,B))),Nb B2, Eb2(f(FN,Nb2,B2)+Eb2(g(FN,Nb,B2))),Nb2 (to be checked by the server)
B1 sends to A GI B, Eb(f(FN,Nb,B)+Eb(g(FN,Nb,B))),Nb B2, Eb2(f(FN,Nb2,B2)+Eb2(g(FN,Nb2,B2))),Nb2 B1, Eb1(f(FN,Nb1,B1)+Eb1(g(FN,Nb1,B1))),Nb1 (to be checked by the server)
A sends to AS GI B, Eb(f(FN,Nb,B)+Eb(g(FN,Nb,B))),Nb B2, Eb2(f(FN,Nb2,B2)+Eb2(g(FN,Nb2,B2))),Nb2 B1, Eb1(f(FN,Nb1,B1)+Eb1(g(FN,Nb1,B1)))Nb1 A, Ea(f(FN,Na,A)+Ea(g(FN,Na,A))),Na (to be checked by the server)
AS verifies that all encryptions by the various users' key forwarded to him, indeed are correct, select a group key Kgr and computes and sends to A: A,Ea(g(Ns,Na,GN))+Kgr, A,Ca(Kgr) (as above) B,Eb(g(Ns,Nb,GN))+Kgr, B,Cb(Kgr), B1,Eb(g(Ns,Nb1GN)+Kgr, B1,Cb1(Kgr), B2,Eb2(g(Ns,Na,GN))+Kgr, B2,Cb2(Kgr).
This last message goes to A then tp B1 to B2 and to B. As a result all users in the group share a new key Kgr.
In case registration is required, then each user sends back to the server (from B to B1, to B2 and to A, to the server from A: A,Ea(g(Na,Ns,A,Kgr) to certify the receipt of the key from A to AS, and similar computation from B,B1,B2 (using their user keys and nonce). This concludes the protocol.
The logic of a user is similar to the three-party case, where a user has to know if it is an initiator (A's task), a responder (B's task) or an intermediate (B1,B2's tasks).
The server can also play a role of a user (in addition to server).
We note that the server can use the protocol to share a key with a group which contains itself (as a member of the group) in which case the server can play both roles in a protocol server and one of the users, omitting sending authentication verification to itself (which is not needed). In particular, this can be used to refresh the keys shared by the server and a user in a reliable way that makes sure that only the server and the actual user can change the key they share.
It may be the case that we need a protocol in which the exact key has to be certified by the server. In this case, AS also sends an encryption using the new key of a random value to certify the key. It can be a second encryption expression using the new key being issued as a key which something like Eab(f(A,B,AS,Na,Nb,Ns)+Eab(g(A,B,AS,Na,Nb,Ns))). This certification becomes part of the encoded information (which so far included the Ca(Kab), and Cb(Kab)). This extension may be needed when the key is not to be used as direct authentication between A and B, but to be shared for other reasons say for future applications such as secure communication, in which case this extra certification may be needed. If the key given is to be encoded to A and B using a separate mechanism (say directly by an additional encryption key), then the encrypted key rather then the key Kab may be used in the Ca and Cb expression of the basic protocols.
Additional fields of information (like time, expiration time, access code etc.) can be sent via the protocol. These fields may need to be certify. To certify them, these extra information fields can be used in the expression being encrypted. This is done by taking, for example, these fields and breaking them to 64-bit strings and adding the blocks to the expression. The addition is done by X-oring a block with the expression already encrypted, and encrypting again, and repeating this operation until all blocks are used.
A protocol in which the initiator goes first to the server is possible as well. It is easily combined into the family. The only problem is the nonce generated by the party not communicating with the server. However, it is possible when the other party (non-initiator) shares a random value with the server (e.g., the common time, or previous value) which can serve as a freshness information (instead of a nonce). Such a protocol can be played by the initiator playing B's role in A-B-AS (of FIG. 5, but starting from step (a) and sending only its own nonce Nb, Na is determined as above). This gives a protocol compatible with A-B-AS which can be combined as a basic block protocol in the family. The use of such protocol is when the initiator has to get additional information about the other parties. It can get this information (address, access-control information etc.) from the server. One example is the one where the server keeps the list of which party is allowed to access which other party and connectivity information, so that the initiator must address the server first. The server may then reject or accept this session and determine the inner sub-group order of communication.
It is possible that information about one user's key (A's key Ka) is in one physical location (server) and the other user's information (B's key Kb) is in another. A simple extension of the protocol in which the servers actually runs an internal protocol (A 2 pp protocol of FIG. 3, where the message sent also includes a relay and exchange of information about users, and where each location does the operation on behalf of the user it shares initial information (user key) with). The users are unaware of the intra-server communication, and which location did what operation.
In very dynamic environments (such as wire-less networks), users change locations quite often. The protocol should first activate a search procedure which tries to find a server, according to the result of the search the actual instance of the protocol and actual ordering of communication is started. The parties may have to search for a server in case the first one fails. Then they can decide on the variant according to performance constraints. In future environment of mobile entities, the flexibility provided in the design is crucial. They can also know the group and search for it locally relaying previous information and adding their on, while adding the actual route information to the message. Thus, the route can be determined by the users locally, knowing who got the messages already and who still needs to get it.
To understand the embodiment we have to make sure that it is indeed secure thus we need to argue its security. We will argue about the three-party versions We show that the protocol is secure to a large variety of attacks by individuals and groups. This is important to its correct operation.
The adoption of 2 pp flows (of FIG. 3) and expressions between A and B in the three-party (which is the minimal example of our multi-party: two or more users and a server) case is a straightforward decision for two reasons:
the multi-party protocols thus become compatible with two-party implementations without the AS server;
the multi-party protocols can capitalize on the high degree of security provided by 2 pp (of Bird et al.) for the mutual authentication between A and B, A and AS, and between B and AS.
the multi-party protocols do not have to use decryption operation.
On the other hand, the choice of a 2 pp expression for the interactions between A or B and the AS does not seem so straightforward and needs to be clarified. One clearly would like to use an expression simpler than the 2 pp one. The reason why the 2 pp expression is required in the flows between AS and A or B is explained below together with the possible attacks that justify the presence of each element in that expression.
Impersonation of the AS by an intruder is prevented by the presence of a challenge generated by A (Na) and B (Nb) in the key-tokens sent by the AS to A and B respectively in Ca(Kab) and Cb(Kab). The presence of these challenges in the certificates prove to A and B that each certificate has been freshly generated by the AS.
The term "past key attack" denotes the attempt of an intruder to obtain all (or many of) the pair-wise secret keys distributed to A and B in the past, by breaking one pair-wise key. The future key attack conversely denotes the attempt to break all future pair-wise secret keys using the knowledge of one pair-wise secret key.
Both attacks are overcome by the presence of the term Ns in Ca(Kab) and Cb(Kab).
If Kab is broken during one session between A and B, the intruder would attempt to break past keys (Kab') using the Ca(Kab') and Cb(Kab') certificates recorded from previous executions of the protocol between A, B and the AS. The intruder would in fact be able to obtain Ea(f(Na,Ns,B)+Ea(g(Na,Ns,B))) from Ca(Kab) by x-oring Ca(Kab) with Kab, as well as Eb(f(Nb,Ns,A)+Eb(g(Nb,Ns,A))) from Cb(Kab). Even if the intruder may find, over a long period of time, past certificates constructed with the same challenge from A (Na) or B (Nb) as the ones used in the broken certificate of Kab, he could not get Kab' from such a past certificate (Ca(Kab') or Cb(Kab')) by simple exclusive-oring, because the x-oring of Ca(Kab')=Ea(F(Na,Ns',B)+Ea(g(Na,Ns',B)))+Kab' with Ea(f(Na,Ns,B)+Ea(g(Na,Ns,B))) would not yield Kab' because of the difference between Ns and Ns'.
Similarly, once a pair-wise key Kab between A and B is broken, an intruder could attempt not only to break future keys but also to impersonate A or B, using the exclusive-oring technique described above and by sending the same challenge (Na or Nb) as the one used during the protocol exchange for the broken key Kab. This attack cannot succeed for the same reason as for the past key attack, i.e. because the key certificates generated for future keys will depend on additional nonces (Ns) generated by the AS.
Without the presence of A's name and B's name in Cb(Kab) and Ca(Kab) respectively, either A or B could be impersonated by another party C that is registered with the AS. In the AS-A-B scheme, in order to impersonate A, the intruder C would first send B the nonce Na together with A's name, B would then reply with the 2 pp expression which C would send to the AS telling that he is C. Since C is a legal party known to the AS and because the 2 pp expression sent by B does not indicate the identity of B's partner, AS would accept C's request and reply with two valid certificates for a key to be shared by C and B that both C and B would be able to use and the authentication of C to B would complete using that key, B wrongly believing that C is A.
In fact, such an attack can never succeed thanks to the presence of A's and B's names in the certificate Cb(Kab) and Ca(Kab)) respectively. In the above scenario, the certificate Cb(Kcb) generated by the AS for B would include C's name and C would not succeed in impersonating A to B because B would clearly verify with the certificate Cb(Kcb) that the partner is C and not A.
In the combination attack, the intruder would try to take advantage of the co-existence of both A-B-AS and AS-A-B schemes and the similarity between the expressions used for peer authentication and the expressions sent by the AS.
After having received the challenge Na from A in the AS-A-B scheme, the intruder C, impersonating B, could go to the AS, using the A-B-AS flows. The reply from the AS to C's request would in fact contain an expression (Cb(Kab)=Eb(f(Na,Ns,A)+Eb(g(Na,Ns,A)))+Kab) which C could use to fool A, by sending it as B's reply to A's challenge. But this reply would never be accepted by A since instead of carrying a simple 2 pp expression, it carries the result of a 2 pp expression exclusive-ored with a random value (Kab). Even if the intruder could extract the random value (Kab) from that expression, the result would still be rejected by A, containing A's name instead of B's name as expected by A.
One could imagine the dual of this attack where the intruder C impersonates A to B, starting with the A-B-AS protocol and continuing with the AS-A-B after having received B's reply. This attack would not succeed because AS in the AS-A-B exchange never delivers any expression that could be used as the message expected by B (Eab(g(Na,Nb,A))).
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text: A girls geometrical bedding collection in bright purple circles, the Cosmo Girl Baroque bedding ensemble blends chic design and popping color to give your girls bedroom a modern and alluring look. Embossed with a geometric pattern, the Baroque Circle bedding collection certainly lends a modish aesthetic ideal for a dorm room. Available in Twin size, the Cosmo Girl comforter set includes a comforter and a standard sham. The comforter and standard sham is replete with bright purple circles on a white ground against alterations of fleur de lis in purple.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
SV1000 where ya all at?
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Joined: Jan 2010
Location: Cin City, OH
Oddometer: 6,936
Originally Posted by
I am seriously lusting for a SV1000N, and have been for a long time.
Right now they're going kinda cheap here (not that much more than a SV650), and I'm really tempted, but I know nothing about those bikes and I've never ridden one.
What are the pro's/cons of the naked SV1000?
I just love the thought of riding a big v-twin. I'd love to own something like an aprilia RSV Mille (since i'm very passionate about aprilia), but it's much more expensive than the SV.
Think of it as a "Sucati" monster.
I never found the brakes on my N model to be anything less than great. There are plenty of fixes for the suspension, which is actually more than adequate for anything up to 8/10s. To me the seat is the worst part.
The pros are a killer motor with power everywhere in the power band, great sound, smooth engine with just enough vibes to let you know it's there. Maintenance? Change the oil. No ridiculously short valve adjustment sequence as on the Italian bikes
By installing the Buell foot pegs you drop them about an inch (2.5cm) and then add Heli-Bar risers to bring them up and back and you have a touring quality position, except for that F**King seat. There are aftermarket fixes for that too.
I had a SV650 which handled better in the tight stuff and was a lot of fun, but the amazing rush from the 1000cc engine cannot be denied!
I've never met anyone who had one that was unhappy with it. Go for it!
Oh I used to be disgusted, but now I try to be amused-E.Costello
'01 Kawasaki W650, '05 Yamaha XT225
Speedo66 screwed with this post 02-04-2011 at
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text:
Typically when we ask, "What is going on here?!" it's a rhetorical question.
But in the case of the pants Jessica Chastain wore to the Givenchy Fall/Winter Ready-to-Wear Show, it's not. Literally, what is going on with these pants?! We cannot find the waistline, for one, and those cream, lace cutouts on the thighs are mind boggling.
On top of that, is her black, silk shirt intentionally clashing with the rest of the outfit?
We typically love the Zero Dark Thirty star's style, so we'll assume this is a case of death by gift from the designer.
Now check out Jessica Chastain's Top 10 red carpet looks!


text:
By KELLY DANIELS
Starkville Mayor Parker Wiseman's expected veto of the industrial park's exemption from sidewalk ordinance requirements will arrive in February, a notice of intent confirmed Friday.
In a 4-3 split Tuesday, the Board of Aldermen approved exempting areas in what is called the city's industrial Park — Miley Drive, Airport Road, Pollard Road and Industrial Park Roads — from requirements in the city's sidewalk ordinance.
Ward 2 Alderwoman and Vice Mayor Sandra Sistrunk, Ward 5 Alderman Jeremiah Dumas and Ward 4 Alderman Richard Corey voted against the action
At the advice of City Attorney Chris Latimer citing state law, Wiseman will not issue the veto until after the board adopts the minutes of Tuesday's meeting — an action they are scheduled to consider on Feb. 1.
Tuesday's vote came after a long public debate about whether to grant an exception for the Golden Triangle Planning and Development District's plans for a new facility or to establish an objective variance process in the sidewalk ordinance.
While all officials agreed that the law adopted in 2009 needed a variance process, the philosophical split occurred when GTPDD director Rudy Johnson publicly warned that he would move his business out of the city if he had to build a $25,000 unconnected sidewalk for a $1.6 million facility.
But the mayor had a warning of his own weeks ago before the exception was proposed.
To save the board time, Wiseman said he would veto its proposed amendment, stating that the blanket exemption does not address the need for an impartial variance process.
According to Friday's notice, a "common thread" found in 2004 among residents' suggestions for improvement was that the city should require sidewalks with new development, officials found after holding a series of public forums in each ward. Five years later, the Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance meeting that wish.
"The sidewalk ordinance, along with increased investment in sidewalks by the City, is pushing Starkville to
become a more pedestrian friendly community," Friday's notice reads.
"Nevertheless, the ordinance does need to be more flexible than its current form. There should be a clearly defined, objective process for seeking variance or exemption from the requirements of the ordinance."
Wiseman went on to say that Tuesday's amendment does not establish such a process, but offers a blanket exemption from the requirements of the law to property located on four streets.
"Such an exemption is unfair to owners and developers of property on all other streets in the city who must still abide by the law," he said. "Ultimately, the exemption is unfair to the citizens of this community who faithfully rely upon the City to establish the law in a manner that extends the same justice to everyone."
Following the Board of Aldermen's orders over two months ago, the Board of Aldermen's appointed Transportation Committee conducted research and held public hearings of their own to gauge public opinion on creating language in the sidewalk ordinance that would establish a sound variance system, which members would present this year. But a majority of the aldermen voted to act before the Transportation Committee presents its recommendations and called for public hearings of its own, proposing an exemption of its own.
Wiseman wrote Friday that he hopes the Transportation Committee will work to establish an objective process by which the citizens may receive a fair hearing to determine whether variance or exemption from the requirements of the sidewalk ordinance is merited.
"I am confident in our ability to establish such a process while continuing our march toward becoming a more pedestrian friendly community," Wiseman said.


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Bobst Info
Search BobCat
Search for books, journals, videos, etc. in our local libraries and special collections.
NYU Libraries' online catalog.
Introduction and Related Guides
Welcome to the Caribbean Studies research guide. This guide is designed to serve as a starting point from which students and researchers can begin their research. It is a selective listing of general resources related to Caribbean Studies. Please consider consulting related guides:
Quick Resource Links
The following are digital libraries, bibliographies and databases where you can begin your research.
- dLOC, Digital Library of the Caribbean: a cooperative digital library for resources from and about the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean.
- Handbook of Latin American Studies Online (1936-1989) and Handbook of Latin American Studies Web (1990 to present): A bibliography on Latin America consisting of works selected and annotated by scholars. Edited by the Hispanic Division of the Library of Congress, the multidisciplinary Handbook alternates annually between the social sciences and the humanities. Each year, more than 130 academics from around the world choose over 5,000 works for inclusion in the Handbook.
- LANIC, Latin American Network Information Center: a digital initiative of LLILAS Benson at the University of Texas at Austin, LANIC provides access to online content to, from and on Latin America.
- Oxford Bibliographies, Latin American Studies
- PRISMA publicaciones y revistas sociales y humanísticas: a database that provides access to over a hundred scholarly journals dedicated to the study of the region.
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All my "Jeff in the Morning" Brekky shows begin with The Fabulous Thunderbirds track "Why get up"? So dont worry if it sounds familiar.
This comment has been deleted.
Tribetronic Tribefm3 years agoReplyDelete and block
Hey! If you go to my TRIBETRONIC TRIBE FM page on here there are lots more to listen to.


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The EF Scale (below) is the standard way to measure tornadoes based on wind damage.
Ready for do-it-yourself weather predicting? Long before meteorologists had sophisticated technology to help them predict the weather, people made forecasts based on their observations of the sky, animals, and nature.
With a rain garden, use—don't lose—the water that falls on your paved areas and roof. Here are two beautiful plot plans featuring great plants for sun and great plants for shade from The Old...
It is hard to argue against the merits of a large rain barrel positioned to catch rainfall, especially from downspouts or gutters, and using it for your plants on dry days or during drought.
Know your winter weather terms. Whether there is a winter storm or blizzard in the forecast, these terms will help you know what to expect.
Find average frost dates for your last spring frost and first fall frost.
Below is a chart showing Canada frost dates in the spring and fall for various Canadian cities. (Click here for the U.S. frost dates...
El Niño and La Niña are two faces of a large weather phenomenon. Here are a few questions and answers to help.
Sometimes there is a change in Earth's atmosphere or oceans that disrupts typical weather patterns. Here are descriptions of different weather events—teleconnections and oscillations—that can affect weather near the disruption and far from it.
Consult the Windchill Temperature Chart below to avoid severe winter conditions that could cause frostbite, hypothermia, and other hazardous health problems.


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Blend : Cool vertical storage space by Karim Rashid
Blend is a vertical storage space from Karim Rashid's first collection for Horm. Made of lacquered wood, the piece has a tremendous visual appeal to it and is certainly unique – no matter what you decide to call it. This piece of furniture is something that looks good, but there is one problem …you'll have to spend a very long time to clean out the dust. Blend is available from gnr8 for $3,009.00.
2 comments
I don't like this cabinet
I like this. It's creative. My kids will love using it.
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The Vampire Diaries
The Vampire Diaries Spoilers: Season 4, Episode 19 — Who Dances?
Even more important than what everyone wears to prom is whom they dance with. Since we already know the answer to the first part, Zap2it's Vampire Diaries spoilers for Season 4, Episode 19, "Pictures of You" will help us with the second part.
According to the site, Stefan (Paul Wesley) and Caroline (Candice Accola) share yet another dance. She's really good at getting him to ditch those hang-ups! Plus, she tells him she hopes he meets someone new and can move on from Elena (Nina Dobrev).
Speaking of the girl with a Salvatore on each arm, Damon (Ian Somerhalder) and Stefan are busy trying to get her to turn on her emotions, while she's attempting to win Rebekah (Claire Holt) the title of prom queen. For some reason, Damon has a terrible time at the event.
KSiteTV reports Bex has promised to attend prom as a real girl — aka, no vamp powers. It's apparently too big of a spoiler to reveal whether or not Matt (Zach Roerig) asks her dance, but the quarterback does see a new side to her, says Zap2It's Carina MacKenzie.
Bonnie (Kat Graham) dances — with danger. KSite reports she's pretty badass in the episode.
We're sure there are more pairings than those, so we can't wait to see who else couples up on Thursday!


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PANAMA CITY BEACH – Breakfast is an important way to start the day year-round, but summertime often means more time to savor the experience.
This is especially true on the weekends, when many families fuel up before heading out for a long day in the water.
"Friday through Monday is our busiest for breakfast time," said Leia Mayer, who co-owns Bridge Span 14 in Carillon Beach with her husband, Andy. "We've been having some fun lately with our menu."
The organic restaurant, 105 Carillon Market St. Suite B, has been "crazy" with an influx of vacationers, but the Bridge Span team still manages to find creative inspirations.
"You never know. We might add on a lobster omelet. The other day we had an Aged 1855 Ribeye hash and ribeye omelet," said Mayer, who serves breakfast 8-11:30 a.m. daily.
Pizza, usually a lunch or dinner staple, gets made over for a breakfast favorite. The organic Breakfast Flatbread Pizza is made in-house and topped with heirloom tomatoes, roasted garlic, white cheddar, bacon, breakfast sausage, fresh basil and a cooked cage-free egg.
"This dough is so amazing," Mayer added.
Just what qualities does she look for in a good breakfast?
"Since it's first thing in morning and you are just waking up, you need something satisfying that wakes you up and gives you energy you need for the day — even if it's just having a glass of raw juice."
When it comes to breakfast, Executive Chef Konrad Jochum goes big.
Since May, Jochum has been cooking up breakfast favorites for weekend customers at Schooners, 5121 Gulf Drive, in Panama City Beach.
From 8:45-10:45 a.m. Saturday and Sundays, guests can linger with a view of the beach. Schooners for Breakfast includes a Vegetable Garden Bloody Mary and Mimosa — also offered by the bucket. With most of these entrees, you won't be going anywhere for a while anyway.
Indulge with buttermilk biscuits served with homemade sausage gravy and grilled andouille sausage or the Monte Cristo Sandwich stuffed with ham and Havarti cheese, deep fried and served with raspberry preserve. Schooners "Big Bagel" is toasted and stuffed with jalapeno bacon cream cheese, sliced tomato, baked egg soufflé and American cheese.
For a little more meat, try the Maple Glazed Grilled Pork Belly served with andouille, potato hash and baked egg soufflé or the Hungry Man Gravy Train Scramble.
Schooners for Breakfast also includes Cinnamon French Toast with maple syrup and whipped cream, Fresh Stuffed Croissant, Baked Sweet Cheese Blintzes and Crispy Fried Apple Turnovers.
Most are entrees, ranging from $7 to $9, are served with fresh fruit, but the Beach Body Cocktail offers a lighter option. The cocktail, a mix of vanilla and strawberry yogurt, is topped with fresh fruit and granola served with a banana muffin.
1½ cups warm water (105 to 110 degrees F)
½ teaspoon active dry yeast
4 cups all-purpose flour
1 teaspoon salt
2 tablespoons olive oil plus more for bowl
1-2 organic heirloom tomatoes
1 tablespoon ribboned organic fresh basil
Olive oil for crust
1 head of roasted garlic
Salt and pepper to taste
2 strips bacon, crumbled
1 cage-free organic egg
¾ cup good quality hormone- and antibiotic-free white cheddar cheese
¼ cup cooked breakfast sausage
Mix water and yeast in a large bowl and let stand 5 minutes to proof. Gradually pour in 2 cups of the flour and stir to mix. Mix for about 1 minute, then let sit, covered, for at least an hour.
Put dough in the bowl of a mixer, or knead by hand. Using the dough hook, add the salt and oil, then add the flour, ½ cup at a time, to form flatbread dough. Remove from bowl and knead. Place in a clean oiled bowl and let rise, slowly, about 2½ hours. Let rise again for ½ hour, and then hand press dough into desired size.
Divide dough into 4 sections. Flatten one section of flatbread dough, brush liberally with olive oil and grill. Grill on both sides until golden brown. Spread 1 side with thinly sliced heirloom tomatoes first, then sprinkle with salt and pepper. Sprinkle with roasted garlic, add cheese, bacon and sausage. Allow cheese to melt. Meanwhile, cook your egg to desired temperature Garnish with fresh basil and your cooked egg.
(You may repeat process and toppings on other 3 sections of flatbread dough or save remaining dough for another use.)
Source: Leia Mayer, Bridge Span 14
1 organic Yukon Gold potato, chopped
2 links of Aidells Chicken & Apple smoked chicken sausage
4 medium organic cremini mushrooms
¼ organic red pepper
¼ organic Vidalia onion
¼ organic heirloom tomato
½ cup organic baby spinach
4 organic free-range eggs
1 tablespoon fresh organic parsley
1 tablespoon extra virgin olive oil
Extra virgin coconut oil for frying potatoes, 1-inch deep
Horizon Organic Sour Cream for garnish
Real Salt Kosher Salt and pepper to taste
Sauté all vegetables and sausages in olive oil, except tomato and potatoes, then set aside.
Meanwhile, heat a small skillet and add about a teaspoon of butter. Once butter has melted and stopped foaming, cook eggs, two at a time, until desired temperature.
Heat a deep pan and melt coconut oil. Once coconut oil is heated, add chopped Yukon Gold potato and cook until golden brown. Add hot cooked potatoes to vegetables and sausages and toss to mix.
Add potato sausage mixture onto a plate and top with two eggs. Add sour cream, tomato, and chopped parsley. Enjoy!
Makes 2 servings.
Source: Leia Mayer, Bridge Span 14
Sausage Gravy:
1 pound breakfast sausage (Jimmy Dean)
½ pound andouille Sausage, ground or chopped
4 tablespoons butter
4 tablespoons flour
3 cups half & half
2 teaspoons ground black pepper
½ cup chopped parsley
Cook sausage in skillet until lightly brown; remove from skillet.
Add butter and flour to skillet and cook for 2 minutes. Add remaining ingredients and simmer 5 minutes.
2 cups flour
½ cup shredded Parmesan cheese
1 tablespoon baking powder
1 tablespoon sugar
½ teaspoon Kosher salt
1 cup buttermilk
Mix all ingredients; let rest for 10 minutes.
With scoop, form biscuits and bake at 350 degrees for 10 minutes.
To serve, cut biscuits in half, the top with gravy and grilled andouille sausage slices.
Serves 4 hungry people.
Source: Executive Chef Konrad Jochum


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Archived Webinar #19 - Shooting Portraits with HyperSync
Originally aired June 27, 2013
In this webinar host Mark Wallace gives a thorough overview of PocketWizard's revolutionary HyperSync® technology while using the latest firmware. You learn how to extend the capabilities of your studio strobes for on-location work when shooting in bright sunlight. Mark covers the basics of sync speed and the limitations that photographers face when using traditional methods. Mark then explains how HyperSync works using animations, whiteboard illustrations, and live demonstrations in the studio. Finally, Mark shows you how to put everything into practice by showing an actual shoot on-location.
Here are some frequently asked HyperSync Questions.
Here is the Q&A from the studio during the HyperSync webinar.
Equipment List:
Canon 5D Mark II
Canon 24-70 f/2.8
Benro C1682T with V1 head
Tether Tools Orange Tether Pro Cable
Tether Tools Tether Table Aero (Master Size)
Profoto D1 1000 w/s
Profoto 2x3 RF Softbox
Matthews Baby Jr. Triple Riser Stand with Wheels
Matthews Low Boy Junior Double Riser Stand with Wheels
AlienBee B1600 640w/s
Paul C. Buff 3x4 Softbox
PocketWizard MiniTT1
PocketWizard Flex TT5
PocketWizard AC9
PocketWizard AC3
Apple MacBook Pro
Adobe Lightroom 5
Canon 70-200 f/2.8L lens from the pre recorded video
|Photo: © Mark Wallace


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If you have been following my Twitter (@WhiteSponge) or Facebook, you would know that there's a 2nd character for Small Chronicles! Did I also mention that all characters have their own unique dialogues? On the other hand their stories are intertwined with one another.
Creating different dialogues for each character allows me to give all of them their individual character traits or personalities. I could potentially give the main character, Kon, a very masculine and brave personality by providing him lines such as "I will definitely protect you!".
As with the story of Small Chronicles, Kon goes on an adventure searching for his sister, who has been abducted by unknown evil forces. Just from that line, it is possible to tell that Kon has a sense of justice, is brave and cares for his sister.
On the other hand, Lyea, the leading female character of Small Chronicles, has a not so straightforward personality. Although she does appear strong, she doesn't really say things that she means. Oh and she can be cheesy at times when Kon isn't around…
Now compare the 2 leading characters and you'll see a stark difference in personality. It may be due to a gender difference but let's not go into gender stereotypes. Hey it's totally possible for me to give Lyea a very masculine personality just like Kon's. But where's the fun in that?Tweet


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Cowboys and Aliens
3 stars out of 5. Will most likely be enjoyed by horny women.
The Good-
For the most part, it was entertaining. It was written by Roberto Orci and Alex Kurtzman, who also wrote the 1st two Transformers movies, the newest Star Trek movie, Mission Impossible 3 and the last Zorro movies. So as you can expect, there were a lot of one liners with the same kind of attitude as in those other movies.
It was directed by Jon Favreau, who directed the Iron Man movies. I think he has demonstrated that he has a pretty good eye when it comes to camera work, and there were a lot of cool looking scenes in this movie.
The best thing about this movie however was a pretty damn near flawless performance by Daniel Craig. If you liked his raw, tough guy portrayal of James Bond in Casino Royal, you will like him in this movie. His American accent was great, and he definitely commanded the screen. Its was hard to believe the guy is British.
The Bad-
Parts kinda dragged. Most of the plot was good, but also predictable. The most original aspect of the story is that you have cowboys fighting aliens, and obviously that is no big secret. Its not very suspenseful.
There were also a lot of very dark scenes. And by dark I mean it was hard to see the screen, even in a black movie theater. I couldn't help wonder how anyone was going to manage watching this movie in there living room if god forbid any of the lights are on.
The main girl in the movie couldn't act. That would have been more understandable if she was hot, since a lot of female actresses seem to get roles based on sex appeal rather than talent, but she was not really that attractive. Her eyes are her most redeeming quality, but they have this confused look all the time.
The Ugly-
Parts of this were extremely cheesy. I don't want to give too much away, but the worst parts had to do with a humming bird, a pointing hand, and the girl that can't act. Another thing I can't stand is when people are in a dangerous situation and stop to kiss or talk, in the middle of a battle. If it was a really quick kiss, or "Thanks for saving my life", I would understand. But the way everything goes on pause for two minutes so the can have a moment in safety really irritates me for some reason. Oh wait, I know why- cuz every other fucking movie does it!
In conclusion-
All this being said, if you have a crush on Daniel Craig, you will love this movie. If you are a hillbilly who believes your uncle was raped by extra-terrestrials, you will also love this movie. Most of the rest of you will enjoy most of the movie.... the first time you see it.
I'll have to think about going to the theater then, to see this. I don't usually go see things in the theater, unless it's a MUST. Like Transformers, Fast & Furious 5, ect.......lol!
I don't have a crush on Daniel Craig and I'm not a horny woman....hahahaha, so I'll watch it based on the title. Oh and the hillbilly part! ROFL!! Great review Shaws! It's good to get a little insight, before spending hundreds of dollars on theater tickets & popcorn ;)


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Message to Arizona: Be like Florida
As former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush touts his education reforms on a national platform, he's finding support not only among GOP politicians such as the governor of Indiana, but also in the Arizona think tank crowd.Matthew Ladner of the conservative Goldwater Institute continues to write about why Florida's accountability program would be the best thing his state could implement to turn its poor performance around. He has a guest column in the White Mountain Independent:
"Florida's policymakers achieved these results with a multifaceted education reform approach, not with a single magic bullet. Reliable testing, real consequences for school failure, expanded parental choice, alternative teacher certification, reforming reading instruction and curtailing social promotion all played critical roles in improving Florida schools.
"With the correct mix of policies, Arizona could enjoy the same level of success. But we first have to admit that we have a serious problem and summon the moral courage required to enact serious reform."


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Eizirik, E., Johnson, W.E. and O'Brien, S.J. Submitted. Molecular systematics and revised classification of the family Felidae (Mammalia, Carnivora). Journal of Mammalogy. [see http://dobzhanskycenter.bio.spbu.ru/pdf/sjop/MS636%20Eizirik%20Felid%20Taxonomy.pdf]
Johnson, W.E., Eizirik, E., Pecon-Slattery, J., Murphy, W.J., Antunes, A., Teeling, E. and O'Brien, S.J. 2006. The late Miocene radiation of modern Felidae: A genetic assesstment. Science 311: 73-77.
Nowell, K. and Jackson, P. 1996. Wild Cats. Status Survey and Conservation Action Plan. IUCN/SSC Cat Specialist Group, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK.
O'Brien, S.J. and Johnson, W E. 2007. The evolution of cats. Scientific American July: 68-75.
Sliwa, A. 2004. Home range size and social organisation of black-footed cats (Felis nigripes). Mammalian Biology 69: 96-107.
Sliwa, A. 2006. Seasonal and sex-specific prey composition of black-footed cats Felis nigripes. Acta Theriologica 51: 195-204.
Sliwa, A., Herbst, M. and Mills, M. J. 207. Prey consumption and distances covered by black-footed cat (Felis nigripes) and African wildcats (Felis silvestris) - a comparison of two small felids from South African arid lands. In: J. Hughes and R. Mercer (eds), Felid Biology and Conservation: Conference Abstracts, pp. 56 pp.. Wildlife Conservation Research Unit, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Sliwa, A. In press. Felis nigripes. In: J. S. Kingdon and M. Hoffmann (eds), The Mammals of Africa, Academic Press, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Sliwa, A., Wilson, B., Lamberski, N. and Herrick, J. 2007. Report on catching and surveying black-footed cats (Felis nigripes) on Benfontein Game Farm, 8-24 May 2007.
|Sliwa, A. 2008. Felis nigripes. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2015.2. <www.iucnredlist.org>. Downloaded on 08 July 2015.
|To make use of this information, please check the <Terms of Use>.
|If you see any errors or have any questions or suggestions on what is shown on this page, please provide us with feedback so that we can correct or extend the information provided


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Iraq veteran hopes nature can help younger vets connect
When Ben Haberthur returned from Iraq in 2003, he found solace and recovery in 10-hour hikes along California's coasts, often with fellow veterans.
Now a restoration ecologist with the Forest Preserve District of Kane County, Haberthur is determined to offer that same cathartic experience to Chicagoland's veterans.
Earlier this year, Haberthur secured a $10,000 grant from the National Audubon Society and Toyota to establish a Veterans Conservation Corps, which he hopes will provide a way for younger veterans to connect in nature.
Read more about Haberthur's efforts to reach out to younger veterans in the Chicago Tribune.


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Free delivery when you spend over £75 (GBP).
Will be calculated at checkout
Suit pants - Indigo
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Suit pants by J LINDEBERG. Zipper with hook and eye at the fly. Belt loops at the waist and pleats in the front. Two front pockets and two welt pockets, with button in the back. Dry clean only.
Made of 100% Wool.
J. Lindeberg successfully combine fashion and sportswear for men and women that has a sense of effortless elegance. A Scandinavian perspective, functional technology and sophisticated tailoring define their collections. Find elegant and functional J. Lindeberg clothing and shoes here at Nelly.com.
Free delivery when you spend over £75. Standard shipping £3.95. Delivery time: 3-6 days. We deliver with UPS.
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Junior Landon Williams helped ONU gain two points in Tuesday's match versus Marian
BOURBONNAIS, Ill. — In five of their last six matches, the
No. 23 ranked Olivet Nazarene University men's tennis has been victorious, winning four straight in the last two weeks. The Tigers made it five wins with a 6-3 decision over Marian University
(Ind.) on Tuesday afternoon, April 8, in a nonconference match. Olivet swept all three
doubles points and half of the singles to take the contest.
Coach Chris Tudor's
Tigers (7-7) got back to .500 with three doubles points against Marian (12-15). Landon Williams (Erie, Pa.) and Rodolfo Sanchez (Morelia, Mexico)
defeated Jason Denton and Marty Pochop 8-4. Navarro Veys (Mortsel, Belgium) and Caio Barros (Belo Horizonte, Brazil) won 8-4 over Danny Albert and Taylor
Kinney. Peter Jensen (Yuba City, Calif.)
and Oscar Cornella (Lleida, Spain)
took match No. 3 by a score of 8-3 over Nick Batiello and T. Cunningham.
In singles play, No. 1 Veys lost to Denton (6-3, 6-2). No. 2
Cornella defeated Sach Miatt (6-0, 6-4), and No. 3 Barros lost by a score of
(6-4, 6-4) to Albert.
No. 4 Landon Williams defeated Pochop (6-4, 6-4). No. 5 Barros
won over Kinney (6-1, 6-2), and No. 6 Jensen lost to Ryan Meller (6-4, 6-2).
ONU will be back in action Thursday, April 10, against CCAC
foe (RV) University of St. Francis (Ill.) at home, starting at 3:30 p.m.
Results: http://web.olivet.edu/sports/Tennis/2014/Marian.jpg


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Facts About Deciduous Forest
Posted In: Geography.
Deciduous forest are generally forest that have trees that loose their leaves, yearly. In America, we have over five times more trees, much more abundantly then any European forest. However, that is just one simple old fact about these kinds of forests that make up a lot what we see and hear about in America. Here are few other things about these forests you most likely did not have an understanding of.
Where it is located?
In North America, you can expect to find deciduous forest from Minnesota to Maine and from Florida to east of Texas. In Europe, you can find them from Ireland to south of Norway and Sweden to Kazan in Russia to Austria and west of France. In Asia, you can spot them from east of China to North Korea and Japan. You also can find them located on the eastern side of Australia as well as the southern tip of South America (Chile and Argentina).
Do we really cause these habitats to die?
Sad but true, due to farming and hostile take over of the land of which these forests once lived, much of what once lived in some of these habitats have died off or at least been driven out of the forest to another location.
The food chain
It starts from the bottom, where you got nematodes, fungi and soil bacteria. These are base food and then you got ferns, flowers, fruits, deciduous trees and even berry bushes. These are called the primary producers.
Primary producers are consumed by primary consumers, whom are plant eaters. These includes animals like birds, deer, insects and rodents. Primary consumers are hunted by insectivores, small predators and carnivores. These animals include larger birds, opossum, foxes and owls.
The top of the food chain are large predators like bears and cougars. They basically eat small predators and carnivores including fish.
Anything about the flowers?
Yeah, wildflowers are pretty abundant in these kinds of forests, they sprout during the spring so they can get as much sunlight as they can before autumn begins and the Sun gets blotted out by the leaves on the trees turning brown.
Does bark really protect these trees?
Yes, it does, now it all depends on how thick it is but yeah, it will keep it warm, no cool air will get through this trees armor.
Are there brown bears?
Yep, there are brown bears and these bears have some of the sharpest claws out there that will rip apart their prey and consume every bit, nasty stuff, but an efficient t way of life.
Do the animals hibernate?
All the mammals in the forest such as the woodchucks will stay out of the limelight during the cold seasons and they will hibernate until spring sprouts.
Are there coyotes?
Coyotes make up a lot of the predators you'll find in this forest; they will hunt together in packs to be more effective hunters, most prey won't even know what hit them before it's too late.
What do the plants use to grow?
Most plants get to grow based on the richness of the soil around them, which have an assortment of good nutrients to help in the growth process.


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Kodak Zi8 camcorder3 August 2009
The follow-up to the Kodak Zi6, the new Kodak Zi8 pocket camcorder from Kodak, brings with it 1080p video resolution and a host of new features, but should you be rushing out to get one? We took it out and about to find out. Yes we know, chances are you... >>


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THE Tanzania Cricket Association (TCA) has released fixtures for this year's Advanced Players League (APL), which will kick off at the Leaders Club ground in Dar es Salaam on Thursday.
The tournament is organized by the Tanzania Cricket Association (TCA), with a view to improving the performance of local players by providing regular 50 overs and Twenty/20 competitive opportunities to players who are keen to play competitive games. Four Franchise teams will participate in the league.
They are Castle lager Rockets (Tanzania Breweries Ltd) Dikdiks (Dar International Cricketers). Event coordinator Kazim Nasser said the curtain raiser game of the event will pit Gyproc Strikers and Maxx Changers to take place at Leaders Club ground on Thursday, while two matches will be played on Friday.
The morning match will pit Castle lager rockets and Dikdiks at the same venue, while Dikdiks will confront Gyproc Strikers in the afternoon. On Saturday morning Maxx Changers will play against Castle Lager Rockets while in the afternoon Castle Lager Rockets will lock horns with Gyproc Strikers.
The final will be played on Sunday afternoon and it will be preceded by the morning match between Dikdiks and Maxx Changers. Nasser said that on January 29, there will be two T20 games between the APL professionals and TCA combine team.
At least 12 professional cricket players from South Africa, Kenya, India and UK will join four local teams for this year's event. Nasser named South African players to join the local sides as Wayne Kylander, Brian Tyrone Isitt and Willem Mostert, while Kenyan players are Maurice Ouma , Alex Obanda and Nehemiah Odhiambo.
He named Indian players as Shrideep Mangela, Jaideep Pardesi and, Raunaq Sharma, while those coming from UK will be Richard Wilkinson, Timothy organ and Christopher Watling. The APL 2013 will be the fifth edition of the event. The inaugural event took place in 2009.


text: Yesterday, Josephine shared four Picnic Tartines for this weekend's picnic or a back-to-school lunch. Today, we're sharing a fancier recipe using juicy grilled peaches, an easy Middle Eastern yogurt dip, and homemade Pistachio Dukkah. This tartine needs a grill, a bottle of wine, and good company. Get to it, quick, before summer ends! – Amy


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LG Venus VX-8800
Info Photos Reviews 72 News Forum
Top message: Using bitpim by word.
Replying to: Re: Using bitpim by word.
Re: Using bitpim
Yes, I don't think you can put any longer than a 30 sec clip. I haven't tried because there is no point, most songs you don't want to ring from the very beginning. I use nero wave editor to crop my music, I know there is plenty of free software to do this.
- Re: Using bitpim by wnrussell


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French foreign minister Théophile Delcassé makes a diplomatic visit to St Petersburg, and successfully extends the Franco-Russian alliance which has been in place since 1894.
Please log in to consult the article in its entirety. If you are not a subscriber, please click here to read about membership. All our articles have been written recently by experts in their field, more than 95% of them university professors.


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Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Masking Tape Murals
The new Art One class spent the day creating masking tape murals around the school. Take a look at the process we went through to get to this point.
First, we talked about hatching and cross hatching. We tried out some hatching techniques in out sketchbooks.
Next we talked and made a list of different topics that were important to us.
We formed teams based on topics we selected and talked about symbols and words that would relate to our topic.. Each team created sketches based on those ideas.
We even practiced with the tape on the table to get used to working with this medium. Then we went to work... Here are the results.
8 comments:
These are great! Thanks for sharing! You do great things with your students!ReplyDelete
My favorite part of this is that you KNOW the kids LOVED doing this... like doing graffiti that is allowed. I know I would have loved this when I was in high school.ReplyDelete
Very clever stuff....well done! Thanks for sharing your artwork with us.ReplyDelete
Do you recommend a specific type of tape? My custodial staff is concerned about residue... How long do you leave them up? Thanks!ReplyDeleteReplies
We used masking tape which didn't leave any marks on the lockers or brick.Delete
Do you recommend a specific kind of tape? My custodians are concerned about residue. How long do you leave the murals up?ReplyDeleteReplies
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