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Rated 3.9 out of 5 by 980 reviewers.
Rated 5 out of 5 by Woodsie1 This hotel has a beautiful pool and spa The pool is large, clean, and has a beautiful view. The spa is also large and can accommodate lots of people. October 26, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by Jchang3 Excellent service Location is great, excellent service, friendly staff October 26, 2013
Rated 1 out of 5 by GreenSpaceman Green program The Green Program is not recommended. It needs a complete review. It comes across as a big cost savings for the hotel. October 25, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by Mike160 Great Stay This hotel was exactly what was needed for a weekend getaway. Close enough to downtown Toronto to see the sights during the day and to visit the theatre at night. The entire staff from the front desk to the restaurants and lounge were very attentive to ones needs Always very polite and charming. Would recommend this hotel for anyone wanting to get away for some relaxation and sightseeing. October 21, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by dashap Thanks for a great stay My room was great, the location was perfect, but most of all, the staff were all fantastic. Thank you. October 21, 2013
Rated 2 out of 5 by DGBMetso Housekeeping Improvement Required The service from staff was excellent. I arrived late evening and stayed in Roon 10-34, North Tower. I was very disappointed with the room as both beds with white bedspreads were stained and looked very unappealing. I am surprised that these were not taken out of service because even if clean, did not reflect the cleanliness one would expect for the rate of the room. In addition, numerous scratches and smudges on lamps and desk. October 19, 2013
Rated 3 out of 5 by AlyJ Did not meet my expectations The hotel itself is nice, but the rooms need deep cleaning. The furniture was covered in heavy dust to the point that I did not want to place my belongings on the desk and dresser. The baseboards are thick with dust and cobwebs. At a glance the room looks clean but it's not. It appears as though Housekeeping is due for some in-service training. October 15, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by Diamondsun Convenience Near all major attractions. CN tower, Air Canada Center and Harbour Front Centre. The ferry dock to Toronto Islands is beside the hotel. October 14, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by TWM2013 Nice touch from the hotel. We staid on a Saturday night to take in a Leafs game to celebrate my wife's birthday. After getting back to the room after the game we were presented in our room with two pieces of cheesecake done up with her name and happy birthday written in chocolate. Very nice surprise for my wife and just from the checkin person asking when we checked in. Nice job by David who signed a very nice card that accompanied the deserts. And to top it off the leafs won in OT. Great little stay. October 14, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by ConcertGoer ABSOLUTELY OUTSTANDING Our stay at the hotel was fantastic. Our room had an awesome view of the lake and Toronto Island which I confess is something that never ceases to impress us and I am sure will be equally impressive to others.. Our experience at Toula, the rooftop restaurants at the hotel, was superb. The manager, Baldo, took exceptional care of us and every facet of the dining experience was phenomenal. Watching the sun set over the lake while we feasted on mouth watering scallops and juicy steak (or veal in the case of my wife) is an experience we will not soon forget. The meal, washed down with some excellent champagne, was a great prelude to seeing Les Miserables. We both thoroughly enjoyed our breakfast buffet at Mizzen (the hotel's restaurant beside the main lobby). The selection of fresh fruits and pastries was excellent and I particularly enjoyed the breakfast quesadillas. All of the staff at the hotel demonstrated the friendliness we always receive at the Westin. The Westin Harbour Castle remains our favourite Toronto hotel and one we will continue to recommend highly to all of our friends and family. Once again I offer a big thank you to all of the hotel staff for making our stay in Toronto a memorable one. October 14, 2013
Rated 1 out of 5 by Spiritark Old and in need of revamp I stayed here twice between September and October. First time I was given a room with a tiny work table which was no where near a power outlet, and there were two flies in the room some how, which got be very agitated. The airconditioning vent also stuck out like a sore thumb in terms of room configuration. I had to ask for a room change which the staff promptly acted upon the next day, so that was all good. That day right after, they forgot my breakfast order I placed the night before! Again they had to rush out the breakfast but they did not charge me for that. More issues. My room key was not able to access the room and I went up and down a good 5-6 times just to figure out and tell the front desk that the key was not working. In hindsight, I should have demanded that some one gone up with me (in fact I would expect that for a Westin hotel) and figure out what is going on until it works instead of having the guest shuttle back and forth. On my second stay, I was selected to be upgraded to the suite level. As much as it was prestigious in a marketing way, the wooden panels of the presidential floor were chipped off and lacking lustre. It felt like a 1980s hotel that needed restoration. Definitely please do something about that. However, the staff service and promptness was good, despite the poor condition of the hotel. October 13, 2013
Rated 2 out of 5 by SMatthews This hotel was not at all what I expected. The hotel was not clean; my north tower room was very old and outdated. TV would constantly skip for a couple of minutes at a time, bathroom faucet leaked at the base, so vanity was always wet. October 10, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by JohnColumbus Nice Hotel - Needs Better WiFi In today's day and age, the hotel should have free WiFi available continously. The room rate of $15.00 per nite seems excessive and the free wifi in the lobby (available for only one hour at a time) was slow and often booted me off the system. October 10, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by Seokuee Clean and Cozy The westin harbour castel at Toronto was clean and cozy. I really enjoyed at westin. October 7, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by SpaBoy Good place to stay in Toronto This hotel has been updated over the years and is in very good condition. it is a bit out of the downtown core but it is just a 10 minute walk to the action. October 6, 2013
Rated 2 out of 5 by HM30 Great Staff, clean room, but odd smells The hotel had a odd smell in the lobby and hallways that ruined the experience. I am not sure what it was. I expected more from the hotel due to the 4 diamond rating. Definitely not up to Westin standards that have previously experienced in my travels. October 6, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by Guest451987 Some bad, Some good I don't expect this review to be posted, just want to bring to your attention a room that isn't up to your standards (547). I was moved to a different room which was very acceptable. October 2, 2013
Rated 3 out of 5 by Kat1387 Disappointing! When we walked into the lobby, we were very impressed. The staff were knowledgeable, friendly and efficient. That was where the positive ended. The room was dusty, especially beside the night stands and under the dresser. The carpet was dirty and ripped on areas. Lots of marks on the walls. Bathroom was ok but mildew spots in the shower. Not what I was expecting for $279/night! I would not recommend this overpriced, run down hotel nor would I return! September 30, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by Baldguy Cleanliness I stay here a few times a year and enjoy the hotel but on my last visit the bathroom had not been well cleaned - hair left it the sink. September 28, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by gerg SPG recognition I was not offered a Starwood preferred guest unit on a floor designated as such on Sept 23, but I did get the SPG room for my stay on Sept 9: it was GREAT!! The room on Sept 23 did not have a fridge: is this not standard? ***I hope this feedback will not appear on your site*** September 25, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by emily13631 Fantastic in Every Way This was my first time staying at a Westin property. I typically utilize a different hotel chain, but this hotel was a recommended hotel for the conference I was attending. The hotel was comfortable, accessible, and the staff were excellent in every way. Check-in staff were friendly and efficient. My room view of Lake Ontario and the CN Tower was outstanding. One evening, I needed a cab. After waiting a bit for a cab, the one that arrived was not able to take a credit card. I said that I would be willing to wait for another one, as I didn't have any cash. After waiting a bit longer, the employee actually paid cash for me to take a cab to my destination because he felt I had been waiting for a while. This was going above and beyond and demonstrated fabulous customer service.The concierge assisted me in purchasing/printing a bus ticket to the airport. It was extremely easy to get to the airport from this hotel, as the stop was directly acros the street. I loved Toronto and would absolutely return to this hotel. September 23, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by Poodle77 Wonderful Hotel for a Conference Stayed at this Westin for a work conference. My spouse and I almost always stay at a Starwood property when we travel, and we are SPG Gold members. The conference food was excellent, the room service was good, and I found the hotel staff overall very good and the service great. There are a couple issues that I think ought to be addressed by the hotel. Not sure if it was just our room, but every night I could hear the word for word conversation in the adjacent room, which kept us up at night. I also ordered a breakfast to be delivered by room service the morning of my departure as I had to check out quite early, so ordered it delivered at 6am. It never arrived and I ended up having to get breakfast on the road. Other than these two issues though, the hotel is absolutely wonderful. Would highly recommend the hotel lobby bar. September 23, 2013
Rated 4 out of 5 by WeezieCT Overall, a lovely hotel The hotel is very nicely appointed with a lovely lobby area; valet and front desk staff very courteous and helpful; delicious food, albeit pricey; very comfortable bed. A few issues: the coffee pot overflows due to the large coffee pod stuffed into a small holder. The water cannot drain through fast enough, so it leaks all over the place. Skipped the coffee and drank tea instead (after cleaning up the mess). The location of the ice machine is creepy. (26th flr.) One must enter through a door into a hallway with service elevators and equipment alongside the wall, go to the end and then turn right into a separate room with more supplies and an ice machine. Too remote and utilitarian, and not a place I'd ever want to find myself alone again. Nevertheless, I would definitely stay at this Westin again if in Toronto. September 22, 2013
Rated 3 out of 5 by georgie98 Complain Cancellation fee for shorter visit especially when told at ck in not accecptable . Internet too expensive in this day and age. Your no room clean up is not well explained at ck in and has nothing to do with green policy September 22, 2013
Rated 1 out of 5 by June2456 This hotel is grossly overpriced The room rental is very expensive and offers little service compared to other hotels of the same price range. The wifi is charged to guests and can only be used for 1 hour in the lobby. That is unacceptable. The breakfast buffet is very pricey and the food is not good quality. I do not recommend this hotel at all. September 21, 2013
Rated 2 out of 5 by Elcapitano This hotel is getting tired There was an overall unpleasant smell in the room. It was almost like the hotel was trying to mask an odour and had sprayed it with a febreze type of spray. The front desk said it is some type of eco spray that is circulated in all rooms to give them a fresh smell. My wife and i found the smell sickening. In addition the sink taps and toilet were leaking. September 21, 2013
Rated 2 out of 5 by salesforce101809 Issue with Staff and Iron/Ironing Board Issue with Staff and Iron/Ironing Board. The staff who checked me in was not well trained in customer service. She was not helpful in finding a new hotel. She gave up easily without picking up the phone. I was disappointed. In addition, the iron and ironing board were dirty and almost ruined a shirt. For $340/night, that is unacceptable. September 19, 2013
Rated 3 out of 5 by Marci56 not as expected The cleanliness of the room was quite disappointing, bathroom there were hairs in the tub, on the floor and soap water spots on the counter. We wanted to take a coffee with us on our walk but when I went to put a lid on the cup the lid was full of crumbs. Housekeeping was in the hallway she did give me new cups and lids. I was also expecting a call from the manager but he never did call me back it was regarding to a "lack of communication" in the bar that evening. September 17, 2013
Rated 2 out of 5 by Nininoni A huge disappointment It has been several years since we stayed at the Harbour Castle Westin. Obviously, things have gone way down hill at this property. We arrived just after 2 pm on Saturday, Sept 14. We stood in line for over 20 minutes waiting to check in. This has actually happened to us in the past - BEFORE computers were invented!!! The inadequate number of staff at this busy time did not excuse the fact that the whole process appeared to be handled in an extremely protracted, inefficient manner. The young man who checked us in fumbled through the process, mumbling incoherently, calling me by a name not even closely resembling my actual name (how do you get Donna from Mary on a computer screen?). He held us up unnecessarily, muttering all sorts of inane, useless instructions for anyone who has ever checked in to a hotel. He wrote something on a piece of paper for us, but it was completely illegible. He seemed clueless as to how to handle a check-in in an expeditious manner. Our room, a non-smoking lake-view corner suite was clean and spacious, but the air was hot and humid, the decor was tired and the room reeked of stale cigarette smoke. The porter turned the A/C down to 66 degrees and 10 hours later it was not much cooler and still humid. in fact, the air on the entire 17th floor in the north tower was noticeably warm and damp each time we exited the elevator. There was no mini bar - ridiculous! Pressed for time to get ready for a wedding, we did not bother to complain about the room, but we did go to the lobby in hopes of getting a drink and quick snack. At 2:20 pm on a glorious Saturday, the lake view lobby bar and Starbucks kiosk were closed, and we had to go sit in the dark, cavernous, overpriced restaurant - ludicrous! We were annoyed after being directed to the restaurant by the lobby bar-tender at 2:20, to discover that the bar had opened at 2:30. Why did he not tell us that? Service in the restaurant was agonizingly slow. I heard many similar complaints about check-in delays, problems with rooms and noise on the same date as our stay. Westin needs to step up their game at this property. They are not taking advantage of the five-star setting and the quality of service at the front desk and room amenities are at best 2-3 stars. There is absolutely no way we will be back to this hotel. September 16, 2013
Rated 5 out of 5 by DEVA Fantastic Hotel Excellent hotel from when you pull up to check out. The front desk was very courteous. MIMI at the Mezzin restaurant for Bfast was exceptional in service. DID NOT LIKE TOULA RESTAURANT. Took 2 hours to eat and we didn't make it to a show, unbelievable. But everything else made up for it. Next time Ill just get room service. September 16, 2013


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Bargaining stances and outcomes in buyer-seller negotiations: experimental results.
Buyer-supplier relationships are affected by contractual negotiations between the respective parties (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Negotiation has been addressed in the literature from many different angles, including the psychological approach (e.g., Oliver, Balakrishnan and Barry 1994; Barry and Oliver 1996; Brenner, Koehler, Liberman and Tversky 1996; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), the economic approach (e.g., Nash 1950, 1953; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), collective negotiations (e.g., Walton and McKersie 1965) and international negotiations (e.g., Graham 1985; Graham and Sano 1986; Graham, Kim, Lin and Robinson 1988; Graham, Mintu and Rodgers 1994; Adler, Brahm and Graham 1987; Adler, Graham and Gehrke 1992). However, despite much work in the field of negotiation, relatively little is known about what determines negotiation outcomes (Van Poucke and Buelens 2002).
Many papers in the negotiation field rely on experimental research, which allows researchers to control for a number of variables that would otherwise interfere with the tested relationships. This obvious advantage also allows researchers to interpret the relative importance of the tested variables with more accuracy. On the other hand, controlling for too many variables removes some of the richness, or the details, of the environment surrounding a negotiation and hampers the ability of researchers to generalize results.
Most of the literature on two-party negotiations has focused on identifying the variables that influence the outcomes of a negotiation, including reference points, anchor points, opening offers and the attitudes of the negotiators. However, despite using controlled experimentation, researchers have reported conflicting results over the relative importance of reference points. For instance, some studies have found support for the importance of reservation prices (White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale and Peck 1994; Kristensen and Garling 1997a), whereas others (Min, LaTour and Jones 1995; Van Poucke and Buelens 2002) have reported that the only relevant reference point is the opening offer. Similarly, there are conflicting results regarding whether buyers tend to outperform sellers or vice versa (Neale, Huber and Northcraft 1987; Lim 1997; Van Poucke and Buelens 2002).
Do the bargaining stances of the respective parties affect the outcome of the negotiated settlement? Do the bargaining stances affect the way negotiators choose their reference points? Is it possible to measure the effect of bargaining stances on the outcome of a single negotiation? This research aims to study the variables likely to influence the outcome of a two-party negotiation in an experiment that reproduces some of the richness encountered in real-life negotiations. Two-party negotiations were conducted using university students. This paper analyzes the effect of reservation prices, aspiration prices and competitive stances on the outcomes of a two-party negotiation. Further, the results of this study are compared with previous studies and, finally, managerial implications are provided.
The negotiation literature has focused on analyzing the influence of different reference points. Reference points are the significant data points that negotiators refer to during a negotiation based on research on market conditions, labor and material costs, and so on (Kahneman 1992). Four types of reference points have received particular attention in the literature: aspiration price, reservation price, opening price and market information. The current research focuses primarily on two reference points: aspiration price and reservation price. Because the terms and definitions vary somewhat across the negotiation literature, Table I provides a glossary and a synthesis of the definitions most commonly used in the field.
The literature on reference points is largely experimental and minimal research has been done to determine how reference points can help assist in explaining the outcomes of negotiations in the professional supply environment. On the other hand, the purchasing and supply literature tends to have a "macro" outlook and scant research has been done to evaluate how firms' strategies and types of production (e.g., JIT) translate in terms of negotiation tactics.
Although the literature emphasizes the importance of reference points for negotiators for reaching an agreement, it provides conflicting findings regarding the relative importance of the following three reference points: reservation price, market price and aspiration price. Thus, these reference points are reviewed next in the paper.
Reservation Price
Reservation price refers to the price that is least acceptable to a party in a negotiation (Blount, Thomas-Hunt and Neale 1996). From a buyer's perspective, the reservation price represents the price at which they will be indifferent about buying a good from a particular supplier or "walking away" from the negotiation. At this point, the buyer is likely to consider dealing with competing suppliers, based on the BATNA: Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (Fisher and Ury 1981). For example, a buyer's BATNA could be the price of a similar product from a different supplier. From a seller's or supplier's perspective, the reservation price represents the lowest acceptable selling price--the price at which the seller will walk away from the negotiation. Many factors may affect the lowest acceptable selling price. For example, a supplier might consider selling at a price below cost to keep workers employed in the short term. Thus, a supplier's reservation price may be difficult for the buyer to determine.
Contradictory results have been reported regarding the importance of reservation price in determining the settlement price of a negotiation. For example, White et al. (1994) reported that reservation prices are the only relevant reference point that influence the settlement price (Kristensen and Garling 1997a). In contrast, Min et al. (1995) and Van Poucke and Buelens (2002) reported that reservation price is not relevant and that the only significant variable is the initial offer.
Directly related to reservation price is the concept of the bargaining zone. The bargaining zone incorporates the buyer's and seller's respective reservation prices (Walton and McKersie 1965; Raiffa 1982; White et al. 1994). The bargaining zone is defined as the region between the buyer's and seller's reservation prices, and is the region in which the settlement price is most likely to take place (Raiffa 1982). In the case of a positive bargaining zone, as shown in Figure 1, the overlapping area represents the surplus to be shared between the two negotiators (Neale and Bazerman 1991). When the bargaining zone is negative, as shown in Figure 2, the buyer's reservation price is lower than the seller's reservation price. In this situation, the likelihood of an impasse is high because there is no apparent common ground for agreement between the two negotiators.
Nash (1950) established the idea that under distributive bargaining conditions, where each party attempts to maximize their own interests in the negotiation (Pruitt 1983), and with both parties knowing each other's preferences, rational behavior by negotiators would lead them to equally share the gains of negotiation. Hence, the settlement of a negotiation should logically take place at the so-called "Nash equilibrium," that is, the mid-point between the buyer's and seller's reservation prices, as shown in Figure 1. Researchers have reported mixed results regarding the consistency of negotiated outcomes with the Nash equilibrium. For example, White et al. (1994) found support for the Nash equilibrium, but other research efforts (e.g., Neale and Bazerman 1991, 1992) did not find support.
Market Price
Negotiators generally rely on private and public information as two fundamental types of information resources. Private information represents the information available to the negotiator from inside the firm, such as cost data or profit margins. Public information is information available to the negotiator outside of the firm, including market price, and has various origins, including professional publications, annual reports, word-of-mouth and the Internet.
The concept of market price is rooted in the field of economics and represents the market clearing price (Blount et al. 1996). In a market with many buyers and sellers and where transactions are conducted in an anonymous manner, the market clearing price represents the average price that maximizes social welfare (White et al. 1994). However, in individual transactions, it is more appropriate to define market price as the "average price for which comparable goods have recently sold" (White et al. 1994). Thus, market price represents a benchmark that both parties may use to evaluate the fairness of a settlement and is likely to serve as a strong reference point in the negotiation (White et al. 1994).
Researchers have reported conflicting results regarding the importance of market price as a reference point. White et al. (1994) suggested that market information has no influence on the settlement of a negotiation. On the other hand, Blount et al. (1996) determined that market price is significantly related to the settlement price. One possible explanation for these conflicting results may reside in the level of confidence negotiators place on the market price and on the source of that information.
Aspiration Price
The aspiration price represents the best settlement a buyer or a seller can expect to achieve (Walton and McKersie 1965). Kristensen and Garling (1997a) proposed that a buyer's aspiration price reflects the estimate of the seller's reservation price. Because the seller's reservation price is typically a well-kept secret, buyers may have to research the market and develop an estimate of the supplier's cost structure to establish the aspiration price. Previous research has shown that negotiators generally tend to simplify the information available to them and focus on only one particular reference point (White et al. 1994). Moreover, it has been suggested that aspiration price may be affected by the opening offer or by information regarding the market price (Kristensen and Garling 1997b).
White and Neale (1994) showed that aspiration price has an influence on the settlement price, even when controlling for bargaining zone size, and argued that negotiators often think in terms of ranges rather than a specific point estimate. This introduces the notion of an aspiration zone as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Thus, the aspiration zone is the distance between a party's aspiration price and reservation price (White and Neale 1994). A large aspiration zone may imply that a negotiator will make a more aggressive opening offer but at the same time has more room for making concessions later in the negotiation (White and Neale 1994). As a consequence, the size of the aspiration zone may influence the probability of an impasse.
White and Neale (1994) demonstrated that when two negotiators have similar aspiration zones, in terms of size, the likelihood of an impasse is lower than when the size of their aspiration zones are significantly different. This result may be explained by the fact that a larger aspiration zone allows a party to be more flexible in giving concessions.
Bargaining Stance
The literature reports two primary stances by negotiators: distributive and integrative (Walton and McKersie 1965; Lewicki, Saunders and Minton 2001). Distributive negotiation, also called competitive or win-lose bargaining, refers to a negotiation stance in which the party, or parties, views resources as fixed and thus attempts to maximize their own share at the expense of the other. Fisher and Ury (1981) refer to this bargaining stance as "positional bargaining," whereas Pruitt (1983) introduced the term "contending" or "contentious bargaining." Distributive bargaining implies an effort to dominate the negotiation through the use of pressure tactics, persuasive arguments and threats (Pruitt 1983).
Integrative bargaining, also called cooperative, collaborative, win-win or problem solving bargaining (Pruitt 1981; Graham 1986), refers to a negotiating stance where one party's gain does not necessarily come at the expense of the other and where mutual benefit might accrue to both parties when they work to find mutually acceptable solutions (Lewicki et al. 2001). Graham (1986) proposed that an integrative bargaining stance in an industrial setting involves an "act of balancing" between a firm's own profits and the satisfaction of their customer firm, but works only when both firms use this approach. Table II summarizes the characteristics of integrative and distributive bargaining stances, adapted from work by Lewicki et al. (2001).
Negotiations between a buyer and a seller may appear to be a zero-sum game because each dollar of overall value that one party gains is one lost by the other party. This situation is particularly true for a one-time negotiation with a supplier for a nonrepetitive purchase. As a consequence, a one-time negotiation may increase the likelihood of both negotiators adopting a distributive strategy because they have little expectation for future interaction. One example is a nonrepetitive purchase such as hiring a construction firm to replace a roof on an office building. On the other hand, the prospect of repeated purchases with the same party may increase the likelihood for both parties to adopt a more integrative style. Repetitive bargaining offers both parties a chance to share information and to identify a position that will benefit both parties. However, even under conditions of repetitive bargaining, many negotiators assume that integrative solutions are not possible. This position is called the "fixed-sum assumption" (Thompson and Hastie 1990; Simons 1993). Almost by definition, the bargaining stances taken by the respective parties may affect the tactics used by negotiators, which in turn may affect the settlement. Much of the experimental research in negotiation assumes that both parties use a distributive bargaining stance (White et al. 1994; Kristensen and Garling 1997a).
The first set of hypotheses proposes relationships between the independent variables of buyers' and sellers' reservation and aspiration prices, and the dependent variable of the settlement price. As noted previously, reservation prices are the least acceptable outcome for each of the respective parties and because disclosing these figures would negatively affect the disclosing party, reservation prices are thus private information (Blount et al. 1996). In contrast, the aspiration price is much less private and may be shared explicitly with the other party in the form of opening offers, and can thus be considered public information. For example, a buyer may provide an aspiration price as the opening counter-offer to a seller's initial offer.
The reasoning behind these hypotheses is that aspiration and reservation prices should logically reflect how the negotiators are approaching the negotiation. For example, a very high aspiration price by a seller would imply that they may be quite optimistic about their position in the negotiation and may feel as if they hold a position of power. Conversely, when a buyer sets a relatively high aspiration price, it may reflect the idea that the buyer believes they lack power in the negotiation, or that they are willing to compromise. Similar reasoning applies to reservation prices. Thus, the underlying theory behind these hypotheses is that reservation and aspiration prices are reference points that are established by the respective parties and which manifest, indirectly, the motives and relative positions of power the parties believe they hold. Stated another way, reference points are a manifestation of the negotiators' perceptions, goals and expectations for the negotiation.
H1a: There is a direct and positive relationship between the buyer's reservation price and the negotiation settlement.
H1b: There is a direct and positive relationship between the seller's reservation price and the negotiation settlement.
H1c: There is a direct and positive relationship between the buyer's aspiration price and the negotiation settlement.
H1d: There is a direct and positive relationship between the seller's aspiration price and the negotiation settlement.
The second set of hypotheses tests whether the bargaining stances taken by the buyer and the seller moderate the relationship between the buyer's and seller's reservation and aspiration prices, and the settlement price. As discussed earlier and shown in Table II, bargaining stances are either integrative or distributive. An integrative bargaining stance is characterized by a problem-solving approach, more openness to concessions and some attempt to understand and accommodate the other party's needs. In contrast, a distributive stance is characterized by a short-term orientation, and hard bargaining aimed at taking the most away from the other party in the negotiation. For example, in a distributive-distributive context, both parties would be expected to emphasize their aspiration prices, that is, each party would aggressively strive to reach their best price at the expense of the other party. In contrast, in a negotiation where both parties assume an integrative posture, the negotiation might be characterized by more concessions and a willingness by both parties to not be so driven to achieve their aspiration prices. In a mixed situation where one party takes a distributive approach and the other party takes an integrative approach, results might be mixed and dependent upon the availability of a BATNA for each of the parties. The following hypotheses do not test this level of detail. However, they do test whether the bargaining stance affects the relationship between the parties' reference points and the settlement price. In other words, hypotheses H2a-d test whether the presence of bargaining stances in the negotiating parties makes the relationships postulated in H1a-d stronger.
H2a: The initial bargaining stance taken by the buyer and the seller moderates the relationship between the buyer's reservation price and the settlement price.
H2b: The initial bargaining stance taken by the buyer and the seller moderates the relationship between the buyer's aspiration price and the settlement price.
H2c: The initial bargaining stance taken by the buyer and the seller moderates the relationship between the seller's reservation price and the settlement price.
H2d: The initial bargaining stance taken by the buyer and the seller moderates the relationship between the seller's aspiration price and the settlement price.
Next, this study attempted to identify the factors that contribute to a negotiation impasse. In the experimental setting in this study, two factors could be responsible for an impasse. First, a lack of common ground between the buyer and the seller could lead to irreconcilable positions. Second, the bargaining stance taken by negotiators could affect the rate at which concessions were made.
The bargaining zone is said to be positive when the buyer's reservation price is higher than the seller's reservation price, as shown in Figure 1. However, with a negative bargaining zone, as shown in Figure 2, there is no common ground for agreement between the buyer and the seller. A negotiation taking place under the conditions in Figure 2 may be quickly abandoned (Raiffa 1982; Lewicki et al. 2001) unless one or both parties revise their reservation price. Hypothesis 3 tests this relationship as follows:
H3: A negotiation with a negative bargaining zone has a higher likelihood of impasse, where the negotiation is abandoned, than one with a positive bargaining zone.
The data in this study were collected from upper-level, primarily seniors, undergraduate students who were studying negotiation in a purchasing course at a large public university in the United States. The students had received approximately 3 weeks of interactive lectures exclusively on the topic of negotiation. Topics included problem framing, negotiation strategies, integrative and distributive negotiation stances, goal setting and other related negotiation topics. A large majority of these students had real-world work experience, typically in the form of summer internships in some area of supply chain management, and a minority had some industrial negotiation experience. The students were randomly assigned to teams of three or four people, and the teams were randomly assigned as either buyers or sellers. This assignment yielded 128 teams. The teams were provided with a buyer or seller negotiation scenario as shown in Appendices I and II.
Before the negotiation started, the teams were given time to review their respective negotiation scenarios and to discuss how they would approach the negotiation. They were then asked to state which bargaining stance they planned to pursue, either integrative or distributive, and also to declare their reservation prices and target prices. The teams were given approximately 60 minutes to complete the negotiations. Impasses were allowed, that is, teams were not forced to reach a negotiated agreement. Grades were assigned only for participation in the negotiation so as not to influence the outcomes of the negotiation in a particular direction.
Data Analysis and Results
Table III provides the regression results for H1a-d. The regression tested the direct influence of four reference points on settlement price. The reference points analyzed included the buyer's reservation and aspiration prices, and the seller's reservation and aspiration prices. The results of the multiple regression suggest that only two of these reference points are statistically significant: the seller's aspiration price (p < .01) and to a lesser extent buyer's reservation price (p < .1). These results provide support for hypotheses H1a and c and do not support hypotheses H1b and d.
The next step was to analyze the moderating effect of the negotiation stances taken by two parties. The negotiation stance taken by the buyer and the seller was either integrative or distributive. Following a game-theoretic framework, four combinations are possible: distributive-distributive (DD), distributive-integrative (DI), integrativ-distributive (ID) and integrative-integrative (II). These combinations were grouped into three categories: (1) Integrative-integrative (II), (2) integrative-distributive and distributive-integrative (ID-DI), and (3) distributive-distributive (DD). These three categories were coded using two dummy variables, NS1 (difference between DD and II) and NS2 (difference between the ID and DI combined group and the II group) with II as the reference group. The information was assumed to be symmetrical, that is, both groups had similar, although not identical information. Thus, for the analysis the ID and DI groups were incorporated into the same group after preliminary analysis suggested that ID and DI subgroups were not significantly different. All the independent variables were mean centered to reduce unnecessary multicollinearity. Mean centering is accomplished by subtracting the mean of a given predictor variable from each related observation (Aiken and West 1996; Jaccard and Wan 1996; Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 2003).
The results, shown in Table IV, indicate that NS1, the dummy variable coding the difference between the DD and II, is statistically significant for each of the four different independent variables tested. This result suggests that distributive-distributive (DD) stances significantly alter the settlement price compared with integrative-integrative (II) stances and that this alteration increases the settlement price. Thus, a DD stance tends to increase the settlement price and, therefore, improves the seller's performance in terms of the settlement price.
The moderating effect of the bargaining stance was not found to be significant except in the relationship between seller's aspiration price and settlement price (p < 0.05) and to a lesser extent in the relationship between buyer's aspiration price and settlement price (p < 0.1). These results provide support for hypothesis H2d, marginal support for H2b but no support for hypotheses H2a and c. For the seller's aspiration price, the interaction term representing the moderating effect of a DD bargaining stance compared with an II bargaining stance was significant (p < 0.05). Therefore, the more distributive the bargaining stance taken by the negotiating parties, the higher the level of the increase of the settlement price associated with the bargaining stance. This result confirms the importance of bargaining stance on the outcome of a negotiation.
Testing Hypothesis 3 consisted of analyzing the effect of the size of the bargaining zone on the likelihood of the negotiators reaching a settlement. This analysis was performed to determine whether a negative bargaining zone has a higher likelihood of not reaching a settlement when compared with a positive bargaining zone. Results reveal that out of 10 negotiations with a negative bargaining zone, three did not reach settlement. In contrast, out of 53 negotiations with a positive bargaining zone, only three were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement. To analyze the frequency table, the Fisher exact test was used, which is a statistical tool used to identify a nonrandom association between two categorical variables. The Fisher test calculates the p-value for a 2 x 2 frequency table for small sample sizes where a [chi square] test is inappropriate. This analysis resulted in a p-value of 0.0458 (p < 0.05). Thus, the results of the Fisher exact test support the notion that negotiations have a statistically significant higher likelihood of reaching a settlement with a positive bargaining zone than with a negative one. This result provides support for Hypothesis 3.
The experiment used in this study attempted to reproduce the richness of a real negotiation by providing enough background to negotiators such that they could clearly understand and identify with their respective roles. For example, negotiators were provided with market price references and personal constraints from which aspiration and reservation prices could be easily extracted. Negotiators were asked to choose a bargaining stance, either distributive or integrative, at the beginning of the negotiation.
Despite a rich environment with multiple reference points and in a relatively uncontrolled environment when compared with similar studies in the negotiation literature, some definite predictors of price settlements were identified. In this experiment, both seller's aspiration price and buyer's reservation price were significant predictors of the settlement price. Hypothesis H1a and d stipulated significant relationships between the independent variables of buyer's reservation and seller's aspiration prices, and the dependent variable of settlement price, and were supported. Hypotheses H1b and c were not supported.
Although both parties had predetermined goals in terms of aspiration prices, the results of the analysis suggest a balance of power in favor of the seller. Buyer teams appear to have retreated from their aspiration points, and to focus more on their reservation prices. Conversely, sellers appear to have kept aspiration price as an anchor point during the negotiation. This result is consistent with previous research (Raiffa 1982; Kristensen and Garling 1997a), which suggests that negotiators may adjust their expectations during the negotiation. This result is reinforced by the average selling price of $1,229, which is higher than the price predicted by the Nash equilibrium ($1,159), which suggests that sellers took a higher share of the available welfare and generally dominated the negotiation. It is also possible that the wording of the scenario implicitly gave sellers more power than the buyers, possibly because of the time pressure imposed on the buyer. However, in feedback sessions only a small minority of the negotiator groups reported feeling pressed for time. Moreover, regardless of the facts of a particular negotiation scenario, it is the negotiators' perceptions and interpretation of those facts that influence the behavior of the parties during the negotiation.
The test of the second set of hypotheses, which examined the effect of the negotiators' bargaining stances on the settlement of a negotiation, also received mixed results. Before determining the presence of possible interaction effects, the data were examined to identify the main effect of various negotiation stances. The results, shown in Table IV, suggest that a DD bargaining stance consistently increased the settlement price, which indicates an advantage to the seller. The analysis of the dummy variable used to measure the difference between an II and a DD stance (NS1), indicated that NS1 was positive and significant, and ranged from $48 to $82. However, there were no similar significant differences in the negotiations where the two groups were mixed (DI or ID). Thus, the seller groups appear to have benefited from adopting a distributive bargaining stance. The results also imply that when both parties adopt a distributive stance, the party with the highest negotiation power may be able to manipulate the settlement price. If true, this interpretation would give an incentive for a powerful negotiator to adopt a distributive stance in order to leverage power and improve performance, at least in the short run and when unit price is the primary decision criterion.
Second, the analysis of possible interaction effects of bargaining stances provided only limited support for hypotheses H2a-d. Specifically, a DD bargaining stance was found to be a significant moderator in the relationship between the sellers' aspiration price and settlement price whereas DD was only marginally significant (p < 0.1) in the relationship between the buyers' aspiration and settlement price. Thus, support was found for H2d (p < 0.05) and more moderately for H2b (p < 0.1), but not for H2a or c. It is interesting to note that these interaction effects were identified only for aspiration prices (for both buyer and sellers) and not for reservation prices. This result implies that a DD bargaining stance exaggerates the importance of a bargainer's aspiration price, assuming no regard for any considerations of the opposite party.
An additional finding is that the likelihood of success or impasse may be predicted by determining the sign of the bargaining zone, positive or negative, rather than by determining the bargaining stance taken by each negotiator. For this particular data set, bargaining stance is not relevant in determining the aspiration zone. However, even the sign of the bargaining zone should not be taken as a reliable predictor of a negotiation success. Of the 10 negotiations with a negative bargaining zone, none of the negotiations should, theoretically, have been successful because there was no common ground for agreement on settlement price between the two parties. However, seven of the 10 negotiations with an initial negative bargaining zone actually did culminate in an agreement. This result confirms the fact that negotiators may change their reference points during a negotiation and also that they may be willing to shift their reservation prices in order to reach an agreement with the other party. Thus, as noted earlier, some information may be known before a negotiation, such as the seller's initial quote or asking price. However, despite preparations and strategizing for the negotiation, there is still information that will only emerge during the negotiation, and this new information may influence the negotiators to rethink their reference points.
For negotiators, this study suggests several important points. First, these findings reinforce the fact that reference points that are determined before the negotiation can influence the outcome of a negotiation. This finding reinforces a frequently stated assumption in the negotiation trade literature that negotiation success is dependent on significant effort in the preparation stage.
Second, the results point to the fact that negotiators may change their reference points during the negotiation. Knowing that negotiators do change their reference points emphasizes even more the need for thorough prenegotiation preparation. Moreover, preparation should not only focus on the determination of reference points but should also determine the courses of action to follow based on different case scenarios. For example, a buyer may not know whether the seller's negotiation team will come to the negotiation with a distributive or an integrative strategy. Thus, they should be prepared to respond to either one.
Third, armed with the knowledge that negotiators are likely to switch the reference points during the negotiation, negotiators must be ready to use strategies that will influence the other party to change their reference points. Thus, for instance, a negotiator could attempt to change another party's perceptions by using a more extreme opening offer as a way to modify the other party's perception of their own aspiration and reservation prices.
Finally, because negotiators are likely to switch reference points and strategies during the course of the negotiation, the results suggest that even after the most thorough preparation negotiators will be confronted with unforeseen events. In other words, even the best-prepared negotiators may have to readjust their position during the negotiation and without time to prepare. Under these conditions, it appears that a negotiator's experience and skill can potentially have a high impact on the success of a negotiation.
There are a few limitations to the current study. First, the sample size was relatively small with 128 negotiating teams. Second, the experimental design did not test multiple scenarios. For instance, future research could involve the manipulation of reference points to determine the effect on outcomes. Because of the fixed scenario, no analysis was possible for the market reference points.
Generalizability of results is always of concern in research, and this study is no exception. As noted earlier, the subjects of this experiment were upper-level undergraduate students who were taking a negotiation course at a large public university. One question of interest from the perspective of generalizability is: to what extent does the use of students as subjects in an experiment affect the generalizability of results to the general population of industrial negotiators in buyer-supplier negotiations? The extant research provides some useful perspective in this regard. Neale and Northcraft (1986) explicitly investigated whether the results of negotiation research, which gathered data from student subjects, were generalizable to the population of expert negotiators. Their results suggest that experts did outperform the students in similar situations, but that the patterns of performance were very similar. An additional negotiation study by Min et al. (1995) gathered data from both student and professional buyer groups. Min et al. (1995) reported "essentially the same" results in comparisons between the two groups (p. 21). Other researchers have also used students as subjects in negotiation research (e.g., Blount et al. 1996). These results suggest that the results of the present study are valid in terms of using students as a respondent population in a negotiation experiment. Replication and extensions of the present research could make valuable contributions to the field and provide additional evidence of generalizability.
Future research could also investigate whether bargaining tactics are valid representations of a firm's strategic approach to buyer-supplier relationships. In other words, researchers could seek to determine whether there is congruence between what the literature refers to as cooperative and competitive relationships, and the integrative versus distributive tactics used during negotiations. Another interesting question surrounds the issue of how bargaining stances might change during a negotiation, and why. Overall, the negotiation literature has done little to advance the understanding of bargaining stances on the outcomes of negotiation. We hope that other researchers will contribute to this area.
Adler, N.J., R. Brahm and J.L. Graham. "Strategy Implementation: A Comparison of Face-to-Face Negotiations in the People's Republic of China and the United States," Strategic Management Journal, (1:6), 1992, pp. 449-466.
Adler, N.J., J.L. Graham and T.S. Gehrke. "Business Negotiations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States," Journal of Business Research, (15:5), 1987, pp. 411-429.
Aiken, L. and S. West. Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting Interactions, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA, 1996.
Barry, B. and R.L. Oliver. "Affect in Negotiation: A Model and Propositions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (67:2), 1996, pp. 127-143.
Blount, S., M.C. Thomas-Hunt and M.A. Neale. "The Price Is Right--or Is It? A Reference Point Model of Two-Party Price Negotiations," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (68:1), 1996, pp. 1-12.
Brenner, L.A., D.J. Koehler, V. Liberman and A. Tversky. "Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency Judgments: A Critical Examination," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (65:3), 1996, pp. 212-219.
Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S.G. West and L.S. Aiken. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Science, 3rd ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., Mahwaw, NJ, 2003.
Dwyer, F.R., P.H. Schurr and S. Oh. "Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships," Journal of Marketing, (51:2), 1987, pp. 11-27.
Fisher, R. and W. Ury. Getting to Yes, Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1981.
Graham, J.L. "The Influence of Culture on the Process of Business Negotiations: An Exploratory Study," Journal of International Business Studies, (16:1), 1985, pp. 81-96.
Graham, J.L. "The Problem-Solving Approach to Negotiations in Industrial Marketing," Journal of Business Research, (14:6), 1986, pp. 549-566.
Graham, J.L., D.K. Kim, C.Y. Lin and M. Robinson. "Buyer-Seller Negotiations Around the Pacific Rim: Differences in Fundamental Exchange Processes," Journal of Consumer Research, (15:1), 1988, pp. 48-54.
Graham, J.L., A.T. Mintu and W. Rodgers. "Explorations of Negotiation Behaviors in Ten Foreign Cultures Using a Model Developed in the United States," Management Science, (40:1), 1994, pp. 72-95.
Graham, J.L. and Y. Sano. "Across the Negotiating Table from the Japanese," International Marketing Review, (3:3), 1986, pp. 58-72.
Jaccard, J. and C. Wan. LISREL Approaches to Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1996.
Kahneman, D. "Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (51:2), 1992, pp. 296-312.
Kristensen, H. and T. Garling. "Determinants of Buyers' Aspiration and Reservation Price," Journal of Economic Psychology, (18:5), 1997a, pp. 487-503.
Kristensen, H. and R. Garling. "The Effects of Anchor Points and Reference Points on Negotiation Process and Outcome," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (71:1), 1997b, pp. 85-94.
Lewicki, R.J., D.M. Saunders and J.W. Minton. Essentials of Negotiation, 2nd ed., Irwin McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2001.
Lim, R.G. "Overconfidence in Negotiation Revisited," International Journal of Conflict Management, (8:1), 1997, pp. 52-79.
Min, H., M.S. LaTour and M.A. Jones. "Negotiation Outcomes: The Impact of the Initial Offer, Time, Gender, and Team Size," International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, (31:4), 1995, pp. 19-24.
Monczka, R., R. Trent and R. Handfield. "Purchasing and Supply Chain Management," South-Western, Mason, OH, 2002.
Nash, J.F. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, (18:2), 1950, pp. 155-162.
Nash, J.F. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, (21:1), 1953, pp. 128-140.
Neale, M.A. and M.H. Bazerman. "The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes," Academy of Management Journal, (28:1), 1985, pp. 34-49.
Neale, M.A. and M.H. Bazerman. Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation, The Free Press, New York, 1991.
Neale, M.A. and M.H. Bazerman. "Negotiating Rationally: The Power and Impact of the Negotiator's Frame," Academy of Management Executive, (6:3), 1992, pp. 42-51.
Neale, M.A., V.L. Huber and G.B. Northcraft. "The Framing of Negotiations: Contextual Versus Task Frames," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (39:2), 1987, pp. 228-241.
Neale, M.A. and G.B. Northcraft. "Experts, Amateurs, and Refrigerators: Comparing Expert and Amateur Negotiators in a Novel Task," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (38), 1986, pp. 305-317.
Oliver, R.L., P.V.S. Balakrishnan and B. Barry. "Outcome Satisfaction in Negotiation: A Test of Expectancy Disconfirmation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (60:2), 1994, pp. 252-275.
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Pruitt, D.G. "Strategic Choice in Negotiation," American Behavioral Scientist, (27:2), 1983, pp. 167-194.
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Thompson, L. and R. Hastie. "Social Perception in Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, (47), 1990, pp. 98-127.
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Appendix I
You want to sell your 1989 model pickup truck. You have just finished figuring your income taxes, and need an additional $1,000 soon. The only quick source of cash is to sell your vehicle. The average local trade-in value for a clean, low-mileage 1989 pickup is shown in the latest Blue Book as $1,400. You have taken excellent care of the truck, with regularly scheduled maintenance and oil changes; however, the tires have only a couple of 1,000 miles left on them. The actual mileage is 127,000, although the truck's odometer shows only 86,000. You have maintained the body by touching up the paint and waxing it frequently, but the right front fender was dented last week--it remains dented.
You have had a "For Sale" sign posted in the truck's back window and have had it advertised for sale for the last 2 weeks. A neighbor has been the only seriously interested party. After letting your neighbor test-drive the truck, you decide to try and negotiate a sale for the highest price you can get.
With summer coming on, you have been looking for a riding lawn mower. You have heard that the neighbor who test-drove the truck just purchased a new one and wonder what happened to the old one in his garage. You had planned to spend around several hundred dollars for a decent one. You have less than 1 h to reach a negotiated agreement.
Note: This scenario is similar to the one presented in Monczka, Trent and Handfield (2002, p. 751).
Appendix II
Sears has just delivered your new riding lawn mower, and you were wondering how you will get rid of the old one, particularly since it has a broken drive shaft.
Your spouse just took your only car for the day to visit your ailing mother-in-law. You must commute 30 miles to work, and no public transportation or taxi service is available. You have been planning to buy a new full-size US-built pickup truck for some time now. You must leave for work in a half-hour or risk being late for your annual job appraisal with your manager.
A week ago you noticed a neighbor's pickup truck with a "For Sale" sign in the back window. You have about $2,000 in cash from your latest bonus check, but you must keep between $500 and $750 for living expenses. Other savings you have are committed to paying your Federal income taxes, which are due in a month.
The compact pickup for sale is a 1989 model Toyota with 86,000 miles showing on the odometer and a bald set of tires. The shocks are mushy, and the right front fender has been recently smashed. You have driven this pickup, and the engine and transmission seem to be in acceptable working condition. The brakes seem solid, and the steering is tight, but the muffler is getting loud.
If you buy the truck today, you will not be late for your annual performance appraisal (which, you hope, will include a raise). You recall that similar used pickups that are barely drivable sell for around $800-$900 at the local auto auction yard.
If you get to work 5 min early, you figure it could be worth an additional $500 per year since you will have time to review your preparation for the appraisal meeting and negotiate a better raise. You assume your neighbor will not lend you the pickup to get to work.
Note: This scenario is similar to the one presented in Monczka et al. (2002, p. 751).
Daniel R. Krause is an associate professor in the Department of Supply Chain Management in the W.P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University in Tempe, Arizona.
Regis Terpend is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Supply Chain Management in the W.P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University in Tempe, Arizona.
Kenneth J. Petersen is an associate professor of management in the College of Business at Colorado State University in Fort Collins, Colorado.
Table I GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FIELD OF NEGOTIATION Terminology Definitions Reservation price The point at which a negotiator is or indifferent about accepting the Reservation value (Blount et al. offer or end the negotiation (Van 1996) Poucke and Buelens 2002) Resistance point (Walton and The least acceptable outcome McKersie 1965) (Blount et al. 1996) Walk-away price The boundary between an acceptable deal and an unacceptable deal or the lower acceptable price Aspiration price (White and Neale The best outcome that a negotiator 1994) can reasonably expect (Walton and or McKersie 1965) Negotiation target The best result, the most desired Target price (Walton and McKersie outcome, with a nonneglectable 1965) probability of being accepted by the other party (Van Poucke and Buelens 2002) Opening price The first price a negotiator is or going to mention (Van Poucke and Opening offer Buelens 2002) Market price Pricing information of a negotiated or object as available externally to Market information the firm (e.g., Blue Book value of a car) Market clearing price (White et al. 1994) Bargaining zone Any overlap between the parties' or reservation prices (Raiffa 1982) Bargaining range Contract zone (Walton and McKersie 1965) Settlement range Zone of agreement Aspiration zone The distance between a party's reservation price and aspiration price (White and Neale 1994) Offer zone The absolute value of the difference between the intended opening offer and aspiration price (Van Poucke and Buelens 2002) Reference point A point which serves as a basis for comparison in the negotiation, and more particularly separates the domain into region of desirable outcomes and region of undesirable outcomes (Kahneman 1992) Anchor point A point toward which negotiators or will convey a stubborn level of Anchor adherence (Kahneman 1992) Nash equilibrium The mid-point of the bargaining zone (White and Neale 1994) BATNA Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (Fisher and Ury 1981) Overconfidence A common bias among negotiators (and humans in general) which consists of over evaluating the acceptability of a bargaining position (Neale and Bazerman 1985) Distributive bargaining stance, Trying to persuade the other party also referred in the literature to accept alternatives that favor as: one's own interest (Pruitt 1983) Competitive bargaining Win-lose bargaining Discrete transaction (Dwyer et al. 1987) Contentious bargaining (Pruitt 1983) Positional bargaining (Fisher and Ury 1981) Integrative negotiation stance, The pursuit of a formula for also referred in the literature reconciling the two parties' as: aspirations (Pruitt 1983) Problem-solving (Pruitt 1983) Trying to maximize own economics Cooperative reward while attempting to keep Collaborative client satisfied (Graham 1986) Relational exchange (Dwyer et al. 1987) Table II CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRIBUTIVE AND INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING Distributive Bargaining Integrative Bargaining Also called Competitive bargaining Cooperative Hard bargaining Collaborative Win-lose bargaining Win-win Problem solving Goal Attain one-sided target Attain a mutually acceptable target Characteristics Short-term orientation Long-term orientation One-time deal Repeated transactions Few concessions Open to concessions Secretive/deceptive Open communication communication Strategy Push the settlement near Try to understand other the other party's party's needs reservation price Define the problem in a way Get the other party to that is mutually acceptable move its to both sides reservation price Establish trust Tactics Disruptive actions Depersonalize the problem Manipulation Separate problem definition Alliance with outsiders from solutions Aggressive opening offer Generate alternative Threats/intimidation/ solutions aggressive behavior Expand the resources for Hardball tactics. both parties Find a bridge solution Use breaks to cool off Clear and accurate communication Adapted from Lewicki, Saunders and Minton (2001). Table III RESULTS OF REGRESSION--MAIN FACTORS Model Variables B SE [gamma] t Sig. Model 1 Intercept 637.128 155.869 4.088 0.000 B Reservation* 0.243 0.127 0.333 1.910 0.062 B Aspiration -0.023 0.133 -0.029 -0.171 0.865 S Aspiration (#) 0.183 0.066 0.359 2.751 0.008 S Reservation 0.023 0.123 0.026 0.191 0.850 [R.sup.2] Adj- Model Variables [R.sup.2] Change [R.sup.2] F Sig. Model 1 0.263 0.203 4.372 0.004 Intercept B Reservation* 0.128 B Aspiration 0.001 S Aspiration (#) 0.133 S Reservation 0.001 *Denotes p < 0.1. +Denotes p < 0.05. (#) Denotes p < 0.01. Table IV RESULTS OF MULTIPLE MODERATED REGRESSIONS Models Independent Buyer's Buyer's Seller's Seller's Variables Reservation Aspiration Reservation Aspiration Constant 1230 (17) 1231 1233 1225 B Reservation 0.331 (#) -- -- -- (0.092) B Aspiration -- 0.191* -- -- (0.114) S Reservation -- -- 0.335 (#) -- (0.115) S Aspiration -- -- -- 0.189 (#) (0.061) NS1 74.7 (#) 62.60 (#) 82.29 (#) 48.14 (+) (22.21) (22.76) (23.66) (21.18) NS2 30.25 21.36 9.30 5.76 (23.00) (24.32) (23.41) (22.46) B Reservation 0.151 -- -- -- *NS1 (0.123) B Reservation -0.047 -- -- -- *NS2 (0.117) B Aspiration -- 0.256* -- -- *NS1 (0.139) B Aspiration -- 0.055 -- -- *NS2 (0.140) S Reservation -- -- 0.195 -- *NS1 (0.129) S Reservation -- -- 0.062 -- *NS2 (0.118) S Aspiration -- -- -- 0.194 (+) *NS1 (0.076) S Aspiration -- -- -- 0.031 *NS2 (0.085) *Denotes p < 0.1. (+) Denotes p < 0.05. (#) Denotes p < 0.01.
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Event: Young Adult Gathering and Talk Topic: "Is Life Worth Living?"Location: Professor Nathan Carlin's Home
When: August 9Event: PreacherTime: 8:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.Location: St. Philip Presbyterian Church, Houston, TexasOpen to the public.
Event: Sunday School ClassTopic: "Stuff My Teachers Taught Me" Location: St. Philip Presbyterian Church, Houston, TexasOpen to the public.
When: May 29Topic: "Hume and Smith on Religion"Location: University of Antwerp, Belgium
When: June 26Topic: "Practical Reason and Religious Understanding"Location: Fordham University, New York, New York
When: June 7Event: Preacher/SpeakerTopic: "Who Are My Brothers and Sisters?"Time: 1:00 p.m., Worship Service; 2:45 p.m., Adult Education ProgramLocation: Taiwanese American Fellowship Presbyterian Church, New Brunswick, New JerseyOpen to the public.
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PatioArt Hanging Basket
Customers Also Bought
Exclusive | Jazz Up Your Patio Flowers with a Hanging Art Basket
- Colorful hanging basket adds a bright splash of color
- Basket collapses flat for storage
Fill these eye-popping baskets with colorful flowers or simple foliage plants; either way, they'll be the talk of the town. Made from fade-resistant nylon fabric with a waterproof liner and drainage hole. 14" diameter basket collapses flat for easy off-season storage.
- Metal frame, chain and hook; UV-resistant nylon fabric
- Basket is 14" in diameter; hanging chains are 22" from top of basket to hook
- Holds 10 quarts of container mix
- Collapses flat for storage
- Imported
- Gardener's Supply Exclusive
Reviewed by 3 customers
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- Porch
- The Baskets Brigten Up My
Best Uses
I thought my hanging baskets were in good taste with just the right colors that I wanted. They give just the right touch with out looking gaucheness.
- Was this a gift?:
- No
Add color to my front porch.
- Something different
- Have To Hang To Plant
Best Uses
- Hang To Add Extra Color
I will hang in the spring. Wish I ordered a brighter one. Saw complaints about staining. Will line with plastic. It is already lined with woven plastic. Will use unwoven and maybe put a hole in the bottom at the drainage hole.
- Was this a gift?:
- No
There are no special shipping restrictions or charges associated with this item. For detailed information about our delivery methods and charges, click here.
We're proud of the fact that this item is shipped to you directly from our warehouse in Vermont, by one of our 250 employee-owners. In-stock items are packed with care and shipped within the next business day to ensure prompt delivery to your home and garden!


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UPDATE: The summer special has ended. Thank you to everyone that signed up and took advantage of it. Be sure to check back in the future for more specials coming your way!
June through August are our busiest months at ADA. So, to ensure you have a seat you'll need to pre-register & by doing so I'm going to give you $50 OFF!
Register for any of our classes in June, July, or August prior to May 1st and receive a $50 discount off your tuition. You must register prior to May 1st and this applies to any of our driver education packages. Please contact Stephanie at 335-2226 to register for this summer special so that she can properly apply your discount and explain any rules or restrictions that may apply.
Don't wait to the last minute and not have a seat. REGISTER TODAY and take advantage of this Sizzling Summer Discount Special!


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I think I'm just about done calling Danielle Sharp Britain's hottest co-ed. It was a cute title that stuck around for a little while, but kind of like an old dude calls his young escort date his 'niece', I'm kind of ready to dispense with the silly promotional campaign and just start referring to Danielle Sharp as one wicked young hottie.
Featured in the current edition of Nuts magazine, Danielle Sharp shows off her ridiculously sweet body, her bare boobtastic, and even though we're not calling her a co-ed any longer, she's definitely teaching us a lesson in the laws of attraction. We can only hope Danielle goes for an advanced degree. Enjoy.


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Pro-Life Open Forum
Do you consider the unborn human fetus a person?
Even though abortion is wrong under Catholic teaching, we also cannot limit other people's free will under the law. So how can you justify making it illegal under the law?
Why is in vitro fertilization morally objectionable?
How do you respond to the pro-choice argument that "It's my body and I can do what I want to it"?
Are you familiar with a proposed bill in the Senate (s1696) (The Women's Health Protection Act) that will strike down pro-life protections in all fifty states?
How come I never hear this issue talked about in a homily? Are seminarians taught to preach about pro-life issues?
What is the Church's stance on couples who are having trouble conceiving? What kind of treatment is acceptable? Fertility drugs? Artificial insemination? What would be objectionable?
If someone has ALS and go on a respirator to breathe and later down the line wants to take themselves off the machine, is that considered suicide?
These days we hear a lot about "death with dignity," but what does the dignity of human life demand? As the lobbyists for euthanasia and assisted suicide grow in influence, and as we face a healthcare future more murky and frightening than it has been in generations, our society finds itself in desperate need of sound and compassionate guidance on end-of-life issues. In The Laws of Life and Death, George Delgado—a Catholic physician and expert on both the medical and ethical issues surrounding terminal patient care—offers a useful layman's guide to navigating the choices faced by the aged, sick, and dying, and those who care for them.


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2002 Pontiac Montana • 151,000 miles
I just moved to Indiana and found out this morning that my car doesn't pass the emissions standards because of the P0135 error and incomplete o2 and catalyst monitors. The check engine light was also on, and had been on for as long as I can remember. After leaving the emissions test site, I went and got the o2 sensor and replaced it. The check engine light went off and stayed off for about 35 minutes but came back on. I'm now trying to figure out what else I need to do. I've gotta get this vehicle up to par so I can get it plated. What is a catalyst? Would that incomplete monitor make the light go back on? If so, how do I fix that? I'm feeling pretty lost right now, any info would be greatly appreciated.
June 24, 2012.
June 24, 2012.
Where is the o2 sensor located you replaced?Also the catalyst is the cataltic convertor. It not ready because of the code your setting most likely.
It was bank 1 sensor 1, screwed into the top side of the exhaust pipe on top of the exhaust manifold. How do I set the right code?
So its a 4cyl engine?Also what do you mean set the right code?The reason the monitors arent setting is because of the code your setting. Also when ever you disconnect the battery or clear codes that clears/resets the monitors so they have to be relearned again.
No, it's a 6 cyl. I wasn't sure if you meant a code I myself was setting or the vehicle. We also didnt disconnect the battery, and I don't think we cleared codes. So are you saying that the light coming back on isn't anything to worry about? Will it pass an Indiana emissions test?
The light cannot be on and must be repaired correctly to pass emissions.
Take it to a shop for a real diag and they will tell you the failures and the needed repairs.
Take it to a shop for a real diag and they will tell you the failures and the needed repairs.
If the ligh is on what coees do you have now since the repair?Also with the light on its a auto fail for emissions. Plus the monitors wont set.
I'm going to take it to AutoZone today to get another diagnostic. I'll fill you in on the code once I get back.
Autozone are parts salesman, not techs. They will sell you the world.
You need a real shop to check it for you, not a parts house.
You need a real shop to check it for you, not a parts house.
Well it's Sunday and it's free, so I'm gonna see what it says and then make some calls tomorrow to see if any shops in the area do free checks as well
Let me know what you find.
I have a 2001 kia rio auto i brought it to the emissions and it failed they said none of the moniters were workin they asked if u had a code cleared lately and i had cleared one for a ...
1 answer • 2001 Kia Rio • 245,000 miles
My truck keeps displaying code P1495. I took the battery tray out and looked for the LDP, but there is nothing there, and looks like nothing had ever been there. I bought this truck ...
21 answers • 1999 Dodge Dakota • 150,000 miles
1987 Toyota Landcruiser 6 cyl Four Wheel Drive Manual 70,340 miles Ok i live in houston texas and today i took my 1987 toyota landcruiser to get inspected, it passed everything ...
2 answers • 1987 Toyota Landcruiser
Altima gxe high HC emissions, 1993 automatic. Can oil soaked ignition wires arking cause high HC and CO emissions? Auto shop ran diagnotics and said sensors were fine and insisted on ...
1 answer • Nissan Altima


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Search Result
Search Tags: salmonella
Unilever recalls Skippy reduced fat peanut butter
Unilever has announced a limited recall of Skippy Reduced Fat Creamy Peanut Butter Spread and Skippy Reduced Fat Super Chunk Peanut Butter Spread because they may be contaminated with Salmonella.
Tags: Unilever , recall , Skippy Peanut Butter , peanut butter ,
CDC re-evaluates food illness analysis methodology
Dr. Chris Braden of the CDC explains why and how CDC made the decision to change its methodology
Tags: Federal Drive , Technology , e-coli , Centers for Disease Control , Chris Braden
Trader Joe's recalls tainted cilantro products
A batch of cilantro that may be contaminated by salmonella bacteria has prompted the Trader Joe's grocery chain to launch a nationwide recall.
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Farmers improving food safety by tracking produce
As the effort for new food safety legislation is slowing on Capitol Hill, farmers and food suppliers are already moving to improve the way produce is traced from the fields to kitchen tables.
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Salmonella outbreak has inspectors on alert in Md.
Small scale farmers say buying local is a good way to make sure you're getting quality eggs. But how can you be sure?
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Zombie Outbreak
10,000 - 50,000 downloadsAdd this app to your listsTweets por @Appszoom
"Zombie Outbreak is a great free game which has good stylisation. This is a surprisingly entertaining game" - androidgamesreview.com
Welcome to hell.
Zombies are biting and infecting all the civilians they found on their way. Exterminate them and save a given percent of civilians. Be careful and avoid zombies to not end being one of them.
Find different weapons. You can share ammunitions with other civilians with the same weapon type than yours.
Find antidotes. You can treat you if you have been infected or use it on infected civilians.
Manage your energy.Don't run too fast to catch your breath and your normal speed.
- Create your own maps
- Two game modes
- Save civilians from ending up infected
- Kill all zombies
- Pick up many weapons and antidotes
Tags: zombis como contaminacion, test te convertirias en zombi, игра в стиле сурвайвер зомби, jeux gratuits zombie et sauve des survivant.
- In-Game ads removed
- New HD graphics
- New levels
- New Name
- New evacuation levels
- Play with your own evacuation maps
- Following civilians run faster
- Zombies only infect one civilian at a time
- NEW FEATURE: New Evacuation game mode.
- New social options
- Share your maps with us
- NEW FEATURE: You can play with your own maps
- Longer infection time
(43 stars)
Best game ever!
(43 stars)
It was very fun. I try to figure out how to make my own map.
(43 stars)
Add free roam
(43 stars)
Love how its like a real zombie outbreak (you get biten and start turning) but, probly my screen size, cant get any gun hits with a tiny screen dpad. Shame really. Looked promising for a new game on my phone.
(43 stars)
Gawd why can't i play it?.... I can open it but i cant play either extermination or evacuation.... Pls fix this soon! I wanna play it. It seems awesome! Pls! Anyway can you add an gamemode Free roam? Where i srsly dont do anything. No objectives but just looting the city. And killing zombies.
(43 stars)
I hate this game
(43 stars)