text:
UNITED STATES v. STANDARD OIL CO.
- 1960-1969
Legal provision: 33 U.S.C. 407
Argument of Nathan Lewin
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Number 291, United States versus Standard Oil Company.
Mr. Lewin.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court.
This case is here on the Government's direct appeal from the dismissal by a District Court in the Middle District of Florida of a one-count information charging the Standard Oil Company of Kentucky with having caused, suffered and procured the discharge of gasoline into navigable waters in violation of Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
The facts relevant to a disposition of the case appear in a stipulation which is at pages 5 to 7 of the trial -- of the transcript of record and that stipulation was entered into for the purpose of the motion to dismiss made by Standard Oil.
It discloses that in November 1963, after having completed the process of repairing and cleaning a line connecting the company's bulk storage tank, we have certain dock facilities on the same challenged river, the company, the employees, ran aviation gasoline from the tank into the line.
They then accidentally left open the main shut off valve, and 300 gallons of the gasoline spilled from the line on to the docks and into the river.
Justice William J. Brennan: May I ask you if the -- if that seemed to have (Inaudible) mandatory sentence?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: I think there's a minimum fine.
Justice William J. Brennan: Because (Inaudible) shall be fine or fined or (Inaudible) by not less than 30 days within the year
Mr. Nathan Lewin: I --
Justice William J. Brennan: Does that means, if it's an offense that the (Inaudible) mandatory?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: That issue of course isn't here right now but I don't think it necessarily means that, Mr. Justice Brennan.
I think -- I think they are -- well, I think that there is a mandatory minimum sentence in terms of a fine, yes.
I don't think that that the -- well, the infringement certainly is the -- to the extent that the statute is mandatory provides either for minimum infringe -- that either for a minimum fine or imprisonment, therefore, if it's a natural person who commits the offense, of course he can be fined and not imprisoned.
Justice William J. Brennan: (Inaudible)
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Yes, he must be fined.
I think that's true, but that's not involved here.
Justice William J. Brennan: Whether or not it was accidental as the (Voice Overlap) --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Yes.
Justice William J. Brennan: -- to the facts here.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Yes.
Justice William J. Brennan: Is that right?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: That's right.
The amount of the spill just to return the facts very briefly was not sufficient to impede navigation or to cause any fire or explosion.
But the matter was reported to the Jacksonville Fire Department and to the coastguard which arrived and dissipated the gasoline into the river.
The St.Johns River is concededly a navigable water and the gasoline, it was concededly valuable and useable before it was unintentionally spilled into the river.
The relevant portion of the governing statute which appears at page 2 of our brief is -- and here, I'm just quoting the relevant portions, makes it an offense to throw, discharge or deposit, or cause, suffer or procured to be thrown, discharged or deposited from the shore, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever, into any navigable water of the United States.
The District Court dismissed the information on the ground that valuable and useable materials such as the gasoline in this case was not refuse matter within the meaning of Section 13.
Our contention here is that that was error because refuse matter as used in that statute does not make this -- the applicability of the statute turn on how valuable or useless the matter that spills under the river is to its owner but on the effect it has on the water into which it is spilled.
Since gasoline is clearly a polluting material, we believe that the stipulated fact stated in offense and that the District Court's order should be reversed and the case sent back for trial.
Now our construction of Section 13, is supported we believe by the three standard touchstones for legislative interpretation.
It's most consistent with the purpose for which the statute was enacted.
It's -- our construction we believe is entirely clear as a matter of legislative history that it was Congress' intent to cover the kind of conduct that was involved here.
And finally, we believe that even on the face of the statute itself construing the provision in its entirety, Section 13 as a whole, it would be clear to any reader of the statute that it must apply to use a valuable matter which spills negligently or unintentionally into a river as well as to useless matter.
Let me turn first to the purpose of the statute.
The -- it's entirely clear, we think from the very broad language that the statute uses and from the history -- the legislative course before its enactment in 1899, that Congress was concerned with two evils, one being obstruction to navigation and the second being the discharge of damaging materials or injurious deposits, as it was called in our predecessor statute into navigable waters, in other words, pollution.
Congress also meant to cover the entire range of conduct which could lead to these evils.
The statutory terms which cover not only the throwing, discharge or deposit, but also anybody who causes, suffers, or procures, the word suffer is we think is particularly broad, discloses that Congress was reaching not only willful and intentional dumping but any form of negligence or other kind of fault which could cause the discharge of these kind of materials into the water.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Are you asking this for a per se rule?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: We think this -- we think that the statute in effect requires that, yes Mr. Chief Justice.We think that the statute said --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Is that why you stipulated that this was accidental, you didn't attempt to show any negligence or anything, but you stipulated that it was accidental.
Was that in order to have us -- give you a per se (Inaudible) on this question?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: No, Mr. Chief Justice.
It wasn't done with any such intention at the time.
As a matter of fact, we intend to prove at the -- at trial that it was actually negligence or a form of fault that caused the spill into the river.
And we read the word accidental is not precluding that kind of evidence.
Of course, that wasn't the issue in which the District Court dismissed the information and we think that under this Court's decisions really, the only question presently before the Court wouldn't touch on whether there's a per se rule or not.
The only question presently before the Court is, whether the District Court's reading of the statute was correct, in other words, whether the word refuse matter applies only to valueless rather than valuable materials.
Justice Byron R. White: What do we suppose to say if -- that the District Court was wrong, and now reverse?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: The District Court was wrong and the case is reversed for trial, yes Mr. Justice.
Justice Byron R. White: You never -- supposed to say what's the right rule (Voice Overlap) --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Well, the right rule is that -- yes, the right rule is that refuse matter includes valuable as well as valueless material.
That's what the District Court held, that was its construction and we submit a misconstruction of the statute.
Justice William J. Brennan: Well, you sum --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Now --
Justice William J. Brennan: You sum it up, I guess at page 5 in this one sentence, don't you?
If it is foreign matter, that is likely to pollute the water or endanger navigation that constitutes that rule.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: That's right.
We say --
Justice William J. Brennan: That's your position.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: That is exactly our position.
We say, refuse is not what the owner doesn't want but what the river as it were doesn't want.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: If this goes back for trial, are you precluded from showing this is negligence have caused this?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: No, Mr. Chief Justice.
The stipulation was entered into solely for the purpose in a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, even if the District Court would hold that the stipulation read very, very strictly means only acts -- means that the spill was entirely accidental as it were by an "Act of God" we wouldn't be precluded from preceding a trial to prove negligence because that situation was limited only for the purpose of motion to dismiss.
And the -- it was I dare say, a missed choice of terms, I think the facts on their face is stated in the stipulation to indicate that there was somebody who was careless and let the valve open.
And that's what we would intend to prove at a retrial -- at a trial.
Justice Potter Stewart: I think you have to prove that, negligence or carelessness.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: I think we can prove it here.
I really don't know.
I think it would be very hard to apply -- to apply the statute when they were -- we're entirely inadvertent and it were an "Act of God" that caused the spill.
Justice Potter Stewart: Because of the opening language of the Section 13 I suppose.
The person as to himself either to throw, discharge or deposit or he has to cause, suffer or procured to be thrown, discharged or deposit.
Now that would -- I suggest my question requires some sort of a primitive action or negligence in action on the part of the person whom you're going to try to punish.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Although that question isn't here now.
Justice Potter Stewart: No.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: I think that that's a fair reading of the statute.
Now, we really -- it would really be quite an extension to read suffer as meaning totally in harmless or as imposing liability without cause.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Suppose the pipe just corroded and the gasoline escaped, would you contend that they suffered this to be done and that the statute applied it?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Not if we couldn't find any fault Mr. Chief Justice.
In other words, if they -- I think there might be an obligation to check these pipes from time to time.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Yes, and if the --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: But if the pipes had been checked and they were in good order and they just broke on their own, I think it'd be quite hard to read the word suffers encompassing that kind of conduct.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Well, that's what I add when I asked if you're on the per se rule because it's one thing if they left that valve opened negligently and that the gasoline be discharged, it might be entirely another thing if the pipe corrodes for instance and broke and then the gasoline poured out.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Oh, we agree, we'd --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: You're not asking this to go that far.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: No.
No, and I don't think that question really has to be reached on -- at this posture of the case.
The only question I think that has to be reached before we introduce any proof at all really is whether the statute reaches the kind of conduct and not which the District Judge held it did not, which is the deposit of valuable material or the discharge of valuable material into the river.
Now, in terms of the statute's purpose, it hardly makes any sense to say that Congress intended to make it a crime negligently to deposit discarded material into a river, but not to make it a crime negligently to deposit valuable material into the river.
If the statute were in terms of willfulness, if the statute had a willful element then the fact that the material were not discarded or valueless, would be an indication, it would be some proof of willfulness because people can -- that can be presumed, would not be willfully depositing their valuable material, whatever it may be into the river.
But when -- if Congress was concerned, as we think the statute clearly indicates with negligent conduct as well as with willful conduct, then it makes far more sense to look at the results because people after all are negligent with property that they considered valuable to them just as they may be with property that they consider valueless, highway accidents, countless number of highway accidents prove that, people are negligent with property which you say consider valuable.
Unknown Speaker: Is this the same section we had in the Republic Steel case?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: It was the same section that this Court discussed in the Republic Steel case, yes.
So, we submit that so far as the purity of the river is concerned, and that was what Congress is aiming at, it makes no difference whether the oil or gasoline is desired by its owner or is not desired by its owner.
The history of Section 13 which is the -- we think the second touchstone which establishes our construction of statute establishes, we think not only that nobody in Congress conceives of a distinction or abrogate any thought of -- possible thought to the distinction that the District Court here relied upon but indeed, that in light of all the prior statutes Congress' intention was clearly to cover the conduct involved here.
In 1896, after -- there had been a series of river and harbor statutes mainly appropriations bill into each one of which there was (Inaudible) one or more provisions pertaining to pollution or destruction of the rivers, Congress delegated to the Secretary of War the task of codifying these areas provisions.
And in 1899, that codification was submitted by the Secretary of War to the Senate and the relevance to -- the section, they were in effect 10 sections that were aided for the 1899 River and Harbor Appropriations Bill.
And one of those sections is the present -- is the one here involved.
Now, it's entirely clear from the discussion on the floor of Congress when the bill was introduced and we've reproduced that as Appendix B of our brief, that the Senator who presented it on the floor of the Senate as well as those who spoke in support of it and that's in effect the entire legislative history for all intents and purposes of Section 13, thought that they were doing nothing more than codifying existing law.
Now what was existing law?
It included the River and Harbors Act of 1894, which appears at page 24 of our brief.
And the River and Harbors Act of 1894 made it an offense, stated that it will -- it shall not be lawful to deposit a whole enumeration of materials and ended with the statement or any other matter of any kind into certain navigable waters for which Congress had appropriated by it.
Now that enumeration included for example, assets which certainly could be of a valuable material.
And clearly we think, and I don't -- we think our appellee doesn't dispute this, that that statute covered valuable deposits as well as valueless one.
Now, Congress was not intending to change existing law when it enacted Section 13 of the River and Harbors Act of 1899, then it must have meant to include precisely the provisions which was included in the River and Harbors Act of 1894.
Justice Potter Stewart: Now how about the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: The River and Harbors Act of 18 --
Justice Potter Stewart: That was also existing law.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: The River and Harbors Act of 1890 Mr. Justice Stewart was also existing law and that was more limited.
Justice Potter Stewart: Yes.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: We agree that it was.
It covered only other waste of any kind.
Justice Potter Stewart: So the question is --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: But we --
Justice Potter Stewart: -- which did it --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Right.
Justice Potter Stewart: -- but which of these inconsistent prior laws that it means to be codifying.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Well, we submit Mr. Justice Stewart that those two were not inconsistent, they were prohibitions, one of which was broader than the other.
Now, we submit that when a codi -- a codifier takes a prohibition against depositing waste into the river and has the form of prohibition against depositing any matter of any kind, whether it'd be waste or valuable matter, then the two aren't inconsistent, we codified them by including the broader provision in this codification, he's not really forced to any choice at all.
However, we contend that that Congress was forced to make a choice between inconsistent provisions, we submit it was an offense in 1899 to deposit valuable matter into the water and that -- and Congress when it shows not to change that law, continued making it an offense to deposit valuable matter into the water.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Which was the broader of the two laws, the earlier or the later?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: The later statute.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: The later was the broader?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: The 1894 statute is the broader of the two.
Now, that -- we contend that the word refuse must have been intended to narrow the application of the statute only to valueless material.
But we submit that its entirely consistent and it makes very good sense to read the word refuse not as limiting the statute in that way but as limiting it to the kinds of deposits which are enumerating those two statutes, both the 1890 and the 1894 Act.
Both of them had a long enumeration of materials which could not be deposited in the water and then concluded with general catch-all statements such as other waste of any kind or any other matter of any kind.
What the codifier did in 1899 is he eliminated the enumeration.
But of course, it was nonetheless necessary to keep the scope of the statute as no broader than those catch-all phrases would have been if construed as just and generous.
Now, in other words, if somebody has distilled water which he's throwing into the river, that ought not to be covered by the statute.
And we think that's why the codifier in 1899 put the word refuse in there, because he meant to exclude the kind of things which would not have been covered had those catch-all phrases been read a just and generous.
And we submit that the present application in Section 13 to the kind of gasoline involved here is entirely consistent with reading those statutes and their concluding phrase as prohibiting the discharge of any materials which would be harmful to the water, things such as refuse, dirt, ashes, acid and such materials and not making it a crime to deposit matters which are not foreign to the waters such as water or if somebody would put live fish into a stream and these are the sort of things that Congress was not intending to make a crime and that they -- that Congress intended to exclude from the scope of the statute by putting the word refuse then.
Justice Potter Stewart: Your difficulty is that simply not what the word refuse means, does it?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: What we think in common usage Mr. Justice Stewart, refuse means garbage, it means that -- it's true that Webster's Dictionary definition focuses on a discarded material.
But we think in common use, it means not only waste material but garbage.
And as a matter of fact, we think that the (Voice Overlap) --
Justice Potter Stewart: Well, but your argument would cover a freight cart full of diamonds.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Well, a couple of but right.
But garbage in the sense -- well, I think garbage is probably a relative term.
It depends where it is.
A freight cart full of diamonds in a river --
Unknown Speaker: Do you say refuse?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: -- unless somebody salvages them, this is garbage.
Justice Potter Stewart: A refuse.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: From the point of view of the river, it's garbage and it's useless.
And we think that that support is indeed by the earlier legislation, the 1890.
And the 1894 statutes indeed used the word refuse or other waste of any kind or used the word -- or other refuse or mill waste apparently distinguishing between refuse and waste, not the -- not intending to have refuse and waste mean precisely the same thing.
Finally, we submit that the statute on its face means and means to a careful reader of it exactly what we say.
There are two portions to the statute.
The first provision, the first clause makes it an offense to deposit or suffer the deposit of refuse matter of any kind directly into the river.
The second is a narrower cause which makes it an offense to deposit material of any kind on the bank of the river if it's liable to be washed into the water and impede or obstruct navigation.
Now we submit that if the District Court were right and if the first half of this statute meant to apply only to valueless material, that's clearly not true of the second half.
The second half doesn't have the word refuse.
But if the District Court were right, there would be a -- an inexplicable gap in this law because what Section 13 would be providing with the -- that it would be an offense to negligently deposit valuable material on the banks of a river, from which it could be washed in to the stream, but it would not be an offense negligently to deposit the same obstructive material directly into the stream if they're valuable.
Now, any as I -- as I say, any careful reader of the statute is bound to conclude that if the second half of the statute makes it a crime negligently, for example, if you're driving pass the banks of the river with a -- with an open truck full of logs which you're taking to build the log cabin some place and you negligently allowed the logs to fall off the truck on to the bank.
And these logs are likely to be washed into the water and obstruct navigation.
Well, that's an offense under the second half of the statute.
Justice John M. Harlan: Would there be any room for play of the second half of the statute on the facts of this case?I mean, did the gasoline --
Mr. Nathan Lewin: We think (Voice Overlap) --
Justice John M. Harlan: -- flow right into the -- from the spicket or the pipe whatever it was under the river, did it drift along to the shores of the bank.
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Well, it did drift along at the docks and then into the water.
But we think the reason the second half wouldn't apply Mr. Justice Harlan is that the second half is limited to obstructive matter.
If the concluding clause is that it applies to material which whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed and the --
Justice John M. Harlan: And the possibility the gasoline burning would be a first class (Inaudible).
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Definitely, but we stipulated ourselves out of that.
We agreed to the end -- the stipulation specifically said that this did not construct any -- that this did not constitute any impediment to navigation of any sort.
But it -- at any event this would leave this big void in the statute whereby returning to my illustration, if I were driving fast with this open truck of logs and the logs fell directly onto the bank because of my negligence, I would have committed an offense.
And yet if the logs fell directly into the river because of my negligence and not on to the docks, then I would not have committed an offense.
That we think is the kind of construction which is -- which obviously should inform a careful reader of the statute that valueless as well as valuable material -- valuable as well as valueless materials are covered by the first part.
Justice John M. Harlan: What part do you think the rules strict construction should play in this case of any criminal statutes?
Mr. Nathan Lewin: Well, in this area Mr. Justice Harlan, as opposed to some of the cases which the appellee has cited there's really not very much reliance.
Appellee cited for example cases in which -- particular illustration being that the Harris case in 177 U.S. in which the statute was unclear as to whether it imposed a certain duty on the defendants in that case and duty to have the cattle removed from the train that was carrying them from one place to another in water.
But now, there I think the defendants been effect plan their conduct in accordance with their construction of the statute.
When -- what we're dealing with this negligence or on a strict liability, this is far less of this kind of reliance, in other words, Standard Oil knew it was liable, knew it is probably doing something responsible to itself by -- and possibly violating the statute when -- if any oil negligently or any gasoline negligently escaped into the water.
And in any event, we submit that a reading the statute on its face of course are construction.
And in prior cases, where the very same client was made for example on the Wiesenfeld Warehouse case in 376 U.S. this Court looked to the legislative history and said, "Well, from the legislative history would have been clear."
And here, we think the legislative history could just not have been clearer, that Congress was intending to encompass this kind of conduct as well as the discharge of valueless and useful material.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Mr. Hadlow.
Argument of Earl B. Hadlow
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court.
Mr. Lewin has set forth the facts of this case I think precisely.
I add to that only the fact that Standard Oil Company when this -- the land was being aired during the cleaning process as a safety precaution and when they reopened the land from the shore tank to the dock side, the employee in-charge of it had left open the valve that the other -- and he immediately saw it run over and closed the valve but a few hundred gallons had spilled out.
Standard Oil then called both the Fire Department and the coastguard as a safety precaution.One which we submit would be inhibited by any such interpretation of this law as the Government would impose on people of absolute liability irrespective of cause.
They called the coastguard and once that call was made, even though the thing with them -- a very minor insignificance, it was said into effect this full weight of the Governments -- an investigative and enforcement procedure ending up this day before this Court.
The statute that's involved in this case, Section 407 of Title 33, prohibits in very plain language the throwing, discharging or depositing of any refuse matter of any kind or description other than sewage, a tremendous pollution exception, other than all sewage in the navigable waters.
It was plainly an anti-obstruction statute as any sort of reading of all of the first section of 33 U.S.Code will evidence you.
It's an anti-obstruction statute.
The first half made it unlawful to throw, discharge or to deposit any refuse matter of any kind in the navigable waters.
Now the Government in this case was faced with the fact that the material that was deposited was valuable aviation gasoline.
That can't be changed so the only way they could proceed under this statute is to eliminate the word, the descriptive adjective written from that statute.
And they have eliminated it by -- it by analogizing and saying that refuse matter is synonymous with any matter of any sort or any foreign matter.
And that is -- that's any matter of any sort of pure water, Mr. Lewin was perfectly frank about that.
He thinks that this statute saying any refuse matter covers any matter of any sort other than pure water.
Justice William J. Brennan: Do I understand your brief that you interpret the statute as if the Government is right imposing this criminal liability however it gets into the stream accidentally --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir.
Justice William J. Brennan: -- or other way?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: That's my position.
The statute --
Justice William J. Brennan: Well, does that go so far for example as supposed -- suppose there's some youngster that come along and turned this thing open.
Do you think it would go so far as to (Voice Overlap) liable?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: All I say is -- excuse me sir.
All I say is that there is nothing in the statute which would inhibit prosecution, even under those circumstances.
A better example I believe is the one that Mr. Chief Justice suggested a minute ago, if the valve broke without any faults or responsibility.
Then, Standard Oil's gasoline would have -- been placed into or discharged into the river and I think we would be -- under the terms of the statute, absolutely without fault.Criminal liability without fault.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Criminal liability without fault and that's one of the issues that we will subsequently urge is all the more reason that the language must be precisely read because the only protective provision of this statute is the limiting adjective, refuse.
There are several ways that Congress could have given the public some protection.They could have limited the amount of the spill.
As we've done in the second half of this Act, when they said that it had to be sufficient to impede navigation to make a stacking on the bank illegal, they could have said as they did in the Oil Pollution Act of accidental spills without fault are excluded in the Oil Pollution Act of 1924.
Or they could have done it as they did here.
They could have said, only refuse is covered because that is a limiting word.
I've -- I mention to say if you ask a thousand town people, if refuse meant any matter of any sort, you wouldn't get a single person to say that's what it meant or that is what you could reasonably construe or believe it to mean.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Mr. Hadlow, I purport your statement that this is an obstruction statute only, seems to me I've read the number of instances where they have prosecuted ships for discharging oil in a navigable stream or a bay.
What statute have they prosecuted those (Voice Overlap) violations?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: -- those prosecuted Mr. Chief Justice, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1924.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Yes, not under --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: There's a later section of this same Act.
This -- it's the later section of Title 33 was passed in 1924 and it does -- does not have a word refuse in it.
It profit -- it makes a criminal offense, the dispensing of oil into the navigable waters of any sort of oil.
It specifically says oil, and the legislative history of that Act goes into some detail about problems they were having with 1899 Act about whether or not oil had to be refuse or waste oil or not.
So they clarified it as -- with respect to oil from ships in 1924.
Justice Abe Fortas: Did you say that that part of the statute expressly excludes accidental discharge of oil?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir and under the Oil Pollution Act of 1924.
Justice Abe Fortas: Which you say is now incorporated as part of this statute?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: But not the one we're proceeding under, that's another separate section of this Title.
Justice Abe Fortas: Of the same Title?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Of the same Title, yes sir.
And it specifically excludes accidental or "Acts of God", or discharges the -- unconnected with fault which definitely is not here.
Well, to summarize briefly if I may, the argument that Standard Oil uses against the Government position, it seems clean to Standard Oil that the statute doesn't say what the Government says it does.
It simply doesn't -- it says refuse, it doesn't say any matter.
It could have been any matter in several other federal statutes have said that.
The New York Harbor Act says, the 1894 Act that he said, mentioned and said it, but this one doesn't.
This one says refuse, a limiting word.
The second point is would this highly sophisticated interpretation which the Government would impose upon this normal word, would it give the public fair notice?
Mr. Lewin was frank to admit, in respect to that that there's not much a reliance on that but we don't get the notice, there's no question about that.
The public doesn't get fair notice.
Is there any specific logical congressional history to justify this strained construction that he imposes on us.
And I'd say there's not a word.
The only thing that his research in mind could find in the congressional history in 1899, was a very brief five senatorial remarks were urging the Senate to pass it without discussions saying, we're not trying to make any material change, we're simply trying to wind up one of -- which the -- is codifying existing law and to eliminate one or two ambiguity.
That seems to me the most obvious ambiguity of all is the one between barring all waste that it was in 1894 Act.
All matter of any sort in 1894 Act which applies by the ways only to rivers and harbors on which Congress had previously appropriated money in answer to a question that you asked Mr. Chief Justice.
Mr. Lewin said that the later Act was broader but that -- it was not broader in scope, it applies to a limited theory.
The 1890 Act was broad over all Rivers and Harbors Act of that day, it applies to all rivers.
The 1894 Act was imposed on top of it later.
Without repelling the 1890 Act, instead as to these few rivers which we've already appropriated money in respect to -- as to those rivers, it shall be wrongful to deposit any matter of any sort.
Then in 1899, they have two of this, Congress was going to codify existing law, with almost no congressional approval, they took the two existing laws, they put the 1890 Act in my view and passed it almost verbatim again.
They've -- so that Act said that would be illegal to deposit any waste or refuse matter of any sort in the river.
They were faced with a choice when they selected the narrow and not the broad approach.
It seems inconceivable to me that they were faced with a choice.
The two statutes were right, the form, one of them saying any matter, one of them saying any waste or refuse.
They'd selected the narrow and the Government says they meant to select the broad and that the narrow must submit the broad.
Well, I can't just follow that at all.
That --
Unknown Speaker: (Inaudible)
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Well, the only way you can say that they've collected both Your Honor is if --
Unknown Speaker: (Inaudible)
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Is that a codification designed not to make any material change in the law but simply to eliminate one or two ambiguities and this is the only ambiguity we've been able to find, the one between any matter on the one hand and any refuse on the other.
Unknown Speaker: (Inaudible)
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: And finally --
Unknown Speaker: (Inaudible)
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: My final point in here is there any need for the Government's awkward construction of the statute and I say there has been none shown, none in the congressional history.
No practical needs proven and I don't believe there is any.
Briefly, that really concluded my summary of what I -- what I'm going to argue and I got really just carried away when my summary that I --
Justice John M. Harlan: Well, what you do say, it's just the right (Inaudible)?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: In my brief, I pointed out two very good reasons I believe Your Honor, for that difference.
In the first place, the second section which is broader saying, any material which is stacked alongside the bank is a violation.
That is likely to be washed into the river and impede navigation, has a protective kicker on the ends of it and that is, it must be such a large deposit that it will impede navigation.
The public is given some protection against willy-nilly enforcement of liability without fault there.
It must be a large deposit.
And second, it is likely that a person will deposit valuable, useable material alongside of a bank purposely or in a negligent manner where it will be washed into the river.
But it is -- and it's therefore you need a statute protecting against that course of conduct.
But it is totally unlikely that you will purposefully deposit valuable material into the river.
And therefore, you don't need the same amount of protection against that.
Justice Abe Fortas: Well, how about that -- suppose you had a refinery located near a river and for some economic reason whatever it might be, the company operating their refinery decided that it did not want to salvage one of the constituent products from their refining process?
But let us assume that that constituent product had a -- has a value, commercial value, market value, and so they turned it into the stream.
In your construction, that would not be a violation of the statute because it would not be inherently a refuse.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: No sir.
Justice Abe Fortas: It would be a product of value.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: No sir, I -- it is the Government that ties refuse to value.
It is not our -- I say that it is material which is thrown away, rejected, refuse and the material that you describe in your analogy is both.
The value is absolutely immaterial.
If the (Inaudible) -- if the effluent or refuse may be valuable and have some value and they poured it into the river and they're nevertheless determining willfully to reject it, to refuse it then it's covered under the Act.
Justice Abe Fortas: What you're doing as I understand it is relating the standard, the word refuse to the matter of willfulness and you're saying that unless it is willful, a willful and deliberate rejection it cannot be refuse.
Now we're not -- as I understand it, we don't here have to struggle with the question of whether willfulness is necessary under this statute.
But your -- what you're doing as I understand it is to say that is substance is not refuse unless it is rejected by the respon -- person responsible for its deposit, is that your point?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Refuse is in the eye of the person holding the material.
It does not have to be willfully poured into the river because a garbage truck could be bouncing along with a load of refuse and negligently dumped it in there and there would be the element of negligence.
Or you could have material which you have determined to be refuse or any reason and it could negligently get in the river.
But what I say is not covered is the accidental spillage into the river of valuable material, when it did not go in willfully and therefore would not refuse nor was it otherwise refuse.
It seems to me there's more than one way for it to be refuse.
But there's one way that cannot be reached is to say that valuable material accidentally spilled is refuse.
I just can't think of any possible description of the word that doesn't read it right out of existence, it obliterates it from the statute.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: But would it make any difference in your argument whether if it was accidental or willful, if it did not follow your definition of refuse?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: My definition of refuse is brought in a -- and it seems to me to cover almost any material.
And I'm not certain I understood your question sir.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Well, I mean this, would it make any difference whether it was accidental or willful if the ship discharged into the waterway something that was not refuse under your decision, under your --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Under my definition of refuse, if it's waste oil for example, whether when in accidentally or on purpose, it would be refuse.
If it was valuable oil and it went in on purpose, they must have thrown it in as refuse, so it would be covered.
If it was valuable oil, accidentally discharged, then it would not violate the statute.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: May I give you another case, suppose your ship was loaded and at the time it was about to depart to determined that weather conditions being taken into consideration that was -- it was overloaded and they had -- they wanted to get rid of some of the cargo and they discharged it into the stream.
Would that be refuse?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: In my view, that's plainly refuse.
They have (Voice Overlap) --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: I beg your pardon?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: It is plainly refuse --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: It is refuse --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir that's --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: -- under your --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: They have determined to dispose of it and they did.
Now whether it has some value a moment before is immaterial but they've -- they made it refuse when they elected to throw it away, and that would be covered.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: I see.
Justice Abe Fortas: And then she would --
Unknown Speaker: (Inaudible)
Justice Abe Fortas: If you or wasn't the gasoline here a refuse after it was deposited in the stream in the same way as conceded by your response to the Chief Justice's question after it was deposited in the stream, it was not valuable, was it?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: No sir.
My response to the Chief Justice was that when the people determined to lighten their load and reject and all these -- throw away the oil, that was refuse.
They determined to do so.
In an accidental spill, it was not refuse, it was valuable material accidentally falling out into the river.
The time --
Justice Abe Fortas: So --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: The time, the critical time as to whether it's refuse or not is when it goes in, not what it becomes afterwards because in the navigable streams of this country almost anything that falls into the river becomes refuse once it gets in there.
And that -- and if that were the determining factor, those -- the car load of diamonds becomes refuse.
And the Government's own brief uses a tremendous example it seems to me of how far they will go with -- once they are (Inaudible) -- once they are freed from the des -- limiting descriptive word refuse.
There's no length of it -- were a logical thinking, they used the example of a barge full of chlorine, a valuable barge full of chlorine.
It sunk in the Mississippi River and stayed there a year or two and the owner abandoned it finally.
And after abandoning, the Government went in and dug it up.
The value of the cargo and the barge when they got it up after being at the bottom of the river for two years was $80,000.
But the Government in its brief claims that could be refuse because the cost of getting it up was a million dollars and that the -- now it seems to me that shows you the literature --
Justice Abe Fortas: What you're saying is that if that barge were deliberately sunk, it would be refuse but if they were not deliberately sunk, it would not be refuse.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir.
To me that's entirely plain that if you abandon the barge and throw it away and throw it in there as refuse, no matter how it's built or what it is.
But if it's accidentally sunk, the thought of a barge full of a valuable cargo being a refuse when it's accidentally sunk and being subjective of this mandatory penalty --
Justice Byron R. White: That's when he decide not to reclaim it, if it's salvageable that these -- that the moment he decides not to reclaim it, it becomes a refuse?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Well, that -- not under my view.
My view is once that -- it depends on how it gets into the navigable waters.
If it is thrown in there or disposed of, and that's what the Act says that you throw it or dispose of it or dispatch it into the river.
It doesn't say what happens to it after it gets in.
And --
Justice Byron R. White: You don't think that if I -- if I'm sailing down the river or if on a canoe going the river and I just get to the bank and I don't want that canoe anymore, I just push it back out into the streams, is that refuse or not?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: That's -- in my view, that's refuse.
You refuse it, you threw it away.
Justice Byron R. White: Well it wasn't -- it wasn't when went in?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Well, you put it back in when you abandon it.
When you --
Justice Byron R. White: Well, wasn't -- never got out.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Well, that's the refinement that I wasn't prepared to go to but for all practical purposes, you made a new decision on that canoe when you got out on the bank.
You then threw it into the water --
Justice Byron R. White: Just like the chlorine, mode of chlorine, negligent based -- negligently sunk and then decision to abandon.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir.
Justice Byron R. White: Would not be refuse?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: No sir.
Justice Byron R. White: Alright.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: The sinking of a valuable barge is simply not refuse.
That was not refuse or rejected or anything.
It went down.
Now, there's another separate statute on the books, Section 403 of the same title.
That is directly aimed at sunken barges that impede navigation.
And in the very case that's cited by Mr. Lewin in his brief, they did not even mentioned the refuse statute.
The chlorine barge, they preceded under Section 403.
And that -- it's only applicability here is to show you that if you eliminate the restricted word refuse from the refuse statute, you can -- there's no end to where you can go.
If two automobiles run off of a pier, as one did in Jacksonville just a week ago, the value of the automobile before it went in is going to determine under Mr. Lewin's theory whether it's refuse or not.
Well, if it's a valuable car and you have some salvage value, then it's alright.
If the car was an old cheap car and the cost of salvaging it exceeded the value of the car then it would be refuse and you'd be -- you violated a criminal statute.
And I submit --
Justice Abe Fortas: (Voice Overlap) theory anyway under the second part of the statute here, wouldn't you?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: The second part of the statute is the stacking part which says that if you stack or deposit it alongside of a bank where it is likely to be washed into a stream and impede navigation, then you have violated the second half.
The -- I see, I only have few more minutes.
The legislative history on which the Government based this substantially, its own case, simply takes two Acts which involve a choice.
It seems to me, one of them broad and one of them narrow, the Government selected the narrow one.
And the Government then would impose on this Court.
It seems to me that the -- that they should have or they meant to somehow pick the broad one.
As a matter of interest, 11 years later, they passed another Act almost identical to this one, applying to Lake Michigan and it's found in 33 U.S.C. 421.
And 11 years later, they used the same language of refuse, the narrow language instead of the broad.
The New York Harbor Act was changed from the narrow to the broad but not by judicial construction, they simply amended the statute in 1888 from the 1886 statute and they went from refuse and waste matter to any matter.
It seems to me that it's impossible to believe that Congress did not understand the difference between the narrow word and the broad when they have used the two in separate statutes.
And in the same statute and in the two-halves of this very same statute, they used the narrow in the beginning and the broad in the second half.
They say, "Refuse that is forwarded into the stream and any matter or material if it's stacked along the bank where it's likely to be washed in."
Justice Byron R. White: Do you think Congress just would normally rely what this normal -- normally we're just relying on the normal -- this in connection to throw away valuable material?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: In my view, there's -- that would -- under my section of brief where I talk about the need for it, I'd say -- it seems to me that there is -- it is so unlikely that a person will normally repetitiously throw away valuable materials that there is simply no need for criminal sanctions against it.
And in 1948, at the very end of this Title, the Government had passed a long comprehensive Water Pollution Act under which without criminal sanctions, the Government can prohibit and update nuisances to water pollute (Voice Overlap) --
Justice Byron R. White: Yes, but there is criminal --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: -- new (Voice Overlap) water pollution.
Justice Byron R. White: There are criminal sanctions, there's criminal negligence, criminal negligence is covered in the Oil Pollution Act.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: In the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 but there's a --
Justice Byron R. White: That's right.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: -- comprehensive Water Pollution Act which had just been passed.
It was just amended for 1965.
But if it's been on the books since 1948 and there's a Water Pollution Control Commission and they have the right to abate any sort of pollution to the navigable water of this country now.
And that's the Act the Government ought to proceed under and they're not limited in anyway by this readable construction of this Act.
The only construction it seems to me which give the public fair notice of the crime of which it might be guilty.
Justice Abe Fortas: Does the new Federal Water Pollution Act cover this situation?
I know that -- I believe it has no criminal proceedings but do the abatement provisions in the new Water Pollution Act applied to this kind of a situation?
Justice Byron R. White: It said it can abate any sort of water pollution which is contrary to the health, morals and general welfare of this country.
So I'm saying it's very broad language.
It can be abated by any sort of procedures available to the Government.
I would say that it could very easily -- if somebody persistently abuse --
Justice Abe Fortas: Persistently, then it -- do you have to have the omen of persistent abuse for purposes of abatement under the Water Pollution Act, do you --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: I assume that under the enforcement, that they were the -- there's a persistent course of conduct that they would be after.
And it seems to me after all that needn't -- need be protected against.
Justice Abe Fortas: But I gather you're not --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: And --
Justice Abe Fortas: -- you're not confident, well, that's a different matter.
I don't want to get an -- misapprehens in what you're saying.
You're not representing to us your view that the Federal Water Pollution Act would apply to this kind of a situation, that is to say the one time discharge of gasoline into a navigable stream?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: I don't think they will -- that it's designed for that purpose.
And I don't think that's likely they'll use it for that purpose and neither do I think this was designed for that purpose.
Just to conclude if I may, the Government --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: May I ask you just one more --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: -- question there.
What was the basic purpose of Congress in enacting any of this legislation?
Was it to regulate the disposal of refuse or was it to prevent pollution?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: It was to prevent obstruction of the water by regulating the disposal of all sorts of enumerated waste.
The 18 (Voice Overlap) --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: But this doesn't have to be obstruction.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: This does not have to be obstruction.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: (Voice Overlap) -- this has to do with pollution.
Now when it enacted these laws it referred to pollution, what was the basic purpose of it?
Was it to regulate the manner in which the ships dispose the refuse or was it to prevent the pollution of our waterways?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: It was to -- I hate to argue with the --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: No --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: -- with you sir, but --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: No, it's alright.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: I think --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: You --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: -- it was designed to prevent the filing of the waterways.
It leaves --
Chief Justice Earl Warren: But suppose --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: It was mostly for obstruction that -- and twice in that same statute it refers to obstruction of navigation.
There was an exception at the bottom that neither side has mentioned in this case because I hadn't been material where the Department of the -- Army Engineers can permit refuse to be put in the water if it doesn't feel that it would restrict unduly navigation and impede navigation.
That's right in this same Section, 407.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: But I under -- I understood you to say that if this gasoline was tainted in some ways so that it's no longer merchantable and they poured it into the stream that it would be refuse and therefore would come within the Act.
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: Yes sir.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Now that one wouldn't obstruct --
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: No sir.-- wouldn't obstruct the navigation?
Mr. Earl B. Hadlow: You do as the requirement of an obstruction of navigation does not apply to the first half of the Act, but I'd say that this Act in all of the sections surrounding in at the time of passage was designed and aimed at prohibiting the fouling of those waters.
If the 1890 Act lists 18 different kinds of material and every one of them was a waste product, a refuse, a residue, saw dust, ashes, cinders, it's everything and then finally concluded with refuse or waste matter of any sort.
That's what they were aimed at.
Now if -- my concluding remark is this, the Government in its brief is frank to admit that you could be prosecuted for the most trivial spillage under this Act.
And it says, in one of the most unusual statements and one of the most frank statements I've ever heard, that the protection that the public need in a case like this, comes from the good conscience and circumspection of prosecutors.
And I submit our own case is the best and most conclusive evidence that you'd done that that certain inspection is off and absent.
We have con -- we've cooperated with every arm of the United States Government in this case.
The United States Engineers, the coastguard, the prosecuting attorney, I worked -- I've worked with them from the very beginning on this case, nobody could stop it, it just got -- there was snowball in the long and not a soul would stop this little case.
Another case that's cited in the Government's brief is United States versus Standard Oil of California and California was prosecuted and convicted and fined of a crime because of two barrels of Bunker C Fuel Oil in Hawaii harbor.Once the case gets started there's no stopping it.And it is not right under American jurisprudence to subject a major corporation to a criminal conviction because it lost two barrels of Bunker C Fuel Oil.
Thank you.
Chief Justice Earl Warren: Mr. Lewin.
Rebuttal of Nathan Lewin
Mr. Nathan Lewin: May it please the Court.
I just like to cover two -- three points that were raised in the appellee's argument.
First of all, it seems to me the important point with regard to this statute that must be recalled is that Congress was legislating with regard to what harmed river is.
And it's equally of harmful to rivers when injurious deposits are put in there whether the owner personally wants them or not.
It doesn't make any difference to the river what the owner is subjective and can't is, whether he wanted to throw it in or whether it ended in there negligently.
So far as the Oil Pollution Act is concerned, and that was right, the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 applies only to deposits of oil from ships into coastal waters, it wouldn't cover this kind of a deposit.
And the problem at the time, the reason that the Oil Pollution Act was passed had nothing to do with whether the statute applied to refuse or not but it was because of a limiting construction which we submit was a misconstruction of the statute.
The reading this refuse act is defined only to obstruct the materials that the Oil Pollution Act was passed and that that made entirely clear that ships in coastal waters were committing offenses.
And of course, let the Refuse Act and specifically did left any other Act enforced that would apply to cover violations of this sort.
And Mr. Hadlow's there repeated references to our illustrations regarding the sunken barge, we don't contend and didn't contend that that was a violation of Section 13 because it was entirely -- insofar as we can tell inadvertent or an accident in line with your line of questions Mr. Chief Justice.
That illustration was put into a footnote in our brief only with reference to an alternative argument which we made for the construction of the word refuse.
And that construction was supported by the decision of the Second Circuit by the late Judge Learned Hand and we put the -- a reference in the footnote in there to explain what it would cover and what it would not.
And finally, although -- I must say that Mr. Hadlow say that this is a -- just a very minor case, of course the readings from prosecution don't appear from the record but we contend that this has to be left to the good sense of prosecutors and that there was good cause in this instance to proceed criminally against this discharge of valuable matter into navigable waters.
It doesn't appear in the record but there was good cause.


text:
Here's a partial list of notable Irvine natives and residents, excluding athletes:
Joey Allen, guitarist for glam metal band Warrant.
David Baker, commissioner of the Arena Football League and former Irvine councilman.
William Barber, Medal of Honor United States Marine Corps officer.
Thrice, a post-hardcore band.
John Campbell III, U.S. Congressman.
Jeanne Carmen, model, pin-up girl and actress.
Justin Chon, actor.
Zack de la Rocha, lead singer for rock band Rage Against the Machine.
Jack DeSena – sketch comedy actor on Nickelodeon's 'All That.'
Kevin Drum, political blogger for the Mother Jones magazine website.
Tom Dumont, guitarist for rock band No Doubt.
East West, Christian rap-core band.
Will Ferrell, actor and comedian.
Shane Haboucha, actor.
Mishavonna Henson, American Idol season 8 contestant.
Hugh Hewitt, author, radio talk show host and blogger.
Quinton Jackson, professional mixed martial arts fighter.
Ezra Klein, Washington Post columnist, MSNBC contributor, blogger.
Nam Le, professional poker player.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Cheap SMV to Nagasaki flights
Popular Flights from St. Moritz, Switzerland
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Top Nagasaki Flights to US Destinations
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SMV to NGS Route Map
St. Moritz to Nagasaki Flights, Stats and Airplanes
Route information for flights from Samedan to Nagasaki.
5,800.07 miles
NGS - Nagasaki Airlines
Browse the most popular airlines servicing the Nagasaki (NGS) airport. Visit their flights pages to learn more about the most popular routes these carriers fly.


text:
Pronunciation: gettare la maschera
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Number nama
1.02 lakh complaints were received from Mumbaikars in 2013
65,913 were registered on the centralised complaint registration system
29,282 grievances were resolved
What's pothole for you can be a name game for corporators. If bad roads and potholes are your major concerns, for your corporators, it's the naming and renaming of roads that's priority No 1.
A white paper released by city-based NGO Praja Foundation on Tuesday showed that the number of road-related complaints with the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) went up by 41 percent – from 29,967 to 42,287 – in 2013 (January-December) from 2012 (March-December).
Poor drainage and solid waste management (SWM) were the other issues that figured in the list of Mumbaikars complaints.
At the same time, the paper said, the maximum number of questions asked by corporators related to naming and renaming roads. During ward committee meetings held in 2013, the 227 corporators asked 141, 34 and 51 questions related to roads, SWM and drainage services, respectively.
"Councillors are elected to raise public issues in their respective constituencies. However, year after year, renaming of roads seems to be higher on their agenda," Nitai Mehta, founder-trustee of Praja Foundation, said.
Grievances on drainage system dropped by 21.5% – from 16,194 in 2012 to 12,708 in 2013. The BMC registered 6,562 garbage-related complaints in 2012 vis-à-vis 6,075 in 2013 – a drop of 15.9%, the report said.
Milind Mhaske, project director with the NGO, attributed the rise in number of road complaints to the pothole-tracking system introduced by the BMC since November 2011. He suggested similar mechanism to help residents report grievances about other services and insisted on using the centralised complaint registration system (CCRS) extensively, besides a status on action taken report (ATR).
Additional municipal commissioner SVR Srinivas, who heads the roads department, said the civic body is trying to bring down the number of road complaints through better planning and timely execution. "We have already started executing our master plan. We also undertook the pre-monsoon preventive maintenance work. Through such measures, we will bring down the complaints' number," Srinivas said.
Reassuring words, but is it for namesake?


text:
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On July 19, 2011, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did not prevent the government from criminalizing the communication of truthful, harmless information about rental properties. Despite this holding, the Court stated that Kansas City Premier Apartments would be exempt from regulation if it "merely wanted to advertise or provide information," but the Court offered no guidance as to what KCPA must do to comply with the law. In this filing, KCPA asks the Court to clarify the line between the information it may lawfully provide and the communications that the Court believes to be forbidden.
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In Flash Professional CS5 Essential Training, author Todd Perkins explains the fundamentals of Flash Professional CS5, the industry standard for creating animations and interactive applications for the web, desktop, and mobile devices. This course starts with the basics, such as using the drawing tools to create simple animations, and progresses to automating animation with tweens and adding interactivity with ActionScript. This course also covers how to add sound and video to projects, enhance realism with effects like easing, and publish a project to a variety of platforms. Exercise files are included.
Let's look at how to animate a 3D object in Flash. Remember that if you want to rotate or move an object in 3D space, it needs to be a movie clip symbol, not a graphic symbol and remember that you can create a movie clip symbol in the same way as a graphic symbol. Select your artwork on the Stage, Modify > Convert to Symbol, and then choose Movie Clip for the Type instead of Graphic. So here on the Stage I actually already have an instance of a movie clip symbol and I'm going to rotate this bridge in 3d space.
So I'll right click the bridge and choose Create Motion Tween. I'll lock every other layer by Option+ clicking or Alt+clicking the dot under the lock icon on the bridge layer and then I'll go to the last frame and using the 3D Rotation tool, I'll rotate the bridge on the Y-axis and then using the 3D Translation tool, I'll move the bridge along the X-axis. So I can scrub the playhead to preview this animation. Let's see what it looks like in the Flash Player.
Command+Return on the Mac or Ctrl+Enter on the PC. So using a motion tween I can even animate 3D objects.
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UCSD looks at football and Division I upgrade
Some faculty also have concerns about how big-time athletics would fit on campus.
"Our student-athletes are amazingly talented and dedicated, as is indicated by their above-university-average academic standing and by numerous national titles and All-American designations; yet very few of our student-athletes were courted by premiere Division I athletic programs." math professor Daniel Wulbert wrote in an e-mail. "I would hate to see us put in an athletic program with full scholarships, special admissions, and academic tutoring for athletes, and with coaches paid more than academic deans; and in which our current student-athletes and coaches would not be welcome."
Edwards said McAloose's firm was picked because of his experience moving from Division II to Division I. Three firms were considered.
Brent Schrotenboer: (619) 293-1368; email@example.com. Follow Brent on Twitter @schrotenboer


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In accordance with the Battlefield Park Master Plan (January 2011), Landscape Architectural Services is pleased to announce that a new site identification feature will be constructed this fall at the northwest corner of Battlefield Park (intersection of King St. West and Centennial Parkway North).
The installation is timely as the City begins preparations for the Bicentennial of the Battle of Stoney Creek (June 6, 2013). (Please refer to the following link).
A steering committee consisting of staff from Culture and Public Works met several times throughout the year and made final recommendations on the design layout and material selection for the site identification feature. Ward 9 Councillor Brad Clark has given full support to the steering committee's decision of the final design.
The site identification feature is 2.2m in height x 11.5m in length (7.25ft. X 37.5ft.) and will be constructed of natural stone veneers, granite sign face and limestone coping, materials which are similar in appearance to the Battlefield Monument on Monument Hill. The area surrounding the new feature will have planting beds with an irrigation system, and concrete and granular pathway connections. The front façade will have in-ground lighting for lighting of this feature at night.Click on the links below to view the Park Identification Feature:
Hamilton Public Works ~ Providing services that bring our City to life
Copyright © 2013 hamilton.ca - Hamilton, Ontario, Canada


text:
Amelia Pereira
Barney School Management major and member of the Hartford Hawks women's soccer team, Amelia Pereira, was the subject of a story about her work this summer as an in-studio analyst for television coverage of Euro Cup '12 for a television network in her native Portugal. Read the Hartford Courant story, that was published on Thursday, Sept. 6, and watch the NBC Connecticut story that aired on Monday, Sept. 10, evening newscast. Amelia is also off to a great start this season with the Hawks


text:
Pretty much the perfect song for today.
Pretty much the perfect song for today.
Was the Kings of Leon frontman sickly drunk or having a tummy ache from the heat.
Want to get your week started with a pretty great Beyonce cover of "Sex on Fire" (following Prince's "The Beautiful Ones") from this weekend's Glastonbury music festival in England.


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text:
Biomechanics and injury risk of a headbutt
- Jiri Adamec,
- Vera Mai,
- Matthias Graw,
- Klaus Schneider,
- John-Martin Hempel,
- Jutta Schöpfer
- … show all 6 hide
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Headbutt is a relevant type of a criminal assault that can result in injuries. The aim of this study was to collect basic biomechanical data and assess the injury risk associated with a headbutt. Series of measurements were carried out with volunteers with and without relevant soccer heading experience, and the impact velocity of the striking head was measured. A soccer ball was used as a surrogate of the stationary victim's head. Two scenarios were considered: one corresponding to the typical headbutt situation, i.e. short movement of the assailant's head without backswing, and one representing the worst case, i.e. the most severe head impact without time or space constraints for the assailant. The results as well as epidemiological data from court cases and a large Munich's university clinic show that a typical headbutt is not likely to lead to life-threatening injuries, but bony injuries of the face can easily occur. Under certain circumstances (support of the victim's head, secondary impact on the ground etc.), severe injuries with potentially lethal outcomes are possible. A thorough analysis of each case is thus an imperative. The (soccer) heading experience does not influence the velocity of the headbutt.
- Smith, MS, Dyson, RJ, Hale, T, Janaway, L (2000) Development of a boxing dynamometer and its punch force discrimination efficacy. J Sports Sci 18: pp. 445-450 CrossRef
- Waliko, TJ, Viano, DC, Bir, CC (2005) Biomechanics of the head for Olympic boxer punches to the face. Br J Sports Med 39: pp. 710-719 CrossRef
- Shewchenko, W, Withnall, C, Keown, M, Gittens, R, Dvorak, J (2005) Heading in football. Part 1: development of biomechanical methods to investigate head response. Br J Sports Med 39: pp. i10-i25 CrossRef
- Bauer, JA, Thomas, TS, Cauraugh, JH, Kaminski, TW, Hass, CJ (2001) Impact forces and neck muscle activity in heading by collegiate female soccer players. J Sports Sci 19: pp. 171-179 CrossRef
- Goldsmith, W, Plunkett, J (2004) A biomechanical analysis of the causes of traumatic brain injury in infants and children. Am J Forensic Med Pathol 25: pp. 89-100 CrossRef
- McIntosh, AS, McCrory, P, Comerford, J (2000) The dynamics of concussive head impacts in rugby and Australian rules football. Med Sci Sports Exerc 32: pp. 1980-1984 CrossRef
- Broglio, SP, Sosnoff, JJ, Shin, S, He, X, Alcaraz, C, Zimmerman, J (2009) Head impacts during high school football: a biomechanical assessment. J Athl Train 44: pp. 342-349 CrossRef
- Viano, DC, Casson, IR, Pellman, EJ, Bir, CA, Zhang, L, Sherman, DC, Boitano, MA (2005) Concussion in professional football: comparison with boxing head impacts—part 10. Neurosurgery 57: pp. 1154-1172 CrossRef
- Stan, A-C, Guenther, D, Fieguth, A, Hori, A (1996) Traumatic ponto-medullary tear: a case report. For Sci Int 77: pp. 37-43
- Enoch, DA, Gilham, MI, Macfarlane, R, Antoun, N, Sule, O (2007) A troublesome head-butt. Lancet Infect Dis 7: pp. 694 CrossRef
- Rimal, D, Thapa, SR, Munasinghe, N, Errington, M (2007) An unusual presentation of a minor head injury sustained during a game of rugby. Emerg Med J 24: pp. 485-486 CrossRef
- Viano, DC, Parenteau, CS (2008) Analysis of head impacts causing neck compression injury. Traffic Inj Prev 9: pp. 144-152 CrossRef
- Clauser CE, McConville JT, Young JW (1969) Weight, volume, and center of mass of segments of the human body. Technical Report AMRL-TR-69-70, Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory, Wright–Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton
- Schneider DC, Nahum AM (1972) Impact studies of facial bones and skull. In: Proceedings of the 16th Stapp Car Crash Conference, Detroit, pp 186–203
- Advani S, Powell W, Huston J, Ojala S (1975) Human head impact response—experimental data and analytical simulations. In: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Biomechanics of Impact (IRCOBI), Berlin, pp 153–162
- Nahum AM, Gatts JD, Gadd CW, Danforth JP (1968) Impact tolerance of the face and skull. In: Proceedings of the 12th Stapp Car Crash Conference, Detroit, pp 302–317
- Allsop D, Perl TR, Warner CY (1991) Force/deflection and fracture characteristics of the temporoparietal region of the human head. In: Proceedings of the 35th Stapp Car Crash Conference, Detroit, pp 269–278
- Advani, SH, Ommaya, AK, Yang, WJ (1982) Human body dynamics. Claredon, Oxford
- Hampson, D (1995) Facial injury: a review of biomechanical studies and test procedures for facial injury assessment. J Biomech 28: pp. 1-7 CrossRef
- Nyquist GW, Cavanaugh JM, Goldberg SJ, King AI (1986) Facial impact tolerance and response. In: Proceedings of the 30th Stapp Car Crash Conference, Detroit, pp 379–400
- Gadd CW (1966) Use of weighted-impulse criterion for establishing injury hazard. Proceedings of the 10th Stapp Car Crash Conference, Detroit, pp 164–174
- Newman, JA, Shewchenko, N, Welbourne, E (2000) A proposed new biomechanical head injury assessment function—the maximum power index. Stapp Car Crash J 44: pp. 215-247
- Ommaya, AK, Goldsmith, W, Thibault, L (2002) Biomechanics and neuropathology of adult and paediatric head injury: review. Br J Neurosurg 16: pp. 220-242 CrossRef
- Bremer, S, Praxl, N, Schönpflug, M, Schneider, K, Graw, M (2003) The human punch—a forensic biomechanical research. For Sci Int 136: pp. 264
- Smith, PK, Hamil, J (1986) The effect of punching glove type and skill level on momentum transfer. J Hum Movement Stud 12: pp. 153-161
- Schneider, K (1985) Der Einfluß motorischer und mechanischer Stoßbedingungen auf das Verletzungsrisiko beim Fußball-Kopfstoß. Sportwissenschaft 15: pp. 183-192
- Yoganandan, N, Pintar, FA (2004) Biomechanics of temporo-parietal skull fracture. Clin Biomech 19: pp. 225-239 CrossRef
- Title
- Biomechanics and injury risk of a headbutt
- Journal
International Journal of Legal Medicine
Volume 127, Issue 1 , pp 103-110
- Cover Date
- 2013-01-01
- 10.1007/s00414-011-0617-y
- Print ISSN
- 0937-9827
- Online ISSN
- 1437-1596
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Additional Links
- Topics
- Keywords
- Biomechanics
- Headbutt
- Biomechanical tolerance
- Injury risk
- Head injury
- Industry Sectors
- Authors
- Jiri Adamec (1)
- Vera Mai (1)
- Matthias Graw (1)
- Klaus Schneider (2)
- John-Martin Hempel (3)
- Jutta Schöpfer (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Institute of Legal Medicine, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
- 2. Institute of Sports Sciences and Sports, University of the Federal Armed Forces, Munich, Germany
- 3. Department of Otorhinolaryngology, Head and Neck Surgery, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich, Germany


text:
Miami String Quartet with Scott Haigh, bass (06/24/2009)
Miami String Quartet with Scott Haigh, bass (06/24/2009)
The Miami Quartet returns for their final concert of the summer with bassist Scott Haigh to premiere Robert Carl's Quintet for String Quartet and Bass. Patrons will also experience the drama of two masterpieces – Haydn's String Quartet in C Major, Op. 73, No. 6, "Emperor," and Dvorak's enormously popular String Quartet in F Major, Op. 96, "American." The concert will take place on Wednesday, July 8 at 7:30 p.m. in the Ludwig Recital Hall.
Media Contact: Effie Tsengas, 330-672-4102, email@example.com


text:
PORTLAND -- An 11-year-old boy arrested in downtown Portland last week for allegedly brandishing a handgun on a MAX train will likely be released to live with an aunt, under state supervision.
A judge on Monday ordered the boy to wear a GPS bracelet and be supervised by the state. The boy will also be allowed to leave juvenile custody to live with his aunt if the Department of Human Services approves her home as a foster care placement.
The boy's mother said the family has been struggling and pleaded for help from the courts.
The alleged gun incident occurred last Thursday night. Transit police were dispatched about 8:20 p.m. to the Old Town/Chinatown MAX stop on a report of someone with a gun on the train, said Sgt. Pete Simpson.Officers learned that a group of boys and girls, including two boys age 11 and 13, had been in a dispute with a passenger.
One of the boys had reportedly bumped into a woman's baby stroller when getting on the train and an argument broke out.
During this dispute, the 11-year-old reportedly lifted his shirt to reveal a handgun in his waistband, which he began to pull out, Simpson said.
The boy kicked my stroller, knocked my soda and I told him it was really rude, Anisa said.
He ll smack the (expletive) stuff off my face and that s when he stood up like he was going to do something.
The woman called 9-1-1 and the train stopped in Old Town. Police said they took away a .22 caliber semi-automatic handgun from the child's waistband.
The 13-year-old had a BB gun in his backpack, police said. He was also taken into custody.
I think it's disturbing, said TriMet spokeswoman Mary Fetsch, When you think about transit as a reflection of the community, and what happens in the community well, at times will happen on transit. An 11-year-old. Wow. You think, 'What has our community come to?'
Shaquita Louis, the boy's mother, pleaded for him tobe released into the custody of an aunt, as first reported in The Oregonian.
Louis is the mother of Yashanee Vaughn, whose body was found just a few hundred yards off Rocky Butte Road in July, about four months after she disappeared. Vaughn's boyfriend, 14-year-old Parrish Bennette, is charged with her murder.
(KGWReporterKatherine Cook contributed to this report.)


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Magti Club: Live music Club
It's the second time, I've visited the capital of Georgia. To tell the truth there are few night clubs. last saturday I've been in Rustaveli Avenue, in Magti Club. The music was FANTASTIC I'd say. really didn't expect... I've found even their facebook profile, where you can join. If you visit Tbilisi, dont miss the chance and visit MAGTI CLUBRelated to:
- Music
- Luxury Travel
- Work Abroad
Most pubs or watering holes: Drinking in Georgian Style
More than anything else, Georgians LOVE to drink and with a passion. In Kakheti, you will no doubt stay in a homestay and try the gorgeous white wine that has been made by fermenting the grape on the grape skin- a process only used for red wine in the West. It is a gorgeous drink but one that you will remember the next day with a booming headache. Vodka and spirits are common everywhere and Georgians love their national drink called chacha which has to be experienced to be understood. Beers are everywhere with Kazbegi and Argo dominating the market. No doubt you will end up trying one some night in a homestay or locals house and if the night and mood is right you will end up trying all three ;) Not many places are home to people that can eat cheese and bread and wash it down with a 500 ML of beer at 8am right?
Dress Code: Just wear black ;)
any pub in the wall: Drink the night away
Most travellers dont have to wait very long before they experience a black out condition that is according to the Georgians solved with a few candles and pints of beer. It is a really fun way to meet the locals because almost anyone that is walking by on the road steps into a pub or local watering hole ie sometimes it is a hall or neighbours house and waits for the powercut to finish. If you are in a place like Tbilisi and the power goes out then you could find yourself sitting next to the most random Georgian people you could ever imagine but it makes the experience more interesting. I personally spent several nights meeting the locals in this way making my overall experience extremely memorable.
Dress Code: Anything black! The moment you step into the country you will notice that it is like one huge funeral. Men, women and young people love black and you will find yourself leaving your yellows and light blues in the backpack :)
Switch club: Clubbing in Tbilisi
Switch is one of the coolest clubs in Tbilisi! It is actually kind of a private club as not everyone is allowed inside. You can go in if your name or your friend's name is on the list. But if you're desperate to get in (and you should be), make sure you're dressed well... sometimes the guards will let you in if you look decent ;-) The club is small and it's usually packed. The music is awesome and everytime they have really cool DJs. Once in awhile famous DJs from all over the world come to play at Switch. There's a small bar and the bartenders are VERY good - they make awesome cocktails. There are also sofas by the dance floor but they're usually taken. The place closes at around 7am.
Dress Code: No sneakers of course, otherwise need to look cool ;-)Related to:
- School Holidays
- Work Abroad
- Romantic Travel and Honeymoons
- 1
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text:
From the article: MRSA, C.Diff, VRE, CRE and Other Superbug Hospital Acquired Infections
According to the US Centers for Disease Control, 101,000 Americans die from hospital acquired infections like MRSA, C. Diff or VRE each year. Have you or a loved one experienced an infection? How did you know you were infected? How did the hospital take care of you? Have you been able to recover? Please share your story to help others.
staph mrsa
- hi my name is leah i got staph from the hospital i had an op and now i am suffering from staph its on my face and body i got it in 2012 and it has made my life hell i have scares and my teeth are yuk i have to live now with this all over me some days are bad where i can not go out side coz of my sores all over i carnt live with this no more its a horrible infection to live with
- —Guest leah matthews
- My Mother had total knee replacement surgery with in a week it started to bleed. Went to the Dr's office and was told it was a superfical hematoma this went on for 3 weeks, two Dr's appointments and one trip to the emergency room. She was sent home again a superficial hematoma. Finally her visiting nurse called an ambulance concerned about blood loss. Found a terrible infection that was in the bone. Another surgery and put on a picc line vancomycin she developed Steven's Johnson's sydrom witch was not diagnosed as the skin peeled off her hands. She went into acute renal failure, back to the hospital. In two days she developed Cdiff and several vancomycin resistant infections. She died two months after the orginal surgery on her death certificate cause of death was septicema. Lost my Mom over knee replacement.
- —Guest sandy
Doctors need to Listen
- My mother was recently diagonised with pancratic cancer in less than two had the Whipple surgery. In hospital for two weeks sent home. Five days later back to hospital by ambulance emrgency surgry remove drain tube, you have infection here some antibotics go home. Been seeing the surgen regularry complaining I hurt, I smell funny and am running a fever. There is nothing wrong in Jan saw her regular doctor who sent to the hospital for emergancy care for severe infection. In hospital six days sent her home w/ anitbotics, she is now back in hospital again so far five days and CDC has been brought in, she has a super bug. Now she cannot have Chemo or Radation because window has passed, why didn't her doctor listen to her and why is it just now being treated now? Something is wrong when you go from end of Oct to end of March before you actually start getting a real treatment for your infection. So Sad!!!!!:-(
- —Guest cv
Acquired Staff Four Days After Surgery
- I had surgery on the back of my ankle for a cyst after which they bandaged me and told me not to remove the cast for two weeks. Four days later, I was in extreme pain and told my wife. We removed the dressing and the smell was horrific. Called doctor and was told to go to ER asap. Waited 3 hrs in ER, told I had an infection and almost lost my foot. Now they want to bill me for that 3 day stay. Fighting it, any suggestions from someone who went thru the same thing???
- —Guest Tony Richard
Infected, my concerns were overlooked
- I had ankle surgery in feb 2009, two weeks later my stitches were removed and i was told a cast would be applied. I told drs that i was concerned about casting, they did it anyway. 10 days after i was in ER and having emergency surgery due to severe staph infection. I had to have hardware removed and a picc line put in and iv antibiotics for almost 6 months. Do i have a right to sue the Dr or is it an acceptable risk to the surgery?
- —Guest Susan
back surgery
- January 2011 L 2/3 & L 4/5 back surgery. Acquired CDIF infection. Had infection in hospital that was originally diagnosed as bladder infection from cathiter. Had 4 re-occurrences of CDIF. 1st diagnosed Feb 2011 with CDIF - last outbreak took Vancomycin from July 2011 thru Sept 2011. The antibiotics are almost as bad as the infection. Have not had any more occurrences. The hospital &/or re-hab center have not done anything. Altho to be fair my insurance covered their expenses but I had to pay out of pocket over $4000.00 for Vancomycin and other expenses totaled over $10,000.00. I also lost my job. Found out in Nov 2011 that have to have another back surgery - a spinal fusion - because the laminectomy didn't work! There has to be something done about the cost of the antibiotics and should not be sent home with an infection.
- —Guest kaye
Hospital staph virus
- My wife under went chemo and while she was neutropenic she contracted a hospital borne virus. She died a week later . Now I'm left with 4 children to raise alone can I sue the hospital?
- —Guest Eddie medina
- —Guest VICTORIA
Received Urinary Tract Infection from MD
- A few weeks ago I went to the doctor's office for a Cystourethroscopy. The procedure was painful enough, but then a couple days later the pain that I thought was residual from the procedure began to get worse. Whenever I would urinate, it burned. Come to find out that I had developed a urinary tract infection. Once the infection was diagnosed (by the same Dr's office), I was placed on antibiotics and the infection was cleared up. Now I am being asked to pay for the Dr visit and lab work involved with diagnosing and healing the infection. Since the infection was caused by their procedure, it seems unfair that I should be charged for the visit it took to clear it up. Am I wrong to think that these charges should be reversed?
- —Guest Thom
My best friends dead because of careless
- Doctors in LV Nevada were anything but sanitary. She had emergency open heart they said she wouldn't live through surgery. Well she did no thanks to them less than two years later she was dead. Knowing all that I do know that I'm older I'm gonna go after these bastards. I'm 21 this was over 13 years ago but believe you me justice will be served. >:(
- —Guest Grandkid
what can i do?
- my mother went into the hospital 2 weeks ago because of water rentention, they had to flush out some of the fluids in her stomach. a few days after she gets released from the hospital she started feeling nauseous and had a hard time breathing. last night she started vomiting dark liquid with coffee ground like substances. now shes in another hospital vomiting constantly, weak as anything, an wearing a diaper. the doctor who examined her said she has an infection from when she was in the hospital previously. can i sue that hospital?
- —Guest really mad
Where is it?
- In 11-'10 I was told I was diagnosed with MRSA when I'd been admitted with pneumonia in 4-'10, but nobody knows where the MRSA is. One Dr. pooh-poohs it, but when I go in to ER or hospital, I'm put in isolation & everyone gowns & gloves before entering the room, even if contact will not be made. I worked in healthcare & am filing for disability (chronic progressive pancreatitis) & my employer let me go rather than extend medical leave & Social Security says I can just go get a different kind of job. What kind of job is that? Not in healthcare if I'm honest with employers, and if I'm honest with other employers? The CDC doesn't extend the healthcare setting precautions (isolation, gowns & gloves) to 'regular' workplaces. How potentially dangerous is that? How can I pooh-pooh the MRSA or ask an employer to when ER & hospital put me in isolation & gown + glove before being around me? Maybe others can say, "I know where my MRSA is", but I can't. I may as well change my name to Pariah Carey
- —Guest Lorri G.
Infected with MRSA by my boyfriend :(
- I have had MRSA for 3 years now. My boyfriend was a carrier and neglected to tell me. (jerk) Now it seems I have given to my five year old son. I am shocked by the lack of knowledge, concern or even care we have received from doctors. I have an appointment to see an infectious disease doctor in 2 weeks but am pretty skeptical as to whether he can help us or not. I have had to have 3 surgeries to treat my MRSA. One surgery they had to leave a cton drain tube in me for 3 months to allow for proper healing. I have done a lot of research on the topic and am convinced that diet and changing our bodies pH will help to control this. I have ordered a product: phenomenal to try in an attempt to make my body more alkaline. I really hope this works as I feel horrible for my lil mancub. I will let everyone know if I find any relief from this...
- —Guest Andrea
I am the prisoner of superbugs
- I'm Kirsten and I am living in the Netherlands. Last Septembre, 2010, we heard from my specialists that I am very ill. I have Klebsiella Pneumoniae (CRKP), and Mrsa. I am dying of it. These both bacteria, superbugs, literally are eating me alive. It first started from the inside out, now it's also from the outside in. My whole body is infected. doctors are lying to us: "It's not contagious" "It's just like a flu" "You don't have to worry about anything, it will heal by itself" HELLOOOOO!!!! My boyfriend has it now too!! Lies!! They are murderers with pre knowledge. They know that I am dying, and my friend too. No help for us at all. We just have to wait till death comes for us. A painful death. Find everything at: htt://hetfamiliekabinet.nl (English & photo's). I wrote to 63 specialists, professors and laboratory around the globe. Three letters came back: "Sorry, we can't help you." Now they've found microscopic worms eating me also, in- and outside. It's going fast now. Thanks!
- —KirstenVisser
untreated hospital yeast infection
- My mom was given a hospital skin yeast infection in 2010 after a minor surgery that she had. The infection may have been given to her on purpose. I am trying to figure out why. Maybe it had something to do with an insurance scam or maybe they had her in a case study or maybe just pure neglect, not sure. If that was the case the hospital should have been closed until they figured out what the problem was.The infection would have been so easy to cure. Yet the medical staff just bandaged it and acted like they did not know what was wrong as it continued to spread. She was finally given the meds that she needed when she was in a coma from a drug overdose of psychosomatic drugs. They pass these drugs out like candy in many hospitals to make the staff comfortable. The family is told it makes the patients comfortable.They do this no matter how dangerous these deadly drugs are. After all the medical staff is what matters not the patients this is what I found out.
- —Guest family of a patient
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NEW YORK ( TheStreet) -- Sen. Chris Dodd of Connecticut and Rep. Barney Frank of Massachusetts, both Democrats, saw nothing wrong with the subprime mortgage industry, Fannie Mae (FNMA) or Freddie Mac (FMCC) months before the meltdown.
(HPQ) board seemed befuddled by then-CEO Leo Apotheker's decision to sell off HP's core PC business.
Incredible experts of investment, J.P. Morgan Chase's (JPM) Jamie Dimon and Ina Drew were unable to understand the $2 billion gamble, er, investment, they made.
MF Global's chief, former New Jersey senator and governor and former Goldman Sachs (GS) CEO Jon Corzine had a problem misplacing $1.6 billion.And the list goes on.... It seems the most blatantly obvious issues that could risk the downfall of millions of employees, investors and other stakeholders were unpredictable, unknown or incomprehensible for even the smartest people in America. Excuse the hyperbole, but surely when the best and brightest and most powerful can't get it right, how can the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice go after any company for not getting it right? Is risk management too much for mere mortals? Maybe the billions of dollars invested in salaries, hardware, software, consultants, lawyers, accountants and enforcement is simply a waste. But wait a minute: Isn't risk about deciding, "Does the upside outweigh the downside?" No, most executives seem to think it's about, "Is the worst likely to happen and, if so, can we survive it?" These are two different views. The former is common sense while the second is gambling on survivability. The first scenario says, "Our reputation is too important to jeopardize on this move, decision, etc." The second scenario of likelihood and survivability yields settlements and calculated gambling that begging forgiveness and paying a fine is "the cost of doing business." The reality is there is no crystal ball for predicting a catastrophe, but there certainly is common sense board governance and CEO leadership that should avoid risk by "putting it all on black 22." Risk is not gambling, or it least it shouldn't be. Risk is knowing the value of your company and determining the values that will govern its sustainability and growth.