text:
U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy in Action
Skip Navigation
Secretary Kerry
Media Center
Daily Press Briefings
Public Schedule
Press Releases & Special Briefings
Remarks, Testimony by Senior Officials
Key Policy Fact Sheets
Reports and Publications
International Media Engagement
Photo Gallery
Foreign Press Center
Email Subscriptions
RSS News Feeds
Travel Information
Emergency Services
Intercountry Adoption
Parental Child Abduction
Foreign Per Diem Rates
Foreign Service Officer
Civil Service Officer
Foreign Service Specialist
International Organizations
Student Programs
USAJobs: Working for America
Business Support: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Office of Global Partnerships
Commercial and Business Affairs Office
Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts
Trade Policy and Programs
Country Commercial Guides
Defense Trade Controls
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Service Contract Inventory
Youth and Education
Discover Diplomacy
Global Youth Issues
Diplomatic History
Office of Overseas Schools
Exchange Visitor Program
Fulbright Program
Student Career Programs
Youth Exchange Programs
U.S. Diplomacy Center
Intercountry Adoption
Parental Child Abduction
My State Department
About State
Mission Statement
Organization Chart
Department of State by State
Rules and Info Collection
Partner With State
Senior Officials
Alphabetical List of Bureaus and Offices
Advisory Groups
Plans, Performance, Budgets
Agency Financial Reports
Open Government Initiative
No FEAR Act
Inspector General Hotline
U.S. Embassies and Other Posts
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Policy Issues
Climate Change
Cyber Issues
Democracy and Human Rights
East Asia and the Pacific
Economic Issues
Energy Security
Food Security
Sub-Saharan Africa
Trafficking in Persons
Women's Issues
Countries and Regions
A-Z List of Countries and Other Areas
Africa (Sub-Sahara)
East Asia and the Pacific
Europe and Eurasia
Near East (northern Africa, Middle East)
South and Central Asia
Western Hemisphere (Latin America, the Caribbean, Canada)
UN & Other International Organizations
Economics, Energy and Environment
Economic and Business Affairs
Food Security
Global Partnerships
Science and Technology
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
Trade Policy and Programs
Arms Control and International Security
Arms Control
Defense Trade Controls
Diplomatic Security
Narcotics and Law Enforcement
New START Treaty
Political-Military Affairs
Civilian Security and Democracy
Conflict and Stabilization
Global Criminal Justice
Human Rights
Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Population, Refugees, Migration
Trafficking in Persons
Women's Issues
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Daily Press Briefings
Press Releases
Register for Events & Updates
International Information Programs
Public Affairs
Education and Culture
History of Foreign Relations
Youth Issues
Assistance and Development
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources
Office of Global Health Diplomacy
U.S. Agency for International Development
AIDS Relief
Ebola Response
You are in:
-- By Date
Sudan Panel Discussion with NGO Experts and USG Officials
FPC Briefing
David Abramowitz
Humanity United
Jehanne Henry, Human Rights Watch; Suliman Baldo, International Center for Transitional Justice; and Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat
Foreign Press
Washington, DC
October 22, 2010
Thank you and welcome to the second half of today's briefing. I think this is also a very important part of the dialogue on Sudan. We need to hear from our colleagues in the advocacy and NGO communities who are playing a huge role in Sudan.
So we're fortunate to have with us on our panel today four important members of that community: Mr. David Abramowitz, director of policy and government relations at Humanity United; Jehanne Henry, senior researcher on Sudan at Human Rights Watch; Mr. Suliman Baldo of the International Center for Transitional Justice; and Carne Ross from Independent Diplomat.
And so, we will have a quick round of opening statements from our colleagues and then we will go to a question-and-answer session. So I believe, David, you're going to take the lead? Thank you.
Great. Thank you very much, and thanks to the Foreign Press Center for holding this event and inviting all of us to participate, and also a welcome to all of you here. Thanks for staying, and those who are abroad and joining us by conference call.
First, I just want to express, I think, the appreciation of a number of organizations, many organizations who are working on Sudan with respect to the increased level of urgency that the Administration, and President Obama in particular, has been showing towards the issue of Sudan. I think as it was laid out in the previous panel, events are really surging and coming to a head, and it was very important that there be a higher level of engagement, both as there was beginning in the spring, and then continuing on, in particular, with the meeting on September 24
in New York. And I want to congratulate UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for holding that meeting, and then the President for joining it, along with so many of his high-level colleagues.
I think that the issues were framed in the last panel. I'm not going to go into it. Let me just make a few points on some of the – three of the big issues, which is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and post-CPA arrangements, the contingency issues that were discussed and that were raised in your questions, and finally, Darfur and issues relating to accountability.
First, with respect to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, I think one of the key issues that we have to look for in the coming few weeks, as talks in Addis start again with Princeton Lyman being out in the region and also President Mbeki from the AU High Level Panel being involved, is how much the international community is going to be continuing to coordinate and work to ensure that the progress that was made on September 24
continues. Many countries have a role – both as General Gration indicated and as Ms. Power indicated – Norway working on oil too; some of the key post-CPA issues relating to citizenship, borders, et cetera. And we really need to have everyone supporting the work of the AU High Level Panel.
I think President Mbeki is putting together a good team. And I think, despite some of the things that were said about the Abyei conversations that have occurred so far, I think that one of the really excellent things that came out of that was an indication that if the mediators are prepared to put ideas on the table and press forward with creative solutions, that they can engage the parties in moving towards the peaceful solutions that we're all looking for. So that was very encouraging.
One of the issues that we need to follow very closely is what is going to happen on the border. As many of you may have seen, UNMIS has talked about trying to put some sort of forces in – on the border in hot locales. The government in Khartoum has expressed reservations about that. I think it's very important to watch that. It's impossible for UNMIS, with its current capacity, to actually create a buffer zone between the parties in case tensions go to a much higher level. But I think the idea of having at least pockets where there looks like tensions might be breaking out is a very good idea, and we have to see if they're able to carry that forward.
That sort of leads to my second point, which is the issue relating to contingency planning. I was very pleased to hear a number of the government representatives in the last panel speak about that. There's been – there has been some increasing efforts, both within the USG, but also with the UN agencies and others in Sudan to step that up. Obviously, we are all hoping that the negotiations succeed, and we need to keep our maximum effort on trying to ensure that the peaceful solutions are found, both on the issues relating to Abyei, which I think is linked to the broader set of issues, but also trying to ensure that if the worst happens, that we have both the resources in place and the planning in place so that there's a seamless response. And I think that there's work being done on that, and I think more needs to be done, and that's an issue we're following.
Finally, with respect to Darfur, obviously, this is a big challenge for the Administration. You've got this set of huge events that are coming up with respect to the North-South conversations and the diplomatic activity that's happening in Addis. At the same time, they need to be pressing forward in Darfur. It's – we've been very concerned about ongoing reports that have been going on all year about conflict in Darfur. I think others are going to speak about that more, so I won't talk about that.
But I think that it's really important that the Darfur issue is not lost and that a comprehensive solution is sought, and particularly that unhindered humanitarian access is provided. And I think that will be an important benchmark to be seen if Khartoum is prepared to look at the – all the Sudan issues and reach a peaceful solution to the range of complicated, center-periphery challenges that there are in that country and that have plagued it for its entire existence, and whether then we could really move towards the path of normalization that the Administration talked about.
Obviously, UNAMID has a role in trying to assist on that unhindered humanitarian access and civilian protection. I think more should be done on that, and that's an ongoing conversation I know the Executive Branch, the President, and his team has been having with the UN. And finally, I think it was interesting that nothing was spoken about in terms of accountability on the last panel. Obviously, you're all aware of the International Criminal Court's actions with respect to the president of Sudan and also the AU High Level Panel's efforts to try to come up with a hybrid internal solution with – that would create accountability for perpetrators of the violence that occurred during the height of the Darfur conflict. That's going to be an issue that's going to have to be looked on as we move through.
With that, I'll just stop and turn it over. I'm sorry that went on so long.
Okay, good. Thank you. Thanks for being here. My name is Jehanne Henry and I'm with the Human Rights Watch. I spend several months a year in Sudan. And I just wanted to tell you a little bit about our main concerns, sort of moving forward right now at this critical period. So I'll touch on Darfur. Silence there does not mean that the story there is over, that the conflict there is over; to the contrary. I'm also going to touch on two issues related to the referendum process itself. One is protecting minority rights, which some of the panelists on the previous panel were discussing, and the other is protecting civilians from other types of physical violence.
So first, on the issue of Darfur, the international focus on the referendum has been sidelining the Darfur story, perhaps leading to the impression that the conflict there has subsided. But in fact, the government is still attacking rebel positions and civilians, most recently in Jebel Marra, and the government has blocked off the area from international organizations' access, and this means that we do not have accurate death tolls. It is not possible for us to accurately report on some of the conflict that's occurring in Darfur right now.
Meanwhile, the government has launched a new Darfur strategy that focuses on improving security and accelerating the return of IDPs from IDP camps. And this raises concerns about the government's intentions to dismantle the IDP camps, which it has stated in the past. And we would urge that all efforts be made to make sure that camps be treated in a manner consistent with international standards and that IDP's rights be upheld.
On the referendum and issues related to human rights moving forward directly connected with the referendum, the panelists in the previous panel talked about the need to protect minority rights, so Southerners in the North and Northerners in the South; this is certainly a huge concern. There have been mixed rhetoric coming out of the government of Khartoum. Some authorities have been threatening people. Southerners would lose their citizenship rights, should the South secede.
Other officials have been much more reassuring. In the South, President Salva Kiir has been more reassuring. What we would urge is that both governments be very, very clear that citizens are not going to be stripped of their rights and that they will not be subjected to intimidation and attack and any form of physical violence. For example, in the context of demonstrations or public campaigning around the referendum, the pro-secession and pro-unity camps are already starting to speak out, and there is certainly potential for violence around campaigning season which is coming upon us ahead of the referendum. So we would urge much more scrutiny.
Keep in mind, that the UN mission in Sudan does not have a protection mandate in Khartoum and Northern states. Its protection mandate is operational in the South and we know the limitations there. So the protection of civilians, of minority populations, in particular, in Khartoum and other parts of the North, is a point of concern. It is not clear that there is enough in place to ensure that those populations who will be voting are protected.
In addition, other protection concerns around the North-South border and other parts of Sudan, should Southerners return to the South en masse because of uncertainties about the vote or their ability to vote, they could be indeed subjected to intimidation or attacks along the road; this has happened before. There is a likelihood that if violence against one minority population in one part of the country occurs, it will tip off retaliatory violence in other parts of the country. So protection readiness throughout the South is of equal concern.
There are flashpoints along the North-South border that are already well known. For example, in Abyei, the oil-rich zone that straddles that border has already seen clashes. There are several other areas as well, particularly in places where the Joint Integrated Units, which are units of soldiers from both the Southern and Northern armies, they are co-located in areas throughout the South and in Khartoum. Those Joint Integrated Units are not joint or integrated and they have, in fact, clashed in Abyei and in Malakal and in other places. So this is another flashpoint.
Finally, it is really important to understand the extent to which the SPLA itself poses security threats to civilians because of inter-Southern problems and political violence that we saw in the aftermath of the elections in the South. We did see the Government of South Sudan and its security forces engage in violence against civilians following the elections in an effort to deal with opponents of the ruling SPLM. This is something we need to keep an eye on, and we need to understand it as a separate issue. I mean, at times it is related to the referendum, at other times it is not. It is important to understand this for the future of Southern Sudan and how Southern Sudan will manage.
So, I will stop there with a final comment about the UN mission and Sudan's ability to protect civilians throughout the South. As my colleague just pointed out, there are gaps in its ability to do this. It's a very vast country. The idea of patrolling the border in its entirety does not seem realistic, but having forces ready to deal with very particular flashpoint areas could be possible, and it's something that we want to keep pushing for.
And with that, I will stop. Thank you.
Thanks, Jehanne. Suliman.
Thank you. I want to bring more focus to the impact of the referendum on Darfur, because it's indeed the case that the focus on the referendum in Southern Sudan and the likely separation, or secession of the South, has drawn or overshadowed the situation in Darfur. It's very preoccupying, preoccupying because the very organization of the peace process in Darfur has happened in relation to the referendum agenda. The idea is to have a peaceful settlement in Darfur before the referendum in Southern Sudan so that the referendum could at least be approached without this other problem.
So there was an external factor that led the mediation and all the international actors with influence on the situation to really put pressure on the Darfur movements and the parties to reach some form of agreement, as a result of which we have witnessed progress in Doha, where the talks are taking place. But it's a preoccupying progress, preoccupying because the negotiations and the talks are now going between the government and one Darfur movement being the Liberation and Justice Movement. This movement is created by the needs of the mediation to represent a large sector of the population in Darfur – the (inaudible) tribe is (inaudible). And it leaves out two factions that are very representative with regard to their popularity on the ground.
I am referring here to the historical Sudan Liberation Movement and the following it receives in loyalty among the displaced. And the other movement is militarily very important, the Justice and Equality Movement, which has frozen its participation in the talks.
So, as we grow nearer to the signing of an agreement -- and there is a sort of a deadline for that, before the end of the year -- the situation on the ground is actually deteriorating for two reasons. Justice and Equality Movement is not going to accept to be left out of the peace, and is more likely to do more of military initiatives to prove its presence on the ground.
Secondly, we are witnessing an attempt by the government to suppress and to take out factions that are staying out of the peace process in Doha. And, hence, an escalation in the violence in direct confrontation between government security forces and those of the Justice and Equality Movement.
But, as happens always in Darfur, civilians are the primary victims of these bombings. In the (inaudible) area, for example, there have been recent waves of massive displacements of civilians from the (inaudible) area, whose little access to information is through the areas cordoned off. Therefore, there is an opportunism from the government when it uses the spotlight on the referendum to try and score some military agenda on the ground.
The scenario is as follows. An agreement will be signed with those present in Doha, government and the Liberation and Justice Movement. Other factions would have to join in through a process of declaration of commitment to such an agreement. In the past, with the Darfur peace agreement in Abuja, the government has used this as a tool to accelerate further division of factions in Darfur. And, therefore, a peace agreement in Doha may not necessarily lead to peace on the ground. On the contrary, it could lead to more chaotic violence on the ground.
We have witnessed of late some strands of this chaotic violence, inter-tribal fighting among Arab groups, groups of Arab origin in Darfur, because arms have been distributed so generously by the (inaudible) in the region, that each single localized dispute translates into major military clashes among tribal militias within the Arab communities, leading to significant deaths, equivalent, in fact, to violent deaths from direct confrontation between government and rebels. We witness casualties in these intertribal fights that are of the same importance in figures as those between the government and the rebels.
It is true that the direct proxy war between Sudan and Chad has been put to some rest. But the current escalation on the ground, of which, you know -- in which the Justice and Equality Movement is a key player, is an extension of that conflict. Therefore, that dog has not been kept silent from barking, and is still barking on the ground. And Sudan has still the ability of reigniting the front on the Chadian side of the border.
So, the referendum is not going to lead to a situation necessarily of calm on other fronts. On the contrary, I expect it will lead to further deterioration of the security situation.
My final comment relates to what happens next, after the signing, eventual signing, of a peace agreement. The process will be brought back to Darfur. Under the plans of the African Union High Implementation Panel, they will lead comprehensive political dialogue on the ground to bring all the stakeholders who are not present in Doha -- Doha is just a forum for the government and the rebels, so they want to associate all the other stakeholders displaced, the refugees, civil society, tribal leaders, new elected officials, and the like to the peace process.
The problem with that, the government has also declared a strategy for peace in Darfur which appropriates the proposal of the African Union for broadening the peace process and building consensus about it. And it's trying to drive that back to the ground. And, hence, there is a lot of distrust from Darfur movements, and they are already rejecting the government strategy for resolving the conflict on the ground.
My final comment relates to the situation of protection of civilians. Reference has been made to those southerners in the North and northerners in the South, but there is a dynamic dimension to this protection issue. There are 22 tribes of Arab origin in the transitional border between North and South who depend on crossing the border into Southern Sudan for part of the -- at least four months if not more each year, for their own livelihoods. These are nomadic tribes that have for generations, and since forever, been interacting with southern communities along that border. And a situation of deteriorating security for southern residents in the North would mean that the liberty of these tribes to continue crossing into southern Sudan and back into the North would be put at great risk if there were retaliating measures.
So, we are talking here about eight, nine million members of these nomadic groups in northern Sudan, and southern nomadic groups who also rely on crossing the border into that part of North Sudan. The independence of livelihoods is such that everything has to be deployed now and constantly, to really put the two parties before their historic responsibility to really ensure a peaceful outcome of this process.
It's not just a matter of separation between Muslim North and Christian South. Government (inaudible) Muslims in Darfur, and there are millions now in IDP camps who are Muslims entirely. So it's about governance, it's about responsibility of a state towards its own citizens, and this applies also to (inaudible) southern Sudan. Thank you.
Thank you, Suliman. Carne?
I -- before talking about the diplomacy around the issue, I should explain my role. I was a British diplomat for 15 years. I founded Independent Diplomat to advise governments, countries, and non-state groups on diplomatic processes. One of our clients is the Government of Southern Sudan. We are advising the Government of Southern Sudan on the diplomatic situation. So my comments should be heard in that light, though I should also say that I don't speak for the SPLM, the government, they speak for themselves.
I've got just three brief comments about the nature of diplomacy today, as I see it. First of all, as you probably gathered, it's very complicated. There are multiple actors engaged: the UN, the AU, the Troika, the U.S., and IGAD. The issues between North and South and negotiations between North and South are themselves very complicated. They are technically complicated and they are psychologically complicated because, essentially, what we are looking at is a negotiation to establish the foundations of a relationship between two states. That is a very, very big deal, and involves a great deal of technical issues, as well as a huge psychological shift, particularly for Khartoum.
Throw into that mix the security situation on the ground is pretty volatile, there is a great deal of concern at the moment in the South about the security situation. This has led to the issue of emissary deployment rising up the agenda. The Security Council is considering this on Monday. I think that's a very important discussion, how that resolves itself. I don't know, but I expect that UNMIS will be redeployed, as people have committed to these trouble spots with a greater mobile capacity, and I also hope a monitoring capacity enhanced.
What this complexity means is that individual actors who are the kind of top of their pyramid, like Thabo Mbeki, have, by intent or by accident, got an extraordinarily important role in steering this process, both in chairing the talks between North and South, but also in a way in legitimizing the process for the rest of the world, particularly to Africa. Many African states are extremely nervous about this process, and the precedent that it sets for the rest of Africa.
One consequence of this complexity is that there is enormous amount of diplomacy going on, simply to keep the international community on the same page. In June there was a formal meeting of the Security Council where many countries spoke. In September there was this high-level meeting organized by the UN where 34 countries signed up to a kind of general communiqué about the process.
And in November there will be another formal meeting at the Security Council chaired by the British foreign secretary, no less, with the same attempt: basically, to bring all the international community on the same message, which is to keep the parties on time, on board for implementing the referendums in a prompt, timely, and free and fair manner.
I dare say, though, that despite all of this effort, the unity in the international community is, in my view, very, very fragile. If the talk of delay on the referendum starts to rise, as we approach the referendums -- I expect that to happen -- or if the process goes off the rails in any way, I do not see that unity enduring.
The other thing that's going on is, as you've probably gathered too, the pace of diplomacy is increasing very rapidly. We now have several different processes going on. We have the Addis talks -- or they're somewhere in Ethiopia, I'm not exactly sure if they're going to be in Addis -- beginning just next week between the North and the South. That will be, I expect, quite a long tendentious and very challenging process.
Secondly, this issue has moved to the top of the agenda of the UN Security Council. They will be discussing it on Monday. I would expect there to be weekly, if not more regular discussions, about Sudan in the Security Council. Everybody at the UN is saying this is the number one issue.
However, I would say perhaps one slightly skeptical word, which is that lots of activity doesn't necessarily equate to lots of progress. I would also suggest that the more activity there is on all these different tracks with scores of special envoys and foreign ministers doing the rounds, and all talking to each other and showing up in great processions of diplomats to tell the SPLM what to do, there is a bit of a risk of systems overload with so much diplomacy to follow. And with that risk comes, I think, a bit of a risk of miscalculation by the parties. As the pace increases, they're forced to make decisions more quickly. And when you make quick decisions, you may miscalculate, particularly if you're not getting all the information about all the discussions that are going on. And I am a bit concerned about that as we go into the next couple of months. That's all.
Thank you very much, Carne. Okay, that concludes our round of opening remarks. We will move to the Q&A session. We have about 20 minutes for Q&A, which obviously does not do enough justice for such a complex situation as Sudan. So I ask our journalists to keep their questions short, and don't forget to mention your name and media outlet, and then we will take a couple of questions here, and then to our colleagues in Africa. We will start right here, quickly. Thank you.
Thanks very much. I have a question for Jehanne. I mean the international community has obviously invested a lot of time, effort, prestige, and other things in trying to secure the rights of the southerners in the post-referendum period and before the referendum. Why not invest that same amount of effort and time and prestige in keeping Sudan together while securing those rights for people in the South?
And, the follow-up to Suliman, who is responsible, do you think, for the situation that has led us now to be talking about the referendum? Is it the successive governments in the north that have failed to do right by the southerners, or is it the international community which, as you know, some people suspect that it has specific agendas in splitting Sudan?
Those are two short questions.
Shall I start?
Yes, Jehanne, please.
Well, I mean, on the question of the protection of southerners in the North, I would argue that there hasn't actually been enough attention on that. And I pointed out that UNMIS's mandate doesn't actually include protecting southerners in the North, and I am concerned that there isn't enough sort of international readiness to deal with that, particularly if there are large population movements. I was glad to hear Samantha Power talk about those concerns as well, indicating that perhaps people are thinking about it. But what's on the ground now in Khartoum, I mean, what's the likelihood that, when something does happen, if there is any violence in the context of demonstrations or otherwise, that the UN or others would be able to come in and actually quell the situation – a big question mark.
As to your second question about sort of the merits of unity or secession, I mean, our framework is the CPA itself. So I'm a lawyer. I'm looking at this from the point of view of the rights that are already agreed to, so I really wouldn't be the best person to talk about those larger political considerations of the merits of unity over secession. I think that's very complicated. And obviously, it's something that's on all the regional actors' minds.
Suliman, maybe you can fill us in.
Yes, in relation to your question about the separation, I attribute it to the failure of Sudanese (inaudible) in the North to manage the country's diversity in a way that would preserve its unity. All Sudanese want to be Sudanese and this is the premise even of the southerners, but in their own identity. And what we have witnessed over the years is policies at the central level – economic, cultural, religious – that tended to totally ignore the rights of the peripheries and (inaudible) only South Sudan.
Let me give you the example of Darfur. Darfur, until the late 1980s, was the land which is a melting pot. Ninety-seven types, according to a survey in which I participated, of different origins were mixing, adopting Arab language, and uniformizing their cultural – because of the influence of the radio and media and education, national education and national civil service, and living in harmony and in peace.
When you have government policies that reverse these natural tendencies, pushing people to polarize along ethnic grounds – and this is what the Government of Khartoum had achieved – by, for example, for very short-sighted policies of (inaudible) tribes for political or counterinsurgency gains of the moment, then you reverse the real dynamics that could have encouraged people to create unity.
What I am worried about is not the separation between North and South. Next on the agenda would be that (inaudible) who are demanding self-determination, because they feel that they have been so marginalized in their own country that they don't belong there. And there is already talk, if you follow the discussions in Darfur (inaudible) of the right of self-determination for Darfur. So the issue is much greater than some agendas of foreign forces. It's the failure of ruling in (inaudible) Sudan, but particularly the current -- successive governments since independence, yes, but this particular regime here, which is here today, has really pushed this marginalization to the extreme by real manipulation of ethnicity for parties and for the military gains that do not take into account what is needed to create a harmonious population.
Thank you, Suliman. Let's take a question right here, please.
Hi, I'm Mark Goldberg with UN Dispatch. David, you mentioned sort of the somewhat conspicuous absence of a mention of accountability or the ICC in the previous panel's discussion. Yet if you ask government officials, you know, "What about the ICC," they will remain at least rhetorically committed to the ICC action and in Sudan.
Yet, you know, the general creation seemed to lay out the potential of a normalization of relations with Khartoum, sort of as a carrot at the end of the negotiations. I am wondering. Is there a way to sort of square these two seemingly opposing ideas, ideals, or goals of U.S. foreign policy: one, supporting the ICC; two, supporting some sort of normalization of relations with Khartoum?
Thanks. It's a very challenging issue. If any one of you were following what would happen in Kampala for the ICC Review Conference, this whole issue of peace and justice and sequencing was really at the heart of a number of conversations. And, I think as we've seen in some of the actions in African countries in the lead-up, including efforts by President Bashir to establish stronger relations, it's an issue that's very much in dialogue.
I think, for many of us in the NGO community, our view is you can't have a sustainable peace unless you have accountability and justice. So there is always a sequencing issue about how you get to that place, but that's a very important element to remember. So, I think that the Administration, you know, has more than merely a rhetorical commitment to the ideas of international justice, if you look at their efforts both in Kampala and elsewhere. In this particular situation, I think that they're trying to figure out their sequencing issue.
And let's not -- remember that it's not only President Bashir who is subject to arrest warrants from the ICC. There are other actors, including those who have been involved in Darfur on the ground and others who are in sub-national roles, like Mr. Haroon (ph), that are subject to the warrant, and there can be efforts along those lines. And I think one of the issues that -- just building on some of the comments previously -- one of the issues around Darfur is looking at a comprehensive solution that includes accountability issues. And I think that's a key area where it can be done.
And one of the reasons that the advocacy community has been calling for some sort of additional high-level U.S. diplomat to focus on the Darfur issue alone is -- and as was reflected in Senator Kerry's legislation that is going to be, hopefully, moving during the lame duck session of Congress this November, is that I think that, as you could hear from the conversation here and on the last panel, it's enormously complicated issues that are coming to a head right now that range from humanitarian access all the way to trying to get the highest level of attention in the international community in a way that doesn't kind of blot out the capacities of the party. And having a high-level U.S. representative that focuses on Darfur only can actually help reach the whole range of issues that were discussed, as well as the accountability issues.
Thank you very much, Dave. We will take a couple questions from our Africa colleagues.
This first one comes from Jason Straziuso, from AP in Nairobi, Kenya. His question for the panel: What poses a greater risk of violence in the next year in Sudan, internal southern violence or a return to North-South conflict? Perhaps each of you could just make a quick comment on that.
Well, very briefly, I think the risks of both are high. I think that the dangers of an outright conflict between North and South along the border leading to a high level of civilian casualties, as well as the issues about southerners in the North is sort of the greatest challenge. But there are South-South issues that have been going on. They're ones that we really have to pay attention to. I think that the SPLM and President Salva Kiir have been trying to reach out to a bunch of the disparate elements, and we really strongly urge him to continue that. But more has to be done to try to avert the South-South violence.
Yes, I would agree that it's a combination. I think there are risks of both. But it is important to understand that some of the South-South tensions between communities in the South really exist independently in the North, even though a lot of the rhetoric that you hear in the South ties the two. So a lot of explanations about what's going on in the South include sort of pointing fingers at Khartoum. To an extent, maybe there are links, but to another extent there aren't links.
There are pre-existing and independently existing conflicts between communities that need to be managed. And the Government of Southern Sudan is a very young, new government. It does not have the capacity to reach out into the vast areas of the states to properly manage those conflicts. And it is a huge problem.
After the elections we did see some fairly serious patterns of human rights abuses committed by southern soldiers against communities that are affiliated with opponents of the ruling SPLM. Some of those issues have been quelled with the efforts of the president, more recently, Salva Kiir reaching out compromise with the so-called renegade commanders. But those issues are simmering in the background, and I would say that they certainly are going to become more exposed to us all in the days surrounding the referendum and after the referendum. So I would like to underscore that risk. But both risks are there, yes.
Thank you. Suliman, which situation --
Yes. I don't expect a traditional warfare between North and South of the type that happened between (inaudible) and the issue of the referendum collapsed two years after the referendum was held in 1991. So the situation is not likely to be one of (inaudible) some resources areas where the (inaudible) tried to establish military presence to control resources that are on the other side of the current administrative border between North and South.
And then, perhaps instrumentalization of tribal militias in these areas, presidal of those transitional tribes that depend on livelihood on southern Sudan, in which case it will be a situation of chaos, chaotic violence and proxy war to try and destabilize the South.
There are the issues of tensions within southern Sudan entirely. I agree with Jehanne here, that there are particular dynamics that are proper to the South, and that are not necessarily linked to help to manipulating this, but the potential is also there through its command of some of the former militias who were under control of Khartoum to stoke these local tensions, and to create situations in the South to demonstrate the inability of the new government to be in control in southern Sudan.
Thanks, Suliman.
I would only add to all of this one other issue that's not been mentioned is the Lord's Resistance Army is very much seen as a source of conflict by the government in the South. The Lord's Resistance Army is now very present in the DRC, Sudanese border areas. I have seen reports having them as far North as Darfur. They are a very unpleasant, aggressive source of instability, which I think all of us should be aware of and calculating in this very -- this witch's brew that we've got.
Thank you, Carne. The next question comes from Ivo Vegter of the Daily Maverick, in Johannesburg. Question: South Africa has sent several trade delegations to Sudan. It has also been very involved in civil service training, especially for bureaucrats in the South. How much value do such efforts have in cementing a peaceful resolution in the region? Are they enough? And which do you view as more important?
Well, let me just take a first shot at that. I think that the needs of the southern Sudan, the government of southern Sudan, to build its capacity and able to have a successful, stable environment with good governance is critically important. If you go to Juba and meet with members of the government and the SPLM, they are very, very good people. But it's quite thin, and they need to really build up that governance.
I think the efforts by South Africa have been excellent. They really -- they have made a difference. The United States was discussed as expanding its efforts in the South in order to try to help develop both the economy in the South, as well as the governance. But more needs to be done. The South, the government of southern Sudan itself, needs to make a greater commitment to improve its capacity, to improve its transparency. And I think anything that the international community can do to do that is not only welcome, but urgently needed.
Would anyone else like to comment?
I would just say that this is a very long-term task. Viewing this as a short-term sort of intervention to stop conflict is wrong. I have been in several post-conflict situations, including in Kosovo. It is a very, very long-term task to build up effective government from an admittedly very low base in southern Sudan. I would simply send that message to South Africa and other donors and countries involved in the effort.
Thank you, Carne. Ivo had a follow-on question regarding the referenda: Do calls for a postponement until border issues have been settled and agreements about debt, oil revenue, and water resources have been finalized, do those arguments have any merit?
If I may, I mean, I don't think those arguments are currently accepted in the international community. I think there is a belief that we have got to make as much progress as possible on these outstanding issues before the referendums take place, in order that the post-referendum relationship between the two entities is clear, that there is some framework for that, that the basic principles have been agreed. I don't think anybody feels it's likely that all of these issues will be wrapped up by January the 9th.
I think that -- just to follow up on that -- I think that the issue "finalized" is really the big concern about that question, in the sense that I think the parties are aiming towards a framework agreement, as was just mentioned, where the large-scale issues can be settled. Under the CPA itself, of course, there is a transition period until July 9th in which the parties can continue to work on finalizing a number of these elements.
So, the fact that the referendum occurs on January 9th is not the end of the conversation. And I think, inevitably, because of the ties between North and South, there is going to have to be some sort of modality for the two sides to continue to cooperate. Obviously, as you all know, the oil issue is one in which the North has the infrastructure for delivering the oil to market, the South has the actual deposits. So there is going to be a continuing need for an ongoing conversation regarding how that will move forward, and those things can be done after January 9th, when the referendums -- referenda are held on time.
The situation has been created in southern Sudan where the expectation is that the referendum will be held on time. And the SPLM is not at all in a position to accept, I believe, any form of delay. There are practical technical considerations, logistical considerations that may force a delay, in my assessment. But it has to be demonstrated, and it has to be seen that everything is in target to do our maximum for the referendum to take place on the time it has been provided.
And, therefore, then it becomes more acceptable to the SPLM to say, okay, a delay could occur by this amount of time, because there is no lack of will to make it happen on time. This is my reading of the situation.
Thank you, Suliman. We have time for approximately two more questions. Let's start with this gentleman right here.
Hodari Abdul-Ali from Give Peace a Chance Coalition and WPFW. I want to come back to the issue of the unity of Sudan. There seems to be a glee on the part of many organizations and international players to break up Sudan, both North, South, and Darfur. And I want to remind people that the CPA stipulated that the SPLM and the NCP should campaign for unity. And this seems to have been lost. And many African countries in the AU have spoken for the importance of Sudan's unity.
And I wanted to ask Ms. Henry what safeguards have been put in place that you have observed for those persons who want to campaign for unity in the South? And I am glad -- because I was in Sudan as an observer for the elections in April, I went to both Khartoum and Juba, and I am glad you mentioned the heavy-handedness that the Government of South Sudan has exhibited toward other southern players. I mean this is -- they want to blame everything on Khartoum. And certainly Khartoum is not blameless. However, there was a lot of corruption and intimidation of other persons in the South who wanted to campaign outside of being official candidates. And I am glad you brought that up.
And my question to Mr. Baldo is, what pressure is being put on JEM to join these Doha negotiations, if Doha represents, at this point, the best possibility to find a peaceful solution in Darfur? Because this has been going on endlessly. And we want to know what can be done to get some of these other players who just say no, or who stay in hotels in Europe or other places. It's easy to say no, and it's easy to pressure the government. But what pressure is being put on some of these other supposedly leaders or representatives of the Darfurians to join the peaceful negotiations?
Okay, thank you. I think there are a couple of questions in there. But Jehanne, if you want to start?
Yes, let me take that. Regarding the unity question, the CPA does say that unity should be made attractive. And one of the ways that the agreement lays out for unity to be made attractive is through a series of democratic reforms to be undertaken by the government of national unity. And those include legal and institutional reforms, and they include making the governance systems in Khartoum work to protect minorities: the Commission for Non-Muslims, the constitutional court, reforming the national security laws so that the much-feared national security and intelligence service agents, who are currently arresting and detaining people for very long periods of time without bringing legal charges, and also who engage in ill treatment and sometimes torture in cases that we have documented, the reform of these institutions.
And I think one of the things we have noticed documenting the human rights patterns in Sudan over the last years is that those reforms haven't taken place. Those human rights and democratizing reforms that were supposed to occur under the CPA haven't largely taken place. So that's just a comment on this whole concept of unity in the CPA, as it was described.
The issue of freedom of expression and the freedom to campaign is something we are also really concerned about. Whether you are interested in unity or secession, it's critical that both governments -- the national unity government in Khartoum and the government of southern Sudan and Juba -- that both governments provide the protections and the freedoms to the journalists to be able to report on these things. And we have documented for years restrictions on freedom of expression in Khartoum in the North, and increasingly we have found cases in -- I wouldn't say increasingly, but over the last few years of looking at the situation in the South, particularly during the elections, we found cases of serious restrictions on expression there, too, including arrests of journalists during the elections.
Southern Sudan currently doesn't have media laws on the books. That is one of the issues that the journalists there are fighting for. And it needs to have a regime whereby expression of political opinion, particularly in a voting process like an election or a referendum, are protected. So it's good to flag those, and it's certainly one of our key concerns with respect to both governments.
Suliman, did you have a comment?
Yes, a response to the type of pressures put or not put on the JEM, the Justice and Equality Movement had a presence in Chad. And the agreement to expel it from Chad was actually a tremendous form of pressure on it to join the peace process. This was the key driver of this bilateral agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Government of Chad. But many international actors had a key role in bringing the two to reach this pacification agreement between the two countries, so that the JEM is driven to the peace process.
JEM did go to Doha, did sign a framework agreement in mid-February of this year. And with -- that agreement between Chad and Khartoum actually provided for the JEM to assemble its forces in one area, and the framework agreement signed in Doha allowed for -- there was a declaration of cease fire.
However, what happened with that, the government immediately started circling these forces, because there was an opportunity there to militarily crush them, since they did not longer have the support or the possibility of seeking haven in neighboring Chad. And the failure of that campaign by JEM forces scattering for -- the close-in of government forces is what has led to a serious escalation and, literally, confrontations between the government and the forces of the Justice and Equality Movement.
The demand of Justice and Equality Movement to go back to the Doha negotiations is very simple. The process, the peace process, has taken its leaders from Darfur to Doha to take part in the negotiations. They ask they be allowed to go to Doha, to Darfur, to establish safe passage on which they were – the assumption was that they would be free to go and come back when they called – the negotiations are in recess. That hasn't happened. And this draws attention to the fact that the process has, in fact, siphoned out of Darfur hundreds of field commanders who are sitting in hotels in Doha – and I'm not talking about political leaders – field commanders, and who are staying now there for months under the pretext of the peace process. Forces on the ground are, therefore, rendered more vulnerable to any campaign in -- a counterinsurgency campaign by government.
Therefore, there is a lot of complexity in how the dynamics of war and peace play out in this peace process. JEM is saying no, "We will not be in that position of being shut out of the field; we need to go back," and that's the obstacle.
Hodari Abdul-Ali follow-up. They were given a respite after they invaded. I mean, what stopped them from going to Doha today?
Well, the argument currently that there hasn't been a decisive victory for either side, not for the JEM -- neither for the government nor for the JEM. And therefore, they will not accept an agreement in which they were not party during the negotiations. And that's why I predict there will be an escalation of fighting on the ground if there is an agreement in Doha without the Justice and Equality Movement, the one that has the real forces on the ground.
You should tell them to go. They'll follow you. (Laughter.)
Yeah, I mean, it's --
We'll have an opportunity for a little bit of follow-up after the official press briefing. I think we have one more question in the back of the room, and we'll wrap up with that. Please go ahead, sir.
My name is John Tanza, VOA Sudan program. My question is regarding the role of Egypt in the whole situation, because historically, Egypt colonized Sudan and the Egyptian Government has been on record saying the unity of Sudan is what they prefer. What kind of messages are you getting from the Egyptian authorities? And this question is directed to David and Ross.
Well, that is a very good question. The Egyptian position is very interesting. This morning, there was a press report that Egypt is calling for a delay in the referendums. I don't think that press report is actually correct and I think this is partly to do with the U.S.-Egypt dynamic – let me put it like that delicately. The U.S. does not want talk of delay at this point. And I think any sentiment from Cairo that Sudan – the message should be that Sudan should be kept together, or that the referendum should be delayed for further negotiations about keeping the country together, that is going to be suppressed internationally.
I wanted to introduce a broader comment about this sense of glee in the international community at the separation of Sudan. I have to say I don't see that at all myself. Instead, I see a very weary reluctance to get into this at the UN, which is, of course, a body of states, and the AU, likewise. There has been enormous reluctance to get into this process, and indeed, really, quite a strong mental antipathy towards it, including from the likes of Ban Ki-moon, who was once -- once said that we should work for the unity of Sudan. Jean Ping has said the same thing; Thabo Mbeki is saying the same thing.
But all three of them have now shifted over the last year -- and the last year has been very important, psychologically -- to a dawning recognition that when the vote comes – and it has to come under the CPA – the very large majority of people in the south are going to vote for separation, and we just have to deal with that reality and make sure that happens peacefully.
Thank you, Carne. David, the final word.
Well, just briefly, I think that you'll find Cairo is quite conflicted on these issues. They have very serious national security concerns and economic concerns that are involved in the separation of north and south water, which has not been an issue that we've discussed being a critical one. I think that, at the end of the day, Cairo does recognize, as does the others that have called for unity in the past, that there is a certain direction that the people of southern Sudan are going, and I think they will understand and accept that reality.
My understanding is that at times they've played a helpful role over the last few months of trying to bring the parties together for further conversations. I think that suggests that they – one of their key objectives is to make sure that there's not outright conflict breaking out south of their border, and I think that we'll see them being part of an effort if there is a peaceful resolution of joining that effort.
Thank you very much, David. Okay. That officially concludes our briefing today. I want to thank all of our colleagues in the media who may have attended the longest briefing in FPC history, so thanks for hanging in there. I also want to thank our colleagues from the advocacy community for your insightful comments and unique perspective. We appreciate that.
Thank you all very much for coming today.
# # #


text:
Every Sunday, New York on the Potomac presents some of the best political cartoons from the award-winning artists of Hearst Newspapers. Today, we feature work by John de Rosier of the Albany Times Union and Nick Anderson of the Houston Chronicle.
New York on the Potomac
Political cartoons of the week: Republican hypocrisy on gays in the military
5 Responses
As a Republican, I am dismayed at the GOP's bigotry on gay rights, whether it be in the military or same-sex marriage. I doubt that any Republican candidate would state that he did not want any gays to vote for him or her, but when it comes to granting human rights to gays, it's a different story. Wake up, and get over it, you GOP credins. You make me reluctant to admit I am a Republican sometimes.
Allowing gays to openly flout and practice their sexuality in the military would destroy the morale, cohesion and esprit de corps of the greatest arm forces in the world. I'm proud of Senator John McCain's (R-Arizona) position on this matter; he's 100% correct in questioning the impact of such a policy change. By the way, what is a credin? Unlike comment #1, this is a proud Republican.
Once again the TU's liberal biased slip is showing.
JDR cartoon is a joke, but not a funny one! Why is it that the democrats
who had control of the house for the last 4 years haven't repealed DADT?Why is is that Obama AND the democrat controlled hoise and senate for the last two years haven't repealed DADT when they had absolute power to do so?
As for Delay, while he is a crook, so are many democrats including Rangel who by all rights should be jailed but is still in office.
Your hypocracy is noted…
Some want to change "don't ask and don't tell" to "ask and tell". Who will now be doing the asking and what if you refuse to tell? Will that now be grounds for dismissal. Be careful what you wish for.
Readers of this blog might find the content of these articles to be of interest as well:
What do you think?

subset: commoncrawl


text:
You can now listen to Classical and Choral Music on your iOS (iPhone, iPod Touch, and iPad) or Android device.
March 2007 | ||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | ||||
4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 |
18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
Posted at 10:05 AM on March 1, 2007
by John Zech
(1 Comments)
Filed under: The blog
One of our funniest local commentators, James Lileks, is a very thoughtful consumer and presenter (and blogger) of classical music. I think in many ways he is a prototype of our target audience.
He had some interesting things to say about classical music the other day in his column in the Strib. Talking about what he listens to on satellite radio in his car he said:
There's a good classical station, called "Pops" -- meaning, pieces you know and like, as opposed to the serious spinach classical station that rolls out interminable bolts of baroque chamber music or shrieking atonal opera that sounds like the singer is giving birth to a porcupine.
So are we a "serious spinach" classical station? Maybe once upon a time, but I think we're more on the "balaced and tasty" side of the classical food pyramid.
Any thoughts?
Posted at 2:47 PM on March 1, 2007
by Don Lee
Both the Fargo-Moorhead and the Duluth-Superior Symphony Orchestras are celebrating 75th anniversaries this season. I guess 1931 and '32 were banner years for making music across state lines.
The coincidence made me curious. Do our other "regional" orchestras date from that same time? Well, basic Web research tells me the South Dakota Symphony is about a decade older. And the Rochester Symphony was founded a little earlier than that, in 1919. (For the record, the Minneapolis Symphony gave its first concert in 1903.)
So we're not left to wonder about some kind of seismic shift in the Upper Midwest's symphonic landscape during the early 1930s. Still, it's remarkable enough that the Twin Ports and Fargo-Moorhead had the faith and gumption to get these organizations going just a couple of years into the Great Depression.
Posted at 4:23 PM on March 1, 2007
by Rex Levang
In case you were left wondering by a previous posting and its vivid description of conductor Valery Gergiev: here's just one image of the foremost Russian conductor of his generation.


text:
Michael Schumacher remains in a "critical but stable" condition, his spokeswoman said, as French investigators hoped a helmet-mounted camera he was wearing at the moment of his ski accident could provide answers.
It was not known whether the GoPro camera filmed the moment when the retired seven-time world champion slammed his head against a rock, or whether images have been damaged by the impact, which was so hard it split the helmet he was wearing.
But investigators may yet find another clue in a film made by a German witness, who claimed to have captured Schumacher's accident by chance, German news magazine Der Spiegel reported late Saturday.
The magazine quoted the witness describing Schumacher descending the slope at a "leisurely" pace and "at a maximum speed of 20 kilometres an hour".
In the background, a skier could be seen descending on an unmarked run between two groomed pistes before falling, the magazine reported.
Key among elements that investigators are hoping to establish is the speed at which Schumacher was skiing, as it could determine responsibility in the December 29 accident in the French Alps near the Meribel ski resort.
French prosecutors and the ski resort say Schumacher was skiing at great speed. His spokeswoman Sabine Kehm has challenged that, saying he could not have been going fast "because it appears he helped a friend who had just fallen".
Edouard Bourgin, a specialist on accident claims said: "There could have been a catapult effect that explains the violence of the shock, even in the absence of excessive speed."
Prosecutors are also looking at whether the limits of the ski runs next to the accident site were correctly marked and whether the rock in question was lying close enough to the piste to require some kind of protection or signage.
In addition, they are examining whether the safety releases on Schumacher's skis operated properly.
"I don't think it's normal that between two marked slopes there would be this passage with rocks showing that is not fenced off," said Philippe Streiff, a former French racing driver, in the French sports daily L'Equipe.
A paraplegic since an accident in Rio de Janeiro, Streiff visited the Grenoble hospital on Friday to hand a message to Schumacher's wife Corinna. Other family members at his bedside include his two teenage children, his father Rolf and brother Ralph, who is also a racing driver.
Schumacher turned 45 on Friday, and fans marked the birthday with a silent vigil outside the


text:
Probable defrost timer malfunction Pat A. • Newport News, VA • June 12, 2014 My Repair & Advice Ordered up the timer, took about 5 minutes to swap out. Video was for a different model, but the procedure was nearly identical. Was this review helpful to you?
Icemaker died Neil H. • Morrisville, PA • June 26, 2014 Appliance: Model FRIGIDAIRE GALLERY REFRIGERATOR My Repair & Advice Bought replacement icemaker. Entire repair took ten minutes. Two hours later I heard the klink of new ice cubes falling into the tray. Part and shipping was about $100.00 and repair estimate from Sears was over $300.00. I would definitely order from Appliance Parts Pro again. Was this review helpful to you?
Freezer frosted over fridge not working defrost thermostat not working Robert L. • Sugar Land, TX • June 12, 2014 My Repair & Advice Bought new thermostat and installed it. Even though it did not look the same I was able to figure it out. Was this review helpful to you?
Refrigerator shelf bracket Robert W. • Ovilla, TX • April 17, 2015 My Repair & Advice Watched Online Video - Ordered Part - Part Delivered / Installed in 5 minutes - Total time from video watching - less than 24 hours Was this review helpful to you?
Drawer slide was broken James W. • Makawao, HI • January 19, 2015 Appliance: Frigidaire Frigidaire/refrigerator FRS26R4CWB My Repair & Advice Replace both slides, it took about 5 minutes not counting cleaning time of shelf and drawer. Simple repair. Was this review helpful to you?


text:
APC 700VA Power Saving Back UPS - 8 Outlets, 420 Watts, 120V Input & Output, 340 Joules, 4.9 Ft Cable - BN700MC
Item#: A75-3044 | Model#: BN700MC- List Price:
- $149.99
- Instant Savings:
- - $50.00 (33%)
- Price:
- $99.99
- Shipping:
- In Stock (Details)
APC 700VA Power Saving Back UPS Product Details
APC 700VA Power-saving Back UPS (BN700MC)
The APC 700VA Power-saving Back UPS will not let power failure affect your PC. This 420W Power-saving Back UPS provides you with abundant battery backup. With 120V of Input & Output and 340 Joules of AC Suppression, you can continue working with this UPS even during medium or extended length power outages. The cord length is 4.9 ft. and the power capacity is 700VA which makes it the perfect unit to protect your productivity from the constant threat of bad power. With up to 8 power outlets to protect your entire system, this Power-saving Back UPS is the best value for your home and office computers. The Battery Recharge Rate is 24 hours so you dont have to worry about low battery power. Buy the APC 700VA Power-saving Back UPS and protect your valuable data.
What It Is And Why You Need It:
- 120V of Input & Output and 340 Joules; works even during medium or extended length power outages
- 700VA; makes it the perfect unit to protect your productivity from the constant threat of bad power
- 8 power outlets; can increase your connectivity simultaneously by plugging in multiple devices
- 24 hours Battery Recharge Rate; dont have to worry about low battery power
Want to Upgrade?
- For Just $80.00 More Upgrade to:
APC Back-UPS BX1500G Battery Backup
Manufactured by: APC
Warranty provided by: APC
Limited Warranty: 36 months parts; 36 months labor
Mfg Part No: BN700MC
UPC No: 731304302810
Box Size: ( Length:15, Width:5, Depth:9)
Shipping Weight: 15.2000 pound(s)
Click here for full warranty and support information - Limited Warranty: A full text version of the limited warranty
may be obtained by mailing a self addressed, stamped envelope to the
address below and requesting the warranty for item number: A75-3044
Warranty Information
7795 W. Flagler St. Suite 35
Miami, FL. 33144 - APC logos are registered trademarks of APC. All others trademarks and copyrights mentioned herein are the property of their respective owners.


text:
All JCOM students have a JCOM faculty adviser (call 435-797-3292), plus GenEd adviser Amanda Adison (email@example.com) in Taggart Student Center 302; 435-797-3883
Majors must take a minimum of 30 and maximum of 36 credits in JCOM, pursuing one of the four concentration course sequences outlined below. Of the basic 120-126 semester credits needed to graduate from Utah State University, JCOM majors must take at least 90 credit hours outside the major, including 65 in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences.
Beyond the basic 120-126 hours needed for graduation, students may take as many JCOM courses as they like. Majors must complete a minor outside of JCOM, selected with the approval of an advisor, and a minimum of 18 credits from the department's list of approved "Breadth Requirements," courses in disciplines outside the major.


text:
Pandarus /ˈpændərəs/ or Pandar /ˈpændər/ (Greek: Πάνδαρος, Pándaros) is a Trojan aristocrat who appears in stories about the Trojan War. In Homer's Iliad he is portrayed as an energetic and impetuous warrior, but in medieval literature he becomes a witty and licentious figure who facilitates the affair between Troilus and Cressida. In Shakespeare's play Troilus and Cressida he is portrayed as an aged degenerate and coward, who ends the play by telling the audience he will bequeath them his "diseases".
Classical literature[edit]
In Homer's Iliad, Pandarus is a famous archer and the son of Lycaon. Pandarus, who fights on the side of Troy in the Trojan War, first appears in Book Two of the Iliad. In Book Four, he shoots Menelaus and wounds him with an arrow, sabotaging a truce that could potentially have led to the peaceful return of Helen of Troy. He is goaded into breaking the truce by the gods, who wish for the destruction of Troy. He then wounds Diomedes with an arrow and acts as Aeneas' charioteer. He is later killed by Diomedes, whose spear strikes him in the face, severing his tongue.
Pandarus is also the name of a companion of Aeneas in Virgil's Aeneid.
Pandarus is not to be confused with Pandareus.
Later literature[edit]
Pandarus appears in Il Filostrato by Giovanni Boccaccio, in which he plays the role of a go-between in the relationship of his cousin Criseyde and the Trojan prince Troilus, the younger brother of Paris and Hector. Boccaccio himself derived the story from Le Roman De Troie, by 12th-century poet Benoît de Sainte-Maure. This story is not part of classical Greek mythology. Both Pandarus and other characters in the medieval narrative who carry names from the Iliad are quite different from Homer's characters of the same name.
In Geoffrey Chaucer's poem Troilus and Criseyde (1370), Pandarus plays the same role; though Chaucer's Pandarus is Criseyde's uncle, not her cousin. Chaucer's Pandarus is of special interest because he is constructed as an expert rhetorician, who uses dozens of proverbs and proverbial sayings to bring the lovers Troilus and Criseyde together. When his linguistic fireworks fail at the end of the story, the proverb and human rhetoric in general are questioned as reliable means of communication.[1]
William Shakespeare used the medieval story again in his play Troilus and Cressida (1609). Shakespeare's Pandarus is more of a bawd than Chaucer's, and he is a lecherous and degenerate individual.
In "The Duke's Children" by Anthony Trollope when the Duke of Omnium suspects Mrs Finn of encouraging his daughter's romance he refers to her as a 'she-Pandarus'.
The plot function of the aging lech Pandarus in Chaucer's and Shakespeare's famous works has given rise to the English terms a pander (in later usage a panderer), from Chaucer, meaning a person who furthers other people's illicit sexual amours; and to pander, from Shakespeare, as a verb denoting the same activity. A panderer is, specifically, a bawd — a male who arranges access to female sexual favors, the manager of prostitutes. Thus, in law, the charge of pandering is an accusation that an individual has sold the sexual services of another. The verb "to pander" is also used in a more general sense to suggest active or implicit encouragement of someone's weaknesses.
- ^ Richard Utz, "Sic et Non: Zu Funktion und Epistemologie des Sprichwortes bei Geoffrey Chaucer," Das Mittelalter: Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung 2.2 (1997), 31-43.
- This article contains content from the Owl Edition of Nordisk familjebok, a Swedish encyclopedia published between 1904 and 1926, now in the public domain.


text:
County Distribution
Poa laxiflora Buckley - looseflower bluegrass POLA3 in the state of Washington
Click the map above to view a larger image.
Our county data are based primarily on the literature, herbarium specimens, and confirmed observations. However, not all populations have been documented, so some gaps in the distribution shown above may not be real. Remember that only native and naturalized populations are mapped!


text:
Adjacent Areas
< None | Low Man >
A huge tilted block, the size of a small planet, home to a small set of hard routes and much bouldering. Although the routes look like extended boulder problems they feel like proper routes when you are trying to access the block's shelving summit. Escape is by down-climbing North Climb (Diff)
Route (click for voting and user comments) | Symbols | Grade | |
1 |
Morrell's Wall A popular problem up the shady leaning wall. Big holds lead to a steep pull on fingery holds. Eliminates abound. | 3 Stars Crimpy | f5+ 5c |
2 |
Overhanging Rib The steep rib, using the block for your feet. Without the block is V5. | 1 Stars Strong | f6A 6a |
3 |
B2 Eliminates Climb the steep face from the flake. As the name suggests, there are loads of eliminates possible. | 1 Stars Strong | f5 5b |
4 |
Flying Arete Start off a small boulder and climb the right-hand side of the arete. | 2 Stars | f6B 6a |
5 |
Stretch Armstrong Make a huge reach from a low hold under the roof. | 1 Stars Reachy Strong | f7C |
6 |
Canine The central line is very hard. The right-hand side of the roof, followed by a hand-traverse leftwards on the pockets, is Sewer... | 1 Stars Reachy Technical Strong | f8A |
7 |
The Lady 6m. The left arete of the pathward face to a balding top. Low gear isn't much use when you are trying to top out. | Rounded | E4 6c |
8 |
The Virgin 12m. Grovel the deep crack rightwards until a pocket and pinch-grip allow the top to be reached. Large gear protects. The... | 1 Stars Pumpy | E3 6b |
9 |
Jack on Fire 6m. The leaning wall (large cam out right) keeping right of the shallow groove. The exit is very rounded. There are several... | 1 Stars Rounded | E4 6c |
10 |
Virgin Traverse Start with feet and hands on the block on the left. Traverse the low break around the corner to a niche. The continuation is V9... | 3 Stars Pumpy Rounded | f6B 6b |
11 |
The Gypsy 10m. Climb the arete left to a break - a popular V4 (6a) to this point. Move right then back left above a too-large drop. 1 user comment | 3 Stars Pumpy Rounded Fluttery | E3 6a |
12 |
Gypus 10m. Climb the south face of the boulder dynamically, trending slightly left to join and finish up The Gypsy. | Technical | E3 6b |
13 |
Opus 10m. The centre of the wall is climbed via a set of deep slots to a small overhang and a desperate leftward exit. 1 user comment | 2 Stars Technical Fluttery | E4 6b |
14 |
Magnum Opus 12m. Layback up the flake/ramp and a short crack to join Opus at its desperate exit. The direct start to the left is V9. | 2 Stars Technical Fluttery | E5 6b |
15 |
Fisher's Stride 14m. Leap onto the back of the boulder from the nearby slab then trend left to a ledge. Step round the arete and continue in... | 1 Stars Fluttery | VS 5a |
16 |
The Virgin Climb 8m. A short traverse leads left around the south east arete to a line of polished holds up the slab. | 2 Stars | S 4a |
17 |
Chastity Climb direct from the start of Virgin Climb. | 1 Stars Technical | f6A 5c |
18 |
North Face Arete The excellent north east arete on its left-hand side. The right-hand side is V0 (5a). | 1 Stars Technical | f3+ 4c |
19 |
In Limbo From a sitting start, pull over the left-hand side of the roof. | 1 Stars Reachy Strong | f6C 6c |
20 |
Keel Crack The central crack is a great strenuous struggle. | 1 Stars Strong Pumpy | f6B 6b |
21 |
The Keel/Fin The low arete from a pinch, to a chipped hold on the lip. Loads of variations exist including one eliminating the chipped hold! | 3 Stars Technical Strong | f7C+ |
22 |
Natural Traverse Start on the nose and traverse uphill along the lip on slopers to join and reverse Sloper Patrol. | 2 Stars Pumpy | f7C |
23 |
Sloper Patrol Starting at the top of the block, traverse the sloping lip downhill and flop onto the slab at the end. Often done in reverse. | 3 Stars Pumpy | f6C 6b |


text:
7 posts found | |
Anyone know if all the current worlds will be available at launch? Im just curious if they will keep em all because I doubt the high population will still be an issue like it is for open beta. I was forced to create a toon on Exodus because Leviathan has population issues...wanting to know if Exodus will still be around.
as far as i know the worlds will all still be around. but if not you would be able to move your toon for free so you dont need to do a complete reroll.
RIP Ribbitribbitt you are missed, kid. Currently Playing EVE, DFUW Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. Dwight D Eisenhower My optimism wears heavy boots and is loud. Henry Rollins |
Originally posted by Nativegamer Yes, they'll still be around. If they're smart they'll even add a few new servers, and maybe even have a short-term program to swap to a new server if desired. |
Originally posted by aesperus Hopefully no new servers. Servers will never be as crowded as they are right this moment, when everyone can play for free temporarily and it just came out. |
Originally posted by Justsomenoob It's debatable. Typically launch is the largest influx of new players, not open beta (though there are definitely some games that have had exceptions to this). The other thing that's kind of uncertain atm, is how their server caps work. There seems to be info that suggests that they might be false server caps to begin with. I think I read something about the error 3102 actually putting empty players into the world (who aren't actually logged in), and is created a lot of artificially AFK players in the game atm. There's also the issue of servers being 'character locked' instead of 'account locked' which means, if they changed it to an account-based system, that might also free up a lot of space. Who knows. They've already added a few new servers. The last thing they wanna have happen at launch (which is less than a week from now) would be to have players still having trouble logging into the game. If they do end up having too many servers, they can always consolidate them back together again. |
Once the free time expires and people will need to P2P, servers will start having more room since all the kids will be gone and won't be able to pay a monthly fee (muhahaha, that's where I'll jump in to the game! :D)
Thx for the quick reply guys! My second archer this beta due to login issues.. I already dont want to go through the intro again! This game sure isnt alt friendly. :) Wich ok with me as long as I dont gotta reroll again.


text:
We offer discount to nonprofits, government agencies, and federal contractors
The AILA Career Center offers more than access to the best possible industry candidates.
AILA Doc No. 13072949 | Dated July 29, 2013 | File Size: 491 K
Download the DocumentUSCIS alert that the Guangzhou, China field office has moved to the new U.S. Consulate General facility. Beginning 7/29/13, all USCIS services will be provided at the new location.
[[To print the PDF on this page please use the print function in the PDF reader.]]
Cite as AILA Doc. No. 13072949.
Open the DocumentAmerican Immigration Lawyers Association
1331 G Street NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005
Copyright © 1993-2015
American Immigration Lawyers Association.


text:
Former New Ulmite publishes 5th novelSeptember 5, 2013"Behold a Lone Horseman," a historical suspense novel by former New Ulm novelist, Jeannie Hudson, is now on the market. This is Hudson's fifth novel to be published.... No comments posted for this article.
Post a Comment |
News, Blogs & Events Web |


text:
Hawaii County Mayor Billy Kenoi declared a state of emergency Thursday as the lava is projected to reach the residential area in one week. The lava has been passing through the forest setting of large smoke plumes.
Officials said the path of the lava is unpredictable due to changes in topography, unmapped obstacles and pocket for the lava to spread.


text:
Friday, April 27, 2012
Friday Food Files
Breakfasts are a challenge around here on most mornings. Someone might have eaten something one day and refuses to touch it the next day. My son will eat a piece of bread with cheese most days and maybe a banana, but my daughter would rather skip breakfast. However, letting her skip breakfast leads to crying at school - so, not an option.
We have three varieties of cheerios at home now and with some persuasion I can usually get her to eat that. Sometimes we have to break down and serve Nutella (and even that doesn't always work). We've tried bread, yogurt, cheese, bananas, apples, berries, breakfast muffins, eggs...I just want to crawl back into bed.
Do your kids eat breakfast? What works for you?
5 comments:
oh my gosh. I have the same thing with dinner... Baby C just doesn't want to eat dinner for weeks on end. And than start crying at bedtime that she's hungry. It's incredible how creative parents become to get their kids to eat!
I make buckwheat every Sunday night and hubby and Baby C will have that with milk for breakfast. Or I make pancakes from baker's cheese with raisins and that can be just stored in the fridge for a very quick breakfast. Very high in protein and keeps everyone full for hours. (very traditional Ukrainian breakfast food) Rye bread with cheese is always a winner too. And if all else fails, plain yogurt with honey
I hope things get better for you. She might just outgrow it. Fingers and toes crossed.I don't have kids, but I do have a husband who refuses to eat breakfast...until I made a batch of "energy bites" with peanut butter, oatmeal, flaxseed, plus some chocolate chips and coconut flakes. He doesn't know they are good for him and now eats 3 every morning :)
Recipe here: http://www.chef-in-training.com/2012/01/no-bake-energy-bites/


text:
"Realm Of Chaos", the classic 1989 album from British death metal legends BOLT THROWER, has been remastered with Full Dynamic Range audio and is available now on CD/DVD and limited-edition vinyl LP.
BOLT THROWER's second full-length album and their Earache Records debut, "Realm Of Chaos" cemented the band's position in 1989 among the heaviest of the underground scene. The LP features new artwork from the original artist, John Sibbick. "Realm Of Chaos" has been specially remastered from the original tapes using Full Dynamic Range (FDR) mastering, allowing the music's nuances to shine through, giving the whole album a more ferocious and dynamic sound and enabling the listener to immerse themselves in the full audio heaviness like never before. The "Realm Of Chaos" Full Dynamic Range CD includes a bonus DVD featuring a full, previously unreleased live performance from the legendary 1989 "Grindcrusher" tour. The album is also available on limited-edition vinyl. Get the "Realm Of Chaos" Full Dynamic Range edition now in Europe at or get the European import in North America.BOLT THROWER: 'Realm Of Chaos' Full Dynamic Range Edition Out Now
To comment on a BLABBERMOUTH.NET story or review, you must be logged in to an active personal account on Facebook. Once you're logged in, you will be able to comment. User comments or postings do not reflect the viewpoint of BLABBERMOUTH.NET and BLABBERMOUTH.NET does not endorse, or guarantee the accuracy of, any user comment. BLABBERMOUTH.NET reserves the right to "hide" comments that may be considered offensive, illegal or inappropriate and to "ban" users that violate the site's Terms Of Service. Hidden comments will still appear to the user and to the user's Facebook friends. If a new comment is published from a "banned" user or contains a blacklisted word, this comment will automatically have limited visibility (the "banned" user's comments will only be visible to the user and the user's Facebook friends). To report any abusive, obscene, defamatory, racist, homophobic or threatening comments, or anything that may violate any applicable laws, please send an e-mail to blabbermouthinbox(@)gmail.com with pertinent details.


text:
We will delivery to all cities in
Puerto Rico
We deliver flowers to the following zipcodes near Villa Cristina Puerto Rico PR: 00769, 00705 We send flowers to these cities near Villa Cristina Puerto Rico PR: Bo Rio Jueyes PR, Coamo PR, Est de Coamo PR, Ext Jard de Coamo PR, Jard de Coamo PR, Jard de Santa Ana PR, Parc Niagara PR, Paseo Real PR, Urb Coamo Gdns PR, Urb El Eden PR, Urb La Arboleda PR, Urb Las Aguilas PR, Urb Los Flamboyanes PR, Urb San Antonio PR, Urb Valle Arriba PR, Urb Vista del Sol PR, Villa Cristina PR, Villa de San Blas PR, Villa Madrid PR, Aibonito PR We deliver flowers to these hospitals near Villa Cristina Puerto Rico PR: Hospital Oncologico Grillasca Centro Medico De Ponce, Ponce, PR, 733, (787) 848-0800 Industrial Hospital Puerto Rico Medical Center, San Juan, PR, 936, (787) 764-3660 San Juan City Hospital Puerto Rico Medical Center, San Juan, PR, 928, (787) 766-1298 Mennonite General Hospital Jose Vasquez, Aibonito, PR, 705, (787) 735-8001 Hospital Del Maestro 550 Sergio Cuevas, San Juan, PR, 00918-3741, (787) 758-8383 We deliver flowers to these funeral homes near Villa Cristina Puerto Rico PR: |
Local Villa Cristina PR Puerto Rico Flower Delivery: • Villa Cristina, Puerto Rico Flowers • Villa Cristina, PR Flowers • Villa Cristina Flowers |
Send Flowers with confidence in the USA and Canada. Secure Online Service. |
We deliver through FedEx and UPS delivery services as well as from our own brick and mortar flower shops. Also as a member of FTD and other flower-by-wire associations we have access to floral shops around the world and provide delivery through these networks. This website is a property of Flower Delivery Express ®, a Michigan, USA domiciled business. Copyright(c) 2011-2015 All Rights Reserved. Flower Delivery Express 2985 Haggerty Highway, Commerce Township MI 48390 USA
FLOWERS Villa Cristina | Flower Delivery Villa Cristina PR | FTD Flower Shop Order Flowers Online for Villa Cristina PR, Puerto Rico | Florist Shop | FLORISTS


text:
The original deal pioneer keeps on pinching pennies and cracking wise. No, that price isn't a typo.
Go to Woot
Candlepower and puppet shows are so passé. Get the newest TVs, speakers, home theater gear, and more.
Go to Electronics.Woot
The robots are coming! And so are the laptops, the tablets, the chargers, and all sorts of other gadgets!
Go to Computers.Woot
High living at low prices with name-brand deals for your pad, crib, nest, or castle - inside and out.
Go to Home.Woot
Make it, build it, improve it. But whatever home project you've got in mind, start by saving money on it.
Go to Tools & Garden
Sports, fitness, and outdoors deals, because saving money is only one of your passions.
Go to Sport.Woot
You don't have to spend a lot to look like you do. Werk it and twerk it with amazing deals on designer watches, handbags and more.
Go to Accessories & Watches
Deals for moms and dads and anybody else who needs kids' stuff, from toys to baby gear to furniture to clothing.
Go to Kids.Woot
Our exclusive graphic tees will make you laugh, will make you cry, will make you look totally hot.
Go to Shirt.Woot
Direct from the winery to your thirsty lips: wine deals worth doing a spit-take over.
Go to Wine.Woot
Last chance deals for hardcore cheapskates. Catch 'em before they - you guessed it - sell out.
Go to Sellout.Woot
459,283 deals (and counting) from around the web, shared and ranked by a community of deal fiends like you. Go to Deals.Woot.
I own this kettle and I love it! Great for boiling water for coffee and tea with no ugly gunk hiding in the nooks a crannies to mess up your brew.
Hmm... Swore I just saw this at CostPlus World Market today for $50.00. Totally want this, but my bank account says no. And when I say bank account. I actually mean "wife".
Be careful if you have unfiltered water, because the heating element will gather all sorts of minerals. I pass my water through a Brita before boiling it in this kettle.
I had one. It's gorgeous and very fast, but I could never get rid of the nasty odor and off flavor due to the plastics used in the construction (I believe it came from the lid). It's a shame because it's a fatal flaw in my book. I don't know if they ever revised the materials.
Lots of pictures and some comments Looks like the 'zon offers it for about $55. So not really that much savings. I have the Breville Perfect Tea Maker and love it.
lintile wrote:Be careful if you have unfiltered water, because the heating element will gather all sorts of minerals. I pass my water through a Brita before boiling it in this kettle.
Brita Filters do nothing for minerals in the water.
It's available on Amazon for $58 (link). I reaaaaally want this but Chrimma has broke me!
Waitwaitwait. Did the odd couple just go all Cole Porter / Gene Kelly + Fred Astaire Bromance on me? 'Cause I'm cool with it. ;) Just sayin'.
I have a water kettle on my Christmas list but I am really hoping I get one with an adjustable temperature control. Different teas need different temps to really bring out their subtle notes. I don't consider this to be a de facto guide, but this illustrates my point. http://coffeetea.about.com/od/teaandtisanebasics/a/TeaBrewingTemperatures.htm
I'm confused as to why the list price is so expensive when you can go out and buy something that does exactly the same thing for 10 bucks at Rite-Aid. If I'm paying 50 to 100$ for an electric kettle I would at least expect to be able to fiddle with the temperature settings. What is the extra money going toward? The fact that it's glass and thus breakable? I don't get it.
Wow. Over 200 1 and 2 star reviews versus over 300 4 and 5 star reviews. That ratio should be much greater so I'll pass.
Got this as a gift for my Freshman year at college (3 years ago) and has held up well since. I've only used it mildly for things like boiling water for Ramen, Cocoa and Coffee. If you read reviews online you'll note the mentioning of a weird odor and sometimes an odd taste with the water and I can confirm those claims. Recently, mine began to deteriorate and somehow rust. The grooves between the metal bubble in the middle and the glass are impossible to clean well. The glass is quite thick, but the handle feels really cheap, especially the "on" switch. Recently, I've been getting into preparing Tea and it just was time for a replacement. I found the Adagio UtiliTEA electric Kettle to be a far stronger performer than the Capresso in the short time I've had it. It is competitively priced and is frequently the top 5 in many surveyed lists of reviews for electric kettles. (I'm thorough in my own purchases). I got it from Amazon http://amzn.com/B001A5NFQA The UtiliTEA excels past the Capresso by featuring a stainless steel build with no odd grooves, a spring loaded cover that clicks shut, adjustable temperature controls, 360 swivel detached base w/plug, a more out of the way on switch and a mesh screen near the pour if you decide to steep the Tea directly in the device (which I don't really recommend). My comparison: Capresso: Pros: Fancy glass aesthetic, quicker boil time, larger liquid capacity Cons: hard to clean thoroughly, touchy on switch, cheap handle, odor & taste funky at times, kind of bulky comparatively, boiling anything besides water will make the metal instantly turn brown and will need to be intensely scrubbed UtiliTEA: Pros: Slim size, mesh filter screen, cover lock, better switch location, temperature control, easy to clean, no odd taste or smell, quick boil time Cons: Smaller liquid capacity ~1 Quart, the completed "click" can go unnoticed if you forget about it, water viewing window is a bit slim and can be hard to read when it fogs up (oddly located behind the handle)
Another design defect: the metal heater bubble has to be fully immersed in order to boil the water. Otherwise it shuts off too early. If you want just one cup, you waste the energy taken to boil two more. The all stainless model I had before this one was both easier to clean and far more efficient. Looks real nice though.
The price in the email is $42.99 and the price on the website is $47.99, but still claims to be 57% of the $100 list price. Ooops.
so it is both fast and beautiful, my in-law have one. But while we were there, it just stopped working. Don't know how long they had it, but still an unexplained working fine to complete zero overnight gives me no desire of ownership
I love how this looks, but the negative reviews will not have me replacing my two-year-old Aroma X-Press. The thing was $20 at Wally World and still runs $31 shipped at Woot's ugly step-mom. I use it for tea, chai and oatmeal. Initially, I found I had to clean it after a couple of uses, due to the softened water I used. I simply switched to distilled water and haven't looked back.
I've had another brand of water kettle (from the big box store) and I use it every day at home. I threw out my coffee maker, and just use the Melitta single coffee filter. Best cup of coffee ever and so much more affordable than those k-cups. I've never had a smell problem with my water kettle, but I always keep water in it and even when I've just filled it up and won't use it to the next day, I put it through a boiling cycle. http://www.amazon.com/Melitta-Ready-Single-Coffee-Brewer/dp/B0014CVEH6/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1356191023&sr=8-1&keywords=single+cup+coffee+filter
I'm tempted, because it looks cool /now/, but water deposits will quickly mean it either looks grungy, or I'll have to scrub it frequently. For the same reason that I now use dark-interior coffee cups at work, I'll stick to an opaque tea kettle.
I had this one for awhile, the taste of the plastic never went away, perfer the metal variety
I love it!!! I received the Capresso 1.5 quart glass water kettle as a birthday gift about 4 years ago. I use it regularly for tea, coffee, anything that requires boiling water including pasta, rice. My stove can not boil a quart of water in 90 seconds, but the Capresso can. It is one of the most useful gifts I have ever received.
Just go buy one at Bed Bath and Beyond. They are 59.99 but if you use a 20% coupon its 47.99 and you wont have to pay for shipping and wait forever. Plus, if it ever craps out or you don't like it, they will gladly return it for you. Just a thought. I see no where that sells this thing for 99.99 like it says. So this Woot is really not that great of a deal.
eforte wrote:The price in the email is $42.99 and the price on the website is $47.99, but still claims to be 57% of the $100 list price. Ooops.
I was wondering if I was the only one that noticed the $5 increase in price after clicking on the email!
The Tuesday Morning store in my area has this for $39.99
rhinoceros1 wrote:The Tuesday Morning store in my area has this for $39.99
Same here. And, I can confirm that nasty industrial chemical smell. I boiled a chlorine bleach solution in mine for several cycles and then vinegar for several more. Then left that in the unit overnight. The problem was better after all that - also leave the excess water in between uses and dump, then refill before next boil. I only use RO water in mine with about 12ppm dissolved content. During the smelly phase, freshly boiled water was up to 67ppm TDS. I wonder what nasties were added! The smell was totally gone after about 40-50 uses, but I did a lot of those "cleaning cycles". Have had it for about 3 years now with no signs of build-up, though the finish on plastic lid is beginning to deteriorate due to heat/steam.
They are great until they stop boiling water and they do stop - unreliable item!! Have had 2 and no more
12thgear wrote:I had one. It's gorgeous and very fast, but I could never get rid of the nasty odor and off flavor due to the plastics used in the construction (I believe it came from the lid). It's a shame because it's a fatal flaw in my book. I don't know if they ever revised the materials.
I agree - I've had mine a while - got it free with some points, and the odor is still there. Don't notice a bad taste though.
Is the dome Stainless Steel or chrome plated plastic as in the images seen in Amazon? Specifically, this one after use for a year:
The emperor wears no clothes.
dliidlii wrote:Wow. Over 200 1 and 2 star reviews versus over 300 4 and 5 star reviews. That ratio should be much greater so I'll pass.
It's a lovely kettle, fast to the boil and good looking too – makes great tea. I have had 4 so far! They fail after a couple of years. With my first one the lid broke off, the second the handle became detached, and with the third the switch stopped working and the silver peeled off the lid. So far, with the fourth, the little blue light cover has popped off but I stuck it back on with a little super glue. I usually call the company in NJ because they offer a replacement service for $35 after the warranty runs out.
biodello wrote:Is the dome Stainless Steel or chrome plated plastic as in the images seen in Amazon? Specifically, this one after use for a year:
It's chrome-plated plastic and it evntually flakes-off.
michael2255 wrote:The emperor wears no clothes.
Wait, we have royalty amongst us? /looks for the nekkid parade