text:
The distinctions between means and ends, and between being and doing, result in the following structure of action, from beginning to middle to end, upon which much ethical terminology, and the basic forms of ethical theory (ethics of virtues, action, and consequences), are based. Note that "mean" in this context originally meant "middle," as it still does in statistics and in scientific expressions like "the mean annual temperature" of a place. This is very different from "mean" as the verb form of "meaning," or "mean" as in a petty, small (), or hostile, malevolent attitude -- the Confucian , "mean person."
Beginning | Middle | End |
Source of Action, Character | Means | Ends |
Actions, Means to Ends | Consequences, Ends of Action | |
Good and evil persons, good and ill will, intentions.
aretaic judgments: judgments of moral worth of character (Gk. aretê = virtue). Plato & Aristotle: ethics of virtues (e.g. wisdom, justice, bravery, temperance); no rules. Compare the Boy Scout Law: to be trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. Contrast the Seven Deadly Sins: pride, envy, wrath, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust. [note] |
Moral right and wrong, good and evil actions (also instrumental goods, means that are simply effective to bring about some end).
deontic judgments, judgments of obligation (Gk. déon = needful, right, proper). deontological theories: the nature of actions instead of or as well as the consequences determines moral worth; must have rules to judge nature of actions. |
non-moral value, good and bad things obtained by actions. What is the Good? pleasure, virtue, happiness, being, life, knowledge? teleological theories: only consequences determine moral worth. (Gk. télos = end) |
Being | Doing | Ends |
Moral character, virtues, what a person is: honest, trustworthy, etc.; what we know about people when we know them & trust them to behave in characteristic ways. | Actions, manifestation of moral character; what we expect from what we know of people, or what we use to establish what we know about people; a bad person may do what is right, and a good person may do what is wrong. |
The common definitions of teleological and deontological ethics, in terms of means and ends, result in some logical confusion that is a real source of error in the history of ethics. If we begin with the definition of a teleological ethical theory as one where only the ends count (as in the basic form of act Utilitarianism), this secures things pretty clearly. If only the ends (consequences) count, then the ends do count, but the means do not count. In the traditional Square of Opposition at right, the truth of "only the ends count" implies (1) the truth of "the ends count" and the falsehood of both (2) "the means count" and (3) "only the means count." The simple proposition "the means count" contradicts the proposition "only the ends count."
If the basic meaning of a deontological ethical theory is that it contradicts the basic premise of a teleological theory, then all we have is the truth of "the means count." This then does not logically imply either the truth or the falsehood of either "only the means count" or "the ends count." So we are left with a significant ambiguity about the meaning of deontological ethics. This can go either way. "Only the means count" and "the ends count" contradict each other and so cannot be both true or both false. Picking one determines the other. This has been a source of great confusion in ethics, where we often have the sense that because "only the means count" and "only the ends count" are logically exclusive (they cannot both be true), they are therefore logical contradictories (the falsehood of one implies that truth of the other), which they are not. In fact, they can both be false.
Traditional deontological theories in ethics, where the consequences are absolutely irrelevant to right action (e.g. Kant, Confucius), do tend to go with "only the means count." This can be called a strong or exclusive deontological theory. With either a teleological or an exclusive deontological ethical theory, there are no ethical dilemmas of the common "the right versus the good" form. The goodness of the ends is the only consideration for a teleological theory, and the rightness of the means is the only consideration for an exclusive deontological theory. To the extent that such dilemmas are ruled out rather than accounted for, we may say that the given of ethical life (with dilemmas) falsifies both teleological and exclusive deontological ethical theories.
The alternative then, is to go with the other logical possibility for deontological ethics: Both the means and the ends count. This allows for common dilemmas, since good ends may be chosen despite the wrongness of the means used to obtain them OR the right means may be chosen despite the fact that they lead to bad or worse ends than the wrong means. This is a weak or inclusive deontological ethics. What it implies is just the Polynomic Theory of Value, where the means and ends are judged in terms of different domains of value, which may agree or conflict in their valence. Similar dilemmas can occur between further distinct domains of value, including conflicts between the domains here represented by being and doing. Consequently, this all represents a significant discovery in ethics for the Friesian School.
The Roman Catholic Church (i.e. the Church of the Latin Rite under the authority of the Bishop of Rome) includes, of course, a system of moral teaching, largely founded on Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. As we see in the Catechism of the Catholic Church [Doubleday, 1995, pp. 407, 411; translation of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, United States Catholic Conference, Inc., Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994], the "Sources of Morality" are divided up in a fashion comparable, in some ways, to the system here [with the section numbers of the edition, pp.485-487]:
The Object Chosen | The End in View or the Intention | The Circumstances of the Action |
§1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience. | §1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one's whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one's neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it. | §1753 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent's responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. |
§1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting "in order to be seen by men").
The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts -- such as fornication -- that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil. | ||
§1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing according as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil. | §1759 "An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention" (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means. | §1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together. |
The treatment of the "sources of morality" in the Catechism begins in medias res, i.e. "in the middle of things," in terms of the analysis above, with the action considered first. However, there is a significant ambiguity here. The "object chosen" can mean either the action that is the immediate manifestation of the will (the legal actus reus), or the goal, end, or purpose that the action is intended and expected to bring about. This confuses the means and the ends of action and thus does not promise a clear analysis, despite the later statement, suddenly introducing the distinction, that "The end does not justify the means." This ambiguity puts us in the position that we canot immediately say whether the system of morality will be deontological or teleological. The absence of the terms right and wrong, and a preference for the terminology of "good" and "evil," betrays a neglect of the centrality of the action itself in moral judgment. The "virtue ethics" form of Aristotelian ethics may explain the underdeveloped character of the distinctions.
The end of action as such is introduced under the heading of the intention, which again involves an ambiguity, since the inherent value of an end, as a good or evil object, is a different question from the internal quality of the intention or motive (the legal mens rea). Thus, a good action, such as distributing food to the poor, although causally resulting in a good end, that the poor have been fed, may be done from a bad motive, for an ulterior end, "in order to be seen by men." This may be seen as something that "corrupts the action," but the action and its outcome as such actually remain good and laudable. As Sir James Frazer said, it is better (for all the rest of us) to have people doing good from bad motives that doing evil from good ones. The objective value of the action or its natural outcome are different from what the subject thinks he is doing, and why. The Catholic system makes it difficult to separate these elements.
What are then called the "circumstances" of the action involve a further ambiguity. The circumstances of an action may determine whether it is right or wrong, or even a moral issue at all. But the Catechism includes the consequences in these "circumstances," which again confuses the means with the ends. The statement of §1760, that "A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together," is simply false. As we see in moral dilemmas, right action may have bad consequences, or wrong action good consequences. Hence the dilemmas. The act of killing may be right or wrong depending on the circumstances, with good or bad consequences, or even good or bad motives, occurring quite independently. A person may hate another and wish them dead yet quite justifiably end up killing them in self-defense -- and thankful for the opportunity to do so. In fact, a morally good act does require a morally innocent motive -- an act of out good will. That does not affect whether the action is right or wrong in itself. Jesus may reproach the killer for ill will, but the law will stop at a justifiable actus reus. Yet the formula just quoted does not even mention the motive, unless, because of the previous ambiguity, the phrase "of its end" is supposed to refer to the mens rea.
Failure to Distinguish | ||
Means from Ends | Intention from Object | Circumstances from Consequences |
Thus, every one of the three "Sources of Morality" cited in the Catechism involves ambiguity and confusion that subvert an understanding of the structure of morality. Some of the consequences of these confusions may be seen in the general statement, "There are some concrete acts -- such as fornication -- that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil." Choosing a moral evil may involve a "disorder of the will," and fornication may even be, ex hypothese, an intrinsic moral evil; but a "disorder of the will" is not entailed by the act, as this statement asserts, unless fornication is itself a evil independently of an ordered or disordered will. Thus, it doesn't explain anything to a person committing fornication to say, "You have a disordered will." They will want to know why, in itself, fornication is wrong. We are not told that here and are provided with nothing that would enable us to figure it out. Instead, the confusion we see in these distinctions allows a statement like that to come in "under the radar."
Despite these confusions, Catholicism features conceptions of atonement and expiation that are generally superior to what we find elsewhere in philosophy and religion. These motivate the theory of Purgatory, which, although rejected by Protestants, is morally more sophisticated than their view of forgiveness, redemption, and the afterlife.
The terminology used by Confucius easily fits the categories of the analysis above. The discussion of Confucianism is reserved for the page at the link. See also the Chinese Virtues.
Confucian Terminology | ||
Rén, "benevolence, charity, humanity, love," kindness. The fundamental virtue of Confucianism. Confucius defines it as "Aì rén," "love others." | Yì, "right conduct, morality, duty to one's neighbor," which may be broken down into: zhong1, doing one's best, conscientiousness, "loyalty"; and shù, "reciprocity," altruism, "what you don't want yourself, don't do to others." Li3, "propriety, good manners, politeness, ceremony, worship." Xiào, "to honor one's parents," filial piety. | Lì, "profit, gain, advantage': NOT a proper motive for actions affecting others. The idea that profit is the source of temptation to do wrong is the Confucian ground of the later official disparagment of commerce and industry. |
Crime and Punishment, Repentance, Restitution, and Atonement
The Fallacies of Moralism and Moral Aestheticism
Envy and Jealousy in Peter Toohey's Jealousy
Confucius [K'ung-fu-tzu or Kongfuzi]
In Mediaeval Europe the "Four Cardinal Virtues" -- wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance -- were the virtues listed in Plato's Republic. The three Christian or Theological virtues -- faith, hope, and charity -- were given by St. Paul (Corinthians I, 13:13). These seven together are sometimes said to correspond to the Seven Deadly Sins -- pride, envy, wrath, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust (in this form the original work of Pope Gregory the Great). So far, however, I have not seen these systematically matched up and explained.
A clue, however, may be found in Dante's Divine Comedy. The levels of Purgatory in the Purgatorio are organized around the Seven Sins, while the levels of Heaven are organized around the seven virtues in the Paradiso. If we match these up, top to top and bottom to bottom, we get the first two columns of the following table. At the top of the table are Love (or Charity), which of course is the most characteristic of God in Christianity, and Lust, characteristic of the highest circle of Purgatory for Dante, and which may be the functional equivalent of love for some people.
Virtues | Vices | Virtues |
Love/Charity, Caritas | Lust, Luxuria | Chastity |
Hope, Spes | Gluttony, Gula | Abstinence |
Faith, Fides | Avarice/Greed, Avaritia | Liberality |
Temperance, Temperantia | Sloth, Acedia, La Paresse | Diligence |
Justice, Iustitia | Wrath, Ira | Patience |
Courage, Fortitudo | Envy, Invidia | Kindness |
Wisdom, Sapientia | Pride, Superbia | Humility |
That Wrath can be a corrupted sense of Justice is something that we might see at the end of the very disturbing movie Seven (1995), where Brad Pitt, who has tracked down the serial murderer Kevin Spacey (who has killed people he thinks are guilty of each of the Seven Deadly Sins) and has just discovered that the man has also murdered and decapitated Pitt's own pregnant wife, kills him. This exemplifies Wrath, but it also happens to be Just Retribution. Divine Justice, indeed, has commonly been characterized as the Wrath of God.
Someone who thinks they are Wise, but isn't, is likely to be Proud. One who is Slothful, may sometimes appear Temperant, but only because they are too lazy to do wrong or overindulge, not because they are deliberately restraining themselves. Explanations could be produced for the other matches, but they seem less obvious.
Felix Vallotton, La Paresse, "Sloth," 1896 |
I don't know why, but a small industry now seems to have developed over the Seven Sins. Multiple books have been published, and The History Channel has featured a series on the Sins, often featuring authors of the recent books. One interesting addition to the lore mentioned in these venues is the demonology of the Sins. From the 16th century we have the demon of Lust identified as "Asmodeus," of Gluttony as "Beelzebub," of Avarice as "Mammon," of Sloth as "Belphagor," of Wrath as "Amon," of Envy as "Leviathan," and of Pride as "Lucifer." A curious thing about this list is that several of the names, especially "Beelzebub" and "Lucifer," are alternative names for Satan himself. Indeed, I wasn't aware the "Lucifer" could possibly refer to anyone else. This may be an example of a general problem with supernatural beings, whether different names go with different beings or belong to the same one. The same dynamic can be seen in India, where Brahmâ and Prajapati may or may not be the same person, and goddesses like Kâlî, Pârvatî, and Mahâdevî are worshiped independently but at some level of theory seem to merge into a single Goddess. We also get something of the sort with the difference between, say, the Virgin of Guadalupe and the Virgin of Fatima. They are clearly both supposed to be the Virgin Mary, but they each have a separate cult and very different associations. In Classical religion, of course, this is like the differences between Athena Parthenos, Athena Promachos, Athena Nike, etc. With the demonology of the Sins, however, the assignments may well be the imaginative work of a single idiosyncratic modern writer.
A new book, Jealousy by Peter Toohey [Yale, 2014], argues that envy and jealousy are really the same thing. In a review of the book in The Wall Street Journal, Andrew Stark says:
Mr. Toohey says, when we look closely at such distinctions, they seem to dissolve. Jealousy, some say, arises when we lose something that is ours to someone else. Envy, by contrast, is what we feel when another person gains something we would like to have for ourselves...
The idea that jealousy targets one's own loss, and envy another's gain, doesn't make sense in a world where, too often, one entails the other. ["The Green-Eyed Monster," December 9, 2014] But Toohey and Stark seem to be wrong. There is a difference between envy and jealousy, along just the lines indicated in the review. And we can start with something mentioned by Stark himself at the beginning of the article: "The Almighty himself was jealous." This is a reference to Exodus 20:5, "for I, the LORD [] your God, am a jealous God [, Êl qannâ]." Here "jealous" is , qannâ. God is jealous that Israel should not worship other gods. However, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that God is envious of the other gods. I've never heard it said, even by Stark, that the God of Israel is an "envious God." This even sounds kind of ridiculous. There is not much for God to envy about either other gods or the human condition. But it should be clear that if God can be jealous but not envious, then these words do not mean the same thing.
The difference between envy and jealousy begins, as Toohey and Stark say, with the distinction, as in so much else useful in ethics, between self () and other (). Beyond that, concepts are both missing and mistated in their treatment. Thus, "jealousy targets one's own loss" is wrong in that one need not have lost anything to be jealous. The logical extreme of jealousy is when someone is disturbed by their spouse merely speaking to or having some sort of other innocent contact with, anyone who can be seen as a potential rival. Usually it is absurd to say that this person is envious of the rival -- unless they actually possess some trait that can excite envy and create a jealous worry about its appeal to the spouse. That is not a factor in God's regard for other gods; but God will indeed be jealous whether Israel worships other gods or not.
At the other extreme, we can be envious of the good fortune of someone who has absolutely nothing to do with us and whose gain does not "entail" our loss. Thus there is the story of the Russian peasant who envies his neighbor's cows, praying to God, not that he should similarly have cows, but that his neighbor's should die. Similarly, "Whenever a friend succeeds, Gore Vidal once said, a little something in me dies" [William Voegeli, The Pity Party, Broadside Books, 2014, p.47]. These are particularly vicious and sterile kinds of envy, where it is simply the success of others that is offensive. Nevertheless, such is the basis of a great deal of modern politics -- especially where accusations of "greed" merely mask an impotent envy. On the other hand, a little envy may not be a bad thing. A friend may be flattered that you envy their plans for travel; and envy of another's achievements might inspire the enterprise to equal them. Similarly, a little jealousy may be flattering to one's mate, since it is evidence of your attachment for them. "You're jealous!" may be a delighted and amused exclamation with the implication, "You care!" Or it may have very different context and overtones.
The key elements so far are therefore that in envy there is some good in the possession of another, while in jealousy there is some good that is or, as is thought by the self, ought to be in the possession of the self. In unpacking this, a new element enters the question. We can get some sense of this looking at Latin, where we already know that "envy" comes from invidia. "Jealous," however, comes from "zeal" and does not appear to derive from a relevant term in Latin. We discover, however, that another Latin term can be used for "jealous," and that is aemulus, from aemulor, "to rival." Used as a noun aemulus can mean "a rival." Thus, in jealousy, the fear that a good in one's possession, like a spouse, may be taken by another, or that another posesses some good that ought to belong to one's self instead, introduces an element of rivalry, in which the other and their fortune is not remote and unrelated to one's own but instead involves a direct confrontation over a good that cannot be shared and is not fungible. In jealousy, there is a sense of a contest, and a zero sum game. These can be entirely lacking in envy.
The sense of contest goes back to the origins of both "jealous" and . "Jealous" is from "zeal," ultimately from Greek , zêlos, which is "eager rivalry" and even, of all things, "jealousy" -- as with both in Latin aemulatio. The Greek word at Exodus 20:5 in the Septuagint is actually , zêlôtés, which St. Jerome has simply transcribed into the Vulgate as zelotes. The Hebrew can also mean "ardour" and "zeal." The root of the Hebrew word may even mean "become red," or livid, as in the face. Thus, an Arabic cognate is , qâni', "blood red" or "deep red," from a hypothetical verb , qana'a. The jealous God is an angry God. Indeed, jealousy seems a passionate state, as is typical in love rivalries. Envy may be more distant, cold, and bitter, like the peasant's sterile resentment against his neighbor. And so the title of Stark's review for the book Jealousy, "The Green-Eyed Monster" (and the book's own green cover art), isn't even right. That's envy, not jealousy -- although the identity is the claim that he and Toohey make. But it does gives us a nice way to express the difference. Envy is green; jealousy, like anger, red. The jealous husband is liable to be angry, both at his wife and at the man paying attention to her; but it makes less sense that the envious person, however resentful, is angry. Jealousy may involve shouting; envy, not so much. Envy may conceal itself and express false praise.
Of course, elements of envy and jealousy can be involved in the same situation; and many languages have words that scholars uneasily define using both -- although part of that may be the lack of clarity that is evident with Toohey and Stark themselves. Pure envy is for the goods or good fortune of another. But a person may see the fortune of another as the result of rivalry and loss, when there actually isn't any rivalry and the gain of the other has nothing to do with the absence of fortune in the one. This sort of thing occurs in life (especially the politics of envy, which is particularly nasty when it is ethnic envy) and is explored in fiction. A person who is the object of an envy with overtones of jealousy may be astonished that he is seen as a rival or that his success is seen as damage or loss to the envier. A puzzled "You should be happy for my success" is a sentiment expressed in history more than once -- one wonders if a "friend" ever expressed it to Gore Vidal. The complexity of these cases has confused Toohey and Stark into a thesis of identity, which is rendered absurd by many counterexamples.
Return to Text of "Value Structure of Action"Envy and Jealousy
Is there any reason to view envy as jealousy's evil twin? In fact, is there any difference between the two at all? Toohey is not so sure...
five virtues | ||||
benevolence | propriety | good faith | righteousness | knowledge |
wood | fire | earth | metal | water |
four principles | |||
humanity | propriety | ||
East | South | ||
four virtues (of women ) | |||
right behavior | proper speech | proper demeanour, appearance | proper employment, needlework & cookery |
four studies | |||
literature | conduct | ||
The next set of four, although simply the "four virtues," are traditionally supposed to be those in particular of women. Their content would, of course, be traditional notions about the proper roles of women, though, curiously, the gloss of "proper employment" meaning "needlework & cookery" is from a modern dictionary [ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary, edited by John DeFrancis, University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, p.888] rather than in an old source like Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary [Harvard University Press, 1972, p.770]. There is an old expression, the "three obediences and the four virtues" for women, . The "three obediences," "subjections," or "dependencies," are upon the father, the husband, and the son. As elsewhere historically, these attitudes tend to persist in rural society but break down in urban, if not liberal, society.
The "four studies" mostly involve virtues of conduct, including , "loyalty" or "conscientiousness," which we do not otherwise find in these lists -- despite its importance for Confucius. But we also find "literature," which sounds like it should be in the "six arts" below, but isn't. The character for "study," , can also mean "teaching," "doctrine," "religion," etc., as discussed with the Six Schools of Japan.
six virtues | |||||
bene- volence | good faith | righteous- ness | harmony | ||
six (virtuous) actions | |||||
kindness | |||||
six arts | |||||
archery | chariot- eering | mathe- matics | |||
The "six virtuous actions" definitely fall into the class of virtues, and they lead off with the significant Confucian virtue of filial piety, . The character here for "action" we have seen already as "conduct" among the "four studies."
Next, with the "six arts," we mostly get things that are extra-ethical skills, even two martial arts (archery and charioteering), but they lead off with propriety, , which is not only a significant Confucian virtue, but one of the "five virtues" and "four principles." This is an interesting and perhaps revealing choice. "Propriety" encompasses manners and etiquette. In general, such things seem to have less to do with morality than with the artistry of polite society. As such, "propriety" was despised by Taoism but treasured by Confucianism. If propriety is not fully a matter of ethics, but a kind of art, this would effect a compromise between Taoism and Confucianism, retaining a place of importance for it, while exempting it from the "persuasion by force" that to Taoism was the "beginning of disorder []."
Despite all these virtues, actions, and arts, we are still missing an important Confucian moral quality. Thus, at Analects IV:15 we see the "one thread" that runs through the teaching of Confucius, the qualities of and , "conscientiousness and reciprocity." "Reciprocity," though defined with the Confucian equivalent of the Golden Rule, is missing from the lists here. So we still don't get a comprehensive system. Profit, , of course, is not a virtue for either Confucianism or Taoism. It might be for Mohism, but does not occur here anyway.
six schools | |||||
Cosmologists | Sophists | Mohism | Legalism | Confucian- ism | |
six kingdoms | |||||
Ch'i | Ch'u | Han | Wei | Chao | Yen |
four classes | |||
scholars | farmers | artisans | merchants |
four great beauties | |||
Hsi Shih, Xi Shi | Wang Chao-chün, Wang Zhaojun | Tiao-ch'an, Diaochan | Yang Kuei-fei, Yang Guifei |
b.506 BC, Spring & Autumn Period | b.c.50 BC, Former Han Dynasty | b.c.161/176 AD, Three Kingdoms | 719-756 AD, T'ang Dynasty |
seven passions | ||||||
sorrow | ||||||
Return to Value Structure of Action
The Virtues of Franklin and Wooden
Psychological Types, Typology of the Chinese Virtues
Confucius [K'ung-fu-tzu or Kongfuzi]
Karman.y evâdhikâras te mâ phales.u kadâcana / Set thy heart upon thy work, but never on its reward. The Bhagavad Gita, 2:47, Juan Mascaró translation [Penguin Books, 1962, p.52] Should we then, in the face of this criticism, reconcile ourselves to the view -- expressed countless times by so many: by some of the Sophists in Plato's dialogues, by Hobbes and by many more recent authors -- that what is just is what has been laid down as law by the legislator, and that there is no other valid law apart from this? This view can of course be expressed with varying degrees of consistency. The radical version says that whatever a sovereign or ruling power has established is indeed just: Hitler's Nürnberg laws, and Stalin's codes, and the American Constitution -- all are equally just. But this compels us to accept the inconvenient conclusion that norms which contradict each other may be equally legitimate and equally just. Advocates of this view, therefore, usually try to circumvent the problem by arguing that the value-laden concept of justice has no discernible meaning if it is taken to suggest a supreme paradigm according to which we can measure and assess existing legislation; if, on the other hand, 'justice' means nothing except positive law, i.e., what is established in existing legislation, it is a misleading and useless concept.
Leszek Koakowski (1927-2009), "On Natural Law," Is God Happy? Selected Essays [Basic Books, 2013, pp.242-243] Some key distinctions can be used to characterize the nature of ethics. Most fundamental is whether morality is a matter of rational knowledge or not. If it is a matter of rational knowledge, then our doctrine would be objectivism, which implies that morality is "out there," in the objects, and so is independent of personal preferences or sentiments. If it is not a matter of rational knowledge, then we could subscribe to subjectivism, that morality is indeed a matter of personal preferences or sentiments, in the subject, i.e. only in the mind or self. David Hume, is very properly often cited as the classic representative of subjectivism, as in the ethics textbook Moral Reasoning, by Victor Grassian, which I used to use in my ethics class. To Hume, morality depends on our own sentiments or feelings, as there is no matter of fact to determine moral truth [note].
If morality is just a matter of feeling, and not a matter of rational knowledge, then it is not really amenable to dispute. I have my feelings and you have yours. It is not uncommon, however, for people to think that others disagree with them on moral issues, not because of different feelings, but because of a lack of feeling. We see this in an example given by Grassian, who recalls responding at the time to a speech by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the war in Vietnam.
We have no difficulty, however, imagining Rusk telling Grassian that he "did not feel sufficient sympathy for the vast suffering of human beings" who lived under Communism. There are no "unclear ideals of American security" involved. After mass murderers like Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sung, and Ho Chi Minh, the United States wanted to preserve South Vietnam and Cambodia from Communism. We failed. As it happens, more people were murdered in Indo-China after the Communist takeovers than had died in the wars there that involved France and the United States [cf. Death by Government, by R.J. Rummel, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1995]. Many Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees live in the United States after fleeing the terror of the new regimes. Richard Nixon's prediction that there would be a "bloodbath" after a Communist victory, greeted with derision at the time, was fully born out by events.
Basing a moral argument, with an appeal to feeling, on only part of a story of suffering, has also occurred in relation to the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003. Many antiwar protesters express outrage over the suffering to the Iraqi people caused by the United States in military actions in Iraq. But the story of an Iraqi exile in Los Angeles, Tamara Darweesh, was related by the Los Angeles Times on 24 March 2003:
"I'm so disappointed with the left," said Darweesh, who considers herself a liberal. "They are in complete denial because it doesn't fit into their equation of the Mideast. But Saddam is an Arab leader who has killed more Arabs than Israel ever has."
The antiwar protesters, she added, are "very condescending. They are supposed to be for human rights, but the suffering of the Iraqi people just doesn't exist for them. They deny us our stories." For people whose argument is their sensitivity to suffering, the political left thus puts itself in the position of protecting one of the nastiest neo-Nazi dictators in recent history. As a matter of fact, examined elsewhere, feeling cannot be morally commanded; and so the approach of insufficient feeling for moral correctness is barking up the wrong tree.
If morality is not just a matter of feeling, but of rational knowledge, we then must face the question of how that works. This is addressed in detail elsewhere. Here it may be noted that Aristotelian arguments about knowledge, which reduce reason to the self-evidence of first principles, leaves us with certainties that seem fully as subjective as Hume's moral sentiments. There is no more verification of self-evident propositions than there is of those based on feeling. This problem is resolved when it is noted that Socratic Method, as used by Socrates himself (not that described by Plato in the Meno), examines the logical consequences of propositions in order to expose contradictions. This will falsify some of our premises, in a manner first appreciated by Karl Popper. Which premises is a matter of continuing inquiry. This does not, to be sure, verify with certainty any remaining premises, but it does give us something to do, which subjectivism and self-evidence do not.
A common misconception in ethics is that another distinction, absolutism and relativism, means or amounts to the same thing as objectivism and subjectivism, and that any absolutist or objectivist view of ethics is necessarily heteronomous (see definitions in chart below). Likewise with relativism, subjectivism, and autonomy. The "Pirsig" of the chart is Robert Pirsig in the popular philosophizing novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Grassian and Pirsig, although no more than a popular novelist, are taken to represent views that are very characteristic of current academic philosophy. (A further version of this chart, below, proceeds to better known recent philosophers.)
It is easily assumed that autonomy implies subjectivism and relativism. This is especially deceptive when dealing with Hume, who is a subjectivist and is thus liable to be presented (as in Grassian's Moral Reasoning, and elsewhere) as a relativist. But Hume's theory of knowledge allows him to believe things he cannot rationally know (or prove); so while his theory is subjectivist, his beliefs are in fact absolutist. That was also the case with the issue he is the most famous for -- causality: He had no doubt that everything that happened had a cause, he just didn't believe that this could be proven or otherwise rationally motivated. Most important for our purposes is the Socratic differentiation of absolutism. Socratic Ignorance means that ethical values are real, objective, and absolute but that the human condition is to be ignorant of them. This enables us to distinguish Socratic Absolutism, where values are absolute but unknown, from Dogmatic Absolutism, where absolute values are claimed to be already known. Platonic Recollection is Plato's theory that knowledge is possible but that it comes from within and is our memory of another world, a place of perfect goodness, justice, and beauty (the "World of Being"). This is the classic combination of autonomy with objectivism, although, of course, it is not the only way that autonomy can be combined with objectivism.
Whether Hume was a heteronomist or autonomist is a good question. After a fashion he was both: he explains the occurrence of morality by reference to the customs of society as those develop over time, just as he explains causality itself on the basis of habit and custom. That sounds very heteronomous. However, as with causality again, he is aware that morality is not proven or rationally justified by his explanation. Indeed, it cannot be: Hume is also famous for noting that a proposition with an "ought" (assertions of value) cannot be logically derived from propositions merely with an "is" (assertions of fact):
And so the assertions of morality cannot be logically derived from factual assertions about social or historical habit and custom. The force, certainty, and actual moral nature of morality is a residue that reference to society cannot account for. Since that residue is found in our own moral sentiments, this is something left to autonomy. While Hume's distinction between "is" and "ought" is often used as an argument that moral statements are baseless or meaningless, this was not what Hume had in mind. Instead, we must take him as arguing for what now would be called the "axiomatic independence" of ethics, something that would have already been comprehensible to Aristotle, who expected that each area of knowledge possessed its own first principles. It seems like many recent philosophers neither know their Aristotle nor understand their Hume.
Hume is a skeptic (which in philosophy means believing that knowledge is impossible) but of a certain kind. "Pyrrhonian" skepticism, named after Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 BC), is that because knowledge is impossible, we should practice suspension (epochê) of judgment on all things. On the other hand, this was later modified when the scholars in Plato's Academy went through a phase of skepticism. Carneades of Cyrene (d. 129 BC), a Scholarch (president) of the Academy, is particularly associated with this movement of "Academic" skepticism. The Academic skeptics ultimately said that although there may be no certain knowledge, there is reasonable belief, and this is necessary for practical judgments in life. That is the term that Hume uses, as he says, "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life" [Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding p. 126], and "There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection" [p. 129]. Kant understood that Hume was in no doubt of the quid facti (the matter of fact, the existence) of causality or morality but that his skepticism merely consisted in his inability to account for the quid juris, the foundational justification of them. The failure to find the quid juris cast no doubt whatsoever on the quid facti. Hence Kant famously says that Hume's critics "were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting..." [Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics p. 259, Lewis White Beck translation, Library of the Liberal Arts, 1950, p.6].
To think that Hume did not believe in the principles of causality and morality is to confuse the content of knowledge with its object, or de dicto ("concerning what is said") properties with de re ("concerning the thing") properties. Observing that moral claims are made in historically contingent, fallible, and corrigible ("correctable") propositions, some infer that the objects of those propositions share in the same historical contingency. There is no force to that inference whatsoever, since it can only be made by confusing dictum with res and applying predicates of the former to the latter. Could that inference be made, it would simply erase the entire significance of moral discourse: no moral imperative (an "ought"), as Hume himself noted, can be derived from the contingent fact of something being said at some moment in history (an "is"). The idea that the description of practice, as the natural history of what we actually do, is sufficient for moral theory, which is what many philosophers today wish to do with Hume, effects a grotesque reductionism of people's sense that they ought to do certain things into the bare, retrospective indicative that they have. This would indeed be a pure Pyrrhonian suspension of moral judgment, and it is not at all a reflection of Hume's views.
Modern historicist and linguistic relativist theories (see Relativism about Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Robert Solomon) combine relativism with objectivism and heteronomy -- since history and language are objective things that exist outside of us but vary in time, place, and context. These connections are the worst of all possible worlds: putting the moral agent at the mercy of external standards (language, society, culture, etc.), even while these standards cannot be rationally questioned. Hegel had thought that history was the concrete exemplification of Reason and so could be rationally critiqued and changed, but the real, external reality, as such nevertheless derived authority from its presupposed rationality. Other versions of heteronomous relativism, even those derived from Hegel, now do not need to take Hegel's notion, or any notion, of reason very seriously. This can give near or complete totalitarian force to mere social and cultural traditions.
The idea that actual, heteronomous institutions and practices thereby possess moral force is "judicial positivism" -- what Leonard Nelson called Rechtswissenschaft ohne Recht, "Jurisprudence without Justice." This can be stated as the doctrine that:
The opposite of "positive law" is natural law, i.e. principles of natural justice, including natural rights, that do not exist as statutes or case law but that actually have moral force. Thus, Martin Luther King, quoting St. Augustine, said, "An unjust law is no law at all" ["Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 1963].
While the terminology of natural law goes back at least to St. Thomas Aquinas (also quoted by King), the scholastic versions of it nevertheless emphasized obedience to authority. This changed with John Locke, who justified the English Glorious Revolution (1688) on the principle that unjust authority did not merit obedience, and might rightfully be overthrown. This view was simply taken over by Thomas Jefferson and the other theorists of the American Revolution.
Later, in the debate over the Constitution, one problem was whether there should be a Bill of Rights. The Federalists Alexander Hamilton and James Madison argued that a Bill of Rights could produce misunderstandings:
When most of the States insisted on a Bill of Rights, and Madison was won over by his friend Jefferson, he suggested the Ninth Amendment to prevent such misunderstandings: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Various sophistries have been offered to get around the plain meaning, and the historical motivation, of this text, but it clearly allows that rights exist which are not listed in the Constitution, and it thus implies that such rights do not exist because they are granted by positive law.
Today, the most infamous self-professed judicial positivist is probably the late Robert Bork, who famously stated that the Ninth Amendment was a "blot of ink," i.e. a meaningless hieroglyph that could not be interpreted. In this, he at least honestly admitted that his judicial philosophy denied the existence of the very things the Ninth Amendment was talking about. Bork was not confirmed for the Surpreme Court. Later, however, when Clarence Thomas was nominated, he was actually attacked, before other things were found to accuse him of, for not being a judicial positivist. Thomas's acknowledged adherence to, and Bork's rejection of, natural law principles, however, are both unusual. Most judges today (and most Constitutional case law) are reflexive and unconscious positivists; and modern American political and judicial attitudes are overtly hostile, as was Bork, to principled disobedience to existing law, even law that is grotesquely unjust and, on any honest reading of the Constitution, unconstitutional. A good example of this reflexive positivism was President Clinton, who said, after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City:
The stigmata of positivism are all over this, with Clinton, a former professor of Constitutional law (!), considering whether some of the freedom "given" to us in the Bill of Rights should be taken back. To have politicians, and especially such a man as Clinton, considering how others have been "irresponsible" and should be deprived of their freedom is full of a particularly bitter but tragicomic irony. The same positivist animus to natural law principles of justice and freedom can be found in the modern rejection of the powers of juries, and in recent treatments of Jefferson.
While Bork is now infamous as a positivist, more prestigious Justices articulated positivist priniciples long ago. An important and influential example of that was Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841–1935), who said:
Noteworthy about this passage is the apparent contempt and disparagement that Holmes has for natural justice, natural law, and natural rights. He dismisses such conceptions as about "the infinite," a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," or a "mystic overlaw." But the United States, and every American, is indeed subject to some "mystic overlaw that it is bound to obey," and that is, in the memorable words of President Calvin Coolidge, "the eternal foundation of righteousness":
In the great words of Sherlock Holmes, "It's every man's business to see justice done" ["The Crooked Man," Memories of Sherlock Holmes, 1892]. Justice Holmes directly contradicted this when one day Judge Learned Hand (1872–1961) told him, in parting, "Do justice, sir, do justice." Holmes actually stopped and called Justice Hand back so that he could object that their job was to apply the law, not to "do justice": "That is not my job... It is my job to apply the law." One wonders if Holmes would have enforced the Fugitive Slave Laws without flinching. Ironically, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle had named his immortal detective after the father of Justice Holmes, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (1809–1894). But one might not know from Justice Holmes's words that he was denying the philosophical basis of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, as Coolidge and Hand were affirming them.
We see the full meaning of the positivism of Justice Holmes in his statement that law is "the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified" [ibid.]. This goes back to the Code of Justinian, that "law is the will of the sovereign" -- although, with Holmes, in a democracy, sovereignty lies in the People, not with a Roman Emperor. But this is still not right. Even democracy does not miraculously turn things that are unjust into things that are just. As Coolidge says, "Men do not make laws"; and, as shown at right, Leonard Nelson correctly held that moral obligation depends on no will, either our own or that of any other. Socrates already argued this in the Euthyphro. The Pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, not pious because it is loved by the gods. Justice Holmes and most Constitutional jurisprudence since does not believe in eternal righteousness; and, indeed, Holmes is regarded as representing a form of moral skepticism -- very different from that of Hume, at least in his autonomous form. Confusions about Hume in Antony Flew
The Fallacies of Moralism and Moral Aestheticism
I am discussing Grassian here because the book is familiar to me, having used it in my ethics classes for a number of years, and because it seems to be representative, in ideology, to other contemporary ethics textbooks that I have examined.
As it happens, Grassian shies away from a complete commitment to feeling and subjectivism:
Unfortunately, on page one of his book, Grassian quotes one of Hume's most famous statements, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions..." If Grassian now disagrees with Hume, and frees reason from Humean slavery, he must explain how reason provides a source of moral knowledge and certainty independent of feeling. This is precisely what Hume denied, and Grassian, now inexplicably breaking with Hume, does not bother to explain how it is that reason, with no identified resources of its own, can overrule moral sentiment -- what is the moral "matter of fact" that Grassian has discovered that Hume did not? Having trashed any clarity in his commitment, Grassian naturally goes on to say that we cannot choose between objectivism and subjectivism. Indeed. The result is simply incoherent, or, at best, missing an account of rational moral knowledge. Since he begins the passage by actually saying that "Hume was right" that the "ultimate source" of our moral principles is in feeling, he evidently doesn't realize that an account of rational moral knowledge, of the rational moral matter of fact, has been rendered necessary.
Key Distinctions for Value Theories,
and the Importance of Hume
mâ karmaphalahetur bhûr mâ te sango 'stv akarman.i,
Work not for a reward; but never cease to do thy work.
Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason.... Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. [A Treatise of Human Nature, Shelby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1888, 1968, pp.468-469, original spelling, boldface added]
At that moment, it appeared to me that the Secretary of State simply did not feel sufficient sympathy for the vast suffering of human beings who were being sacrificed for unclear ideals of American security. As I listened to Rusk, my predominant reaction was not to argue with him rationally, but in some sense to shake him into an emotional realization of the enormity of human suffering we as a nation were creating in Vietnam. [Moral Reasoning, Second Edition, Prentice Hall, 1992, p.24]
A few days ago, Darweesh went to the Third Street Promenade in Santa Monica, where antiwar protesters were gathered. She asked to talk to them about why it is important to topple Hussein. The protesters thanked her, turned and walked away.
"Is" and "Ought"
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason. [op.cit., pp.469-470, original spelling, boldface added]
Judicial Positivism
When we got organized as a country and we wrote a fairly radical Constitution with a radical Bill of Rights, giving [sic] a radical amount of individual freedom to Americans, it was assumed that the Americans who had that freedom would use it responsibly... that they would work for the common good, as well as for the individual welfare... However, now there's a lot of irresponsibility. And so a lot of people say there's too much freedom. When personal freedom's being abused, you have to move to limit it. [boldface added]
There is a tendency to think of judges as if they were independent mouthpieces of the infinite, and not simply directors of a force that comes from the source that gives them their authority. I think our court has fallen into the error at times and it is that that I have aimed at when I have said that the Common Law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky and that the U.S. is not subject to some mystic overlaw that it is bound to obey. [quoted by Thomas Sowell, Intellectuals and Society, 2011, p.159; boldface added]
Men do not make laws. They do but discover them. Laws must be justified by something more than the will of the majority. They must rest on the eternal foundation of righteousness. That state is most fortunate in its form of government which has the aptest instruments for the discovery of law. [to the Massachusetts State Senate, January 7, 1914; boldface added]
Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved
Key Distinctions for Value Theories,
and the Importance of Hume, NoteAlthough Hume was right that the ultimate source of our moral principles resides in our feelings, one should not assume that we must be slaves to our feelings. One cannot only change one's principles when they conflict intolerably with one's natural feelings, one can also attempt to adjust one's feelings when they conflict with one's reasoned preferences. The moral life is a constant interplay between reason and feeling. [p.24-25]


text:
This site is part of an ongoing, collaborative project to compile and share important resources for Global Mental Health (GMH). Our desire is to help provide a "global map for a global movement" for navigating the GMH domain better and find relevant ways for connecting and contributing. The site is committed to complement the growing efforts to develop GMH broadly, to work across sectors, and to promote sustainable development. We welcome your suggestions and materials in order to make GMH-Map as useful as possible. Click here for more information about the overall project and click here for ideas about how to contribute content.
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How we view GMH:
"GMH is an international, interdisciplinary, and multi-sectoral domain which promotes human well being, the right to health, and equity in health for all. It encourages healthy behaviours and lifestyles; is committed to preventing and treating mental, neurological, and substance use conditions (MNS); and seeks to improve policies and programs, professional practices and research, advocacy and awareness, and social and environmental factors that affect health and well being." (GMH--Finding Your Niches and Networks, 2012) *********************************************************************************************** Note: For some quick updates, see the items below preceded by New. For comprehensive updates, review the various GMH newsletters and GMH websites. Featured Highlights: The UN Secretary-General informally presented an advance, unedited version of his synthesis report for sustainable development, entitled "The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet," to UN Member States today. The advanced unedited version of the report is available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ (4 December 2014) Online training/webinars related to GMH: Global Integration 3: Reflections on GMH--Past Milestones, Current Issues, and Future Directions, 12 Dec 2014 Dr. Richard Mollica, Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma Organised by GMH-Map. Click here to access the audio-power point ***** Global Integration 2: Developing Mental Health in Low-Resource Settings, 21 November 2014 Dr. Paul Bolton, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Organized by GMH-Map with support from USAID Victims of Torture Fund. Click here to access the audio-power point. ***** Part One--GMH Updates Overviews, Views, and News New: Bi-weekly news bulletin from the APA Office of International Affairs with information about opportunities for international engagement in mental health (www.apa.org/international). For more information or to send information to include: firstname.lastname@example.com. New: Transcultural Psychiatry (Dec. 2014)--Special journal issue on GMH; free access to the opening editorial, 12 pages with reflections on contributions from GMH and concerns about GMH http://tps.sagepub.com/content/51/6.toc New: Mental Health in Development Work: Compassionate Societies--This 12 page booklet by HimalPartner and Digni provides a good overview of GMH. It has an artistic feel to it, includes positive images from Nepal, and is easy to read, compelling, and oriented towards the importance of MH in development work. Available in Norwegian and now also in English. New: Tracking and Trekking with GMH! Presents seven core GMH categories for connecting and contributing to GMH. Featured is a listing of several GMH gatherings (conferences/events) 2013-current, many with links to power point/video presentations. (article en route, June 2015) GMH: Strategies for Staying Current, Kelly O'Donnell, Psychology International, March 2014, Vol. 25, No. 1 Click here for full version of the article (this Psychology International issue has many articles related to GMH/international psychology) Some GMH websites (click here) see also listing at: http://in2mentalhealth.com/ Global Mental Health: A Resource Primer for Exploring the Domain; International Perspectives in Psychology: Research, Practice, Consultation, 2012, Volume 1, Issue 3) ;Kelly O'Donnell. Note: This is the foundational research article for the initial development of the GMH-Map website. Access to the World of Psychology (Psychology International, March 2012--brief article on broadening psychology globally) Responding to critiques about GMH--see part four in the Perspectives section of this website GMH and its Discontents (a summary of conference/workshop at McGill University in July 2012 on GMH: Bridging the Perspectives of Cultural Psychology and Public Health) Poppy field outside of Geneva. ********** Part Two--GMH Updates Advocacy, Videos, and Lots In-Between Advocacy and Programmes New: #FundaMentalSDG is an initiative aiming to include a specific mental health target in the post-2015 agenda. It is committed to the belief that there can be no health without mental health, and that there can be no substantial development without including mental health into the post-2015 agenda. For more information and to watch the short and moving advocacy video on mental health by Robin Hammond: http://www.fundamentalsdg.org New: Joint statement on the inclusion of health and mental health in the sustainable development goals; NGO Committee on Mental Health (New York) and NGO Forum for Health (Geneva), 10 September 2014 New: Including Mental Health among the New Sustainable Development Goals, British Medical Journal, 20 August 2014, by Thornicroft and Patel. New: United Nations General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals. Policy Brief 4: Recommendations on Human Rights. (Helpful update/perspectives on the macro picture/efforts for development, justice, and wellbeing for all.) Position Statement on Mental Health in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Movement for Global Mental Health, September 2013) Three GMH updates related to UN/WHO--GMH Action Plan, NCD Action Plan, Sustainable Developmental Goals. WHO Mental Health Action Plan 2013-2020 (final version, 27 May 2013) WHO QualityRights Project--Toolkit launched 15 June 2012 (goals: improve the quality and human rights conditions in mental health and social care facilities; empower civil society organization to advocate for the rights of people with mental and psychosocial disabilities) Reports and Resolutions New: World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior (World Bank, Dec 2014).."Development policies based on new insights into how people actually think and make decisions will help governments and civil society achieve development goals more effectively. A richer and more accurate understanding of human behavior can make it easier to tackle such difficult development challenges as increasing productivity, breaking the cycle of poverty from one generation to the next, and acting on climate change...." (from official Press Release) Suicide resources (links on WHO MH website) http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/suicide-prevention-report/en/ --Preventing Suicide: A Global Imperative (WHO report, September 2014) --See also the 5 minute video on suicide and the Suicide Fact Sheet Making mental health count: The social and economic costs of neglecting mental health care (July 2014, OECD; available for free online download). Investing in Mental Health: Evidence for Action (WHO, September 2013, 36 pages) WHO Resolution 134 R8 (24 January 2014). Contributing to social and economic development: Sustainable action across sectors to improve health and health equity (follow-up of the 8th Global Conference on Health Promotion) http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB134/B134_R8-en.pdf ["Recognizing that a number of mental disorders can be prevented and that mental health can be promoted in the health sector and in sectors outside health and that global support is necessary for national and local work on mental health and development, including through the Mental Health Action Plan and the WHO MINDbank;"] The Human Development Report 2013--The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World. This is the annual report from the UN Development Program. The Overview section is easy to review, especially in light of busy schedules! Books and Journals New/coming soon: Global Mental Health: Anthropological Perspectives (2015), edited by Brandon Kohrt and Emily Mendenhall, Left Coast Press. New/coming soon: Re-Visioning Psychiatry:Cultural Phenomenology, Critical Neuroscience, and Global Mental Health (2015), edited by Laurence Kirmayer, Robert Lemelson, and Constance Cummings) Launch early 2015: Global Mental Health, new open access journal from Cambridge University Press; "aims to publish papers that apply the global point of view to mental health research...seeks to cultivate the emerging field of [GMH], and to provide a forum for the publication of the new perspectives and paradigms developing from it." Four categories of papers to be included: Interventions, Etiology, Policy and Systems, Training and Learning. http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=GMH New: Proceedings of the 30th International Congress of Psychology New: Special issue.of Intervention: International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work, and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict Currently there are at least five recent GMH edited volumes, full of materials useful for practice, policy, health systems, advocacy, training, etc. These are: GMH: Trauma and Recovery (2011, edited by Richard Mollica); 21st Century GMH (2012, edited by Eliot Sorel); and GMH: Principles and Practice (2013, edited by Vikram Patel, Harry Minas, Alex Cohen, and Martin Prince), Public Mental Health: Global Perspectives (2013, edited by Lee Knifton and Neil Quinn), and Improving Mental Health Care: The Global Challenge (2013, edited by Graham Thornicroft, Mirella Rugeri, and David Goldberg) Global Mental Health Special Issue, International Health (March 2013--three of the 11 GMH articles are available online for free, Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene) Global Member Care: (volume 2): Crossing Sectors for Serving Humanity. This 400+ page book is filled with cutting edge resources to help us keep current with our globalizing world and to further develop the global field of member care. It encourages us to connect and contribute to various international sectors (e.g., humanitarian/development, health/mental health, human resources/human rights) on behalf of mission/aid workers and humanity. Edited by Kelly and Michele O'Donnell--Click here for the full description (with links to Table of Contents and Endorsements). Click here to order the book from the publisher at the special rate. Electronic version available on Amazon Mental Health: Breaking Down Barriers (10 articles). This is the special theme of the March-April 2013 issue of Health Progress (Volume 94, number 2, Catholic Health Association of the United States). Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health (five-part series of articles in PLOS Medicine focusing on integrating mental health into other health care platforms, emerging from the 2012 NIMH workshop "Grand Challenges in GMH"; open access online) Harvard Review of Psychiatry special issue on GMH ( January-Febraury 2012, eight articles) MHPSS and Humanitarian New: Intervention: International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work, and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict : http://www.interventionjournal.com/Special issue on "New Frontiers in Mental Health and Psychosocial Wellbeing in Low Resource and Conflict Affected Settings" (Volume 12:2—December 2014). Note that previous issues are available online starting one year prior to the current issue. http://journals.lww.com/interventionjnl/Fulltext/2014/12001/Rethinking_mental_health_care___bridging_the.3.aspxNew: The Core Humanitarian Standard (second version 2014, eight commitments) "...supports humanitarian actors to apply fundamental humanitarian and human rights principles, improve the quality and effectiveness of assistance, and bring greater accountability to communities and people affected by disaster." Consultative input was done until mid-September 2014. See the website for more information and updates. Building Back Better: Sustainable Mental Health Care after Emergencies McKay, L. (2009) Family matters: Self-care for family membersof humanitarian workers. Pasadena, CA: Headington Institute. (online
training module) Training New: Global Perspectives on Mental Wellbeing--Knowledge Exchange/Summer School. A one-week course offered by the University of Glasgow and University of Rwanda, 15-19 June 2015, Kigali, Rwanda. Contact: http://global-perspectives-on-mental-wellbeing.eventbrite.co.uk New: Challenges in Integrating GMH and Cultural Psychiatry, Society for the Study of Psychiatry and Culture webinar online, 2 March 2015 New: Columbia University, Global Mental Health Program, Seminar Series on GMH (topic 9 March 2015: GMH and Poverty) Two International Courses on Mental Health (MH Law and HR-- India; MH Policy and Services--Portugal) GMH-Geneva and CART model (proposal for GMH net-hubs--why not set up these informal groups in strategic locations?). Websites New: Mental Health Innovation Network (this site facilitates and shares progress in the development, evaluation, scaling up, promotion, intervention, and treatment for mental disorders around the world; its three emphases are innovations, resources, and community) WHO MINDbank Online Platform (launched on the occasion of Human Rights Day, 10 December 2013 and on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;. This tool "brings together a range of country and international resources, covering mental health, substance abuse, disability, general health, human rights and development. These include policies, strategies, laws, and service standards." It is part of the WHO QualityRights Project and supports the WHO Mental Health Action Plan 2013-2020). For more GMH websites, click here. Conferences and Events New: Crossing Boundaries: Meeting the Needs of Refugee Communities Around the Globe, Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology (William James College), 26 June 2015, Newton, Massachusetts USA (email@example.com).. Organised by the GMH Program at MSPP New: Culture and GMH Conference, Society for the Study of Psychiatry and Culture, 23-25 April 2015, Providence, Rhode Island USA New: Global Integration 2: Global Mental Health in Low-Resource Settings This 90 minute, interactive webinar features Dr. Paul Bolton. Paul will discuss a) his work in developing mental health services in low resource countries (power point) and why it is important for sustainable development; and b) some of his personal experiences and suggestions for working in global mental health (interview). --Speaker: Dr. Paul Bolton, Associate Scientist, Applied Mental Health Research Group and Center for Refugee and Disaster Response, Departments of International Health and Mental Health,Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. --Date: Friday 21 November, 12 noon-13:30 Eastern Standard Time --Organized by: Dr. Kelly and Dr. Michele O'Donnell, GMH-Map Project, Member Care Associates -Participants: 25 max --Register at firstname.lastname@example.com: send us your name and organizational affiliation; we'll send you the link/access code 2 October 2014--Integrating Physical and Mental Health to Promote Well-Being; commemorating World Mental Health Day; NGO Committee on Mental Health; in New York. Update: Click here to see the summary/comments by the Discussant (Kelly O'Donnell). 10 October 2014--Mental Health: New Challenges in the Americas; webinar (English, Spanish) commemorating WMHD; PAHO, WHO, George Washington University, OECD; in DC GMH: Staying Updated-Crossing Sectors, Spring Conversation Series, O'Neill Institute, Georgetown University. Tuesday 6 May, presenter: Dr. Kelly O'Donnell Click here for the power point presentation. GMH and NGOs: Working Together Well! (short version of power point-plenary session, HimalPartner GMH Seminar, Oslo, 7 March 2014) Gathering on Mental Health and the Church (Orange County, California, USA 28 March 2014) NAMI, Catholics, and Evangelicals seriously connect on behalf of mental health with an estimated 10,000 people participating in person/online. See the article: Can Churches Separate Mental Illness and Shame? Also see: more reflections by a plenarist; NAMI news; the Event website GMH Forum: Sustainable Development through Global Action--The Case for Investing in Mental Health (hosted by the Centre for Global Mental Health, Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London--27,28 September 2013) GMH Week+ Geneva: Connecting-contributing via a strategic week of events/activities (3-11 October 2013) This is an example of some of the various activities done around World Mental Health Day (in, around, and related to Geneva). Click here to see the various events (point 5 in the training section of this website). GMH: A Resource Map for Connecting and Contributing (keynote/powerpoint presentation at the Nordic WHO Simulation Conference, Copenhagen, 7 August 2013--a GMH overview including six short video links; click here for the handouts) Help to Alleviate the Global Burden of Trauma New Responses to a Challenge for Governments, UN Agencies and Civil Society 6-8 June 2013 Geneva, in/around the Centre International de Conférences Genève Click here to view the program Advances in Trauma Care Videos and Film New: Living with a Black Dog (animated, creative video to support those who help others with depression; a companion video to I Had a Black Dog) http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/suicide-prevention-report/en/ New: Condemned is a powerful (and disturbing but hopefully motivating) four minute video focusing on mental disabilities in Africa countries in crisis. It won second place in the Contemporary Issues category of the 2014 World Press Photo Awards. Done by Robin Hammond. http://www.robinhammond.co.uk/ Hidden Pictures Project. The first short video features the work of Vikram Patel in India, recruiting/training community members to provide basic counseling. Breaking the Chains (Indonesia, Erminia Colucci) Mental Health in Liberia (psychoscial scars, post war trauma, PBS 2011) Like a Death Sentence (MH in Ghana, Human Rights Watch, 2012) WHO GMH and the MH Action Plan (five minute video; more videos are on the WHO website in the Mental Health-->Media Center section)
Sunflower field outside of Geneva.
The GMH-Map web site is managed by Member Care Associates, Inc. (MCA).
Additional organisations and colleagues are encouraged to link to the site and contribute content.
MCA is a member organisation of the Movement for Global Mental Health and the NGO Forum for Health.
The materials and views expressed on this site are those of the authors-contributors only
and not necessarily those of Member Care Associates, Inc. or the site endorsers.
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Stylish yet functional
By Texas Gypsy
from Columbus, TX
See all my reviews
Comments about Women's Tessa Handmade Convertible Wool Mittens:
Fun gloves that function perfectly in the South during the winter days. They can keep your whole hand warm if needed. Love the colors.
Comment on this review
Cozy & Cute
Love the colors and material. Pratical and priced right. I will get a lot of use out of these gloves since I can either use them as mittens or fingerless gloves.


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Meeting to Mixer Dress
By Kling
$64.99 $19.9970% off!
Go from wowing the execs with your research to impressing potential clients at a company mixer, all while looking posh and poised in this twofer dress by Kling! This Spanish brand infuses its quirky, detail-oriented designs with vintage inspiration and modern appeal. The truth is as black and white as your dress - you're savvy when it comes to style and your job, and it shows as you meet and mingle with the ruffled hem of this lined, collared look accented by pastel pumps and gold earrings!
Final Sale: This item cannot be returned or exchanged.
- Shell: 95% Polyester, 5% Spandex. Lining: 100% Polyester.
- Shell fabric provides stretch. Contrast and lining fabrics do not provide stretch.
- Machine wash.
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- Imported
Product Measurements:
Size | XS | S | M | L | XL |
Length | 33.5 | 34 | 34.5 | 34.5 | 35 |
All measurements in inches.


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Ohio Gadfly Daily News 7-10-14
July 10, 2014
- A little-noticed provision in the recently-passed education MBR bill allows up to 10 school districts or other entities to obtain waivers from parts of Ohio's accountability system (testing, teacher evaluation, etc.) if they are members of the Ohio Innovation Lab Network. The waivers, requiring alternative assessments/accountability to be approved by ODE, will likely be written in 2014-15 with implementation for those whose waivers are approved beginning in 2015-16. The list of ILN members thus far (i.e. – eligible for waiver consideration) is a mixed bag of high-flyers, known innovators, and question marks. (Gongwer Ohio)
- The K-12 education subcommittee of the Ohio Constitutional Modernization Committee meets again today. Expect some more thoroughly efficient fireworks. (Dayton Daily News)
- Homeschoolers, by definition, have opted out of the traditional education system as far as their states will allow. In Ohio, it's pretty hands-off, so surely the Common Core shouldn't bother homeschooling families that much. Well, the Midwest Homeschoolers Convention is going on in Cincinnati this week, and Common Core is apparently a big topic, at least to this one mom who was interviewed. Why? The impending alignment of college entrance exams – which even homeschoolers need to think about – to the standards. (Cincinnati Enquirer)
- Youngstown City Schools' superintendent had his annual evaluation recently, and the results are pretty much right down the middle – 3 out of 5, or Satisfactory. Good on teamwork, needs improvement in communication, etc. But interestingly the article is mostly taken up with describing the change in the evaluation process between last year and this. Last year, he got a 5 out of 9, or Satisfactory. But the board thought that the 9 categories were "too broad" and so refined them down to 5. But really this is neither here nor there, because as one board member puts it: "If we got all A's, he would have all 5s." Interesting parallels to student evaluations in there probably. (Youngstown Vindicator)


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Biography Linda C. Ehrlich |
Linda C. Ehrlich, associate professor of Japanese, Comparative Literature and Cinema at Case Western Reserve University, has published articles and reviews about Asian and Spanish cinema in East-West Film Journal, Journal of Film and Video, Post Script, Literature/Film Quarterly, Cinemaya, Japan Forum Cinema Journal, and Film Quarterly, among others. She has co-edited
Cinematic Landscapes, an anthology of articles on the
interface between the visual arts and the cinemas of
China and Japan (University Texas Press, 1994), and An
Open Window: The Cinema of Víctor Erice (Scarecrow Press
Filmmakers' Series #72, August 2000). |
JR & F Home Page |


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With my pet rock (it adopted me...) in t…
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Play our fun game and find out if the one you like likes you back. Confide in us if you think you'd hit it off by clicking: Yes, No, or Maybe. We'll anonymously find out and let you know if the feeling is mutual. You have nothing to lose!
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You both said YES! The feeling is mutual. Now the rest is up to you! Say Hi and get the conversation started.
Poetic and mystical, yet grounded. My life is a balance between my reclusive and contemplative nature, often connected to my creative work - visual art and music - spiritual inquiry, and my extroverted side, which includes family, friends, and community, also deeply important to me. The Golden Rule, compassion, equanimity, and embracing the shadow side in myself and others are spiritual aspirations and my bottom-line values. My home is my haven, a creative and sacred space, filled with art, Hafiz, modal Appalachian fiddle tunes, sweet Louisiana Creole waltzes, and world music. Do come over for fragrant spice tea and home made vegan cookies! I have taken a break from teaching art to young adolescents in a Brooklyn public school, and just relocated to good ol' Bergen County, NJ to work in a special needs school, focus on my creative and healing work, garden, and, importantly, be closer to my elderly parents who will eventually be needing someone to oversee their caregiving needs. I swim daily, spend a lot of time with my own creative work (which sometimes includes performing), am vegetarian, practice Reiki, and play fiddle, banjo, and accordion. And if you've thought about writing, please take that leap of faith - My deepest regrets are the missed connections, the chances not taken rather than the failed risks. On a purely practical level, I would enjoy spending time with someone who might share some common interests, particularly making art, gardening, yoga, travel, chocolate (after all, it is a sacrament...), music (playing and listening), laughing, flea markets, water (beaches, baths, hot springs...), nature, talking, reading, and learning. On a deeper level, do you know the poem "The Invitation", by Oriah Mountain Dreamer? Ultimately, that's what I yearn to share with a partner. I value honesty (with self and others), compassion, strong sense of self, creative interests, being able to distinguish past issues from present triggers, and devotion while honoring a quality of spaciousness.You're not a drinker (been there, done that...) and you don't engage in disparaging remarks about your ex. That Mystery of Chemistry is also important. And, hey, did I neglect to mention a sense of humor...?


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Jon Gosselin Promises the Holidays Will Be the Same for the Kids
The 'Jon & Kate Plus 8' dad -- who will be spending both holidays with his kids -- details for us their family traditions like his apple crisp, and also discusses the foundation he set up with his brother to honor their father and help children in need. Read the Full Interview
Are you getting ready for the holidays?
I'm going to spend Thanksgiving with my kids when I get back from Hawaii, not all day, just like half the day.
What are your plans for Christmas?
Christmas Eve and Christmas day are joint-shared custody days, which means we're both in the house. So we'll be there.
Have the kids started asking for presents yet?
I haven't started my Christmas shopping yet. Don't put pressure on me! It will probably be all Internet based this year, pre-wrapped. You know, I'm a guy, when there's free gift wrap, I'm like, 'Yeah, yes please.'
It's easier that way.
Oh my goodness, doesn't your back hurt so much? And why do we sit on the floor and reach over, you can never reach the end of the wrapping paper, you need monkey arms, it's annoying. Nothing ever matches up. My mother is like the best wrapper on the planet. The pattern matches perfect and she puts Hershey kisses on top [of the gift.] I'm envious of her wrap jobs.
What are your favorite family traditions to do at this time of the year?
On Thanksgiving I make apple crisp, that's like my thing. They always ask for it. I juice up my mom's recipe, I add more sugar and stuff. So they are always happy about that. They do like apple picking and make cider, all the Pennsylvania stuff that we've been doing for years anyway. We still keep those traditions. We have an organic apple orchard that we go to. There are a couple of apple trees on my property, so we can pick those ... We do stuff outside. I have landscapers, but I still tell them to leave leaves, so we can make a big pile and jump through it ... We do stuff like that at Christmas, hanging the stockings. They do the stockings early Christmas morning. Kate makes sticky buns. We keep it all the same. Nothing has changed. That way they have the sense of security with everything that's going on. But, this year, there's a lot of paparazzi, so who knows? Every year it's different.
Do they get up really early on Christmas?
Oh yes, because they are used to school. For school they have to get up at 5 o'clock in the morning. And the parents [do, too].
You started a new foundation. What can you tell me about that?
I started the Jon Gosselin Children's foundation in the name of my father. It's something that my brother and I wanted to do, but we never had the finances to do so. And obviously this year has been a pretty good year for me financially, so I started the foundation in memory of my father. My father was a children's dentist for 30 years and he dedicated one day a week for 30 years to handicapped children for free. It never really hit my brother and I. When my dad passed away that's when we started noticing at the viewing all these handicapped patients coming in. Now ... they were adults by now, but they were so thankful for all the work he did. He fixed their cavities and stuff like that. But he dedicated full service to them. That was amazing to me and my brothers and I always thought, "That's amazing what Dad did." All the time he spent with us and all the dedication he spent with us and he still had time to help other people. And that's what I want to do. I'm not a doctor obviously and the only way we could do this was start a foundation to allocate funds to children and a few parents that need help with medical bills. We're trying to get corporate sponsorships and hopefully everything will work out and we can continue the legacy of my father.
Is there anything else you'd like to get involved with?
Once you start a foundation, then other foundations call you. Now I'm not trying to reinvent the wheel because I've never ran [one] before. But you learn from other people and what they do and sometimes you can link foundations together, which would be great. Stuff I do, I visit cancer kids, not because it's a pat on the back for myself. It was just a turning point in my life going to St. Jude's. I did a film shoot with TLC last year at St. Jude's. That was the first time I really was shocked. I didn't know whether to laugh or cry. You have kids who are not going to make it. You're happy they are there because they are getting the best care in the world. But, it really touched my heart. Just because we showed up, they were happier just that one day. That's amazing you can change someone's life and attitude just by appearing. It's something that you have to realize within the public eye. People look to you and that's why I decided to change my life in recent months and started taking initiative for my actions, owning up to my mistakes and learning from them.
It must be difficult to reconcile the fact that you're in the public eye, but it also gives you the opportunity to help people.
Right. People always say to me, 'Jon, you are famous.' And I'm like, 'Yeah, OK, whatever.' They say, 'You can do two things with your fame. You can have your 15 minutes, or you can take your fame and do good for the world.' And that's what I'm trying to do.
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- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy caringvoice
Christmas will be the same despite Kate??? Kate was the one in the beginning who sad despite what happens she wants the holidays to stay the same for the kids sake. Once again it is sad to see this man trying to victimize himself. When will he learn to work with Kate, and stop all the hate. Did he lie to everyone at the synagogue when he sad he was going to stop his negative actions towards Kate? It is sad that he just doesn't get it!!!!
- Friday 13 NovemberBy Diane
Good for Jon. Too bad Kate does not seem to realize that she should give back, as well.
I'm proud of you Jon. - Monday 16 NovemberBy Ginger
Ok, he talks about what a wonderful man his father was, which he may well have been. But go back a few months when he talks about his father being an alcholic and how he did not want to be like him, wanted to break the pattern. Maybe he needs to retrace his words before he done an interview so he can keep track of all the lies he's told over thr course of time. And going to Hawaii for Thanksgiving, wasnt't he spending it with the bimbo's family? Or did her words penetrate his dead head when she told him not to do her family the favor.
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy dan
Seriously - Take the energy you would be putting into this slimebag and go read a book. - Wednesday 11 NovemberBy joy
Jon.if you cannot accept your wife and forgive her,dont come to your house..your kids come from your wife..you dont love them...if you want to forget your wife and you want her to die because of problem from you...no need to visit them...its pretending that you love them...in reality not...continue to be far from them..you started it and you didnt change..useless celebrating this christmas without your respect and honor with them...
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy joy
please Jon,dont come during Christmas,your adding their heartaches..its better not to see you,than you are there to recall them of what you did to them..its better if you say that you reconsile to each other during that time..but you say only to visit and pretending you are good..its enougth heart aches you did...let them happy without you...they can survive without your presence..They only recall you and Hailey making embarrassing to them...
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy joy
jon dont let your family recall your bad deads to them...you hurt them so much and now go with them for what acting that your good?i think enougth your so stupid father,they dont need to see you anymore...if you come there may be they will prepare bump for you..so that your bad behavior will stop...new year continuing hatred to your wife?what kind of a person you are that you dont need to change being bad...crazy....crazy.. you are..
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy joy
Jon,this coming Christmas..if you dont forgive your wife and you dont forgive of what you did..i think go away!!!!!they dont need a stupid father...they need a father who is loving to their mother and everything will be fine...your adding problem to them..your making trouble not peace.they felt ashamed with you..your not a model to them...you make them truggle...please dont do and come to them...
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy janie
My 1st thought echoed Pete's "Oh, please....." Who cares - go away Jon Gosselin & tend to your family and stop feeding on the media frenzy which you constantly avow. So now he jets off to Hawaii - Kate had better stash that cash safely or this guy will blow through it in short time. A guest spot on the Insider? Why? I am glad I am not a fan or I would have to now stop watching.
What a parasite. And he begrudges the continuation of their own show so Kate can't profit. How despicable is this this guy. - Wednesday 11 NovemberBy cat
In his father's honor-how about a good way to hide away money. Of course in his name-that way gets to take it out without any one noticing. had to take those paying jobs on other networks as needed the money to hide in the father's name. Silly silly Jon. No taxes either I believe.
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy joy
jon,wheres your friend who supporting you during your dirty work?are they protect you and help you inspite ofyour crises or they will witness agains you.if you have money many girls will come to you and now you become loser are they provide money for you to pay TLC?your alone if trouble will come,so its your lesson,only your family will sopport you if you go down,dont hate them,dont abandon them..they still love you..change you immoral behavior...and comeback to your family...
- Wednesday 11 NovemberBy Marcia
I am praying for you and Kate and your entire family. Your family is precious. FIGHT for what is right! What is RIGHT is that you two forgive, forget and get together as the good Lord planned it! Do not let the world destroy what is good in your life. Hope you read this message of HOPE for you all! I believe strongly in my heart that you two will be reunited as a family. So...what's stopping you two??
- Friday 13 NovemberBy Cheryl
OMG--this is such a poorly written article. How many times can you use the word "like"? It sounds worse than a teenager. Maybe Jon says it (he's such a class act) but who is the smarty who needs some grammar lessons here?
- Friday 13 NovemberBy jdrummys
I have the perfect Xmas idea for Kate- Stick a star on his balding head and light his a-- up like a tree!
- Friday 13 NovemberBy lor
Do you mean he decided to not spin the dreidel with the kids? Thank God! Our tribe wants no part of him.
- Sunday 15 NovemberBy annyk
Eniugh already. Every sinle day there are new quotes from Jon. Will someone tell him to shut the h up
- Monday 16 NovemberBy Seahorsey
Jon's 15 minutes of fame was up hours and hours ago! Don't believe a word of either of Jon's stories; 1. That it has ever been about what is best for his children and 2. Dental Charity? Gimme a break!
- Tuesday 17 NovemberBy Kurt
lets see ...Thanksgiving with my family...or Hawaii...hum....eenie meanii minie moe....wait both yeah both....i mean its only the first thanksgiving since the divorse....and theyre still young...besides i'm so busy i cant even shop for their christmas presents....everything bought with just a click of the mouse...i wont even haveto log off facebook....yep...i'm the most famous man next to micheal jackson...maybe theyle erect a statue of me....yeah...i giant one...next to the statue of liberty
- Thursday 19 NovemberBy maggie
I feel sorry for the kids if the holidays are going to be the same for them. That means they have to put up with a screaming mother with a short fuse and a selfish self centered tightwad of a dad. What kind of happy holidays can that be for the kids?
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