text:
- versus – THOMAS G. AQUINO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Chairman and Chief Delegate of the Philippine
Coordinating Committee (PCC) for the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement, EDSEL T. CUSTODIO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Co-Chair of the PCC for the JPEPA,
EDGARDO ABON, in his capacity as Chairman of the Tariff Commission and lead
negotiator for Competition Policy and Emergency Measures of the JPEPA, MARGARITA
SONGCO, in her capacity as Assistant Director-General of the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and lead negotiator for Trade in
Services and Cooperation of the JPEPA, MALOU MONTERO, in her capacity as
Foreign Service Officer I, Office of the Undersecretary for International
Economic Relations of the DFA and lead negotiator for the General and Final
Provisions of the JPEPA, ERLINDA ARCELLANA, in her capacity as Director of
the Board of Investments and lead negotiator for Trade in Goods (General
Rules) of the JPEPA, RAQUEL ECHAGUE, in her capacity as lead negotiator for
Rules of Origin of the JPEPA, GALLANT SORIANO, in his official capacity as
Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and lead negotiator for Customs
Procedures and Paperless Trading of the JPEPA, MA. LUISA GIGETTE IMPERIAL, in her capacity
as Director of the Bureau of Local Employment of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and lead negotiator for Movement of Natural Persons of the
JPEPA, PASCUAL DE GUZMAN, in his capacity as Director of the Board of
Investments and lead negotiator for Investment of the JPEPA, JESUS MOTOOMULL,
in his capacity as Director for the Bureau of Product Standards of the
DTI and lead negotiator for Mutual
Recognition of the JPEPA, LOUIE CALVARIO, in his capacity as lead negotiator
for Intellectual Property of the JPEPA, ELMER H. DORADO, in his capacity as
Officer-in-Charge of the Government Procurement Policy Board Technical
Support Office, the government agency that is leading the negotiations on
Government Procurement of the JPEPA, RICARDO V. PARAS, in his capacity as
Chief State Counsel of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and lead negotiator
for Dispute Avoidance and Settlement of the JPEPA, ADONIS SULIT, in his
capacity as lead negotiator for the General and Final Provisions of the JPEPA, EDUARDO
R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and ALBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the DFA,*
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 170516
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, & BRION, JJ. Promulgated: |
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Petitioners – non-government organizations,
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – seek via the present petition for
mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Tañada III
and Mario Joyo Aguja filed on January 25, 2005 House
Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements
then being negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the
JPEPA. The Resolution became the basis
of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on
Globalization (the House Committee) into the negotiations of the JPEPA.
In the course of its inquiry, the
House Committee requested herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino),
Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating Committee created under Executive Order
No. 213 ("Creation of A Philippine
Coordinating Committee to Study the Feasibility of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement")[1]
to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a
copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the
request, however.
Congressman Aguja
later requested for the same document, but Usec. Aquino, by letter of
In a separate move, the House Committee, through Congressman Herminio G. Teves, requested Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with "all
documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement,
the requests and offers etc."[2] Acting on the request, Secretary Ermita, by letter of
In its letter dated 15 June 2005 (copy enclosed), [the] D[epartment of] F[oreign] A[ffairs] explains that the Committee's request to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a work in progress for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will however be forwarded to the Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled and complete. (Emphasis supplied)
Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA
Director-General Romulo Neri
and Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon, by letter of
Chairman Abon replied, however, by letter of
In its third hearing conducted on
August 31, 2005, the House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most
recent draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by Committee
Chairman Congressman Teves' information, then House
Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President gives her consent to
the disclosure of the documents.[3]
Amid speculations that the JPEPA might
be signed by the Philippine government within December 2005, the present
petition was filed on
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral
free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country
in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of
topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance
and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final
While the final text of the JPEPA has
now been made accessible to the public since
Before delving on the substantive
grounds relied upon by petitioners in support of the petition, the Court finds
it necessary to first resolve some material procedural issues.
For a petition for mandamus such as
the one at bar to be given due course, it must be instituted by a party
aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person
which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right.[7] Respondents deny that petitioners have such
standing to sue. "[I]n the interest of a
speedy and definitive resolution of the substantive issues raised," however, respondents
consider it sufficient to cite a portion of the ruling in Pimentel v. Office
of Executive Secretary[8] which
emphasizes the need for a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" on
questions of standing.
In a petition anchored upon the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public
right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens
and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.[9] As the present petition is anchored on the
right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as
citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the
standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in
Considering, however, that "[t]he
principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents
of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,"[10]
public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President,
during the pendency of the present petition, has been
largely rendered moot and academic.
With the Senate deliberations on the
JPEPA still pending, the agreement as it now stands cannot yet be considered as
final and binding between the two States.
Article 164 of the JPEPA itself provides that the agreement does not
take effect immediately upon the signing thereof. For it must still go through the procedures
required by the laws of each country for its entry into force, viz:
Article 164
Entry into Force
This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which the Governments of the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective legal procedures necessary for entry into force of this Agreement have been completed. It shall remain in force unless terminated as provided for in Article 165.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
President Arroyo's endorsement of the
JPEPA to the Senate for concurrence is part of the legal procedures which must be
met prior to the agreement's entry into force.
The text of the JPEPA having then been
made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the
extent that it seeks the disclosure of the "full text" thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to
obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers
in the course of the negotiations.[12]
A discussion of the substantive
issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the
Philippine and Japanese offers, is thus in order.
relied upon by petitioners
Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the
government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates
their right to information on matters of public
and contravenes other constitutional
provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.[14] Second, they contend that non-disclosure of the same
documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.[15] Lastly,
they proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement
has been concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of
the Executive, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.
Significantly, the grounds relied upon
by petitioners for the disclosure of the latest text of the JPEPA are, except
for the last, the same as those cited for the disclosure of the Philippine and
Japanese offers.
The first two grounds relied upon by
petitioners which bear on the merits of respondents' claim of privilege shall
be discussed. The last, being purely speculatory given that the Senate is still deliberating on
the JPEPA, shall not.
JPEPA is a matter of public concern
To be covered by the right to
information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it
be a matter of public concern. Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like 'public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
From the nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of
public concern. This, respondents do not
dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full
public disclosure.
claim of privilege
It is well-established in
jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full
public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public
concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. The types of information which may be
considered privileged have been elucidated in Almonte
v. Vasquez,[17] Chavez
v. PCGG,[18]
Chavez v. Public Estate's Authority,[19]
and most recently in Senate v. Ermita[20]
where the Court reaffirmed the validity of the doctrine of executive privilege
in this jurisdiction and dwelt on its scope.
Whether a claim of executive privilege
is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made.[21] In the present case, the ground for
respondents' claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:
x x x The categories of information that may be considered
privileged includes matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and
review. In this case, the privileged
character of the diplomatic negotiations
has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents
particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA
as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the
parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on
matters of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive
privilege. At the time when
the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations
were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still
uncertain and subject to change.
Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now, these
are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal
provisions and settled jurisprudence.
Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the "rolling texts" which may undergo radical change or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The ground relied upon by respondents
is thus not simply that the information sought involves a diplomatic matter,
but that it pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
character of diplomatic negotiations
The privileged character of diplomatic
negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right
to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on
inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest."[23] Even
earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People's Movement for Press
Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus[24]
wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus,
the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President's
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement.[25]
The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations
with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information." The Resolution went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires
centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in
executive action. Another essential
characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has been said about "open" and "secret"
diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the
practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:
"A complicated negotiation . . . cannot
be carried through without many, many private talks and discussion, man to man;
many tentative suggestions and proposals.
Delegates from other countries come and tell you in confidence of
their troubles at home and of their differences with other countries and with
other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do under other circumstances. . . If these
reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust American
Delegations in another conference? (United States Department of State,
Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284.)."
x x x x
There is frequent criticism of
the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is
concerned. This, it is claimed, is
incompatible with the substance of democracy.
As expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more
rigid system of silence anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the
Censorship, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for
the conclusion of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants,
openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned
his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[26]
that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations
with foreign countries, viz:
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.
Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it. As
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus,
it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential – since there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before
[a treaty] is approved" – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that "historic
would govern the same. Disclosing these
offers could impair the ability of the
A ruling that Philippine offers in
treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage
future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first
impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering
into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation
for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to
grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. Apropos
are the following observations of Benjamin S. Duval, Jr.:
x x x [T]hose involved in the practice of negotiations appear to be in agreement that publicity leads to "grandstanding," tends to freeze negotiating positions, and inhibits the give-and-take essential to successful negotiation. As Sissela Bok points out, if "negotiators have more to gain from being approved by their own sides than by making a reasoned agreement with competitors or adversaries, then they are inclined to 'play to the gallery . . .'' In fact, the public reaction may leave them little option. It would be a brave, or foolish, Arab leader who expressed publicly a willingness for peace with Israel that did not involve the return of the entire West Bank, or Israeli leader who stated publicly a willingness to remove Israel's existing settlements from Judea and Samaria in return for peace.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we
may be jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore,
are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita
holds, recognizing a type
of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after
a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined
if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
Whether petitioners have established
the presence of such a public interest shall be discussed later. For now, the Court shall first pass upon the arguments
raised by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus
to the present case.
Arguments proffered by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus
Petitioners argue that PMPF v. Manglapus cannot be applied in toto to the present case, there being substantial
factual distinctions between the two.
To petitioners, the first and
most fundamental distinction lies in the nature of the treaty involved. They stress that PMPF v. Manglapus involved the Military Bases Agreement which
necessarily pertained to matters affecting national security; whereas the
present case involves an economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade
and commerce between the
Petitioners' argument betrays a faulty
assumption that information, to be considered privileged, must involve national
security. The recognition in Senate
v. Ermita[29]
that executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying kinds, such that it
may even be more accurate to speak of "executive privileges," cautions against such
While there certainly are privileges
grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those
involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the "informer's privilege," or the privilege of the Government not
to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.[30] The suspect involved need not be so notorious
as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given
instance. Otherwise, the privilege would
be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would
this be contrary to long-standing practice.
It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in
Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential
communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing
between those which involve matters of national security and those which do
not, the rationale for the privilege being that
x x x [a] frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. x x x[31] (Emphasis supplied)
In the same way that the privilege for
judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated
upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve
matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the
privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that "the
Executive cannot, any more than
the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to
shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing." [32] This qualification applies whether the
privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a
congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.[33]
Closely related to the "presidential
communications" privilege is the deliberative
process privilege recognized in the
diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the
deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the
rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations,
deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus[36]
shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a
frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by
shielding such negotiations from public view.
Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic
negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the
independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity
as "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."
And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded
to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the
information per se, but because the information is part of a process of
deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed
The decision of the U.S. District
between two countries to draft a treaty represent a true example of a
deliberative process. Much give-and-take must occur for the countries to
reach an accord. A description of the negotiations at any one point would
not provide an onlooker a summary of the discussions which could later be
relied on as law. It would not be "working law" as the points discussed and
positions agreed on would be subject to change at any date until the treaty was
signed by the President and ratified
by the Senate.
policies behind the deliberative process privilege support
non-disclosure. Much harm could accrue to the negotiations
process if these notes were revealed. Exposure of the pre-agreement positions
of the French negotiators might well offend foreign governments and would
lead to less candor by the
Finally, releasing these snapshot views
of the negotiations would be comparable to releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the notes state the
tentative provisions and language agreed on. As drafts of regulations typically
are protected by the deliberative process privilege, Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Internal
Revenue Service, C.A. No. 80-705 (D.C.Cir., May 21,
1982), drafts of treaties should
be accorded the same protection.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence
from the privileged character of the deliberative process.
The Court is not unaware that in Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL), et al. v. Office of U.S. Trade Representative[38] – where the plaintiffs sought information relating to the
just-completed negotiation of a United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement – the same district court, this time under
Judge Friedman, consciously refrained from applying the doctrine in Fulbright
and ordered the disclosure of the information being sought.
Since the factual milieu in CIEL seemed to call for
the straight application of the doctrine in Fulbright, a discussion of
why the district court did not apply the same would help illumine this Court's
own reasons for deciding the present case along the lines of Fulbright.
In both Fulbright and CIEL, the
Judge Friedman, in CIEL,
himself cognizant of a "superficial similarity of context" between the two
cases, based his decision on what he perceived to be a significant distinction:
he found the negotiator's notes that were sought in Fulbright to be
"clearly internal," whereas the documents being sought in CIEL were
those produced by or exchanged with an outside party, i.e. Chile. The documents
subject of Fulbright being clearly
internal in character, the question of disclosure therein turned not on the
threshold requirement of Exemption 5 that the document be inter-agency, but on
whether the documents were part of the agency's pre-decisional deliberative
process. On this basis, Judge Friedman found that "Judge Green's discussion [in
Fulbright] of the harm that could
result from disclosure therefore is irrelevant, since the documents
at issue [in CIEL] are not inter-agency, and the Court does not reach
the question of deliberative process." (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, Fulbright was not overturned. The court in CIEL merely found the
same to be irrelevant in light of its distinct factual setting. Whether this conclusion was valid – a
question on which this Court would not pass – the ruling in Fulbright
that "[n]egotiations between two countries to draft a
treaty represent a true example of a deliberative process" was left standing,
since the CIEL court explicitly stated that it did not reach the
question of deliberative process.
back to the present case, the Court recognizes that the information sought by
petitioners includes documents produced and communicated by a party external to
the Philippine government, namely, the Japanese representatives in the JPEPA
negotiations, and to that extent this case is closer to the factual
circumstances of CIEL than those of Fulbright.
Nonetheless, for reasons which shall be discussed shortly,
this Court echoes the principle articulated in Fulbright that the public
policy underlying the deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic
negotiations should also be accorded privileged status, even if the documents
subject of the present case cannot be described as purely internal in
It need not be stressed that in CIEL, the court
ordered the disclosure of information based on its finding that the first
requirement of FOIA Exemption 5 – that the documents be inter-agency – was not
met. In determining whether the
government may validly refuse disclosure of the exchanges between the
In this jurisdiction, however, there is no counterpart of the
FOIA, nor is there any statutory requirement similar to FOIA Exemption 5 in
particular. Hence, Philippine courts,
when assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are
more free to focus directly on the issue of whether the privilege being claimed is indeed supported by public
policy, without having to consider – as the CIEL court did – if these negotiations fulfill a formal requirement
of being "inter-agency." Important
though that requirement may be in the context of domestic negotiations, it need
not be accorded the same significance when dealing with international
There being a public policy supporting a privilege for
diplomatic negotiations for the reasons explained above, the Court sees no
reason to modify, much less abandon, the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus.
A second point petitioners proffer in their
attempt to differentiate PMPF v. Manglapus from the present case is the fact that
the petitioners therein consisted entirely of members of the mass media, while
petitioners in the present case include members of the House of Representatives
who invoke their right to information not just as citizens but as members of
Petitioners thus conclude that the
present case involves the right of members of Congress to demand information on
negotiations of international trade agreements from the Executive branch, a
matter which was not raised in PMPF v. Manglapus.
While indeed the petitioners in PMPF
v. Manglapus consisted only of members of the
mass media, it would be incorrect to claim that the doctrine laid down therein
has no bearing on a controversy such as the present, where the demand for
information has come from members of Congress, not only from private
The privileged character accorded
to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso
facto lose all force and effect simply because the same privilege is now
being claimed under different circumstances. The probability of the claim
succeeding in the new context might differ, but to say that the privilege, as
such, has no validity at all in that context is another matter altogether.
The Court's statement in Senate v. Ermita that "presidential refusals to furnish
information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations
[state secrets privilege, informer's privilege, and a generic privilege for
internal deliberations], and may be asserted, with differing degrees of
success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations,"[41]
implies that a privilege, once recognized, may be invoked under different
procedural settings. That this principle
holds true particularly with respect to diplomatic negotiations may be inferred
from PMPF v. Manglapus itself, where the Court
held that it is the President alone who negotiates treaties, and not
even the Senate or the House of Representatives, unless asked, may
intrude upon that process.
Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not
only against citizens' demands for information, but also in the context of
legislative investigations.
Hence, the recognition granted in PMPF
v. Manglapus to the privileged character of
diplomatic negotiations cannot be considered irrelevant in resolving the
present case, the contextual differences between the two cases notwithstanding.
As third and last
point raised against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus
in this case, petitioners proffer that "the socio-political and historical
contexts of the two cases are worlds apart." They claim that the constitutional traditions and concepts prevailing at
the time PMPF v. Manglapus came about, particularly the school
of thought that the requirements of foreign policy and the ideals of
transparency were incompatible with each other or the "incompatibility hypothesis,"
while valid when international relations were still governed by power, politics
and wars, are no longer so in this age of international cooperation.[42]
Without delving into petitioners'
assertions respecting the "incompatibility hypothesis," the Court notes that
the ruling in PMPF v. Manglapus is grounded
more on the nature of treaty negotiations as such than on a particular
socio-political school of thought. If
petitioners are suggesting that the nature of treaty negotiations have so
changed that "[a]n ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank
declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides" no
longer "lead[s] to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations," or
that parties in treaty negotiations no longer expect their
communications to be governed by historic confidentiality, the burden is on
them to substantiate the same. This petitioners failed to discharge.
Whether the privilege applies only at certain stages
of the negotiation process
Petitioners admit that "diplomatic
negotiations on the JPEPA are entitled to a reasonable amount of
confidentiality so as not to jeopardize the diplomatic process." They argue, however, that the same is
privileged "only at certain stages of the negotiating process, after which such
information must necessarily be revealed to the public."[43] They add that the duty to disclose this
information was vested in the government when the negotiations moved from the
formulation and exploratory stage to the firming up of definite propositions or
official recommendations, citing Chavez v. PCGG[44] and Chavez v. PEA.[45]
The following statement in Chavez v. PEA, however,
suffices to show that the doctrine in both that case and Chavez v. PCGG
with regard to the duty to disclose "definite propositions of the government"
does not apply to diplomatic negotiations:
rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.
x x x[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It follows from this ruling
that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed
if they fall under "recognized exceptions."
The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the
recognized exceptions, for the footnote to the immediately quoted ruling cites PMPF
v. Manglapus itself as an authority.
Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege
It being established that diplomatic
negotiations enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure, even against the
demands of members of Congress for information, the Court shall now determine
whether petitioners have shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to
overcome the privilege in this instance.
To clarify, there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be
taken into account. One is the presumed public
interest in favor of keeping the subject information confidential, which
is the reason for the privilege in the first place, and the other is the public
interest in favor of disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by
the party asking for information. [47]
The criteria to be employed in
determining whether there is a sufficient public interest in favor of
disclosure may be gathered from cases such as U.S. v. Nixon,[48] Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,[49]
and In re Sealed Case.[50]
U.S. v. Nixon, which involved a claim of the
presidential communications privilege against the subpoena duces tecum of a district court
in a criminal case, emphasized the
need to balance such claim of privilege against the constitutional duty of
courts to ensure a fair administration of criminal
x x x the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Senate Select Committee v. Nixon,[51] which
involved a claim of the presidential communications privilege against the
subpoena duces tecum
of a Senate committee, spoke of the need to balance such claim with the duty
of Congress to perform its legislative functions.
The staged decisional structure established in Nixon v. Sirica was designed to ensure that the President and those upon whom he directly relies in the performance of his duties could continue to work under a general assurance that their deliberations would remain confidential. So long as the presumption that the public interest favors confidentiality can be defeated only by a strong showing of need by another institution of government- a showing that the responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be fulfilled without access to records of the President's deliberations- we believed in Nixon v. Sirica, and continue to believe, that the effective functioning of the presidential office will not be impaired. x x x
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In re Sealed Case[52] involved a claim of the deliberative
process and presidential communications privileges against a subpoena duces tecum of
a grand jury. On the claim of
deliberative process privilege, the court stated:
deliberative process privilege is a qualified
privilege and can
be overcome by a sufficient showing of
need. This need determination is to be made
flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative
process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh
balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such
as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other
evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the role
of the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by
government employees. x x x
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners have failed to present the
strong and "sufficient showing of need"
referred to in the immediately cited cases.
The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject
documents fall short of this standard.
Petitioners go on to assert that the
non-involvement of the Filipino people in the JPEPA negotiation process
effectively results in the bargaining away of their economic and property
rights without their knowledge and participation, in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution. They
claim, moreover, that it is essential for the people to have access to the
initial offers exchanged during the negotiations since only through such
disclosure can their constitutional right to effectively participate in
decision-making be brought to life in the context of international trade
Whether it can accurately be said that
the Filipino people were not involved in the JPEPA negotiations is a question
of fact which this Court need not resolve.
Suffice it to state that respondents had presented documents purporting
to show that public consultations were conducted on the JPEPA. Parenthetically, petitioners consider these
"alleged consultations" as "woefully selective and inadequate."[53]
AT ALL EVENTS, since it is not
disputed that the offers exchanged by the Philippine and Japanese
representatives have not been disclosed to the public, the Court shall pass
upon the issue of whether access to the documents bearing on them is, as
petitioners claim, essential to their right to participate in decision-making.
The case for petitioners has, of
course, been immensely weakened by the disclosure of the full text of the JPEPA
to the public since September 11, 2006, even as it is still being deliberated
upon by the Senate and, therefore, not yet binding on the Philippines. Were the Senate to concur with the validity
of the JPEPA at this moment, there has already been, in the words of PMPF v.
Manglapus, "ample opportunity for discussion
before [the treaty] is approved."
The text of the JPEPA having been
published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be
able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making
unless the initial offers are also published.
It is of public knowledge that various
non-government sectors and private
citizens have already publicly expressed their views on the JPEPA, their
comments not being limited to general observations thereon but on its specific provisions. Numerous articles and statements critical of
the JPEPA have been posted on the Internet.[54] Given these developments, there is no basis
for petitioners' claim that access to the Philippine and Japanese offers is
essential to the exercise of their right to participate in decision-making.
Petitioner-members of the House of Representatives additionally anchor
their claim to have a right to the subject documents on the basis of Congress'
inherent power to regulate commerce, be it domestic or international. They allege that Congress cannot meaningfully
exercise the power to regulate international trade agreements such as the JPEPA
without being given copies of the initial offers exchanged during the
negotiations thereof. In the same vein, they
argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations
since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international
trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article
VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential
Decree No. 1464.[55]
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the
power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix
tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes. Thus it provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
As to the power to negotiate
treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the
article on the Executive Department – which
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making
power is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary[56]
where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and
by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the
country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's
foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded." Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
As regards the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and
the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain
solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring
The same
doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary[57] where
the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the
President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties,
and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President
has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While the power then to fix tariff
rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the
President only by delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the
power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President
to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464[58]
may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the
President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of
treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of
course, that the
President's power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement
of Senate concurrence, since the President
must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant
provisions of the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations.
While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such
pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the
conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a
means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners
suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House
of Representatives fail to present a "sufficient
showing of need" that the information sought is critical to the performance
of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include
Respondents' alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege
On respondents' invocation of
executive privilege, petitioners find the same defective, not having been done
seasonably as it was raised only in their Comment to the present petition and
not during the House Committee hearings.
That respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their
Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioners' position presupposes that an
assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House Committee
investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.
When the House Committee and
petitioner-Congressman Aguja requested
respondents for copies of the documents subject of this case, respondents replied
that the negotiations were still on-going and that the draft of the JPEPA would
be released once the text thereof is settled and complete. There was no intimation that the requested
copies are confidential in nature by reason of public policy. The response may
not thus be deemed a claim of privilege by the standards of Senate v. Ermita, which recognizes as claims of privilege only
those which are accompanied by precise and certain reasons for
preserving the confidentiality of the information being sought.
Respondents' failure to claim the
privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as
a waiver thereof by the Executive branch.
As the immediately preceding paragraph indicates, what respondents
received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly
stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier
resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then
Speaker Jose de Venecia's alleged request to Committee
Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in
While it is a salutary and noble
practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials
– out of respect for their office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the
fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly
call for an assertion of executive privilege.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress' power of inquiry.[59] So long as Congress itself finds no cause to
enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents' failure to
invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount
to a waiver thereof.
The Court observes, however, that the
claim of privilege appearing in respondents' Comment to this petition fails to
satisfy in full the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the claim should be invoked by the President or
through the Executive Secretary "by order of the President."[60] Respondents' claim of privilege is being
sustained, however, its flaw notwithstanding, because of circumstances peculiar
to the case.
The assertion of executive privilege by the Executive Secretary, who is one of the respondents herein, without him adding the phrase "by order of the President," shall be considered as partially complying with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita. The requirement that the phrase "by order of the President" should accompany the Executive Secretary's claim of privilege is a new rule laid down for the first time in Senate v. Ermita, which was not yet final and executory at the time respondents filed their Comment to the petition.[61] A strict application of this requirement would thus be unwarranted in this case.
to the Dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice
We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine
zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of
executive privilege. It is a zeal that We
fully share.
The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of
executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite
extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate
exercise thereof.
We respond only to the salient arguments of the Dissenting Opinion which
have not yet been sufficiently addressed above.
1. After its historical discussion on
the allocation of power over international trade agreements in the
There is, at least, a core meaning of
the phrase "sole organ of the nation in its external relations" which is not
being disputed, namely, that the power to directly negotiate treaties
and international agreements is vested by our Constitution only in the
Executive. Thus, the dissent states that
"Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations but does not
have the power to negotiate international agreements directly."[62]
What is disputed is how this principle applies to the case at bar.
The dissent opines that petitioner-members
of the House of Representatives, by asking for the subject JPEPA documents, are
not seeking to directly participate in the negotiations of the JPEPA,
hence, they cannot be prevented from gaining access to these documents.
On the other hand, We hold that this
is one occasion where the following ruling in Agan
v. PIATCO[63]
– and in other cases both before and since – should be applied:
This Court has long and
consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that cannot be done directly
cannot be done indirectly. To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite
the clear statutory prohibition against a direct government guarantee would not only make a mockery of what
the BOT Law seeks to prevent --
which is to expose the government to the risk of incurring a monetary
obligation resulting from a contract of loan between the project proponent and
its lenders and to which the Government is not a party to -- but would also render the BOT Law
useless for what it seeks to achieve –- to make use of the resources of the private sector in the "financing,
operation and maintenance of infrastructure and development projects" which are
necessary for national growth and development but which the government,
unfortunately, could ill-afford to finance at this point in time.[64]
Similarly, while herein
petitioners-members of the House of Representatives may not have been aiming to
participate in the negotiations directly, opening the JPEPA negotiations to
their scrutiny – even to the point of giving them access to the offers
exchanged between the Japanese and Philippine delegations – would have made
a mockery of what the Constitution sought to prevent and rendered it useless
for what it sought to achieve when it vested the power of direct
negotiation solely with the President.
What the
x x x The fluctuating, and taking its future increase into
account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to
expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of
such a trust. Accurate and
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence
to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character, decision,
secrecy and
dispatch; are incompatible with a body so variable and so
numerous. The very complication of the
business by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different
bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon
the house of representatives, and the greater length of time which it would
often be necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain their
sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be source of so great
inconvenience and expense, as alone ought to condemn the project.[65]
These considerations a fortiori apply in this jurisdiction,
since the Philippine Constitution, unlike that of the
Since allowing petitioner-members of
the House of Representatives access to the subject JPEPA documents would set a
precedent for future negotiations, leading to the contravention of the public
interests articulated above which the Constitution sought to protect, the
subject documents should not be disclosed.
2. The dissent also asserts that respondents can no longer claim the
diplomatic secrets privilege over the subject JPEPA documents now that
negotiations have been concluded, since their reasons for nondisclosure cited
in the June 23, 2005 letter of Sec. Ermita, and later
in their Comment, necessarily apply only for as long as the negotiations were
still pending;
In their Comment, respondents contend that "the negotiations of the
representatives of the
Judicial deliberations do not lose
their confidential character once a decision has been promulgated by the
courts. The same holds true with respect
to working drafts of opinions, which are comparable to intra-agency recommendations. Such intra-agency recommendations are
privileged even after the position under consideration by the agency has developed
into a definite proposition, hence, the rule in this jurisdiction that agencies
have the duty to disclose only definite propositions, and not the
inter-agency and intra-agency communications during the stage when common
assertions are still being formulated.[67]
3. The dissent claims that petitioner-members of the House of
Representatives have sufficiently shown their need for the same documents to
overcome the privilege. Again, We disagree.
The House Committee that initiated the
investigations on the JPEPA did not pursue its earlier intention to subpoena
the documents. This strongly undermines
the assertion that access to the same documents by the House Committee is
critical to the performance of its legislative functions. If the documents were indeed critical, the
House Committee should have, at the very least, issued a subpoena duces tecum or, like what the
Senate did in Senate v. Ermita, filed the
present petition as a legislative body, rather than leaving it to the
discretion of individual Congressmen whether to pursue an action or not. Such acts would have served as strong indicia
that Congress itself finds the subject information to be critical to its
legislative functions.
Further, given that respondents have
claimed executive privilege, petitioner-members of the House of Representatives
should have, at least, shown how its lack of access to the Philippine
and Japanese offers would hinder the intelligent crafting of legislation. Mere assertion that the JPEPA covers a subject
matter over which Congress has the power to legislate would not suffice. As Senate Select Committee v. Nixon[68] held,
the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality
turns, not only on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance
of which the material was sought, but also the degree to which the material
was necessary to its fulfillment.
This petitioners failed to do.
Furthermore, from the time the final
text of the JPEPA including its annexes and attachments was published,
petitioner-members of the House of Representatives have been free to use it for
any legislative purpose they may see fit.
Since such publication, petitioners' need, if any, specifically
for the Philippine and Japanese offers leading to the final version of the
JPEPA, has become even less apparent.
In asserting that the balance in this
instance tilts in favor of disclosing the JPEPA documents, the dissent contends
that the Executive has failed to show how disclosing them after
the conclusion of negotiations would impair the performance of its
functions. The contention, with due
respect, misplaces the onus probandi. While,
in keeping with the general presumption of transparency, the burden is
initially on the Executive to provide precise and certain reasons for upholding
its claim of privilege, once the Executive is able to show that the documents
being sought are covered by a recognized privilege, the burden shifts to the
party seeking information to overcome the privilege by a strong showing of need.
When it was thus established that the
JPEPA documents are covered by the privilege for diplomatic negotiations
pursuant to PMPF v. Manglapus, the presumption
arose that their disclosure would impair the performance of executive
functions. It was then incumbent on
petitioner- requesting parties to show that they have a strong need for the
information sufficient to overcome the privilege. They have not, however.
4. Respecting the failure of the
Executive Secretary to explicitly state that he is claiming the privilege "by
order of the President," the same may not be strictly applied to the privilege
claim subject of this case.
When the Court in Senate v. Ermita limited the power of invoking the privilege to the
President alone, it was laying down a new rule for which there is no
counterpart even in the
The rule was thus laid down by this
Court, not in adherence to any established precedent, but with the aim of
preventing the abuse of the privilege in light of its highly exceptional
nature. The Court's recognition that the
Executive Secretary also bears the power to invoke the privilege, provided he
does so "by order of the President," is meant to avoid laying down too rigid a
rule, the Court being aware that it was laying down a new restriction on
executive privilege. It is with the same
spirit that the Court should not be overly strict with applying the same rule
in this peculiar instance, where the claim of executive privilege occurred before
the judgment in Senate v. Ermita became final.
5. To show that PMPF v. Manglapus may not be applied in the present case, the
dissent implies that the Court therein erred in citing US v. Curtiss Wright[72]
and the book entitled The New American Government and Its Work[73] since
these authorities, so the dissent claims, may not be used to calibrate the
importance of the right to information in the Philippine setting.
The dissent argues that since Curtiss-Wright referred to a conflict between
the executive and legislative branches of government, the factual setting
thereof was different from that of PMPF v. Manglapus
which involved a collision between governmental power over the conduct of
foreign affairs and the citizen's right to information.
That the Court could freely cite Curtiss-Wright – a
case that upholds the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations against congressional
demands for information – in the course of laying down a ruling on the
public right to information only serves to underscore the principle
mentioned earlier that the privileged character accorded to diplomatic
negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect simply
because the same privilege is now being claimed under different
PMPF v. Manglapus
indeed involved a demand for information from private citizens and not an
executive-legislative conflict, but so did Chavez v. PEA[74]
which held that "the [public's] right to information . . . does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation
of powers." What counts as privileged
information in an executive-legislative conflict is thus also recognized as
such in cases involving the public's right to information.
Chavez v. PCGG[75] also involved the public's right to
information, yet the Court recognized as a valid limitation to that right the
same privileged information based on separation of powers – closed-door
Cabinet meetings, executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
These cases show that the Court has always
regarded claims of privilege, whether in the context of an
executive-legislative conflict or a citizen's demand for information, as
closely intertwined, such that the principles applicable to one are also
applicable to the other.
The reason is obvious. If the validity of claims of privilege were
to be assessed by entirely different criteria in each context, this may give
rise to the absurd result where Congress
would be denied access to a particular information because of a claim of
executive privilege, but the general public would have access to the
same information, the claim of privilege notwithstanding.
would be the ultimate result if, for instance, the Court adopts the "clear
and present danger" test for the assessment of claims of privilege against citizens'
demands for information. If executive
information, when demanded by a citizen, is privileged only when there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent, it would be very difficult for the Executive to establish the validity
of its claim in each instance. In
contrast, if the demand comes from Congress, the Executive merely has to show
that the information is covered by a recognized privilege in order to shift the
burden on Congress to present a strong showing of need. This
would lead to a situation where it would be more difficult for Congress
to access executive information than it would be for private citizens.
We maintain then that when the
Executive has already shown that an information is covered by executive
privilege, the party demanding the information must present a "strong showing
of need," whether that party is Congress or a private citizen.
The rule that the same "showing of
need" test applies in both these contexts, however, should not be construed as
a denial of the importance of analyzing the context in which an executive
privilege controversy may happen to be placed.
Rather, it affirms it, for it means that the specific need being
shown by the party seeking information in every particular instance is
highly significant in determining whether to uphold a claim of privilege. This "need" is, precisely, part of the
context in light of which every claim of privilege should be assessed.
Since, as demonstrated above, there
are common principles that should be applied to executive privilege
controversies across different contexts, the Court in PMPF v. Manglapus did not err when it cited the Curtiss-Wright case.
The claim that the book cited in PMPF
v. Manglapus entitled The New American
Government and Its Work could not have taken into account the expanded
statutory right to information in the FOIA assumes that the observations in
that book in support of the confidentiality of treaty negotiations would
be different had it been written after the FOIA. Such assumption is, with due respect, at
best, speculative.
As to the claim in the dissent that "[i]t is more doubtful if the same book be used to calibrate
the importance of the right of access to information in the Philippine setting
considering its elevation as a constitutional right," we submit that the
elevation of such right as a constitutional right did not set it free from the
legitimate restrictions of executive privilege which is itself constitutionally-based.[76] Hence, the comments in that book which were
cited in PMPF v. Manglapus remain valid
6. The dissent further asserts that the Court
has never used "need" as a test to uphold or allow inroads into rights
guaranteed under the Constitution. With
due respect, we assert otherwise. The
Court has done so before, albeit without using the term "need."
In executive privilege controversies,
the requirement that parties present a "sufficient showing of need" only means,
in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of
disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of
privilege.[77] Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing
of interests. Such a balancing of
interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving
fundamental rights. Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion,[78]
which was cited in the dissent, applied just such a test.
Given that the dissent has clarified
that it does not seek to apply the "clear and present danger" test to the
present controversy, but the balancing test, there seems to be no substantial
dispute between the position laid down in this ponencia
and that reflected in the dissent as to what test to apply. It would appear that the only disagreement is
on the results of applying that test in this instance.
The dissent, nonetheless, maintains that
"it suffices that information is of public concern for it to be covered by the
right, regardless of the public's need for the information," and that the same
would hold true even "if they simply want to know it because it interests
them." As has been stated earlier, however,
there is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of
public concern. The Court has earlier
concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any
specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA
as an international trade agreement.
However, when the Executive has
– as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the
subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a
party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded
is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the
doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation
on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies
would be whether an information is a matter of public concern.
Moreover, in view of the earlier
discussions, we must bear in mind that, by disclosing the documents of the
JPEPA negotiations, the Philippine government runs the grave risk of betraying the
trust reposed in it by the Japanese representatives, indeed, by the Japanese government
itself. How would the Philippine
government then explain itself when that happens? Surely, it cannot bear to say that it just had
to release the information because certain persons simply wanted to know
it "because it interests them."
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is
covered by the right to information, a specific "showing of need" for such
information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a
matter of public concern. When,
however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established
that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding
it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is
vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to
effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic
7. The dissent maintains that "[t]he
treaty has thus entered the ultimate stage where the people can exercise their right
to participate in the discussion whether the Senate should concur in its
ratification or not." (Emphasis supplied)
It adds that this right "will be diluted unless the people can have
access to the subject JPEPA documents". What,
to the dissent, is a dilution of the right to participate in decision-making is,
to Us, simply a recognition of the qualified nature of the public's right to
information. It is beyond dispute that
the right to information is not absolute and that the doctrine of executive
privilege is a recognized limitation on that right.
Moreover, contrary to the submission
that the right to participate in decision-making would be diluted, We reiterate
that our people have been exercising their right to participate in the
discussion on the issue of the JPEPA, and they have been able to articulate
their different opinions without need of access to the JPEPA negotiation
Thus, we hold that the balance in this
case tilts in favor of executive privilege.
8. Against our ruling that the
principles applied in U.S. v. Nixon, the Senate Select Committee
case, and In re Sealed Case, are similarly applicable to the present
controversy, the dissent cites the caveat in the Nixon case that the
U.S. Court was there addressing only the President's assertion of privilege in
the context of a criminal trial, not a civil litigation nor a congressional
demand for information. What this caveat
means, however, is only that courts must be careful not to hastily apply the
ruling therein to other contexts. It
does not, however, absolutely mean that the principles applied in that case may
never be applied in such contexts.
Hence, U.S. courts have cited U.S.
v. Nixon in support of their rulings on claims of executive privilege in
contexts other than a criminal trial, as in the case of Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services[80]
– which involved former President Nixon's invocation of executive privilege
to challenge the constitutionality of the "Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act"[81] –
and the above-mentioned In re Sealed Case which involved a claim of
privilege against a subpoena duces tecum issued in a grand jury investigation.
Indeed, in applying to the present
case the principles found in U.S. v. Nixon and in the other cases
already mentioned, We are merely affirming what the Chief Justice stated in his
Dissenting Opinion in Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability[82] –
a case involving an executive-legislative conflict over executive privilege. That dissenting opinion stated that, while Nixon
was not concerned with the balance between the President's generalized interest
in confidentiality and congressional demands for information, "[n]onetheless the [
Verily, while the Court should
guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full
recognition to the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the
proper bounds of executive power, as in this case. Otherwise, the Court would undermine its
own credibility, for it would be perceived as no longer aiming to strike a
balance, but seeking merely to water down executive privilege to the point of
To recapitulate, petitioners' demand
to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot
and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since
Diplomatic negotiations have, since
the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF
v. Manglapus on
That the privilege was asserted for the
first time in respondents' Comment to the present petition, and not during the
hearings of the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment,
since it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the
Executive branch.
For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as
departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita
that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the
Executive Secretary "by order of the President."
the petition is DISMISSED.
Associate Justice
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
In the case title as indicated in
the petition, only the name of Usec. Thomas G. Aquino appears in the portion for "Respondents," to wit:
"HON. THOMAS G. AQUINO, in his capacity as Chairman and Chief Delegate of the
Philippine Coordinating Committee for the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement, et al."
(Underscoring supplied) The other
respondents are enumerated in the body of the petition. (Rollo, pp. 20-23) The Court motu proprio
included the names of these other respondents in the case title to conform to
Sec. 1, par. 2, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the
capacities in which they are being sued.
Moreover, it inserted therein that respondent Usec.
Aquino, as stated in the petition, is also being sued
in his capacity as DTI Undersecretary.
[1] Effective
[2] Annex "F" of Petition, rollo,
p. 95.
[3] The Petition quoted the following
statement of Congressman Teves appearing in the transcript
of the Committee hearing held on
CHAIRPERSON. Now I call on Usec. Aquino
to furnish us a copy of the draft JPEPA and enunciate to this body the positive
as well as the negative impact of said agreement. Is this the draft that the government will
sign in December or this will still be subjected to revisions in the run-up to
its signing? x x x We
requested also to subpoena this but then the Speaker requested me to hold in
abeyance because he wanted to get a (sic) consent of the President before we
can x x x the department
can furnish us a copy of this agreement. (Rollo,
p. 32)
[5] Annex "A," Comment, rollo,
p. 207.
[6] Respondents' Manifestation dated
[7] Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119,
[8] G.R. No. 158088,
[9] Supra
note 7 at 536.
[10] Reply to the Comment of the Solicitor
General, rollo, p. 319 (underscoring supplied).
[11] Business
[12] By Resolution dated August 28, 2007, this
Court directed the parties to manifest whether the Philippine and Japanese
offers have been made accessible to the public just like the full text of the
JPEPA and, if not, whether petitioners still intend to pursue their prayer to
be provided with copies thereof. In
compliance, petitioners manifested that the offers have not yet been made
public and reiterated their prayer that respondents be compelled to provide
them with copies thereof, including all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto (Manifestation and Motion dated September 17, 2007). Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that
the offers have effectively been made accessible to the public since
[13] Constitution,
Art. III, Sec. 7.
[16] Supra note
7 at 541.
[17] 314 Phil.
150 (1995).
[18] 360 Phil.
133 (1998).
[19] 433 Phil.
506 (2002).
[20] G.R. No. 169777,
[22] Rollo, pp.
[23] 360 Phil.
133, 764 (1998), citing V Record Of The
Constitutional Commission 25 (1986).
No. 84642, Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
[25] Specifically,
petitioners therein asked that the Court order respondents to (1) open to
petitioners their negotiations/sessions with the U.S. counterparts on the
agreement; (2) reveal and/or give petitioners access to the items which they
have already agreed upon; and (3) reveal and/or make accessible the respective
positions on items they have not agreed upon, particularly the compensation
package for the continued use by the U.S. of their military bases and
facilities in the Philippines.
[26] 299
[27] Vide Xerox Corp. v.
[28] B. DuVal, Jr., Project Director, American Bar Foundation.
[29] Supra note 20 at 46.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Supra note 19 at 189.
[32] Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 162 U.S.App.D.C.
[33] Vide Arnault
v. Nazareno, 87 Phil.
29, 46 (1950): "In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the
Special Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the
petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and
as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and
allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000
of public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. x x x"
[34] 421 U.S., at 150, 95 S.Ct. 1504, reiterated in Department of the
Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective
Association, 532
[36] Supra
note 24.
[37] 545
F.Supp. 615,
[38] 237
F.Supp.2d 17.
[40] CIEL v. Office of U.S. Trade
Representative, 237 F.Supp.2d
17. Vide Department of the
Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective
Association, 532 U.S. 1, 121 S.Ct. 1060:
"Exemption 5 protects from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
To qualify, a document must thus satisfy two conditions: its source must be a
Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against
discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the
agency that holds it."
[41] Supra note 20 at 46 (emphasis supplied).
[42] Petitioners
expound as follows:
has been 18 years since the PMPF v. Manglapus case,
and the world has changed considerably in that span of time. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, bringing down
with it the Cold War and its attendant hostilities, and ushering in a new era
of globalization and international economic cooperation as we know it. The
[43] Rollo, pp.
[44] Supra note
[45] Supra note
[46] 433 Phil.
506, 534 (2002), citing PMPF v. Manglapus, supra note 24 and Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 18.
[47] In re Sealed Case (121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S.App.D.C.
276 [1997]) states thus: "Nixon, GSA, Sirica, and the other Nixon cases all
employed a balancing methodology in analyzing whether, and in what
circumstances, the presidential communications privilege can be overcome. Under
this methodology, these opinions balanced the public interests served by
protecting the President's confidentiality in a particular context with those
furthered by requiring disclosure." (Emphasis
[48] 418
[49] Supra note
Supra note
[51] Supra note
[52] Supra
note 47.
[53] Rollo, p. 349.
[54] For a small
sampling, vide "Primer sa Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement" (JPEPA) at www.bayan.ph/downloads/Primer%20on%20jpepa.pdf;
(JPEPA)" at www.nccphilippines.org/indexfiles/Page1562.htm;
"JPEPA Ratification: Threat Economics" at http://www.aer.ph/index.php?option/=com_content&task=view&id=632&Itemid=63
(all sites visited on February 2, 2008).
[55] Entitled "A
PHILIPPINES," promulgated
(1.1) To enter into trade agreements with
foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof; x x
[56] 396 Phil. 623, 663 (2000).
[57] G.R. No. 158088,
[58] Supra note
[59] G.R. No. 169777,
[61] According to the records of this Court, the
judgment in Senate v. Ermita was entered on
[62] Revised Dissenting Opinion, p. 15 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
[63] 450 Phil.
744 (2003), penned by then Associate Justice Puno.
[65] The Federalist, No. 75 (Italics in the original,
emphasis and underscoring supplied).
[66] Article II
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states: "He [the President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur
x x x". (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) On the other
hand, Article VII Section 21 of the Philippine Constitution states: "No treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
[67] Supra
note 18.
[68] 162
[69] 365
F.3d 1108, 361 U.S.App.D.C. 183 (2004).
[70] Supra
note 47.
[71] 345
[72] Supra at
note 63.
[73] Supra
at note 64.
[74] Supra
note 19.
[75] Supra at
note 18.
[77] In re
Sealed Case (121 F.3d 729) states thus: "Nixon, GSA, Sirica, and the other Nixon cases all employed a balancing
methodology in analyzing whether, and in what circumstances, the presidential
communications privilege can be overcome.
Under this methodology, these
opinions balanced the public interests served by protecting the President's
confidentiality in a particular context with those furthered by
requiring disclosure." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[78] G.R. No. 139465,
In that case, respondent Mark
Jimenez claimed under the due process
clause the right to notice and hearing in the extradition proceedings
against him. Consider the
following enlightening disquisition of
the Court:
the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private
respondent's claim to due process
predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law…" Without a bubble of
a doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized
society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves.
brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give
more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to
expedite the extradition to the
that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation
stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is
nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak,
we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government
thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. x x x (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied)
[79] Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 16.
[80] 433
[81] 88 Stat. 1695.
[82] G.R. No. 180643,
[83] Emphasis


text:
Red Bull and Mercedes share fastest pit-stop times
After 17 races of the 2011 season, there have been a total of 988 pit stops in race conditions. To compare pit crew performance, an analysis of average stop times (excluding repair stops and stops under the safety car) puts Red Bull and Mercedes in equal first place, followed by McLaren (+0.3s), Force India (+0.4s) and Ferrari (+0.5s). Bringing up the rear are Virgin (+1.6s) and HRT (+3.2s).
11 Nov 2011 - Source
Sebastian Vettel
Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes again!! Red Bull number one!! Oh, and also "joint first", AKA "number two", haha Mark.
Mark Webber
Ah fair go mate, pit stops are a team effort, I'm defo getting some credit for this one.
Sebastian Vettel
I suppose you do give the pit lads a bit of extra practice when you break the car Mark, which I never ever do.
Christian Horner
Don't worry Seb, even in the very unlikely event that you break something, we have spares for everything on the car. In fact Adrian tells me we have so many spare parts, we could actually make a second car out of them.
Fernando Alonso
Bloody hell, how did HRT manage to be 3.2 seconds off the pace... are they still refueling in the pits or what?
Michael Schumacher
Hmm... lighter fuel loads - that would explain their blistering race pace.
Colin Kolles
Lay off guys, everyone has to start somewhere. We're in a development phase at the moment.
Michael Schumacher
Seems your pit crew's motor skills are still in development. Surely if there's one thing you loser teams could be expected to be reasonably competitive at, it would be wheel changing. I've seen it done quicker on the side of a motorway.
Fernando Alonso
And that's with cars and lorries whizzing past, probably also at speeds far in excess of HRT capabilities.
Jerome d'Ambrosio
I think it's pretty scary in the pit lane though Fernando, at least that's what my pit crew says.
Fernando Alonso
They're probably referring to that time you tried to run over the lot of them backwards in Hungary, remember that?
Jerome d'Ambrosio
Oh yeah, I mixed up the accelerator and the brake, I think that happens to everyone sometimes.
Fernando Alonso
Everyone with a severe brain impediment at least. Anyway forget that "braking" stuff Ambrosia, brakes only make you go slower, none of the top drivers ever use them. You'll go, ahem... a long way without them.
David Coulthard
It's hard to believe a team like McLaren have only the 3rd fastest pit crew Martin.
Martin Brundle
Well Red Bull have been setting the standard this year David, and the German efficiency at Mercedes doesn't surprise me that much either.
David Coulthard
I'm not sure I believe the numbers Martin, I've seen Hamilton do pitstops where the McLaren crew were so fast that I didn't even notice the mechanics working on the car.
Martin Brundle
Christ, those were drive-through penalties David. Lewis has had a few of those this year.
David Coulthard
When I was a kid going to the drive-thru was a treat, not a punishment. No wonder kids are so spoilt these days.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
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text:
Tony. Plush.
By Rich Ward in Brewers, Featured on October 7, 2011 8:22 pm / 3 comments
Nyjer Morgan may be eccentric. He may be a child at times. He may have been a locker room "cancer" in the past, and he may even have been louder off the field than his talent on the field should allow. But tonight, he's a hero.
As Miller Park erupts, with 44,000 in attendance and millions across the state spill tears of finality as the NLDS comes to a close with the Brewers rejoicing, Nyjer Morgan celebrated like only he knows how:
"Yeah! Woo! F*** YEAH! F*** YEAH!"
Again, eccentric; perhaps a little out of line. But there is no denying his youthful exuberance and all-out glee. Morgan has fun. He enjoys the game, and his celebration makes me feel like a 10-year child, remembering my very first "big game" moment. Simply said, he's a blast to watch and a blast to root for. Bathe in this moment Milwaukee, you certainly deserve it.
Me? I'm off to riot.
We Don't Have to Take Our Clothes Off
Tags: Milwaukee Brewers, NLCS, NLDS, Nyjer Morgan, Tony Plush
I don't really watch baseball much. I did watch a bit of the Brewers game until the prick in the restaurant grabbed the remote and changed it to Seinfeld. Augh. But I follow "The Real T Plush" on Twitter, and I like him. His reactions last night were joyous, if a little profane. Good for him.
And how did you know that is one of my favorite songs of the 80′s? Talk about a one hit wonder – but what a hit!
Nice touch with Jermaine Stewart! LOL!
http://www.twitter.com/RichWardJr Rich Ward
It's impossible to listen to Mr. Stewart without feeling the itch to dance. I'm glad at least a couple of people (the coolest) noticed. In the mood to celebrate, it was the first song that came to mind. =)
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text:
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By Mark I love these CINCH shirts and am very glad these "run big" on all sizes.
The quality is great ! The buttons and other details make this a good buy.
By DawnaI purchased this shirt as a Christmas gift for my husband who loves Cinch and wears them all the time. We were very disappointed when we ordered a small and the shirt label indicated small but the shirt would easily fit a large man. Either the shirt is labeled incorrectly or Cinch changed their sizing. So...not satisfied at all with this purchase.
By GregThis is a well made shirt that holds up
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text:
Charter Buses in Bolton, MA
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text:
I just logged into MDE and got a message that they were moving all their reservation information over to a new system. After a few minutes of waiting while it moved my information it said it did so. However, now nothing is saved and it says I need to manually re-enter each resort and dining reservation and my ticket information, and my FastPass+ selections do not even show up on My Itinerary. What the what???
write or take a pic of the confirmation numbers. i've found with the new system things will disappear and reappear at random without ever being changed by me. i've gone to disney more times than i can count and have found more problems using the current system than any in the past. cover your bases and keep your confirmation info with you just in case.
Yeah, mine got lost too. I was changing from All Star Music to Coronado though, so I just called and cancelled them. They found them easily, it's just the link to the MDE site, not the actual reservation.


text:
Edit: Mom moved in. She has early onset Alzheimer's and does not listen! I have started spanking her and it works!
- 271 Replies
I treat her the same way she treated me as a kid. If she doesn't listen she gets two warnings then a spank with a wooden spoon or a belt. She's my family and I can discipline her in my own way. My house, my rules.
i don't understand what's getting everybody so upset. I am fully legally entitled to hit my kids when they misbehave and they are way smaller and more vulnerable. My mom justified her beating me as a child by telling me it was for my own good. So how could it not be for her own good to get the same punishment that she thought appropriate to dish out to her kids when they behaved the same way. I do it because I love her. My house my rules. Spare the rod spoil the person. I was spanked and I turned out just fine. It hurts me more than it hurts her. She needs to learn respect.
Ok just so we're clear - it's ok to smack my kids but its not ok to smack my mom for the same behaviour. Got it... Thanks for clearing that up.
re edit: this post was satirical. i do not smack ANYONE, i dont smack my kids, my mother, my dogs or my husband. i dont believe violence has any place within the home.
Quoting jojo_star:That's elder abuse and against the law. I hope someone reports you and your mother gets help.
But that's exactly what she did with us as kids. Two warnings then the belt. I am tired of cleaning up after her, she knows better, she's just being lazy. When she dumps her dinner on the floor she gets a whack! It works, she has been much better behaved.
Quoting jojo_star:That's elder abuse and against the law. I hope someone reports you and your mother gets help.


text:
Publisher's Description
+The software is designed for management of computers at schools and training centres. The application allows remote control of all computers at the classroom from one place - a teacher can lock or unlock computers for the students by one click as well as enable or disable browsing on the internet.
What's new in this version:
Pre-selected Internet sites blocking based on the blacklist principle (e.g. social networks blocking).