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DOES MONEY MAKE THE STATE? POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE GREENBACK, AND THE EURO November 2003 Kathleen R. McNamara Associate Professor of Government Department of Government and School of Foreign Service Georgetown University Washington, DC 20057 firstname.lastname@example.com For helpful comments on earlier versions of this project, I thank Sheri Berman, Jerry Cohen, Frank Dobbin, Aaron L. Friedberg, Eric Helleiner, Jeffrey Herbst, Jacques Hymans, Nicolas Jabko, Jeffrey Kopstein, Michael Mastanduno, Jonathon Moses, Kirsten Rodine, James Savage, Steven Teles, Keith E. Whittington, Bill Wohlforth, seminar participants at University of California at Berkeley, Princeton University, Georgetown University, Brandeis University, Dartmouth College, Rutgers University, University of Toronto, and Johns Hopkins University. The Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton provided financial support for this research. ABSTRACT The recent creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe challenges much of what we have come to take for granted about states and the components of sovereignty. What does the willingness of twelve European Union (EU) members to abandon their own currencies mean for the nation-states of Europe? Does the Euro automatically imply further political development at the EU level? To address these questions, this paper draws on the literature of comparative political development to parse out the role that national currencies play in statebuilding, and develops this approach with reference to the creation of a national currency in nineteenth century America. I argue that just as US federal authorities engaged in a political project to wrest control over money from subnational authorities to the center and unify the currency, so has European currency unification involved important changes in the location of legitimate authority. In particular, I highlight the role of war and market integration in prompting currency consolidation, and the importance of linkages between money and fiscal capacity for statebuilding, and apply the analytical lessons learned from the US experience to the case of the Euro and the future of European political development. 1 INTRODUCTION The recent establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe seems to challenge much of what we have come to take for granted about states and the components of sovereignty. What does the abandonment of their national currencies by twelve European Union (EU) members mean for the political future of the nation-state in Europe? Does the Euro automatically imply further political development at the EU level—and should we therefore view the EU as a state in the making? Or is the relationship between currency and the structure of political authority weaker and more tenuous? EMU has typically been studied from perspectives that make it difficult to answer these questions. Scholars have understood EMU either as a technical solution to an economic problem, or as an example of an intergovernmental cooperative regime, remaining silent on questions of political authority. This essay moves beyond these perspectives to examine the creation of the Euro through the lens of comparative political development.1 National currencies were largely created in the nineteenth century in tandem with the modern state, a contentious process of monetary consolidation involving power struggles over the rightful locus of authority and the nature of governance (Tilly, 1975; Poggi, 1978; Cohen, 1998; Helleiner, 2003). Studying these historical processes of currency creation and statebuilding may help us understand the implications of the Euro today. One historical case of currency consolidation in particular, the antebellum United States (US), provides a striking analogy from which we might draw lessons for contemporary Europe. The Greenback we carry in our wallets did not appear with the initial founding of the US, but rather its creation during the civil war was part of a broader monetary consolidation that coincided with a gradual political transformation towards a more centralized and unified sovereign state. Just as US federal authorities engaged in a political project to wrest control over money from subnational authorities and unify the currency, so have the dynamics of currency unification in the EU involved important conflicts over the location of the legitimate exercise of control and rule. If indeed the Euro"s creation has historical precedent in the US case, we may learn something from an analysis of the parallels, and differences, between the two cases. In this essay, I argue that just as political authority was consolidated in tandem with a single money at the US national level in the nineteenth century, so are similar 1 While the specific analysis I am undertaking here has few precedents, EU scholars have wrestled with questions of political development more generally: see Sbragia (1992), Caporaso (1996, 2000), Marks (1997) and Hooghe and Marks (2001). Nicolaidis and Howse (2001) offer a comparative survey of federalism in the EU and the contemporary US. Analyses of the relationship between money and political order include Bensel (1990), Helleiner (1998), Gilbert and Helleiner (1999), Woodruff (1999), and Cohen (1998). In particular, Helleiner (2003) offers an extraordinarily rich and sophisticated analysis of the historical creation of territorial currencies. 2 processes of polity creation generating federal governance structures, albeit very unevenly, in the EU alongside the Euro. I draw out two lessons from the US case about the specific causal relationship between currency consolidation and statebuilding, and its value for understanding Europe today. First, the US-EU comparison highlights the importance of currency for statebuilding, as a successful national money strengthens the policy capacity and authority of the central state. But it also demonstrates the greater importance of fiscal policy linkages in furthering political development. While the federal takeover of currency creation in the US promoted statebuilding in a variety of ways, it was the role of a national currency in stimulating fiscal policy capacity and revenue extraction that locked-in political authority at the federal level. Because one of the key factors that prompted US leaders to create a national currency and expand fiscal capacity, namely, the demands of war fighting, is missing in the EU case, however, it less likely that fiscal policy developments, and thus political change, in Brussels will mirror that of the US. The second, and more general, lesson this comparison between the US and the EU highlights is the broader relationship between market building and polity building, and the critical role played by political and social institutions in this process (Ruggie, 1982; North 1990; Dobbin, 1990; Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002). The integration of Europe"s single market seems to closely parallel the experience of US market integration, providing a similar impetus for the development of a single currency. In both cases, societal pressures for authoritative rules to govern market integration interacted with the desires of some political actors to move policy capacity to the federal level, producing new forms of legitimate political control at a higher level of governance. In particular, in the antebellum US as well as today"s Europe, an activist federal court has played a pivotal role in constructing the single market thorough the creation of rules governing exchange, setting the stage for currency consolidation. Both of these lessons, the limited nature of fiscal policy capacity and the strong links between market construction and political development in the EU, have implications for the nature and extent of political development at the European level today. The rest of this article details these claims as follows. I begin by briefly outlining why conventional scholarship on European monetary integration cannot address the question of how a single currency impacts political development. I then explain why an comparison of the antebellum US case and today's EU as cases of political development is a plausible exercise. The next section outlines my alternative perspective on currency consolidation, drawn from the American political development and European state formation literature, and lays out a template for understanding the links between currency and statebuilding. I then offer a brief history of the drive towards a single currency in the US, highlighting the role of war and market integration in shaping actors' interests in pushing forward monetary consolidation, and demonstrating the importance of linkages between currency and fiscal policy capacity in transforming political authority. I apply the analytical lessons learned to the case of the Euro, and conclude. 3 EXPLAINING THE SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE Why do we need a new scholarly approach to understand the politics of the Euro? Although valuable in providing explanations of the sources of a single currency, conventional analyses of EMU cannot readily address the question of how money relates to political authority. One of the prominent approaches to currency consolidation, optimum currency area (OCA) theory, was developed to determine when a single currency would be economically efficient (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). Although valuable as a policy guide, the OCA predictions bear little resemblance to the real world of currency areas: economists have concluded that both the US and the EU are not optimum currency areas (Cohen, 1993; Bini-Smaghi and Vori, 1992; Eichengreen, 1990, 1992). Others have focused instead on the distributional consequences of currency unification to explain the drive to EMU. Frieden (1991) argues that the push for monetary union in Europe came from particular sectoral interests in society, such as multinational exporters, which might gain from reduced currency instability and lowered transaction costs. This approach would seem to be strengthened by recent empirical work showing strong effects of currency union on trade (Rose, 2001). Yet although this sectoral interests approach may help predict the political sources of currency consolidation, it is silent on the broader political and institutional consequences of the move to a unified currency. Alternatively, some international relations scholars have assessed the Euro in terms of theories of international cooperation and international regimes (Sandholtz, 1993; McNamara, 1998; Moravcsik, 1998). In this view, states will enter into monetary regimes, be they ad hoc as in the G-7, or formalized and binding arrangements such as the Euro, in order to achieve goals not reachable unilaterally. States thus retain their essential sovereignty and power as governance does not meaningfully shift with currency consolidation. Instead, certain functions are merely delegated as they can be more effectively executed at the supranational level (Moravcsik, 1998). Again, although they may offer convincingly explanations on how EMU was created, because their analyses are squarely within the international relations sovereign state paradigm, this perspective rules out the question of what sort of political development may flow from a common money. The literature on EMU, therefore, can be drawn upon to understand the sources of the Euro, but to assess the potential for political authority to be transformed in tandem with the Euro we must look elsewhere. Instead of strict economic analyses or the international relations literature, it is to the perspective of comparative political development and to the historical record of other cases of currency consolidation that we now turn. 4 COMPARING ANTEBELLUM AMERICA AND TODAY'S EU How is such historical comparison possible, given the claims of certain scholars that the EU is a sui generis phenomenon?2 I argue that the American nineteenth century move from multiple currencies to a single currency and nationalized monetary system, and the EU's transformation from multiple currencies to one single currency and monetary union, can both be coded as cases of currency consolidation. 3 As is described in detail in the case study section, below, before the American Civil War, foreign currencies as well as multiple versions of the dollar circulated widely throughout the US, and state-based banks issued notes which functioned locally as paper money. There was no permanent national central bank and little in the way of federal mechanisms for control. While the dollar was the standard unit of account, state dollars floated at different rates within the antebellum US, similar to the floating of European national currencies prior to EMU. Just as in the EU today, the American states followed independent fiscal policies with few interstate fiscal mechanisms to promote redistribution or encourage political solidarity across the union. The antebellum states could even borrow directly from foreign capital markets in pursuit of their own goals.4 The American Greenback was created, national money consolidated and competing paper currencies abolished, at the same time as the US states vehemently resisted further forays into other aspects of their sovereignty. Likewise, today multiple national European currencies previously circulating across Europe have been unified, through an exercise of immense political will, into a single currency, while other components of governance, such as social policy and taxation, remain at the EU member state level. Thus, I contend that the US and the EU cases may be viewed as examples of currency consolidation in situations of contested political authority. If this is so, the earlier US case provides an opportunity to investigate the causal processes linking money and political structures so as to understand the contours of political change in Europe today. Inferences must be carefully drawn, however, given the particular differences across the two cases. Most centrally, the Euro replaced twelve national currencies and is issued by a European Central Bank, whereas the US change involved a move from a chaotic situation of thousands of private and public currencies to a single legal tender currency, the United States dollar or Greenback, but several other forms of currency continued to circulate and there was no national bank for many decades. Although the dollar was the functioning unit of account in the US from 1790s onwards (Hurst, 1973, 32-34), before the Euro, the EU states used their national currencies as distinct unit of 2 See Caporaso et al (1997) for a discussion of this contention. 3 Although political scientists have not yet made much of this comparison, Bordo and Jonung note that American monetary history "...is commonly used as a benchmark by economists when examining various issues of the process of European Monetary unification." (Bordo and Jonung, 1999, p. 27). See for example, Sheridan, 1996, Eichengreen, 1990; Bordo and Jonung, 1999; and Hefeker, 1995. 4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 5 accounts within their territories, despite the efforts of some to make the ECU (European Currency Unit) play this role. What about the comparability of the two cases along a range of other potentially important variables? Even if both cases can be categorized as a move to a single currency, if they vary too widely in other ways, it is hard to imagine that lessons learned from the US case might be transferable to the EU. Yet along a variety of dimensions, particularly culture and political structure, there may be enough similarities to make such a comparison fruitful--with appropriate caveats. First, in terms of political culture, we might assume that the high degree of cultural heterogeneity in the EU would present more of a barrier to political development in the EU case than in the relatively homogenous antebellum US. While the American states began with a shared language and national political tradition, Europe today is composed of states with longstanding and diverse cultures, languages, and political histories. This assumption may overstate the differences in the two cases, however. Although the American colonies had a shared political history in the war of independence, and largely (but not completely) a shared common language, the bonds across the colonies and with the new states of the union had by no means assumed inevitability in the period before the civil war.5 Instead, the antebellum US was marked by deep cultural and political divides, violently expressed in the civil war but felt long before and afterwards. These divides extended beyond the North-South cleavages to secessionist movements in the mid-West region and Western expansion states.6 Language of the time reflected this felt sense of separateness: the US was referred to in the plural, as in 'the United States are' and usage only changed to 'the United States is' after the civil war (McPherson, 1991, viii). The views of prominent observers at the time express this sentiment clearly. For example, after visiting America, Chateaubriand wrote: "It is immensely difficult to create a country out of states without any community of religion and interests...how many centuries will be needed to make these elements homogenous?" Likewise, others, such as De Tocqueville in Democracy in America, and Madison in the Federalist Papers, spoke of the "distinct nations" formed by the states of the US. It can be argued that American cultural and political identity, and their links to nationhood were constructed over a long time period, not fixed by the nineteenth century. If this is true, the US case before the civil war might not be as dissimilar from the EU in terms of political culture as we might initially assume. Second, in terms of their formal political structures and institutions, prior to the creation of the single currency, both today's EU and the US of the nineteenth century can 5 Indeed, even the shared memories of fighting the British were a double edged sword for advocates of a stronger federal union, as this memory also contained in it the cultural tradition of resisting centralized authority and an emphasis instead on local or state control. 6 Bensel, 1990, 62. 6 be described as loose federal structures with central control limited to a few key areas. 7 At the founding of the US and the EU, the political structure of both was based on a unified customs union with a rapidly integrating single market. The constitutional hierarchy of political authority was fiercely contested in the antebellum US; recently, compliance with European level (European Court of Justice) law has been higher than antebellum compliance was with federal US law (Goldstein, 1997, 2001). Of course, important differences in the concentration of federal power obviously remain: the foreign policy capacity of the US was much greater than it is in today"s EU. Political parties were also more organized at the federal US level than they are in the EU, where parties have yet to have a European identity. Nonetheless, we should be careful not to overstate the degree of societal, political or legal consensus on the hierarchy of political authority in nineteenth century America. Third, any comparison of these two cases should also take into account the similarities and differences in the overall economic environment of the period. Here we may find the starkest differences between the two eras. While both the antebellum US and the EU were integrating single markets with states at varying levels of economic development, today"s EU is highly industrialized, whereas the nineteenth century US was industrializing but still significantly agrarian. Finally, the meaning of government control over money differs today, with higher expectations about macroeconomic management over the economy, in contrast to the more limited expectations of the nineteenth century. These differences may influence the move to a single currency and its subsequent impact on political development. Despite the differences, there are enough parallels between today"s EU and the antebellum US to make a comparison potentially useful. As Europe today is a collection of divergent polities and economies seeking some balance between collective governance and local sovereignty, and so was the antebellum US. The act of consolidating monetary authority over a single paper currency may be consequential for this precarious balance of power in both cases. Understood in this way, comparisons of political processes across these two cases might be helpful for understanding the implications of the Euro for political development in Europe. MODELS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT In arguing that the broad lines of the American historical case and today's European experience may be comparable despite important differences, I am making the case for analyzing the EU through the perspective of comparative political development. Fortunately, such an exercise can draw on an extensive statebuilding literature from comparative and American politics. Below, I sketch out the basic premises of this approach and develop a template to understand the potential causal linkages between the sources of currency consolidation and a single money's consequences for political development. 7 See Kelemen (2003) for a comprehensive comparison of the EU to other federal systems. 7 The statebuilding literature examines the process by which power is consolidated and institutionalized through policymaking capacity at the center of a bounded geographical territory and population.8 For most theorists, the modern Western state is characterized as having a unique, distinct, independent power of rule with a unity of state territory, bounded by geographically defensible borders. Components of modern states generally (but not always) include a unified fiscal system; a single, often imposed, national language; a unified legal system; and, critical for our purposes here, a single currency (Poggi, 1978, 93). Statebuilding is related to but distinct from nation building: the latter implies the creation of a political community and common identity. Nation building can be a critical enabling foundation for state power and capacity, however. How does the process of statebuilding unfold, and, most importantly for understanding the experience of the EU today, how might we know it when we see it? Scholars have attempted to offer a generalized trajectory of political development which identifies the sequence and timing of the stages of statebuilding. The fact that this process is always historically contingent has prompted divergent models, making it easier to identify a process of political development than to predict its likely end result. From the European experience, Huntington proposed a three stage stylized description of statebuilding: it begins with the centralization of state power, continues with the development of specialized bureaucracies, and finally spreads to increased political participation at the new level of government (Huntington, 1968). Political development in the US case is generally agreed to have evolved differently: the broadening of political participation came first, not last, in the American case, before the development of a consolidated central state, and the creation of an extended and highly differentiated bureaucracy lagged behind. In addition, the role of the courts is different across the historical European and American cases: in the nineteenth century European statebuilding, the state itself was the fundamental source of political authority, whereas in America, the law was the ultimate authority and arbitrator. What causes statebuilding? A central cause is war, as summed up in Tilly's succinct phrase, "War made the state and the state made war" (Tilly, 1975, 42). Political leaders" desire to win at war have historically prompted them to centralize and strengthen the state. Effective mobilization for war may require an expanded state bureaucracy, a deepening of revenue extraction, and government involvement in a wide array of activities within the economy (Porter, 1994). Just as important, the perception of crisis and a security imperative has often been crucial in overriding the objections of societal groups and local officials to such statebuilding. 8 On the development of states in Western Europe, see Tilly (1975); Poggi (1978); and Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985). The US experience is explored in the American Political Development literature: see Burnham (1970); Skowronek (1982); Bensel (1990); and Friedberg (2000). I use the terms statebuilding and political development interchangeably in my analysis, as the literature does not have a more general term to describe the supranational federal system that is emerging in the Europe Union. 8 In addition to war, theorists have emphasized the linkages between statebuilding and the development of capitalist markets (Poggi, 1978; Skowronek 1991). As economic activity becomes more integrated and complex, societal actors make claims on the state to stabilize and regulate markets against the volatility inherent in their growth. Rules are generated, often by federal level courts, to enable markets to function. The creation of a market system, accompanied by the establishment of legal institutions and an administrative bureaucracy, centralizes authority over time as a newly deepened polity is constructed in tandem with the newly enlarged market. A single currency can be seen as part of this market and polity construction, as a single money reduces uncertainty and transactions costs and bolsters market integration at the same time as it creates a new authoritative political institution to regulate money. This reciprocal relationship between market construction and polity construction has been identified by authors emphasizing the necessity of authoritative governance structures to sustain markets (Polanyi, 1947; Ruggie, 1983; Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002). Figure 2 provides a heuristic illustration of the potential relationship between statebuilding, war and market integration. In this conceptualization, statebuilding is most likely when both factors pushing statebuilding, war and market integration, are present and least likely when they are not. When one but not both factors are present, statebuilding is likely to occur only unevenly. Figure 2: The Causes of Political Development Threat of War Low High Market Low No Uneven Integration Statebuilding Statebuilding High Uneven Statebuilding Statebuilding This framework suggests the possible causal relationships at work, however, there is no guarantee that state and societal actors will always respond with statebuilding in wartime or when markets integrate (Centano, 1997). Indeed, political systems can degenerate under such pressures, rather than developing, as may be the case today in Russia (Stoner-Weiss, 2003). As we will see in the cases, the combination of public and private interests at work will ultimately determine outcomes, and a finer grained analysis 9 of the coalitional politics producing specific policies must be added to the larger structural account presented above. What role for a national currency? Where does currency fit into the rubric of political development? Monetary consolidation and the creation of a national currency has been assumed to be a component part of the state building process, yet few authors writing on political development have explicitly focused on currencies per se. This is curious, for currency consolidation institutionalizes the power to rule and control, and is generally "hard-won, the culmination of a process of organized coercion and political negotiation similar to those that resulted in the other powers defining the modern nation-state" (Woodruff, 1999, 3). Therefore, I propose a template drawn from the statebuilding perspective that theorizes why actors may find a national currency attractive, and establishes the reciprocal connections between currency unification and statebuilding. In particular, I focus on how a national money can bolster administrative and bureaucratic capacity and provide a crucial foundation for the creation of a national fiscal regime. The causal factors of war and market integration are important for currency consolidation as they are in other statebuilding areas. A national money can be a component part of the development of state capacity in times of warfare, facilitating the collection of revenues, payment of federal expenditures, and organization of debt. A single currency can also help facilitate the development of a national single market, simplifying transactions and lowering uncertainty across economic actors. If motivated actors at the center of the polity are able to seize the opportunity presented by security threats or the destabilizing effects of enlarging markets, they may successfully move governance upwards. Societal groups may be more likely to support such actions (or at least not mobilized in opposition), as the fact of war or economic change may legitimize the currency unification. What might be a single currency"s subsequent effects on political development? A single currency most directly and prosaically contributes to the development of administrative and bureaucratic power and capacity on the part of the central state, as responsibility for management of a uniform money moves to the national level. This task is often initially housed inside preexisting treasury or finance departments or ministries and then spawns new and more highly differentiated bureaucracies in conjunction with a national bank system, and ultimately, a national central bank. In so doing, policymaking capabilities come under purview of central authorities, moving power to the national level government and providing the instruments for its effective use, in line with the description of political development described by Huntington and others. In particular, a national currency is important for political development because of its four-fold ability to facilitate the creation of a national fiscal system. First, once a paper currency is created and delinked from traditional metallic standards, it loosens the ties on government spending. The ability to run deficits and issue national public debt greatly enhances the capacities of states, and a national currency makes it easier both to 10 raise and organize public debt. Second, the creation of a single currency also significantly reduces the transaction costs of designing and running public fiscal systems, for example in allowing authorities to collect taxes and make payments more effectively. Third, nationalizing the currency can enhance the growth and efficiency of private financial markets. Finally, a single currency can have direct and important impact on national revenues through seinorage gains. While these four effects seem to accrue benefits to political elites at the center, they also may benefit particular societal actors, such as well situated finance capitalists, who therefore might see the development of a federal level monetary system as directly in their interest. In summary, national currencies may arise from the same political sources that push forward statebuilding, and a single currency has the potential, in turn, to reinforce governance from the center through its effects on administrative and fiscal capacity. 9 The next section examines the antebellum US case to illustrate and refine this conceptual frame. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE AMERICAN CURRENCY To develop a template with which to understand the contemporary European case of currency consolidation, I ask two questions of the American historical record. First, what conditions prompted actors to seek the consolidation of monetary authority? Second, how did this process of consolidation contribute, if at all, to statebuilding in the United States? In line with the literature on comparative political development, I highlight the role of war and market integration in stimulating certain public and private interests in monetary reform and creating the conditions under which actors desiring a single currency might prevail, and then draw out the connections between the consolidation of the monetary system, fiscal capacity, and American statebuilding. From Many Currencies to One: Antebellum Monetary History The road to the American Greenback was long and contentious.10 The US Constitution provided Congress with the power to coin money and regulate its value, but there was no specific instructions for a single American currency or central bank (Hurst 1973). The assumption was that a self-adjusting metallic standard would suffice, but the logistics of using gold soon provoked a demand for paper money, which in turn implied the need for active oversight and public regulation. Paper monies began to be used in earnest in the late eighteenth century in tandem with the development of a commercial banking system, with three state banks, issuing their own local notes, chartered by Congress along with a national level First Bank of the United States in 1791. Federal control of the monetary system remained weak, however, as hostility to national control sunk the renewal of the First Bank"s charter (Timberlake 1978, 10). After a period of 9 A second, more subtle way a single currency may promote statebuilding is through its impact on the creation of national identity. See Helleiner, 1998; 1999; Risse et al, 1999, Hymans, 2002. 10 McNamara (2002) examines the American case in detail. 11 state oversight over banking, a Second National Bank was established in 1816 but it too struck only a temporary and precarious balance between federal power and state sovereignty. Its charter ended without renewal in 1836 after becoming a central issue in Andrew Jackson"s 1832 anti-federalist campaign for presidency.11 Despite the lack of a national bank, the American economy developed and modernized in the period before the Civil War; unsurprisingly, however, its monetary system was highly decentralized and often chaotic. The federal government issued specie money, gold and silver coins, which were used to settle accounts, while a variety of paper currencies, not created by the federal government, also circulated (Sheridan, 1996, Ritter, 1997). Although estimates differ, before the Civil War, approximately 7000 different kinds of bank notes were used as currency and, to further complicate matters, a good portion of those in circulation were counterfeit (Hepburn, 1924; Timberlake, 1978, 84; Rockoff, 1974, 151, 143). Moreover, "To cope with this chaos, merchants were forced to consult monthly bank note 'detectors' which informed them of the relative value of each note" (Helleiner 1999, 320). State governments were charged with overseeing local banks after the demise of the Second National Bank, but a large variation existed in the extent and effectiveness of their oversight. A series of banking crises prompted debate over the need for reform of this chaos, but there was little consensus on how to do so (Timberlake, 1978, 65-74). To further the confusion, local bank notes also were traded across state borders, like national currencies today, and these paper currencies would rise or fall in value based on the assessment of the credibility of the commitment to exchange the note for specie. While some state bank systems were sound, such as those of New York and Louisiana, "others, particularly those along the Western frontier, were unstable and poorly managed. Since bank notes were often of uncertain value, they were heavily discounted by eastern banks." (Ritter, 1997, 66). Financial intermediaries tested the willingness of the banks to redeem notes at the stated value, and by the mid-1860s, clearinghouses were set up in major cities to facilitate this process. In effect, the antebellum US had a system of floating exchange rates and multiple currencies not unlike the European exchange rate system before EMU, as Sheridan (1996) has argued, although more chaotic and costly. A standardized American currency system finally became a reality only with the onset of the Civil War. A series of reforms, described more fully below, centralized the monetary system at the federal level by outlawing local currencies and largely transferring monetary power to the center. A central part of these reforms was the introduction of large quantities of Greenbacks or "United States notes", which were issued by the federal government as fiat money, full legal tender for all debts public and private. Although several types of national level monies continued to circulate as currency after the early 1860s, the overall consolidation of federal control over money during the civil war was dramatic. 11 There is disagreement among historians over the Second Bank's powers. See Timberlake (1978, 1993), Fraas (1974), Hammond (1957), Catterall (1902), and Smith (1953). 12 The Causes and Consequences of the Single American Currency What were the dynamics that produced these changes towards a more centralized monetary system and single currency in the antebellum United States, and what were their effects on governance? As outlined in the theoretical discussion of currency and political development above, two factors were important in motivating actors to seek currency consolidation. The most immediate and proximate cause was war, specifically public officials need to rationalize the monetary system and increase federal revenues to prosecute the American civil war. The second factor setting the stage for a single currency was the creation of a single American market, spurred on by the federal courts, which created rising societal pressures for regulation of the monetary regime. The political processes set in motion by these factors impacted not only the creation of the American single currency, but rather governance structures and political authority more broadly as well. I treat each factor in turn. War The creation of the American Greenback well illustrates the relationship between war fighting, the development of national currencies, and statebuilding. Even prior to the civil war, some political elites had linked monetary control to security concerns. The Second National Bank's founding was spearheaded by Congressional members concerned with strengthening the union and national capacities in the wake of the War of 1812 (Hammond, 1957). As the pressures of war faded, Congressional mistrust at the centralization of power within the executive reasserted itself "reflecting the general antipathy in Congress to discretionary executive control" (Timberlake, 1978, 48), and ending debates over granting legal tender status to Treasury notes (Hurst, 284, note 221). The role of war in federalizing currency control reappeared with a vengeance in the 1860s with the secession of the South from the union and the fragmenting of the American political union to the West and Midwest. President Lincoln and the congressional Republicans pushed through a series of critical monetary reforms in 1962- 63 that significantly strengthened the ability of the North to wage its military campaign (Bensel 1990, 14; Hurst, 1973, 64, 176-181). 12 First, Congress created a single currency by conferring legal tender status on Greenbacks, the new dollar paper currency issued in the winter of 1861-2, and abandoning the domestic specie standard. As the Greenback was fiat money that did not need to be matched by gold or silver reserves, it gave greater leeway to the government to print money to raise revenues, as long as authorities could maintain credibility over the worth of the paper currency.13 This significantly increased the Union government's 12 Many of the reforms were contained in the 1863 National Bank Act, also called the National Currency Act. 13 This pure greenback lasted until January 2, 1879 with the resumption of the greenback's link to gold. 13 policy flexibility in financing of the war. Between 1862—64 Congress authorized the issue of $450 million in Greenbacks. The Greenback was the only currency with legal tender status, although it continued to coexist with several other forms of currency, namely newly standardized national bank notes, as well as silver and gold certificates.14 Nonetheless, the new federal paper dollar heralded a simplified and standardized monetary order ruled over by the US Treasury and the US Congress instead of the US states. Second, the reforms created a national bank system that abolished locally chartered banks and replaced them with federal chartered banks. The national bank notes issued by these banks now had to be uniform in design and accepted at par throughout the US. This centralization of monetary power was matched by a comprehensive effort in on the part of the federal authorities to remove foreign currencies from circulation, begun in 1857 and largely completed by 1861. In addition, federal initiatives in the 1860s cracked down on counterfeiting, with new policing mechanisms that further enhanced the control of the national government over money. Since the collapse of the second Bank of the US, the government had conducted its operations in coins and specie, a logistical nightmare. These currency reforms facilitated the collection of tax revenues and payment of government bills, one of its chief advantages in the eyes of government officials such Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase.15 Finally, as part of these reforms, the Union permanently placed a large part of the national debt with finance capitalists through the newly nationalized banking system. The federal government did this by forcing private banks which issued the newly standardized 'national bank' notes to hold government bonds and "thus created an instant market for these bonds which could finance its spending requirements" (Helleiner 1999, 325). Essentially, the state banks became fiscal agents of the Treasury, extending the capacity and reach of the federal government. In sum, the need for an effective state apparatus to prosecute and finance the civil war was a key spur for currency consolidation by Lincoln and his party. The war was also instrumental in enabling the Republicans to achieve this goal, in part because of the departure of southern Congressmen who had been traditionally hostile to centralization of monetary authority. This shifted the balance of power towards the federalist Whig- Republican party and a national money. The impact on statebuilding was significant as currency consolidation carried with it a series of new administrative and organizational powers based in Washington. The reforms enabled the expansion of fiscal authority while co-opting new social groups into a national level financial system, part of the gradual transformation to a consolidated federal political system. 14 Southern states issued their own confederate dollar during the war, and only adopted the Greenback after the Union"s victory. Congress finally retired national bank notes in 1935. 15 I thank an anonymous reader for bringing this point to my attention. 14 A Single American Market While war provided the immediate motive and means for federalizing monetary control, less dramatic but equally consequential societal changes brought on by market integration also provided ripe ground for currency consolidation. The construction of an American single market in the mid-nineteenth century, crucially aided by the federal courts, had been steadily transforming societal and public interests in national governance, and more specifically, monetary control. Political leaders faced new pressures to develop the American political infrastructure to stabilize and regulate the growing national market and its increasingly industrial nature. Secretary of the Treasury Chase, whose "stubborn persistence" was key to the passage of monetary reform legislation, was keenly supportive of the need to facilitate market exchange through currency uniformity, although the more public justifications centered on the civil war imperative and reasons of state (Hurst, 1973, 79). The American single market's sources were economic, technological, and political. Trade across the U.S. states had begun to rapidly increase in the first part of the nineteenth century, with an integrated national market emerging in the 1840s and 1850s.16 Increasing revenues from Southern cotton exports financed the demand for western foodstuffs and Northeastern services and manufactures in the latter years of the antebellum period (North, 1966, 68). Technological advances in transportation, both waterways and rail, further promoted the expansion and integration of the US economy. However, government intervention and the exercise of political authority also shaped the new market. A key role in this increase of interregional trade was played by the US federal courts, who promoted an integrated market through their interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause (ICC), which barred state discrimination in commerce with other states. Although the ICC did not expressly implicate money, the integrating national market made more salient the need for the reorganization of the chaotic monetary system of thousands of currencies, and the courts upheld the view that federal currency regulation was linked to successful commerce across state borders, and therefore appropriate (Hurst, 1973, 72). Federal judges used their independence and authority to create laws that reduced the uncertainty of interstate business by more clearly specifying the rights and obligations of parties to contracts, particularly regarding the negotiability of bills of credit (Freyer, 1979). The law was also important more directly in questions of how to stabilize expectations and confidence in the monetary regime. After all, "legal tender" is made such by law, and the US courts actively concerned themselves with the question of the authenticity of the paper currency's source and form. A central practical concern was how the law could promote the day to day acceptability of a national system of money, and the Supreme Court sided with the federal government on the question of monetary authority, stating that "promoting popular acceptance of the currency was one proper purpose for congressional action." (Hurst 1973, 44). Significantly, when Congress 16 See North (1966, 32-36 and 101-121), and Schmidt (1939). 15 imposed a severe tax on the notes of the state banks as part of its civil war era reforms this tax was upheld by the courts, who "accepted this claim of authority, apparently as a "necessary and proper" incident to the [constitutionally] granted power to coin money." (Hurst, 1973, 37) . The courts were able to shape the path of the national monetary system in part because societal dissent was relatively muted on these issues. Hurst argues that the rulings did not bring into play a wide variety of battling interest groups but rather were commonly perceived as being functionally necessary to the fundamental goal of market exchange (1973, 39). The courts also drew on common custom and prevailing business invention and practice, allowing for more acceptance of its support of currency consolidation. For example, "recognition of the utility of legal tender requirements generated substantial banker support" for currency reforms as bankers worried about enforcing contracts with appropriate payments (Hurst 1973, 45). In sum, the courts promotion of a single market, the confluence of interests on the part of commercial coalitions in society who wanted to simplify and stabilize the currency system, and the Lincoln administration's desire to exert its authority and policy capacity in wartime created the right conditions for the single currency, despite the historically strong antagonism to federal control over money throughout the antebellum years. The immediate monetary reforms of 1862-63 may have been accomplished by virtually by edict, but societal ground was prepared because of the growing single market and its political repercussions. Currency and US Political Development Because the civil war moved policymaking to the federal level along a variety of policy areas, it is viewed by some scholars as "the true foundational moment in American political development." (Bensel, 1990, 10; McPherson, 1991). The long term political consequences of the creation of a nationalized monetary system bear this out, evolving from a Madisonian ideal of local control over the levers of governance towards a Hamiltonian vision of a strong centralized government with the potential to raise revenues and float debt. 17 However, just as the American state continued to develop in fits and starts even after the critical moment of the war, monetary reform was far from complete. Several forms of currency continued to circulate and a national central bank or Federal Reserve was not established until 1913. Nonetheless, the centralization of state power and the development of a differentiated bureaucracy outlined in the statebuilding literature were certainly found in the process by which the American currency was consolidated. The centralization of money also had more subtle institutional effects, as it forged important new links between the state and powerful societal actors in ways that shaped subsequent American political development. Substituting Greenbacks for gold redeemable bank notes "effectively nationalized the payment clauses of private and 17 Timberlake, 1978, p. 5; see also Savage 1988, p.70. 16 public contracts in the northern economy and tied these agreements to the future financial policy of the central state." (Bensel 1990, 162). In other words, the explosion of government bonds served to create a client group and social base of support for the federal government by establishing an enduring interest in the health of the state on the part of certain private actors. The creation of federal level policy capacity meant the gradual organization of societal interests at the national level, transforming the American polity towards new set of authority structures.18 COMPARING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE EURO19 Armed with the theoretical insights from the comparative political development literature and the specific insights on currency's role in American development, we can now assess the political causes and consequences of the Euro. I analyze the similarities and differences between the two cases, focusing on the role of war and the role of market integration and the ways in which differences in the sources of currency consolidation may shape political development in the EU. The Role of War War clearly has played a very different role in the creation of the Euro than it did in the US case. It was the shadow of war, not in its crucible, that brought forth the Euro, and therefore the consequences for European political development through monetary reform has been fainter and more attenuated than in the US case. In Europe, the desire to minimize the potential for a revival of hostilities among the great powers was a critical original motivation for European integration more generally, expressed in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Dinan, 1994, 9-38). The continued deepening of the EU project over the following decades has been understood by many as an attempt to solve the 'German problem' by binding Germany tightly together with its former enemies in a quasi-federal union. To further this end of stabilizing political relations, a single money was promoted by various political actors and agreed to as a goal by European leaders as early as 1969 (Tsoukalis, 1977). The decision to finally go forward with the Euro in 1992 at Maastricht was influenced by similar concerns, but there was little security imperative to the single currency. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany have been argued to have prompted French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to seek the binding of European nation-states to Germany through the Maastricht Treaty and the single currency (Sandholtz, 1993; Dyson and Featherstone, 1999).20 Thus, 18 On a symbolic level, as well, the greenback may have impacted statebuilding by promoting a more homogenous, unified and collective vision of the American state. See Helleiner (2003, 1999) and Helleiner and Gilbert (1999). 19 Detailed accounts of the creation of the Euro are found in Dyson and Featherstone (1999) and Moravcsik (1998). 20 See Moravcsik (1998) for an opposing view. 17 while EU leaders sought to lock-in cooperation in the EU and the Euro was seen by some as potentially making secession from the EU less likely, the level and immediacy of threat was not the same as in the American case. Europe faced the end of an external cold war in partnership with a reformed Germany, not the mobilization for a bloody civil war. While the Greenback was imposed on the South in an exercise of power by the winning Northern states, in Europe, EMU was agreed to, not coerced, among states of legally equal status. The difference in the levels of threat between the two cases may account for the differential effects of monetary consolidation on statebuilding. Most importantly, the pragmatic and pressing need to finance war fighting expenditures is missing from the contemporary European context. The Greenback had decisive impacts on statebuilding in part because it was intimately linked to the need for public financing of the civil war and the development of new revenue extraction capacities on the part of the federal state. In contrast, the low level of threat has prompted as yet very little in the way of fiscal capacity at the EU level. Thus, the end of the cold war can be argued to be a catalyzing event for a longstanding interest in monetary integration in Europe, but in a much less immediate and salient way than the civil war was for the US, and with therefore very different consequences for the development of fiscal linkages and further economic policy capacity at the European level, as will be discussed further below. The Single European Market Market integration in the EU may be the causal factor that more closely parallels the US Greenback case. A key goal of the EU's founding constitution, the Treaty of Rome, was the creation of a single European market with the protection of the 'four freedoms' -- free flows of people, goods, capital and services. The 1985 Single European Act, which strove to remove all barriers to commerce across the EU by 1992, was a milestone in the achievement of this goal (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Moravcsik, 1998). While certain private commercial interests actively promoted the European single market (Green Cowles, 1995), the European Court of Justice was also critical in the creation of the European wide market through its interpretation of the EU's treaties. Decisions such as the 1979 Cassis de Dijon judgment, which reinforced the principle of mutual recognition of national product standards across the EU member states, gave political ammunition to supporters of integration, rejuvenating EC harmonization policy and spurring the development of the Single European Act (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994). The ECJ did not, however, create the single market whole handedly, rather, as with the American case, the court's decisions sparked political responses on the part of the European Commission to move forward integration and triggered the mobilization of various interests groups, for and against the further federalization of economic activity and governance. The ECJ has also used a broad interpretation of the legal reach of the 'four freedoms' of market integration to create a constitutional framework for a European level legal order that has promoted deeper integration at the European level, even in areas not directly under the Treaty of Rome (Ball, 1996). In this way, the political dynamics of the single market seem to parallel that of the political and legal uses of the Interstate Commerce Clause in the creation of the American single market. 18 The ECJ has not, however, promoted monetary integration directly through legal rulings as the American supreme court did. Rather, EU and national officials made the linkage politically, as the single market was widely cited as a key reason for the drive to a single currency in the run up to EMU. The European Commission actively promoted this policy linkage between market integration and monetary integration, as codified in an influential report, One Market, One Money (Emerson and Gros, 1992). National political elites often remarked on the need for a single currency to complete the project of market integration. Similar dynamics had been in play for some time: the difficulties of having a single market for agriculture combined with a federal subsidy system in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) prompted interest on the part of policymakers fixed exchange rates in the 1970s and 1980s (McNamara, 1993) similar to the antebellum American Treasury"s interest in rationalizing receipts and payments. As more widespread market integration gathered steam in the 1980s and 1990s, the idea of a single currency gained a certain political logic. However, EU market integration alone did not necessitate the creation of the Euro. Rather, we need to understand the EU single market creation and the Euro as political responses in a situation where different societal, legal and governmental actors varied in their preferences for monetary union and for a more federalized market and governance structure. The single market-Euro linkage was created in part as a political strategy by those in the Commission and national capitals interested in the goal of further integration (Jabko, 1999), just as in the American case linking the single market to the Greenback represented a chance at state and nation building. But others rejected this perspective and viewed the single money as an end in itself, for example, to lock in price stability policies (Moravcsik, 1998; McNamara, 1998). Both factors, war and market integration, present opportunities for political actors to move forward with currency and statebuilding, but such an impetus needs to be filtered through specific private and public actors for these outcomes to be realized. Generalizing from our comparison across the US and EU cases allows us to propose a simple potential relationship between market integration, the threat of war, and currency consolidation. As shown below, high levels of both market integration pressures and the threat of war may produce the most likely scenario for the creation of a single currency and fiscal authority at the federal level, as in the US, whereas low levels on both are likely not to produce such effects. The EU case illustrates the ways in which high levels of market integration without a pressing threat of war may produce currency without fiscal power. The final cell is left indeterminate until further research can determine what a high threat of war alone produces, absent market integration. 19 Figure 3: Comparing Historical Outcomes of Currency Consolidation Threat of War Low High Market Low (Multiple Integration Currencies, ? Multiple Fiscal Authorities) High EU US Currency Currency & Authority & Fiscal authority Multiple fiscal authorities Currency and Statebuilding in the EU If the civil war was the "true foundational moment" of the American state, the EU has yet to experience such a dramatic and consequential moment. While the EU shares the impetus of market integration for statebuilding with the early US case, European level political development is remarkable for its incremental, endogenous evolution rather than exogenous imperatives. The recent creation of the Euro, taking place not in the context of war but rather in its very long shadow, has brought new monetary policy capacity and thus new administrative and bureaucratic powers to the European federal level in the European Central Bank. It has also brought new responsibility to the European Parliament in monitoring the Bank, notwithstanding the ECB's high level of independence, and deepened the activities of Commission officials in the monetary and financial sphere. In part because of the differences in the sources of the single currency across the two cases, however, this transfer of political authority has not extended to fiscal policy, as taxing, spending and borrowing privileges remain overwhelmingly at the national level in Europe. Instead, the EU is severely constrained in the fiscal area and has relied on cooperation among national finance and treasury officials. In fact, the EU is prohibited by its own laws from borrowing to balance its budget and must operate entirely within its revenues (Laffan, 1997). It cannot impose direct taxation on EU citizens and strict limitations are placed on EU expenditures as a proportion of the overall 20 European GNP.21 Although such expenditures have grown over the 1990s, the current EU budget runs at less than two percent of total EU GNP, a fraction of the 30 to 50 percent spent by national governments as a proportion of their economies. The truncated nature of EU revenue extraction and expenditure has mean that the EU must rely on administrative rule making as the chief means of policy development and on the European Court of Justice and the national administrations of the member states for implementation and enforcement (Majone 1993). While there is today very little publicly voiced support for an EU fiscal institution and increased public financing at the EU level, privately many high level EU and national officials argue that the single currency can only function effectively if it is joined with fiscal policy capacity. 22 Given the lessons from the US case, it may take a severe crisis, military, economic or social, to move fiscal capacity to Brussels, but such an outcome is now more feasible and, perhaps, more likely with the single currency in place. A further lesson for EU political development can be drawn from the ways in which market integration linked to statebuilding in the American case. The EU has been able to sustain a single market without fiscal capacity in part because of its emphasis on market liberalization instead of traditional welfare or social objectives (Laffan, 1997, 35). But political contestation over the purpose of the EU and the role of fiscal federalism will continue as the balance between national and EU policy capacity evolves. The US case underscores the tension in this dynamic. While the centralization of money in the US forged important new links between the state and powerful societal actors that generated a new federal level polity, the fact that these societal coalitions were formed in the process of capital market integration meant that broader concerns of national wealth redistribution and social protection had no natural allies. The public justification for the Euro project, as with the EU integration as a whole, is similarly focused on its purported market efficiency aspects. The federal level polity that has begun to organize around the single currency and its institutions is one overwhelmingly rooted in the money and finance, with very weak participation by the social partners. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has been a lack of coalitional support and correspondingly incomplete and uneven development of the policy capacity of the EU. While the creation of federal level policy capacity in the EU will, by definition, mean the gradual organization of societal interests towards a new set of authority structures, they are unlikely to be widely representative of European society. Keeping in mind these more subtle discussions on the nature and content of statebuilding, and the role of specific private and public actors in mediating between the 21 The largest part of EU revenue itself comes from value added taxes, collected at a harmonized rate across the EU, which in 1999 was limited to 1 percent of EU GNP. The next largest source are national contributions to the EU budget determined annually as a proportion of national GNP. Finally, a diminishing amount of revenue is derived from agricultural levies and customs duties on imported products (Hix, 1999, 244-48). 22 Many economists also argue that the single currency must be matched by EU level fiscal federalism, see for example Eichengreen (1990). 21 causal impetus of war and market integration and outcomes of political development, Figure 4, below, enters our two empirical cases into the statebuilding framework developed earlier. The US case demonstrates the presence of both causal factors, and the EU shows how market integration alone produces uneven statebuilding; further research is needed to explore how the pressure of war without market integration shapes political development. Obviously, this two case study can only be suggestive; a larger sample of states is necessary to move beyond theory generation to actual testing of these relationships. Figure 4: Political Development in the US and EU Threat of War Low High Market Low (No ? Integration Statebuilding) (Uneven Statebuilding) High EU US (Uneven (Statebuilding) Statebuilding) CONCLUSION: WHITHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU? Just as the creation of the Greenback was part of a gradual transformation of the American polity towards a federal state in the nineteenth century, so is the Euro part of a larger process of political development in the European Union. While we know how the historical American case turned out, however, the institutionalization of authority at the European level is ongoing and thus unresolved in terms of its ultimate endpoint. Nonetheless, examining currency creation in the EU through the lens of comparative political development allows us to address the broader consequences of the federalizing of power over money, and the comparison with the antebellum American experience draws out a series of specific lessons about the potential path of political development in the EU. In line with the broader literature on statebuilding, the US and EU cases highlight war as a key catalyst to a single currency, and ultimately political development, particularly because of the demands of war fighting on fiscal capacity. While the desire for peace and stability motivated some European elites to promote the Euro, the lack of security imperative means money has not yet been linked to EU fiscal capacity. If fiscal 22 authority also starts to evolve to Brussels as some believe is likely in the long run, that will signal a decisive transfer of power and conformity to historic models of statebuilding. While the differences in the impact of war and consequent fiscal developments point to divergences in political outcomes across the two cases, parallels in the role of market integration suggest some potential similarities. The process of market creation was shown to be a potent factor spurring a single currency in the US and EU, and the joining of the market and currency within a federal framework of laws and institutions can be consequential for political development as well. The US experience demonstrates also how moving political authority to the federal level shifts the organization of interests around the new governance structures, and we can expect the federalizing of money in the EU to produce similar results. However, as in the American case, the form and content of state-society relations will likely be shaped by the emphasis on market liberalization and economic efficiency concerns, as they have formed the rhetorical and political foundation for the drive to integrate Europe. The empirical materials presented here demonstrate an evolution of political capacity at the EU level that fits within the models of political development drawn from historical episodes of statebuilding and the broader literature on comparative political development. The centralization of state power and differentiation of bureaucracy typical of nineteenth century experiences is reflected in Brussels today, and the strong role for the courts in authority construction in the EU seems to parallel American political development. The literature on comparative political development also calls attention to the phase of political development that the EU has been most criticized as lacking, that is, the broadening and deepening of democratic participation at the European level. While strong arguments have been made about the desirability of insulating monetary policy from democratic pressures, the ECB remains legally more politically independent than any existing national bank, while having weak EU level institutional counterparts. The uneven nature of political development at the European level will continue to be a challenge to policymakers and politicians even beyond concerns over democratic accountibility. Although the EU is undergoing a process of political development that parallels other cases of 'states in the making,' it is not a nation-state with a clear hierarchy of internal order and authority. Yet neither is it a collection of sovereign states in anarchy. In perhaps this most basic sense, the EU and antebellum American cases find their closet parallel. While most observers today assume that the US was from its founding a clearly delineated, hierarchical nation-state, our assessment of currency politics indicates a much more contested balance between the US states and the federal government than we might assume. It may be that the story of the single American money is reflective of Deudney's argument that the American state system before the civil war actually constitutes an alternative form of governance, not captured by standard conceptualizations of international relations or comparative politics theory (Deudney, 1995). Instead, what he calls the early US 'Philadelphian system' mixes anarchical elements with political order more akin to domestic rule.23 Both the EU of today, and the pre-civil war US, may be 23 See also Sprinkle (1999) and Nau (2002). 23 best seen as cases encompassing multiple and contested levels of authority with different powers being located at difference levels.24 The question remains as to whether the EU can remain in the space between anarchy and hierarchy or must move forward or fall apart. When the Greenback was created in 1861, the status of the US as a unified nation- state was by no means a foregone conclusion. The complexity and contingency of the US case demonstrates the variety of ways in which political authority is expressed and contested, ways that are replicated in today's European Union. 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We saw in ROTJ Luke's saber was able to withstand the electricity attack by Palpatine. Could the crystals in the light sabers inert enough power to hold off a Dragonball Z like energy blast. For arguments sake we will say
Could a light sabre withstand the force of a Dbz energy blast?
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Fuel for the Fire
Edit Page Last Edit: 2 years 10 months ago
Fuel for the Fire
Secure the drilling ships and complete the mission
Campaign related. Cannot be missed.
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