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"The City of Cape Town is proud to once again be hosting this premier event, and we wish participants well as they tackle the challenging route," says Mayoral Committee Member for Tourism, Events and Marketing, Councilor Grant Pascoe.
The following special arrangements will be in place for the day of the event:
Area | Details | Time of closure |
Foreshore, Cape Town CBD | Hertzog Boulevard, outbound carriageway between Heerengracht and Christiaan Barnard |
Saturday 16:00 – Sunday 11:30
Green Point
Helen Suzman Boulevard, Beach Road to Traffic Circle (city bound carriageway) | Saturday 12:00 – Sunday 21:00 |
Noordhoek, Hout Bay
Chapman's Peak Drive (M6), Noordhoek Road (M6) to Princess Street |
Saturday 18:00 - Sunday 17:00
Area | Details | Time of closure |
Hertzog Boulevard, both carriageways between Heerengracht and Nelson Mandela Boulevard (N2)
00:00 – 11:30
Heerengracht, both carriageways between Hans Strijdom Ave (Fountain Circle) and Coen Steytler Avenue
04:00 – 11:30 |
Woodstock, University Estate
De Waal Drive (M3), outbound between Roodebloem Road and Hospital Bend. Traffic will be diverted to Main Road
05:30 – 11:30
CBD, Woodstock
Nelson Mandela Boulevard (N2) Eastbound |
05:30 – 11:30
Hospital Bend (N2, M3) Interchange
Settlers Way (N2) to M3 (Muizenberg) ramp (Southbound)
M3 on-ramp from Groote Schuur Hospital (Southbound)
05:30 – 11:30
Mowbray, Rondebosch, Newlands, Claremont, Bishopscourt
M3 (Rhodes Drive, Union Avenue, Paradise, Edinburgh Drive) Southbound, including all on-ramps between Nelson Mandela Boulevard up to Trovato Link |
06:00 – 11:45
Wynberg, Constantia, Tokai
M3 Freeway (Blue Route), Southbound, including all on-ramps between Trovato Link and Steenberg Road | 06:00 – 12:15 |
Steenberg Road (M42), M3 off-ramp to Main Rd |
06:15 – 12:15
Tokai, Lakeside, Muizenberg, False Bay Coast to Cape Point, Scarborough
Main Road (M4) - Between Steenberg Road & Clairvaux Road
Main Road (M4) - Clairvaux Road to Fish Hoek Traffic Circle
Main Road (M4) - Fish Hoek Traffic Circle to Glen Road, Glencairn
Main Road (M4) - Glen Road to Simon's Town
Main Road (M4) - Simon's Town to entrance of Cape Point Nature Reserve
Main Road (M4) - Entrance of Cape Point Nature Reserve (M4) to Perdekloof (M65)
Main Road (M4) - Perdekloof to Soetwater
06:15 – 12:30
06:15 – 12h50
06:30 – 13:00
06:30 – 13:15
06:45 – 14:30
07:00 – 14:30
07:00 – 15:00
Cape Point, Scarborough, Kommetjie, Ocean View
Slangkop Road (M82), Soetwater to Kommetjie Road (M65) |
06:45 - 15:00
Kommetjie, Ocean View, Masipumelele | Kommetjie Road (M65), Slangkop Road to Glencairn Expressway (M6) |
06:45 - 15:30
Noordhoek, Sun Valley
Ou Kaapse Weg Extension (M64), Kommetjie Road (M65) to Noordhoek Road (M6) |
06:45 - 15:30
Noordhoek, Sun Valley
Noordhoek Road (M6), Ou Kaapse Weg Ext. (M64) to base of Chapman's Peak Drive Chapman's Peak Drive |
06:45 - 16:00
00:00 – 16:30
Hout Bay, Llandudno
Chapman's Peak Drive (M6), Princess Street (M90) to Victoria Ave (M6) Hout Bay |
07:00 - 17:30
Hout Bay, Llandudno, Camps Bay, Bakoven
Victoria Road (M6) Northbound and Southbound, Princess Road (M90) Hout Bay to Camps Bay |
07:00 - 17:30
Camps Bay, Bantry Bay and Clifton
Victoria Road (M6) Northbound and Southbound: Between Houghton Road and Camps Bay Drive
Victoria Road (M6) Northbound and Southbound:
Between Camps Bay Drive and Meadway
07:30 - 17:30
05:00 - 17:45
Camps Bay, Clifton, Bantry Bay
Victoria Road (M6) North and Southbound, Mead Way to Lower Kloof Road |
07:30 - 18:00
Camps Bay, Clifton, Bantry Bay
Victoria Road (M6), Northbound and Southbound, Lower Kloof Road to Queens Road, Sea Point |
04:00 - 17:45
Bantry Bay, Sea Point
Queens Road (M6), Victoria Road to Beach Road |
06:00 - 17:45
Sea Point, Green Point & Mouille Point
Beach Road (M6) City bound carriageway - Queens Road Circle to St Johns Road
Beach Road (M6) City bound carriageway –St James to Helen Suzman Boulevard (M6)
Beach Road/Beach Road to Fritz Sonnenberg
06:00 - 18:30
07:30 - 19:30
07:30 – 19:30
Green Point area
Fritz Sonnenberg between Beach Road and Granger Bay Blvd Green Point Circle. Controlled Access point | 07:30 – 18:30 |
Green Point area
Bill Peters Drive, at Bay Road |
04:00 - 19:30
Green Point area
Helen Suzman Boulevard (M6) - Eastbound from Beach Road to Green Point Traffic Circle
Helen Suzman Boulevard (M6) – Westbound from Green Point Circle to Beach Road
00:00 - 21:00
04:00 – 19:30
The Cape Town Cycle Tour Trust, organisers of the Cycle Tour, appeals to all residents in Muizenberg, St James, Kalk Bay, Clifton, Bantry Bay and Sea Point (including Victoria and Beach Road) not to park along the Main Road on the day of the event. Please use alternative side roads or designated parking areas.
Traffic Services personnel will be deployed along the entire route, to assist with the free flow of traffic.
Public transport – Sunday, 10 March 2013 | ||
MyCiTi - Civic Centre Station | The Civic Centre Station will be closed from 04:20 to 14:00. All MyCiTi services operating from the Civic Centre Station will be relocated to Thibault Square Station on Hans Strijdom Avenue during this period. From 14:00 the usual service will operate from Civic Centre Station. | 04:20 – 14:00 |
MyCiTi – Woodstock Station | The Woodstock Station will be closed. No services will operate from this station for the duration of the closure. | 05:40 – 14:00 |
MyCiTi - Airport – Civic Centre Service
Route Deviation: Airport – Civic Centre Route
From 04:20 to 14:00 the airport service will arrive and depart at Thibault Square Station and not Civic Centre Station. The service will travel without stopping between the Airport and Thibault Square Stations. From 14:00 the usual service will operate from Civic Centre Station.
04:20 – 14:00 |
MyCiTi - Table View - Civic Centre Service (Additional service) |
Route Deviation: Table View – Civic Centre Route
From 05:40 to 14:00 the Table View – Civic Centre Service operating from Civic Centre Station will be relocated to Thibault Square Station. Table View buses will travel directly between Paarden Eiland and Thibault Square Stations and will not pass Woodstock Station in either direction. From 14:00 the usual service will operate from Civic Station.
This service will start one hour earlier at 05:40 and run every 20 minutes. The F14, F15 & F16 services will also start one hour earlier. Spectators are encouraged to use this service due to limited parking in the CBD.
05:40 – 14:00 |
MyCiTi - F1 Gardens –Civic Centre – Waterfront Service |
Route Deviation: Gardens – Civic Centre - Waterfront Route
From 06:40 to 14:00 the Gardens – Civic Centre - Waterfront service operating from Civic Centre Station will be relocated to the Thibault Square Station. Buses will not pass the Adderley Street and St George's stops during this period. From 14:00 the usual service will operate from Civic Station.
06:40 – 14:00 |
MyCiTi - Cape Argus Pick n Pay Cycle Tour Shuttle Service from Thibault Square to Stadium Station (Additional service) |
Event Service
A free shuttle service will run every 10 minutes from 06:00 to 18:00 between Thibault Square Station in the City Centre and Stadium Station in Green Point. Spectators are encouraged to use this service due to limited parking in Green Point. From 14:00 the shuttle will also stop at Civic Centre Station.
06:00 – 18:00 |
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Updated September 5, 2000 |
Iain Kenworthy-Neale 14 Launcelot Crescent Thornhill Cardiff, n/a CF14 9AQ Wales |
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Rest in peace: Owner-operator Don Mulder of Nebraska
Owner-operator Donald Ray Mulder of Lincoln, Neb., passed away Saturday, Sept. 7, 2013. In the 1980s he was head of the Nebraska chapter of the Independent Truckers Association.
Final send-off for a Maine log-hauling legend
Dale Crawford was the owner of the Maine Crawford family's log-hauling outfit until he sold it to his brother, Robin, in 2000 upon becoming ill. He passed away last week.
Ruan Transport founder remembered at memorial ceremony
The $2 bill, you may not have known, was a calling card of Ruan Transport founder John Ruan, who passed away at age 96 on Sunday, Feb. 14, and was remembered fondly by many in ...


text:
Welcome to Knoxville Disc Golf Association!
Knoxville Disc Golf Association (KDGA) members are made up of all types of disc golfers. We promote disc golf in the Knoxville area by performing maintenance on the courses, holding tournaments and teaching others about the game. The KDGA hosts weekly events including doubles and singles events that rotate between local courses. PDGA tournaments are held periodically throughout the year and are sanctioned by the Professional Disc Golf Association.
Tommy Schumpert Open
Saturday, February 28st, 2015
Tommy Schumpert Park
6400 Fountain City Rd, Knoxville, TN 37918
PDGA Pro & Am C-Tier Tournament
2 rounds of 18 holes
Late Registration: 8:00 am - 9:00 am
Players meeting: 9:10 am
Tee off: 9:30 am
**Recreational divisions playing for trophy only**
Register at Disc Golf U
Please explore our site and be sure to sign our Guestbook or Contact Us for any questions or feedback you may have.


text:
Search Missouri public |
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This page lists public record sources in Stoddard County, Missouri. Additional resources can be found on our Missouri State Public Records page, on city pages, and on topic pages.
Stoddard County, Missouri - Free Public Records Directory
Recommend a link for this page County Info Stoddard County, Missouri Home PageGeneral information about Stoddard County
Population: 29,773 Area: 827 sq. miles County Seat: Bloomfield Area Code(s): 573 Time Zone: Central Free Search Missouri Court Records and other ResourcesLinks to state and local court records, general Missouri court information, directory of courts, and online resources for courts in Missouri. Free Search Court Directory and Court Records InfoDirectory of court locations in Stoddard County, Missouri. Includes local links to searching court records, dockets, legal research, self help, and more. Contact Info AssessorStoddard County Assessor 401 South Prairie St., Bloomfield, MO 63825 Phone (573)568-3163 Fax (573)568-2051 Contact Info Recorder, Marriage Licenses and Marriage RecordsStoddard County Recorder of Deeds 316 South Prairie St., Bloomfield, MO 63825 Phone (573)568-3444 Fax (573)568-2545 Contact Info Birth and Death RecordsView Stoddard County information about obtaining birth and death certificates. Contact Info Birth and Death RecordsStoddard County Public Health Center 1001 North Highway 25, Bloomfield, MO 63825 Phone (573)568-4593 Fax (573)568-4736 Free Search Stoddard County census information summaryStoddard County statistics for population, ethnicity, housing, geography and businesses. From the U.S. Census Bureau. Contact Info Delinquent Taxes and Tax Sales Stoddard County Collector 312 South Prairie St., Bloomfield, MO 63825 Phone (573)568-3327 Free Search Genealogy Records SearchSearch Stoddard County genealogy records such as cemeteries, census records, death records, marriage records, obituaries, and more. Free Search
Free Search Offender SearchSearch Missouri Department of Corrections offender records by doc id number or name. Free Search Sex Offender RecordsSearch Stoddard County sex offender records by name or address including search through GIS map. Free Search Crash ReportsSearch Missouri traffic crash reports by name, county or location. Contact Info Voter and Election InformationStoddard County Clerk
401 South Prairie, Bloomfield, MO 63825 Phone (573)568-3339 Fax (573)568-2194 Links for Missouri towns and cities have been moved. Please use the town links below to get to the correct page:
Bernie Dexter |


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You are here
Our blogs
Our blogs
Janine's story: We helped turn around a young runaway's life
'The Children's Society has really helped me turn my life around,' Janine says.
Melissa's story: We helped turn around a young carer's life
'I've received so much support from The Children's Society's Young Carers in Focus programme', Melissa says.
Emily's story: One of our children's centres helped a family rebuild its life
When Emily's twin died at just eight months old, her parents were devastated. One of our children's centres was able to help.
John's story: Our mentoring project helped him change his life
'My mum says that things are now going our way for once and The Children's Society can take a lot of credit for that', John says.
What children say about making decisions
We involve children and young people in decision-making, giving them a say in our work.
Revs on a roller coaster
Some 20 revs from across the country took their faith to new heights by braving the country's biggest roller coaster, all in the name of raising money for our charity
Where it's map: Dynamic maps on our website and elsewhere
A quick look at how we've used online maps to highlight aspects of our work, last week's big map-related news, and what's coming up in March
Be BenevoLent this Lent
Giving up something for Lent can mean that you stay motivated and help vulnerable children
Join us in protecting children from payday loan adverts
Tell the House of Lords that we need to act today
Singing at the Young Carers Festival was one of the most amazing experiences of my life
'I wrote Shy to Be Human about a part of my life that I have both struggled with and have been blessed by'
Welcome to the Autumn 2014 issue of Voice magazine
I'm proud to be the guest editor of Voice, the first of many young people who will be getting involved.
Archbishop Justin Welby welcomes us to Advent
This year, Archbishop Welby joins a fantastic team of Advent calendar contributors to remind us that 'for the children. . . it can seem like endless waiting – like days of sitting in an aeroplane without getting closer to our destination.'


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Private Insurance
See more about Private InsuranceFilter Results
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Beyond Rebates: How Much Are Consumers Saving from the ACA's Medical Loss Ratio Provision?
The Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) saved consumers an estimated $2.1 billion last year, in the form of lower premiums and rebates, according to a new analysis by the Kaiser Family Foundation. Under health reform, insurers must issue consumer rebates if they fail to spend a certain portion of premium income on health care claims and quality improvement expenses, thereby limiting what they may spend on administrative expenses or keep as profits.
Perspective Read MoreQuantifying Tax Credits for People Now Buying Insurance on Their Own
This analysis estimates that Americans currently buying insurance on the individual market would receive $2700 in subsidies (as tax credits) in 2014 under Obamacare. Tax credits are available for qualifying people buying insurance through the new health care marketplaces, or exchanges.
Issue Brief Read MoreAnalysis: Tax Credits to Average $2,700 Per Family Next Year for People Who Now Buy Their Own Insurance
This analysis estimates that Americans currently buying insurance on the individual market would receive $2700 in subsidies (as tax credits) in 2014 under Obamacare. Tax credits are available for qualifying people buying insurance through the new health care marketplaces, or exchanges.
News Release Read MoreEmployer-Sponsored Family Health Premiums Rise a Modest 4 Percent in 2013, National Benchmark Employer Survey Finds
Annual premiums for employer-sponsored family health coverage reached $16,351 this year, up 4 percent from last year, with workers on average paying $4,565 toward the cost of their coverage, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research & Educational Trust (HRET) 2013 Employer Health Benefits Survey. This year's rise in premiums remains moderate by historical standards. The 15th annual Kaiser/HRET survey of more than 2,000 small and large employers provides a detailed picture of the status and trends in employer-sponsored health insurance costs and coverage.
News Release Read MoreCalifornia's Uninsured on the Eve of ACA Open Enrollment
This report presents the findings of a baseline survey of California's uninsured adult population just before the start of the first open enrollment period under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). It will be followed by three other surveys over the course of the next two years that will capture the…
Report Read MoreA Guide to the Supreme Court's Review of the Contraceptive Coverage Requirement
This issue brief dissects the issues raised by the legal challenges to the Affordable Care Act's requirement that private insurance plans include contraception as part of their coverage of preventive services for women. Over 40 for-profit corporations and over 40 nonprofit corporations have filed lawsuits claiming that the requirement to provide their employees with contraceptives violates their religious rights. On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases filed by for-profit corporations, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties, that claim that this requirement violates their religious rights. At the crux of these cases is a question that the Supreme Court has not previously addressed: Do for-profit corporations have religious protections under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment? The brief provides background on how the ACA's contraceptive requirement works, summarizes some of the legal challenges brought by for-profit and non-profit organizations and discusses the implications of potential rulings by the Supreme Court.
Issue Brief Read MoreThe Numbers Behind "Young Invincibles" and the Affordable Care Act
As enrollment statistics in the new health insurance marketplaces start to become available, there is a growing focus on whether the enrollment of so-called "young invincibles" will be sufficient to keep insurance markets stable. Enrollment of young adults is important, but not as important as conventional wisdom suggests since premiums…
Perspective Read MoreHow Will the Uninsured in West Virginia Fare Under the Affordable Care Act?
This state report explains how the ACA expands coverage in West Virginia, including a breakdown of how many uninsured people are eligible for Medicaid, how many are eligible for financial assistance to help them buy private insurance in the new Marketplace and how many will not receive any financial assistance at all. The report also details, in specific dollar figures, the income levels at which people in West Virginia are eligible for Medicaid or financial assistance in the Marketplace. For states not expanding Medicaid, the report quantifies how many uninsured people fall into the "coverage gap," meaning they will be ineligible for financial assistance in the Marketplace or for Medicaid in their state despite having an income below the federal poverty level.
Fact Sheet Read MoreData Note: How Many People Have Nongroup Health Insurance?
The implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has focused attention on the composition of the nongroup market: how it looked before the new regulatory provisions take effect and how it will change afterwards. There are several ways of answering this question, depending on the time period for measuring enrollment and the information source. There is substantial turnover among people with nongroup coverage, which means that the number of people covered at the beginning of a year (or at any other point in time) is quite different than the number of people who keep that coverage throughout the whole year.
Issue Brief Read More


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New Pleading in the Twenty-First Century: Slamming the Federal Courthouse Doors? is the first book to comprehensively analyze, critique, and provide solutions for the new pleading regime in U.S. federal courts. In two recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically altered the pleadings landscape by imposing a version of fact pleading and merits screening--what the author calls "New Pleading"--that has not existed in the U.S. for 70 years.
The result of this abrupt regime change is a broad, significant, and adverse effect on litigant access to civil justice. But because of its nascence, no scholar has provided a comprehensive, doctrinal, theoretical, and prospective look at what it means for U.S. federal civil procedure, both in the United States and in the larger global community. This book takes on that task. It synthesizes a theoretical account of New Pleading, argues that New Pleading is inconsistent with a system of procedural justice, and provides two distinct solutions for rectifying the inconsistency: return to Old Pleading or the adoption of "New Discovery." Finally, this volume situates New Pleading and the solutions the author advocates in a wider international comparative context.
Today, when a single person can turn an airplane into a guided missile, no one objects to rigorous security before flying. But can the state simply declare some people too dangerous to travel, ever and anywhere? Does the Constitution protect a fundamental right to travel? Should the mode of travel (car, plane, or boat) or itinerary (domestic or international) make a constitutional difference? This book explores the legal and policy questions raised by government travel restrictions, from passports and rubber stamps to computerized terrorist watchlists.
In tracing the history and scope of U.S. travel regulations, Jeffrey Kahn begins with the fascinating story of Mrs. Ruth Shipley, a federal employee who almost single-handedly controlled access to passports during the Cold War. Kahn questions how far national security policies should go and whether the government should be able to declare some individuals simply too dangerous to travel. An expert on constitutional law, Kahn argues that U.S. citizens' freedom to leave the country and return is a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution.
The Second World War saw the rise not only of new technologies, new freedoms, new terrors, and a new world order, but of new legal issues. This book takes a global perspective in looking at the legal situations in seven major countries affected by the war. Fifty legal issues are identified from the war, ranging from subverting the judiciary and creating a divine military to economic and social issues to genocide and nuclear weapons. And more than 300 lawyers and judges, from more than 20 countries around the world, are brought to life. Whether you want to read this book to gain a global perspective to WWII legal issues or gain a comprehensive understanding of the legal issues involved this book has something for everyone, lawyer, history buff, or general reader.
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Explore - Kitchenware
Raise High the Roof Beams
Creative bartering and a healthy dose of sweat equity allowed a young Charleston couple to transform a derelict 19th-century structure into an inspired living space.
written by: Kelsey Keithphotos by: Daniel Shea08.29.11 -
Looking Inward
For Paul and Shoko Shozi, a pair of retiring Angelenos, the goal was to shut out the neighborhood but bring in the sunny skies. Their new prefab home, the Tatami House, designed by Swiss architect...
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Wine Tasting with Georg Riedel
Not so long ago I was at a dinner with a handful of food writers--I was there merely as a food taster--and the fancy stemware from the Austrian firm Riedel came up. One woman extolled the famed...
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8 Kitchen Measuring Tools
A pinch of this and a dollop of that are fine instructions for the seasoned chef but for the rest of us (especially the precision-oriented), a good set of measuring cups and spoons are essential....
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A Trivet Trove
To protect and serve: the slogan of any good trivet. Make sure your prized tabletop doesn't become singed from fresh-out-of-the-oven casseroles nor soggy from a tasty chilled delight. This oft...
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Nature Calls
Whether you're on your way to the beach, the park, or just the back patio, we've got a few handy items to take along for the ride.
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7 London Products We Love
The London Design Festival kicked off Saturday, and we, like the rest of the design world, is waiting with bated breath to see who shows up and what comes out of this year's events. Our own Dwell...
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Scandinavian Designed
Having just returned from a trip to Copenhagen, I have Scandinavian design on the brain. Though the region arguably experienced its golden era in the mid-20th century, with the work of icons like...
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Bialetti's Aeternum Cookware
If you've ever seen a Moka stovetop espresso maker—and what design or coffee fan hasn't (especially visitors to the Museum of Modern Art in New York where it's part of the permanent...
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Design Shop Visit: Mjölk in Toronto
This Canadian duo searches out top Scandinavian and Japanese designs and brings their best finds back to this Toronto shop.
written by: Miyoko Ohtakephotos by: Christopher Wahl07.27.11 -
Marimekko's Iconic Patterns
It's hard not to adore (and lust after) Marimekko's fabrics. In the early 1950s, as Finland continued its slow recovery from World War II, textile designer Armi Ratia seized the opportunity to...
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New from OXO
OXO has always been one of our favorite product companies: it has been at the forefront of universal design and seamlessly integrates function into the form of all its products. Here we spotlight...
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Maison & Objet: Part 2
I'm just back from Paris, and still processing all the exciting new furnishings, accessories, and objets I spied at Maison & Objet over the weekend. In case you missed my first dispatch, check...
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Cityboy Picnic Grill
For our June 2011 Beach Houses We Love issue (now on newsstands!), we rounded up seven mini grills. One we loved but weren't able to include in the mix was the Cityboy Picnic Grill by designer...
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Urban Picnic Box
Don't just dispose of this alfresco fine-dining set—Boxsal offers a completely compostable spread.
AWAA's Cast Iron Cookware
There are few things nicer than cooking in cast iron (you can make everything from casseroles to cookies in such a skillet). At this year's Milan Furniture Fair, design team Angell Wyller Aarseth...
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Q&A with Black+Blum Founder
For more than a decade, London-based design company Black+Blum has been cranking out beautiful, sometimes quirky or humorous, and always functional products for the home. From its elegant tabletop...
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kMix by De'Longhi
This month, kitchen and home appliance company De'Longhi is launching its new kMix breakfast collection. The foursome—which includes a two-slice toaster, coffee maker, pump espresso maker,...
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Cow&Co. is an international online design superstore delivering new, unique & vintage items & gifts straight to your door....
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Hi, I'm Donna M. (Also known as the author Kamilla Murphy) |
Congratulations, Super Bowl Champion NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS! True adventures of mine are at the bottom of the page (click here) |
You can e-mail me at firstname.lastname@example.com |
Have you read my first full-length novel yet? Written under my pen name Kamilla Murphy, "Watching January" is the story of a husband who pushes his wife into the bed of another man. Available for the Kindle, it's both romantic and highly erotic and I know you'll enjoy every page. Click here to purchase it and other books of mine on Amazon) While there, read the reviews of my books! FICTION: NEW! Terzetto She delivered much more than what she was asked for ©2015 She was marrying one man but in love with another. What else could she do? ©2014 Sterling He was the boss, so each employee's wife was ripe fruit ©2014 The invitation from her husband was for her to check into a posh hotel, but not with him ©2014 The Masseuse She couldn't refuse this client a happy ending ©2014 A young girl struggles with her budding sexuality ©2014 She's Got a Map of the World He was the tutor, but she was the one that did the teaching ©2013 Swimming into Deeper Waters Stevesaint's "Swimming Lessons" ten years later ©2013 Cherubs His experience was out of this world ©2013   Butterfly Prequel to "Olfaction" ©2013   Olfaction Her natural scent was her power ©2012 I am no Seuss, you may deduce - a tale of a male to seduce a recluse ©2012 The Ice Queen needed to thaw ©2012 Runner Running was her only refuge ©2012 Alana NOT FICTION = She's not your average young lady ©2012 MEMORY A short story about not leaving things unsaid or undone ©2012 Her 'toy' party was a success, and not without surprises ©2012 Stripped The price was right, but at what cost? ©2011 T h e E a r r i n g s If her husband was cheating, why couldn't she? ©2011 backpage A married woman just loves the extra income. ©2011 He rounded third, would he score? ©2011 EVAN A short story about being taken. ©2011 Walk Unafraid She had to work through betrayal and loss in her own way. ©2011 "The Reader" He reads her stories. He has his fantasies. Do you? ©2011
S C H O O L E D Some lessons are harder to learn than others ©2011
Cursed A short story about an orgasmic affliction. ©2011
A new part-time job comes with GREAT benefits ©2011
An American girl's French lessons on a Spanish beach. ©2011
A 'short' story of little people having BIG fun! ©2011
Between a MILF and a Hard Place A pick-up at the beach gets complicated. ©2011
HOT FUN IN THE SUMMERTIME Bisexual discoveries during a week on Cape Cod. ©2010
Beryl's Diary A teen's diary turns into red hot reading. ©2010
The B.W.'s What are friends for? ©2010 A LITTLE EXTRA CA$H
Desperate times call for desperate actions. ©2009 Afterglow Sometimes singles' bar hook-ups can be special. ©2008 Having
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text:
By John T. Soma†1, David A. Forkner‡, and Brian P. Jumps‡‡
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required the formerly monopolistic telephone local exchange companies to open their networks up for competitors' use. This shift from anticompetitive federal regulation to mandated competition shook up an industry and necessitates another look at the basic antitrust jurisprudence undergirding the pro-competitive rationale. As this article points out, sections 251 and 252 of the Act, while purporting to encourage competition, actually may hamper entry into the local services market and provide a disincentive for current market participants to innovate. These deleterious effects can be overcome, the authors postulate, by returning to antitrust principles enumerated in the essential facilities doctrine.
A. Divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies *
B. Line-of-Business Restrictions on the Local Operating Companies *
C. Equal Exchange Access *
A. Antitrust's Doctrinal Justifications and the Essential Facilities
Doctrine *
B. The Doctrine's Historical Underpinnings: Supreme Court Recognition Of
The Essential Facilities Doctrine *
1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine as Applied to Horizontal Combination
Cases: Concerted Action In Violation of Section 1 *
2. Monopoly Misuse Cases in Violation of Section 2 *
3. Lower Courts' Distillation of Supreme Court Doctrine: The MCI
Test *
4. Control of an Essential Facility by a Monopolist *
5. The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor *
6. The feasibility of providing the facility *
C. The Role of the Regulatory Regime Within the Essential Facilities Doctrine *
After six decades of regulation, the judicial break-up of the Bell
System, and no fewer than four legislative endeavors to regulate telecommunications,
the advent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act)2
attempts to create the collapse of an anticompetitive telecommunications industry
"like the walls of Jericho."3
A transition away from an antiquated regulatory paradigm, however, is "never
complete and immediate."4
Rather, the transition toward a truly competitive telecommunications environment
necessitates the return to basic antitrust jurisprudence.5
Specifically, invocation of the essential facilities doctrine within section
2516 and section
2527 of the
1996 Act provides the doctrinal tool necessary to unravel the Gordian knot of
federal telecommunications regulation.8
Part I of this article reviews the telecommunications regulatory history preceding
the 1996 Act. Part II examines the 1996 Act and its purposes. Part III explains
the interconnection, unbundling, and resale provisions of the 1996 Act. Part
IV evaluates the emergence of the essential facilities doctrine and provides
its historical underpinnings and doctrinal justifications. Finally, part V posits
a vital role for the essential facilities doctrine within a deregulated telecommunications
industry to achieve facilities-based competition and an ordered transition toward
II. Telecommunications Regulatory Background
Telecommunications, as an industry, has transformed from "technical
balkanization" to a "reality of technological convergence."9
This technological convergence, however, has not engendered a consonant response
in the regulatory field. Of consequence, only four significant governmental
responses have occurred in the past 63 years,10
the last of which is the 1996 Act.11
These responses furnish the relevant telecommunications regulatory and legal
backdrop for this discussion.12
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act)13
provided the original and only national telecommunications policy for more than
sixty years. Congress enacted the 1934 Act to address the monopoly of the Bell
System14 over
telephony in the United States.15
Functionally, the most important attributes of the 1934 Act were the creation
of a dualistic regulatory scheme and the establishment of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).16
Pursuant to the 1934 Act, the FCC inherited the regulatory authority over interstate
wire and radio communications, a dominion formerly held by the Interstate Commerce
The states retained regulatory control over intrastate wire and radio communications.18
The AT&T antitrust litigation provided the next two pertinent regulatory
and legal developments. Until 1984, the Bell System represented both the largest
and the largest monopoly in the world.20
The Bell System controlled "nearly every sector of the telecommunications
industry within the United States," of which the most influential included
long-distance service, local communications networks, and telecommunications
equipment manufacturing and leasing.21
The Department of Justice (DOJ) initially addressed the anticompetitive aspects
of the Bell System in 1949, which resulted in the 1956 Consent Decree.22
In 1974, the DOJ attacked AT&T's Bell System again, resulting in the 1982
Modified Final Judgment (MFJ).23
Although both actions sought structural adjustments, it was not until the 1982
MFJ that radical changes transpired.24
The 1949 DOJ suit against the Bell System sought to end the anticompetitive
equipment manufacturing and leasing activity of Western Electric.25
The DOJ alleged "that the defendants had monopolized and conspired to restrain
trade in the manufacture, distribution, sale, and installation of telephones,
telephone apparatus, equipment, materials, and supplies, in violation of Sections
1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act."26
Thwarting divestiture, AT&T utilized its political influence over the DOJ
by arguing that a divestiture of Western Electric from the Bell System would
"effectively disintegrate the coordinated organization which [was] fundamental
to the successful carrying forward of critical defense projects" contrary
to the "vital interests of the nation."27
In 1956, to serve the interests of the public, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey approved the Consent Decree absent any structural
changes within the Bell System.28
AT&T, however, did agree to focus exclusively on the telecommunications
industry and, of course, remain regulated by the FCC and the 50 state public
utility commissions (PUCs). Remedially, the 1956 Consent Decree was considered
"virtually useless in restraining AT&T's exercise of its anticompetitive
The DOJ's next offensive stratagem against the Bell System began on November
20, 1974,30
when the DOJ filed suit against AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell Telephone
Laboratories alleging that AT&T had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act
by monopolizing a range of telecommunications services and equipment markets.31
Again, the DOJ brought suit seeking remedial divestiture of the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) and the dissolution of Western Electric.32
The MFJ resulted from Judge Harold Greene's review of the Consent Decree proposed
by the parties.33
The MFJ mandated divestiture of the BOCs, inclusion of line-of-business restrictions
on the BOCs, and equal exchange access.34
A. Divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
The first remedy mandated by the MFJ was the total divestiture of the
22 BOCs.35
Due to this forced divestiture, seven surviving independent Local Exchange Carriers
(LECs)36 emerged
as the controllers of the local telephony service domain.37
Each of the seven LECs maintained a monopoly over several local networks, also
known as "exchange areas" or "local access and transport areas"
Each exchange area was designed to be "large enough to comprehend contiguous
areas having common social and economic characteristics but not so large as
to defeat the intent of the decree to separate the provision of intercity services
from the provision of local exchange service."39
In essence, the LECs would "provide[] telephone service from one point
in an exchange area to other points in the same exchange area (called 'exchange
telecommunications'), and to originate and terminate calls from one exchange
area to another exchange area (called 'exchange access')."40
Any interexchange of a call from one exchange area to another remained the province
of AT&T and other interexchange carriers like Sprint and MCI.41
The rationale underlying the divestiture of the BOCs was that AT&T would
be unable to exercise monopoly control over the long-distance market without
control of access to the local operating networks.42
Prior to the divestiture, AT&T restrained competitors' endeavors to provide
competitive long-distance service by requiring customers of competing carriers
to dial significantly more numbers to acquire network access than users of AT&T
AT&T also refused to provide a number of specialized local services to competing
long-distance service purchasers.44
Last, evidence during the suit demonstrated that AT&T subsidized its long-distance
rates with monopoly profits from its local access operations.45
Central to all of these practices was the fact that the BOCs were "functioning
as bottlenecks."46
The BOCs possessed facilities deemed essential to competition for the competing
interexchange carriers. These facilities were the local network. Local networks
dictated all access to long-distance communications, and thus, all "user
premises telephone equipment had to be connected to the local network."47
The MFJ countered AT&T's monopolistic anticompetitive practices with divestiture48
because the local networks were "textbook examples of natural monopolies."49
B. Line-of-Business Restrictions on the Local Operating Companies
The MFJ also included restrictions on the newly created independent
LECs to avert the recurrence of monopolistic control by the Bell System.
50 Of
importance to this discussion were the restrictions on the LECs' ability to
enter interexchange markets.51
These particular restrictions were thought necessary because, even with heavy
regulation from the district court and the FCC, each of the seven independent
LECs maintained monopolistic control over their corresponding local access networks.52
As with the Bell System before divestiture, any company with monopoly control
over the local access networks could discriminate against competing interexchange
carriers with respect to interconnection facilities essential for service.53
This discrimination could occur by means of complete denial, or if they allowed
access, inferior quality of access and transmission.54
Further, the LECs would have the impetus and the capacity to cross-subsidize
their prices with profits from the local exchange markets.55
Although the restrictions applied to all seven of the independent LECs, a
provision in the MFJ allowed courts to waive the competition restriction under
certain circumstances.56
Originally, a petitioning LEC only had to demonstrate that "no substantial
possibility" existed that the LEC "could use its monopoly power to
impede[] competition in the market" it sought to enter.57
Subsequent case law, however, expanded the requirements to include the public
interest considerations so prevalent throughout the MFJ.58
Examples of these considerations include protection of equal access for interexchange
carriers and the maintenance of quality telephony services.59
Part VIII of the MFJ focused on the removal of barriers to interconnection.60
A central concern was the inherent bias in favor of AT&T that existed in
the telephone network.61
To alleviate this bias, the MFJ required that by September 1, 1986, the LECs
would have to provide access services to competing interexchange carriers that
were "equal in type, quality and price" to the services provided to
AT&T and its affiliates.62
III. The Impetus For And Purpose Of The 1996 Telecommunications Act
Since the MFJ, the advent of new technologies has continually altered
the telecommunications landscape. Though by no means complete, many monopolies
in the local telecommunications markets have been eroded.63
Cellular communication providers, cable providers, and "bypass" access
serve as the catalysts for change.65
Although questions exist whether these alternatives can provide direct competition,
"satellites, cellular service, land microwave networks, and expanded fiber
optics have been viewed as technologies capable of allowing direct competition
in transmission of local calls."66
Moreover, "[n]ew developments in switching facilities" and "coaxial
cables" may also furnish potential competition. These changes provided
the impetus for the 1996 Act.67
The purpose of the 1996 Act is to "promote competition and reduce regulation
in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies."68
The 1996 Act's delineated goals were to establish a "national policy framework"
calculated to deploy private sector advanced telecommunications services to
all customers in the United States by opening up competition.69
In addition, the 1996 Act sought to: (1) promote and encourage affordable advanced
telecommunications; (2) spur economic growth; and (3) preserve and advance universal
Congress also issued a series of findings pertaining to the stated goals.71
Among these findings were that: (1) competition should supplant regulation as
the impetus for technological advancement;72
(2) the monopolistic nature73
of local telephony market hindered competition74
and necessitated a cooperative effort on the part of both the state and federal
to develop a regulatory regime76
that facilitated a transition77
from regulation to a competitive marketplace; (3) a competitive marketplace
engenders technological development;78
and (4) the protections of antitrust law within a competitive marketplace ensure
economic growth and universal access.79
The importance of these findings is set forth in part V in conjunction with
a discussion of the deficiencies of the 1996 Act and the overlay of antitrust
law to its current interconnection mandate.80
Section 251(a) of the 1996 Act81
imposes a general duty upon all telecommunications carriers82
to "interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment
of other telecommunications carriers."83
The 1996 Act also requires LECs to provide: (1) resale of telecommunication
(2) nondiscriminatory access to "telephone numbers, operator services,
directory assistance, ... directory listing[s;]"85
and (3) access to "poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way" to competing
telecommunications service providers.86
Section 251(c) imposes coterminous requirements on incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILEC).87
ILECs88 must
provide interconnection to facilities and equipment at the request of any challenging
local exchange carrier (CLEC)89
and unbundled access to "network elements."90
In order to render interconnection and unbundled access economically feasible,
ILECs must permit physical collocation of their competitors' equipment.91
Additionally, in order to effectuate price competition, the 1996 Act requires
ILECs to resell their telecommunications services to CLECs at wholesale prices.92
Section 251's interconnectivity, unbundling, and resale mandates are premised
upon the supposition that permitting competitors to interconnect with an incumbent's
network, expedites both price-based competition and facility based competition:
ultimately enabling the generation of an acquired customer base from which new
entrants may construct rival facilities. The 1996 Act's interconnectivity, unbundling,
and resale mandates remain effective until "explicitly superseded by regulations
prescribed by the Commission."93
Notwithstanding an express legislative override, the only limitation on the
Act's interconnectivity and unbundling mandates is a simultaneous requirement
that the rates, terms, and conditions of interconnectivity and unbundled access
be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.94
A host of harmonious standards exists for determining the reasonableness of
rates, terms, and conditions of interconnectivity.95
The result is a quagmire of disjunctive standards. In response to the anticipated
conflict between ILECs and CLECs, the 1996 Act imposes a system of dispute resolution
by which either party may request mediation by a state commission during the
negotiation process.96
Failure to reach a negotiated settlement for interconnectivity
within 135 days97
leads to mandatory binding arbitration to settle any remaining unresolved issues.98
The 1996 Act designates the State as the arbitrator of the dispute99
and mandates the resolution of all contested issues no later than nine months
after the dispute becomes the subject of arbitration.100
The state commission must review all negotiated and arbitrated agreements.101
Rejection of an agreement is warranted if the agreement fails to comply with
the interconnection requirements of section 251 or the pricing standards of
section 252(d).102
Despite these ostensible requirements, the 1996 Act purports to entitle an aggrieved
party to appeal a state commission's determination to a federal district court.103
V. The Essential Facilities Doctrine Within The Deregulated Telecommunications
Section 251 clearly imparts a duty to deal on the part of telecommunication
providers, LECs, and ILECs with respect to facilities and equipment useful for
providing telephony services.104
Antitrust law confers a corresponding duty to deal in the form of the essential
facilities doctrine.105
The essential facilities doctrine imparts liability on a monopolist who denies
competitor access to a resource essential106
for competition in a relevant antitrust market.107
This confined duty to confer access to an essential resource provides a viable
mechanism to supplant section 251's general duty to share equipment necessary
for the provision of local telephony services.
In addition to offering an ordered deregulation of the local exchange market,
the essential facilities doctrine provides an alternative avenue for challenging
a monopolist's conduct. To understand fully the role of the essential facilities
doctrine in the deregulation of the local exchange market, however, it is necessary
to examine antitrust's doctrinal justifications, the essential facility doctrine's
role within antitrust jurisprudence, and the doctrine's historic underpinnings.
A. Antitrust's Doctrinal Justifications and the Essential Facilities Doctrine
Congress enacted the antitrust laws to promote economic efficiency108
via the protection of the competitive process.109
Courts and commentators have recognized that distortion occurs in the competitive
process when a monopolist refuses access to an essential facility.110
The instances in which a monopolist has a duty to provide access to an essential
facility is "one of the most 'unsettled and vexatious' issues in antitrust
Antitrust law rarely mandates access to a monopolist's facility for several
reasons: (1) liberal access encourages firms to abstain from significant investment
initiatives in an attempt to free ride on the investment of their competitors;
(2) access inhibits firms from undertaking risky and costly investment in the
absence of countervailing first-mover advantages; and (3) mandated access does
not have pro-competitive effects unless the terms and conditions of access are
reasonable. Absent reasonable access requirements, a monopolist can either permit
access on terms that are so onerous that, as a practical matter, access is unavailable112
or charge monopoly rents for access, in which case price competition becomes
Despite these implications, antitrust policy supports a limited duty to deal
only when an actual probability exists for enhancing competition.114
The essential facilities doctrine facilitates competition in two circumstances:
(1) a monopolistic consortium of competitors jointly controls an essential facility
enabling the consortium to restrain trade;115
and (2) a single monopolist controls an essential facility and via this control
unilaterally forecloses competition in a relevant antitrust market.116
Antitrust liability attaches only when a particular resource is central to a
competitor's viability in the marketplace.117
Liability primarily occurs when a monopolist obtains a substantial cost advantage
by possessing an essential resource118
that competitors cannot practicably duplicate;119
the monopolist possesses a natural monopoly; and the monopolist has no valid
business justification for denying access to the essential resource.120
B. The Doctrine's Historical Underpinnings: Supreme Court Recognition Of The
Essential Facilities Doctrine
In support of the essential facilities doctrine, two clusters of Supreme
Court precedents have emerged: concerted horizontal combination cases in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act121
and unilateral monopoly misuse cases in violation of section 2.122
Concerted action among unrelated enterprises occurs infrequently, is readily
detectable, and is easily remedied.123
Unilateral activity, however, is pervasive, evades detection, and frequently
requires remedial measures that consign the courts' duties to those of a regulatory
1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine as Applied to Horizontal Combination
Cases: Concerted Action In Violation of Section 1
The seminal case establishing the essential facilities doctrine pursuant
to section 1 of the Sherman Act is United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n
of St. Louis.124
The Terminal Railroad Association (Association) was a unitary corporation consisting
of fourteen competing railroads.125
The Association acquired numerous independent terminal companies and operated
them as a united system.126
The Association sought to control all practicable means of railroad access through
St. Louis by acquiring ownership of all trackage, access bridges, and terminal
facilities necessary for effective interchange in the St. Louis terminal.127
At the time, St. Louis was the terminus for numerous trunk-line railroads and
a critical terminal for a substantial amount of rail transportation.128
The Association permitted all railroads to use its facilities, whether or
not they were Association members.129
While no showing existed that the Association had excluded nonparticipating
carriers, there was nothing preventing the Association from doing so.130
Consonant with the simplest economic theory of vertical integration, the Association
charged nonmembers the same price for terminal access that they charged themselves.131
This price, however, constituted monopoly rents132
that disadvantaged nonparticipating carriers.133
The Supreme Court recognized that in ordinary circumstances, a number of independent
entities could combine for the purpose of controlling or acquiring terminals
for their common but exclusive use.134
If access or exclusion terms were excessively onerous, competitors had the ability
to exercise the right and power to construct plausible substitutes.135
Two factors were determinative of the inability to construct plausible substitutes
in this case. First, the Association was a natural monopoly.136
The geographical constraints made the construction of a viable rail alternative
The minimum efficient scale also easily accommodated all existing railway traffic.138
Secondly, control over the trackage and access bridges created a bottleneck.
Limiting access to the St. Louis interchange threatened to substantially curtail
travel along an extensive rail network on either side of the interchange.139
Given the essential nature of the St. Louis interchange140
and resultant inability to construct a viable substitute,141
the Court viewed the Association's unified ownership142
as "an obstacle, a hindrance, and a restriction upon interstate commerce."143
Rather than ordering dissolution of the Association, the Court entered a decree
requiring the consortium to allow nonparticipating competitor railroads access
to the facilities essential for the St. Louis interchange.144
The Court ordered access for the ten remaining railroads "upon such just
and reasonable terms as shall place such [railroads] upon a plane of equality
in respect of benefits and burdens [incurred by Association members]."145
Forcing the Association to admit competitors to their collaboration enabled
the Court to avoid becoming a regulatory agency charged with ordering the rationing
of the Association's assets.146
The Court's focus upon the essential nature of the trackage, access bridges,
and terminals accessing the St. Louis terminal lends support for the existence
of the essential facilities doctrine.147
Even the most contentious critics148
acknowledge that the Terminal Railroad decision imparts a limited responsibility
upon competitors who jointly acquire a natural monopoly to allow reasonable
access for rivals.149
The rationale undergirding Terminal Railroad was eventually extended
in Associated Press v. United States.150
Approximately 1,200 newspapers joined together creating the Associated Press
News Organization (AP). The AP provided a vehicle for the gathering, transmission,
and exchange of news reports created by domestic and foreign newspaper members.151
The collaboration realized significant economies of scale resulting in the saturation
of the news gathering market.152
Although the AP generally extended membership to all news-generating newspapers,153
the AP bylaws established oppressive entry requirements for applicant papers
in competition with existing local incumbents.154
Each existing member could "block membership by competing newspapers and
thereby remain the exclusive outlet for AP news in its locality."155
Blocked entrants were able to access a limited number of alternative news gathering
Despite the existence of limited competition among newsgathering enterprises,157
the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, determined that the concerted effort
of AP members to exclude local competitors violated section 1 of the Sherman
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion offers the only clear support for the
essential facilities doctrine.159
Equating the AP with a public utility,160
Justice Frankfurter opined that AP was clothed in public interest and must,
therefore, deal with its rivals.161
Although the remaining Justices expressly disclaimed Frankfurter's public utility
rationale for the opinion,162
it provides a useful perspective for invoking the essential facilities doctrine.
Despite confusion over the proper rationale underlying the decision,163
the case seems to stand for the proposition that in limited situations, collaborators
must allow access to rivals on nearly equal terms.164
These limited circumstances exist when competitors collaboratively conceive
a profitable facility, the facility is essential to the competitive viability
of rivals and to a competitive market, and admission of rivals is consonant
with the legitimate goals of the collaboration.165
2. Monopoly Misuse Cases in Violation of Section 2
The Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States166
decision formed the foundation of the essential facilities doctrine within the
single firm context.167
Otter Tail Power Co. (Otter Tail) was a regulated public power utility168
that maintained an upstream monopoly in electric transmission lines169
while simultaneously selling power at the retail level.170
Otter Tail refused to sell wholesale power to municipal systems171
and to transfer electric power from one utility to another over the facilities
of an intermediate utility.172
Additionally, Otter Tail instituted litigation aimed at forestalling or delaying
the establishment of alternative systems, and invoked contract provisions aimed
at denying municipal systems access to alternative suppliers requiring the use
of Otter Tail's transmission lines.173
The effect of Otter Tail's refusal to deal was the elimination of competition
in the downstream market.174
The Court determined that Otter Tail violated section 2 of the Sherman Act
by intentionally exploiting its wholesale energy monopoly power to gain a competitive
advantage at the retail level.175
The Court affirmed the decree enjoining Otter Tail to either sell its own power
or wheel power supplied by other wholesalers to the downstream retail market.176
The Otter Tail decision has generated a torrent of conflicting commentary
over the duties owed to competitors by the owner of an essential facility. Some
commentators suggest that Otter Tail does not establish a general duty
to deal.177
The unique circumstances surrounding the case serve as the premise of this argument.
Otter Tail possessed a natural monopoly subject to governmental regulation.
The regulatory agency had the authority and capacity to regulate prices and
terms of transmission. The existence of agency oversight supplanted the need
for the Court to assume the role of energy transmission regulator.179
Some commentators conclude that in these limited circumstances, a duty to deal
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.181
represents the second unilateral refusal to deal case considered by the Supreme
Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.) and Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands)
competed in the Aspen Ski basin skiing facilities market.183
Ski Co. owned three of the four skiing mountains in Aspen184
and thereby obtained control of 80 percent of the Aspen area ski ticket sales.185
For many years, Ski Co. cooperated with Highlands, the owner of the fourth mountain,186
to jointly provide a four-mountain, multi-area, six-day, ski pass.187
Ski passes are typically sold on a daily basis, but the four mountain pass enabled
skiers to access any of the four mountains throughout a six-day ski week.188
Ski Co. and Highlands sold the six-day pass at nearly 14 percent below the equivalent
six-day daily rate.189
Initially, Ski Co. and Highlands divided revenues received from the multi-area
pass based upon the actual usage of their respective facilities.190
The Highlands facility typically received 16 to 18 percent of total revenues
from the multi-area pass.191
Ski Co. threatened to discontinue the multi-day pass unless Highlands was
willing to reduce its percentage of the revenue to 13.2 percent without regard
to actual usage.192
Despite the abandonment of this particular effort to reduce Highlands' share,
Ski Co. became increasingly dissatisfied.193
Ski Co. continued its efforts to reduce Highlands' revenue share from the four-mountain
pass. Ultimately, Ski Co. refused to continue its participation in the four-area
ski pass.194
After discontinuing the four-area pass, Ski Co. instituted its own three-area
pass allowing access exclusively to its three skiing facilities.195
Highlands made several attempts to accommodate Ski Co.'s new position including
marketing its own multi-area pass that contained coupons exchangeable for Ski
Co.'s day pass, at day pass prices.196
Despite the backing of a local bank, Ski Co. refused to accept Highlands' coupons.197
Highlands responded by offering to purchase passes directly from Ski Co.198
Ski Co. refused to sell any skiing passes to Highlands despite continual requests
from Highlands.199
The result of Ski Co.'s actions was a significant decline in Highlands' revenue
share of the skiing market.200
Ski Co.'s lower prices also had the practical effect of capturing consumers
unwilling to purchase a more expensive Highlands' pass.201
Once Ski Co. was determined to be a monopolist in possession of a unique facility,
its actions constituted a de facto exclusive dealing arrangement.202
Ski Co. justified its actions on the grounds that (1) Highlands was an inferior
skiing facility; (2) the method of determining actual usage was unsatisfactory;
and (3) accepting Highlands' coupons created an undue administrative burden.
Ski Co. offered these explanations despite no evidence of a greater administrative
burden, Highlands' willingness to provide qualified accountants to survey usage
rates, and Ski Co.'s continued dealings with inferior ski facilities in other
The Tenth Circuit determined that the multi-day, multi-area, ski pass was
an essential facility;204
and that Ski Co.'s actions evidenced intent to create or maintain a monopoly.205
Without addressing the essential facilities claim,206
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision.207
The Court declared that a monopolist does not have an unqualified duty to deal
with competitors, but refusals to deal may have "evidentiary significance."208
The Court seemed to suggest that the refusal to deal might evidence an anticompetitive
intent for the purposes of determining impermissible exclusionary conduct. Ski
Co.'s radical departure from its cooperative effort with Highlands,209
coupled with a lack of valid business justifications,210
formed the basis of the Court's conclusion that Ski Co. willfully acquired,
maintained, and used its monopoly power in the destination ski resort market
for anticompetitive and exclusionary purposes and this violated section 2 of
the Sherman Act.211
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Court upheld a jury instruction requiring
jurists to find the defendant liable if "the defendant acted 'with exclusionary
or anticompetitive purpose or effect.'"212
Despite the possibility that nearly any act by a monopolist could render a monopolist
liable pursuant to this jury instruction,213
several factors limit the instruction's application.214
First, the Court's formulation emanates from the particular factual background
of the case. The Court never implied that monopolists have a general duty to
cooperate with rivals.215
Secondly, the decision does not mandate the particular terms on which Ski Co.
must deal with Highlands. Nothing in the opinion prevents Ski Co. from charging
monopoly prices for its goods and services either to its customers or to Highlands.
Finally, the decision allows a monopolist to deny access to particular goods,
services, and facilities if a legitimate business reason exists.216
The Court seemed to suggest that a legitimate business justification negates
a monopolist's anticompetitive purpose.
3. Lower Courts'
Distillation of Supreme Court Doctrine: The MCI
Attempts to distill Supreme Court precedent in a consistent and predictable
way has confounded lower courts and generated a torrent of conflicting commentary.217
Given the Court's insistence on an ad hoc approach to the essential facilities
doctrine, the key issue is its proper scope. Courts should employ a theoretical
framework that limits the doctrine's applicability to situations that enhance
competition. This is the only viable reconciliation of Supreme Court precedent,
antitrust law's conventional underpinnings, and congressional intent as embodied
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.218
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.219
(MCI), the Seventh Circuit devised a useful test delineating the applicable
standards for invoking the essential facilities doctrine.220
MCI filed its original complaint on March 6, 1974, alleging four counts, including
"monopolization, attempt to monopolize ... conspiracy to monopolize ...
and conspiracy in restraint of trade ...."221
A major contention by MCI was the extent to which AT&T allowed MCI to interconnect
with "local circuits."222
According to MCI, it was imperative that MCI make contact with the AT&T
operating companies' local networks to provide "full end-to-end transmission."223
MCI attested that AT&T unlawfully proscribed interconnections for particular
switches and local lines.224
MCI further alleged that AT&T unlawfully refused multipoint interconnections.225
These behaviors, according to MCI, "constituted an abuse of AT&T's
monopoly power over facilities essential to MCI's success."226
The court set forth a four-part test to discern the merits of MCI's essentiality
claim. This test has come to dominate the essential facilities landscape.227
Pursuant to MCI, courts must examine the following factors: "(1)
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial
of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing
the facility."228
The second element of the test is effectively part of the definition of what
constitutes an essential facility. If a competitor can reasonably or practically
the facility, the facility is not essential.230
The fourth element implicates the question of whether a legitimate business
justification exists for the refusal to provide access to the facility.231
An analysis of each aspect of this test illuminates the proper role of the essential
facilities doctrine.
4. Control of an Essential Facility by a Monopolist
The essentiality of a facility is the initial condition required by
the doctrine before a duty to deal attaches. A facility is essential only when
two conditions are satisfied: (1) an alternative viable facility is impossible
or unduly expensive to construct;232
and (2) the facility is central to the competitor's viability in the relevant
antitrust market.233
A number of factors operate to satisfy the first condition: geographical and
topographical conditions prevent construction of alternatives; a legal license
precludes duplication;234
a natural monopoly exists;235
the unique physical characteristics of the resource are not duplicable; a bottleneck
the governmental regulatory environment prohibits the construction; the existing
resource satisfies the minimum efficiencies of scale; public subsidies are necessary
for construction and are lacking;237
a minimum market condition exists;238
natural fortuity disallows the construction of an alternative;239
lags in technology render the alternative infeasible or unduly expensive; or
any other factor that provides a substantial cost disincentive for the creation
of a viable alternative.240
Although a substantial reproductive cost may render a facility essential,241
the key factor is that the reproductive cost be enormous.242
The requisite high costs are most frequently typified by the existence of public
subsidization. The substantiality of the requisite cost advantage, however,
involves difficult questions of degree. A competitor can invariably replicate
a facility at some price, constrained only by technological and legal impediments.
The existence of technological impediments, legal prohibitions, or the necessity
of public subsidization, coupled with a natural monopolistic market condition,
are all factors in determining if a facility is essential.243
Satisfaction of the second condition proves equally onerous because successful
invocation of the doctrine imposes two distinct requirements: (1) a competitor
must demonstrate that the facility is central244
to competitive viability, and (2) in a relevant antitrust market.245
Examination of these requirements in inverse order necessitates the owner of
the essential facility first to be a monopolist in the relevant antitrust market.246
An analysis of the relevant antitrust market requires an examination of the
market allegedly controlled by the owner of an essential facility and the market
for the unique facility itself.247
To illustrate the distinction, suppose an ILEC in the telecommunications industry
owns all of the copper telephone lines that comprise the local exchange grid.
Although the ILEC is a monopolist of copper telephone lines, the essential facilities
doctrine is not premised upon a copper telephone line monopoly. Rather, application
of the doctrine requires the examination of competition in the relevant market
controlled by the facility, anticompetitive radiations among local telephony
service providers. If cellular, fiber-optic, cable, and satellite technologies
effectively compete with the copper telephone lines, the ownership of copper
telephone lines would not be central to the provision of telephone service within
the relevant market.248
Possession of a copper telephone line monopoly would also not be central to
competitive viability if: (1) the copper telephone lines are available from
another source;249
(2) copper telephone lines are easily duplicable by a competitor;250
or (3) other technology provides an equivalent substitute.251
Allowing access to copper telephone lines within the confines of these divisions
enables a competitor to simply substitute itself for the incumbent local exchange
provider. This substitution creates few (if any) pro-competitive effects and
has the potential of chilling desirable behavior.252
Determining the required level of monopolistic control that ownership of an
essential facility must have before antitrust liability attaches has spawned
numerous judicial decisions. Some courts treat the threat of downstream monopolization
as the sine qua non of a valid essential facilities claim.253
Other courts require that the control of the facility actually be accompanied
by the power to eliminate competition in the relevant downstream market.
5. The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor
Under the essential facility doctrine, a valid antitrust claim is contingent
upon the denial of access to the essential facility.254
Obviously, a competitor permitted to access an essential facility has little
room to contest the actions of a monopolist. The denial need not be a total
denial; rather, it is sufficient that the "terms of [access] be unreasonable
in price, profit margin, time obligation, or other substantive criteria."255
Additionally, denying access does not automatically implicate antitrust liability.256
Antitrust liability is premised on the enhancement of competition.257
Denying access to a competitor or potential competitor may do little to effectuate
Output and price-competition are unaffected so long as the monopolist is permitted
to charge monopoly rents for use of the facility.259
A different result occurs when the monopolist operates in a regulatory environment.
When a regulated monopolist denies access to a competitor and this denial aids
in the evasion of rate regulation or undermines the regulatory competition enhancement
scheme, an antitrust claim exists.260
In situations involving firms that do not compete in the market dominated
by the essential facility owner, a duty to deal does not attach, as a monopolist
has little incentive to restrain competition in an upstream or downstream market
in which the monopolist does not compete.261
A monopolist refusing to deal with a non-competitor may have a negative impact
upon firms in competition in a downstream market. For example, dealing with
firm A while simultaneously refusing to deal with firm B, firm A's competitor,
may enable firm A to charge lower prices, thereby distorting competition in
a downstream market. Courts recognizing this phenomenon have entertained an
essential facilities claim in situations where a monopolist has refused access
to a non-competitor.262
This precedent, however, ignores the fact that refusal to deal with non-competitors
neither produces competitive dominance in a vertically related market263
nor bolsters the monopolist's power in the monopolized market.264
The absence of these effects necessarily confines the essential facilities doctrine
to refusals of a competitor or a potential competitor to deal with the owner
of the essential facility.265
6. The feasibility of providing the facility
The scope of the doctrine is further limited by the existence of a
legitimate business justification for denial of access.266
Several ensuing subordinate questions arise. First, what constitutes a legitimate
business purpose and what criteria are to be used to evaluate whether a business
purpose is legitimate?267
Second, does the fact-finder have unfettered discretion to determine the legitimacy
of the business justification?268
Third, does the monopolist have deference in devising a legitimate business
justification? Fourth, does the monopolist's state of mind factor into the legitimacy
afforded the business justification? And finally, does a legitimate business
justification accompanied by an anticompetitive intent warrant a finding of
The answers to these questions continue to confound courts and commentators.
In general, "a business justification is valid if it relates directly or
indirectly to the enhancement of consumer welfare."270
A proper distillation of a legitimate business justification defense, however,
must recognize such a defense at both a micro and a macro level.271
The micro level consists of the particular facts of each case.272
For example, if a firm can demonstrate that providing access would violate an
existing regulatory scheme, a legitimate business justification exists.273
Telephone interconnection cases provide good examples. AT&T was a natural
monopoly protected from rivalry by public restrictions on entry.274
Prior to divestiture, AT&T provided local and long-distance service.275
Rival producers of long-distance service needed to connect their long-distance
lines with callers through the local telephone exchanges.276
AT&T allegedly misused its local monopolies to protect its long-distance
power by denying or obstructing those interconnections.277
The Seventh Circuit held that notwithstanding any duty to interconnect, AT&T
may deny interconnection if it had a "reasonable basis in regulatory policy
to conclude, and in good faith concluded that denial of interconnection is required
by concrete, articulable concerns for public interest ...."278
AT&T failed to articulate any such legitimate reason.279
The proper methodology for determining the legitimacy of the monopolist's
business justification at the micro level begins with the plaintiff's burden
to persuade the fact-finder that the defendant's refusal is unreasonable.280
The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to provide evidence establishing
a legitimate business justification.281
An important caveat exists: Claims of economic self-interest rarely serve as
a legitimate justification for denying access.282
A firm is never obliged to sacrifice legitimate business objectives.283
Upon evidencing a legitimate business justification, the plaintiff is charged
with demonstrating that the defendant's justification is merely pretextual.284
The essential facilities doctrine also recognizes a legitimate business justification
at the macro level.285
Macro legitimate business justifications do not pertain to any particular firm,
but constitute "propositions of general policy."286
For example, the justification for refusing access to a patented invention does
not implicate the practicality of providing access. Such a denial is predicated
on social policy grounds that access would both deprive a lawful monopolist
of its legitimate rewards and chill desirable innovative activities.287
Determining whether access deprives a lawful monopolist of legitimate rewards
or chills desirable behavior288
provides the requisite criteria for determining the applicability of legitimate
business justifications at the macro level. Macro level policy decisions necessitate
the oversight of a judge rather than a jury.289
This requirement facilitates the development of consonant standards for similar
firms in similar markets, and removes the determination of national economic
policy from the unqualified hands of jurors.290
C. The Role of the Regulatory Regime Within the Essential Facilities Doctrine
Invocation of the essential facilities doctrine necessarily implicates
the prices upon which the court orders compulsory access. Plaintiffs invariably
will challenge the defendant's access price on the grounds that the price: (1)
is so excessive as to constitute a denial of access, (2) impedes price competition,
or (3) precludes a reasonable rate of return.291
Courts are often ill-equipped adequately to assume the role of a price regulatory
agency by entertaining such claims.292
Courts willing to undertake a price control function still must grapple with
the unyielding antitrust principal that a legal monopolist may charge monopoly
rents for an essential facility.293
Charging monopoly rents for access does little to effectuate competition within
a relevant antitrust market.294
Additionally, the essential facilities doctrine heavily relies on legal precedent
derived from various courts resulting in a lack of coherence and consistency.295
The regulatory environment rectifies many of the problems that elude antitrust
For example, the existence of a regulatory agency both facilitates the price
control function and provides an industry-specific solution. Regulatory agencies
have the expertise and continuing relationship with a regulated industry so
as to eliminate the presumption that a monopolist may charge monopoly rents
for access.297
It is within this regulatory context that the essential facilities doctrine
has unique relevance.298
The case for applying the doctrine is strongest when a regulated monopolist's
"denial of access aids [the monopolist] in evading rate regulation or undermines
the regulator's plan to encourage rivalry in either the primary or adjacent
This situation currently confronts the telecommunications industry.
VI. The Role Of the Essential Facilities Doctrine Within The Deregulated Telecommunications
Despite the transformation of the telecommunications industry from
"technical balkanization" to a "reality of technological convergence,"
the local telephony market remains highly concentrated.300
Currently, ILECs control 99.7 percent of the local exchange market.301
The advent of section 251 was intended to provide a transitory legislative decree
aimed at facilitating a competitive local exchange market via interconnectivity,
unbundling, and resale provisions.302
Despite its purpose, congressional enactment of section 251 is incongruous with
a transitional regulatory regime free from artificial impediments. The result
is price competition without limitation and retarded growth in facilities-based
Section 251 is premised upon the notion that competition, rather than regulation,
provides the necessary incentive to spur innovation and alternative telephony
Section 251, however, establishes highly discounted resale rates, unbundling
below-full-cost items, and ordered interconnectivity.304
ILECs confronted with below cost resale and unbundling requirements have little
incentive to invest in the public network when doing so automatically benefits
Section 251's interconnectivity, unbundling, and resale provisions also discourage
incumbents and competitors from directing their efforts toward alternative technologies
and delivery systems. Entrants permitted to access an incumbent's facilities
are obligated to obtain market share by engaging in price warfare for delivery
Absent substantial improvements in efficiency, price competition necessarily
entails revenue losses. Telecommunication providers are forced to lower prices
to obtain a sizeable customer base.307
Discursively, the development of alternative telephony infrastructure is highly
capital intensive and generally requires subsidization via the price mechanism.308
Reduced revenue coupled with capital intensive technological development threatens
to create stasis for the industry where competitors simply divide a dollar market
without simultaneously facilitating new demand sources via technological differentiation.309
The resulting predicament threatens to freeze current communication modes for
the next ten years.310
Additionally, section 251's resale, unbundling, and interconnectivity requirements
remain effective until explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the
The absence of any clear statutory time limitation on section 251 expressly
contradicts congressional findings312
and undermines the rationale underlying the 1996 Act. Three problem areas may
arise. First, Congress intended section 251 to expedite facility-based competition
by first fostering price-based competition on the assumption that price-based
competition enables new entrants to acquire a requisite customer base from which
they may construct rival facilities.313
Many of the new entrants, however, are multi-billion-dollar service providers
such as AT&T, Sprint, and MCI. These service providers have historically
invested billions of dollars in their brand images and have obtained more than
80 percent customer awareness.314
Entrants armed with an arsenal of name-brand recognition and capital base do
not seem to require the ability to piggyback off incumbents' facilities.
Second, section 251 makes no distinction among these multi-billion-dollar
entrants and smaller revenue based entrants with respect to interconnectivity,
unbundling, and resale. Smaller revenue based entrants face a daunting challenge
in attempting to compete with large scale service providers other than incumbents
possessing name-brand recognition and large capital bases.315
The 1996 Act thus paves the way for an oligopolistic market structure in which
well-financed and well-known entrants piggyback off the facilities of incumbents,
driving prices down and stripping the incumbents of their most profitable customers
while simultaneously overpowering smaller, revenue-based competitors. Third,
an absence of temporal limitations on the 1996 Act forces incumbents to provide
access, resale, and unbundling in perpetuity. Incumbents are thus forced to
commit massive resources to the sustenance of the current copper wire system.
As technological developments render this system obsolete, incumbents are placed
at a competitive disadvantage. Entrants are encouraged to resell copper wire
service in an effort to cross subsidize the development of new technology. Without
proper judicial interpretation, the 1996 Act could simultaneously relegate incumbents
to ditch diggers and force service repair personnel to maintain an outdated
exchange system for competitor exploitation.
Ironically, the 1996 Act provides no evidence of congressional intent to divest
incumbents of their local networks, even if some natural monopolies survive.316
Indeed, the 1996 Act verifies congressional intent that ILECs be vigorous competitors.317
Mandating interconnection, however, enables a competitor to abstain from economically
and technologically duplicating the incumbent's facilities. The 1996 Act permits
a competitor simply to request interconnection without further justification
or explanation.318
Competitors thus have little incentive to construct alternative rival facilities
or engage in highly capital intensive technological development.319
LECs are faced with a Hobbesean choice of either incurring substantial development
costs while risking the potential of allowing competitor access, or choosing
not to take the development initiative, instead relying upon competitors to
develop the new facility. Either choice has deleterious consequences upon competition
by discouraging the development of new facilities among competitors.
The solution lies in the antitrust principles embodied within the essential
facilities doctrine. Congress explicitly recognized the role of antitrust enforcement
in the deregulation of the telecommunications industry but failed to interlineate
antitrust principles properly within the confines of section 251.320
Instead, Congress generated a highly complex regulatory environment. The Interconnection
Order alone comprises more than 700 pages of regulations and guidelines.321
The highly regulatory environment is entirely inconsistent with congressional
findings that the "deployment of existing and future advanced, multipurpose
technologies will best be fostered by minimizing government limitations on the
commercial use of those technologies."322
Fortunately, the existing provisions of section 251, coupled with modification
of section 252 pricing terms, enable a regulatory reduction and the infusion
of the essential facilities doctrine. Section 251 requires that access, resale,
and unbundling be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. In determining just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory interconnectivity, resale, and unbundling
terms the following criteria should be considered. First, the duration of ordered
resale must reflect the relative size of each entrant. Well-established interexchange
market carriers should receive less deference than fledgling exchange providers
when determining the continuance of the resale provisions as applied. Second,
below-cost resale must be limited in duration to the time necessary to give
each carrier an adequate opportunity to establish a necessary customer base.
Carriers such as MCI and AT&T obviously need less time to establish the
requisite customer base than lesser-known entrants. This limitation would preclude
carriers with substantial name recognition and an established customer base
from overly relying on an incumbent's facilities. Third, regulators must determine
access and unbundling terms by drawing upon the essential facilities doctrine.
The essentiality of a facility becomes the first relevant inquiry.323
The particular facility must be central to competition in the local telecommunications
market and not practicably duplicable.324
Within the local exchange networks, operational features such as switching
elements, transport elements, signaling systems, and databases seem to satisfy
these requirements.325
The essentiality of ILEC's local exchange networks arise inter alia from legal
licenses; the existence of a bottlenecks; a historically rigid regulatory environment;
the satisfaction of minimum efficiencies of scale by the existing local exchange
loop; the necessity of public subsidies for the development of relevant exchange
loop elements and telephony services; the presence of a minimum market within
rural areas; the high cost associated with the development of technologically
viable alternatives; and the ability of ILECs to cross-subsidize future endeavors
by their ownership of the local exchange loop.326
Despite the fact that technological development promises to erode the essentiality
of the facilities and generate facilities-based competition,327
ILECS currently supply the wires, which provide the path for the vast majority
of voice and data services reaching consumers.328
Replication of the essential elements built over 120 years and valued at $270
billion would cost trillions of dollars.329
Thus, ILECs have effectively obtained a vital bottleneck on the local exchange
The essential facilities doctrine recognizes that the effect the copper telephone
line monopoly has is limited over time.331
As cellular, fiber-optic, cable, and satellite technologies become more prevalent,
ownership of a copper telephone delivery system no longer remains central to
the provision of telephone service within the relevant exchange market.332
If the potential market entrant is able to duplicate the copper lines monopoly
with a new telecommunications technology, the essential facilities doctrine
does not apply.333
Thus, the essential facilities doctrine recognizes the dynamic nature of the
telecommunications industry and serves as a catalyst for advanced multi-purpose
Potential market entrants unwilling to forgo the expanding telecommunications
market will either develop alternate facilities or merge with other telecommunications
providers to engender facilities-based competition with the incumbent provider.335
The second inquiry pertains to the denial of the essential facility to a competitor.336
Because the 1996 Act mandates interconnectivity and unbundling, this question
seems moot. The terms of access, however, remain relevant. Access terms pertaining
to a facility deemed essential should remain consistent with section 252. The
essential facilities doctrine forecloses an entrant's ability to free ride on
nonessential facilities owned by the ILECs.
The final inquiry pertaining to the essential facilities doctrine is the feasibility
of providing access to the facility.337
The 1996 Act partially addresses this issue. Section 251 permits regulators
to deny access plans that are contrary to the public interest.338
This broad policy statement recognizes a legitimate business justification for
denying access at the macro level. The ability to deny access plans should also
extend to micro legitimate business justifications when an incumbent can establish
that access is not technically or economically practicable. The nature of the
existing local loop limits the applicability of a micro level business justification.
Disputes will invariably arise over the essentiality of a particular facility
or the existence of a legitimate business justification. Infusing the essential
facilities doctrine into the 1996 Act's interconnectivity, unbundling, and resale
provisions, however, provides a superior mechanism to continuing adherence to
the rigid anticompetitive terms of section 251339
for achieving ordered deregulation of the telecommunications industry. Simply
allowing access to copper telephone delivery systems without invocation of the
essential facilities doctrine enables a competitor to substitute itself for
the incumbent local exchange provider. This substitution has limited pro-competitive
effects and has the potential of chilling desirable behavior. Nothing in the
legislative history of the 1996 Act suggests that Congress intended such a skewed
competitive result.
Recognition of the essential facilities doctrine provides invaluable
transition rules and criteria in the ordered deregulation of the telecommunications
industry. Infusing essential facilities principles within section 251 of the
1996 Act creates investment incentives and ensures a competitive marketplace
by mandating interconnectivity, resale, and unbundling at competitive rates
only when a monopolist denies access to a facility essential to competition
in the local telecommunications market that cannot be practicably duplicated
by a competitor.340
The essential facilities doctrine thus provides an incentive for facilities-based
competition necessary to achieve the congressional goal that "all Americans,
regardless of where they may work, live, or visit, ultimately have comparable
access to the full benefits of competitive communications markets."341


text:
Drug-resistant bacteria have spread in a Los Angeles hospital, perhaps from contaminated endoscopes.
Drug-resistant bacteria have spread in a Los Angeles hospital, perhaps from contaminated endoscopes.
Researchers document the bacterial life living among New York City's transit stations.
Microorganisms continually challenge our assumptions of what life can achieve.
Extremophiles should not be viewed through an anthropocentric lens; what's extreme for us may be a perfectly comfortable environment for a microbe.
Using ultraviolet light to disinfect drinking water may simply drive bacteria to dormancy, rather than kill them.
Scientists design bacteria reliant upon synthetic amino acids to contain genetically modified organisms.
Mouse offspring conceived by in vitro fertilization are metabolically different from naturally conceived mice.
Whole-animal, light-based imaging of infected small mammals
A new microscope attachment can allow smartphone users to take a closer look at fluorescently labeled DNA.
A paralyzed woman has used mind power and a robotic arm wirelessly connected to her brain to achieve the most dexterous movement yet accomplished with BMI.


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Re: Put your mouth where your money is?by ChuckularOne (Parson) |
on Aug 15, 2006 at 14:50 UTC ( #567481=note: print w/ replies, xml ) | Need Help?? |
Me too! (What am I replying to? I have no idea, I jut want to vote.)
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