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RICHARD HAASS: Well, good evening, and thank you all for coming to the Council on Foreign Relations this evening for this special event in memory of Richard Holbrooke.
Let me just take a minute to describe how tonight came about. It was just over a year ago, when we were beginning the conversation, both in-house and as well as between Kati and myself, about how we could best honor Richard's contributions and his memory, and this -- and there were, as all of you know, several powerful and moving memorials. And what -- we thought we could do something that was somewhat different but also consistent with Richard's association with the council and with the council's own mission, which is to focus on some of the issues and some of the lessons that could be derived from his -- from his extraordinary career. And that is essentially what we will be doing tonight.
The whole idea is to pay some attention to one of the most vexing problems that policymakers often confront, which is relations with individuals and countries that fall into the general category of friends.
The tool kit for dealing with adversaries is actually quite well- articulated and quite familiar, whether it's sanctions or negotiations, uses of forces and so forth -- the entire, if you will, coercive tool kit.
But dealing with friends, with partners or with individuals and countries that are purported to be friends and partners can be extraordinarily difficult, because in many ways you have none of those tools to bring to bear, plus the domestic politics here and there tend to be particularly complex.
And when you think of Richard's career -- Vietnam; the Balkans, dealing with, you know, not just the former Yugoslavia but with NATO and the rest; Afghanistan and Pakistan -- there's a thread here, and in every one of these situations, one was dealing as -- I mean, often, much of the time, again, with friends and partners, with all the complications that that -- that that entailed.
Richard was a council member -- and Kati and I were just talking about this -- not just for most of his adult life but for most of his life. He became a member at the ripe age of 29. He was, as a result, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations for no less than four decades. During that time he also served on our Board of Directors for approximately 13 years and spoke at I don't know how many meetings over those years and decades.
The turnout tonight is extraordinary by any measure, and it's a real testament, I think, to how you, the membership, feels and felt about Richard. There are a few people tonight who I'd like to single out. It's always a dangerous thing to do in an organization like this, but so it goes.
Two of my predecessors are here, Les Gelb and Peter Tarnoff, and two of the former chairmen of the institution are here, David Rockefeller and Pete Peterson -- and all of them had the opportunity not just to know but to work with Richard -- tonight, so I and we are especially that they are with us.
We also have tonight the great pleasure of having several members of Richard's family here with us, and again, we're really pleased that you could be here and that we could do this with you.
And now there's no person I'm happier to hand things over to than Kati Marton. (Applause.)
KATI MARTON: Good evening, dear friends of Richard's. Richard Haass, thank you for organizing this wonderful tribute to Richard Holbrooke.
It's -- it's quite overwhelming for me to see so many of our dear, dear friends and companions gathered again in Richard's memory. And of course Richard Haass summoned the most distinguished and the most -- and the closest-to-Richard panel imaginable, Les and Frank and Vali and Chris Hill -- Hi, Chris -- peering down from cyberspace at us. It's -- I couldn't think of a better tribute except not having one.
It's absolutely fitting that, as Richard Haass mentioned, that this should be the final memorial after a year of astonishing tributes -- from the Asia Society, from the United Nations, from the American Academy in Berlin. It's fitting that this should be the final one because this is, as Richard mentioned, where Richard Holbrooke really got his start in life. This is where he honed his diplomatic skills. This is where he formed his lifelong friendships. And this is the organization that he poured heart and soul into to making it the dynamic platform that it was under Peter and Les and now under Richard Haass. And though I've not been a member for 40 years, I've been a member long enough to have tremendously benefited from that membership.
Most importantly, this is where Richard and I met. (Chuckles.) You didn't know that, Richard. We did not court within these hallowed halls -- (laughter) -- let me assure you. I found Richard Holbrooke to be way too scary in those meetings to do anything like court. But we courted under much more relaxed circumstances amid the cafes and great cathedrals of Europe. And by the way, Richard knew as much about cafes and great cathedrals as he did about nuclear throw weights and the fine points of getting very bad people to do good things across the negotiating table.
But you could not share 17 years of Richard's life and not be passionately engaged in the biggest issues of the day, from the Balkans, to paying U.S. back dues to the U.N., to NATO enlargement, to AIDS, to, finally, attempting to rein in the Taliban. Those were our bread-and-butter subjects. Once in a while when Richard forgot to ask me what kind of a day I was having, I'd have to chide him and say, hey, this isn't Wisner or Gelb you're talking to, this is Kati, your wife. (Laughter.)
Many years ago, Richard Bernstein, the distinguished New York Times correspondent, said to me that he'd only ever personally known one great man -- Richard Holbrooke. Why, I asked. Why is that? It's not that I didn't think Richard was great; it's just that when you live with a person, particularly a person who'd just as soon wear the same necktie for five days in a row, you don't think of them as a great man.
Well, Richard Bernstein had a very good answer. He said that Richard Holbrooke -- there are too many Richards around here -- that Richard Holbrooke was the only one who was actually changing the world. In the past year since Richard's death, I have come to fully appreciate that. Richard did leave the world a different place. He ended the nastiest European war since the Second World War. He changed the way the world deals with HIV/AIDS. He built what I think is the most dynamic American European cultural platform, the American Academy in Berlin.
But in this past year, I've discovered that Richard's most meaningful legacy is as mentor. I have heard from hundreds of young diplomats, FBI agents, CIA agents, journalists and humanitarian workers -- my daughter Lizzie (sp), who is here with us from Haiti, one of them -- who Richard touched and transformed in some way.
If he saw a spark in a young person, Richard had all the time in the world for them. I think it in part because he was young himself -- obviously, not in years, but in spirit. He did not have a cynical bone in his body. There is always something that can be done. That was Richard's mantra. He was the youngest middle-aged person I have ever met. (Laughter.)
So I've come to agree with Richard Bernstein; he was a great man. Thank you for being here, and thank you for honoring him.
GELB: Kati -- thank you, Kati. Thank you, Richard.
Just a minute to say a word about some of the people sitting here in the front row because you may not know their special connection to Holbrooke.
Peter Tarnoff was not only my predecessor as president of the council, but Peter and Frank who were -- are really Dick's oldest friends, back from the Vietnam days. And Peter was a terrific successor to have as president of this place.
And I would also mention Pete Peterson and Joan Cooney because they were really surrogate parents and friends to Dick Holbrooke and friends in need. They played a special role in his life, and I thank you for it.
It's very sad and glad for me to talk about Dick. It's glad because I love talking about him. (Laughter.) There's no end to Dick Holbrooke's stories. And it is sad because all of the time I think about him.
We have three people tonight who worked with him very closely at key moments in his career. I'm not going to introduce them in detail, save to say that Frank was there, knew him first in Vietnam, and Frank subsequently was ambassador everywhere. (Laughter.) Chris Hill, on the screen here, worked with Dick on Bosnia, and he was ambassador everywhere else. (Laughter.) And then, finally, Vali Nasr who became a guru to Dick with Af-Pak -- Vali likes to say he was a mentee of Dick's, and he was. Just to be around Dick, you're forced into the mentee role -- (laughter) -- but he was also the guru.
So we have three very special people to talk about key moments of his life. I'm going to save my comments till the end. Each of the panelists will speak for seven minutes in their own fashion, and we'll do it chronologically, starting with Frank Wisner in Vietnam, then Chris Hill in Bosnia, and finally Vali with Af-Pak.
FRANK WISNER: Les, thank you.
Kati, I almost don't know where to begin. Your eloquence and the moving words you gave us tonight -- (inaudible) -- the stage for our memories of Richard. I am -- I'm very honored to be here. I miss him hugely, Les.
I -- like all of you, I first met Dick Holbrooke, as you know, as Les has pointed out, in Vietnam. I wasn't there at the beginning when Dick first arrived and was part of a secondment to the AID mission and assigned to a province in the southern part of the Mekong Delta. I really caught up with Dick after his first tour. He came to visit from Washington where he had returned to the Washington staff in the Department of State, eventually in the White House, that dealt with Vietnam and the support of the Vietnam mission. I lived through three phases of Richard Holbrooke's association with Vietnam.
The first phase was an intense -- as everything was in his life -- view that we as a nation were committed to Vietnam, and we had to see our way through it, that we had made a promise to ourselves and the world to stand by the Republic of Vietnam.
And he was determined, whether he was in the delta working with a local Vietnamese administration or working with the American mission in Saigon, to make certain we did our best. And he put energy into this that was unparalleled with any officer in his time.
The second feature of him that came out besides his energy -- and that was his absolute knack for how to get things done, how to find the people who made the decisions, to impress upon them that he knew what he was talking about. And in Vietnam, let me tell you, the leadership that we had deployed in the country was as lost, in a real sense of the application of the mission, as you can imagine. And Richard was determined to make a difference.
He helped, and I was associated with him, as we put together the pacification program -- not he and I, obviously; it was a governmentwide effort, and -- but from Washington, bringing foreign service officers to serve in the field, to staff our missions, to give advice, to bolster the government of Vietnam, to make sure the resources of the United States were available to those involved in the war.
This time in Vietnam also gave Richard another opening, and that was an experience in dealing with the American media. And he made deep, enduring, important friendships. He became -- he loved it -- he became the man you went to in Saigon if you wanted an articulate view of what was going on. And his energy, his outreach meant that he could speak at firsthand about officers in the field, officers at headquarters, civilians, military, the enemy.
GELB: Frank, give us -- excuse me -- give us a sense of Dick's beliefs and the evolution of his beliefs about Vietnam in the few minutes you have left.
WISNER: Well, in the few minutes I have left, I will end quite right getting carried away. In the -- Richard in Washington, after the Honolulu conference, after attempts to make the pacification mission work and to see MACV transformed into an operation that could win a war on the ground, gradually saw that there was no way forward and that the way -- only way forward was to head towards a negotiation and secure peace.
I was able to be with Richard in Paris when he was part of the delegation, when he was David Bruce and Cabot Lodge, at their side, an enormously influential member of that mission. But it was very clear to me then that he had given up any sense of confidence the war could be won in anything approaching a conventional sense.
The third phase of Richard came even a bit later than that, and that was a conviction that we'd made the wrong decisions about Vietnam. He took, in that sense, a U-turn in his life. And as he left government, left the foreign service, went into the press, himself began writing, thinking, the lessons of Vietnam marked him forever after that this great nation of ours could make mistakes and that we could not afford to make them again. And I believe very deeply that that experience marked him for the balance of his days.
The energy, the commitment, the outreach to other people, the capacity and knowledge that shaping opinion is to shape policy, therefore dealing with press, the ability to understand and zero-base your thinking and come around at the end to recognize the mistakes we'd made -- it was that determination, that drive and that flexibility that remains in my mind.
GELB: Thank you so much, Frank.
Chris, you won't be able to hear me clicking when your seven minutes are up, but if I start coughing, that's what that means.
CHRISTOPHER HILL: OK, (I'll be on it ?).
Well, first of all, I'm very honored to be included in this gathering, included especially among so many close friends of Richard Holbrooke. I am truly one of those people that Kati alluded to who was absolutely helped and mentored, yelled at and sort of kept after throughout my career.
I used to refer to Richard as both my mentor and my tormentor -- (laughter) -- and I think he definitely played both roles.
I feel very fortunate to have been a part of that because, in a sense, I was -- I was a bit of an accident. He had just taken over the European Bureau. He had made some personnel decisions, where he didn't like the attitude, frankly, of some of the people who were working on Bosnia, because he felt they were defeatist. And one thing about Richard is, when he took on an assignment, he did -- he did it with the notion that there could be success at the end of the day.
So he turned to his principal deputy and said: Who do you have? Who can be the director of the Balkans? And John Kornblum had just met me on the bus that morning -- (inaudible) -- (laughter). He said: I've got just the guy. (Laughter.) And (one catch was ?) that Richard insisted that he meet me. So I went up to his office at 7:00 at night; I wasn't even sure what it was about. He was watching Andrea Mitchell, who was on NBC that night, and he muted her and asked me a question about the -- about the Balkans. And before I could answer him, he pointed the remote at me and muted me. (Laughter.) And so I never really got a chance to talk to him. (Laughter.) So he said -- he said OK -- this was a Friday night, and he said: OK, we'll meet you in New York on Sunday; we've got to go meet Itzebegovic. And that's where it began. (Laughter.)
It was a -- it was an -- it was an extraordinary ride. I remember he looked at me -- we got into the car, and he hadn't really looked at me before, and he said -- he asked me how old I was. And when I told him, he said: Why do you have less hair than I do, if you're so much younger? (Laughter.) And then I explained, because I worry a lot more than he does. (Laughter.) In fact, I was wrong. He worried an awful lot.
And when -- one of the things about working on the Balkans with him -- first of all, he understood the history. He really read it, and he expected other people to read history. And I guess, in his disarming way, he would mention reading a book, and then asking whether I had actually read the book. And before I could change the subject to not having to tell him no, I hadn't, he kind of quizzed me, and eventually threw the book at me. And I had to read it that night and be quizzed on it again the next morning. I mean, he really felt people ought to understand the facts.
The second thing about the Balkans was, you know, a lot of people might think that it was just happenstance that he dealt with the Balkans, but I think he understood that region for two very profound reasons. One, he understood the human rights dimensions of the problem, the fact that so many innocent people were suffering so much, and he really took this to heart. And to go with him to a refugee camp or somewhere was really to understand his humanity. And -- but the second issue, that I think is not so well know, is he understood how corrosive this was to the trans-Atlantic relationship. And he was a huge believer in the trans-Atlantic relationship and the need for the U.S. and Europe to work together in the -- in the Cold War -- in the post-Cold War period. So I think he really understood that it was somehow bigger than just the confines of the Balkans.
And finally, because he was such a student of history, he understood that big problems in the world don't necessarily happen in big places. He understood that big problems can happen quite often on the scruffy edges of places. And he was willing to go wherever and to do whatever to deal with those scruffy places --
GELB: But Chris, let me interrupt you for a sec --
HILL: -- (inaudible) -- he's very much missed.
GELB: Let me interrupt you for a sec. Give us a sense of why Dick thought he could do this. All sorts of people had tried and failed. What made him think he could succeed?
HILL: Well, he was not someone lacking in self-confidence. (Laughter.) I think that's important in this game.
Secondly -- and maybe I'm flattering myself here -- but he really believed in his team. You know, once he took you on, he really felt that he had the best people working for him. And he took on a lot of people. It was a -- you know, there are a lot of people who kind of feel that they are very much a part of a Holbrooke team, even to today.
So I think he had self-confidence. He put together a good team. He knew the issues. And he also understood that when you're dealing with bad guys -- and that was a great deal of the legacy, though I certainly appreciate Richard Haass mentioning that there's another element to the legacy, that is, dealing with allies -- you know, it was either Napoleon or Holbrooke who said, my greatest strength is that I have no allies. (Laughter.) It is a full-time job to take care of your allies. (Laughter.) But he understood that in dealing with -- in dealing with bad guys, you had to -- (inaudible) -- close to them. You had to get them to trust you.
GELB: Chris, thanks a lot.
Vali -- (applause) -- very good. Vali, up to you to tie the recent loose ends.
VALI NASR: Well, thank you very much. It's a great privilege to be here and to speak about my reminiscences of Richard a year after he passed away. I still -- when I think, I still don't know quite how I ended up with him. It was one of those flukes of life, but a life- changing experience. In many ways, it was an intense experience that I'm still, in some ways, recovering from. (Laughter.)
But actually, to the point that Chris mentioned, I think one of the unique things about Richard was this idea of a team. And I think the way, in particular, he conceived of the idea -- of the notion of SREP (sp), the office of a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a whole-of-government entity that would bring people from the outside to address issues, was interesting, was -- but also said something about the way he viewed government. He knew it very well, but he fundamentally believed that it was not functional in terms of addressing pressing foreign policy issues.
I think, you know, these days it's very difficult not to think of Richard given what's happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms of, you know, what was his contribution in the first two years of this administration and what would it have been had he lived or if he was here today. I think, you know, one of the most important issues to keep in mind about him is that he fundamentally believed that his job -- or at least that's what he saw as one of his missions is to restore the balance in American foreign policy between civilians and the military, that fundamentally, it shouldn't be the U.S. military who makes American foreign policy, it should be the State Department and the diplomats.
GELB: But was it?
NASR: No, it wasn't. And actually, it was -- it was -- it was part of the entire, you know, mission was to essentially argue that we shouldn't -- and that was his experience with Vietnam. I mean, I never heard him once refer to the Balkans in the two years that I worked with him. It was not a pertinent example even though it was the crowning achievement of his career in some ways. But Vietnam, to him, had many lessons, one of which was that, you know, you're not going to succeed in these difficult situations if the diplomats are not in charge.
And he also thought that fundamentally, the best way to look at this problem of Afghanistan and Pakistan is to -- is to start big. You have to have actually a vision for U.S. strategy, for U.S. future in that region, and then you work your way to seeing where you want Afghanistan and Pakistan end up. And he argued very effectively we should see these regions as one, you know, one entity; their fate is tied together; the problem crosses the borders; without Pakistan, you can't win in Afghanistan, and if you don't win in Afghanistan, Pakistan is going to be hell, and you're going to be dealing with it for a very long time. So he put his shoulder to that.
And fundamentally, he was not in favor of sending troops to Afghanistan. He was a loyal soldier. He followed, you know, what his superiors wanted, defended the policy, but he thought it was awfully close to a Vietnam scenario of gradually getting more and more into a war. And what his recipe was was that you have to find a way to just keep, you know, Pakistan in a Goldilocks situation, positively oriented. You can't fix it short-run, you can't get full cooperation, but if you get more cooperation (than you don't ?), and in Afghanistan, you need to work on a peace deal.
And now, for instance, we recently read in the papers that the Taliban has agreed to open an office in Qatar. This is really a crowning achievement of Richard's work. You know, when he was arguing in a sort of a guerrilla-war fashion in the State Department, the White House about talking to the Taliban, nobody wanted to hear it. We didn't talk to terrorists; we were going to win this on the battlefield; this was static that distracted attention from, quote/unquote, "COIN strategy" and convincing the president to send more troops into the field.
But he persisted, in the ways that Richard only would persist -- you know, calling people every five minutes, getting in their face -- (laughter), and pushing and pushing -- I don't know how many memos we wrote about the fact that it is possible to talk to the Taliban -- until, literally right after Richard passed away, this began to become American foreign policy, with the secretary of state giving a speech, the first Richard Holbrooke speech at the Asia Society, embracing the idea and then, you know, sitting in Pakistan and telling the Pakistani press that, yes, we are talking to the Haqqani Network, we are talking to the Taliban, this is now officially U.S. policy.
This is what Richard fought for, that the -- ultimately, you know, we have to finish this war. And just -- you know, one of the things Richard was very good at was, obviously, working the media, and partly was to keep them positively oriented towards these issues. And that's very clear that, you know, since he's gone, even -- you know, that that element has also been lost.
GELB: Vali, give us a sense of how Dick thought this war would end. What did he think was going to happen?
NASR: Well, ideally he thought that it was possible to arrive at a peace settlement that would provide a semblance of stability and a political order that would allow us to declare victory and leave. He didn't believe we could turn Afghanistan into a democracy. He didn't believe that, you know, we can forever stay there and pay for state building, for varieties of other commitments that we had made.
But at the same time, he didn't think that we could defeat the Taliban on the battlefield, either; that that was not surmountable; that the military was selling the president and the American people a bill of goods that would get them deeper and deeper into this war. And ultimately, if you're not going to just cut and run, if you're not going to fight it out, the only other option is to find a diplomatic solution.
I think he really believed that the American political system has lost a sense of value of diplomacy. It doesn't value its diplomats. It doesn't value its diplomacy. It starts and ends with arguments that came out of Iraq, out of military options. COIN totally dominated the discussion then. This is counterinsurgency doctrine. And I think, you know, probably when General Petraeus referred to him as "my wing man," I think that, to him, was the biggest insult, even though they were friends, that that's how low, you know we have come, that the diplomats serve as aide-de-camps to generals.
GELB: But that's all right, actually, because all the rest of us were Dick Holbrooke's wing men. (Laughter.) It's true.
Let me ask a question of all of you as a way of pulling some of this together, because -- I mean, Frank and I talked to Dick about Af- Pak all the time. I'm sure Chris did as well. Here he had the Vietnam experience and he comes away from that saying, my Lord, how could we get into this situation of trying to change a country, do this nation building? It was really an impossible task.
And he also saw in Vietnam that, sure, we could sit down at the negotiating table, but in the end, to negotiate was just a softer landing toward losing. So how did he get mixed up in this Af-Pak thing, you know, with that in his head? And this is really addressed to all three of you. How does he think this really all evolves with that Vietnam history in his head? Frank, why don't you --
WISNER: Well, it's a very tough question, in part because among -- Richard was an enormously disciplined person. As scattered as he appeared to be and -- with Kati's neckties, he was in fact enormously disciplined. He was out to accomplish his commitment to the job he'd been given, and he wasn't going to put that at risk. He didn't sit and wring his hands and say we're on the wrong track. What he tried to do was accommodate what was -- what was required of the mission as it had been handed to him by the president, by our national security system: to provide a strong civilian presence in Afghanistan, to provide a logic and a commitment of resources and engagement with the government of Pakistan, and at the same time begin to define in his own mind, but not articulate out to the public, that we had to contain this matter and move it to a political conclusion.
He did not ever show his cards in public. He maintained that discipline all the way through. And any attempt to try to get Richard to say where are we going, why are we doing this, he would deflect the question; talked about what we were accomplishing, but then made it clear that the political outcome, providing a political solution, providing a negotiation with Pakistan -- and I think Vali put it so well, the "Goldilocks solution" in -- to deal with Pakistan -- was what drove his thinking.
NASR: If I may -- oh, Chris, go ahead.
GELB: Go ahead, Chris.
HILL: I would -- I would first say that I don't think he was every daunted by long odds. And certainly, Af-Pak had very long odds, even perhaps more so than we took on -- than when he took on the Balkans. But I think he really did have a sense of the thing going in the wrong direction. And I think the whole issue of militarization of foreign policy was something very much on his mind. As he saw the debate of, you know, "Is Afghanistan important because of Pakistan, or is Pakistan important because of Afghanistan?", he had a sense of balance that I think he felt that the military was erring to the side that Afghanistan was more important because that's where our troops are and we cannot be perceived as not having won. And I think he was very concerned about that kind of imbalance.
So I think that helped drive him there. But, you know, I think fundamentally he loved a challenge. He understood how so fundamentally important this was to our country, and he wasn't going to shy away from it.
GELB: Before Vali goes on, I failed to mention at the outset that this meeting is on the record, so you can take back anything you want. (Laughter.) Thank you.
NASR: Well, I --
GELB: And by the way, we have, as you can see, teleconferencing not only with Chris, but with council members -- is it all over the world, or only in Denver? (Laughter.)
(Chuckles.) Vali, go ahead.
NASR: I remember one time I asked -- I said to Richard that, you know, the Pakistanis, even they are wondering why are you doing this; that, you know, anybody who wants to build a career or, you know, move up or do something better, this -- Pakistan is not the place to get in -- (laughter) -- and especially the manner that he did try to move things: you know, lobby in Congress, work -- you know, promise them things.
And I think, you know -- and I know a lot of people in the press have talked about, you know, the fact that he didn't become secretary of state or he -- or that he had ambitions. I never felt that. I thought, you know, as Henry Kissinger said about him, that he had -- that he didn't have ambition to be; he had ambition to do. And I think it really mattered to him that he accomplished these things, rather than whether or not they were a stepping stone to something more.
I also think he really liked doing it. I mean, you know, when he was on these trips, he was more -- and, you know, some of my colleagues here -- Dan Feldman, I'm sure, would attest -- he had more energy than all of us. We would be totally exhausted; he would -- he liked talking to, you know, diplomats; he liked talking to people, to civil society; he was on the go. And I think, you know, Afghanistan, Pakistan, above everything else, was not just a national security challenge, it was a diplomatic challenge that, you know, allowed him to actually exercise his skills. And I think he enjoyed doing that.
GELB: Well, let me ask the question a different way. First of all, I have to disagree with you, Vali. I think Dick wanted to do as secretary of state. (Laughter.) He wanted to combine these two things: the doing and the secretarial thing. And all of us who've worked with him believed he should have been secretary of state, what's more.
But let's say he was in that job. What could he have done from that pedestal to shape this Af-Pak war that he couldn't do from where he was? What were the main forces in this administration? Is -- was the resistance from the military, the CIA, from the president himself? What was going on? And I address again to all of you.
NASR: I mean, you know, the rules of American bureaucracy and government are there.
In other words, there is interagency rivalry. They looked at Afghanistan/Pakistan from different prisms. They had different priorities.
But I think he had an impossible job, largely because he was -- his office was embedded in one of those agencies, which could not --
MR. : And the weakest agency.
NASR: As the weakest of them. So essentially what -- the way Richard compensated for that was essentially lobbying at a personal level. So you know, he -- given the relationships he had at Treasury, at Pentagon, at -- in Congress, he essentially worked it at a personal level, but he didn't have the authority to order another agency to do X, Y and Z. I mean, for instance, we couldn't even get the Homeland Security to go easy on visiting Pakistani generals and not do body searches on them. That would take weeks and weeks of, you know, going through the whole system. So you know, there is the way -- can you call somebody you know, one of his many mentees over the years, who was at the Department of Homeland Security, to sort of accommodate a visiting Pakistani.
But I think, you know, the -- there was a handicap, and that -- and particularly given that the intelligence operations at the Pentagon were so much more powerful in terms of policy making, you know, you -- he felt the fact that he had one hand tied behind his back trying to work these issues.
WISNER: You know, I think I'd add only, Vali, to that last observation that the sense of having a hand tied behind his back -- as I watched him and related somewhat to him during this period, which was -- you could tell how difficult that his time in government was. It was very difficult because at core I don't think he ever believed nor did he have the equation with the president that he would have wanted to have. He had to wrestle with the fact that he almost came from another generation and that he was up against a White House staff that was skeptical of him. He had to face as well a military which was in a position of dominance with regard to the policy, and he had to make his way against that and never in any of these regards appear to be whining or complaining, but rather the confidence in his own personality, the power of his arguments to be able to overcome and shape a way forward, and to be able finally to break through to disbelieving or skeptical audiences by having the analytical answers to the questions that were in front of him. And he never gave up. He never lost that spirit or heart. But it was a very, very tough road.
GELB: You know, I would add or underline something that all of my colleagues here have said, which really should surprise you, if you focus on it, but it was absolutely true. They each made the point that however Dick felt about policy -- and boy, he was brimming with problems about the policy -- he was loyal. Now you'd never guess it, because Dick was such a pain in the neck -- (laughter) -- but he was loyal to his secretary, Hillary Clinton; he was loyal to the president.
WISNER: Right.
GELB: And you know, even in intimate conversations with his staff or whatever, he never broke that, which is a really important facet of the guy that I think has gotten lost in the commentary.
Chris, you wanted to chime in here?
HILL: Yeah, I completely agree with that last point, Les. He really was very loyal. I mean, I saw him a couple of weeks before his death, and we were at La Chamais (sp) restaurant till pretty late at night, and he talked about the problems he faced, you know, the issues in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the problems with the politicians there, and obviously, I mean, I could tell that some of the major problems were happening in Washington. And he was really very careful never to let his guard down.
I think it was a real old-school loyalty. I mean, he had a kind of institutional loyalty. You know, he'd talk about the State Department. He -- whenever I'd do something he didn't like, he'd call me a typical foreign service officer -- (laughter) -- which was an epithet -- (laughter) --
MR. : Right. Right. Right. Right.
HILL: -- (yet he had ?) this great sense of loyalty to the institution. And I think this institutional loyalty was kind of old- school in him and continued into being very loyal to all his bosses.
GELB: Let's explore Bosnia a bit more. Bosnia is his -- I guess, his first contact with a problem involving ethnic clashes. And somehow or other, he figured out a solution that all the different ethnic groups could abide by, Chris, which was -- which is really a stunner in this day and age where we seem unable to corral these ethnic hatreds in almost every other venue. Well, what made it possible in Bosnia, and what makes it so hard here? Frank can deal with that as well.
HILL: Well, first of all, I think with respect to Bosnia, he was -- again, I can't emphasize enough what a student of history he was. I mean, he really knew what he was talking about, and he knew that the complexity of the issues in Bosnia kind of went beyond some of the cartoon images of it that would be reached in the U.S. -- (inaudible) -- he understood that these things did indeed go way back, they did indeed involve different (equities ?) of different groups.
And so he tried to work with everybody. And when you look at the Dayton peace accords, you know, a lot of people say it ended up with, you know, political structures that were far too complex for that small country to handle. Well, one of the reasons for the complexity was he was trying to give everybody a kind of stake in the game and a sense that they have gotten something out of it.
So I think it was a combination of this historical understanding of the place and also his role as negotiator, where when you're a negotiator, you kind of have to get close to everybody, listen to everybody and try to work out something where everyone has some sense that they got something out of it. So I think it was that part of his personality. He did not like to disappoint people.
GELB: We've got 20 minutes left. And we now turn it all over to you plus our members on the tube.
Farah (sp), are you here?
MS. : I'm here.
GELB: So the floor is open for questions or comments or whatever. Please raise your hand. Identify yourselves. Anybody raising their hand?
(Off-mic exchange.)
Go ahead, over there.
QUESTIONER: Susan Woodward -- as Chris will remember, had a lot of contact with Richard in the '90s in Washington on Bosnia, and Les will know that, too -- from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York now. I'm fascinated by Vali Nasr's discussion of this civil- military relations issue, right, which I think someone should -- it'd be better to be a Ph.D. dissertation right now, but somebody should be writing a book on this because -- I don't -- I didn't know that he didn't discuss the Balkans with you. But to me, what he was doing in Afghanistan in the year before he died was exactly what -- the lessons he drew from what happened at least in Bosnia, if not also in Kosovo.
GELB: (Inaudible.)
QUESTIONER: And the point I wanted to ask --
GELB: I thought you just made it.
QUESTIONER: Well, no, I wanted to ask a question -- (inaudible) -- and Chris might want to come into this, too -- is that it wasn't so much the balance between military and diplomatic, it was using military success on the battlefield to get people, in his mind, to the negotiating table. We can talk about whether that was a good idea in the last two or three years or not. But would you at least talk, the two of you, about that particular argument, about under what conditions diplomacy works?
GELB: Very good point. Chris, why don't you start this one off, the relationship --
HILL: Well --
GELB: -- of the force to the diplomacy?
HILL: First of all, he was a strong proponent of the use of military tools to affect the diplomatic outcome. So he saw, really, military strength as a tool of diplomacy. I think he parted company with other people who saw somehow that diplomacy should be an element in military strategy. I mean, so I think that's one kind of clear difference.
But I was struck by Vali's comments as well because I think some of the things he did to try to reach out to sort of -- he and his bad guys -- you know, it's not like he liked Milosevic or anything remotely like that. He couldn't stand these people, but he understood he needed to reach out to them.
And I think to some extent what I could see in Afghanistan was stuff from his playbook in the Balkans very much.
GELB: But let me put the point more directly. What I'm hearing is, in the Balkans -- it's true -- we had the capability to hurt Milosevic very badly, and he understood that. In the case of Afghanistan, our ability to really crush the Taliban is much, much less. So Dick could use the military threat in a much more constructive, productive way in Bosnia than he could in Afghanistan.
NASR: This is all true. The problem was that none of this was actually on the table in terms of discussion. I mean, the reason he wasn't -- in his mind, I'm sure, he had a lot of reference points about what happened in the Balkans, and even balancing, you know, Northern Alliance and is with Hazaras, with, you know, the south. But the problem was that the debate in the United States did not include diplomacy at all. I mean, if you look at Bob Woodwards' book of -- account of what was being discussed, it was about, you know, winning on the battlefield with more troops or, you know, a much more targeted approach using drones and special forces.
For the first two years that I was involved, the job of the State Department at least was not defined to do diplomacy, it was to manage assistance and aid to Afghanistan. So, you know, our office and Richard ended up doing pomegranates in Kandahar and, you know, quince (in Western ?) Afghanistan, largely because that's all the State Department was allowed to do.
So diplomacy like that had no place. This idea that, you know, you could use force to bring people to the table is clearly what he would have liked to be authorized to do. So he had to actually fight in order to convince people that there is -- (ready ?) -- for diplomacy. The way diplomacy was understood is that the diplomats' job is to go around the world and get money and troops for the ISAF mission, so that their job is to corral resources for the war, but not to end the war. And the strategy that was being presented to the president, was being discussed, was heavy on military solution and very sort of light on a diplomatic solution.
But otherwise, I agree. I think he fundamentally would have supported the idea that, you know, you should use military force in order to bring people to the table.
GELB: Thank you.
WISNER: Vali, let me just add an additional thought. There is no doubt in my mind that simply delivering more troops and more agricultural assistance was not going to make a difference. I also believe that he was not persuaded that military power would end up producing a political settlement inside of Afghanistan, and that as he came to the end of his time, he came to a conclusion that if you didn't deal with the geostrategic aspects of the problem, you were not going to be able to settle Afghanistan.
GELB: As frank is saying, that Dick was trying to solve it from the outside rather than the inside.
WISNER: That you could not bring the Taliban and Haqqani to the table and get a deal, but what you had to do was go to India, to Pakistan, to Afghanistan and try to forge an understanding, backed by the nations around, that they recognized that radicalism was their collective worst enemy; and if you could create that coming together of these three, you could actually then begin to shape a political settlement.
This would not be driven by the military. This had to be an act of statesmanship. And that's the way he saw the way through the problem.
GELB: As you can see, my problem with this panel is that they're too smart and they know too much. (Laughter.)
A question back there.
QUESTIONER: Me?
GELB: Someone back there.
QUESTIONER: (Inaudible.) I published "To End a War."
GELB: Peter, identify yourself.
QUESTIONER: Is this on?
GELB: What?
QUESTIONER: It's not on.
GELB: Oh, Harold. Hello, Harold.
QUESTIONER: How's that? Can you hear me now?
GELB: Yes.
QUESTIONER: OK. I published "To End a War," so I discussed the Balkans quite a lot with Richard. But maybe out of loyalty, out of my maybe lack of real historical knowledge of what was going on, it always intrigued me, when he got to the Balkans and did the brilliant job he did, why the hell did it take so long for the Europeans and the United States to actually get their act together to get to the point of intervention, where he could display his skills?
What light can you shed on Richard's role in that formative period before intervention?
GELB: Chris, why don't you handle this?
HILL: Well, I think, first of all, Washington was divided on the issue of how to proceed, and it wasn't really until summer of '95 -- that is, after Srebrenica massacres -- that there's a consensus position that we needed to aggressively seek a solution that did involve some internal partition. You recall there were a lot of people who felt that we should not create -- or recreate the Bosnian state as some sort of federal state. So that was one issue.
I think the second issue was there was a -- through the spring time, there was an effort to have the Europeans take a go at it; that's where Carl Bildt (ph) came in. While we couldn't make up his -- our mind, maybe the Europeans could. And thirdly, there were practical issues on the ground where the Europeans were totally invested in UNPROFOR and an investment in UNPROFOR essentially meant that you couldn't bring NATO into the picture as an instrument of diplomacy, which is finally what was done.
GELB: Thank you. I'm sure you could give a good answer to this too, Harry (sp).
There's a hand back here.
QUESTIONER: Gerard Gutley (ph). Just as a former journalist, I would observe that it was a very good point and people mentioned his -- Richard's belief in informing the public, the power of public opinion. In fact, we all knew that he -- at heart, he was really a journalist, and one of his earliest ambitions was to become a journalist, but I understand The New York Times did not hire him. So -- (laughter) -- we know the results. Had he gone into journalism, media, he would have risen right to the top, no doubt.
We've been talking about specific events here and rightly so: the Balkans, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Pakistan. We haven't really talked -- and I'm not sure Richard really spoke much about his strategic view of what was happening in the world globally.
For example, he was not only assistant secretary for Europe, but also for East Asia at a very important point -- this was a while back -- dealing with Japan and China and Korea and the rest. Do any of you -- have you talked, Chris or others, with him about how he felt -- the power shifts taking place in the world over the last 20 years in this global sense, particularly of China, India, et cetera, and what he thought of that and what he thought America's response to that could or should be?
GELB: Well, maybe Frank can handle this.
WISNER: Well, I think you put your finger on a very important point. I cannot remember a specific conversation I had with Richard that treated it directly. But the way he thought about power and the way he imagined nations can react, one to the other, the current shift in the global situation was exactly the world he saw working.
He saw a balance of power as a driving force. He believed balance of power had to be nourished with a strong sense of responsibility, believed deeply in the humanitarian thrust of American diplomacy. He believed deeply in the primacy of democracy. But he also believed that the United States was entering a period in its life, where it would share power, where it had to make consensual arrangements, where it had to work with allies and today's adversaries would not be necessarily tomorrow's adversaries. So I think he was with it and on top of the -- (inaudible) -- that you're putting out even if I don't remember a specific conversation where he brought all the points together.
GELB: Yeah, I think I did have a few conversations with him that dealt with these issues. In the first place, he didn't think that China was an enemy or even an adversary. It was a competitor, another major power -- (inaudible). And he was very worried that we were going to transform it into an enemy. He wanted to be tough with the Chinese, he had had experience with them, but not the degree of turning them into a certain hostile power.
There was a long way to go, and this wasn't the Cold War. In the Cold War, we just had military competition with the Soviet Union -- no economic relationship. In the case of China, we had a -- have a profound economic relationship. And that was a lever to do things.
As far as the Europeans are concerned, I think Dick had come close to writing them off; that he didn't think they were going to do a damn thing; that in the end, he had pushed and shoved them on Bosnia, but on Af-Pak, you know, they were doing what they were doing, because they felt they had to, but as far as accepting any kind of real responsibility in the world, he thinks -- he thought that that had passed the day in Europe.
HILL: (If I -- ?)
GELB: Chris has a -- Chris?
HILL: I wonder if I could --
GELB: Yeah, go ahead.
HILL: If I could just add, I agree with you that Richard was very frustrated with the Europeans, but I would not just look at the European diplomacy in Bosnia as a function of trying to get the Europeans engaged on Bosnia. Obviously, that's part of it. But he was a huge believer in maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance after the Cold War. I think he really believed in the idea of that relationship. And he was also a very powerful figure in the whole NATO enlargement debate, which, obviously, went well beyond the issue of Bosnia.
And then, I was the assistant secretary for Asia some 28 years after he had the job, and so I was the beneficiary of a lot of his advice on the subject. And he was very much a believer in a robust dialogue with China, and the notion that the U.S. and China should be able to work together on these things -- huge believer in that relationship, and a believer that if we could work that relationship well, we could deal with some of these scruffy problems; notably, North Korea.
GELB: Thank you.
David Holbrooke -- and then, do we have a question from the ghost online? Vera (ph)?
MR. : I think right here.
GELB: Go ahead, David.
DAVID HOLBROOKE: David Holbrooke. Thank you, Richard, for doing this. Thank you to the council. The family really appreciates this. And, of course, thank you all.
One of the things, looking around the room, I see are a lot of his friends. I know how important his friends were to my father. And one of the friends who came to visit, (along with you, Vali ?), in the hideous days when he was in the hospital 13 months ago was Ambassador Haqqani from Pakistan. And I've followed that story. I don't begin to understand it, but I've wondered to myself -- and perhaps you can answer this -- would he have been able to make a difference? Would he have been able to intervene so that -- and he really -- they really seemed to be legitimate friends -- that he wouldn't be in this situation now?
GELB: Thank you, David.
NASR: I'm sure Richard would have -- would have done everything he could to help Ambassador Haqqani at this time. And I think, you know, he had enough, if you would, relationships built with various people in Pakistan -- with General Kayani, General Pasha, et cetera -- to intervene.
But I think, you know, a lot of what's happened with Pakistan (fundamentally ?) would not have happened had Richard been there, largely -- not only because of the stewardship he was doing, but largely because after he passed away there's nobody really minding the relationship on a day-to-day basis. You know, when there is crises, we focus on Pakistan, but not in between. And I think one of the things Richard understood very well is that relationships are made if you invest time in them.
The number of times he, you know, went to Pakistan on the slightest, you know, development, and the amount of time he spent meeting, you know, every single person that he had to meet, you know, was one reason why there was a -- there was an open channel; so that, you know, many of the things that now sort of snowball and become a problem were addressed at that point in time.
And I think, you know, the whole -- this whole issue of "memogate," of, you know, Pakistanis allegedly trying to pass information to the Pentagon -- and I'm sure that, you know, if Richard was alive, he would have been on the phone with Admiral Mullen the minute this memo arrived, and this -- somehow, the whole memo thing would have had a very different life cycle than the one -- (than it sounded ?).
GELB: Have a question?
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Bill Haseltine, XSL (ph). There is a(n) aspect about Richard's career which isn't often discussed, and that's his business career.
And my question, after a couple of remarks, is -- to you is to what influence did that have on his foreign policy judgments and --
GELB: His business career? (Laughter.)
QUESTIONER: But I can say personally that he was a(n) equal visionary, to me at least, in business as he was in foreign policy. He heard me talk about the genome many years before you knew about the genome. He made a very active effort to become involved in that project. He introduced me to his business friends, and a result of that, we raised $2 billion to help get that business off the ground and bring drugs. He didn't make a penny off of it, much to his continual regret. (Laughter.) He went off to the U.N. at that point. And then he came back after his U.N. stint, brought in friends like Dick Beattie and others and helped me enormously. I had a motto for him, which you might recognize, that he was terrible in little things and great in big things. (Laughter.)
But the question I have for you as panelists is to what extent did that vision that extended to genomes and business to some extent influence his foreign policy?
GELB: Well, that is indeed a challenging question. (Laughter.)
MR. : We'll let you answer.
GELB: Pete Peterson liked to say that the most difficult thing ever said about himself was that he taught Dick Holbrooke everything he knew about banking. (Laughter.) But let me try to answer that.
I think Dick did banking as the most interesting thing available to him outside of being secretary of state and that he learned a tremendous amount in the process about the importance of economics in this world, something I think that Richard Haass and I talk about regularly. And Dick Holbrooke talked about it all the time, something that we've not really adjusted to in American foreign policy and something that I think ought to be at the core of our foreign policy.
Last question.
WISNER: Way in the back.
GELB: Way in the back. Oh, no, wait a second. Before we do that -- excuse me -- we have a call from the beyond --
WISNER: Steve Pieczenik.
GELB: -- from Steve Pieczenik. Steve, are you there? Oh, can he talk?
MR. : No, just read it, Les. (Inaudible.)
WISNER: Steve Pieczenik asks, how did Richard's unique personality affect the success of his diplomatic efforts? (Laughter.)
GELB: Well, it did. (Laughter.) I think -- Steve, I think what you've heard from my colleagues here was that this was a -- this was a guy who could overwhelm a problem and overwhelmed some of the -- some of the worst problems. Maybe that's a transition to some final remarks I'd like to make.
It -- I like to talk about Dick essentially only with close friends. Very hard for me to talk about him sincerely and realistically in groups. He was so special and so really different. He was the -- he really was far and away the most outstanding diplomat of my generation and a guy of enormous capacity to get things done. It's quite astonishing when you look at all the things he thought of doing and did.
He reminded me, as I was thinking about it this evening, about Prospero, the central character in Shakespeare's last play, The Tempest. Prospero -- at the end you'll remember he gave up or had to give up his magic. He was a magician. He made himself into a magician. He called it his arts. But he had to give it up in the end, though at the height of his powers, he could command beasts like Caliban -- not to be confused with Taliban -- (laughter) -- and Ariel, a spirit, and his fellow man.
Prospero had a chance to say his peace at the epilogue to the audience and to ask for its approval.
Dick never had a chance to make that last speech, but everything that's happened since his -- since his death has been testimony to how much we think he was one of the extraordinary people of our time.
I thank my fellow panelists.
MR. : Thank you, Les. Thank you. (Applause.)


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George Saunders: "You Can Talk About Sex or Religion But [Money] Makes People Uncomfortable"
George Saunders has never been to Miami. But when he arrives on Thursday to discuss his latest book, he will likely immediately recognize it. That's because Miami is almost identical to the creepy, dystopian, sci-fi landscape conjured up in his short stories.
"I'm very class anxious and have been my entire life," he tells New Times ahead of his Thursday appearance at Books & Books. "When I've written stories that have worked for me, they were always exaggerations of that interior landscape. That matches exactly what you just described about Miami: the extremes of wealth and the extremes of poverty."
"I think that's a kind of American story that I don't see very often in fiction: that naked anxiety about money," Saunders says. "Somehow you can talk about sex or religion but when you start talking about money, especially scarcity of money, it starts to make people uncomfortable."
Saunders is widely considered one of the best American short story writers alive. His latest collection, Tenth of December, puts ten tightly drawn vignettes together like cartridges in an ammo clip: each one packs a killer blow. (Spoiler alert!)
The book begins at a sprint and rarely slows down. In the first story, "Victory Lap," a teenage track star must decide how far he'll go to save a neighbor from a brutal rapist. In the last one, a man's carefully plotted suicide unravels when a young boy stumbles upon him in the woods.
In these two stories, Saunders' prose is pure electricity, propelling the reader from page to page. Each story revolves around a terrible possible outcome. And yet, they are about much more than terror.
"A lot of people think a story is dark because something bad happens," Saunders says. "But my feeling is... it's invigorating or it isn't. You listen to Shostakovich's string quartets written during the purges and they are all brooding and minor key. But they are so beautifully done that you go away kind of buzzed."
"It's an interesting thing. In America there is often a simplistic idea about darkness which is that if there is any negative truth stated, that's dark. And it's pessimistic. But to me, just telling the truth and getting the energy going is a real positive thing. That's what art is supposed to do: get the energy going. It doesn't really matter if it's got a happy ending. Who gives a shit? Read Flannery O'Conner. Or the Bible. That's not exactly a peppy document!"
"You're trying to take the reader on a wild ride" in fiction, he says. "Like when you go to the amusement park and you go on some kickass roller coaster that did things you didn't know roller coasters could do, that feeling when you come off it, it's not dark or light. It's just rrrrrraaaahhhh! Invigorating is a great word. And then you can put aside all the questions of politics and light and dark."
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Update : Aug. 01, 2013
[Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc.]
TSE has cancelled the designation of Securities Under Supervision (Confirmation) as follows.
1. Issue Name |
SJI Inc. stock (Code: 2315, Market Division: JASDAQ Standard) |
2.Date of Cancellation of Designation as Securities Under Supervision (Confirmation) | Aug. 2, 2013 (Fri.) |
Provision |
Securities Listing Regulations, Rule 604-2, Paragraph 1, Item 3 (Rule 601, Paragraph 1, Item 10 of the same regulations is a related rule) (due to deeming as not falling under a delay in submission of a securities report) |
3.Reason |
OSE designated the stock of SJI Inc. (hereinafter, "the Company") as Securities Under Supervision (Confirmation) because the Company had disclosed on Jun. 27, 2013 (Thu.) that the securities report would not be submitted by the deadline (Jul. 1, 2013 (Mon.)). On Jul. 16, 2013, TSE inherited the designation by OSE and designated the stock as Securities Under Supervision (Confirmation). Today, TSE confirmed the submission of the securities report by the Company. As such, the designation as Securities Under Supervision (Confirmation) will be removed for the Company's stock as of Aug. 2, 2013 (Fri.). |
DISCLAIMER: This translation may be used for reference purposes only. This English version is not an official translation of the original Japanese document. In cases where any differences occur between the English version and the original Japanese version, the Japanese version shall prevail. This translation is subject to change without notice. Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or Tokyo Stock Exchange Regulation shall individually or jointly accept no responsibility or liability for damage or loss caused by any error, inaccuracy, misunderstanding, or changes with regard to this translation.
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Judith Ripka Fontaine Cushion Cut Green Quartz Earrings in Sterling Silver
by Judith Ripka
#: 448711
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- In Club purchase only
Delivery estimates, taxes, and fees are based on ZIP Code. Club Pickup orders are based on your club's current price and item availability on the day of payment.
Our Fontaine earrings can be worn from day into evening!
It's one of our best selling earrings because of its versatility! This brilliant green quartz cushion cut earring is the perfect color of the season. A sweet heart detail at top of earring makes it the perfect gift for anyone you love.
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Metal: | Sterling Silver |
Primary Gem Type: | Green Quartz |
Primary Gem Shape: | Cushion Cut |
Earring Back Type: | Shepherd's Hook |
Diamond weights (ct.) and total weights (ct. t.w.) are not exact and may vary by .05 carat. Jewelry may be enlarged to show beauty of detail.
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App Description
%%%% PRICE DROP - NOW %%%%NOMIS is based on the classic "Simon" (puzzle).
The game consists of four colors and the player must follow the pattern of lights, which specifies the computer.
For example, during round one the color "red" will appear and in the second round the color "red" and "blue", etc.
With each new round, there is an additional color that is specified by the computer. In addition to the four different colors, there are four different tones. Thus, the memory will be better trained, and the order is easier to remember.
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App Changes
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May 16, 2013 Initial Release


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Document: dbr020 [view transcript]
Letter: Arlington, Florida to Douglass Theatre, Macon, Georgia, 1926 Oct. 9author: Norman, Richard E., 1891-1961 extent: [1] p. date: October 9, 1926 summary: Letter from Richard E. Norman, head of Norman Film Manufacturing Company, a Jacksonville-based, white independent film company active from 1921 to 1926 that specialized in outdoor adventure films for African American audiences, to the gentlemen of the Douglass Theatre, dated October 9, 1926, negotiating terms for film rental. Norman relates that, having contracted with Milton Starr, president of Theatre Owners Booking Association, to play his circuit of theaters, he can provide The Flying Ace, the last film produced by Norman Film Manufacturing Company, to the Douglass Theatre on November 5th. Norman states his terms and requests a telegrammed response at his own expense and describes the great success of the film, which has played to huge crowds in multiple theaters. repository: Middle Georgia Archives collection: Charles Henry Douglass business records box: 19 folder: 171 item: 29 subjects: Macon (Ga.) Page: [1] [view image] [Note: This document contains typewritten, handwritten, and printed text.] [Note: The Norman Studios logo appears superimposed on an image of the Arlington Plant.] [printed text:
[typewritten text: Douglas Theatre, Mr. Milton Starr, of Nashville, learing [learning] of the tremendous success of The Flying Ace, has just signed up a contract with me to play his circuit of theatres. And as this circuit includes his theatre at Augusta, Ga. [Georgia], I will again be in your vicinity with this great picture. I can play you Friday, Nov. [November] 5th., with The Flying Ace, proposition same as usual, fifty per cent [percent] of the gross receipts after deducting cost of vaudeville from gross receipts. Should the above date be available to me, please do me the favor to wire at my expense care Victoria Hotel, Norfolk, Va. [Virginia] I will be here until the night of Friday, Oct. [October] 15th. In conclusion, let me state that The Flying Ace has just played the big Palace Theatre here in Norfolk to a three day standing room only business during each day and on the first night, we ran to 12:30 A. M. and even then turned away about 300 people who were not able to get in. It played to a third more business in Paramount Theatre Atlanta, than Regeneration. Broke the house record in North Birmingham of 6 years standing. Broke the house record for a three day consecutive run for any picture, white or colored, in the big beautiful Lyric Theatre, Louisville, Ky. [Kentucky], and so far has proven my banner picture. Again you have a chance to play it and I would appreciate a wire one way or the other. Thanking you, I am, Yours very truly,] [Signed] [written text: R E Norman] [typewritten text: NORMAN STUDIOS] [written text: Wire R E Norman VICTORIA HOTEL Norfolk, Va. [Virginia]] |


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News Releases
ABC Interactive to Conduct Audit of Adobe Digital Publishing Suite Metrics
Will Allow Publishers to Report Streamlined Audited Metrics for Digital Publications and Magazines
Arlington Heights, Ill. (May 15, 2012)—ABC Interactive announced it is working with Adobe to audit metrics provided by Adobe's Digital Publishing Suite, an industry-leading set of hosted services and viewer technologies that enable publishers—many of whom are ABC members—to create, distribute and monetize digital publications and magazines on leading tablet devices and smartphones. The news along with the next generation of the Digital Publishing Suite was unveiled at Adobe's annual Digital Publishing Summit in New York today.
ABCi will audit aspects of Digital Publishing Suite application development and the integrated analytics captured through the Adobe Content Viewer through Adobe SiteCatalyst. In parallel to the platform audit, ABCi will conduct test audits of several publishers that currently use Digital Publishing Suite, verifying the ways the system measures and reports such items as the number of readers and sessions per issue, the number of articles read, and the average time spent with an issue.
At its last meeting in March, the ABC board of directors outlined new requirements for magazine publishers to report these types of measurements in ABC audit reports. If given final approval by the board at its next meeting, magazines will begin providing this additional information to advertisers in July of 2013. ABCi's audit of Digital Publishing Suite, expected to be completed later this year, will enable a more streamlined digital audit process for publishers, with more frequent release of key data of interest to advertisers.
ABCi is seeing growing demand to include independently verified tablet application metrics in its newest audit service, the Consolidated Media Report (CMR). Newspapers have released nearly 80 such reports thus far, and publications like Popular Science, Fine Cooking, and The Economist are among those that have released magazine CMRs in recent months.
"We're pleased to be working with Adobe on this initiative," said Neal Lulofs, executive vice president and general manager of ABC Interactive. "Many of our publisher members use Digital Publishing Suite to create and publish tablet editions of their publications, while advertisers increasingly ask to have key tablet usage metrics included in ABC's audit reports."
Last November ABCi announced that it was also verifying Adobe's AudienceResearch platform, the company's digital audience measurement tool that captures and filters key online usage metrics via Adobe SiteCatalyst, the company's flagship analytics application.
"Adobe and ABC's joint initiative strengthens the overall digital publishing industry, bringing a wealth of key data and measurements to publishers and advertisers," said Jim Guerard, vice president and general manager, Creative and Media Solutions at Adobe. "These insights will impact ABC members as they leverage Adobe's digital publishing innovations to create, distribute and monetize their content on tablets and smartphones, resulting in more dynamic and optimized reading experiences for their customers."
ABC and Adobe are also working with the MPA (the Association of Magazine Media) and its tablet metrics task force to help establish a common set of standards and definitions that will aid advertisers in analyzing and comparing readership of magazines' tablet versions. The initial recommended metrics from the MPA include:
- Total consumer paid digital issues -- consumer paid subscriptions and single paid issues
- Total number of tablet readers per issue -- issues opened by individual devices
- Total number of sessions per issue -- aggregate number of times an issue was accessed
- Total amount of time spent per reader per issue -- time spent (on average) with an issue across the total audience
- Average number of sessions per reader per issue -- the average number of times each reader accessed the issue
About ABC
ABC is a forum of North America's leading magazine and newspaper publishers, advertisers and advertising agencies. The organization provides credible, verified information essential to the media buying and selling process. ABC maintains the world's foremost online database of audited circulation information and a growing array of readership, audience and website usage data. ABC's digital arm, ABC Interactive, is one of the world's leading independent auditors of websites and digital ad-based technology. To learn more, visit www.accessabc.com.
Corporate Communications Contact: |
Rachael Battista Communications Specialist t: 224-366-6365 |


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What's Your Glee Club Audition Song?
Hey, gleeks! While you're singing along to your TV sets, take this quiz to find out which Glee song you'd sing in an audition! Would you choose one of Rachel's perfectly practiced ballads or are you more into current hits like Mercedes? Find out now!


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Chocolate fudge cake was the chosen one. This was a 20 cm sandwich cake; as I don't have any 20 cm moulds (I really must get some as they would be REALLY useful), I thought smaller would be better than bigger, so went for an 18 cm cake and four cupcakes. I also cut down the quantity of ganache used.
This is what I did:
- Creamed 175g unsalted butter with 175g vanilla sugar (caster) until well incorporated and fluffy textured.
- Beat in 3 tbsp of syrup and a pinch of salt.
- Beat in 3 medium eggs alternating with a spoonful of the flour mixture.
- Sieved in 175g flour (half wholemeal, half white), 1/2 tsp baking powder, 1/4 tsp bicarbonate of soda, 40g cocoa and 40g ground almonds.
- Stirred this in alternating with about 50 ml of milk (although would have used water as stated in recipe if I didn't have some milk that needed using up).
- Spooned into two buttered 18cm tins and 4 cupcake cases.
- Baked for 20 minutes at 180C.
- Melted 150g dark chocolate (used Green&Blacks 72% cook's chocolate) in a heavy pan over a gentle heat with 1oz dark muscovado sugar and 110g unsalted butter.
- Stirred until smooth.
- Added 5 tbsp double cream and 1/2 tsp vanilla extract.
- Stirred and left in my cold kitchen for about 1/2 an hour to firm up - but not set!
- Used some to sandwich the two cakes together, then spread most of the rest over the top and around the sides of the cake, leaving just enough to top the four cupcakes.
- Decorated with silver stars on top and alternating pink and white sugar flowers around the edge.


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Parks Canada
Home > National Parks of Canada > Kouchibouguac National Park > Activities > Summer Activities > Nature Trails > Bog Trail
The peat bog trail is self-guided. The first part crosses through the forest to the edges of the peat bog, where visitors can climb a six-meter spiral staircase to the top of the tower that provides a bird's-eye view of the bog. In the early morning, you may even see a moose.
The trail then leads through the bog, where carnivorous plants can be seen growing in the wet world of the sphagnum mosses. The interpretive panels provide general information on the formation of the bog and its plant life.
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quote:frick you, that is all
quote:hoping to find some white perch
quote:Give us a report when you get done
quote:What do you think about making a trip to Toledo in a 15' G3 w/ 25 yammy? Is that enough boat to get around?
quote:Patroon -Ben's and Piney are holding fish.


text: The Giants went 11-5 and won the NFC East last season, but Manning's disappointing second half and the team's collapse in the playoffs left plenty of questions about how the franchise quarterback is progressing in his development. So will Manning get it done? Will the new secondary shut down opposing quarterbacks? Vote on the outlook for the Giants!


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Giant Magnetic Breach
NASA's THEMIS spacecraft recently discovered a giant breach in Earth's magnetic field, and as a result, we may be in for more powerful geomagnetic storms. Additionally, researchers were surprised at the way the breach was formed. For more, see this article(1)/video(2) from NASA.
1. http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/16dec_giantbreach.htm
2. http://www.nasa.gov/mpg/297403main_THEMIS_svsLG.mpg


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Increase Conversion by Decreasing Engagement, Even with Video. Engagement is a magnetic "measure" of online effectiveness.
You might call it an "engaging" metric. This is because it is a nice stand-in when real measures of sales, leads or subscriptions are too difficult to track or deliver disappointing results. "No, we didn't increase sales, but look at the engagement!" Is the mantra. The Blueprint for a Perfectly Testable Landing Page - The Infographic. Landing Pages: What are the best viral landing pages. How Moving Fast Doubled Our Feature Engagement - SaaS Tips. As a SaaS business, we regularly make improvements in our software product because we care about our customers.
We also want to give our customers a competitive advantage with our customer data so they can make better business decisions. When we started working on our new version of Live two weeks ago, we had a lot of discussion about whether we should rewrite the whole thing or just improve the visual designs. SaaS products aren't viral. I recently gave a short talk to the portfolio companies of a SaaS investor, and prepped some notes around the topic of SaaS products and virality.
It's hard enough in consumer, much less SaaS For consumer internet entrepreneurs that are working on big markets, getting to virality is hard enough. There are plenty of sectors, like commerce or moms, where it's almost impossible to achieve sustained viral growth, just because of the dynamics and narrow nature of the audience. When you turn your attention to SaaS products that are narrow in industry and profession, it's even harder. The product is what matters1 The main point I make in this talk is that virality has a lot to do with product category. You can stack the odds in your favor by choosing a product that has many of the following characteristics: What Spending $252,000 On Conversion Rate Optimization Taught Me. Speaker Deck - Share Presentations without the Mess.
Why The Most Important Part of Your Brand is Invisible. By Mars Dorian, Contributing {grow} Columinst We talk all the time about writing cornerstone content, building effective web design, and connecting with your community in the social media world.
Yessss, it's all essential, that's why it's getting poured again and again into our membranes. But what about the invisible world behind engagement creation? Big Picture CRO. Twitter Open-Sources Clutch.IO, The Mobile A/B Testing Service It Recently Acquired. In August, Twitter acquired the small A/B testing service and development framework Clutch.io and announced that it would shut the service down on November 1st.
Clutch, which Twitter describes as "an easy-to-integrate library for native iOS applications designed to help you develop faster, deploy instantly and run A/B tests," will live on, however. The company today announced that it is open-sourcing the code on GitHub. The code is available under the relatively permissive Apache License 2.0. Clutch.io, it is worth noting, consists of two projects: the native A/B testing service for iOS and Android, as well as a toolkit for developing hybrid native/HTML apps for iOS. Why "saving money" and "ROI" are probably the wrong way to sell your product by. I can't remember how many times at Smart Bear I tried to sell Code Collaborator with the argument that it "saves you money."
And customers demanded it — some even required that we produce an ROI spreadsheet. And we did. The argument makes sense (though it's wrong). Code Collaborator is tool which helps software developers review each other's work, just like an editor of a book. It cuts the time of a code review in half — maybe better — because it eliminates busywork. Marissa Mayer's Data-Driven Sales Revamp At Yahoo. Yahoo CEO Marissa Mayer has always made her decisions based on as much data as possible.
She famously relied on data to pick colors for Gmail and the Google homepage Right now, Mayer, and Yahoo's chief revenue officer Michael Barrett, have some huge decisions to make about Yahoo and one of its most important groups: its sales force. It's no surprise, then, that Yahoo just sent out a survey to its advertising clients: Mayer needs data! Removing This Design Element Improved CTR by 27% Search filters are a critical UX feature to ecommerce sites.
The larger your product assortment, the more necessary they are. But how you display the features may be helping or hurting your conversion rates. How to Use a Single Metric to Run Your Startup. Collecting data is easy.
There are lots of tools out there and ways to gather data about everything that's happening with your business, from lead generation through to customer satisfaction. But what are we supposed to do with all that data? How does it help us focus on the key challenges at hand, provide us insights into our next steps, and drive success? The Shocking Truth About How Web Graphics Affect Conversions. Does this situation feel familiar?
— Your web designer reckons your site is outdated. It makes you look amateurish. If we're being honest, we might even say it's downright ugly and you should be ashamed of attaching it to your brand. The solution? 4.1.7 Dave McClure - Startup Metrics for Pirates: AARRR! - I. Understanding new AWS I/O options and costs. One of the most common issues we hear is that I/O on AWS is hard to predict, and often a bottleneck for applications.
So today's news that AWS have introduced two new ways to improve your I/O performance is an exciting development. Aside from the performance benefits, these new options also introduce a number of additional cost variables. I'm excited to announce that, on the same day of introduction (as we did we programmatic billing!) CloudVertical now fully supports, analyses and provides reporting for these new EBS and EC2 options! We thought you might find it useful to get more information on the cost implications, so continue reading to learn about the options, costs and how they differ from existing standard EC2 and EBS resources. Startup Metrics 4 Pirates (Seoul) Does Conversion Rate Tell The Whole Story? Editor's Note: Everyone wants to improve their conversion rates right?
But are "conversion rates" the right indicators for steering you towards your most important goal: increasing revenues? The case study presented here is about how FoxTranslate.com (a document translation service), found that focusing on conversion rates alone can be misleading. Read this article to discover what they learned. Jraitamaa.visibli.com/share/b5roxo. Building For The Enterprise — The Zero Overhead Principle. Editor's note: DJ Patil is a data scientist in residence at Greylock Partners. You can follow him on Twitter. The enterprise is back. We're seeing a resurgence of companies to help support everyday work tasks. Workday is replacing stodgy-feeling HR systems with intuitive software that users can easily navigate.
Www.dashboardinsight.com/CMS/127a78af-82ff-4e91-a183-24ce58b9189d/MLR.pdf. Learn how to do Customer Development, an essential part of the Lean Startup® framework. The Entrepreneur's Guide to Customer Development 7 Ways to Make Customers Love You. Know Your Customers First Before Building A New Technology Company. By Martin at September 19, 2012 | 8:33 am | Print Even though I love technology, I always cringe when an entrepreneur starts his pitch by touting his new technology. He has forgotten that new technologies are perceived by most customers as causing more pain than the problems they hope to eliminate. I chastise these startups to highlight the solution created by the technology, rather than highlight the technology itself. I usually get pushback about the success of all the great technology companies, like Intel and Apple. Interview with Steve Blank. Steve Blank is a Silicon Valley-based retired serial entrepreneur, founding and/or part of 8 startup companies in California's Silicon Valley.
A prolific educator, thought leader and writer on Customer Development for Startups, Blank teaches, refines, writes and blogs on "Customer Development," a rigorous methodology he developed to bring the "scientific method" to the typically chaotic, seemingly disorganized startup process. 10 Things Your Customers Wish You Knew About Them [Infographic] Mobile and Web Analytics.
5 Psychological Studies on Pricing That You Absolutely MUST Read. Actionable Metrics - Say Hello to Cohort Analysis. 5 Reasons Recurring Revenue Models Work. Why Companies Need to Iterate Based on User Feedback. The 2 Things About Your Start-up Idea That Actually Matter.


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Hamilton Beach puts a spin on the French press
Technology has had a major impact on the goings-on in the kitchen. However, there are still some things that are hard to improve upon (at least from a preparation perspective). Take French press coffee for example. The simple preparation of steeping ground coffee in hot water produces results that are well respected for a reason: it just works.
Now, that's not to say an automatic plunger and integrated timer that tweets wouldn't improve the device, but for the most part, French press coffee makers are manual creations that do a really good job at what they do. But … Read more


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Hot DealHallucinations by Black's Magic $19.95 $6.70 Save: 66% off Reward PointsNo points earned yet on current order. Log in to see how many reward points you have already earned Categories
LoginTestimonialsThey go above and beyond for their customers
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von Willebrand disease (vWD) is an inherited blood disorder. It decreases the blood's ability to clot. As a result, bleeding lasts longer than usual.
von Willebrand's disease is the most common hereditary bleeding disorder, affecting about 1% of the population. It affects both sexes approximately equally. There are no racial or ethnic associations with this disorder.
vWD is caused by a reduced amount of a protein called von Willebrand factor (vWF) or an abnormality in this protein. This protein helps blood to clot. When a person is bleeding, blood cells called platelets form a plug to stop the bleeding. Normally, vWF allows platelets to adhere to the cells that line the inside of the blood vessels (endothelium), a process necessary for successful clotting. If there is not enough vWF or if it is defective, platelets cannot properly grip onto the injured area and bleeding does not stop as quickly as it should.
VWF has a separate function of protecting against the break down of another protein involved in clotting—factor VIII:C. The relative absence of functioning vWF, therefore, can lead to minor clotting problems through this mechanism as well.
von Willebrand disease can often be traced through several generations in a family. Some have symptoms, while others just carry the gene. Most people with vWD inherit only one gene with the vWD defect. They have one of the milder forms of the disorder—either type 1 or type 2. This means they have some blood clotting ability. The small percentage of people who inherit two defective genes—type 3 vWD—have little clotting ability and experience severe bleeding episodes.
Types 1 and 2 are usually inherited in what is known as a "dominant" pattern. A man or woman with the disease has a 50% chance of passing the gene to his or her child. This means that if even one parent has the gene and passes it to a child, the child gets the disease. Whether the child has no symptoms, mild symptoms, or, less commonly, severe symptoms, he or she definitely has the disease. Regardless of severity of the symptoms, the child can still pass the gene to his or her own offspring.
Type 3 von Willebrand disease, however, is usually inherited in a "recessive" pattern. This type occurs when the child inherits the gene from both parents. Even if both parents have mild or asymptomatic disease, their children are likely to be severely affected.
A risk factor is something that increases your chance of getting a disease or condition. The only risk factor for vWD is having family members with this disease.
Many people with the vWD gene have very mild symptoms or none at all. When symptoms do occur, the severity varies from person-to-person. Many people only notice symptoms after taking aspirin or similar medications that interfere with clotting. Symptoms usually begin in childhood and fluctuate throughout life. Common symptoms include:
Your doctor will ask about your symptoms and medical history, and perform a physical exam. Blood tests may be done to check the following:
Many people with vWD do not need treatment. If you do, your treatment will depend on the type and severity of your vWD. In many cases, treatment is only necessary if you are having a surgical or dental procedure that is likely to cause bleeding.
Treatment may include:
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
National Hemophilia Foundation
Health Canada
Network of Rare Blood Disorders Organizations
Bleeding disorders. MedlinePlus website. Available at: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/bleedingdisorders.html . Accessed October 7, 2005.
Bleeding disorders. MedlinePlus website. Available at: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/bleedingdisorders.html . Accessed October 30, 2006.
Longe JL, Blanchfield DS. The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine . 2nd ed. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Research Company; 2001.
Longe JL, Blanchfield DS. The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine . 3rd ed. Stamford, CT: Thomson Gale; 2006.
Von Willebrand disease. National Hemophilia Foundation website. Available at: http://www.hemophilia.org/bdi/bdi_types3.htm . Accessed October 7, 2005.
von Willebrand disease. National Hemophilia Foundation website. Available at: http://www.hemophilia.org/bdi/bdi_types3.htm . Accessed October 30, 2006.
von Willebrand's disease: what you need to know about this inherited disorder. Am J Nurs . February 2000.
Last reviewed November 2008 by
Please be aware that this information is provided to supplement the care provided by your physician. It is neither intended nor implied to be a substitute for professional medical advice. CALL YOUR HEALTHCARE PROVIDER IMMEDIATELY IF YOU THINK YOU MAY HAVE A MEDICAL EMERGENCY. Always seek the advice of your physician or other qualified health provider prior to starting any new treatment or with any questions you may have regarding a medical condition.
Copyright © 2007 EBSCO Publishing All rights reserved.


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One hundred years after Jamaica's Marcus Mosiah Garvey formed the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in his birth island, his legacy is being touted. Continue Reading →
Tag Archives: Garvey
HW Pick: 'Marcus Garvey, Look For Me In The Whirlwind' Film In Harlem
Marcus Garvey: Look For Me In The Whirlwind, the first comprehensive documentary to tell the life story of this controversial leader, uses a wealth of material from the Garvey movement-written documents, film and photographs-to reveal what motivated a poor Jamaican to set up an international organization in Harlem for the African diaspora, what led to his early successes, and why he died lonely and forgotten. Continue Reading →
W. A. Domingo, Harlem, 1919-
Apart from Randolph and the Messenger crew, there was another organization that attacked Garvey just as bitterly—the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB). Continue Reading →
Marcus Mosiah Garvey, Jr. in Harlem
Marcus Mosiah Garvey, Jr., National Hero of Jamaica (August 17, 1887 – June 10, 1940),