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[OS] 2008-#90-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-15 17:00 GMT
Email-ID | 1217745 |
Date | 2008-05-08 16:38:04 |
From | email@example.com |
To | recipient, list, suppressed: |
List-Name | email@example.com |
8 May 2008
A World Security Institute Project
JRL homepage: www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
Support JRL: www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/funding
1. Interfax: Russians Fear Environmental Disasters Most -
2. Reuters: New PM Putin vows to curb inflation, cut taxes.
3. Reuters: HIGHLIGHTS-Russia's Putin becomes Prime
4. ITAR-TASS: Life changes for better under Putin's 8-year
5. Interfax: Smoking, drinking disastrous for Russia - Putin.
6. Moscow Times: Alexander Osipovich, President
Medvedev Stresses the Law.
7. Kommersant: Andrei Kolesnikov, Vladimir Putin Toppled
Himself. Dmitry Medvedev became the new Russian
8. ITAR-TASS: Medvedev addresses Kremlin reception.
9. Kremlin.ru: Speech by Vladimir Putin at the Inauguration
Ceremony of Dmitry Medvedev as President of Russia.
10. ITAR-TASS: President Medvedev's Inauguration Oath
Adapted For Children.
11. ITAR-TASS: Medvedev To Make 'An Interesting President' - 1.
12. ITAR-TASS: Medvedev To Make 'An Interesting President' - 2.
13. Moscow Times editorial: Empower Medvedev.
14. Washington Post editorial: Mr. Medvedev's Rule.
Is Russia's new president serious about ending 'legal nihilism'?
15. ITAR-TASS: Communist leader disillusioned with Putin
16. ITAR-TASS: Russian Govt Led By Putin Likely To Perform
Better - Poll.
17. Moscow Times: Yevgeny Kiselyov, The Day of the Bear.
18. ITAR-TASS: Gorbachev Wishes Every Success To President
19. ITAR-TASS: State To Continue Developing Special Relations
With Church - President.
20. OSC [US Open Source Center] Analysis: Russia -- Outlook
for Relations Between Medvedev, Orthodox Church.
21. Transitions Online: Andrew Wilson, Medvedev: Into the
Shark Tank. Can Russia=92s new president become his own man?
For clues, one analyst looks at how Putin did it.
22. Moscow News: Kirill Bessonov, Alternative Journalism.
(re Peter Lavelle)
23. St. Petersburg Times/AP: Russia =91Not Ready=92 For HIV
24. Bloomberg: Russia Stocks Cheapest in Europe on Higher
25. Interfax: Privatization Of Russian Film Studios To Be
26. Moscow News: Vladimir Kozlov, Russia=92s Studio System.
27. Reuters: Lawmakers urge Bush to shelve Russia nuclear
28. Reuters: Despite anti-Semitism, Russia lures back Jews.
29. ITAR-TASS: Schwab Cautiously Optimistic About Russia
WTO Talks Chances.
30. Gazeta.ru: Moscow Website Eyes Foreign Policy
Challenges Facing New President Medvedev.
31. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Nikolai Zlobin, INAUGURATION AND
32. OSC [US Open Source Center] Analysis: Russia --
Strategic Thinkers Vie for Foreign Policy Influence.
33. Interview with U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation
William J. Burns with Aleksey Venediktov at Ekho Moskvy Radio
34. Vremya Novostei: Ivan Sukhov, CAUCASUS LEGACY.
35. Russia Profile: Georgy Bovt, Too Alien for Europe.
The Relationship Between Russia and the EU Has Reached
a Stalemate.
36. Moscow News: Daria Chernyshova, Memories Live Forever=85
37. Moscow Times: David Marples, Remembering Victory Day
in a Different Way.
38. New York Times: Bill Keller, Books of The Times.
The Making of Yeltsin, His Boldness and Flaws. (re YELTSIN
A Life by Timothy J. Colton)]
Russians Fear Environmental Disasters Most - Poll
MOSCOW. May 7 (Interfax) - Of all possible=20
adversities seen as threatening Russia,=20
environmental disasters and terrorist attacks=20
against strategic facilities cause the greatest=20
fear among the country's population, an opinion=20
studies group said on Wednesday, citing an opinion poll.
Environmental catastrophes are the threat 48%=20
percent of Russians fear most, and 46% are most=20
afraid of terror attacks on strategic facilities,=20
the Russian Public Opinion Research Center=20
(VCIOM) said in a statement posted on its website.
The running out of reserves of oil, natural gas=20
and other minerals comes next on the list, with=20
40% putting it at the top of their apprehensions.
Then come fears of cultural, scientific and=20
educational decay (36%), a low birth rate=20
decimating the population (31%), a sharp decline=20
in living standards (31%), wide-scale epidemics=20
(29%), territories seeking to secede from Russia=20
(24%), and armed conflicts with neighboring countries (21%).
Only 17% see outer space as the greatest source=20
of danger, and 16% are afraid that March's=20
presidential election has split up the ruling=20
elite and see this as posing the greatest danger to the country.
Other potential developments feared by Russians=20
are an "Orange" revolution in Russia, with 15%=20
being particularly afraid of it, a coup supported=20
by Western secret services (14%), a civil war=20
(13%), a war against a Western country (13%), a=20
war against a "southern" or "southeastern"=20
country (12%), and fascists taking power (7%).
However, the poll suggests that the Russians see=20
any of the possibilities that have been mentioned=20
as much less likely to become reality today than they did three years ago.
Those for whom a possible living standards=20
decline was the greatest source of fear accounted=20
for 70% of the population three years ago, and=20
those for whom a possible drastic population=20
decrease was the greatest concern made up 58% then.
Today, however, each of the two categories makes up 31%.
The proportion of those fearing a split in the=20
ruling elite has plummeted from 46% to 16%.
The survey, carried out on April 12-13, had a=20
margin of error of 3.4%, VCIOM said.
New PM Putin vows to curb inflation, cut taxes
By Oleg Shchedrov and Michael Stott
MOSCOW, May 8 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin on=20
Thursday took over as Russia's prime minister a=20
day after leaving the Kremlin and pledged to curb=20
inflation and cut taxes to make Russia a leading economic power.
Putin said in a speech to parliament presenting=20
his candidacy that he wanted "single-digit=20
inflation within a few years" as part of a=20
long-term plan to make the country a global economic leader by 2020.
Legislators voted 392-56 to appoint him as prime=20
minister, with the opposing votes coming from the=20
Communists, the only opposition grouping in parliament.
Dmitry Medvedev, Putin's protege who was sworn in=20
as president on Wednesday, later signed a decree confirming the appointment.
Putin's appearance marked the latest stage of a=20
carefully choreographed transition of power to=20
Medvedev, the man Putin anointed as his successor.
Medvedev earlier presented Putin's candidacy,=20
saying in brief remarks that his mentor would=20
play a "key role" in shaping the country's development over the next 12 yea=
"All these years we worked with him and continue=20
to work together and I think no one has any=20
doubts that our tandem will only get stronger," the new president said.
He then sat on the platform and watched as Putin=20
took the rostrum for a 45-minute exposition of his priorities.
"First and foremost we need a robust=20
macro-economic situation," Putin said. "We will=20
devote the closest attention to all aspects of=20
financial policy -- first of all to measures directed at reducing inflation=
Investors have said inflation is Russia's biggest=20
economic problem, with price rises running at=20
14.3 percent in April on an annualised basis and=20
growing fears of labour unrest.
In keeping with the delicate division of power=20
between Putin and Medvedev, the new prime=20
minister stuck to economic policy and did not=20
stray into politics or foreign policy, his=20
favoured arenas when he was president.
Russia is in its 10th year of rapid growth and=20
Putin said it would displace Britain this year as=20
the world's sixth biggest economy based on purchasing power.
Putin called for lower taxes on the oil industry,=20
which has complained that excessive duties are=20
crippling its ability to boost production, but gave no details.
"Lightening the tax burden will be a significant=20
stimulus for the country's business climate," Putin said.
Russia's RTS share index rose by 3.5 percent=20
after Putin's speech, before falling back=20
slightly. Markets welcomed Putin's comments on=20
easing the tax burden, in particular on the oil industry.
"... Putin reignited the stock market today by=20
outlining an ambitious set of policy priorities,"=20
Yaroslav Lissovolik, chief economist at Deutsche=20
Bank in Moscow, wrote in a research note.
"Most important of all was a clear message coming=20
from Putin on the need to reduce the tax burden=20
on the oil sector in order to stimulate production and refining of crude oi=
Putin also vowed to step up the fight against=20
rampant official graft, which he said was one of=20
Russia's biggest problems, by cutting red tape=20
and supporting a new law against corruption.
The confirmation vote was a technicality because=20
Putin's United Russia party controls more than=20
two-thirds of the seats in the Duma, or lower house of parliament.
The Communists' small grouping has been the only=20
opposition force in the chamber since an election=20
last year, when a small group of independent=20
Kremlin opponents was barred from running by tough new election rules.
HIGHLIGHTS-Russia's Putin becomes Prime Minister
MOSCOW, May 8 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin, who=20
became Russia's prime minister on Thursday, set=20
out the economic programme he plans to implement in his new role.
Following are the highlights of Putin's speech,=20
made to parliament before a vote to confirm him as prime minister.
First and foremost we need a robust=20
macro-economic situation. In this connection, we=20
will devote the closest attention to all aspects=20
of financial policy -- first of all to measures directed at reducing inflat=
Our goal is to reduce inflation to single digits within the next few years.
It is important to develop the agricultural sector to avoid price rises.
I believe today we have come very close to=20
creating one of the best tax systems in the world.
Lightening the tax burden will be a significant=20
stimulus for the country's business climate.
I believe that we need to decide on the strategy=20
and tactics of further tax cuts no later than by=20
August, (we must decide) when and by how much we=20
need to cut taxes to create additional stimulus for economic development.
The government will present all its tax=20
initiatives to the Duma (lower house of=20
parliament) during the upcoming autumn session.
Such steps will mean that our economy, national=20
business, and the social sphere will get serious=20
additional resources for development. According=20
to experts, we are talking about hundreds of billions of roubles per year.
We need to liberalise amortisation policies to=20
help upgrade production facilities. Therefore we=20
need to put in place as early as next year=20
mechanisms for a speeded-up amortisation of=20
certain categories of tangible assets.
Russia's fundamentally stronger economic=20
potential and substantial financial reserves=20
provide a robust foundation whichy will allow us,=20
with confidence, to pass through this period of=20
instability in the world economy.
We can reap good benefits from a certain number=20
of opportunities, which are opening up now. This=20
includes expansion of national capital abroad,=20
expansion in the good sense of the word. It also=20
includes opportunities for boosting returns on=20
investments of state financial reserves, and=20
boosting the role of the rouble in inter-state transactions.
As soon as our (financial) capabilities=20
increased, some markets started closing for investments by our companies.
Last year, our companies failed to invest around=20
$50 billion in developed countries' economies due=20
to what they (developed countries) thought were political considerations.
We all know about high energy prices on the=20
global markets. Oil firms' incomes are not small=20
indeed. But we confiscate a big part of these profits.
The time has come to take a decision to reduce=20
the tax burden on this sector to encourage oil production and refining grow=
I would like to highlight that we need to focus=20
on private investors when talking about infrastructure development.
We need to create a competitive environment for=20
the long-term for business in infrastructure=20
projects, including by setting new tariff policies.
The government has drafted a strategy to develop=20
the transportation sector to 2030. It is an=20
ambitious programme. Financing will amount to=20
over 13 trillion roubles, including 4.7 trillion from the federal budget.
I believe it is necessary for the State Duma to=20
approve a law as early as this spring to raise=20
the minimum wage in our country to 4,330 roubles=20
($182.3) from January 1... As of today the minimum wage is 2,300 roubles.
Going forward, we must put in place indexation of=20
minimum wages exceeding the forecast inflation level.
The volume of our GDP calculated on a purchasing=20
power parity basis has exceeded $2 trillion.=20
Russia is currently standing in seventh place in=20
the world. According to international experts, it=20
can climb another step as early as this year and overtake Britain.
In the future, support for the army and navy will=20
remain our indisputable priority.
We must admit: the existing system of money=20
allowances ... does not let us pay honourably=20
those carrying out their military duties in most responsible jobs.
(That includes) those on duty on submarines and=20
strategic bombers, in air defences and in=20
strategic nuclear missile forces, those on duty=20
in units playing a key role in upkeeping our defence capacity.
In 2009 no less than 25 billion roubles ($1.05=20
billion) will be channelled for these purposes.
There will be further increases (in funding) to=20
eventually raise this volume to an appropriate=20
level to radically boost material support for the=20
entire category of these army servicemen.
Life changes for better under Putin's 8-year presidency-Medvedev
MOSCOW May 8-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,=20
nominating Putin's candidacy for the premiership=20
at the State Duma, said that the main result of=20
Putin's 8-year presidency is "Russia is now=20
respected, and the key task now is to ensure=20
continuation of this course and to make all=20
necessary things for the accumulated powerful=20
resources to work for the further upsurge of our Fatherland".
"Highly esteemed deputies of the State Duma,
I nominate today the candidacy of Vladimir=20
Vladimirovich Putin for the post of Chairman of=20
the Government of the Russian Federation.
This applause also means the evident fact that=20
Vladimir Vladimirovich needs no special=20
recommendations. He has already to his credit two=20
terms of presidential powers. You know what these=20
periods were like, how pivotal they were for the=20
life of our country. What successes have been=20
scored. In actual fact, they gave a chance for=20
the advance of our society to spectacular achievements.
What's the main thing, life in our country started turning for the better.
We know how much President Putin has done for=20
strengthening Russian statehood and consolidation=20
of our country's security. We also know how=20
sweepingly Russia's international position has=20
changed. To put it plainly, Russia is respected again.
The most important task now is to ensure=20
continuation of this course. We should do our=20
utmost for the accumulated powerful resources to=20
work for the further upsurge of our Fatherland.=20
The upsurge on the basis of innovations and on=20
the basis of economic modernisation and=20
improvement of the situation in the social sphere.
There is very much work for us in store. It will=20
be necessary to improve infrastructure and to=20
create favourable conditions for the development=20
of entrepreneurial activities as well as to=20
integrate more actively the Russian economy into=20
the world economy. To achieve serious successes=20
in education, public health, agriculture and the=20
housing sphere. And, of course, the main task is=20
to make life of people in Russia comfortable and secure.
I'd like to stress specially that all these tasks=20
were worked out under the guidance of Vladimir=20
Vladimirovich Putin. They are now recorded in the=20
strategy of Russia's development up to 2020.
I'm sure that Vladimir Vladimirovich, apart from=20
clearly understanding ways of their solution,=20
will play the key role in their implementation as chairman of the governmen=
Well, I'd like to add that we worked jointly with=20
him all the previous years and continue to work.=20
I believe nobody doubts that our tandem and our=20
cooperation will consolidate even more.=20
Therefore, it will ensure the necessary=20
continuity and at the same time development of=20
the course, supported by Russian society.
Highly esteemed deputies of the State Duma,
In compliance with the Constitution of the=20
Russian Federation, I request you to agree to the=20
appointment of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin to=20
the post of Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation."
Smoking, drinking disastrous for Russia - Putin
MOSCOW. May 8 (Interfax) - Smoking and=20
drinking are disastrous for Russia, candidate for=20
prime minister Vladimir Putin said at the Thursday meeting of the State Dum=
"The number of drinkers and smokers in=20
Russia twice exceeds that in the majority of developed states," he said.
The government and society should=20
tackle this problem, he said. "Certainly, we=20
will not fight this evil with bans or higher prices," he added.
Moscow Times
May 8, 2008
President Medvedev Stresses the Law
By Alexander Osipovich / Staff Writer
In his first speech as head of state, newly=20
inaugurated President Dmitry Medvedev vowed=20
Wednesday to strengthen the rule of law and to=20
bring as many Russians as possible into the middle class.
As he addressed more than 2,000 VIP guests who=20
had gathered in the Great Kremlin Palace for the=20
pomp-filled inauguration ceremony, Medvedev also=20
said he would rely in office on the continued=20
support of his predecessor, Vladimir Putin.
He carried through on his words less than three=20
hours later by nominating Putin as prime=20
minister, fulfilling a promise he made in=20
December. The State Duma is expected to confirm=20
Putin's nomination in a special session Thursday.
"I give heartfelt thanks to President Vladimir=20
Vladimirovich Putin for his constant, personal=20
support, which I have always felt," Medvedev=20
said. "I am certain this will continue going forward."
Describing the eight years of Putin's presidency=20
as a "strong foundation" for growth, Medvedev=20
said his priorities would include defending civil=20
rights and raising living standards.
"I fully understand how much needs to be done,"=20
he said, "to make the state genuinely fair and=20
attentive to citizens and to guarantee the=20
highest living standards, so as many people as=20
possible can join the middle class, get a good=20
education and quality health care services."
Returning to a theme from his election campaign,=20
Medvedev promised to strengthen rule of law,=20
which he said was necessary to stop corruption and encourage growth.
"We must achieve true respect for the law and=20
overcome legal nihilism, which seriously=20
interferes with development today," he said,=20
singling out the problem as one that needed "special attention."
A lawyer by training, Medvedev first used the=20
term "legal nihilism" in a January speech that=20
marked the beginning of his election campaign.=20
Boosting the rule of law was also a favorite=20
Kremlin theme during the early years of Putin's=20
presidency, when Putin called for a "dictatorship of the law."
Putin appeared somber throughout much of=20
Wednesday's ceremony. State television showed him=20
arriving in a small motorcade and walking alone=20
through the Kremlin's Cathedral Square toward the Great Kremlin Palace.
He summed up his legacy in a short farewell=20
speech, which he gave immediately before Medvedev was sworn in.
"Yes, our work was not without its failures and=20
mistakes, but we managed to achieve serious,=20
concrete results and effect a breakthrough to a new way of life," Putin sai=
"Today we are forming goals and tasks not for one=20
or two months ahead, but for 20 to 30 years=20
ahead; we are taking on major problems, and I am=20
absolutely convinced that we can handle them, but=20
only with your active, direct participation and support," he said. "Thank y=
Putin's words were met with applause. Cameras cut=20
to the outgoing first lady, Lyudmila Putina, who=20
appeared gloomy and was looking down at the floor=20
=AD a sharp contrast to the beaming expression on=20
the face of Medvedev's wife, Svetlana, who was standing beside her.
Putin ended his speech by wishing Medvedev good=20
luck and telling the audience: "Support him."
The audience seemed more supportive of Putin,=20
however, breaking out into applause three times=20
during Putin's speech, then standing quietly=20
through Medvedev's address and applauding only when it was over.
State television reported that more than 2,000=20
guests were invited to the Kremlin for the=20
inauguration, including State Duma deputies,=20
governors, Cabinet ministers, religious leaders and foreign ambassadors.
Patriarch Alexy II and outgoing Prime Minister=20
Viktor Zubkov stood at the front of Andreyevsky=20
Hall, the lavish tsarist-era throne room where Medvedev was sworn in.
Other guests in the standing-room-only crowd were=20
huddled in nearby Alexandrovsky and Georgiyevsky=20
Halls, where they watched the proceedings on=20
television screens and could only glimpse=20
Medvedev as he came and went, walking along a red carpet.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, film director=20
Nikita Mikhalkov and St. Petersburg Governor=20
Valentina Matviyenko were among the guests.
State television pulled out all the stops in its=20
coverage, using aerial cameras to show Medvedev's=20
motorcade arriving in the Kremlin and even=20
filming the gears inside the famed clock in the=20
Spassky Tower during the countdown to noon, when=20
the inauguration was scheduled to start.
Medvedev's motorcade =AD consisting of a Mercedes=20
limousine flanked by two bulky sport utility=20
vehicles and a swarm of motorcycles =AD entered the=20
Kremlin through the rarely used Spassky Tower gates, which face Red Square.
The president-elect stepped out of his limo,=20
entered the Great Kremlin Palace and walked down=20
the red carpet to Andreyevsky Hall, where he took=20
the stage with Putin, Federation Council Speaker=20
Sergei Mironov, State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov=20
and Constitutional Court Chairman Valery Zorkin.
Once Zorkin had sworn in Medvedev, an orchestra=20
played the Russian anthem. At the end of the=20
ceremony, Medvedev and Putin walked back to=20
Cathedral Square and watched the presidential=20
honor guard marching past them in full regalia.
Standing next to one another, Medvedev and Putin=20
appeared to be the same height on television even=20
though the new president is shorter.
In his first afternoon as president, Medvedev=20
attended a church service led by the patriarch,=20
submitted Putin's nomination, signed a decree for=20
the development of housing construction and=20
received the launch codes to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.
Gryzlov told reporters Wednesday afternoon of the=20
plans for the special State Duma session to confirm Putin as prime minister.
In line with a decision last month by the United=20
Russia party, Putin automatically became its=20
chairman upon leaving office Wednesday. With the=20
party holding a commanding majority in the Duma,=20
there was little doubt he would be confirmed.
In another key reshuffle, Gazprom CEO Alexei=20
Miller will chair the company's board of=20
directors until a new board is elected on June=20
27, RIA-Novosti reported, citing a company spokesman.
Miller replaces Medvedev, who had been chairman at Gazprom since 2002.
May 8, 2008
Vladimir Putin Toppled Himself
Dmitry Medvedev became the new Russian President
By Andrei Kolesnikov
Yesterday Russia=92s new president was sworn in.=20
Kommersant special correspondent Andrey=20
Kolesnikov, who attended the inauguration in the=20
Kremlin, watched the fierce struggle of the=20
guests of the ceremony for their =93place in the=20
sun,=94 and the key people changing places.=20
Yesterday=92s ceremony differed from the previous=20
ones at least in that there were not enough=20
coatracks for all the guests. And coatracks are=20
indispensable, you know: Stanislavsky once said that theatre starts with th=
At some moment you could notice an improper=20
throng in the entrance hall, and the creams of=20
the nation=92s creams grew red in the face. The=20
reason was simple: There were no free coatracks in the cloakroom any more.
This was for the first time in the history of the=20
venue. The size of the cloakroom hasn=92t changed,=20
evidently. So, you could presume, the Russian=20
elite had grown in number drastically. It seemed it had gotten twice as big.
And so, the people having a small talk about the=20
weather (and it was certainly the issue to=20
discuss: on the day of the inauguration, just at=20
that very moment, it began snowing, whereas the=20
day before yesterday it was as =93hot=94 as +21=B0C) a=20
minute ago rushed to the only queue remaining,=20
with their changed faces. But the cloakroom=20
attendant claimed that the last queue had seized=20
to exist. All those people, finding themselves=20
bankrupt, did not know what to do with their=20
coats and jackets. And themselves, too.
In a situation like that you can see who is who.=20
People show their best, not to mention the worst.=20
So, Vladimir Gurevich, editor-in-chief of the=20
=93Vremya novostey=94 (=93News times=94) paper, happened=20
to be the only person to show his best. Five days=20
ago he became grandfather, and he came to the=20
inauguration right after bathing his grandson.=20
That=92s why he was in a way more dignified than=20
the rest, and offered to share his coatrack unit with someone of those pres=
The cloakroom attendants began treating coats as=20
hand luggage and even put them in the shoes=20
sections. Mr Gurevich attracted the attention of=20
Grigory Yavlinsky to the fact that the coats were=20
laid, rather than hung. The leader of the Yabloko=20
party replied that in Russia they would always hang you, and then lay you d=
I couldn=92t help asking Mr Yavlinsky whether=20
Vladimir Putin had offered him a post in his=20
government and whether he was considering the offer.
Mr Yavlinsky got embarrassed and then said with a=20
kind of artificial excitement, =93Putin ordered me=20
to consider it, and I=92m doing it now.=94
Alas, Grigory Yavlinsky didn=92t answer anything to=20
my question whether he always did what Mr Putin ordered him to do.
But according to the information of Kommersant,=20
Mr Yavlinsky has been really offered a key post=20
in a department responsible for solving=20
ecological problems. And you can=92t rule out that=20
he=92ll be offered a post in the ministry. This is=20
truly an issue to consider; it would be silly to=20
reject it, because no one will offer you anything=20
like that in the future, and at the same time it=20
would be uneasy to accept the relatively minor=20
post compared, say, with the Ministry of Industry=20
and Energy, with the volume of work immense.
In the Grand Kremlin Palace, the audience was=20
separated in three parts: in the St. Andrew, St.=20
Alexander and St. George Halls. The ceremony=20
proper was held in the St. Andrew Hall, where the=20
closest circle was present. In the St. Alexander=20
Hall there were MPs and senators. And the largest=20
hall, the St. George one, where Dmitry Medvedev=20
was to walk through, hosted journalists,=20
businessmen, Administration officials, and=20
cultural workers, who were anxiously waiting for Dmitry Medvedev to appear.
Member of the Public Chamber of Russia, lawyer=20
Anatoly Kucherena said, squeezing his invitation=20
card in his hand, that he hadn=92t minded which=20
hall to enter. And only at the moment when the=20
secret was finally revealed to him, he understood=20
everything. You might think, however, that=20
Anatoly Kucherena didn=92t mind the matter only=20
because he had always been invited to the St. George Hall.
Businessmen preferred to stick together =AD=20
something they would avoid in real life. You=20
could see Onexim fund president Mikhail=20
Prokhorov, MIRAX Group president Sergey Polonsky,=20
and Severstal head Alexey Mordashov standing=20
together. Mr Polonsky shared his trouble with me:=20
He was almost the first to arrive, at 9 o=92clock,=20
but the ceremony would not start before midday.
=93What for did you do it?=94 I wondered. =93Did you=20
fear you would not be able to have your place at the aisle?=94
It need be said that by that time the people at=20
the aisle had formed sort of a brick wall five bricks thick.
But Sergey Polonsky=92s story was far more=20
dramatic. He said that at the previous=20
inauguration, he had arrived the last moment,=20
like another businessman, Vim-Bill-Dann CEO David=20
Yakobashvili, and they hardly managed to get in.=20
Yesterday Sergey Polonsky decided to avoid the=20
same mistake and came before the massive oak=20
doors were opened. And surely, David Yakobashvili was the first person he m=
People around us discussed in a low voice how=20
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev were going to=20
rule the state. You could hear the words=20
=93duumvirate=94 and =93dual power=94 more often than =93Good day.=94
=93And to my mind everything will be all right. For=20
example, I had to share the same office room with=20
my partner without suffering too much,=94 Sergey=20
Polonsky shared another trouble with us.
The brick wall was getting thicker: Everyone=20
wanted to see Dmitry Medvedev, and, what was more=20
important, to arrange it so that Dmitry Medvedev=20
could see them. Oleg Mitvol, Deputy Head of=20
Russia=92s environmental watchdog, was impressed by what he saw.
=93Some of them arrived as early as 9 a.m.,=94 he=20
told me, which meant that he arrived no later.=20
But, to tell the truth, he preferred to stay away=20
from the aisle. =93But there are those smarter and=20
craftier. You see that man close to the turning?=20
The one standing sideways? He was good at physics=20
at school, I presume. You see, he wants to look=20
the President in the eye, which would be like=20
sending a message =93I will always be there to help=20
you at hard times!=94 And he may be shown on TV later, who knows.=94
The final assumption was not pointless, I=92d say.=20
The TV preparation was unprecedented as usual,=20
and the tourists visiting Red Square that day=20
will surely remember two lifting cranes at St.=20
Basil=92s Cathedral and the Kremlin embankment, and=20
a videocamera hovering between them a hundred=20
meters above the Earth. But judging from the fact=20
that from time to time the footage of the=20
ceremony got trembling, the creativity of the organizers was not duly rewar=
Omitting those video imperfections, everyone saw=20
what was happening in the Kremlin, and I barely=20
need to describe it. Everybody saw the soldiers,=20
freezing in their new uniform and with their=20
noses red, turn their heads following Vladimir=20
Putin who passed by. It was like sunflowers=20
followed the sun. And then another sun rose =AD=20
Dmitry Medvedev got out of his car.
He entered the Grand Kremlin Palace and went=20
through the crowd. You could only get amazed at=20
how his gait resembled that of Vladimir Putin: He=20
walked quickly, with his right hand close to the=20
body, and waving his left one. But their looks=20
are quite different. Vladimir Putin had never=20
looked anyone in the eye during his ceremonies of=20
inauguration (and everyone wanted to look him in=20
the eye). He kept walking without looking at=20
anyone, and only when turning, he would blink.
And Dmitry Medvedev cast his look down sometimes.=20
Perhaps he was walking along that red carpet for=20
the first time (though he had been there, like=20
Vladimir Putin, before the ceremony, and had=20
studied that way during rehearsals). But mostly,=20
he looked at the audience, I=92d say, with sort of=20
curiosity. It seemed he was trying to remember=20
them, and so, the efforts of those who arrived at=20
9 a.m. were not in vain. And as he walked back,=20
he managed to greet dozens of people nodding his=20
head. I watched him thinking that, to my surprise, he was so much polite.
At that, Dmitry Medvedev, who would become=20
President in 5 minutes, was paler than usual on=20
his way to the hall =AD something he had never=20
dreamt of, perhaps. Weren=92t it the ceremony of=20
the inauguration of the Russian President, where=20
he, Dmitry Medvedev, was going to be sworn in,=20
you could say that one would hardly envy that man=92s fate.
Then everybody heard Vladimir Putin say that he=20
had taken up the commitment to protect Russia,=20
and he had lived up to his promise and would=20
stick to it in the future. You also heard him say=20
that he had pledged to work faithfully and=20
openly, and he hadn=92t broken his promise.
And you certainly heard his final phrase =93Let=92s=20
support him!=94 Everybody remembers Boris Yeltsin=92s=20
final phrase addressed to Vladimir Putin =93Take=20
care of Russia!=94 And now everybody knows that=20
Vladimir Putin told Dmitry Medvedev =93Let=92s support him!=94
Did he mean that Dmitry Medvedev needed that=20
support badly? Apparently, yes. At least that was=20
what Dmitry Medvedev spoke about when taking his oath.
=93You might understand how deep my feelings are=20
now. I would like to express a hearty gratitude=20
to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin for his personal=20
support I have always felt. I am sure I=92ll have it in future.=94
The second ceremony followed the first one:=20
Dmitry Medvedev inspected the parade of the=20
Kremlin guards. The two men were standing=20
together, they only changed places. Now it was=20
Dmitry Medvedev who inspected the parade. He=20
stood at the microphone saying what was due to be=20
said at that moment, and as he finished, Vladimir=20
Putin gave him a nod and said only with his lips moving, =93That=92s it.=94
As you walked out of the hall, you could get a=20
gift =AD a package with a medal =93The Inauguration=20
of the President of Russia Dmitry Anatolyevich=20
Medvedev.=94 One package pro person. But not=20
everyone managed to get them (like the coatrack=20
units in the cloakroom), because the military,=20
who were the first to leave the hall as if on=20
command, grabbed two packages each.
They might have feared not to be invited to the next inauguration, I guess.
Medvedev addresses Kremlin reception
Moscow, 7 May: The inauguration of a president is=20
always an important event in the life of the=20
country, Dmitriy Medvedev said at a formal=20
reception on the occasion of his inauguration as head of state.
Medvedev said that those who had nominated him=20
for the post of president and helped him during=20
the election campaign were present at the=20
reception in the Kremlin. He once again thanked=20
everybody and expressed hope for "further joint=20
work to implement common plans".
"Now we have to pool our efforts in order to=20
fulfil the obligations we have given to people=20
and live up to the expectations of millions of=20
Russian citizens. Let me emphasize again: the=20
trust of voters is not so much my personal=20
success as the result of hard work of our entire=20
team. As far back as eight years ago it addressed=20
the most challenging tasks and has achieved=20
impressive changes in Russia of today," Medvedev said.
He addressed "special words of gratitude to=20
Vladimir Putin. He has made a truly historic=20
contribution to the development of our country=20
and is an example of a truly strategic leader."
"I am confident that we will continue to work=20
together successfully for the benefit of our=20
country, its present and future," he added.
Medvedev stressed that "achieving high living=20
standards has been and remains" an absolute=20
priority in his work. "And this does not simply=20
mean a decent salary, education, health,=20
comfortable everyday life but also reliable=20
security of citizens and broad opportunities for=20
self-realisation and, of course, active cultural life".
The president stressed that "Russia needs=20
creative and pro-active people who are=20
responsible for their own fate to ensure a rapid=20
technological and intellectual thrust. And we=20
must do everything we can to ensure that their=20
personal victories serve as a foundation for our common success".
He said "leading scientists, educators and=20
culture workers" were present at the reception.=20
"These are people whose ideas and actions, and=20
creative attitude can further consolidate the=20
nation and society around new and even more challenging tasks," he said.
Medvedev expressed confidence that "the future of=20
Russia depends directly on the development of=20
civil society and rule-of-law state, including=20
the conscious 'habit' to respect other people's=20
rights while being able to defend one's own, to=20
be responsible for one's life and the fate of the country".
Medvedev said "there are also representatives of=20
Russia's business community present here; these=20
are people whose life and work experience in a=20
free market environment has proved that it is=20
possible to achieve the highest future-oriented results".
"We will continue assisting them in the=20
development of their business," Medvedev pledged.
"A lot in our plans will depend on the=20
professional and moral qualities of=20
representatives of the civil authorities, law=20
enforcement agencies and the armed forces, their=20
openness to society and immaculate service to the=20
people, their readiness to strengthen the=20
country's security, ensure its integrity and=20
inviolability of its territory," he said
The president stressed he considered all this to=20
be the "cornerstone principles of the work of the=20
whole state mechanism and the most important=20
conditions for the implementation of strategic=20
goals and long-term development policy".
Medvedev expressed firm confidence that "together=20
we will be able to multiply what has been=20
achieved with new, better and more substantive=20
results and we will make Russia prosperous".
The president proposed a toast "to peace, accord=20
and prosperity of the Motherland, to happiness in=20
every Russian family" and "to our great and beloved Russia".
May 7, 2008
The Kremlin, Moscow
Speech by Vladimir Putin at the Inauguration=20
Ceremony of Dmitry Medvedev as President of Russia
VLADIMIR PUTIN: Citizens of Russia, friends!
The inauguration of the President-Elect is a=20
moment of great importance in the formation of=20
democratic power, a uniting moment for all of the=20
country=92s regions, all the national political forces, and for civil socie=
It is crucial today that, together, we all=20
continue the national development course that has=20
already proved its worth, guided in all our=20
undertakings by the interests of our citizens.
Overall, we have completed this change at the=20
highest level of state power, a change that has=20
taken place in strict accordance with the law and=20
democratic principles. At the same time, not for=20
an instant have we delayed our work in addressing=20
our citizens=92 most pressing problems, but have=20
moved ahead, keeping up the pace of our country=92s development all the whi=
It is my conviction that the state can be truly=20
socially oriented, while at the same time being=20
modern, innovative and able to strengthen its=20
influence and standing in the world only if it=20
keeps constantly in mind the welfare of its=20
people and the development potential of each and every individual.
Today, on the eve of Victory Day, we feel with=20
particular intensity the spiritual strength of=20
our people, a nation who has more than once=20
steadfastly defended its own road and statehood=20
and has made an immense contribution to the=20
preservation and progress of civilisation and to=20
world science, culture and the arts.
Dear friends! Eight years ago, when I first swore=20
the oath as President of Russia, I promised to=20
work openly and honestly and to loyally serve my=20
people and country. I have not broken my promise.
It is my conviction that to win the people=92s=20
trust, the authorities must be morally upright=20
and true to their promises. This is no less=20
important than professional skill and is just as=20
essential for attaining results that will benefit all of society.
Today, as I step down from the office of head of=20
state, I want to say that this obligation to look=20
after Russia has always been for me my greatest=20
duty as a citizen, and will remain so. This duty=20
has guided me through all these years and will=20
continue to guide me throughout my entire life.
I want to stress in particular that in a vast=20
country with as many different ethnic groups and=20
religious faiths as Russia, it is vital that we=20
also nurture and continue to strengthen our unity=20
=AD unity of the state, unity of purpose, unity of our national spirit.
Citizens of Russia, friends, I thank you=20
sincerely for your faith, understanding and=20
support, support that I have felt throughout=20
these eight years as President, and that has=20
given me strength and confidence that what we are=20
doing is right. I thank all of you for having=20
stood together as we worked towards our goals,=20
overcoming difficulties, living through tragedies=20
together, not stopping even before what at first=20
glance seemed to be insurmountable obstacles.=20
Yes, this work has not been without problems and=20
mistakes, but we have nevertheless achieved real=20
and important results and have taken a real=20
stride forward towards a new life. Today we are=20
setting goals and objectives not just for the=20
next month or two, but for the next 20-30 years.=20
We are setting ambitious goals, and I am=20
absolutely certain that we can achieve these=20
goals, but only with your active and direct=20
participation and support. Thank you.
As I hand to Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev the=20
symbol of state power today, I wish him luck and=20
success as President of the Russian Federation.=20
Let us all give him our support.
Thank you for your attention.
President Medvedev's Inauguration Oath Adapted For Children
MOSCOW, May 7 (Itar-Tass) - New Russian President=20
Dmitry Medvedev was sworn into office on=20
Wednesday. President Medvedev took his oath on a=20
special book of the Russian Constitution used at=20
inauguration ceremonies. A Russian president's=20
oath numbers 33 words, it has three words fewer=20
than the oath taken by a US president at an inauguration ceremony.
"In performing my duties as the President of the=20
Russian Federation, I pledge to respect and=20
protect the rights and liberties of every=20
citizen; to observe and protect the Constitution=20
of the Russian Federation; to protect the=20
sovereignty and independence, security and=20
integrity of the state and to serve the people=20
faithfully," Dmitry Medvedev told the=20
inauguration ceremony in the St. Andrew Hall in=20
the Great Kremlin Palace on Wednesday.
The text of the presidential oath written in a=20
language for grown-ups was adapted to make it=20
comprehensible to citizens of a school age. The=20
adapted version for children says that the president promises that he will
not violate himself and will not let any other=20
person violate the human rights and liberties,=20
which means that the president promises to=20
respect and protect not only the rights and=20
freedoms of citizens of this country, but also=20
universally recognized human rights and=20
liberties. These rights and liberities are=20
stipulated in the Russian Constitution and=20
therefore, the president promised that no law=20
enacted in this country, no rule hung on any=20
school wall in our country shall contravene the Russian Constitution.
There is one more thing - the president has=20
promised to ensure that no other state should be=20
given a possibility to offend our country, to=20
dictate to our country what it should and what it=20
should not do, or annex any city or any river=20
from Russia, the children's version of the presidential oath explained.
Full text of the adapted presidential oath is=20
available on the Kremlin Internet site for citizens of a school age.
The press and information service of the Russian=20
president has reported Wednesday that in=20
connection with Dmitry Medvedev' s inauguration=20
the official Internet sites www. kremlin.ru and=20
www. yznai-prezidenta.ru have been renewed.
Medvedev To Make 'An Interesting President' - 1
MOSCOW, May 7 (Itar-Tass) -- Who is he, Mr.=20
Putin? The question was first asked back in=20
January 2000, but for many in Russia and in the=20
West it has remained unanswered in a sense to=20
this day. Now there has emerged a no less=20
enigmatic puzzle. Who is he, Mr. Medvedev?
The gist of the official biography of Russia's=20
newly-elected and inaugurated president is=20
several lines long. Dmitry Medvedev, age 42, has=20
had jobs at four places of work@Destussian cities=20
(the St. Petersburg State University, the St.=20
Petersburg Mayor's Office, the Russian=20
government, the Russian presidential staff).=20
Also, he held the unsalaried position of the=20
Gazprom board of directors' chairman. Married, with a son.
Medvedev himself is a little bit more talkative,=20
although he gained publicity as a politician not=20
very long ago, in the autumn of 2005, when he was=20
moved from the office of the presidential chief=20
of staff to the seat of a first deputy prime minister.
"I have no record of work for a secret service,=20
but publicity for me proved not so easy to cope=20
with, although I was not just a civilian person,=20
but also a career lawyer," Medvedev has confessed.
Whatever the case, in the capacity of the=20
overseer of national projects he eagerly opened=20
himself to the media. Long interviews lasting=20
over an hour each, invariably granted to regional=20
media during his numerous trips about the country=20
(about 40 a year), have proved an integral part=20
of his own, unique style in politics, although=20
for a politician it is a far trickier business to=20
give a simple answer to a simple question (say,=20
when a retail gas pipeline will be laid to an XYZ=20
village), than dwell at length on things philosophical.
The public statements Russia's future president=20
has made over the past two years are a clear=20
indication that he is quite realistic about the=20
country and its capabilities - without any exaggerations or understatements.
"We are not a very rich country. We are an=20
emerging economy. I would even say we are a=20
booming economy, but not a very rich country=20
yet," Medvedev said in Moscow in January 2007.
In Davos several days later he would say "Russia,=20
once a debtor country, has turned itself into a=20
creditor nation. We are perfectly aware that as=20
we gain the status of a leader of world=20
development, we inevitably assume additional=20
responsibility for the condition of the world=20
economy .875 We are not persuading anybody to=20
develop an affection towards Russia, but we shall=20
not let anyone cause harm to it, and we shall be=20
pressing for respect - towards the citizens of=20
Russia and towards our country as a whole, and we=20
shall achieve this not by force, but with our=20
responsible behavior and successes."
Medvedev, who has worked together with Vladimir=20
Putin for over 17 years, has emphasized in a=20
variety of ways that he will go ahead with the=20
policy of his predecessor, because Russia needs=20
"decades of normal, calm development."
He declared this as the basis of his work.
"The things we have been doing over the past=20
eight years, things proposed by the president=20
(Putin) and accomplished to a great extent - were=20
absolutely positive changes that have brought=20
stability and calm for most of our families," the future president said.
Medvedev find it necessary to emphasize the idea=20
that measures to ensure freedom are the driving=20
force that will keep Russia moving along this road.
"Our policy should rely on the principle 'freedom=20
is better than non-freedom.'" This refers to=20
freedom in all of its manifestations - personal=20
freedom, economic freedom, and, lastly, the=20
freedom of self-expression." This is the gist of Medvedev's credo.
Medvedev the Lawyer professes faith in the power of law.
"Freedom is inseparable from the factual=20
recognition of the supremacy of the law by=20
citizens. It implies not chaos, but respect for=20
order established in the country. The supremacy=20
of law is to become one of the most significant values of ours."
His dream is to "banish legal abuse from the list of national habits."
"This is the minimum, the groundwork on which we=20
shall keep building Russia. Russia of today and=20
of tomorrow," Medvedev promised.
In the economy Russia's new president positions=20
himself as a liberal. In his opinion, "the=20
presence of the state in the economy must be=20
reasonable, precisely matching the level of society's development."
Medvedev plans to continue the transition to a=20
market economy, to a situation in which "the=20
state will be not commanding the economy, but=20
creating sensible rules of economic regulation=20
and controlling the observance of human rights."
In the capacity of president-elect Medvedev held=20
a meeting with businessmen. On his instructions=20
many inspections of small and medium businesses=20
will be canceled in the near future and the=20
amount of paper work slashed. As a matter of=20
fact, this heralds revolutionary changes in the=20
struggle with bureaucracy and corruption.
Medvedev has identified the four 'i's crucial to=20
economic development - innovations, investments,=20
infrastructures and institutions.
As many priorities he sees in the social sphere -=20
the national projects he has supervised -=20
housing, education, medicine and agriculture.
"True, government investments in the social=20
sphere have been the determining ones and they=20
will remain so in the future. The state has no=20
right to drop the financing of the social=20
sphere," Russia's future president said more than=20
once. "We are obliged to perfect the pension=20
system, to raise the impermissibly low pensions=20
of a significant number of our citizens."
The overseer of the national projects described=20
them as a "symbol of reform in the key spheres of life."
"With the help of national projects we have been=20
trying to resolve not only the accrued acute=20
problems, but also to create a new lifestyle, new=20
standards of life, fundamentally new humanitarian benchmarks," he explained.
At the same time Medvedev warns, "We cannot=20
afford to support one and all. This will be=20
unrealistic, and in some cases immoral. Support=20
must go to those who wish to work, who prove with=20
one's daily activity, probably, not a very=20
noticeable one, the ability to be useful."
Medvedev To Make 'An Interesting President' - 2
May 7, 2008
Russia's new president pays much attention to=20
such matters as morality, ethics and decency.
"Money is a significant yardstick to measure=20
one's status. But it is not the sole incentive.=20
There is morality and, naturally, it has its own=20
place in the life of any society. The more=20
prominent that place, the more developed the=20
given society is," Medvedev says with certainty.
He talks about ecological responsibility - not=20
only that of industrial enterprises, but also of=20
weekend picnickers in the woods, about the moral=20
responsibility of those getting shadow wages,=20
about the duty to respect and take care of the=20
mother tongue protect it from "the processes of=20
internal and external corrosion," and about the=20
need to remember that in Russia there are about=20
730,000 orphaned children, each one dreaming of adoption.
It is for the first time that an official of such=20
a high rank was not shy to say what he really=20
thinks about what it takes to make a good father.
"A man has no right to shirk one's family duty to=20
rear children. This depends on you and me. If a=20
man really wishes to take a proper position in=20
the family and to rear and educate one's=20
children, he will be doing so, whoever he is,=20
even a very-very big boss. And if a man wants to=20
shirk, an excuse can be easily found - 'I come=20
home late,' 'I'm very tired,' 'I'd like to watch TV lying on the sofa.'"
It looks like by saying so Medvedev hit the nail=20
on the head, winning the support of millions of mums and grannies.
Medvedev is for the freedom of speech, but he=20
does not exaggerate the capabilities of today's civil society.
"Civil society is effective only if it consists=20
of mature personalities, prepared for democracy.=20
The civil society that we have generally matches=20
the level of the country's development. It is=20
neither better nor worse that that society. A=20
strong civil society can exist only there where=20
there is a developed, strong state. There is no=20
contradiction between the two. But the=20
authorities must never put on airs. They must=20
maintain permanent, critical cooperation with civil society," says Medvedev.
On the list of risks Russia is faced with=20
Medvedev emphasized the problem of governing and running such a big territo=
"We have the trivial problem of the=20
self-isolation of individual territories, not of=20
political isolation some signs of which developed=20
in the 1990s, but of economic self-isolation - a=20
situation in which people resident in Siberia and=20
the Far East simply cannot afford to visit other=20
parts of Russia and the other way round. In the=20
meantime, the country must be united economically=20
and politically. This is a question of prolonged=20
perfection of the economic mechanism, of=20
developing the economy, of conducting a competent=20
tariff policy, and so on," says the new president=20
about his tasks. At the same time he is aware=20
that it will be impossible to control everything=20
from Moscow, from the Kremlin, or the office of=20
the federal government. "The main tier of power=20
is the tier occupied by our colleagues in regions - the governors."
The new head of state looks proud of his family and he likes to talk about =
His ancestors, he says, had a rural background,=20
his father once drove a combine harvester. Both=20
granddads were in the army during World War II=20
and his son, Ilya, 12, attends fencing classes and is not very good at draw=
"I believe that I had a good childhood," says=20
Medvedev. The most important book he got from his=20
father as a present was the Smaller Soviet=20
Encyclopedia (read from beginning to end with great pleasure).
Medvedev is quite glad about the ongoing changes in the country.
"In my trips about the nation I have never had=20
any negative feelings. This does not mean that=20
there are no problems. There are piles of these,=20
but that feeling of hopelessness that existed at=20
the beginning of the 1990s is no more."
The new president has a well-known hobby he also=20
calls "part of the job." It is the Internet.=20
Medvedev is a regular visitor to the world web.=20
"I visit various sites - those which like the=20
authorities and others that hate them. I have no=20
problems with tapping the keys. There was a time when I typed a lot myself."
"If a person wants to keep abreast of time,=20
mastering these technologies and using them=20
actively is a must," says Medvedev. He forecasts=20
complete merger of personal computers, the=20
Internet and television in 3-5-7 years and the=20
emergence of a completely new situation.
"It will be a great, universal humanitarian=20
problem that will have to be addressed. Otherwise=20
it will bury copyright law," he warned.
Medvedev, just as Putin, is a firm supporter of=20
an active lifestyle and fitness. As for the=20
preferences of Russia's third president, they are=20
somewhat different from those of his predecessor.=20
Putin is a fan of judo and Alpine skiing.=20
Medvedev swims. In music Medvedev prefers hard=20
rock - Black Sabbath, Led Zeppelin and Deep=20
Purple are his favorites. But, in his opinion,=20
"classical music should be listened to, too."
"If there is the real wish to do something, then=20
one will surely find the time - to rear children=20
and to listen to music. Laziness explains idleness," he says with certainty.
Medvedev says he can derive the feeling of=20
pleasure from what he does this very minute at=20
any job, because "work is of interest when you can see the fruit of one lab=
"Probably, in this sense I am a happy person," says Russia' s new president.
"The mass media have been more or less impartial=20
in presenting my modest image, but I am far more=20
interested to see how the people rate the results of my work," Medvedev sai=
He believes that "a politician must be honest in=20
relations with one's people and oneself, and to=20
take decisions only after in-depth analysis,=20
because they affect the lives of thousands and millions of people."
His predecessor, Vladimir Putin, said more than=20
once that Medvedev will have his own style of presidency.
"He will keep you interested," Putin said one=20
month before the end of his tenure of office.
Moscow Times
May 8, 2008
Empower Medvedev
With Vladimir Putin's expected confirmation as=20
prime minister on Thursday, both he and President=20
Dmitry Medvedev, inaugurated Wednesday, will have new jobs.
There is some doubt whether this will actually=20
change the balance of power. But for the sake of=20
the country's political development, Medvedev=20
will have to become president in more than just name.
Medvedev's election has generated some serious=20
expectations. Investors -- both foreign and=20
domestic -- are looking to him to foster stronger=20
rule of law in the commercial sphere. Medvedev's=20
promise to do so during his inauguration speech was reassuring.
Civil society groups, meanwhile, hope the new=20
president will follow up on calls to give them a=20
greater voice in monitoring government policy and=20
performance. Foreign governments are hoping for=20
some softening in Kremlin rhetoric.
For the most part, Medvedev's primary=20
constituency -- the electorate -- has made it=20
fairly clear that what it wants is a continuation=20
of the government's recent policies. Given the=20
country's strong, albeit heavily=20
hydrocarbon-fueled, economic performance of the=20
past eight years and memories of the topsy-turvy=20
1990s, this is understandable. People want stability and prosperity.
If Putin remains the one calling the shots in the=20
country, this will reduce the chances for=20
long-term stability, as counterintuitive as it may seem.
The overwhelming majority of the world's stable=20
and effective political systems generate=20
stability through rules, frameworks and practices=20
that help guarantee that they function normally.=20
Put simply, they depend on institutions, not on individuals.
Russia's history demonstrates the danger inherent=20
in systems that depend on personal conceptions of=20
power. Events arising at least partly from this=20
approach to governance include the Time of=20
Troubles, Catherine the Great's accession to the=20
throne, the Decembrist revolt, Stalin's deadly=20
machinations to achieve power, the Brezhnev era=20
of stagnation and the attempted putsch against Gorbachev.
In most of these cases, the leader who ended up=20
in power achieved some measure of success, and=20
there isn't any reason to believe that Putin=20
won't be able to do so as well. The problem is=20
that the personal power accumulated by each=20
leader only contributed to the return of=20
instability once he or she left the stage. There=20
is no reason to believe that life post-Putin would be any different.
Russia's Constitution is often referred to as=20
"superpresidential," with the head of state=20
holding the overwhelming balance of power and=20
responsibility. As the basic rules of the game,=20
the Constitution should serve as the basis for=20
political stability. If, instead, real power=20
remains in Putin's hands, future stability will=20
depend on Putin alone. A century of stability, it=20
follows, would require Putin to stay in power for another 100 years.
He can't.
Washington Post
May 8, 2008
Mr. Medvedev's Rule
Is Russia's new president serious about ending 'legal nihilism'?
SHORTLY AFTER being sworn in as Russian president=20
yesterday, Dmitry Medvedev declared that "my most=20
important task is to further develop civil and=20
economic freedoms." Above all, said the=20
42-year-old former law professor, "we must=20
achieve true respect for the law and end the=20
legal nihilism that is seriously hindering modern development."
That was a remarkable statement under the=20
circumstances. Mr. Medvedev, after all, owes his=20
position to the "legal nihilism" of outgoing=20
president Vladimir Putin, who grossly abused both=20
the letter and the spirit of Russia's nominally=20
democratic constitution to install a handpicked=20
successor. Mr. Putin, who takes over the post of=20
prime minister, accumulated a fortune estimated=20
in the tens of billions while serving two terms=20
as president. In recent weeks he has been=20
twisting the law again to ensure that he will=20
remain Russia's most potent leader.
Chances are that Mr. Medvedev's statement was no=20
more creditable than Mr. Putin's own claim that=20
the presidential transition was carried out "on=20
the basis of strict observance of the laws and=20
the principles of democracy." Still, it's not yet=20
clear what the relationship between the new and=20
old Russian presidents will be -- whether Mr.=20
Medvedev will remain a puppet of Mr. Putin, or=20
begin to assert his own agenda. For that reason,=20
it's worth Western governments taking Mr.=20
Medvedev at his word about his legalistic passion=20
-- and suggesting some ways he might act on it.
To begin, Mr. Medvedev could be asked for action=20
on the 14 unsolved murders of journalists during=20
Mr. Putin's tenure -- such as that of Anna=20
Politkovskaya, in whose case suspects have been=20
identified but never tried. Britain should invite=20
the new president to cooperate in pressing=20
Scotland Yard's charges against a former KGB=20
agent in the assassination of a Putin critic in London.
If that's too hard, Mr. Medvedev at least could=20
end the use of the law as a weapon against=20
opposition leaders, independent civic=20
organizations and human rights groups -- not to=20
mention Russian and foreign businesses whose=20
assets are coveted by the Kremlin and its=20
friends. Tax and environmental inspectors=20
repeatedly found ways in the Putin years to shut=20
down offices or force sales on concessionary=20
terms; several intellectuals who criticized the=20
government were imprisoned on bogus espionage=20
charges. Russia's most successful business=20
executive of the 1990s, Mikhail Khodorkovsky,=20
still languishes in a Siberian prison long after=20
his Yukos oil company was confiscated.
Above all, President Bush and other NATO leaders=20
should ask Mr. Medvedev to begin respecting=20
international law. In Mr. Putin's last months in=20
the presidency, Russia repeatedly violated the=20
sovereignty of its southern neighbor, Georgia,=20
granting recognition to illegal separatist=20
regimes in two of its provinces and dispatching=20
troops to one of them in what has become a=20
dangerous game of brinkmanship. As Mr. Medvedev=20
takes office, Russia is veering toward open=20
confrontation with the West and an entrenched=20
autocracy at home. A shift toward respect for the law would be welcome, ind=
Communist leader disillusioned with Putin presidency
MOSCOW May 8-The leader of the Communist Party of=20
the Russian Federation (CPRF), Gennady Zyuganov,=20
regrets that Vladimir Putin has not become=20
president of the Russia-Belarus Union State and=20
believes the current government won't be able to=20
solve the tasks facing the country. He said the=20
time of Putin's presidency was the time of missed opportunities.
"Vladimir Vladimirovich has a good quality: he=20
has established good contacts with faction=20
leaders, he can listen, make notes and=20
immediately comment on opinions expressed,"=20
Zyuganov said at the State Duma before the voting=20
on Putin's candidacy for premiership.
"I believe that Putin had luck. In eight years of=20
his presidency there was not a single cold=20
winter, not a single major drought, while gold=20
and currency reserves were falling like a rain,"=20
he said. "And nevertheless, we assess that time=20
as the time of missed opportunities," the Communist leader said.
"Yes, you have managed to strengthen the unity of=20
the country, and the world has begun listening to=20
us," he continued. "However, we assess the=20
situation as extremely difficult and prevailing=20
tendencies as threatening," Zyuganov continued.
"The country produces 1.5 percent of=20
science-intensive production and has stopped=20
being an industrial state. Wear and tear of the=20
fleet of machine tools has exceeded 20 years -=20
this is a critical level behind which a collapse begins," he said.
"Nowadays every second loaf of bread is foreign.=20
We are spending 30 billion dollars on that ,=20
while 40 billion hectares are overgrown with wild=20
grass and thistle," he stressed.
"Out of 74 million working people, 55 million=20
live on 5,000 to 6,000 roubles a month, while the=20
rent of a one-bedroom apartment is about 2,000 roubles," Zyuganov stressed.
"The most important thing you have failed is that=20
you have failed to launch development and=20
preserve the foundations of democracy," he=20
continued. "The latest elections once again=20
demonstrated that. With this course and this team=20
we won't advance, and there will be stagnation of=20
even those achievements that you take pride in," he added.
Zyuganov also criticized the activity of=20
ministers, in particular Finance Minister Alexei=20
Kudrin, Minister of Education and Science Andrei=20
Fursenko and Regional Development Minister Dmitry Kozak.
"I believe there was a better alternative for you=20
- to become president of the Russia-Belarus Union=20
State. I repeatedly tried to convince you to do=20
that. But unfortunately, you did not agree," Zyuganov concluded.
The CPRF faction voted against Putin's candidacy for premiership.
Russian Govt Led By Putin Likely To Perform Better - Poll
MOSCOW, May 7 (Itar-Tass) - Russians believe that=20
Vladimir Putin's appointment as prime minister=20
will improve the Cabinet's performance. According=20
to the all-Russian opinion poll conducted by the=20
Bashkirova and Partners company, 42.4 percent of=20
the respondents said the government led by Putin=20
would work better than the previous one.
At the same time, 44.2 percent of those polled=20
believe that there would be no significant changes.
Certain pessimism was expressed by 4.2 percent=20
who think that the new government would be worse=20
than the previous Cabinet, and 9.2 percent of the respondents were undecide=
Commenting on the poll's results, sociologists=20
noted that positive expectations were related to=20
the feelings about Putin, who had succeeded in=20
winning the trust of the Russian society during his presidency.
According to the latest survey, Putin's rating=20
hit a record high of 84.7 percent. As many as=20
49.5 percent of those polled claimed they had complete trust in him.
As for the outgoing government, 4 percent of=20
respondents graded its work "excellent" (on a=20
five-point scale), 23.4 percent graded it "good,"=20
and 43 percent assessed its performance as "satisfactory."
Bad grades ("two" and "one") were given by 12.2=20
percent and 2.3 percent of the respondents, respectively.
Another 11.7 percent were undecided. Therefore,=20
the average grade of the performance by Viktor=20
Zubkov's Cabinet is 3.16 points (on a five-point scale).
Taking part in the polls on April 10-14 were=20
1,500 adult citizens of the country from 110=20
settlements in 45 regions in seven federal=20
districts. The margin for error was 3.4 percent.
Moscow Times
May 8, 2008
The Day of the Bear
By Yevgeny Kiselyov
Yevgeny Kiselyov is a political analyst and hosts=20
a political talk show on Ekho Moskvy radio.
President Dmitry Medvedev has a very Russian=20
surname, one derived from one of the more=20
prominent symbols of Russia -- the medved, or=20
bear. Bears have served as the heroes of fairy=20
tales, fables, proverbs and anecdotes, and they=20
are depicted on the coat of arms of many Russian=20
cities. A bear named Misha was the official=20
mascot of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and=20
a bear is now the symbol of United Russia, which=20
controls an absolute majority of seats in the=20
State Duma. The bear is a symbol of power and=20
authority with practically no rival in the animal kingdom.
In contrast, however, the other medved -- our new=20
president -- is still weak, and it is not clear=20
when, if ever, he will possess real presidential=20
authority. The reasons for this are clear. First,=20
Medvedev suffers from a critical lack of=20
legitimacy. Everyone understands that Vladimir=20
Putin effectively appointed him, that he came to=20
office through unfair elections devoid of any=20
real competition, and that his victory was=20
ensured from the outset with the help of the mass=20
media parroting the Kremlin line. Since the=20
elections were a sham, Medvedev cannot be viewed=20
or accepted as the genuine tsar.
Second, Medvedev's legitimacy will be undermined=20
even more when Putin, who remains more popular,=20
takes over as prime minister. Nobody knows or=20
understands how the new two-headed authority structure will work.
There are two opposing, radical points of view on=20
this issue. On one hand, liberal opponents of the=20
administration cast Medvedev as a puppet,=20
completely dependent on Putin. Medvedev lacks his=20
own base of support, and he was placed=20
temporarily on the presidential throne on the=20
condition that he vacate it the moment Putin=20
demands -- perhaps before his term is finished.=20
On the other hand, Kremlin liberals devoutly=20
preach that Putin is sincerely proud of his=20
chosen successor and believes that the country=20
will have a young, progressive and educated=20
leader. According to this theory, Putin is so=20
eager to help Medvedev that he would not mind=20
playing second fiddle to ensure Medvedev's success.
The truth most likely lies somewhere in the=20
middle. Both Putin and Medvedev have repeatedly=20
declared that they have no plans to redistribute=20
authority between the president and the prime=20
minister, especially at the expense of=20
presidential authority. But it is probably not=20
wise to put too much faith in these statements.=20
After all, Putin has made many promises that he=20
later broke. For example, he once spoke out=20
publicly against bankrupting Yukos, eliminating=20
elections for governors and joining United=20
Russia. Most interesting of all, he also flatly=20
denied any plans to become prime minister.
One element of Putin's trademark style is to put=20
off making major decisions until the last minute.=20
When he does decide something, it is usually done=20
impulsively and then he often changes his mind.=20
For example, it seems that Putin named Viktor=20
Zubkov as prime minister as part of a plan that=20
he later scrapped. Putin probably did not want to=20
become prime minister under a Medvedev presidency=20
and planned to delegate this role to the tried=20
and true Zubkov. But at the last minute, Putin=20
gazed into the future and, dismayed by the=20
thought of being out of power for the next four=20
years, picked the option of becoming prime minister.
On one hand, there is no basis for doubting that=20
Putin and Medvedev really have a close, trusting=20
relationship. They might actually be able to work=20
out all of the most delicate questions, such as=20
how to avoid conflict in the decision-making=20
process, whom to name to various posts, who=20
should be fired, how to provide guarantees of=20
legal impunity and personal security, and so on.
On the other hand, it is not clear how the two=20
centers of power will be able to avoid heated=20
competition and potential conflict when one side=20
attempts to outsmart the other and gain the upper=20
hand. Any parent knows this well. For example,=20
when you are unaware that your wife has already=20
forbidden your son to go to the movies and he=20
comes to you asking for permission. If a=20
minister, governor or CEO cannot get the=20
necessary green light from Putin on one of their=20
key projects, they will inevitably run to=20
Medvedev in hopes of getting approval.
Nonetheless, a law will probably be passed=20
freeing Putin from having to deal with routine=20
tasks as prime minister, but did anybody=20
seriously believe that Putin would be handling=20
dull issues like improving roads or the rotting=20
plumbing system in the country's dilapidated apartment buildings?
It seems that all of the speculation about=20
Putin's White House becoming more powerful than=20
Medvedev's Kremlin is nothing more than the=20
wishful thinking of the ruling elite who have a=20
vested interest in maintaining Putin's hold on=20
power. Many of Putin's supporters and=20
beneficiaries hoped that he would send a strong=20
signal during his speech at Wednesday's=20
inauguration that the real power would remain=20
with him, even as Medvedev was about to take the=20
oath of office. But, in reality, Putin appeared=20
subdued -- perhaps even dismayed -- during the=20
ceremony. This leads me to believe that Putin has=20
accepted, albeit grudgingly, the transfer of=20
power to Medvedev. The basic distribution of=20
power between the president and the prime=20
minister will remain unchanged. The president is=20
still the commander in chief, and he still=20
appoints the defense, interior and foreign=20
ministers. He also appoints top leaders of the=20
Federal Security Service and, last but not least,=20
he can fire the prime minister.
Moreover, the president determines Russia's=20
foreign policy. When the West recognizes Medvedev=20
as Russia's top leader in July at the Group of=20
Eight summit in Japan, this will certainly boost=20
his legitimacy. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev=20
used a similar tactic in the late 1960s and early=20
1970s when he took personal control over all=20
negotiations with the leaders of the United=20
States, France, West Germany and others. Using=20
this as leverage, he soon managed to dominate=20
other, more influential Soviet leaders.
What is most important today is that the=20
Constitution provides the president with a great=20
amount of power. This authority is further=20
strengthened by the traditional belief among=20
people that the Kremlin, which controls the armed=20
forces and massive security infrastructure, has=20
historically always been the sole and supreme=20
center of authority in the country.
It is true, however, that the president must do=20
more than simply occupy the top spot in the=20
Kremlin. He has to be strong and tough enough to=20
maintain the power that comes with the position.=20
Only time will tell if Medvedev is able to do this.
Gorbachev Wishes Every Success To President Medvedev
MOSCOW, May 7 (Itar-Tass) - Former Soviet=20
President Mikhail Gorbachev feels confident that=20
the Russians made the right choice by electing=20
Dmitry Medvedev this country's President.
"I have a growing confidence he will cope with=20
the job," Gorbachev, who attended Wednesday's=20
inauguration ceremony as one of the most honourable guests, told Itar-Tass.
"The inauguration was well-organized and the=20
first steps taken now add to my confidence," he said.
Gorbachev indicated that he liked the things=20
Putin had said in his farewell speech, as well as=20
the contents of Medvedev's speech after the presidential oath.
"I liked what Dmitry Anatolyevich said and I wish=20
him success in everything," he said.
According to Gorbachev, Putin sound self-critical=20
enough and this stands to his credit.
"Also, I liked the moment when he spoke about=20
morality in the approach to everything," he said.=20
"That's important because nothing good will be=20
achieved without morals. Then they'll miss all=20
the objectives they are setting forth now. This=20
especially concerns human rights, freedoms and opportunities."
He praised the inauguration ceremony itself,=20
calling it "well-arranged and festive."
Although Gorbachev said that "it could've been=20
more modest," what really matter is that it did=20
take place and that the change of men in power did happen.
"That's why it's good that the power changed this=20
way," he said, recalling that fairly recently=20
some people would actively mull the possibility=20
of a third term of office for Putin.
"What the outgoing President said at the=20
inauguration ceremony was very important,"=20
Gorbachev indicated. "He said good-bye to=20
everyone in a very good manner, and I think we've=20
finally entered a phase of political culture."
Now Medvedev as President and Putin as Prime=20
Minister must continue what they have already=20
started - "the tasks they've thoroughly and=20
solidly have set before the nation," he believes
As task number one in this, he named the=20
energizing of the activity of executive power.
"That's really hard labour, and the most=20
difficult problem of all is to get the right=20
people, to organize the activity to all executive=20
agencies from the local to the federal level, and=20
to form the government staff and the presidential=20
administration correctly," Gorbachev said knowledgeably.
He indicated, however, that Putin and Medvedev=20
know this only too well because "they themselves=20
have been doing it for quite some time."
"I gain more and more confidence they'll cope=20
with all this and then genuine prospects will=20
open up in front of our country, and when people=20
are trying hard one can only wish success to them=20
- and they do work hard and I see it," Gorbachev=20
said. "We must wish them success, indeed."
State To Continue Developing Special Relations With Church - President
MOSCOW, May 7 (Itar-Tass) - President Dmitry=20
Medvedev said special relations with the Russian=20
Orthodox Church would preserve and develop.
After the prayer service at the Kremlin's=20
Annunciation Cathedral in honour of the=20
inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev on Wednesday,=20
Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia=20
stressed: "The Church is ready for further=20
cooperation with the state because we have only=20
one homeland, one history and one future."
Medvedev assured the patriarch that special=20
trusty relationship with the Russian Orthodox=20
Church "will preserve and develop for the sake of homeland".
Alexy II noted that Medvedev had become president=20
"on the light moment of Easter". The patriarch=20
congratulated him on taking office. "At the=20
previous elections the Russian people gave you=20
trust to be head of the great power. This is not=20
an easy burden. This is a great responsibility=20
for the present and the future of the state in=20
difficult times of social and economic reforms," Alexy II said.
He said, "Power is not words and honour. This is,=20
primarily, big responsibility and everyday=20
service for the country and the people that needs=20
strength, wisdom and tenacity."
The patriarch said on his previous post Medvedev=20
"is an example of professional and sincere=20
service to Russia without any fear of set tasks".=20
Alexy II riveted special attention to Medvedev's=20
attitude towards spirituality and moral of the=20
country, his solicitous attitude towards the=20
country's historical and cultural heritage. "The=20
people's well-being mostly depends on its=20
spirituality and moral," the patriarch said.
Alexy II said he is hopeful that Medvedev would=20
continue the policy begun by second President=20
Vladimir Putin. "I hope that in the coming years=20
you'll be able to do much for the development of the society," he said.
The patriarch said he is convinced that the=20
president's priority "is to take care of people".=20
At the same time, he said the president had to=20
strengthen Russia's international prestige. Alexy=20
II wished Medvedev "warm-heartedness, wisdom and=20
patience". The patriarch also wished Medvedev's=20
wife Svetlana "to support his husband to allow=20
him to find warmth and support at home". The=20
patriarch presented the Medvedevs the sanctified=20
icon of Vladimir Mother of God - the patroness of Russia.
Patriarch Alexy II ministered a prayer service at=20
the Kremlin's Annunciation Cathedral.
Just after the inauguration Dmitry Medvedev and=20
his wife Svetlana came to the Annunciation=20
Cathedral. He was greeted by Alexy II who said:=20
"It became a good tradition to invoke God's=20
blessing" just after the inauguration. Alexy II=20
and the Medvedevs entered the cathedral following Easter anthems.
During the service, Alexy asked God to bless=20
Dmitry Medvedev for service to Motherland and the=20
people of our land. The patriarch asked God for=20
giving the new Russian president "strength and=20
wisdom, peace and well-being, as well as to defend the country from enemies=
"Let us pray for our country, the army and our=20
people," Alexy II said by asking God for blessing=20
the new president for "good management of our=20
country". The patriarch asked God "to make him=20
wise and teach him, give him reason and wisdom=20
and quiet and peaceful life to all of us".
The patriarch attended the inauguration at the=20
Kremlin's St. Andrew Hall jointly with the heads of other confessions.
This was the third service. The previous two ones=20
were conducted during the inauguration of=20
Vladimir Putin. The patriarch congratulated first=20
Russian president Boris Yeltsin on behalf of all=20
confessions during the inauguration.
Father Vladimir Vigilyansky, spokesman for the=20
Moscow Patriarchate, told Itar-Tass, "The=20
Annunciation Cathedral was a church where Russian=20
princes and tsars observed services. The main=20
essence of these services is to ask the Holy Spirit for good deeds."
Father Vladimir explained: "Even if the president=20
was not an Orthodox believer this service will be=20
ministered." "But in this case the newly elected=20
president is an Orthodox believer and he'll pray=20
jointly with the patriarch," he added.
The inaugurations of Vladimir Putin took place on=20
Days of Easter Season - 40 days after Easter. The=20
May 7, 2000 inauguration was held on the first=20
Sunday after Easter and the 2004 inauguration=20
took place on Friday of the fourth Easter week.=20
The May 7, 2008 inauguration is the 10th day after Easter.
Medvedev thanked the patriarch for warm words. He=20
said, "The history of our country in the 20th=20
century was dramatic - the history of people's=20
death and the destruction of hopes." "At the end=20
of the 20th century Russia embarked to a new=20
path. In the last eight years the state could=20
concentrate their forces and began developing=20
under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church=20
and all sturdy forces," the new president said.
In his view, "now it is necessary to do=20
everything possible to continue the positive tendencies."
OSC [US Open Source Center] Analysis: Russia --=20
Outlook for Relations Between Medvedev, Orthodox Church
May 7, 2008
New Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev and his=20
wife Svetlana appear to have strong ties with the=20
Russian Orthodox Church, which began to play an=20
increasingly prominent public role under former=20
President Vladimir Putin, and have promoted=20
church interests. In a departure from his recent=20
practice during presidential campaigns, Patriarch=20
Aleksiy welcomed Medvedev's nomination while=20
church officials stressed Medvedev's Orthodox=20
credentials. It appears likely that the church is=20
hoping that Medvedev will be more receptive to=20
its initiatives than Putin, who, while evidently=20
close to the church, stopped short of endorsing=20
all its policies, balancing church interests with=20
other political considerations and the=20
constitutional separation of church and state.(1)=20
Medvedevs greet Patriarch Aleksiy on his birthday=20
(patriarchia.ru, 23 February)
After Putin publicly identified Medvedev as his=20
favored successor 10 December 2007, Medvedev=20
sought to demonstrate his Orthodox credentials during his election campaign.
In a campaign interview with the Gazprom-owned=20
weekly Itogi, Medvedev said that he had been=20
christened into the Orthodox Church at the age of=20
23 in one of Petersburg's major cathedrals. He=20
said that he made the decision to be baptized himself (18 February).
Major Russian TV channels showed Medvedev=20
attending the Orthodox Christmas service=20
conducted by Moscow Patriarch Aleksiy at the=20
Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow (Channel=20
One, Rossiya, 7 January). Medvedev and his wife=20
Svetlana also visited Aleksiy on his birthday=20
(Interfax, ITAR-TASS, 23 February).
The glossy weekly Ogonek reported that Medvedev's=20
confessor is high-profile Father Vladimir=20
(Volgin) of St. Sofia's Church in Moscow.=20
According to Ogonek, Volgin shared the same=20
spiritual father as Putin's religious mentor,=20
Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov) (17-23 December 2007).
Medvedevs Promote Church's Interests
The Medvedevs appear to have played an active=20
role in promoting the interests of the Orthodox Church.
In December 2007 Medvedev expressed support for=20
church-backed legislative amendments that would=20
permit the state accreditation of diplomas=20
awarded by religious academies and seminaries,=20
and also allow members of the clergy to teach in=20
state universities (Rost.ru, 5 December 2007).=20
The amendments passed their second reading in the=20
State Duma in February (Newsru.com, 6 February).
Medvedev heads a special government commission=20
which in March approved the transfer to church=20
ownership of land and property which the church=20
currently is entitled to use indefinitely, but=20
does not own (Kommersant, 12 March).
In April 2007 Svetlana became head of the=20
Trusteeship Council of a charitable and=20
educational program entitled "Spiritual and Moral=20
Culture of the Rising Generation of Russia"=20
(DNKRUS), which was founded with the blessing of=20
Patriarch Aleksiy (Gazeta.ru, 11 December 2007).
Church Voices Support for Medvedev
Unusually, the church leadership and Orthodox=20
groups quickly voiced support for Medvedev's=20
presidential campaign, portraying him as a true Orthodox believer.
The day after Medvedev's nomination Patriarch=20
Aleksiy said he had "performed very well" in the=20
post of first vice premier and in overseeing=20
implementation of the national projects. The=20
patriarch particularly praised Medvedev's support=20
for state recognition of diplomas awarded by=20
religious educational institutions and for the=20
introduction of "a spiritual component in school=20
curriculums," declaring: "This could be a major=20
breakthrough" (pravoslavie.ru, 11 December 2007).=20
Independent analyst Vladimir Pribylovskiy noted=20
that this was Aleksiy's first endorsement of a=20
presidential candidate since 1996 (Moscow Times, 12 February).
Georgiy Ryabykh, head of the Moscow=20
Patriarchate's External Church Relations=20
Department, praised Medvedev as "a type of modern=20
intellectual and energetic leader" and "a devout,=20
Orthodox person, as far as an outsider can tell."=20
Ryabykh said Medvedev appreciated "the need to=20
protect Russia's spiritual and cultural=20
traditions" and had "an understanding of the=20
positive role of traditional religions in our=20
nation's social life" (Newsru.com, 10 December 2007).
The Union of Orthodox Citizens voiced support for=20
Medvedev, declaring: "Professional 'fighters=20
against clericalism' must be disappointed with=20
Dmitriy Medvedev, because he is not merely=20
sympathetic to Orthodoxy but is a churchgoing=20
Orthodox Christian" (pravoslavie.ru, 18 January).
Patriarch Aleksiy also honored Svetlana=20
Medvedeva, presenting her with the Grand Princess=20
Yevdokiya of Moscow award for her work with=20
DNKRUS (patriarchia.ru, 23 January).
Putin Sets Precedent as Orthodox President
In emphasizing his links with the church,=20
Medvedev is following in Putin's footsteps.
According to the English-language Moscow Times,=20
Putin specifically asked for Patriarch Aleksiy's=20
blessing when he took over as acting president=20
when Boris Yeltsin resigned 31 December 1999 (12 February).
Putin reportedly "does not part with" a cross=20
which his mother gave him and which survived a=20
fire at his dacha (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 22 April 2006).
Media reported that high-profile nationalist=20
cleric Archimandrite Tikhon wields influence as=20
Putin's spiritual adviser. For instance, the=20
mass-circulation daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets=20
reported that Tikhon had persuaded Putin to=20
support canonization of the family of Czar Nicholas II (16 August 2000).
During his presidency Putin has made numerous=20
visits to Orthodox holy sites (Moscow Times, 12=20
February). Major Russian TV channels have=20
frequently shown Putin attending religious=20
services, such as Orthodox Christmas at Velikiy=20
Ustyug (Channel One, Rossiya, 7 January).
Church Gains Prominent Role Under Putin...
Under Putin, the Orthodox Church has taken on a=20
more prominent role in Russian public life. The=20
church has sought to develop close relations with=20
many state agencies and government departments,=20
and many senior officials have displayed public allegiance to the church.
All major Russian national TV channels carried=20
lengthy live relays of the Orthodox state funeral=20
of former President Boris Yeltsin -- the first=20
Russian head of state in 113 years to receive an=20
Orthodox funeral (Kommersant, 26 April 2007).
In March 2002 Patriarch Aleksiy consecrated an=20
Orthodox Church at the Lubyanka, headquarters of=20
the Federal Security Service (FSB). After the=20
ceremony FSB head Nikolay Patrushev presented the=20
patriarch with an icon and the key to the church=20
door and held a reception for him and other=20
dignitaries. By this time similar "departmental=20
churches" had also opened in the Ministry of=20
Internal Affairs and Defense Ministry=20
(Kommersant, 7 March 2002). According to the=20
Moscow Times, the opening of the Lubyanka church=20
marked a "historic reconciliation" with the FSB (12 February).
The Moscow Times noted that Putin had promoted=20
"professed believers" such as Russian Railroads=20
head Vladimir Yakunin, who "generously funds=20
Orthodox causes," and Georgiy Poltavchenko,=20
presidential representative in the Central=20
Federal District. According to the daily, under=20
Putin "government officials have become more=20
pious -- at least outwardly -- and have deepened=20
their contacts with the church hierarchy" (12 February).
Reviving pre-Soviet traditions, the Orthodox=20
Church has sought to develop ties with the Armed=20
Forces. Patriarch Aleksiy sent greetings on the=20
60th anniversary of the Defense Ministry's 12th=20
Main Directorate, responsible for nuclear=20
weapons, and Bishop Amvrosiy of Bronnitsa held an=20
anniversary service at which he blessed "Russia's=20
nuclear shield" and invoked the intercession of=20
"the patron saint of the nuclear forces," Saint=20
Serafim Sarovskiy (patriarchia.ru, 4 September=20
2007). Orthodox clerics serve as unofficial=20
chaplains to servicemen (Moscow Times, 12 February).
The growing assertiveness of the church during=20
Putin's presidency led some secular critics to=20
speak out against the clericalization of the state.(2)
Vladimir Glazychev, head of a commission of the=20
Kremlin-backed Public Chamber, warned of=20
"creeping clericalism" and complained: "The=20
church's energetic interference in all state=20
affairs, instead of occupying itself with=20
parochial matters, is excessive" (Politkom.ru, 30 July 2007).
Ten academicians, including Nobel Prize winners=20
Vitaliy Ginzburg and Zhores Alferov, sent Putin a=20
letter complaining that the church wanted=20
theology to be treated as a scientific subject=20
within the educational system and was promoting=20
the introduction of "Fundamentals of Orthodox=20
Culture" as a school subject (ITAR-TASS, 22 July=20
2007; Politkom.ru, 30 July 2007)
....But Some Church Initiatives Are Blocked
Although the church thanked Putin for "advancing=20
good mutual relations" with the state during his=20
presidency (ITAR-TASS, 15 April), Putin sometimes=20
resisted church pressure on political issues and downplayed the church's ro=
At a meeting of the Council for Priority National=20
Projects Putin rejected the church-backed=20
introduction of "Fundamentals of Orthodox=20
Culture" as a mandatory element in the school=20
curriculum (ITAR-TASS, 13 September 2007).=20
Anti-Kremlin website Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal noted=20
that Putin had pointedly made his comments in=20
Belgorod, the center of the only oblast to have=20
introduced this subject by means of a regional law (19 September 2007).
Putin bridled at Time magazine's contention that=20
the Orthodox Church's cooperation agreements with=20
the Defense Ministry and law enforcement agencies=20
show that the church is becoming dominant again.=20
He declared that "Russia has four traditional=20
religions," of which Orthodoxy "happens to be the=20
biggest" since 80% of Russia's population=20
"consider themselves as having a connection with=20
Orthodoxy." Putin said that he would "welcome" it=20
if representatives of other religions also marked=20
the anniversary of Russia's nuclear forces=20
(president.kremlin.ru, 19 December 2007).
In 2006 Archpriest Dimitriy (Smirnov), head of=20
the Synodal Department for Collaboration With the=20
Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Institutions,=20
called for the "around 2,000" priests serving as=20
unofficial chaplains to be formally included on=20
the Armed Forces' books, arguing that this would=20
help reduce the incidence of hazing and suicide=20
(Gazeta.ru, 23 February 2006; patriarchia.ru, 7=20
February). Although drafting of a law formalizing=20
priests' status within the army began then=20
(Gazeta.ru, 23 February 2006), the bill has still not been passed.
Church officials have lobbied, so far without=20
success, for the repeal of provisions in a Putin=20
edict abolishing draft exemptions for students=20
attending seminaries (patriarchia.ru, 12=20
February; Portal-Credo.ru, 20 February).=20
Implications With Medvedev's inauguration as=20
president, the Orthodox Church will likely take=20
the opportunity to push for greater influence in=20
politics, perhaps in exchange for help in=20
pursuing his social programs. Issues such as the=20
place of religious education within the school=20
curriculum and the treatment of non-Orthodox=20
denominations may provide telltale indicators of=20
the church's success in this endeavor.
Although Medvedev seems sympathetic to the=20
church, like Putin he will have to balance his=20
personal allegiance with other political=20
priorities and Russia's secular constitution.
(1) Article 14 of Russia's 1993 Constitution=20
declares that Russia is a secular state and may=20
have no established state religion. The 1997 Law=20
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious=20
Associations recognizes Orthodoxy's "special=20
contribution" to Russia and singles out=20
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism for=20
mention as "an inseparable part of the historical=20
heritage of Russia's peoples."
(2) See the 27 September 2007 OSC Analysis,=20
Russia: Orthodox Church's Ideological Role Debated (CEF20070927517001).
Transitions Online
7 May 2008
Medvedev: Into the Shark Tank
Can Russia=92s new president become his own man?=20
For clues, one analyst looks at how Putin did it.
By Andrew Wilson
Andrew Wilson is a senior policy fellow at the=20
European Council on Foreign Relations and a=20
senior lecturer in Ukrainian Studies at the=20
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London.
[This is an excerpt from a policy brief, Meeting=20
Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession,=20
published in February by the European Council on Foreign Relations.]
[I]t is worth remembering that this is not the=20
first period of cohabitation. There are some=20
echoes from Putin=92s own rise to power that may contain clues to the futur=
In 2000, political technology helped to disguise=20
the regime=92s simultaneous need for continuity and=20
change. This paradox was reflected in the=20
complexity of the succession deal. On the very=20
day he took office, Putin signed a deal to give=20
Yeltsin immunity. Most senior members of the=20
1990s old guard remained in office for a year,=20
but the powerful Family =93gatekeepers=94 survived=20
for much longer. (=93Family=94 meant both Yeltsin=92s=20
literal family, including his daughter and=20
influential son-in-law, Valentin Yumashev, the=20
then-head of the Presidential Administration, as=20
well as the oligarchs whose interests they=20
promoted.) For example, the Yeltsin ally=20
Aleksandr Voloshin remained as Kremlin chief of=20
staff until October 2003 and Mikhail Kasyanov=20
served as prime minister until February 2004.=20
Even Putin=92s immediate moves against the=20
oligarchs were limited to settling specific=20
scores: Vladimir Gusinsky had used his media=20
empire against the new president; Boris=20
Berezovsky was brought down by hubris, after=20
boasting that he had made the new president.
But after some time in office, Putin was able to=20
break away from the old regime. Putin himself was=20
the fulcrum of the transformation. He represented=20
both the old =93Family=94 (for whom he had performed=20
vital services in seeing off its rivals) and=20
wider circles in St. Petersburg and the KGB, now=20
rebranded as the FSB (Federal Security Service).=20
Putin=92s allies staged the so-called Yukos affair=20
to change the rules of engagement and create a=20
new balance of power at the top of Russian=20
society. By destroying Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the=20
owner of Yukos =AD whose estimated fortune of $8=20
billion then made him the richest man in Russia =AD=20
the siloviki cleared the way for their rise to=20
power, accelerated the redistribution of=20
property, and launched a populist campaign of=20
revenge against the Yeltsinite superrich during=20
Putin=92s second election in 2004. Behind the=20
scenes, however, oligarchs were replaced by=20
silovarchs or silogarchs, [as Russia expert Daniel Treisman has termed them=
The main instigator of the Yukos campaign, Igor=20
Sechin, first deputy head of the Presidential=20
Administration, was appointed to head the board=20
of Rosneft in July 2004. Rosneft acquired Yukos=92=20
main asset, Yuganskneftegaz, via a shell company=20
in December 2004. Other assets transferred from=20
oligarchs to silogarchs included Aeroflot (Boris=20
Berezovsky to Viktor Ivanov) and Avtovaz=20
(Berezovsky to Sergey Chermezov). The rise of the=20
silogarchs was also abetted by the Kremlin-backed=20
creation of huge state and semi-state national=20
champions, like United Aviation and United=20
Shipbuilding. Medvedev himself was Gazprom=92s=20
chairman of the board, a company that functions=20
almost as a state within the state; its interests=20
include Gazprom-media, an estimated 17 commercial=20
banks, and a controlling stake in Roman=20
Abramovich=92s old company, Sibneft, promptly=20
renamed Gazpromneft. In July the Duma even passed=20
a law allowing Gazprom to set up its own militia.
By the end of Putin=92s second term, these economic=20
empires controlled over a third of Russia=92s GDP.=20
Politics under Putin was never really about=20
=93liberals=94 versus =93nationalists.=94 It was more=20
about the relationships among different clans=20
that were feeding at different points along the=20
trough. Their precise configuration is=20
ever-shifting. But by 2007 discernible battle=20
lines could be drawn. The most important group of=20
siloviki businessmen is led by Sechin. Like a=20
17th-century first minister or court councilor,=20
Sechin=92s immediate power derived from his=20
position as a direct conduit to Putin,=20
controlling the information the president=20
received and how his decisions were implemented =AD=20
a role Sechin had performed since the early 1990s=20
when Putin was deputy mayor of St. Petersburg.=20
Sechin=92s secondary power derived from being at=20
the dead centre of the fusion of economic and=20
political power achieved after Yukos.
However, the siloviki are not a single clan.=20
Another siloviki group liked to think of=20
themselves as =93honest Chekists (the Cheka being=20
the Bolsheviks=92 first name for the KGB), and=20
tried to =93police the police=94 through their=20
dominance of the Presidential Security Service,=20
the Procuracy, and the Federal Drug Control=20
Agency. The old =93Family=94 survives, some in=20
literal exile like Berezovsky, others like=20
Anatoly Chubais and Aleksandr Voloshin in=20
=93internal exile=94 at United Energy Systems,=20
Russia=92s monopoly electricity supplier. A handful=20
of post-Yukos liberals remain in influential=20
positions like Aleksey Kudrin at the Ministry of=20
Finance and Sergey Ignatev at the National Bank.=20
Skilful operators like Roman Abramovich survive=20
and prosper by keeping a foot in all camps.
Medvedev=92s early period in office will also be=20
dominated by clan conflict. He may have his own=20
=93Yukos moment=94 in time, but, as was the case for=20
Putin, he will first have to accommodate the=20
outgoing elite=92s strongest group. In 1999-2000=20
this was the =93Family=94; in 2007-2008 it is the=20
Sechin siloviki, who seemed to be using the=20
political uncertainties around the succession to=20
assert themselves through political technology=20
and the FSB. In August 2007 they targeted the oil=20
producer Russneft (worth an estimated $8 billion=20
to $9 billion) with draconian tax demands, and=20
succeeded in prising it away from its owner, Mikhail Gutseriyev.
In a sign of their growing confidence, the=20
siloviki even arrested an investigator from=20
Viktor Cherkesov=92s Federal Drugs Control Agency,=20
sent to probe their involvement in an alleged=20
customs scam (the =93Three Whales=94 affair). This=20
episode forced Putin to make a public call for=20
unity. Thirdly and most crucially, the Sechin=20
group appeared to be targeting the Stabilization=20
Fund, the repository of Russia=92s energy wealth,=20
which had reached a massive $147.6 billion by=20
November. Sechin reportedly pressured new Prime=20
Minister Viktor Zukav to dismiss Finance Minister=20
Aleksey Kudrin in September, meaning Putin=20
himself had to intervene (Kudrin had got Putin=20
his first job in the Kremlin and the outgoing=20
president is nothing if not loyal). Kudrin=20
survived, but in November a $43 million=20
corruption charge was laid against his deputy=20
Sergey Storchak. Medvedev is expected to take=20
over the job of protecting the liberals once he becomes president.
Most surprisingly, there were rumors that Sechin=20
was behind a move against Putin himself.=20
Stanislav Belkovsky, who had helped launch the=20
original Yukos affair, claimed in Die Welt on 12=20
November that the president had quietly amassed a=20
personal fortune of no less than $41 billion. On=20
30 November Marina Salye=92s 1992 report on Putin=92s=20
allegedly corrupt foreign trade dealings in St.=20
Petersburg appeared on the Internet. This seemed=20
to be a very public warning to rival groups not=20
to rock the boat, and specifically to Putin, or=20
more likely Medvedev, not to push any =93liberal=20
revival=94 too far. The message was that Putin=92s=20
own system could be turned against him and that=20
even the president was vulnerable to kompromat=20
[compromising information.] With Gazprom=92s record=20
on transparency being less than shining, there is=20
no doubt that Medvedev shares in that=20
vulnerability. Pavlovsky even talked of =93managed=20
instability=94 if the Sechin siloviki failed to get their way.
Putin could hardly let such a calumny go=20
unanswered. Given typical Russian standards of=20
omerta, it was little short of a declaration of=20
war. A few days later, a previously little-known=20
businessman, Oleg Shvartsman, claimed in the=20
newspaper Kommersant that his Finansgroup ran a=20
$3.2 billion joint venture fund whose assets were=20
acquired through =93velvet reprivatization=94 on=20
behalf of the Sechin=92s =93siloviki block.=94 The=20
charge, in other words, was that the siloviki=20
used legal shakedowns and exorbitant tax demands=20
to bring down the market value of several=20
high-profile companies so that they could buy them up at knock-down rates.
It is far from clear whether Medvedev was=20
involved, although Kommersant has been owned=20
since 2006 by Alisher Usmanov, who runs Gazprom=20
Investment Holdings. Will President Medvedev=20
continue the counterattack or make peace with the=20
siloviki? Without Putin=92s support, Medvedev does=20
not have the clout to ramp up the pressure on=20
Sechin. However, after a few years in the job he=20
may have accrued enough political capital to pull=20
off his own Yukos-style defining moment.
Moscow News
May 7, 2008
Alternative Journalism
By Kirill Bessonov
Peter Lavelle is the host of Russia Today's=20
commentary program IMHO ("In My Humble Opinion")=20
and anchors Russia Today's special reports series=20
In Context. Russia Today viewers can also find=20
Peter in the studio commenting on breaking=20
events, which include live press conferences and=20
wherever the world's movers and shakers may be=20
assembling. In the realm of print media, Peter=20
Lavelle is also widely published. His commentary=20
has appeared in many publications, including Asia=20
Times Online, The Moscow Times, In the National Interest, and Current Histo=
MN: You were among the first foreigners who=20
started giving an alternative view on what is=20
going on in Russia. Why were you doing this?
Peter Lavelle: I always said that if you try to=20
understand Russia, you have to understand it by=20
its own terms. I have been living in Russia for=20
ten years and you have a lot of people who are=20
based here, working for major newspapers and=20
television stations, but their opinion is always=20
lame - an American trying to explain Russia is=20
always comparing life here with how it is like in=20
America. But to make a real understanding you=20
have to go an extra mile - try to understand=20
Russia by its own terms. Many argue that "Putin=20
is making a power grab by becoming Prime=20
Minister." But according to the law, there is=20
nothing wrong with that whatsoever. It is a=20
perfectly legal move and it is actually popular.=20
So why should we judge? people tell me, "Peter,=20
we have such an exciting campaign in the United=20
States, but everyone knew who was going to become=20
President in Russia..." And I said - "Yeah, so?=20
What is your point? I do not see it. Are you=20
saying that the Russian campaign was not that=20
entertaining? Because this is what politics has=20
become, entertainment, especially in the United=20
States. The Russian campaign might not be very=20
exciting, but the choice was very clear - continue the course or change.
MN: But do you think such an approach would be=20
popular among the foreign public, in particular,=20
among Westerners? Do they like your way of covering events here?
PL: One of the things we have to do and what I=20
have done with the National Public Radio in the=20
United States is that we have to change the gears=20
and more or less play by their rules, but change=20
the rules against them. Let us look at the Yukos=20
affair for example. When you look at the=20
high-level corporate crimes in the United States,=20
people go to prison for 25 years and they are=20
fined hundreds of millions of dollars. In the=20
case with Khodorkovsky, he gets eight and a half=20
years. We can compare this and I will show you=20
that the Russian system is far more lenient than=20
the one in the United States. My point is that=20
you have to change positions. And as for my=20
Untimely Thoughts column, my point is that it was=20
for Russia watchers, not for the outreach reader.
Here at Russia Today, we do two things - first of=20
all we have to educate people, to present facts.=20
And then there must be people like me who will=20
explain what it all means. That's because the=20
political discourse on global politics is so much=20
controlled by the English language media,=20
especially television. They determine the rules=20
and conditions about how to look on something and=20
how to look on something in a very special way.=20
We here have a double project to do - for=20
example, what I have to tell you is that Chechnya=20
today is not like it was in 1999. I don't know=20
how many times I can tell you that, I can show=20
you pictures, video if you want - no, it is not=20
like 1999. But still, over the last two weeks I=20
see references to it - "the problems in=20
Chechnya." What problems specifically are we=20
referring to? There are lots of other places in=20
the world that are dealing with criminalized=20
gangs, people that are infested with Islamic=20
fundamentalism and Russia is not teetering on the=20
brink as result. Are there problems there? Of=20
course, there are. But there is no English=20
language television in the world that covers the=20
North Caucasus more than Russia Today. And that's=20
by a long stretch. So you can learn about=20
Chechnya if you want to, but still there is that=20
barrier when The New York Times, The Washington=20
Post and the Financial Times try to determine how we should talk about this.
MN: There are more reporters like you now who are=20
trying to give an alternative view on Russia, but=20
the mainstream media keep criticizing Russia's=20
actions as they did for the eight years when Mr.=20
Putin was in office. Do you personally think that=20
nothing has changed in these eight years?
PL: Russia is a different country in eight years.=20
I came here months before the financial crisis of=20
1998. What I saw in this city - I cannot say for=20
the whole country, but for this city - the place=20
was chaos. When coming out of the metro you had=20
to look out, because of all these homeless=20
children sleeping in the metro, some of them=20
could bite you. Or you could see babushkas in the=20
street hitting each other to pick up an empty=20
bottle. And then you see all these shiny Mercedes=20
Benzes and golden necklaces and foreigners in=20
bars having good time - that was a pretty=20
disgusting time in Russia, I would say.
I was an investment banker so I hung out with=20
that type of crowd and I can say that things that=20
people did here were of a type they would never=20
do back home and that was due to the moral=20
degradation of this country, the moral collapse=20
it experienced. Money was all that was important=20
and there was no leadership at all. And I think=20
that the inability to recognize that a former KGB=20
officer would be able to build the entire economy=20
virtually from scratch... Let me give you one=20
more example - can you name one specific event=20
that the western media has got wrong and that the=20
Western businessmen would never forgive? I said=20
this before. Can you pinpoint the year when=20
Russia became a bad, bad country and Putin became=20
a devil? Because before this event The Financial=20
Times ran an article praising Russia. Putin was=20
bringing order, but he was doing the right thing=20
according to this article. A month later it all changed.
MN: I think you already mentioned the event, you=20
must be talking about the Yukos affair.
PL: Yes, exactly. This is very important,=20
especially in the United States where you have=20
politicians who are in bed with oil. Russia was=20
the last place on Earth where you could get=20
reserves. That is why everyone is here. BP has=20
had a tough time, but it is still here and they=20
will stay. That is because an oil company is=20
valued by investors by their barrels of reserves.=20
Exxon supposed that their reserves would grow=20
immensely, because Exxon was supposed to get=20
Yukos - not 49 percent but 51 percent. They were=20
to get control of the company. So look at the=20
media reports - they say that Khodorkovsky is=20
Solzhenitsin, he is Nelson Mandela... But he was=20
a crook. All of them were at that time. And he=20
was given a clear choice - work with the state or=20
face the consequences. And we know what the=20
outcome was. But the Western media never forgot=20
that. They started saying that it was Putin's=20
asset grab, that Putin was turning Russia into an=20
energy superpower to challenge the world, to=20
challenge the States. I have been working with=20
Russia Today for two and a half years now and I=20
keep telling people this: Russia's energy policy=20
is exactly what Russia should be doing, that any=20
other country in the same position would be=20
doing. You know what Dick Cheney is saying?=20
Russia is using its energy assets as a political=20
weapon... and they he says exactly the same -=20
lets build our pipelines around Russia - what he=20
claims Russia is doing he says the West should do=20
against Russia. This is absolutely hypocritical.
MN: Why in your opinion does the Western media=20
keep pressing Russia over the Yukos affair even=20
now when its obvious that it is over and what was=20
done was done. Do they think that something can be reversed?
PL: What is another important question is that it=20
is close to public relations and that is what we=20
are doing here in Russia Today. An important=20
thing about Mr. Putin and one of his fundamental=20
differences from Mr. Yeltsin is that he first and=20
foremost as a politician as the President of this=20
country cared about public opinion at home.
Unfortunately, Russia is not doing a lot to help=20
itself. See, we have Putin, we have Lavrov, we=20
have Churkin... how many more? Not a whole lot.=20
And now we are looking at a generation change.=20
What I am saying is that Mr. Medvedev was an=20
ideal choice for this country. A younger=20
generation, not from the Soviet era, a lawyer,=20
someone who understands problem solving and knows a lot.
But public relations is still an issue. Here at=20
Russia Today we have a lot of good guests who can=20
speak very fluently in English and get their point across.
MN: Mr. Medvedev said just recently that he finds=20
Russian television to be the best in the world.=20
Unfortunately, I cannot ask Mr. Medvedev to=20
elaborate on the subject, but I can now ask you -=20
do you share this opinion and what national=20
stations do you think are good and why?
PL: I think that here, just as in other parts of=20
the world, people are not very much interested in=20
politics. And when I talk about it with my=20
producers they tell me - why are we talking so=20
much about politics in our programs? Most of the=20
people here in this country just don't care.=20
Well, they don't have to care. This is one of the=20
reasons why Putin is popular - you don't have to=20
worry about politics. So, some people say that's=20
not good, but I think that's OK. But going back=20
to your question - I think that Russian=20
television reflects the tastes of most people in=20
Russia. It is as commercial as ever - it is about=20
making money. If its state owned or state=20
affiliated or however you want to connect it to=20
the Kremlin - it is all about businesses. As for=20
our political programs, maybe we do not have a=20
variety of opinions, but this is not because it=20
is forced out. It is like it was at the elections=20
- people were asked if they want a change and=20
people said no, we want things to go on the way=20
they are. This is now reflected in television in political programs.
The country is on the path to prosperity and it=20
has its own course, with bumps and downs and with=20
bumps on the road, but Russia is on this trajectory and the people support =
MN: So, you are very optimistic then?
PL: Cautiously optimistic, I will say. Because=20
there are things of course that worry me, like=20
this stabilization fund - the money is not put to=20
good use. Because look at the infrastructure in=20
this country - it is in terrible condition.=20
Another thing is this quasi apartheid happening -=20
there are middle class people who are happy=20
because they are on the right side of change and=20
can avoid the infrastructure problems. They can=20
afford a hospital where they will not burn to=20
death in some fire, for example, or receive=20
inadequate care. But there are people who suffer=20
in hospitals, and this is a disgrace for the=20
country. So, if you can avoid these problems that=20
are a part of the Soviet legacy your life is nice=20
and fine, but there are other people and they=20
need to be addressed. Like pensioners and elderly=20
people, it worries me a lot and I can be=20
extremely critical of the government policy -=20
they are not doing enough. Or take high food prices. Same thing
St. Petersburg Times
May 8, 2008
Russia =91Not Ready=92 For HIV Measures
By David Nowak
The Associated Press
MOSCOW =AD Russia is =93not ready=94 to adopt measures=20
that could prevent thousands of people from=20
getting infected with the virus that causes AIDS,=20
the country=92s chief public health officer said.
Gennady Onishchenko said regulations were not=20
strong enough to allow measures such as methadone=20
replacement therapy for heroin addicts to work=20
properly. Health advocates say such therapy is=20
vital because of the particular way HIV has spread through Russia.
Up to 80 percent of the country=92s 1.6 million=20
HIV-positive people became infected through dirty=20
needles, according to various estimates. The=20
World Health Organization, the United Nations and=20
the United States, among others, have published=20
studies showing that injecting drug users who=20
switch to clinic-supplied methadone are up to=20
five times less likely to contract HIV.
Nevertheless, Onishchenko said Monday that he was=20
=93not convinced=94 about the effectiveness of the=20
so-called substitution therapy, which is illegal=20
under current legislation. Even if it were=20
effective, Onishchenko said, weak law enforcement=20
would mean the clinics would =93turn into shops for=20
drugs.=94 He spoke at a news briefing at the=20
conclusion of a conference in Moscow on AIDS.
Craig McClure, executive director of the=20
International AIDS Society, said scientific=20
evidence about the effectiveness of substitution therapy was overwhelming.
Substitution therapy, he said, =93could have a=20
dramatic impact if implemented properly.=94
Michel Kazatchkine, the director of the Global=20
Fund to Fight AIDS, said substitute therapy was=20
serious and that Russia should not handle the=20
issue as it does regular politics.
=93You have countries that are moving in the right=20
direction ... and others that do not move. Russia=20
is like an isolated island,=94 Kazatchkine said.=20
=93Where intravenous drug use drives over 60=20
percent of the epidemic, you cannot afford not to=20
have a comprehensive approach.=94
Compounding the problem, activists said,=20
Onishchenko=92s sentiments on substitution therapy=20
reflect the attitudes of the government and the=20
population as a whole. Kazatchkine said few=20
voices in the national legislature and=20
pro-Kremlin party United Russia supported such=20
initiatives, and that the Moscow government was=20
overly conservative in its approach toward AIDS=20
issues. =93There is a basic lack of political support,=94 Kazatchkine said.
Onishchenko said uninformed Russians had little=20
patience for drug users, preferring to ostracize=20
them rather than address their needs.
Still, most activists and officials agree that=20
there has been progress in Russia, highlighted by=20
a general slowing in the number of new cases registered annually.
McClure said the myths about AIDS were gradually=20
being erased from the public=92s consciousness,=20
with television ads that try to convince people=20
that they cannot catch HIV from washing the dishes or, say, holding hands.
Russia has pledged at least 9.3 billion rubles=20
($392 million) to fight AIDS in 2009, more than=20
20 times the amount spent in 2005.
=93The money is enough; the question is whether the=20
money is spent on the right things,=94 Kazatchkine said.
Russia Stocks Cheapest in Europe on Higher Inflation
By William Mauldin
May 8 (Bloomberg) -- Russia's stock market is=20
telling Dmitry Medvedev that investors are losing=20
confidence as inflation accelerates and taxes=20
curb profits at the nation's biggest oil producers.
Russia's RTS Index is off to its worst start to a=20
year since 1998, when the government's $40=20
billion default sent equities around the world=20
tumbling. The 50 companies in the RTS, dominated=20
by energy producers, through yesterday traded at=20
an average 9.52 times estimated earnings, the=20
lowest among Europe's 10 biggest stock markets=20
and a 29 percent discount to the MSCI Emerging=20
Markets Index, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
The combination of the quickest inflation in five=20
years and a 45 percent increase in oil taxes=20
spurred the benchmark RTS Index's 3.1 percent=20
decline this year. While former President=20
Vladimir Putin presided over eight years of=20
economic growth and a 14-fold increase in the=20
RTS, Medvedev, his handpicked successor, inherits=20
a stock market that's performing worse than=20
Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Africa.
``For the new Medvedev-Putin administration,=20
inflation is the biggest challenge,'' said Ian=20
Hague, founding partner at Firebird Management=20
LLC in New York, which has $1.5 billion of its=20
$3.5 billion emerging-market assets in Russian=20
equities. ``And those who think that by buying=20
Russian oil stocks they're going to capture the=20
oil windfall are kidding themselves.''
The RTS rose 2.2 percent yesterday as Medvedev,=20
the chairman of OAO Gazprom, took over the=20
presidency, and added 0.9 percent to 2,220.7 as of 12:34 p.m. today in Mosc=
Gazprom Overtakes GE
State-run Gazprom, the biggest natural-gas=20
producer, overtook General Electric Co. as the=20
world's fourth-largest company by market value=20
after Medvedev became Russia's third president.
The RTS trades at a 17 percent discount to the=20
U.K.'s FTSE 100 Index, which is valued at 11.5=20
times estimated profit. France's CAC 40 trades at=20
11.3 times and Germany's DAX at 11.8.
OAO Rosneft, Russia's largest oil producer, has=20
underperformed the MSCI Emerging Markets Energy=20
Index by 41 percentage points since it went=20
public in 2006. The Moscow-based company trades=20
at 11.8 times profit, compared with a ratio of=20
13.3 for Beijing-based Cnooc Ltd., China's largest offshore oil producer.
Rosneft has been hurt by inflation because of=20
rising equipment, infrastructure and wage costs,=20
Peter O'Brien, the company's chief financial=20
officer, said in an interview last month in Moscow.
Lukoil Shares
OAO Lukoil, Russia's second-biggest oil producer,=20
trades at 7.32 times estimated profits after=20
underperforming the MSCI Emerging Markets Energy=20
Index by 41 percentage points in the past two=20
years. The Moscow-based company is valued at a 34=20
percent discount to the 11.1 price-to-estimated=20
earnings ratio for MSCI's gauge of oil and gas=20
producers in developing markets.
In addition to inflation-related expenses for=20
energy companies, the export duty on oil has=20
risen 45 percent this year and will be set at=20
$398.10 a metric ton, or about $54 a barrel, on June 1.
Medvedev, 42, pledged yesterday to fight=20
inflation as he was sworn in. The government may=20
formulate a plan in two months for tax cuts on=20
oil companies to overcome production=20
``stagnation,'' Energy and Industry Minister=20
Viktor Khristenko said in an interview in April.
Societe Generale Asset Management bought Lukoil=20
and Rosneft this year because they may benefit=20
from tax reductions and are cheap. Goldman Sachs=20
Group Inc. raised Lukoil to ``buy'' this week=20
because of the possibility that oil prices will=20
rise to between $150 and $200 a barrel within two years.
`At the Beginning'
A tax reduction on oil is ``more likely to happen=20
earlier rather than later,'' said Nerea Heras,=20
who managed the $280 million eastern Europe fund=20
at Societe Generale in London before leaving in=20
April for Madrid to help oversee Banco Santander=20
SA investments in eastern Europe and other=20
emerging markets. ``You have to do it at the beginning of a new term.''
Medvedev may increase taxes on other commodity=20
producers to compensate for lower oil revenue.=20
That probably would mean earnings at Moscow-based=20
OAO GMK Norilsk Nickel, Berezniki, Russia-based=20
OAO Uralkali and Solikamsk, Ural Mountains-based=20
OAO Silvinit would suffer, according to Alexei=20
Zabotkin, chief investment officer at United Capital Partners in Moscow.
``There will be redistribution of taxation in the=20
commodity sector away from oil and toward other=20
resources,'' said Zabotkin, whose firm manages=20
$1.5 billion in Russian stocks and private equity.
Norilsk, Russia's biggest mining company and the=20
supplier of everything from nickel and palladium=20
to platinum and copper, is valued at 6.79 times=20
estimated earnings, compared with 12.7 times for=20
the MSCI Emerging Markets Materials Index.
Soybeans, Alfalfa
Uralkali, the Russian company developing the=20
world's second-largest deposit of potash -- used=20
to fertilize corn, wheat, soybeans and alfalfa --=20
and Silvinit, Russia's biggest potash producer,=20
are trading at more expensive valuations as=20
global shortages cause food prices to soar.=20
Uralkali is valued at 25.5 times estimated=20
profit, while Silvinit has a ratio of 53.4.
At the same time, OAO RusHydro, the world's=20
second-biggest hydroelectric generator, may be=20
``impacted negatively'' as the government debates=20
whether to let utilities raise domestic power=20
prices at the risk of boosting inflation, Credit=20
Suisse Group, Switzerland's second-largest bank, said in a note this week.
RusHydro, based in Moscow, trades at 13.1 times=20
earnings, according to data compiled by=20
Bloomberg, compared with 14.6 times earnings for=20
the MSCI Emerging Markets Utilities Index.
Privatization Of Russian Film Studios To Be Suspended
MOSCOW. May 7 (Interfax) - Russian film studios=20
will be assessed for professional efficiency,=20
following which a decision will be made as to=20
whether some of them should be privatized or=20
sold, said Valery Rusin, Deputy General Director at the Gorky Film Studio.
"The consultative group consisting of=20
representatives from the Russian Public Assets=20
Agency, the Federal Agency for Culture and=20
Cinematography, the Mosfilm Studio, and the Gorky=20
Film Studio met more than a week ago and decided=20
that the group should seek the suspension of the=20
privatization of film studios because there is no=20
strategy as to how this privatization will be=20
held," Rusin told Interfax on Wednesday.
The working group is to conduct a examination of=20
Russian film studios and their technical=20
facilities, in order to establish which of them=20
are able to compete with Western filmmakers and=20
to create good- quality productions.
As a result of this monitoring, indispensable=20
film studios will be identified which can meet=20
modern standards, Rusin said. Those studios which=20
fail to demonstrate their efficiency are likely to be privatized, he said.
So far, the merger between the three largest=20
Russian film studios - Mosfilm, Gorky and Lenfilm=20
- is not being considered, he said.
"Some decision will be made concerning those=20
studios which are unable to compete. But no=20
merger is being planned between Mosfilm, the=20
Gorky studio and Lenfilm," Rusin said.
Moscow News
May 7, 2008
Russia=92s Studio System
By Vladimir Kozlov
Gorky Studio, the country's oldest film studio=20
complex, is slated for privatization by the end=20
of this year, raising fears that a potential=20
buyer could acquire it for the land, which could=20
be used as a site for a shopping center or residential complex.
When about a week ago the government announced=20
that it included Gorky Studio in the list of=20
state-run assets to be sold by the end of this=20
year, the news didn't surprise industry insiders=20
and observers. Talks about privatizing the=20
country's large film studio complexes that were=20
built in Soviet times and are in need of=20
renovation, have been going on for all the=20
fifteen years or so that privatization has been taking place in Russia.
So far however, none of the major film studios,=20
such as the country's biggest complex Mosfilm -=20
which many believe to be comparable to European=20
studios at least in size if not in quality of=20
provided services - or St. Petersburg's Len=ADfilm=20
and Moscow's Gorky Studio, have been privatized.
Mosfilm seems to be set to remain state-run,=20
while the sale of the other two above mentioned=20
complexes has been seriously discussed in the=20
last few years, and a tender for Gorky was even=20
an=ADnounced a couple years ago. That coincided=20
with an upsurge in the domestic film production,=20
resulting in dozens of companies placing bids for=20
the complex. The government eventually chose to=20
cancel the sale as the original starting price of=20
$5 million must have been too low.
While the sale of Lenfilm has been postponed at=20
the request of city authorities, Gorky is now on=20
the block again. Certainly, little detail is=20
available at the moment as for what companies=20
would place a bid for the complex. But one thing=20
is more or less sure: the domestic film industry=20
largely consists of smaller companies that would=20
never have cash to buy the complex, so a bidder=20
from outside of the film industry would potentially have an upper hand.
What could be possible ramifications of that? The=20
land on which the complex is located - a huge=20
piece not far from the center of Moscow - is=20
certainly attractive for developers eager to=20
build something on it, rather than go on with the=20
film studio business. Although conditions of the=20
sale tender may stipulate that the studio should=20
not be converted into something else, there are always ways around.
But would it really be a tragedy, if the complex=20
is torn down and the site is used for a big=20
shopping mall or a business center? I don't think=20
so. When it comes to film production here, market=20
factors are more important than anything else.
If there is demand for studio facilities, there=20
will be supply. Although it may not necessarily=20
come from where people expect it. For example,=20
there have been talks about erecting a studio=20
complex outside Moscow, which some people have=20
already christened "Russian Holly=ADwood."
One major argument in favor of the preservation=20
of Gorky Studio is nostalgia. True, this is the=20
country's oldest film studio - if assumed that it=20
is a direct successor to film society Rus, which=20
was established back in 1915. In addition to=20
that, the Soviet Union's first sound feature=20
film, 1931's Putyovka v zhizn (Road to Life), was=20
shot there, and in the 1950s to 1980s, when the=20
complex became focused on children's films, many=20
movies well known to generations of Soviet people=20
were produced at Gorky Studio.
Lawmakers urge Bush to shelve Russia nuclear deal
By Susan Cornwell
WASHINGTON, May 7 (Reuters) - Key U.S. lawmakers=20
urged President George W. Bush on Wednesday to=20
shelve a civilian nuclear cooperation pact with=20
Russia until concerns about Russia's nuclear ties to Iran are cleared up.
Letters from members of the House of=20
Representatives and the Senate expressed=20
widespread unease on Capitol Hill about links=20
between Moscow and Iran. Washington believes the=20
latter harbors ambitions to acquire a nuclear weapon.
"Prior to consideration of this agreement,=20
Congress needs a detailed assessment of Russian=20
assistance to all aspects of Iran's nuclear and=20
missile programs," said a letter to Bush from=20
Rep. John Dingell, who chairs the House Energy=20
and Commerce Committee, and Rep. Bart Stupak,=20
chairman of the subcommittee on investigations. Both are Michigan Democrats.
In the Senate, a missive to Bush signed by 32=20
senators said Russia's "increasingly abrasive=20
foreign policy" was one reason Bush should not=20
send the civilian nuclear cooperation deal to Congress for review.
The letter written by Minnesota Republican Sen.=20
Norm Coleman and Indiana Democratic Sen. Evan=20
Bayh also said Russia's assistance to Iran's=20
nuclear fuel cycle program and support for Iran's=20
ballistic missile program were hurdles to=20
cooperating with Moscow on civilian nuclear technology.
Russia and the United States on Tuesday signed=20
the pact allowing the world's two biggest atomic=20
powers to boost their nuclear trade. It was=20
initialed by Bush and former Russian President=20
Vladimir Putin two years ago, and it was signed=20
on the last day Putin was in office.
A 123 agreement, so-called because it falls under=20
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, is required=20
before countries can cooperate on nuclear=20
materials, such as storing spent fuel, or work=20
together on advanced nuclear reactor programs.
The deal was applauded on Wednesday by the=20
U.S.-Russia Business Council, which said working=20
to develop new technologies with Russia could be=20
"extremely beneficial" to the United States.
The Bush administration argues the deal could=20
help solve the concerns about Iran by clearing=20
the way for Washington to cooperate with Russia's=20
offer to host an international uranium enrichment=20
center that would supply nuclear fuel to countries like Iran.
Putin has said that such a uranium enrichment=20
center, a sort of fuel bank, would discourage=20
Iran and other countries from developing nuclear=20
fuel cycle facilities that could be used for covert weapons programs.
The Bush administration is keen to have the pact=20
with Russia go into force this year, its last in=20
office. Once the deal is sent to lawmakers, it=20
would take effect if Congress does not pass a=20
disapproval resolution within 90 days.
But many lawmakers are wary of Russia's past and=20
present ties with Iran, including its exports of=20
nuclear fuel to Iran's nuclear power plant at Bushehr.
Dingell and Stupak pointed out that the House was=20
already on record as saying no nuclear=20
cooperation pact should be made with Russia until=20
the U.S. president can report that Iran is not=20
pursuing nuclear weapons, or that Russia is no=20
longer assisting with Iran's nuclear program.
Those requirements were part of a bill that=20
passed the House overwhelmingly last September. A=20
similar bill with some 70 co-sponsors is pending in the Senate.
Despite anti-Semitism, Russia lures back Jews
By Amie Ferris-Rotman and Conor Sweeney
May 5, 2008
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Tens of thousands of Jews who=20
fled oppression in the former Soviet Union are=20
returning to Russia to make the most of an=20
economic boom, even though a new strain of=20
anti-Semitism is emerging in their old homeland.
Around one million Jews fled during the Soviet=20
era and the post-communist chaos. Those returning=20
now from Israel, the United States and Europe=20
hope to use their new skills and old knowledge to do business.
"Now there are services here, like in New York=20
and Paris, but the lifestyle is more interesting=20
than in either of them -- it's easy to understand=20
why thousands are coming back," said Yevgeny=20
Satanovsky, president of the Russian Jewish Congress.
Hard statistics on Jews returning to Russia do=20
not exist, said Satanovsky, but anecdotal=20
evidence is there. He estimates 80,000-120,000=20
Russian Jews have returned, plus many more who=20
originated in other Soviet republics.
"If you look at industry or banking you'll find=20
thousands of families who have come back," he said.
The Israeli embassy in Moscow estimates around=20
90,000 of its citizens live in Russia.
"New Russian corporations are now hunting for=20
managers from all over the world who have western=20
experience and a Russian background. These=20
emigrants know the language, the lifestyle, so=20
it's very easy for them to integrate," Satanovsky said.
But the end of the Soviet Union also gave rise to=20
a new phenomenon for Russia's Jews: skinheads and=20
far-right groups who daub swastikas on walls and=20
throw petrol bombs through synagogue windows.
In the 17 years since Soviet rule collapsed,=20
attacks on Russia's Jewish population of around=20
one million and their property have been=20
increasing in both number and severity, say=20
community leaders and human rights organizations.
Last year, they included the vandalizing of a=20
synagogue in the far eastern port of Vladivostok,=20
the spray-painting of "Holocaust 2007" on a=20
Jewish centre in Arctic Murmansk, upturned=20
gravestones in the south and an assault on a visiting Canadian rabbi.
"In Russia there exists 'bytovoi' anti-Semitism,=20
literally meaning everyday or household, which is=20
grassroots anti-Semitism, which is the main=20
problem," Pinchas Goldschmidt, Moscow's chief=20
rabbi and chairman of the European Conference of Rabbis, told Reuters.
"This is attacks on synagogues, spontaneous=20
attacks on cemeteries, etc ... In Russia, we fear=20
the skinheads and neo-Nazis," said Goldschmidt, a=20
native of Switzerland who moved to Russia in 1989.
Anti-Semitism reared its head during Russian=20
presidential election campaigns earlier this=20
year, when dozens of websites and forums appeared=20
saying candidates were Jewish.
The most severe attacks were directed at=20
president-elect Dmitry Medvedev, who was cast as=20
having Jewish roots and therefore unfit to run the country.
Sites used pejorative words to describe him,=20
asked surfers to compare his face to well-known=20
Jewish billionaires and said Medvedev would favor=20
Israeli foreign policy in Russia's dealings with Iran and other Muslim stat=
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been=20
explicit in his condemnation of anti-Semitism. On=20
a 2005 visit to the Nazi death camp Auschwitz and=20
Polish city Krakow, he said he was "ashamed" of=20
anti-Semitism in his own country.
Rights campaigners link the new anti-Semitism to=20
the social turmoil that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.
"This is a country where the social safety net=20
disappeared overnight," said Mark Levin,=20
executive director of the National Conference on=20
Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), a U.S. group.
"A lot of young people didn't see a future, and=20
these (neo-Nazi) groups give them a sense of=20
belonging and community in some ways and a structure," he said.
SOVA, a Russian NGO that tracks racist crime,=20
estimates there were 632 racially motivated=20
attacks and 67 murders in Russia in 2007.
Anti-Semitism is just one strand of that: most=20
attacks are on dark-skinned immigrants, many of=20
them Muslims, from ex-Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
"Race-hate violence is increasing in Russia. We=20
have noticed that 50 percent of people in Russia=20
have xenophobic tendencies, and if someone is a=20
nationalist, he will naturally be an=20
anti-Semite," said SOVA's director, Alexander Verkhovsky.
While a law exists against inciting racism, it is=20
rarely applied, say anti-racism groups. Most hate=20
crimes are classified only as "hooliganism" by=20
the authorities, say campaigners.
"What the community would like to see is the full=20
implementation and willingness of state=20
authorities to go after these (skinhead) elements=20
which are a danger," Rabbi Goldschmidt said.
Russian Jews have experienced anti-Semitism for centuries.
Empress Catherine the Great attempted to remove=20
Russia's Jews to the Pale of Settlement, an area=20
on the western fringes of the Russian empire.
In 19th century pogroms Jews were killed, raped=20
and robbed and their villages razed. Many fled westwards.
Later, the Soviet leadership was suspicious of=20
the Jewish community because of its links to a=20
world Jewish movement that was based in the West.=20
In the 1970s and 80s, there was a one million-strong exodus.
Ari Rozichner moved to Israel from Ukraine, then=20
part of the Soviet Union, with his parents as a boy in the early 1970s.
"The main difference between my immigration wave=20
and that of the 90s was conceptual," he says,=20
adding that his parents had believed in a Jewish=20
state, while a later generation left "because supermarket shelves were empt=
"Israel has a nice climate -- it's better than=20
winter in Moscow with the black snow," he said.
After working in Israel, the United States and=20
Japan, he has settled in Moscow as an associate=20
vice president of sales with Gilat satellite=20
networks. His clients include state agencies=20
which want to bring the Internet to remote Siberian schools.
"I have one foot here, one foot there. My family=20
is in Israel, it's a different life for them,=20
whereas Moscow is a huge megapolis, the distances=20
are huge, to get by is not easy and life is very expensive," he said.
But "there are more opportunities here, Israel is=20
like a village," he said from his offices in a Moscow suburb.
Apart from the economic transformation, Rozichner=20
says there has been a dramatic change in the=20
official attitude to Jews, who once had a letter=20
'J' marked in their internal Soviet passports.
"In Russia now, I feel very comfortable as a Jew."
Holocaust Day, January 27, was marked in Moscow=20
schools for the first time this year.=20
Kremlin-friendly Russian billionaire and Jewish=20
European Congress President Moshe Kantor=20
initiated the programme with the Moscow government.
"We are already seeing concrete steps in the=20
right direction," added Rabbi Goldschmidt.
Schwab Cautiously Optimistic About Russia WTO Talks Chances
WASHINGTON, May 7 (Itar-Tass) - US Trade=20
Representative Ambassador Susan Schwab has with=20
cautious optimism assessed the chances that the=20
process on Russia's accession to the World Trade=20
Organisation (WTO) will be completed this year.=20
She confirmed this on Tuesday answering an=20
Itar-Tass question at the Peterson Institute for=20
International Economics in Washington. However,=20
the ambassador did not explain on what her assessment is based.
It is said in the US-Russia Strategic Framework=20
Declaration that "The United States and Russia=20
are committed to achieving WTO accession for=20
Russia as soon as possible and on commercially meaningful terms.
We believe that with a major effort, especially=20
between now and June of this year, and with the=20
cooperation of other parties, and by meeting the=20
terms for WTO accession, Russia can qualify for=20
membership and thus accession to the WTO can be=20
achieved this year. The United States is=20
committed to working with Congress to achieve=20
legislation on Jackson-Vanik and Permanent Normal=20
Trade Relations with Russia. In conjunction with=20
WTO negotiations, the US Administration looks=20
forward to working with the US Congress and the=20
business community to enact this legislation this=20
year. In recognition of Russia's growing role as=20
a major economy, the United States is also=20
committed to helping Russia accede to the=20
Organization for Economic Cooperation and=20
Development and other global economic institutions."
The question to Schwab was about what is being=20
done for the fulfilment of this task and if the=20
stated period is realistic, in her view.
The answer was on the whole rather watered down.=20
She said the US administration is seriously=20
working in the WTO with the Russian colleagues in=20
order to help Russia to pass the very complicated=20
process of admission to the WTO. According to=20
her, considerable progress has been made. Russia=20
has not followed through, it has something to=20
finish yet. But the US side is narrowing the=20
(remaining questions) to reduce them to the=20
minimum in order to compete this process in the current year, Schwab added.
The US trade representative also said that the=20
admission of Russia to the WTO is an issue rather=20
of the foreign political than foreign trade=20
nature. When Russia fulfils its obligations=20
linked with the admission the US side will be=20
glad to work with interested Congress members so=20
that the legislators make the necessary=20
decisions, the American ambassador promised.
It is understood that with this end in view the=20
White House will have to spend a certain=20
political capital. The amount of this spending=20
depends on the current position of Russia on the=20
Capitol Hill and at this moment may turn out to=20
be rather substantial. It is at least unclear if=20
the US administration is ready for this.
Schwab's speech was on the whole devoted to=20
severe disagreements in the trade policy emerged=20
in early April between the US administration and=20
Congress. Lawmakers, in essence, blocked an=20
agreement with Colombia on the creation of a free=20
trade zone and with this aim changed along the=20
way the internal Washington's rules of the game.=20
This caused indignation of the whole economic=20
team of President George W. Bush that since then=20
has not been missing a single opportunity for=20
severe criticism of the present Democratic=20
leadership in the Congress. All this happens=20
against the backdrop of the quickly approaching US General Election.
Specialists say that with the presence of the=20
political will in the White House and US Congress=20
the WTO issue with Russia is rather solvable,=20
both as the accompanying problem of cancelling=20
the effect of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik=20
amendment against Russia. However, nobody can=20
guarantee here that the needed decisions will be made.
Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei=20
Denisov told Itar-Tass earlier that the US side=20
has an equally big interest in withdrawing Russia=20
from the realm of the infamous Jackson-Vanik=20
amendment as Moscow does, and in the light of it=20
the Russian authorities do not take any lobbyist=20
actions to push through with the lifting.
Denisov and the Under Secretary of State for=20
Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs Reuben=20
Jeffery last week held a debut session of the=20
US-Russia Business Council, a body set up at the=20
initiative of Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush.
"Of course, this visit and the conversations we=20
had here were very important if one looks at them=20
through the prism of creating an atmosphere=20
conducive to the finalization of Russia' s=20
joining the World Trade Organisation, at least in=20
the American segment, and the alleviating of=20
concurrent burdens," Denisov said, adding that=20
the Jackson-Vanik amendment definitely is one of them.
"Recall that we had meetings not only with our=20
counterparts from the Department of State and=20
other governmental organizations, but also on the=20
Capitol Hill where we met with influential=20
senators, Republicans and Democrats likewise," he said.
"You see, we don't ask for abolishing the=20
Jackson-Vanik amendment as such," Denisov went on=20
saying. "In the final count, it doesn't spoil our=20
existence if you look at it pragmatically. The=20
problem is it mars the atmosphere at this stage=20
and of course it'd be much better if it were gone."
"But when the situation really comes down to the=20
beginning of our accession to the WTO, the=20
presence of that amendment will really put up big=20
obstacles to the operations of US businesses in Russia," Denisov said.
"We've changed places with the Americans now, so=20
to speak," he said. "That's why it'd be totally=20
inappropriate to put up the question in a=20
categorical tonality at this moment," he said.=20
"We should simply bring home to our partners the=20
things they are not quite aware of, namely, that=20
if Russia gets the WTO membership, the U.S. won't=20
have any legal right to subject it to various trade restrictions of this so=
"This is to say, it'll turn out then that the WTO=20
regulations, which Russia undersigns, won't apply=20
to the US," Denisov said. "That's why I think=20
it'd be more appropriate to say now that the=20
Americans have as big an interest in lifting the=20
amend - or even greater interest - than we do,"=20
he said. "Hence it's not the lobbying but,=20
rather, explanatory efforts that really matters=20
now," the first deputy foreign minister noted.
Moscow Website Eyes Foreign Policy Challenges Facing New President Medvedev
May 6, 2008
Article by Andrey Kolesnikov, deputy chief editor=20
of The New Times magazine: "Demonstration of Increasing Potential"
The verbal bombing carried out by the Russian=20
Foreign Ministry in respect of the Georgian=20
flying objects of "silvery metal" is a=20
continuation of the parade in Red Square by other=20
means. Both are pure PR. A virtual action. On the=20
parade -- mock-ups; on the Georgian front --=20
words alone. The more irascible things get, the=20
more inoffensive they are in practice. Missiles=20
will not fly. War will not commence, because how=20
is it to be waged in reality: Are we to organize=20
a second Chechnya for soldiers serving a one-year=20
term? For the motherland, for the beaches of=20
Abkhazia, for our own palm-trees, for big Olga and small pebbles -- fire?!
Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin), who is not going=20
away, said that what is happening is "not=20
saber-rattling but a demonstration of increasing=20
potential in the defense sphere." Who will=20
explain what the difference is here? Who will=20
find even one distinction between these two=20
actions? Only it turns out that the demonstration=20
of increasing potential does not make Dmitriy=20
Medvedev's inauguration more convincing but only=20
spoils the successor's image. Particularly in the=20
area for which, by virtue of his office, he will=20
simply have to answer independently and with his head -- foreign policy.
If we, while flying over the heart of the=20
motherland, send ardent greetings to our=20
Euro-Atlantic adversaries, if the Russian Foreign=20
Office expresses itself in the rough language of=20
a poster from the time of Mr No ((Soviet Foreign=20
Minister) A.A. Gromyko), what kind of opinion can=20
Russia's slanderers form of its future foreign policy course?
For PR our chiefs need a small victorious verbal=20
war with Georgia. For PR our chiefs need to teach=20
a convincing lesson, with caterpillar tracks=20
rumbling over our own paving stones alongside the=20
gap-toothed Kremlin wall. The question is a=20
different one: Why such PR? What is its distant=20
aim? Its expected result? Its target audience? In=20
short, what is the purpose of this entire=20
lezghinka (Caucasian dance) around the Mausoleum=20
with missiles between our teeth?
Employees of the core television channels are=20
working for Russia's external image, as are=20
several sparkling structures which are=20
distinguished by predictable effectiveness in=20
assimilating funds, mainly budget funds. But,=20
with such a Foreign Ministry and such a lesson to=20
teach, how is unwashed Russia to be washed from the square?
A fine start for Dmitriy Medvedev. A fine foreign=20
policy legacy for him, which he is not refusing=20
(not yet, at any rate). His image as a liberal is=20
fading. Belief in his independent role is=20
vanishing on Russia's political Mount Olympus.=20
But then people will say: "President Medvedev's=20
foreign policy," maybe even "President Medvedev's=20
foreign policy doctrine." Only where is it, and of what does it consist?
All eight years of Putin's rule were essentially=20
nothing other than a "demonstration of increasing=20
potential," without this potential being realized.
The "demonstration" was also to be observed in=20
the sphere of foreign policy. The image of an=20
embittered country suffering an inferiority=20
complex alternating with a sense of unjustified=20
superiority over others. Incomprehensible=20
relations with the West coupled with periodic=20
reloading of the energy weapon. The shot that=20
missed the target at the time of the Ukrainian=20
election campaign. The deportation of Georgians.=20
The beating up of Poles. The introduction into=20
circulation of the verbal expression "dead=20
donkey's ears" (allusion to Putin's comment on=20
border dispute with Latvia) and the scandal over=20
the "Bronze Soldier" (Soviet monument in Tallinn,=20
Estonia). The intimate friendship with Schroeder=20
and Berlusconi. The comradely light supper with=20
Chavez. The loss of determining influence within=20
the CIS and the post-Soviet area. The inability=20
to protect our own citizens in Turkmenistan. The=20
conquest of the Arctic shelf by placing the=20
national flag down on the bottom. The British=20
Council and dislike. The blackmail over South=20
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The defeat in the contest=20
over Kosovo. The anti-NATO rhetoric at the level=20
of Kukryniksy (collective pseudonym of three=20
Soviet poster artists). The support for the=20
fraternal people of long-suffering Palestine. The=20
rather coarse verbal exercises a propos something and nothing.
What is this -- a foreign policy line, doctrine,=20
course? Although at least the set of these=20
Brownian movements points in one direction --=20
anti-Western and quite aggressive. Are Medvedev's=20
actions their chaotic and impulsive continuation=20
or their dismantling with attempts to formulate Russia's foreign policy?
This challenge is one of the most important to=20
the young president. Of course, he must try to=20
get to grips with the monopolized economy,=20
"sovereign democracy," political prisoners, the=20
media, and the opposition. But the head of state=20
has a no less crucial task -- that of=20
representing the country on the international=20
arena in an era when leaders are changing, when=20
the world order is falling apart at the seams and=20
its new configuration is on the point of being=20
formed, when the challenges of the new era demand=20
cooperation with Western civilization, not mutual repulsion.
We can no longer get away here with a change of=20
rhetoric alone. Although, after listening to the=20
dialecticisms of the Russian Foreign Ministry,=20
even a simple change of language is capable of=20
accomplishing a revolution in the sphere of=20
international relations. It is not easy to do=20
this after such a parade. But it must be done.
This will be a demonstration of the new president's increasing potential.
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
No 97
May 8, 2008
Author: Nikolai Zlobin
The US establishment is somewhat perplexed but quite
intrigued by what is taking place in Russia.
On the one hand, very many in Washington expected Vladimir
Putin to remain the president again and developed their policy
with regard to Russia on this premise. The Western community would
have accepted this turn of events. The widespread opinion in the
international community is that resignation of an unquestionable
leader at the peak of popularity collides with the Russian
political tradition. It sets a precedent that requires from the US
establishment to revise some fundamental principles of relations
with Russia and that is never easy. On the other hand, the
intricate combinations (electoral, political, and nomenclatural)
Russia has been demonstrating for some months now definitely
raised some eyebrows in Washington and even fomented certain
Needless to say, the first thing Washington wants to know is
who and how will determine Moscow's foreign policy and its
priorities. It has been Vladimir Putin's prerogative so far, a
state of affairs the international community more or less is
accustomed to. Putin's foreign policy evolved from the calls for
integration with the West and emphasis on Russia's European roots
to the concept of self-sufficiency in security and international
affairs. Anyway, the West always knew who it had to deal with and
whose words to take into account.
The second category of questions the American elites would
dearly like to find answers to concerns Russian economy. Putin's
administration exerted colossal influence in practically all
spheres and actually made all more or less important decisions
over the heads of other power structures. Will the presidential
administration retain its political monopoly now?
Putin's reign is clearly divided into two phases. In Phase
One, Putin concentrated on modernization of the country, its
economy, and administrative structure. After 2004, however, he
began emphasizing unique nature of Russia at every opportunity.
Dmitry Medvedev is known as promoter of Putin's policy but which
policy will it be? Even Russia's enemies (and there are quite a
few of them in Washington) realize that should Medvedev decide to
concentrate on modernization of Russia and succeed, it will
augment Russia's role and importance in international affairs.
Certain forces in the American establishment will certainly try to
push Russia and put it on the defensive and their efforts may
compel the Kremlin to abandon all modernization and integration
trends once again. Once they are abandoned, Russia may once again
focus on the policy of proving its sovereignty and uniqueness.
How the state power is arranged and how functions within it
are distributed, how to behave in international affairs - all of
that is something for Russia itself to decide. The United States
has already made a lot of blunders telling other countries what to
do. In order to be able to deal with Moscow effectively,
Washington has to know how things are done in Russia.
All three candidates for US president castigate George W.
Bush and his foreign policy. Foreign policy of the next US
Administration will be different, whoever wins the election. The
sooner the United States understands what is happening in Russia
and the clearer signals from Moscow are, the better the chance
that the next US Administration will work out an adequate policy
with regard to Russia. It's a slim chance of course, but even that
is better than another fiasco.
OSC [US Open Source Center] Analysis: Russia --=20
Strategic Thinkers Vie for Foreign Policy Influence
May 7, 2008
Prominent Russian strategic thinkers outside the=20
government range from intellectual pragmatists=20
favoring constructive engagement with the United=20
States to hard-liners, philosophical=20
Eurasianists, and isolationists who view the US=20
as a malign force to be confronted or contained.=20
All have exposure in a range of media, and many=20
seem influential among various Kremlin factions.=20
The pragmatists appear to have closer ties to the=20
new president, Dmitriy Medvedev, or at least=20
share some of the same viewpoints, while the=20
others may have influence among more hard-line=20
elements in the government, military, and security services.
Think Tank Pragmatists
A number of thinkers at Russian foreign policy=20
think tanks, research institutes, and journals=20
support policies that are assertive but not=20
rigidly ideological or reflexively anti-US.=20
Examples of these think tank pragmatists include=20
Sergey Karaganov, director of the Council on=20
Foreign and Defense Policy; Aleksey Arbatov, head=20
of the Center on International Security at the=20
Institute of World Economics and International=20
Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and=20
Fedor Lukyanov, chief editor of the quarterly=20
journal Russia in Global Affairs. (1)
These think tank pragmatists have broad exposure=20
in the media, appearing in official as well as=20
nonofficial newspapapers and websites and on=20
radio and television. The extent of their=20
influence in the Kremlin is unclear, though they=20
may have some ties to Medvedev.
An article in the daily Vechernyaya Moskva cited=20
unidentified sources close to Deputy Head of the=20
Presidential Administration Igor Sechin who said=20
that he was displeased with the level of=20
influence that some political scientists who are=20
viewed as overly "pro-US," particularly Karaganov=20
and Arbatov, have in the Kremlin (13 December 2007).
Additionally, new President Dmitriy Medvedev is=20
establishing a think tank called the Institute of=20
Modern Development whose membership will include=20
Karaganov (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 19 March 2008).
Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin and state=20
electric monopoly head Anatoliy Chubays, who=20
appear to be allies of Medvedev, sounded a=20
similar note to the pragmatists in 30 January=20
remarks suggesting that Russia needs to give more=20
weight to the economic costs of a confrontational=20
foreign policy (ITAR-TASS, 30 January).
The pragmatists back the official Russian=20
position on NATO enlargement, missile defense, and other issues.
Arbatov sees US moves on NATO enlargement and=20
missile defense as forcing Russia toward a=20
confrontation he hopes can be avoided: "Russia's=20
leadership is changing.... It would be desirable=20
for Europe to correctly understand Russia's=20
concerns and Russia's attitude to issues of=20
security on the continent. Give the new=20
leadership a chance, give the new people an=20
opportunity to snap out of this trend toward=20
confrontation. NATO and the European Union must=20
take a more independent (of the US) and=20
responsible position on these issues" (Strategiya Rossii, 15 March).
Karaganov posited that Russia should "by indirect=20
methods signify to the Europeans and Americans=20
the price which they might pay for conducting an=20
openly hostile policy toward Russia. This price=20
might seem unacceptable to them, and they will=20
wrap up their plans" to extend NATO membership to=20
Ukraine (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 8 February).
Lukyanov has stated that the US has already=20
accomplished the tasks for which it established=20
bases in Central Asia and that "now it is time=20
for them to leave" (Russkiy Zhurnal, 16 August 2007).
Pragmatists generally accept Russia's recent more=20
assertive foreign policy stance.
Karaganov predicted a coming "acute phase of the=20
counterattack of a West which is beginning to=20
lose" and stated: "Concessions are senseless.=20
They will be perceived as a show of weakness. But=20
we should also avoid unjustified demonstrations=20
of harshness, which will only squander the modest=20
reserve of power that Russia has acquired. All=20
the more so since we will be provoked" (Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 4 March).
Lukyanov stated that Russia is operating without=20
"paying much attention to the views of either=20
distant or nearby neighbors. In view of its scale=20
and resources, Russia can allow itself this. Is=20
this policy appropriate? I don't know. There are=20
pluses and minuses, there are serious costs, but=20
this is a fact of life...." (RIA-Novosti, 17 December 2007).
The pragmatists are, however, wary of a shift=20
from assertiveness based on pragmatic=20
considerations of the national interest to a=20
confrontational posture based on ideology.
Lukyanov asserted that "Russia must not get=20
itself mixed up in yet another 'Cold War'. The=20
new president of Russia must conduct a flexible=20
foreign policy and make compromises" if=20
necessary. He criticized the popular opinion that=20
"any compromise is a concession to the detriment=20
of national interests" (Strana.ru, 5 March).
Karaganov posited the "constructive character" of=20
recent tensions with the West but warns against=20
confrontation for its own sake (Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 15 January).
Lukyanov also stressed that Russia should take a=20
pragmatic approach to foreign policy and=20
implicitly criticizes the US for failing to do=20
so: "One could make many claims against Russian=20
policy, but so far it has avoided an ideological=20
bent." He noted, however, that "behind the=20
concept of multipolarity looms something=20
messianic: it is said we will defend diversity at=20
any cost. God forbid we will engage in a contest=20
with the missionaries on the other side of the=20
Atlantic" (Vedomosti, 10 September 2007).
They are skeptical of attempts to ground Russia's=20
foreign policy in military rearmament and are=20
opposed to Russia becoming entangled in any major=20
wars that might arise beyond its borders.
Lukyanov doubts that increased military=20
expenditure will be an effective means of=20
advancing Russia's geopolitical position: "If we=20
toss everything aside and arm ourselves, we won't=20
catch up with the US. We are in different=20
military-political categories. Furthermore,=20
America's experience over the last ten years=20
showed that enormous military force is not a=20
guarantee of policy success" (Strana.ru, 5 March).
Karaganov stated: "The supertask of the new=20
leader" of Russia "is to prevent the slide" into=20
a new large war or series of wars "or at a=20
minimum to avoid Russia being drawn into the=20
conflicts" (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 3 March).
The pragmatists see Russia's current=20
disagreements with the US as obstacles to be=20
overcome rather than an intractable clash of civilizations.
Arbatov views current disputes with the US and=20
the West as obstacles impeding cooperation on=20
other issues. He urged the next president to=20
"urgently stop the slide into a new Cold War with=20
the US, NATO, and Japan, take the initiative into=20
his own hands in moving forward with agreements=20
on disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, and=20
conduct much more energetic cooperation in the=20
struggle with terrorism and the conduct of UN=20
peacekeeping operations" (Politicheskiy Klass, 15 February).
Karaganov asserted: "Poor relations with the US=20
are simply irrational, because... in spite of the=20
monstrous idiocy of the intervention in Iraq, it=20
is still the most powerful, most innovative=20
economy and an extremely attractive socioeconomic=20
and political model" (Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 15 January).
Lukyanov opined that it is important to stress=20
that, "in spite of all their differences," Russia=20
and the US "are not enemies" (Golos Rossii, 11 September 2007).
They argue that Russia must propose its own=20
solutions to difficult international issues, not=20
simply work to block US proposals. They also=20
oppose closer relations with other countries such=20
as Iran and North Korea based simply on their resistance to US foreign poli=
Karaganov asserted that Russia should "try to=20
cash in our new strength," moving beyond "saying=20
no and fencing more or less effectively with our=20
rivals to put forward our own driving ideas for=20
the creation of a new world order" (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 24 January).
On issues such as Kosovo and Iran, Lukyanov=20
proposed that Russia should "offer some active=20
measures, and not merely try to correct or=20
perhaps work against that which the United States=20
proposes" (Strategiya Rossii, 15 November 2007).
Lukyanov is skeptical of the benefits of close=20
relationships with countries like Iran, which=20
"likes to use the Russian resource to solve its=20
own problems." He also said that while Russia=20
does not want to be dependent on the US, it also=20
"cannot be a hostage of the Chinese giant in the East" (Strana.ru, 5 March).
Hostile Schools of Thought
Arrayed against the pragmatists are several=20
different schools of thought, each of which=20
posits the hostile nature of the US while=20
differing on how best to counter or constrain US=20
policy. Some seek to compete with the US in the=20
international arena while others lean toward=20
isolationism. They also differ in the degree to=20
which they stress international alliances and=20
domestic military potential as tools of geopolitical influence.
Eurasianism, personified by the philosopher=20
Aleksandr Dugin, leader of the International=20
Eurasian Movement, assumes that the world is=20
composed of discrete civilizations, among which=20
Russia plays the predominant role in the Eurasian=20
civilization, and that Russia is destined to be an empire.
Dugin has considerable media exposure in both=20
official and nonofficial sources and has=20
previously had access to the Kremlin, where his=20
views may have some following among the siloviki.=20
(2) He does not, however, appear to have ties to=20
Medvedev, of whom he has opined: "These liberals,=20
of course, are for Putin. We understand that=20
Putin needs the liberals. And let him have them=20
-- just not in charge of the state. There should=20
be patriots in charge of the state" (Evrazia.org, 30 September 2007).
Dugin argued: "(F)or a Russian, empire is an=20
inalienable part of our history, it is our=20
identity and our destiny....We are capable of=20
only one thing: building an empire, uniting lands=20
and peoples, cultures, and faiths" (Literaturnaya=20
Gazeta, 31 January 2007). He has called on Russia=20
to create a "democratic empire" which would=20
engage not in conquering or acquiring colonies,=20
but in "strengthening its strategic, cultural,=20
economic, and technological influence" (Gazeta, 30 November 2005).
Dugin portrays Russia's contemporary conflicts=20
with the West as part of an unending clash of=20
civilizations dating back more than a millennium:=20
"(W)e are dealing with two civilizations that=20
continue the schism of Churches, which occurred=20
over the course of 300 years, practically from=20
800 to 1056, when the Great Schism occurred"=20
(Moskovskiye Novosti, 30 November 2007).
While Dugin sees Russia's conflicts with the US=20
and Great Britain as the inevitable clash of the=20
"Atlanticist" and "Eurasian" civilizations, his=20
views of continental Europe are more nuanced.=20
Dugin says that a Europe that views itself as=20
distinct from both Russia and the US is=20
"extremely attractive for contemporary Russia,=20
because it is already by definition friendly for=20
us." Consequently, Dugin takes a dim view of the=20
replacement of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard=20
Schroeder by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel,=20
whom he refers to as "American puppets" and=20
compares them to Ukrainian President Yushchenko=20
and Georgian President Saakashvili (Moskovskiye Novosti, 30 November 2007).
More broadly, Dugin appears to evaluate foreign=20
countries and their leaders primarily through the=20
prism of their attitude toward US power.
He asserted: "Iran could be called an icebreaker=20
of world politics: Ahmadinezhad together with=20
Hugo Chavez is laying a path to an alternative=20
multipolar world." Ignoring both the range of=20
Iranian missiles and disagreements over Caspian=20
Sea delineation, Dugin stated: "Iran cannot=20
threaten us, and we don't have any disputed zones=20
with them" (Profil, 15 October 2007).
Dugin has said that Russia should seek allies=20
"wherever it can, except for the US" and called=20
for a "great Eurasian alliance of Russia, Europe,=20
China, and the Islamic world" held together by a=20
rejection of US "neoimperialism" (Politkom.ru, 28 April 2005).
Dugin contrasts Eurasianism with both liberal and=20
isolationist opponents, criticizing the "fortress=20
Russia" concept explicitly and blaming=20
isolationism for contributing to the fall of the=20
USSR. He continued: "If the pro-US lobby thinks=20
that Russia has only one ally -- the US, and if=20
the isolationists assert that 'Russia's allies=20
are her army and navy', then the Eurasianists=20
suppose that Russia today has a multitude of=20
allies.... This is all the countries of East and=20
West which... reject the American hegemony of the=20
US, unipolarity, and the notorious 'benevolent=20
empire'" (Kreml.org, 21 January 2005).
While Dugin favors joining forces with the=20
surrounding "civilizations" he also supports a=20
dominant role for Russia among Russia's smaller=20
neighbors. He lauds the Eurasian Economic=20
Community because the Shanghai Cooperation=20
Organization is developing as a=20
"military-strategic model where China together=20
with Russia has a leading role, but Russia needs=20
its own integrating project where she would be=20
the undisputed leader" (Kreml.org, 10 October 2007).
Military Hard-Liners
Some retired high-ranking military officers still=20
adhere to the adversarial view of US-Russian=20
relations that characterized the Cold War period.=20
Examples include retired Colonel General Leonid=20
Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of=20
Geopolitical Problems, and retired Major General=20
Aleksandr Vladimirov, vice president of the=20
College of Military Experts. The military=20
hard-liners see US-Russian tension as a natural=20
and enduring geopolitical feature, and either a=20
standoff like the Cold War or US hegemony as the only possible equilibriums.
Ivashov averred: "'The Cold War' between the=20
Anglo-Saxon world and the USSR, and later with=20
Russia -- is a constant permanent process of=20
political confrontation." (Strana.ru, 5 March).=20
Ivashov said the main problem between the US and=20
Russia is that "the normative-legal basis of=20
strategic stability -- treaties which we started=20
still in the Soviet period and developed in the=20
early 1990's -- has been destroyed" (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 6 December 200=
The hard-liners do not appear to have any direct=20
ties to Medvedev, but they do appear regularly in=20
both military and regular media. Their views are=20
likely shared by a significant number among=20
Russia's military and defense establishment.
They have repeatedly asserted that the US is=20
preparing for an eventual military attack against Russia.
Ivashov said that US "public opinion is being=20
worked up against Russia" and "Some leaders=20
directly point to Russia as an object for the=20
application of force." He asserted that the US=20
would seek the "realization of the age-old dream=20
of world dominion and the removal of Russia as=20
the main obstacle to the establishment of=20
complete control over Eurasia" with its many=20
natural resources (Patriot, 9 August 2007).
Ivashov said the US "is preparing both the=20
situation and its military potential for a war=20
with Russia" (Forum.msk.ru, 19 July 2007).
Vladimirov said he believes a US-Russian war is=20
possible "within the next 10 to 15 years.... And=20
the direct aggressor will be the US," which is=20
seeking control over Russia's natural resources (Patriot, 9 August 2007).
The military hard-liners differ from the=20
Eurasianists in emphasizing the restoration of=20
Russia's military potential as the central=20
element of restoring Russia's place on the world=20
stage and deterring US aggression.
Ivashov asserted: "In order to withstand (the US)=20
we need not only a powerful economy, but also=20
real steps toward the restoration of the military=20
readiness of the army" (Strana.ru, 5 March 2008).
Vladimirov said Russia can avoid a war with US by=20
means of a "systematic and rapid provision of new=20
military power of the highest quality" (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 17 July 2007).
Unlike the Eurasianists, Ivashov also expressed=20
wariness that Russia has fallen behind China in=20
conventional military capabilities and asserted=20
that China will reach nuclear parity around=20
2015-2020. He said that Russia, "aside from=20
pressure from the West, may receive pressure...=20
from the East." He therefore calls for Russia to=20
"build its security based on the principle of the=20
balance of forces," though he also calls for=20
expanded participation in the Shanghai=20
Cooperation Organization and the Collective=20
Security Treaty Organization. (Strana.ru, 5 March 2008).
While seeing little room for direct compromise=20
with the US or NATO, Vladimirov advocates working=20
around them through "the governments and publics=20
of its key states, which sooner or later must=20
realize the necessity of changing their own=20
security policies, and then NATO's security=20
policy" (Rossiyskiye Vesti, 26 December 2007).
The concept of geopolitical autarkism was=20
developed by the philosopher Vadim Tsymburskiy,=20
senior fellow at the Institute of Philosophy of=20
the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the=20
political scientist Boris Mezhuyev, currently=20
chief editor of the journal Smysl and previously=20
the chief editor of the APN.ru, and has been=20
simplified and marketed to a wider audience by=20
Mikhail Yuryev, a prominent businessman and=20
former Duma vice speaker. (3) Other supporters=20
include Mikhail Remizov, director of the=20
Institute of National Strategy, and the Orthodox=20
author Natalya Irtenina. They have asserted that=20
Russian greatness depends upon maintaining its=20
identity as an intrinsically distinct=20
civilization from both the West and Asia.
According to a sympathetic review in the=20
left-nationalist magazine Politicheskiy Zhurnal,=20
understanding Tsymburskiy's treatise Island=20
Russia means "accenting the full territorial and=20
spiritual independence of (ethnic) Russian civilization" (9 July 2007).
Mezhuyev argued in an essay in left-nationalist=20
weekly Zavtra that "Russia should be an=20
independent civilizational and cultural unit of=20
the world, which does not depend on and is=20
separate from the European Union, and from China,=20
and from Islamic Asia, if something should=20
develop there in the near future" (17 October 2007).
Irtenina warned repeatedly of the need to defend=20
Russia from liberalism, which she referred to as=20
a "creeping reformatting of ancient civilization=20
and the destruction of its traditions," and also=20
as the "Masonic religion which created the US=20
empire" (Politicheskiy Zhurnal, 10 September 2007, 23 July 2007).
The scholarly autarkists do not regularly appear=20
in the media, but Yuryev has written columns for=20
Profil and several official and nonofficial=20
newspapers. Although there are no known ties=20
between Medvedev and the Autarkists, observers=20
have previously cited unnamed sources who claim=20
that Yuryev's views have been influential in the=20
Kremlin, even with President Putin (Ekho Moskvy,=20
16 June 2007; Russkiy Newsweek, 5 March 2006).
The autarkists position themselves in ideological=20
opposition both to Westernizers and Eurasianists.
Tsymburskiy stated that Western Europe "permits=20
the existence of Russia in the Western world's=20
backyard as a source of raw materials and cheap=20
labor," but it would never accept Russia as an=20
equal member of Euro-American civilization. He=20
also said that a hypothetical military victory=20
over the West would lead to "the dissolution of=20
the essence of Russia" into a reconstituted=20
Europe (Politicheskiy Zhurnal, 9 July 2007).
Although acknowledging that distinctions between=20
neo-Eurasianism and autarkism are less stark,=20
Tsymburskiy posited that Russia is not "a mixture=20
of European and Asian elements, the proportion of=20
which can change with the course of time," but an=20
"independent essence distinct from both the=20
European and Asian civilizational essences"=20
(Politicheskiy Zhurnal, 9 July 2007).
The autarkists are largely opposed to Russian=20
territorial expansion beyond the former Soviet borders.
According to a reviewer, Tsymburskiy has argued=20
that the task of Russian civilization today=20
consists in "holding up to the world the lantern=20
of Christian truths. Or, in the words of Boris=20
Mezhuyev, to accomplish a 'geocultural=20
expansion'.... not by the annexation of new=20
territories and not by merging with Europe in=20
some sort of double-breathing mutant organism,=20
but via the preservation of world Orthodoxy and=20
the further re-Christianization of the entire=20
world" (Politicheskiy Zhurnal, 9 July 2007).
Mezhuyev is also largely opposed to expansionism,=20
though he has argued that while the North=20
Caucasus should be given independence as Russian=20
protectorates, Ukraine and Belarus should be=20
incorporated into Russia, with Ukraine employing=20
federalism to defuse tensions between its regions (Zavtra, 17 October 2007).
Remizov has called for Russia to establish=20
customs, energy, and defense alliances with=20
Central Asian states, but to avoid strategic=20
alliances outside of the former Soviet space and=20
maintain neutrality in the "next world war."=20
Remizov advocates spinning off Chechnya and=20
Ingushetia as a protectorate, while incorporating=20
Belarus, eastern and southern Ukraine, and=20
Moldova's Dniester region into Russia. He also=20
supports "normalizing relations with Europe on=20
the basis of a clear demarcation of=20
civilizational boundaries and refraining from=20
mutual absorption" (Zavtra, 3 October 2007).
Both Tsymbursky and Mezhuyev favor a general turn=20
away from the West and reorientation inward toward Russia's regions.
Tsymbursky asserted that Russia's political=20
priorities should include a "reasonable=20
isolationism" politically, economic and spiritual=20
"autarkism, and a "farewell to the Western=20
orientation of the basic vector of political=20
efforts" in favor of a focus on Russia's=20
underdeveloped provinces (Politicheskiy Zhurnal, 9 July 2007).
Similarly, Mezhuyev asserted that Russia's=20
"resource potential should not be used in the=20
interests of geopolitical expansion," which "many=20
representatives of so-called big business,=20
closely tied with corrupted authorities," desire=20
for personal gain. He called instead for=20
"isolationism" and the "reorientation of these=20
resources to the task of internal development" (Zavtra, 17 October 2007).
Yuryev similarly favors neo-isolationism, but his=20
approach is distinct from Tsymbursky and Mezhuyev=20
in that it also incorporates elements similar to=20
Eurasianism in its focus on the external threat from the US.
Yuryev argued that "our confrontation with=20
America does not have an ideological character --=20
now for us it is simply a question of national=20
survival.... Why should our answer to 15 US=20
aircraft carriers be to build our own 20... after=20
all, we aren't striving for world hegemony, are=20
we?" Yuryev has argued that when Russia wishes to=20
confront the US, it should simply use its=20
stabilization fund to cause the dollar to collapse (Profil, 18 June 2007).
Yuryev also argued that Russia should consider a=20
military alliance with China against the US=20
(Profil, 16 January 2008). Outlook The=20
pragmatists' apparent ties to Medvedev suggest=20
that Russia may further tone down its rhetoric=20
and seek constructive engagement with the US on=20
some transnational issues, though Russia is=20
unlikely to back away from its opposition to=20
current US policy on missile defense or NATO=20
expansion. However, if bilateral relations=20
deteriorate because of international crises or=20
other reasons, the influence of the=20
ideology-driven groups could increase and push=20
Russia on a more anti-US course than it has followed under Putin.
References to Selected Foreign Policy Thinkers in=20
National Media 1 January 2006-15 April 2008
TV and Radio
National Newspapers and Magazines
Internet Media
Sergey Karaganov
Aleksandr Dugin
Leonid Ivashov
Mikhail Yuryev
Sergey Markov
Vyacheslav Nikonov
2361 (Integrum Database)
Some foreign policy thinkers appear frequently in=20
the media, though they have less exposure than=20
pro-Kremlin observers like Markov and Nikonov,=20
who promote Russia's official foreign policy line.
(1) For more on Karaganov, see the 30 May 2006=20
OSC Media Aid, Russia: Profile of Commentator=20
Sergey Karaganov (CEF20060530381006 ). For more=20
on the pragmatists' view of China, see the 6=20
September 2007 OSC Analysis, Russia: Foreign=20
Policy Thinkers Undaunted by Rising China (CEF20070906517001 ).
(2) For earlier assessments of Dugin, see the 3=20
May 2001 FBIS Analysis, "Eurasia" Movement Suits=20
Elites (CEF20010503000343 ) and the 15 November=20
2000 FBIS Analysis, Dugin Position Sign of=20
Kremlin-Putin Ties (CEF20001115000341 ).
(3) For more on Yuryev, see the 22 June 2007 OSC=20
Analysis, Russian Commentators Debate 'Besieged=20
Fortress' Rhetoric (CEF20070622324001 ).
US Embassy Moscow
Interview with U.S. Ambassador to the Russian=20
Federation William J. Burns with Aleksey=20
Venediktov at Ekho Moskvy Radio Station
William J. Burns, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Ekho Moskvy Radio Station, Moscow, May 6, 2008
VENEDIKTOV: Mr. Ambassador, you are leaving for=20
Washington because you were nominated recently to=20
be Under Secretary of State for Political=20
Affairs. What do you think of the relationship=20
between the U.S. and Russia over past three years=20
=AD did the relationship improve or decline?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: We have a very complicated=20
relationship today, the United States and Russia,=20
which I think is a mixture of cooperation and=20
competition. There is certainly no shortage of=20
difficulties between us, but I think as President=20
Bush and President Putin discussed in Sochi a=20
month ago, there are also some very important=20
areas of common ground. The one thing I am more=20
convinced of today than when I arrived three=20
years ago as Ambassador, is that our relationship=20
matters enormously to both of us. And how well or=20
how poorly we manage our relationship matters a lot to the rest of the worl=
VENEDIKTOV: What legacy are you leaving your=20
successor? Is it an easier or more difficult=20
situation than that which you received from Ambassador Vershbow?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: What our two presidents agreed=20
to in Sochi a month ago, when they met in their=20
last summit as presidents, is a useful foundation=20
for the relationship. It doesn't pretend that we=20
don't have difficulties, because we do, but it=20
highlights some specific areas =AD nuclear=20
cooperation, economic cooperation =AD in which we=20
really do have a lot in common. Despite our=20
difficulties, it offers a constructive roadmap in the years ahead.
VENEDIKTOV: Do you think that this year, before=20
President Bush leaves office, a post-START agreement will be signed?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I honestly don't know whether=20
it will be signed this year. All I can say is=20
that the United States is committed to reaching a=20
legally binding post-START agreement with Russia.=20
We want to make as much progress as we can this=20
year. The START treaty expires at the end of=20
2009, so we should have a sense of urgency about=20
this issue, because it is important not just in=20
the interest of strategic stability between the=20
United States and Russia, but also because of the=20
signal it sends to the rest of the world at a=20
time when one of the biggest challenges facing=20
the international community is the spread of=20
nuclear weapons. It is a sign of responsible=20
leadership from the United States and Russia.
VENEDIKTOV: Has the U.S. actually agreed that=20
this is going to be a legally binding document?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: Yes.
VENEDIKTOV: You are going to be the sixth=20
Ambassador that I ask this same question and I am=20
afraid I will get the same answer: what about Jackson-Vanik?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I'm sorry you have to keep=20
asking that question, because the repeal of=20
Jackson-Vanik for Russia is long overdue. The=20
original purpose behind Jackson-Vanik 30 years=20
ago has long since disappeared. What I am=20
convinced of is that as Russia moves towards full=20
membership in the World Trade Organization =AD=20
which I hope and believe will take place in 2008=20
and which the United States very actively=20
supports =AD that Russian's accession to the WTO=20
will create a compelling case in the American=20
Congress to repeal Jackson-Vanik. Because then=20
the reality will be that American businesses=20
cannot take advantage of the new more favorable=20
terms of trade if Jackson-Vanik is still in place.
VENEDIKTOV: We all know that one of the barriers=20
to Russia's accession to the WTO is Russia's=20
relationship with Georgia. We also know that the=20
Speaker of the Georgian Parliament is in=20
Washington now asking for help against Russia.=20
What is your view, what is Washington's view, on=20
the very difficult and historically complicated=20
relations between Russia and Georgia, and of=20
course I am referring to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
AMBASSADOR BURNS: You are certainly right that it=20
is a very complicated situation. The United=20
States has made clear its support for the=20
territorial integrity of Georgia. We have not=20
been shy about expressing our concerns about some=20
recent Russian steps which call into question, in=20
our view, Georgia's territorial integrity. At the=20
same time, the United States and our European=20
partners have been very clear that there is no=20
military solution to the problems of Abkhazia and=20
South Ossetia. That is a message that we have=20
reinforced in all directions. We firmly believe=20
that there needs to be a diplomatic resolution=20
[to the conflict] which takes into account the=20
concerns of all parties. We are going to do=20
everything we can to work with the parties, the=20
European Union, Russia and Georgia, to try to=20
return to a diplomatic process and reduce tensions.
VENEDIKTOV: [Georgian] President Saakashvili=20
expressed his opinion that Russian peacekeepers=20
should be replaced by peacekeepers of another=20
nationality because they are no longer an=20
uninvolved third-party: Russia is now a party to=20
the conflict. What does Washington think?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: Our view has been a very=20
straightforward one. All the parties should do=20
everything they can to reduce tensions. There are=20
diplomatic mechanisms which exist to help resolve=20
the problems in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.=20
That is what we think we should focus on.
VENEDIKTOV: You just reminded me of former=20
Secretary of State General Colin Powell. When I=20
had him in this very studio a number of years=20
ago, when he was Secretary of State, I asked him=20
not to give me a diplomat's answer, but a=20
general's answer. He told me that "at this moment=20
I can only give you a diplomat's answer.."
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I have a lot of respect for=20
Colin Powell; I used to work for him.
VENEDIKTOV: Of course, you know how we journalists hate diplomatic evasiven=
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I admire your journalistic skill.
VENEDIKTOV: I interviewed Russian Foreign=20
Minister Sergey Lavrov in Sochi right after the=20
two presidents met. He made the statement that=20
Russia will do everything possible to not allow=20
Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. As a follow up=20
question, the majority of the population of the=20
Russian Federation where you now serve as=20
Ambassador is basically [opposed] to what Lavrov=20
described as the "pulling" of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Can you commen=
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I have no doubt about the=20
strength of views in Russia on the question of=20
NATO enlargement. We have a clear difference over=20
this issue. It is the position of the NATO=20
alliance, not just Washington, there should be a=20
pathway to membership in the future for Ukraine=20
and Georgia. That's what the NATO summit in=20
Bucharest decided. There was no decision made in=20
Bucharest about the next practical step towards=20
membership, the so-called Membership Action Plan.=20
The process of membership can often be a long and=20
complicated one; it depends on steps that the=20
countries that want to become members take and=20
the will of their people and a lot obviously=20
depends on decisions made in the NATO alliance.=20
But you're right, it's the decision of NATO that=20
there should be a pathway to membership. And that=20
is an area of difference between the United=20
States and Russia, and NATO and Russia, today.
VENEDIKTOV: Do you think that at the April [2009]=20
Anniversary Summit in Strasburg there will be an=20
offer of MAP to Georgia and Ukraine?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I don't know. Certainly the=20
United States has made clear its view that there=20
should be [an invitation to Georgia and Ukraine=20
on MAP], but I do not know what the NATO alliance is going to decide.
VENEDIKTOV: Today a U.S. delegation will be in=20
Warsaw to discuss missile defense. This is=20
another area of difference between us, however=20
the Kremlin told us that there were some=20
proposals made by the United States to alleviate=20
some Russian concerns and to offer some=20
transparency. Would you comment on the proposals=20
that were made by the United States?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I would be glad to comment on=20
this in general. We know that Russia continues to=20
have objections to our plans with the Poles and=20
the Czechs, but we have worked hard together =AD=20
the United States and Russia =AD in recent months=20
to try to address those concerns; both to try to=20
provide reassurance about what those programs=20
would involve and also to keep the door open to=20
broader cooperation on missile defense between=20
Russia, the United States, and Europe in the=20
years ahead. The kinds of transparency and=20
confidence building measures we proposed include=20
the following: it would include the ongoing work=20
of liaison officers at sites in Poland and the=20
Czech Republic, it would include technical=20
measures that would provide some reassurance=20
about activities at those sites, it could include=20
a discussion about when to actually deploy=20
interceptors and to try to connect that to the=20
actual emergence of long-range missile=20
capabilities that might threaten us from Iran or=20
from other states. Such steps obviously are=20
subject to the agreement of the host countries =AD=20
Poland and the Czech Republic. There are=20
obviously a lot of details to be worked out and=20
it is a complicated process. But I think it is=20
possible to reach an understanding which would at=20
least help ease some of Russia's concerns.
VENEDIKTOV: We know that President Putin put=20
forward an initiative for a global missile=20
defense that would include the Qabala radar=20
station in Azerbaijan and also antennas in=20
[unclear]. However, journalists don't know the=20
U.S. response to that initiative. Can you comment?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: President Putin at the=20
Kennebunkport Summit with President Bush last=20
summer made some interesting proposals for=20
broader cooperation on missile defense. In Sochi=20
last month, our two presidents -- in their=20
declaration -- made clear our continuing interest=20
in broader cooperation involving Russia, the=20
United States, and Europe on missile defense. So=20
I hope very much in the future that we will be=20
able to take advantage of capabilities that all=20
of us have to help deal with common threats for=20
long-range missiles. Even if the focus right now=20
is on what measures might be taken to help=20
address some of the concerns that Russia has=20
raised about plans in Poland and the Czech Republic.
VENEDIKTOV: So I guess the answer is "No."
AMBASSADOR BURNS: No, the answer is that we hope=20
very much to be able to take advantage of=20
capabilities that all of us have =AD Russia, the=20
United States, and Europe -- to deal with common threats.
VENEDIKTOV: How would you characterize the=20
cooperation between Russia and the United States=20
on the Iranian nuclear problem?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: The United States and Russia=20
have worked constructively together on the=20
Iranian nuclear problem, along with our European=20
partners and China. The problem remains a very=20
difficult one. We have had tactical differences=20
from time to time about how to best approach the=20
problem. But I think we share the same strategic=20
goal, which is to ensure that Iran lives up to=20
its obligations to the international community,=20
that it addresses the concerns of the=20
International Atomic Energy Agency, and that it=20
meets its obligations to the UN Security Council.=20
We have cooperated, the United States and Russia,=20
on a two-track strategy. One track makes clear=20
the consequences for Iran of not meeting its=20
obligations to the international community. The=20
other track makes clear the possibilities if Iran=20
meets its obligations and demonstrates that all=20
it is interested in is a peaceful nuclear program.
VENEDIKTOV: Is a war [with Iran] possible this year?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: The United States has made it=20
very clear that our commitment is to a diplomatic=20
resolution. We want to work with Russia, with our=20
European partners, and with China to try to bring that about.
VENEDIKTOV: Mr. Ambassador, over the last 8 years=20
do you think the relationship between Russia and=20
the United States was based on shared interests=20
or the good personal relations between our two presidents?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: As I said before, I think our=20
relationship today is a mixture of cooperation=20
and competition. There have been good relations=20
between our two presidents despite obvious policy=20
differences, and I think that is a good thing.=20
But it seems to me there is a need for more=20
structure in the relationship. You remember in=20
the 1990's there existed the so-called=20
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which dealt very=20
systematically with a whole range of issues in=20
our relationship: economic issues, security=20
issues, and diplomatic issues. I am not=20
suggesting that we resurrect something like the=20
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, but I think one of=20
the challenges for the new Russian administration=20
=AD as well as for the new American administration=20
=AD is going to be to try to revive systematic cooperation and structures.
VENEDIKTOV: So can you say that on the Russian=20
side Commission will be chaired by Prime Minister=20
Putin and on the U.S. side by Mr. Al Gore?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: I am not sure that we are going=20
to revive that commission, but what we have tried=20
to do over the last year is rebuild some of the=20
structure. For example, the 2+2 mechanism between=20
our Foreign and Defense Ministers, which has met=20
twice in recent months in Moscow, and the new=20
Economic Dialogue between our governments, which=20
just met for the first time last week in=20
Washington. Those are the types of mechanisms which help both of us.
VENEDIKTOV: Both the United States and Russia are=20
Presidential Republics. What does Washington =AD=20
the Congress and the Administration =AD think about=20
newly- elected President Medvedev? What are your=20
expectations of the new president?
AMBASSADOR BURNS: First, as President Putin made=20
clear in Sochi, the Russian Constitution accords=20
the president the responsibility for foreign=20
policy and managing relations with other=20
countries. President Bush looks forward to=20
working with President Medvedev. As the Strategic=20
Framework Declaration in Sochi outlined, we hope=20
to work together on a number of important areas=20
of common ground and we hope to work together to=20
manage, as best we can, the differences between=20
us. The issues between us are too important for=20
there to be a pause in relations as both of us go through transitions.
VENEDIKTOV: The last question, Mr. Ambassador:=20
journalists here in Russia follow the U.S.=20
Presidential campaign very closely. We follow all=20
of the candidates =AD Hilary Clinton, Barack Obama,=20
and John McCain =AD and all of them are very sharp=20
critics of Russia's foreign policy and of Russia=20
in general. Should we expect the new U.S. President will be tougher on Russ=
AMBASSADOR BURNS: It is obvious that there are a=20
lot concerns across Washington about our=20
relationship today. I think the reality that any=20
American administration =AD whomever is our next=20
president =AD will acknowledge and deal with is=20
that Russia matters in some very important ways=20
and that our relationship matters. Russia is the=20
only nuclear power in the world today comparable=20
to the United States. It is the biggest producer=20
of oil and gas in the world today. It is a=20
permanent member of the Security Council. We=20
don't have the luxury of ignoring one another.=20
Ours is going to be a complicated relationship=20
for some years to come, but it is a very=20
important relationship and it is worth working hard on.
VENEDIKTOV: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Vremya Novostei
No 79
May 8, 2008
Author: Ivan Sukhov
[Russia's reluctance (or is it inability?) to formulate its
objectives in the Caucasus makes Georgia wary.]
Dmitry Medvedev's inauguration took place with a dramatic
aggravation of the situation in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict
area in the background.
Analysis of what is happening in Abkhazia (and South Ossetia)
is difficult because of external factors. The first factor comes
down to appearance of a new president in Russia, the second to the
forthcoming parliamentary election in Georgia (scheduled for May
Vladimir Putin did not exactly make life easier for Medvedev
with his order to advance cooperation with de facto authorities of
the self-proclaimed republics. Informally, interaction with
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali had always been quite energetic but Putin
had it officially legalized in standard acts. Needless to say,
Georgia hit the roof. Even the Russian Foreign Ministry recently
joined the chorus of Russian politicians and the military claiming
that Georgia was making preparations for a war to settle the
territorial conflicts and that Russia would be compelled to defend
its citizens residing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The ominous rhetoric is reiterated by incidents with Georgian
drones shot down in Abkhazia and reinforcement of the Russian
peacekeeping personnel in the conflict area.
Georgia is leery. It always is when Russia increases
activeness in conflict areas but leaves the involved parties
completely in the dark concerning its true program objectives.
Absence of these objectives in the meantime is confirmed by the
Russian Foreign Ministry's taciturn response to the idea of
establishing Russian military protectorate Abkhazian Foreign
Minister Sergei Shamba advanced. The Foreign Ministry merely said
that Russia prefers other forms of cooperation and left it at
Russia Profile
May 7, 2008
Too Alien for Europe
The Relationship Between Russia and the EU Has Reached a Stalemate
Comment by Georgy Bovt
In 1994, President Boris Yeltsin signed the=20
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the=20
European Union on the Greek island of Corfu. If=20
he could foresee the difficulties his successors=20
would confront ten years after the agreement took=20
effect in 1997, when the time would come for=20
making a new treaty, he would be very upset. At=20
that time, only 15 states were members of the EU,=20
and it took just a few months of the experts=92=20
=93pure work time=94 to draw up the agreement.
The agreement expired in December 2007.=20
Negotiations on a new one, however, have not even=20
begun. Both sides keep pretending that nothing=20
serious is really going on =AD after all, the old=20
agreement is automatically renewed. However, in=20
practice everyone understands that the=20
relationship between the EU and Russia has=20
reached a dead end, and so far nobody knows how to get out of it.
For over a year now, Moscow and the EU have been=20
unable to start negotiating a new agreement=20
because one of the EU member states was blocking=20
the way forward. For a long time, it was Poland.=20
The reason behind the impediment was a commercial=20
argument with Russia concerning Polish meat=20
imports: Moscow accused Warsaw of importing =93God=20
knows what=94 from third countries into Russia as=20
Polish meat. Russia banned all Polish meat=20
imports because they did not comply with the=20
sanitary code. At the time, the interference of=20
the European Commission representatives did not=20
bring the sides any closer to reaching a=20
compromise: either the European commissioners=20
were not too insistent, or the Polish were too=20
stubborn. As a result, Moscow and Warsaw were=20
left one-on-one, and finally reached an agreement=20
after a new government came into power in Poland=20
that was less hostile toward Russia. And Moscow=20
simply lifted the embargo on Polish meat imports.
Both sides understand that the Polish veto can be=20
imposed again under a new pretense anytime. There=20
are enough other irritating issues between Poland=20
and Russia. In particular, Poland is not happy=20
with the construction plans for the =93North=20
Stream=94 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. The=20
pipeline will bypass Poland, and thus deprive it=20
of a significant amount of gas transit payments.=20
Ecological arguments are also added: according to=20
the Polish side, the pipeline potentially=20
threatens the entire Baltic Sea, while there is=20
already German chemical ammunition that has been=20
buried on the bottom after World War II.
Some political forces in Poland also demand=20
repentance from Russia for Joseph Stalin=92s=20
repressions, and in particular for the mass=20
execution of Polish officers outside of Katyn.=20
This demand alone is unlikely to be brought forth=20
as a formal reason for vetoing Russia-EU=20
negations; however, it reflects the sad state of=20
the Russian-Polish relationship, when almost=20
anything can be used as a pretense for a veto.=20
For example, a number of Polish politicians have=20
already demanded that Russia not stand in the way=20
of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. Others=20
relate the start of the negotiations to Moscow=92s=20
ceasing to support Abkhazian separatists.
Other Eastern European EU members are no less=20
=93creative=94 when it comes to demanding various=20
things of Russia. As soon as Poland removed its=20
objections, Lithuania expressed its own,=20
concerning a number of controversial points. In=20
particular, the Lithuanian =93ultimatum=94 mentions=20
the oil pipeline =93Druzhba=94 (Friendship), built=20
during the Soviet era. After yet another accident=20
with the rather worn pipeline, Russia completely=20
stopped using it to pump oil to Lithuania, and=20
then began using it again for transporting very=20
limited amounts. Lithuania demands that the oil=20
supply is resumed in full, but that is not all.=20
The list of demands, presented by a number of=20
Lithuanian politicians, also mentions Abkhazia:=20
they insist that Russia observe Georgia=92s=20
territorial integrity and stop supporting Sukhumi=92s separatist aspiration=
And, finally, the most painful fact: Latvia, as=20
well as Lithuania, is preparing a multi-billion=20
dollar bill for Moscow as compensation for the=20
losses incurred during the period of =93Soviet=20
occupation,=94 beginning in 1940 and on to the=20
consequences of the Chernobyl power plant=20
accident. This includes ecological damages (for=20
example, damages caused by the Soviet Army in all=20
the years of its presence in the republic), and=20
compensations for victims of Stalin=92s repressions=20
and deportations, as well as many other items.
The potential list of complaints that can be used=20
against Moscow by a number of other Eastern=20
European countries can be practically endless.=20
The list is so long that in the eyes of Russian=20
diplomats, that there is not that much motivation=20
left to take the path of literally fulfilling all=20
the new requirements. As soon as some=20
requirements get fulfilled, new ones are bound to=20
appear immediately. So far, it is hard to imagine=20
practical negotiations between Moscow and Riga,=20
for example, about the monetary =93compensations.=94
So where is the way out? It clearly lies outside=20
the context of a formal complaint discussion. It=20
lies in the context of much wider interaction=20
based on the search for common values. As soon as=20
there is a mutual value platform for dialogue =AD=20
the =93damned past,=94 as well as the monetary=20
compensations, will be forgotten. Otherwise,=20
Russia and the EU will not take one step forward=20
on the path of framing their relationship with an=20
agreement--it will still be blocked by those who=20
consider Russia to be =93too alien=94 for Europe.
Moscow News
May 7, 2008
Memories Live Forever=85
By Daria Chernyshova
"The war was everywhere. We lived in a small=20
village close to the Finnish border while Dad was=20
on active service, serving as a colonel and=20
fighting for our Motherland. My Mum and I had to=20
leave our home for a safer place not to be caught=20
by the ravages of the war. Father sent a soldier=20
to help us. But war is unpredictable; you never=20
know what may happen next. My father was unaware=20
of our departure because he never received our=20
letter. When he returned home, he found nothing=20
left in its place. Only a shell-crater adorned=20
the landscape. The shock of the moment made him=20
desire revenge against his enemies, thinking he=20
would never see his wife and daughter again."
That is the story of my grand=ADmother's childhood.=20
How many such stories do we hear from those who=20
went through the Second World War? Thousands upon=20
thousands, each family was torn, everyone was=20
touched by this common sorrow. The Great=20
Patriotic War left its scar on Russia and each=20
year it is celebrated for the heroism and of the=20
Russian people, who suffered such losses.
Today, the events of World War II seem to be more history that reality.
It is studied at school and universities like=20
other subjects. But whenever a Russian faces this=20
topic a flow of patriotism streams out. It is a=20
bitter sort of treasure that we must never lose.=20
That is why there are lots of monuments around=20
the country to commemorate this great event of Russian history.
On the eve of Victory Day, the Russian capital is=20
adorned with decorations and the festive spirit runs through the city.
Since 2005, the so-called Saint George ribbon has=20
been a conspicuous item. From April 24 until May=20
12 people are given these gold and brown ribbons,=20
which should be displayed in public - on clothes=20
or cars, for example. Though you may consider it=20
silly, lots of people are happy to participate.=20
The slogan is "I remember, I am proud," and that=20
is very true. The ribbon has a way of uniting us,=20
and everybody seems to understand its importance=20
as a tribute to those who fought in the fierce struggle for our Motherland.
It is important to remember the veterans who=20
risked everything, even their lives, to beat back=20
the wave of fascism. This sentiment has become=20
very popular and is regarded as an integral part=20
of Victory Day celebrations everywhere: it covers=20
approximately all the regions of the Russian=20
Federation, several European countries, such as=20
Great Britain, Italy and Greece.
Traditionally, on May 9 Moscow holds a Victory=20
parade on the Red Square. This year, the clouds=20
will be driven away and elite flying=20
squadrons will show off their extraordinary=20
maneuvers; tanks and other military equipment=20
will also be on display for the first time in 40=20
years, and the new Russian president will express=20
his gratitude on behalf of all Russians to the=20
veterans of the Great Patriotic War.
I think I am lucky to live with my great=20
grandfather - he introduced me to the ritual of=20
visiting the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and=20
leaving flowers. Though the number of people who=20
witnessed the difficulties of war and who fought=20
for their Motherland is declining, we will never=20
forget the Anniversary of Victory and Russia's=20
incredible contribution to this moment in history.
Moscow Times
May 8, 2008
Remembering Victory Day in a Different Way
By David Marples
David Marples, a professor of Russian history at=20
the University of Alberta, Canada, is the author=20
of "The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991."
May 9 marks the 63rd anniversary of Victory Day,=20
the day that Stalin set aside to commemorate the=20
end of the World War II in Europe. The fighting=20
had ended by May 5, and the Western allies=20
accepted Germany's surrender three days later.=20
But the Soviet Union opted to recognize the=20
following day. Victory Day, as its name suggests,=20
was intended originally to celebrate the Soviet=20
victory over fascism. Today, it is used to=20
remember those who took part in the greatest=20
conflict in history and those who sacrificed=20
their lives in the Red Army. Very few of them remain alive today.
Though the government of former President=20
Vladimir Putin has continued to incorporate the=20
war into national consciousness -- and presumably=20
President Dmitry Medvedev will continue the=20
practice -- propaganda has always taken=20
precedence over any quest for historical=20
accuracy. The only difference is that the=20
official number of Soviet dead has risen -- from=20
Nikita Khrushchev's original estimate of 20=20
million to about 32 million combined civilian and=20
military deaths, which is roughly equivalent to=20
the current population of Canada.
But the official narrative in the Soviet era=20
contained several distortions and even glaring=20
omissions, some of which were continued during the Putin era.
First, the term coined by the Soviet leadership=20
of "Great Patriotic War" denotes the beginning of=20
the conflict on June 22, 1941, when the German=20
Wehrmacht, with more than 3 million troops,=20
invaded the Soviet Union. But World War II broke=20
out on Sept. 1, 1939, when Hitler's troops=20
attacked Poland. Stalin watched the conflict for=20
16 days before sending in his own troops to=20
occupy the eastern regions of the Polish state,=20
ostensibly to liberate Ukrainians and=20
Belarussians living there. The subsequent Soviet=20
annexation of eastern Poland, the Baltic states,=20
Bessarabia (located in modern-day Moldova) and=20
northern Bukovina (located in western Ukraine=20
along the border with Romania) had been carefully=20
elaborated in a secret protocol, the=20
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, between the two=20
dictators. From late 1939 to the summer of 1941,=20
the new Soviet rulers deported some 400,000=20
Poles, Ukrainians and Belarussians from their homeland on various pretexts.
Stalin was shocked by Hitler's decision to break=20
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and this was evident=20
not only from his lack of preparation and refusal=20
to listen to warnings from Winston Churchill and=20
his own spies about the forthcoming German=20
assault, but also from official propaganda that=20
referred to a "treacherous attack" by Hitler. It=20
could only have been considered treachery if the=20
Soviet Union were attacked by its own ally. The=20
Soviet Union thus bears some responsibility for=20
allowing Hitler a free hand in Western Europe,=20
though some historians argue that he had little=20
choice given the reluctance of the British and=20
French to form an alliance with the Soviet side.
Both Stalin and his chief general, Marshal Georgy=20
Zhukov, were always prepared to sacrifice troops=20
for territorial gains. Stalin was never=20
interested in hearing casualty lists. Rather, in=20
the early part of the war he ordered armies to=20
remain firm as they were being encircled by the=20
German Blitzkrieg operations resulting in the=20
capture of more than 5.5 million prisoners of=20
war, many of whom died in captivity. Front=20
commanders who retreated were shot. By 1942, more=20
than 77,000 Soviet citizens had been executed by=20
the NKVD for "cowardice" and "treachery."
These tactics were put into legal form with two=20
decrees: Order 270, issued on Aug. 16, 1941, made=20
it a criminal offense for any soldier to=20
surrender; and Order 227, applied on July 28,=20
1942, declared that any commander retreating=20
without express permission would be tried before=20
a military tribunal. This policy was known=20
informally as "Not a step backward!" To ensure=20
that such demands were met, the NKVD dug trenches=20
behind Soviet armies, filled with sharpshooters=20
who would dispense summary justice to any=20
soldiers who might feel inclined to flee from the Germans.
As the defeats turned to victories after the=20
Battle of Stalingrad (from August 1942 to Feb. 2,=20
1943), Stalin's generals ordered rapid advances=20
even during spring flooding, and they sent troops=20
en masse across major rivers. Hundreds drowned=20
crossing the Dnepr River to recapture Kiev. No=20
one ever explained to Soviet citizens why their=20
army lost three times more than the Germans. In=20
1945, Stalin ordered his front commanders Zhukov=20
and Marshal Ivan Konev to race for Berlin, while=20
Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's troops advanced to the north of the city.
Berlin was duly captured, but the losses were=20
extraordinarily high. The Soviet army, with=20
Stalin's encouragement, went on the rampage in=20
former German and Austrian territories, raping,=20
pilfering and murdering. In the Soviet Union's=20
western borderlands, new wars broke out with=20
local insurgents that lasted into the 1950s in Ukraine and the Baltic state=
Though Soviet writings focused constantly on=20
German atrocities in the postwar period, there=20
was never any specific information about=20
Germany's execution of the Holocaust on Soviet=20
territory. Rather, official Soviet reports=20
focused on prisoners liberated from Nazi camps=20
without specifying the Jewish identity of the=20
victims. By the late 1940s, Stalin had begun his=20
own campaign of anti-Semitism. He had no wish to=20
turn his new Jewish enemies into victims; in=20
fact, members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist League were the first to be target=
The Soviet Union also consistently denied the=20
NKVD's execution of some 22,000 Polish officers=20
at Katyn, Tver (Kalinin) and Kharkov in 1940. It=20
never explained satisfactorily why, after=20
encouraging the Polish resistance movement, which=20
was called the Polish Home Army, to mount an=20
uprising in Warsaw at the start of August 1944,=20
it allowed the First Belarussian Front of=20
Rokossovsky to observe the battle from the east=20
bank of the Vistula without offering any aid.=20
Stalin even refused Allied planes the right to=20
land and refuel on Soviet territory in order to=20
assist the Poles. The Germans not only crushed=20
the insurgents, but they destroyed Warsaw afterward.
The Soviet Union emerged from the war as a=20
superpower. But this doesn't excuse the fact that=20
official Soviet propaganda ignored the crucial=20
role that Western aid to the Soviet Union, such=20
as lend-lease, or the opening of the Western=20
front -- albeit somewhat delayed -- played in the=20
Soviet and Allied victory. Stalin was given the=20
benefit of the doubt by U.S. President Franklin=20
D. Roosevelt -- even to the extent of allowing=20
the Soviets to enter Berlin first. This, one=20
could argue, precipitated the Cold War. Stalin=20
outmaneuvered Roosevelt and Churchill at the=20
Yalta conference in February 1945 and gained=20
control over East European states. Over the next=20
three years, Stalin imposed Communist regimes that would last for four deca=
These events render May 9 a mixed blessing. The=20
sacrifice of the Soviet people in defeating=20
Hitler and fascism should never be forgotten. At=20
the same time, however, the current Russian=20
leaders should not forget or gloss over the=20
callousness and cruelty of the regime that ruled=20
their country during the war years.
New York Times
May 7, 2008
Books of The Times
The Making of Yeltsin, His Boldness and Flaws
By BILL KELLER
Bill Keller, the executive editor of The New York=20
Times, is a former chief of the Moscow bureau.
A Life
By Timothy J. Colton
Illustrated. 616 pages. Basic Books. $35.
In the introduction to his biography of Boris N.=20
Yeltsin, Timothy J. Colton lists more than 100 of=20
the similes and analogies that have been applied=20
over the years to Yeltsin, among them martyr and=20
jester, Lincoln and Nixon, Alexander the Great=20
and Ivan the Terrible, Hamlet and Hercules, bear,=20
bulldog and boa constrictor. The wry list is an=20
early signal that Mr. Colton knows he is treading=20
into a subject that has inspired rival mythologies.
To some Western academics and more than a few=20
Russians, Yeltsin=92s role was almost wholly=20
destructive. Interrupting Mikhail S. Gorbachev=92s=20
cautious reforms of the Communist Party and the=20
Soviet state, Yeltsin smashed both institutions.=20
He sold off the country=92s resource-rich=20
industrial heritage to a few moguls in a corrupt=20
insider auction. His economic =93shock therapy=94=20
plunged the country into a period of falling=20
output and runaway inflation that Mr. Colton=20
likens to the Great Depression. He unleashed the=20
army against a mutinous parliament and waged a=20
brutal, scorched-earth war against separatist Chechnya.
For years after Yeltsin crashed onto the=20
political scene, the Gorbachev-infatuated West=20
was overwhelmingly dismissive. Mr. Colton, a=20
professor of government and director of Russian=20
studies at Harvard and the author of a grand=20
history of the city of Moscow, cops to being one=20
of those early dismissers. But he declares up=20
front that his research brought him around to the=20
view that Yeltsin, while flawed and enigmatic, was a hero.
=93As a democratizer,=94 Mr. Colton writes, =93he is in=20
the company of Nelson Mandela, Lech Walesa,=20
Mikhail Gorbachev and Vaclav Havel. It is his due=20
even when allowance is made for his blind spots and mistakes.=94
Mr. Colton is not the first to undertake=20
Yeltsin=92s redemption. Leon Aron=92s =93Yeltsin: A=20
Revolutionary Life=94 took up the case for Yeltsin=20
in 2000, as his presidency was petering out, and=20
his popularity was at a low ebb. But Mr. Colton=20
has used the extra time to excellent effect. He=20
has mined declassified Kremlin transcripts;=20
fact-checked many memoirs; conducted extensive=20
interviews with participants, including Yeltsin,=20
shortly before his death last year; and=20
synthesized a story that anyone curious about=20
contemporary Russia will find illuminating. And=20
though this is densely researched scholarship,=20
Mr. Colton writes a fluid narrative that only=20
occasionally wanders into the briar patch of academic-speak.
Yeltsin=92s grievance against the Communists began=20
before he was born, in an all-too-common history=20
of family heartbreak that Mr. Colton pieces=20
together with a good deal of original reporting.=20
The Yeltsins were dispossessed for the bourgeois=20
crime of having built a farm, mill and=20
blacksmithing business. Yeltsin=92s grandfather=20
died a broken man. His father was charged with=20
the catch-all crime of =93anti-Soviet agitation and=20
propaganda=94 for grousing at his job on a=20
construction site, and sent to a forced-labor camp for three years.
When Yeltsin joined the Communist Party, it was=20
not out of devotion to the professed ideals but=20
because a party card was a requirement for=20
promotion to chief engineer in the construction=20
industry. And when he moved into the hierarchy,=20
he was already a man who chafed at party=20
orthodoxy. No radical, he =93nibbled at the edges=20
of what was admissible,=94 Mr. Colton writes,=20
pushing for market prices in the local farm=20
bazaars, encouraging entrepreneurial initiative=20
in the workplace, complaining that the top-down system smothered self-relia=
In his moderation he was at first rather like Mr.=20
Gorbachev, Yeltsin=92s exact contemporary (the two=20
were born 29 days apart, in 1931), his sponsor=20
for a time, but ultimately his foil and nemesis.=20
Mr. Colton nicely sums up the two men=20
metaphorically: Yeltsin is feline, with an=20
instinct for the great and unexpected leap; Mr.=20
Gorbachev is canine, =93trainable, tied to the=20
known and to the previously rewarded.=94
Mr. Gorbachev promoted Yeltsin to be Moscow party=20
boss, but soon came to see him as an impetuous=20
showboat. Yeltsin saw Mr. Gorbachev as a=20
vacillating windbag, and made little effort to=20
hide it. He infuriated his party leader by=20
complaining about Mrs. Gorbachev=92s meddling in=20
Moscow affairs. They clashed in the Politburo=20
over Yeltsin=92s populist jibes at the privileges of party leaders.
The decisive break came in October 1987 when=20
Yeltsin, in a disjointed speech to a (closed)=20
party plenum, declared that people were losing=20
faith in reforms and accused Mr. Gorbachev of=20
tolerating a personality cult. Mr. Gorbachev=20
orchestrated a ritual humiliation and demotion,=20
but half a year later the audacious outcast=20
seized a more public moment =AD a conference of=20
5,000 party delegates =AD to repeat his broadside,=20
assuring both his permanent estrangement from the=20
party and his status as a popular hero.
Shrewdly, Yeltsin recast himself as the champion=20
of the Russian republic =AD the heart of the Soviet=20
Union =AD and campaigned for a seat in a new=20
federal Congress of People=92s Deputies. Mr.=20
Gorbachev chose to enter the congress in an=20
uncontested seat reserved for party leaders. His=20
unwillingness to subject himself to a popular=20
vote (which, at the time, he probably could have=20
won) was, Mr. Colton recognizes, =93a blunder of=20
biblical proportions.=94 Yeltsin sailed into the=20
parliament despite the Communists=92 best efforts,=20
and the tide of credibility had shifted decisively his way.
Mr. Gorbachev=92s last gambit, shoring up the=20
Soviet leadership with hard-line appointees,=20
backfired when several tried to overthrow him.=20
That ham-handed coup gave Yeltsin his famous=20
tank-top photo op and his ultimate triumph.
Once he won the Kremlin, Yeltsin began drinking=20
heavily. Mr. Colton concludes that while=20
Yeltsin=92s drinking was a distraction and an=20
embarrassment, it did not critically influence his decisions as president.
=93No sensible historian would reduce Ataturk=92s or=20
Churchill=92s career to his drinking escapades,=94=20
Mr. Colton writes, generously. The booze did,=20
however, ruin Yeltsin=92s health; he had at least=20
four heart attacks before bypass surgery.
The last half of the book has Yeltsin confronting=20
the blank slate of post-Communist Russia. His=20
three highly improvisational terms as Russian=20
president were marked by periods of political=20
gridlock, government by decree and constant=20
intrigues, including a near-impeachment. His=20
crash economic program, which Russians joked was=20
all shock and no therapy, was meant to unleash=20
entrepreneurial energy. But it also unleashed=20
colossal avarice and corruption, along with five years of economic misery.
In defense, Mr. Colton writes, =93By the day=20
Yeltsin called it quits in 1999, the cradle of=20
state socialism boasted a market economy of=20
sorts,=94 inflation had been subdued, economic growth rebounded.
=93Reforming the system from within, as Gorbachev=20
meant to do,=94 he writes, =93was a respectable=20
choice. Heading for the exits was a cleaner and better one.=94
Within this democratizer =AD whom Mr. Colton ranks=20
alongside Mr. Mandela =AD there resided a deeply=20
Russian and sometimes ruthless fear of=20
instability. He rebuffed entreaties from his=20
liberal supporters to uproot the K.G.B. Indeed,=20
in his appointments he often reached for young=20
security apparatchiks, men he regarded as possessing =93steel backbone.=94
Most of these securocrats he discarded when he=20
grew disenchanted or needed a scapegoat. But the=20
last in the line, Vladimir V. Putin, endured and=20
became Yeltsin=92s successor because he captured=20
public esteem and loyally stood by Yeltsin=20
through severe tests, including the bloody crushing of Chechnya.
In retirement, Mr. Colton says, Yeltsin confided=20
mounting disapproval as his prot=E9g=E9 tightened the=20
screws on the press and political opposition. No=20
doubt =AD and Yeltsin can=92t be entirely blamed for=20
his successor (any more than Mr. Mandela could=20
have foreseen how his hand-picked successor would=20
disappoint South Africa). But Mr. Putin is doubly=20
Yeltsin=92s legacy. Yeltsin anointed him, and the=20
persistent popularity of his hard regime owes=20
something to the stomach-churning ride of Yeltsin-style democracy.
David Johnson
home phone: 301-942-9281
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