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[OS] 2011-#146-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-10 17:00 GMT
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Date | 2011-08-15 17:14:20 |
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Johnson's Russia List
15 August 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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In this issue
1. RFE/RL: Russian Health Care Provides No Real Safety Net.
2. Moscow News: Gorbachev hits out at Putin and United Russia.
3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Experts Analyze Gorbachev Interview, Impact on Current
4. Sunday Times (UK): Young choose to abandon corrupt Russia. According to the
latest opinion polls, a record 40% of Russians aged between 18 and 24 want to
emigrate in search of a better future.
5. Sunday Times (UK): 'In a third world war, Russia would survive.' A generation
of 20-year-old Russians who have never known communism are preparing to vote for
the first time, in next year's elections.
6. BBC Monitoring: Liberals routed as Russian TV talk show premiere discusses
Stalin, Magnitskiy.
7. Moscow Times: Victor Davidoff, Putin's Dive for IKEA Jugs.
8. Rossiiskie Vesti: Stanislav Tarasov, POWER WITHIN THE TANDEM. A group of
associates versus a team of like-minded people? In case either part of the
Medvedev-Putin tandem announces the intention to run for president, the process
of polarization of the ruling elite will accelerate, and government activities
will be dramatically undermined.
9. Moscow Times: 2 Prison Doctors Charged in Death of Lawyer. (re Magnitsky)
10. Politkom.ru: Differing Views of Putin, Medvedev of Development of North
Caucasus Eyed.
11. RFE/RL: Why Is The North Caucasus An Unholy Mess?
12. Newsweek.com: Russia's Young Hemingway. Chechen War Veteran Zahar Prilepin is
an unabashed nationalist and critic of the Kremlin.
13. Moscow Times: Moscow Ponders Mayor's Face-Lift.
14. RIA Novosti: A battle for Moscow's soul and history.
15. Moscow News: Learning from life in Korea.
16. Russia Profile: Dmitry Babich, The Contagion of Anonymity.
17. Moscow News: Smoking ban due in Russia by 2014.
18. The Irish Times: Seamus Martin, How Yelstin blocked coup that sought to
preserve USSR.
19. Russia Beyond the Headlines: Ben Aris, Then and now: Purchasing power. While
some yearn for a return to the times of cheap foodstuffs and fixed wages, a new
study shows Russians are much better off materially now than 20 years ago.
20. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: China's Economic Growth Said Result of Rational
Policies, Contrasted With Russia.
21. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Diving from a springboard.
22. Moscow Times: Putin Names Himself, Gref, Others to New Agency Board.
23. Russia Profile: Time to Burn the Books. Work Books May Be Obsolete in
Contemporary Russia, but Many Employers and Employees Still Cling to Them for a
Sense of Security.
24. Voice of America: Donald Jensen, Moscow's Ambivalence About the West's
Economic Crisis.
25. Moscow Times: Vladimir Frolov, The Reset Is Fizzling Out.
26. www.foreignpolicy.com: Samuel Charap, Reset This. What's behind the ginned-up
crisis in U.S.-Russia relations?
27. Financial Times: John Lloyd, Russia must forget its imperial aims. A work
containing illuminating details, but few illusions, argues that Moscow must
modernise to avoid being marginalised. (re Post Imperium: A Eurasion Story by
Dmitri Trenin)
28. www.russiatoday.com: Russian security chief in Iran for nuclear talks.
29. Christian Science Monitor: Russia's Arctic 'sea grab.' Russia is expected
within months to claim to the United Nations its right to annex about 380,000
square miles of the Arctic.
30. Russia Profile: Brotherhood in Resistance. In Lieu of the Revolutions in
Africa and the Middle East, Heads of CSTO Member States Have Agreed to Establish
a Joint Rapid Reaction Force that Can Legally Intervene in Case of Internal
31. AP: 20 years later, ex-USSR is a cracked mosaic.
32. Georgia Times: Shevardnadze: Georgia needs Russia.
August 14, 2011
Russian Health Care Provides No Real Safety Net
By Tom Balmforth, Gregory Feifer
In February, Muscovite Svyat Kozlov felt ill and lost consciousness. Taken by
ambulance to a top cardiovascular clinic, he soon stopped breathing.
"I was clinically dead," he says. "But I had a super-professional team of
doctors. Thanks to them, I'm still alive today."
Kozlov, who suffered a double heart attack, may appear to be stating the obvious
by claiming he was incredibly lucky. But he means it in more ways than one.
"Moscow and other big cities are oases of happiness where it's possible to get
medical help," he says. "But outside the city limits, people don't have the same
Two decades after the Soviet collapse, Russia's constitution still guarantees
free medical care for everyone. But many Russians say their country is actually
segregated between a lucky few who can afford good medical care in private
clinics and the vast majority who are left with almost no safety net -- or are
forced to make side payments to doctors to get care.
In many regions, crumbling hospitals rely on Soviet-era equipment. Even in
Moscow, many hospitals don't even have air conditioners to stave off the summer
Natalia (who did not want to give her last name) is a nurse at a top state
ophthalmology institute. She maintains that in most cases there are two levels of
care: free and paid-for.
"The free procedures are ones patients don't need," she says. "Anything that
concerns life-threatening conditions costs a fee."
A Looming Demographic Catastrophe
That's a serious issue in a country that's one of the planet's least healthy,
ranking number one in the world in smoking and fourth in per capita alcohol
The average life expectancy for men is 59 and the population continues to drop
despite solemn government promises to stop the decline.
In part of its bid to stave off a looming demographic catastrophe, the government
says starting this year, it's spending more than $15 billion on modernizing
health care.
At Moscow's Sklifosovsky Institute, the city's top emergency-care hospital,
phones ring as nurses chat in a reception area.
The institute's director, Anzor Khubtia, praises President Dmitry Medvedev for
spending "very big money" that's enabled him to buy the latest equipment.
"Any Russian citizen can get care wherever he wants," he says. "If someone from
Magadan [in the Far East] wants treatment in Moscow, he can come to any clinic
Patchwork Reforms
But others disagree. Aleksandr Saversky, head of the Patients' Rights Protection
League, claims that access to health care is increasingly divided.
"Some wealthy Russians only get medical care abroad," he says, "while many
pensioners and handicapped people wait in long lines for care they have to beg
Most working people who can afford it, he says, end up paying for their own
private care anyway.
Saversky argues that, although the government has done much to publicize reform,
major health-care projects have had no visible effect.
"Everyone agrees there's been an increase in funding," he says. "There's enough
money for health care, but even still, people say there's been no improvement
Instead of addressing systemic problems by developing a unified health-care
concept, Saversky believes patchwork reforms have introduced new contradictions.
Although patients now have the right to treatment anywhere in the country, he
says, the government has failed to overhaul the old system of keeping doctors to
care for residents of specific districts.
Another reform requires Russians to buy medical insurance, contradicting the
constitutional right to free care.
Far from improving, Saversky says, the quality of health care has declined since
the 1970s, when he says it was ranked 22nd in the world for quality and
accessibility of services.
Now the World Health Organization (WHO) ranks Russia's medical care 130th in the
Russians are increasingly unhappy about the situation. In a recent survey by the
independent Levada polling agency, almost 60 percent of respondents said they
were dissatisfied with their medical care.
Endemic Corruption
The Levada Center's Marina Krassilnikova indicates that most believe nothing is
improving in Russian health care, while a growing number says it's actually
getting worse.
"What's most upsetting is that two-thirds of the population are certain they
wouldn't receive good medical care if it were needed," she says.
More than half of respondents say they avoid seeing a doctor to treat illness.
Krassilnikova says that probably means the country's health is even worse than
official statistics show.
Under the circumstances, Russians say, the best way to get decent treatment is to
"know someone." Or pay.
Quietly paying doctors on the side for care they're supposed to provide free is a
legacy of the Soviet system of "blat," slang for using connections and payments
to obtain otherwise unobtainable services.
Krassilnikova thinks corruption inside the health-care system means government
funding isn't getting to the nurses and doctors who need it, perpetuating the old
practice of payments in the form of "presents" that patients give doctors and
other medical staff for care.
"Many Russians don't actually see it as corruption," she says. "They see it as a
voluntary and morally justified form of gratitude for services."
A House Of Cards
Nurse Natalia says corruption is seriously affecting quality of care even in
private clinics, which she claims employ unqualified staff, including those who
received medical degrees by paying for them. "Most clinics are geared toward one
thing," she says, "and that's earning money. State bureaucrats earn good money.
All the rest of us real people earn very little. That's what's making the
corruption grow."
Paradoxically, despite their overwhelming unhappiness with the health-care
system, Krassilnikova believes a large majority of people is wedded to the idea
of free medical care. That includes wealthy Russians who prefer to have the
option of simply paying more for services if they want to.
"People just aren't ready to give up the right to free medical care under any
circumstance," she says, "even though they know they can't exercise it."
Lack of popular support for overhauling health care doesn't provide much hope for
change anytime soon. With no real reform in sight, Saversky says, contradictions
in the current system will probably continue building "until the whole system
collapses like a house of cards."
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
August 15, 2011
Gorbachev hits out at Putin and United Russia
ByAndy Potts
On the 20th anniversary of the coup d'etat which ultimately brought the Soviet
era to a close, Mikhail Gorbachev has launched another attack on Vladimir Putin.
Gorbachev, the former Soviet president, complained that Russia's current rulers
have no interest beyond preserving their own power, and likened United Russia to
the Communist Party of his era.
In comments which echo remarks earlier this year, he also accused Putin and
colleagues of holding the country back.
The drag factor
"They want to drag us back into the past, while the country is in dire need of
modernization," Gorbachev told Der Spiegel in an interview cited by Deutsche
And he urged against Putin returning to the presidency in 2012, saying his prime
motive was simply to remain in power, "but not to solve urgent problems".
He was also critical of the opposition, and fired what could be a veiled shot at
Mikhail Prokhorov's recently formed Pravoye Delo party.
The billionaire has spoken about becoming the second party in the state Duma, but
Gorbachev claimed that "all parties are just puppets in the hands of the regime."
Repeated criticisms
It is far from the first time Gorbachev, whose political stock is rather higher
in the west than among many Russians, has been critical of Putin and the current
Russian authorities.
In February, around the time of his 80th birthday, the former Communist leader
said he was "ashamed" of Russia's elite.
He complained that the on-going mystery Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev
created over who will stand for president in 2012 was "conceited" and warned of a
possible "Arab spring" sweeping through Russia.
[return to Contents]
Experts Analyze Gorbachev Interview, Impact on Current Politics
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
August 11, 2011
Report by Aleksandra Samarina, under the rubric Politics: Modernization a la
Gorbachev. The former president of the USSR is becoming an important factor in
the 2012 campaign.
On the eve of the latest anniversary of the GKChP (State Committee for the State
of Emergency), former leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, in an
interview with the Austrian newspaper Presse, summarizes the results of the
country's development in the last 20 years. He also gives an assessment of the
political situation in Russia. He believes that it will not be a disaster if
Dmitriy Medvedev is not nominated for president. And that Vladimir Putin too
appears to be ready to take the path of modernization. Experts see Gorbachev's
statements as an effort to signal to the West: there is no variant of the
presidential election campaign in the Russian Federation that will shake the
stability, and (he also gives) a characterization of contemporary domestic
Russian politics with all its uncertainty.
Gorbachev sees "two opposed directions" in present-day Russia: "One is for broad
modernization in all areas. The other is afraid of changes and is engaged mainly
in preserving its power. For what? To keep the wealth they have acquired?" It
seemed that next he would name the leaders of the two directions. But the name of
Vladimir Putin -- as the opponent of the first path -- was not heard in this
They reminded Gorbachev of the recent article by two experts from the Institute
of Contemporary Development (InSoR): "Well-known people in Russia are already
talking about the idea that stagnation will lead to a national disaster if
Medvedev does not run in the election." Gorbachev answers firmly: "There will not
be a disaster." It is true that he immediately qualified that: "But it is
important which direction wins. If Medvedev leads the reform camp, he needs very
large support forces. He has potential." The correspondent from the Austrian
newspaper does not let him evade the main question: "But with Putin at the top is
modernization possible?" And he hears an evasive answer: "At this point it seems
that he has not made up his mind. I think that he recently said that we do not
need modernization. But now he has definitely said that it is necessary."
In the opinion of Nikolay Petrov, member of the learned council at the Moscow
Carnegie Center, the haziness of Gorbachev's answer is not accidental. It
certainly does not indicate absence of knowledge -- what the premier did and did
not say. Petrov assesses the pointed softness and evasiveness of the former
Soviet leader as some kind of calming signal for the West: the main thing is not
the name of the future leader (Medvedev or Putin), but rather the model that will
ultimately be realized. This leads to the reference to Putin's ("recent")
statements relative to the necessity of modernization. "Gorbachev," Petrov
reminds us" is one of the few people the West listens to."
This signal is important, the expert believes. But, Nikolay Petrov notes, we
should not exaggerate the West's interest in this or that development of events
in Russia: "The West does not want to multiply its problems by interfering in
Russian politics. It is a rational player who values stability over sharp dashes
in this or that direction."
Speaking of domestic Russian problems, the former president observes: "We are
moving along the democratic path, but at this point we have only traversed
perhaps half the way." He is happy that "Gorbachev is not forgotten; on the
contrary, perestroika figures do not leave him in peace." He still does not agree
that the collapse of the USSSR was inevitable: "I continue to hold the opinion
that the Soviet Union could have been saved if it had been decentralized and
democratized." It was that kind of effort, Gorbachev is certain, that activated
the enemies of perestroyka.
Gorbachev here is arguing not so much with his old political enemies as with
public opinion. Because there are more and more people who share the views of the
putschists. According to recent findings by the Public Opinion Fou ndation, 17%
of the citizens are sure that it would have been better for the country if the
putschists had been able to seize power in August 1991. We will note that the
number of respondents who thought otherwise decreased by almost half, from 31% to
17%, in the last 10 years.
Against the background of growing doubts among the population about the need for
perestroyka, a scandal broke out recently at the Gorbachev Foundation: part of
the foundation's materials turned up in the hands of an associate who sent them
to the West. Gorbachev assistant Pavel Palazhchenko told NG (Nezavisimaya Gazeta)
that it was "not an associate, but just a person who was given the opportunity to
work in our archives"; "Pavel Stroilov stole and copied a large quantity of
material from our foundation."
"He is now trying to make use of this stolen material and is passing all bounds
of decency. The foundation "will remind journalists that to use the results of
theft is at a minimum unethical," Palazhchenko said: "It seems to me that
journalists should think about whether their hands are clean or not as the result
of contacts with certain people. This is theft on the same model as was used by
people in Great Britain and other countries. Stroilov is engaged in
self-advertising and dealing in stolen materials. And we are not entirely sure
that everything he is dealing is from the foundation. Because he talks about a
fantastic number of pages." The actions of certain publications here remind Pavel
Palazhchenko of "the behavior of one London newspaper that recently ceased to
As NG has learned, in the near future Mikhail Gorbachev will publish one more
interview in a major foreign publication. And next week he will hold a press
conference in Russia where, obviously, he will repeat the main points of the
present, Austrian text. How important is Gorbachev's message in relation to not
the foreign but already the domestic electorate -- in light of the approaching
election campaign?
In the opinion of Boris Makarenko, head of the directorate of sociopolitical
problems of development at InSoR, it is hard to argue with Gorbachev: "Really,
there are two directions. Conservative and modernization. But in my opinion,
Gorbachev is not praising Putin, but more likely is skeptical of his statements.
After all, he says: Putin expresses himself, but Medvedev takes action!"
Makarenko is not sure that Gorbachev's arguments are capable of shaking the
United Russia electorate, for example: "The former president has his own, very
narrow audience of those who regard him with great respect. For the rest of
Russia's citizens to the present day 'Gorbachev' is a swearword."
Nonetheless, the pubic activity by the country's former leader is very welcome --
to the most diverse forces. This is probably why Gorbachev is less definite in
his assessments of the present. And he is more confident in his approaches to the
country's past: "The Stalin model, built on the command-administrative system and
containing diktat and party control and monopoly completely outlived itself."
The Gorbachev interview is a calque of Russia's present political uncertainty.
Which is not useful for the country. "The Putin consensus," remarks Gleb
Pavlovskiy, chief of the Effective Politics Foundation, in conversation with NG,
"was trust added to sympathy. We even measured our own state's reasonableness by
Putin. In this Putin truly was 'one of us.' The country was ruled by a person in
whom it was easy to recognize one's own opportunism, caution, and hard-earned
moderation. In Putin's speech and gestures there were imprinted traces of the
former people's decency or, as it was called in Soviet times, 'Leningrad
culture.' It seemed that Putin took from the past that quintessential decency and
common sense that livened us up inside the grim Soviet machine. And suddenly
something happened. To Putin or to us? It is terrifically interesting to know
precisely to whom."
[return to Contents]
Sunday Times (UK)
August 14, 2011
Young choose to abandon corrupt Russia
According to the latest opinion polls, a record 40% of Russians aged between 18
and 24 want to emigrate in search of a better future
By Mark Franchetti, Moscow
Too young to remember the Soviet Union, Maria Donova has known only political
stability and prosperity during her teens in Russia under Vladimir Putin, the
former president and current prime minister who came to power in 1999.
A 24-year-old with a degree and good career prospects, the Moscow-based travel
industry specialist should be looking to her future with optimism. Instead she
has only one aspiration to leave her homeland for good, preferably for Britain.
"Life outside Russia is completely different and offers far greater
opportunities," she said. "I feel far more comfortable when I'm in the West. I
don't feel that I can fulfil myself in Russia.
"I'd love to move to Britain but that's proving very difficult. So for now I'll
emigrate to Latin America but later will try to make it to the UK or another
European country."
Alarmingly for the Kremlin, Donova is no exception. According to the latest polls
a record 40% of Russians aged between 18 and 24 want to emigrate in search of a
better future.
A recent survey revealed that more Russians would like to leave their homeland
now than in 1991, the year the Soviet Union collapsed a time of bread queues
when millions of Russians were left impoverished.
Earlier this year the head of the Russian state audit chamber said that about
1.25m of his compatriots had already turned their back on Russia a greater
exodus than that sparked by the 1917 revolution.
The brain drain of young professionals and entrepreneurs is all the more
surprising given that Russia has become considerably wealthier and far less
turbulent since Putin came to power.
Those dreaming of a new life outside their homeland, especially young
businessmen, cite rampant corruption, byzantine red tape and the lack of an
independent judicial system for their wish to emigrate. According to Transparency
International, the non-governmental body, Russia is the world's 154th most
corrupt country, out of 178.
"The figures show what Russians think of the current political direction, they're
voting with their feet," said Alexei Samokhvalov, a political analyst. "They
clearly do not see positive changes and are not prepared to wait for another 10
The exodus among young people is all the more damaging as Russia is experiencing
a severe population decline. America and Europe are the most coveted
destinations; Britain is viewed as highly appealing but is notoriously difficult
to emigrate to. Scientists, technology specialists and small businessmen are
especially eager to escape.
"I love Russia and obviously things are easier for me than they were for my
parents in the early 1990s when they queued for hours to buy sausages, but I've
no doubt that I'll have far greater opportunities abroad," said Alexei Kaminin,
28, a cafe owner in Moscow who wants to move to Germany.
"In my business I'm constantly being shaken down by health officials, policemen
or firemen seeking a bribe. In Russia it's more about who you know rather than
what you know. I want to live in a meritocracy where the rule of law works."
"In Russia one doesn't feel that one is valued," said Asya Sherbakova, 22, a
student who is leaving to study in Spain and has no plans to return. "I've no
doubts that going abroad I'll be happier and will have a greater say over my
This exodus is in contrast to the rosy picture of life in Russia under Putin
portrayed by the bikini-clad members of "Putin's army", an activist group set up
to show their support for the prime minister.
The group consists of attractive girls who "really love the PM", a sentiment they
have expressed by posing seminaked as they offer Moscow motorists free car
washes. In a racy internet video, the group has also called on women to express
their support for Putin by ripping their shirts.
A copycat group was launched last week to support Dmitry Medvedev, the president,
who was given the post by Putin three years ago. Both men are thought to want to
stand for president next year.
Whatever the outcome, it is unlikely to stem Russia's brain drain. Andre Geim, a
Manchester-based emigre who won the Nobel prize for physics last year, was asked
recently what it would take for him to return to Russia. "Reincarnation," he said
[return to Contents]
Sunday Times (UK)
August 14, 2011
'In a third world war, Russia would survive'
A generation of 20-year-old Russians who have never known communism are preparing
to vote for the first time, in next year's elections
Mark Franchetti
Yulia Rizhkova
Member of Molodaya Gvardia, the ultra-patriotic pro-Kremlin youth movement that
the failed spy Anna Chapman recently joined
I grew up in a small town 250 miles from Moscow, and moved to the capital after
turning 18. My father died two years earlier. I have no brothers or sisters,
because my parents couldn't afford it. My mother always worked as a seamstress
and we barely got by. I started working at 14. After school and at the weekends
I'd earn a little in a local supermarket.
I'm now studying to become an engineer. I work in the student union to support
myself, for -L-130 a month, and at night I go to classes. It's tough, but you
have to make sacrifices if you are to achieve anything. I'm confident my life
will only get better. I wanted to become a child psychologist, but the fees were
too high and there were no grants available. Maybe later.
I'm not a political person, but joined Molodaya Gvardia because it teaches young
people that it's best to unite to achieve things. I have great respect for Prime
Minister Putin and President Medvedev [whose portraits flank her, above]. They've
brought back stability to Russia and have given us greater confidence in the
future. They've improved our lives. Putin is a strong leader who gives an
extremely positive example. I consider myself a patriot, and would never leave
Russia. Our country needs young people like me. I believe in a strong state and
in patriotism. There's too much indifference among young Russians. Molodoya
Gvardia teaches that it's important to be active and get involved. We don't
smoke, are anti-drugs, support sport and believe it's good to have more than one
For me, the ideal employer is the state. Some say there's no press freedom in
Russia, but I don't think so. Sure, there's corruption but it's not been getting
worse, we just hear more about it.
I regret that the idea behind the Soviet Union didn't work out. But Russia
remains a great and strong country. I don't care what the West thinks of us. Some
people say there will be a third world war. If so, I have no doubts that Russia
will survive.
Alexandra Novikova
Daughter of Russia's most successful restaurateur, Arkady Novikov, who recently
bought Gianni Versace's Lake Como villa for -L-26m
I've had a very privileged life. It's incomparable to that of my parents, who
grew up poor in Soviet times. Instinctively I feel negative about the Soviet
Union because of its lack of freedom. In Moscow I went to a rich-kids' school.
There was no discipline, very little education and a lot of showing off. When I
turned 14, I told my parents I wanted to go to school in England,to learn English
and get a better education.
The first six months in boarding school I cried every night, and the first two
years were tough. I hated it, was homesick and lonely. Everything was so
different and alien, from the mentality to the sense of humour. The food was
horrible, and smelling Marmite for the first time was enough to nearly make me
sick. Then I made more of an effort and everything changed. The next two years
were amazing. I made friends, felt at home and just loved it. I now even like
British sarcasm, but when I try it out on my parents they don't always get it.
I'm studying at the London College of Fashion. England has built up my character
and I see my future in London, which I adore.
I live in Sloane Street. Sometimes I get embarrassed, as it's clearly too posh
for a student. I'm certainly not into bling. I've travelled on a private plane,
but I wasn't brought up as a spoilt child, and my parents restricted me. A lot of
the rich kids I knew in Moscow are now into drugs and alcohol and do a lot of
partying. I think I would have turned out differently if I'd stayed in Moscow.
Filip Avdeyev
Actor, who was caught in the Moscow theatre hostage crisis of October 23, 2002
I started acting at seven. I have wonderful memories of the Nord-Ost musical we
had been staging, before the terrorist attack. I was just about to go out to do
my routine when armed Chechen terrorists jumped on stage and began shooting. I
was 11. I ran and hid in a make-up room with a small group of people. At first, I
thought this would be like in the movies when some superhero would come and save
us. Then we heard someone being gunned down in the corridor, and I got really
scared. We were rescued by police and escaped through a window before the
Chechens found us.
The two child lead actors who died in the attack were my close friends. It
definitely changed me. Ever since, I've felt a greater responsibility to do
something in life, because I was lucky to survive. I don't have a right to just
sit around and waste time. It made me more determined and I've channelled all my
energy into acting. When I was born, my parents lived in a cramped room in a
dilapidated student house. They're now into property and construction and have
done well. They laugh when they recall queueing for hours to buy sausages. The
Soviet Union failed, but at least then people were moved by a strong ideal. Now
people just live without clear aspirations.
Many of my friends want to leave Russia because there are more opportunities
abroad. But I think it's more interesting to stay the challenge to improve
things is greater. If my generation does not revive things, who will? I've been
to Europe and Asia but not the US. My friends and I have a negative view of
America. I'm very suspicious of it and I often get the feeling that people are
brainwashed there. Compared with Russia it's a country with little culture or
I don't watch the news here because we are fed a bunch of lies. What's aired is
all for show. It's unpleasant to watch. I'll be able to vote for the first time
in the 2012 elections, but I don't know if I will. I find it hard to believe in
Alexander Fomin
Student and entrepreneur from a small town 500 miles south of Moscow
Both my parents were in the military and I grew up in garrison towns. My father
served 20 years, first in the Soviet and then Russian army. We moved around a
lot. He was posted to Germany, Mongolia and fought in Chechnya. Once, he spent a
whole year away. Life was tough for them when communism collapsed. In the early
1990s the army stopped paying salaries and we had no money for food. I'm their
only child because, then, the future was too bleak to have more.
In the late 1990s both Mum and Dad left the military and became entrepreneurs,
and now have their own small business. That's where I get my inspiration from.
When I turned 17, we started thinking what our small town lacks. I took all my
savings -L-2,000 and opened a small shop selling sugar-free food for diabetes
sufferers. It's not going as well as I'd like but it's a start. I'm studying
economics at university. I want to be a businessman and one day make it to
Moscow. That's where most opportunities are. It's difficult to imagine that in
Soviet times doing business would land you in jail, or that people had to queue
for bread and that there were no cars.
When I finish studying I'll be drafted into the army for a year. Many young
people try to avoid it, but it doesn't scare me. Entrepreneurs had a bad
reputation in Russia because in the 1990s people cut corners, but the image is
starting to improve. I've not yet come across corruption but know it's the
reality. I think it's almost impossible to be a successful businessman without
paying bribes to get simple things like permits. It seems an impossible curse to
defeat. For me, the important thing is to respect others and to be honest.
Anarchist and anti-fascist activist
My mother is Russian and my father's from Azerbaijan. My non-Russian features
make me a target for neo-nazi groups that go around beating and killing any
dark-skinned person they come across. I was once attacked and badly beaten in the
Metro. The police are not much kinder to left-wing opposition activists like me.
After a recent protest I was detained, handcuffed, roughed up and insulted by
several burly officers who forced me to sign a paper saying that I'd act as their
informant. It was pretty scary. I get satisfaction from being an activist and
taking to the streets. I'm not interested in status or money. I think it's
important to do something to improve our society. Russia under Putin is not a
democracy. It's authoritarian and we have neither a free press nor an opposition.
I demonstrate because I want people to have more rights.
I'm into hardcore punk music and I'm against nationalism, the state and the
military. In Russia, that's dangerous. Like millions, my parents had a hard time
when communism collapsed. My mum told me she used to travel two hours to buy
milk. We lived in dire poverty and were constantly on the move. The owner of a
small room we rented was killed in a dispute.
I make -L-300 a month as a courier, and live with Mum, a shop assistant. We often
argue about the Soviet Union. She believes Russians need to be ruled with an iron
fist. She's against me taking to the streets. She says it's dangerous and naive
to go against those in power, that it's impossible to change things. But deep
down I know she's also proud of me for defending my beliefs.
For me, it's a matter of principle. We must make our voices heard and those in
power must listen. That's the only way to start building a civil society. There's
no point turning to the West for help, because the West sees Russia as a rival.
It doesn't want us to do well.
Angelika Barinova
Student, young mother and lap dancer in K19, one of Moscow's most exclusive
gentlemen's clubs
I was born into a poor family. My father left us when I was one. I lived with
Mum, but was mostly raised by my grandmother. She is 65 and still works as the
head of a chemistry lab in a state research institute. She's my family's rock.
She regrets the end of the Soviet Union, as her life was far better then. After
decades of work she earns only -L-400 a month. But she's not nostalgic.
As a child I heard good and bad things about life under communism. People
appeared to be kinder then, but life could also be hard. Growing up in the early
1990s was very tough. I remember times when we had no food and I always wore only
second-hand clothes. We lived in a tiny rundown flat full of cockroaches. It was
a hard but happy childhood, mainly thanks to my grandmother's sacrifices.
I'm studying history of art at university. I've always loved the arts, especially
paintings. My favourite painter is Wassily Kandinsky. I dream of becoming a
gallery curator. University fees are nearly -L-7,000 a year. It's a lot of money.
I started working in a strip bar only two months after I turned 18. Morally, it
was a very hard decision. It's humiliating to be seen only as a body, rather than
as a human being, especially if, like me, you have a proper education.
My boyfriend is 20 and is studying to become a diplomat, but given that to make
it in Russia one needs friends in high places, I'm very sceptical. I stopped
working as soon as I got pregnant. We had not planned a child now, but I've
always loved children so aborting was never an option.
I went back to work a month after Arseny's birth. Becoming a mother has made me a
woman. I feel stronger and more self-confident. But it's even harder to work at
the club now. I have no choice. I've taken a year off university. I work two
weeks a month and can earn up to -L-3,000.
Most of my fellow students come from well-off families who made money in the
lawlessness of the early 1990s. They don't know where I work. They wouldn't
understand. I don't see my future in Russia. It's not a meritocracy, there's too
much corruption and everything is down to who, not what, you know. I'd love to
move to Switzerland.
I'm a patriot and love Russia, its heritage and history, but given the way things
are now, I don't want my child to grow up here.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Liberals routed as Russian TV talk show premiere discusses Stalin, Magnitskiy
Rossiya 1
August 12 2011
Stalin's legacy and Hermitage Capital investment fund lawyer Sergey Magnitskiy's
death in a remand prison were discussed on the "Historical Process" talk show,
which premiered on the Russian official state television channel Rossiya 1 on 12
August. The general topic was the individual's "legal protection" in Russia, with
examples from the practice of Stalin's extrajudicial troikas to the Magnitskiy
Presented in adversarial format by Nikolay Svanidze and Sergey Kurginyan, both
known as TV personalities in addition to their other endeavours, the show, with
breaks for ads, was a little more than an hour and a half long. Human rights
activist Lyudmila Alekseyeva and Magnitskiy's aunt Tatyana Rudenko were on
Svanidze's panel of "liberals". Vadim Rechkalov, a journalist on the
mass-circulation daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets, was on Kurginyan's team, among
others. The members of the audience were seated around them in an auditorium.
Svanidze's general argument, which he set out in his declaration at the start of
the programme, was that the individual's rights are "systematically" flouted in
Russia. Stalinism in particular is yet to be condemned "legally or morally" in
Russia, he remarked. He saw a connection between that and Magnitskiy's death in
pre-trial detention.
Kurginyan disagreed with Svanidze's basic argument that disregard for human
rights in Russia was either exceptional or endemic, which he said was an
"exaggeration". He said Stalin's rule typified a "left-wing dictatorship" which,
"whatever it perpetrated", "achieved certain historic objectives, what is more in
the interests of a great many people". As for the case of Magnitskiy, it is, he
said somewhat vaguely, the "new tradition" of a "colonial-corrupt-criminal
quagmire". Russia, Kurginyan said, is being both victimized and plundered,
including by "international forces".
While Kurginyan tried to link the Magnitskiy case to the broader case of
Hermitage Capital, Alekseyeva and Rudenko focused on the fact of his death in
On the format of the show, Kurginyan's behaviour throughout the show could be
described as highly strung and at times aggressive. As a consequence, the debate
often degenerated into chaotic exchanges. At one point, as she clashed with
Kurginyan on the Magnitskiy issue, Alekseyeva threatened to walk out. Rudenko
almost walked out a little later. From Kurginyan came a lot of hostile rhetoric
in relation to the investment fund's and its co-founder William Browder's past
activities in Russia.
In the discussion on Stalinism, which took up the first half of the programme,
Svanidze was the first to speak. There were graphic descriptions of torture, with
a contribution on the subject from author Isaak Babel's grandson. He was among
Svanidze's "witnesses", who were then cross-examined by Kurginyan. Kurginyan's
main argument, which he backed up with Soviet-era statistics as well as examples
from "feudal" times to Abu Ghraib, was that there was nothing unique in the
phenomenon of Stalin's reprisals.
In his comments, Kurginyan appeared to lack either compassion for Svanidze's
witnesses over their families' suffering at the hands of Stalin's machinery of
reprisals, or - with his smirks and interruptions - respect for Svanidze himself.
The result of the audience vote on the cases argued by Svanidze and Kurginyan was
7,709 for Svanidze and a whopping 37,017 for Kurginyan.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
August 15, 2011
Putin's Dive for IKEA Jugs
By Victor Davidoff
Victor Davidoff is a Moscow-based writer and journalist whose blog is
With four months to go before Russians cast their votes in parliamentary
elections, the first signs of an emerging electoral campaign have finally
appeared. In a democratic country, there would be rallies, campaign posters and
public debates of the candidates. But not so in Russia.
Here the campaign was kicked off on the Internet by "Putin's Army," made up of
what the enlistees themselves call "young, smart and pretty girls." The smartest
action that these "smart" girls could think up was to rip off their T-shirts in
public. This dubiously radical act was meant to express support for Putin's
as-yet unannounced presidential campaign.
The army was followed by an anonymous group of "Girls for Putin" who produced a
professional-looking video of the song "I Want to be Your Connie" a reference to
Putin's favorite pet dog. "I want to be your Connie / On the table and on the
balcony," the singer croons to the prime minister as she takes off items of
clothing one by one.
The object of this female adoration also showed his mettle on television, this
time in diving gear in the Azov Sea. Followed by Channel One cameras, Putin dove
into the water and resurfaced with two broken sixth-century amphorae. The
significance of this archeological find is indisputable. A veritable choir of
archeologists noted that the area had been combed for almost 75 years, and
finding something there especially something lying on the surface of the sand
is simply impossible. Nonspecialists also noted that the amphorae looked too
clean to be 1,500 years old. As Nikolai Uskov, editor of GQ and a historian by
education, noted acidly: "Putin came out of the sea with clean but slightly
broken jugs from IKEA. It was comical."
But the campaign isn't just made up of scenes from a Russian version of the movie
"Wag the Dog." State Duma Deputy Andrei Isayev from United Russia unveiled the
draft election platform of the Putin-led All-Russia People's Front called "Five
Years of Sustainable Growth." The program has five major points, the first of
which is "Raising Living Standards": "The country will have high-tech medicine,
and everyone will have the right to choose their doctors. There will be
accessible high-quality education. ... The median income and pensions will reach
European levels." The economy will quickly grow, allowing the country to kick its
fossil fuel habit and raise production of manufactured goods to more than 50
percent of gross domestic product.
The program promises that by strengthening the government and, first of all,
rearming the military, Russia will regain its superpower status in five years.
But the most amazing promise is that as a result of these policies, "our citizens
will feel freer and more secure both inside the country and abroad. ... In the
country, the multiparty system, basic political freedoms and democratic
participation will be developed."
Many were quick to point out the contradictions in the draft document. For
example, strengthening the state and the lack of separation of powers are more of
a threat to political freedoms than a way to develop them. Public Chamber member
Vyacheslav Glazychev told Actualcomment.ru, "The political elite must realize
that solving two problems at the same time modernization and sustainable growth
is impossible."
Needless to say, the document is silent about the most pressing and difficult
problems facing Russia, like budgetary federalism, an independent judiciary,
protection of property rights and the lack of oversight of law enforcement
As for "the development of a multiparty system" and democracy, United Russia
already established a precedent in what party functionaries are now calling
"primaries." Theoretically, the goal of these primaries is to nominate candidates
to be on the party's electoral list. But in practice, information from several
regions shows that people are voting for lists that have already been approved
from above. And even this is being done with a variety of procedural violations.
As one of the leaders of the democratic opposition, Ilya Yashin, summed up in an
interview with Ren-TV: "In all its work, United Russia uses the technique of
imitation. It imitates activity in the parliament, it imitates intraparty
discussions, and now it's imitating intraparty democracy."
All the signs point to another imitation of the democratic process in the
December parliamentary elections.
[return to Contents]
Rossiiskie Vesti
August 8, 2011
A group of associates versus a team of like-minded people?
In case either part of the Medvedev-Putin tandem announces the intention to run
for president, the process of polarization of the ruling elite will accelerate,
and government activities will be dramatically undermined
Author: Stanislav Tarasov
Source: Rossiiskie Vesti, N24, 08.08.2011, EV
[In view of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in
Russia political scientists consider the ratings of all forces
involved and evaluate their chances for winning the election.
Generally, there is an opinion that Russia is entering a zone of
political uncertainty]
It appears that the governing structure of Russia dubbed as
'the Medvedev-Putin tandem' will hold the clue to the intrigue until
the very end. If, say, Dmitry Medvedev announces that he will run
for president, it would accelerate the process of polarization of
the ruling elite and dramatically weaken the mechanism of government
activities. If Vladimir Putin does the same, then Dmitry Medvedev
will immediately turn into a 'lame duck', and vice versa. So, the
'game' goes on.
As in war, the Head of Government and head of the ruling United
Russia party is building a 'common front'. Meanwhile, in Germany
President Medvedev noted to reporters that "very little time is left
to sit and wait", and that the ruling tandem was about to determine,
who of them "history will assign" in the future to play the main
violin in the orchestra consisting of handpicked musicians. Medvedev
is relatively young; in case of withdrawal he may cherish the hope
of trying to become 'master of the Kremlin' once again in the
future. Putin has so little time left, and he will simply not be
allowed to act as a "shadow Cardinal" under Medvedev, because the
United Russia party of power could collapse as a result of the
liberal course declared by Medvedev.
So far, Dmitry Medvedev is attacking. He boldly 'kicks' the
government (he promised to send ministers to extinguish fires, if
last year's situation repeated), sends appropriate signals to the
West (remember his interview with Financial Times, which was
published under the subtitle "The Russian president wants a second
term"), disagrees with Putin on Libya and Khodorkovsky, and scolds
Defense Ministry officers for thwarted defense contracts. Last May,
the President claimed to find the culprits in the failure of last
year's Defense Ministry contracts. Several top military officials
were dismissed then. But it appeared later that this year's order
also failed in fact. The furious head of state reminded Anatoly
Serdyukov of the laws of war, when the guilty were executed. But it
did not help either. Therefore, Vladimir Putin himself had to
intervene. In early July, General Designer of Moscow Institute of
Heat Engineering Yury Solomonov made a public announcement about the
situation around the state defense order. The developer of strategic
missile weapons declared: "The government order of 2011 has already
been ruined; it will never be implemented due to the fact that to
date not a single contract regarding the Strategic Nuclear Forces
has been concluded. It is July now, and this has never happened in
the past 14 years. For the current year we usually signed contracts
in late April - mid May at the latest".
At the head of state level, all the necessary decisions were
made in time. The heads of state signed all the documents; they
organized the process at their level. And then system failures
started. On July 12th the President chaired a meeting on the arms
supplies issue, which was attended by the Minister of Defense and
Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov in charge of the military
industrial complex. The officials assured the Kremlin's master that
"the process of placing the state defense order goes smoothly;
though in some areas there is a delay, there is no reason to fear
that it will fail." In fact, RUB 230 billion of the RUB 750 billion
remained pending because of 'unreasonable' prices, which defense
enterprises requested for their products, but Serdyukov vowed to
spend it within ten days. This is kind of a political portrait of
the era. According to Director of the International Institute of
Political Expertise Yevgeny Minchenko, such abuse of subordination
on the part of the Prime Minister indicates his desire to deprive
Dmitry Medvedev of the last area, in which the latter could feel
master of the situation. The political scientist noted: "Recently,
Putin has been playing a fine game from the apparatus point of view;
he has been demonstrating that no themes have been left for Medvedev
to consider them to be his own sphere of competence".
At the same time, common people get a feeling that the
elections have already been held long before the schedule, and they
are only expected to play the role of historical extras. Therefore,
when people hear opinions on this subject in the name of the
'tandem', it appears again that those opinions are increasingly
directed at the West, which should not question the legitimacy of
all obvious and apparent events in Russia. At the same time, Dmitry
Medvedev successfully manages to play the role of 'a political
orderly'. He has already entered the history of the Interior
Ministry as the main 'pusher' of the project to rename the militia
into the police, and has initiated under this pretext a total
personnel reshuffle, which is officially called "re-certification of
Russian law enforcement bodies". But the problem is that the
militiamen have always been in the public eye. In the situation of
public confidence to all power structures of the country decreasing
in general, the militia was simply destined to act as a 'political
lightning rod'. We are still too far from the situation when law
enforcement structures have already stopped 'protecting' criminal
businesses and become engaged in the establishment of institutions
protecting the interests of citizens. It will only happen after
genuine social and political control of the executive branch has
been established. In the meantime, the authorities prefer to
communicate with people through the TV, because, as we know,
'Parliament is no place for debate'. So both security officials and
political parties are in exactly the same position, in which the
remaining power structures, including the United Russia party, find
Boris Gryzlov declared that Vladimir Putin is the only party
leader. What if United Russia members will face the necessity to
support Medvedev's second term? In that case, what would United
Russia members call him - a comrade-in-arms or a reserve leader?
What if Putin and Medvedev be both nominated for presidential
candidates? By the way, this election competition could play in
favor of Russia's democratic 'education'. But it appears the
situation will be pending until the United Russia party congress
scheduled for the upcoming autumn.
There is no doubt Putin will head the United Russia party
federal list in the State Duma elections, but it is not obvious that
he will be nominated for president. Then Medvedev will be the main
candidate of the party of power for another presidential term, as in
the biblical story we have already quoted. So, as political analyst
Gleb Pavlovsky aptly noted, "the Russian matrix has got stuck
again". In that connection the well-known political scientist is
concerned that the 'tandem' members virtually have no personal
ratings, there is only their mutual rating. But according to some
sociologists, there is a gap in the ranking of Medvedev and Putin,
namely 5-7% in favor of Putin. This is too small a gap for Putin's
election victory, taking the existence of the 'common front' and
United Russia party. According to a survey of the Public Opinion
Foundation, in January some 55% of Russians declared they trusted
Medvedev, while currently only 43% of respondents trust the
President. In turn, the anti-rating of the President (the number of
those who do not trust him) increased to 23% from 14% in early 2011.
At the time of President Medvedev's election, 49% of respondent
trusted him. The same pattern can be observed with regard to
Vladimir Putin. In January 2011, 63% of Russians trusted the Prime
Minister, and in July - only 50% of respondents. 21% of respondents
(13% in January) do not trust Putin. To tell the truth, head of the
Public Opinion Foundation Alexander Oslon believes that reducing
ratings of the country's leadership are negligible. According to
him, "as a whole, everything is pretty steady and stable," and the
recent research results are only due to "random deviations from the
It is these factors that characterize the peculiarities of the
current situation. In addition, the rating of the ruling party,
whose leadership has almost no bright charismatic personalities,
also decreases. According to some political analysts, this is a
direct result of the tandem's work. According to political scientist
Olga Kryshtanovskaya, at the end of his presidential term Medvedev
is left with a group of loyal entourage, but without a team. At the
same time, Putin remains with the losing influence, but still rather
popular team. The danger is that earlier the Kremlin led the
country's political process, but the floodgates of freedom, opened
by Dmitry Medvedev, pushed the Kremlin into the tail of events. Gleb
Pavlovsky calls the coming era to be "the end of the myth of the
power as a world class grand master with ambitions to control
reality." So Russia is entering a zone of uncertainty, when the
political resource of 'assessing/conferring officials', dramatic
statements, resignations and dismissals, financial disclosures, and
other daily 'sensations' has been exhausted. Has Russian history
started to develop in a vicious circle, when the creator of the
administrative system starts getting bored with his own creation,
and the new leader cannot really change anything without a
revolutionary uprisal? We shall get the answer to this question in
the near future.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
August 15, 2011
2 Prison Doctors Charged in Death of Lawyer
By Alexandra Odynova
The Investigative Committee has filed the first charges in connection with the
pretrial detention death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, 20 months after he died and
two weeks after the United States blacklisted dozens of Russian officials
implicated in the case.
But the charges, announced Friday, are limited to two minor officials in the
saga, prison doctors who Magnitsky's supporters and human rights activists say
are scapegoats.
Larisa Litvinova, the doctor for the Butyrskaya prison responsible for
supervising Magnitsky's health, was charged with causing death by negligence and
faces a maximum of five years in prison if convicted.
Dmitry Kratov, the deputy director of the prison whose responsibility includes
health care, was charged with carelessness and, if found guilty, could be
imprisoned for up to three years.
The Investigative Committee said in a statement that it had established a "direct
link" between the doctors' conduct and Magnitsky's death.
"In the course of the inquiry, a direct cause-and-effect link was determined
between Magnitsky's death and the actions of the doctors at the detention center
where he was held," the Investigative Committee said.
Investigators opened a criminal case into Litvinova and Kratov last month around
the time that the Kremlin's human rights council released an independent report
into Magnitsky's death that concluded that both doctors and law enforcement
officials were to blame.
The Investigative Committee statement made no comment about the report's finding
that Magnitsky had been severely beaten by prison guards in the Matrosskaya
Tishina detention center, where he had been moved for medical treatment, shortly
before his death.
Valery Borshchyov, the human rights activist who oversaw the independent inquiry
on behalf of the human rights council, said Sunday that Kratov and Litvinova
share a minor part of the responsibility for Magnitsky's death.
"But he died at Matrosskaya Tishina, not the Butyrskaya prison," Borshchyov said
by telephone.
He said Interior Ministry investigator Oleg Silchenko, who helped oversee the
arrest of Magnitsky and later denied him medical treatment, and Matrosskaya
Tishina chief doctor Alexandra Gauss should be charged "before anyone else."
In an indication that more people could be charged, the Investigative Committee
said in its statement that the inquiry was ongoing. But it gave no hint about who
might be charged.
Borshchyov said the two doctors could provide investigators with helpful
information. "I hope Litvinova and Kratov won't keep quiet," he said.
Litvinova and Kratov, who have not been taken into custody, could not be reached
to comment Sunday.
A member of the human rights council, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, head of the Moscow
Helsinki Group, criticized the charges as a "half-measure," Interfax reported.
The council's report, which was presented to President Dmitry Medvedev late last
month, also found that Magnitsky was denied treatment for existing health
problems partly in an effort to make him testify against London-based Hermitage
Capital Management, once the biggest foreign investment fund in Russia, whom he
represented through the Firestone Duncan law firm.
Hermitage Capital questioned the credibility of Friday's charges, saying the two
doctors were "scapegoats who followed the orders of their seniors."
"The authorities are trying to create the impression they are doing something
with these indictments of doctors for negligence, but all they are doing is
protecting killers and thieves in uniforms," Magnitsky's former boss, Jamison
Firestone, told The Moscow Times.
Magnitsky, 37, accused Interior Ministry officers Artyom Kuznetsov and Pavel
Karpov of participating in a $230 million tax refund fraud and was subsequently
arrested by those same officers on charges of organizing tax evasion in 2008.
Magnitsky died of health problems in November 2009, after 11 months in jail, at
which point the Interior Ministry accused him of organizing the $230 million
theft that he reported and closed the case without bringing charges against any
of the officers or recovering the stolen money.
The charges against the doctors came amid escalating international pressure that
has resulted in the U.S. State Department blacklisting dozens of Russian
officials connected to the case.
"Their names Kratov and Litvinova were familiar to investigators more than 20
months ago, but the charges have been pressed only now, when the West has
introduced sanctions against officials on the list," Hermitage Capital said in an
e-mailed statement.
Litvinova and Kratov are both on a list of 60 Russian officials that Magnitsky's
supporters have asked Western governments to sanction with travel restrictions
and asset freezes. The United States has not said which officials are on its
But the measure has angered Medvedev, and the Foreign Ministry is drafting its
own blacklist of U.S. officials that apparently will include U.S. agents involved
in the arrest of suspected arms dealer Viktor Bout and a Russian pilot on drug
[return to Contents]
Differing Views of Putin, Medvedev of Development of North Caucasus Eyed
August 8, 2011
Article by Tatyana Stanovaya, director of the analytical department of the Center
for Political Technologies, under the rubric "Analysis": "The Problems of the
North Caucasus: Between the President and the Government"
A session of the governmental commission on issues of the socioeconomic
development of the North Caucasus Federal District under the leadership of Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin was held in Kislovodsk on 3 August. Before this session
he met with North Caucasus activists of the Mashuk-2011 youth forum, which was
attended for the most part by activists of public patriotic organizations like
the Chechen Putin and Ramzan clubs.
The problem of normalizing social and economic life in the regions of the North
Caucasus becomes especially important in the run-up to the elections --
politicians are compelled to devote more attention to the issue as one of the
most acute on the present sociopolitical agenda. Questions of the Caucasus are
being vigorously pursued by Dmitriy Medvedev, who bet on the region's economic
development, recruiting Aleksandr Khloponin, the former governor of Krasnoyarsk
Kray, to become head of the North Caucasus District with the rank of a vice
premier of the Russian Federation government and giving him the job of attracting
investments to the Caucasus regions. In the last few months, Medvedev has also
initiated a reform of interbudgetary relations where key roles will be played by
Khloponin (tax and financial aspects) and Vice Premier Dmitriy Kozak, who used to
be responsible for federative reform at the start of Putin's presidency (the
legal aspect of the reform). Khloponin and Kozak are supposed to assemble working
groups before 15 September, and by 1 December present an action plan for the near
As Vedomosti wrote in late June with a reference to a source in the Kremlin, the
essence of the idea of the decentralization of government that Russian Federation
President Dmitriy Medvedev announced at the International Economic Forum in St.
Petersburg is that the regions can distribute resources allocated from the budget
more independently, but local authorities will bear even more political
responsibility than before for the decisions made.
In that way, until recently the Caucasus was primarily a "Medvedev" topic. Putin
distanced himself from the problem. The tough position of the Ministry of
Finance, which came out against redistributing taxes and levies to the benefit of
the regions, became the main obstacle on the path of the implementation of the
president's policy in the North Caucasus. In the department they remind people
that the federal tax organs work on collecting taxes and redistributing them. At
the same time, the regions do not participate in collecting income at all. At the
Ministry of Regional Development, in turn, they propose to abandon subsidies and
switch over to allocating grants to increase the region's tax potential.
It is interesting here that a source close to the President's Staff was telling
Vedomosti that the reform announced by Medvedev is an election move. After the
changes made in legislation, the dissatisfaction of the people living in the
regions would be transferred to the governors and municipal authorities, since
the federal center would shift responsibility for social payouts and money to the
regional level. In the Kremlin they note that the required changes in legislation
might take effect as early as 1 January 2012. Actually, on the one hand, plans to
transfer extensive powers to local areas are constantly discussed in the Kremlin
and the government taking into account that the governors must also share part of
the political responsibility for the social problems in the country. But with
consideration of the system for granting powers to the heads of regions and the
publicly key role here of the party of power, the question of responsibility
becomes more complicated: the rating of governors is becoming one of the
important factors for the "vertical hierarchy" of power that has become
established. The transfer of "responsibility" to local areas has a number of
political restraints.
Proceeding from that one can say that a political-apparat battle is simply u
nfolding over the reform of interbudgetary relations. Medvedev is in a hurry to
implement at least part of what has been planned right now, while the Ministry of
Finance is trying to put off the changes until after the elections. It is
significant, for example, that according to the information of Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, Aleksey Kudrin, the head of the Ministry of Finance, announced at the
annual conference of Renessans Kapital that the Ministry of Finance envisions
that the hard work to implement the economic reforms will begin in the government
only after the 2012 election. Kudrin told foreign investors that only after the
elections would the "drive to conduct economic reforms" appear. The political
uncertainty regarding the 2012 problem is also superimposed on that. It turns out
that the government is impeding the adoption of decisions before the presidential
election, which may be linked both to differences over key issues of the reforms
and the problem of the redistribution of financial resources. And here the "North
Caucasus" topic has become paramount.
To illustrate, the Ministry of Finance and MER (Ministry of Economic Development)
came out against allocating the almost 4 trillion rubles (R) for the program for
development of the North Caucasus until the year 2025. Two-thirds of the amount
was envisioned to be taken from the federal budget. Federal budget expenditures
are supposed to come to R2.7 trillion of the total R3.9 trillion envisioned for
the development of the Caucasus. In the next three years -- from 2012 through
2014, R357.7 billion would be taken from the public treasury for this program.
However, less than 30% of the proposed expenditures has been envisioned in the
draft federal budget for the next three-year period. And in the long term until
2025, it turns out that only 5% of the R2.7 trillion can be covered. According to
Vedomosti 's information, the draft of the state program Development of the North
Caucasus Federal District (SKFO) Until 2025 will be submitted to the government
with the disagreements and comments of the economic departments. Proceeding from
that, at the Ministry of Finance, they believe that the government's proposals on
the Caucasus are simply unrealistic. The budget will not be raised again, and
taking into account the expenditures for the Caucasus called for, either the
parameters would have to be raised, which would mean a higher deficit, or taxes
raised. Vedomosti wrote on 1 August that they (the proposals) are being
criticized in the Ministry of Economic Development too.
The state program was developed by the Ministry of Regional Development on the
instructions of Premier Vladimir Putin. It is supposed to replace the federal
target programs -- Southern Russia and the programs of socioeconomic development
of Chechnya and Ingushetia that are now operating in the region. According to the
premier's plan, the new program is supposed to improve control over the
implementation of the projects. At the same time, one-third of the entire budget
of the state program -- about R1.2 trillion -- would go to develop Dagestan.
Chechnya asked the Federal Center for R500 billion. But essentially the premier's
directive was given in the context of the instructions from Medvedev, who
actively supported Khloponin's initiative to create a tourist cluster on the
territory of the North Caucasus regions. The idea was discussed back in September
of last year (2010) when agreements on intentions to build the Arkhyz alpine
skiing resort were supposed to be signed by Aleksandr Khloponin, Boris Ebzeyev,
at that time the president of Karachayevo-Cherkesia, Vladimir Dmitriyev, the
chairman of VEB (Foreign-Economic Bank), and Dmitriy Pumpyanskiy, the chairman of
the Pipe Metallurgy Company board of directors. The tourist cluster plan was
definitively approved by Medvedev during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in
June. Right then it was announced that around R300 billion in state capital would
be required for its implementat ion -- R60 billion for the next four years to
build the infrastructure, and the rest -- to provide tax breaks for 10 years.
Questions of the development of the North Caucasus are also included on the
agenda of foreign policy measures with Medvedev's participation. To illustrate,
based on the results of the meeting of Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the G8 summit meeting, the plan for the
tourist development of the North Caucasus was included among the priority areas
of the strategic partnership between the two countries. The OAO (open-type
joint-stock company) Kurorty Severnogo Kavkaza (North Caucasus Resorts) and the
bank Caisse des Depots et Consignations will create a joint venture, which will
make it possible for the Caucasus resorts to become some of the world centers for
alpine skiing tourism together with the European Alps. Moreover, Suleyman
Kerimov's company Nafta Moskva will invest R1.4 billion in the construction of
the sport and tourist infrastructure in Dagestan.
But on 3 August Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Finance Tatyana Nesterenko
announced that the Ministry of Finance will not approve the state program for the
development of the North Caucasus. According to her, the proposed level of
financing goes far beyond what has been planned. "Either it turns out in our
country that all the expenditures of the federal budget are taken out of the
general context and we start considering support of individual regional clusters,
or we actually implement state policy overall in such spheres as health care,
transport, and industry and we single out among other things the priorities
pertaining to what needs to be implemented on this Russian territory," Nesterenko
The problem of reconciling the sums of federal resources that can be directed to
the development of North Caucasus projects is far from the main one. Debate is
intensifying over what is a higher priority: resolving the social-political
problems of the region and questions of security, or financial-economic problems.
Judging from everything, the government and the president are answering this
question in different ways. The cabinet of ministers at this point is not willing
to expand financing of North Caucasus programs, while the social-political
problems are proving to be "suspended" because of the established system of
government with two decision-making centers.
The extremely critical question of the wisdom of developing tourism in the
regions of the North Caucasus was heard during Putin's meeting with the young
activists of the Mashuk-2011 forum. One of the participants in the forum said
emotionally: "Wait on tourists?! I do not see that kind of future! That is not
one of the principles of the Caucasian people! Our mentality is different!" He
proposed to develop the agricultural direction at an accelerated rate. Such a
situation already took place, although it dealt with the reform of the system of
internal affairs organs. At the interregional United Russia conference in March
of this year (2011), Putin was asked about the funny acronyms that have been
formed after the renaming of certain organs within the internal affairs system,
and this became evidence of the party of power's negatively ironic attitude
toward the reform. It is unlikely that such critical questions would have been
heard without the approval of Putin's public relations people.
Moreover, just as in March, this time Putin answered more likely ironically while
formally supporting the idea of the development of tourism in the North Caucasus.
"Mountain-dwellers, of course, a mountain people," Putin agreed, "but they were
not created only to fight. They are very talented people... I remember from the
construction detachments, they are good builders. Construction brigades from the
North Caucasus knocked off work throughout the entire country!" "And tourism is a
very important sector of t he economy of many countries. And when you comprehend
that your well-being is changing, your mentality changes too. The understanding
comes that this is prestigious work," the head of the government said, adding
that "if a local employee pinches the bottoms of female tourists, some will like
it, of course. But far from all. So they simply won't come here," Putin added.
"But you can always avoid 'pinching bottoms,'" the premier noted.
For Putin the trip to the North Caucasus became an opportunity to personally
support those organizations that among other things joined the All-Russia
People's Front (ONF). It was important to Putin to demonstrate political support
of those who are willing to rally around the ONF and United Russia on the
threshold of the elections.
At the same time, such issues as interethnic relations and the "Russian question"
are also closely related to the problems of the North Caucasus. And here too we
can sense the difference in emphasis between the president and the government,
especially after the pogroms on Manezh Square in December of last year. In
December 2010, in commenting on the riots on Manezh Square, the president said
that "fomenting interethnic hostility in our country is an extremely serious
crime," and he added that the participants in the riots should be brought to
criminal rather than administrative justice, in his opinion. In March 2011, at
the conference The Great Reforms and the Modernization of Russia, he called
"intolerance, extremism, and their extreme manifestation -- terrorism" the
enemies of the country's free development.
At the same time, however, the law enforcement organs were very reluctant to
start criminal cases under the article "Inciting Interethnic Hostility," while
Premier Vladimir Putin met with fanatic soccer fans (who were called the main
"force" of those who carried out the pogroms) at the end of December and visited
the grave of the murdered Yegor Sviridov. Putin, unlike Medvedev, carefully tried
to share the concern of the protesters, sending signals that were ideologically
close to them. For the premier it is important to show that the government has
heard the protest. At the same time, even while maintaining a balanced position,
it was obvious that the premier was appealing primarily to Russian "patriots."
"If we do not understand what I was talking about now and do not treat each other
respectfully, just what will we have to do? To put it mildly, we will have to
refine the rules for registration on the country's territory, especially in major
centers -- in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other major cities," Putin said. The
prime minister reminded them that in Russia this procedure in accordance with the
Constitution has been "liberalized to the maximum."
In the government they had simultaneously begun to discuss the idea of reviving
the nationalities affairs ministry (Minnats), which Dmitriy Medvedev sharply
opposed. In January of this year, the head of state announced that "bureaucratic
structures like the Minnats never accomplished interethnic and interfaith tasks."
On 29 July, in order to intensify the fight against extremism, the president
signed an edict creating a special interdepartmental commission that will
coordinate federal organs of power and their interaction with the regions,
municipalities, and public organizations. Dmitriy Medvedev was talking about the
need to improve coordination of departments and regions in the cause of fighting
extremism on 22 May of this year at a conference at the MVD (Ministry of Internal
Affairs) devoted to this problem. At that time the president pointed out that in
2010 the number of reported crimes of an extremist orientation rose by roughly
20%; that "radical and nationalist groupings are becoming increasingly
well-trained and refined in their tactics"; and that additional steps are needed
to counter the radicalism of individ ual social groups. Right then he instructed
them to think "about refining the mechanism for coordinating the work to counter
At the same time, when the talk turns to radicalism, Medvedev often means
nationalist organizations, while Putin means religious ones. To a question of the
radical religious views that are widespread in the Caucasus, he frankly told the
people who share them to go to hell. "If you have radical religious views -- why
don't you go where these radical views are the norm!" the premier said. Yet
another participant in the forum told Putin that there are young people who
respond to the influence of outside extremist circles. "Those who bullshit
("kompostirovat mozgi") people and try to dupe them will not make the world a
better place. They are exploiting the existence of negative phenomena --
corruption, disorder, and unemployment... the ground must be knocked out from
under their feet!" Putin answered.
The problem of normalizing the situation and developing the regions of the North
Caucasus encounters difficulties of primarily a political and administrative
character: in conditions of the tandemocracy, which has led to the isolation of
the two decision-making centers and more disagreements between them; the search
for the priorities of the region's development and reconciliation of the sums of
budget support is impeded, while the contradictions between the government's
political tasks and the administrative ones intensify. For Putin, as the leader
of the ONF and United Russia, election priorities and outlining post-election
prospects right now become paramount. For Medvedev, who bears more responsibility
for the situation in the region and the success of the way to resolve the North
Caucasus' main problems that he has selected; the concrete results that will be
achieved right in the next few months -- during his first term as president --
are more important. But the basis of all these difficulties is the overall
uncertainty over who will implement what within the framework of the
socioeconomic policy in the country, and in particular in the North Caucasus,
after the presidential election in 2012.
[return to Contents]
August 15, 2011
Why Is The North Caucasus An Unholy Mess?
By Liz Fuller
Over the past 15 years, Russia's North Caucasus has become a byword for war,
destruction, human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, corruption, economic
collapse, and Islamic terrorism. Last year, 754 people were killed in ongoing
low-level hostilities -- two a day on average.
On August 12, gunmen killed two police officers after Friday Prayers at a mosque
in Khasavyurt, Daghestan, near the border with Chechnya. A day later, in the
nearby village of Kurush, a local fire chief was shot and killed while driving
his car.
The region is variously compared to a tinderbox ready to erupt, a cancer on the
body of the Russian Federation, and a financial black hole that absorbs without
trace billions of rubles intended to promote stabilization and desperately needed
economic development.
How did a predominantly rural, mountainous region of fewer than 10 million people
degenerate so swiftly into chaos, misery, endless bloodshed, and religious and
social polarization?
That process was triggered and perpetuated by the short-sighted, misguided,
self-serving and amoral actions of a small handful of men. On the one hand,
Russia's leaders and their local satraps pinned their careers and reputations to
retaining control initially over Chechnya, and then over the North Caucasus as a
whole. On the other, the local population took up arms against them, first in the
name of Chechen independence, but now increasingly under the banner of Islam.
'Restore Constitutional Order'
The struggle began when then Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent the Russian
Army into Chechnya in December 1994 to "restore constitutional order." In
November 1990, Chechnya's mercurial president, former Soviet Air Force General
Jokhar Dudayev, had signed a sovereignty declaration that the population
construed as cementing the republic's emergence as an independent state. And for
almost three years after the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, Chechnya
indeed functioned independently of Moscow.
Yeltsin's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev boasted that Dudaev could be ousted and
Chechnya brought to heel by a "small victorious war." But the Chechens,
collectively psychologically scarred by the memory of the entire nation's
deportation by Stalin to Central Asia in 1944, mobilized en masse and fought
back, David against the Russian Goliath. Dudayev was killed in April 1996, but in
August that year several hundred Chechen fighters succeeded in retaking the
capital, Grozny, and forced Moscow to sign a peace agreement and withdraw its
defeated troops.
But the peace was short-lived. True, in May 1997 Yeltsin signed an agreement with
Dudaev's successor as president, Aslan Maskhadov, which referred to the Chechen
Republic Ichkeria as a "state" with which Moscow pledged to structure relations
"in accordance with the universally accepted principles and norms of
international law." But Moscow failed to provide funds to restore the republic's
devastated infrastructure and create new jobs. That neglect played into the hands
of rival bands of demobilized Chechen fighters who turned to banditry and
hostage-taking and, increasingly, came under the influence of purist Salafi
The radical Islamist faction was headed by field commander Shamil Basayev, the
mastermind of the June 1995 seizure of hundreds of civilian hostages in the south
Russian town of Budyonnovsk, and Saudi jihadist Khattab. Having sidelined the
secular nationalist Maskhadov, they invaded neighboring Daghestan in August 1999
and proclaimed an independent North Caucasus state. That incursion furnished the
Russian authorities with the excuse they needed to launch a second war and paved
the way for the election of Vladimir Putin to succeed the ailing and ineffective
Yeltsin as Russian president.
'Stabilizing' Chechnya
The second time around, the Russian Army avoided the tactical errors it had made
during the first war. Within months, the Chechen resistance forces retreated from
Grozny at night through a snow-covered minefield, losing hundreds of men, and
headed for the southern mountains. They are still entrenched there, sallying
forth at intervals from a network of well-equipped underground bases to attack
Russian troops.
Putin's plan for "stabilizing" Chechnya hinged on tasking pro-Moscow Chechen
officials headed by former mufti Akhmed-hadji Kadyrov with stamping out the last
vestiges of resistance and providing virtually unlimited funds for postconflict
reconstruction. When Kadyrov was killed in May 2004, Putin continued to back his
son, Ramzan Kadyrov.
Since his formal confirmation as Chechen Republic head in March 2007 at the age
of 30, Kadyrov has successfully overseen large-scale reconstruction that has
transformed Grozny from a rubble-strewn battlefield into a functioning city. But
his continued reliance on brute force against anyone suspected of sympathizing
with the Islamic insurgency and his opulent lifestyle in the face of chronic
poverty and deprivation have made him the most hated and feared man in Chechnya.
Meanwhile, "preventive strikes" against suspected Islamist fighters outside
Chechnya impelled more and more angry and alienated young men to join the
insurgency ranks, and thus contributed to the spillover into neighboring
republics of what had begun in 1994-95 as a battle to defend Chechen
In Ingushetia, Putin's former FSB crony Murat Zyazikov gave the green light for
the abduction and summary execution of hundreds of blameless young men whose
brothers retaliated by flocking to fight under Basayev's banner. They killed
nearly 80 police and security personnel in one night of revenge attacks in June
Further west in Kabardino-Balkaria, local police systematically harassed,
detained, and tortured young practicing Muslim men. Basayev recruited them, too.
In a wakeup call to Moscow, his fighters launched similar attacks in Nalchik, the
republican capital, in October 2005.
Islam As New Ideology
As the flames of insurgency spread, Islam gradually superseded the original
ideology of national liberation. In late 2007, then Chechen president and
insurgency commander Doku Umarov formally abjured the cause of Chechen
independence and proclaimed himself head of a virtual Caucasus Emirate. More
recently, he has pledged to "liberate" Russian regions far from the Caucasus that
have historically been populated by Muslims.
Umarov's positioning of the insurgency as part of a global jihad enabled Moscow
to rationalize the ongoing indiscriminate reprisals in the North Caucasus as part
of the war on terror. So, too, did the terrorist attacks launched by new recruits
to the militants' ranks. Aleksandr Tikhomirov (aka Said Buryatsky) a convert to
Islam from Buryatia and a hugely popular ideologist of jihad, staged two car
bombings in Ingushetia in 2009, one of which narrowly missed killing Zyazikov's
successor as president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Daghestani Magomed Vagapov (aka
Seyfullakh Gubdensky) recruited the two women from Daghestan who blew themselves
up in the Moscow metro in March 2010, killing 40 people and injuring a further
Yevkurov and Daghestan's President Magomedsalam Magomedov have both appealed
repeatedly to young fighters to lay down their arms and return to peaceful
civilian life. But only a few dozen have availed themselves of that offer, far
fewer than continue to "head for the forest" to join the insurgents' ranks.
Ninety-six fighters were killed in Daghestan during the first six months of this
year, compared with 53 in Kabardino-Balkaria and 27 in Chechnya. As Magomedov
complained last month: "You kill two fighters and four more spring up to take
their place."
The insurgency is certainly not the only problem the North Caucasus faces. But as
the most visible one, it eclipses the others, which is one reason why for years
the Kremlin channeled into fighting it funds that could otherwise have been spent
on badly needed economic and infrastructure development and creating new jobs.
Shift In Focus
When Dmitry Kozak, Putin's intelligent and perceptive point man for the North
Caucasus from 2004-07, argued the need to address other problems plaguing the
region -- entrenched corrupt elites, crime, human rights abuses, interethnic
tensions, disputes over the use of land, economic stagnation, unemployment -- he
was ignored.
Only when Dmitry Medvedev succeeded Putin as Russian president did the focus
shift. Many observers doubt, however, whether the grandiose 15-year plan to
exploit the region's tourism potential recently unveiled by Deputy Prime Minister
and North Caucasus Federal District head Aleksandr Khloponin can turn the tide.
The specter of terrorism already deters most investors from financing projects
even in those republics (North Ossetia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Adygheya) where
the insurgency has made only minimal inroads to date. Moreover, the maladies
afflicting the region are immune to a "quick fix," even if large-scale investment
could provide one.
Russian nationalists increasingly advocate allowing the North Caucasus to secede.
But that would play into the hands of the Islamic militants fighting to transform
the virtual Caucasus Emirate into a functioning state. Those fighters have
reportedly already threatened to inflicting the maximum carnage on spectators and
participants in the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi on the Black Sea coast.
At least for the next few years, Moscow has no choice but to continue the
struggle to retain its grasp on the region. But that struggle is motivated more
by prestige and a residual imperial mindset than by concern for the fate of the
millions of Russian citizens for whom it is home.
[return to Contents]
August 15, 2011
Russia's Young Hemingway
Chechen War Veteran Zahar Prilepin is an unabashed nationalist and critic of the
By Owen Matthews
Last year, at a literary festival in St-Malo, France, Russian writer Zahar
Prilepin and I spoke on a panel about Russia's war in Chechnya. The audience was
fired up with anti-Russian sentiment, having just seen a documentary on the
devastation of Grozny by Russian forces in 2000. Prilepinmuscular, silentsank
sullenly in his chair as the experts waffled on about Russia's unhealed
psychological wounds. Finally, I suggested we give Prilepin the microphone, since
he was the only one in the room who'd fought in Chechnya, as an officer in
Russia's paramilitary police. He weighed his words. "All I can say is that the
Russian soldier has a natural talent for fighting," he declared. "And he's ready
to demonstrate that skill in any European country you like." Cue howls of Gallic
Yes, Zahar Prilepin is an unapologetic nationalist. He's also a leading critic of
the Kremlin who has been arrested more than 30 times. And he's probably the most
important writer in modern Russia, a sensitive and intelligent critic of his
country's condition.
To understand Russia today, you need to understand Prilepinfirst and foremost
because he doesn't fit into the preconceptions most outsiders have about the
place. He hates Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the "thieves" in the Kremlin.
But unlike the liberal opposition, Prilepin cheered when Russian tanks rolled
into the breakaway republics of Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. He served in
Chechnya but was an admirer and colleague of Anna Politkovskaya, the
investigative journalist who criticized abuses by Prilepin's own brutal unit, the
OMON (and who was slain in 2006). Much of his writing is dark and violent, yet it
shines with a Tolstoy-like faith in the Russian people. "In Russia everything has
been destroyed except the people, with all their reserves of strength, love, and
patience," he says. The Russian people have reciprocated: every Prilepin book is
a bestseller, especially among young, urban readers, and he recently won a major
literary award for best new writer of the last decade.
The paradoxes are endless. It's only when you see Prilepin and his work in the
context of his generation that the picture starts to make sense. Born in 1975, he
grew up in a provincial intelligentsia family during the stifling days of
Brezhnev stagnation. But as he came of age, his country fell apart and the
certainties of Soviet life disintegrated into a kaleidoscope of ideologies. Small
wonder, then, that Prilepin's world view seems patched together from so many
apparently contradictory sourcesa bit of Tolstoyan mysticism, some German
nationalism, a dash of Jeffersonian democracy.
Prilepin is most incisive when he draws portraits of youths a few years younger
than himselfRussia's lost generation, who grew up in a dystopic world where
bandits were kings and the politicians were corrupt thieves. In his 2005 novel
Pathologies, Prilepin writes of young men at war in Chechnya, and the intense
camaraderie and casual brutality of kids with no role models and precious little
family except each other. In San'ka, his second work, Prilepin spins the tale of
a young boy whose father has drunk himself to deatha metaphor for the wider
"fatherless generation searching for those whose sons they can become." San'ka
finds such a father figure in the charismatic leader of an ultranationalist
group, based on the real-life National Bolshevik Party, a radical opposition
group banned by the Kremlin. San'ka and his friends are rebels, but hopeless and
ineffective ones, who end up beating themselves to pieces on the walls of the
cage that the state has built around them.
Where San'ka is just a doomed rebel, Prilepin is a literary revolutionary, that
peculiarly Russian figure who believes that his words and ideas can transform his
country. It's no coincidence, Prilepin thinks, that all the great Russian writers
of the last 150 years have been intensely political. The old cursed questions of
RussiaWhat is to be done? Who is to blame?are as important today as ever. Such
questions don't allow Russian writers to stray far from politics, "not even
Nabokov, running around with his butterfly net." One can't write about Russians
without writing about their relations with the state.
Prilepin is a political writer in the way that Maxim Gorky or Fyodor Dostoevsky
were political: he shows vulnerable, all-too-human characters fighting giant
forces more powerful than themselves. And like Dostoevsky's, his work is shot
through with irrepressible beauty and the promise of redemption: a
wannabe-terrorist punk called Negative who talks tenderly to his plants; a
soldier who daydreams about his simple love for his girlfriend, even as he
terrorizes Chechen civilians.
Prilepin's two tours of duty in Chechnya were the basis of Pathologies. Today he
ducks questions about how much of the brutality he describes is actually true. "I
write fiction, not autobiography," he says curtlythough he does volunteer that
his driver was shot just yards from him in an ambush. He's also not ashamed to
admit that he made money the way most Russian police do, shaking down
truckdrivers for bribes. Prilepin is an intensely male writerlike Ernest
Hemingway, he's intoxicated with the rituals and bonds of maleness, and, by
extension, war, which he sees as the ultimate test of manhood. "Men are designed
to deal with war like women are designed to overcome childbirth," he says.
It's clear that Prilepin is a patriot, albeit one who sees his country as fatally
sick, and who feels a duty to do something about it. That's why he edits Nizhny
Novgorod's edition of the liberal paper Novaya Gazetawhich employed
Politkovskayaand why he heads the local branch of the banned National Bolshevik
Party. To an extent, he's protected by his fame, and perhaps by a family
connectionhis cousin-in-law is the Kremlin's chief ideologue. But Prilepin hasn't
totally escaped the ire of the authorities. He's had his phone routinely tapped,
he's been arrested dozens of times, and he faces three criminal cases brought by
officials accused of corruption by his paper.
In the end, what makes Prilepin such an important figure is that he's been into
the heart of Russia's darkness and seen some kind of light. Despite his dystopic
portraits of the lost generation, he says that in real life he's met plenty of
Russian kids who are "smart, curious, intelligent, kids who want to travel and
learn languages." And unlike his nihilistic characters, Prilepin actually gives a
damnwhich is another way of saying he still has hope. "The apocalypse starts
within each of us," he says, echoing Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's call to reject the
passivity and conformism that allows the state to trample its people.
One evening in June, Prilepin and I sipped cognac on the porch of a bathhouse by
the vast, slow-flowing expanse of the Volga. Sitting and watching rivers slide by
is one of the recurring images in his books: in one story, a boy tells his father
he wants to wait and see when the river will run dry. "Russia lives on a
precipice into which it can collapse at any moment," Prilepin says. "Russia has
two pathsto change or to die." As the dusk gathers, he seems strangely serene as
he speaks about the coming revolution. "People used to believe that the state was
all-powerful," he says. "But not anymore ... Anyone who thinks and reads wants
change." For Russia's sake, one hopes that it won't be San'ka's kind of
revolution, a bloody affair of lynchings, broken glass, and fire.
With Anna Nemtsova
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
August 15, 2011
Moscow Ponders Mayor's Face-Lift
By Alexander Bratersky
If you've walked around downtown Moscow in recent weeks, you most likely got to
wander through a maze of brick stacks and roadblocks, all swarming with migrant
Trying to understand why Mayor Sergei Sobyanin decided to replace the asphalt
sidewalks with red bricks is almost as confusing.
The facelift, which started in May and whose first phase is slated to end Aug.
25, was ordered without a City Duma vote or a public discussion, opening the door
to speculation about its purpose.
Complicating matters, City Hall has been forced to fend off media reports that
Sobyanin's wife has a finger in the sidewalk pie, and experts have questioned
whether the bricks will really be better for Moscow than good old asphalt.
Sobyanin rolled out the 4 billion ruble ($136 million) plan in late March,
promising to replace the 4 million square meters of Moscow sidewalks within the
Garden Ring with bricks over the next few years.
While more expensive, city officials point out that bricks have a longer life
span, withstand rough weather better, are more environmentally friendly than
asphalt, and are more pleasing to the eye.
Contractors, however, will not be able to meet this year's goal to replace 1.1
million square meters of sidewalk because brick production facilities cannot keep
up with demand, First Deputy Mayor Pyotr Biryukov said earlier this month.
The sidewalk work will be halted on Aug. 25 to avoid disrupting the start of the
new school year in September but will resume next year, RIA-Novosti reported.
Biryukov did not elaborate on the actual area that will be replaced this year,
but Kommersant, citing City Hall sources, put the figure at a mere 400,000 square
meters. The stretches include prominent locations such as Ulitsa Ostozhenka and
the Kremlin Embankment.
The brick industry saw the missed deadline coming, said a representative of one
of city's brick producers, who called "the terms simply unrealistic."
City Hall further contributed to the confusion by changing the requirements for
the bricks which come in various shapes and sizes on short notice, said the
representative, who asked not to be identified to avoid problems with City Call.
City officials did not comment on the criticism, but they strongly rebuffed
claims that contractors hired for the sidewalk work included any firm affiliated
with the mayor's wife, Irina Sobyanina.
"She is not involved in any commercial activity whatsoever," Sobyanin's
spokeswoman Gulnara Penkova said earlier this month, Interfax reported.
Sobyanin has denied similar claims himself, saying in April that he is "better at
ballet than his wife is at business."
But Andrei Tsibin, head of City Hall's utilities department, fueled the
speculation last month, saying he was not aware of Sobyanina running any
businesses but the media should conduct their own investigation into the matter.
Talk about Sobyanina started shortly after the sidewalk project was announced. A
number of media outlets, including Kommersant and BFM.ru, wrote in April that
Sobyanina had run a brick maker called Aerodromstroi in Tyumen, where her husband
served as governor in the early 2000s, and that she even had the nickname "Ira
the Road Curb."
Aerodromstroi, since rebranded MDS Group, was indeed one of the 16 companies to
win tenders to replace Moscow's sidewalks. It does not list Sobyanina among its
owners not all of whom, admittedly, are identified. Russian business databases,
including SPARK, contain no mention of Sobyanina either.
Reports linking Sobyanina to the brick maker were fabricated by Sobyanin's
political enemies during his tenure in Tyumen, Dmitry Muratov, editor-in-chief of
the liberal Novaya Gazeta, told Ekho Moskvy this month.
Sergei Udaltsov, leader of Left Front and an outspoken critic of the authorities,
also said there was no evidence of any link between Sobyanina and bricks, Finam
FM radio reported last month.
Udaltsov, however, went on to denounce the sidewalk project at a rally near City
Hall on July 31. The rally was dispersed by police, and Udaltsov was jailed for
15 days a sentence that caused Amnesty International to declare him a "prisoner
of conscience" last week.
Questions about the need to pull up the sidewalks, meanwhile, resonate among
people struggling to navigate the city's excavated center.
"This looks like a mass cavalry charge on Moscow," Alexei Klimenko, an adviser to
the city's chief architect, said by telephone about the project's sudden
implementation without public discussion.
But officials insist that the trouble is worth the money. The cost of one square
meter of bricks is 3,400 rubles ($116), about 2.5 times more than asphalt, but
the bricks last 25 to 30 years, or four times longer than asphalt, and are easier
to repair, said Tsybin of City Hall's utilities department.
"In the long run, bricks are more economically efficient than asphalt," Tsybin
said at a roundtable on the project last month.
Tsybin said replacing 1 million square meters of asphalt with bricks would reduce
emissions by 665 tons per year, mainly due to the fumes that asphalt, an oil
byproduct, emits in the sun. But this is a drop in the bucket, given that the
city's roads, which occupy a much larger area, remain paved with asphalt, Forbes
Russia noted.
Road bricks are also harder to navigate for wheelchair users, women in high heels
and baby carriages, critics said. Several women interviewed by Komsomolskaya
Pravda complained of having already broken their heels on the new sidewalks.
Riding the brick sidewalks in wheelchairs is bad for the back, prominent blogger
Oleg Kozyrev wrote in April. He has participated in events where celebrities
travel across Moscow in wheelchairs to spread awareness about the problems that
the disabled face in Moscow.
City Hall said on its web site that it is conducting a check to see whether the
bricks are indeed harmful for wheelchair users.
Bricks are worse for pedestrians overall than asphalt if not laid properly
because they may become loose and shaky and, in the winter, become very slippery,
critics said.
City Hall appears to be taking these concerns seriously, ordering some
contractors to pull up finished sidewalks and relay them again.
Some companies, including those working on the Garden Ring, have had to relay
sidewalks after using bricks of low quality, Forbes said.
City Hall has courted brick sidewalks before. An initiative in 1997 failed
dismally, said Yury Vasilev, a professor at Moscow's Automobile and Road
Institute. "It barely survived the winter," he said.
Residents, meanwhile, are divided over the switch in sidewalks. A survey by the
independent Levada Center last week found that 57 percent were in favor, but a
poll by Superjob.ru, also last week, showed that 52 percent opposed. The figure
was higher for women than men, apparently reflecting the problem with high heels.
Incidentally, the Levada poll also indicated that Sobyanin has yet to catch up
with his predecessor, Yury Luzhkov, in popularity, with 23 percent calling
Sobyanin a better mayor, compared with 26 percent for Luzhkov. Fifty-one percent
remained undecided, although in all likeness a few months of walking on the new
sidewalks will tip opinions one way or the other.
[return to Contents]
RIA Novosti
August 12, 2011
A battle for Moscow's soul and history
By RIA Novosti correspondent Alexei Korolyov
For the past month, residents of a quiet alley in central Moscow have been
embroiled in an escalating conflict with a property developer that destroyed a
historic building without permission.
The whole area around Bolshoi Kozikhinsky alley - just a 20-minute walk from Red
Square and the Kremlin - feels like a war zone. The ruins of the 19th-century
building at no. 25, which was pulled down despite last-minute efforts to save it,
are fenced off. There is a palpable tension in the air as a clutch of residents
pace the sidewalk in front of a nearby police station, which has the word 'suki,'
or bastards, etched into its door.
"This is plain outrageous," says a local resident, who declined to give his name.
"All of Moscow is united in fighting against this crime."
At least 20 people were injured after scuffles broke out between residents and
masked workmen in the early hours of Monday, as demolition work went ahead -
despite an official ban. About fifty locals and heritage campaigners were trying
to stop the bulldozers from knocking down the 125-year-old building, which is to
be replaced by a new 7-storey luxury apartment block.
The building is the latest to be razed in a demolition drive that has ravaged the
Russian capital's historic neighborhoods in the past two decades. In June, there
was outrage when two 19th-century buildings were bulldozed overnight in what
became known as "the night of long scoops," just weeks after Mayor Sergei
Sobyanin forbade developers to demolish listed buildings.
In a press release following Monday's clashes, heritage watchdog Archnadzor said
police simply looked on as dozens of masked thugs beat protesters. Ambulances
were not allowed to attend to the injured until the police finally moved in.
"The hasty demolition of the remains of the building is ample proof of the
unwillingness of the building firm to discuss... the legality of their division
of the area," the statement read.
When I called the Satori construction company for further enlightenment, they
merely told me that the building had been "scheduled for demolition."
They were, the spokesman went on, "simply acting on orders," and had "no idea"
who the heavies were.
Activists say police could easily find this out, but had so far failed to suggest
they were particularly keen on doing this.
Opponents of the demolition also complain they were not consulted - nor informed
- properly about plans and say they will take Satori to court because the new
building would be disastrous for the neighborhood's architectural harmony.
"Architecturally, the project has been carried out extremely sloppily,"
Archnadzor activist Dmitry Lisitsyn told me. "An architect is someone who is
tasked with installing a new building into the existing environment...but this
project breaches elementary construction norms."
"The people who designed this showed a recklessness that went beyond common
sense. The people who approved this should be investigated," he said.
"This approach, where a building is stripped of its protected status, does not
and will not work here. The authorities should give this some thought. Do they
really want to help attract investment in a way that is being met with such
opposition? "
Meanwhile, the demolitions look set to go on.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
August 15, 2011
Learning from life in Korea
By Anna Sulimina
Recently on the radio, I heard a statement from the Moscow Mayor, where he
proudly promises to build 20 new metro stations in Moscow next several years.
Russian officials often talk on how beautiful life in Russia and in Moscow will
soon be so everyone got already used to it.
If it sounds too good to be true for Moscow, in Korea it's possible to see how
these ambitions are being converted into reality. After visiting the country, it
seems that people regularly manage to act rather than talk. I would urge all
Russians to take a look at South Korea and see how people work and live now,
rather than in some elusive, golden tomorrow.
First off all go to the capital - Seoul, which personally I immediately felt in
love with. A huge megapolis, home to about 40 per cent of the country's
population, it should be reminiscent of the stress and chaos of Moscow. Yet it
isn't. The city was rebuilt from scratch following the twin disasters of Japanese
occupation and the Korean War.
Although 16 million people live in Seoul, it is strikingly clean, very
well-organized and easy to get around unlike Moscow.
And while Russia talks about making the capital into a global financial center,
Korea has gone ahead and done it. Seoul today is among the world's biggest
financial and economic centers, ranked eighth on the number of big multinational
South Korea is home to 14 global business giants, setting trends all over the
world or successfully catching them up. Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics,
Hyundai Motors are already enough to bring prosperity to a country which is not
packed with natural resources.
While the Russian auto industry relies on state backing and protectionist
policies, in Korea Hyundai is the top make because it is a well-made,
value-for-money vehicle. Last year it also became Russia's top selling motor
And it seems that the same corporations, as well as making money, are trying to
improve people's quality of life.
Even in a provincial town, the railway station will have several Samsung plasmas
showing films or music concerts for commuters and any metro train will be
entertaining passengers with cartoons or commercials.
Korea is very digital, stylish and creative in every sense - starting from light
and elegant high-rise buildings, people of all ages dressed up as well as
possible and even the smallest kiosk boasting glowing, interactive illumination
to brighten up the streetscape. The country is not cheap, but it offers value for
There is a flip side, however.
It seems that Koreans just love money and money loves them. They use every single
opportunity to make tourists split the cash - buying pretty love locks to hang
them on the top of Seoul tower will be one of the millions "spend-for-nothing"
moments for lovers in Seoul.
But the main source of South Korean well-being is the extreme industriousness of
its people. They say school pupils have only one week of summer holidays during
which they eagerly take extra classes to improve their performance. My friend and
I heard lots of shocking stories about competitive top managers of
above-mentioned corporations, who had their first holiday when they retired. It
might sound depressing for Russians, but obviously that's why they succeed.
"The Koreans are rich and can work a lot but they don't know how to relax and
spend their money, that is funny," said one of the local expats.
Perhaps as well as Russians learning how to work more effectively, Koreans could
learn a thing or two about lightening up from us?
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
August 13, 2011
The Contagion of Anonymity
By Dmitry Babich
Russia seems to have caught a sort of contagion named anonymous exposures. During
the whole past week the offices of the country's biggest media outlets received
detailed accounts of the "corrupt practices" of the director of Moscow Museum of
Architecture, Irina Korobyina. The letter, signed by an obviously fictional
Aphonasy B., tried to attract the attention of the media (and, in this way,
obviously that of society and government) to numerous irregularities in the
museum's work, carrying copies of letters, statistics, amounts of misspent money
etc. Similar stories happen every day in Russia, but this exposure was
exceptionally well prepared. An insider's hand could be guessed behind it.
Irina Korobyina said it was "below her dignity" to comment on anonymous
accusations. In 1989-1993, when Russia had full democracy, she would be 100
percent right. In the beginning of his democratization campaign, perestroika,
Mikhail Gorbachev declared anonymous complaints no longer eligible for the
authorities' review and reaction, and this was a step in the right direction.
However, there was an important replacement that Gorbachev found for the
Stalinist practice of "purging" society's evils by secret complaints to police,
KGB and communist party bodies. It was the institution of "workers' collectives,"
which under perestroika even had the capacity to elect their plants' directors
and to distribute social benefits.
When one has an opportunity to speak up openly, there is indeed no need for
anonymous letters to the authorities at least, for an honest person. But what if
there is no such opportunity? Or if speaking up leads not only to losing your
job, but also to what the Germans call Berufsverbot a prohibition to occupy any
positions inside your profession, for example in museum sphere or in media? Here
I have to break my old rule and quote the anonymous letter of Aphonasy, in its
ideological part:
"Unlimited power, given to the heads of the state-financed organizations, was
probably designed for the people with high moral qualities and professionals in
their sphere... unlimited power, however, gives rise to arbitrariness and
I couldn't agree more. Modern communications, so much eulogized in the West,
provide new tools for arbitrariness, since they help to locate and blacklist the
open dissenters years after their actions or thousands of miles away from these
actions' initial locations. But the modern communications also provide great
opportunities for anonymous dissemination of information, and the honest and not
very honest whistle-blowers seize upon the opportunity. Instead of an ancient
Agora which we had under Gorbachev, we have a bad spy novel played before our
eyes on various levels. One can imagine what an atmosphere is now reigning in the
Museum of Architecture.
Let me now disappoint the Western commentariat: this atmosphere did not come with
Vladimir Putin. The situation changed for the worse already under Boris Yeltsin,
who had little respect even for those "workers' collectives," which actually made
his democratic rise to power in 1989-1991 possible. He ignored cries for help
from the staffs of Izvestia daily and RTR television during the 1990s, when these
then important media outlets were seized and changed beyond recognition by a
coalition of oligarchs and government-appointed "effective managers." These
events, much more tragic than the heavily publicized "destruction" of NTV in
2001, did not attract any attention from the West, which did not see much use in
non-oligarchic media as long as the "democratic Boris" was in power. NTV, ruled
by the iron hand of the "liberal oligarch" Vladimir Gusinsky, which destroyed the
very notion of workers' collective inside his media empire, became a darling of
the West precisely because it was an oligarchic media. No leftist deviations, the
amounts of criticism or praise for the authorities on NTV were regulated by
"effective managers" depending on the authorities' concessions to the oligarch
himself and his Western supporters.
By the end of the 1990s, Russia started to be ruled by "effective managers" from
bottom to the top. The very notion of "workers' collective" became anathema in
Russia, it was ridiculed and declared outdated by both the liberal and
conservative media.
The result is devastating. This time, authoritarianism comes to Russia not "from
the top" not from some utopian ideology or a group seizing power, as it was case
in 1917. This time, it comes "bottom up." A good example is the billionaire
Mikhail Prokhorov who is running his liberal party the Right Cause as if it was a
business project, easily trashing whole regional organizations without as much as
asking a rank-and file member for his opinion. One can easily imagine what a
president or prime minister he is going to be.
Internet is inundated by anonymous letters, which little by little squeeze out
the denunciations made by "open" whistleblowers, such as a disgruntled
Novorossyisk policeman Alexey Dymovsky, who denounced his superiors via an
Internet video only to be fired and persecuted.
The "effective managers" shrug their shoulders and pretend not to notice, much in
the way of Irina Korobyina of the Architecture Museum. But the truth is that only
a free worker (or, better, "workers' collective") can be innovative and
productive. I hope Mikhail Prokhorov understands it by the following election.
The next one he already lost.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
August 15, 2011
Smoking ban due in Russia by 2014
By Evgeniya Chaykovskaya
The long-anticipated ban on smoking public places is coming closer, with the
health ministry publishing plans to impose tough new laws by 2014.
The law prepared by the cabinet ministers proposes banning smoking in public
places, including transport, airports and train stations in time for the Sochi
Olympics. The price of a packet of cigarettes is also due to go up in an attempt
to dissuade people from taking up the habit.
Smoking will become illegal in hotels, cafes and nightclubs in 2015, and it will
include a ban on hookah pipes, popular in the capital.
Prisons and pre-detention centres would also become smoke-free zones.
The law is the first step in acting on World Health Organisation's fight against
tobacco, which Russia joined in 2008.
Economic measures
A minimum retail price will be introduced, pushing costs up significantly, and
will be indexed once a year according with inflation.
Tobacco companies will also be banned from sponsoring events and "stimulating
sales of tobacco products" and will have a duty to "protect the population's
health from the ramifications of tobacco use".
"Any citizens and organizations can introduce their suggestions during the public
debate, which will follow after the project is coordinated with state
authorities," the ministry said.
Restaurants will not suffer
Similar bans have been in place in many European countries, like the UK, France,
Norway, Finland.
The association of restaurateurs is ready for the ban, co-chairman of
anti-tobacco coalition Daria Khalturina told Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
Experience from around the world shows that not only their profits did not fall,
but occasionally even rose, as people were willing to take children with them,
and would sit longer in a room with clean air than with one filled with cigarette
Smoking world champion
According to a global survey of Russian adults (GATS), 60.2 per cent of men and
21.7 per cent of women in the country smoke, Interfax reported.
The 43.9 million Russian adults who smoke make up almost 40 per cent of the
economically active population.
An average Russian smokes 17 cigarettes a day, and 400,000 Russians die every
year because of illnesses caused by smoking.
Russians are skeptical
"The solution to the problem of smoking lies, of course, not in bans, but in
helping those who want to quit," wrote famous blogger Anton Nosik. "Who wants to
smoke will smoke."
Others think that strict measures can only lead to an increase in corruption.
"In order to have doubts, one only has to walk through any train, where anyone
who feels like it smokes right under the 'no smoking' signs," wrote nickola-r.
"It is not a question of how heavy the punishment is, but of its inevitability.
And we don't have that. Who will enforce the law? The cops, of whom 99 per cent
smoke like chimneys?"
"Ban the sales and production of tobacco in any shape, and I will be the first to
quit smoking and start jogging," wrote blogger Andrei Kuprikov. "But while
tobacco is being legally sold, do not limit my rights in consuming it, and leave
millions of people enjoying the great taste and aroma in peace."
[return to Contents]
The Irish Times
August 15, 2011
How Yelstin blocked coup that sought to preserve USSR
SEAMUS MARTIN in Moscow
FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION - 20 YEARS AFTER THE COUP: Emotions still run strong and
ideologies deep for those on both sides of the 1991 events
ON THE afternoon of Saturday, August 17th, 1991, 20 years ago this week, my wife,
Anita, my younger daughter Deirdre and I went on a pleasure cruise on the Moscow
river. Nothing, we had been told, happened in Moscow in August.
Some leading American correspondents had even left Moscow for good and handed
over to their successors, believing a quiet time was ahead.
My plans were for colourful journeys to Samarkand and Bukhara. Instead, as Irish
Times correspondent, I found myself in Moscow for a five-month political
convulsion that brought about the death of the USSR and for the years of turmoil
that followed.
As our river cruiser glided past the Kremlin, Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the
KGB, had gathered a group of men together to finalise plans for a military coup.
The following Monday, the tanks were on the streets of Moscow in an attempt to
block the signing of a new treaty that would give the individual Soviet Republics
greater autonomy, leading in some cases to independence.
The coup failed and the hero of the hour was deemed to be Boris Yeltsin, who
stood on a tank outside the Moscow White House and defied those who planned the
coup. In hindsight, matters look different. The plotters got cold feet not long
after the coup was launched but they still had Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev
detained at his holiday home in the Crimea.
With both hardliners and Gorbachev out of the equation, Yeltsin saw his chance to
grab power and he took it. He was a man who wanted power, according to the late
Yegor Yakovlev, one of Russia's most committed democrats. Before his untimely
death, Yakovlev spoke to me of Yeltsin's "animal, his beastly, desire for power".
From this, he said, stemmed his savage hatred of Gorbachev "who was the main
obstacle to his coming to power in the first place".
Yeltsin succeeded in defeating both Gorbachev and the coup plotters, and he
brought the Soviet Union to an end on December 8th in a political coup with the
leaders of Ukraine and Belarus. A formal lowering and raising of flags took place
later on Christmas Day.
But Yeltsin was not as comfortable in replacing Soviet power as he was in
destroying it. Boris Nemtsov was a member of the Russian parliament who stood
side-by-side with Yeltsin against the coup. It was an exhilarating time for him
and it kick-started his successful political career.
In Moscow during the week, Nemtsov now a leader of the democratic opposition to
what is known as the "power tandem" of the president, Dmitry Medvedev, and the
prime minister, Vladimir Putin was open about the way things were run. "Yeltsin
said to me, 'I need a governor of Nizhny Novgorod and you are the only one I know
from Nizhny Novgorod, so I'm appointing you as governor'." From the governorship
of what was then Russia's third-largest city, Nemtsov went on to become prime
minister, only to be sacked by Yeltsin, for whom sacking had almost become a
hobby until he brought Putin to power.
Yuri Firsov was a political insider in 1991. I met him in Ne Skuchni Sad (the Not
Boring Garden), a park once part of the Moscow domain of Catherine the Great's
favourite, Prince Orlov.
Firsov had served as foreign affairs adviser to four Soviet prime ministers and
was working in the office of prime minister and coup plotter Valentin Pavlov in
the Kremlin on those fateful August days.
As we walked through the pathways that wound their way through birch and pine
woods, he told how he had been kept in the dark about plans to launch a putsch
but he did feel a build-up of tension during the week before.
"I was in Pavlov's office one day during that week. There was a special phone
there to take calls from the president, Mikhail Gorbachev. It rang and Pavlov
picked it up. Usually when the president spoke to the prime minister we civil
servants would leave the room. On this occasion, I stayed for a while. Then I
heard Pavlov utter the following words: 'Mikhail Sergeyevich, I may be a thief
but I'm a Soviet thief.'"
It was obvious the president and prime minister were at loggerheads. Kryuchkov,
Pavlov and the other plotters brought the tanks out and said they were doing so
to save the Soviet Union. "That may very well have been the case but they were
also saving their jobs," Firsov told me.
Oleg Baklanov thinks differently. A member of the group that planned the coup, he
was imprisoned for his efforts. He is not only unrepentant, he believes there's
nothing to repent. Opening his remarks by saying Gorbachev and Yeltsin were a
"renegade and a drunkard", Baklanov continued in Russian in the Ukrainian accent
of a man born and raised in Kiev.
His one regret was the coup's failure: "It was our fault. We should have arrested
Yeltsin and Gorbachev." His feeling of guilt at the coup's failure seemed
genuine. When I asked him how he felt now as he walked around Moscow to see the
flag of the Tsar flying where the Red Flag once flew, he left the room in tears.
[return to Contents]
Russia Beyond the Headlines
August 12, 2011
Then and now: Purchasing power
While some yearn for a return to the times of cheap foodstuffs and fixed wages, a
new study shows Russians are much better off materially now than 20 years ago.
By Ben Aris, business new europe
In the months after the fall of the Soviet Union, western goods long banned by
the Communist Party began to flood into the country. Street vendors stocked their
kiosks with soft toilet paper, Levi's jeans, good shoes and foreign-made
cigarettes. But what is the point of quality products if you can't afford them?
The irony of the free market is that most things are actually expensive.
"Many people yearn for a bygone era, the symbols of which were vodka for 3.62
rubles, sausage for 2.20 rubles and bread for 13 kopecks. Today, you cannot get
anything for a ruble. But has our existence worsened because of this?" asked
Margarita Vodyanova in a piece in the newspaper Obshchaya Gazeta.
The minimum salary for a Russian just after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991
was 548 rubles a month 72 U.S. cents, at real rates of exchange according to
Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, chief economist at Troika Dialog. But this was still enough
to have a decent life, as the state provided housing, education, utlities, health
and child care, vacations and retirement homes. None of this was of particularly
good quality, but it was universally available, and it was all free.
Money went a long way in 1991 Russia. The basic minimum salary could buy 74
loaves of bread or a choice of: 6.2 kg of meat; 6.5 kg of sausage; 13.5 liters of
vegetable oil; 163 liters of milk; 6 kg of cheese; 160 eggs; 28 kg of sugar; or
3.5 liters of vodka.
A recent survey conducted by the Higher School of Economics and the magazine
Ekspert on changes in Russian living standards between 1990 and 2009 found that
per capita income has increased by 45 percent, while the volume of consumption
per capita has more than doubled according to G.D.P.-based consumption figures.
If you measure quality of life in terms of possessions, Russians are living much
better now than they were 20 years ago. In 2008, a consumer could buy 70 percent
more durable goods, 25 percent more food, and two to three times more cigarettes,
vodka, cars and clothing than he could during the Soviet era.
At the same time, however, household spending on childcare and education has
increased substantially, along with spending on health care. The survey notes
that the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) found that Russian spending on
private health care is now 40 percent of total health care spending a level well
above the E.U. average.
The average amount of living space for Russians has risen about 40 percent over
the past two decades, to a current level of about 237 square feet per capita,
although this is still behind a country such as Finland, where the number in 2009
was 420 square feet per capita.
A 45 percent increase in income is actually not very much over 20 years,
especially considering that incomes plummeted for most of the 1990s and only
began to rise after the 1998 financial crisis. And although most Russians enjoy
higher incomes now than they did 20 years ago, a recent survey showed that one in
five Russians today lives below the poverty line and is worse off than he was
under the Communists.
[return to Contents]
China's Economic Growth Said Result of Rational Policies, Contrasted With Russia
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
August 11, 2011
Editorial headlined "A Joke No Longer. In Only 30 Years China Has Attained Global
Last week China asserted itself for the first time as a global leader with the
right to lecture Washington, and even to demand that the States revise its
economic policy. Its current economic leadership is the logical result of 30
years of the responsible policy of the Chinese leaders. In three decades the
Chinese have proved to the whole world that rational state administration enables
one to achieve cardinal improvements in the life of one's country. If the
national elites are involved in achieving state tasks and do not line their own
pockets or find themselves in thrall to ideological myths, a positive result can
be achieved in the shortest historical time frame. Thirty years ago -- before the
beginning of economic reforms -- China was only the world's 13 th largest
economy. Today, the Celestial Kingdom is the largest exporter country in the
world and in terms of the size of its economy is second, at the moment, only to
the United States.
Directly the opposite example was shown in the past few decades by the so-called
(Russian) national elites, who were unable, or unwilling, to achieve a single
task of the development of society or the state. Nor did these national elites
want to digest the experience of other countries that had demonstrated
indisputably positive results of reforms.
The Chinese do not hide the fact that they have been consistently carrying out
market reforms since the end of the seventies. Beijing makes no secret either of
the list of its remedies, or of their results. The unprecedented growth of
prosperity has been ensured in China by fairly simple and intelligible measures:
moving toward family contracts, opening free economic areas, attracting foreign
investments, granting autonomy to enterprises, and retaining elements of the
planned economy. This road was not prohibited for our country either. But the
Soviet elites proved to be capable neither of evaluating the real state of the
country, nor of learning. At the time when the Chinese were painstakingly
building a new market economy, the USSR's leadership was distracted by a
pointless arms race, adventures in Afghanistan, and preparation for the 1980
Olympics. As a result, the Soviet elite strangled the economy with their own
hands and ruined the country. The new Russian elite also does not want to, or
cannot, carry out a rational policy in the interests of society and the state.
Today marks the 20th year of Russian reforms. In this time, the Russian economy
has practically not grown at all. At the same time, it has become more primitive,
and has effectively lost all prospects of entering the path of technological
development. By way of comparison: In the first 20 years of reforms, the Chinese
economy grew almost sixfold. GDP per head in this period increased more than
Before the eyes of a single generation, China has turned from a symbol of
backwardness and poverty into the template of the most successful and rationally
governed state. It was only quite recently, it would seem, that jokes in Russia
were told about how the Chinese were launching space satellites with the aid of
rubber bands or, from hunger, eating rice that had only just been planted. Today,
it is Russia that is becoming the model of backwardness and target of jests. Our
technological achievements in their bulk have long since ceased to interest these
same Chinese, and are seen by them as hopelessly outmoded. Almost everything that
Russia delivers to the Celestial Empire is in the way of primitive raw material
goods. We exchange them for the most complicated technology from the Chinese --
from drilling installations to modern computers. The Chinese have joined the
world division of labor, which assures them access to the latest technological
achievements. The Chinese are moving in the shortest space of time from copying
foreign technologies to their own original designs. At the same time, our
engineers and scientists often do not even understand how equipment purchased in
China is put together. Russia's technological backwar dness compared with China
is rapidly increasing -- this is confirmed, in particular, by the change in the
structure of our exports to the PRC. As a result, literally in the space of a
single generation, Russians could change places with the Chinese in jokes about
backwardness, hunger, and poverty.
[return to Contents]
Rossiyskaya gazeta
August 15, 2011
Diving from a springboard
By Tatiana Zykova
Panic on the global financial markets will not affect Russia's long-term
borrowing policy, aimed at covering the budget deficit. This was firmly stated to
journalists by the deputy finance minister, Sergey Storchak, while commenting on
the results of the Government Presidium meeting, where he presented the Finance
Ministry's report on the country's borrowing strategy between 2012 and 2014.
It is being proposed that 2 trillion rubles be borrowed on domestic and foreign
markets to cover the budget deficit (in 2014, the borrowed funds will amount to 6
trillion rubles). The state borrowing program will be presented to the government
by the end of this year, after the federal budget approval in the fall of 2011.
The proposed debt ceiling of 25% of the GDP has raised some questions. The head
of the government found it to be too high.
Meanwhile, the deputy finance minister explained that Russia's debt "ceilings"
for 2012-2014 have been established at 14, 16, and 17 per cent of the GDP
respectively. "The 'debt threshold' of 25% is a limit of risk that the state has
no right to cross when borrowing funds," explained Storchak. This, according to
him, is a very conservative figure compared to other countries, where debt-to-GDP
ratio reaches 60 and 70%.
But the chairman of the government, according to Storchak, was "truly bothered"
by the fact that the Finance Ministry is suggesting increasing the current 10%
debt load to 25%. The deputy finance minister believes that while in the early
2000s our foreign debt hindered development and complicated the dialogue with
foreign partners, today it is a different situation. "A margin of safety has been
created; and today, the borrowed funds could be used as a springboard to resolve
issues concerning the country's economic and social development, and to stimulate
structural changes," stressed Storchak. "Therefore, we recommend that the
government takes a calculated risk." However, this explanation left the prime
minister unconvinced: for a one-dimensional economy that is dependent on
commodity markets, a debt ceiling of 25% represents a high figure.
What size of the total debt will be outlined in the final document, time will
tell. Everything will depend on whether the future budget is balanced or not,
instead of whether government spending is restrained or increased. "If by 2015 we
are not running a budget deficit, then there will not be a need for mass
borrowing," says Storchak. The ministry supports the modernization of the
borrowing policy. And the prime minister, according to the deputy finance
minister, has supported the Finance Ministry's idea that after 2008 the role of
state guarantees had "soared". "Why be under so much pressure, when it is
possible to give credit for any project. These are the most vulnerable aspects of
state guarantees," concluded Sergey Storchak.
State-guaranteed projects should not be regarded as godsend; and if they fail,
loan reimbursement by the borrower must be obligatory. The Finance Ministry
insists on this tough approach, suggesting focusing on the issue of federal
bonds. Mainly, the mechanism aims at domestic investors. But that requires
finding those who are conservative and ready to issue long-term loans. Today,
these types of investors are extremely hard to find in Russia. So the ministry is
placing its bets on foreigners pension funds, insurance and investment
companies. The arrival of long-term loans to Russia is impossible without
modernization of the securities market, says Konstantin Vyshkovsky, director of
the Finance Ministry's State Debt and State Financial Assets Department. They
need to have comfortable and familiar conditions. Creation of the International
Financial Center in Moscow will help in this respect. According to Vyshkovsky,
interest in Russia's bonds has already been displayed by the issue of ruble
Eurobonds, which helped Russia obtain 50 billion rubles. Investors, in his
opinion, are ready for the ruble-related risks, but not for the infrastructural.
Meanwhile, the draft law on Russia's Financial Agency (RFA) will be introduced in
the State Duma this fall. According to Sergey Storchak, the Finance Ministry has
drawn the government's attention to the need for creating this agency, about
which a political decision was made back in 2008. However, effective management
of the state debt and sovereign funds calls for the establishment of the RFA.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
August 15, 2011
Putin Names Himself, Gref, Others to New Agency Board
By Anatoly Medetsky
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has appointed himself and Sberbank chief German
Gref to the board of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, a project to curry
favor with businesses.
The prime minister, who will chair the board, ordered the organization to
officially register itself by Aug. 25.
The other banker on the 11-member oversight body is Vladimir Dmitriyev, chief of
state-owned development bank VEB, according to a government decree released late
last week.
The agency, set up to help midsized companies expand their business, will also
include the governors of the Sverdlovsk region and Tatarstan republic Alexander
Misharin and Rustam Minnikhanov, respectively and Economic Development Minister
Elvira Nabiullina.
The governors qualified for the seats because their regions had "good experience
in supporting entrepreneurship and modernizing social services," Putin said at a
Presidium session Thursday.
The board will meet at least once every three months and will endorse projects
for the agency to pursue. Its other members include Sergei Vorobyov, chief of
recruitment company Ward Howell International; Alexander Galushka, president of
Delovaya Rossia, a lobby group for midsized businesses; and editor-in-chief of
Expert magazine Valery Fadeyev.
In addition to supporting growth of companies and their export plans, the agency
will seek to establish certification systems for the work force, upgrade
professional standards and back social organizations.
At the Presidium, Putin asked all government agencies and regional governors to
help the new agency, which will function as a nonprofit organization.
The Agency for Strategic Initiatives' chief, Andrei Nikitin, said Thursday that
the group was still looking for an office, and considering one of the City Hall
office buildings on Novy Arbat as an option, RIA-Novosti reported.
Nikitin, 31, comes to the agency from the position of chief executive at a
company that produces composite and fiberglass materials for domestic energy
companies, such as Gazprom, Rosneft and LUKoil.
The company, called Management Company Ruskompozit, is a member of the Delovaya
Rossia political party and has manufacturing facilities in Tver and Ufa. Its
latest efforts to remain the industry leader included an agreement signed in
April with Holland's Polyworx to develop a technology for using composite
components for building pedestrian and motorway overpasses.
Ruskompozit agreed in March to support the pro-government youth camp at Lake
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
August 15, 2011
Time to Burn the Books
Work Books May Be Obsolete in Contemporary Russia, but Many Employers and
Employees Still Cling to Them for a Sense of Security
By Svetlana Kononova
The Russian government has announced plans to abolish the so-called "work books"
official personal documents that trace one's employment history in 2012.
Recruitment experts support the idea, claiming that work books have long since
served their purpose and can easily be replaced with employment contracts. But
employers and staff have different attitudes toward the proposal, since work
books are both a means to put pressure on unruly employees and a convenient way
to track official employment records.
Work books were implemented in Soviet Russia in 1918, when the All-Russian
Congress of the Soviets changed the country's Constitution. According to the new
law, all citizens were obliged to work. Paradoxically, the first Russians to
receive work books after the revolution were the so-called "class aliens:" people
of independent means, business owners, tradesmen, brokers, private lawyers and
creative professionals. They all were obligated to perform compulsory public
service street cleaning, for example. Information about their work hours was
recorded in personal labor books, which were also recognized as identification
cards. "Class enemies" with no work books were imprisoned; it was impossible to
travel inside the country and get food stamps without a labor book.
In the 1920s, the Soviet government tried to expand the work book requirement to
all residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, but the document didn't replace
In 1939 Josef Stalin finally instituted labor books for all citizens of the
Soviet Union. The design of a Soviet work book was very similar to that of an
Arbeitsbuch in fascist Germany. Since then work books became one of the main
documents in the Soviet Union and an effective means to put pressure on
employees. Labor books tied staff to enterprises and prevented people from moving
even inside the country. Any person who sought work for himself and not for the
state became an outlaw. Work books also prohibited people from taking on more
than one job. If one was fired for political reasons, a record was made in the
work book, precluding one's further professional development.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, work books continued to be used for
tracking employment history and pension calculations. Even now, when pensions are
calculated and disbursed by the Pension Fund and all information is stored on
computers, most Russians are against cancelling labor books. A recent poll
conducted by the research center of the recruitment Internet portal SuperJob.ru
found that 35 percent of respondents support the move to get rid of work books,
while 46 percent are against the idea.
"A work book doesn't play any significant role. Its cancellation scares
conservative specialists with a long employment history. But the Pension Fund
tracks all the information about a person's career anyway," said Alexander
Zakharov, the president of SuperJob.ru.
Yuri Virovets, the president of the recruitment company HeadHunter, agreed. "I am
sure that it is time to abolish work books. They turned into a bureaucratic
formality that puts meaningless stress on the resources of enterprises. HR
departments have to practice this 'calligraphy' that nobody needs, instead of
paying more attention to real problems of human resources management," he said.
Sophia Gromova, a corporate labor rights lawyer at the Ancor recruitment holding,
thinks that the abolition of work books can have both positive and negative
consequences. "Cancelling labor books will help stop fraudulent actions on behalf
of both an employee and an employer. For example, the worker can take their labor
book home and later file a lawsuit against the employer for compensation, because
the company 'lost' the work book and deprived one of the opportunity to work for
a new employer. Such cases have been known to happen in judicial practice. On the
other hand, work books may be used as a way to put pressure on employees. An
employer may threaten to withhold a labor book or to make a record in it that one
was fired for an inadequacy," she said. "However, the absence of labor books
would prevent employers from seeing why a candidate left his or her previous
place of work. From my point of view, this is a disadvantage."
Strangely enough, the international practice of requesting reference letters and
phone conversations with previous employers is still rare on the Russian job
market. In most cases, reference letters are required for domestic workers
(babysitters, housekeepers, personal drivers, etc.) only most likely because
rich Russians really care who works for them. Large international companies also
require reference letters with contacts from previous employers. "The most
interesting are not the references supplied by the candidate, but from their
direct supervisors at their previous jobs. Finding these people is not a problem
for a professional headhunter," Virovets said.
However, average Russian companies rarely use this practice. According to
Superjob.ru data, only one in five employers does a background check on a
candidate with reference letters. One in seven conducts tests, while the majority
about half still rely on labor books for information.
HR-officers have a rather conservative attitude toward work books. A poll
conducted by HeadHunter found that half of recruiters think labor books are
necessary. Twenty three percent said they are ready to abandon them right away.
Others believe that work books may be needed in some cases but not others, and
might be replaced with something else, by which many mean a unified electronic
database that would include information on taxes and pensions. Tellingly, only
six percent of respondents said that job contracts are a good replacement for
labor books this shows that an employment contract still isn't a trustworthy or
respectable document in the eyes of most Russians.
The Federation of Russia's Independent Trade Unions called the proposal to
abolish work books "insufficiently elaborated." The main arguments against it are
that firstly, information about pension contributions is available in the Pension
Fund's electronic database only if an employer pays in to the fund on time. If a
company transfers nothing, it looks like the employee is not working, and it
would be very difficult for one to prove his or her employment history and to
receive his pension. Secondly, any electronic database may be hacked, which would
force thousands of people to prove their own employment history by other means.
Moreover, representatives of the federation note that work book data is used to
calculate different social benefits, such as workers compensation and others.
However, recruitment experts don't think that anything will change significantly
on the Russian job market if work books are abolished. "An employment contract
can take on the main functions of labor books. But it is necessary to change the
public's attitude toward this document. Many people believe that it is impossible
to protect their rights with a job contract, but it's not true," Zakharov said.
[return to Contents]
Voice of America
August 11, 2011
Russian Service
Moscow's Ambivalence About the West's Economic Crisis
By Donald N. Jensen
Prime Minister Putin sharply criticized the United States for its financial
problems last week during visit to a state-run youth camp. The Americans "are
living beyond their means and shifting ...their problems to the world economy, he
said, "They are living like parasites...leeching on the world economy. " He
added that the dominance of the dollar in the international financial system was
a threat to global financial markets.
This was not the first time that a Russian leader has criticized US economic
leadership. In the past, Russia has often argued for lesser reliance on the
dollar and an international system in which the US plays a smaller role. Putin
recently described Russia's low sovereign debt grade as an "outrage," leading
Sergey Glazyev, the deputy general secretary of the Eurasian Economic Community,
to say that it was "madness" to trust American ratings agencies. (Earlier this
year Russia announced it would collaborate with the other so-called BRICS to
create a new, presumably more sympathetic, ratings firm.). Above all, Putin's
remarks showed Moscow's deep ambivalence about closer economic engagement with
the West.
On the one hand, Russia's current foreign policy doctrine seeks to modernize the
Russian economy by attracting foreign technology and investment and to promote
the international interests of Russian business. Achieving these goals would
allow the country to maintain its role as a world power. Russia needs the US
economic engine -- as Putin is well aware -- if it is eventually to prosper.
Russian elites have also bought real estate in Western Europe, sent their
children to school there, and kept Swiss bank accounts to hide their wealth.
On the other hand, many of these same elites have grown rich from profits
generated by one of the main impediments to continued US and European prosperity:
high commodity prices. Although Russia has no direct control over international
energy prices, such prices are ensured, among other reasons, by international
tensions. Russia thus maintains relatively close ties to authoritarian, but
energy rich regimes in Venezuela and Iran. When the Middle East was thrown into
turmoil earlier this year, as economist Aleksey Bayer has reminded us, Russia had
an opportunity to become a responsible oil supplier and a true member of the
Group of Eight by taking the lead in calming world markets. It refused. While
Moscow claims that the international economic system is in need of reform, it
relies on global markets -- not only to sell commodities but to buy imports and
borrow funds and manipulates the system to its advantage,
As with markets in Europe and Asia, Russian stocks plummeted this Monday and
Tuesday in line with developments in the United States 7.9% on the RTS and 5% on
the MICEX. The Russian ruble declined 10%. A deeper cause for gloom was the
slide in the price of oilbelow $100 per barrel for Brent and below that for Urals
a change to which Russia is vulnerable because its own market is too small to
sustain independent growth. According to Renaissance capital, a $15 per barrel
drop in the oil price can curtail Russia's GDP growth by 1.2%. To have a
balanced budget, according to experts, Russia needs oil to be $105-$110 per
barrel this year and $125 per barrel in the election year of 2012, when
government expenditures will increase.
The US government took time out from its poisonous debt debate last month to
approve visa restrictions on scores of Russian officials linked to the death of
lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. The action, taken by the State Department, was intended
to preempt Congressional passage of the Cardin-McGovern Bill, which specifies a
longer list of Russians to be denied papers and includes financial sanctions.
Moscow has threatened to retaliate in kind, though President Medvedev reportedly
refused pressure from hard liners to "punish" Washington by stopping cooperation
with the US on Afghanistan and Iran. Russia would do well to modulate its
response, since too strong a reaction could provoke stronger measures limiting
the freedom of Russian elites to pursue the lifestyle they prize. They certainly
would not be ambivalent about that.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
August 15, 2011
The Reset Is Fizzling Out
By Vladimir Frolov
Vladimir Frolov is president of LEFF Group, a government-relations and PR
The future of the U.S.-Russian "reset" could shape President Dmitry Medvedev and
U.S. President Barack Obama's legacy in foreign affairs. But their venture is in
need of an upgrade to acquire a sense of strategic purpose and direction.
The reset is turning into a policy of diminishing returns. It is yielding less
and less bang for the buck, despite the flurry of diplomatic meetings and
presidential phone chats.
After significant early achievements like the New START treaty, cooperation to
support the U.S. war in Afghanistan and joint United Nations action to curtail
Iran's nuclear program, Donald Jensen, a former senior diplomat at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, wrote on Voice of America's web site: "The rewards have become
more modest and less frequent. A child adoption agreement and the promise of
fewer visa restrictions for travel between the countries ... pale next to the
earlier expectations of a much broader range of joint work."
The missile defense talks have stalled over U.S. opposition to Russia's demands
for either a jointly run system or legally binding guarantees and technical
limitations on U.S. radar stations and interceptors in Europe that would preclude
their use against Russia's strategic nuclear missiles.
Cooperation on Afghanistan has reached a dead end because the United States is
desperately seeking to disengage from that war-ravished country.
Mutual trade and investment are unlikely to grow significantly in the foreseeable
future as "neither country produces much of what the other wants," Tom Graham,
managing director at Kissinger & Associates, wrote in a June paper titled "The
Future of U.S.-Russian Relations."
The reset is a caretaker policy designed to keep the relationship from heading
over the cliff. It offers no answer to what the two nations should aspire to move
beyond, and the uneasy cooperation is skidding at every turn into open rivalry.
It lacks a mutually shared strategic purpose.
In his paper, Graham suggests searching for a common strategic purpose, uniting
Russia and the United States in managing the strategic challenges both nations
face along Russia's periphery "a rising China with an insatiable appetite for
natural resources and an increasingly assertive foreign policy ... radical
Islamic fundamentalism penetrating the fragile states of both the Caucasus and
Central and South Asia ... and strategic disarray in Europe."
Yet, Medvedev and Obama have shied away from engaging on these issues. They have
sought to exploit the reset only to maximize their domestic political gains,
making clear their preferences for the presidential election outcomes in each
In Moscow, Medvedev's supporters have sought to put the blame for the stalling
reset on Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who, according to political analyst Gleb
Pavlovsky, discourages Medvedev from accepting Obama's offer on limited missile
defense cooperation.
The Kremlin has sought to drag Obama into Russia's presidential politics by
engineering his visit to Moscow later in the fall. Obama's advisers have wisely
resisted the push.
Neither Obama nor Medvedev has stepped forward to outline a strategic vision for
the U.S.-Russian relationship. The coming electoral season in both countries
makes it unlikely that they ever will.
[return to Contents]
August 12, 2011
Reset This
What's behind the ginned-up crisis in U.S.-Russia relations?
Samuel Charap is director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American
Storm clouds are gathering over what has been a signature shift in U.S. foreign
policy under President Barack Obama: the "reset" of relations with Russia. The
usual suspects, from the Weekly Standard to the Washington Times to hawkish cold
warriors in Congress, see recent news as vindication of their argument that the
reset represents dangerous appeasement of a relentless foe on the march, an
adversary with which it would be folly to cooperate in any way.
Some of the headlines, including a supposedly Kremlin-ordered attack on a U.S.
Embassy, leave one with the impression that the U.S.-Russia relationship is on
the brink of a return to the state of near confrontation that Obama inherited.
Reset-bashing is, of course, nothing new; critics of the policy have seized on
every faint hint of Russian hostility abroad and revanchism at home to denounce
Obama for his weakness and naivete. But much of the recently published analysis
is deeply misleading. Some of the reset-bashers seem so blinded by their rage
that they simply refuse to acknowledge its successes and have conveniently
forgotten how disastrous the alternative -- an antagonistic U.S.-Russia
relationship -- is for U.S. national interests and Russia's own development.
Let's first be clear about what the reset is not. It is not a secret weapon to
vaporize all those in the Russian security establishment who deeply distrust U.S.
intentions and at times act on that mistrust. It is also not a reset of Russia's
political system, some sort of magic wand for effecting instantaneous
What it was, and remains, is an effort to work with Russia on key national
security priorities where U.S. and Russian interests overlap, while not
hesitating to push back on disagreements with the Kremlin at the same time. The
idea is that engagement, by opening up channels of communication and diminishing
antagonism, should -- over time -- allow Washington to at least influence
problematic Russian behavior and open up more space in Russia's tightly
orchestrated domestic politics.
At the core of the reset policy is a determination that "linkage" -- making
bilateral cooperation on a given issue dependent on a given country's behavior on
other matters -- is an ineffective instrument when dealing with states that are
neither ally nor enemy. That's especially true for great powers like China and
Russia, which, whether Americans like it or not, play a major role on global
issues that matter. This diplomatic tactic is not new; it harks back to George
Shultz, secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan, and his approach to the
Soviet Union. In his memoirs, Shultz writes:
"[M]ost Soviet experts liked to link all aspects of our Soviet relationship
together and try to use the presumed Soviet desire for progress in one area, such
as trade, as leverage to achieve progress in another.... I felt that we must be
prepared to fight out each issue on its own terms, and that we would be better
off if we thought of the relationship that way.... We must not ignore Soviet
actions that trouble us. On the contrary, we need to respond forcefully....
[L]inkage is a tactical question; the strategic reality of leverage comes from
creating facts in support of our overall design."
There is a case to be made that finding any sort of accommodation with the
pre-perestroika Soviet Union, which often exhibited an expansionist, ideological
foreign policy that ran directly counter to U.S. interests and featured a
political system that by definition trampled on basic human rights and freedoms,
was impossible. Russia in 2011, though at times a bully in its neighborhood and
far from a consolidated democracy, has neither of these traits. But Shultz's
assertion that "a policy which dictates that nothing can be solved until
everything is solved" will both make it harder to achieve U.S. objectives and
will cede initiative to the other side is equally valid today.
Shultz's view had many detractors at the time, and recent events have brought the
same linkage brigades out of the woodwork. And their laundry list of alleged
Russian offenses all lead to the same conclusion: Kill the reset. What's striking
is that the severity of the supposed sins committed by Moscow pale in comparison
with the benefits the reset has provided to the United States, from facilitating
U.S. operations in Afghanistan to the creation of a strong international
consensus to rein in Iran's nuclear program.
Indeed, the main claims gleefully put forth by the reset-bashers -- rehashing
Russian spy games involving U.S. officials, retelling an improbable story about
Moscow's complicity in a string of bombings last year in Georgia, and trumpeting
the Kremlin's negative reaction to proposed legislation in the Senate -- seem to
reflect a continuing desire of many in Washington to deep-six U.S.-Russia
relations, not to address the issues at hand.
One source of consternation, especially on Capitol Hill, was a series of reports
in the Washington Times regarding a number of explosions in Georgia last year.
The Georgian authorities say there were about a dozen small explosions in all,
one of which claimed the life of an elderly woman. One of the bombs went off in a
cemetery about 200 feet from the outer wall of the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi in
September 2010. In December of that year, the Georgian authorities publicly
fingered a Russian military intelligence officer they said was serving in
Abkhazia, the breakaway Georgian region that Russia recognizes as an independent
state, as the mastermind behind the plots.
Bombs exploding near U.S. government buildings overseas should certainly not be
taken lightly. As we have learned in recent days through the Times's own
reporting, the Obama administration did in fact take the matter seriously,
producing an intelligence community assessment and raising the matter at the
highest levels with the Russian and Georgian governments.
But, as is the case with many violent incidents in the South Caucasus, this
episode remains murky. The Georgians have signals intelligence and a taped
confession from the bomber that they say link the incidents to the Russian
officer; the Russians reply that the officer has not been in Abkhazia since early
2010 and therefore couldn't be behind the explosions. And even the Georgians are
not claiming to have documentation of a Moscow-hatched plot to blow up the
embassy -- they suspect the officer of acting on his own and want Russia to hand
him over for questioning.
But the Washington Times saw no need for nuance, or factual accuracy for that
matter: "Russian agent linked to U.S. Embassy blast" the July 21 headline
claimed. The "news" came from a Georgian official telling the reporter what he
and his government have been claiming publicly for nine months. When a U.S.
official subsequently leaked to the same reporter his reading (later disputed) of
a classified U.S. report on the incidents, the hyperbole only intensified: "U.S.
Intelligence Confirms: Russia Bombed U.S. Embassy," proclaimed a Weekly Standard
The bottom line is that, as other, subsequent descriptions of the U.S. report
show, there isn't adequate information to prove much of anything conclusively
about this disturbing case, and certainly not a Kremlin-hatched bombing of the
U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi.
The Georgia bombings story came at the same time as the leak of an administration
note to Congress about the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2011, introduced by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.). While expressing its shared
"concerns about the tragic death of Sergey Magnitskiy," a Russian lawyer who died
in pretrial detention after putting forth corruption allegations, the
administration noted the numerous steps that have been taken to address this
issue, including, through the use of existing legal authority, denial of U.S.
visas to a number of individuals associated with Magnitsky's apparent murder. The
note raised a number of concerns about the bill, ranging from its unnecessary
duplication of this authority to the vagueness of its provisions.
It also relayed Russian officials' reactions: "Senior Russian government
officials have warned us that they will respond asymmetrically if this
legislation passes. Their argument is that we cannot expect them to be our
partner in supporting sanctions against countries like Iran, North Korea, and
Libya, and sanction them at the same time. Russian officials have said that other
areas of bilateral cooperation, including on transit to Afghanistan, could be
jeopardized if this legislation passes." In other words, if the United States is
going to put Russia in the category of these brutal theocracies and
dictatorships, Russia will have to reconsider its current support for sanctions
against them. The rogue-state label might also harm Washington's efforts to
diversify its supply lines for the war effort in Afghanistan.
Washington's reset-bashers once again pounced. "Moscow's Sanctions Tit-for-Tat
Threatens to Kill the 'Reset'" read one headline, while one proponent of the
legislation was quoted as saying, "Are we really resetting relations with this
country if they are threatening to halt international cooperation in order to
allow their torturers and murders to travel to America?"
Let's be clear: The officials suspected of Magnitsky's apparent murder would not
have been granted visas to the United States. It's just that many such visa bans
are not made public, or if they are, are done so in accordance with regulations
that apply globally. The legislation in question does much more than that: It
essentially demands that the State Department regularly and publicly "name and
shame" officials in a single country for a single category of individual crimes.
Russia goes into the same category as a number of countries against which the
United States maintains unilateral sanctions, such as Belarus, Burma, Iran,
Libya, and Syria.
Fortunately, Russia, for all its political dysfunction, is a far more open place
than any of these countries. And perhaps as a result, the Magnitsky legislation
is unlikely to have a positive impact on human rights in Russia. Even the
possibility of its adoption has fundamentally altered the nature of the
conversation in Moscow: Instead of responding to their citizens' outrage about
the crime, Russian politicians are busy fulminating about the U.S. bill and have
even introduced their own legislation to sanction U.S. officials.
"While I support President Obama's efforts to improve U.S.-Russian relations, we
must not abandon American values in the process," Cardin has written. More often,
however, the proponents of his bill present a false choice between the reset and
promoting Russian democracy, when in fact their proposals are likely to worsen
the very "fortress Russia" mentality that was so closely associated with the
undoing of pluralism in politics there from 2003 to 2008. Those propounding the
"embassy bombing" story present an equally false choice.
Both groups seem more interested in antagonizing Moscow than in promoting
democracy and human rights in Russia, supporting Georgia, or protecting U.S.
diplomats. As one neoconservative Washington Post blogger wrote, "Russia's human
rights atrocities, campaign of intimidation and even violence haven't caused the
administration to rethink its policy of appeasement, dressed up as 'reset.'" To
paraphrase: On the basis of a murky bombing incident in a cemetery 200 feet from
a U.S. Embassy, Russian officials' taking umbrage at being put in a box with
genocidaires, and the behavior of some spooks who haven't gotten the memo about
the end of the Cold War, the administration should put an end to its attempts to
engage Russia.
That might be a sensible argument if engagement had not produced results, from
mutual strategic arms reductions and the inspections to verify them to
cooperation on reining in Iran's nuclear ambitions to unprecedented logistical
support for the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan. (It is hard to imagine any U.S.
president deciding to take out Osama bin Laden, thus risking U.S. supply lines
through Pakistan, if the Northern Distribution Network going through Russia was
not functional, to say nothing of the air-transit deal that has seen more than
170,000 Americans fly over Russian airspace to Afghanistan -- both products of
the reset.)
And those are just the best-known examples. In June, an unprecedented NATO-Russia
joint anti-terrorism operation in Poland intercepted a simulated hijacked plane.
Nearly 900 kg of Russian and U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium have been
repatriated from third countries since 2009, in accordance with joint U.S.-Russia
plans. Bilateral military-to-military engagement is also proceeding apace:
Altogether, 67 events, exchanges, exercises, and consultations between the U.S.
and Russian militaries are scheduled for this year. Going forward, any
missile-defense cooperation between the United States and Russia would involve
the Russians sharing data from their radar station in Azerbaijan, a state that
borders Iran, whose missile threat the U.S. system is aimed at repelling.
The question the reset-bashers need to answer is: What's their alternative, and
how will it more effectively serve U.S. interests and values? Given the utter
failure of the Bush administration's finger-wagging-and-isolating approach, their
calls for a return to that policy are simply not credible.
In the meantime, they might contemplate the implications of what they're
advocating, whether it's undoing the international consensus on Iran's nuclear
program, endangering U.S. troops in Afghanistan, allowing more nuclear material
to remain insecure, or ensuring that Russian politics becomes even more closed
and monolithic. There's more at stake here than just giving Obama a bloody nose
in an election season.
[return to Contents]
Financial Times
August 15, 2011
Russia must forget its imperial aims
A work containing illuminating details, but few illusions, argues that Moscow
must modernise to avoid being marginalised
Review by John Lloyd
The writer is an FT contributing editor
Post Imperium: A Eurasion Story , by Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment
(RRP$19.95, e-book $16)
An army officer in the service of the Soviet imperium, Dmitri Trenin was
nevertheless glad when it collapsed. "I took," he writes, "the demise of the USSR
as a liberation" adding, though, that he had also hoped that "Mikhail
Gorbachev's efforts to reconfigure the USSR [was] a chance to build a genuine
union, even if only on a loose confederal basis."
Trenin was, and is, a liberal-minded man, but also a Soviet whose grasp of
geopolitical strategy was honed in the 1970s. His career has been one of strong
contrasts, including spells as a Soviet military intellectual in liaison and
teaching posts up to and beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early to
mid-1990s he was attached to the Nato Defense College and to the Institute of
Europe, a Moscow-based think-tank. He is now director of the Carnegie Moscow
Center, which has for 20 years been a hub of free discussion and research.
This unique experience gives him a useful double vision, able to see and
understand the positions not just of Russia and the US still the former's main
foreign policy preoccupation but also the conflicting stances taken by the other
14 former republics of the Soviet Union; by the former members of the Warsaw
Pact; by the old imperial powers of the UK and France, as well as Germany, China
and the European Union. The result is a book of great clarity and illuminating
detail. It is the work of one who has closely observed the meaning and the likely
trajectory of the momentous events through which he has lived.
Glad that empire has gone, regretful that a confederation could not be built, he
is certain that empire of any kind will not be back. Russia has 2 per cent of the
world's population and 2 per cent of its gross national product and its
demographic crisis means its population is shrinking rapidly. It is not a
neo-imperial power, but a post-imperial one where the necessary will to expand
and command is gone.
Still, a Georgian recalling that in 2008 Russian tanks streamed over what is
still the country's recognised international border, brushed aside the Georgian
army that had been trying to recapture the country's breakaway province of South
Ossetia and advanced to within striking distance of Tibilisi, the country's
capital might say: really? To that, Trenin responds that the tanks stopped and
pulled back; and that the hostility ended with Russia's de facto recognition of
South Ossetia and the other breakaway, Abkhazia, as independent states being made
Post Imperium thus pitches itself directly against such theses as that in Edward
Lucas's The New Cold War , which highlights Russia's often bellicose
pronouncements, its suppression of civil rights and of free expression, its
looming menaces to the Baltic statelets as well as to Georgia, and its habitually
zero-sum view of international relations. To Lucas, this denotes "an explicit
rejection by the Russian regime of western values such as political freedom, the
rule of law, the separation of powers, a free press and individual rights".
Trenin gives assent to much of this especially the zero-sum approach but his is
a glass-half-full argument. Russia has mounted "one of the most stunning
demilitarisations in history", he argues, and has come to "a basic realisation of
all neighbouring states as geopolitical realities". It lauded, but ignored, the
late Alexander Solzhenitsyn's call for a "reorganised Russia", taking back
Belarus, Northern Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Mother Russia. Compared with such
imperial hangovers as the messy and murderous withdrawing roars of France,
Portugal and the UK, Russia got out of empire "unbelievably well".
Still, this is no glad endorsement of the new Russia. Trenin presents himself as
unillusioned about his country and his fellow citizens, arguing that "the state
is too corrupt to inspire national consciousness" and that it presents "an
atomised society beholden to personalised power". The surrounding former Soviet
republics are held to it by ties, not of affection, but need for energy. Yet
they are pulled in various directions towards Europe, China, Turkey and the
Muslim world.
The largest charge Trenin makes is that the state has balked at modernisation of
almost every kind. It needs to project soft power to its neighbours, but it
prefers the old method of showing its claws. Its constitution claims a republican
form of government, but the res publica is not ample enough to give its citizens
real freedoms. Its economy is a one-trick pony, liable to stumble at every lurch
in energy prices. It has nothing to offer the world in the way of innovation,
creativity or even decent low-cost products. Though it cannot be of the EU, it
could be of Europe, and create a common European space but it will not. It is
not a threat to the world, yet neither is it a boon, least of all to itself.
[return to Contents]
August 15, 2011
Russian security chief in Iran for nuclear talks
Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council and former FSB
director, has arrived in Tehran to talk politics and nuclear issues.
Patrushev's visit to Iran starts on Monday and will last for two days. Iranian
media reported that the Russian security chief is scheduled to meet with his
Iranian counterpart the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security
Council Saeed Jalili. The Russian official will also meet Foreign Minister Ali
Akbar Salehi and the President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Iranian Foreign Ministry has said that the Russian official's visit is being held
within the framework of ongoing Russian-Iranian consultations on bilateral
cooperation and on regional and international issues. The ministry said that it
was possible that the sides would discuss cooperation in the nuclear sphere.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has also informed the press about the upcoming visit
but gave no details on its schedule or objectives.
Russia is currently completing construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in
Iran. The construction was supervised by the International Agency of Atomic
Energy of which Iran is a member, but some nations, including the USA, still say
that the Iranian nuclear program is a potential threat.
The head of the Iranian Nuclear Agency Fereidoon Abbasi said on Sunday that the
power plant will be commissioned by the end of Ramadan, which falls in late
August. Abbasi went on to say that the Bushehr inauguration could take place in
November or December. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in July this year that
the decision concerning the power plant's launch depends only on the Iranian
side, which should ultimately set the date. In a recent interview with RT,
Iranian President Ahmadinejad said that he had discussed the issue with Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev, and he said that "there was no obstacle to the plant
launching its operations according to schedule."
In June 2010 the UN Security Council approved a fourth resolution to tighten
international sanctions against Iran after Iran once again refused to wrap up its
nuclear program and to clear up some ambiguities regarding its alleged military
In July Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested a step-by-step approach
to international talks on the Iranian nuclear program, which could see Iran being
rewarded with a lifting of sanctions if the country meets certain international
demands for transparency.
In addition, the United States and NATO consider Iran to be a "rogue state"
capable of launching missile attacks against European countries and thus, the
potential threat the country represents has been given as one of the official
reasons behind the development of new missile defense systems. Iran denies any
aggressive plans towards Europe but maintains a hard line against Israel, which
Iranian leaders call an artificial state that should be "erased" from the face of
the Earth.
[return to Contents]
Christian Science Monitor
August 14, 2011
Russia's Arctic 'sea grab'
Russia is expected within months to claim to the United Nations its right to
annex about 380,000 square miles of the Arctic.
By Fred Weir, Correspondent
Moscow - In a multinational race to seize the potential riches of the formerly
icebound Arctic, being laid bare by global warming, Russia is the early favorite.
Within the next year, the Kremlin is expected to make its claim to the United
Nations in a bold move to annex about 380,000 square miles of the internationally
owned Arctic to Russian control. At stake is an estimated one-quarter of all the
world's untapped hydrocarbon reserves, abundant fisheries, and a freshly opened
route that will cut nearly a third off the shipping time from Asia to Europe.
The global Arctic scramble kicked off in 2007 when Russian explorer Artur
Chilingarov planted his country's flag beneath the North Pole. "The Arctic is
Russian," he said. "Now we must prove the North Pole is an extension of the
Russian landmass."
In July, the Russian ship Akademik Fyodorov set off, accompanied by the giant
nuclear-powered icebreaker, to complete undersea mapping to show that the
Siberian continental shelf connects to underwater Arctic ridges, making Russia
eligible to stake a claim. Around the same time, Defense Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov announced the creation of an Arctic military force tasked with backing
up Moscow's bid.
"We are open for a dialogue with our foreign partners and with all our neighbors
in the Arctic region, but of course we will defend our own geopolitical interests
firmly and consistently," Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in July. Among other
things, Moscow plans to build at least six more icebreakers and spend $33 billion
to construct a year-round port on the Arctic shores.
Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Norway own Arctic coasts that
could, theoretically, be extended as far as the North Pole. But in the absence of
a regional deal, tensions are mounting.
This month, Canada holds Operation Nanook, an Arctic military exercise designed
to send a stern message to Moscow. Canada also has plans for its own territorial
claim. The US, which has not signed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
under which any territorial divisions would be made, is also beefing up its
regional military might.
"Interest is growing in the region, as it becomes obvious that new economic
possibilities will open up as more of the icecap melts with each successive
summer," says Alexander Konovalov, president of the independent Institute of
Strategic Assessments in Moscow. "But time is running out to make an orderly
division of the territories."
Russia and Norway recently ended a 44-year dispute over division of the Barents
Sea, which borders the Arctic Ocean, in a bargain that could set a precedent for
an Arctic deal. Under that treaty, the two countries will split a 67,500 square
mile area, thought to contain 7 billion tons of oil and gas, and open it up for
joint exploration.
"The UN commission will soon receive the claims of Russia and Canada, but it's
unlikely to come to any decision without agreement among the countries involved,"
says Vassily Sokolov, an expert with the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies
in Moscow. "The truth is that Canada and Russia have a lot of common interests
here, and we should be able to come to an equitable arrangement, but we belong to
different clubs. Canada's in NATO, and we're not, and that makes it difficult to
cut a deal between Moscow and Ottawa based on our common interests."
The real threat perceived by the big Arctic states may not be each other but the
chance that other countries will press for claims, say experts. "There are 20
other countries that have already expressed an interest," says Mr. Sokolov, who
notes that at a May Arctic Council meeting, members blocked several nonnorthern
states including China, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union from
becoming "permanent observers" in the group.
Canada even rebuffed NATO's offer to help it defend its Arctic interests against
Russia. According to a US diplomatic cable published in June by WikiLeaks, Canada
is not only concerned that having NATO in the Arctic would exacerbate simmering
tensions with Russia but Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper fretted it might
give non-Arctic states influence in a part of the world where "they don't
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
August 15, 2011
Brotherhood in Resistance
In Lieu of the Revolutions in Africa and the Middle East, Heads of CSTO Member
States Have Agreed to Establish a Joint Rapid Reaction Force that Can Legally
Intervene in Case of Internal Conflict
By Tai Adelaja
Whatever their revolutionary potentials, it would have been inconceivable a few
years ago to expect social networks like Twitter or Facebook to galvanize
dithering post-Soviet leaders into a concerted action. Yet, as heads of
member-states of the Kremlin-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
gathered in Astana on Friday, it was precisely the perceived threat from such
social networks that brought a sense of unity to the diversity at the summit.
Russia had long sought sometimes using sticks and carrots to bring former
Soviet Union satellite states into its fold, but the efforts had largely failed
as diverging national interests prevented many from moving too close to Moscow.
But with Arab Spring protests spreading like wildfire in the summertime, some
long-serving post-Soviet leaders are having second thoughts.
Discussions at Friday's informal summit in the capital of Kazakhstan have focused
squarely on the ongoing upheavals in the Middle East, and on how to prevent the
Arab Spring protests from spilling over into the territories of the former Soviet
states, the Kommersant business daily reported. But the leaders of the CSTO, a
military-political alliance of seven countries including Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, needed little
persuasion to appreciate "the destructive role" that social networks had played
in such protests. After a three-hour meeting behind closed doors, the leaders
decided to create a unified preventive strategy for cyberspace, which could mean
restricting the use of social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, widely seen
as the bane of authoritarian Arab regimes, the newspaper said.
In a keynote speech, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev reminded his guests of
the need to put up an impregnable wall against the spread of color revolutions on
the territories of the former Soviet Union. Echoing similar calls made at the
tenth summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June, Nazarbayev also
called for a curtailment of freedom in cyberspace. Unregulated information space,
he said, poses "threats to regional security and stability in the CSTO member
states, especially in light of the latest developments in the world." The
national security threat in cyberspace happens to be familiar territory for the
Kazakh president. Conscious of the role that the Internet played in mobilizing
protesters in Iran and Moldova in 2009, president Nazarbayev signed the "Law on
the Internet," which classifies all Web sites, blogs and forums in Kazakhstan as
mass media and imposes strict regulations on them, including restrictions in
reporting on elections, mass protests and strikes.
But as the Middle East continues to be wracked by a wave of protests that toppled
long-serving leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, experts say some of the leaders
gathered in Astana still have much to worry about. President Nazarbayev has been
leading his nation for the past 20 years, while both Tajik President Emomali
Rahmon and President Alexander Lukashenko have each ruled their countries for 17
years, sometimes with doubtful democratic credentials. President Lukashenko, the
current chairman of the Moscow-led alliance, told journalists on Friday that the
leaders have been discussing how the CSTO could help them avoid the fate of their
colleagues from Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. "We agreed to work together to develop
measures to counter possible threats, especially in cyberspace," Lukashenko said.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, diverging political and economic
interests have thwarted Moscow's endeavors to transform the largely symbolic
political organization into a credible security organization. However, the
tumultuous events in the Arab world appeared to have changed all that. "In the
past, some countries perceived membership in the organization almost as a burden,
but the events in Africa have had a sobering effect, alerting them to the need
for a concerted effort to resist such destructive tendencies," a source told
Kommersant on Friday. Lukashenko conceded as much, saying "recent events in the
world, including the Arab arc and North Africa, beg for new areas of work."
The leaders also took an unprecedented step on Friday to turn the CSTO, a largely
symbolic political organization, into a more cohesive militarized security
alliance with powers to intervene in internal conflicts in member-states.
President Lukashenko, who in the past vehemently opposed the creation of the
organization's Collective Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), said member-states are now
determined to complete the process of recruiting and equipping CSTO's rapid
reaction forces "in view of the difficult situation in the world." The RRF, he
said, would deal with issues like border conflicts, but could also be used to
repulse military aggression and combat international terrorism, organized crime,
drug trafficking and other emergencies. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said
the CSTO rapid reaction force, which now numbers about 20,000 troops, "has become
a regional force that can neutralize potential threats."
Analysts said, however, that the measure could run into bumps, as it entails
making amendments to the CSTO charter so that the alliance's forces can intervene
on the territories of member-states. "It is a double-edged sword and many
countries in Central Asia and Belarus are unlikely to want to give Russia an
opportunity to interfere in their internal affairs," said Fyodor Lukyanov, the
editor in chief of Russia in Global Affairs. "Allowing the RRF to intervene in
internal conflicts could also transform it into the likes of Saudi-led Gulf
Cooperation Council, which is now largely engaged in quenching revolutionary
fires across the Arab world."
[return to Contents]
20 years later, ex-USSR is a cracked mosaic
By JIM HEINTZ
August 14, 2011
MOSCOW, Russia (AP) -- First came Mikhail Gorbachev, who moved a monolithic
Soviet Union toward reform. Then in August 1991, an ill-conceived coup attempt by
clumsy and occasionally drunken men opened a crack that could not be closed.
A few pieces of the empire fell off and floated away. Soon the rest of the mass
Triumphalists in the West saw the USSR's disintegration as the inevitable triumph
of democracy, even as "the end of history." Others, as Russian leader Vladimir
Putin, later put it, bemoaned the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the
The shards of the Soviet Union lie somewhere between those extremes a jumbled
pile of countries, totaling one-sixth of the world's land mass, that are wildly
different from each other and facing futures ranging from promising to troubling
to anyone's guess. Islamic insurgencies threaten to explode into wide fighting,
and two "frozen conflicts" appear nowhere near resolution.
They range from Europe's poorest nation, Moldova, to Russia, which breeds tycoons
of Pharaonic wealth. Some are genuine democracies; others are unconvincing, or
cynical, imitations; Turkmenistan is an open dictatorship and Belarus and
Uzbekistan effectively are the same. In the assessment of the Freedom House
watchdog group, three of the 15 former Soviet republics are considered free,
seven not free and the other five somewhere in between.
Russia is among the "not free," losing ground over the past decade. By far the
largest former Soviet republic, the one with the most lavish treasure chest of
natural resources and the only one to still have nuclear weapons, the path that
Russia chooses is of key concern to the world and the path is far from clear.
In the first years after the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia's political scene
seemed wide open, as reformers, opportunists and rabid nationalists entered the
arena. In 1996, the presidential election competition was so intense that it
forced a second round of voting, which Boris Yeltsin won with only 53 percent of
the vote.
But Putin's Russia, though nominally a democracy, has clamped a tight lid on any
genuine opposition politics, except for the increasingly marginal Communist
Party. Authorities routinely deny opposition groups permission to rally and
police harshly break up unauthorized gatherings; election-law changes over the
past decade threw up almost-insurmountable obstacles to independents and true
opposition groups.
President Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly spoken of the need for reform, but as a
weak president who attained office only because Putin could not run for another
presidential term in 2008, his words have had little impact. Putin, currently
prime minister, is widely expected to run for the presidency next year and would
be certain to win. That would reinforce the so-called "managed democracy" system,
which many observers believe could lead to catastrophe.
"Russia throughout its history repeatedly saw political reforms launched only
when it was already too late. And now the nation is again heading in the same
direction," said Boris Makarenko of the independent Moscow-based Center for
Political Technologies. "The government can't endlessly ignore society's opinion.
If they attempt to do that, it could lead to the scenarios of 1917 or 1991."
Russia's recent stability and its citizens' willingness to accept declining
political freedoms are closely tied to the astonishing wealth that has flowered
in the country since the Soviet collapse, hinging on world demand for its vast
supplies of oil and natural gas. Even Russians who can't afford the
multimillion-dollar apartments of central Moscow appear excited by watching from
the sidelines.
But the global economic crises of 2008 and 2011 starkly illustrated how
vulnerable Russia is to drops in hydrocarbon prices. Prolonged economic
stagnation or decline could rock the political system.
"Without growth, it would be difficult for the government to 'buy off'
discontent," University of California at Los Angeles professor Daniel Treisman
said in a paper for the Carnegie Moscow Center.
Russia also is plagued by an Islamic insurgency in its Caucasus provinces, an
offshoot of the two post-Soviet wars with Chechen separatists. The violence
periodically spreads deep into the heartland, as in January when a suicide bomber
killed 36 people at Moscow's largest airport.
Kazakhstan, smaller than Russia but still larger than all of Europe, has also
thrived on its gas reserves and other natural resources. And its prospects for
democracy are even more doubtful than Russia's. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has led
the country since the Soviet collapse, holds unchallenged power and his party
occupies every seat in the national legislature. Yet Nazarbayev strikes a more
progressive posture than have Russia's leaders, eagerly giving up the nuclear
weapons that Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union and promoting ethnic and
religious tolerance.
However, neighboring Kyrgyzstan remains a focus of worry because of violent
animosity between ethnic groups, which exploded last year in pogroms in the south
that killed hundreds. Both the United States and Russia have air bases in the
country and stability there is a key concern for both Moscow and Washington.
Kyrgyzstan's moment of truth may come in national elections in October, showing
whether the country can return to the democratic path it bloodily veered away
from in recent years. Once regarded as the region's "island of democracy,"
Kyrgyzstan since 2005 plunged into two violent overthrows of power.
Two other former Soviet states' moves toward democracy and the West deteriorated
but have not definitively collapsed.
Ukraine, where massive protests in 2004 ushered in a reformist Western-leaning
pro-NATO government, almost immediately devolved into factional jealousies that
effectively paralyzed the country. Voters threw out that regime last year in
favor of a Russia-friendly president, who is under wide criticism from the West
for politically motivated prosecutions and pressure on independent news media.
Ukraine meanwhile has acquired international notoriety for frequent brawls in
parliament, and whether the country ultimately tilts West or East remains a
Georgia, whose 2003 "Rose Revolution" led the way for the region's
regime-changing mass protests, was driving firmly toward NATO and European Union
membership under reformist President Mikhail Saakashvili. But the momentum
petered out after Georgia's five-day war with Russia in 2008, which both the
Kremlin and many Georgians blame on Saakashvili's impetuosity.
The two Georgian regions that split off in the war, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
remain potential flashpoints, with Georgia alleging they are occupied territory
used as staging points for Russian terrorist incursions.
Not far from Georgia lies another obdurate problem Nagorno-Karabakh. This
Luxembourg-sized territory, deep inside Azerbaijan, has been controlled by
Armenian soldiers and ethnic Armenian forces since a 1994 cease-fire ended
separatist fighting. More than a decade of international mediation has brought no
apparent move toward resolution, and both sides frequently report small clashes
across the no-man's-land that separates them. A renewal of full-scale fighting
could shake European markets because of the key oil pipeline that passes through
Azerbaijan en route to the West.
Less volatile, but equally stagnant, is the status of Transdniester, a separatist
sliver of Moldova reinforced by Russian troops.
At one extreme of the post-Soviet experience lie Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The first to leave when the USSR was disintegrating, these three small countries
have taken a firmly Westward course, all joining NATO and the EU.
At the other stand authoritarian Uzbekistan, Belarus and Turkmenistan. No change
appears even remotely likely in Uzbekistan until strongman leader Islam Karimov
leaves office. Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko, who has suppressed
opposition and independent media, currently faces the biggest threats to his
17-year rule as the Soviet-style command economy collapses.
Turkmenistan, where huge natural gas revenues have transformed the once-dismal
capital into a shiny desert showpiece resembling Las Vegas, has thrown off much
of the personality cult engendered by the late eccentric leader Saparmurat
Niyazov, who had banned gold teeth and ballet, but it remains a single-party
state. However, Niyazov's successor has invited exiled opposition leaders to
return to take part in next year's elections in what may be a hesitant step
toward openness.
The differing fates and prospects of the countries add up to a historical irony:
Whereas the Soviet Union sought to spread a single ideology throughout the world,
its former territory is now as varied as the world itself.
Associated Press writer Vladimir Isachenov in Moscow contributed to this story.
[return to Contents]
Georgia Times
August 15, 2011
Shevardnadze: Georgia needs Russia
Former Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze is convinced that his country can not
do without Russia.
"It's lie, when they say that Russia means nothing for Georgia" - this, as
reported by VZGLYAD, Shevardnadze said in an interview to the local edition of
At the same time, former President of Georgia noted that in the next two or three
years relations between Moscow and Tbilisi are unlikely to recover.
Earlier, Shevardnadze noted that current head of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili must
"try all the ways" to start the dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi. According to
him, "they can not bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia" without such efforts on the
part of the Georgian president.
Eduard Shevardnadze also convinced that a major role in the negotiation process
between the two countries can play the spiritual leaders of states. "In these
conditions, a meeting in Kiev of the Patriarchs of Russia and Georgia on the eve
was a ray of light" - said Shevardnadze.
Shevardnadze has also said that relations with Russia at the highest level are
very important for Georgia. At the same time, he also talked about the fact that
it is advantageous for Georgia if Vladimir Putin once again becomes the Russian
"Remember, the president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev has refused to negotiate with
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. Considering that Putin has recieved
Georgia's opposition leaders, and I don't exclude that he will hold talks with
Saakashvili" - said the former head of Georgia.
He also believes that Putin is quite loyal to the Georgians.
[return to Contents]
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