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[OS] 2011-#180-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-16 17:00 GMT
Email-ID | 3272562 |
Date | 2011-10-06 17:29:47 |
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Johnson's Russia List
6 October 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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In this issue
1. Wall Street Journal: Russia's Medvedev, an Ardent Apple Fan, Remembers Steve
2. Moscow Times: Counting the Cost of Russia's Melting Permafrost.
3. RIA Novosti: Democracy And Human Rights Least Of Russians' Worries - Opinion
4. Vedomosti: CIVIL SOCIETY: LONG ROAD. SOCIALLY AWARE RUSSIANS SEETHE OVER
5. Kommersant: Pollster Attributes Fall in Medvedev's Rating to Assertions of
6. www.russiatoday.com: 'We need great Russia, not great turmoil' Putin.
7. Moscow Times: Putin's Scuba Expedition Was Staged, Aide Says.
8. Valdai Discussion Club/The TImes (UK): Anatol Lieven, Putin's Character:
Discipline and loyalty drawn from a tough life growing up followed by the world
of the KGB.
9. Vedomosti: Medvedev Seen Forced To Embrace 'Super-Populism' To Win Votes Among
the Poor.
10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Democracy Would Benefit If United Russia Nominated
Medvedev for President.
11. Der Spiegel: The Puppet President. Medvedev's Betrayal of Russian Democracy.
12. RFE/RL: Brian Whitmore, Twelve Days That Shook The Kremlin.
13. Washngton Post: Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen, Why the pessimism
over Putin's return?
14. www.russiatoday.com: Final countdown to Duma race: forecast and analysis.
16. BBC Monitoring: TV sees Russian parliamentary parties playing nationalist
card in election.
17. BBC Monitoring: Unregistered opposition parties unite against One Russia in
Duma election.
18. Moscow Times: Magnitsky Foe Held On Bribery Charges.
19. Moskovsky Komsomolets: MAGNITSKY LIST: THE FIRST ARREST. Senior investigator
was caught red-handed.
20. Interfax: Russians Unsure Whether Security Services Organized High Profile
Murders - Poll.
21. AP: Putin: Russia strong enough to face market shocks.
22. Interfax: Prolonged Stagnation in Developed Countries May Impact Russia -
23. ITAR-TASS: State's task is to offer shoulder to business - Putin.
24. RIA Novosti: Putin says to continue work with former finance minister despite
25. Moscow Times: $49.3Bln Capital Flight So Far This Year.
26. Russia Profile: Crumbling Confidence. A New Survey Highlights Growing
Distrust Among Russians Toward Banks and Other Financial Institutions.
27. Moscow News: Business lobby calls for twice as many migrants.
28. Huffington Post: John Sullivan, The Russian Business Enigma.
29. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: GAZPROM'S WAR. Attacks against Gazprom in Europe are
really attacks against Russia.
30. Izvestia: Russian Premier Putin Sets Out Agenda for Eurasian Integration
31. Politkom.ru: Putin's 'Eurasia Integration Project' Analyzed, Voter Seen as
Likely Target. (Sergey Markedonov)
32. ITAR-TASS: Putin's plan for Eurasian Union meets with doubts in CIS
33. Moscow Times: News Analysis: Kremlin Not Hardening Policy With Syria Veto.
34. Interfax: Senior Russian MP Says Libya 'Lesson' Behind Syria Resolution Veto.
(Konstantin Kosachev)
35. Reuters: Russia criticizes latest U.S. missile defense deal.
36. US Department of State: William Burns, Keynote Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the U.S.-Russia Business Council.
37. The National Interest: Thomas de Waal, Vladimir Putin and the South Caucasus.
Wall Street Journal
October 6, 2011
Russia's Medvedev, an Ardent Apple Fan, Remembers Steve Jobs
By Olga Razumovskaya
MOSCOW Russia's No. 1 admirer of Apple products, outgoing President Dmitry
Medvedev, expressed his condolences to the loved ones and fans of Steve Jobs, the
Apple co-founder and former CEO who died Wednesday.
"People like Steve Jobs change our world. My sincere condolences to his loved
ones and to everyone who admired his intellect and talent," Mr. Medvedev said on
his blog.
President Medvedev visited Silicon Valley in June 2010 to reinforce the message
of "restarted" relations between the U.S. and Russia. During the tour, he met Mr.
Jobs, who presented him with an iPhone that was locked to U.S. carrier AT&T and
thus unusable in Russia. On Twitter Thursday, Mr. Medvedev's aide Arkady
Dvorkovich called the meeting with the tech giant "interesting."
"Applause to Steve Jobs for all he has accomplished during a not such a long
life," the aide said on Twitter Thursday.
Mr. Medvedev, who also set up a Twitter account during his trip to the U.S. in
June, uses the iPad religiously. The president is also an ardent supporter of
modernization and innovation in Russia and a backer of Skolkovo, the
state-supported Silicon Valley-type hub near Moscow.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 6, 2011
Counting the Cost of Russia's Melting Permafrost
By Roland Oliphant
Take a shovel anywhere in two-thirds of Russia's vast expanses, dig more than a
meter into the ground, and you're likely to hit something rock-like.
But it isn't stone. It's permafrost technically defined as any ground that is
continuously frozen for at least two years, but in some areas it is hundreds of
meters deep and tens of thousands of years old. And it is melting putting roads,
railways and buildings across the country at risk of sinking.
"In the next 25 to 30 years, the permafrost zone in Russia could shrink by 10 to
18 percent. By mid-century that could rise to 15 to 30 percent," Vladislav Bolov,
head of the Emergency Situations Ministry's Center for Forecasting and
Monitoring, told RIA-Novosti at the end of the summer.
The effects, he warned, would be devastating, especially on roads and railways
built across the zone of permanently frozen earth.
That zone is a vast territory. Permafrost covers 10.7 million square kilometers
of Russia about 63 percent of the country.
Counting On Past Experience
Russians have been learning to live with the peculiarities of permafrost since
the first explorers pushed into Siberia in the 16th century, and there is plenty
of traditional knowledge and technology to draw on.
Siberian architecture has largely evolved with this experience in mind. In frozen
cities like Yakutsk and Norilsk, buildings stand above the ground on piles, which
are drilled through the active layer to rest on the "eternal" icy foundation
And water and heating pipes wind through the streets not underground, but on
overhead gantries.
"It can look pretty strange to the unaccustomed eye," said Darya Smolikova, a
Yakutsk native who has been living in Moscow since 2001. The buildings resemble
centipedes, she said.
The legs of these "centipedes" help insulate them from the cold in winter but
more importantly, they inhibit the warmth of the structures from being conducted
downward and melting the frost that acts as their foundations.
Thanks to this, Smolikova said, Yakutsk's buildings are remarkably stable,
considering the harsh conditions they are built in.
In the same way, infrastructure including roads and railways, multistory
apartment buildings, oil and gas production facilities has been built directly
on the frozen ground.
But all that could change if the permanently frozen layer beneath the seasonally
thawing surface begins to melt.
Russian Railways, which operates more than 5,000 kilometers of track in the
permafrost zone, says it is already familiar with the problem and regularly
struggles with sinking rail beds.
"The primary effect of permafrost melt is subsidence sections of land that sink
or shift unpredictably. These can appear as local subsidence tens of meters long,
and as long 'wavy' areas that extend for a kilometer or more," Russian Railways
said in a written statement describing the effects of melting permafrost on the
The resulting "thermokarst" landscape is characterized by rapidly appearing lakes
and uneven hummocks of ground interspersed with marshland.
To make matters worse, the resultant accumulation of water lowers the upper limit
of the permafrost, causing flooding. It also reduces the ground's load-bearing
capacity, the company said.
And it is not just railways that are suffering. An earlier report into the impact
of global warming by the Federal Meteorological Service noted that "the strength
of basements of buildings and engineering constructions located on permafrost has
declined in some Siberian regions" because of changes in the bearing capacity of
ground induced by warming and an increase in the depth of seasonal thawing.
Not everyone is convinced that there is a problem, however.
A spokesman for road builder Rosavtodor reached by telephone struck a note of
bravado when asked whether the melting was a cause for concern.
"On the contrary, we're only glad," spokesman Andrei Menshov said. "Actually, the
less permafrost there is, the easier it is to build roads." He did not elaborate,
and a promised interview with a Rosavtodor expert never materialized.
And Smolikova, who grew up in Yakutsk, said a lot of the rules have turned out to
be bendable.
"There was a myth that because of permafrost it was impossible to lay asphalt
because it would crack in winter. But then a new mayor came a long who so they
say stole less, and the roads miraculously became much smoother," Smolikova
"Another myth was that you couldn't build railways in eastern Siberia, but as
soon as Putin said we should produce more diamonds and precious stones, it turned
out you can," she added.
"Personally, I think that if houses are collapsing in Yakutsk, it's for the same
reason they do everywhere else in Russia: because of dilapidation and violations
of building technology."
Bolov said the "negative effects on transport links can already be observed."
Nonetheless, Mikhail Grigoriyev, an expert at the Russian Academy of Sciences'
Institute for Permafrost Studies in Yakutsk, which has been researching the
phenomenon since the 1960s, is not alarmed.
"We have seen warming. In eastern Siberia, for example ... it's getting warmer
in some places we've seen rises of half a degree Celsius, and in others 2 degrees
and that's serious. But we don't see catastrophic consequences," he said by
Glacial Speed Affects Perceptions
The process, however, is gradual. Russian Railways estimates that the ground
temperature is rising by "as much as" 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade in the
north, and 0.5 degrees in the east.
Grigoriyev cautioned that the climate models such forecasts are based on are not
perfect and the speed of warming (and the consequent degradation of permafrost)
can vary from year to year.
"It's happening but warming has slowed in the past couple of years. It's not
happening now as fast as it was in 2006 or 2007, for example," he said.
Nor is the thaw uniform. It depends on altitude, moisture in the soil and a host
of other factors that mean total temperature increases recorded in various
locales of Siberia vary from 0.5 to 2 degrees Celsius.
Zones of Danger
Russia's vast permafrost is divided into three zones the insular, discontinuous
and continuous depending on the durability and depth of the frozen ground.
In the "continuous" zone, which includes most of Siberia from the Yenisei River
to the Bering Strait, the ground is permanently frozen to depths of hundreds of
meters, and the temperature is as low as minus 10 degrees Celsius.
But the continuous zone, which has been frozen for tens of thousands of years, is
bound by less durable belts of "discontinuous" and "insular" zones, where
freezing may last only a few years at a time.
It is here that marginal temperature increases can have far-reaching
Temperatures in western Siberian zones, including the Yamal Peninsula, will rise
1.5 to 2 degrees, bringing it up to between minus 3 and 4 degrees, Bolov of the
Emergency Situations Ministry estimated.
That is not enough to completely thaw the ground, but it does mean that the
so-called "active" surface layer that thaws during summer could become deeper and
thaw for longer, jeopardizing buildings whose foundations rely on the "eternal"
frost below.
The biggest threats, if there are any, will occur in the peripheral "insular"
belt, which extends from the Kola Peninsula and Arkhangelsk region on the
European Arctic coast, sweeps to the south through parts of northern China and
Mongolia and includes parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
According to the Emergency Situations Ministry, the southern boundary will
retreat 150 and 200 kilometers to the northeast in coming decades. "Several tens
of kilometers" could be lost by mid-century in the Irkutsk region, Khabarovsk
territory, the Komi Peninsula and Arkhangelsk, and between 100 and 150 kilometers
in Khanty-Mansiisk and the Sakha republic.
Different Scenarios, Same Problems
But that is not set in stone; the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring report considered no less than four potential scenarios
ranging from complete melt on the steppe by 2020 to only a partial melt by 2050.
All this makes the process difficult to predict, said Kirill Chistikov, a fellow
of the Russian Geographical Society and expert on permafrost at St. Petersburg
State University. And it also complicates the response.
The main danger in the frozen heart of the continuous zone that covers the vast
expanses of the Sakha republic, Chukotka and Magadan is to buildings whose
foundations may fracture as the depth of the summer melt increases and reduces
the load-bearing capacity of the frost.
The threat to roads, railways and pipelines is much more significant in the
south, where the discontinuous and insular belts are in retreat. "Islands" of
permafrost exist alongside nonfrozen ground, and the constantly shifting
boundaries cause some dramatic shifts in topography.
Experience Brings Solutions
Nonetheless, these are not especially new processes, Grigoriyev said.
And since the 1960s, Russian road and rail builders have stabilized ground
temperatures with the use of "liquid-vapor thermo-siphons" metal tubes filled
with frozen carbon dioxide that are put in the ground along roads and rail lines,
with one end in the frost below the active layer and another in the air above it.
Natural heat exchange reduces temperatures by between 1 and 5 degrees Celsius.
Russian Railways favors thermo-siphons in areas of high snowfall in the north,
but said it also recommends building drainage systems to remove meltwater from
thermokarst lakes.
This may explain the nonchalance of companies like Russian Railways or Rosavtodor
they have, after all, been dealing with these problems for years.
The difference is that the increased pace of change will require a more proactive
A 2009 Greenpeace report into the social and economic impact of climate change in
the permafrost zone, which Grigoriyev co-authored, recommends careful monitoring
by city authorities of building foundations in the north so that they can either
be stabilized with thermo-siphons, or at least abandoned before they collapse,
and a monitoring system to give early warning of the subsidence threat to roads,
railways and pipelines in the south.
But no strategy to deal with anticipated permafrost changes had been adopted at
either the federal or regional level at the time that report was written, and
there have been no announcements in the two years since that would indicate any
improvement in the situation.
How Much Could It Cost?
"To be honest, we don't really know," said Igor Podgorny of Greenpeace. "We
simply don't know how to assess such a big change so many years in the future."
Despite the Emergency Situations Ministry's warning forecasts, it is anyone's
guess how much the melting could cost companies or the government.
If the authorities have attempted to estimate the economic effects of thawing,
their studies have not been made public.
Neither Russian Railways nor Rosavtodor responded when asked whether they had
estimated the costs associated with mitigating permafrost melt.
The Human Factor
The immediate threat is not from the long-term progress of degradation, say both
Grigoriyev and Chistikov, but poor understanding of proper behavior for those who
choose to live and build in the zone.
"There are a lot of rules about how you need to build. Unfortunately, we have
structures that are sometimes not properly built and not properly used," he said.
"In some places waste disposal goes directly into the ground, under or near
buildings, including hot water, and even worse, salty water. In those areas where
the permafrost temperature is minus 1, or even just zero degrees, that can have a
sharp impact very quickly," Grigoriyev said.
"On the other hand, I can show you some Soviet-built structures that were built
properly, are still there today and doing absolutely fine," Chistikov said.
[return to Contents]
Democracy And Human Rights Least Of Russians' Worries - Opinion Poll
Moscow, 5 October: A majority of Russian people, 53 per cent, believe inflation
is the biggest problem in the country, according to a survey carried out by the
All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM), the results of which were
published today.
The other top two issues which worry people in Russia are the situation in the
housing sector and communal services (52 per cent) and low standards of living
(51 per cent).
People are also concerned about alcohol and drug abuse (48 per cent), corruption
and bureaucracy (42 per cent), and unemployment (40 per cent).
Twenty per cent of Russians are concerned about the oligarchs' influence on the
life of the country, 19 per cent about the situation in the army, and 18 per cent
about the economy and environmental issues.
Only 17 per cent of Russians are concerned about the problems of demography and
terrorism, and 13 per cent are worried about wage arrears.
Democracy and human rights once again proved to be the least important issue for
the Russians (11 per cent).
According to VTsIOM, last month the Russians have started placing more importance
on the situation in the housing sector, but the problems of alcoholism,
unemployment and crime have become less important for them.
The poll was conducted on 24-25 September among 1,600 respondents in 138
locations in 46 Russian regions. The margin of error does not exceed 3.4 per
cent. (passage omitted)
[return to Contents]
October 6, 2011
Author: Maria Eismont
[The forthcoming election: unable to win and knowing it, the opposition is
determined to make life hard for the powers-that-be.]
Unhappy with the loss of control over the powers-that-be, socially
aware Russians discuss tactics to be used at the forthcoming
parliamentary election. Not even heated debates produced any new
ideas save for the three old tricks - boycott, tearing up of
bulletins, and voting against the so called party of thieves.
Regrettably, all of them are no-win tactical devices.
The resolve to at least try and thwart United Russia's pre-
programmed triumph in the election persuades most voters who care
to opt for active resistance.
Aleksei Navalny appealed to all who cared to vote "any other
party" but the ruling. Garry Kasparov suggested boycott of the
election and Boris Nemtsov promoted spoilage of bulletins. Navalny
carried the day, proving once again that people preferred action
to inaction - even knowing in advance that action would fail.
People turn up and volunteer to become observers at polling
stations. They know that the opposition cannot win but they are
resolved to make life hard for the falsifiers all the same.
Even the latest opinion polls conducted by Levada-Center
sociologists show that respondents tend to back Navalny's variant.
The ruling party stands to poll 57% votes of the Russians
determined to participate in the election and 39% votes of all
Russians (it was 34% a month ago). It means that the more people
turn up at polling stations on December 4, the fewer votes will be
cast for the ruling party.
Association Vote and Gazeta.ru combined efforts and presented
Map of Violations, a site where everyone was welcome to post
information (photos, films, whatever) on violations in the course
of the election.
Association Vote experts suggested another tactical device.
The idea comes down to the monitoring of TV programs, both federal
and regional. Since media outlets are supposed to provide
information on how much they charge political parties for
propaganda, it will be possible in theory to prove that the ruling
party exceeds sum total of what it is permitted by the law to
spend on propaganda. This particular violation may see a political
party removed from the parliamentary race.
Not that anyone expects removal of United Russia from the
parliamentary race, of course. It won't hurt, however, because it
will teach the socially aware patient and systematic resistance
and remind the powers-that-be that the book might be thrown at
them too.
[return to Contents]
Pollster Attributes Fall in Medvedev's Rating to Assertions of 'Independence'
October 4, 2011
Article by Viktor Khamrayev: "Citizens Are Holding Back Votes for Vladimir Putin.
By Taking Them Away From Dmitriy Medvedev"
Dmitriy Medvedev's rating will fall and Vladimir Putin's rating will rise, in the
view of sociologists from the Levada Center for analysis. Society will form its
final opinion about the "tandem" no earlier than in three weeks' time, when the
mass consciousness has formulated its own opinion of the "job swap" that took
place at the United Russia congress on 24 September. This will not influence the
results of the Duma and presidential elections, political experts believe.
Pollsters put the question "Whom would you like to see as candidate for
president?" to citizens on the day that it became clear at the United Russia
congress that Vladimir Putin will again be candidate for president in the
election coming up in March 2012. And in the event of his victory Dmitriy
Medvedev will become prime minister. At the moment ordinary citizens "remain in
some confusion," Aleksey Grazhdankin, deputy director of the Levada Center,
explained to Kommersant. Therefore the news of the upcoming "job swap in the
tandem" has not yet affected their view on the next presidential election. The
largest number of Russian citizens would like to see Vladimir Putin (29%; in June
the figure was 27%), the smallest number would like to see Dmitriy Medvedev (11%;
in June the figure was 15%). Some 18% of respondents would be pleased if both of
them took part in the race (in the summer that figure was 19%). Some 27% do not
want to see "either one of them" as candidates (in June the figure was 23%).
But the "trend is obvious," Mr Grazhdankin believes. According to him, regardless
of the congress, by September "Vladimir Putin's rating had stabilized, while
Dmitriy Medvedev's rating was slowly ebbing." Although from January through May
people regarded Mr Medvedev as "more of a winner, and he was collecting points in
the context of a very low opinion of the activities of both the president and the
prime minister." Whereas in September 2010 only 17% of respondents were prepared
to vote for candidate Medvedev, in December the figure was 21%, and in March of
this year 22%. At the same time the number of supporters of the possible
candidate Putin was slowly falling. In September 2010 36% of those polled by the
Levada Center wanted to vote for him as candidate for president, in December 31%,
and in March only 28%.
But beginning in May "the process started going in the other direction." As a
result in June 18% were willing to vote for candidate Medvedev, in August 16%,
and in the latest poll, in September -- 15%. Meanwhile candidate Putin's rating
had stabilized at the level of 30%. And if the elections had taken place in the
last week of September 32% would have voted for him. It cannot be ruled out that
some of the citizens who do not yet know whether they will turn out for the
elections (10%) would also vote for him. As well as some of those who are going
to turn out but have not yet decided whom to vote for (13%).
The reasons lie not only in the fact that in May Mr Putin began to act much more
energetically than Mr Medvedev in the media space. According to Mr Grazhdankin,
the president's rating was maintained by the fact that in the mass consciousness
Dmitriy Medvedev was perceived first and foremost as the "continuer of Putin's
course." His own individual initiatives were perceived by the majority as "slight
whims with no serious influence on the course." But beginning in the spring,
various groups of the elite began frequently expressing their wishes to the
tandem, demanding -- even in public -- clarity: who is next for president.
Because of this, any independence that Dmitriy Medvedev indulged in turned him,
in the public consciousness, into "some kind of alternative figure to Putin." By
virtue of which he began to lose the "reserve of support" that Vladimir Putin's
supporters had given him. Moreover, the sociologist emphasizes, because of the
independenc e displayed by the president, the mass consciousness began to
associate him to a greater extent precisely with "everything bad in our lives,"
while associating "everything good" to a greater extent with the prime minister.
As for the extent to which citizens' preferences will change "under the influence
of the party congress decisions," the pollsters will understand this, in part, by
the end of this week when they receive the results of the latest poll, which the
Levada Center conducted specially outside its monthly schedule. "The final and
substantiated opinion about the 'job swap' within the tandem will take shape in
society no earlier than in three weeks' time," Mr Grazhdankin asserts. According
to his prediction Dmitriy Medvedev's rating "could fall significantly, while
Vladimir Putin's rating will begin to rise."
But this will have little effect on United Russia's achievements in the Duma
elections, which the party has entered with Dmitriy Medvedev at its head. "The
party will receive less than in 2007, but still more than 50%," Boris Makarenko,
head of the board of the Center for Political Technologies, told Kommersant. Nor
will the "job swap" boost the chances of any of the opposition candidates for
president. The presidential election "will again take place in a single round,"
in the view of Yevgeniy Minchenko, general director of the International
Institute of Political Expertise.
The expert's opinion is confirmed by figures from opinion polls by the Levada
Center. Vladimir Putin's main rival, CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian
Federation) leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, would have collected 10% of the votes if
the presidential election had been held at the end of September. LDPR (Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia) leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy would have gotten 7%.
The presidential ratings of other candidates fall within the statistical margin
of error (3.4%).
[return to Contents]
October 6, 2011
'We need great Russia, not great turmoil' Putin
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has agreed with criticism about the Russian
political system and promised that there will be changes. However, he stressed
that any changes should be "evolutionary".
On Thursday, Putin, who intends to run for the presidency in 2012, was speaking
at the Russia Calling! investment forum organized by VTB Capital, where he
outlined key directions that the state will focus on in the near future.
The PM vowed that there will be political changes in Russia, but insisted that
they should be applied carefully in order to avoid previous mistakes that the
country faced in the '90s.
"There is no doubt that changes are needed and they will be happening, but it
will be an evolutionary path. We don't need great turmoil, we need great Russia,"
he stated, addressing the get-together in Moscow. Putin said that "we will act
very carefully, strengthening the fundamental foundations of our political system
and developing it."
He noted that it is obvious that in order to make Russia attractive to foreign
investors, it is necessary to minimize both economic and administrative risks.
"The predictability of the political course and political stability are certainly
no less important than macro-economic stability," Putin said.
The PM underlined that the state must not substitute for business in economy: its
mission is to offer a shoulder to entrepreneurs when it is necessary and "to
remove barriers" that impede them.
'We are not goin to join NATO or EU'
Putin assured the audience that it was not in Russia's plans to enter NATO or the
European Union.
The Russian Prime Minister said that the European states must settle their own
debt crisis before making offers to Russia. "Are you offering us to join the EU?
First sort out your debts," Putin said, answering a question from a German
participant of the forum.
The prime minister also said that Russia was not going to seek NATO membership.
"We are not going to join NATO or the EU. We can secure our own safety," Putin
However, Putin noted that Russia will closely co-operate with the European Union
in building the free-trade zone.
'People always look for better places'
When one of the forum participants told Putin that according to latest public
opinion polls about 22 per cent of Russian residents wanted to emigrate, the
prime minister said that the poll results should be perceived as part of the
whole picture.
"We have a well-known proverb fishes look for deeper places and humans for the
better ones," Putin said. "We should first look up how many people actually leave
Russia and how many leave other countries," he said. Putin added that though he
listened to sociologists' reports attentively, he always "divided the figures by
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 6, 2011
Putin's Scuba Expedition Was Staged, Aide Says
By Nikolaus von Twickel
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov raised eyebrows Wednesday
after admitting that his boss's discovery of ancient amphorae in the Black Sea
this summer was staged and claiming that fears of an imminent "Brezhnevization"
were unfounded because Leonid Brezhnev was a good Soviet leader.
Speaking in a one-hour live interview on the Dozhd online television channel late
Tuesday, Peskov also claimed that he was left in the dark about Putin's decision
to return to the Kremlin until President Dmitry Medvedev announced it at the
Sept. 24 party convention and that search engines' auto-complete functions were
doctored to show unflattering keywords when entering "Putin."
Although Peskov is arguably the most accessible spokesman in the government, he
has rarely appeared live on television, leading analysts to speculate that this
was an attempt to calm the country's liberal intelligentsia who had hoped that
Medvedev would run for a second presidential term.
"His motive is clearly to iron out imbalances of [Putin's] image before the prime
minister is elected to the highest office," Tatyana Stanovaya, an analyst with
the Center for Political Technologies, wrote on Politcom.ru.
Dressed in a black suit and open white shirt, Peskov often chuckled when pressed
by a round of five opposition-minded female journalists from various media
outlets into explaining seemingly embarrassing details of Putin's elaborate
image-building machine.
Asked by Vedomosti's Yulia Taratuta about the two Greek amphorae held up by Putin
after a dive off the Black Sea coast in August, Peskov said it was obvious that
Putin did not find them himself and that they had been placed by archeologists
exploring the site.
"I was on vacation, and I could not think this up," he said.
But on Wednesday, Vladimir Kuznetsov, who headed the archeological team visited
by Putin, denied this. "I did not order anyone to put amphorae there ... and no
member of my expedition made such an initiative," he told the BBC.
Peskov also took pains to argue that frustration about Putin's likely return to
the Kremlin was confined to the Moscow intelligentsia.
"There are people who think that the atmosphere in the country is suffocating and
it is time to escape to the banks of the Thames River, while others want 3
percentage points off their taxes to get their farms going," he said.
In another sign of widespread concerns that the country will return to Soviet
gerontocracy because Putin is allowed by the Constitution to serve two more
six-year terms as president, the Russian Internet has been flooded over the past
two weeks by an image of Putin's face superimposed on a portrait of Brezhnev.
Peskov argued that comparisons with the Brezhnev era were false because only the
last few years of the Soviet leader's 18-year reign were characterized by
stagnation, while the others laid a basis for economic growth.
"Brezhnev is not a negative in our country's history but a strong positive," he
But Peskov admitted that Putin was old-fashioned in some ways, saying he prefers
to write by hand. He also said one popular sign that the Internet is an indicator
of dissent was falsified.
Asked why search engines auto-complete searches for "Putin" with terms like
"blows up buildings" or "and Kabayeva," he suggested that this was the result of
elaborate schemes by his opponents.
"We know how this is done technically. ... We know the authors of these efforts,"
he said, adding that he would not reveal any names.
Putin has been accused of being behind a series of deadly apartment bombings that
killed almost 300 people three months before the 1999 State Duma elections.
Yandex, the country's most popular search engine, said it does not permit
attempts to manipulate search prompts.
"Our task is to ensure that the prompts show users' real demands and interests,"
company spokeswoman Tatyana Komarova said in e-mailed comments. She added that
Yandex was constantly improving its search algorithms to fight manipulation.
In April 2008, the Moskovsky Korrespondent newspaper reported that Putin was to
marry Duma deputy and former rhythmic gymnast Alina Kabayeva. Peskov said the
rumor was "slander" and claimed he had forgotten the paper's name.
Moskovsky Korrespondent was shut down after publishing the story, and its owner,
media tycoon Alexander Lebedev, said at the time that this was purely because it
was loss-making. In a sign of how far Lebedev's star has fallen, a criminal
investigation was opened into him this week in connection with a recent televised
brawl with another tycoon.
Peskov also serves as a powerful deputy chief of staff to Putin, but he suggested
that he was not so close to the prime minister, saying he was just as surprised
as anybody about his boss's announcement that he would reclaim the presidency.
"If anybody tells you that he knew in advance, he is lying," he said.
He was adamant that Putin and Medvedev had told no one about their decision to
trade jobs after the March 2012 presidential election, which both leaders have
said was made years ago.
However, one senior lawmaker from Putin's United Russia party rightly predicted
the Sept. 24 announcement in an interview with The Moscow Times two days earlier.
Peskov also dismissed suggestions that he plays a leading role in Putin's image
strategy, saying the prime minister has no need for that.
"Overall, Putin needs no press secretary, no image makers, no PR services. ...
Most often, it is he himself" who makes the decisions, he said.
Launched in 2010 as an online and cable television station, Dozhd, or Rain, has
quickly become a focus for critical independent journalism. Its owner, Natalya
Sindeyeva, also owns the Slon.ru portal and the Bolshoi Gorod weekly.
Bolshoi Gorod this week appeared with a daring front cover that showed nine lines
of blank verse under the slogan "Enough" and ending with a call to "Sack them
[return to Contents]
Valdai Discussion Club
October 6, 2011
Putin's Character: Discipline and loyalty drawn from a tough life growing up
followed by the world of the KGB
By Anatol Lieven
Anatol Lieven is a professor in the War Studies Department of King's College
London and author of "Pakistan: A Hard Country".
This article was originally published in The Times (London) on October 1st 2011
The first impression on meeting Vladimir Putin is how short he. Immediately
counter-balancing this is an impression of intense physical energy, intensely
controlled. At 58, and after 11 years in power, Putin still looks as if he were
in his late 40s, and fit enough to keep going in power for a great many years to
The public image of Putin as a sportsman has been built up by propaganda, but it
reflects something fundamental about the man. He has the sportsman's combination
of physical strength and taut self-discipline. On the occasions when I have seen
him at dinners hosted by the Valdai Club, he has drunk no wine except a sip when
giving or responded to a toast, and has waved away by far the greater amount of
the delicious food put before him often before some other poor sybarites have
finished eating theirs.
Energy and ferocity would be the key words to describe the qualities that Putin
grew up with. To these he then added discipline, watchfulness, and cynicism.
Putin is a product of two profoundly shaping environments: the working-class yard
where he grew up, and the secret service in which he enlisted.
As he has said himself, "growing up in the yard was like living in the jungle".
He learned to fight hard and ruthlessly from an early age, and was "a hooligan,
not a Pioneer" (ie a Boy Scout), to quote him again. Equally, he decided early to
fight in an intelligent way, with everything that this demanded in terms of
training and self-discipline. To this was then added the intense discipline of
the KGB; and the cynicism and watchfulness of the street kid were reinforced by
the even greater cynicism and watchfulness of the intelligence officer.
The other defining marks of the KGB and its successor services have been
patriotism, elitism, mutual loyalty and entitlement. Its officers are in their
own minds at least genuinely devoted to the state. Putin often reminds me of
something that Keynes said of the French leader Clemenceau, that he was a
complete cynic who "had only one illusion France."
The former KGB believes that without its services, the state would collapse and
that because its service is so great, its rewards should also be great. As Putin
himself recognises, the corruption this combined with the Yeltsin era to breed is
now one of the greatest obstacles to Russia's progress; to attack it however
would mean betraying close associates and reversing much of Putin's own style of
For while Putin has turned his ferocity against declared enemies of Russia and
his regime, as far as the governing elites themselves are concerned, Putin has
operated not as a dictator but an intelligent manager, always taking care to
compensate the losers in any dispute. Putin looks much younger than he is; but
few people are young enough at 58 to change their whole way of doing things.
[return to Contents]
Medvedev Seen Forced To Embrace 'Super-Populism' To Win Votes Among the Poor
October 4, 2011
Editorial: "Elections for the Poor"
Since 24 September Dmitriy Medvedev has been faced with an ambitious new
challenge -- to lead the United Russia party, of which he has suddenly become
head, toward a confident victory in the State Duma elections. Two months of the
election campaign remain. The Kremlin has gotten down to work, and it is already
obvious that the campaign will have a clear social thrust; it will definitely
include "fair prices," promises to support the poor and pensioners, and a
solution to the problems in the healthcare system, education, and housing and
municipal services.
Of course, unthinking social populism is an attribute of most election campaigns.
But in the case of Medvedev there is a kind of discomfort; hitherto the president
has attempted to build the image of a reforming president with a slight rightist
inclination. In his public statements he has focused on the active part of the
population, young people, and professionals and has talked about reducing taxes
and improving the conditions for doing business. But Medvedev has now become head
of a party advocating (ideologically not very clear) stability and has set about
mobilizing an electorate consisting mainly of recipients of budget money.
There is also the status problem: By giving up the struggle for the next
presidency Dmitriy Medvedev has become a "lame duck," and in this condition it is
very hard to mobilize anybody. At the administrative level this problem is
solvable -- because he can tackle the election campaign not only in his own name
but also on behalf of Vladimir Putin. Correspondingly, everything associated with
the organization and correct counting of votes can be organized quite easily. But
the image of the "new" Medvedev is extremely vague: It has not been defined
ideologically and has been compromised from the point of view of leadership
because this is a politician who has just given up the struggle for power.
It will therefore be necessary to apply super-populism and disavow everything
that has been said during the years of his presidency -- to produce a policy
article entitled "Backward, Russia!" for example. Technologically the
super-populism required for the campaign will be leftist; unlike, for example,
the United States, where there is an electoral conflict between taxpayers and
recipients of budget money, in Russia few people recognize themselves as
taxpayers. And a significant proportion of those who do so recognize themselves
-- that is, entrepreneurs -- are in a specific relationship with the state that
does not allow them to openly oppose its policy. Whereas there are very many
recipients of budget money, and most of them are poor.
Literally last week Rosstat (Federal Statistical Agency) reported that the number
of poor people (with an income below the subsistence minimum) has risen by 2
million in the course of a year and that 14.9% of the population are now below
the poverty line. Promises to raise wages and pensions, curb monopoly and housing
and municipal services charges, and provide free medicines and surgery are bound
to work if they are adequately funded. In all opinion polls relating to current
problems Russians put price inflation or a shortage of money in first place. For
example, in an August Levada Center poll 73% regarded price inflation as the most
acute problem facing society, while 52% opted for the poverty and destitution of
the majority of the population, and 41% said the rise in unemployment (it was
possible to choose several responses).
And although the Russians to not trust elections -- 46% feel that the Duma
elections will involve manipulation and rigging -- the decision to participate is
based on other motivations. First and foremost, elections sustain symbolic social
order and the existence of the state per se (see Aleksey Levinson's column on
this page). So 60% intend to go to the polls.
The promises of all kinds of goodies are intended to help them to leave their
homes on 4 December and vote for the correct party . A poor voter is more likely
to make a choice if he is given or promised something for doing so. New United
Russia leader Medvedev is faced with the cheerless task of uttering slogans,
conducting a "campaign for the poor," and handing out unearned money. Medvedev
has given up the attractive and worthy job of earning money -- that is,
developing the country -- without even having tried properly to resolve it.
[return to Contents]
Democracy Would Benefit If United Russia Nominated Medvedev for President
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
October 4, 2011
Article by Roza Tsvetkova: "The Fate of the President. The Scenario Proposed at
the United Russia Congress Could Prove Inconclusive"
Ten days ago, on 24 September, the country experienced another revolution -- a
bloodless one this time. The voluntary handover of supreme power long before 7
May 2012 -- until which date, as Dmitriy Medvedev himself reminded us, it is he
who is the elected president of the Russian Federation -- came as a shock to
apparently everybody, also including the immediate donor. Many journalists,
particularly Western journalists, saw anguish and coercion in the Russian
president's behavior. The British publication Financial Times wrote virtually
immediately: Medvedev was emotional at the United Russia congress, where it was
announced that he would not run for a second presidential term and "several times
he was apparently on the verge of tears." Excessive emotion if you consider that
"we actually discussed this option for the development of events back when our
comradely alliance was being formed."
Fallback option
If there had really been a preliminary agreement within the tandem -- and we are
being assured with might and main that there is nothing like this phenomenon in
modern and maybe all Russian political history -- never before had such a
high-ranking state figure openly admitted that he knew from the very beginning
that he was there just for a while as the "fallback option."
Society, not only in Russia, feels deceived -- what about those guidelines and
horizons that Medvedev presented so alluringly in his policy article "Forward,
Russia!"? And criticism from "dissenters" can be heard increasingly frequently:
Why are the 4 March 2012 presidential elections necessary if they have de facto
taken place already in September this year, at the United Russia congress? This
is a party that the president quite recently accused of having become "sclerotic"
and utilizing administrative leverage, but after that he has today become its
leader with great enthusiasm. And a new version of the tandem can be seen. While
proposing that his colleague head up the United Russia list, Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin has not yet renounced his own leadership.
The disappointment is even stronger because in the last two years just about
everybody had been trying to find out about the presidential ambitions of both
Dmitriy Medvedev and Vladimir Putin!
Here is an interview that Putin gave to the well-known American television
presenter Larry King on 2 December 2010. Their conversation was over a satellite
"L. King: Mr Prime Minister, thank you for joining us. Let us start right off.
You could run for president again in 2012? Are you thinking about doing that?
"V.V.Putin: President Medvedev and I work together closely. We made up our minds
long ago that we would take our decision concerning the 2012 elections in the
interests of the Russian people.
"L. King: So your answer is 'maybe.'
"V.V. Putin: We'll see. The elections are still a long way away. They are slated
for April 2012. I repeat, we will consult with each other and we will come to a
decision that takes account of the economic, social, and political situation in
the country."
Why the Russian prime minister scheduled the elections for April next year in
that interview is a mystery. Admittedly not such an intriguing mystery as his
comment about the interests of the Russian people. To this day they, the people,
cannot remember at all when time has been found to consult with them on the
matter of presidential elections.
Then there were the diligent Swedish journalists who persistently pestered
Vladimir Putin during his visit to Stockholm last April. "As yet it is premature
to talk about this. The time will come, and we will make a decision. You will
like it. You will be happy!" was our laconic prime minister's answer.
And another Putin comment that looked totally mystifying -- to this day political
psychologists are racking their brains over it -- was when one of the delegates
to the June interregional United Russia congress asked the prime minister about
his first actions after the presidential elections.
"I will go and clean up. In both the hygiene and the political sense. After all
the campaigns that lie ahead of us I believe that addressing hygiene will be a
possibility," Putin answered.
Elbow syndrome
Unlike his senior comrade, Dmitriy Anatolyevich did not camouflage that strongly
his wish to continue his presidential career. Journalists asked him about it so
frequently that if the question of Medvedev's plans for a second presidential
term was not raised during contacts with the media, the country's leader felt
uncomfortable. "Well, you finally asked about it," was his half-joking,
half-relieved response to the author of these lines at a Skolkovo news conference
in May. "I had expected that it would be the first question, but it turned out to
be only the fourth." And he started to explain that politics is not a show and
that a different, broader format was necessary for statements of this kind.
And now the time has come. Dmitriy Medvedev will not venture to run a second time
for the presidency because "Prime Minister Putin is definitely the most
authoritative politician in our country at the present moment and his rating is
somewhat higher." In Medvedev's words, he does not want to "elbow anybody." He
said this outright: "Do not sit on the edge of your seats; it will not happen!"
And he tried to persuade us from the television screen that it would look just as
absurd as if Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton were to start competing with each
other in a fight for the presidency. "It is unimaginable! They are both from the
Democratic Party and they have made a decision on the basis of who is capable of
delivering the best result," our president argued in an interview with the
leaders of the three federal television channels on 30 September. "And so this is
the decision we have made."
Commenting on this contention by Medvedev, Ekho Moskvy Chief Editor Aleksey
Venediktov exclaims in his blog on the radio station's website: "This is
something, Dmitriy Anatolyevich.... Just who said this crazy thing to you that
you decided to repeat it to the whole world? It is so sad...." And he recalled
that in the national Gallup ratings on the eve of the primaries Clinton had been
20 (!) percentage points ahead of the incumbent US president (39 as against 19).
"It is possible to find out that Clinton beat Obama among Democratic Party
supporters in the first two primaries in January. And it is possible to realize
that it was not a case of 'they made a decision,'" a depressed Venediktov says.
But words cannot be unsaid. And they have already been broadcast on television
and broken down into quotations that are being malevolently cited by the current
president's political opponents who are not afraid of falling victim to
disciplinary action, like former Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin. And the well
and truly depleted ranks of his supporters are attempting to find at least some
kind of hidden point in Dmitriy Medvedev's speeches. Despite the fact that
Dmitriy Anatolyevich especially stressed: "We have always told only the truth."
Secrets of the Kremlin court
And what, dear reader, would you feel about the following development?
Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev has indeed topped the United Russia
party list by agreement with the prime minister. Exclusively in order to improve
the damaged rating of the party of power, whose position even the rapidly-born
ONF (All-Russia People's Front) could not help to strengthen much. It would now
be a sin if the party, which is headed by the country's two leaders at the same
time, was not to achieve its prescribed 60% (even top United Russia officials no
longer want to recall the previously-stated 70%). After the December parl
iamentary elections, grateful United Russia members -- again by agreement with
VVP (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin) but in accordance with the law -- nominate
their candidate for the presidency. But not Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, as
Medvedev proposed, but himself -- Dmitriy Anatolyevich. And the smart prime
minister will nobly say: "I am going."
With such an arrangement
a) the continuity urged by both Medvedev and Putin is preserved;
b) the tradition initiated by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is not disrupted;
c) there is again a conspicuous surge of political activity and intriguing;
d) all the skeptics who claim that democracy has no place in Russia will be
e) all "dissenters" will not have to vote on principle for the Communists, who
will not win a big "protest" percentage;
f) Vladimir Putin will go down in history forever as the author and guarantor of
the slogan "you will like it," and he will not have to undertake much of a
g) Dmitriy Medvedev will be able to urge Russia forward for a further whole six
years, and during this time a very great deal in the country, including officials
and the government, will be able to modernize.
Here there is a danger that is presupposed, incidentally, by all electoral
scenarios: The president is convinced that any politician and any party can be
"passed over" (in elections). If such a thing was suddenly to happen, that would
be very real DEMOCRACY! (Preceding word published in all uppercase in original)
And then it would not be a case of us envying the West's political freedoms;
rather they would start admiring us.
Russia, the choice is yours!
[return to Contents]
Der Spiegel
October 4, 2011
The Puppet President
Medvedev's Betrayal of Russian Democracy
By Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp in Moscow
Dmitry Medvedev shocked Russians with his announcement that he was ceding the
presidency back to Vladimir Putin. It is now clear that Medvedev was never more
than a placeholder for his mentor, and his supposed plans to modernize Russia
were little more than empty soundbites. Indeed, Medvedev may have damaged the
country even more than Putin has.
There is a scene that serves as a metaphor for the fate of Dmitry Anatolyevich
Medvedev. It took place in December 2008, long before Russia's 46-year-old
president committed political suicide last Saturday.
Medvedev had only been in office for seven months at the time. He was giving a
speech to 5,000 guests at the Kremlin, at an event to commemorate the 15th
anniversary of the Russian constitution. The constitution had just been amended
to lengthen the terms of the president and the parliament -- and thus reduce the
frequency of elections.
Just as Medvedev was praising the Kremlin for its contributions to freedom and
democracy, a young man, a student of economics at a Moscow university, stood up
and shouted: "Why are you listening to him? He has violated all civil and human
rights himself! This country has censorship and no free elections..."
Security officers in black suits pounced on the 25-year-old and held his mouth
shut. "Let him go!" Medvedev shouted. "The constitution was ratified precisely so
that everyone could have the right to express his opinion!" But the men from the
Kremlin security service completely ignored Medvedev. Instead, they grabbed the
troublemaker and carried him out of the room.
A similar problem has plagued Medvedev throughout his presidency. Whenever his
limousine approached the Kremlin, the security guards would announce: "The
president is about to arrive!" But when it was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in
the limousine, they would say: "Nastoyashtchiy yedet" -- "Now the real one is
It has been a week since Medvedev, at the convention of the ruling party, United
Russia, meekly agreed to give up his post and allow himself to be sidelined into
the position of prime minister. It was the most important shift in Russia's
course since Boris Yeltsin promoted then KGB Colonel Putin to the highest office
in the country, less than 12 years ago, and one that will likely continue to
affect the enormous country for more than a decade to come. Medvedev will remain
Russia's leader for only seven more months. Since last weekend, the state-owned
broadcasters have been referring to Medvedev as the "current" president, as if
they couldn't wait for the changing of the guard to be completed.
There has been no public outcry in Moscow since then. On the day after the
announcement, only 500 outraged citizens assembled in front of the Pushkin
monument, a favorite meeting place for dissidents.
But there has been fierce discussion in political circles over the many questions
that remain. Is Putin's return to the Kremlin good for Russia's stability, or is
it the kiss of death for democracy and liberalism? Does it herald an economic
upturn or stagnation?
The most important question is whether Medvedev, in the three-and-a-half years of
his presidency, ever fought for the values he promoted. It is quite possible that
he knowingly accepted the role of the obedient Kremlin soldier in a drama, whose
outcome the Putin/Medvedev tandem only revealed to the public last weekend. If
that is the case, he was merely a seat warmer on the Kremlin throne -- a
figurehead not unlike the farmer's son Mikhail Kalinin, who formally represented
the Soviet Union as its nominal head of state for 23 years under Stalin, or the
Ukrainian Nikolai Podgorny, who did the same thing for 21 years under party
leader Leonid Brezhnev.
If things truly unfolded the way it appears, this president played an ominous
role for Russia in the last few years, despite his supposedly liberal views -- or
precisely because of them. It appears that he was nothing more than Putin's
Portrayed as Weak
Shortly before his election in 2008, many already believed that Medvedev would
merely serve as a placeholder in the Kremlin. In recent months, however, there
had been growing rumors that Putin would return to power, rumors reinforced by a
weekly barrage of images of Putin as an omnipotent leader presented: at the
steering wheel of a Lada, as he drives (alone, supposedly) across Siberia,
hunting a gray whale in the Pacific, riding a motorcycle with a group of bikers
and diving down to the sea floor to recover an antique amphora. The most recent
photo is of Putin standing bare-chested in front of a doctor, who confirms that
he is in excellent health.
The message was clear: Look at me, I'm the strongest man in the country. At the
same time, photos of Medvedev portrayed him as weak and almost despondent,
constantly announcing that he would soon issue a statement about his political
future as president -- which he never did. He had already given up months ago.
It isn't Putin's return that is surprising, but the manner in which the tandem --
or rather, Putin -- staged the game they were playing: as a big production at the
convention of the United Russia party. The directors had brought in 10,000
schoolchildren and students to be an enthusiastic audience for the eerie
government drama at the Luzhniki Palace of Sports in Moscow. No one knew what
exactly the party would be voting on, but each attendee was given a sheet of
paper with instructions on what to wear ("jacket, no tie, with jeans") and a list
of slogans to chant ("chant each one at least five times").
Medvedev, who had condemned the practices of Russian state propaganda several
times, was nothing but decoration. He sat silently next to Putin, the politician
who could very well end up ruling Russia longer than Leonid Brezhnev.
Yuri Ryzhkov, the former Russian ambassador to France, says it was Yeltsin's
biggest mistake, even "a crime," to install as his successor Putin. He describes
Putin as a "man full of complexes" who is convinced "of his absolute freedom to
do as he pleases when it comes to his own people."
But it is now becoming clear that it was just as irresponsible to install a man
like Medvedev at the Kremlin three-and-a-half years ago.
A Secret Agreement
Putin had chosen him because he knew he could depend on Medvedev. He had made him
his assistant in the St. Petersburg city administration in the early 1990s. When
Putin became prime minister in 1999, he brought Medvedev with him to Moscow.
Later, as president, Putin made Medvedev the head of the Kremlin administration
and chairman of the energy giant Gazprom. In all of these positions, Medvedev
proved to be loyal to the point of self-abandonment. As a result, he was able to
outdo his rival Sergei Ivanov, the self-confident former defense minister, when
it came time to determine who would succeed Putin in 2008. If Ivanov had become
president, Putin would have stood the chance of being sidelined.
In other words, Medvedev was by no means Putin's liberal opponent when he moved
into the Kremlin, even if the West and Russian intellectuals wanted to see it
that way. He had merely been socialized differently than Putin, who had been
shaped by the chaotic 1990s, when governing was informal and laws and
institutions were ignored. In contrast, Medvedev was no longer the classic power
player. He apparently believed in ideas and the Internet, whereas Putin avoids
computers, which portray a world that differs completely from the one that exists
in his head.
The decision Medvedev made at the beginning of his term to lengthen the terms of
the president and the parliament shows that he did arrive at the Kremlin with his
own agenda. The serious constitutional amendment, which signified yet another
erosion of the democratic system, was part of a secret agreement that Medvedev
and Putin had made before the election. It was the first betrayal of the liberal
ideas that he later publicly preached, the birth defect of his failed presidency.
'A Country of Beggars'
It remained a presidency without highlights. Only once was there a phase in which
Medvedev tried to make his mark. It lasted less than a year and began in
September 2009, with an Internet article in which the president offered a
clear-sighted view of conditions in Russia. He sharply criticized Russia's
"primitive raw material economy" and "chronic corruption," the "semi-Soviet
social sphere" and the "paternalistic mood" within the population. Soon
afterward, he told SPIEGEL: "Trading gas and oil is our drug." Medvedev believed
that the country needed to rethink its approach, and that it needed "strict and
consistent changes."
But he did not follow his own advice. A disappointed citizen named "Vanya" wrote
in the president's blog: "We are a country of beggars, a country without a
future, a country of slaves, chaos and disintegration. Mr. President, it's time
to do something. Stop waffling!"
But Medvedev rarely made his own decisions. The firing of Moscow Mayor Yury
Luzhkov and later the Kremlin's pro-Western position on the NATO campaign in
Libya, which Putin had sharply criticized as a "crusade," were his only
significant, independent positions. All other attempts by Medvedev to separate
himself from his mentor Putin failed miserably. The president wanted to quickly
lead Russia into the World Trade Organization (WTO), hoping to integrate the
backward country more effectively into the world economy. But whenever Medvedev's
advisers eliminated a hurdle to joining the WTO, Putin would erect a new one. He
even single-handedly raised import duties on foreign cars.
In an interview that was broadcast nationwide in late December 2010, Medvedev
once mentioned the names of Putin's opponents, which had been a taboo on
government television until then. A few days later, Putin had Boris Nemtsov, a
former deputy prime minister and current member of the opposition, arrested at a
rally. He vilified Nemtsov and his supporters as traitors to their country "who
want to sell out Russia."
Medvedev also criticized Putin's premature condemnation of oil magnate Mikhail
Khodorkovsky before the end of his second trial. Putin had said that Khodorkovsky
was guilty of at least three murders. But Medvedev's objection was of little use.
Khodorkovsky was sentenced to 14 years in prison.
Humiliating the President
The fact that Medvedev, the son of a professor, was never able to fully take
advantage of his political power probably had something to do with his solid
upbringing. He was no Boris Yeltsin, who was willing to put his office and his
life on the line for his beliefs, nor was he an alpha dog like Putin, who learned
early on how to assert himself against stronger boys during his childhood in the
backstreets of a working-class St. Petersburg neighborhood.
Medvedev has always seen himself in the role of Putin's little brother, as almost
every photo depicting the two men clearly shows. From his posture, to his
behavior, to the way he walked, it was clear that the president was trying to
emulate the prime minister.
This relationship enabled Putin, who addresses Medvedev by his first name while
Medvedev addresses the prime minister in a more formal tone, to humiliate the
president whenever he pleased. When Medvedev proposed his Skolkovo project, a
Russian version of Silicon Valley he had dreamed up, as well as a modernization
commission, only EUR250 million ($340 million) was made available in the budget.
Putin, for his part, created his own modernization committee with a
EUR2.4-billion budget to set himself apart from Medvedev.
Did Medvedev truly hope to run for president again, as sources at the Kremlin had
suggested? And did Putin pressure him to pull back during a fishing trip in
August on the Volga River in Astrakhan?
It will remain their secret. But for Medvedev, it was doubly humiliating that
Putin forced him to run as the top candidate for United Russia, which Medvedev
had often criticized as a party of yes-men.
Medvedev will not even be able to escape the experience of being upbraided by
Putin when he becomes prime minister -- if the appointment materializes in the
first place. Then he will have to implement the program that Putin had announced
at the United Russia convention. This too is contrary to Medvedev's ideas,
because Putin has turned Russia into a land of state capitalism. During Putin's
time in office, the share of GDP earned by state-owned companies increased once
again to almost 50 percent. Medvedev, for his part, sought to privatize
state-owned operations like oil giant Rosneft and the national airline Aeroflot,
but his efforts quickly failed.
Heavy Burden on the National Budget
The world's largest country by area is still highly dependent on its oil and
natural gas exports. Aside from space travel, the nuclear and the defense
industry, all attempts to develop other economic sectors to make them
internationally competitive have failed. The gap between rich and poor has
widened, and the healthcare system in some parts of the country is comparable to
that in much poorer countries.
To conceal these shortcomings, Putin sugarcoated his record wherever he could at
the United Russia convention. He raved about the 6 million children born since
2008, the "highest number in 20 years," but neglected to mention that deaths
still outnumbered births by at least a million within the same period. He also
said nothing about the fact that well-educated young Russians are leaving the
country in growing numbers.
Instead, the delegates were deluged with a flood of campaign promises that will
impose a heavy burden on the national budget and businesses. He promised a
19-percent increase in pensions, new equipment for the army and navy in the
coming years, a freeze on local fees for electricity and water and the
construction of 1,000 new schools. Effective immediately, teachers, doctors,
police officers and soldiers will receive a 6.5 percent pay hike. How Putin
expects to achieve the 7 percent annual growth rates he envisions remains a
Of course, Putin isn't the one who will have to implement everything. That task
will fall to Medvedev when he becomes prime minister in May. He will also have to
press ahead with tax increases and raising the retirement age, both reforms that
are no longer avoidable. Putin will be able to confidently look on from his new
office at the Kremlin, where he will not be the target of the expected popular
outrage. He will be able to use Medvedev as his scapegoat and even throw him out
of office if it suits him, which is something Medvedev wouldn't have dreamed of
doing. It is a safe bet that the hapless president will also remain unsuccessful
as prime minister.
Slipping into Putin's Role
Was Medvedev ever really a reformer? In the week after the decision on the
transition of power was made, the president didn't show the slightest sign of
supporting liberal ideas. On the contrary, he was slipping into Putin's role as a
macho politician. On live camera, he churlishly dismissed Finance Minister Alexei
Kudrin, because Kudrin had criticized the Kremlin's fiscal policy. On Tuesday of
last week, he attended a military maneuver wearing a leather jacket and called
for higher defense spending. He pointed out that Russia is a nuclear power and
"not a banana republic," and that anyone who felt otherwise should look for a new
These weren't the words of someone who disagrees with Putin. This leads to the
sobering conclusion that Medvedev was greatly overestimated, and that he wasn't
an honest president. "He preached the mantra of modernization and in doing so
awakened hopes of change -- while at the same time doing absolutely nothing at
all," says Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Center, a Moscow-based think tank.
Many, she adds, believed in his plans to bring Russia forward.
Now, says Shevtsova, Medvedev has yielded the floor to Putin again. This means no
reforms and the return of the old model of tough leadership. It is an irony of
history, she says, that "a politician who looks like a reformer can be a greater
impediment to progress than an open traditionalist." Liberal rhetoric in a
non-liberal environment in which the thumbscrews are tightened even further, she
argues, "only increases cynicism in society."
This is precisely what is already happening. In an opinion piece this week,
journalist Yulia Latynina wrote that in a normal electoral system, only one
person could become president, but everyone can vote. In Russia, on the other
hand, the situation was reversed. "Everyone can be president here, even Putin's
beloved Labrador -- but only one person can call the shots: Putin."
Throwing in the Towel
If there is one thing Medvedev's former supporters hold against the president, it
is that this young, healthy and completely capable man did not find it necessary
to explain to his more than 52 million voters why he is throwing in the towel
after only one term.
"You gave people false hope of a normal future," a young Moscow opposition
politician wrote on his blog, "but now it's clear that you are like Putin."
Many Russians have now shed their last illusions, says political scientist
Anatoly Bernstein. "As a result, Russia is losing the energy and faith of many
decent citizens," he says, things that it urgently needs to revitalize itself.
The tabloid newspaper Moskovskij Komsomolets wrote: "The course of history was
apparently stopped in our country. A power that is no longer capable of awakening
hope is opening the door to its own grave."
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
[return to Contents]
October 5, 2011
Twelve Days That Shook The Kremlin
By Brian Whitmore
It took less than two weeks for the long-standing debate in Russia's ruling elite
to come to a screeching halt.
On September 15, Mikhail Prokhorov abruptly resigned as chairman of Right Cause,
casting a cloud over plans for a regime-friendly center-right party to enter the
State Duma.
Ten days later, on September 24, United Russia nominated Vladimir Putin as its
candidate for president in 2012, dashing the hopes of those who hoped to see
Dmitry Medvedev remain in the Kremlin for a second term.
And two days later, on September 26, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin resigned
following a public dustup ostensibly over military spending, removing one of the
most strident advocates of fiscal probity and political reform from the
The managed-democracy project, if not dead, appears to be on life support at best
(Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko may still yet get into the State Duma as a token
liberal party). And with Putin set to occupy the Kremlin until 2024, any hopes
for economic modernization and a gradual transition to more democratic governance
have been buried.
But was this really preordained? In his speech at the United Russia congress,
Medvedev provoked cries of betrayal from his supporters when he suggested as
much, saying the decision for Putin to return was made "years ago."
The past four years could conceivably have been a big ruse, with only Putin and
Medvedev in on the con -- but color me skeptical on that score. The evidence
overwhelmingly points to a debate over how to proceed post-2012 among the inner
core of the ruling elite. And one side won and one side lost -- decisively.
The result was the mirror image of the decision back in 2007-08, when Putin
resisted the appeals of Igor Sechin, Viktor Ivanov, and others urging him to
change the constitution and serve a third consecutive term.
This time, those seeking Putin's return to the Kremlin won the argument. And
there was an argument, not just about the Putin-Medvedev question, but also the
composition of the State Duma and whether United Russia would be allowed a
continued constitutional majority.
The lines were often blurred and it wasn't always easy to determine who was on
which side (with the exception of obvious advocates of a Putin return like Sechin
and supporters of political reform like Kudrin). Some, like Deputy Kremlin Chief
of Staff Vladislav Surkov, the regime's unofficial ideologist, appeared to be
playing both sides of the fence.
Back in June 2009, for example, Surkov appeared to telegraph the doomed Right
Cause project when he argued that United Russia needed to share power in the Duma
with other parties.
"We believe that once a system has settled, there should be more degrees of
freedom inside it. One should be flexible, one should learn to enter into
coalitions. Democracy is a compromise. Democracy is a procedure. It's a tedious
one, but it's a procedure," Surkov said at the time.
Surkov's comments drew a harsh response from Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, who
said: "Our parliament of the majority based on one party is a necessity for
Russia.... The parliamentary majority allows us to adopt laws that determine
political and economic stability."
Looks like Gryzlov won that argument. Or Surkov had second thoughts.
Another sign of conflict inside the elite was the abrupt departure from the
Kremlin in April of onetime uber-spinmeister Gleb Pavlovsky, one of the key
architects of Putin's first presidential campaign in 2000.
Pavlovsky was a vocal proponent of a second term for Medvedev, with Putin keeping
a dominant role in Russian politics and was becoming increasingly critical of
United Russia. And it was for these sins that he was reportedly pushed out into
the wilderness.
In interviews after his firing, Pavlovsky said the elite was close to endorsing a
second term for Medvedev but was getting cold feet.
"I think that, of course, that first and foremost, this debate is painful for
Putin. Not easy for him to step aside. Also, he rightly fears that there could be
instability in the bureaucracy after the nomination of a candidate," he told
Moreover, on several occasions, Kudrin spoke out in favor of greater democracy --
at the Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum in February, in an interview with "The Wall
Street Journal" in April, and in an interview with "The New York Times" in June.
Kudrin's basic argument was that effective economic reform was not possible
without political reform because the authorities will need a "mandate of trust"
from the people.
So the argument came down to this: one side argued that modernizing Russia's
economy requires at least limited reforms of the political system while another
argued that loosening things up politically could lead to instability and chaos.
Putin was going to be the key player in either scenario -- he could be the formal
leader as president or an informal national leader and head of the deep state.
Putin is indispensible because he is the power broker among the Kremlin clans and
without him, open warfare among them would likely break out.
I expected, wrongly, Putin to choose the informal leader route. In a recent
interview, longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, the international editor of "The
Economist" and author of "The New Cold War," offered interesting insight into why
Putin and a critical mass of the elite decided he had to return to the Kremlin:
"The way the Russian system works, these formal channels of power are important.
It isn't like China where you can have Deng Xiaoping behind the scenes or
Singapore where you have Lee Kuan Yew behind the scenes. The paper flow matters,
the signature matters, the pechat [stamp] matters. I think that it was a source
of some awkwardness and instability for them that Medvedev was theoretically in
the top job and so Putin had to have a guy in Medvedev's office managing the
paper flow so people didn't run around behind him."
[return to Contents]
Washngton Post
October 5, 2011
Why the pessimism over Putin's return?
By Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen
Katrina vanden Heuvel is editor and publisher of the Nation and writes a weekly
online column for The Post. Stephen F. Cohen is a professor of Russian studies at
New York University and the author, most recently, of "Soviet Fates and Lost
We make no brief for Vladimir Putin as a democrat, but much of the U.S.
commentary following the announcement that he will return to the Kremlin as
president in 2012 is simplistic morality posing as political analysis.
A Sept. 28 New York Times editorial, for example, insisted that Putin, who "has
made clear his disdain for democratic rights," is casting out the "more liberal
and Western-oriented" Dmitry Medvedev. According to a Sept. 26 Post editorial,
"Vladimir Putin decided that he would like to be president again, and so he will
But the complexities of Russian politics cannot be reduced to the whims of one
man however powerful he may be. As was clear from polemics in Russian newspapers
before the Sept. 24 announcement, Putin's return to the Kremlin is prompted in
part by the preferences of Russia's ruling class top officials and the financial
elite known as the oligarchy. As the leading pro-Medvedev advocate, Igor Yurgens,
acknowledged, "influence groups" favoring Putin "turned out to be stronger." In
their eyes, and probably in Putin's, the ever-tweeting Medvedev was never able to
shed his image as an ineffectual political figure. In effect, Medvedev failed his
four-year audition for a second term.
The Russian elite, including the Putin and Medvedev camps, seems to understand
that the country's economy urgently requires diversification away from its heavy
dependence on oil and gas exports. The state must find other sources of revenue
for its growing budget. As Putin warned recently, such reforms will require
"bitter medicine," including higher taxes on the business class, which has
prospered grandly under a 13 percent flat tax while many Russians have fallen
into poverty. The governing class, eyeing its own interests, wants the tougher
and popular Putin to preside over these changes.
It may turn out, as some U.S. commentators have asserted, that Putin's return is
"bad news for the Russian people." But opinion polls show that, after more than a
decade of Putin's leadership, a majority of Russians still do not associate him
with the country's "bad news." The reason is clear to anyone who has followed
Russia since the end of the Soviet Union: It was Putin who restored pensions,
lifted wages and elevated living standards after the traumatic 1990s, when Boris
Yeltsin's policies impoverished the country.
And what about President Obama's highly touted "reset"? The Russian expert at the
Center for American Progress asserts that "Putin's return next year will reverse
all of these positive trends" and "is no good for the United States." This may be
so in the limited sense that the Obama administration unwisely based its reset
primarily on Medvedev while directing gratuitous insults at Putin, such as when
Vice President Biden told groups of Russians during his visit to Moscow this year
that Putin should not return to the presidency. But the larger assumption that
Putin's return will mean a further diminishing of Russia's democratic prospects
is based on the false premise that Yeltsin, like Medvedev today, was a liberal
But it was the U.S.-backed Yeltsin who used tanks in 1993 to destroy an elected
parliament, thereby reversing the democratization of Russia that began under
Mikhail Gorbachev, a reversal accelerated under Putin. And while Medvedev has
spoken often in the idioms of Western-style liberalism, it was Medvedev who took
personal credit for using military force against Georgia in 2008 and then
increasing military spending so sharply that his widely admired finance minister,
Alexei Kudrin, resigned last month. Moreover, if Putin is determined to pursue
retrograde policies, why would he promise to appoint the "more liberal" Medvedev
as prime minister an office Putin empowered during the past four years?
Indeed, given the real alternatives, and not those that Americans might prefer,
why the assumption that Putin's return to the Kremlin will be bad for Western
interests? For example, the New York Times reported Sept. 28 that Western bankers
and corporations welcomed the announcement as "a net positive for foreign
investors." It's also noteworthy that from 2000 to 2008, when Putin was
president, he made more important concessions to Washington than Medvedev has
during the past four years giving the Bush administration critical support in
Afghanistan after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks; bowing to a new round of NATO
expansion; swallowing the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;
and agreeing to an expansion of Russian supply routes for U.S. troops in
Those days of a yielding Putin, however, may be behind us. He said as early as
2002 that "the era of Russian geopolitical concessions [is] coming to an end."
What's clear is that Putin's future cooperation with Washington will depend on
his understanding of Russia's national interests and equally on Washington's
cooperation with Moscow, which, despite Obama's heralded "reset," has not yet
involved any tangible American concessions.
[return to Contents]
October 5, 2011
Final countdown to Duma race: forecast and analysis
As the runners in December's race for the Duma have now all been confirmed, RT
talked to the deputy head of United Russia elections committee, Dmitry Polikanov,
about Russia's election process and the prospects of its participants.
Polikanov stressed that current elections legislation is the best possible option
for Russia. The analyst pointed out that the four parties that are presented in
the State Duma according with Russia's law have best chances to pass through will
represent 85 or 90 per cent of voters, meaning that others will have a chance to
look at the agenda promoted by the leading parties.
"If you compare the programs, you will see that the United Russia and the
Communist Party try to raise the most topical issues for the voters. Much depends
on the solutions, but as for the issues, they are basically the same," Polikanov
He also stressed it is not that hard now for a new party to get into competition.
"The 150,000 signatures you need to get in are not much if you compare this to
over 100 million voters in Russia," Polikanov told RT. "Parties that want to
participate in the competition just need strong regional branches and enough
resources to meet 150,000 people and convince them to sign for their party. This
is not a great challenge or a huge task to perform if you are really a party."
Speaking on possible changes in the elections legislation, Polikanov underlined
that political reforms should be a step-by-step process.
"We have already made significant changes in the elections legislation," he said.
"We have diminished the obligatory number of members in the political party. We
have changed the legislation so that parties that get more than five per cent but
less than seven per cent could get one or two seats in the State Duma, and so on.
Probably in the next electoral cycle in 2016 we could come to the point when this
idea will be successful, so we could move to a five-per-cent threshold. But first
we should test the innovations."
When asked out the prospects of opposition parties, Polikanov stated that their
chances are rather slight. The Fair Russia party, he said, was compromised by the
behavior of its leader, Sergey Mironov, who earlier lost his position as a head
of the Federation Council.
"Fair Russia is now in ruins," Polikanov told RT. "They have lost their
popularity, which was very tiny anyway. It will be very difficult for them to get
it back. They claim to be a kind of real and radical opposition, but people know
very well that they do not have these kinds of qualities. So far, their attempt
to make a socialist agenda alliance with the Communists has failed. It will be
hard for them to get a significant number of votes."
The Liberal Democrat Party, Polikanov said, is likely to keep its position in the
"The Liberal Democrats can do well, simply because they always make some very
harsh slogans," he said. "Fortunately for Russia in general, they are not trying
to play the nationalist card. They try to kick into the political agenda by
issuing some mild nationalism, and I think that would be wise. The president made
it clear that no party in Russia should exploit the nationalistic agenda. So I
think they will get their regular number of votes slightly over seven per cent."
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
TV sees Russian parliamentary parties playing nationalist card in election
Text of report by privately owned Russian television channel REN TV on 5 October
(Presenter) The word "Russians" has come into fashion on the eve of the election.
Communists and LDPR, among others, have become preoccupied with the ethnic
question. Fellow sympathizers are among their political opponents. What is the
cause of this excitement? Mikhail Bazhenov tried to find out.
(Correspondent) Russian parliamentarians have been struck by a new idea. On the
eve of the election, as many as two parties have started to play the ethnic card.
Liberals (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) are wooing voters with the slogan
"LDPR for Russians", while Communists are setting up a nationalist wing, Russian
Vladimir Volfovich (Zhirinovskiy, LDPR leader) talked about his indigenously
Russian roots as early as the dawn of his political career. The crisp taste of
the ethnic question has stimulated Liberals' appetite for portfolios on more than
one occasion.
(Maksim Rokhmistrov, Russian State Duma deputy, LDPR faction) The LDPR has
existed for 22 years. Throughout the 22 years, in its election campaigns, its
(draft) laws, its statements, it has always put emphasis on the protection of
Russian people on the territory of the Russian Federation.
(Correspondent) Communists are another matter. They crossed out the first part of
the word internationalism at one stroke. Taking up the Russian question is almost
a revolution at party level.
(Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the CPRF faction in the Russian State Duma) With
regard to the Russian question, we adopted a special programme at our congress.
Moreover, we are the only ones who have held a plenary session - listen to this -
on the protection of the Russian culture as the basis of unity of multiethnic
(Correspondent) The parliamentary turn towards the Russian question does not
surprise genuine nationalists. The trend is a rousing, emotional one. It would be
a sin not to join in.
(Aleksandr Belov, head of the National Supervisory Council of the movement
Russians) Even in the ruling party, One Russia, even in Right Cause, there are a
huge number of people who would love to use this subject, but it is a taboo, it
is banned.
(Correspondent) Irina Khakamada describes patriotic rhetoric and nationalism as
the final resting place of scoundrels. It is easy to line people up behind an
idea. It is hard to clear the consequences.
(Irina Khakamada, captioned as a politician) The Russian card and the Russian
world are traditionally played by all the opposition parties. The wave
subsequently subsides but it remains on the bottom, in everyday life. And
everyone has to deal with the consequences.
(Correspondent, over footage of December 2010 riots in Moscow's Manezhnaya
Ploshchad) The Centre for Political Technologies estimates that about 5 per cent
of the voters follow nationalist slogans. Deputies have already seen them.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Unregistered opposition parties unite against One Russia in Duma election
Text of report by privately owned Russian television channel REN TV on 5 October
(Presenter) In the run-up to the Duma election (on 4 December) the opposition is
ready to unite against One Russia (ruling party). The opposition's main means of
communication is the internet. Anti-ruling-party slogans and instructions what to
do to make sure that your vote is not stolen at a polling station have already
appeared there.
Members of the opposition are setting up their own social website - its
provisional name is Democracy-2 (Russian: Demokratiya-2). On this website people
can register and cast votes in their own parliamentary elections. The website is
already functioning but for the time being only as a pilot.
(Garri Kasparov, co-chairman of the Solidarity movement, addressing a news
conference) We should create an impression that it is not that there are few of
us and many of them but - what we have been saying here - that there are many of
us and few of them. But because they have control of the media and, let's face
it, because of the social apathy of the population, they have created an illusion
that one should not stick one's neck out, that there are few of us - just a bunch
of people. We are not a bunch, in actual fact we are the people.
If, with the help of Democracy-2, we resolve this problem, the situation will
start changing very quickly. It is an illusion to think that the internet has no
influence - it has a lot of influence.
(Presenter) The opposition, however, still has not agreed on its tactics.
Proposals include a total boycott of the elections and spoiling voting papers.
(Sergey Udaltsov, leader of the Left Front left-wing opposition movement, told
the same news conference, according to a later REN TV report: "Nothing depends on
us. Two people or one person or some alien forces decide who will be president
and how Russia will develop. Nobody is asking us. At the same time they are
urging that we should take part in some procedures which, for whatever reason,
they call elections."
According to Udaltsov, the membership of the registered parties accounts for less
than 3 per cent of all the people entitled to vote in Russia.)
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 6, 2011
Magnitsky Foe Held On Bribery Charges
By Alexandra Odynova
A police investigator implicated in the prosecution of Hermitage Capital lawyer
Sergei Magnitsky has been charged with extorting a $3 million bribe, officials
said Wednesday.
Nelli Dmitriyeva, a senior investigator with the Interior Ministry's Moscow
branch, is suspected of extorting the bribe while holding an inquiry into
contraband medical equipment, the Investigative Committee said in a statement.
Her arrest was sanctioned by a Moscow court on Wednesday.
Dmitriyeva is one of 60 officials linked to the 2009 death of Magnitsky, 37, who
died in detention after being beaten badly by guards and being refused treatment
for existing health problems. Dozens of the officials have been banned from
entering the United States. It was unclear whether Dmitriyeva is among them.
Dmitriyeva's name topped a list of investigators identified on a search warrant
for a June 4, 2007, raid of Firestone Duncan's office, which employed Magnitsky
and represented Hermitage Capital, a Hermitage spokesman told The Moscow Times.
During the course of the search, the investigators confiscated documents that
were subsequently used to steal a Hermitage subsidiary, he said.
Later, in 2009, Dmitriyeva was part of the team that prosecuted Magnitsky.
Investigators said Wednesday that unidentified middlemen linked to Dmitriyeva
were caught by the Federal Security Service in August while accepting the $3
million bribe. The money actually consisted of 50,000 euros and $1,000, and the
rest was fake banknotes.
Prosecutors protested against her arrest Wednesday.
Dmitriyeva pleaded not guilty during the closed-door court hearing, Interfax
reported. She also offered to testify against "high-ranking officials," but said
she would not accuse her boss, Ivan Glukhov, head of city police's main
investigative directorate, of wrongdoing, the Rapsi news agency reported. She
said her arrest was an attempt to force her to testify against him.
Glukhov is also on the Magnitsky blacklist.
Notably, the investigation against Dmitriyeva was initiated at a high level, by
Investigative Committee deputy chief Vasily Piskaryov, the committee said.
Dmitriyeva faces up to 15 years in jail if convicted of extorting the bribe.
Meanwhile, Dutch lawmakers urged Dutch Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal to ban the
60 Russian officials implicated in the Magnitsky case from entering the
Netherlands in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Dutch Parliament in
[return to Contents]
Moskovsky Komsomolets
October 6, 2011
Senior investigator was caught red-handed
Author: Lina Panchenko, Eva Merkacheva, Yekaterina Petukhova
The Investigative Committee arrested investigator Nelli
Dmitriyeva, functionary from the so called Magnitsky List, for
corruption. An insider said, "Investigating an episode of
smuggling, Dmitriyeva told suspects that she would drop charges
and the investigation for $3 million. She was caught red-handed,
right on the premises of the Main Directorate of Investigations of
the Main Directorate of the Interior Ministry at 45,
Novoslobodskaya Street."
Criminal proceedings against Senior Investigator Dmitriyeva
were instituted by Investigative Committee Assistant Chairman
Vasily Piskarev.
A source within law enforcement agencies explained that the
matter concerned procurement of tomographic scanners for Karelian
The scandal flared up when the Presidential Control
Directorate studied the prices paid for imported medical equipment
and discovered that scanners worth 20 million rubles had been
bought for 50 million rubles. Damage to the budget was estimated
at 3 billion rubles.
Dmitriyeva was investigating the matter. One of the suspected
businessmen was told that certain palms ought to be greased and
that charges would be dropped for $3 million. The businessman
contacted the Federal Security Service. The money changed hands
under secret services' control. Dmitriyeva was arrested. The
investigator called herself innocent. She refused to testify and
would not accept services of a lawyer.
Sources within the Interior Ministry meanwhile deny
Dmitriyeva's involvement in the notorious Magnitsky scandal. A
source said, "Matter of fact, Dmitriyeva was just a member of a
team put together to search the offices of some companies where
the investigation hoped to find documents proving tax evasion on
the part of the Hermitage Foundation."
As a matter of fact, Dmitriyeva was put in 2009 on the team
of investigators handling the charges pressed against Magnitsky
Magnitsky's colleague said, "It is known that Magnitsky
proposed her disqualification at once. He stated that Dmitriyeva
could not participate because of a conflict of interests... The
Investigative Committee of the Interior Ministry paid no attention
to his complaint."
[return to Contents]
Russians Unsure Whether Security Services Organized High Profile Murders - Poll
Moscow, 5 October: The views of Russians on the possible involvement of the
security services in the killings of former FSB (Federal Security Service)
officer Aleksandr Litvinenko and Novaya Gazeta commentator Anna Politkovskaya are
According to the findings of an opinion poll carried out in late September in 45
regions around Russia by sociologists from the Levada Centre, 31 per cent and 28
per cent of Russians believe the security services were involved in the deaths of
Litvinenko and Politkovskaya respectively (20 per and 23 per cent respectively do
not believe this). At the same time, one in two of those asked struggled to
express an opinion on this issue (49 per cent in both cases).
Meanwhile, as the sociologists told Interfax on Wednesday (5 October), the
majority of our compatriots doubt that the people who ordered this high-profile
murders will be found and brought to court (59 per cent and 57 per cent), and
only one in 10 is counting on this happening.
(Passage omitted: background to murders of Litvinenko and Politkovskaya)
(BBCM note: The fifth anniversary of Politkovskaya's death will be on 7 October.
The fifth anniversary of Litvinenko's death will be on 23 November.)
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Putin: Russia strong enough to face market shocks
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV
October 6, 2011
MOSCOW (AP) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Thursday courted investors jittery
about Russian stocks amid turmoil in global finances, saying that his country is
strong enough to withstand market shocks.
Putin, who is set to easily regain the presidency in elections in March, told an
investment forum that his government will work to reduce the state role in the
economy and encourage foreign investment to help industrial modernization.
He argued that hard currency reserves exceeding $500 billion and a low level of
debt will help Russia cope with the impact of the eurozone debt crisis.
"Russia is certainly better prepared than it was in 2008," Putin said. "A strict
budget discipline, an increase in the efficiency of spending, and limits on
increase of state debt have been and will remain our priorities."
He said Russia expects 4.1 percent economic growth this year and that the annual
inflation will be down to 7 percent this year, its lowest level since the 1991
Soviet collapse.
Putin also sought to assuage the audience over the recent dismissal of Russian
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, whose fiscal hawkishness made him a darling of
investors, saying that Kudrin is his personal friend and will remain part of his
Kudrin lost his job after telling reporters that he wouldn't work in the Cabinet
once, as expected, President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin swap places after the
March elections. Putin praised Kudrin as a strong professional, but wouldn't
comment on Medvedev's move to sack him.
Putin also defended an increase in Russia's military spending opposed by Kudrin,
saying that the nation must replace its aging Soviet-era weapons approaching the
end of their service lifetime. He argued that the military modernization will
have a spinoff effect, helping modernize the nation's industrial technologies.
Putin's talk at the forum was his first major speech to investors since he
announced his intention last month to reclaim the presidency. He served as
president in 2000-2008 before shifting into the premier's job due to a term
limit. He has remained the nation's No. 1 leader, and his protege Medvedev
proposed that Putin run for president.
Putin turns 59 Friday. He is eligible to serve another 12 years, benefiting from
the extension of the presidential term from four to six years. If he does it,
that will have made him the nation's longest-serving leader since Soviet dictator
Josef Stalin.
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Prolonged Stagnation in Developed Countries May Impact Russia - Nabiullina
MOSCOW. Oct 5 (Interfax) - The Russian economy is "sensitive" to prolonged
stagnation in developed countries, Russian Economic Development Minister Elvira
Nabiullina said during government hour at the State Duma on Wednesday.
"Global risks have increased sharply, risks linked to the deterioration of the
global economy and deeper capital outflows. Europe's debt problems could shake
the global financial system and restrict growth potential all around the world,"
she said.
"The likelihood of another recession in developed countries has strongly
increased," the minister said.
"But if there is a second wave of crisis, the crisis will not be as deep as it
was in 2008-2009," she added.
Developed countries will have to make serious budget savings and for the long
term, the minister said. "For the Russian economy this means raw materials
exports to European markets will have a reduced impact as a source of growth,"
she said.
"The 2008-2009 crisis, as with the current upheaval on global financial markets,
showed that Russia is subject to significant risks," she said.
"The new wave of international crisis, if it comes, or prolonged stagnation in
developed countries, in our opinion will probably have quite an impact on us,"
Nabiullina said.
However, if we compare Russia with most developed economies and its CIS
neighbours "then our position is not so bad. We have relatively low debt - the
government, businesses and the population. In the post-crisis period, banks
considerably improved their foreign currency positions and the quality of their
assets. Gold and foreign currency reserves remain high and there is a good
current account surplus. In contrast to the pre-crisis period, the stock market
is not overheated," the minister said.
We are observing a capital outflow, which reached around $50 billion over nine
months, she said. "There has been a serious increase in the capital outflow in
the last few months due to the situation on international financial markets."
The anti-crisis measures adopted by the government have increased state spending
and "now we do not have the pre-crisis (budget) surplus that we had in 2006-2007.
But overall our budget position is not bad," she said.
"If in the short-term the Russian economy is well enough prepared for possible
disturbances in the global economy as well as the situation in the corporate
sector and the budget, which will probably be deficit-free this year and is
forecast to have low deficits in the next three years, then prolonged stagnation
(in developed countries) will be difficult to survive just with savings. Domestic
sources of growth - consumer demand and investment - are needed to withstand
prolonged stagnation in the world economy," Nabiullina said.
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State's task is to offer shoulder to business - Putin
MOSCOW, October 6 (Itar-Tass) The state must not substitute for business in the
economy, while the space for a private initiative must be consistently expanded,
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said at the Russia Calling investment
"We believe that the mission of the state is to offer a shoulder to entrepreneurs
there where it is necessary and remove those barriers that impede them," the
prime minister stressed.
"It is obvious that in order to make investments in our country prestigious and
advantageous, it is necessary to minimize risks, both economic and
administrative," the prime minister stressed. "And the predictability of the
political course is no less important than macroeconomic stability," Putin added.
According to the prime minister, "reasons for making control checks have been
reduced, the procedure of attracting foreign specialists for work in Russia has
been liberalized, and we are updating technical regulations within the framework
of the Customs Union".
"All bills involving the interests of business will be discussed with
entrepreneurs and with their leading associations," the prime minister stressed.
He also reminded the audience that "starting from this autumn, business also gets
an opportunity to influence not only projects but also the correction of bylaws
in force if they impede entrepreneurs' activity in this or that way".
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Putin says to continue work with former finance minister despite 'outburst'
MOSCOW, October 6 (RIA Novosti)-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said he
will continue to work with former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin.
Kudrin resigned last week following a public row with President Dmitry Medvedev,
who is set to swap roles with Putin next year.
"I have talked with Alexei Leonidovich about this," Putin told an investment
forum in Moscow on Thursday.
"Despite this emotional outburst, Alexei Leonidovich will remain part of our
team," Putin said. "He is a useful man for us."
"I'd like to tell you that this is both my opinion and the opinion of President
In a resignation statement, Kudrin criticized the government's budget policy and
accused it of taking risks despite his objections.
The liberal official, largely credited with helping Russia weather the global
financial crisis, earlier said he would not sit in a cabinet headed by Medvedev.
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Moscow Times
October 6, 2011
$49.3Bln Capital Flight So Far This Year
By Howard Amos
Capital outflow from Russia has reached about $49.3 billion so far in 2011, with
an estimated $18.7 billion leaving in the third quarter, the Central Bank said.
Third-quarter outflows were more than double outflows in the second quarter,
which were revised to $9.2 billion, a Central Bank statement released late
Tuesday showed.
The flood of capital leaving the country appears to have swelled in recent
months. Sergei Ignatyev, chairman of the Central Bank, said Wednesday that $13
billion or 70 percent of the third-quarter outflow had left the country in
September, Bloomberg reported.
A loss of $49.3 billion or about 4 percent of gross domestic product since
January means that by the end of the year Russia is likely to record its largest
annual capital outflow figures since 2008, when the world was in the throes of a
global economic crisis.
The 2011 total has already exceeded that of 2010, when $35.3 billion left the
country. Central Bank numbers show that $56.1 billion left in 2009 and $133.7
billion in 2008. The last time a capital inflow was recorded was in 2007, when
$81.7 billion entered Russia.
The gloomy third-quarter figures have defied official predictions and optimistic
statements by government ministers.
The Central Bank's most recent forecast for total capital outflow this year was
$36 billion. The Economic Development Ministry initially predicted that there
would be no capital flight from Russia in 2011 but Deputy Economic Development
Minister Andrei Klepach said in August that outflows were likely to reach up to
$40 billion.
Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum
in June that net capital outflow could be less than the Central Bank forecast.
Capital flight was caused, he said, by "the high oil price and the impossibility
of investing this revenue on the domestic market."
But the recent hike in outflows had little to do with domestic political
developments, or the business climate, and was much more likely to have been
precipitated by stock market declines, weakness in the ruble and increasing
difficulties in accessing European debt markets, said Vladimir Tikhonov, chief
economist at Otkritie Capital.
The ruble dropped to its weakest close against the dollar for more than two years
Wednesday, and Russian markets tracked the downward plunges of global stocks in
August and September.
Logged by the Central Bank, capital flows measure the cross-border movement of
cash. As well as direct investment, this includes debt. If companies have
difficulty rolling over debt, then it can lead to sharp reductions in capital
The most recent figures were reminiscent of those during the 2008 crisis,
Tikhonov said. "I wouldn't rule out that we could get $20 billion to $30 billion
of capital outflows in the fourth quarter, if the current global situation
continues," he said.
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Russia Profile
October 6, 2011
Crumbling Confidence
A New Survey Highlights Growing Distrust Among Russians Toward Banks and Other
Financial Institutions
By Tai Adelaja
Russians have never liked their banks, but with stock markets roiling, the ruble
tumbling and the economy hemorrhaging billions of dollars in capital flight,
their dislike for banks is turning into a permanent distrust. Public confidence
in the credibility of Russian credit institutions is at its "lowest ebb" since
2008, according to a new survey by Romir, a market research firm. Many more
Russians are voting with their wallets by moving their life savings elsewhere,
said the survey, which was published on Wednesday.
The latest survey was Romir's attempt to gauge the reputational risk posed to the
largest Russian banks by a new bout of jitters in the global financial markets.
But the researchers also tried to show how Russian bank customers are bracing
themselves for a likely second recession and its attendant liquidity crunch. The
researchers found that, with the exception of Russia's largest lender, Sberbank,
and the state-owned VTB Group, trust in most other banks has fallen to its lowest
point since 2008. "This is perhaps because, despite an upswing in optimism and
consumer confidence, people felt when the crisis ended in 2010 domestic banks had
failed to meet people's expectations," the researchers said in the report.
According to the survey, five Russian banks Sberbank, VTB Group, Alfa Bank,
Russky Standard and Gazprombank continue to enjoy the highest brand-name
recognition. However, all five are not equally trusted. Sberbank garnered 87.7
points out of a possible 100 points in confidence-ranking, while VTB 24 and
Alfa-Bank received 73.5 and 67.6 points to place second and third, respectively.
Also counted among the trusted top five are Gazprombank, with 66.1 points, and
Rosbank, with 63.9 points.
Falling confidence coupled with lower levels of trust in banks make Russian
customers more likely to withdraw ruble-denominated deposits, said the report.
The gradual depreciation of the national currency does not help matters, either.
Household savings and bank deposits dropped 1.9 percent, or 242.7 billion rubles
($7.4 billion), in the past month, according to the State Statistics Service.
Over the same period, Russians spent 145 billion rubles ($4.4 billion) to buy
dollars or Euros a 5.1 percent increase and the highest since the summer of
2009, Rosstat said.
More Russians have started to transfer their savings from ruble-denominated
accounts into foreign currency accounts to hedge their exposure to a possible
liquidity crisis, the report added. Over the previous month, depositors moved
91.8 billion rubles, or 4.9 percent, of their savings from ruble to dollar or
euro accounts, according to Rosstat. While ruble deposits increased by 10.3
billon, or 0.1 percent, over the same period, it was hardly enough to offset the
negative effects of the mass withdrawal.
So far, the Central Bank has spent billions of dollars to prop up the ruble,
which has lost more than 10 percent of its value since January 2011. "The ruble
is mainly being driven by the global risk-avoidance sentiment that has cut
support for currencies in most developing economies," Chris Weafer, chief
strategist at investment bank Troika Dialog, said in a note to investors
Wednesday. "But, domestically, news of an acceleration of capital flight plus the
growing possibility that the Central Bank may cut its refinance rate by year-end
are also undermining the currency."
The net capital outflow from Russia in 2011 could be higher than earlier
predicted, Deputy Economic Development Minister Andrei Klepach said on Tuesday.
Capital outflow could reach $50 billion or more, significantly higher than the
$36 billion forecast by the Central Bank, Klepach was cited by RIA Novosti as
saying. People's behavior has been impacting capital outflow through significant
increase in the volume of foreign currency deposit, Klepach said. He stated that
Russian banks tend to place their foreign currency deposits in banks abroad,
thereby statistically increasing the volume of capital outflow from the country.
Capital outflow from Russia has reached about $49.3 billion so far in 2011, with
an estimated $18.7 billion leaving in the third quarter, the Central Bank said.
Klepach said he expects capital outflow to abate by the year's end or in early
2012. The ruble, too, may strengthen to around 30 rubles to the dollar this year
or early next year on the back of "the country's sufficiently strong balance of
payments," Klepach said.
"What is happening now is a repeat of the events of July to September 2009," said
Igor Polyakov, an analyst at the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term
Forecasting. "Back then, people were buying foreign currencies at an average of
140 billion rubles a month. About 110 billion rubles was moved from ruble to
foreign currency accounts or invested in commodities." But the disturbing trend,
Polyakov said, is that Russian middle class are taking out their deposits and
spending heavily on goods and services. The share of income spent on the purchase
of goods and services grew to 78.9 percent in August compared to 74.7 percent in
the same period last year.
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Moscow News
October 5, 2011
Business lobby calls for twice as many migrants
By Nathan Toohey
Opora, the small business association, has called on Russia to double its migrant
intake to help boost the economy and the Federal Migration Service agrees that
the nation needs more too.
This was the conclusion of a round table conference "Does Russia need migrants?"
held Tuesday at RIA Novosti.
Business needs migrants
Yevgeny Yakubovsky, member of the board of directors at Opora, said that staffing
problems had become a major issue for business.
"Problems relating to staffing shortages were mentioned by 90 percent of those
surveyed by Opora," Yakubovsky said at the conference. He added that given the
current demographic situation the country needed twice its current number of
migrant workers.
"Immigration is simply essential for the development of our country's
entrepreneurial business and the economy on the whole. To fulfill our declared
strategic development plans the country can not avoid doubling the number of
working migrants it recruits."
Fight for migrants
Yekaterina Yegorova, deputy head of the Federal Migration Service, agreed with
"In those countries where there is a falling demographic the economy dictates the
need to not simply attract, but fight for migrants," said Yegorova.
Yegorova said that 1.3 million of the more than 9 million foreigners who had
arrived in the country in the first eight months of the year were working here
legally and that only 150,000 were staying illegally.
Yakubovsky said one of the main obstacles to legally attracting more workers was
the government's work-permit quota system.
"The size of the officially confirmed quota is 10 times less than what is needed
and that is why employers often hire illegal immigrants," said Yakubovsky.
Fyodor Prokopov, vice president of the Russian Industrialist Union, said the
quota system had widespread damaging effects upon the nation's economy. "The
quota institution doesn't work to protect the labor market, but to create a
ridiculous situation," said Prokopov.
He cited an example of an enterprise that was forced to close due to being denied
the right to hire foreigners, which lead to Russian citizens being laid off as
No stealing jobs
FMS' Yegorova said that the idea that foreign laborers where stealing locals'
jobs was incorrect. "It is not a [legitimate] argument that we have 7 million
unemployed people and [migrants] are filling the vacant employment places," said
She cited figures showing that 30 percent of unemployed people had been looking
for work for over a year. "That shows that either these people are not being
offered high-quality retraining programs or there are other reasons. The foreign
labor force is not competing with the Russian [labor force]."
Increased tensions
Russia has been facing increased racial tensions in recent years as large numbers
of migrant workers from neighboring CIS countries have arrived looking for work.
The issue came to a head in December last year when a race riot broke out on
Manezh Square after a football fan was shot and killed in a brawl with men from
the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus.
Olga Chudinovskikh, head of the population problems laboratory at the economics
faculty at Moscow State University, said it was a myth that migrants increase
crime rates, however. "This is not just harmless rhetoric," said Chudinovskikh.
"Among migrants, crime rates are two times lower than among our own citizens."
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Huffington Post
October 5, 2011
The Russian Business Enigma
By John Sullivan, Executive Director, Center for International Private Enterprise
Winston Churchill famously summarized his view of Russia as "[A] riddle wrapped
in a mystery inside an enigma." Even for the Russian people, Churchill's view
remains largely true today, particularly in the business sector. Regulations are
convoluted and subject to misinterpretation. Rules do not apply equally.
Corruption remains rife. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that 50 percent of
Russians -- including two-thirds of those under age 35 -- "dream of leaving the
country," according to recent polls by the Levada Center. Such a youth drain
would devastate the country economically.
Yet some reforms and progress are being made, as my colleagues and I learned from
business association leaders during meetings in September at the Russian Chamber
of Commerce and Industry in Moscow. For example, Dina Krylova of OPORA (the Union
of Business Associations of Russia) cited procurement reform as an example where
Churchill's riddle is a little less enigmatic. She noted that, through legal
reforms pushed by OPORA, Russia's small and medium-sized businesses now are able
to play a larger role in government procurement.
According to an OECD report, in 2009, $27 billion out of Russia's total
procurement budget of $133 billion went to small businesses.
In another Moscow conversation, Elena Mironova, vice president of the Perm
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, offered fascinating insight into why Russia is
still struggling to establish property rights -- the bedrock of a market economy.
She explained how the true price of property is often hidden by those wishing to
avoid paying taxes on a transaction. As Elena said, "The difference between the
price in the land register and the price in reality can differ by a thousand
times." Such a lack of transparency has implications not just for Russia's
economy, but for the development of its democracy, as well. After all, when
property's true price is obscured, corruption flourishes and insiders use that
knowledge for advantage. This has a corrosive effect on democracy and Russians'
faith in democratic institutions.
In some regions, business associations are successfully battling to increase
transparency. Take the case of Leonid Perminov, Elena's counterpart at the Kirov
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Leonid's group recently fought to change the
way that government-owned land is leased to kiosks. Because of reforms in the
leasing process that made it equitable and transparent, 900 kiosk owners now have
a degree of stability and certainty about the future that they previously lacked.
Nine hundred kiosks may not sound like a lot, but it is a crucial victory for
businesspeople in the Kirov region.
Despite such progress, issues connected to property rights continue to be a top
priority for all of the chambers and associations that we interviewed. Many of
them cited frequent corporate raiding, where companies are seized through
backroom maneuvering. Others talked about the difficulty getting access to land,
much of which is still owned by local and regional governments.
Weighing all these different factors and sometimes contradictory trends takes us
back to Winston Churchill. As Churchill famously said about the first years of
World War II, "Now this is not the end; it is not even the beginning of the end.
But, it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning." While there remains much room for
improvement, Russia's business associations and chambers of commerce have
developed effective coping strategies for a sometimes chaotic environment.
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Nezavisimaya Gazeta
October 6, 2011
Attacks against Gazprom in Europe are really attacks against Russia
Author: not indicated
EU Commissar Gunther Oettinger (Energy) admitted that
searches of the European offices of Gazprom's subsidiaries had
been caused by suspicions that Gazprom was violating EU antitrust
legislation. To be more exact, the European Commission accused
Gazprom Germania of abuse of its position in the market and price
collusions which it said were interfering with fair competition.
BBC suggested that the searches could be sparked by complaints
from East European countries against steep gas prices and by
rivalry between Russian South Stream and European Nabucco. At
first, Gazprom called it all "routine checks". European Commission
spokeswoman Amelia Torres said, "These were not routine checks.
Antitrust investigations are never initiated unless reasons to do
so are valid."
According to BBC, a full-fledged antitrust investigation
might cost Gazprom billions in terms of fines the way it already
happened to Intel.
As matters stand, import from Russia meets 31% of EU's gas
consumption. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently said that
it was wrong for the European Union to rely on Gazprom so heavily.
There is an undeniable connection between these developments
and the signing of a legally binding South Stream agreement by
shareholders (Gazprom, ENI, EDF, and Wintershall) in Sochi not
long ago. Success of this project will expand Russian niche of the
Old World's gas market and actually elbow out gas suppliers like
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan from Europe. No wonder
Gazprom found itself under attack from several directions at once.
According to Der Spiegel, there is more to the matter than
gas alone. The catch is, it is Gazprom that is supposed to make
Russia a global power again.
Wikileaks once posted minutiae of U.S. Vice President Joe
Biden's conversation with the Czechs on his visit to Prague in
2009. The Czechs admitted being concerned by Moscow's plans to
have its own zones of influence in the world. Biden in return
urged the hosts and their neighbors to prevent Russia from
becoming the sole supplier of gas to Europe. He said he was
surprised that EU countries were not protesting loudly enough
against the state of affairs where a single country could leave
them all without gas. Biden said that Moscow would have learned to
behave differently had Europe found alternative gas suppliers.
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Russian Premier Putin Sets Out Agenda for Eurasian Integration Project
October 4, 2011
Article by Vladimir Putin "specially for Izvestiya": "New Integration Project for
Eurasia -- A Future That Is Being Born Today"
On 1 January 2012 a most important integration project -- the Single Economic
Area of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -- is launched. A project that is,
without exaggeration, a historic landmark, not only for our three countries, but
also for all the states in the post-Soviet area.
The road to this frontier was difficult, and at times, tortuous. It began 20
years ago, when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of
Independent States was formed. To a large extent, the model was found that helped
to preserve the myriads of civilizational and spiritual threads uniting our
peoples. To preserve the production, economic, and other ties without which it is
impossible to imagine our lives.
It is possible to assess the efficacy of the CIS in various ways, and to argue
about its internal problems and unrealized expectations endlessly. But it is
difficult to dispute the fact that the Commonwealth remains an irreplaceable
mechanism enabling positions to be brought closer together and a single point of
view on the key problems facing our region to be elaborated, and that it brings
visible, concrete benefit to all its members.
Moreover, it is precisely the experience of the CIS that has allowed us to launch
integration on multiple levels and at various speeds in the post-Soviet area, and
to create such much-needed formats as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, the
Customs Union, and, finally, the Single Economic Area.
It is characteristic that in the period of the worldwide financial crisis, which
has forced states to seek new resources for economic growth, integrative
processes have received an additional impetus. We have approached objectively the
task of seriously modernizing the principles of our partnership -- both in the
CIS, and in other regional associations. And we have concentrated our attention
above all on the development of trade and production ties.
Essentially, it is a question of transforming integration into a stable and
long-term project that is intelligible and attractive to citizens and to
business, and that does not depend on mood swings in the current political or any
other climate.
I will remark that it is precisely this task that was posed during the formation
of the Eurasian Economic Community in 2000. And in the final analysis, it was
precisely the logic of close, mutually advantageous cooperation and the
understanding of the communality of strategic national interests that led Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to form the Customs Union.
On 1 July 2011, controls over the movement of goods was removed on the internal
borders of our three countries, which completed the formation of a full-fledged,
single customs territory with clear prospects for the realization of the most
ambitious business initiatives. Now we are making the step from the Customs Union
to the Single Economic Area. We are creating a colossal market with more than 165
million consumers, standardized legislation, and the free movement of capital,
services, and labor.
It is fundamentally important that the Single Economic Area will be based on
harmonized actions in the key institutional spheres -- in macroeconomics, the
safeguarding of competition rules, the sphere of technical regulations and
agricultural subsidies, transport, and the tariffs of natural monopolies. And
later, on a single visa and migration policy also, which will allow us to remove
border controls on internal borders. That is to say, to make creative use of the
experience of the Schengen agreements, which were good not only for the Europeans
themselves, but also for all those who go to work, to study, or on vacation in
the EU countries.
I will add that the technical equipment of the 7,000 km Russian-Kazakhstani
border will now not be required. Moreover, qualitatively new conditions are being
created to increase cross-border cooperation.
For citizens, the removal of migrational, border, and other barriers and the
lifting of the so-called "labor quotas" will mean the possibility of choosing
without any restrictions, where to live, where to obtain education, and where to
work. Incidentally, such a freedom never existed in the USSR, with its
institution of residence permits.
In addition, we are significantly increasing the volume of goods for personal
consumption that can be imported duty free, thereby ridding people of the
humiliating checks at customs posts.
Extensive opportunities are also opening up for business. I am speaking of the
new dynamic markets, where unified standards and requirements on goods and
services will operate -- moreover, in the majority of cases, they have been
standardized with the European norms. This is important because we are currently
moving toward contemporary technical regulations, and a harmonized policy will
enable us to avoid technological breakdowns and the banal incompatibility of
products. Moreover, every one of our countries' companies will effectively enjoy
in all member states of the Single Economic Area all the advantages of the home
producer, including access to state orders and contracts.
Naturally, in order to consolidate itself in such an open market, business will
have to work on its efficiency, reduce costs, and invest resources in
modernization. Consumers will only benefit from this.
At the same time, we can also talk of a genuine "competition of jurisdictions"
and of a battle for the entrepreneur. After all, every Russian, Kazakhstani, and
Belarusian businessman receives the right to choose in which of the three
countries to register his firm, where to conduct business, and where to carry out
the customs clearance of goods. This is a major incentive for national
bureaucracies to work on improving market institutions and administrative
procedures and on improving the business and investment climate. In short, to
remove those "bottlenecks" and lacunae that up to now have remained untouched,
and to improve legislation in accordance with the best worldwide and European
In the past, it took the Europeans 40 years to travel the road from the European
Coal and Steel Community to the full-fledged European Union. The formation of the
Customs Union and the Single Economic Area is proceeding far more dynamically,
because it takes into account the experience of the EU and other regional
associations. We can see their strong and weak aspects. And in this lies our
obvious advantage, allowing us to avoid their mistakes and to prevent the
reproduction of various kinds of bureaucratic overkill.
We are also in constant contact with the leading business associations of the
three countries. We are discussing contentious issues and taking account of
constructive criticism. In particular, the discussion at the Customs Union's
Business Forum held in Moscow in July this year was extremely useful.
I will repeat: For us it is very important that the public of our countries and
entrepreneurs should see the integrative project not as bureaucratic games among
the ruling elite, but as an absolutely living organism and a good opportunity to
realize initiatives and to achieve success.
Thus, in the interests of business, the decision has already been adopted to
begin the codification of the legal base of the Customs Union and the Single
Economic Area so that participants in economic life do not have to wade through a
"forest" of numerous paragraphs, articles, and reference norms. They will need
only two basic documents to work -- the Customs Code and the Codified Treaty on
Issues Pertaining to the Customs Union and the Single Economic Area.
From 1 January 2012 the Eurasian Economic Community Court will also begin to
operate in full format. Not only states, but also participants in e conomic life
will be able to appeal to the court on all incidents connected with
discrimination and with the breach of the rules of competition and equal
conditions for conducting business.
The fundamental distinguishing feature of the Customs Union and the Single
Economic Area is the presence of supranational structures. Also fully within
their compass is a basic requirement like the minimization of bureaucratic
procedures and a focus on citizens' real interests.
In our view, the role of the Customs Union Commission, which already now
possesses significant powers, should be increased. As of today, it possesses
around 40 powers, but in the future -- in the framework of the Single Economic
Area -- there will be over 100. They include powers to adopt a number of
decisions on competitive policy, technical regulations, and subsidies. It is
possible to achieve such complex tasks only by creating a full-fledged,
permanently operating structure -- one that is compact, professional, and
efficient. This is why Russia has put forward a proposal to create a Customs
Union Commission Collegium with the participation of representatives of the
"troika" of states, who will work as independent, international functionaries.
The construction of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Area lay the
foundations for the formation, in the long term, of a Eurasian Economic Union.
The gradual expansion of the club of members of the Customs Union and the Single
Economic Area via the full-fledged inclusion of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the
work will proceed at the same time.
We are not stopping at this, and set ourselves an ambitious task: to reach the
next, higher, level of integration -- a Eurasian Union.
How do we see the prospects and outlines of this project?
First, it is not a question of recreating the USSR in one form or another. It
would be naive to attempt to restore or to copy something that now remains in the
past; but close integration on a new axiological, political, and economic basis
is the imperative of the era.
We propose the model of a powerful supranational association capable of becoming
one of the poles of the contemporary world, and, at the same time, of playing the
role of an effective "link" between Europe and a dynamic Asia-Pacific region.
This means, inter alia, that it is necessary to move, on the basis of the Customs
Union and the Single Economic Area, toward the closer coordination of economic
and currency policies, and to create a full-fledged economic union.
The combination of natural resources, capital, and strong human potential will
allow the Eurasian Union to be competitive in the industrial and technological
race and in the competition for investors and the creation of new jobs and
advanced production operations. And along with other key players and regional
structures -- such as the EU, the United States, China, and APEC -- to ensure the
stability of global development.
Second, the Eurasian Union will serve as a sort of center for further integrative
processes. That is to say, it will be formed by means of the gradual merger of
existing structures -- the Customs Union and the Single Economic Area.
Third, it would be a mistake to compare the Eurasian Union and the Commonwealth
of Independent States. Each of these structures has its own place and its own
role in the post-Soviet area. Russia intends, together with its partners, to
actively work on improving the institutions of the Commonwealth and on infusing
it with a practical agenda.
In particular, this means launching specific, intelligible, and attractive
initiatives and joint programs within the CIS. For example, in the sphere of
power engineering, transport, high technologies, and social development. There
are great prospects for humanitarian cooperation in science, culture, and
education and for collaboration in the sphere of the regulation of the labor
markets and the creation of a civilized environment for labor migration. We have
received a mighty inheritance fro m the Soviet Union -- it includes
infrastructure, the existing production specialization, and a common linguistic
and scientific and cultural area. It is in our common interests to use this
resource for development together.
In addition, I am convinced that the economic basis of the Commonwealth should be
maximally liberalized trade regulations. On the initiative of Russia -- in the
framework of its chairmanship of the CIS in 2010 -- the draft of a new Free Trade
Zone Treaty was drawn up, on the basis, incidentally, of the principles of the
World Trade Organization, and aimed at the full-scale removal of various kinds of
barriers. We expect serious progress in the harmonization of positions on the
Treaty during the next session of the Council of CIS Heads of Government, which
will take place very soon -- in October 2011.
Fourth, the Eurasian Union is an open project. We welcome other partners,
especially the Commonwealth countries, who wish to join. At the same time, we do
not intend to rush or to push anyone. This must be a state's sovereign decision,
dictated by its own long-term national interests.
Here, I would like to touch on one, in my view, extremely important topic.
Certain neighbors of ours explain their unwillingness to participate in advanced
integrative projects in the post-Soviet area by claiming that this contradicts
their European choice.
I believe that this is a false dichotomy. We do not intend to fence ourselves off
from anyone or to oppose anyone. The Eurasian Union will be founded on universal
integrative principles as an inalienable part of Greater Europe, united by
integrated values of freedom, democracy, and market laws.
As far back as in 2003, Russia and the EU agreed on the formation of a common
economic area and on the coordination of the rules of economic activity, without
the creation of supranational structures. As an extension of this idea, we have
invited the Europeans to think together about the creation of a harmonious
commonwealth of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok, and about a free trade zone
and even more advanced forms of integration. About the formation of an agreed
policy in the sphere of industry, technologies, power engineering, education, and
science. And finally, about the removal of visa barriers. These proposals have
not been left hanging -- they are being discussed in detail by our European
The Customs Union, and later, the Eurasian Union, will now become a participant
in the dialog with the EU. In this way, membership of the Eurasian Union, apart
from the direct economic benefits, will allow each of its members to integrate
more quickly, and from stronger positions, into Europe.
In addition, an economically logical and well-balanced system of partnership
between the Eurasian Union and the EU is capable of creating the real conditions
for changing the geopolitical and geo-economic configuration of the entire
continent, and would have an undoubted positive global impact.
Today it is obvious that the world crisis that erupted in 2008 bore a structural
character. Even now we are seeing severe relapses of this crisis. The root of the
problems lies in the accumulated global imbalances. At the same time, the process
of elaborating post-crisis models of global development is proceeding with great
difficulty. For example, the Doha round of talks has virtually come to a
standstill, there are objective difficulties within the WTO also, and the very
principle of free trade and the openness of markets is experiencing a serious
In our view, the solution could be the elaboration of common approaches "at the
grassroots level," as the saying goes. At first, within the existing regional
structures -- the EU, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN, and others -- and then, by means of
dialog between them. It is precisely from such integrative "bricks" that a world
economy of a more stable character could be formed.
For example, the two biggest associations on our continent -- the European Union
and the Eurasia n Union now being formed --, basing their collaboration on the
rules of free trade and the compatibility of systems of regulation, are
objectively capable, including through relations with third countries and
regional structures, of extending these principles to the entire area -- from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. To an area that will be harmonious in its economic
nature, but polycentric from the point of view of specific mechanisms and
executive decisions. It will then be logical to begin a constructive dialog on
the principles of collaboration with the states of the Asia-Pacific Region, North
America, and other regions.
In this connection, I will note that the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan has already begun talks on the creation of a free trade zone with the
European Free Trade Association. The topics of liberalizing trade and removing
barriers in the way of economic cooperation will find an important place on the
agenda of the APEC forum that will take place in a year's time in Vladivostok.
Moreover, Russia will promote the common, agreed position of all members of the
Customs Union and the Single Economic Area.
Thus our integration project is reaching a qualitatively new level, is opening up
broad prospects for economic development, and is creating additional competitive
advantages. This pooling of efforts will allow us not just to blend in with the
global economy and system of trade, but also to genuinely participate in the
process of elaborating decisions setting the rules of the game and defining the
contours of the future.
I am convinced that the creation of the Eurasian Union and effective integration
is the path that will allow its members to occupy a worthy place in the complex
world of the 21st century. Only together are our countries capable of joining the
leaders in global growth and civilizational progress, and of achieving success
and prosperity.
[return to Contents]
Putin's 'Eurasia Integration Project' Analyzed, Voter Seen as Likely Target
October 5, 2011
Commentary by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, D.C., USA, under the rubric "The Russian
World": "Eurasian Integration: Vladimir Putin's Version"
Vladimir Putin's article "A New Integration Project for Eurasia -- The Future
That Is Being Born Today," published in Izvestiya on 4 October 2011, was simply
destined to prove to be a focus of attention for experts and journalists. The
reasons for this interest lie on the surface, as they say. The "castling move"
within the "ruling tandem" immediately revived interest in the topic of "Putin's
return." Today one can talk as much as one might want to about the idea that in
itself this topic is an artificial one, since the current prime minister of the
Russian government has never left politics but has remained the key individual in
making administrative decisions . In addition to the "objective reality," there
are numerous perceptions of it that often are much stronger than what is
Let us recall just the reaction that Vladimir Putin's speech at the international
conference on security in Munich in 2007 produced. For many experts in the West,
it became the occasion for alarmist predictions regarding a second "cold war".
Eduard Lucas even wrote a weighty book regarding this. For Russian political
scientists and journalists, the speech of four years ago marked the "end of the
retreat" and Russia's claim to its special place in international relations. Once
again theories of "multipolarity" and a "multi-vector approach" proved to be in
demand. But in reality the speech that so agitated many minds textually was very
strongly reminiscent of Boris Yeltsin's statement at the Istanbul OSCE Summit
Meeting in 1999. With the only difference being that the criticism by the first
president at that time was directed against the attempts of the United States and
the European Union to use "double standards" in evaluating their actions in
Kosovo and Russian policy in Chechnya.
I think that Putin's Izvestiya text can expect a similar fate. Some people will
see in it a desire to revive the Soviet Union, since for many veterans of the
"ideological front" in the West, contemporary Russia is the continuer of the
cause of the USSR and the Russian Empire (at the same time, the fact that the
Soviet Union rejected the imperial "great-grandparent" and was ideologically
based on altogether different objectives and values is ignored). Some people will
consider the main Russian politician an adherent of "Eurasian values." But in
Russia. It is not out of the question that we will once again hear the theory of
the birth of a new gravitational field in geopolitics where Moscow will have a
decisive role. The text written by a major state figure probably cannot even be
interpreted only from the point of view of source studies. Those are the laws of
the genre since the author of the article, with a high degree of probability, is
the new president of the Russian Federation. But all the same a meaningful
analysis of the Putin text is no less important than affixing political labels.
Simply because it gives a picture of the system of coordinates that the Russian
government is trying to use. Let us try to examine the basic points of the
"integration article."
Vladimir Putin starts the story of the project "Unified Economic Space" (which is
supposed to start in the new year) from the period that followed the dissolution
of the USSR. He tries to build a footbridge from the Union state that broke up
across the CIS to the new project. Putin's comments about how the new project is
different from the USSR contain many precise details. "It is naive to try to
restore or copy what is already in the past, but close integration on a new
value, political, and economic basis is a demand of the times," Putin says. But
any reader of his text (even a politician or an expert) will find himself under
the impact of his evaluation of the dissolution of the USSR as a "major
geopolitical catastrophe." This conclusion is repeated in the Izvestiya text. The
dissolution of the USSR is called a "collapse." To that let us add the
information priorities of the Russian state television channels, where the Soviet
Union is considered more of a positive phenomenon, while its collapse is
presented as the result of an artificial policy that was in addition under the
impact of an external factor. In that way the reasons for the complicated process
that ripened over the years and in addition to superficial actions had an
objective character are left without proper attention and understanding. In the
meantime, a more careful and, if you will, "objectivist analysis" would make it
possible to understand (not for the sake of academic interest but with a
practical goal) the reasons why the CIS never did become anything bigger than a
"civilized marriage and divorce process" (a term introduced by the first
president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk but later repeated by Putin at one of the
summit meetings of the Organization). The fact that the CIS did not impede
ethno-political conflicts (Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia and Georgia), as
well as the differing thrusts of the foreign policy of its members, was also left
without proper attention. Were they really not noticed at GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova) (later GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova) and once again GUAM)? And in organizing their "separate" contacts
with the European Union, NATO, the Islamic world, and the nonaligned movement?
"The experience of the CIS permitted us to launch multilevel integration at
differing paces in post-Soviet space and to create such in-demand formats as the
Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization,
the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union, and finally, the Unified
Economic Space." I would like to dwell in more detail on this thesis of Vladimir
Vladimirovich. Where are the criteria of effectiveness of and demand for these
integration associations specifically for Russian policy? The CSTO did not
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in September 2008, as
Moscow wanted it to. Nor did Russia's closest ally -- Belarus, which formally is
a member of the same Union State with the Russian Federation. But can the entire
problem area of Russian policy in Eurasia be limited just to the Abkhazian and
South Ossetian problem? Not by any means! The CSTO, which many experts in a rush
of publicist emotion called a "post-Soviet NATO," really remained an organization
with a very strong regional slant -- Central Asian. And it cannot be declared
adequate as an instrument for resolving, for example, the Caucasus problems. And
in fact in Central Asia too, Moscow, not finding the keys to Tashkent (and they
were never in fact found for 20 years), cannot in a full-fledged way even bring
into play an effective regional system of security.
In that way, the following hypothesis about building up the integration potential
that already exists and converting it into a "project understandable and
appealing to citizens and business and stable and long-term, one that does not
depend on dips of current political or any other conditions" does not seem
altogether well-thought-out. Where does the certainty come from that not too
effective projects will provide brilliant results in the new year of 2012? "It is
fundamentally important that the YeEP (Unified Economic Space) will be based on
coordinated actions in key institutional areas -- in macroeconomics, in ensuring
the rules of competition, and in the spheres of technical regulations and
agricultural subsidies, transport, and tariffs of the natural monopolies. And
after that -- in a uniform visa and migration policy that will make it possible
to remove border control at internal borders. In other words, to creatively apply
the experience of the Schoengren Agreements, which became a blessing not only for
the Europeans themselves but also for ever yone who comes to work, study, or
vacation in the European Union countries. I will add that the technical equipping
of the 7,000 kilometer Russian-Kazakhstan border will not be required now.
Moreover, qualitatively new conditions for building up cooperation near the
border are being created," Vladimir Putin says.
But certainly no one has eliminated questions of security. How will the situation
develop in Afghanistan? How effective will the interaction between Russia and the
United States in the Central Asian direction prove to be? After all, the answers
to both development of the borders and a common security strategy depend directly
on the answers to those questions. Unfortunately, many theses of the article seem
similar to those approaches that inside the country Moscow is attempting to apply
to the North Caucasus. The same conversations about the economy and development
of business without an understanding of the idea that a significant part of the
problem "centers" are not social-economic but political in nature. A special
topic is the similarity of European and Eurasian integration. It is unlikely that
a project with dominant Russian participation (and even, to be frank, "feeding"
others at the expense of its own budget) can be considered integration in the
complete sense of this word. Loyalty can be acquired through loans (although in
the Belarusian case, and earlier in the Kyrgyz -- it is a relative concept). But
that is a question of tactics rather than long-term integration strategy, when
not only your resources but also others' potential work for the common good.
Integration for the sake of a loan merely devalues the significance of the
integration project itself.
"We are offering a model of a powerful supra-national association capable of
becoming one of the poles of the contemporary world and at the same time able to
play the role of an effective 'link' between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific
Region," the prime minister says. In itself the formulation of such a task is
interesting. And probably it could have been welcomed in every possible way if
not for one nuance. Around which values and which objectives will this "pole"
arise? On this level there was a great deal of clarity with the Soviet Union,
which in the West many experts continue to use to frighten the public. What
special mission is the new project ready to offer in order to attract others
under its banners in the near future (and certainly any project that is directed
to the future must pose such a task)? The role of the "link" seems too technical
and tactical a task that by no means presumes building a new special "pole." That
is also the source of a certain utopian approach in the justification of the next
thesis: "At one time the Europeans needed 40 years to take the path from the
European Coal and Steel Association to the full-fledged European Union. The
establishment of the Customs Union and the YeEP is moving much more dynamically,
since it takes account of the experience of the European Union and other regional
However, in conditions of the election context, this thesis cannot cause
reprimands. Promises are just as inseparable a part of election stylistics as
notes are for a musical composition. Only then the question naturally arises of
the objective of both the integration project and of the concrete text. If the
Russian voter who is being given a kind of "substitute" for the USSR and Soviet
nostalgia is the target of both, that is one thing. If it is a matter of a
serious undertaking, that is something altogether different. But for now upon
reading the Izvestiya article, one gets the impression that the first proposal is
correct. Since in the second case, the text might have contained more reflection,
critical analysis of one's own omissions and mistakes, and a deeper examination
of the "background factors" (the role of the United States and the European
Union, t he events in the Near East, and the instability in post-Soviet space).
Unfortunately, all-conquering optimism not reinforced by concrete things once
again remains the basic methodology of analysis of the top representatives of the
Russian government. But no strategy can be nothing but PR. It needs not only
accounting spreadsheets but also values, which there is a great scarcity of in
Russia (and in post-Soviet space overall).
[return to Contents]
October 6, 2011
Putin's plan for Eurasian Union meets with doubts in CIS countries
By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova
Vladimir Putin's plans for creating a Eurasian Union have met with doubts in
other CIS countries.
In an article published by the daily Izvestia on Monday Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin offered his reasons for the idea of ..a Eurasian Union - "a powerful
supranational union capable of becoming one of the poles of the modern world."
Experts point out that Putin's attempt to become "a collector of Soviet lands,"
which some have already called an attempt to revive the Soviet Union, may
encounter misunderstanding by the leaderships of Russia's neighbors in the CIS.
Potential members of the Eurasian Union will surely respond with discontent to
the guaranteed dominance of Russia. Some experts have called the initiative of
the Russian leader "hasty."
In his article Putin assured that "we are not talking about plans for recreating
the Soviet Union in one form or another."
"We propose a model of a powerful supranational union capable of becoming one of
the poles of the modern world and playing the role of an effective link between
Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region," Putin wrote.
Initially, he unveiled plans for a Eurasian Union last July, at the Business
Forum of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. He expressed the
hope that the declaration of its emergence would be signed as early as 2012, and
this integration project will go operational a year later, in 2013.
Putin sees a future Eurasian Union as the next, higher level of integration,
which is already proceeding within the Customs Union and the Common Economic
Space (CES) among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The CES will be "up and
running" January 1, 2012, and hopefully it will create a huge market with more
than 165 million consumers (the 27 European Union countries are a home for
approximately 500 million people).
"Clearly, the creation of a Eurasian Union will be one of Putin's main priorities
in the next six years, especially given the positive momentum of the unification
process and the large amount of work done, which has been accomplished over the
four years that he has led the government," Putin's press-secretary Dmitry Peskov
told the daily Kommersant.
He explained that "the member-countries of the Eurasian Union countries are to
retain their political sovereignty, but the control of economies should be most
integrated." According to the spokesperson, the closest target model of the
Eurasian Union is the EU. In particular, Moscow would like to create a single
currency of the Eurasian Union with a single emission center.
Russia already has made many different attempts at integration - the CIS, the
Union State with Belarus, the SCO and the EurAsEC. Multispeed integration within
these structures has lasted long enough and by and large it is either close to
implementation of the stated goals, or has run into political obstacles.
For example, Moscow and Minsk have for a second decade been discussing with
relative success the creation of unified bodies of power and transition to a
common currency. During this time they have had four trade wars: two over gas,
one over oil and one over dairy products. For the success of the Eurasian Union
the participation of Ukraine is essential, because that country controls the
transit of Russian gas to Europe. However, Kiev does not want to join even the
Customs Union, preferring to create a free trade zone with the EU.
Kommersant believes that potential members of the Eurasian Union will respond
with resentment to the guaranteed dominance of Russia. While in the EU no single
state holds the commanding position, in a future Eurasian Union the size of
Russia's market and GDP surpasses by far those of any other potential
participants, explain the authors.
Whatever the case, Putin's ideas outlined in the article, according to Peskov,
had not been previously discussed with either Kazakhstan, or Belarus.
Kazakh presidential political adviser Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, is quoted by the
periodical as saying, "Millions of people in Russia and Kazakhstan want
integration. But entry into the Eurasian Union should be natural, and only if
Russia gives up the nostalgia for the Soviet greatness and is ready for equal
cooperation, it will become more attractive to new countries."
"Vladimir Putin's article surprised some Ukrainian analysts," Ukrainian political
scientist Nikolai Mikhalchenko told the news agency REGNUM. "But is there an
objective opportunity for the revival of the empire? Many believe that Russia now
has no such opportunities."
Firstly, he says, Russia now lacks real modernization. Russia has not made a leap
forward to new technologies. "To create a new empire one should take a look at
the real economic process. Therefore, the article is rather an expression of a
wish, than of real opportunities," the politician said, adding that to him the
idea looked "somewhat hasty."
"There is a real process underway these are not just fine words, but real action
- the integration of the former Soviet Union," the agency REGNUM quotes
Belarusian political scientist Nikolai Malishevsky as saying. "Objectively,
Russia is turning into one of the centers of power in a future multipolar world.
It will soon become the pole of an alliance uniting Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
and, at least, part of Ukraine."
Belarusian economist Vladimir Artyugin believes that there is a long way to go
from declarations of intent to its practical realization and this is seen in the
experience of the EU. "Implementing the stated intentions would take at least ten
years, and only if there are mutual agreements and common goals of the Union's
countries," he said.
Putin's offer of the Eurasian Union project is based on the ideas of President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, put forward in 1994, the network agency REX quotes
independent analyst Vitaly Sednev as saying. "Then the post-Soviet elites turned
a deaf ear to Nazarbayev, they were obsessed with the construction of independent
states. And Russia, involved in the war in the Caucasus, cared little about
super-projects. Now there is a different situation. The world crisis is just
pushing our states towards joining forces. Either we shall create a new type of
an effective union, or post-Soviet space will be "pie" to be shared by more
successful and ambitious players," said Sednev.
Putin's Eurasian Union Putin might be built exclusively with Russian money,
writes political analyst Vitaly Portnikov on the Politkom.ru site.
He also believes that Putin's proposal actually repeats the old idea of ..Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was Nazarbayev who at several CIS summits in
the early 90s lobbied for the establishment of an Eurasian union - and invariably
faced with powerful opposition from colleagues. Even though in 1994 the idea was
much more realistic and feasible than in 2011 there had not yet emerged
independent political elites, the oligarchic clans-based economic model had not
been built yet, and there was no alienation among the inhabitants of the former
Soviet republics. There had not yet grown a whole generation of people perceiving
the Soviet Union as something ancient and strange.
However, Nazarbayev's proposal did not envisage one very important circumstance
for the Kremlin - Russia's leading role in a new union, Portnikov said.
"Nobody wants to unite with Russia for free - Belarus will be kept within the
Eurasian project only if it subsidized, Ukraine might consider participating in
it only if it can buy gas at Russia's domestic prices. Kazakhstan will take part
in any undertakings exactly to the degree to which Russia's ambitions will not
affect its interests. Putin's Eurasian Union might be built exclusively with
Russian money - if, of course, such resources are available and somebody wishes
to spend them on such an ambitious project."
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 6, 2011
News Analysis: Kremlin Not Hardening Policy With Syria Veto
By Roland Oliphant
Russia supported new UN sanctions on Iran. It abstained from a vote on a Libya
no-fly zone. And it firmly vetoed a Western-backed condemnation of the Syrian
government's crackdown on protesters.
Moscow's decision to exercise its veto in the UN Security Council on Tuesday
angered Washington and its allies and raised questions about whether the Kremlin
was adopting a tougher foreign policy in the months before a presidential
election expected to be won by hawkish Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
But analysts said Wednesday that Russia's seemingly hardening stance on UN
resolutions targeting its allies who incidentally are also major buyers of
Russian weapons mainly signaled a return to a well-established Kremlin line.
In Moscow, the Foreign Ministry countered criticism over its Syria veto by
announcing that it would host two Syrian opposition delegations this month and
condemning President Bashar Assad's crackdown as "unacceptable."
The ministry also repeated its earlier criticism of Western powers for using
Russia's abstention on the Libya no-fly zone to launch airstrikes that helped
overthrow leader Moammar Gadhafi's government.
"We have warned from the beginning that efforts to turn what happened with the UN
resolution on Libya into a model for action by Western coalitions NATO is
absolutely unacceptable," ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich told
Announcing the upcoming opposition visits, Lukashevich insisted that Russia had
not become an "advocate" for the Assad regime, saying Russia's misgivings about
the European-drafted resolution on Syria had been "repeatedly ignored."
Russia and China both used their Security Council vetoes to block adoption of the
resolution proposed by Britain, France, Germany and Portugal, saying it was "one
sided" and smacked of an "ultimatum."
The European countries replied that they had done everything possible to come up
with a draft acceptable to Russia, including removing all references to
sanctions, ruling out the use of military force and calling instead on "all
sides" to reject violence.
The double veto prompted the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, to deplore
the "cheap ruse by those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than
stand with the Syrian people."
British Foreign Secretary William Hague used a keynote speech at a party
convention Wednesday to accuse Russia and China of "siding with a brutal regime."
The last time Russia and China jointly vetoed a resolution was in July 2008, when
they opposed sanctions against Zimbabwe.
Kremlin spokesman Alexei Pavlov, reached by phone, reiterated concerns voiced by
UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin on Tuesday that the Syria resolution was "based on a
philosophy of confrontation" and failed to urge the country's opposition to
disassociate itself from "extremists" and start negotiations.
Analysts said Russia was following its normal foreign policy line after the
"strange and untypical" decision to abstain from the vote on Libya.
"What Russia did in Libya was an exception," said Fyodor Lukyanov,
editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine. "After they saw how
quickly the no-fly zone turned into full-scale military action, they returned
very firmly to the line of avoiding anything that could lead to unintended
Russia and China both abstained from the March 17 vote on Resolution 1973, which
paved the way for military action against Libya.
Putin quickly accused NATO of using the abstention to launch a "crusade" in
Libya. The remark earned a sharp rebuke from Dmitry Medvedev, who as president is
responsible for foreign policy, and sparked speculation of a rift between the
two. Putin announced late last month that he planned to run for the presidency in
March 2012.
Libya was probably only a "tactical" deviation from a long-held foreign policy
doctrine of opposing any kind of revolution, said Pavel Bayev, an analyst with
the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. "At that point, there was some nervousness
that they would be backing the losing horse if they opposed the uprising against
Gadhafi," he said by telephone.
He said Gadhafi's tenacity might have convinced the Kremlin that the fall of
Assad's regime was not inevitable and convinced it to return to its cast-iron
policy that "all revolution is evil."
"Russia is interested in building a counter-revolutionary alliance with China and
some Middle Eastern monarchies," he said. "And from that point of view, it is
probably more worried about Turkey's position than criticism from Europe or the
United States."
Turkey, which neighbors Syria, announced Wednesday that it would implement
unilateral sanctions despite the veto.
There also were strong self-interested reasons for Russia's reluctance to
countenance regime change in Syria, said Timofei Bordachyov, director of the
Center for Comparative European and International Studies at the Higher School of
"Russia's relationship with Assad's Syria is much closer than its relationship
with Libya under Gadhafi was," he said.
Among other things, Syria hosts Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean
and its only one outside the former Soviet Union at the port of Tartus.
And there are also strong financial links.
Russia's embassy in Damascus reported exports to Syria worth $1.1 billion in 2010
and investment in the country valued at $19.4 billion in 2009. Companies running
operations there include Tatarstan-based oil company Tatneft, which began pumping
Syrian oil in April 2010 through a joint venture with Syria's national oil
company and said in January that it would spend $12.8 million drilling
exploratory wells near the Iraqi border.
Other contracts include gas facility construction company Stroitransgaz, with
projects worth $1.1 billion; Uralmash's Drilling Equipment Holding, which has
been exporting to the country for the past 14 years; and water engineering firm
Sovintervod, which has been linked to Syria since the Soviet era.
Despite Russian rebuttals, Rice was on to something when she brought up arms
According to data from Moscow Defense Brief, Russia has more than $4 billion in
active arms contracts with Syria, including for MiG-29 fighters, Pantsir
surface-to-air missiles, artillery systems and anti-tank weaponry.
State arms exporter Rosoboronexport has complained that it lost $4 billion in
sales to Libya because of the uprising there this year. Russia's approval of a UN
resolution to slap new sanctions on Iran in June 2010 cost it a lucrative
contract to supply the Islamic republic with S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems.
[return to Contents]
Senior Russian MP Says Libya 'Lesson' Behind Syria Resolution Veto
Strasbourg, 5 October: The head of the Russian delegation to PACE (Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe), Konstantin Kosachev, believes that Russia was
absolutely right, just as China, to veto the UN Security Council resolution on
"The vetoing of this document by Russia, as well as China, only means that it
does not properly reflect the current situation in Syria. It is absolutely wrong
to present it as a black-and-white situation in which all responsibility for
recent events lies with official Damascus, while all hopes for the future are
pinned solely on the opposition," Kosachev said in an interview with Interfax.
He said that the international community's intervention in such situations would
only be possible if there was full confidence that it would not harm the people
of Syria. However, the Russian side currently has no such confidence, said
Kosachev, who is the head of the Duma Committee on International Affairs.
He noted that "some of the wording of this document (the draft UN Security
Council resolution - Interfax) allows for dual interpretation, which is
"I would not say that the sad experience of the Libyan resolution has alone
influenced Russia's position on Syria, but I think that this position is dictated
by a profound and accurate understanding of what is really happening in Syria
today," Kosachev said.
He also noted "the sad experience of how the Libyan opposition and, above all,
NATO forces interpreted the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, that is too
"This, too, is a major factor in Russia's current position in relation to
official Damascus," Kosachev said.
He added that "until the UN Security Council passes an appropriate resolution on
Syria, no external action, whether political pressure or military force, is
possible, since it would be in complete contravention of international law".
In Kosachev's opinion, Russia has learnt a serious lesson from the unjustifiably
broad interpretation by NATO forces of the UN Security Council resolution on
"That is a serious lesson for us, and I think that in future we should not be
fully guided by the views of our partners in the UN Security Council. There is
now just one scenario for Damascus - the continuation of urgent consultations in
the UN Security Council because the situation in Syria is, unfortunately,
deteriorating," Kosachev said.
He added that there was no alternative to attempts to reach consensus on this
issue in the UN Security Council.
[return to Contents]
Russia criticizes latest U.S. missile defense deal
By Steve Gutterman
October 6, 2011
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia said on Thursday moves by the United States to create a
NATO-wide missile shield could undermine its security, ramping up criticism of
the project following a new deal that will see U.S. anti-missile warships
deployed on the Spanish coast.
The agreement with Spain "cannot fail to cause concern," the Foreign Ministry
said in a statement. It said the deployment would represent a "significant
increase in U.S. anti-missile capabilities in the European zone."
The criticism clouds prospects for cooperation between the former Cold War
superpowers on the European missile shield.
President Barack Obama's plan calls for an initial deployment of ship-based
anti-ballistic missiles in the Mediterranean followed by ground-based systems in
Romania, Poland and Turkey.
The system, which is expected to become fully operational in 2018, is designed to
protect European NATO states and the United States from missile attack from
countries such as Iran, which is developing longer-range missiles.
Obama pleased the Kremlin by scrapping his predecessor's plan for longer-range
interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic, a
move that helped to improve U.S.-Russia tie
Moscow, however, says Obama's version could undermine Russia's security if it
becomes capable of shooting down Russian nuclear missiles and has warned of a new
arms race if its concerns are not dispelled.
"If events continue to develop this way ... the opportunity to turn missile
defense from an area of confrontation into a subject of cooperation will be
lost," the Foreign Ministry said.
Russia is demanding a legally binding guarantee that the system would not be
aimed against Russia, something the United States is unlikely to provide because
of strong opposition in Washington to any set restrictions on missile defense.
The U.S. ambassador to Russia expressed confidence this week that Russia and NATO
would reach an agreement on missile defense cooperation -- a goal laid out by the
former foes in November 2010 -- in time for an alliance summit next May.
But Russia warned that U.S. deployment plans such as the agreement with Spain
were undermining chances for a deal.
The Foreign Ministry said it saw no sign the United States was prepared to
address its desire for binding guarantees that the NATO system would not be a
threat to Russia.
"On the contrary, we are seeing an ongoing effort to broaden the areas of
deployment of U.S. anti-missile facilities," the Foreign Ministry said in a
[return to Contents]
US Department of State
October 3, 2011
Keynote Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the U.S.-Russia Business Council
Remarks by William J. Burns
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Chicago, Illinois
Thank you for that kind introduction. I'm delighted to be here in Chicago,
Moscow's sister city, and one of the world's leading commercial centers. And I'm
delighted to be speaking again to the USRBC, a group of people with whom I've
greatly enjoyed working in the past, and for whom I have great respect.
Let me acknowledge at the outset my own abiding interest in relations between
Russia and America. During the course of my checkered diplomatic career,
including my most recent posting in Moscow, as U.S. Ambassador from 2005 until
2008, I have seen many ups and downs in our relationship. Along the way, I have
no doubt made my own share of missteps and misjudgments. I have learned that few
things come quickly or easily in our relationship; that interactions between
Russia and America are often an uneasy mix of competition and cooperation; and
that navigating past the mistrust and misapprehensions of the past takes
considerable time and effort, from both of us. But I have also learned to deeply
respect Russians and their history, culture and language; to realize how much we
have to gain by working together on the main challenges of a new century; and to
understand that the opportunities unfolding before us far outweigh our
differences. Rarely has there been a moment when getting relations right between
our two countries, and between our two societies, mattered more than it does
Before I offer a few thoughts on the road ahead, and especially about the
significance of our economic agenda, let me first take a quick look backward.
Where We have Been: The Origins and Results of Reset
By the end of 2008, in the wake of the Russia-Georgia war, relations between the
United States and Russia were as sour as they have been in more than twenty
years. Mutual frustration obscured mutual interest. Americans believed that
Russians were too quick to assume the worst about American motives, and prone to
bully their neighbors. Russians believed that Americans were too quick to lecture
and preach, and prone to double standards. While U.S. and Russian officials
rightly noted that there was no ideological basis for a "new Cold War", we lacked
the diplomatic architecture, the political and economic ballast, and most of all
the basic trust, that might have helped manage differences and preserve
perspective. It was, all in all, an unhappy mix.
We've come a long way since then. When President Obama and President Medvedev
first met in London two and a half years ago, they agreed to make a fresh start,
to "reset" our relations. That effort has brought practical benefits for both of
us, and for the rest of the world.
We signed the New START Treaty. We brought into force a 123 agreement on civilian
nuclear cooperation, and agreed to dispose of enough weapons-grade plutonium for
17,000 nuclear warheads. We reached a military transit accord on Afghanistan that
has so far allowed over 1500 flights across Russian airspace, carrying more than
225,000 U.S. military personnel to the region. Our law enforcement agencies have
stepped up information sharing and conducted joint operations to stop the flow of
narcotics. We have cooperated in unprecedented ways to counter Iran's failure to
meet its international non-proliferation obligations. We worked together at the
United Nations to counter the Qadhafi regime and open up a new era for the people
of Libya.
Instead of a new Cold War, together we achieved a new opening -- one whose gains
have already extended beyond security and global politics to touch the daily
lives of Americans and Russians. Last July, Secretary Clinton and Foreign
Minister Lavrov signed an agreement to build trust and transparency on the
sensitive issue of inter-country adoption. They also approved a reciprocal visa
agreement to make it easier for business people and tourists to travel between
our countries. And through the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission and
its 20 working groups, we have built new partnerships and engaged our citizens,
businesses and non-governmental institutions in areas such as health care and
energy efficiency that would have been hard to imagine in the not-too-distant
In a spirit of mutual respect, we've built a solid foundation for future
cooperation. Mutual respect does not mean, however, that we cannot speak plainly
about our disagreements. We can, and we must, speak plainly about human rights,
and about our conviction, as President Obama said during his visit to Moscow in
July of 2009, that "the arc of history shows that governments which serve their
own people survive and thrive ... governments which serve only their own power do
not." We can, and we must, speak plainly about differences in Russia's
neighborhood, where we will continue to urge that Russia show respect for
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We ought to be able to continue
to build on shared interests while not pulling our punches on differences, and
take steps that benefit both of us without grand bargains or tradeoffs that come
at the expense of others.
Where We Go From Here: Moving Beyond Reset And Strengthening Our Economic Agenda
So where do we go from here? Managing big, complicated Great Power relationships
is a little like riding a bike; if you don't keep pedaling forward, you're likely
to fall over. Our challenge today is to move beyond the reset, to find new ways
to propel and organize our relationship, to widen the arc of our cooperation.
Nowhere is that task more important in 2011 and the years beyond than in
deepening our economic ties. The truth is that this remains one of the most under
developed areas of our relationship, and it's time to consider a more ambitious
After a decade of growth, an emerging generation of Russians aspires not just to
see their country a wealthy nation -- but a nation with a strong and connected
middle class; a nation whose economy can compete in an intensely competitive 21st
century global marketplace; a nation that is not just a great power but a global
innovator. Russians want to take part in and shape the world's knowledge economy.
Today half of Russians over age eighteen are on the Internet. Three million
Russians are blogging. Russians made over thirty-six million trips abroad last
year. More Russians received visas to travel to the United States than ever
before -- twice as many as came just seven years ago.
Russia's realization of these aspirations can have profound importance for
Americans. I don't need to tell you that this is a moment when American foreign
policy needs to be a force for economic renewal at home. In the last year, we
have seen major business deals such as Boeing's sale of 50 aircraft to Aeroflot
as well as last week's agreement to sell 40 planes to Russian airline UTAir; the
recent ExxonMobil-Rosneft joint venture to explore the oil and gas fields of the
Arctic; and two major Russian joint ventures announced by General Electric and
Rostechnologii and Inter-RAO just last month.
And yet this audience knows better than anyone that these deals only hint at the
potential of our economic relationship. Two-way trade flows grew last year, but
still they reached just $31 billion -- less than one percent of our total trade.
Russia is the world's seventh-largest economy, but it is our 37th largest export
market. Today, Russia is the only member of the G20 -- the only one of the
world's twenty-five largest economies, in fact -- that has not joined the World
Trade Organization.
Russian WTO membership would deepen its investment in the success of the global
economy and in the rules of open, free, transparent and fair competition that we
believe create wealth for everyone. It would create exciting opportunities for
the Russian people.
But our interest in Russia's accession is far more direct. The simple fact is
that Russia's accession matters to the U.S. economy. It will create new markets
for American exporters in one of the world's fastest growing markets.
If we want to meet President Obama's goal and double U.S. exports by 2015 -- if
we want to put more Americans back to work -- then WTO membership for Russia must
be a part of our strategy. By one independent estimate, Russia's WTO accession
would allow U.S. exports to Russia to more than double (from $9 billion in 2008
to $19 billion annually).
Here in Illinois, for example, global exports support over 145,000 jobs. Illinois
exports to Russia grew by over 90 percent last year, faster than its exports to
the rest of the world, thanks to companies like Boeing, John Deere, Caterpillar
and Case New Holland. As a WTO member, Russia would be bound to lower its average
tariff rates on agricultural equipment and other goods. That means that companies
like John Deere can sell more tractors at more competitive prices in Russia and
employ more people in Moline -- proving that our foreign policy can create jobs
for the American people.
Nor is it just the John Deeres and Boeings who stand to benefit. A predictable,
rules-based system with recourse to dispute resolution will also help small and
medium-sized businesses that lack the reach and resources to compete in a more
uncertain environment. Respect for WTO rules can unleash a new wave of business
activity in Russia -- not just from American businesses but from businesses
around the world.
For the first time, Russia would be bound to honor the WTO rules that underlie
open, free, transparent and fair global economic competition. Russia would be
required to provide predictable tariff rates and adhere to an enforceable dispute
resolution mechanism.
Of course, I should add that Russia's WTO membership will do U.S. exporters no
good unless Congress also terminates the application of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment and extends permanent normal trading relations to Russia. Otherwise,
Russia's markets will open, but U.S. companies will remain shut out as our
partners benefit. Jackson-Vanik long ago achieved its historic purpose by helping
thousands of Jews emigrate from the Soviet Union. Four decades after
Jackson-Vanik was passed, a vote to grant Russia PNTR is a vote to create jobs in
the here-and-now.
The business community has a vital role to play in making this case. When you
speak to Congress, you bring to the table a unique credibility to speak about the
jobs your companies could create with greater access to Russian markets.
Russia has missed a number of opportunities to achieve accession over the last 18
years, but now is the time, with strong American support, to finally get this
done. While a lifetime of diplomacy has taught me that each country will be the
judge of its own interests, the real benefits for Russia in WTO accession are
unmistakable. World Bank economists have estimated that gains to Russia from
eliminating barriers to the establishment of foreign service firms could reach
3.7 percent of GDP.
To reach its potential, to fully modernize, Russia will have to move beyond its
dependence on hydrocarbons. For the great economies of the 21st century, what
will matter most is not what's in the ground, but what's in the minds of their
citizens. To tap into its remarkable pool of talent, and to attract the critical
mass of investment needed to diversify its economy, Russia must also provide
firms -- both foreign and Russian -- with a level playing field, including better
legal protections and transparent, predictable rules. Russia's ratification of
the OECD anti-bribery convention will be a step in the right direction and we
welcome systemic reforms such as those proposed last spring that would protect
whistleblowers who expose official corruption. These steps would send strong
signals to investors about Russia's commitment to rule of law. Other tools like a
Bilateral Investment Treaty should also be explored. The protections and
reassurance that Bilateral Investment Treaties bring would encourage Russians and
Americans alike to invest in each other's economies.
I'll make just a few final points. This is obviously a moment of intense domestic
preoccupation in both Russia and America, when election-year decisions and
political personalities dominate the headlines. It's easy for both of us to
become totally transfixed by the "who" questions: Who will lead our countries?
Who will be shaping the choices that matter so much to the future of both our
The "who" questions matter. Personalities and leaders matter, enormously, and it
makes little sense to pretend otherwise. But it seems to me that it's at least as
crucial to keep a steady focus on the "what" questions. What is each of our
countries going to do at this profoundly consequential moment? What is America
going to do to create jobs, fix our deficits, rebuild our infrastructure, renew
our educational and health care systems, develop clean energy and ensure our
energy security?
What is Russia going to do to move beyond dependence on hydrocarbons and
diversify its economy? What is Russia going to do to cultivate its remarkable
human strengths, its young tech-savvy entrepreneurs and innovators, who need only
a strong and predictable rule of law to thrive in the global economy? What is
Russia going to do to fight corruption, a cancer in any modern economy which can
only be cured with an independent judicial system and an independent media able
to hold people and governments to account? What is Russia going to do to foster a
healthy and independent media, when the killers of courageous journalists like
Anna Politkovskaya and Paul Klebnikov are not brought to justice? What is Russia
going to do to foster a healthy and independent judicial system, when courageous
lawyers like Sergey Magnitsky die in pre-trial detention without those
responsible being held to account?
These are all hard questions. They are questions that only Russians can decide. I
know that Russians generally contain their enthusiasm for American lectures or
free advice, which we're generally pretty uninhibited about offering. So I'll
simply restate the glaringly obvious: how those questions are answered, by
Russians themselves, will shape whether Russia takes advantage of the historic
window for modernization which is still wide open, but which won't stay open
forever. It remains deeply in the interest of the United States to see a strong
Russia continue to re-emerge, a peaceful, prosperous and modernizing Russia fully
integrated into the global economy, a Russia which respects the rights of its
citizens and realizes their extraordinary potential.
Fifty-four years ago tomorrow, Sputnik, the first-ever manmade satellite, was
launched into space. Sputnik came to symbolize the intense competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union, a competition which summoned the best
energies of citizens in both countries, a competition which produced capacities
to destroy unmatched in human history, as well as unrivalled advances in science
and technology.
Maybe it's time today for a new and very different kind of "Sputnik moment" -- a
moment in which each of us can renew our capacities for innovation, bring out the
best in our peoples, compete in a modern global economy, and work together on the
great common challenges before us. We are on the cusp of such a moment today,
with Russia's WTO accession and so much else so clearly within reach.
It's time, despite all the hard challenges and differences and unsettled
questions before us, to stay focused on the possibilities which lie ahead. It's
time, mindful of the tangible progress we've made together over the past two and
a half years, to kep trg to widen the arc of our cooperation. It's time, for both
of us, to seize the moment.
Thank you.
[return to Contents]
The National Interest
October 4, 2011
Vladimir Putin and the South Caucasus
By Thomas de Waal
Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Russia's neighbors are asking what the heralded return of Vladimir Putin to the
Kremlin means for their own regions. One such region is the South Caucasus.
Caucasian leaders' calculations will certainly change in the wake of the Putin
move. In Armenia, news of his return will have gladdened Robert Kocharian,
another ex-president who has been lurking in the shadows. There are obvious
parallels between the two: both men gave up the position of president in 2008
after serving two terms and handed over power to a trusted successor. Kocharian
is, like Putin, a man of action with a tough, uncompromising personality. And he
may see the return of his former ally as a chance to relaunch his own public
There are important differences, however. Unlike Dmitry Medvedev, current
Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian (whose term expires in early 2013) is the
equal of his predecessor. Indeed, the two men were partners for thirty years;
when they began their political careers in the early 1980s, in the Komsomol
(Young Communist Party organization) of the town of Stepanakert, Sarkisian was
the senior partner and Kocharian was his junior.
More crucially, Putin is genuinely popular in Russiaif the country had an
authentically competitive election and not just a choreographed coronation, he
would probably win it. Kocharian, by contrast, is extremely unpopular with much
of the Armenian public, and he would encounter strong public opposition if he
initiated a comeback. Serzh Sarkisian will know thatand may indeed win some
covert support from opposition figures, who prefer to see him in office over
In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliev will not be cracking open the champagne. He
and Putin got off to a fairly good working relationship, but it deteriorated in
2006 when Aliev refused to cooperate with Putin's plans to deprive Georgia of
cheap gas. Aliev struck up a better relationship with Medvedev, who signed a
grandiose declaration of Azerbaijani-Russian partnership and friendship in Baku
in July 2008, a month before Georgia and Russia went to war.
When it comes to the biggest issue in the South Caucasus, the smoldering
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorny Karabakh, we can expect far less
engagement from Putin than from Medvedev. Putin was reportedly infuriated on the
one occasion he genuinely tried to mediate between the Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents in September 2004 in Astana. The two men kept him waiting, then
quarreled with each other in his presence. Putin does not like being treated that
wayunlike Medvedev, who had the stamina to convene nine meetings between Aliev
and Sarkisian.
In February 2007, at one of Putin's marathon Kremlin press conferences, an
Azerbaijani journalist asked a question about the Karabakh conflict. The answer
reveals all one needs to know about Putin's views on the issue. The Russian
leader began sensibly, telling the Azerbaijani that Russia would not impose a
solution, "You [Armenians and Azerbaijanis] shouldn't shift this problem onto us.
It's you who have to find an acceptable way out of this situation." But Putin
didn't stop there. He went on to muse aloud how drinkable the Soviet-era cheap
alcoholic drink Agdam portvein had been and said the Armenians and Azerbaijanis
should restore the town (now under Armenian control and in ruins) and resume
alcoholic production. He gave the impression that this conflict was a far-away
problem unworthy of much concern and which he associated with a student-era cheap
In Georgia, the reality is stark. Putin and Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili
deeply loathe each other. Putin told French president Nicolas Sarkozy that he
wanted to see his Georgian adversary hung by the testicles. Saakashvili's joke
about the smaller man being "Liliputin" got back to Moscow. They went to war
once, and their animosity should guarantee that Georgian-Russian relations will
go from bad to very bad next year as Putin returns. In the mean time, Georgia is
still, using its veto power to block Russia's World Trade Organization accession
until it gets concessions over monitoring of the borders of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. We can only hope that a deal is done before Putin returns.
None of this is very promising. But any predictions on the Putin comeback are
inevitably incomplete. After all, Putin is a pragmatist who will be dealing with
a different and probably weaker Russiacertainly a Russia in a very different
economic and political circumstance from 2008. Hence, it's possible that Putin
could use his authority to be the Charles de Gaulle of the Caucasus, promising
his small southern neighbors a big strategic reconciliation on the part of
Russia. Possible, but not probable.
[return to Contents]
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