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[OS] 2011-#111-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-10 17:00 GMT
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Date | 2011-06-23 17:19:56 |
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Johnson's Russia List
23 June 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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Your source for news and analysis since 1996n0
In this issue
1. www.russiatoday.com: A third of Russians wish they could shoot dead corrupt
2. Kommersant: NEW REFORMS ANTICIPATED. EXPERTS SAY THAT NEW RADICAL REFORMS IN
3. Vedomosti: The price of democracy.
4. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Medvedev To Speak on Russia's Political Modernization at
Yaroslavl Forum.
5. Moskovskiye Novosti: Frustration of Medvedev's Plans of Last Three Years
Detailed. (Konstantin Gaaze)
6. Wall Street Journal: Geoffrey Smith, Medvedev Puts Russia in a Choice
7. Moscow Times: Opposition Party Denied Duma Run.
8. RBC Daily: "WE ARE NOT LOSERS TO LITIGATE." The Popular Freedom Party is
denied official registration.
9. ITAR-TASS: PARNAS to focus on preparations for presidential polls - leaders.
10. Novye Izvestia: ABOVE BARRIERS. Boris Gryzlov: The barrier will remain
unchanged come December.
11. Moscow Times: Vote Monitors Await Russia's Nod.
12. Profil: SECOND ECHELON. Rating of the most powerful politicians and
functionaries of the second echelon of state power.
13. Interfax: Margelov May Become Head of Russian Upper House -- Kremlin Source.
14. RFE/RL: Brian Whitmore, Managed Pluralism And Its Limits.
15. RIA Novosti: Bruno Sergi, Medvedev-Putin tandem: steps to a fully-grown
electoral democracy in Russia.
16. Moscow News: Navalny calls for probe into Putin's People's Front.
17. Russia Beyond the Headlines: A new kind of opposition. The recent
Anti-Seliger meeting grew out of the political activism of people like Alexei
Navalny and Evgenia Chirikova.
18. Interfax: Russian Interior Ministry Denies Existence Of Activist Data Base.
19. Moscow Times: Chaika Vows Shuffle in Shaky New Tenure.
20. Interfax: Over 40,000 corruption cases opened in 2010 - Chaika.
21. Moscow News: Clampdown fears for Russian internet.
22. Washington Post: In Russia, a new voice for patients.
23. Moscow News: Russian courts will submit to Christ alone.
24. Russia Profile: Expandable Moscow. Medvedev's Initiative May Relieve the
Pressure on Moscow from Overcrowding, but Logistics and Financing Details Still
Loom Large.
25. Izvestia: REDUCTION-IN-FORCE. The Finance Ministry suggests a reduction of
defense and security costs.
26. Interfax: Most Russians believe USSR could have won WWII even without Allies
- poll.
27. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Russia is losing its reputation of a highly-educated
country. European business is frustrated with the shortage of highly-qualified
28. Russia Profile: Privatizing Russia. Economists Signal Approval but Urge
Caution as Russia Prepares for a New Round of Privatization.
29. Reuters: Russia's Putin wants offshore oil spill funds.
30. Business New Europe: Renaissance Capital, Are you a Russia bull?
31. www.agoodtreaty.com: Kevin Rothrock, Should Five Percent Appear Too Small:
Medvedev & Russia's Social Insurance Tax.
32. AFP: EU, Russia in poisonous vegetable row over costly ban.
33. Reuters: Obama wants Russia trade vote before WTO deal: trade official.
34. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: FALSE DATA EXCHANGE. Russia had better start demand
genuine parity and sincerity in data exchange with the United States.
35. Interfax: Russia to export military helicopters to Afghanistan under deal
with U.S.
36. Moskovskiye Novosti: US Pullout Plan Essentially Means Division of
37. The Hill: Samuel Charap, Congress deserves a voice on human rights in Russia.
38. US Department of State: Assistant Secretary Posner's Remarks to the U.S.
Russia Civil Society Working Group.
39. RIA Novosti: Feodor Lykyanov, Twenty years after the Balkan tragedy.
June 23, 2011
A third of Russians wish they could shoot dead corrupt officials
A sociological research study has revealed that over a third of the country's
population wish they could shoot down all bribe-takers and speculators while 70
per cent of Russians admit they are hostile to people of other nationalities.
As many as 34 per cent of Russians "always" feel like killing the corrupt and 38
per cent of the population "sometimes" wish they could do so writes Kommersant,
citing the Russian Academy of Sciences' (RAS) analytical report entitled "20
years of reforms in the eyes of Russians". In Moscow the number of citizens who
are fed up with bribe-takers is even higher: almost two thirds of locals would
gun them down.
Moskovskiye Novosti (Moscow News) website points at yet another dangerous trend
discovered by sociologists. 70 % of Russians and 60 % of non-Russian nationals
admit that they dislike other ethnic groups. To add fuel to the fire, over a
third of ethnic Russians say they would not mind if representatives of other
nationalities were kicked out of their home towns by force. 15 per cent are
certain that Russia should be a state for Russians, while about a third of
respondents believe that Russians should have more rights since they have more
obligations. Surprisingly, 13 per cent of national minorities' representatives
approve the idea of giving preferential treatment to Russians and 9 per cent
agree that Russia is for Russians.
After the dissolution of the USSR, each of the former 15 Soviet republics
followed its own path. While some of them have managed to develop into quite
successful sovereign states, others still face economic difficulties and cannot
provide an acceptable standard of living and high salaries for their population.
Seeking better conditions and jobs, millions of people from former Soviet
republics have been flocking to Russia to the chagrin of locals. Despite the
government's calls for inter-ethnic peace and efforts to convince the population
that inter-ethnic hatred in a country that is home to hundreds of nationalities
is "mortally dangerous", ethnic conflicts still regularly occur.
The level of social aggression has increased rapidly over the last decade,
observed the deputy head of the RAS Institute of Sociology, Natalia Tikhonova.
She noted that such findings came as a surprise to experts. The main point of the
research was to find out how Russians feel about the reforms launched in the
country after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 90s. As it
turned out, the majority of those questioned believe that what is happening in
the country is unfair. They feel shame for the situation in Russia and fear
"abuse and the explosion in crime". This mix, according to Tikhonova, explains
why the citizens have become a lot more intolerant.
"Despite all of its achievements, the country is experiencing the delegitimation
of power," she concluded, Kommersant cites.
Striving to improve the situation, the leadership has been carrying out reforms,
made legislative improvements and taken other steps aimed at making life in the
country better. Dmitry Medvedev made the battle against Russia's gravest sin
corruption one of the pillars of his presidency. Hundreds of corrupt officials
have lost their posts and faced charges for taking bribes. In spring, the
President signed into law an amendment to the Penal Code that increases the fine
for taking bribes by a hundredfold.
Addressing the St Petersburg Economic forum earlier in June, Medvedev pointed out
that among other things, only by tackling corruption could Russia achieve its
major goal the modernization of the economy.
"We hear constantly that corruption is strangling Russia. We need to reply in
kind and put a relentless stranglehold on those guilty of corruption," he said,
adding that the whole of Russian society shares this view. The president admitted
that corruption is difficult to detect and the current criminal prosecution
procedures in these cases are very slow and complex. "We should keep these
procedures in place if only to ensure reliable guarantees in the case of
unfounded accusations, of which there are a fair few, regrettably," he said.
Medvedev stressed that state bodies "need to clean themselves of corrupt
employees faster and more decisively, and to do this we should broaden the
grounds for firing people suspected of corruption from the civil service". He
pointed out though that it is important "to keep legal procedures in place which
give people the right to appeal against such dismissals".
Speaking at the forum, the head of state noted that "we could also look at making
civil servants and state officials bear full material liability to the state
treasury, which in the past always compensated the losses caused to private
individuals by civil servants' unlawful action or inaction". Medvedev stressed
that "we need to squeeze out everyone who holds the law, order, and their honest
colleagues in contempt, and sadly, there are many such people, including in the
law enforcement system".
Yury Chaika, who was re-appointed as Prosecutor General on Wednesday, told
journalists that over 40,000 corruption cases were opened in 2010. Chaika
promised the Federation Council the upper house of the Russian parliament that
he would continue an uncompromising fight against corruption.
"As you know, six prosecutors, including four town prosecutors, were fired in the
Moscow region. Over the past 12 months, we've exposed 38 cases of violations of
service regulations by personnel in the prosecutors office and 96 instances where
office powers were used contrary to the public interest. A majority of these
employees were relieved of their duties," he said, addressing the senators, cited
Itar-Tass. Chaika added that 43 prosecutors were dismissed for corruption.
[return to Contents]
June 23, 2011
Author: Victor Khamrayev
[Sociologists say that most Russians have little if anything to thank the reforms
Experts of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of
Sciences presented a report "20 years of reforms through the eyes
of the Russians". The conclusion drawn in the report is that new
radical reforms in Russia are inevitable regardless of the outcome
of the elections in 2011 and 2012.
Sociologists have been monitoring the moods prevailing in
society practically since the onset of the reforms in 1991. The
report they presented toted up two eras - Yeltsin/Gaidar's reforms
and Putin/Medvedev's reforms. These days, the shape mass mentality
and attitude is in can best be termed as "loss of hopes". The
matter concerns the hopes society first pinned on Yeltsin's free
market reforms and then on Putin's stabilization.
It is the "disparity between reality and the coveted personal
status" that people find the hardest to live down. According to
Institute of Sociology Director Mikhail Gorshkov, this disparity
has been steadily growing these last ten years. A "prestigious
job, career, one's own business venture" gained prominence on most
Russians' scale of values. As matters stand, however, all of that
is available only to a minority. Hence the desire to leave Russia
expressed by nearly every second respondent. Gorshkov said that
this desire is particularly typical of the Russians under 30.
Thirty-five percent of them will be content to go abroad to make
money and come back. Twelve percent, however, "are prepared to
leave Russia for good. And that's twice as many as a decade ago,"
said Gorshkov.
Most Russians heartily dislike "capitalism and democracy"
"for whoever belongs" installed in Russia over the last two
decades. It should be noted that most Russians retained their
dislike of the reforms of the 1990s from the standpoint of all
aspects of life of society save for "development of democracy,
rights, and freedoms". Vladimir Petukhov, the head of the
Institute's Center for Complex Social Studies, said that society
is more magnanimous now in is evaluation of those reforms than it
was 10-15 years ago. On the other hand, the Russians have much
more to seethe over and dislike nowadays, and that means the
reforms of the 2000s. These reforms are mostly associated with
"corruption, deteriorating morale, and collapse of the social
sphere." It is on account of these negative factors that a "new
social demand" is being formed.
People aware of it constitute a minority for the time being
but that will change and change soon, so that the demand for
"better quality of life" will inevitably evolve into a demand for
"new reforms". "It means that a new wave of the reforms is
inevitable regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming
elections," said Petukhov. "In any event, public support for these
reforms will only keep growing." Sociologists say that the
authorities had better make use of it or Russia will slide into a
long period of "step-by-step degradation" with sporadic bursts of
aggressiveness on the part of certain groups within society.
Institute of Sociology Assistant Director Natalia Tikhonova
commented on steep rise of the degree of aggressiveness within
Russian society over the last decade. Asking respondents what they
felt in connection with two decades of the reforms, sociologists
discovered that the Russians felt "deceived" as well as "ashamed
for the shape the country is in" and "afraid of lawlessness and
crime". Tikhonova attributed the rise of aggressiveness in society
to this "volatile brew". Thirty-four percent admitted that they
constantly wished they could execute "all crooks and profiteers"
and 38% said that they experienced this desire every now and then.
In Moscow, the former numbered upwards of 60%. "The so called
successes notwithstanding, delegitimization of the state power in
Russia continues," said Tikhonova.
[return to Contents]
June 23, 2011
The price of democracy
[summarized by RIA Novosti]
Democracy becomes much stronger when a per capita income reaches $10,000, but not
in Russia, Renaissance Capital concluded after surveying 150 countries'
development over the past 60 years.
The evolution of political systems can be compared to Maslow's hierarchy of
needs, from the most basic physiological needs to self-actualization at the top.
Only democracy can ensure self-actualization, Renaissance Capital experts write
in a report.
"We demand political rights only when we have enough to eat, a place to live and
are thinking of buying a car," they write. The hierarchy of democratic needs can
be gauged by the GDP per capita level.
Democracy is fragile when GDP per capita is below $6,000. A higher level makes
democracy more secure, yet the probability of political unrest is high in
non-democracies even when it is above $6,000. Evidence of this is Tunisia, whose
GDP per capita level was $8,300 in 2009, according to the Penn World Table.
Democracy is virtually indestructible in rich countries. There has not been a
change of political system in a democratic country with a GDP per capita above
$10,000, which means that 45 countries, including Eastern Europe, Mexico and
Lebanon, will not slide into non-democracy, say the report's authors. Brazil
($9,352) and Turkey ($9,910) may soon become "indestructible democracies."
China, with a GDP per capita between $6,000 and $10,000, has entered a dangerous
period. High inflation may trigger political unrest there despite plans to double
the per capita income by 2015.
Autocracies become indestructible with a $19,000 level, but this is attainable
only in energy exporting countries that keep taxes low. Their citizens do not
care how the government spends money and hence are less interested in free
Russia has elections but they are not entirely democratic. According to Polity
IV, which examines the qualities of democratic and autocratic political systems,
Russia is an anocracy a mixed-system regime, said Renaissance Capital's chief
strategist Charles Robertson.
With a prosperity level exceeding $14,000, Russia is a rich country with a weak
democracy and a 30% probability of making it more secure. "The 2018 presidential
elections may be more competitive," the report's authors believe.
If Russia reaches the level of $19,000 without strengthening democracy, it may
have to use force to attain this goal, the report says.
Greater prosperity alone cannot strengthen democracy without free elections, a
quality government and innovative business, say MIT economist Daron Acemoglu and
Harvard Professor James Robinson.
GDP growth does not directly depend on the form of government, said New Economic
School rector Sergei Guriyev. There are rich dictatorships and poor democracies
(India), but democratic economies grow faster, he added.
Russia is the richest country stuck between autocracy and democracy, and if it
makes the transition to democracy, there is no reason to believe that it will not
last, Guriyev said. The government may use oil revenues to redistribute profits
in favor of the most protest-prone groups.
[return to Contents]
Medvedev To Speak on Russia's Political Modernization at Yaroslavl Forum
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
June 20, 2011
Report by Aleksandra Samarina: "President To Speak About Politics in Yaroslavl:
Yurgens: 'Medvedev's Ideas Are Sometimes Prophetic'"
Igor Yurgens will offer a new InSoR report at the Yaroslavl forum.
The Yaroslavl international political forum may be a continuation of the recent
economic one in St. Petersburg. As NG (Nezavisimaya Gazeta) was told at the
Institute for Social Development (InSoR), at this event President Dmitriy
Medvedev will more than likely lay out his vision for the country's political
problems. The speech by the head of state, InSoR Director Igor Yurgens thinks,
will comprise the second, political part of his modernization program.
Three roundtables are planned for the forum. One of them will be devoted to the
problems of global security; a second to everything connected with international
governability, the processes of democracy, provisionally speaking. The third
aspect of the work is research into the processes occurring at the intersection
of interethnic and internationality relations and social justice.
Dmitriy Medvedev will be speaking at the international political forum for the
third time. As usual, he will express himself on issues of Russia's democratic
development and on issues of its international positioning. According to Igor
Yurgens, "the extensive and conceptual program for the economy's development that
was heard at the Petersburg forum will logically be continued at the Yaroslavl
one." "I'm expecting some significant formulations from the president with regard
to the development of Russia's political system. Inasmuch as he has always
considered Russia an inalienable part of the global world -- and in its
leadership segment, moreover. It is obvious that Medvedev will talk about how
Russia's developing political model is going to interface with our partners in
the 'big eight,' the 'twenty,' and the world as a whole."
The event in Yaroslavl, Yurgens told NG, will be highly representative "for its
array of very high-ranking specialists invited: former prime ministers, foreign
ministers, and Nobel laureates." "It is clear from the caliber of the heads of
state who have accepted the invitation, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel
and Turkish President Abdullah Gul, that our head of state will make substantive
generalizations at this forum. We know Medvedev's general line; it is not hard to
calculate it on domestic political issues and problems of the development of
democracy from the Petersburg forum materials."
First of all, NG's interlocutor comments, it is a matter of the development of
regional self-governance, the division of responsibilities between the federal
Center and the regions. "We understand that this is taking place two months
before the parliamentary elections, and Medvedev simply cannot help but talk
about this. Therefore we will definitely hear some important statements on the
development of the Russian domestic political model. Obviously, they will be
complemented by the foreign policy segment coming out of here. In this way, the
presidential trilogy will be completed: the economy and domestic and foreign
policy. The creation of the architecture of the presidential program will be
InSoR materials are being used actively in the process of preparing the
presidential speech, Yurgens told NG. "They are unquestionably in demand. Of
course, each person, especially the president, uses more than one source, and the
people around Medvedev are exceptionally smart, advanced, and energetic,
therefore his program is being structured not only on the basis of our documents;
from textual and other comparison I can see that we have made a definite
contribution, fortunately."
Yurgens considers the most important part of the current directives from the head
of state to be Medvedev's statement concerning the fact that what is being built
in Russia is not state capitalism but a different, more open model, where the
free producer is the main author of the scenario of his own life and his own
future. Moreover, it is important, NG's interlocutor comments, "that no one will
ever forget the social obligations to those people who due to certain
circumstances of age or life cannot for now provide for themselves. This is not
even up for discussion."
The InSoR chief considers Medvedev's statements to be the beginning of the
evolutionary opening up of the political system, "which has been excessively
hemmed in." "I want to emphasize that here we have not only a gradual evolution
but an opening up as well. The president began this process in his 10 principles
concerning small parties, in his solution of the problems of the transformation
of local legislative assemblies, and in his attempts to limit the system of
manual governance of the country."
Of course, Yurgens remarks, "some of our experts and liberals want more and right
away." "But Medvedev is a man accountable to the entire country, not only to the
experts and liberals. He is accountable to the people who have established
themselves but also to those who have not, due to objective reasons, through no
fault of their own, but because this kind of thing is going on all over the
world. . . ."
At last year's forum, NG's interlocutor reminds us, the president already talked
about what democracy means for Russians and how it is going to develop. Now
Medvedev, according to Yurgens, "has demonstrated his sharp reaction to the
Internet and opinions arising among the population concerning any initiative, not
only his, but in general the activities of the federal Center -- through the
method of direct, online democracy." Medvedev's ideas, the expert points out, are
sometimes prophetic. "All the events that took place recently in Africa, he
largely predicted them back in September 2010. The president's ideas are being
worked out today, and many politicians support them, and not only Russian ones."
According to Igor Yurgens, at the Yaroslavl forum on 7-8 September, there will be
a presentation of the next InSoR report, which will be a "direct action report."
[return to Contents]
Frustration of Medvedev's Plans of Last Three Years Detailed
Moskovskiye Novosti
June 20, 2011
Commentary by Konstantin Gaaze, free-lance journalist: He Was Careful and He Was
Cautious. Konstantin Gaaze, a free-lance journalist, sympathizes with Dmitriy
Medvedev's difficult fate.
The fate of some political leaders is extremely difficult, if not tragic,
irrespective of their own goals, expectations, or aspirations. Their plans,
promising them greatness and a place in history, collapse under a hailstorm of
external circumstances, which they are simply incapable of escaping. Good
intentions and wonderful ideas turn out to be irrelevant or untimely as soon as
they are voiced, and perfectly reasonable and even sensible programs suffer
immediate failure as a result of catastrophic events completely changing the
projected course of events.
I think Dmitriy Medvedev is one of those leaders. Each time he musters up the
strength to make another political declaration, the circumstances of a force
majeure obliterate his plans within a few weeks. Virtually all of the Russian
president's plans seem to be ruined with this insidious inevitability.
This happened in 2008, for example. After making several disparaging statements
about the impermissibility of state interference in the economy (the famous "stop
creating nightmares for businessmen"), the president had to abandon his plans a
few days later and concentrate completely on the unexpected war with Georgia. And
a month later, the global economic crisis made its way to Russia.
It happened again in 2009. Medvedev's commission for modernization seemed to be
on the brink of seizing the initiative from the cabinet and taking charge of the
Russian economy. It never happened, however. The specter of a wave of social
protests - Pikalevo, Tolyatti, and others - forced a halt to the imminent assault
on the cabinet of ministers and a return to the customary bureaucratic routine.
In 2010 the president's plans were ruined again by the drought and the fires and
then by Luzhkov's demarche.
Last Friday Medvedev used his favorite platform - the St. Petersburg Economic
Forum - to make a new set of political declarations. Judging by the intensity of
his delivery and the specific rhetorical phrasing ("state capitalism is not my
choice"), it seemed that the president's speech was the last stop on the road to
his announcement of his intention to run for a second term. The context in which
the speech was delivered, however, again raised questions about the
implementation of the program Medvedev proposed and even about his own political
It is most probable that Russia again has no chance of quick or gradual
modernization according to the Medvedev formula: The global economy has returned
to the point many believed it had left behind after the crisis reached its peak
in 2008. It is obvious that a hot summer is in store for the European Union,
Russia's main partner, regardless of the action taken on specific Greek
Good solutions to the problem of a possible European default domino effect simply
do not exist. If Germany and France save Greece now, they probably will soon be
in a state of severe political crisis themselves. The impoverished German or
French citizen is certain to ask his leaders why the money he needs so much was
given to the careless Greeks for the hundredth time. The subsequent course of
events is fairly predictable. Portugal, which is commonly thought to be the next
in line for assistance, will arrive at the same default through a political
crisis. Spain (which, according to most economists, is standing just behind
Portugal in this line) will be in a hopeless position - either a political crisis
and a default or merely a default.
The choice of the leaders of the Romanic nations of Europe and the economic
consequences of the parade of defaults - sudden crisis or a smooth decline into
recession - are irrelevant. The Russian partner and consumer of Russian
hydrocarbons is seriously ill, and this means that difficult days are ahead for
Russia. The "volatility peaks" - or, in simpler terms, the range of fluctuations
in oil prices -- will be significantly broader and the celebrated economic
stability will again seem to be an impossible dream.
At that point, and it probably will arrive at the end of summer or the beginning
of fall, the Russian elite, already conservative and easily frightened, will
close ranks and unanimously call a halt to all of Medvedev's modernization plans.
Putin's leadership will again be in great demand, and Medvedev's second term -
his Holy Grail - will be lost to him forever.
I do not know what Medvedev will tell himself to explain his failure. Fate
definitely has not smiled upon him in his three years of work in the Kremlin.
Aside from fate, there was another important factor, however. Medvedev's cautious
nature, forcing him to always hesitate and then retreat, has played a nasty trick
on him. Without ever trying to put everything on the line, he could go down in
history as a president who always said the right things but never did what he
said he would do.
[return to Contents]
Wall Street Journal
June 23, 2011
Medvedev Puts Russia in a Choice Situation
By GEOFFREY T. SMITH
For someone supposed to be a puppet, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is making
a surprisingly convincing job of faking autonomy.
In his keynote speech last week at the Saint Petersburg International Economic
Foruma glitzy, carefully orchestrated affair at which Russian officialdom has
traditionally given a pretty accurate description of its priorities to outside
investorsMr. Medvedev not only renounced many of the principles of Putinism, but
also issued a thinly veiled criticism of some of his prime minister's recent
policy measures.
Most intriguingly, Mr. Medvedev returned again and again to that infinitely
dangerous and powerful concept that hasn't had much of a role in Russian politics
this past decade: choice. Mr. Medvedev used the word six times in the space of
two minutes.
Of course, any notion of free choice over the next year remains decidedly
relative. The Justice Ministry's refusal on Wednesday to register the People's
Freedom Party of former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov for
parliamentary elections later this year is proof that the Putin-Medvedev tandem
is as unwilling to allow competition for the center of Russian politics as it
ever was. Such opposition parties as are allowed to take part will be the same
old freak show of xenophobes and Soviet nostalgists, whose only purpose is to
remind the voter that safety and comfort exist only in the protective folds of
Old Mother Putin's skirts, and that the virtues of Western pluralism are
So what is this choice of which Mr. Medvedev made absolutely sure to remind his
The priorities that he outlineddecentralization, privatization and
modernizationare undeniably different from those that could be expected under a
new Putin presidency.
Decentralization is the polar opposite of the concentration of power in Moscow by
Mr. Putin, which culminated in the abolition of direct elections for local
governors. Privatization signals an abandonment of those "commanding heights of
the economy" where Mr. Putin and his clique of security-service associates
planted their standard. Modernization, while being the hardest of the three to
define, is still clearly an expression of the need for Russia to reduce its
dependency on natural resources, and move to an economy based more on knowledge
and skillssomething the country signally failed to do under Mr. Putin's
But if that is Mr. Medvedev's choice, what is the alternative? Obviously the
"stable, calm development" that Mr. Putin promised in a speech in April. Without
being so careless as to name his mentor in person, Mr. Medvedev warned that "it's
wrong for us to orient ourselves only to calm and measured growth. This apparent
stability can conceal a banal stagnation."
The final, and deliberately chosen, word of that sentence sums it up, at least
for Russian audiences who know it in another political context: either give me
and my crowd of advisers more say in running Russia, or we will return to the
days of Brezhnev. But this time we will have no way of compelling the young and
capable to keep their talents at home.
Given the closeness of the two at a personal level, it would be a surprise if any
of this came as a shock to Mr. Putin. And if you believe Mr. Medvedev says
nothing his mentor hasn't sanctioned, then you must conclude that this is the
closest we will ever get to hearing Mr. Putin say his economic policies haven't
Or perhaps it's fairer to say that they have reached the end of their natural
life span. Thanks to the prudence shown between 2000 and 2008, Russia at least
had the option of throwing money at the crisis to make it go away, a luxury EU
leaders would dearly love to have right now.
But the figures suggest the Putin growth model is not sustainable. Despite an
average oil price over $100 a barrel in 2011, Russia's sovereign wealth funds are
bleeding assets, not accumulating them, because social and military spending have
rocketed. Ten years ago, the Russian budget balanced at an oil price of barely
$20 a barrel. This year, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin says it won't balance
even at $115 a barrel. The non-oil budget deficit, according to the International
Monetary Fund, will be 12.7% of gross domestic product this year, more than eight
percentage points higher than before the financial crisis. The three-year budget
plan approved by Mr. Putin earlier this year still sees it at 10.5% of GDP in
In St. Petersburg, Messrs Medvedev and Kudrin both fretted publicly about the
inflationary risks of such a situation. Unless Mr. Putin has an answer to this
problem, this would be the time for him to start distancing himself from it. A
job, for example, as head of the National Security Council would allow him to
keep effective control of internal affairs, and maintain his prestige with the
security services, without requiring him to take the blame for six more years of
inflation at 8% and above. It would also afford a more radically reform-minded
administration under Mr. Medvedev some kind of insurance against a reaction from
those of Mr Putin's proteges whom it would be pushing away from the state trough.
From a purely economic viewpoint, this would seem the best trade-off of stability
and reform that could be hoped for. Whether there is the will or the means to
deliver that outcome is another question entirely.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
June 23, 2011
Opposition Party Denied Duma Run
By Alexandra Odynova
The Justice Ministry on Wednesday refused to register the opposition Party of
People's Freedom on the grounds that it had submitted a membership list with dead
and underage members.
The decision, not unexpected, eliminates a direct rival to the newly insurgent
Kremlin-linked Right Cause party and all but ensures that no anti-Kremlin forces
will run in the State Duma elections in December.
The Justice Ministry's rejection also deals a blow to the leadership of the
liberal opposition, many of whom previously served in the government and had
hoped to regain a say in state affairs.
Leaders of the Party of People's Freedom accused Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of
personally orchestrating the decision.
"It was quite a predictable decision," Ilya Yashin, leader of the party's Moscow
branch, said by telephone.
"I'm sorry that Putin decided not to allow our party to enter the elections,"
party co-leader Mikhail Kasyanov, a former prime minister, said in a statement.
"It's evident that he is afraid of risks."
Kasyanov shares leadership duties at the party, also known by its Russian acronym
Parnas, with former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, former Duma Deputy
Vladimir Ryzhkov and former Deputy Energy Minister Vladimir Milov.
Putin did not comment on the charges. But he accused Nemtsov, Milov and Ryzhkov
during a live broadcast in December of embezzling millions of dollars when they
held government jobs, and he said they sought to return to power to steal more.
The three unsuccessfully sued him for slander.
Yashin said Putin's televised remarks had provided a clear hint that the party
would not be registered.
The ministry said in a statement that the membership list submitted by the party
had included teenagers and people who died before the party's founding congress
in December. Moreover, it said, people had written to the ministry to say they
had given up their membership after the list was compiled in December. It did not
identify any of the people or specify what prompted them to leave the party.
A second violation, the ministry said, was found in the party rules because they
did not include a provision for the mandatory rotation of party leaders.
Yashin called the ministry's reasoning "gibberish" based on an "illegal"
political decision.
The party can appeal the decision in court or refile the registration request. It
was unclear whether it would do either. Nemtsov and Ryzhkov said on Ekho Moskvy
radio that they saw no point in challenging the ministry's decision in court,
where judges nearly always side with the government in cases involving political
parties and elections.
But the party may sue in the European Court of Human Rights, Yashin said. He
noted that the European court in April ruled as illegal a Supreme Court decision
to disband Ryzhkov's Republican Party in 2007. The European court would be
obliged to review any lawsuit this year, which means that the party might have a
slim chance of participating in the December vote, Yashin said.
A lawmaker with the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, promised last week that
lawmakers would increase pressure on the Kremlin to hold free elections if the
party were not registered.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed disappointment that the party
wasn't registered Wednesday and urged a review. "It is hard to understand how
this decision today by the Ministry of Justice is consistent with Russia's
international commitments and recent statements by Russia's own leaders," Clinton
said in a statement. "We urge the authorities to investigate the reports of
irregularities in the Parnas registration process to ensure that the procedures
used to deny registration of this party were consistent with Russian laws and
international standards."
The party's other option refiling the registration request would do no good,
because the ministry would reject it again, said Yury Korgunyuk, a political
analyst with Indem, a think tank. He said he also believed that the ministry's
decision was political. "They just needed to find a pretext" to prevent the party
from running, Korgunyuk said by phone. "It's not a question of how many
nonexistent members the Justice Ministry has counted but why it was checking
those documents at all," he said, adding that no such check is mandatory to
register a party.
Indeed, party leaders knew in advance that getting their name added to the list
of seven registered parties would be hard. Since 2006, only one party, Right
Cause, has managed to obtain registration.
The Party of People's Freedom with its liberal and pro-business stance would have
posed a direct challenge to Right Cause, which is restructuring and expected to
elect billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov as its new leader at a congress this weekend.
Prokhorov has promised to give the party the second-biggest faction in the Duma,
after United Russia.
Right Cause official Andrei Dunayev offered his regrets and urged the Party of
People's Freedom to apply again, Interfax reported. He also said the registration
rules, which his party cleared in 2009, are "very cumbersome."
At least seven opposition parties have been denied registration with the Justice
Ministry since 2009. The leftist Rot Front has been turned down five times since
last year over technicalities. In the latest instance, in April, the ministry
said the party emblem, a fist held high, could be interpreted as promoting
Opposition leader Eduard Limonov said in February that his group, The Other
Russia, had copied the registered Communist Party's charter when filing for
registration, but the Justice Ministry had still said it violated federal
Justice Minister Alexander Konovalov said in an interview published this week
that the registration rules should be canceled altogether. But he said he would
enforce them as long as they are in place.
United Russia, headed by Putin, praised the ministry's decision Wednesday.
"Political necrophilia is unacceptable in our country," senior official Alexei
Chesnokov said, Interfax reported. "Including deceased people on the party's
membership list when filing for registration is plain immoral."
The Communists dismissed the denial as a non-event, saying the Party of People's
Freedom had no chance of winning any seats in the Duma anyway. A Just Russia's
founder, Sergei Mironov, called the refusal "simply unwise."
The Party of People's Freedom, meanwhile, will stage a protest over the
ministry's refusal on Pushkin Square on Saturday, Ryzhkov said on his web site.
[return to Contents]
RBC Daily
June 23, 2011
The Popular Freedom Party is denied official registration
Author: Olga Zhermeleva
Leaders of the Popular Freedom Party submitted documents to the
Justice Ministry on May 32. One of them, Mikhail Kasianov, assured
journalists that everything had been done properly (organizations
established in 53 Federation subjects, membership exceeded 46,000,
documents for registration checked and re-checked). Nothing
helped. The Justice Ministry denied the Popular Freedom Party
registration and with it, official status.
"Random check of the data provided by documents submitted for
registration established that the list of party members included
people who had expired before the foundation conference of the
Popular Freedom Party on December 13, 2010," the Justice Ministry
stated. It added that some members of the party turned out to be
juveniles and that its charter lacked the clause on rotation
within the upper echelons. Besides, it was established that
foundation conferences of some regional organizations of the
Popular Freedom Party had never taken place on the sites specified
in the documents submitted to the Justice Ministry.
The opposition condemned Justice Ministry's decision as
political. "Well, it merely shows all over again that Russia is
anything but a rule-of-law state," said Boris Nemtsov, one of the
leaders of the party. "Decisions such as this might finish off the
opposition altogether."
No litigation is contemplated. "Why bother? The decision [of
the Justice Ministry] is anything but legitimate," said Kasianov.
"We kind of expected it."
"We are not losers to litigate," said Nemtsov.
Some political parties meanwhile suggested that
representatives of the Popular Freedom Party might opt for
membership in other political structures now. Leonid Gozman, one
of the chairmen of Right Cause, allowed for this turn of events.
"In theory, it is possible. Three-four people may thus defect
in Russian regions and one or two in Moscow," said Kasianov.
"Still, I do not know who they might be."
Popular Freedom Party leaders plan a rally in central Moscow
come Saturday to protest against the decision of the Justice
Political Information Center Director Aleksei Mukhin
meanwhile said that the Popular Freedom Party was better off
without registration than with the official status. "Officially
registered, they will be unable to appeal to the European
Parliament or count on aid from abroad. As matters stand, however,
they are free to count on foreign grants as political victims...
and to elaborate on how laws in Russia are bent for political
considerations," he said.
[return to Contents]
PARNAS to focus on preparations for presidential polls - leaders.
MOSCOW, June 23 (Itar-Tass) The People's Freedom Party (PARNAS) despite the
setback in its official registration, will continue its activity and intends to
focus on the presidential elections, Party leaders told a news conference on
"We won't recognize the Justice Ministry's decision; we believe the party is
fully established and will continue our activity, despite the obstacles the
authorities are creating," Party co-chairman Mikhail Kasyanov said.
According to Kasyanov, the Party is unlikely to challenge the Justice ministry's
decision in court, as it believes it is useless.
"The final decision on the matter will be made by the Party conference in July,"
Kasyanov said.
Vladimir Milov, another PARNAS co-chairman, thinks it is important to take up the
forms of activity that will yield a political result.
He explained that he meant the upcoming presidential election.
"We'll hold primaries and bring forward one candidate," Milov said, adding that
the Party Congress is scheduled for September.
"It will enable use to nominate one candidate and form his convincing program,"
Milov said.
The leaders of the unregistered party are convinced that the upcoming elections
to the State Duma (parliament) will not be legitimate, so it makes no sense for
PARNAS to participate.
On Wednesday, the Russian Justice Ministry denied registration to PARNAS, citing
inconsistencies between its Charter and registration documents.
"It has been found that the Party's Charter contains the provisions that
contradict the law on political parties and other federal legislation.
Specifically, the Charter does not envision the rotation of the leaders of the
permanent governing body, in violation of Article 24 of the law on political
parties. The Charter contains other contradictions of federal laws," a Justice
Ministry official said.
The information in the Party's registration documents does not meet the
requirements of Article 23 of the law on political parties, according to which
underage persons cannot be party members.
"A random check of the data ascertained that Party documents contain information
on citizens who died before the PARNAS founding Congress on December 13, 2010, as
well as information on minors and citizens who are not on files of permanent
residents in a given region," the Ministry said.
It also said the ministry's regional departments had reported statements from
citizens who had denied their membership in PARNAS or participation in its
general meetings.
In a number of Russian provinces, the regional PARNAS branches had never convened
meetings at the addresses designated in official protocols, according to the
Justice Ministry.
The Party was founded in December 2010. Its co-chairpersons are Mikhail Kasyanov,
Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov and Vladimir Ryzhkov.
They submitted the registration papers to the Ministry in late May. As of that
time, the Party had 53 regional branches and had over 46,000 members, PARNAS
activists said.
PARNAS co-chairman Vladimir Ryzhkov told Echo Moscow on Wednesday that "filing an
action is a vicious circle."
In his opinion, the decision to deny registration is politically motivated.
PARNAS' Charter does not contradict the law and is similar to the charters of
other parties.
Commenting on the reasons, as cited by the Justice Ministry, which accused PARNAS
of signing dead persons, he said "one or two such cases do not change the
"We have over 45,000 live people for sure," Ryzhkov said.
The law on political parties adopted in 2009 commits each of them to having at
least 45,000 members and 450-strong regional branches in more than half of
Russian regions.
[return to Contents]
Novye Izvestia
June 23, 2011
Boris Gryzlov: The barrier will remain unchanged come December
Author: Vyacheslav Riabykh
Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov said yesterday that the entry barrier
for political parties running for the lower house of the
parliament in the forthcoming election would remain unchanged.
According to Gryzlov, the head of the lower house of the
parliament and one of United Russia leaders, its reduction will be
left to the next Duma. This statement collided with the words of
President Dmitry Medvedev who had said in an interview with The
Financial Time that the barrier ought to be brought down to
encourage political competition. Practically all political parties
within the "red zone" took Gryzlov's words in stride.
According to results of the latest poll conducted by Levada-
Center sociologists, two political parties might have no fears
regarding their ability to scale the 7% barrier. They are United
Russia whose rating is estimated at 57% and the CPRF with 17%.
Position of the LDPR is relatively stable. Its rating is estimated
at 14% even though last October it hovered near 9%. Judging by
opinion polls, no other parties including Fair Russia that has a
faction in this Duma and whose rating is 4% stand a chance of
being elected come December. Even so, practically all of them took
Gryzlov's words with equanimity born of (unwarranted?) optimism.
Yabloko leader Sergei Mitrokhin said that Gryzlov had
challenged the president. "It is common knowledge after all that
our Duma adopts amendments to some laws in all three readings in a
single day," he said. "And what do we see here? United Russia
plainly shows that political competition is the last thing in the
world it wants. After all, a good deal of political parties
including Yabloko will scale a 3% or 5% barrier given half a
chance." According to Mitrokhin, "... what we have in Russia is
not election in any event" so that "... all of that will change
The Right Cause party in its turn expects that businessman
Mikhail Prokhorov as the new leader will enable it to boost its
rating significantly. "We will surely poll more than 7%, so that
this barrier is nothing to lose any sleep over," said Boris
Nadezhdin, member of the Federal Political Council of Right Cause.
Fair Russia feigns optimism too and claims that it will
certainly be represented in the next Duma. "Regional elections are
a fine indicator. This spring, our party averaged 15%. We do not
really care what the barrier is," said Oleg Shein, Fair Russia
faction assistant leader. Shein said, however, that Fair Russia
stands for a reduction of the entry barrier but only because other
political parties might encounter difficulties with polling more
than 7%.
The LDPR is stone-cold confident of its ability to poll
upwards of 7% in December. "All these polls are misleading. We
will make it to the Duma, and that's certain. We do not care about
barriers," said LDPR faction leader Igor Lebedev.
Institute of National Strategy Director Stanislav Belkovsky
called Gryzlov's reaction to the words of the president "logical".
"No way for the Duma to discuss the matter before the summer
vacation," he shrugged. "Besides, there is no pressing necessity
to table other matters and concentrate on this one because there
are no political parties in Russia to make use of lower barriers.
Whoever the Kremlin wants in the Duma will be there in any event.
As for all others, I do not think that they will be permitted to
poll even 3%." According to the expert, a good deal here depended
on the president himself. As a matter of fact, Medvedev had said
once that there would be no gubernatorial elections in Russia
within the following 100 years or so. The president must have
changed his mind afterwards because he signalled not long ago that
he was ready for a discourse on the matter of gubernatorial
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
June 23, 2011
Vote Monitors Await Russia's Nod
By Nikolaus von Twickel
Europe's top elections watchdog hopes to send several hundred observers to
monitor the State Duma elections, but the Central Elections Commission has yet to
respond to a request to send a fact-finding mission in August.
If the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe gets its way, it will
be the first time since 2004 that a significant number of European and North
American observers are present at a major election in Russia.
The government's response will also send a strong signal about its readiness to
let outsiders monitor elections on a larger scale.
The 2007 Duma elections and the 2008 presidential vote were marred by scandal
when the OSCE canceled its main observer missions, saying that Moscow had imposed
"unacceptable restrictions."
The few Western observers who did monitor those votes said afterward that they
failed to meet democratic standards.
Janez Lenarcic, director of the OSCE's Warsaw-based Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, has asked elections commission chairman Vladimir
Churov to let a small expert team into the country in mid-August.
The group of up to four experts would reassess conditions for an observation
mission for the Duma vote in December, Lenarcic wrote in a letter to Churov,
which was dated June 15 and published on the commission's web site Wednesday.
Commission spokeswoman Anna Fomenkova refused to say Wednesday if and when an
official invitation would be made for the expert team.
Lenarcic said in the letter that he could not make a clear estimate on the size
and format of the proposed observer mission for the elections, but he noted that
the last such assessment in 2003 had recommended sending 460 observers, 60 of
them long-term.
OSCE spokesman Jens Hagen Eschenba:cher told The Moscow Times that the
organization would make a formal decision on sending monitors only after hearing
the fact-finding mission's report.
Eschenba:cher also said the organization would then discuss the elections
commission's rules for international observers.
The new rules, which were published earlier this month, prohibit observers from
making any public comments before the vote is finished.
Over the past few years, Moscow has consistently tried to reduce the number of
Western observers. In 2007, the commission limited the OSCE mission to 70
short-term observers, no long-term observers and 30 members of the organization's
Parliamentary Assembly. Moscow also refused to allow more than 400 observers in
total, a figure that it called "common for civilized states."
Rights groups say the figures were far from sufficient to monitor 95,000 polling
stations across Russia.
As an OSCE member, Russia is bound by a 1990 treaty to invite election observers.
But it is alone among the organization's 56 members, which include all former
Soviet states, most European countries and the United States and Canada, to
impose any restrictions.
The Kremlin has long criticized the OSCE's human rights activities and in 2007,
then-President Vladimir Putin infamously denounced the organization as "a vulgar
instrument" designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one country,
presumably the United States.
[return to Contents]
No. 23
June 20, 2011
Rating of the most powerful politicians and functionaries of the second echelon
of state power
Author: Pyotr Orekhin
There are two constants in Russian politics (and in power
structures) these days - Premier Vladimir Putin and President
Dmitry Medvedev. They are the decision-makers who consult with
their subordinates and make decisions with the subordinates'
opinion taken into account. The degree of influence these
subordinates and experts wield may and does vary on account of all
sorts of factors and circumstances.
Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin is the
unquestionable leader in terms of influence and clout. It is
logical of course considering that Kudrin controls finances of the
state. Kudrin scored some additional points lately, gaining even
more influence.
Russia's financial standing is quite stable. Russia owes this
stability to high oil prices. Budget deficit this year is expected
at only 1.3% of the GDP. Budget surplus in the first five months
of 2011 amounted to 1.8% of the GDP. What really counts and what
Kudrin ought to take justified pride in is that he managed to
protect additional oil and gas export revenues from countless
lobbyists. In 2011, the government is only permitted to spend 364
billion rubles additionally whereas additional revenues as such
will amount to 1.46 trillion rubles.
"Kudrin enjoys support within the Russian political elite and
foreign financial circles," said Anatoly Vakulenko, an analyst
with Finam. "His position is rock-solid to the extent where his
removal might unleash financial chaos and a change in the
country's kudos and attractiveness to investors indexes."
Kudrin is followed in the rating by deputy premiers Igor
Sechin and Sergei Ivanov. It will be wrong to say that these
functionaries manage it on account of their professionalism. It is
just that they belong to the inner circle of Putin's closest
confidants and associates. This is why not even fiascoes and
failures weaken their positions to any noticeable degree. And yet,
Sechin who is in charge of the fuel and energy complex did let
several hard blows through his defenses not long ago. First, the
president ordered the removal of all state functionaries from the
boards of companies and corporations. Sechin therefore resigned
from the board of directors of Rosneft. Second, the deal between
Rosneft and BP fell through on account of the mistakes made in the
work on it. Third, a series of fuel crisis hit Russia in 2011...
Anyway, analysts who know what they are talking about claim that
not even the Rosneft/BP alliance failure weakened Sechin's
positions too much. Oil prices remain high, and the Russian fuel
and energy complex still has some aces up its sleeves. Signing of
a gas contract with China was expected within the framework of the
St.Petersburg International Economic Forum.
Same thing with Ivanov. Ivanov is so firmly entrenched that
not even public tongue-lashing from the president (for the failure
to implement the state defense order or the GLONASS fiasco) can
shake him loose. Whenever he is criticized, Ivanov fires some
generals and directors of defense factories and that is that.
Unlike deputy premiers, Senior Deputy Premier Igor Shuvalov
has been doing without any major disasters. He remains in charge
of a lot of projects from Strategy'2020 to new rules of vehicle
inspection and somehow manages them all.
Economic Development Minister Elvira Nabiullina is fairly
safe too. Aware of her own incompetence in bureaucratic intrigues
and backstage fighting, Nabiullina is focused on her duties.
Economic situation in Russia meanwhile is stable. Analysts
actually say that the Economic Development Ministry regularly
opposes the Finance Ministry and presents its arguments well.
"Nabiullina's ministry generates some interesting ideas that often
challenge what the Finance Ministry stands for," said Vadim
Loginov of Alfa-Capital. In fact, Nabiullina even strengthened her
positions in late May when her ministry was given the power to
recall departmental acts that interfered with businesses through
under and unwarranted redtape.
Presidential Aide Arkady Dvorkovich can probably challenge
Nabiullina in terms of "creativity". Lacking any formally defined
functions, Dvorkovich serves as the president's "brain" and
"mouthpiece". His liberal views and ideas serve as a catalyst for
The head of the Central Bank Sergei Ignatiev with his team of
competent assistants including Aleksei Ulukayev have been gaining
administrative weight as well... And so has been Dmitry Pankin. A
deputy finance minister until recently (April 2011), he is now
director of the Federal Service for Financial Markets. This
structure is on its way to becoming Russia's foremost financial
The small team of top state managers wielding clout and
influence also includes Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin. Some
observers and commentators suspected that sabotage of Luzhkov's
team would make life hard for Sobyanin but he stifled all
resistance and took over with unexpected ease. "Considering his
position and importance of Moscow in the greater i.e. federal
scheme of things, Sobyanin's influence will keep growing," said an
* * *
Top functionaries (ranked in the descending order):
1. Aleksei Kudrin, Deputy Premier and Finance Minister;
2. Igor Sechin, Deputy Premier;
3. Sergei Ivanov, Deputy Premier;
4. Igor Shuvalov, Senior Deputy Premier;
5. Elvira Nabiullina, Economic Development Minister;
6. Arkady Dvorkovich, Presidential Aide;
7. Sergei Ignatiev, Central Bank Chairman;
8. Dmitry Pankin, Director of the Federal Service for
Financial Markets;
9. Sergei Sobyanin, Mayor of Moscow.
* * *
Top expert groups (ranked in the descending order):
1. Academy of Economy and Civil Service of the Government of
the Russian Federation (Vladimir Mau);
2. National Research University - Supreme School of Economics
(Yaroslav Kuzminov, Yevgeny Yasin, Sergei Aleksashenko);
3. Gaidar Economic Policy Institute (Sergei Sinelnikov-
4. Business Russia (Boris Titov);
5. Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasts
(Dmitry Belousov);
6. Expert Economic Group (Yevsei Gurvich);
7. Institute of Contemporary Development (Igor Yurgens);
8. Center of Strategic Studies (Mikhail Dmitriyev);
9. Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
(Alexander Shokhin);
10. Elements of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Institute of
Economics, Institute of Economic Forecasts, etc.)
[return to Contents]
Margelov May Become Head of Russian Upper House -- Kremlin Source
MOSCOW. June 22 (Interfax) - Mikhail Margelov, head of the International Affairs
Committee of the Federation Council, may be elected as speaker of the upper house
of Russia's parliament, a Kremlin source told
Interfax on Wednesday.
Margelov, who is presidential envoy for contacts with African countries, has held
talks recently with the Libyan opposition leadership in Benghazi and
representatives of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in Tripoli.
On Tuesday, Margelov met with President Dmitry Medvedev and briefed the Russian
leader on the results of the talks.
Russian political analyst Dmitry Orlov told Interfax on Wednesday that he saw
Margelov as the main candidate for the position of Federation Council speaker.
"There are quite many candidates for this post, but Margelov possesses numerous
positive qualities that would enable him rather than anyone else to be put at the
head of the Federation Council," Orlov said.
As head of one of the council's key committees, Margelov is an influential figure
in the Federation Council, among Russia's political elite, and in international
affairs. "In the international arena, he is seen as a very well-informed and
serious player, who represents the opinion of the Russian elite," Orlov said.
Moreover, Margelov is a member of the United Russia party, which holds the
majority of seats in the Federation Council, Orlov said.
"Besides, he is a young politician, and his appointment would appear to be
absolutely democratic and would be in tune with the spirit of the policy of the
president," he said.
[return to Contents]
June 22, 2011
Managed Pluralism And Its Limits
By Brian Whitmore
Russia appears to be moving toward some form of managed pluralism. But the
stress will clearly be more on the managed and less on the pluralism.
The limits of how far the ruling elite is prepared go in opening up the political
system became clear today when the Justice Ministry denied registration to the
opposition People's Freedom Party (known in Russian by the acronym PARNAS), led
by Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Vladimir Milov, and Mikhail Kasyanov. The
decision most likely means that the newly formed party will not be able to run in
elections to the State Duma in December.
The ruling came just days after Medvedev, in a widely discussed interview with
Britain's "Financial Times," said it was time to open up the State Duma to more
Medvedev indicated that it was time to lower the threshold to win seats in the
Duma in order to bring more parties into the parliament, which could cut into
United Russia's dominance:
"It is very bad that there are no rightwing parties in the parliament. I would
like the whole of political spectrum to be represented in our parliament, the
State Duma. There are parties combining several political paradigms. This is
possible too, because there is no longer such a stringent political division as
there was 100 years ago. Sometimes, it is difficult to understand who is actually
a socialist and who is a liberal.
"Nevertheless, I believe the whole of political spectrum should be represented
[in the State Duma]. I have taken decisions to this end to the best of my
ability, but still I would like these decisions not to run counter to the general
trend of development. What do I mean? The rules governing the election of members
of the State Duma should be modified carefully, rather than overnight. For
instance, once we raised the State Duma admittance threshold for political
parties up to 7 percent
"I think this might be the right thing to do to achieve the organization of the
political forces. There cannot be hundreds of political parties in the country
indeed, because this is weird, this is an indication of an underdeveloped
political system. However, one day we will have to revise the decision and lower
the barrier so that political competition improves and those unable to clear the
7 percent barrier can scrape together at least 5 percent or even 3 percent to get
to the State Duma. This is an issue of political expediency in the final
What Medvedev's comments suggest is that the newly rebooted Right Cause party,
led by the Kremlin-connected oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, will probably be headed
for the Duma. Right Cause is scheduled to hold its congress on June 25, when they
will formally elect Prokhorov as leader and adopt a platform.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, is tightening his grip on United Russia
as the ruling party goes through an overhaul ahead of the December elections.
Last week, Putin addressed the Federal Coordinating Council of the nascent
All-Russian Popular Front, which is laying the groundwork for its participation
in the Duma elections.
Putin called on the Popular Front to hold competitive "primaries" among its
members to choose candidates to run for the Duma on the ruling United Russia's
party list:
"We need real competition that would make it possible to nominate the best
candidates. United Russia, itself, is interested in seeing interesting and
effective people come to positions of authority through its capabilities, through
its channels. This will strengthen United Russia, and there is nothing to be
afraid of here."
"Kommersant" reported on June 20 that the "joint United Russia and Popular Front
primaries" will be held throughout the country from July 21 to August 10 in
preparation for the ruling party's annual congress on September 3-4.
But just as managed pluralism has its limits, the "real competition" Putin called
for inside the ruling party will only go so far.
"Putin, the leader of United Russia and the All-Russia Popular Front, will be
able to include and exclude candidates from the list that the party congress will
approve for submission to the State Duma as he sees fit. So victory in the
primaries does not guarantee inclusion on the party list," according to
Several analysts, including Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Center, have
pointed out that the Popular Front is being used as a vehicle to purge United
Russia of its less effective members and bring in fresh blood.
Deputy Prime Minsiter Vyacheslav Volodin appeared to confirm this last week when
he said the party would go through a "soft upgrade" by bringing in new members
from the Popular Front. If this is the case, Putin clearly does not want to lose
control of that process.
The composition of the Duma, and how much United Russia will dominate it, will be
a key component of Russia's post-2012 political landscape.
Deputy Kremlin chief of staff Vladislav Surkov had been pushing a plan to create
a tightly managed multiparty system that resembled that in communist-era
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. The plan was staunchly opposed by the
current speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, who feared seeing United Russia lose
its constitutional majority.
Gryzlov has said the party intends to hold on to -- and even augment -- its
two-thirds majority, although I suspect this is still an open question and will
remain so until very late in the game.
The first signals about what post-2012 Russia will look like will come in the
(highly stage-managed) December elections.
With United Russia undergoing a rebranding, with Right Cause appearing as a
plausible parliamentary party under Prokhorov, and with the recent meltdown of A
Just Russia, the signals are still mixed at this point.
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RIA Novosti
June 23, 2011
Medvedev-Putin tandem: steps to a fully-grown electoral democracy in Russia
By Bruno Sergi
Bruno Sergi is Professor, International Economics, at the University of Messina;
Principal Research Fellow and Member, Advisory Board, Centre for EMEA Banking,
Finance and Economics, London Metropolitan Business School
Political ambitions, political intrigues, and more similar campaigns are on the
way in Russia, especially in the run-up to the March 2012 presidential elections.
The latest political scandal centers on Medvedev and Putin appointing new
personal photographers. In each case the photographer chosen was a young,
strikingly attractive woman, which caused a stir.
While nothing prohibits the two men from running against each other in March
2012, the truth is that, when Medvedev was elected in 2008 he thought he had
cleared the way with Putin through to the next presidential election. This was a
widely held assumption in Moscow in 2008, and was either ascribed to their
personal friendship or Medvedev's political respect for Putin.
In reality, Putin himself was in effective control of the ballot and endorsed
Medvedev as United Russia's presidential candidate back in 2007. What is more,
Putin had paved the way for the young lawyer from St. Petersburg's startling
ascent. In 2000, he became Chairman of Gazprom's board of directors, before being
appointed Chief of the Presidential Staff and eventually the country's First
Deputy Prime Minister in November 2005. All this would lead one to assume that
Medvedev would not hesitate to back Putin in March 2012.
That said, despite Western doubts, Russia does have a free and fair electoral
system, and Russian politics is becoming more western-oriented. Opinion polls are
of foremost importance as a guide to this kind of political environment. Vladimir
Putin's recent attempt to form a new political movement is a definite move in
this direction; it aims to revive public confidence, something that is, in
itself, startling proof. But what really is "Western-style" politics? After many
decades of free elections in the West, we have followed politicians through
opinion polls in good times and bad, through all points on the fiscal and
electoral cycle, we have even seen them dip into public funds to revitalize and
stimulate their flagging electoral fortunes.
We in the West have observed our own governments' attempts to tame public opinion
by reaching for populist slogans, frequently made on shaky grounds. Russia must
be careful not to follow this path. Then there is the issue of military
intervention in Libya: an intervention that has done nothing to improve French
President Nicolas Sarkozy's approval ratings. Had Dominique Strauss-Kahn's
presidential candidacy not been brought to an abrupt and premature conclusion in
New York, Sarkozy would be in a very weak political position today. These are
just a few examples from the West, which show these common strategies do not
always make a politician more popular.
In this context, let me take a step forward and consider the measures Russia's
next president will have to implement. Putin has publically said that he can
envisage Russia rising to become the fifth largest economy worldwide. This will
be hard to achieve but is technically possible as long as the country's
productivity rises significantly, to a level equivalent to that of the world's
other major economies.
The country should make the most of its oil resources, increase efficiency, and
reinvigorate its efforts to achieve higher productivity. The hardest part of this
new course will be designing a comprehensive growth plan to be implemented
throughout Russia. Reserve currency status would also, long-term, be a healthy
step to strengthen Moscow's economic role, thereby encouraging economic and
financial interdependence with other economies in the region and worldwide.
Other steps in a decisive economic vision would be outlawing the corrosive
practices of corruption and fraud from the system. In addition, if Russia proves
itself a profitable location for business, then foreign direct investment will
once again start flowing into the country. However, the greatest challenges
facing the country today involve addressing how it uses its oil and gas
resources, its extensive geographic, demographic, and resource asymmetries, all
of which seriously complicate planning for any post-economic crisis growth model.
Surely, Russia's economic vision needs to shift the long-term engine of growth
away from natural resources to a variety of domestic stimuli, targeting only a
few important sectors, mobilizing funds, prioritizing the relationship between
science and industry, and all possible innovative policy measures.
Healthy electoral competition between the two leaders could be the natural end of
this "dual power" relationship in Moscow, giving Russians the final choice on who
should reside in the Kremlin for the next six years. This election could
transform Moscow into a modern and mature electoral democracy, in a process that
even the influential critics of Russian affairs would be powerless to deny or
Moreover, instead of attention focusing on newly appointed women photographers,
why not consider the possibility of a political coup de theater in Moscow, which
would be politically and historically fascinating for modern Russia?
This could well extend to running for the presidency, or the possible appointment
of a bright, energetic and forward-looking woman as prime minister of the Russian
government after the March 2012 elections. This would be indeed a fashionable
step for modern Russia. The West would finally feel immensely proud of all this
new evidence testifying to the decisive steps the country has taken towards a
fully-grown electoral democracy in Russia.
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Moscow News
June 23, 2011
Navalny calls for probe into Putin's People's Front
By Tom Washington
Corruption crusader and hard-hitting blogger Alexei Navalny is demanding that the
prosecutor-general gets busy over Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's People's Front.
In an open letter to Yury Chaika, Russia's senior prosecutor, Navalny points out
that the recently formed People's Front, created to reinvigorate United Russia
and headed by Putin, is not a legal organization and consumes taxpayers' money.
Posting on his Livejournal page (link in Russian), Navalny, a lawyer by trade,
lays out his grievances.
Missing the mark
Under the law, a public association must fulfill three criteria: it conducts
general meetings, it adopts a statute, and that it forms governing and auditing
Navalny points out that the People's Front does not meet these criteria and as
such violates the law. "That is to say, at the current time the United People's
Front has not acquired the status of a public association," he wrote.
And its members, and presumably leader, are therefore deluding themselves. "The
situation is absurd and incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law,
since it is impossible to become a member of a formation which does not exist,"
he noted.
Sucking up resources
Given its dubious status, he does not mention its affiliation to one particular
party, Navalny also questions whether the Prime Minister and his press-secretary
should be giving up their time for it, seeing as their time is paid for by the
Citing Kommersant, he says that Dmitry Peskov, Putin's press secretary, said the
front's office would be in leased premises in the City Hall building on Novy
"It is unclear how the People's Front, not being a legal entity or a public
association, that is, without being subject to civil law, could conclude a lease
agreement for non-residential premises and the office staff," he queried.
He also pointed out that time which Putin takes from his prime ministerial duties
to devote to the front and announcements by Peskov, also a public servant, are
therefore questionable.
Under pressure
Navalny is himself feeling the heat, as investigators look into allegedly
questionable advice he gave to a timber firm which resulted in a thumping loss.
He himself is preparing to sue prosecutors for not officially notifying him of
the charges, despite wide press coverage.
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Russia Beyond the Headlines
June 23, 2011
A new kind of opposition
The recent Anti-Seliger meeting grew out of the political activism of people like
Alexei Navalny and Evgenia Chirikova.
By Vladimir Ruvinsky
Five years ago Evgenia Chirikova, a resident of the Moscow Region town of Khimki
had no fan base outside her own friends and family. She was a typical
30-something Russian woman, focused on her children and her career. Ambitious by
nature, she earned three college degrees and ran a small business with her
engineer husband. She had no interest in politics: "I didn't think it was
possible to change anything, so politics seemed a senseless endeavor."
Chirikova, 34, has a clear voice and could pass for a student in her jeans and
t-shirt. She doesn't look like a person who commands the attention of a broad
spectrum of opposition parties and movements and is known for her criticism of
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the ruling United Russia party. Her
metamorphosis from suburban working mother to one of Russia's best-known
activists occurred after the Moscow city government decided to bulldoze the
forest next to her house to build a highway to St. Petersburg.
Chirikova became interested in the forest's fate after the birth of her second
daughter: "Suddenly I had time to look around, and I realized that while I was
working and paying taxes, somebody else was using that money to destroy my
habitat." Chirikova gathered local residents together and spoke out in favor of
rerouting the highway. Ecologists later came up with 11 alternative routes.
Bureaucrats reacted to this initiative with bewilderment, while many local
residents were suspicious: In Russia, an international multimillion-dollar
project had never been stopped by a forest before. "The Khimki administration
didn't understand what we wanted: 'If you want to live in the woods,' they said,
'go to Siberia,'" Chirikova said.
"If we're afraid, we've lost"
Chirikova didn't realize what she was getting into. "I was so naive at first. I
thought this highway must be some mistake. I also thought that I lived a
law-based state." During the conflict over the Khimki Forest, 10 activists were
maimed by unknown assailants. Chirikova, too, received anonymous threats. But she
refused to give up. Some thought this young mother must be crazy; others thought
that she was an aspiring politician trying to make a name for herself; still
others believed that she had a commercial interest in the deal. "It's the
bureaucrats who turned me into an opposition leader," said Chirikova. "I became a
citizen very late, at 30." She and her husband own two companies specializing in
the electromagnetic protection of equipment. Mikhail manages both companies while
Evgenia does public relations, and she is used to the threats on her life. If
she's afraid, she doesn't show it.
"Every time [someone else was beaten up], I said to myself: one more time and
I'll run away. But you can't spend your life running away. If we're afraid, then
we've lost," Chirikova said.
Her many exchanges with bureaucrats who told her that the highway was a federal
project and therefore not subject to change did nothing to increase her
confidence in the powers that be. "I grew up fast," said Chirikova. At first she
put her hopes in Prime Minster Vladimir Putin, who as president had shifted the
construction of a new oil pipeline further from Lake Baikal. But in 2009, Putin
approved the construction of the highway.
That same year Chirikova, with the opposition's support, ran for mayor of Khimki
on a single platform the rerouting of the highway. She came in third. But the
wide range of beliefs among Chirikova's supporters shows that there is a demand
in Russian society for specific problems to be solved, said Alexei Mukhin, head
of the Center for Political Information. "That's why traditional opposition
movements afraid to switch from slogans to actions are losing popularity," said
The fight for the Khimki Forest ended in a decision to narrow the highway from
600 meters (2,000 feet) to 100 meters (330 feet) and prohibit commercial
construction either side of the highway. And today, Chirikova mainly blames the
destruction of the forest not on Russian bureaucrats with "their sleepy views of
ecology," but on the French construction company Vinci, the foreign partner in
this project. It was Vinci, claiming European ecological standards, that insisted
on the routing the highway through the forest and threatened huge forfeits if the
concessionary agreement were broken; according to the business daily Vedomosti,
the fine for breaking this deal could reach some 4 billion rubles ($143
Navalny: "It was senseless to get involved"
One of the people who doubted Chirikova's chances for success was lawyer Alexei
Navalny, an activist and blogger who has made his name fighting corruption in
state companies. Several years ago he was a member of the liberal party Yabloko
and worked on a committee to protect Muscovites. "People came to me complaining
about the construction of a highway in Khimki," he said. "My answer then was that
it was senseless to get involved. They would put together an initiative group and
then all be beaten up." Chirikova was one of the people who came to Navalny. "Now
I see how wrong I was," said Navalny. Today Navalny is an active supporter of the
Khimki movement and is helping members make sense of the competitions to build
the highway, in which, according to Elena Panfilova, head of the Russian branch
of Transparency International, "corruption is a large component."
Like Chirikova, Navalny became famous thanks to actions rather than words,
defending the rights of minority shareholders in large Russian state companies.
He and Chirikova are the same age, neither is affiliated with any political
party, and both prefer to work independently as activists, attracting supporters
from across the political spectrum. They are a new kind of opposition in Russia,
oriented toward solving real problems, said Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie
Center. "If with Evgenia it's the transformation of a civil position from a
private protest, then Alexei targets political activity at the outset," Petrov
Chirikova "didn't plan to go into politics, she was pushed into it by the local
authorities," said Mukhin, adding that both Navalny and Chirikova "have the image
of a popular leader responding to public despair."
Because he has no access to television, Navalny considers the Internet the best
purveyor of his ideas because it is fast and cheap. He has a large following
online and in the past has raised contributions totaling some 7 million rubles
($250,000) in a month to support his anticorruption work. His current project is
to lower the level of support for party of power United Russia in December's
parliamentary elections. To this end, he has rolled out a campaign calling on
people to vote for anyone at all except United Russia, as he believes it is a hub
for Russia's most corrupt politicians. Petrov thinks Navalny has a chance of
winning wide support since he has a "promising and well-considered position."
Chirikova and Navalny are ready to share their experience. In June, they
participated in a four-day workshop in the Khimki Forest that attracted more than
3,000 people of different and divergent political. The workshop became known as
Anti-Seliger, in reference to the annual meeting of pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi
at Lake Seliger in the Tver Region. The Khimki workshop succeeded, said
opposition politician and participant Boris Nemtsov, because it drew people of
different views and from different walks of life. The goal of Anti-Seliger, said
Chirikova, was to create a dialogue between different political and civil forces
and to "give Russian citizens real knowledge about how to defend their honor,
dignity and rights in this country." The organizers intend the workshop to be an
annual event.
[return to Contents]
Russian Interior Ministry Denies Existence Of Activist Data Base
Moscow, 22 June: The Russian Interior Ministry does not have the Storozhevoy
Kontrol (Guard Control) data base containing information about citizens, who may
be predisposed to extremism and side with the opposition, a source in the
law-enforcement agencies has told Interfax on Wednesday (22 June).
"The data base called Storozhevoy Kontrol is not envisaged in any regulations of
the Russian Interior Ministry," the agency's source said.
Meanwhile, according to him, the term is used by police officers in their routine
work and "sometimes may be misinterpreted by ordinary citizens".
The source noted that there was "no such term as preventive registration" in
personal information data bases used by the ministry with the exception of the
data base used by juvenile delinquency departments.
"The data base Rozysk-Magistral (Search-Thoroughfare), which exists since 1999,
envisages distribution of information about individuals suspected of being
involved in criminal activities and implicated in actual criminal cases to
specific sources with limited access," the source said.
According to a Kommersant newspaper article, the European Court of Human Rights
yesterday found that the creation of the Storozhevoy Kontrol police data base,
which, within the framework of combating extremism, is used for registration and
surveillance of socially active citizens as well as their "preventive" detention,
violates the European convention on human rights. (Passage omitted: further
details of the Kommersant article.)
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
June 23, 2011
Chaika Vows Shuffle in Shaky New Tenure
By Alexander Bratersky
Prosecutor General Yury Chaika promised to shake up his staff as he was appointed
to a new five-year term by the Federation Council on Wednesday.
But Kremlin insiders and an analyst predicted that Chaika would lose his job
after the March presidential election in connection with a losing turf war that
the prosecutor's office is waging with the Investigative Committee.
The re-appointment was expected, because Chaika, 60, was nominated earlier this
month by President Dmitry Medvedev, who enjoys the unquestioned support of the
Federation Council. The senators voted 128-5 to keep Chaika in the job, Interfax
"I voted in favor of Chaika because I know him as a very professional man,"
Senator Aslambek Aslakhanov said by telephone.
"There have been some questions regarding him, but serious investigations have
not proved any of the allegations," he said.
Aslakhanov was referring to a gambling ring scandal in the Moscow region that has
led to the dismissal of several local prosecutors. The crackdown was initiated by
the Investigative Committee, which accused local prosecutors of offering
protection to a chain of illegal casinos in exchange for perks.
In his speech to the Federation Council on Wednesday, Chaika conceded that the
scandal had prompted his agency to "think things over."
"We're doing some soul-searching right now," he said, according to RIA-Novosti.
"I think staff rotations will become ubiquitous."
Forty prosecutors were fired for various violations in 2010 alone, Chaika added.
He also fired back at the Investigative Committee, saying it enjoys too wide
powers at the expense of the prosecutors. "The investigator is there for the
prosecutor, not the other way around," Chaika said.
The Investigative Committee, which handles inquiries into serious crimes such as
murder and large-scale fraud, was created in 2007 as part of the Prosecutor
General's Office. Medvedev separated the two agencies in January.
Investigative Committee head Alexander Bastrykin is believed to be a staunch
supporter of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the other half of the country's
"ruling tandem." Putin and Medvedev insist there are no tensions in the tandem,
but Medvedev said recently that they would not run against each other for
The Investigative Committee has said the gambling case was in the works for some
time even though it only cracked down on prosecutors in February. It has
attempted to charge and arrest a swath of local prosecutors and even implicated
Chaika's son, Artyom Chaika, as a middleman between the prosecutors and casino
Medvedev chided both agencies for bringing the case into the open last spring.
Investigators have not mentioned Chaika's son since, but they have continued to
press ahead with their cases against half a dozen prosecutors, some of whom have
been detained or fled the country.
Medvedev intends to dismiss Chaika over the scandal but does not want to do so
before the March presidential election because that would weaken the Prosecutor
General's Office, Vedomosti reported Wednesday, citing several unidentified
Kremlin insiders.
Political analyst Iosif Diskin, who sits on the Public Chamber, said Chaika's
shaky position was due to corruption problems within his office, not tensions in
the ruling tandem.
Chaika likely convinced Medvedev to reappoint him by promising to shakeup the
prosecutor's office, Diskin said by telephone.
"It's hard to believe that he would get nominated otherwise after the total
annihilation of Moscow Regional Prosecutor's Office," he said.
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Over 40,000 corruption cases opened in 2010 - Chaika
MOSCOW. June 22 (Interfax) - More than 40,000 criminal cases over corruption were
opened in Russia in 2010, Russian Prosecutor General Yury Chaika told journalists
on Wednesday.
"There has been some progress. Over 40,000 criminal cases over corruption were
launched last year. We consider it progress," Chaika said.
At the same time, the rate of prosecution is highest among bribe-givers and often
low among bribe-takers, he said.
"Due to this, I believe there is something to work on," the prosecutor general
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
June 22, 2011
Clampdown fears for Russian internet
By Tom Washington
The government is tightening the virtual screws on that unruly bastion of frank
and fearless speech, the internet, highlighting diminishing room to maneuver for
Kremlin critics.
Despite rhetoric from President Medvedev both at home and on the international
platform onlookers say the noose has been tightening on government criticism over
the last two years.
Although the Kremlin issued a firm slapdown to FSB proposals on banning Skype,
Gmail and Hotmail, other issues continue to worry net users.
"Today the G8 summit discussed the future of the internet. The net must be free,
authors' rights need new defenses," tweeted Medvedev last month, after the G8
summit in France on the state of the internet, as cited by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
But he failed to convince. "This statement contradicts much of what is currently
taking place in Russia, especially the public targetings of opposition bloggers
and other political dissidents," Jarrod Rifkind wrote in a CSIS report
Controversy erupted in April after Alexander Andreyechkin, deputy head of
technical services at the FSB, said that the security services were threatening
to ban Gmail and Skype.
A source close to Medvedev dismissed Andreyechkin's statements but a spokesman
for Prime Minister Putin called the ideas "well-reasoned" said they required
further debate, highlighting the complexity around the issue, Rifkind said.
Flames of discontent
Freedom to blog certainly does not seem to be a given in Russia and a commission
is examining the security implications of online communication, to publish a
report on Oct. 1. Google, Skype and Microsoft representatives have not been
invited to participate, Vedomosti reported in April.
"They are especially worried after the African revolutions, most of which were
organized through social networks. They again found that opportunities to
communicate on the internet are great, and now they are attentively monitoring
the social networks and popular opposition networks," Damir Gainutdinov, from
civil rights group Agora and author of a report entitled 'Lack of Freedom on the
Internet', told Moskovskiye Novosti.
Hit list
The statistics are stacking up against online critics and Agora has documented 65
cases of what it calls persecution.
Blogger celebre Alexei Navalny is facing charges and is being touted as the next
Syktyvkar-based blogger Sava Terentyev was sentenced to one year in jail after
posting "burn the infidel cop" on his LiveJournal page, the first case when the
hitherto largely unregulated blogosphere felt the firm hand of law on its collar.
Last year Artyom Loskutov, of the jokey protest movement Monstration, published a
picture of a policeman as a demon and criminal proceedings were initiated.
More recently 18-year-old Alexander Domrachev has been contemplating four years
inside for creating a social network entitled 'Kill the cops! Save Russia!'.
Journalist Oleg Kashin is the most famous victim of physical attack: he was
beaten six months ago, possibly due to his blogging. Two prominent opposition
politicians and successive bosses of opposition website Ingushetia.ru were shot
in 2008 and 2009.
"The internet was the most effective tool for criticizing the republic's
leadership. Ingushetia.ru was very popular, in many respects this is due to what
happened to [the victims] Yevloyev and Aushev," Gainutdinov told MN.
[return to Contents]
Washington Post
June 23, 2011
In Russia, a new voice for patients
By Will Englund
NOVOSIBIRSK, Russia The wrong prescription, the ridiculous diagnosis, the
ill-equipped ambulance, the hospitals that wouldn't accept him, the doctor who
wouldn't let her see him after he was dead. The treatment of her 11-month-old son
Maxim, and the way he died, are why Darya Makarova decided she had to do
something about the incompetence and callousness of Russian health care, to take
a stand and mount a campaign.
And in a country with a million unhappy stories, hers struck a chord.
Thousands have turned out for her rallies, written letters, signed petitions or
joined in Internet forums. Since Maxim's death in November, she has already
raised the money to reopen a children's clinic, with an emergency room, in her
community. She has shamed the city into buying three new ambulances, with proper
equipment. She has launched a nonprofit organization, Health Care for Children,
that has national ambitions.
Politicians have sought her out. Pavel Astakhov, who holds the newly created of
children's ombudsman, came from Moscow to see her and then appointed her his
unpaid deputy, giving her more access and clout. Even officials from the
sprawling and notoriously indifferent Health Ministry started to pay attention.
Makarova, who just turned 29, is determined to shake up the system from the
outside, from the grass-roots level. That goes deeply against the grain here,
where the idea of civil society gets a frosty reception at best, and where
activists are more likely to get beaten up than listened to. But she's one of a
rising generation of passionate Russians who, in fields ranging from business
corruption to the environment, are rejecting the passivity of their elders.
"Several thousand Russian people have come together and said, 'Enough! It's time
to do something,' " she says. She hopes she can turn that into several million
Russian people. "People are tired. Tired of everything."
Russians are especially tired of the pitiful public spending on health care
(about $500 per person annually), and the corruption that pervades the system.
Budgets are opaque, the cost of equipment is suspiciously high, salaries are
pitifully low. A new study commissioned by the Russian government suggests that
health is the most corrupt field in the country.
Though medical care is supposed to be free, demoralized doctors demand
under-the-table payments from their patients. Hospitals try to avoid difficult
cases, like Maxim's. They have no incentive to do otherwise.
When Makarova couldn't awaken her son the morning of Nov. 10, her options were
few. The pediatric clinic in his neighborhood had been converted into a
for-profit adult treatment center. Hospitals nearby wouldn't admit him. The
ambulance that came for him, from 20 miles away, was in service despite failing
its road test, and had no equipment for treating infants. The hospital that
finally accepted him, and where he died two days later, was built in 1913, and
was falling apart.
"I hate this country," Makarova's mother told her, and immigrated to England.
A middle-class movement
But Makarova had another idea. She lives in Akademgorodok, a community of
scientists in the forest along the River Ob. She has degrees in geology and
marketing management, and had a high-paying job at an IT firm; she and her
husband, a biologist, live in a $300,000 apartment.
She used the Internet to tell her story, and middle-class people all over Russia
subjected to the rudeness, incompetence and deterioration of public health care
have responded because it seems so believable. "Anytime you deal with Russian
medicine you come away with a bad feeling," says Tatyana Antonova, a
dermatologist who stopped practicing out of disgust with the system and is now
one of Makarova's top associates.
People who have never done anything political before have joined her cause. Iva
Avrorina, who works in advertising, makes videos for Makarova. Getting involved
has been a revelation for her. "It changes your view of the world," she says.
"You're leading your life, with all its troubles, and then something like this
happens and suddenly you're meeting all these good people."
In the months before he died, Maxim had been having occasional trouble breathing.
One doctor said it was because he was teething. Another gave him a prescription
for a drug that, Makarova later learned, is inappropriate for infants. It may
have killed him.
In October she had applied for a passport for him so she could take him to
Germany for treatment. But by the time it arrived he was dead.
"When he died I understood I could have done much more for my baby," she says.
"So now I do it and maybe I can help other babies. But, still, you know, children
are still dying."
Makarova has arrived on the scene just as Russia is launching a $900 million
health-care modernization project. She says her organization will make sure the
money is well spent, though others worry that it just opens up whole new
possibilities for corruption.
"Our goal is to look at the system and see what's wrong," she says. "Where's the
money? Where's our money?"
She has public opinion on her side, and her campaign has already forced local
officials to steer modernization funds toward children's hospitals. "She has the
qualities of a leader," says Andrei Andreichenko, a member of the city council.
"She's persistent. She's confident. She's strong."
Recently she recruited theater companies to put on shows at eight children's
hospitals here. At the hospital where Maxim died, members of the Young Guards, a
Kremlin-backed youth group, horned in on the program, uninvited. Makarova wasn't
much disturbed she saw it as testimony to her success.
Every television station covered the event, and it was on the front page of the
local paper the next day.
This is only the beginning, says Vladimir Bespalov, head doctor at a small
hospital in the town of Koltsovo that has benefited from Makarova's efforts. "In
this swamp, she was able to get attention, and forced the government to spend on
children. You cannot lock this movement down, because it's coming from the soul."
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Moscow News
June 22, 2011
Russian courts will submit to Christ alone
By Evgeniya Chaykovskaya
Alexander Torshin, acting chairman of the Federation Council, will only pay
attention to Europe when Jesus Christ is put in charge.
Fending off criticism of a law which he hopes would allow Russia to override the
European Court of Human Rights at will, he made it clear that he was only willing
to submit to one authority and not one found in Strasbourg.
Only Jesus can tell Russia what to do
"The obligatory conclusion of the Constitutional Court is our reference point.
The constitutional court is at the head of our court system. The European Court
of Human Rights is not the sole guardian of truth. When Jesus Christ becomes head
of the court, I will call back my bill," Torshin said.
"I think that everything is in order here. No one is taking anything away from
anyone. I just think that we should not be told how to construct our own laws,"
he told Interfax.
He stressed that this bill is aimed at protecting Russia's sovereignty, which was
being "really violated."
Human rights activists concerned
Earlier, human rights groups had expressed concern over the proposed bill that
would allow courts to ignore European decisions if they contradict Russia's
That could force Russia out of the Council of Europe.
Russia's human rights commissioner Vladimir Lukin claimed he would look at the
bill in detail on how it fits the "human rights declaration signed by us."
Court rules against Russia again
In the meantime the Strasbourg court ruled that keeping information about
socially active citizens and using "preventative" measures against them within
the "guard control" program is illegal.
The complaint was filed by Nizhny Novgorod human rights activist Sergei
Shimovolos in 2008. He claimed the police were following his movements and
keeping track of his trips, often questioned him and even arrested him once.
Shimovolos was arrested in May 2007 before a "march of discontent" in Samara for
no apparent reason. The activist could not prove his case in Russia's courts, but
applied to Strasbourg and won his case.
"The suspicion must have been caused by the fact that the claimant was a member
of human rights organisation," the court concluded, ruling Russia's actions
The court ruled that a database on socially active people was a violation of
human rights and freedoms. The database was created by an unpublished order of
the Interior Ministry.
Sources at the ministry denied the existence of this database to Interfax.
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Russia Profile
June 22, 2011
Expandable Moscow
Medvedev's Initiative May Relieve the Pressure on Moscow from Overcrowding, but
Logistics and Financing Details Still Loom Large
Many of Moscow's federal government officials will be finding a new home outside
of Moscow's historical center, said Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at last
week's St. Petersburg Economic Forum, proposing an initiative to widen the
borders of the city to make way for new government and financial nerve-centers in
the city's outlying regions. The far-reaching restructuring is being touted as a
means to provide for Moscow's future economic development, and also to alleviate
some of the capital's problems with overcrowding and severe traffic. Yet with
little information forthcoming about the scale of the restructuring and exactly
how much it may cost, many experts remain skeptical about the possible benefits
of the plan.
"We may be considering expanding Moscow's borders in order to improve the
development of the metropolitan area, for the needs of the [international]
financial center and simply to make life easier for numerous people," said
Medvedev on Friday at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, reported RIA Novosti.
Numerous political leaders at both the city and federal levels have come out in
support of the plan, including Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, who on Saturday said
that the new plan would help Moscow develop more "harmoniously... so that
everything was not concentrated in the historical center and didn't lead to the
collapse of the transport and infrastructural development of the city."
The issue of widening Moscow's borders, or indeed of simply combining the city
with the surrounding region, has been suggested by Sobyanin before, who has
vacillated on his support for such an initiative in the past. Yet despite his
past and current support for the plan, experts have noted that the creation of a
federal district and the movement of federal agencies to the outskirts of the
city are likely to reduce the power of the Moscow mayor, which was brought to its
zenith under Sergei Sobyanin's predecessor, Yuri Luzhkov. "Medvedev wants to put
more power in the hands of the federal government so that no future mayor could
ever pose a threat to the Kremlin," said Nikolai Petrov, an analyst at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in an op-ed in the Moscow Times. "In
this way, future Moscow mayors will be relegated to the status of functionaries
rather than true political heavyweights."
Far more speculation, however, has followed the possibly massive financial
expenditures that would be required to put the plan into action, particularly
following a statement by Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin that the plan would
"not cost anything." This is likely to be achieved by the sale of the federal
government's property within the city, which they say will cover the cost of
construction of new government buildings and the expansion of Moscow's transport
network to the city's new outer regions. According to Kommersant, with the
federal government holding 40 to 50 billion rubles ($1.3 to $1.6 billion) worth
of property and land as a "conservative" estimate, the movement of a small number
of individuals, 20 thousand or so, to outside Moscow's Third Transport Ring could
be viable without additional expenditures. A larger move, however, of most of
Moscow's 150 to 200 thousand federal government employees would make the project
so massive that private financial investment might become necessary, wrote the
Alexander Puzanov, department head of the Laboratory of Industrial Market Studies
and an associate professor at the Higher School of Economics, noted that while
the financial plan of swapping the federal government's real estate in the
capital for that outside the city could be "theoretically" possible, the proposal
needs to be presented in greater detail, as unplanned-for costs and the problem
of demand for the government buildings may undermine government calculations.
"Each of these buildings has its own characteristics, take for instance the State
Duma on Okhotny Ryad. It's clear that it can't be made into an office building,"
said Puzanov. "Thus while the potential cost for these buildings is quite high,
who's going to buy them is still unclear," said Puzanov.
The claim that the resettlement of Moscow's vast federal bureaucracy would solve
the city's problems with overcrowded transport systems and mile-long traffic jams
also requires greater research, said Puzanov. Dmitry Bychkov, the PR director for
Penny Lane Realty, a Moscow-based real-estate group, said that any gains from
bureaucrats leaving the city would quickly be erased by new arrivals in their
place. "The transport problem is not going to be solved by people just moving out
of Moscow. When some people move out, others are going to move in, and this could
make the situation even worse, especially if more families with private cars come
in their place."
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June 23, 2011
The Finance Ministry suggests a reduction of defense and security costs
Author: Dmitry Litovkin
Ordered to do something about budget deficit and determined
not to fail, the Finance Ministry suggested a reduction of
national defense and security costs. Finance Minister Aleksei
Kudrin had said once that he wanted the "hole in the budget"
restricted to 2% of the GDP by 2013 (from 4.1% in 2010). Military
costs reduction proposals were drawn for the special meeting of
the Cabinet in early June.
The Cabinet gave the matter a thought and authorized
additional reduction of the Armed Forces by 150,000 men. This
reduction is expected to save the country almost 50 billion rubles
in 2014. Sources within the Defense Ministry claim that its
bureaucratic machinery already had its budget cut by 40%.
According to Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, the Armed
Forces are down to 1 million men now. Serdyukov called it optimal
numerical strength. It is known that 150,000 of these people are
officers, between 100,000 and 120,000 are professional noncoms,
and the rest are conscripts.
Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political
and Military Analysis, recalled the recent decision to enlarge the
officer corps by 70,000 and the number of contract servicemen to
480,000. "How they are going to enlarge and reduce at the same
time is beyond me," said Sharavin. He added that the final
decision was to be made by the president a.k.a. supreme commander-
Pays will be upped as of January 1, 2012. A private of a
motorized infantry brigade will be paid 27,000, a sergeant (squad
commander) 35,000, platoon commander 50,000, battalion commander
71,000, and brigade CO 96,000 rubles. Additional money is to be
found for civilian organizations and structures catering to the
This latter is Serdyukov's pet idea. The minister is
convinced that it is wrong for servicemen to draw kitchen details
or sweep streets in their respective garrisons because combat
training is all they ought to be focused on. Outsorceing already
enabled the Defense Ministry to enlist the services of 380,000
civilian specialists working for the military.
According to Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Bulgakov,
contracts for repair of 4,500 vehicles were signed with civilian
organizations. The military is permitted to fuel its vehicles at
civilian gas stations (and even have its aircraft and helicopters
fuelled by civilian organizations) in 84 Russian cities. Bulgakov
said that nearly every brigade had a civilian laundry working for
it. "It is civilians who do the washing... and the cooking by the
way," he said. There are no civilians only on surface combatants
and submarines of the Navy.
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Most Russians believe USSR could have won WWII even without Allies - poll
MOSCOW. June 22 (Interfax) - Most Russians believe that the Soviet Union could
have won WWII even without assistance from the Allies, the Yury Levada Analytical
Center told Interfax based on the results of a public opinion poll.
As many as 60% of Russians are sure that the USSR would have won in WWII without
support from the Allies, while 32% hold the opposite view.
Asked to explain the Soviet Union's huge losses at the beginning of the war
against Nazi Germany, 29% said this happened because the enemy's aggression was
unexpected, 26% mentioned Germany's military and technological superiority, and
21% said this happened because of unskillful actions by the Soviet military and
political leadership.
In the view of 48% of those polled, Germany's aggression against the USSR on June
22, 1941, was not unexpected by the Soviet leadership, while 46% disagree with
Russia marks the Day of Memory and Grief on June 22, the date when the Great
Patriotic War against Nazi Germany began in 1941. In the run-up to this date,
specialists from the VTsIOM sociological service asked Russians about their
attitude toward the key nations participating in WWII.
The poll has shown that 39% of Russians like the Italians and the Frenchmen each,
38% the Japanese, 35% the Britons, 36% the Germans, 34% the Finns, 31% the
Americans, and 26% the Poles.
In general, from 52% to 60% of Russians have indifferent attitudes to all the
said nations that were involved in WWII.
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
June 23, 2011
Russia is losing its reputation of a highly-educated country
European business is frustrated with the shortage of highly-qualified specialists
By Sergey Kulikov
Foreign investors have traditionally regarded Russia's highly-educated population
as its most important competitive advantage. However, European companies' actual
experience in Russia quickly destroys this myth. Yesterday the European Business
Association (EBA) was presented with the results of a survey of entrepreneurs,
who consider the lack of qualified specialists to be one of the main obstacles to
doing business in our country. However, European businesses, operating in the RF,
are full of optimism and report rising profits.
According to one of the authors of the study, General Director of GfK-Rus,
Aleksandr Demidov, optimism among EBA members is rising. "According to the
survey, in 2010 70% of respondents, the heads of EAB member companies, reported a
rise in turnover, and only 13% reported a decline," he noted. "Another
interesting fact is that in 2011 investments, turnover, and profits will rise,
argue 72%, 79%, and 71% of respondents, respectively." The third conclusion,
drawn from the survey, is paradoxical one of the main obstacles in Russia
(besides the perennial corruption and bureaucracy) is a lack of qualified
personnel, say European businessmen.
Meanwhile, according to Demidov, usually Europeans make the decision to work in
Russia in the hope of a high-level of education and the availability of qualified
personnel in the country. "Initially, foreigners are attracted by the general
level of education and qualification in Russia, which is fairly high in
comparison to other countries. Whereas, in reality, they discover an acute
shortage of qualified, highly-specialized experts," says Demidov.
While commenting on this data, Aleksey Kozlov, deputy director of the Department
of Sales and Securities Trading at the UFS Investment Company, explains that the
paradox is found in the fact that in general, such as high school, education
continues to be on a relatively high level in Russia. "But further education,
specialized education, has significantly worsened in the last quarter century,"
he continues. "Many factors are to blame, but the main reason continues to be a
the lack of government involvement in the planning and support of universities
and vocational schools, which generates many economic problems."
At the same time, Oleg Telipko, general director of Agana, does not see a big
problem in this contradiction. "In my opinion, the wider a specialist's horizons,
the better it is for a company," says the analyst. "As for highly-specialized
trainin, that is an issue concerning elaborate in-house corporate programs for
the education and adaptation of the specialist."
Andrey Chernyavsky, a consultant with 2K Audit Business Consulting Morison
International, suggests that foreign companies are attracted to Russia by the
general level of our experts, which is indeed higher than in the developing
economies. And if a highly-specialized expert is needed, a company may have
problems finding such an employee in practically any sector. "This problem is not
specific only to Russia, but many European and Asian countries as well," he
However, Russia continues to attract foreigners looking for an opportunity of
making a profit in the growing market. And the desire for high profits outweighs
all of the negative corruption and bureaucracy factors. "Therefore, the 2011
profit forecasts made by the foreign companies working in Russia look so
optimistic," suggests Chernyavsky. "But in order for them to seriously invest in
production and to expand it, they need to have confidence in the future for 5,
10, 15, and more years to come. But how can they plan for development, if
business conditions can change dramatically? After all, tax rates, rules of
access to strategic industries designed for foreign companies, and the list of
strategic industries, itself, have changed repeatedly. Hence the modest rates of
"Verbally, optimism can be expressed endlessly," notes Oleg Telipko. "What
happens in reality is important. For now, it's hard to say that the situation in
the country is favorable for large-scale investments. Political uncertainly,
associated with the 2012 elections, also plays a certain role." Problems with the
judicial system are cited as some of the business obstacles.
At the same time, Dmitry Shusternyak, general director of FinExpertiza
Consulting, notes that the upbeat responses do not indicate optimism, but rather
the doom of the participants in the process. "Doing business in Russia is
attractive, but by far not all are able to succeed," he notes. "Besides, not many
immediately understand the difference between Moscow and the rest of Russia, as
the regional disparities in our country are enormous."
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
June 22, 2011
Privatizing Russia
Economists Signal Approval but Urge Caution as Russia Prepares for a New Round of
By Tai Adelaja
The Russian government may soon embark on the country's biggest privatization
journey ever, as the Kremlin redoubles efforts to attract foreign investors and
accelerate economic growth. The new privatization drive, which may kick off this
year, is expected to dwarf the country's previous chaotic offerings, which saw
oil and metal assets sold to well-connected oligarchs in the early 1990s. The
renewed impetus for another large-scale privatization, experts say, is a speech
by Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev last week in which he called for less state
involvement in the economy while promising more privatization.
Plans for the second wave of massive privatization were first announced last
year, when the government said it hoped to raise about one trillion rubles ($36
billion) by selling state assets over the next three years. Medvedev called the
plan "too modest" last week, and ordered the government to revise it by August 1.
The president said he wants a new plan that will loosen the state's airtight grip
on the economy by giving up majority stakes in the main state-owned companies. He
added, however, that state-owned companies in sectors of the economy deemed to be
of strategic importance should remain under government control.
The Kremlin's proposals include selling bigger stakes in state companies Rosneft,
Russia's leading oil producer, and VTB Group, the country's second-biggest
lender, Arkady Dvorkovich, the president's top economic adviser, told reporters
on Friday. Sales of state holdings in other key companies such as Sovcomflot,
Sberbank, Russian Agricultural Bank, Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port and
Murmansk Commercial Seaport are also on the table. The Kremlin hopes to boost
proceeds from asset sales by 50 percent to 450 billion rubles ($16.1 billion)
next year, and expects to collect at least the same amount annually in 2013 and
2014, Dvorkovich said.
While last year's privatization efforts were essentially meant to bridge gaps in
the budget, experts see the present privatization drive as an attempt by the
Kremlin to boost the effectiveness of the economy. "At the moment, there are no
gaping holes to plug in the federal budget," Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, the chief
economist at Troika Dialog, said. "If oil prices remain within the projected $105
per barrel, the oil revenues available to the country should be sufficient to
balance the budget within the next five months."
Russia's budget deficit hit 5.9 percent of GDP in the first eight months of the
year, as low oil revenues threatened its resource-based economy, which has lately
become a perpetual drag on president Medvedev's modernization efforts. But with
global oil prices again in upward swing, the Kremlin appeared in a hurry to
diversify the country's economy in part by luring foreign investors. But the
dominance of state-controlled companies in the economy is stifling such efforts
by undermining competition and threatening investment, Medvedev declared last
The latest rhetoric coming from Russian paramount leaders appears to indicate
that there is now a general agreement across the board on the need to put an end
to state capitalism in the country. Both president Medvedev and Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin have also talked of allowing greater foreign access to Russian
companies. Putin, who as president created a number of powerful state
corporations, told journalists in Paris on Tuesday that he and president Medvedev
shared a "joint program" for Russia's development. "I have said many times, in
different situations and to different audiences, that we are not going to build
any state capitalism," Reuters quoted Putin as saying. "The creation of state
corporations is not intended to increase the share of state property. It is
intended to pull together assets, consolidate them and raise their capitalization
and then take them to the market," Putin said.
"The question is no longer whether or not there will massive asset sales in the
near future," Evsei Gurvich, the director of the Economic Expert Group, said.
"There is a general consensus in government circles that Russia must reform its
raw-materials-oriented, monopolized and government-controlled economy and start
building a market economy. This is not an election gimmick. This is forced upon
the government by objective circumstances."
Alexei Moiseyev, the chief economist at VTB Capital, said a further argument in
support of sincerity and intensity with which the government will likely pursue
the present privatization drive is that revenues from assets sales are not meant
to boost the government's pre-election war chest. "I think asset sales will
follow the recent template, when most went to private investors," Moiseyev said.
"The president was very specific when he said he wants to do away with state
Yet some experts have expressed concerns over whether the government is capable
of conducting a privatization transparent enough to attract private investors. "A
lack of competitive bidding that will allow private investors to buy state assets
will leave them up for grabs by cronies who may turn public monopolies into
private monopolies," Gavrilenkov said. Gurvich believes that the only way to
ensure that assets that will inevitably end up in the hands of well-connected
Kremlin insiders will not be transformed into private monopolies is for the
government to "privatize and de-monopolize simultaneously." Another option,
Gavrilenkov said, is to declare another "people's IPO" or sell assets en-masse to
private equity investors and strategic buyers. "If past privatization experience
is any indication, the government seems determined to open up the economy to
private domestic and foreign investors."
But past experiences also include a long list of backdoor dealings when state
assets ended up in the hands of mysterious bidders, as in the case of seized
Yukos assets. "The $64 million question is who gets to buy these assets," said
Peter Westin, the chief strategist at Aton Capital. "A lot, of course will all
depend on the price. One can also speculate that some assets, especially in
transportation, previously a strategic sector, will be sold to Russian interest
groups rather than to foreigners."
With global oil prices on the rise, some experts believe that a Russian
government awash in oil revenue could easily be tempted to delay massive
privatization. "Rising commodity prices can indeed break the privatization
process in terms of speed," Westin said. But while fluctuating oil prices often
get the blame for delays in restructuring and reforms, he said, there are reasons
to expect the present privatization to pick up steam. "If we take the president
at his word, the clear-cut goal is to improve corporate governance and
transparencies in state-owned companies," Western said. "This is a different
agenda and it's likely to go ahead whatever the price of oil."
[return to Contents]
Russia's Putin wants offshore oil spill funds
MOSCOW, June 22 (Reuters) - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gave his
backing on Wednesday to a bill that would require oil companies seeking offshore
exploration licences to set aside financial reserves that would be used in event
of an oil spill.
Putin told a government meeting that the bill, if approved by the parliament,
would only allow those companies with "sufficient resources and (financial)
reserves" to work on the shelf.
Russia is one of many oil producing countries looking to tighten safety
regulation in the aftermath of last year's disaster at BP's (BP.L) deep-water
Macondo well when 5 million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico.
The law will apply to all offshore zones on Russia's continental shelf including
Arctic waters, which hold Russia's largest untapped oil and gas reserves.
Only state-controlled energy companies Rosneft (ROSN.MM) and Gazprom (GAZP.MM)
can obtain Arctic shelf licenses, but because neither company has sufficient
technological expertise or offshore experience to develop complex offshore
projects, they are in partnership talks with foreign companies.
The new law could push up exploration costs. Rosneft is talking to Chevron
(CVX.N) about a possible Arctic oil partnership after the collapse of a deal
British oil major BP (BP.L).
Gazprom picked Norway's Statoil (STL.OL) and France's Total (TOTF.PA) to develop
Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea.
Rosneft has also said that oil majors Shell (RDSa.L) Exxon (XOM.N), China's CNPC
[CNPET.UL], Malaysia's Petronas [PETR.UL] and Brazil's Petrobras (PETR4.SA) are
candidates for Arctic deals.
Natural Resources Minister Yuri Trutnev told reporters after the cabinet meeting
that before an energy company is allowed into an offshore project, it will have
to estimate the project's spill risks and then prove that it has the cash,
insurance policies or bank guarantees sufficient to cover them.
"The size of (a company's) reserve fund will depend on the technology used as
well as on the pollution level that could result from an emergency situation. The
company calculates the amount, but it has to go through a state examination," he
[return to Contents]
Business New Europe
June 23, 2011
Are you a Russia bull?
Renaissance Capital
Our key message to Russia investors is that, post-crisis, they should expect to
see less robust, but still solid, growth rates. More importantly, these growth
rates should be less volatile as Russia has now embarked on an admittedly slow,
yet in our view genuine, set of reforms.
In that sense, we define as a Russia bull an investor who believes Russia's
medium-term growth potential is around 4-5%. Pre-crisis growth was driven mainly
by total factor productivity as Russia had considerable underutilised resources
that were subsequently employed in more productive sectors. However, we think
post-crisis performance will see the emergence of a new growth paradigm, centred
on the rotation of growth drivers towards capital accumulation. The recognition
of this phenomenon may still be crystallising, but the increase in the
investment-to-GDP ratio constitutes the key ingredient in attaining potential GDP
growth of 4-5%. Even this is not guaranteed, however, hence we do not think an
investor should consider herself bullish if she believes investment spending will
indeed be ramped up to overcome unfavourable labour dynamics.
This may seem materially lower than the pre-crisis growth average of 7-8%, but is
consistent with a view of the world characterised by subdued G-10 growth and less
scope for sustained increases in oil prices. The view that Russia should somehow
return to its pre-crisis growth momentum still seems to be prevalent among many
investors. However, we calculate that about half of the pre-crisis growth was
driven by sustained multi-year oil price increases, and we are sceptical that
history will repeat itself. Growth rates of 7-8% are possible, but only on a
meaningful reversal of the demographic slump and very strong productivity growth.
Realised GDP growth rates of about 4-5% should therefore be interpreted as
positive signs of an economy achieving its potential. Many have found 2010 and
early 2011 growth figures disappointing, but seen through the lenses of the
Russia bull, the 4-4.5% GDP prints should rather be interpreted as signals that
Russia is growing close to, if still not at, its full potential.
Russia is also often singled out as underperforming the rest of the BRIC
economies in terms of GDP growth, but in terms of GDP per capita growth - which
is the key driver of living standards - Russia fares much better. Russia's growth
performance over the past three years has failed to measure up to that of its
BRIC counterparts, in particular against the background of its pre-crisis growth
rates. However, when assessed on a per-capita basis, the differences in growth
rates are much smaller, and we forecast Russia to accelerate the strongest this
Key macroeconomic challenges, including the uncomfortable prospect of running
twin deficits by 2014-2015, are compelling the country to reform. The
twin-deficit problem lays bare the need to improve Russia's business climate in
order to attract the requisite foreign financing. Reading the leaves on
authorities' intentions is a perilous game, but in our view, a new and more open
frame of mind is now taking hold in the Kremlin.
We think reforms will provide the basis for a less volatile economic performance
along a lower post-crisis growth trajectory - although one consistent with
Russia's potential. One would be remiss to assume any changes will take place
rapidly: we think it much more likely that they will be implemented only in an
evolutionary manner. Therefore, although one should tread very cautiously when
trying to extrapolate from a few data points, we think there is more serious
underlying momentum to the current reform agenda.
WTO accession is but one example of this, and should be a key catalyst for
reforms. Some still question the benefits for Moscow, given that Russia's
commodity exports already face only minor import duties; but this, again, misses
the key point, in our view. The key benefit will lie in Russia having to import
rules and regulations that will open up uncompetitive sectors, in particular
business services, thereby improving the overall business climate. We think most
households will also benefit from WTO accession, despite some transitional
[return to Contents]
June 20, 2011
Should Five Percent Appear Too Small: Medvedev & Russia's Social Insurance Tax
By Kevin Rothrock
On March 30, 2011, President Medvedev gave a speech in Magnitogorsk, where he
announced a series of executive orders aimed at improving Russia's miserable,
"bad, very bad" investment climate. In an apparent effort to reach out to
business interests, Medvedev declared that social insurance payroll taxes
(strakhovye vznosy) were too high, and he ordered the government to work out a
tax reduction plan, due on his desk by June 1, 2011. That deadline came and went,
as officials brushed off Medvedev's directive and loosely advised a return to the
subject perhaps in a year. Vladimir Putin dragged his feet and Finance Minister
Aleksei Kudrin openly criticized as fiscally irresponsible the idea of lowering
the social tax (the main revenue source supporting Russia's pensions system).
Commentators speculated that this was a standoff, between either Putin and
Medvedev or between Medvedev and cabinet members like Kudrin. As talk turned to
tax cuts favoring just small businesses, many wondered if the President would
backtrack on his effort to reduce taxes for all and settle instead for reductions
affecting only some employers. (In his March speech, he never singled out
different-sized businesses.)
On June 8th, Presidential Aide Arkady Dvorkovich told the press that the
government would spend two weeks debating two possible tax cut ideas: one plan in
which reductions would be made only for medium and small businesses, and another
plan that would lower payroll taxes for everyone, marginally more so for small
businesses. Dvorkovich signaled that the Administration preferred the first
option (given the greater priority of alleviating smaller entrepreneurs), but
added, "If such a business-friendly scheme cannot be reached, then we are left
with only the second option. There simply won't be another way." On June 14,
2011, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov revealed to the media that the
first tax cut plan had "no chance" of becoming a reality, as dividing taxes into
three tiers would be "technologically" unfeasible.
It's worth noting that members of the business community have long warned that
increased rate differentiation and favored categories will simply increase
evasion and push entrepreneurs to either break up their businesses or pay more
employees under the table. For decades, the Russian economy has been plagued by
massive tax evasion. Salaries 'in envelopes,' also known as 'grey pay,' is an
unfortunate reality of Russia's tax collection situation, and has been a major
feature of the social tax debate. Officials like Shatalov have proposed levying a
small tariff on higher income brackets (currently untaxed), in order to recover
some of the revenue lost by Medvedev's tax cut. Yet, just as officials have
highlighted the difficultly of determining 'business size tiers,' any effort to
collect money from higher earners will undoubtedly lead to new schemes aimed at
hiding or dividing income. This is a problem Russia has and will continue to
After Dvorkovich's press conference, it seemed Russians would have to wait until
June 22nd, before the government would announce its recommendation to the
President, who in turn would approve or reject the final tax cut plan.
Then, on June 16th at the Petersburg International Economic Forum, President
Medvedev announced before Dvorkovich's 'two weeks' timetable was up and
apparently without the government's formal recommendation that the state would
implement the second tax cut scheme: social insurance taxes would fall from 34 to
30 percent for salaries paid at most businesses, dropping to as low as 20 percent
for small businesses. The 'compromise' was a belated and partial, but still
surprising, fulfillment of Medvedev's Magnitogorsk speech, when he ordered his
cabinet to try to return tax rates across the board to what they were before new
changes took effect this past January. Before 2011 s social tax reforms, the
federal pension fund was financed mostly by the United Social Tax (the ESN). This
year, the ESN was eliminated and replaced with increased social insurance taxes,
raising the total payroll burden from 26 percent to 34 percent. The amount of
state revenue flowing specifically to the Pension Fund was 20 percent of salaries
under the ESN and rose to 26 percent under expanded social insurance taxes. (The
remainder of the tax money finances the Social Insurance Fund, Mandatory Medical
Insurance Fund, and Territorial Health Insurance Fund.)
Aleksei Kudrin, Russia's indefatigable fiscal conservative, opposed the tax cuts
publicly, warning in April that other taxes would have to rise as a result.
Before Medvedev's official order (while the Kremlin and the ministries of
Economic Development and Public Health were still just kicking around the idea),
Kudrin warned that cutting the social insurance tax for small and medium
businesses down to 14 percent would result in the loss of 120 billion rubles.
Despite Kudrin's call for alarm, it has been difficult to tell in the tax debate
who exactly is warring with whom. Economist Maksim Blant, a columnist for
Newsru.com and contributor to EZh, initially interpreted the battle to be between
Medvedev and Kudrin. In April, Blant authored an interesting piece about the
divide between the country's elite, splitting the camps into proponents of (a)
deficit spending and (b) surplus accumulation. Blant argued that Medvedev's
Magnitogorsk initiative was a pre-election populist stunt: cutting taxes without
cutting state spending (that is, running a deficit). "When [Putin] was
president," Blant claimed, "he, as a rule, did not encroach on the MinFin's
domain, requiring only a bit of extra financing before elections to raise
pensions and state employee salaries." With Medvedev, Blant continued, things are
different: he can't trust Kudrin to simply handle the budget and secure his
reelection. (Gazeta.ru was also cynical about Medvedev's motives, concluding in a
June 7th editorial, "Everything will end in a political compromise: they will
lower taxes on businesses before the elections, and reduce social spending
immediately afterward.")
On June 8, 2011, after the government failed to meet the President's deadline for
a tax cut plan, Blant announced a total victory for Kudrin over Medvedev. "It is
no secret," he wrote, "that the main opponent of lowing the social insurance
taxes is Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, and he became the main victor." Blant
was so convinced of Medvedev's defeat that he went so far as to proclaim the
death of his entire reelection campaign, titling the article "A Farewell to
Now skip ahead to June 17th, the day after Medvedev's Petersburg speech (where he
announced the social insurance tax compromise). In his Newsru.com column, Blant
writes the following:
"Having integrated into his own platform key theses expressed in recent months by
Finance Minister Kudrin (except perhaps for the unpopular idea of raising the
retirement age), Medvedev is obviously trying either to enlist the support of a
key member of the current cabinet in the battle with his potential rival,
Vladimir Putin, or (more likely) trying to attract to his side forces
dissatisfied with Putin's authoritarianism but in favor of Kudrin's liberal
As Blant's change of heart about the relationship between Medvedev and Kudrin
indicates, social insurance taxation is part of an issue convoluted and important
enough to inspire serious intrigue: the future of the pensions system.
Earlier this month, as Medvedev's deadline was sailing by, it was apparent that
some in the government wished to postpone social tax reforms until next year,
given the impending need for a massive overhaul of the pensions system itself.
This redesign would rival changes made at the outset of Putin's presidency,
occurring early in the next President's administration in order to provide
maximum 'breathing room' between inevitably unpopular cutbacks and the next
election in 2018. The biggest changes to come will likely include: (1) raising
the number of work years necessary to qualify for a full pension, (2) returning
pension funding to a pay-as-you-go system, and (3) introducing "demographic" and
"macroeconomic" benefit-determination powers for the state.
The first reform is widely popular with market liberals, craftily allowing the
government to pressure people to work longer, without formally raising the
retirement age. (The numbers often floated are 15 years for a minimum pension and
30 years for a full pension.)
The second idea means scaling down the individually-owned pension investment
accounts funded by the nakopitel'naia portion of pension benefits, which is
funded by a 6 percent payroll tax. Currently, the rest of social insurance taxes
(amounting to a 20 percent payroll tax) funds the strakhovaia chast', which feeds
the Pension Fund. Half of this money goes to pay current pensioners. For more
than two years, Deputy Minister of Healthcare Yuri Voronin has raised concerns
about the shortcomings of the pension investment accounts (the nakopitel'naia
chast'), arguing that its gains fail to overcome inflation.
According to Vnesheconombank, the yield (between 2006 and 2008) of pension
investment accounts owned by low earners was 3.71 percent annually, and the
average profits of private pension management companies was negative 2.8 percent
annually. During that same period, the annual inflation average was 11.4 percent.
Voronin has said that the Healthcare Ministry would like to make the investment
accounts optional for workers, allowing Russians the choice between
nakopitel'naia or strakhovaia deposits for that 6 percent bit of their payrolls.
Voronin says the only thing undecided is which option should be the default.
In May earlier this year, Anatoly Puzyna (president of 'Sotsium,' a private
pension fund) went on Ekho Moskvy and defended his organization's record on
inflation, when asked why the government shouldn't simply liquidate the
nakopitel'naia system. Puznya claimed to have earned almost 10 percent for
investment accounts in 2010 (which is slightly above the current inflation rate
of 9.6 percent and higher still above the year's average).
The third major potential pension reform has experts most worried. Voronin
describes it in the following deliciously Orwellian terms:
"It is a complicated integrated coefficient that will take into account the
demographic and macroeconomic burden. It will be calculated annually from an
actuarial perspective. [...] Our proposed formula is complicated, but it corrects
liabilities subject to a changing macroeconomic and demographic situation,
forbidding the acceptance of unfounded liabilities that are not covered by social
insurance taxes, and simplifying for citizens the calculation of their pensions.
Above all, the new formula will allow [us] to take social taxes from all income,
lower the rate, and eventually balance the pension system's revenue and
expenditures. Ideologically, we have come to the point of no other alternatives."
After Voronin made those remarks on June 9th, INSOR's Evgeny Gontmakher visited
Ekho Moskvy the same day to review what such reforms would mean for the pensions
system. Regarding the 'demographic and macroeconomic' coefficient, Gontmakher had
this to say:
"It's an absolutely Soviet mechanism. It's like in Soviet times, when there
wasn't any insurance scheme at all. [...] Then everything was determined by the
decision of the state. Then very little depended on the pensioner himself. [...]
Here it's the exact same thing: it's not the person who will decide what kind of
pension he'll have, striving to earn [the maximum] and this ideology by the way
was introduced back in 2002. And now once again the state is going to decide for
you. People, what have we come to?"
The following week, on June 16th, EZh published a Gontmakher article exploring
the long-term meaning of the proposed pension reforms. According to the INSOR
insider, the nature of cutbacks to the pension system reveals the profound
"catastrophe" facing Russia. "Our economy," Gontmakher writes, "frozen in its own
archaism, is already in the near future (the next 3-5 years) unable to provide
even the low living standards that are today characteristic for the majority of
the population." He concludes with a dire warning that the authorities' dwindling
ability to develop the country could empower "some kind of underground
charismatic" leader, perhaps leading to "a new Manezh" that is, a new wave of
populist violence.
Are Gontmakher's concerns more than alarmism? If Medvedev's tax cuts were a
pre-election giveaway to ingratiate himself to businesses and tax-payers, will
the state follow up (after 2012) with budget-balancing cutbacks to the pensions
system? Or will a struggling economic situation derail liberals' goals of
reducing the government's economic presence, requiring continued deficit-spending
to prevent the kind of immiseration and unrest foretold by Gontmakher?
Whatever his fiscal plans for the future, Medvedev's maneuvers throughout the
social tax debate fill another chapter in the book of 'Looks Like He's Running
For President': issuing unambiguous executive orders in front of TV cameras,
refusing to wait two weeks for the government's late recommendation, and sticking
with the tax cut plan that more closely fulfilled his original initiative.
Medvedev appears to have overcome officials who sought to deny him this populist
opportunity. Were his opponents the liberals, worried he would bankrupt the
pension fund? Or maybe it was the siloviki, convinced the state would later raise
taxes on their pets, the oil and gas industries, in order to balance the budget?
The obstructionism that washed up against Medvedev's tax cuts might also have
been entirely political: certain people in the government could simply have
wanted to deny the President a chance to appease the business community. Mostly
likely, all of these groups made some effort to interfere with Medvedev's plan.
In the end, the President accepted a compromise, but in the process scored an
unmistakable political victory.
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EU, Russia in poisonous vegetable row over costly ban
By Christian Spillmann (AFP)
June 22, 2011
BRUSSELS - The EU and Russia locked horns Wednesday over Moscow's costly ban on
European vegetables with Brussels announcing an imminent end to the embargo that
was swiftly denied by Russia.
Russia's three-week old ban on EU vegetables due to fears of contamination from
Germany's deadly E.coli outbreak would be lifted "this week, or even tomorrow",
said a spokesman for the EU's executive, the European Commission.
"An agreement was signed this morning between the EU and the Russian Federation.
We are heading towards an immediate resumption of exports of European
vegetables," said Frederic Vincent, spokesman for the health commissioner.
"Exports will be able to resume this week, or even tomorrow," he added.
But moments later in Moscow, the head of Russia's consumer protection watchdog
threw doubt on the end of the ban affecting 25 percent of Europe's vegetable
"As far as the claim that it will happen immediately, these rumours are
exaggerated," Rospotrebnadzor chief Gennady Onishchenko told the Interfax news
agency after a Moscow round of negotiations aimed at ending the ban.
"We are introducing a special regime. No embargo has been lifted," he separately
told the RIA Novosti news agency.
Asked to comment on Moscow's position, Vincent told AFP: "I can confirm exports
will resume from tomorrow from Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland."
Russia slapped an embargo on fresh EU produce on June 2, amid the E. coli
outbreak in Germany. As outrage mounted among Europe's fruit and vegetable
farmers, the two sides agreed at a June 10 summit to move toward a certification
system, paving the way for a resumption of trade.
About a fifth of Russia's vegetable imports come from the 27-nation bloc.
Europe's vegetable exports to Russia bring in 600 million euros ($860 million) a
year, mainly from Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Belgium.
Vincent said that under an EU-Russia accord struck early Wednesday, the EU would
supply Russian authorities "temporarily" with laboratory "surveillance and
verification" papers to certify the products did not carry the deadly bacterium.
Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland have already put in place an E.coli
monitoring and certification system.
The European Commission will transmit to Russia's health authorities "the names
of the relevant national authorities competent to sign a certificate that must be
stamped on exports for Russia, and the names of the national laboratories
accredited to monitor the vegetables," the commission said.
The certification system will be a temporary measure kept in place until 10 days
after the last human case of E.coli is reported in the EU.
In Moscow, Onishchenko said the two sides had reaffirmed the principles agreed by
European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso and President Dmitry Medvedev at a
June 10 summit.
The two sides since have struggled to pin down the details since that meeting,
and Russia said imports would remain suspended until all safety concerns were
Onishchenko said Russia and the EU still needed to agree on a list of European
laboratories whose food testing standards meet Moscow's requirements.
"Everything depends on when they submit the lab list to us," Onishchenko said.
"Then we will resume" imports, he added.
[return to Contents]
Obama wants Russia trade vote before WTO deal: trade official
By Doug Palmer
June 22, 2011
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Barack Obama wants Congress to approve
"permanent normal trade relations" with Russia this year, before the former Cold
War enemy finishes its negotiations to join the World Trade Organization, a U.S.
trade official said on Wednesday.
"It's clear that Russia's ambition is to complete the accession process and
become a WTO member by the end of the year," said Chris Wilson, assistant U.S.
trade representative for the WTO and multilateral affairs.
"Our focus is on trying to achieve a vote before" that happens, Wilson said
during a panel discussion of remaining issues blocking Russia's entry into the
world trade body.
Wilson said it was important that Congress approve permanent normal trade
relations, or PNTR, before a final WTO accession deal is reached to ensure U.S.
exporters immediately get the full benefits of Russia's entry, which could occur
this December at a WTO ministerial meeting.
If lawmakers fail to approve PNTR and revoke a Cold War-era provision known as
the Jackson-Vanik amendment, WTO rules would allow Moscow to deny the United
States the new access it has negotiated in the Russian market while providing it
to other WTO members, he said.
But many lawmakers see a vote on PNTR as a proxy for a vote on Russia's WTO
accession and have resisted past efforts to approve PNTR before a final WTO deal
is struck.
They have taken that line even though Jackson-Vanik was originally passed to
encourage Russia to allow Jews to emigrate freely, and Washington has judged
Moscow to be in compliance with that requirement since 1994.
In addition, concern over Russia's record on human rights and its commitment to
the rule of law are expected to enter into the debate on PNTR, requiring the
Obama administration to mount a major lobbying effort with Congress if it serious
about winning approval, one congressional aide said.
Although talks on Russia's bid to join the WTO have taken years, Wilson said
Moscow appeared to see a window of opportunity to finish the process this year,
before the 2012 Russian presidential election.
"It's certainly plausible and conceivable to us" that a final deal can be reached
in 2011, Wilson said.
Russia has already made a lot of progress on that front but two big remaining
issues involve how Russia will harmonize its food, plant and animal import safety
rules with global standards and Russian rules for investing in the automotive
sector that have raised some concern, Wilson said.
Separately, Russia must consolidate all the tariff cuts it agreed to make in
bilateral negotiations with the United States and some 50 other WTO members into
a single tariff schedule.
Related to that, Russia hopes to finish negotiations this month with the United
States, the EU, Australia, Brazil and other WTO members on new tariff-rate quotas
for imported poultry, pork and beef, Wilson said.
Washington also wants further evidence Moscow is serious about enforcing
intellectual property rights, he said.
Russia has been working to resolve trade concerns with Georgia, with which it
fought a brief war in 2008, so the Caucasus nation will not block its entry into
the WTO.
"We are very supportive of that effort," Wilson said, noting the Swiss government
has played an important role in shuttle diplomacy between the two.
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
June 23, 2011
Russia had better start demand genuine parity and sincerity in data exchange with
the United States
Author: Major General Midykhat Vildanov, Professor of the Academy of Military
When the Russian-American START treaty came into force, the
U.S. Department of State published data on American and Russian
offensive strategic weapons. The United States was reported to
have 882 deployed delivery means with 1,800 nuclear warheads and
Russia respectively 521 and 1,537. The former was said to have
1,124 ballistic missile launchers (deployed and mothballed) and
the latter, 865.
Experts, functionaries, and particularly media outlets
meanwhile agreed that these figures mattered little. These figures
only indicate that Moscow and Washington are quite close to
meeting the arms reduction quotas specified by START; that
American missiles and warheads outnumber the Russian by 30%; that
American nuclear forces beat their Russian analog by all
parameters; that no information on quantities and types of
delivery means is available; that the Americans only provide exact
information when Russia can verify it and that they might and
probably do lie when it cannot; and that the Russians learn about
the condition of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces from the
U.S. Department of State.
What commentators and most experts missed was that the
Americans gave an incorrect figure (1,800 warheads) when
disclosing the might of their strategic offensive forces. This
nuance does not check with the principles of transparency and
openness the Russian-American relations are supposed to be based
on. This conclusion is confirmed by the following arguments that
reflect the author's point of view.
State officials and the military know that the ground
component of the American strategic offensive forces includes 300
Minuteman-IIIM missiles (each carrying 3 warheads) and 150
Minuteman-IIIS (one warhead). Four hundred and fifty ballistic
missiles in all and 1,050 warheads. It is known as well that it is
possible to up the number of warheads Minuteman-IIIS missiles
carry to three. (The Americans retained this capacity when they
shamelessly reneged on their obligations under START I.) The
casing the Americans used to disguise their missiles prevented
Russian inspectors from seeing how many warheads each missile
actually carried. Russia's spiritless protests were always turned
down or plainly ignored. Media outlets in the meantime quoted Rose
Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and
Compliance, as saying that "... we will finally get information on
Russian MIRVs." Said Gottemoeller, "Our inspectors will finally
verify the actual number of warheads on Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.
No previous international treaty permitted this truly
unprecedented form of verification and inspection." How come
Russia makes no statements such as this? Something like the
following, "At long last Russian inspectors will be given a chance
to verify that American ICBMs and SLBMs carry as many warheads as
they did when START I expired (December 5, 2009). Casings will be
such as to enable the Russians a look inside, the way the Russians
did when displaying Yars missiles to the Americans. Russian
experts will finally confirm that American B-1B bombers called
conventional weapons are conventional indeed without the capacity
of being converted into delivery means for nuclear weapons"?
[return to Contents]
Russia to export military helicopters to Afghanistan under deal with U.S.
LE BOURGET, France. June 22 (Interfax-AVN) - Russia is to supply 21 Mil Mi-17
helicopters to Afghanistan in 2011-2012 to a total of $350 million under a
contract with the U.S. Department of Defense, the leader of Russian state arms
exporter Rosoboronexport's delegation to the current international air show in Le
Bourget, Sergei Kornev, told reporters.
Kornev said the contract had not yet taken effect. "After a contract is signed,
it's usually three months before a presidential or government directive is ready.
After that the contract comes into force," he said.
The Americans chose the equipment to be installed on the helicopters. Some of the
equipment will be U.S.-made, Kornev said.
[return to Contents]
US Pullout Plan Essentially Means Division of Afghanistan
Moskovskiye Novosti
June 22, 2011
MN Columnist Arkadiy Dubnov report on the future of Afghan-American relations:
"Beginning of the End of Enduring Freedom"
US President Barack Obama will today tell his compatriots and the rest of the
world how in July the withdrawal from Afghanistan of the first American soldiers
will begin and also how he sees the handover of this country's territory by 2014
to the control of the Afghan army and the security forces.
Two days ago US Defense Secretary Robert Gates officially confirmed that talks
with Taliban spokesmen were being conducted by American diplomats.
If we add to these two announcements the fact, which became known at the start of
May, of the elimination of America's main enemy, Usama Bin Ladin, they all
constitute parts of a single whole: Washington is eager to secure as much as
possible the conditions of a dignified end to Operation Enduring Freedom, which
began almost 10 years ago.
The stated aim of the operation at that time--the crushing of the Taliban
regime--has proven unattainable for the mightiest world power. For some this is a
sorry lesson, for some, it goes without saying. Afghanistan has for the umpteenth
time in the 150 years proven its unreceptiveness to Western values.
But this conclusion is fair in regard merely to the part of the country which is
populated predominantly by the Pashtun tribes. It is there, in South and
Southeast Afghanistan, that power de facto belongs to the Taliban, who are
strictly establishing Shari'ah law, which entirely conforms to Pashtun
traditions. The Americans have been forced volens nolens to recognize this, and
the nascent negotiations with the Taliban are of evidence of it.
In order to stimulate these partners invincible by American "freedom" to the
desired concessions, the UN Security Council, under pressure from Western
countries, passed two separate resolutions with lists of sanctions. One, with
members of al-Qa'ida, was even broader than earlier. The other, with the leaders
of the Taliban, was shorter, some of whom were removed from the sanctions and
legalized for participation in the talks.
The purpose of the talks, we may assume, is an aspiration to dispose the
so-called "moderate" Taliban to recognition of the present constitution of
Afghanistan and to renounce combat operations against the government troops and
contingents of the Western coalition. But other objectives have become apparent
as of late also: in exchange for compliance with the above conditions, to offer
the Taliban a formal transfer to their control of power functions in the
provinces where they effectually rule as it is. In other words, the world is
ready to reconcile itself to Shari'ah practices where the local populace is ready
to recognize them. But on one condition: the United States retains control over
Afghanistan as a whole, for which five large American military bases will remain
in the country for a long time. These are those that already exist in Bagram near
Kabul, Shindand in the west on the border with Iran, in the east in Nangahar
Province on the border with Pakistan, and in the south in Kandahar, and, finally,
a base in the north, in Mazar-e Sharif, that is being built at this time.
This plan, which in reality signifies the division of Afghanistan into zones of
influence, could suit a sizable part of the Afghan elite, both Pashtun and that
representing other ethnic and religious communities, which would have an
opportunity to pursue secular statehood projects.
However strange, such a prospect would hardly suit the present Afghan leadership
led by President Hamid Karzai. Endeavoring to distance himself from the Americans
that brought him to power and threatening them with the sorry lot of occupation
forces, Karzai is attempting to find support in Pakistan, China, India, and
Russia. This search for a balance of interests will most likely in the coming
years constitute the main content of the geopolitics focused on Afghanistan.
[return to Contents]
The Hill
June 22, 2011
Congress deserves a voice on human rights in Russia
By Samuel Charap
Samuel Charap is director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American
The death of the young lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in pre-trial detention in a Moscow
prison in November 2009 was a horrific crime, with serious implications for the
development of the rule of law in post-Soviet Russia. Congress is right to be
But the legislation recently introduced to address the Magnitsky case neither
furthers the cause of democratic development in Russia nor provides justice for
his apparent murder. And it would be a mistake, as some have suggested, to use it
as a "replacement" if and when Congress does graduate Russia from the provisions
of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
In its time, Jackson-Vanik, a provision added to the Trade Act of 1974, was a
model of effective U.S. rights-promotion policy. It linked granting of normal
trade relations with then-communist states to their providing freedom of
emigration to their citizens.
Until 1992, the president had to certify annually that the Soviet Union and its
allies respected this fundamental human right for trade to proceed. The pressure
on the Politburo in part compelled an opening, and millions of Soviet Jews and
other minorities who faced systematic discrimination were able to emigrate.
If Russia's WTO accession talks conclude soon as hoped, Congress is likely to
consider legislation exempting Russia from the amendment's provisions - although
it has had no practical impact since the Soviet period, if Jackson-Vanik stays on
the books, the US will be in violation of WTO rules and American firms would
stand to lose big.
It is in this context that the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2011, introduced by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.), has received renewed interest from
members. The bill would compel the Secretary of State to compile a list of those
she has "reason to believe" are responsible for Magnitsky's persecution and
death, the fraud committed against the company, Hermitage, he was representing at
the time, as well as anyone else found to have violated the rights of those who
exposed abuses by the Russian government. Those on the list would be denied visas
and face asset freezes.
Some have claimed that this would represent an effective new forum for Congress
to engage on these issues given the likely impending repeal of Jackson-Vanik.
They're wrong.
First, while Jackson-Vanik dealt with a universal right on a global scale, this
bill is targeted at one individual's case in a single country. While the U.S.
government is in a position to make a judgment about another government's
implementation of the freedom to emigrate, it cannot possibly make definitive
public judgments - nor should it - about the guilt of individuals for a specific
crime committed in a foreign country.
(That's not to say the State Department need grant individuals it suspects of
criminal activities visas - indeed, applications from such individuals are denied
regularly.) That the bill specifically calls for investigation of a private
firm's claims of financial machinations by the Russian government is particularly
inappropriate - all the more so given that the company is led by a British
citizen who allegedly renounced his U.S. citizenship to avoid paying U.S. taxes.
Second, Jackson-Vanik was targeted at communist countries with entrenched
one-party systems that by their nature systematically deprived their citizens of
basic human rights. Russia's political system today, for all its many flaws, is
not the Soviet Union of 1974; far from a consolidated democracy, it is also not a
static autocracy.
Its transformation from the Soviet system - far more non-linear and drawn-out
than Western observers predicted - is ongoing. Its legal system, for example, has
undergone significant changes since Magnitsky's death to strengthen
anti-corruption mechanisms and prevent pre-trial detention for all economic
crimes. And the move to online tenders for government contracts has sparked
unprecedented publicity surrounding kickbacks.
Clearly, all is far from roses, but the point is that Russians themselves, not
the Secretary of State, are the only ones who can create accountability for
Sergei Magnitsky's death and build the rule of law in their country. The United
States can help, by facilitating their efforts, voicing support, speaking openly
about cases like Magnitsky's, and drawing the Russian government into as many
norm-based international institutions (like the WTO) that create binding legal
obligations as possible.
Finally, unlike Jackson-Vanik, the Magnitsky legislation is unlikely to be
effective. One thing is for sure: it will change the conversation in Moscow about
his case. Currently, it evokes outrage among the politically active, but for
Russia's largely apolitical new middle class, who saw in Magnitsky one of their
own - a competent professional just doing his job - the case has been a rallying
cry (if muted) to push behind the scenes for change.
If this bill passes, the conversation will be about the United States. It would
provide convenient cover for the perpetrators of the crimes the bill sanctions,
who can easily travel elsewhere and find other banks.
Congress deserves a voice on human rights and the development of the rule of law
in Russia. When China's exemption from Jackson-Vanik was granted in the 1990s,
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which monitors human rights and
the development of the rule of law, was created.
A similar body could be created for Russia - though it's important to manage our
own expectations about creating change, as opposed to facilitating and assisting
it, in complex societies like these.
Or Congress might consider a boost in funding for some of the innovative
approaches to these issues pursued by the Obama administration, including efforts
on U.S.-Russia civil society to civil society cooperation, that saw a group of
Russian government officials and NGO leaders come to Washington earlier this
month to meet with a wide array of relevant stakeholders and get into the nuts
and bolts of anti-corruption measures. The bill before Congress, however, would
not do justice to Magnitsky, or the legacy of Jackson-Vanik.
[return to Contents]
US Department of State
June 7, 2011
Assistant Secretary Posner's Remarks to the U.S. Russia Civil Society Working
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael
H. Posner
Co-Chairman Surkov, Co-Chairman McFaul, distinguished fellow participants in the
Civil Society Working Group (CSWG): Welcome to you all. It is a pleasure to see
many of you again and to meet new colleagues. I hope our deliberations today will
deepen and expand the discussions we held last year in Russia.
I would like especially to acknowledge Ombudsman Lukin and thank him for his
principled and dedicated efforts on behalf of the rights of his countrymen and
women. His valuable and constructive support of the role of Russian civil society
is helping to establish the foundation for a democratic Russia in the 21st
The working group discussions last year included an exchange on experiences from
both countries, set in the context of relevant international obligations and
commitments. Today, I would like to build on those discussions and on the
exchange of views that are taking place today and offer some thoughts on the way
The working group best exemplifies what President Obama called for in his meeting
with civil society activists at the parallel summit in July 2009a reset not only
between our two governments but between our two societies. He recognized that the
reset needed to be broader than arms control and security, to focus on common
opportunity and "the future of progress and prosperity that we build together."
Each of the working group topics child protection, corruption, migration and
prison reform is compelling and complex in its own way. None of these issues is
unique to Russia or the United States; they are shared challenges. Yet, we know
that every choice or model or measure that works for Russia is not going to work
for the United States. But in the many meetings and discussions we have had over
the last year on these subjects, we are demonstrating that we can learn from each
Moreover, by helping to facilitate partnerships between American NGOS and
activists and their Russian peers, we are giving them the chance to show that the
best ideas and solutions come from engaging at the grassroots level, with
ordinary citizens who are involved in their communities and in their countries to
mobilize change.
There are many other opportunities for partnerships and there are still many
challenges that we should be meeting together.
Each of these topics is also relevant to the broader topic of security and human
rights. We expect our governments and law enforcement to provide a basic level of
security to our people for example, to protect them from those who would do
harm, such as terrorists or criminal elements. At the same time, many societies,
including the United States and Russia, are grappling with the appropriate
mechanisms and venues for detention, interrogation and prosecution of those
suspected of national security violations.
In the United States, we have been engaged in a sometimes painful national debate
about the Guantanamo Bay detention center. The Obama Administration remains
committed to transferring or trying all suspects and eventually closing the
facility at Guantanamo, but the process has proved much longer and difficult than
we had anticipated.
In the post 9-11 world, we face other new challenges, as does every sovereign
government. We seek to regulate migration into our country to ensure that it
takes place legally, but also safely and in a manner that ensures the safety,
dignity and human rights of migrants. That is a huge challenge for a country such
as ours with long borders and one of the most open societies in the world. Our
country has been enriched culturally and economically by migration. American
families and businesses have extensive ties overseas. We strive to strike the
right balance between security and our openness, which serves both our interests
and reflects our values as nation.
As noted in President Obama's National Security Strategy, we reject as false the
choice between the pursuit of our security interests and our values. In all of
the areas that our working groups are discussing today, we strongly believe human
rights values and security interests are more likely to be effectively advanced
when governments and civil society work together. Indeed, we believe that
respecting and supporting human rights at home and abroad is integral to our
domestic wellbeing and our national security.
Fundamental to our success will be sustaining vibrant and open civil societies. I
believe the way forward for Russia, the U.S. and other nations lies in getting
five crucial elements right:
First, consistent with our meetings here today, there must be an engaged and
informed civil society. Governments must meet their responsibilities in each of
these spheres, but governments alone cannot resolve all of these challenges. They
must work in partnership with experts and advocates from civil society. Many of
you here today can attest to the value of initiatives resulting from such
interaction and partnership. We note with regret that even as U.S. and Russian
activists are gathered in Washington to discuss these issues, a brutal attack
took place in Moscow against Bakhrom Khamroyev, an activist of the
highly-respected Memorial human rights enter. Mr. Khamroyev was badly beaten by
unknown assailants in what appears to be a clear attack against him for the work
he was doing on behalf of Memorial. We condemn this attack on Mr. Khamroyev. We
call on the authorities to work quickly to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Governments must take extra measures to protect human rights defenders when they
come under attack.
Second, progress requires a free media. Media freedom is essential to raising
public awareness, identifying problems, opening discussion, and bringing problems
to light so that corrective action can be taken. The role of a free and
independent media is especially crucial and especially challenging in combating
corruption and other abuses of power, whether on the part of elements of
government or powerful corporate interests. I came of age in the Watergate era, a
tumultuous time both socially and politically in this country. Two tenacious and
courageous journalists and their newspaper exposed abuses of power at the highest
levels of our government. And, in the end, our constitutional system of checks
and balances allowed us to address official misconduct. The role of media as
watchdog is not always comfortable for me or other government officials and for
powerful private interests, but an independent media is essential to the
integrity of any democracy, U.S. democracy included. The state needs to be in the
forefront of protecting freedom of the press, providing a secure environment that
ensures the safety of journalists who investigate corruption or criticize
government officials or policy. When journalists die in war zones, it is a
tragedy, but in some ways understandable, as they are placing themselves in
harm's way to report the story. But when journalists in a country at peace are
nonetheless the victims of violence because of their work, it should serve as an
alarm bell to governments.
This year, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted that Russia has made
measurable progress in addressing serious problems of impunity for violence
committed against journalists. Senior Russian investigative officials reopened
several unsolved cases involving journalists who were murdered. Prosecutors won
convictions in the 2009 murder of reporter Anastasiya Baburova and human rights
lawyer Stanislav Markelov. And last week's arrest in the case of Anna
Politkovskaya was an important achievement. But as civil society activists are
advocating, there also needs to be progress in bringing to justice the
perpetrators of the remaining unsolved murder cases, such as those of journalists
Paul Klebnikov and Natalia Estemirova.
Governments must also protect those journalists working in new media. In this
regard, as our colleagues here in the anti-corruption field can attest, the
growth of the Internet has brought tremendous opportunities for journalists and
bloggers to shed light on corruption and for governments to become more
transparent. Increasingly, these bloggers develop a following, like Alexei
Navalny, who has captivated Russia with his innovative approaches to combating
corruption. But they also have suffered physical attacks as a result of their
work, and there are far too many efforts by the state to harass or bring charges
against them in an attempt to pressure them to stop their inquiries. Both
President Obama and President Medvedev have embraced the potential of the
Internet in connecting government with the public and in combating corruption. We
share the challenge and obligation of protecting those journalists who criticize
Third, an overarching climate of respect for the freedoms of expression,
association and peaceful assembly is fundamental to a robust civil society and a
free media. These principles are also firmly rooted in international human rights
instruments, as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Here in the United States we have a long history of citizens who
assemble, sometimes in the face of brutal resistance, to press for their rights.
Peaceful demonstrations were instrumental in achieving women's suffrage, labor
rights, civil rights for all, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
people and people with disabilities. And we have learned through our national
experience at times a painful experience that our democracy is the better for
it. Today, we have a vocal citizenry that consists of individuals who exercise
their right to assemble and express their views, often in large numbers.
People in our country express passionate views on every conceivable issue, from
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to political figures and their agendas, to
globalization, the environment, health care, migration reform, and tax policy.
The overwhelming majority of these demonstrations take place without any
significant incident or restriction. Police work to ensure that all demonstrators
can exercise their rights in safety and that other citizens are able to proceed
with their activities. In the relatively few cases where there are allegations
that unreasonable restrictions have been imposed on demonstrators, or law
enforcement has overstepped its authority, these charges are taken seriously and
Governments, including through law enforcement, must work to ensure an
environment in which all citizens can exercise their fundamental freedoms. Our
primary emphasis must be on the exercise of rights, not on the restriction of
those rights. Of course, there are times when it is challenging for local
governments to guarantee the right to freedom of assembly and make sure
demonstrations can be held in a peaceful fashion. You may have read about the
case of Terry Jones, a Christian pastor who has burned the Koran and who
attempted to hold an anti-Sharia demonstration in front of a mosque in the city
of Dearborn, Michigan, which has a large Muslim population. The city denied him
permission to hold the demonstration in front of the mosque on the grounds that
it could incite a riot, saying he could demonstrate elsewhere, and Jones is
appealing a court decision requiring him to than pay a $1 peace bond. Civil
society groups have held inter-faith demonstrations in support of the Muslim
community of Dearborn, and civil liberties groups have defended Jones'
constitutional right to free speech even though many Americans deem what he is
saying to be highly offensive. So Dearborn has been having a lively public debate
and the media have been covering the story very closely.
And as the Dearborn example shows, in our country it seems that each generation
rediscovers for itself the value of the freedom of assembly the universal right
of people to gather together, voice views, share ideas and urge change. And each
generation learns that this freedom is essential to a strong society that taps
the talent and creativity of its people. We have been following the Strategy 31
demonstrations held in various Russian cities, so named after Article 31 of the
Russian Constitution which protects freedom of assembly. Like others in Russia
and in the international community, we have observed that authorities in Moscow
are allowing some Article 31 demonstrations, while disrupting others. Freedom of
assembly takes on even greater significance in this pre-election season. We echo
serious concerns expressed by many members of Russian civil society that last
week's demonstrations in St. Petersburg and Moscow were broken up by police. We
also noted that last month, for the sixth year in a row, Moscow authorities
refused permission for an NGO to hold a parade for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender pride. We believe these and all individuals have equal rights to hold
peaceful protests and see no legal justification for denying such a request. We
also share concerns about reports of and attacks by private security guards,
police, and other parties on activists associated with the Khimki Forest
environmental campaign. Whether in Dearborn or Khimki Forest, our governments
have the obligation to protect peaceful demonstrators, even when they are
critical of government or expressing unpopular views. Freedom of assembly is
integral to freedom of religion. We share concerns about police raids on places
of worship and subsequent detentions of minority religious groups.
The fourth essential ingredient for progress is adherence to the rule of law.
Within our society, we frequently see that the rule of law, including an
independent judiciary, is a powerful recourse for the most vulnerable, including
the people that many of you work with children, migrants, persons in confinement
and minorities of all stripes. The rule of law and an independent judiciary help
protect their human rights, obtain justice, and redress grievances.
For example, a few weeks ago the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a court order
mandating a state prison population reduction in California. This was necessary
to remedy violations of persons' constitutional rights resulting from
overcrowding in California's state prison system. The court ordered the prison
system to reduce the number of prisoners held by 55,000 within three years. This
court decision made the front pages of our major newspapers and headlined
newscasts on our leading television networks. It underscores the fact that an
independent judiciary can and does protect the human rights of all individuals.
This is an important corrective mechanism.
We applaud President Medvedev for speaking out in support of the rule of law and
judicial reforms and for creating an atmosphere that has permitted progress in
some areas. We hope the Russian media and Russian organizations and institutions,
like their American counterparts, will continue to scrutinize the justice system,
support improvements and speak out about challenges. For example, we continue to
be concerned by the lack of progress in the investigation into Sergei Magnitsky's
2009 death of deliberate medical neglect in a Moscow prison. We join President
Medvedev's in calling for justice in Magnitsky's death, when he said last month
that there "should be an objective, thorough and comprehensive investigation
conducted quickly and its findings must be presented to the public."
The fifth requirement for countries to succeed in a 21st century world is
transparent, accountable, responsive government. By this I mean governmental
systems with built-in checks on abuse of governmental power, independent
oversight structures, and free and fair contested election processes that permit
a free airing of issues of concern. The run-up to elections is always a season of
heightened civic awareness and activism. Media and public interest in social and
political issues intensifies. This is a good thing it connects people to their
governments and prompts politicians to respond to the issues their voters care
about, and that is precisely what makes democracies work better for their
citizens. Free and fair elections renew and reinvigorate the compact between
citizens and their government. In this country, we already see the parties, the
political hopefuls, the public and the press organizing themselves for our
Presidential elections in November, 2012. We welcome international attention to
our elections and international monitoring of them.
When the five elements that I have just described are present a robust civil
society, media freedom, respect for fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and
accountable government we are convinced countries tend to be more resilient,
adaptive and capable of addressing tough issues, including the challenging ones
on which all of you are working. Citizens feel the system will treat them fairly,
and that gives them a stake in its success. Investors feel the legal system will
treat them fairly, and they are more inclined to invest and reinvest. But where
civil society is weak, government is unresponsive, corruption corrodes the rule
of law and undermines citizens' trust in authorities and institutions, and
marginalized populations have little expectation that they will be treated
fairly, citizen have less stake in the success of their own societies. And these
countries tend to be less able to cope with change, less stable and ultimately,
less successful.
Of course these five elements of sustainable democracy are much easier to
describe than to put into practice. Even under the best of circumstances,
progress on these complicated issues will take years of concerted effort by
governments and citizens alike. But as Secretary Clinton has said: "Democracies
demonstrate their greatness not by insisting they are perfect, but by using their
institutions and their principles to make themselves... more perfect."
President Obama, Vice President Biden and Secretary Clinton all have expressed
their strong support for a democratic, modern and successful Russia governed by
the rule of law. Expanding the ability of Russian individuals and groups to
exercise their basic rights will help Russia become the strong, rules-based,
peaceful and prosperous democracy we all desire.
And now, I look forward to hearing from you.
[return to Contents]
RIA Novosti
June 23, 2011
Twenty years after the Balkan tragedy
By Feodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal the
most authoritative source of expertise on Russian foreign policy and global
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia, two republics of the former Yugoslavia,
declared independence. Although political tensions provoked by ethnic strife
started in Yugoslavia long before that, that day 20 years ago is seen as the
beginning of a bloody fratricidal war that was to be the genesis of seven new
European states.
Developments in the Balkans in the 1990s and the 2000s showed that ethnic and
religious conflicts, which had smoldered for decades, if not centuries, can flare
up easily even in the seemingly civilized context of modern European society.
Militant nationalism exterminated the healthy green shoots of development, and
foreign peacekeepers' best intentions warped into blatant cynicism in which
double standards were presented as a moral victory.
The Balkan tragedy is far from over because the borders have not been delineated
and the future of the diverse peoples across the region remains unclear.
Furthermore, European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, which in the past thought
they had the right to decide the region's future, are seeing their ability to
implement their plans atrophy.
Slovenia is the only former Yugoslav republic that is prospering. It seceded from
the federal state without bloodshed, does not consider itself a Balkan state, and
is a member of NATO and the European Union.
Croatia joined NATO but procrastinated too long over the extradition of a very
popular Ante Gotovina in the country general, who is charged with anti-Serb war
crimes, preventing it from being admitted into the EU in 2007. The EU expansion
wave then subsided, as the EU faced too many problems to bother with admitting
new members.
The other day the European Commission said Croatia could become a member in 2013.
However, many Croatians lost their optimism about EU membership after General
Gotovina was sentenced to 25 years behind bars and the EU's economic problems
started to escalate.
Serbia has fulfilled nearly all the Hague Tribunal's requirements. It extradited
Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb military leader accused of war crimes, thus
removing the final obstacle to EU accession talks. The nation is split over
joining the EU. People are weary after losing the wars, and tired of the
opportunistic and unprofessional authorities in Belgrade: they are simply not in
any state to stage protests.
In any case, the decision does not rest with their government. The EU will likely
consider Serbia's membership request in a package with the other regional
Montenegro seems to be problem-free: it is de facto part of the Eurozone and the
EU economic space.
Macedonia has been bickering with Greece over its name for 20 years. Three years
ago Athens blocked its NATO admission and plans to oppose its entry into the EU
down to the last minute.
Although Albania is a NATO member, it is also one of the most socially and
economically unsettled countries in Europe.
Five EU countries still refuse to recognize Kosovo, but it will likely be
admitted together with the other countries of the region due to its status as a
European protectorate. After all, leaving it unattended would only increase
problems. Serbia will hardly protest because its protests would make no
difference anyway.
The biggest regional problem rooted in the 1990s is Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H).
Created after the civil war, this artificial state has been plagued by political
crises despite external governance.
The authorities of Republika Srpska, one of the two political entities within
B&H, have been looking for loopholes in the Dayton agreements, which put an end
to a three-and-half-year war in Bosnia, that would allow it to declare
independence. The Muslim-Croatian Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other
entity within B&H, has not formed a new government since last year's elections.
In short, the three communities still seem to be heading for divorce.
The West first formulated its position in the mid-1990s, when Bosnia and
Herzegovina was created. It had changed dramatically by the late 2000s when the
Kosovo issue was put on the agenda. In 1995, the country's various ethnic
communities were not allowed to go their separate ways after a bloody fratricidal
war. They were told instead that they must learn to live in a multicultural
state. In 2008, the West applied the opposite approach to Serbia and Kosovo,
clearly thinking it would be better to let them split rather than forcing them to
The viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is debatable but any new re-division of
the Balkans would be a nightmare that Europe could not survive. This is why B&H
stands to gain more from EU and NATO membership than any other country in the
region because that alone will give it a chance for a controlled evolution.
Even presuming that developments across the Balkan states take a positive turn,
this will not expedite their EU admission. The European Union is trying to
overcome a deep conceptual crisis, and so the idea of admitting new members that
are still plagued by unresolved problems is rejected by the general public and
politicians alike.
The EU is approaching a fundamental internal change, and no one can tell what the
union will look like in a few years' time. Candidate countries are in fact
seeking admission to an association that essentially no longer exists.
Unfortunately, the risk is that without the EU umbrella, the fragile peace that,
for now, prevails in the Balkans may shatter (NATO is much less useful in this
respect), creating new big problems for the rest of Europe.
The tragedy that began in the Balkans 20 years ago is far from over.
[return to Contents]
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