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[OS] 2011-#118-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-17 17:00 GMT
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Johnson's Russia List
5 July 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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Your source for news and analysis since 1996n0
In this issue
1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: TWO SOURCES, TWO ELEMENTS. SOCIOLOGISTS SAY THAT 54% (!)
2. www.russiatoday.com: Parliamentarians debate limits to freedom of expression.
3. Vedomosti: DEATH STUDIED TWICE. The death of Sergei Magnitsky: an update.
4. Interfax: Head Of Russian President's Human Rights Body Welcomes Report On
Lawyer's Death.
5. ITAR-TASS: Investigators blame lawyer Magnitsky's death on prison medics.
6. Interfax: Rights activists to give press conference on Magnitsky case at
7. Stratfor.com: Russia's Evolving Leadership.
8. www.RussiaTakingStock.com: John Connor, Medvedev vs. Putin in 2012.
9. RIA Novosti: Medvedev's 2011 budget address: an attempt to preserve the
political balance.
10. Moscow News: Sharing the burden. (re budget address)
11. RIA Novosti: 'No revolutions' in Russian parliament's upper house -
12. Vedomosti: Mikhail Fishman, REMOVING A GOVERNOR. TRUST IN THE POWER VERTICAL
13. Moscow Times: Nikolai Petrov, Matviyenko, Don't Pack Your Bags Just Yet.
14. Reuters: Russian tycoon Prokhorov hints he wants Putin's job.
15. Kommersant: "I NEED POWERS BECAUSE I HAVE NO TIME FOR TALKING." An interview
with Right Cause leader Mikhail Prokhorov.
16. BBC Monitoring: Unregistered Russian opposition party adopts election
17. Interfax: Russian nationalists kill 14 people in first half of 2011- human
rights campaigners.
18. Moscow Times: Vladimir Ryzhkov, Europe's No. 1 Violator of Human Rights.
19. Moscow News: To cheat or not to cheat? (re school exams)
20. Kommersant: Medvedev Bombarded by Complaints at Meeting With Scientists.
21. Interfax: Russia must launch scientific mega projects - Putin.
22. RIA Novosti: Senior Russian army officers resign over military reforms -
23. Russia Profile: Advertising Abortion. While Small-Scale Anti-Abortion
Initiatives Have Found Some Footing in Russia, the Public Has Balked at More
Sweeping Legislation.
24. Russia Profile: A Disappearing Habit. Despite Limited Success for Electronic
Books and Decorated Authors among the Intellectual Elite, Russians as a People
are Reading Less.
25. Moscow Times: John Freedman, War Breaks Out Backstage at Taganka Theater.
26. RIA Novosti: Politics, accounting difficulties behind Bank of Moscow's
27. Moscow News editorial: Moscow's banking skeletons.
28. Reuters: ANALYSIS-Taxes, investment gap hinder Russia oil output rise.
29. Moscow Times: Skolkovo 'Population' Grows by 21.
30. Moscow Times: Nanotechnology Stands at the Crossroads.
31. New York Times: Russia Meets With NATO in New Push for Libyan Peace.
32. Interfax: NATO's ground operation in Libya to lead to unpredictable
consequences in region - Russian deputy FM.
33. Moskovskiye Novosti: DIFFERENT MISSILES. Sochi talks between Russia and NATO
ended in a failure.
34. RIA Novosti: Russia and NATO agree to wait until Chicago.
35. Interfax: Russia Says Consultation On Talks On New Conventional Forces Treaty
In Impasse.
36. Interfax: Medvedev Hopes For Positive Results From Obama's Next Visit To
37. Moscow Times: Beyrle: Visas Bigger Deal Than Arms Pact.
38. Interfax: Nuclear disarmament beneficial for both Russia, U.S. - poll.
39. Moscow Times: Michael Bohm, Our Answer to Magnitsky.
40. CNN: From the studio in downtown D.C., it's Russia on your radio. (re Voice
of Russia)
41. www.redorbit.com: NASA Dependence On Russia Looming.
42. RIA Novosti: Survey Ship Sails To Arctic To Strengthen Russia's Territorial
43. Relative Majority of Ukrainians Say CIS Has No Future - Poll
44. Moskovskiye Novosti: MILLER'S SCISSORS. Russian gas prices are more than
Ukraine can afford.
45. Izvestia: WHETHER OR NOT PROBLEM OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH HAS SOLUTION. Experts
say that the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be solved by negotiations.
Fortunately, they also say that there will be no war.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 5, 2011
Author: not indicated
[Russia is in need of political modernization.]
President Dmitry Medvedev keeps talking of the necessity of
political modernization as well as economic. The latest opinion
poll Levada-Center conducted indicates the desired direction of
the political reforms. The poll was conducted in the last ten days
of June.
As it turned out, 22% Russians would not have known who to
vote for had the election been scheduled for the nearest week-end.
Twelve percent would have boycotted the election altogether and
11% are thinking about it.
These figures plainly indicate the apparent weakness of the
institute of political offer in Russia. As matters stand, 45%
Russians are either apolitical or fail to see in Russia a
political party that represents their views.
This weakness of political offer results in frustratingly low
turnouts. Turnout in the meantime is one of the principal
parameters of legitimacy. An emerging democracy like Russian ought
to be interested in a high turnout.
The opinion poll also exposed a fairly high demand for
political competition as one of the sources of legitimacy.
Nineteen percent admitted that they would like to see both
Vladimir Putin and Medvedev running for president (as opposed to
having only one of them in the presidential race).
In March, the respondents who wanted both Putin and Medvedev
in the presidential race numbered 16%. Those who wanted Medvedev
alone numbered 18% in March and 15% nowadays. Assuming that
Medvedev succeeded in a partial conversion of his support into
support for political competition in general, we might say that
this is one of the first and as yet fragile results of the
political reforms.
For successful democratization, these 19% might prove to be
more instrumental than those who support the hypothetical reformer
against the no less hypothetical conservator. This competition
will mean a confrontation resulting in a legitimate success
recognized by both the winner and the loser (and their
electorates). This competition will mean that the defeated
candidate might turn the tables and come in first in the next
election. It will install a regime that will automatically and
naturally involve society in politics.
Success of political reforms in Russia depends on two
elements - on how the demand for political competition is met and
how political offer is improved.
[return to Contents]
July 5, 2011
Parliamentarians debate limits to freedom of expression
During a meeting with Russian NGOs, representatives of the Interior Ministry and
the Federal Security Service have claimed that information being published on the
internet is increasingly coming into conflict with the interests of civil
The Interior Ministry department which deals with cybercrimes, the so-called
"Department C", believes that internet media hosts should be held responsible for
users whose comments are judged to be extremist in nature. These statements
follow a recent decree from President Dmitry Medvedev, who ordered the Ministry
of Communication to prepare a draft law stipulating accountability for the
comments posted by internet media participants by August 1.
As for parliamentarians, there is no unified opinion on the issue. Aleksandr
Pochinik, Deputy Head of the Federation Council Commission for the Development of
Civil Society, is categorically against making media providers responsible for
the statements made by their readers.
"There should be no accountability limiting freedom of expression," he told
Regions.ru website. Still, he suggested that moderators should cleanse websites
of overtly fascist propaganda, intolerance and drugs. But this is more of an
ethical question than a legal one.
His colleague, head of the Federation Council Commission for the Development of
Civil Society Valery Shnyakin, agrees that the media should monitor the content
of readers' posts. However, she goes one step further, believing that a legal
framework should be created to provide for the imposition of certain sanctions
against media outlets that are found to have violated the law.
"Today on the internet, it is possible to find instructions for how to make a
bomb followed by a call to detonate it immediately, as well as ... direct
solicitations to commit crimes," Shnyakin said.
Robert Shlegel, a member of the State Duma Committee for Information Policy,
believes there is a simple solution to the problem. In his view, comments should
not appear in publications without prior moderation.
"In this case, illegal information won't be able to make it onto the website,"
the deputy observed, adding though that not all media outlets have the
technological means to do so. He said that there is a need for an amendment
providing for the user's right to file complaints and demand that the internet
media providers delete certain posts.
"We also need [to establish] legal norms to guide media providers when dealing
with law-enforcement bodies who have found legal violations in this or that
[return to Contents]
July 5, 2011
The death of Sergei Magnitsky: an update
Author: Aleksei Nikolsky, Polina Khimshiashvili, Liliya Biryukova
Sergei Magnitsky of The Hermitage Foundation died in Matrosskaya
Tishina jail on November 16, 2008, because he was denied medical
assistance, according to experts of the Federal Center of Forensic
Examination of the Ministry of Public Health and Social
Development contracted by the Russian Investigative Committee.
Experts told the Russian Investigative Committee that
Magnitsky's problems with health had not been diagnosed on time
and no aid had been given him on November 16. The Russian
Investigative Committee promised that those guilty would be
prosecuted but said that their names would be revealed
simultaneously with the pressing of charges. A source within the
prosecutor's office said that if the statement made by the Russian
Investigative Committee was any indication, then the blame for the
layers' death might be laid at the door of prison medics and
A spokesman for The Hermitage Foundation called prison medics
"instruments" wielded by the investigators and officers of the
Interior Ministry and tax inspectorates who had put Magnitsky
under pressure to stop him blaming them for embezzlement of 5.4
billion rubles from the budget (in a fraud designed to look like
return of the income tax). In May, the Russian Investigative
Committee said that the Prosecutor General's Office had found no
faults with the actions of investigator Silchenko.
Working group of the Presidential Council for Human Rights
will acquaint President Dmitry Medvedev with findings of the
independent investigation today. According to Council Chairman
Mikhail Fedotov, the report will also include evaluation of
medics' actions and performance.
Part of the report on Magnitsky's death and the role doctors
had played in it was written by human rights activist Valery
Borschev. As far as Borschev is concerned, Silchenko is definitely
among those guilty of the tragedy. A week before Magnitsky was to
be operated on in Matrosskaya Tishina, Silchenko engineered his
transfer to Butyrka. Medics there confirm that it was Silchenko
who stalled with the permission to move Magnitsky to the prison
hospital. According to Borschev, the permission was given on
November 16. "Prison wards and doctors lacked the power and guts
to challenge Silchenko."
As for medics, the report drawn by the Presidential Council
pins the blame on Matrosskaya Tishina Doctor Alexandra Gauss. When
Magnitsky told her that his life was in danger, Gauss decided that
he had had a nervous breakdown and summoned eight wardens and
According to Borschev, psychiatrists spent at least an hour
at the prison entrance, awaiting authorization to proceed. Both
they and Magnitsky's family commented on bruises they saw on the
body. Borschev said that Magnitsky could be actually battered to
The parliament of the Netherlands became the first foreign
legislature that backed the European Union and U.S. Congress in
the matter of economic and visa sanctions against Russian
functionaries and officials involved in the tragedy. Its lower
house adopted a resolution asking the government to take measures
to punish those guilty of Magnitsky's death. All 150 lawmakers
unanimously voted for the resolution on June 30. The rest is up to
the government of the Netherlands which, however, usually takes
time to consider resolutions such as this.
U.S. Senator from Maryland and a member of the Democratic
Party, Benjamin Cardin told Radio Echo of Moscow that the bill
might be adopted this year and the list of involved Russian
officials extended. It currently includes Aleksei Anichin (ex-
chief of the Investigative Committee of the Interior Ministry) and
Oleg Logunov (his former deputy, currently Chief of the Legal
Directorate of the Prosecutor General's Office), Deputy Prosecutor
General Victor Grin, officers of tax services who authorized the
return of income tax, eleven judges including Yelena Starshina
(Starshina would not even look at the documents showing him to be
seriously ill, four days before his death), and Matrosskaya
Tishina and Butyrka chief wardens.
The decision of the Netherlands not to let the involved
Russian functionaries enter this country does not mean that these
people are to become persona non grata in all other EU countries.
Insiders say that it will require a decision of the European
* * *
This is the fifth time when Russian diplomats are compelled
to deal with and react to black lists of the domestic siloviki and
bureaucrats involved in the lawyer's death behind the bars. Cardin
drew the first bill in connection with the matter last year. In
December 2010, Human Rights Committee of the parliament of Canada
and the European Parliament passed resolutions urging their
respective governments to deny entry visas to the Russian
officials involved in the tragedy and to arrest their assets in
these countries. Twenty-two MPs in London called for analogous
sanctions in March 2011. All these demarches aim to encourage the
Russian authorities to reactivate the investigation.
Moscow's antsy behavior in the matter and its screams that
Russian courts are being put under pressure are difficult to
explain. After all, not one of the resolutions has brought about
genuine sanctions as such. It goes without saying that Russian
courts will blithely ignore all these resolutions unless they are
given a clear and specific order to the contrary from the
executive branch of the government. Neither can Moscow complain
that foreigners meddle with Russian domestic affairs. After all,
the Penal Code (Part 3 of Article 12) permits Russia to press
charges against foreigners who committed crimes abroad if and when
these crimes were directed against Russian citizens.
Shame on Russian law enforcement agencies and, broader,
authorities, that foreign parliaments handle the death of a
Russian. Had the Russian law enforcement agencies promptly carried
out an impartial and transparent investigation and tried those
guilty, none of that would have happened. In fact, some of the
people believed to be involved in the tragedy were actually
promoted. How is that for justice?
The Russian Investigative Committee reported the forensic
expertise finished. It even said that charges would be pressed
soon. Who the charges will be pressed against is not known yet.
Medvedev expects a report from the Presidential Council for Human
Rights today. A fair trial will become Russia's best possible
response to demarches of foreign parliamentarians.
[return to Contents]
Head Of Russian President's Human Rights Body Welcomes Report On Lawyer's Death
Moscow, 4 July: The head of the presidential council for human rights, Mikhail
Fedotov, has said that rights campaigners agree with the conclusions reached by
the Russian Investigations Committee (RIC) that Heritage Capital foundation
lawyer Sergey Magnitskiy had died in a Moscow remand centre because of the
failure to provide him with medical care.
"The conclusions announced by the RIC today were reflected in our documents too.
I am satisfied with the fact that our conclusions fully coincide with those of
the Investigations Committee," Fedotov told Interfax on Monday (4 July).
On Tuesday 5 July the presidential council for human rights will present its
preliminary report on the Magnitskiy case to (President) Dmitriy Medvedev.
"Our preliminary findings do not deal with medicine alone, and not only with the
Magnitskiy case. We raise the issue of the state of prison medicine in general,"
Fedotov said.
He said that the Magnitskiy case should be investigated on all tracks, including
the corruption-related aspect. "One should deal with all the aspects, (including)
the corruption-related aspect of the Magnitskiy case. As far as we know, the
Investigations Committee is probing into this," Fedotov said.
Independent human rights campaigners blame Magnitskiy's death not only on the
prison doctors but also on the security structures (vernacular: siloviki).
Activists say that there has been so real investigation into Magnitskiy's death.
("Our report also contains names and personal data, so we to not deem it possible
to publish our report until it has been presented to the president," Russian
state news agency RIA Novosti quoted Fedotov saying. He also said that the only
after courts had delivered verdicts in the Magnitskiy case would it "be possible
to say that this part of the work has been completed". He said that it was
necessary to eliminate all the factors that had led to Magnitskiy's death in
custody: "This means eliminating problems in the system for providing medical
care in the institutions of the Federal Penal Service, and gaps in the
legislation," RIA Novosti quoted him saying.
Another RIA Novosti report quoted Anatoliy Kucherena, head of the Public Chamber
commission for control and reform of law-enforcement bodies, as saying that the
investigator who had asked the court to remand Magnitskiy in custody should also
be made personally responsible: "Before taking a person into custody, one should
be very attentive to the medical reports provided by the suspect," he said.)
[return to Contents]
July 5, 2011
Investigators blame lawyer Magnitsky's death on prison medics
By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova
One day before Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was to get a report on the
findings an independent probe into the death of Hermitage Capital fund's lawyer,
Sergei Magnitsky, has unearthed the Investigation Committee of Russia announced
that prison doctors will be brought to justice. The Investigation Committee
announced on Monday the results of a new forensic medical examination, which
discovered that inadequate medical assistance to Magnitsky "had a direct
connection with his death" and promised that in the near future the doctors would
be indicted.
The fund Hermitage Capital continues to insist on the guilt of police officers,
claiming that the doctors were an instrument in their hands, used to put pressure
on Magnitsky to force him make the expected depositions. The same opinion is
shared by human rights activists, who prepared a report on this subject for
Dmitry Medvedev.
Sergei Magnitsky died at a detention center in November 2009. According to
experts at the federal center for forensic examination, his death was due to the
failure to diagnose his illness in time and to provide proper treatment.
Moreover, during the exacerbation no medical care was provided. The investigation
committee is planning to bring criminal charges against medical personnel of
Moscow's detention center N 1, IC spokesman Vladimir Markin said.
Sergei Magnitsky, a 37-year-old legal adviser of the investment fund Hermitage
Capital, was accused of complicity in tax evasion. However, according to fund,
the 5.4 billion rubles paid by its companies to the state in taxes were stolen by
raiders, and some law enforcement officers were involved in the fraudulent
transaction. The fund links the theft with the criminal prosecution of Magnitsky,
who tried to expose the criminal scheme of defrauding the Russian budget.
According to Novaya Gazeta in this way tens of billions of rubles was siphoned
off from the treasury over several years and many Russian businessmen were
stripped of their possessions and sent to jail on trumped-up charges. Involved in
this scheme were many police officers, prosecutors, tax authorities, judges, and
In response to the IC statement an anonymous representative of Hermitage Capital
told the daily Vedomosti that prison doctors were tools in the hands of the
investigators, Interior Ministry officials and tax inspectors, who were putting
pressures on Magnitsky in a bid to make him to stop the exposures.
Human rights activists believe that the cause of Magnitsky's death requires an
in-depth probe. A statement to this was made by the chairman of the Presidential
Council for the Promotion of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, Mikhail
Fedotov. Today, the Council plans to hand over to Dmitry Medvedev its preliminary
report on the Magnitsky case.
"Our preliminary conclusion addresses not just medical aspects. And not only the
Magnitsky affair. We raise the question of the condition of prison medicine in
general," said Fedotov. According to him, the matter should be investigated along
all lines, including the corruption component.
Part of the report on the conditions in which Magnitsky was kept at the detention
center and doctors' measures was written by human rights activist Valery
Borschyov. The role of the investigator Oleg Silchenko was one of the main ones
in Magnitsky's death, he told Vedomosti. Silchenko insisted - a week before the
scheduled surgery in the Matrosskaya Tishina jail - on the lawyer's transfer to
the Butyrskaya prison. Silchenko for a long time prevented Magnitsky's transfer
to a hospital. The jailers could not disobey the decisions of the investigator,
said Borshchyov.
As for the medics involved, the report will point to Matrosskaya Tishina doctor
Alexandra Gauss as the main culprit. When Magnitsky told her that that somebody
wanted his death, Gauss concluded that he had a nervous breakdown and called
eight warders and a psychiatric ambulance team first. The ambulance van was not
allowed into the territory of the detention center for about an hour, said
Borshchyov. The wardens handcuffed Magnitsky and took him to an isolated box.
Magnitsky's body bore bruises, according to the ambulance doctors. The relatives
said the same. Borshchyov does not rule out that in reality Magnitsky died from
According to a member of the Council, Kirill Kabanov, the report by human rights
activists "will present well-founded suspicions of corruption and the names of
officials reportedly involved in this case, and a conclusion will be made on
medical abuse and judicial decisions." He said that one of their proposals was
"making prison medicine subordinate to the Ministry of Health and Social
"There are claims addressed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the
algorithm of judicial decision-making," said Kabanov, when asked what officials
were suspected of corruption in connection with the Magnitsky case.
The human rights organization Human Rights Watch believes that the investigation
of Magnitsky's death has shown progress.
"This is progress in the investigation," the deputy head of the Moscow Bureau of
Human Rights Watch, Tatiana Lokshina, said on Monday.
[return to Contents]
July 5, 2011
Rights activists to give press conference on Magnitsky case at Interfax
A press conference on the public investigation into the death of Hermitage
Capital lawyer Sergei Magnitsky will be held at the Interfax central office
(Pervaya Tverskaya-Yamskaya Ulitsa 2) at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, July 7.
Among the conference participants are members of the working group of the
presidential human rights council on the Magnitsky case, including Vaslery
Borshchev (chairman of the Moscow public observer commission), Mara Polyakova
(the head of the Independent Expert-Legal Council), Yelena Panfilova (director of
the center Transparency International - R), and Kirill Kabanov (the head of the
National Anti-Corruption Committee).
For accreditation, call (499) 250-88-32. Admission by press cards. Accreditation
ends one hour prior to the beginning of the conference.
[return to Contents]
July 5, 2011
Russia's Evolving Leadership
By Lauren Goodrich
Russia has entered election season, with parliamentary elections in December and
presidential elections in March 2012. Typically, this is not an issue of concern,
as most Russian elections have been designed to usher a chosen candidate and
political party into office since 2000. Interesting shifts are under way this
election season, however. While on the surface they may resemble political
squabbles and instability, they actually represent the next step in the Russian
leadership's consolidation of the state.
In the past decade, one person has consolidated and run Russia's political
system: former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin's
ascension to the leadership of the Kremlin marked the start of the
reconsolidation of the Russian state after the decade of chaos that followed the
fall of the Soviet Union. Under Putin's presidential predecessor, Boris Yeltsin,
Russia's strategic economic assets were pillaged, the core strength of the
country the KGB, now known as the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the
military fell into decay, and the political system was in disarray. Though
Russia was considered a democracy and a new friend to the West, this was only
because Russia had no other option it was a broken country.
Perceptions of Putin
Putin's goal was to fix the country, which meant restoring state control
(politically, socially and economically), strengthening the FSB and military and
re-establishing Russia's influence and international reputation especially in
the former Soviet sphere of influence. To do so, Putin had to carry Russia
through a complex evolution that involved shifting the country from accommodating
to aggressive at specific moments. This led to a shift in global perceptions of
Putin, with many beginning to see the former KGB agent as a hard-nosed autocrat
set upon rekindling hostilities and renewing militarization.
This perception of Putin is not quite correct. While an autocrat and KGB agent
(we use the present tense, as Putin has said that no one is a former KGB or FSB
agent), he hails from St. Petersburg, Russia's most pro-Western city, and during
his Soviet-era KGB service he was tasked with stealing Western technology. Putin
fully understands the strength of the West and what Western expertise is needed
to keep Russia relatively modern and strong. At the same time, his time with the
KGB convinced him that Russia can never truly be integrated into the West and
that it can be strong only with a consolidated government, economy and security
service and a single, autocratic leader.
Putin's understanding of Russia's two great weaknesses informs this worldview.
The first weakness is that Russia was dealt a poor geographic hand. It is
inherently vulnerable because it is surrounded by great powers from which it is
not insulated by geographic barriers. The second is that its population is
comprised of numerous ethnic groups, not all of which are happy with centralized
Kremlin rule. A strong hand is the only means to consolidate the country
internally while repelling outsiders.
Another major challenge is that Russia essentially lacks an economic base aside
from energy. Its grossly underdeveloped transportation system hampers it from
moving basic necessities between the country's widely dispersed economic centers.
This has led Moscow to rely on revenue from one source, energy, while the rest of
the country's economy has lagged decades behind in technology.
These geographic, demographic and economic challenges have led Russia to shift
between being aggressive to keep the country secure and being accommodating
toward foreign powers in a bid to modernize Russia.
Being from groups that understood these challenges, Putin knew a balance between
these two strategies was necessary. However, Russia cannot go down the two paths
of accommodating and connecting with the West and a consolidated authoritarian
Russia at the same time unless Russia is first strong and secure as a country,
something that has only happened recently. Until then, Russia must switch between
each path to build the country up which explains shifting public perceptions of
Putin over the past decade from pro-Western president to an aggressive
authoritarian. It also explains the recent view of Putin's successor as
president, Dmitri Medvedev, as democratic and agreeable when compared to Putin.
Neither leader is one or the other, however: Both have had their times of being
aggressive and accommodating in their domestic and foreign policies. Which face
they show does not depend upon personalities but rather upon the status of
Russia's strength.
Putin's Shifts
Putin, who had no choice but to appeal to the West to help keep the country
afloat when he took office in 2000, initially was hailed as a trusted partner by
the West. But even while former U.S. President George W. Bush was praising
Putin's soul, behind the scenes, Putin already was reorganizing one of his
greatest tools the FSB in order to start implementing a full state
consolidation in the coming years.
After 9/11, Putin was the first foreign leader to phone Bush and offer any
assistance from Russia. The date marked an opportunity for both Putin and Russia.
The attacks on the United States shifted Washington's focus, tying it down in the
Islamic world for the next decade. This gave Russia a window of opportunity with
which to accelerate its crackdown inside (and later outside) Russia without fear
of a Western response. During this time, the Kremlin ejected foreign firms,
nationalized strategic economic assets, shut down nongovernmental organizations,
purged anti-Kremlin journalists, banned many anti-Kremlin political parties and
launched a second intense war in Chechnya. Western perceptions of Putin's
friendship and standing as a democratic leader simultaneously evaporated.
Russia was already solidifying its strength by 2003, by which time the West had
noticed its former enemy's resurgence. The West subsequently initiated a series
of moves not to weaken Russia internally (as this was too difficult by now) but
to contain Russian power inside its own borders. This spawned a highly
contentious period between both sides during which the West supported pro-Western
color revolutions in several of the former Soviet states while Russia initiated
social unrest and political chaos campaigns in, and energy cutoffs against,
several of the same states. The two sides were once again seriously at odds, with
the former Soviet sphere now the battlefield. As it is easier for Russia to
maneuver within the former Soviet states and with the West pre-occupied in the
Islamic world, Moscow began to gain the upper hand. By 2008, the Kremlin was
ready to prove to these states that the West would not be able to counter Russian
By now, however, the Kremlin had a new president, Medvedev. Like Putin, Medvedev
is also from the St. Petersburg clan. Unlike Putin, he was lawyer trained to
Western standards, not member of the KGB. Medvedev's entrance into the Kremlin
seemed strange at the time, since Putin had groomed other potential successors
who shared his KGB background. Putin, however, knew that in just a few years
Russia would be shifting again from being solely aggressive to a new stance that
would require a different sort of leader.
Medvedev's New Pragmatism
When Medvedev entered office, his current reputation for compliance and
pragmatism did not exist. Instead, he continued on Russia's roll forward with one
of the boldest moves to date the Russia-Georgia war. Aside from the war,
Medvedev also publicly ordered the deployment of short-range ballistic missiles
to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, on the Polish border, and to Belarus to
counter U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense. Medvedev also oversaw continued
oil disputes with the Baltic states. Despite being starkly different in demeanor
and temperament, Medvedev continued Putin's policies. Much of this was because
Putin is still very much in charge of the country, but it is also because
Medvedev also understands the order in which Russia operates: security first,
pragmatism to the West after.
By 2009, Russia had proven its power in its direct sphere and so began to ease
into a new foreign and domestic policy of duality. Only when Russia is strong and
consolidated can it drop being wholly aggressive and adopt such a stance of
hostility and friendliness. To achieve this, the definition of a "tandem" between
Putin and Medvedev became more defined, with Putin as the enforcer and strong
hand and Medvedev as the pragmatic negotiator (by Western standards). On the
surface, this led to what seemed like a bipolar foreign and domestic policy, with
Russia still aggressively moving on countries like Kyrgyzstan while forming [] a
mutually beneficial partnership with Germany .
With elections approaching, the ruling tandem seems even more at odds as Medvedev
overturns many policies Putin put into place in the early 2000s, such as the ban
on certain political parties, the ability of foreign firms to work in strategic
sectors and the role of the FSB elite within the economy. Despite the apparent
conflict, the changes are part of an overall strategy shared by Putin and
Medvedev to finish consolidating Russian power.
These policy changes show that Putin and Medvedev feel confident enough that they
have attained their first imperative that they can look to confront the second
inherent problem for the country: Russia's lack of modern technology and lack of
an economic base. Even with Russian energy production at its height, its energy
technologies need revamping, as do every other sector, especially transit and
telecommunication. Such a massive modernization attempt cannot be made without
foreign help. This was seen in past efforts throughout Russian history when other
strong leaders from Peter the Great to Josef Stalin were forced to bring in
foreign assistance, if not an outright presence, to modernize Russia.
Russia thus has launched a multiyear modernization and privatization plan to
bring in tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars to leapfrog the country into
current technology and diversify the economy. Moscow has also struck deals with
select countries Germany, France, Finland, Norway, South Korea and even the
United States for each sector to use the economic deals for political means.
However, this has created two large problems. First, foreign governments and
firms are hesitant to do business in an authoritarian country with a record of
kicking foreign firms out. At the same time, the Kremlin knows that it cannot
lessen its hold inside of Russia without risking losing control over its first
imperative of securing Russia. Therefore, the tandem is instead implementing a
complex system to ensure it can keep control while looking as if it were becoming
more democratic.
The Appearance of Democracy
The first move is to strengthen the ruling party United Russia while allowing
more independent political parties. United Russia already has been shifted into
having many sub-groups that represent the more conservative factions, liberal
factions and youth organizations. Those youth organizations have also been
working on training up the new pro-Kremlin generation to take over in the decades
to come so that the goals of the current regime are not lost. In the past few
months, new political parties have started to emerge in Russia something rare in
recent years. Previously, any political party other than United Russia not loyal
to the Kremlin was silenced, for the most part. Beyond United Russia, only three
other political parties in Russia have a presence in the government: the
Communist Party, Just Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. All are
considered either pro-Kremlin or sisters to United Russia.
While these new political parties appear to operate outside the Kremlin's
clutches, this is just for show. The most important new party is Russia's Right
Cause launched by Russian oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov. Right Cause is intended to
support foreign business and the modernization efforts. The party at first was
designed to be led by Medvedev's economic aide, Arkadi Dvorkovich, or Finance
Minister Alexei Kudrin. However, the Kremlin thought that having a Kremlin member
lead a new "independent" political party would defeat the purpose of showing a
new democratic side to Russian's political sphere. Prokhorov has rarely shown
political aspirations, but he has a working relationship with the Kremlin. He
clearly received orders to help the Kremlin in this new display of democracy, and
any oligarch who survives in Russia knows to follow the Kremlin's orders. The
Kremlin now will lower the threshold to win representation in the government in
an attempt to move these "independent" parties into the government.
The next part of the new system is an ambiguous organization Putin recently
announced, the All Russia's Popular Front, or "Popular Front" for short. The
Popular Front is not exactly a political party but an umbrella organization meant
to unite the country. Popular Front members include Russia's labor unions,
prominent social organizations, economic lobbying sectors, big business,
individuals and political parties. In short, anything or anyone that wants to be
seen as pro-Russian is a part of the Popular Front. On the surface, the Popular
Front has attempted to remain vague to avoid revealing how such an organization
supersedes political parties and factions. It creates a system in which power in
the country does not lie in a political office such as the presidency or
premiership but with the person overseeing the Popular Front: Putin.
So after a decade of aggression, authoritarianism and nationalism, Russia has
become strong once again, both internally and regionally, such that it is
confident enough to shift policies and plan for its future. The new system is
designed to have a dual foreign policy, to attract non-Russian groups back into
the country and to look more democratic overall while all the while being
carefully managed behind the scenes. It is managed pluralism underneath not a
president or premier, but under a person more like the leader of the nation, not
just the leader of the state. In theory, the new system is meant to allow the
Kremlin to maintain control of both its grand strategies of needing to reach out
abroad to keep Russia modern and strong and trying to ensure that the country is
also under firm control and secure for years to come. Whether the tandem or the
leader of the nation can balance such a complex system and overcome the permanent
struggle that rules Russia remains to be seen.
[return to Contents]
June 30, 2011
Medvedev vs. Putin in 2012
By John T. Connor
John is the founder and portfolio manager of the Third Millennium Russia Fund
(TMRFX), and the author of Out of the Red, Investment and Capitalism in Russia.
He was the first president of @mail.ru. John is a graduate of Williams College
and he received his JD from Harvard Law School. He is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations.
This fall the members of Russia's State Duma, the national legislature, are up
for election and it is widely assumed that United Russia will again have a
comfortable margin although other parties will be represented in the next Duma,
as at present. Nationwide, thousands of candidates, representing three or four
organized parties, or no party, stand for election at all levels of government in
the Russian Federation on a continuing basis... Russia today is a free market
In March 2012, it is likely that four candidates for President of Russia will
once again offer themselves to the electorate. Both Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir
Putin have kept everyone guessing as to which man, as between these two
favorites, will vie for the head of government position... My hope and
expectation is that President Medvedev will be that man.
It is hard to overstate Vladimir Vladimirovich's accomplishments during his
tenure at the top since 1999. The situation he found upon his advent is spelled
out in Out of the Red (2008) and he certainly brought order from chaos and he and
his team enjoyed a tremendous GDP growth spurt in the mid-decade and made
admirable progress in helping to bring the Russian economy and its outstanding
companies into the modern era...
In a Valdai meeting, VV mused that FDR also had a long tenure due to national
crises in the US... At this point, VV is pushing up against FDR's tenure already
(FDR died early in his 4th term) and Russia today does not face crises comparable
to WWII following on the Great Depression. My own sense is that Putin has shot
his wad; leaders of private and public spheres typically do after 10 years at any
task... I never bought into the "a tandem cannot work" theory, though, and VV and
Dima have been a great team, working together effectively so if Putin continues
on as Prime Minister, they presumably can continue that run.
Medvedev can certainly be said to have met the test Yeltsin set for Putin in
showing strength and determination in the "Take Care of Russia" department. Putin
can be as proud of his judgment in moving Medvedev up as Yeltsin was of giving VV
the nod.
Medvedev gets it... He is not only a youthful, smart, sophisticated,
internationalist leader, he has innovated in the right areas and is determined
that Russia will build on its base of high tech brains and accomplishments and
move out into the world (Please God, let's get the WTO behind us) dynamically and
take Russia's place among modern nations, with the result of higher growth and a
more diversified economy. In short, better return for investors in companies in a
marginally higher growth economy (That's my job: to look for higher returns for
investors!). Perhaps even ameliorating the hurtful "Russia Discount" (the
market's multiple today is 8, way below the other BRICs)... Almost by
definition, for Putin to assert his right to once again be President would be a
step backwards for Russia, a step in the wrong direction, and could engender
increasing sclerosis in the economy... My judgment is he will not do it.
[return to Contents]
RIA Novosti
July 4, 2011
Medvedev's 2011 budget address: an attempt to preserve the political balance
By Kirill Rogov
Kirill Rogov is leading fellow researcher, Institute for the Economy in
At first glance, the 2011 budget address looks like it has all the right words.
However, its anodyne rhetoric will hardly alter the country's economic life
without political will. The address includes a conspicuous paucity of hard
figures every formula is evasively qualified and carefully worded. It mentions,
for instance, that more reliable tax control measures must not obstruct the
activity of honest taxpayers. The idea is all well and good and suits any budget
address, but, in reality, we see those conditions worsening.
The next paragraph is about value-added taxes: honest taxpayers cannot get around
it, but somehow dishonest players can. Government documents mention this issue
every year.
The few figures cited in the address are decidedly vague and do not correspond to
specific targets. Thus, it is proposed that the budget deficit be cut in half by
2013 as compared with 2009. In 2009, the deficit was 5.9% of the GDP, which would
put it at 3% by 2013. The reality is that the budget could already be
deficit-free thanks to high oil prices. What does 3% mean? How did we arrive at
this figure? De facto, we have a deficit-free budget even now.
At this point, we approach one of the address's main concerns the need to reduce
our dependence on oil revenues. This is indeed an urgent problem for the
budgetary and macroeconomic policy. How do we formulate new budget rules? What
portion of oil-and-gas revenues should be channeled into current expenses?
There are various proposals on how to formulate these rules, but the address does
not mention any of them. It merely presents a declarative appeal to reduce the
dependence on market-determined income without mentioning any mechanisms for
doing so.
On the one hand, additional budget revenues encourage expenses. On the other,
price fluctuations make us nervous from time to time and compel us to look for
other ways to compensate. We know that insurance payments are an urgent issue. In
fact, we are increasing the tax burden on the economy. The logic seems absurd we
have large additional revenues, but we are increasing the tax burden to balance
out the budget.
These are the main problems facing our budget. The first question is whether to
increase the level of tax exemptions. The second is how to calculate expenses
based on incoming revenue or in some other way? The address does not even mention
It turns out that it is possible to do remarkably little on the basis of this
address. All possible decision-making options are either suspended or well
I believe that this absence of political will has less to do with certain
features of our political structure or the forthcoming presidential elections
than many think. It is more indicative of a mainstream political trend that is
now taking shape. It may be described as follows: things are not bad enough for
the government to take action, but not good enough for economic players to see a
bright future for the Russian economy. Under the circumstances, the preservation
of political balances is a more important objective for the "broader" government
responsible for Russia's economic policy. They can simply ride on the inertia.
On the one hand, we have very high export revenues. On the other hand, we have
accumulated a number of problems, the resolutions to which are fraught with the
possibility of upsetting the balance. No one is ready to be held accountable for
changing the status quo. It is a systemic problem shared by Russia's economic
policy and its current politics the 2011 budget address only serves to more
clearly reflect it.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
July 4, 2011
Sharing the burden
By Oleg Nikishenkov
President Dmitry Medvedev's budget address for 2012-14 outlined key principles to
transform Russia to a state with a modern economy with decentralized power.
As President Medvedev said, quoted by his website, "Russia needs to put in place
a completely new economic growth model based on private initiative and genuine
massscale innovation.
The president also said that although Russia managed to achieve a stable
post-crisis recovery and carry out all of its social commitments, the existing
budgeting system does not correspond to the proclaimed modernization goals.
Medvedev's "12 points" in most aspects echoed his previous statements and
proposals, including one to reduce a payroll tax and leverage the budget gap by
increasing the tax burden on oil and gas sector, as well as on the alcohol and
tobacco industries.
These measures are aimed at closing the existing budget deficit, estimated at 0.5
per cent of GDP, and a gap to appear in 2012 after the payroll tax decrease comes
into effect. The tax cut has been valued by Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin at 400
billion rubles ($14.3 billion). Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov said that
the mineral extraction tax will soar almost twofold in 2013 with another
subsequent almost 100 per cent increase in 2014.
Commenting on Medvedev's address, Alexander Min, head of the governmental
analytical centre, said that Russia is looking for an alternative to the oil and
gas "safety cushion". One of them is denationalization and, as Medvedev said, he
sees the selling of federal assets as a source of revenue.
Kudrin said last week that "in three to five years the state will leave all key
companies: financial, IT and transport, including Aeroflot and Sovcomflot with
the purpose to raise around $30 billion through the sale."
Medvedev also said in his budget message that the government has yet to decide
what the share of each of these sources should be in budget income. He also
insisted that limits on the use of oil and gas revenues, as well as on the budget
deficit, should be established.
On decentralization, Medvedev said he wanted to see a more active role for the
regions in carrying out social responsibilities, such as healthcare. From January
2012, providing healthcare services will fully come under regional authorities'
Medvedev said the income sources will be redistributed between the regional and
local budgets.
One of them is a tax on real estate, which will replace the existing property tax
by the start of 2012. The property tax will be collected by regional tax
authorities and go toward regional budgets.
It is aimed at raising 0.5 percent to 2 percent of the market value of private
real estate.
Currently the property tax is charged based on the cadastral value of real
estate, which is lower by definition than the market one. Min, the government
analyst, said the tax would be differentiated and the middle class won't pay as
much as the wealthiest.
By adding social responsibilities to regions and municipal structures, Medvedev
wants to give them more power. He has ordered proposals on the decentralization
of powers between federal, regional and municipal governments to be submitted by
December 1.
Medvedev said the transition period for introducing new forms of federal services
provision is to be completed by January 1, 2012. From July 2012, the same should
apply at the regional and local government levels.
[return to Contents]
'No revolutions' in Russian parliament's upper house - Matviyenko
MOSCOW, July 5 (RIA Novosti)-Outgoing St. Petersburg Governor Valentina
Matviyenko, who is expected to head the Russian parliament's upper house in the
near future, said on Tuesday she was not planning to introduce crucial changes in
the Federation Council.
"I am not going to stage any revolutions in the Federation Council," Matviyenko
said during a meeting with Federation Council members in Moscow. "I am not of a
revolutionary nature."
The position of the Federation Council head became vacant in mid-May, when
longtime speaker Sergei Mironov, a leader of A Just Russia party, was recalled
from the chamber because of his criticism over Matviyenko's governorship. He then
became the leader of his party's faction in the lower house of parliament, the
State Duma.
Matviyenko was nominated for the job by a provincial governor last week. Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev said the country "would benefit" if Matviyenko accepts
the post.
"I came to this meeting so that you don't get the impression that I was inflicted
upon you," the 62-year-old told the senators. "I will not be able to work
effectively if it seems to you that somebody forces you to vote for me," she
Russian parliamentary Vice Speaker Svetlana Orlova said last week there was
"unanimous support" in the Federation Council for Matviyenko to become its next
Matviyenko said she believed a ban on the creation of political factions in the
Federation Council should remain in place.
"The Federation Council should not engage in cheap politics," she said.
"Protecting regional interests cannot be combined very well with active political
Matiyenko also said it was too early to change the system of forming the
Federation Council.
"The only thing in the current law that raises my concerns is that the senator is
not protected," she said. "If a governor who nominated a senator changes, a
Federation Council member should again stand for elections in order to make it
into the chamber."
Matviyenko, who has been in office for more than seven years, has faced public
criticism for failing to improve the poor state of the city's communal facilities
as well as for authorizing plans by Russia's energy giant Gazprom to construct a
complex of office buildings dominated by a needle-like skyscraper, derisively
dubbed the Gazoscraper, in the northern part of St. Petersburg.
Critics feared that the tower, which was to go up next to the 18th century Smolny
Cathedral, may ruin St. Petersburg's unique low-rise skyline. The plan, which
prompted fierce public opposition, was abandoned following objections from UNESCO
and the Russian president.
Matviyenko will have to seek a seat on a local legislature before standing for
the post of upper house speaker.
A speaker for the St. Petersburg legislature said last week that the new St.
Petersburg governor may be appointed "as soon as August 24." It is not clear
however who will replace Matviyenko as head of Russia's second largest city.
[return to Contents]
July 1, 2011
Author: Mikhail Fishman
[Valentina Matvienko's removal from St.Petersburg is needed to strengthen the
positions of the ruling party.]
Decentralization on the president's political agenda set
against the vertical developed and installed by Vladimir Putin
looks quite progressive. In the meantime, there is a difference
between decentralization and democratization and replacement of
St.Petersburg governor currently under way is a vivid example of
this difference.
The forthcoming federal parliamentary election provided an
excuse for Valentina Matvienko's removal from St.Petersburg.
United Russia encounters troubles in St.Petersburg where its
positions are weakening. According to the latest estimates made by
the Social Information Agency, support for the ruling party is
down to 27%. It occurred to the federal center that getting a new
governor to St.Petersburg might make things easier for United
Matvienko is known throughout Russia as a flunkey. She is
criticized for everything from failures to clear the city of snow
in wintertime and of garbage all year round, for her relatives'
businesses, for destruction of the historical part of the city,
etc, etc. As a matter of fact, all of that are problems typical of
any Russian city. On the other hand, Matvienko did manage to bring
major tax-payers from Moscow to St.Petersburg. The city did become
wealthier. This is decentralization for you.
According to Roman Mogilevsky of the Social Information
Agency, Matvienko is quite popular with suburbia. It is
intelligentsia that hates her guts. St.Petersburg's eternal
complex of inferiority born of being just the second capital and
hostility toward the arrogant powers-that-be - all these negative
emotions are focused on Matvienko. In a word, intelligentsia never
accepted Matvienko.
Traditionally strong in St.Petersburg, the opposition joined
the chorus of critics. Moscow finally decided that removing
Matvienko from St.Petersburg would be easier. It is some new
governor who will lead United Russia in the forthcoming election
Will it help the ruling party? Perhaps it will, for a time.
Some hopes might be pinned on the new governor but it will
eventually pass. Odds are that Matvienko's successor will follow
in her steps. Nothing personal of course. It all comes down to the
considerable fall of trust in the power vertical at all its levels
- from the president and the premier to United Russia to regional
leaders. Levada-Center sociologists say that governors' rating
throughout Russia dropped 6-8% on the average in the last twelve
In other words, decentralization cannot solve the problem of
trust. Creating the illusion of delegation of powers,
decentralization is really about redistribution of resources
within the power vertical without any radical changes. Power and
legitimacy are two different things, after all.
Legitimacy of the next St.Petersburg governor will originate
upstairs and no additional powers will help him just like
Matvienko's extensive contacts in Moscow or past experience never
helped her. Even if the new St.Petersburg governor is a local, he
or she won't be accepted just like Matvienko was never accepted.
In other words, it won't be long before Moscow will have to start
thinking about ways and means of strengthening the positions of
the ruling party in St.Petersburg. It can always remove the
governor and install someone else, of course.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 5, 2011
Matviyenko, Don't Pack Your Bags Just Yet
By Nikolai Petrov
Nikolai Petrov is a scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
In the run-up to the elections, we are seeing the beginning of a shakeup in top
political positions. The Kremlin started with Valentina Matviyenko. She will be
moved out of St. Petersburg, where she is governor, and sent to Moscow, where she
will serve as speaker of the Federation Council.
It is difficult to say to what extent this is a Matviyenko phenomenon or whether
it reflects the people's irritation with the authorities in general. In any
event, the Kremlin wanted to get rid of a large political dead weight who was not
liked among residents of St. Petersburg.
This reminds me of how Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reacted to regional
elections in 1989. He interpreted the losses to the Communist Party during
elections for regional heads particularly in the Leningrad region as a sign of
how poorly they relate to specific officials, while he failed to understand that
voters were expressing their negative attitude toward government as a whole. As a
result, the Soviet Union simply changed faces in top regional positions, but the
overall decrepit political and economic state of the country remained largely
On June 24, President Dmitry Medvedev, during a meeting with governors, surprised
many when he supported the idea of nominating Matviyenko as the new Federation
Council speaker. There were plenty of regional heavyweights at the meeting. The
main agenda item of the meeting was to discuss Medvedev's idea to decentralize
federal authority. Suddenly, Rustem Khamitov, the leader of Bashkortostan, voiced
the idea of nominating Matviyenko as speaker. He was warmly supported by Chechen
leader Ramzan Kadyrov.
Although Matviyenko's ouster was likely prepared ahead of time, Medvedev staged
the event to make it look like her appointment was an initiative of the
Meanwhile, several days before Medvedev's meeting, Kremlin first deputy chief of
staff Vladislav Surkov, who was visiting St. Petersburg to discuss election
prospects, met with Matviyenko. Surkov reportedly told Matviyenko that she has
hurt United Russia's ratings and should not wait until the beginning of the
campaign to leave St. Petersburg.
Matviyenko, after some deliberation and consultation, wisely chose to accept what
had already been officially announced on June 28. But according to changes in the
law last year, a deputy mandate is a prerequisite for nomination to the
Federation Council. This means that before Matviyenko could become a senator and
then speaker, she would have to be elected as deputy either on a municipal,
regional or federal level.
To makes things easiest, she chose the municipal route. She will run for a
councilwoman's post in one of the city's 111 district councils. But this would
require calling an early special election, which is pegged for September.
Matviyenko hasn't faced the voters in a direct election since 2003, when she won
the governor's seat in an election that many considered unfair because of heavy
support from the Kremlin. Since then, Matviyenko's popularity has dropped
markedly. Moreover, Communist and Yabloko parties are considering an invitation
to join forces with A Just Russia under the slogan "Petersburg Against
Thus, before Matviyenko packs her bags to relocate to Moscow, she will still have
to pass a very difficult test in the St. Petersburg special election. This will
also be a big test for United Russia, which is more significant for the Kremlin
than the Matviyenko appointment.
[return to Contents]
Russian tycoon Prokhorov hints he wants Putin's job
By Alexei Anishchuk and Guy Faulconbridge
July 5, 2011
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov, who leads a small party
praised by President Dmitry Medvedev, ridiculed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's
new political movement on Tuesday and said he would one day like the premier's
Prokhorov, who made a fortune by gaining control of the world's biggest palladium
producer after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, last month took charge of a
party which has called for Medvedev to run for re-election in the 2012
presidential election.
Putin and Medvedev have both repeatedly refused to say which of them will run in
the March presidential election, though Putin created a new movement in May to
widen the support of his ruling party ahead of a December parliamentary election.
The 46-year-old owner of the New Jersey Nets basketball club told the Kommersant
newspaper that he agreed with Putin on some issues but not others, citing the
centralized political system crafted by Putin during his 2000-2008 presidency.
The billionaire also mocked the swift rise in membership of Putin's movement, the
All-Russian People's Front.
"You know, in my opinion, it is really laughable when 38 million agricultural
workers join the Front in a single day," Prokhorov told the paper, referring to a
decision last month by Russia's Agrarian Movement to join Putin's movement.
While steering clear of direct criticism of Putin, he said the United Russia
party which Putin leads was an ineffective monopoly. He said he hoped one day to
be prime minister.
"Do you think I entered politics just to get into the Duma and then to relax and
have a smoke?" said Prokhorov, adding that his free-market Right Cause party
aimed to get 15 percent in the elections to the lower house of parliament, known
as the Duma.
When asked why he wanted to become prime minister, the job Putin took in May 2008
when he stepped down as president after steering Medvedev in to the Kremlin,
Prokhorov said:
"Because this job is clearer to me: it is connected with the things I have had to
deal with in business. I have dealt with all sectors of the economy," Prokhorov
Prokhorov, the most influential Russian billionaire to enter public politics
since the 2003 arrest of oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, said he did not know
what Putin would think of his ambition.
"I don't know. I think it would be better if you asked him," said Prokhorov, who
is ranked by Finans magazine as Russia's second richest man with a fortune of
$22.7 billion, behind steel magnate Vladimir Lisin with $28.3 billion.
Such a response is unusually blunt given the power of Putin, Russia's paramount
leader, who made clear during his presidency his view that the deeply unpopular
oligarchs should stay out of politics.
Khodorkovsky's business empire was carved up and sold after he fell foul of the
Kremlin under Putin. He is still in jail.
But few investors and diplomats believe such a powerful tycoon as Prokhorov would
have entered politics without the direct approval -- or even a direct order --
from Medvedev's Kremlin.
His outspoken entry into politics may even help create the perception of
competition in the election year while garnering support from notoriously cynical
urban professional voters.
Right Cause called in November 2010 -- before Prokhorov's election as leader --
for Medvedev to run for a second term in the 2012 election and last month the
Kremlin chief praised Prokhorov, saying many of his ideas were similar to his
A whiz-kid of Russian finance who is sometimes called Moscow's most eligible
bachelor, he earned a fortune by selling a one-quarter stake in mining behemoth
Norilsk Nickel just before the 2008 global crisis hammered Russia's economy.
He has a 17 percent stake in RUSAL, the world's top aluminum producer, and a 30
percent stake in Russia's top gold producer, Polyus Gold.
Prokhorov quipped that with his wealth, he could even top the campaign financing
for Putin's party: "If not for restrictions on party funding, I would beat United
Russia with one single payment."
[return to Contents]
July 5, 2011
An interview with Right Cause leader Mikhail Prokhorov
Author: Maria-Louise Tirmaste, Gleb Cherkasov
This newspaper planned a series of interviews with leaders of
political parties on the eve of the parliamentary campaign. Here
is an interview with Mikhail Prokhorov, leader of the Right Cause
Question: You are the first businessman after Mikhail
Khodorkovsky to go in for politics, aren't you?
Mikhail Prokhorov: As a matter of fact, I do not think so.
What I mean is that Khodorkovsky never became a bona fide
politician, public and professional. He remained YUKOS director
general and a man wielding immense clout but not a politician. All
business tycoons of his caliber know how things are done in this
country but they cannot change anything as long as they remain
businessmen. I'm therefore the first major businessman to go in
for public politics.
Question: What if you succeed as a politician? It might make
problems for your business ventures.
Mikhail Prokhorov: I'll deal with it the need arises, not
Question: What if sanctions are slapped against you?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Every businessman may make a mistake and
lose. On account of wrong calculations, faulty planning, etc. Same
with politics. Entrepreneurship is about fighting and struggle,
and so is politics. On a different scale, that's all.
Question: Why would you call Right Cause a ruling party?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Because I do not want to be associated
with a party that does not fight for power, that does not aspire
to real power and clout, and that only goes to the Duma just
because it seems a nice enough place under the sun. We want to
change what we can and not simply make it to the Duma and finally
relax. There are always two-three ruling parties that replace each
other or one another in democracies...
Question: And we here have only one party with all the
trimmings - governors, mayors, and even the prime minister.
Mikhail Prokhorov: And look where it got us.
Question: You say that you support Putin. How can one support
a party leader but not the party he is the leader of?
Mikhail Prokhorov: I never said I unilaterally backed Putin,
did I? What I keep saying is that even Putin himself is frustrated
with United Russia nowadays. Hence the Russian Popular Front
Question: Had Putin been frustrated, he'd have stopped being
its leader. Or the RPF would have become a formally registered
political party.
Mikhail Prokhorov: I believe that this is how it will all end
before very long. I'm not here to judge United Russia or call it
an evil or a blessing. What I mean is that the moment United
Russia became a monopoly, it stopped being effective. Putin knows
it, I believe. This is why he is focused on the RPF.
Question: RPF leadership claims that they absorbed all
business structures and public organizations, leaving nothing for
Right Cause to rely on or enlist the services of...
Mikhail Prokhorov: When 38 million peasants join the RPF
inside of a day, I'd say that this is a real laugh.
Question: How do you expect to attract people? Why would they
go to the Right Cause party and not to Putin's RPF?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Not even a strong politician like Putin
can save the country when he is all alone. There are lots of
people in the country whose opinions differ from Putin's.
Question: Do you disagree with Putin? In what?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Let's say that I disagree with the model
of control he installed in Russia. As matters stand, everything is
decided in and by the federal center which is wrong. No country
can develop in this manner. If we appoint governors, we ought to
give them some federal powers as well.
Question: What party do you think is going to be Right
Cause's rival in years to come?
Mikhail Prokhorov: United Russia, what else?
Question: But you said at the Right Cause convention that
alliances with United Russia were possible.
Mikhail Prokhorov: If we agree on any given matter, then why
Question: It is said that your consent to become Right Cause
leader killed it as a right-wing party...
Mikhail Prokhorov: Forget labels. Take a look at the people
who used to be here, on the so called right flank of the political
spectrum before me. They were absolutely different, they were a
wholly incompatible bunch. But they called themselves a right-wing
party, and all of the country did so too. I repeat: forget labels.
Question: Do you rely on defection from other political
Mikhail Prokhorov: Why not? If these people share our views
and convictions, then they are welcome. And there are people like
that in every political party. Some of them joined these parties
in the first place in the hope to make or promote careers.
Question: Does it apply to non-registered political parties
like the Popular Freedom Party? To people like Vladimir Ryzhkov?
Mikhail Prokhorov: I respect him but we do not know each
other. I know Boris Nemtsov, we are friends even though our
political views and convictions are different... I'm sorry that
the Popular Freedom Party was denied official status. I'm
convinced that it must be registered. By and large, I believe that
we need a wholly different concept in registration of political
parties. Enough of these permissions to be granted or denied by
the powers-that-be. The authorities have to be notified of the
existence of this or that party and that is all.
Question: United Russia raises more finances for its
campaigns than all other political parties. They never miss a
chance to boast of it.
Mikhail Prokhorov: Were it not for the restrictions imposed
on funding of political parties, I'd have beaten United Russia
with a single transaction. To tell you the truth, I do not care
how much they raise and I do not intend to compete with them here.
We are getting lots of calls from people who say that they are
prepared to work for us without pay or who offer to transact us
some sum or other. Lots of people apply for membership.
Question: Do you plan to draw a separate program for the
Caucasus? Discipline there is fine so that the region votes the
way it is told. When the administrative resource is mentioned, it
is mostly mentioned in connection with the Caucasus...
Mikhail Prokhorov: Dagestan is the only region where our
party is represented in the local parliament. Sure, it is a
difficult region to work in but we will manage. I believe that we
might poll up to 10% there.
Question: What outcome of the parliamentary election will you
regard as acceptable? Option one: Right Cause makes it to the Duma
and forms a bona fide faction there but United Russia retains a
constitutional majority. Option two: Right Cause polls between 5%
and 7% but United Russia is deprived of a constitutional majority
by some miracle?
Mikhail Prokhorov: I'll choose the latter.
Question: Even at the cost of the Right Cause party?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Yes. I think that should United Russia
retain the constitutional majority, it will be bad for every
Russian even including those who vote for the ruling party.
Question: What results do you expect in the forthcoming
Mikhail Prokhorov: Fifteen percent.
Question: You have some far-reaching plans, right?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Sure. Do you think I decided to go in for
politics just to make it to the Duma and stop there?
Question: Why do you want premiership?
Mikhail Prokhorov: Because I know and understand this job. I
handled it all when I was a businessman.
Question: When are you going to decide whether or not you
want to run for president?
Mikhail Prokhorov: It's really up to people, isn't it? But
the Duma election is the first step.
* * *
The Right Cause party conducted its foundation conference on
November 16, 2008, when it absorbed the Democratic Party, Civil
Power, and Union of Right Forces that had self-dissolved. The
Justice Ministry registered Right Cause on February 18, 2009.
These days, the party has 78 regional organizations and nearly
63,00 members. The party participated in four regional and local
elections in the last two point five years. Its best performance
was recorded in Dagestan where it polled 5.09%. Budget of the
party amounted to 18.76 million rubles in 2010, all of them
donated by private sponsors and organizations. United Committee
for Security and Cooperation in Europe raised 6.1 million rubles
for Right Cause. Before Prokhorov, the party was led by co-
chairmen Georgy Bovt, Leonid Gozman, and Boris Titov.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Unregistered Russian opposition party adopts election slogans
Text of report by Gazprom-owned, editorially independent Russian radio station
Ekho Moskvy on 3 July
(Presenter) The unregistered People's Freedom Party (Parnas) has adopted a
resolution on the political situation in the country and the organization's tasks
in conditions of the lack of access to participation in the State Duma elections.
One of the co-chairmen of Parnas, Boris Nemtsov, gave us more details.
(Nemtsov) The most important point of the resolution is the following: the
upcoming elections are a farce, they are neither free nor legitimate. Not a
single independent party has been allowed to take part in the election. Two
slogans for the campaign have been adopted: "I don't take part in farces" and
"Not a single vote for the party of swindlers and thieves and its satellites".
Furthermore, polls will of course be carried out, and we have already done this,
on how many votes the party of swindlers and thieves (a phrase coined by famous
blogger Aleksey Navalnyy to describe the ruling One Russia party) could actually
secure by honest means. These polls will be published. In short, we will use all
the peaceful and constitutional forms of protest that there are.
(Presenter) Let me remind you that the State Duma elections are meant to take
place on 4 December.
[return to Contents]
Russian nationalists kill 14 people in first half of 2011- human rights
MOSCOW. July 3 (Interfax) - Fourteen people have been killed in Russia so far in
2011 as a result of attacks by radical nationalists, the Sova ("Owl") human
rights center told Interfax on Friday, citing the monitoring data.
"All in all, 14 people have been killed in 15 Russian regions in the first six
months, at least 58 have been injured and five received murder threats," the Sova
center said.
In June 2011, at least six people became victims of racist and neo-Nazi attacks
in Russia, three of which were fatal, human rights activists said.
"So far we are registering a clear reduction in the murder rate compared to the
last year. This is due to the fact that many most dangerous groups of radical
nationalists, who regularly committed murders, have been caught," Sova center
Director Alexander Vekhovsky told Interfax on Friday.
The rate of aggressive xenophobia attacks in Russia is still very high, he said.
"So far well-being remains remote in that respect," Verkhovsky said.
Since the beginning of 2011, at least 28 guilty verdicts have been issued in
Russia against 116 people for racist violence motivated by hatred, the Sova
center said.
"In June 2011, at least six verdicts were issued for xenophobia propaganda
against seven people in the Arkhangelsk, Pskov, Tomsk, Tula and Tyumen regions
and the Republic of Karelia. Overall, the first six months of 2011 saw 32
verdicts issued in racism propaganda cases in 25 regions across the country,
leading to the conviction of 37 people," Sova said.
Moscow and St. Petersburg are leading by the number of radical nationalist
attacks, human rights activists said. Most often attacks target natives of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, representatives of sexual minorities and youth
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 5, 2011
Europe's No. 1 Violator of Human Rights
By Vladimir Ryzhkov
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, hosts a political talk
show on Ekho Moskvy radio and is a co-founder of the opposition Party of People's
Russian authorities have declared a short summer time-out in their conflict with
the Council of Europe and its European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
On Thursday, the State Duma decided to delay until fall a review of a bill
sponsored by Federation Council Deputy Speaker Alexander Torshin that would allow
the Constitutional Court to free the Kremlin in certain cases from its obligation
to abide by the European court rulings against Russia. The bill would also make
it more difficult for Russian citizens to sue the government in Strasbourg.
Despite the summer respite, the conflict will surely escalate once the Duma takes
up the bill again in September.
But the issue is much deeper than the language in the bill. The larger question
is whether Russia deserves to be a member of the Council of Europe at all.
In the early 1990s, one of President Boris Yeltsin's goals was for Russia to
become a member of the Council of Europe as a key step toward becoming a
full-fledged member of European society. Yeltsin very much wanted to show the
outside world and Russian citizens that Russia is committed to European
democratic values and, most important, human rights.
Russia first applied for membership in 1992 and became a member in February 1996.
In 1998, Russia ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and agreed to
subject itself to the legal jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in
cases when Russian plaintiffs have exhausted all legal channels within the
country. The first decisions in favor of Russian citizens against the Russian
government were delivered in 2002.
Over the past 15 years, the Council of Europe has closely monitored Russia to
make sure that it is fulfilling its obligations as a signatory to the European
Convention on Human Rights and to the European Court of Human Rights. In total,
Russia has ratified more than 50 European conventions that commit the Kremlin to
defend human rights in the country. But, unfortunately, these commitments remain
only on paper; they have not been implemented in practice. Reports issued by the
Council of Europe consistently conclude that the Russian government is not free
and democratic because it does not have an independent judicial system and mass
media, as well as fair elections.
Two bloody wars in Chechnya in which there were widespread violations of human
rights caused deep rifts in ties in relations between Russia and the Council of
Europe. In 2000, the Russian delegation's voting rights were suspended in the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as a result of gross violations
of human rights in Chechnya.
But the list of differences between the Council of Europe and Russia goes far
beyond Chechnya and extends to abuses over the Yukos affair, the Russia-Georgia
war in 2008 and violations of election laws aimed at opposition parties,
including violating the constitutional right to participate in elections.
The Russian government loses about 90 percent of cases brought by citizens in the
European court. Russia is by far the leader among the 47 members of the Council
of Europe based on the number of cases filed. Since 2002, Russian citizens have
flooded the council with more than 40,000 cases of human rights abuses, or 29
percent of the total. Turkey comes in a far second with just over 15,000 filed
Even when Russian authorities pay compensation to victims as a result of European
court decisions, this is like putting a Band-Aid over a malignant tumor. It does
little to cure the underlying problem in Russia that human rights continue to be
systematically abused. The government has shown that it lacks the political will
to change this.
Thus the conflict over the respect for human rights between Russia and the
European court is fundamental and, most likely, will not be resolved. The Kremlin
understands this better than anyone, and this is why Torshin and Constitutional
Court chief justice Valery Zorkin have sent the first signal that Russia doesn't
want to subject itself to the European court's jurisdiction anymore. They claim
that the European court's decisions are politically motivated read:
"Russophobic." But this is only a smokescreen to hide the fact that Russia is
Europe's leader in violating the human rights of its citizens.
If the Kremlin continues to violate the human rights conventions that it ratified
and refuses to implement the European court's rulings, it will lead to a serious
confrontation with the Council of Europe after which Russia's total exclusion
from the council will become a real possibility.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
July 4, 2011
To cheat or not to cheat?
By Olga Khrustaleva
High school graduation exams may be over, but the debate about cheating and
corruption is still raging, with reports of college students taking exams for
school graduates and sharing results on popular social networking sites.
And it's not just cheating that's undermining Russia's education culture. Some 25
per cent of students admitted that bribery was rampant at their university,
according to a June 2011 poll conducted by Career.ru, and 44 percent said they
were not satisfied with the quality of their education.
"Corruption in university enrollment has become a socio-political factor," Mark
Levin, a professor at the Higher School of Economics, told The Moscow News. "It's
being discussed both in this country and abroad. It is the country's shame, if
you want. The government should take it as a challenge to the system they head."
Online cheating
Since everyone not just the students and parents, but the teachers as well
benefits from high test results, the pressure to cut corners comes from all
sides, some teachers said.
"That is why only few people are ready to conduct a fair examination." Dmitry
Gushchin, a math teacher from St. Petersburg, told The Moscow News. Gushchin made
headlines after uncovering a group on the popular social network site Vkontakte,
where kids were uploading photos of their exams using their mobile phones and
then getting help online in real time.
But according to the group's organizers, the group had no intention to help
students cheat instead, it was meant to help prepare for the controversial
Unified State Exam. Yes, there is corruption, said Slava Borisov, a math teacher
who created the group, but social networking is not the place to look for the
"I think the situation is just absurd. And its reason is exactly the same we are
fighting against in our group violations in administrating the Unified State
Exam," Borisov told The Moscow News.
Teachers breaking rules
Incidentally, this is where Borisov and Gushchin agree test administrators are
violating some of the rules.
And if Borisov's group was set up before the exam date to help students prepare,
students were finding that the teachers were late, and their exams were already
opened before they even arrived.
"We were let into the building at 9:55 am [five minutes before the start of the
exam] while according to the rules everybody should be inside 15 minutes before
the exam," one of the Vkontakte posts said. "At the tables there were already
opened envelopes with tests. They didn't accept complaints about how the exam was
Controversial exam
Indeed, the Unified State Exam itself, which was created precisely to fight
corruption in education, doesn't seem to be helping.
"There is no serious struggle against corruption in administrating the Unified
State Exam," Levin said. "There are certain people who get caught, but there is a
lot of evident corruption cases which are not paid attention to."
A poll conducted by the Levada Center in May 2011 showed Russians were not very
happy about the Unified State Exam, with only 15 per cent of respondents saying
it gave a better picture of children's knowledge.
But while imperfect, the test is still better than nothing, education experts
said. "In a situation when we can't guarantee entry exams entirely free of
corruption, the Unified State Exam is the best instrument to select students,"
Levin said.
Undermining Russia's reputation
Getting into university is just the beginning.
At the Higher School of Economics, some 20 percent of newly enrolled students
leave because studying there is not easy. "If the students knew that once passing
the Unified State Exam they would enter a good university only to be flunked out,
the situation would change," Levin said.
When students compete abroad, they can encounter further problems, Levin said.
Cheating is "absolutely not acceptable in the West," Levin said. "But Russian
universities lack the spirit of competition." Russian students don't realize that
when they let someone cheat, they are creating a rival. And while in the West
cheaters are often immediately expelled from the university, in Russia they
sometimes don't even have to leave the classroom if caught.
"According to economic theory a person committing a crime weighs the benefit
against the negative consequences," Levin said. "If the consequences are really
small, then why not do it?"
Measures to fight cheating
Teachers and experts say it is possible to reduce the level of corruption
significantly but a number of measures has to be introduced and enforced.
Gushchin, the St. Petersburg math teacher, suggests thorough document screening,
banning mobile phones using metal detectors, and introducing three-year
suspensions of students who get caught cheating.
But a key solution, Gushchin said, is to have the state provide more preparation
materials. "Throughout the last 10 years since the introduction of the exam, it
has been impossible to prepare for the exam using only school textbooks," he
[return to Contents]
Medvedev Bombarded by Complaints at Meeting With Scientists
May 24, 2011
Report by Irina Granik: "No One Is Cleverer. Dmitriy Medvedev Talked to
Scientists About the State of Science and Anti-Science in Russia"
At a meeting with Russian and foreign scientists who have won grants for
scientific projects in Russia yesterday President Dmitriy Medvedev heard a host
of complaints in connection with the impossibility of conducting full-fledged
scientific activity. Education Minister Andrey Fursenko almost paid the price for
this -- the president yet again joked that Fursenko should be fired. But it was
the Rosselkhoznadzor (Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Oversight)
and the customs office that will really suffer as a result of yesterday's
Scientists from various universities and higher educational establishments from
the United States, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland --
winners of the Ministry of Education and Science's competition to carry out
research and development under the auspices of various Russian higher educational
institutions -- were invited to the president's residence near Moscow yesterday.
Let us recall that the president, when announcing his policy of modernization,
set the task of attracting scientists from all over the world to Russia,
especially compatriots who left the country at one time or another. So that they
can demonstrate examples of the successful commercialization of innovative
scientific developments. For the purposes of this task, a program to provide
grants on the basis of a competition to the tune of 12 billion rubles was
launched last year. Scientists, especially former compatriots, responded. Of the
32 competition winners who attended the meeting with the president yesterday, 23
were compatriots. And during the entire meeting yesterday they all explained to
Dmitriy Medvedev that, though they have won a grant, so far it is not possible to
conduct full-fledged scientific work in Russia.
Dmitriy Medvedev's introductory speech, to all appearances, only kindled the
scientists' desire to complain. The president first of all gave assurances that
he is committed to creating conditions for the productive work of scientists and
for the introduction of their developments into production. "We are fully
determined to do everything that is necessary," he stated.
Then he discoursed on the theme that "modern science has no frontiers" and that
"our country is committed to seeing that there is a continual circulation of
ideas, and that the highest degree of scientific mobility is genuinely ensured."
After this, the scientists let rip. They explained to the president that too many
things are necessary, and that scientific mobility in Russia is still a long way
off. "It is necessary to resolve the problem of this ill-starred 94th law (the
law on state purchases -- Kommersant)," Professor Boris Zhivotovskiy of the
Karolinska Institute (Stockholm) demanded. He explained to the president that it
is impossible to quickly purchase a reagent or protein needed for research, and
via procurements under tender where the criterion is low price, it is possible to
buy only a cheap, poor-quality protein. "As a result money is lost! We know
ourselves from whom it is necessary to purchase the protein! Monitor us, but let
us spend money rationally!", Mr Zhivotovskiy almost shouted. "The 94-F3 problem
affects all grants. It is impossible to work when all purchases and the
organization of conferences have to go through complex procedures! We ask that
the law be amended," Professor Aleksey Kondrashev of the University of Michigan
echoed him.
"Law 94-F3 is a kind of death," Professor Konstantin Agaladze of the University
of Kyoto reiterated. "We cannot obtain live cultures. My graduates go to study in
Japan," he stated. "And what is the problem?", a surprised Dmitriy Medvedev
asked. "Live cultures are transported on dry ice, and will be held so long at
customs that they will die," the professor explained, adding that in Germany an
accompanying letter is sufficient to complete the formalities for this kind of
cargo in a single day. Professor Yuriy Kotelevtsev from the University of
Edinburgh King's College of Medicine added to this that for a long time Ros
selkhoznadzor did not ratify the regulations on the importation of animals,
living organisms, and sperm. And in general, Mr Kotelevtsev explained, laboratory
animals could avoid the customs altogether if branches of companies trading in
laboratory animals were created in Russia, as in the rest of the world.
At this point foreigners were also unable to contain themselves. "They do not
allow us not only to quickly import living material into Russia, but also to
export it out of the country," Ernst-Detlef Shulze, director of the Max Planck
Institute for Biogeochemistry, stated sadly. A general impression of working in
Russia was presented by Professor Pavel Pevzner of the University of California.
"In the first months of the grant I felt like a guinea pig. But I am confident
that they will improve the cage and bring it up to European standards," he
At this point Dmitriy Medvedev was also unable to contain himself. He had clearly
not expected that there would be so many complaints about the organization of the
process. "I have been listening and listening, and the desire arises, perhaps, to
fire the minister for education or someone else," the president stated
unexpectedly. "Because some of the problems that you raise, of course, it would
be correct for the government to have tried to resolve them a long time ago at
some level or other."
Admittedly, he did not fire the minister right away. Moreover, Professor
Stanislav Smirnov of Geneva University interceded for him. He stated that the
ministry is helping, but that "there are problems that fall outside its
jurisdiction." Having passed a list of these problems to the president, Mr
Smirnov proposed "establishing contact with the Presidential Staff" in order to
inculcate foreign experience of the organization of scientific activity. "Now
Arkadiy Vladimirovich is smiling," he said, pointing to the president's aide
Arkadiy Dvorkovich. And the president explained: "He is trying out for size the
mission of the conduit."
About 94-F3 the president explained that it is already being modified, because
its "sphere of action has acquired a boundless character, and it has turned into
a brake on development." Admittedly, he did not promise to resolve problems with
purchases quickly. With the customs things proved easier -- the president will
draw up a set of instructions addressed to the government in order to try to
remove scientific activity from general customs regulation. The president dealt
even more straightforwardly with Rosselkhoznadzor. "Phone Dankvert (Sergey
Dankvert, head of Rosselkhoznadzor -- Kommersant) and tell him that they should
fix this problem," he instructed Arkadiy Dvorkovich.
During the meeting the question of poor postgraduate education was raised. "The
main pulling power in Russia is talent. But the standard of postgraduate studies
is pitiful. I mustered only 10 kids for my laboratory. But I do not know where I
would get 20. Who will work in Skolkovo?", Pevzner said, wounding the president
to the quick. Dmitriy Medvedev recognized the problem, but did not scold Mr
Fursenko again. Finally, there were also complaints to the president that
representatives of pseudo-science are flourishing in Russia. "Anti-science has
developed in Russia. Gravitsapa (term originated in 1980s Soviet cult science
fiction film "Kin-dza-dza!" for a device enabling intergalactic transportation;
now appropriated for an "intertiod" -- an engine that operates via "reactionless
propulsion," i.e. in contradiction of the Newtonian principle of action and
reaction; intertiods have supposedly been tested in Russia's Jubilee satellite),
which denies the law of conversation of momentum, is flying in space, and big
money has been spent on this," Professor Vladimir Zakharov of the University of
Arizona stated. He handed the president a letter of complaint from academicians,
admittedly not about the gravitsapa, but about pseudo-science and its
representative, the controversial inventor Viktor Petrik (Petrik claims to have
invented, while under self-hypnosis, a number of groundbreaking devices, which he
markets through his company Goldformula) -- the enemy of the entire Academy of
Mr Zakharov explained to Kommersant that the meeting was beneficial to both
[return to Contents]
Russia must launch scientific mega projects - Putin
DUBNA. July 5 (Interfax) - Russia has created all the conditions for implementing
scientific mega projects of a global level, comparable to the space and nuclear
programs that have already been implemented in the country, Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin said.
"I think that there are currently all the necessary conditions for beginning the
work of creating scientific systems of a global level precisely here, in Russia.
As specialists say, research mega-class installations," Putin told a governmental
commission for high technologies and innovation in Dubna.
These installations should "match the famous Hadron collider and aim at achieving
results of a Nobel level," Putin said.
[return to Contents]
Senior Russian army officers resign over military reforms - paper
RIA Novosti
July 5, 2011
Several influential members of the top brass have resigned due to differences
with the head of Russia's General Staff over his implementation of military
reforms, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on Tuesday.
The newspaper said that although the generals themselves have not made public the
reasons for their departures, a senior officer said the opinion within the army
is that they are leaving because they do not agree with Chief of Staff Army Gen.
Nikolai Makarov's steps to reform the military.
The source denied that Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov was a reason for the
officers' discontent.
"Some media write that Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov is to blame for all the
troubles of the army. But it is not like that," Nezavisimaya Gazeta quoted the
source as saying.
"As defense minister, Serdyukov has proven to be an effective manager," the
source said, praising the minister for giving the troops new weapons and
equipment. "But you can't say this about Makarov." The officer accused Makarov of
creating a situation under which the military is run in a perpetual state of
temporary experimentation.
Russia's armed forces have been undergoing reform for years with mixed results
and frequent reports of dissatisfaction in the officer corps.
As part of efforts to transform the military into a modern fighting force, the
government has vowed to rearm troops with up-to-date weaponry and cut the number
of service personnel to 1 million, increasing the number of professional
There are currently 180,000 contract soldiers in uniform, with the bulk of the
force consisting of enlisted personnel, but Serdyukov said on july 1 that by the
end of 2017, the number of professional troops will increase to 425,000.
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
July 5, 2011
Advertising Abortion
While Small-Scale Anti-Abortion Initiatives Have Found Some Footing in Russia,
the Public Has Balked at More Sweeping Legislation
By Andrew Roth
A bill requiring abortion advertisements to carry health warnings passed the
lower house of Russia's parliament last Friday and seems destined to pass into
law without any major hiccups. While Russia's pro-life movement is seeking to
redefine the debate over abortion in the public sphere, its leaders are keeping
in mind that in Russia, which has historically had a liberal abortion regime and
where more than 1.25 million abortions were performed last year, a legal ban on
abortions remains unrealistic.
The new bill will restrict advertisers from calling abortions "safe," saying that
at least 10 percent of the total space of advertisements for abortion clinics and
services, found mainly in newspapers and classified sections, would have to be
dedicated to listing the possible negative health effects of abortions, including
infertility. The law's passing is only a modest success for Russia's
anti-abortion coalition which has been actively seeking to pass more sweeping
legislation that will strip abortion of its definition as a medical service,
allowing doctors to refuse to perform abortions and insurance providers not to
cover them in their plans.
"In general, we wish there weren't any advertisements for abortions at all, but
as they exist, it's important to put some limits on them," said Father Maxim
Obukhov, the head of the "For Life and Defense of Family Values" non-governmental
organization. Advertisements for abortion clinics play an important role in
legitimizing abortion, he said, so opposing that influence should be one part of
a comprehensive set of legislation to combat abortion in Russia.
In Russia, abortions can be performed for any reason up to 12 weeks into a
pregnancy, and for serious social reasons up to 22 weeks into a pregnancy. In
2008 1.2 million abortions were performed in Russia according to data gathered by
RIA Novosti, making it far and away Europe's per-capita abortion leader: For
every 10,000 people, 87 abortions were performed in Russia that year, with
Romania coming a distant second, with only 59 abortions per 10,000 people, and
Britain a distant third with 35 abortions per every 10,000 people.
While the Russian pro-life movement is heavily led by the country's Orthodox
Church, it has also in recent years been finding more of a home in the leading
United Russia political party, and is a favorite cause of President Dmitry
Medvedev's wife Svetlana. Besides moral reasons, politicians have heavily couched
the abortion debate in terms of the country's demographic crisis. With Russia
watching its population steadily drop, fears that Russians may be eclipsed by the
country's multiplying Muslim population and that the country will further slip as
a world power have made for strong conservative rhetoric from United Russia.
Yet such initiatives have had limited success so far. When only 25 percent of
Russians supported legislation to strip abortion's title as a medical service,
Yelena Mizulina, a United Russia deputy who chairs the Duma committee for family,
women and children, said that the bill would have to be reviewed. "...it's quite
possible that taking into account the public opinion, we'll ditch some of our
initial proposals," Mizulina said. "We want to consolidate the society through
this issue, not split it."
Despite an increase in anti-abortion sentiment in Russia in the recent period, as
well as a decrease in the total number of abortions, the majority of Russians
still do not support banning abortion. "Of course a full ban of abortion would be
the final goal, but we have to consider that most people aren't against
abortions. Not even most politicians are against abortions, and so we have had to
propose more limited measures," said Obukhov.
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Russia Profile
July 4, 2011
A Disappearing Habit
Despite Limited Success for Electronic Books and Decorated Authors among the
Intellectual Elite, Russians as a People are Reading Less
By Svetlana Kononova
Russians may be on the verge of losing their reputation as the world's most
enthusiastic readers, if a recent survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research
Foundation (VTsIOM) is anything to go by. According to the survey, 49 percent of
respondents have less than one hundred books at home, up 20 percent since 1990.
Furthermore, almost one in five respondents owns no books at all, indicating that
Russians are reading far less on average than they used to twenty years ago.
While residents of Moscow and St Petersburg read an average of five books per
month, the rest of the country showed less interest in reading. Traditional books
remain the most popular, with only 28 percent of respondents asserting that they
prefer e-books and 11 percent that they prefer audio books. These alternative
methods of reading have still not reached the majority of the country's
The downturn in Russians' reading habits is having a negative effect on the
country's publishing industry, as a recent government report showed. "The Russian
Book Market. Condition, Trends and Development Prospects: 2011," published by the
Federal Agency of Press and Mass Communications (Rospechat), found that the book
sales have fallen by six to eight percent annually since 2008.
Some experts estimate that the market is undergoing an even steeper decline. "In
general, the demand for books has dropped by 10 to 15 percent since last year,"
said Svetlana Polyakova, head of promotion and branding at the AST publishing
group. "It is difficult to predict what will happen in the future. The crisis in
the book market is complicated. It is linked to changes in the country's economy,
the development of modern technologies including the Internet, and to the law,
mentality and accessibility as well. In terms of attitudes to copyright
downloading pirated books from the Internet is quite typical in Russia."
"People now really are buying fewer books for their home libraries than they used
to in the past. Collecting books and having large home libraries is becoming a
rarity. But this factor doesn't determine the demand for books. Many people are
buying books, especially bedside reads, to read quickly and hand on to a friend.
Pocket-sized books are often simply thrown out after reading," Polyakova added.
Decreasing demand for books is unlikely to be linked to a decrease in Russians'
purchasing power. According to official statistics, the average Russian salary
grew by 15 percent last year, while retail prices for books increased by 12
percent. Therefore experts believe that book sales are declining for
non-financial reasons.
"Interest in reading is decreasing because other activities are attracting
attention. It is much easier to watch a film or to find an overview of the story
on the Internet than to read the book the film was based on. Reading books is an
intellectual task," said Alexandra Shipetina, vice-chairman of the Russian Book
Union, an NGO which promotes educational and cultural programs to support
reading, publishing, libraries and literature. Her opinion correlates with data
produced by the research company TNS Russia which found that on average Russians
spend about nine minutes reading books per day, while they watch television for
about four hours and listen to the radio for more than three hours every day.
Shipetina said that reading habits should be formed in early childhood. "Parents
of children age three to five should read aloud to them. This tradition existed
in the Soviet Union, but now it is going to disappear, so parents should
encourage children to read. Research conducted in western European countries
found that if teenagers do not read regularly when they are12 years old, they
will probably never like reading," she explained.
"As a result, many young people have so-called 'video clip' thinking. They can
perceive bright colorful pictures from TV and the Internet but they can't create
visual images in their minds after reading a text. But pictures on screen are the
same for everybody, while pictures in a person's imagination are individual. So
people who don't read regularly beginning in childhood lose a part of their
creative abilities," Shipetina added.
However, experts also see a more positive trend a growing interest in reading
serious intellectual literature in Russia. "In the early 1990s the most popular
books in Russia were love stories in the style of Brazilian soap operas. After
that, the era of detective novels and thrillers arrived. Later, the reading
public showed an interest in fantasy novels. This interest has continued until
the present day. But last year we noticed a new trend: the growing popularity of
intellectual prose. Foreign and Russian authors who have won prestigious literary
prizes are in strong demand," Shipetina said.
"Usually trends on the Russian book market are three years behind those in the
West. Now the trendiest books in Western Europe and the United States are the
'true stories' of average people who went through unusual, dramatic or
adventurous experiences, for example living in Islamic countries. Dystopian
novels which try to predict the future are also popular. These books will
probably be in demand in Russia soon as well," she suggested.
Polyakova said that the most popular books in today's Russia are still detective
stories, urban romances, fantasy novels and how-to books about topics like
running a home, cooking and raising children. "One of the main factors that makes
a book attractive is the popularity of the author. When an author is nominated
for a literature award or has already won one, we expect a growth in sales," she
explained. Polyakova also pointed to increasing sales of children books.
"Beautiful printed books with lovely, colorful pictures attract parents. They are
associated with happy families," she said.
A promising but controversial area is e-books. While Amazon, the largest online
retailer in the United States, reported this spring that sales of e-books
exceeded sales of printed books for the first time in history, Russian consumers
are also showing an interest in electronic books. Digital copies have already
overtaken printed books. Active Internet users can download pirated e-copies of
popular books from Web sites without even going to a bookstore. At best, they buy
books online. "Currently, there are several online shops that legally sell
e-books in Russia, but their share is very small in comparison to the larger
'pirate' Internet," Polyakova said.
"The current audience for e-books in Russia is probably from 10 to 20 percent of
the total reading public, and up to 30 percent of young readers aged up to 30.
But it doesn't affect people who don't read, but watch TV and listen to the
radio," she concluded.
Shipetina believes it is necessary to promote reading on the national level. "One
way to do that is to popularize family reading. Books should be presented on
social networks and on portals with easy downloading systems; they should be
available for sale in cinemas, shopping malls and leisure centers," she
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 3, 2011
War Breaks Out Backstage at Taganka Theater
By John Freedman
John Freedman has been the theater critic of The Moscow Times since its inception
in 1992.
I have waited my whole adult life to say this: Leo Tolstoy was wrong. On the
first page of "Anna Karenina" he wrote, "Happy families are all alike; every
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."
An epic saga unfolding at Moscow's legendary Taganka Theater indicates just the
opposite, however.
Everybody knows that Russian theater troupes are families. And everybody knows
that when Russian theater troupes fall apart, they do so in the exact same way.
Step one has two variants: Either actors rebel, or management accuses actors of
sin and greed. From that moment on truth is buried in a firefight of escalating
accusations and counteraccusations. It is not a sight for the weak-at-heart.
The scandal at the Taganka and it is now a full-fledged scandal in just one
week has followed all the steps of the archetypal "unhappy family." And it has
seen more mud thrown than a sun-drenched kindergarten sandbox after a downpour.
It began during the Taganka's brief tour of two cities in the Czech Republic.
Alongside successful performances of director Yury Lyubimov's historical
production of Bertolt Brecht's "The Good Person of Setzuan," the director and his
actors were to participate in a master-class for theater fans in Prague on June
24. Instead, the Prague event appears to have become the Taganka's Waterloo.
What actually happened is uncertain, although there are dozens of media accounts.
Shocking stories of actors "demanding" money and giving Lyubimov "ultimatums"
abound, as do accounts of Lyubimov or his wife Katalin, who has doubled as the
unpaid deputy director of the Taganka for years, angrily throwing packets of
money at the actors.
Most of these supposed incidents would now appear to be fiction, as was a rumor
that Lyubimov would be replaced by actor Valery Zolotukhin, a founding member of
the Taganka. What did occur was a disagreement between theater management and the
actors in regards to their honorariums. That was followed by an ugly public war
fought in the press and on the internet.
In a statement issued Friday, and published in its entirety on the Newsland site,
the actors admit that their request was honored by the theater and each received
due payment.
But as writers of less insight than Leo Tolstoy have noted over the centuries,
marriages and families don't really fall apart over money. The problems are more
deeply seated, and that is surely true at the Taganka. This incident has led the
Taganka, as we know it, to the brink of extinction.
Lyubimov, who turns 94 in September and who confirmed at a press conference on
Thursday at ITAR-TASS that he will resign for good when his current contract
expires on July 15, had already tendered his resignation twice earlier this
season. He has declared repeatedly that he cannot work with his current troupe
and has often accused them of being lazy and unprofessional.
According to some accounts, Katalin threw fat on the fire by comparing the actors
to cattle and insects. In a contentious interview published on the website of
Teatral magazine on Tuesday, Katalin let slip a phrase about her husband that
indicated she may be part of the problem. "He and I have had enough," she
Speaking at a press conference hosted by Komsomolskaya Pravda on Friday, one of
the Taganka's leading actors Felix Antipov had this to say: "We have had many
scandals in forty-some years of work, but they all have been smoothed over. Even
now we are willing to put up with anything from Yury Petrovich! But we are not
willing to put up with Katalin accusing us of being unprofessional and greedy."
As a frequent visitor at the Taganka over the last 23 years, I have often heard
rumors among actors about Katalin's difficult and even abusive character. I have
also seen that under her control, the Taganka has perennially been one of the
cleanest, sharpest and best-run houses in Moscow.
Be that as it may, a transcript of the Prague encounter published by
Komsomolskaya Pravda shows that the conversation between Lyubimov and his troupe
was tense, through proper, in tone until Katalin joined it. By apparently raising
her voice (actor Ivan Ryzhikov repeatedly asks her not to shout) and questioning
the actors' commitment to the theater, Lyubimov's wife seems to have brought
underlying animosities to the surface.
"Katalin Lyubimov: There is no collective here!
Sergei Trifonov: You are wrong.
Katalin Lyubimov: What you need isn't a collective but a team.
Yury Lyubimov: Katya, stop it. Don't talk to boors."
For those of us who have watched Lyubimov and the Taganka for decades, this
altercation comes as no surprise. His entire career, during which he became one
of the world's most famous theater directors, has been accompanied by
resignations, expulsions and scandals.
Lyubimov famously was deprived of his Soviet citizenship in 1984 while working in
London on a production of "Crime and Punishment." In 1989, during the Gorbachev
era, Lyubimov was asked to return to Moscow to reclaim control of the playhouse
he founded in 1964, and transformed into an international theater mecca.
But by 1992 Lyubimov had soured on his troupe, and they on him. A protracted
battle ensued, ending in an uneasy peace a year later when half the troupe
seceded under the leadership of actor and former Soviet Culture Minister Nikolai
Gubenko and created a new theater called the Commonwealth of Taganka Actors. The
state gave the new theater a newly-built stage at the Taganka while Lyubimov
retained the old stage, on which he had built his reputation.
More problems of a less public, but no less damaging, nature cropped up in the
mid-1990s. Lyubimov worked abroad more than in Moscow, thus alienating many of
the actors who had stuck with him throughout the conflict with Gubenko. Notably,
actress Alla Demidova, one of the great actors in the history of the Taganka,
left the troupe quietly.
Throughout these conflicts observers continually heard the same accusations that
are presently being tossed around. Greed, laziness and unprofessionalism are the
pylons on which Taganka scandals are built.
At present, the troupe of the Taganka consists primarily of young performers who
studied under Lyubimov at the Shchukin Institute, as well as a handful of
veterans who have been with the theater for 40 years or more. On Friday veteran
Alexei Grabbe indicated that only one of the theater's older actors, Dmitry
Mezhevich, a troupe member since 1968, was supporting his director.
"In the consciousness of the general spectator, the Taganka and Lyubimov are a
single brand," said Grabbe. "But this theater is finished. It's a shame that Yury
Petrovich, a director of genius, is leaving in such an ugly way."
History suggests that Lyubimov and his troupe will be reconciled in some way,
shape or form. It has happened so many times before. On the other hand, the facts
and emotions indicate it won't be possible this time. I hope I am wrong, but I
fear that the Taganka is headed the way of so many unhappy families divorce.
[return to Contents]
Politics, accounting difficulties behind Bank of Moscow's problems
MOSCOW, July 5 (RIA Novosti, Ksenia Nekhorosheva)-Political risks and accounting
difficulties are behind Russia's largest banking bailout of 400 billion rubles
($14.39 billion) for the country's fifth largest bank, Bank of Moscow, the
necessity to save which was revealed after a recent takeover, analysts said.
Bank of Moscow was the capital's investment vehicle under former mayor Yury
Luzhkov, who managed Russia's wealthiest city for 18 years, during which his wife
Yelena Baturina became the country's richest woman with a $2.9 billion fortune
earned in the city's construction business.
Luzhkov used to be a member of the ruling United Russia party, headed by Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin, but last fall angered the Kremlin by suggesting it
needed a stronger and more decisive leader than President Dmitry Medvedev who
then fired him over a lack of trust.
In February, state-controlled VTB bank purchased 48.46 percent of Bank of Moscow
from the new Moscow government and on Friday Bank of Moscow received a 295
billion ruble loan from the central bank. VTB, Russia's second largest bank, will
contribute 100 billion rubles to recapitalize Bank of Moscow. The equity
injection should take VTB's stake to the 75 percent threshold required to qualify
for state aid.
"The central bank is likely to have shut its eyes to (the state of affairs in the
bank) because the bank was connected with the United Russia party," an investment
company analyst told RIA Novosti.
"Money has been stolen from the bank. Why has it popped up now? Because now there
is the possibility to sort it out. A full portfolio revision started only after
the purchase, and after the problem of servicing some loans connected with
companies of (former bank head Andrei) Borodin, Luzhkov and Baturina came up.
After they lost their positions, the loans moved from the payable category to the
bad and hopeless loans category."
Uralsib analyst Leonid Slipchenko said Bank of Moscow's problem was common to the
Russian banking system as it is difficult to classify loans to affiliated firms.
"The role of the central bank is highly exaggerated ... It is clear that our
banking sector is carrying systemic risks. It is connected with the
classification of affiliated loans. Crediting such structures involves risks. It
is difficult to classify them without a detailed check which is not reasonable in
a market economy. The bank should monitor its risks itself," he said.
However, there is still no clarity about the amount of bad loans held by Bank of
According to Valery Miroshnikov, head of the Deposit Insurance Agency, which will
allocate central bank's bailout to Bank of Moscow, bad loans amount to 150
billion rubles, while loans to Bank of Moscow's affiliated companies amount to
360 billion rubles.
The Audit Chamber, which is now checking Bank of Moscow, said bad loans amount to
some 300 billion rubles, while VTB supervisory council member Sergei Dubinin said
only 60 billion was an obvious hole in the bank's assets.
But Uralsib and Alfa-Bank analysts were skeptical about these figures.
"As far as I understand, a full auditors' report was not made public, and we can
only guess what happened there," Alfa-Bank's Eldar Vagabov said.
Slipchenko echoed: "I would not take the published figures at face value."
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
July 4, 2011
Moscow's banking skeletons
By Tim Wall, editor
Seasons in Moscow have a way of uncovering uncomfortable truths.
From melting snows revealing murder victims in the detective novel "Gorky Park",
to hot, dry summers exposing a lack of preparations to combat forest fires, these
moldering "corpses" have a way of coming to the surface.
Similar skeletons have been exposed with the changing of the seasons at Bank of
Moscow, where the ending of the Yury Luzhkov era at City Hall has revealed that
the bank had some $9 billion in "problematic" assets, the Central Bank now says.
The huge, $14 billion bailout the biggest since the global financial crisis hit
Russia in the fall of 2008 can be read in various ways.
The first and simplest explanation is perhaps the one we are being encouraged to
Under this scenario, the bank's problems all stem from its management under
former president Andrei Borodin, who was closely allied with Luzhkov and Yelena
Under Borodin, it seems, questionable loans led to billions being salted away in
offshore accounts and now, after the changing of the guard, new owner VTB cannot
recover those assets.
The next explanation flows naturally from the first, however.
Given the politicized nature of the accusations against the ex-Bank of Moscow
bosses, it seems convenient for the new administration to blame it all on the
now-exiled "Luzhkov clan." And the bailout could come in extremely handy for
bailing out other questionable assets.
But the third, perhaps inescapable, explanation is the most worrying.
In this scenario, the Bank of Moscow debacle merely exposes practices common
across the Russian banking sector, where personal control by billionaire owners
and well-connected insiders leads to "skeletons in the closet" being hushed up
for years.
If Russia's fifth-biggest bank can be exposed this way, what would happen if
loans were called in under a new global recession? This is threatened by the
now-looming default of Greece. Then Moscow's financial "corpses" would start to
smell all too clearly.
And if not one, but a series of Russian banks were so exposed where then would
be the bailout?
[return to Contents]
ANALYSIS-Taxes, investment gap hinder Russia oil output rise
By Vladimir Soldatkin
MOSCOW, July 5 (Reuters) - Russia, the world's largest crude producer, is
unlikely to make substantial production increases in coming years to capitalise
on tight markets or even keep pace with demand due to a lack of investment and a
heavy tax burden.
Lack of new projects in the pipeline, while existing fields mature, is a worry
for the country, which is hoping to at least sustain crude production at over 500
million tonnes (10 million barrels per day) over the next 10 years.
Russia increased its oil output by 1.2 percent in the first half of 2011 thanks
to newly launched deposits. That was a notch above the 1.1 percent forecast in a
Reuters poll for full-year 2011, which was compiled early this year when oil was
about $85 per barrel.
Since that forecast, prices have jumped above $100, boosted by unrest in the
Middle East and a nuclear disaster in Japan, and Russian oil producers have
increased their rate of pumping crude.
But analysts say the increase is still small as companies strive to make up for a
continued decline in production from their existing fields.
"Certainly, Russia's production growth is not catching up with the world's
growing demand. Russia's mature fields base is so large that it needs a lot of
new projects just to offset that decline," Julius Walker, senior oil market
analyst at the International Energy Agency, told Reuters.
"So any changes to the tax regime would have to be ones that encourage
significant new fields start-ups. And/or investments needed into fields with
declining production."
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said the country will need over 8.6
trillion roubles ($308.7 billion) to keep pumping oil at current levels until
2020, while the Energy Ministry has warned output could fall by 20 percent
without substantial financing.
According to leading forecasters, global oil demand will rise by 1.4-1.6 percent
this year.
Russia produced 10.195 million bpd -- 12 percent of the world total -- in June,
according to government data. That is down 0.6 percent from a post-Soviet high of
10.26 million bpd reached in May and compares with its all-time peak of 11.41
million bpd in 1988, when it was still part of the Soviet Union.
The IEA forecasts that Russia's oil and condensate production is set to peak at
10.57 million bpd next year and then start declining. The IEA's definition of
production is slightly broader than that used by Russian officials.
It also forecasts that the rate of increase is set to slow this year.
"Year-on-year, in 2011 I see it up 90,000 bpd, compared with a 240,000 bpd rise
in 2010, as growth from new fields slows," IEA's Walker said.
Government taxation policy has not been helpful for companies that are tapping
hydrocarbon reserves in the country, and analysts do not see a light at the end
of the tunnel.
Russian oil and gas companies pay higher tax rates than other industries, with
taxes taking 78 percent of total oil company profits and 56 percent of gas
company profits.
Proposals to make taxation more diverse and profit-based have long been mired in
discussions, while the government is looking to increase the tax burden to
compensate for more spending ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections.
Russia cancelled preferential export duties for Rosneft's Vankor oilfield -- a
new field launched in 2010 that has become a major driver of overall output
growth -- as well as for TNK-BP's Verkhnechonskoye and Surgutneftegaz's Talakan,
starting from May.
"The key to the answer of whether Russia will increase its production is Vankor.
If Rosneft achieves the target of 25 million tonnes of oil production there in
2013, this will be a decisive factor," Valery Nesterov from Troika Dialog
brokerage said.
The country's green-fields such as Vankor together account for only around 15
percent of total oil output.
According to Nesterov, green-field production grew over 13 percent in the second
quarter, while output from mature fields declined by 0.2 percent.
"The output growth in Russia is hardly sustainable due to a heavy tax burden and
unclear regulation rules. There are simply no drivers for further growth there,"
Nesterov said.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 5, 2011
Skolkovo 'Population' Grows by 21
By Olga Razumovskaya
The expansion of Moscow's borders and creation of the Moscow Federal District
will not affect Skolkovo, the innovation hub near Moscow, Skolkovo Foundation
president Viktor Vekselberg told reporters Monday after presenting participation
certificates to 21 new resident companies.
"As far as I know, changes to the project's configuration are being considered.
[The expansion] has nothing to do with the Skolkovo project," he said.
Skolkovo is among the areas being considered for inclusion in the new federal
district, Vedomosti reported. President Dmitry Medvedev gave instructions to the
heads of Moscow and the Moscow region on Friday to come up with suggestions by
July 10 for how Moscow can be expanded.
Vekselberg said residents should be able to start moving to Skolkovo in 2014. The
first building should be ready by the end of this year and be able to host
residents in the first quarter of 2012.
Among the residents hoping to move into the newly constructed buildings are the
21 companies that received their residency certificates Monday.
Most of the new companies are in the energy-efficiency cluster, while others will
join the biomedical research and IT clusters.
The companies include RusAl and Optogan, a St. Petersburg firm that develops and
produces high-brightness light-emitting diodes and was backed by both Medvedev
and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Biosfera TNK and Technologies of Inverse Problems are among the energy-efficiency
companies that have joined the project. Among IT companies that have joined are
Hamster Soft and Speaktoit, working on natural language interfaces and talking
online products.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 5, 2011
Nanotechnology Stands at the Crossroads
By Olga Razumovskaya
Mikron is proud of its microchips. It uses objects so small that 1,000 of them
laid side by side equal the thickness of one human hair.
The only problem is that this achievement known as the 90-nanometer process was
set in the West in 2002, a dinosaur age ago for the industry.
So Tom Kilroy, a senior vice president with U.S.-based Intel, which is working
with the far-advanced 22-nanometer process, is convinced that software
engineering not microchips will be Russia's "core competence" as it embarks on
a modernization drive.
"It's very rare that I can say that a country represents a core competence
critical to our industry," Kilroy said of Russia's software industry.
The microelectronics industry in Russia is at a turning point. There are two
possible futures for Russia: to shift toward software engineering, as people like
Kilroy suggest, or to focus on trying to catch up with the rest of the world. The
decision that the Russian government decides to pursue could have a significant
impact on projects like the Skolkovo innovation center, Russia's version of the
U.S. Silicon Valley.
Russia's share of the $314 billion global semiconductor market is quite small,
with annual sales of both Russian-made and imported microchips at $1.2 billion,
or less than 1 percent of the global total.
But Karina Abagyan, marketing director at Zelenograd-based Mikron, said there are
reasons for optimism because the worldwide semiconductor market has about doubled
since the 1990s. In addition, it is expected to grow by nearly 10 percent this
year and reach $479 billion in 2015.
In Russia, market volume may double over the next four years if a public-private
strategy to regulate microelectronics development is implemented, said Heinz
Kundert, president of SEMI Europe, a global industry association serving the
manufacturing supply chain for the micro- and nano-electronics industries.
Currently this strategy consists of a set of measures proposed by Rusnano chief
executive Anatoly Chubais and AFK Sistema board chairman Vladimir Yevtushenkov to
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin last August. Putin later incorporated aspects of
these measures into instructions to relevant ministries.
The strategy proposed by Rusnano and Sistema includes elements of protectionism
to support local manufacturers, and the provision of tax breaks and other
economic stimuli for research and production of microelectronic components and
finished high-tech products.
SEMI also suggested creating a microelectronics cluster in Zelenograd, a
Soviet-era electronics production center outside Moscow.
Big Money, Small Products
But while Russian ministries are reading instructions, the cost of investment in
microchip manufacturing is weeding out the weaker players.
"If we are talking about qualitative changes on the world market compared with
the 1990s, the first thing that should be noted is the exponential growth in the
cost of factories and equipment, which led to a decrease in the number of
producers with every shift to a new generation of technologies," Abagyan said.
In the United States, for every $1 billion of a microelectronics company's
revenue, $200 million is invested into research and development, or R&D, and $200
million goes for revamping equipment and construction of new buildings, Russian
Academy of Sciences member Vladimir Betelin said.
Official numbers back up Betelin's words. Intel spent 15 percent of its $43.6
billion revenue last year on R&D alone. Its foremost competitor, AMD, spent
almost 22 percent of last year's revenue on R&D, while Japan's National
Semiconductor spent 19.4 percent.
The driving force behind digital integrated circuit technology is
miniaturization. Smaller transistors mean more of them in the same area of a
silicon chip, so that they work faster and use less energy.
The size of such transistors is measured in nanometers. After the 90-nanometer
level was set in 2002, the process was shrunk to 65 nanometers in 2006, 45
nanometers in 2008 and 22 nanometers this year. Sixteen nanometers is expected in
Intel, a leader in building smaller chip elements, announced plans in October to
invest $6 billion to $8 billion in its next-generation 22-nanometer manufacturing
process at several existing U.S. factories in Arizona and Oregon, and it said it
would build a new plant in Oregon. In February, it said it would invest $5
billion in a new microprocessor factory in Arizona that it plans to complete in
Such sums of money are hard for Russian companies to come up with, leaving them
behind in the global microelectronics race.
Worldwide, only seven companies use 65-nanometer technology in full-cycle
manufacturing in which they develop, design and produce chips.
In Russia, companies and institutions involved in microelectronics research and
production include Sitronics' research and development centers, Rusnano, Mikron,
the Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology and Physics and the Russian Academy
of Sciences Technical University.
Mikron's factory producing integrated circuits with 90-nanometer chips is
Russia's largest semiconductor project, Abagyan said. Currently only eight
countries, including Russia, have such technology, she said.
Chips of 180- and 90-nanometer size are used in many areas, including
telecommunications, smart cards, appliances, automobile electronics and avionics,
and account for 17 percent of total global microchip consumption.
"To be maximally competitive on this market, there needs to be domestic demand
for our products, to launch production and lower production cost. This is what is
happening in Europe, the U.S. and Asia, while the Russian microelectronics market
is just forming," Abagyan said.
The potential for use of such innovative products keeps her optimism alive.
Electronic documents, the Glonass satellite navigation system and universal
electronic card one of President Dmitry Medvedev's recent pet projects all
require high-end research, development and manufacturing of both chips and
That is why Rusnano, Sitronics and STMicroelectronics signed a trilateral
agreement on the transfer of 90-nanometer integrated circuit production
technology to Mikron in March last year.
Today the project involves 50 companies from 12 countries and 16.5 billion rubles
($590 million) worth of investment. They include equipment and materials
suppliers, construction companies and others, including M+W Zander, Air Liquid,
Hager+Elsasser, Applied Materials and ASML.
But compared with Intel and IBM's budgets, this is just a drop in the bucket,
experts say.
In Russia, promising developers get practically no serious investments, said
Alexander Zagnetko, program manager at market research firm IDC. "Misuse of funds
masked as the development of Russian [information and communication technologies]
has become common practice," he added.
"It's quite obvious that R&D in our country is in ... a poor state," Zagnetko
Abagyan countered that Mikron's project, for example, has helped restore some of
the connections between equipment and materials manufacturers, research
institutions, design centers and universities that vanished with the demise of
the Soviet Union.
Two Scenarios
There are two possible futures for Russia in the high-tech electronics sector.
One is to forget about becoming a market leader in microchips and focus on
catching up and staying on par with the rest of the world, said Kirill
Kuzmichyov, senior investment officer at Rusnano, who was involved in the
company's 3.8 billion ruble investment in the first production of
magneto-resistive random access memory, or MRAM chips, in Russia, in cooperation
with Crocus Technology.
Some $125 million was allocated for setting up an MRAM facility, which will be
located in either Kaliningrad or Zelenograd.
Kilroy, of Intel, who came to Skolkovo last month to celebrate the company's 20th
anniversary in Russia, proposed another path: switching the focus to software
"Russia has more than just a small niche here and there," he said in an
interview. "Intel's been able to establish a software expertise with our software
engineers here that's been a critical part of our global business."
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New York Times
July 5, 2011
Russia Meets With NATO in New Push for Libyan Peace
By ANDREW E. KRAMER
MOSCOW Russia stepped up its efforts on Monday to negotiate a resolution to the
war in Libya, with officials here receiving the president of South Africa, who
has offered his services as a mediator, and the secretary general of NATO.
At the same time, the president of the World Chess Federation, who is acting as
Moscow's informal go-between with Libya's embattled leader, Col. Muammar
el-Qaddafi, made his second trip to Tripoli.
On his last visit, the chess official, Kirsan N. Ilyumzhinov, played a game with
Colonel Qaddafi while discussing whether he would consider stepping down and
leaving Libya. During the match, Mr. Ilyumzhinov said later, he maneuvered
Colonel Qaddafi close to checkmate but then offered him a draw instead.
But in their conversation, Mr. Qaddafi said he intended to die on Libyan soil and
would not consider any negotiated settlement that called for his departure from
the country.
On Monday, Mr. Ilyumzhinov told Russian news agencies that he had met with
Muhammad el-Qaddafi, the colonel's eldest son, and had again been told that
Colonel Qaddafi would not leave Libya. But the Libyan government acknowledged
that its emissaries had met on numerous occasions in Europe with representatives
of the Libyan opposition, and that the talks were continuing, Reuters reported.
The Russian diplomatic effort to open a channel of communication with the Libyan
leader, who has been a major buyer of Russian weapons for years, began after
President Dmitri A. Medvedev met with President Obama on the sidelines of a Group
of 8 gathering in France in May.
At that meeting, Mr. Medvedev offered to serve as a mediator, and to use what
leverage Russia has in Libya to persuade Colonel Qaddafi to cede power. To date,
with the colonel refusing the Libyan rebels' demands that he leave the country,
none of Moscow's forays have borne fruit.
Russia has sharply criticized the NATO bombing campaign as overstepping the
United Nations' mandate to protect civilians, instead apparently aiming to oust
Colonel Qaddafi. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned a recently
confirmed French weapons airdrop to the Libyan rebels, saying this, too, violated
the United Nations resolution. Mr. Medvedev has, however, said that Colonel
Qaddafi must step down.
Sergei A. Karaganov, dean of the department of international economics and
foreign affairs at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, said Russia is
appealing to two constituencies. Its mediation efforts gains Moscow points with
the West, while its criticism of the NATO campaign plays well in the developing
"It might bring results, but nobody knows," Mr. Karaganov said. "The game, of
course, includes Qaddafi. And if he has proven one thing, it is that he is not an
easy person to deal with. He doesn't respond to threats."
"And by the way," Mr. Karaganov added of Colonel Qaddafi and Russia, "he is
profoundly distrusted here. We know him better than others."
After Monday's meeting with the NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at
a Russian government retreat surrounded by palm trees in the Black Sea resort
city of Sochi, Mr. Medvedev offered encouraging words but no specifics.
"I think all of us are inspired with the results," he said, the Interfax news
agency reported. "The meeting was rather productive, and I hope we made
Mr. Medvedev also met Monday with Jacob G. Zuma, the president of South Africa,
who has negotiated on behalf of the African Union and proposed that an interim
government take power in Libya, Russian state television reported. At a meeting
over the weekend, the African Union called on its members to disregard an arrest
warrant for Colonel Qaddafi issued by the International Criminal Court, saying
the warrant could hinder any settlement that included Mr. Qaddafi seeking asylum
outside of Libya.
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NATO's ground operation in Libya to lead to unpredictable consequences in region
- Russian deputy FM
MOSCOW. July 5 (Interfax) - NATO's ground operation in Libya will threaten the
country's territorial integrity and may lead to unpredictable consequences for
the whole region, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said.
"Such interference [a ground operation] would be a serious blow to Libya's
sovereignty and territorial integrity and would lead to unpredictable
consequences on the regional scale," Bogdanov said in an interview with Interfax.
UN Security Council Resolution 1973 does not provide for a possibility of a
ground operation in Libya, he pointed out.
"We have proceeded and continue proceeding from the fact that it is impossible to
resolve the crisis by force and that it is absolutely impossible to engage
external forces into the conflict on the ground. UN Security Council Resolution
1973 does not authorize such actions," Bogdanov said.
Speaking about Russia's position at votings on UN Security Council resolutions on
Libya, he said: "we were absolutely aware of the fact that such steps may lead to
considerable material losses to Russia."
"However, we consciously went for it in order to prevent further bloodshed,"
Bogdanov said.
The full text of the interview will appear at www.interfax.ru.
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Moskovskiye Novosti
July 5, 2011
Sochi talks between Russia and NATO ended in a failure
Author: Igor Kryuchkov
Source: Moscow News, No 67, July 5, 2011, pp. 1-2
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen on June 4 and announced after the talks that
Moscow and Brussels had failed to reach an agreement on sectorial
ballistic missile defense framework suggested by President Dmitry
Medvedev last year. "We cannot reach an agreement on sectorial
arrangement," he said. The arrangement in question stipulated a
common European missile shield with a single Russian-Western
command center. Medvedev suggested it for the first time at the
NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010. According to Lavrov, NATO
turned down the sectorial arrangement on account of Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty. It stands for collective responsibility of
NATO countries for their own security, something they are not
supposed to delegate to anyone else.
The sectorial missile shield idea was finally killed for good
at the talks in Sochi on June 4. Moscow has been quite critical of
the Alliance, condemning it for the penchant for stalling and
reluctance to listen to Russia's concerns. Had Russian and NATO
systems been fused, it would have deprived Washington of the
reasons to install new elements of the American (i.e. NATO)
ballistic missile defense system in Europe. Moscow is particularly
upset by Washington's plans for 2018, the year when it intends to
station missile killers in Poland. The United States claims that
these elements of the missile shield are needed to address the
threat from the south i.e. from Iran and that they will have no
effect on the Russian missile potential. Russian military experts
counter it by saying that missiles from a military base such as
this cannot be used against anything launched from Iran.
Russian Representative to NATO Dmitry Rogozin repeated
Medvedev's recent threats right on the eve of the Sochi talks. He
said there was only one alternative to discovery of a mutually
acceptable solution, namely that Moscow would be compelled to
withdraw from the START treaty signed with the United States in
2010. Said Dmitry Polikanov, an expert with the Russian PIR-
Center, "The START is definitely an asset from the standpoint of
Russian security. The ultimatum in connection with it therefore
constitutes an argument that is supposed to encourage a dialogue
with NATO. Fed up with waiting for NATO to meet it halfway in the
matter of missile shields, Moscow is signalling that the waiting
is over and that it wants results." The expert said that the talks
in Sochi had been helpful since they disabused Russia and NATO of
illusions. "Moscow and Brussels know for a fact now that there
will be no sectorial ballistic missile defense framework. It's
time for them to start thinking of something new."
Lavrov confirmed at the press conference after the talks
yesterday Russia did not plan to put forth ultimatums or call the
negotiations over the future European missile shield pointless.
"We believe nevertheless that it is possible for us to work
together an side by side," he said.
Sources close to the negotiations over the sectorial
arrangement say that this idea is fine in itself but time for it
is not ripe. "NATO leadership set out to develop the ballistic
missile defense capacity in the early 2000s. As far as the
Alliance is concerned, there are approximately 30 countries these
days whose missiles might reach its territory. These countries are
regarded as a potential threat and all of the Alliance is united
in the belief that a threat such as this ought to be negated
immediately. As for Russia, it only began the missile shield
dialogue with NATO ten months ago," said the source. "Effective
cooperation in the sphere of security requires a degree of
transparency the relations between Russia and NATO ought to
develop yet."
Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov was present at the
talks in Sochi. According to Rasmussen, the NATO delegation met
Antonov to "expand transparency in the sphere of defense." Said a
source, "The talks with Antonov were centered around the Russian
military reforms. Russia is trying to modernize its military these
days. NATO countries managed it way earlier, and so there is a
dialogue between Russia and NATO over the military reforms." It is
known that Russia is drawing on the Western experience and
simultaneously making its military plans more transparent. This is
a process that will enable Russia to sign more serious treaties on
mutual security with NATO later on.
Rasmussen said in Sochi that NATO fully intended to continue
missile shield talks with Russia. Moreover, the Alliance was even
ready to sign with Moscow a document on the future European
ballistic missile defense framework. According to the diplomat,
NATO and Russia "might reach the decision on the missile shield"
at the next NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012.
Whatever is signed in Chicago, it is not going to be the
legally binding document Moscow insists on. "A document like that
will have to be endorsed by national parliaments of all NATO
countries. This process alone will take at least two years," said
Polikanov. "Whatever document might be drawn for the Chicago
summit less than a year from now, it will be something
declarative. Something like a joint statement or memorandum of
intent in connection with maintenance of mutual security. Moscow
will probably go for it because it will be happening right on the
eve of the presidential election."
Rasmussen yesterday admitted that he saw no points in a
legally binding document emphasizing safety of Russia from the
ballistic missile defense framework of the Alliance.
[return to Contents]
RIA Novosti
July 5, 2011
Russia and NATO agree to wait until Chicago
By RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin
The visiting NATO-Russia Council in Sochi on July 4 (the third in the entire
history of our postwar relations with the bloc) decided once again to postpone
the discussion of American missile defense in Europe. This time the pause will
last until the next NATO summit and G-8 meeting in Chicago in May 2012. This is
inspiring because Chicago is essentially the home city of President Barack Obama
- he was a senator from Illinois and Chicago is the state's biggest city. Obama
has already established his headquarters there for the 2012 elections.
Matters have not yet come to radicalism
After the council meeting, President Dmitry Medvedev told NATO ambassadors that
he was pleased with its results. "I think, in general, we are all inspired by the
results that were achieved. I was told that the session of the NATO-Russia
Council that just concluded was quite productive on the whole."
This is good news. Recently, these sessions have been looking more and more like
meetings between people wearing different hearing aids. Everyone hears only what
they want to hear and offers different, sometimes contradictory, interpretations
of what was said.
But this time NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that
concerning the missile defense project, "we are starting to see things in the
same way," and that it is better to come to a good agreement on the issue, rather
than a quick one. The second part of the statement is clear, nobody would argue
with that, but the first part is vague, and it is not clear what Rasmussen meant.
It's also intriguing that he suggested waiting until Chicago where, as he hopes,
"we will reach an agreement on European missile defense."
The council took place at the ambassador level, at which people generally don't
expect any breakthroughs. But after the talks, Medvedev hosted NATO ambassadors.
There were persistent rumors to the effect that Medvedev will present NATO with
an ultimatum: either we resolve the issue within a year (either they fully
integrate Russia into a new missile defense system, or we arrange it on a
sectoral basis, whereby Russia and NATO would have their own defense sectors) or
Moscow will take appropriate steps. Moscow may develop its missile defense
forces, deploy new missiles on its borders or even withdraw from the New START
Treaty that Medvedev and Obama signed in April 2010. These were the options
presented by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's envoy to NATO.
It's good that matters have not yet come to these radical solutions, even with a
pause that will last till next May when Chicago will host the NATO and G-8
Rogozin is a pugnacious and emotional man, but he would hardly have made such
stern warnings without knowing Medvedev's position.
In principle, Russia is capable of taking these steps, but it must consider the
economic and political price of doing so.
This would mean huge spending on a new arms race. In the case of the hypotonic
Russian economy, this is akin to a person with acute anemia donating blood. It is
unlikely that we could cope with this in the long run. The economies and finances
of the NATO countries are far from brilliant either, but it is still easier to
find the funds through a collective effort, although the United States would pay
for most of it anyway.
A pause until U.S. elections
This is a special demand of the United States, because this is "their" system. It
is hard to imagine that Obama would fully renounce his plans of modernizing
missile defense in Europe a little more than a year before the presidential
elections. He has already changed George W. Bush's plans, and a second concession
to Russia would be a too luxurious gift to the Republicans. The U.S. economy is
not doing very well, and if it gets worse and Obama yields again to Moscow's
pressure on missile defense, he can hardly expect to stay in the White House for
another term. And reaching an agreement with the Republicans will be next to
Probably we'll have to take an actual pause on this issue, and it will last
longer than the May meetings in Chicago. Most likely, it will last till the end
of the U.S. elections.
It is clear to everyone that an agreement on missile defense must be reached not
with NATO, but with the United States, individually.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov continuously repeats that the council
operates on a special basis. He spoke to this again in Sochi, remarking that the
council "works on an equitable national basis: one country, one vote, not NATO
plus Russia." In other words, we must agree not with NATO, but with each member
of the council separately. It's unclear, then, why we need a council if we have
to reach individual agreements with its members. Does NATO know that each of its
members can make individual decisions in the council? But if this is the scheme,
there is nothing to be done about it.
The council was set up at the Russia-NATO summit in Rome on May 28, 2002. NATO's
official site designates its main purpose as follows: "The (NRC) is a mechanism
for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint
action. Within the NRC, the individual NATO member states and Russia work as
equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest." But for
the time being it seems more like a mechanism for the permanent search of
something that can never be found.
There is no guarantee that it will be found in Chicago. Perhaps we really should
join NATO, and check the bloc for sincerity. In that case all problems will
disappear at once, and we'll celebrate the grand Day of Russia's accession to
[return to Contents]
Russia Says Consultation On Talks On New Conventional Forces Treaty In Impasse
Moscow, 4 July: The politicization of the regime of control over conventional
forces in Europe makes it impossible to launch serious talks on a new
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
"Consultations on the framework of new talks on the control over conventional
armed forces in Europe have ended up in impasse. The main reason for this is that
some countries are trying to use the interest of countries in restoring the
viability of this security instrument to resolve political problems that are far
from the sphere of disarmament," Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko told
Interfax in an interview.
According to him, "this kind of approach, which ignores new political realities
in Europe, makes it impossible to agree a reliable foundation for launching
"The collapse of the CFE Treaty was caused by the attempts to bring to it
political issues and conflict problems," Grushko said.
"Russia is calling for starting talks on the basis of principles of consensus,
fixed in the CFE Treaty, with the understanding that the subject of these talks
would be restrictions, the regime of inspections and exchange of information. One
could hope that sooner or later our partners understand that there is no
alternative to this kind of approach," the diplomat announced.
[return to Contents]
Medvedev Hopes For Positive Results From Obama's Next Visit To Russia
Moscow, 4 July: President of the Russian Federation Dmitriy Medvedev hopes to
find mutually acceptable solutions with the American side on a number of globally
important topics in the course of (his) contact with US President Barack Obama
before the end of the year, including his planned visit to Russia.
"I hope that in the course of the contacts before the end of the year, including
your planned visit to Russia, we will manage to find mutually acceptable
solutions to a number of important issues, including those concerning the
interests of not just our countries, but the whole world," reads the
congratulatory message that Medvedev has sent to the US president in connection
with Independence Day. (Passage omitted)
The Russian president confirmed that he intends to "work hard together for
further development of Russian-American relations", taking into consideration the
results of the two leaders' meeting in Deauville in May of this year.
"Russian-American relations traditionally are a key factor in maintaining
security and global stability," said Medvedev in the congratulatory message to
his American colleague.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 5, 2011
Beyrle: Visas Bigger Deal Than Arms Pact
By Andrew McChesney
U.S. Ambassador John Beyrle said Monday that the New START nuclear arms reduction
treaty was important but the real highlight of a "reset" in U.S.-Russian ties
would come next week with the signing of agreements on liberalized visa rules and
child adoptions.
The two countries' top diplomats, Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov, are to sign
a deal granting three-year multiple-entry visas and eliminating the need to
secure visa invitations during July 12-14 talks in Washington.
They will also sign a long-awaited accord aimed at restarting child adoptions,
which stalled in April 2010 when a U.S. mother sent her 7-year-old adopted son
back to Russia unaccompanied on a plane.
Beyrle, speaking at a U.S. Independence Day celebration attended by about 2,000
guests at his Spaso House residence, said the agreements illustrate that the
United States' relationship with Russia has changed dramatically since he arrived
in Moscow on July 3, 2008 just in time to address a similar July 4 gathering at
Spaso House.
"We can talk about a lot that we have got done together over the last three
years, especially this past year, over the past 12 months," Beyrle said, making
his remarks first in Russian and then in English.
Among the achievements, he mentioned New START, which entered force in February
and is seen by President Barack Obama as a hallmark of his foreign policy, and
Russia's pending accession into the World Trade Organization, which Beyrle said
would happen this year.
"But for me, the best is really still yet to come next week when I go to
Washington for the signing by Secretary of State Clinton and Minister of Foreign
Affairs Lavrov of the agreements on adoptions and a more liberal visa regime for
our two countries," Beyrle said.
Beyrle broke the news about the visa agreement last month at the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum, saying the three-year visas would be granted to
business travelers and tourists "as a general rule" and promising that three
years was "just the first step."
The Russian government, which has pushed for liberalized visa rules with the
European Union for months, won a similar visa agreement with France on Friday.
Visiting French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe announced after talks with Lavrov
that both sides would introduce five-year multiple-entry visas by the end of the
year. The visas are a coup for the government because they will allow Russians to
visit any of the 25 European countries in the Schengen zone.
On child adoptions, the Russian government has long sought the agreement after
witnessing a series of deaths of Russian children at the hands of their U.S.
parents over the past decade. The final straw was the U.S. mother's decision to
send her young son back to Russia last year with a note saying he was
psychologically unstable.
Among other things, the child adoption agreement will require adoptive parents to
be more closely monitored for signs of potential abuse and neglect in their
Alexander Zakharov, a senior Foreign Ministry official who helped draft the
agreement, told reporters last week that the document was the product of seven
rounds of talks and that the final round had reconciled linguistic differences
between the Russian and English versions, Interfax reported.
Beyrle, meanwhile, made no mention Monday of when he might leave Moscow, but his
remarks sounded at times like a farewell speech. U.S. media reports said in late
May that Beyrle, appointed by George W. Bush near the end of his presidency,
would be replaced by Michael McFaul, Obama's top adviser on Russia and the
architect of the U.S.-Russian reset.
"The main thing that I have learned in the three years that I have been here is
that as important as the relationship is between the governments, the
relationship between the people is more important," Beyrle said. "And I'm going
to work for that until the very last day that I am ambassador here in Moscow
whenever that day comes."
[return to Contents]
Nuclear disarmament beneficial for both Russia, U.S. - poll
MOSCOW. July 4 (Interfax) - Only 45% of Russians know that Moscow and Washington
signed the New START Treaty last year, while 47% learned about that from a poll
the Russian Public Opinion Studies Center (VTsIOM) held in 46 regions of the
Forty-three percent of the respondents said that the treaty essence was unclear
to them. Thirty-four percent said it was bound to prevent further proliferation
of nuclear armaments, 10% said it would cut Russian and U.S. armaments, and 6%
said it would strengthen bilateral relations.
Six percent said the treaty was nothing but a U.S. attempt to deceive Russia.
No one thinks that the treaty will stop the broadening of the U.S. missile
defense system or its deployment in Europe (5% expressed that opinion soon after
the treaty was signed in 2010).
The number of people who found it difficult to say who benefited from the
reduction of strategic offensive weapons grew from 12% to 30% over the past year.
The number of respondents, who think that the treaty is more beneficial for the
United States than for Russia, dipped from 22% to 15%, and the number of those
who say that it is beneficial for the world reduced from 27% to 21%. Thirty
percent still think that the treaty is equally beneficial for both countries.
Three percent said that Russia gained more from the treaty and one percent said
the treaty was not beneficial for anyone.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 4, 2011
Our Answer to Magnitsky
By Michael Bohm
Michael Bohm is opinion page editor of The Moscow Times.
"Our answer to Chamberlain."
This Soviet slogan originated in the late 1920s as a government protest against
British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain, who was outspoken in his criticism
of the Soviet policy toward China. But instead of addressing the arguments raised
by Chamberlain, the Kremlin responded with the only weapon they had: a massive
propaganda campaign that included military threats aimed at Britain. The
expression later took on the broader meaning of basically "Go fly a kite!" when
the Kremlin had nothing else to say in response to criticism from the West.
"Our answer to Chamberlain" is the best way to describe the bill introduced by
the Foreign Ministry and United Russia (and supported by the other three parties
in the State Duma) that would blacklist foreign bureaucrats and public officials
who have allegedly violated the rights of Russian citizens located abroad.
Foreigners who end up on the list would be barred from entering Russia and
prevented from conducting business deals, and whatever assets they hold in
Russian banks would be frozen.
"The situation around the Magnitsky list was the starting point for this bill,"
Igor Lebedev, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party's faction in the Duma, told
Kommersant last week.
Lebedev was referring to the Magnitsky bill being considered in the U.S. Congress
that, if passed, would impose visa restrictions and freeze the U.S. assets of 60
Russian officials linked to the prosecution and death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky
in a Moscow pretrial detention center. Magnitsky was arrested on charges of
organizing a $230 million tax fraud scheme for Hermitage Capital after he accused
officials from the Interior Ministry of organizing the $230 million tax fraud
Backers of the Russian blacklist bill point to the U.S. arrest of businessman
Viktor Bout in an arms smuggling investigation as a prime example of why "abusive
foreign officials" presumably from the U.S. State Department, Justice Department
and even the White House need to be blacklisted.
The Bout case is a peculiar casus belli and an even more peculiar Russian answer
to the Magnitsky bill. The Foreign Ministry and Duma's logic would make sense if,
for example, U.S. investigators and prosecutors in the Bout case had sent masked
SWAT units to raid one of Bout's subsidiaries in the United States, seized the
company's seals and, in collaboration with U.S. tax authorities, fraudulently
claimed $230 million in tax rebates.
The analogy would also work if U.S. investigators and prosecutors who profited
from the raid on Bout's company had organized a campaign to pressure Bout to keep
silent by holding him in inhumane, squalid conditions in pretrial detention and
denying him medical treatment for a critical illness, from which he later died in
prison. Then, because of pressure from senior officials in the U.S. government,
no criminal charges were filed against the perpetrators who had become
remarkably wealthy since the raid on Bout's company, despite their modest
government salaries. What's more, they were given promotions and awards for
outstanding public service.
Since the 1920s, the Kremlin has been fond of these "answers to Chamberlain" in a
clumsy, infantile attempt to divert attention away from its own abuse of power.
For example, recall the U.S. campaign to free Soviet dissidents in the early
1970s. The Soviet Union's answer was a massive propaganda campaign to free the
United States' own "most-persecuted dissident" U.S. Communist and social
activist Angela Davis.
Soviets, poking fun at this ridiculous habit, used to joke that in response to
every criticism voiced by a U.S. government official, the Kremlin would repeat
the stock answer: "Look who's talking! You still lynch blacks in the United
These "answers to Chamberlain" didn't stop after the Soviet collapse. In 2005,
for example, then-President Vladimir Putin, in response to a French journalist's
question about the Yukos affair, answered that Russia's criminal case against
Yukos doesn't differ from the U.S. case against Enron.
Another example was when Putin was asked during his call-in show in December
about the fairness of the long prison sentence handed to former Yukos CEO Mikhail
Khodorkovsky. Putin, who answered only half-jokingly that Russia's judicial
system is the "most humane in the world," compared Khodorkovsky's "liberal
sentence" to the 150-year sentence that Bernard Madoff, the U.S. mastermind of
the largest Ponzi scheme in history, received for what Putin called "similar
But far worse than these absurd attempts to turn the tables on the West is the
false patriotism and simulated deep concern for "abused Russians" that cut to the
core of the blacklist bill. There is one disturbing irony in this distasteful
attempt to gain political points in an election year. The bill, which officially
claims to protect Russians who end up in "difficult situations abroad," is
supposed to be a "symmetrical answer" to the Magnitsky bill. But it ignores the
fact that it was precisely Magnitsky who ended up in a far more "difficult
situation" not abroad, mind you, but in Moscow's own notorious Butyrskaya
pretrial prison.
While Russia has developed its latest "answer to Chamberlain" in the form of a
blacklist for foreigners, clearly a better answer would be to blacklist and
prosecute its own criminals. If Russia's lawmakers showed as much concern for all
of the Sergei Magnitskys languishing in Russia's own prisons today as they did
for Viktor Bout, there wouldn't have been a need for U.S. lawmakers to propose
the Magnitsky bill in the first place.
[return to Contents]
July 4, 2011
From the studio in downtown D.C., it's Russia on your radio
By Jill Dougherty, CNN Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Washington (CNN) -- Jordan Hostetter doesn't know it, but he's a target. He's a
young professional living in Washington, curious about international events and
listens to the radio while driving to work -- just the kind of person Voice of
Russia radio is trying to reach.
Changing American hearts and minds about Russia has been Voice of Russia's
mission since it first went on the air in 1929, broadcasting from Moscow via
short-wave radio. It still does use short wave but with the Internet, Facebook
and Twitter, that seems like a blast from the past.
Undeterred, VOR is turning to that American classic, morning and evening-drive AM
radio. It broadcasts from a new studio in downtown Washington. It's the first
time VOR has produced programming directly from the United States rather than
from Moscow.
But don't expect to hear shock jocks and in-you-face AM fare.
VOR is soft mix of American and international news and culture, delivered in
English by young American hosts such as Diana Ray.
Why would an American want to work for a Russian broadcaster?
"I think it's very interesting, the perspective that Voice of Russia brings to
the U.S.," Ray says as she gives a studio tour. "There are a lot of, I think,
misperceptions. It's a different voice.
"We want to present the Russian perspective definitely, but in a balanced,
credible way. There has not been any influence at all on what we cover."
Hostetter tunes in as he drives through city traffic to work.
First comes a bouncy musical theme, then "This is the Voice of Russia," followed
by a discussion about Libya and the Arab Spring with an American journalist from
the National Press Club.
There's no specific focus on Russia. "A very legitimate news story -- journalists
in Libya," he notes.
What's Hostetter's image of Russia? "Generally negative," he says. "I'd generally
think of it as oppressive and just propaganda."
In an interview at VOR's studio, Deputy Chairman Yury Minaev, visiting from
Moscow, concedes, "Russia in many respects is seen negatively in this country,
and we would like in some way to overcome this attitude."
Meanwhile, VOR's traditional rival, the Voice of America, has gone totally
digital, reaching out to Russians on the Internet with its Russian-language
website and on Facebook and Twitter. On YouTube, VOA gets a quarter million
monthly viewers for its videos, says Irina Van Dusen, managing editor of VOA's
Russian Service.
"Russia is very oriented toward new technologies," she says. "A lot of Internet
users, a lot of people who go online regularly every day to read news."
According to its charter, says Van Dusen, VOA is not in the business of
propaganda or public diplomacy, attempting to improve the U.S. image. "We give
voices to all the spectrum of opinion because we are not representing American
government," she says. "We are representing America and American society, and
American society has many opinions."
VOA says it tried to get a license to do the same kind of thing VOR is doing --
broadcast on local Russian radio in Russian to Russians. But Elez Biberaj, VOA's
Eurasia division director, says it was prevented from affiliating with Russian
radio and television stations "because of threats and because of the pressure
that the government brings on license holders."
So far, Americans can hear Voice of Russia on 1430 AM in New York and on 1390 AM
in Washington. VOR Chairman Andrey Bistritskiy said at a news conference
announcing the new venture that the aim is to "speak to the Americans in their
language," offering more choices in voices for Americans.
But competition on American AM radio is fierce. As Hostetter maneuvers his way
through Washington traffic, he says he'd be more likely to listen to the Voice of
Russia if they had a celebrity host. But there's no indication Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin or President Dmitry Medvedev is looking for a new gig.
The biggest challenge could be getting Americans to care about what Russia
Hostetter says he wouldn't have a problem if VOR radio explained Russian policy
on issues. "If it came across as propaganda, I might," he says, "but I think if
it's just specifically talking about Russia, they're going to have a very limited
listener base."
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July 4, 2011
NASA Dependence On Russia Looming
The U.S. is closing in on a new era in space exploration as its reliance on its
shuttle program comes to an end and dependence on Russia for transportation
reaches an all-time high.
On July 8th, space shuttle Atlantis will usher out the shuttle program with its
final launch.
The space agency will begin relying on Russia for access to the International
Space Station until private companies being picking up the slack the shuttle
program will leave behind.
The U.S. will be paying $51 million per seat to use Russia's Soyuz spacecraft,
and NASA has said it could be waiting for a new U.S.-based transportation until
between the years 2015 and 2020.
Atlantis' final mission will mark the 135th for the shuttle program, which is an
era that began on April 12, 1981.
During the lifetime of the program, the Columbia and Challenger shuttles met
their end while on a mission, taking the lives of 14 astronauts with them.
According to Brevard Workforce and a report in the Herald Tribune, the shuttle
retirement will eliminate 9,000 direct jobs, with an additional 14,000 layoffs
forecast for the service-industry sector.
The five space shuttles used during the program have logged 537,114,061 miles,
which is roughly similar to traveling from the Earth to the Sun and back three
Atlantis will bring a year's worth of supplies with it to the ISS, which NASA
said would be enough to keep the station running if private companies fall behind
in efforts to launch their own cargo ships.
Launch Complex 39 in John F. Kennedy Space Center has seen its fair share of
launches, but on top of the overwhelming sound of engine rushing into space on
Friday, it will also get to experience the roar of the estimated 500,000 to
750,000 people cheering on Atlantis' final voyage.
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Survey Ship Sails To Arctic To Strengthen Russia's Territorial Claims
Hammerfest (Norway), 3 July: The Akademik Fedorov research ship has left the
Norwegian port of Hammerfest on a new expedition to study the Arctic shelf, a RIA
Novosti correspondent reports from the scene.
"This is a task of state importance, a political and geopolitical task ...
(agency ellipsis) What you are doing is important for Russia and for her future,"
Artur Chilingarov, Russia's envoy for international cooperation in the Arctic and
Antarctica, told the crew.
It is a very important expedition involving the best Russian specialists and
using the latest technologies, he said.
The head of the Federal Agency for Management of Subsurface Resources, Anatoliy
Ledovskikh, in turn said that the expedition was ready to accomplish its task.
"In order to legally consolidate the external boundary of Russia's continental
shelf, we need the scientific proof," he said, adding that this was the purpose
of the expedition. The ship's captain, Igor Stetsun, said that "the ship left
Turku, Finland, on 23 June and will return on 17 September to offload equipment,"
after which she will proceed to St Petersburg and from there in October head to
The Akademik Fedorov is expected to meet up on 8 July with the atomic-powered
icebreaker Rossiya, which will leave Murmansk on 6 July after it has completed
testing seismic equipment. (Passage omitted: ice cap conditions, repetition about
importance of mission)
About 200 people are in the expedition, of whom 74 are the crew of the Akademik
Fedorov and 76 are scientific researchers. The Rossiya will have a crew of 96.
This expedition to study the shelf will be a continuation of a similar one in
summer of 2010, when the Akademik Fedorov was accompanied by the atomic-powered
icebreaker Yamal from July to October as she surveyed the bed of the Arctic
Ocean. She has been fitted with a modern multi-beam echo sounder for this voyage.
In 2010 the scientists were engaged mainly in precisely measuring depths, but
this year they will be concentrating on seismic surveying to establish the
thickness of seabed sediments. This is one of the criteria for determining the
boundaries of a continental shelf. (Passage omitted: more on the Rossiya)
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, littoral states have the sovereign
right to explore and develop natural resources on a continental shelf that is an
extension of their territory. Russia earlier presented its claim on the shelf to
the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea but this was turned down due to
insufficient information.
If Russia can prove that the Lomonosov and Mendeleyev underwater Arctic ridges,
which extend towards Greenland, are a geological continuation of its continental
shelf, then it will have the right to an additional 1.2m square kilometres in the
Arctic and to develop colossal oil and gas deposits in a triangle of Chukotka -
Murmansk - North Pole.
The updated claim to the shelf is expected to be ready by December 2013 and to be
submitted to the UN in about early 2014.
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Relative Majority of Ukrainians Say CIS Has No Future - Poll
KYIV. July 4 (Interfax) - About half of Ukrainian citizens polled in April (47%)
said the Commonwealth of Independent States has no future, and 35% disagree with
this, Research Branding Group (RB) said citing the results of a poll conducted
from April 4 to 14.
"Ukrainians see the CIS as a mechanism of saving interregional ties between the
former Soviet republics after the Soviet Union's breakup (43%), rather than an
effective integration instrument in the post-Soviet space (27%)," the RB said.
Sixteen percent of those polled said that Ukraine is a fully-fledged member of
the CIS, another 16% said that Ukraine has abandoned it, 15% that Ukraine is
represented in individual CIS structures as an observer, 12% that it is an
associated member and 11% that it is the CIS's de-facto member.
Forty-three percent of those polled said that the CIS countries are drifting
apart, 36% that nothing is changing and 21% that the CIS members are moving
closer to each other.
The figures were obtained in personal interviews in 24 regions of Ukraine and in
Crimea. In all, 2,077 people took part in the poll.
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Moskovskiye Novosti
July 5, 2011
Russian gas prices are more than Ukraine can afford
Author: Aleksei Grivach
Ukraine is struggling in the gas grip. The alternatives are fairly
simple: either let Gazprom take over the gas pipelines or find
itself unable to pay Russia for gas. Neither Moscow nor Kiev would
admit it openly.
Said Aleksei Miller of Gazprom, "It's simple. Naphthagas and
Ukraine might solve a good deal of their problems by acceptance of
our suggestion to merge Naphthagas with Gazprom. This united
company will have a common price policy and gas price for the
Ukrainians will be below that which the Belarussians are paying."
This is what Premier Vladimir Putin told his Ukrainian
counterpart Nikolai Azarov just over a year ago.
Putin then and Miller know neglected to mention what really
counts. The deal will only make sense if the united company
becomes owner of the Ukrainian gas transportation system. This is
what Ukrainian delegations are reminded again and against at every
meeting - behind the closed doors.
But official Kiev pretends not to understand what it is that
is wanted from it. Azarov keeps coming to Moscow with some
quixotic price formation formulas that he claims will be fair.
Yulia Timoshenko is facing a trial for the signing of gas
contracts with Russia...
It is easy to understand the Ukrainian authorities. The
parliamentary election is coming up fast, and gas pipelines are a
bona fide fetish for the political elites. Four years ago the Rada
even passed a special law that expressly forbade the sale of gas
pipelines. No wonder Timoshenko, leader of the opposition,
condemns President Victor Yanukovich and Azarov for the intention
to quietly sell pipelines to Gazprom.
Moreover, Kiev is running out of time. Gas prices keep going
up and the national economy can barely keep up with them.
Potential of the Ukrainian gas transportation system is being
exhausted by development of gas transportation routes by Russia,
one that bypass Ukraine entirely. There are Blue Stream and Yamal-
Europe already functioning, and Nord Stream will go on line this
autumn. Construction of South Stream in the meantime will make
Ukraine's transit greatness history.
The situation being what it is, Kiev had better sell the gas
pipelines and thus benefit itself and the population - while it
still has this option. Belarus was in a similar position once. Its
President Alexander Lukashenko used to call Gazprom "fat cats" and
promise that he would sooner cut his throat than sell control over
gas pipelines to the Russians. These days, his government is
haunting these same "fat cats" in the hope to palm off the second
half of Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion (Gazprom paid Minsk the same
sum for the first half) and have the Russians stop boosting gas
This year, Minsk is paying Russia the European gas price
minus the export duty. In other words, it is paying but 50% of
what the Ukrainians pay (but more than the Russians themselves).
As far as Minsk is concerned, Moscow is in the position where
it can dictate its own terms. Lukashenko desperately needs hard
currency, so that stalling with the negotiations is not in his
interests. Miller said in June that the deal with Beltransgaz was
Gazprom's for the asking and that Lukashenko should forget about
Russian gas prices (i.e. what the Russians were paying) all the
same. A discount within the framework of the Customs Union is all
Belarus may rely on.
Kiev might find itself in the same fix several years from
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July 5, 2011
Experts say that the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be solved by
negotiations. Fortunately, they also say that there will be no war
Author: Yuri Snegirev
The situation along the contact line where the Azerbaijani
and Nagorno-Karabakh forces face each other is fairly tranquil at
this point. Politicians in Nagorno-Karabakh try to understand why
the peace talks in Kazan, Russia, on June 24 failed. The meeting
between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan arranged by their
Russian counterpart ended with nothing to show for it. Armenia
kept demanding sovereignty for Karabakh. Azerbaijani insisted on
restoration of territorial integrity and promised Karabakh broad
powers of an autonomy.
"Ilham Aliyev will never sign a document that recognizes
Nagorno-Karabakh," said Bagram Atanesjan of the parliament of the
non-recognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. "Besides, a military
parade took place in Baku on June 26, one to honor the
Independence Day. How could anyone expect Azerbaijani leaders to
sign such a document on the eve of the parade? Some source from
the Russian Foreign Ministry had leaked several hours before the
talks that there was no way for them to be successful."
Said Atanesjan, "As for Karabakh, it will never sign a
document that will make it part of Azerbaijan again... regardless
of what Moscow expects. The Azerbaijanis openly say that there are
25,000 "undesirable" persons living in Nagorno-Karabakh. They mean
the people who fought for independence of Karabakh. Any compromise
will mean their deportation... If it is a war, if Azerbaijan sees
no other solution, then we are ready for them. Let them come.
Either they reach Yerevan or we reach Baku. I'd even say that this
second outcome is more likely."
Said political scientist and Institute of the Caucasus
Director Alexander Iskanarjan, "No talks will ever solve the
problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. And yet, talks are an important
instrument. Even the Azerbaijani claims that they just might send
the army to reconquer Karabakh are an instrument. Skirmishes,
too... All of that are instruments... Karabakh does not want a
war. It has no reasons to wish it. Azerbaijan has the wish but
lacks the capacity. I'm not even talking military might. A war
will void oil contracts, inflation will soar, there will be
refugees all over again, investors will walk away. No economy will
negotiate this storm."
Question: But what about the war in August 2008? Mikhail
Saakashvili lost the war but boosted his rating in Georgia.
Alexander Iskanarjan: Saakashvili had a chance, minor but a
chance, to win a war rapidly. A blitzkrieg. He might have pulled
it off. This option does not exist in Nagorno-Karabakh. No
blitzkrieg is possible here and Baku must know it. I'm telling you
therefore that there will be no war. There will be talks again and
again, fruitless. But even fruitless talks are better than a
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