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[OS] 2011-#175-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-16 17:00 GMT
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Johnson's Russia List
29 September 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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In this issue
1. Interfax: Young Russians Want To Emigrate In Search Of Better Living Standards
- Poll.
2. Moscow Times: Party Is Over for Medvedev the Modernizer.
3. The New Times: REFORMER VS DICTATOR. MOST EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA WITH
4. Financial Times: Out of the shadows. Putin's intended return as president
unleashes open rebellion within the Kremlin.
5. ITAR-TASS: Vladimir Putin talked with writers.
6. Reuters: Russia's Putin: I had no role in oil trading empire.
7. Izvestia: DMITRY MEDVEDEV'S CHANCE. Sadly lacking a following group, Dmitry
Medvedev has a chance to form one now.
8. Moscow Times: Political Zombies Are Mounting Comebacks.
9. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: MARATHON FROZEN. With the outcome of the forthcoming
parliamentary campaign a foregone conclusion, political parties only go through
the motions of running for the Duma.
10. ITAR-TASS: Communists, Fair Russia get ready for State Duma elections.
11. RIA Novosti: Russia's Citizens Watch Urges People To Come To Polls On
Election Day.
12. Russia Beyond the Headlines: Vladimir Babkin, Tandem swap signals sweeping
reforms. Whatever is said about the shortcomings of the Russian political system,
it has at least one indisputable technical advantage: significant changes can be
made without waiting for the next elections.
13. New York Times: Chrystia Freeland, Failure Seen in Putin's Latest Move.
14. Russia Profile: Anna Arutiunova, The Dark Side Has Cookies. This week the
Russian blogosphere has been all Putin, all the time. So much has been said about
Russia's back to the future president it would take a Talmud to record it all.
For the sake of brevity, here is just a quick recap.
15. Valdai Discussion Group: Piotr Dutkiewicz, Medvedev's decision to step down
may serve Russia well.
16. Moscow Times: Vladimir Ryzhkov, Russia for All of Its Citizens.
17. BBC Monitoring: Russian commentator warns of consequences of ruling tandem's
behaviour. (Yevgeniya Albats)
18. Russia Profile: Matthew Van Meter, Putin as Democracy.
19. New York Times editorial: President Putin Redux.
20. Vedomosti: SURKOV'S QUOTA. Presidential quota of the Public House is filled
with people from loyal movements and organizations.
21. Interfax: Poll Shows Russians Divided On Need For Control Over Social
22. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: To an interrogation from prison. Organizer of Anna
Politkovskaya's murder will be interrogated.
24. Moscow Times: Increase in Poverty Confirms Social Imbalance.
25. Izvestia: ADDITIONAL SPENDING. WITH ALEKSEI KUDRIN GONE, THERE IS NOBODY TO
26. RIA Novosti: Alexei Kudrin: Debating controversial legacy of a veteran
27. Russia Profile: Damage Control. Top Russian Officials Are Scrambling to
Minimize the Economic Fallout of the Finance Minister's Ouster.
28. Moscow Times: Gazprom Vows to Fully Comply in EU Raid.
29. BBC Monitoring: Russian late-night talk show looks at origins of Russophobia
30. Washingtonpost.com: Obama team facing new Russian leader.
31. Valdai Discussion Group: Andrew Kuchins, A change in Russia-U.S. relations is
32. Financial Times: Thomas de Waal, Europe urgently needs a new Ostpolitik.
33. Russia Beyond the Headlines: Civil unrest on the agenda. Events in the Middle
East force Russia and the former Soviet Republics to consider reforming the CSTO,
which was set up in another era.
34. http://premier.gov.ru: Vladimir Putin meets with Russian writers attending
the Russian Book Union's conference.
Young Russians Want To Emigrate In Search Of Better Living Standards - Poll
Moscow, 28 September: For almost half of residents of the Russian Federation who
want to leave the country, the main motive for such a step is the chance of
improving living standards (42 per cent), the results of a September poll by
VTsIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Centre) have shown.
Considerably less frequently respondents explain their desire to leave the
country by the fact that there is more order in other countries (18 per cent) and
more prospects (15 per cent). A further 12 per cent simply like some particular
country (generally, 18-24-year-old respondents give this answer).
Among the other reasons are: the aspiration for security (5 per cent) and the
desire to live near relatives (7 per cent). Respondents aged 45-59 more than the
other people polled want to live closer to relatives.
At the same time, potential emigrants are not hurrying to leave, sociologists
note. One-fifth (20 per cent) prefer to limit themselves to collecting
information about the country to which they are intending to move, 19 per cent
consult acquaintances who are emigrants and 16 per cent are studying a foreign
Only 28 per cent take any active steps to realize their wish: 11 per cent are
searching for work abroad, 9 per cent are saving money for the move and 8 per
cent are choosing a programme for moving abroad. A further 4 per cent are looking
for overseas education programmes and two per cent obtain additional education.
Only 1 per cent of respondents respectively are considering the options of either
a job placement in a foreign company with the prospect of moving abroad or
marrying a foreigner.
Meanwhile, one-fifth of those wanting to move (20 per cent) admitted that they
are not taking any steps at all.
According to the research findings, young Russians (aged 18-24) are the most
active in their desire to emigrate. Precisely among these people there are more
of those who collect information about the country, consult acquaintances who
have experience of moving, study a foreign language and who look for work abroad,
VTsIOM noted.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
September 28, 2011
Party Is Over for Medvedev the Modernizer
By Nikolaus von Twickel
When Dmitry Medvedev was named by then-President Vladimir Putin in December 2007
as his preferred successor, he was widely ridiculed as a weak figure who would
allow Putin to continue to hold the reins.
Medvedev "worships Putin like a father figure, or at least like an older
brother," Valery Musin, Medvedev's former academic adviser and law professor at
Leningrad State University, told The Moscow Times at the time.
Almost four years later, the image of Medvedev as a soft and psychologically
dependent man has suddenly returned with force.
"Now Putin is the boss, and all that is left for Medvedev is some technical
function," said Lilia Shevtsova, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center.
It seems that the picture of Medvedev meekly backing Putin as the next president
at last weekend's United Russia convention has all but eclipsed the picture of
the Kremlin's enthusiastic modernizer who dazzled foreign leaders and investors
with visions of a liberal and open Russia.
For many liberals who had clung to the hope that they would see a second Medvedev
presidency, the party is over.
"There is no more room for a strong Medvedev. The ruling tandem ceased to exist
on Sept. 24," Shevtsova said, referring to the second day of the party convention
when Medvedev endorsed Putin as his successor.
The frustration was expressed on Pushkin Square on Sunday, when more than 100
people gathered for a spontaneous protest calling for Putin's ouster. It was
illustrated in thousands of blog posts, which often contained a photoshopped
image of Putin's face superimposed on Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whose
18-year tenure is known as the era of stagnation.
Medvedev has said he will lead a new government after the presidential election
in March, effectively swapping jobs with Putin.
Igor Yurgens, head of the Institute of Contemporary Development and one of
Medvedev's most ardent supporters, said that while the convention's announcement
caused deep dissatisfaction, the work started by Medvedev must continue.
"Political modernization and liberalization is unavoidable after 2012 as well,"
Yurgens told Interfax.
Sergei Markov, a State Duma deputy for United Russia, said modernization would
continue under Putin as president. "It is not correct to call Medvedev the
country's main modernizer. Let's not forget that it was Putin who invited him to
the presidency," he said.
But experts and opposition figures interviewed for this article expressed serious
doubts that Medvedev could be an effective modernizer as prime minister because
Putin barely used the three prime ministers who served during his presidency.
"Under Putin, prime ministers played no role hardly anybody remembers their
names," said Ilya Yashin, co-leader of the Solidarity opposition movement.
Putin added insult to injury last weekend by declaring that he and Medvedev had
agreed "years ago" on his return to the Kremlin, suggesting that the Medvedev
presidency had been a charade.
Medvedev signaled that he wants to be seen as in charge Monday, when he fired
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin in front of television cameras.
The sacking of Kudrin, a longtime ally of Putin who worked with him in the St.
Petersburg city administration in the 1990s, has been characterized as Medvedev's
boldest move as president, but it failed to convince everyone.
Yashin said Kudrin's dismissal suggested that a final decision about Putin's
return was made only last week. He said Kudrin was jealous of Medvedev because he
had been promised the prime minister's job, while Medvedev was supposed to become
State Duma speaker after his term ends next year.
"When this was changed at the last moment, Putin agreed that Medvedev could sack
Kudrin to save his public image," Yashin said.
Shevtsova offered a different explanation, arguing that Putin had agreed to
sacrifice his minister as compensation to Medvedev. "This was Putin's payment for
humiliating Medvedev at the [party] convention," she said.
Some say the struggle between conservatives and liberal modernizers will only get
Billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, who was ousted as leader of the pro-business Right
Cause party earlier this month in what he described as a Kremlin-orchestrated
coup, said Kudrin's sacking confirmed an ongoing struggle between "conservatives"
and "modernizers."
"I think we are facing tectonic upheavals among the ruling elites," Prokhorov
wrote in his blog.
But others offered a more sobering line of argument, saying Putin's return to the
Kremlin would just unmask the fundamental defects of Medvedev's presidency.
"Let's face it: Many of his admirers are already extremely disillusioned today,"
said Leonid Gozman, co-founder of Right Cause who quit the party after
Prokhorov's ouster.
Gozman said Medvedev had set himself an unsolvable task with his modernization
"The question is whether modernization can be reconciled with the political
system built under Putin. I believe this is not possible," he said in a telephone
Shevtsova, from the Carnegie center, went one step further by questioning whether
Medvedev deserved any liberal credentials. She said his reforms were "largely
cosmetic." His real policy record, she said, was characterized by incidents like
the Russia-Georgia war, which she said was "provoked" by Moscow; the Kremlin's
initiative for a new European security architecture, which she described as a
plot to weaken NATO; the second verdict against Yukos founder Mikhail
Khodorkovsky; and the case of Sergei Magnitsky, the lawyer who died in prison.
"Those who call him a liberal are naive," Shevtsova said.
[return to Contents]
The New Times
No. 31
September 2011
Author: Olga Beshlei, Dmitry Dokuchayev, Anatoly Yermolin, Yegor Mostovschikov,
Zoya Svetova
[Expert: Putin is unsuitable for the role of a reformer.]
Agency of Political and Economic Communications Director
Dmitry Orlov became the only specialist to expect reforms from
Vladimir Putin upon his return to the Kremlin. He said, "Sure,
Putin will come back as a reformer. It will be a new Putin, a
politician with a certain agenda... the one that already saw to
establishment of the Agency of Strategic Initiatives... His
program will be centered around interaction between society and
the powers-that-be. His new economic policy will be based on
demonopolization so that emphasis will be made on private
businesses. Calling the political configuration Putin is about to
arrange "dictatorship" will be wrong." Mark Cramer of Harvard
backed the Russian political scientist with certain reservations.
Cramer said, "Yes, Putin may go for certain reforms... in line
with the steps he took in 2000-2002, at the onset of his
presidency. But that will be all. Do not expect too much from
Opponents of the ruling regime and independent experts
meanwhile believe that Putin's comeback will strengthen
authoritarian trends and that all and any reforms will promptly
become history. "Putin is going to be like [Alexander] Lukashenko.
He is bringing with him socioeconomic disturbances, protests,
crises... everything that is typical of an authoritarian country,"
said Boris Nemtsov of the non-registered People's Freedom Party.
Yevgeny Yasin of the Supreme School of Economics said, "What
reformer is he? It was Putin who all but ignored [Herman] Gref's
program, particularly the part of the program that dealt with
institutional reforms; it was Putin who had [Mikhail] Khodorkovsky
and [Platon] Lebedev imprisoned; who did away with formidable
right-wing political parties. Once you remember it all, it becomes
absolutely clear that there is no reason to expect him to do any
better now. I do not think that Putin will abandon his so called
manual control... No, I will not go to the election." Professor
Konstantin Sonin of the Russian School of Economics called Putin a
dictator. "It is not a totalitarian dictatorship of course, but a
fully fledged personal dictatorship all the same. History of Latin
America knew a lot of leaders like that in the 20th century... No
use waiting for any serious reforms from Putin."
Representatives of the military do not care about any reforms
or changes. An officer from the Ground Forces HQ said, "We never
think in terms of reformers vs dictators. All we want to know is
who the czar is. Putin is. That's fine by us." A senior officer of
the General Staff bore it out and said that [Dmitry] Medvedev had
failed to become the czar. "I've always known that we have but one
supreme commander-in-chief. And he is not Medvedev. Once, during
the Georgian crisis in 2008, I tried to update the president on
the latest developments. He interrupted me and said that I had
better take it all to Putin. Anyway, that was the last time anyone
from the General Staff tried to discuss military stuff with
Medvedev. All problems and matters involving the military-
industrial complex and the Defense Ministry were handled within
the triangle formed by [Anatoly] Serdyukov, [Sergei] Chemezov, and
Most experts, however, said that Russia was heading for a
period of stagnation. Sergei Guriyev of the Russian School of
Economics said that the authorities lacked instruments for a mass
crackdown so that there was nothing to fear from Putin's regime
from this standpoint. Guriyev said, "What we ought to be afraid of
is exodus of the free and gifted people from Russia. Reforms are
an objective necessity. Russia is doomed without them.
Regrettably, Putin is uniquely unsuitable for the role of a
Georgy Satarov of the INDEM Foundation bore it out. "Do not
hold you breath waiting for Putin to change. Everything will
continue unchanged, by inertia."
Russian Financial Corporation President Andrei Nechayev said,
"No serious reforms took place in Russia in all eleven years of
life under the tandem. No reforms at all even though they are long
Sergei Aleksashenko of the Supreme School of Economics said,
"He will be neither a prominent reformer nor a distinct dictator.
He will be something in between... Anyway, we've known Putin in
the course of three terms of office - two presidential and one as
the premier. He was always different, always something new
whenever a new term of office began. I reckon that we will see
some new Putin again when he is elected the president in March
Political scientist Rostislav Turovsky suggested that Putin
was going to promote after 2012 a policy that would enable him to
extend his rule as long as possible. Turovsky said, "I'm not
talking reforms. I'm talking maneuvering in connection with budget
restrictions. After all, the next government will be slated to
pull off some highly unpopular reforms." In the meantime, the next
government is to be headed by incumbent President Medvedev who is
associated in Russia and abroad with modernization.
An expert from the National Center for Academic Studies
(France) perceived nothing unusual in the construction Putin was
shaping. She said, "Medvedev the premier will be a signal to the
Russian general public and the international community. A signal
that everything will proceed as before, that Russia will continue
modernization and that it will still need help and assistance from
the West."
Cramer in the meantime said that the unprecedented manner in
which Putin announced his forthcoming comeback indicated "...
complete abandonment of the principles of democracy." "This is the
first time in Russia after Josef Stalin that so much power is
concentrated in one pair of hands," said the author of the famous
"Black Book of Communism".
[return to Contents]
Financial Times
September 29, 2011
Out of the shadows
Putin's intended return as president unleashes open rebellion within the Kremlin
By Charles Clover
It was supposed to be the stitch-up to end all stitch-ups. On Saturday Vladimir
Putin, Russian prime minister, and Dmitry Medvedev, president since 2008,
announced in front of a loudly cheering audience of the ruling United Russia
party that they were once more switching jobs next year.
"I want to say directly: an agreement over what to do in the future was reached
between us several years ago," Mr Putin told the crowd, while Mr Medvedev too
said the pact had been agreed back in 2007 when he was prime minister and Mr
Putin backed him as his successor for the presidency. "We actually discussed this
variant of events while we were first forming our comradely alliance," proclaimed
Mr Medvedev.
It was the epitome of politics by conspiracy perfected by Mr Putin in more than a
decade in power, intended both to end three-and-a-half years of intrigue that had
gripped Russia about Mr Putin's political plans and to demonstrate that the
omnipotent Kremlin political machine was impervious to rivalry, jealousy,
competition and scandal.
But what happened next proved precisely the opposite: since the weekend, Russia
has been gripped by a political crisis after a number of government officials in
effect mutinied, refusing to play along to the script that had been presented to
them as a fait accompli. What they aired was a feeling of betrayal by the
backroom deal of which they had not been informed.
Monday's sacking as finance minister of Alexei Kudrin, who had served 12 years in
the post and is one of Mr Putin's oldest friends from St Petersburg, was the
first and possibly not the last head to roll in what has become a hefty political
brawl. On learning of the deal, Mr Kudrin had questioned Mr Medvedev's competence
in economic matters and summarily announced his refusal to serve in his cabinet
probably because he had had his own eye on the prime ministership.
On Tuesday, the rogue ex-minister aired his grievances in a way deeply unhelpful
to the central bank, which has spent at least $6bn in the past week propping up
the rouble in the midst of global market turmoil. As he lashed out at the
pressure from above, which, he said, had forced him to approve increases in state
spending, particularly on the military budgetary miscalculations would
"inevitably spread to the entire national economy", he warned the political
infighting only exacerbated the pressure on the currency.
It was an unheard-of public brawl between two members of Mr Putin's famously
tight-lipped political team, who have long kept their internal fights to
themselves. In 2007, for example, Mr Kudrin said almost nothing in public when
Sergei Storchak, his deputy, was arrested and charged with embezzlement in a
heavily politicised case. This case, according to a consensus within the
government, was ordered by a rival Kremlin official, also from the Putin circle.
But the matter was settled behind closed doors and the charges against Mr
Storchak were dropped this year.
Such opacity has become typical under the Kremlin's rules of managed democracy.
Political parties are invented; television stations censored (Mr Kudrin's face
has not been seen on national TV since Saturday); decisions are taken by fiat but
then legitimised by an army of pollsters, spin-doctors and broadcasters who sell
these as democratic choices.
Russians have become consumers of politics in the same way that they are
consumers of cosmetics or electronic goods their opinions registered through
tireless market research and sales data but with no formal way to influence the
process through a meaningful vote. The Kremlin has used such "political
technology" for more than a decade to provide a veneer of democracy for an
authoritarian system.
But this week's fireworks indicate that conspiracy as a governing tool is
becoming untenable. Despite the Kremlin's efforts to drain all the spontaneity
and competition from public politics, it just as stubbornly refuses to go away.
"The system of management of politics is exhausted, it's morally worn out. The
situation has changed and it doesn't work any more," says Gleb Pavlovksy, who
heads the Fund for Effective Politics, a Moscow think-tank, and is a former
political consultant to the Kremlin.
Mr Kudrin was not the only rebel. Igor Yurgens, a Medvedev economic adviser, told
the Financial Times he was "disappointed" by the decision. Arkady Dvorkovich, a
key aide to Mr Medvedev on the economy, also registered his displeasure in a mild
way, posting on Twitter that "there is no cause for celebration" in the
announcement that Mr Putin was to return to the top job. He later tweeted that
Luzhniki stadium, where the speech was held, "is better used for playing hockey".
The disgust of the Medvedev team with the voluntary humiliation of their patron
by Mr Putin was palpable. "There are two teams: Medvedev's team and Putin's
team," says Vladimir Pribylovsky, editor of the political website
anticompromat.org, retelling a variation of a joke that has made the rounds in
Moscow. "But it's not clear whose team Medvedev is on.
"Well, we found out that he is actually on Putin's team."
Political transitions in Russia have in some sense always been conspiracies some
more successful than others. The death of communism happened amid the foul-ups of
the failed 1991 coup by hardline generals; the upset 1996 presidential
re-election win by Boris Yeltsin was stage-managed by seven oligarchs. Most
successful was the rise of Mr Putin himself to replace Yeltsin in 1999. Indeed,
the man who wrote Yeltsin's resignation speech on New Year's eve 1999, who wishes
to remain anonymous, says only six or seven people knew at the time.
Mr Medvedev's entire presidency (Mr Putin was constitutionally prohibited from a
third successive term) now appears to have been an elaborately constructed play,
whose final act was the return of the former KGB colonel to his job next March.
But in its refusal to swallow yet another fait accompli, Russia's political
aristocracy is demonstrating that its patience for paternalistic rule is ebbing
and, simultaneously, the Kremlin appears to be losing its touch.
For instance, the deal presented by both Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev as having been
agreed "years ago" may have instead been recent and hastily constructed.
According to one official, it was pushed for by Mr Medvedev, while Mr Putin
wanted it delayed until after parliamentary elections. "It wasn't great
politically now how are we going to get anyone to vote in the parliamentary
elections if we've told them we've already decided everything?" he adds.
Another official speculates that Mr Kudrin's prime ministerial ambitions were
well known at the time and Mr Medvedev wanted to make clear he had been tapped
for the post before Mr Putin could back out of the deal they had made. According
to a consensus of officials and analysts, the two men decided on the succession
not in 2007 but just this August.
The presentation of the plan was botched. The speeches "sounded like they were
written in the car on the way over", says one government official. Telling the
nation that the pact had been made long ago was a big mistake, says a former
high-ranking Kremlin official. "It is a very bad explanation because, first of
all, it's a lie. And second of all, it doesn't explain anything."
Whatever the background, the announcement clearly did not go down well except
among the party faithful at Saturday's rally. Nor was the displeasure confined to
those in the Medvedev and Putin political teams. On Monday, Moskovsky
Komsomolets, a popular and largely apolitical Moscow tabloid, took aim at the
"tandem" in an editorial. "Russia consists not only of government bureaucrats,
not only of those who have a pass to Luzhniki stadium," the article read. "And
everyone whose consciousness has not been demolished by ecstatic glee [over Mr
Putin's return] has understood that you have lied to us for four years." Russia,
it continued, "has just received a lesson in unbridled cynicism".
In a country where resignations and reshuffles are usually choreographed with
care, Mr Kudrin's abrupt departure was already the second political scandal to
erupt in a month. On September 15, Right Cause a pro-Kremlin party of economic
liberals and democrats aimed at emerging middle-class voters self-destructed
after Mikhail Prokhorov, the third-richest man in Russia and the party's leader,
was expelled in a furious public row.
Brought in to lead what was widely thought to be a Kremlin project, Mr Prokhorov
blamed his expulsion on a row with Vladislav Surkov, chief of the Kremlin's
domestic political operations, whom he labelled a "puppet master".
However, the ensuing scandal made it clear that patience with such managed
democracy is running out. Mr Prokhorov himself said on his blog on Tuesday,
commenting on the week's upheavals: "I think that we stand on the verge of a very
important possibly tectonic shift in the consciousness of the elite, including
the ruling elite. There is polarisation. It will inevitably bring to the surface
new ideologies, new conceptions of development and new people."
Few reckon Mr Putin is in any political danger but the scandals this month,
according to some analysts, indicated that he may be under considerable pressure
to liberalise which was formerly a no-go area for the stern ex-KGB colonel. In
power, Mr Putin has shown himself to be (mainly) an economic liberal but a
political autocrat, who strangled the media and clearly feared giving up the
state's implicit veto over the political process.
But the Russia he will take over in 2012 is not the same Russia, sick of the
chaos of democratic transition, that welcomed a strong hand in 2000 when he first
came to power. Today the country is richer, more middle-class and less patient
than it was a decade ago, according to an increasing amount of sociological
Few can predict what Mr Putin's third term as president will bring. But if he is
wise, says one former senior official, he will have to "show everyone that he is
not what they think he is".
The middle class: a potential headache for Putin
Vedomosti, a Russian newspaper part-owned by the Financial Times, recently ran an
online quiz that was an instant hit. It was called "Are you middle class?"
Respondents were judged by their ability to identify pieces of Ikea furniture,
the stamp on a Schengen visa used in parts of the European Union, an iPhone and
various types of sushi all de rigueur accoutrements of a middle-class Moscow
In many ways, this constituency is the most important for Vladimir Putin if he
wishes to have an untroubled third or fourth term in power as president. But the
group's political loyalties are famously hard to read and fickle.
The middle class is a comparatively new phenomenon in post-communist Russia,
created during Mr Putin's first presidency (2000-08) as economic growth soared
and real incomes doubled.
Alongside their greater wealth, they crave more of a voice and are chafing
against the authoritarian culture of the Kremlin that excludes them from
politics. They could prove to be a headache for Mr Putin if he wishes to rule
once again as an unchallenged autocrat.
The Kremlin has recently been keen to build bridges. It backed Right Cause, a
liberal-leaning party headed by billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov that sought to
mobilise the 15 per cent of voters reckoned to be middle class. The venture
flopped, falling apart this month amid scandal.
For Mikhail Dmitriev of the Centre for Strategic Research, a Moscow think-tank,
the middle class comprises 40 per cent of the population of Moscow and 20-30 per
cent of other urban centres. He says it forms the core of a potential opposition
to the Kremlin, which he reckons will soon find itself in a "crisis of
legitimacy" if it does not reform.
Other sociologists are less alarmist, saying that divining a coherent middle
class is practically impossible. Some work for the state, some are in the private
sector; many are intensely nationalistic, others are democrats.
"There is very little you can say about this group as a whole," argues Larisa
Kosova of Moscow's Higher School of Economics, who believes that even the term
itself is something of a misnomer. She says the title refers mainly to the
category of people whose lifestyles most closely mirror the western middle class.
"It consists of the top two deciles of Russian society," she said. "So in what
way is this 'middle' class?"
[return to Contents]
Vladimir Putin talked with writers
MOSCOW, September 29 (Itar-Tass) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited a
congress of the Russian Books Union on Wednesday. He stated that literature
should be supported. The prime minister noted that thanks to new amendments
introduced in the Tax Code the book publishers will be able to minimize the
losses from unsold copies. He also stated the popularity of reading among
Russians should be revived. The premier was speaking with the writers about the
freedom of creativity, about censorship and the right of authors to give
recommendations to the country's leadership.
Speaking on the problem of electronic piracy in Russia, the premier regretted
that the country is losing the status of the most reading nation in the world and
offered to support serious literature, the Novye Izvestia writes. Vladimir Putin
noted that the bookstores and publishing houses buy and print the books, which
will be bought for sure, that is mainly the boulevard literature, in order not to
sell and not to publish loss-making unsold copies. Therefore, the prime minister
noted that the book publishers and sellers should be stimulated through tax
Russia is ranked among five countries with mostly developed book publishing, but
the readers are becoming fewer and fewer, the Rossiiskaya Gazeta notes. Many
speakers dwelt on the problem how to attract young people to reading. Chairman of
the Audit Chamber Sergei Stepashin, who heads the Russian Books Union, was the
first to raise the problem. "The interest to reading in our society is really
falling," he stated. "The books, which the teenagers were eager to read 20-30
years ago, are forgotten long ago. Their heroes are the supermen from foreign
cartoons," Stepashin pointed out. Stepashin offered to recognize the book
publishing industry as socially important and to bring down the VAT on the
children's literature and to restore beneficial rental rates for the bookstores.
Russia lost the status of the most reading country, the Moskovsky Komsomolets
cites Vladimir Putin as saying. From the very top we dropped to the 43rd position
in the rating of 65 positions, even with Azerbaijan being ahead of us. Meanwhile,
Darya Dontsova, with whom Putin was speaking among other writers, named the prime
minister as one of those to blame for this failure, "We saw you behind the
steering wheel, in the submarine, with a fishing rod, with a rifle, but never at
the opening of a bookstore."
The peculiarities of national patriotism were in the focus of a meeting between
the prime minister and well-known writers after the congress, the Nezavisimaya
Gazeta notes. Russia lacks patriotic literature that is quite bad. "We even do
not have toy soldiers," Putin regretted. He meant Russian toy soldiers. Russian
toy soldiers can be bought only abroad.
Zakhar Prilepin asked Putin why a businessman Gennady Timchenko has taken Finnish
citizenship, the newspaper writes. The premier responded that he has nothing in
common with the business of the owner of the largest oil trader Gunvor, "All that
is related to business interests is his personal business. I have never
interfered in this and am not going to interfere. I hope that he will not poke
his nose in my affairs either." Meanwhile, Putin confirmed that he was acquainted
with Timchenko "back from the period of his work in St. Petersburg," "He worked
with my friends and colleagues in Kirishinefteorgsintez." When the privatization
was launched, they separated, engaged in the oil exports and established a
private company." Timchenko "engaged in business not yesterday or the day before
yesterday, but from the very beginning when the privatization was permitted," the
premier remarked. "I would like to assure you I know that it is highly
publicized - that it was done absolutely without my participation," Putin
[return to Contents]
Russia's Putin: I had no role in oil trading empire
By Gleb Bryanski
MOSCOW, Sept 28 (Reuters) - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin publicly
addressed one of the most serious corruption allegations against him for the
first time on Wednesday, saying he did not help businessman Gennady Timchenko
create the Gunvor oil trading empire.
Timchenko, who has repeatedly denied media speculation that his close friendship
with Putin was behind his business success, is ranked Russia's 17th richest man
by Russia's Finans magazine.
Putin, who plans to return to the Kremlin as president next year after a
four-year stint as prime minister, acknowledged that he knows Timchenko, praising
him as a hard-working businessmen who started his company from scratch.
"I have known the citizen Timchenko for a very long time, since my work in St
Petersburg," Putin told a group of Russian writers during an informal
Putin worked in the office of the St Petersburg mayor in the early 1990s while
Timchenko and his friends, Putin said, span off an oil trading unit of the
Kirishi oil refinery and privatised it.
"It was not yesterday or the day before yesterday that he entered commerce, he
came as soon as privatisation was allowed. I assure you, I know that a lot is
being written about it, without any participation on my part," Putin said.
Swiss-based Gunvor has since grown into one of the world's largest oil trading
firms exporting during some years up to a third of Russian oil.
Timchenko, along with Putin's former judo partner Arkady Rotenberg and
scientist-turned-banker Yuri Kovalchuk, make up a group of businessmen whom
Russian opposition branded "Putin's Friends" for their alleged links with the
prime minister.
The trio are mentioned in a report by one of the opposition leaders, former
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, entitled: "Putin. Corruption."
Timchenko, Rotenberg and Kovalchuk rose rapidly in recent years through the ranks
of Russia's richest people rivalling so-called oligarchs, who made their fortune
through notorious loans-for-shares privatisation auctions in the 1990s.
Timchenko expanded in the gas sector and is now the second biggest shareholder in
non-state owned gas producer Novatek .
Putin never before addressed the issue of his links with the trio in public. His
remarks on Wednesday were an apparent attempt to deal with the allegations at the
start of the election campaign.
"I never interfered with anything related to his business interests, I hope he
will not stick his nose into my business either," Putin told the writers in the
latest in a series of meetings with Russia's artists.
The question, which was posed by writer Zakhar Prilepin, a former left-wing
activist, has shown that many in the Russian audience were more concerned with
Timchenko's Finnish citizenship than his business practices.
"One of the people who made a colossal fortune selling Russian oil, Gennady
Timchenko ... took Finnish citizenship and as a Russian writer I am very
surprised at this situation," Prilepin told Putin.
Putin said that Timchenko needed to work abroad to develop his oil trading
business and he saw nothing wrong with Timchenko's choice of residency and
citizenship. He said that to his knowledge Timchenko had retained Russian
"I think it is normal that in the modern world an individual can choose any place
to reside in and still feel connected to his homeland. Although for me such a
thing would be impossible," Putin said.
[return to Contents]
September 29, 2011
Sadly lacking a following group, Dmitry Medvedev has a chance to form one now
Author: Boris Mezhuyev
President Dmitry Medvedev is in trouble at this point. He made two
steps unacceptable from the standpoint of the liberal following
group he has been trying to develop. Medvedev all but let his
partner in the tandem Premier Vladimir Putin take over and he
sacked Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin.
Is it possible for the president soon-to-become the premier
to develop a new following group and thus gain administrative
weight and win society's respect? It is possible and precisely on
account of his decision to part company with the finance minister.
Kudrin did a fine job. Moreover, the job he did was
important. The Russian state is currently in a shape that
precludes spending. Not because state expenditures are ineffective
by default, but because the system of responsibility and
accountability for their ineffective use does not exist. Besides,
Kudrin commanded unquestionable respect among liberals in general
so that Medvedev's conflict with him became the straw that finally
broke camel's back.
Medvedev did try to win liberals over even though his
socioeconomic program was not entirely liberal by Russian
standards. His program was actually an attempt to provide a
modernization breakthrough in vital sectors like medicine, space
exploration, IT, etc. via the so called state-private partnership.
This attempt turned out to be halfhearted and Kudrin's presence in
the Cabinet was one of the impairing factors. And Medvedev himself
never exactly went out of his way to expand his following group
through development of a new (social-liberal or social-democratic)
social base. He has no other way out now. Medvedev must add an
ideological dimension to his conflict with Kudrin i.e. with all of
the liberal community in general.
United Russia congress last Saturday failed to answer some
important questions. Who is going to form the new government -
United Russia or the Duma majority? What kind of premier is
Medvedev going to be - one who represents a single political party
or the parliamentary majority? What if United Russia fails to get
an absolute majority in the next Duma? Does it mean that somebody
else will be the premier and not Medvedev? This is a serious
question. Political legitimacy of the government to be formed
after May 2012 depends on the answer.
Medvedev may make use of this uncertainty. He may engineer an
alliance between United Russia whose ticket he will head and other
left-centrist political parties - the CPRF, Fair Russia, and even
Yabloko. This alliance will form a left-centrist government of
people's trust and composition of this Cabinet will mirror the
actual arrangement of forces within the lower house of the
parliament. Kudrin's resignation offers Medvedev an opportunity to
emphasize his difference from the right-centrist mainstream. This
alliance will look like continuation of the process of
consolidation of all productive forces of society launched by
establishment of Putin's Russian Popular Front.
Establishment of a parliamentary republic was discussed at
United Russia convention as one of the possible avenues of
evolution of the Russian political system. This idea was publicly
condemned and turned down. Somehow, quietly and unobtrusively, it
was nevertheless incorporated into the package of suggestions
formulated by the tandem. Where political awareness is concerned,
Russia is way ahead of the regimes calling the tune in Central
Asia and Belarus... It is never late to abandon political cliches
and the boring ritualistic mantra on stability and continuity.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
September 29, 2011
Political Zombies Are Mounting Comebacks
By Alexander Bratersky and Alexey Eremenko
Vladimir Putin's bid for the presidency is expected to catapult him back to the
top spot after four years in the White House. But then, he never really left the
Kremlin unlike many other politicians who have announced comebacks in recent
The list includes Yabloko's Grigory Yavlinsky, Rodina's Dmitry Rogozin, the
liberal Union of Right Forces and even Andrei Bogdanov, a leader of the
behind-the-scenes political battles that ousted cheeky newcomer Mikhail Prokhorov
as Right Cause leader.
The resurgent shadows of the political past indicate that the country's party
system rigid and Kremlin-controlled lacks diversity, independent analyst
Stanislav Belkovsky said.
But others said the trend is stillborn because the only people interested in
reviving their old careers are the politicians themselves.
Nikita Belykh, the country's most senior liberal who serves as Kirov governor,
pointed out the main problem in commenting on Right Cause's collapse this month,
writing on his blog that when striving for a strong party, it makes sense to
build from the ground up something the returning politicians are loath to do.
Union of Right Forces
Other than Putin, the Union of Right Forces is the most recent comeback hopeful.
Its former members announced plans to revive the party in mid-September, days
after the Right Cause convention that ended with Prokhorov's ouster.
The party, created in 1999 and a vehicle for liberals led first by Boris Nemtsov
and later by Belykh, merged into Right Cause at its inception in 2008 under
apparent Kremlin pressure.
Its former members mostly sided with Prokhorov in his clash with Bogdanov, which
left Bogdanov in charge and Right Cause without any hope of clearing the 7
percent threshold to win seats in the December elections to the State Duma.
Rosnano chief Anatoly Chubais, architect of the 1990s privatizations and
co-founder of the Union of Right Forces, gathered former party members on Sept.
21 and proposed restoring the party apparently with the Kremlin's blessing.
The meeting was not public but was widely reported by leading newswires and media
outlets, including Interfax and Gazeta.ru. The reports said the party might
return after the Duma vote and run in the next elections in 2016.
"I am sure that the issue of establishing a strong, right-leaning party will
become unavoidable, and liberals should be ready for it," Chubais wrote last week
on his LiveJournal blog.
Further bringing himself into the spotlight, Chubais on Wednesday criticized
Putin for dismissing Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, saying the prime minister
was putting the economy at risk with the ouster.
Bogdanov has not commented on the possible split within Right Cause. A prominent
political consultant who created several minor parties in the 1990s, he kept a
low profile throughout the 2000s, surfacing twice to deny ousted Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov, now a Kremlin opponent, leadership of Right Cause in 2004, and
then to run as a spoiler candidate against Dmitry Medvedev in the 2008
presidential election. He won 1.3 percent of the vote.
Bogdanov has said his takeover of Right Cause was provoked by Prokhorov's
authoritarian management policies, but analysts say the incident was orchestrated
by the Kremlin, which authorized Prokhorov's leadership of the party in June but
later grew displeased with his work.
The return of Yavlinsky, who left Yabloko's leadership to Sergei Mitrokhin in
2008, was much more prosaic. The 59-year-old politician, a former amateur boxer
who made a name for himself with his economic initiatives during perestroika, was
elected to lead Yabloko's electoral list for the Duma elections earlier this
month. Mitrokhin backed the decision.
The 2007 Duma elections left the country without public politics, "but now they
might be back, and I'm going to participate," Yavlinsky said during a party
convention on Sept. 12.
Yabloko, which garnered 1.57 percent of the vote in 2007, can count on 10 to 12
percent this year, Yavlinsky said.
Rogozin's comeback was the trickiest of all and the first to be botched. The
media were full of reports of his looming return for weeks, saying he would serve
as frontman for a "civilized nationalist movement" at the elections and lead his
old party, Rodina, now part of A Just Russia, at the polls.
Rogozin, 47, Russia's envoy to NATO, topped the Rodina electoral list in 2003. It
was a leftist party at the time, but he rebranded it into a nationalist one for
the Moscow City Duma vote in 2005, possibly with the Kremlin's blessing. However,
the party grew too popular, and in 2006 the Kremlin merged it into A Just Russia,
a spoiler for the Communists, and awarded Rogozin a sinecure in Brussels.
Rogozin's new public movement (not a party), Rodina-Congress of Russian
Communities, was registered in August and proceeded to join Putin's All-Russia
People's Front, an election group affiliated with the ruling United Russia party.
Rogozin gave a heated nationalist speech in early September at an international
political forum in Yaroslavl attended by Medvedev but announced two weeks later
that he would not give up his NATO job. He also urged his supporters to side with
United Russia.
Gazeta.ru, citing sources it said were close to Rogozin, reported that he had
asked for the post of Duma deputy speaker as a reward for campaigning for United
Russia and against A Just Russia, but the authorities had declined. A Just Russia
has fallen out of favor with the Kremlin for stealing votes from United Russia.
What's Next
Although Rodina and the Union of Right Forces are at opposite ends of the
political spectrum, analysts and political activists interviewed by The Moscow
Times downplayed the parties' futures by citing similar proverbs.
"You can't swim in the same lake twice. You can't get the old Rodina back," said
Yevgeny Roizman, an anti-drug activist who was in Rodina's Duma faction in the
early 2000s.
Incidentally, Roizman joined Right Cause at Prokhorov's request and quit
alongside him.
"You shouldn't pour new wine into old wineskins," Alexei Mukhin, head of the
Center for Political Information, said about the Union of Right Forces.
"A revival of the old guard is needed by the old guard itself," Mukhin said,
adding that the party has no charismatic backers left other than Chubais, who
remains unpopular with voters.
As for Yavlinsky, he is back because the party's rank and file think he is more
likely than Mitrokhin to get them into the Duma, Mukhin said. He said their hopes
might materialize because Putin feels "sympathy for the politician," but did not
Mikhail Vinogradov, an analyst with the Petersburg Politics Foundation, a think
tank, said Yabloko is seen by the Kremlin as a replacement for Right Cause able
to sweep the liberal vote. But he said the party's main hope for success was
access to "administrative resources," not public support.
Analysts agreed that the country's seven-party system leaves much to be desired,
with neither liberals nor nationalists having serious representation in the Duma.
Calls to revive the Union of Right Forces, for one, are an attempt by the ruling
elite to show that the country's political system has "diversity," said
Belkovsky, the analyst.
But he said such attempts are useless under the current system, where parties are
tightly controlled by the Kremlin. "It would actually be profitable for the
Kremlin to loosen the reins, but the problem is that the system wouldn't be able
to handle it," he said by telephone.
Nationalists, who unlike the liberals with Right Cause have no political vehicle
at all, may side with United Russia by getting Rodina members to run on United
Russia's ticket, Viktor Militaryov, a nationalist-leaning analyst, wrote on his
LiveJournal this month. However, no prominent nationalists made the party list
announced on Sept. 25.
Moreover, Rodina's history makes it unlikely that the nationalists will be
allowed to influence policies within United Russia. Meanwhile, the liberal
constituency will be reluctant to back any Kremlin-linked party.
"It is hard to make a fool of liberal-minded people. They belong to an educated
class that don't even vote in elections," said analyst Mark Feygin, a former ally
of liberal reformer and late Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, who co-implemented with
Chubais the economic reforms of the 1990s.
The country needs a strong liberal party to implement unpopular economic reforms,
and it needs one soon, said Belykh, who was appointed Kirov governor after
leaving the Union of Right Forces in 2008. He refused to trade his governorship
for Right Cause's top post this year.
Belykh said a liberal party would be doomed without public support, which can
only be obtained through hard work on the grassroots level.
"We might try to build a strong party from the ground up, taking part in
municipal and regional elections to build influence and reputation," he said on
his blog. But, he added, no one is doing that right now.
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
September 29, 2011
With the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary campaign a foregone conclusion,
political parties only go through the motions of running for the Duma
Author: Daria Mazayeva, Aleksei Gorbachev
With less than three months left before the parliamentary
election, one would expect the campaign to be in full swing. It is
anything but. Political parties are surprisingly passive. Sources
within some of them admit that they are still looking for
sponsors. Of the three officially recognized political parties not
represented in the Duma, the Yabloko party alone seems to be
determined to make it to the lower house of the parliament. The
impression is that the other two do not really care if they make
it or not.
Traditionally complaining against the administrative
resource, political parties are in no hurry to launch their
campaigns. Parliamentary political parties and Yabloko have
functioning web sites whereas the site of the Right Cause party is
shut down for redesigning. Web site of Russian Patriots is working
in a perfunctory manner only.
United Russia in its turn seems to be drawing on the CPRF's
experience. Andrei Nazarov, Duma deputy and activist of the ruling
party's election center, said that the campaign was centered
around all sorts of performances and celebrations. Nazarov said,
"Well, we organize United Russia days in villages and settlements
where our lawyers help the locals with what legal problems they
have and where the locals are invited to see variety shows."
United Russia never paid for billboards and flyers yet. The
party's namesake newspaper is to be printed at some later date.
According to Nazarov, 600,000 copies will be distributed in
Bashkortostan alone. The lawmaker refused to answer questions
about financial standing of the ruling party.
Sources within the CPRF meanwhile said that the parliamentary
campaign was going to cost the party at least 100 million rubles.
Vadim Soloviov of the CPRF faction of the Duma spoke of 200
billboards to be set up all over the country. "No more," he said,
"because emphasis is to be made on actual and direct contact with
voters, as always." The CPRF will make an emphasis on
proliferation of its newspapers and flyers, on radio and TV
commercials, not to say on web sites in every Russian region.
Igor Lebedev of the LDPR's election center said that this
party intended to rent 10-15 billboards in every region. "The LDPR
will spend everything it has on the campaign. The sum amounts to
about 700 million rubles," he said. Yuri Kogan of the LDPR faction
of the Duma mentioned the plans to make a couple of cartoons where
party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky would be represented as a
Russian folk hero.
Oleg Mikheyev, chief of the Fair Russia's election center,
was vague on the subject of the campaign this political party was
supposed to be running. Yes, the party was organizing some rallies
and pickets. Yes, it was putting up billboards and printing a
newspaper. Mikheyev proved unable to give the date of the last
major rally organized by Fair Russia anywhere - or the sum Fair
Russia intended to spend on the parliamentary campaign. "We have
two months yet. Call me then," he said.
As for non-parliamentary political parties, they are mostly
focused on collection of signatures.
Yabloko's fears are centered around the penchant on the part
of the authorities to invalidate signatures in support for the
political parties of the opposition.
Right Cause Chairman Andrei Dunayev said, "No, we haven't
even begun collection of signatures yet. We submitted documents to
the Central Electoral Commission this Monday and we are waiting
for a response."
Political Techniques Center Vice President Aleksei Makarkin
attributed the relaxed nature of the parliamentary campaign to its
pre-programmed outcome. He said that billboards and flyers would
only appear in November. Makarkin said, "As for participation of
small parties in the election, it depends on what it is that the
authorities need them for and expect them to accomplish. Russian
Patriots will only become active if the CPRF and Fair Russia start
getting out of line... from the authorities' point of view, of
[return to Contents]
September 28, 2011
Communists, Fair Russia get ready for State Duma elections
By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova
Last weekend's congress of the United Russia party, where it was announced that
the members of the ruling tandem, President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, will swap seats, has eclipsed all other political events,
including other pre-election conventions. The members of the Communist Party and
Fair Russia adopted their programs and approved of the lists of candidates.
Nothing sensational at their conventions happened and the commentators focused
almost entirely on the composition of lists of candidates.
At this point, experts say, the indisputable chances of clearing the 7-percent
qualification hurdle to get into the new State Duma are shared by only three
parties - United Russia, the Communists and the Liberal Democrats, while Fair
Russia, according to new rules, can lay claim only to a "consolation prize" of
one or two seats, if it gets five to seven percent of the votes.
According to the latest opinion poll, held on September 10-11, the rating of Fair
Russia was 4%, of United Russia, 43%, of the Communist Party, 11%, and of the
Liberal Democratic Party, 9%.
Judging by the ratings of the same parties, released in late August by the
Levada-Center, United Russia would gain 54% of the voters, 18% would go to the
CPRF, the LDPR would get 13% and Fair Russia, 6%.
The key ideas of the Communist Party's program, approved by the congress are "the
nationalization of the oligarchs' property," the introduction of a progressive
income tax, government funding of the health service, and abolition of the
cash-for-benefits swap. In politics - direct elections of Federation Council
members, governors and judges at the city and district level, recall of any
legislators for violation of election pledges. There is no direct criticism of
the country's leadership in the program, nor was there any in the speech by the
invariable leader of the party, Gennady Zyuganov.
The question of the upcoming elections was the central one. According to
Zyuganov, the main task of the party will be to resist election rigging. "For
this we promise to plant our observers at all polling stations."
At the very top of the Communist Party's top ten, as always, one finds Zyuganov
himself. Among the others are the former head of the Federal Service for Drug
Control (FSKN) Viktor Cherkesov, who in 2007 published a sensational article
about the conflict between the federal security service FSB and the FSKN and six
months after that was forced to resign, the vice-president of the Russian Academy
of Sciences (RAS), 2000 Nobel laureate Zhores Alfyorov, woman cosmonaut Svetlana
Savitskaya, deputy chairmen of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Ivan
Melnikov and Vladimir Kashin. The list from Khakassia is headed by a former
member of United Russia, the region's former governor Alexei Lebed. He explained
that he had quit the ranks of the ruling party because of his critical attitude
to the current developments.
All qualifiable positions, as Kommersant has said, are taken by representatives
of all three internal groups, whose efforts have shaped today's of the Communist
Party. In the next Duma there will be representatives of the "anti- Western,
anti-bourgeois group" (deputy chairman of the Central Committee Vladimir Kashin
and secretary of the Central Committee Sergei Obukhov), members of the
"statist-nationalist group" (Chairman of the party's central auditing commission,
Vladimir Nikitin and Central Committee secretary Valery Rashkin), representatives
of the "progressive" group (deputy chairman of the Central Committee Ivan
Melnikov, and coordinator of the faction Sergei Reshulsky).
Now the Communists in the State Duma have 57 seats. The closest level where the
CPRF's parliamentary opportunities would qualitatively change is 90 seats. That
number of mandates would let the Communists to put forward a motion of no
confidence in the government and to address the Constitutional Court with formal
As for Fair Russia, it has found itself in a difficult situation. Their leader,
Sergei Mironov, was forced to give way to Nikolai Levichev, and then to leave the
post of Federation Council speaker, thereby depriving the party of the slightest
administrative and political resource. Some prominent and influential members
left the party, for example, State Duma Deputy Speaker Alexander Babakov joined
the election list of United Russia.
The FR's chances to get into the new Duma, and in any case to have a full-fledged
faction, according to experts, are not very large. Especially because United
Russia sees it as a competitor. According to a source of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in
the regions the governors have allegedly been instructed "to give Fair Russia no
more than 4% of the votes."
At the same time the disappearance of the liberals from the number of serious
participants in the election campaign after the failure of the Right Cause party
project may, according to some political analysts, play into the hands of the FR
and improve their results.
At the party congress the FR's top eight was announced. Alongside Sergei Mironov,
and Nikholai Levichev it also includes State Duma members Oksana Dmitrieva, her
husband, Ivan Grachyov and Yelena Drapeko.
Analysts' hopes for the radicalization of the party and for its strong opposition
to the Kremlin have not materialized the pre-election speech of the FR's leaders
were moderately loyal. Only a handful of rank-and-file party members dared
criticize Putin's nomination for president, while their leader remained silent.
Absent from the party lists are non-system opposition politicians: co-leader of
the PARNAS party Vladimir Ryzhkov and leader of the Movement in Defense of the
Khimki Forest, Yevgeny Chirikov, with whom negotiations had continued until the
very last day. Meanwhile, prominent Duma members form the FR, Gennady Gudkov and
Galina Khovanskaya, who had advocated cooperation with non-system opposition,
have lost their places on the top of the party's list. None of the well-known
political outsiders has been included in the part's list.
On the eve of the Fair Russia congress the party was seething with emotion, said
Moskovsky Komsomolets. The leaders of at least half of the regional chapters had
agreed to oust the official leader Nikolai Levichev. Gennady Gudkov was proposed
as his successor. However, Sergei Mironov, quelled the rebellion.
In its program Five Steps to Justice the FR proposes a 300%-increase in penalties
for violations of labor laws, a progressive scale of taxation and a special
compensating tax on the so-called oligarchs of the 1990s, anti-corruption laws,
an increased pension starting from 70 years of age, and a 50% reduction of
pre-school childcare center waiting lists. How exactly the party plans to go
about this business remains unclear.
[return to Contents]
Russia's Citizens Watch Urges People To Come To Polls On Election Day
Moscow, 28 September: The NGO for the protection of voting rights Citizens Watch
(Russ: Grazhdanskiy Kontrol) argues against an appeal made by some opposition
forces to boycott the upcoming State Duma election and is ready to take its
activists to the streets to support the Russian citizens' participation in the
parliamentary election campaign, it says in a statement by the organization's
press service.
"We are prepared to defend the voting rights of the Russian citizens, including
in open street rallies. In the run-up to the elections, together with fellow
public organization, activists, young people, pensioners and all those who are
not indifferent to the future of our country, we will take to the streets with an
appeal to preserve the right of the Russian citizens to elect state authorities,"
executive director of the Citizens Watch Georgiy Fedorov said.
According to him, appeals by some opposition leaders to boycott the election are
"dangerous attempts to prevent the Russian people from participation in real
"What forces might be behind such calls? Paradoxically, they may play into the
hands of those who will try to rig the election," he said. (passage omitted)
According to Fedorov, activists will distribute leaflets on the streets telling
voters about their rights. Fedorov said that they would urge people to come to
the polls. "You will not hear the names of existing or imaginary parties at our
street actions," he said.
[return to Contents]
Russia Beyond the Headlines
September 28, 2011
Tandem swap signals sweeping reforms
Whatever is said about the shortcomings of the Russian political system, it has
at least one indisputable technical advantage: significant changes can be made
without waiting for the next elections.
By Vladimir Babkin
Vladimir Babkin is former deputy editor-in-chief of Russian daily "Izvestia".
Liberal public opinion is outraged by the news that the Russian president and
prime minister "have long agreed" which job each of them would take. Everything
seems to be strictly constitutional, but the people's will is not being freely
expressed. However, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, as well as much of
Russian society, don't seem to think that's Russia's biggest problem. Perhaps
they are afraid that if they relinquish power, the world would soon see a free
but hungry and embittered people.
Just one day, and a Sunday at that, passed between two important events: the
announcement of the tandem swap and the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister and
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin. It's no surprise that President Dmitry Medvedev
and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin decided to waste no time in showing the
political landscape how to take decisive action. One of these courses of action
is to put loyal professionals in key posts.
Earlier, during a trip to the United States, Alexei Kudrin voiced his opposition
to the president's decision to significantly increase the Russian defense budget,
and also spoke about the growing deficit of the State Pension Fund, which is
currently the only real source of pension financing in the country. The former
finance minister also publicly criticized some of the president's other economic
In Russia, the first move of the new tandem operation was enthusiastically
received by the Communists. Alexei Kudrin more than once gave them good cause for
advocacy when he opposed social obligations for being financially impractical.
Liberal politicians are worried, seeing this as another sign of arbitrary rule.
But because the now former finance minister was by no means a liberalon the
contrary, he was a typical hawkthere is no one to defend him. And there is no
time to do it. It is more important to predict and understand what the
authorities' next actions are and how effective and consistent they will be.
If we are to believe the repeated declarations of the president, prime minister
and much of the Russian political establishment that supports them, the main task
in the coming years will be modernizing and diversifying the economy. That means
we can soon expect more attractive terms for investment in high-tech sectors. But
modernization will mainly be financed, as before, with revenues from the sale of
energy products. So, we shouldn't expect any changes in that sector that could
worsen the investment climate.
One of the most ambitious and expensive programs is the modernization of the
army. For that to happen, sacking the finance minister isn't sufficient. In order
to have enough for the army, for modernization and for social spending, the state
budget will have to be revised. One of the new sources of budget revenue will
apparently be the introduction of a progressive income tax that would require the
rich to pay more. That measure could scare off investors, who will have to divvy
up more of their profits to the Russian treasury.
We can also expect a new wave of privatization of large companies, including the
oil and gas industry, as well as Russian Railways and Russia's biggest bank,
Sberbank. "We are not building state capitalism. There was a period when the role
of the state was intensifying. It was inevitable and necessary. Now the potential
of that path has been exhausted," Dmitry Medvedev told the International Economic
Forum in St. Petersburg last summer.
Some analysts believe that Vladimir Putin does not share that idea, and that once
he is back in the Kremlin, he will seek to strengthen the role of the state, at
least in strategic sectors.
It seems that such arguments mainly serve to confirm the views of the sizable
section of society that opposes the partners working in tandem. Allegedly, Putin
is an advocate of a strong state more like a dictatorship, while Medvedev is more
of a liberal. Compare the "steely gaze of the former KGB officer" with the
"thoughtful gaze" of the former university professor.
That sounds nice but makes no sense politically. Russia's policy, both domestic
and foreign, will be more liberal or more reactionary regardless of the color of
its leaders' eyes. It will be determined by internal and external factors. Right
now, those are very complex. Let us hope that the policy will be pragmatic enough
to change things for the better.
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New York Times
September 29, 2011
Failure Seen in Putin's Latest Move
By CHRYSTIA FREELAND | REUTERS
Chrystia Freeland is global editor at large at Reuters.
NEW YORK The next Russian Revolution started this month. It will be another two
or three or even four decades before the Russian people take to the streets to
overthrow their dictator and the timing will depend more on the price of oil
than on anything else but as of Sept. 24, revolution rather than evolution
became Russia's most likely path in the medium term.
That's because President Dmitri A. Medvedev's announcement last weekend that he
would step aside next March to allow Vladimir V. Putin to return to the Kremlin
was also an announcement that the ruling clique failed to institutionalize its
grip over the country.
We have known since 1996 that Russia wasn't a democracy. We now know that Russia
isn't a dictatorship controlled by one party, one priesthood, or one dynasty. It
is a regime ruled by one man.
"The party doesn't exist," said one of Russia's leading independent economists.
"The politics is all about one person."
That new reality might seem to be a victory for Mr. Putin. But it is a flawed
triumph. His resumption of absolute power is also an admission that he and his
cronies have failed in the project they set themselves in 2008. And that failure
leaves the future President Putin with an Achilles' heel.
The project was to create a self-replicating institutional base for the regime
Mr. Putin brought to power in 2000, when he took over from Boris N. Yeltsin and
dismantled the fledgling democratic structures the first leader of independent
Russia had either created or tolerated.
"In 2008, Putin's message was, 'We aren't like a Central Asian republic, we
aren't going to build a personalistic regime, we will have institutions,"' Ivan
Krastev, chairman of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and one of the
most astute students of Russian power, told me. "This is all abolished now. The
very idea of a governing party and party career, as you have in China, that
didn't work."
Russia's transformation into what political scientists call a sultanistic or
neo-patrimonial regime is a break both with Russian history and with the global
trend. The Kremlin has been home to plenty of murderous dictators. But the czars
drew their legitimacy from their blood and their faith. The general secretaries
owed their power to their party and their ideology. Mr. Putin's rule is based
solely on the man himself.
Russia's shift to sultanism is out of step with the rest of the world, too. The
Arab Spring was a revolt against some of the world's most powerful neo-sultans;
it is no accident that most of the remaining Middle Eastern dictatorships are
ruled by dynastic monarchs, not strongmen. And among the world's great powers a
group to which Russia is desperate to belong only the Kremlin's ruler need say
l'etat, c'est moi. China is certainly authoritarian, but it is a one-party state
of precisely the sort Mr. Putin has failed to build.
One characteristic of paternalistic regimes is that they rule through fear and
humiliation remember the refrains from the streets of Tunisia and Egypt about
people protesting to regain their dignity. That is being lost in Russia. One
analyst, who has always spoken to me freely before, asked not to be quoted. When
I asked a Russian businessman who was traveling in Europe what his friends back
home thought, he was shocked by my naivete: Kremlin politics, he explained, was
no longer an issue it was safe to discuss on Russian telephones.
The sense of humiliation is even greater. "A lot of my friends are very
disappointed that the private decision of two friends can determine the fate of
their great and huge country," one oligarch from the former Soviet Union told me.
Most humiliated of all was President Medvedev, who was required to announce his
abdication from the Kremlin himself. "Medvedev is now the ultimate symbol of
weakness," Mr. Krastev said. "The liberals now hate him more than they hate
Don't, however, expect Western business to complain. When it comes to dealing
with governments, especially foreign ones, chief executives love one-stop
shopping, and that's one thing a personalistic dictatorship provides. As one
European chief executive told me, "We applaud this candidacy. Putin has been
supporting industry in a way that is remarkable."
Another thing Western chief executives like about dealing with dictators is
presumed stability. That's not entirely a myth look at Ukraine to see how
turbulent a post-Soviet state can be when it experiments with democracy but it
isn't totally true either.
Paternalistic regimes can be very strong, but they are also very brittle. They
have two great vulnerabilities. The first is money. Fear and humiliation are
important tools for a neo-patrimonial strongman, but he needs cash, too. A
Russian economist I spoke to calculated that if the price of oil were to fall
below $60 a barrel, and stay there, Mr. Putin's reign could soon be imperiled.
The second is succession. The central problem with a regime built on one man and
a reason Mr. Putin tried to institutionalize Russian authoritarianism is that it
has no mechanism for transferring power.
"For this type of regime, the only succession is that you clone yourself," Mr.
Krastev said. "In 2008, Putin wanted to convince us that he, like Yeltsin, could
retire to the dacha. Now, there is no dacha for Putin anymore. He must die in the
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
September 29, 2011
The Dark Side Has Cookies
By Anna Arutiunova
This week the Russian blogosphere has been all Putin, all the time. So much has
been said about Russia's back to the future president it would take a Talmud to
record it all. For the sake of brevity, here is just a quick recap.
Some are indeed rejoicing in the news that Putin is most likely to lead Russia
for the next 12 years (or in the fact that the show is now over and we can all go
on about our business). The usual suspects are indignant: tales of a Russian
cataclysm, especially told by the country's former residents, line all the
virtual "intellectual parlors." "What happened in Russia this Saturday is called
'a complete loss of hope' for a significant number of people. During Putin's
first term, there was hope that in the end, he would leave. During Mevdedev's
time, there was hope that he would be an independent politician. And now all the
illusions are gone," wrote Konstantin Andreev in his blog for Snob.ru. The
shoulder-shrugging majority is matter-of-factly gloomy. "What a surprise," they
say. "What did we actually do for this not to happen?" A few are packing their
bags (and only time will tell how many will actually walk out the door). The rest
are having fun with it.
And good (albeit not always clean) fun it is. The kings of Photoshop have rolled
out some of their best work yet, and the so-called "de-motivators" (the word
Russians use to describe a photo in a black frame with a caption underneath) are
even better: "Let me be the one on top now," says a caption to a snapshot of
Putin slyly winking at a smiling Medvedev. Twitter is not far behind: "We could
also swap names, but then you guys would really be confused," tweets a
hypothetical Putin. The list of the things that can save Russians from 12 more
years of Putin is also inspiring: "Don't despair, friends. In 2012, Putin will be
60. In Russia, democracy has a lot of allies," wrote journalist Valery Panyushkin
in his LiveJournal blog. "Prostate cancer, hypertension, Alzheimer's,
Parkinson's...This isn't forever."
And then there are those who are still trying to prove a point. A YouTube video
posted by user 111111ex with the telling name of "The country is in deep s**t,
but people are still for Putin," starts with posing the question "what is wrong
with Russia right now?" and goes on to a vox pop of people on the streets, who
vary in age, profession and social status. The answers are as diverse as those
polled: terrorism; constant brawls and fights ("just look at our society!"); the
people are bad and disinterested; poor roads; no respect for each other; we pay
taxes but all still depend on someone; alcoholism, drug addiction; dirt; low pay
that forces people to work at stores instead of sticking to their professions. An
interviewee from Dagestan says he can't find a job due to his origin. The list
goes on: there are too few programs to help young people and families acquire
housing; the devil is in our mentality even when it comes to changing lanes, we
need to start thinking about turning the blinker on. It's difficult to find a
well-paying job, even with higher education; small businesses run into trouble;
the teachers and nannies make pennies; "everyone just fights to survive, everyone
on their own, while the top is getting richer."
Having heard the woes, the makers of the video then pose the question: "Will you
vote for Putin?" And here is the punch line every single person who has just
complained says "yes." "We started living better;" "he is trustworthy, he can
help;" "he takes care of the people, and not just those of his own income and
entourage;" "he is an idealist and people follow his point of view;" "I don't see
anyone else in this job;" "he'll probably want to do something good for Russia;"
"Putin's Plan forever!" "he's been around for years and everything is fine,
everyone is satisfied" (says the Dagestani); "when we had Putin, everything was
good," "before him the country was in disarray, but as honest as a person is,
they can't do anything alone." You get the idea.
I find this video very telling. Although the Russian cyberspace may paint a
different picture (in a Facebook poll asking who you would vote for in the
presidential elections, 4,816 people said "for Putin" and 24,502 said "for any
other candidate, out of principle"), most Russians do genuinely like Putin. "He
satisfies their idea of a strong president a healthy man with a powerful torso,
a sex-symbol of sorts, a tough talker who firmly defends the national interest,"
said writer Victor Erofeyev in an op-ed for the New York Times.
The truth is, most Russians have lived in poverty for so long and have endured
such hardship that the fact that people are no longer getting killed on the
streets randomly (just deliberately) and that their salaries have gone up
together with their purchasing power while the borders remain open is already
cause for satisfaction, if not optimism. The YouTube video clearly shows that
whatever values we may claim to aspire to in Russia (freedom of thought, rule of
law and other "x" of "y") for most remain secondary to material well-being and
the sense of security. One of my Western colleagues recently reminded me that
people only start caring about democracy when they have food on their plates.
Well, maybe Russians really aren't at that stage yet. But who can blame them?
[return to Contents]
Valdai Discussion Group
Medvedev's decision to step down may serve Russia well
By Piotr Dutkiewicz
Piotr Dutkiewicz is Professor of Political Science, Director of the Centre for
Governance and Public Policy at Carleton University, Ottawa, member of the Valdai
Discussion Club Advisory Board.
I believe that D. A. Medvedev's decision to step down as a candidate in the
upcoming presidential elections must have been a difficult one as,
constitutionally speaking, the president is the most powerful person in the
Russian Federation. Why he has done so? To me, President Medvedev would be a very
good president for the next term in office in so-called normal times, prosperous
times, stable times. But what we see today is everything but stability and
prosperity: problems in Europe, financial problems in the U.S., the slowdown of
the Chinese economy, and, finally North African and Arab revolutions. In general,
political instability in the world demands a lot from governments, and this
includes the crisis management that is needed in Russia. Thus, one of the main
reasons of his decision might be the need for stronger leadership, for a crisis
manager who will be able to steer Russia through the period of a global
The second reason might be that D.A. Medvedev started his presidency with very
ambitious plans. We all remember the famous article "Forward, Russia!" The
problem is that many of his ambitious and forward-looking proposals did not
materialize. Judging his presidency from the perspective of his promises, we may
say that a lot of reforms in law enforcement and other legal areas were
implemented, but in the area of modernization of the country few things have been
The third reason might be in the fact that President Medvedev has no
institutionalized political support. He has no support - or until recently he
didn't have the support - of any political party for his own political platform.
It's also doubtful that he will be able to become an effective leader of the
United Russia party that for years was domesticated by V.V. Putin. I believe that
this reason would have been strong enough for very serious consideration of D. A.
Medvedev's decision not to participate in the upcoming presidential election. And
it seems that both leaders fully agreed on that.
All these reasons raise an important question for his political future. It seems
at least based on debates among key economists that the President handling an
economic file is controversial. As he may become a Prime Minister early next
year, it will probably be an eye-opening experience as he will be met with the
constraints and challenges of the real economy and real society. Thus he may
acquire new qualities and new skills that will undoubtedly be very helpful for
fine tuning his leadership style. Maybe it will serve him well in his next bid
for the presidency in seven years' time.
However to me - the current political and to some extent economic cycle in
Russia is coming to an end with the current presidential term. A new cycle should
evolve in the area of industrial revival of the Russian economy, in the area of
slow but firm and predictable modernization of the political system, in the area
of civil service and human resource management, which means bringing new people
(with new ideas) to decision-making positions. Thus the classic tandem as we know
it, the arrangement of the president being closely supported by a more
politically powerful prime minister, is over. Now a new form of the arrangement
will emerge, but this, of course, will depend on the people involved.
Specifically, it depends on the next move of the new Russian president. I very
much hope that Vladimir Putin will launch a new economic and political program
(mainly robust re-industrialization of the country) and will show a more liberal
face both in Russia and abroad. To me, the key areas to address are quite
obvious: strengthening property and civil rights, supporting some political
changes like returning to the elections of governors and allowing new,
independent political parties to emerge, strengthening the courts, effectively
continuing fight with corruption, etc. If such a program will be launched, then
new people that will be required for its implementation, and that may
significantly change the political configuration of Russia.
Finally, the broader question of how such a political move fits into the
democratic framework emerges. Transition of power within a narrow elite is
becoming a global trend. It's obvious that the classic notion of liberal
democracy is changing, very much influenced by the financial crisis of 2008-2009,
by the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, by the looming new financial crisis, and so
on and so forth. It is obvious that we are dealing with an entirely new notion of
democracy when people prefer (to a certain extent) to give up some portion of
their freedom and entitlements in order to have more stability and security. This
process is influencing democracy in the sense that the market is sometimes
becoming more important than democracy. And therefore the relations between the
market and democracy are changing, and not in favor of democracy. The problem is
how much democracy the market can sustain in the times of crisis. That's one
question. Another is to what extent democracy can help the market be stronger.
The answers to both questions are very disturbing. It seems that sometimes
democracy is very costly and slows down the market. On the other hand, democracy
has no direct, no immediate link with strengthening the market. So if you have
this disturbing answer to both questions it means democracy is subordinated to
the market. It seems that the market is now the key focus for most people because
of unemployment, salaries, the future of pensions, the future of their children.
In other words, in this very close relationship between democracy and the market,
now the market is taking the lead at the expense of democratic rights and
freedoms. That's the global trend. Russia is not here an exception.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
September 29, 2011
Russia for All of Its Citizens
By Vladimir Ryzhkov
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, hosts a political talk
show on Ekho Moskvy radio and is co-founder of the opposition Party of People's
Despite President Dmitry Medvedev's appeal to political parties to avoid whipping
up dangerous nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments in their campaign slogans or
political platforms, it is already clear that some parties have begun doing
exactly that. I suspect that the clan allied with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
is most responsible for placing the issue of "protecting Russians against ethnic
minorities" on the front burner among Kremlin-sanctioned parties in this election
Take, for example, the Liberal Democratic Party. During its convention on Sept.
13, it unveiled the slogan "For Russians!" that will serve as its major platform
going into the December State Duma elections. The Liberal Democratic Party list
includes the son of Yury Budanov, who was convicted of killing a Chechen girl.
The list also includes the lawyer who defended Russian ultra-nationalists
convicted of murdering attorney Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasia
In addition, Dmitry Rogozin, the country's leading nationalist, has announced his
plans to return to Russia and play an active role in domestic politics.
Tellingly, the Kremlin invited Rogozin to give a keynote speech at the Yaroslavl
Global Policy Forum earlier this month in which he spoke about protecting
Russians against discrimination from the country's minorities.
It would have been impossible for Rogozin to speak so openly and freely about the
"Russian question" on state-controlled television and at a Kremlin-sponsored
international forum without Putin's approval.
By placing the Russian question at the center of the national agenda, the Kremlin
gains a number of short-term benefits.
First and most important, the focus on the Russian question deflects attention
away from the country's largest problems such as corruption, social
stratification and lawlessness which have become far worse under Putin's rule.
Exploiting the Russian question enables the authorities to manipulate public
opinion and to instill in people's minds the belief that they live poorly because
of ethnic minorities who, the argument goes, trample over Russians' rights by
invading Russian cities, seizing and monopolizing key sectors of the economy
through their organized crime groups and refusing to respect Russian cultural
norms or the law.
According to a Levada Center poll in January, 15 percent of the population fully
supports the slogan "Russia is for Russians," and another 45 percent believe that
it would be good to evict non-Russians using "reasonable methods." With the
nationalistic segment of the population growing each year, it creates a great
temptation for the authorities to exploit these sentiments.
Third, another Kremlin motive behind the Russian question might be to spark a new
interest in voting in both federal and local elections. Russians have largely
ignored elections because of traditional voter apathy and cynicism, which have
only been exacerbated by the instances of massive election fraud over past few
years. Playing the nationalist card may be the only way to increase voter
turnout, which, the authorities believe, would help legitimize the future
composition of the State Duma and the president.
History shows that authoritarian leaders, when faced with eroding public support
and declining economic conditions, often cling to nationalism and xenophobia as
the last lifeline to preserve their hold on power. State-sponsored nationalism,
however, can quickly spin out of control. Take, for example, former Yugoslav
leader Slobodan Milosevic who in the last years of his rule replaced his
socialist ideology with radical Serbian nationalism. This pro-Serbian nationalism
quickly turned into chauvinism, followed by anti-Muslim ethnic extremism. History
has shown that the slope from one to the other is, indeed, slippery. This is
something Putin and his advisers need to bear in mind before they decide to push
the nationalist button too hard.
An aggressive government-sponsored policy aimed at demonizing minorities leads to
a vicious cycle of violence and separatist movements that could easily destroy
the state. The biggest danger for Russia is in the North Caucasus republics, but
there is also potential for separatism and ethnic violence in Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan and other regions dominated by minorities. The Serbian nationalism
championed by Milosevic contributed to the final bloody collapse of first
Yugoslavia, and then Serbia itself. The same thing could happen in Russia.
Rogozin is completely wrong when he says one of the biggest problems facing
Russia is the "main line of tension between Russians and immigrants from the
North Caucasus." The real reasons for Russia's problems are weak state
institutions, rampant corruption, lawlessness, injustice and the lack of normal
conditions for economic and social development. The rise in interethnic tensions
is a symptom of these weaknesses, not the cause of them.
The Kremlin should categorically reject the slogan "Russia for Russians" and
replace it with "Russia for all citizens of Russia." Only this approach will
produce the breakthrough needed to achieve a better future for Russia.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Russian commentator warns of consequences of ruling tandem's behaviour
Ekho Moskvy Radio
September 27, 2011
In its regular "Osoboye Mneniye" (Special Opinion) slot on 27 September,
Gazprom-owned, editorially-independent Ekho Moskvy radio featured an interview
with Yevgeniya Albats, the editor in chief of the opposition weekly The New
Times. The programme, hosted by Olga Zhuravleva, discussed the latest political
developments, including the announcement that President Dmitriy Medvedev and
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would like to swap jobs next year, and Finance
Minister Aleksey Kudrin's dismissal.
Medvedev-Putin role-swap plan "a very big mistake"
Albats said that she was shocked by the announcement about the ruling tandem's
plan to swap roles in 2012. "Frankly, I am shocked by the arrogance with which
all this was done, shocked by the contempt. I want to say that, even under the
Soviet rule, party bosses at least tried to keep some decency. Generally, in the
political literature there are many discussions about why people obey a ruler.
Rulers have always appealed either to God - all we have is from God - or they
appealed to people. But what we saw on Saturday (at the One Russia congress) was
a demonstration of a totally couldn't-care-less attitude to everyone and
everything," she said.
She described President Medvedev's speech at the congress as "20 minutes of
shame" and said that Medvedev's decision not to run for reelection was
"unprecedented" and "unexplainable". "They think everyone will accept it. Their
disgust and contempt for all of us is off the scale. This is clear, they have
demonstrated it. They think that the people of the Russia Federation are just
dust and useless. But this is very reckless, because it is not by chance that
even in the strictest regimes, even in absolute monarchies, where people are
deprived of all rights, rulers always look for arguments justifying why people
should obey them," she said.
"When people are treated in this manner, this gives rise to protest," Albats
said. "What they have done is an incredibly dangerous thing... one must not
humiliate people... I think they have made ??a very big mistake," she added.
"Humiliated" Medvedev "has nothing to lose"
Zhuravleva quoted a listener as saying that Medvedev looked "disgusting" during
his public spat with Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin on
26 September. Albats said that, in her opinion, Medvedev's harsh reaction to
Kudrin's statements had been caused by Medvedev's "humiliation" at the One Russia
"A man who had the supreme power in an enormous country was publicly humiliated.
I do not believe that Medvedev does not understand that. His was publicly
humiliated not only before the people and the country, he was humiliated before
the whole world, and humiliated, of course, before his family. And now this is a
compensation. Look at today's statement by Putin that (First Deputy Prime
Minister Igor) Shuvalov will oversee the economic bloc while a deputy of Aleksey
Leonidovich (Kudrin) will be the acting finance minister. Have we ever heard
Putin saying 'We have agreed this with the president' before? Now he said it
emphatically, because he understands perfectly well that one can expect anything
from a humiliated person. Medvedev has nothing to lose now. Right now, he has
absolutely nothing to lose. And if tomorrow we see another escapade by Medvedev,
I will not be surprised at all," Albats said.
"But who will let him? There are some limits after all. He is still a member of
the tandem," Zhuravleva asked.
"What limits? There are none. The horror of our situation, that we saw on
Saturday (at the congress), is that all the institutions of the Russian
Federation have been demolished. The institution of the Constitution, the
institution of elections have been demolished, the institution of the judiciary
has been completely destroyed, and the institution of reputation has been
destroyed. That is what is important. Therefore, there are no limits, everything
is allowed," Albats replied.
"Again, they do not understand that this is a terrible thing. Putin cannot break
away from his powerful office because there is no institution that would
guarantee his safety. Because, if he leaves power tomorrow, and then someone
decides to put him in prison, what can you do when there is no court? He has
demolished it himself, hasn't he? You see, it is terrible when everything is
allowed, when where are no limits. They think they have eliminated these limits
for themselves, but that is not the case at all. This is a signal that will no go
through the entire system," she added.
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
September 28, 2011
Putin as Democracy
By Matthew Van Meter
Okay, so I was wrong. I've been saying since Dmitry Medvedev's ascendance to the
presidency of Russia that Vladimir Putin had finally figured out how to be
president for life without having to make Western allies unnecessarily squeamish
about his inordinate power. Though Medvedev, to some extent, transcended his
status as a Putin puppet, he was the perfect man to placate the sulking mass of
allies and "allies" accrued by Russia in its 20 years of existence.
The benefits of this arrangement seemed to have outweighed the negative points.
Free to roam the country and show off his physical prowess for the cameras, Putin
could leverage his populist domestic image, fill the role of an imposing big
brother in other CIS countries, and still not worry about the approbation or
censure of other nations, despite occasional suggestions in the media (and a
general but diffuse worldwide sense that he was still "in charge"). Though
Medvedev is the lawyer, Putin was the one most responsible for flouting the
spirit of the Constitution, while fulfilling the letter of the law: everyone
understood who was in charge, but one was hard-pressed to find concrete proof of
that fact. Until now.
This is not to say that I am a Putin-hater. There are plenty of those in the
West, and a few in Russia. The elite in Moscow and many expatriate Russians take
great pleasure in assaulting Putin's character, seeing him as a negative
influence on the infant democracy of their homeland, and with reason. Putin is
certainly no democrat, though he has learned to play that game and speak that
speech. It should not be that difficult to see why he enjoys the popularity that
he does: he seems at least somewhat upstanding, he gives Russia a positive
self-image, and does not appear to be a deadbeat like some of post-Soviet
Russia's finest (Boris Yeltsin, Yuri Luzhkov, Viktor Chernomyrdin, to name a
few). This may seem a low bar for the presidency, but one need not live long in
Russia to understand that men like Putin possessed of ambition, aplomb, and a
relentless refusal to make gaffes are very few and far between.
I do not mean that Putin is democratic; he certainly is not. He has certainly
wronged many people, some as individuals and some as groups, and he clearly has
no true desire to see Russia democratize. However, compare Putin, strong-willed
and disingenuous, to his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who seemed sincerely to
desire some version of Western democracy to become native to his land, but who
was incapable of leading the country, appeared drunk on television and passed out
at cabinet meetings, and effectively sold Moscow to the oligarchs in exchange for
his reelection in 1996 (remember that he would have lost the 1996 election to
Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party; Russia would have been an
extraordinarily short-lived republic). The majority of Russians, having lived
through the 1990s, are supremely uninterested in the sort of democratizing that
went on then, and it hardly seems fair to blame them for flying to Putin who, at
the very least, exudes a sense of stability.
Putin's gambit of leading from behind while Medvedev took the office of president
was effective not least because of the Western media's assumptive treatment of
Putin as pseudo-dictator. This poses a problem of narrative for the Russian
government. Everything from (as I have said many times) the New York Times to
silly PBS documentaries cast Putin automatically in a dictatorial light, without
any of the context that would explain how, exactly, he got to where he is.
Certainly, Putin is a step backward for Russian democracy. Certainly, his reign
has caused undue harm to some people, and to certain groups. Certainly, he is a
disingenuous and, in his own way, corrupt person. But he is popular. And that, in
a democracy, even a young and troubled one, is what matters.
I can't say what exactly drove Putin to give up the position he has held. I can't
think that it is a blind desire for the title of president, as many of my
American friends seem to assume Putin is nothing if not patient, and bided his
time in the background of Yeltsin's administration until he made his move in 1999
(and what a masterful and nefarious move it was!), and seems more attracted to
power than to position. I can only suspect that he feared Medvedev's coming of
age. Having himself been placed at the head of the country initially as a puppet,
Putin may be wary of Medvedev's ambition. In Russian politics, the man who is an
obedient servant one day may be stabbing you in the back or sending you to your
dacha at Barvikha for the rest of your life.
[return to Contents]
New York Times
September 29, 2011
President Putin Redux
Russia's next presidential election is not until March but barring an unexpected
turn the winner is pretty much decided.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, a former president and Russia's main power player,
announced last Saturday that he would run for another presidential term.
President Dmitri Medvedev, the protege Mr. Putin installed in 2008, has agreed to
lead the United Russia party slate in the December parliamentary elections and to
take the lesser post of prime minister after the presidential vote.
Mr. Medvedev, more liberal and Western-oriented, tried to step out of Mr. Putin's
shadow with a push for judicial and political reforms that would break the
Kremlin's iron grip. He never succeeded. Only a few months ago, he seemed eager
to run again for president, but Mr. Putin proved again that he is really the one
in charge.
Russia's Constitution permits only two consecutive presidential terms. If Mr.
Putin wins a six-year presidential term, he could run again in 2018 and stay in
power until 2024. A truly chilling prospect.
Elections alone do not make a democracy, and Mr. Putin, a former K.G.B. officer,
has made clear his disdain for democratic rights. His Russia is a place where
journalists and human rights activists are murdered with impunity, political and
business opponents are thrown in jail, and media outlets are controlled by or
intimidated by the government. Mr. Putin has ridden high on an oil-fueled
economic boom. But production levels are leveling off. The country needs to
expand its revenue base by reducing the dependency on oil and gas, encouraging
business competition and increasing foreign investment. To be successful, that
will require cracking down on corruption, strengthening the rule of law and
building an independent judiciary reforms that Mr. Medvedev talked about but did
not deliver.
The Obama administration has generally done a good job of "resetting" and
managing the relationship with Moscow, working productively on Iran and Libya,
concluding a new nuclear weapons agreement and increasing Russian logistical
support to American forces in Afghanistan. Those interests will continue.
That means President Obama will have to find ways to continue working with Mr.
Putin. He will also have to be ready to speak out, clearly and forcefully, when
Mr. Putin bullies his own citizens or his neighbors. There can be no illusions
about who Mr. Putin really is.
[return to Contents]
September 29, 2011
Presidential quota of the Public House is filled with people from loyal movements
and organizations
Author: Yulia Taratuta
President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree listing the names
of 42 Public House members from the presidential quota. The
remaining 84 are to be delegated to the Public House by general
Academician Yevgeny Velikhov, businessman Vladimir Potanin,
Yaroslav Kuzminov of the Supreme School of Economics and some
others will retain their seats on the Public House. There will be
some new names there as well. Human rights activists Alexander
Brod and Alla Gerber will be replaced on the Public House with
Maxim Mischenko and Anna Bukhalo from some pro-Kremlin movements.
Insiders say that the people comprising the presidential
quota were chosen by Presidential Administration Senior Assistant
Director Vladislav Surkov.
Political scientist Alexander Kynev said, "That's a typical
list of Surkov's making. Representatives of the movements that
never question much less challenge the authorities make room for
others from similar tame movements and organizations."
[return to Contents]
Poll Shows Russians Divided On Need For Control Over Social Networks
Moscow, 28 September: The idea of control over social networks on the internet
has divided Russians: 42 per cent of respondents polled by the Superjob.ru portal
are respectively for and against this measure.
Supporters of this idea believe that control by the state will help "protect both
children and adults from unnecessary information which is imposed on us
regardless of our will", while opponents are sure that "this is a violation of
human rights".
Sixteen per cent of those polled had difficulty answering the question. "It is
necessary from the point of view of exposing asocial individuals but it is not
necessary if they will read my personal messages," these respondents said.
The poll, conducted on 16 September among 1,600 Russians, showed that there are
noticeably more women than men among the supporters of introducing control over
social networks - 50 per cent against 33 per cent.
Russian Prosecutor-General Yuriy Chayka put forward an initiative on establishing
control over social networks on the internet (on 14 September). (Passage omitted:
Chayka's remarks about the need for more control over on-line social networks
following the riots in London and other UK cities in August)
[return to Contents]
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
September 29, 2011
To an interrogation from prison
Organizer of Anna Politkovskaya's murder will be interrogated
By Natalia Kozlova
Yesterday, Lom-Ali Gaitukayev was escorted under guard to Moscow. This man is
serving a lengthy prison term and his relocation is connected to the murder
investigation of Anna Politkovskaya.
Authorities are investigating Gaitukayev's involvement in the murder of the
Novaya Gazeta reporter.
Russia's Investigation Committee official spokesman, Vladimir Markin, told
Rossiyskaya Gazeta (RG) the detainee has been transferred at the special request
of the investigation group.
He has been serving a prison term for the attempted murder of a Ukrainian
Politkovskaya was killed on October 7, 2006. This year marks five years since the
tragedy. But despite the numerous high-profile statements, made by law
enforcement agents of various rank, it still cannot be said that anyone has been
punished for the crime.
In February 2009, three of the suspects were acquitted by Moscow Military
District Court. But the Supreme Court overturned the ruling, ordering a new
trial. At the request of the prosecution and victims, the case was subject to
further inquiry.
Why has Gaitukayev been transported? Investigators suspect he was the organizer
of the murder. According to investigators, he was assigned to kill Politkovskaya
in the summer of 2006. For now, however, the identity of the person who hired him
is not being revealed. He formed a group, which included former police colonel,
Dmitry Pavlyuchenkov, Gaitukayev's nephews the Makhmudov brothers, as well as
Sergei Khadzhikurbanov, a former police officer with the Moscow Directorate for
Combating Organized Crime
Investigators believe the murder was orchestrated as follows. Pavlyuchenkov, who
was then in charge of surveillance, instructed his subordinates to follow Anna
Politkovskaya. All the information and the murder weapon were then transferred to
the hitman, Rustam Makhmudov. All of this had been organized by Lom-Ali
Gaitukayev. Incidentally, he had already served as a witness in the case. In
court, he claimed that $2 million had been paid for the journalist's murder.
His name is well-known in the criminal circles. He has been referred to as an
authority and a businessman. The last name Gaitukayev had also surfaced in
high-profile criminal cases. In the early 1990s, he became engaged in a scheme
with counterfeit Central Bank memos.
He was arrested at the Intourist Hotel in 1992, where he was apprehended by
anti-drugs police, who were sure of his involvement in trafficking. Suddenly,
during the search, one of Gaitukayev's security guards tried to flee with a bag
of money containing 3 million rubles, packaged by a prominent Moscow bank. But
the guard was wounded and arrested, after which the room was searched leading to
some unexpected results.
It was discovered that Gaitukayev was making counterfeit stamps and letterheads
and transferring the fake memos to a bank employee through a person with
connections in banking. After that, Gaitukayev's case was no longer handled by
the anti-drugs force, but by commercial crime experts. They were able to break
the entire chain, which involved bankers, a large number of people from financial
sectors, and numerous criminal personalities. The criminal investigation was
extremely difficult. And the fact that it made it to court was an enormous
achievement on the part of the investigators.
Surprisingly, a large portion of the stolen money was kept in a large 10-ton
shipping container, which stood in one of Moscow's courtyards.
The criminals were able to get hundreds of millions of rubles from the forged
memos, though no one was able to establish the exact amount. In 1993, the court
sentenced Gaitukayev to seven years' imprisonment with confiscation of property.
After his release, Gaitukayev organized a movement "for the development of
cultural and socio-political relations with the Chechen Republic". In 2006, he
was ordered to organize the killing of a Donetsk-based businessman, Gennady
Korban. Gaitukayev found a hitman, giving him a Kalashnikov gun and $1,000. The
businessman was saved by his armored Mercedes. Apparently, neither the client nor
the assassin knew that the Mercedes was bullet proof. Korban was attacked near a
hotel. He survived, but his security guard was severely wounded. Gaitukayev was
apprehended by the FSB in 2007, and sentenced by Moscow City Court to 15 years in
Reports surfaced in September that investigators have evidence indicating
Gaitukayev was the organizer of Anna Politkovskaya's murder. Now, investigators
must confirm or refute this information.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
September 29, 2011
Increase in Poverty Confirms Social Imbalance
By Howard Amos
The number of poverty-stricken Russians has grown by more than 2 million over the
past year, the State Statistics Service reported.
Almost 15 percent of the population 21.1 million people now subsist below the
poverty line, up from 19.1 million people in September last year, the service
said Tuesday.
The current subsistence income is 7,023 rubles ($221) a month for a working
adult, 5,141 rubles for a pensioner and 6,294 rubles for a child.
In last year's first quarter, it was, respectively, 5,956 rubles, 4,395 rubles
and 5,312 rubles.
Employed Russians' average income is at 23,154 rubles per month 330 percent
higher than the subsistence income.
The numbers of impoverished dropped steadily in the early 2000s, amid climbing
oil prices and economic growth. But they remained static from late 2007 until
last year.
According to the State Statistics Service, in 2001, about 50 million Russians 33
percent were living below the subsistence level. This number improved to 24.5
percent in early 2005, and 14.8 percent in the third quarter of 2007.
Russia's population has declined by 1.6 percent since 2002, according to last
year's national census.
Conversely, the number of super-rich has increased in recent years. According to
Forbes magazine, Russia had 101 billionaires in 2011, almost double the number of
the previous year. Moscow is home to more of the world's wealthiest people than
New York.
Social polarity is likely to become an acute political issue as the country
approaches parliamentary and presidential elections.
After announcing that he would seek another term as president at a United Russia
congress Saturday, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suggested that taxes on the rich
could be raised, and he acknowledged "dangerous levels of social inequality."
[return to Contents]
September 29, 2011
Author: Yulia Polyakova, Maria Sarycheva
[The Finance Ministry as a main line of defense of the budget is crumbling.]
Experts fear that with Aleksei Kudrin gone from the Cabinet, the
budget will quickly fall victim of all sorts of lobbyists queueing
for additional funding. Kudrin resigned shortly before
consideration of the country's main financial document by the
Duma. The scandal that resulted in his resignation was fomented by
the ease with which the state boosted state expenses, a policy
Kudrin himself abhorred and always fought.
Explaining his decision to step down, Kudrin referred to the
decisions made over his objections that he said could not help
increasing the risk that the budget would fail to be implemented.
He said furthermore that the promises to the military and social
commitments of the state compromised all of the national economy.
Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov commented to spite Kudrin that
"... the Finance Ministry has never set up conditions for the
timely and rhythmic use of budget means". Anyway, what kind of
budget policy shall Russia expect now?
Anton Danilov-Danieljan of the Investment Policy Committee of
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry expected no dramatic increase
of expenditures and the ensuing budget deficit.
Danilov-Danieljan said, "The way I see it, it was not Kudrin
alone who prevented the undue increase of budget expenditures.
Premier Vladimir Putin was doing it too. After all, the premier
knows all too well what budget recklessness leads to. Even the way
he protected Kudrin all these years shows that the gravity of the
problem is not exactly lost on him."
Yaroslav Kuzminov of the Supreme School of Economics said in
the meantime that there were some risk zones all the same. He
explained, "There are at least two potential red zones. The first
one concerns attempts to increase budget expenditures without
structural reforms in the spheres of education, communal and
housing services, public health, and pensions... Most sums will be
misused or used ineffectively without the long overdue reforms.
The second zone of risk concerns colossal investment projects that
are often launched for political considerations without all pros
and cons weighed in advance. There was no way for Kudrin alone to
thwart these risks. Even so, the Finance Ministry under Kudrin was
a major line of defense for the budget."
Very many regarded the policy of the former finance minister
as a "limiting factor" for a whole number of processes that had
the potential to harm national economy - withdrawal of capitals,
soaring inflation, fall of the ruble, and so on. Danilov-Danieljan
meanwhile said that foreign investors themselves were more
interested in the financial policy of the Russian state and not in
whoever was there to carry it out.
He said, "It is actions that investors find important. Kudrin
is a professional of course which is a trait they value. On the
other hand, they know that the policy he promoted was not always
beneficial and correct. After all, Kudrin was one of the authors
of the reform that introduced the common social tax which
noticeably worsened the investment climate."
Igor Nikolayev of FKB said that Russia already had a good
deal of problems with the investment climate and Kudrin's
resignation did nothing to make things easier.
Nikolayev said, "Upwards of $30 billion were withdrawn from
Russia in the first six months of 2011... Mind you, these finances
were withdrawn despite the reports on the growing economy.
Kudrin's resignation will certainly give an additional boost to
negative processes."
Deterioration of the investment climate, collapsing markets,
and other indicators of the lack of stability interfere with
execution of the privatization plans. The Economic Development
Ministry expects the state to earn 300 billion rubles at
privatization auctions in 2012. (Presidential Aide Arkady
Dvorkovich even said once that the figure might be upped to 450
billion rubles.) The situation being what it is, the forthcoming
privatization might fail to live up even to the most cautious
Nikolayev said, "Of course, there is a chance that Kudrin's
successor will match him in terms of professionalism and savvy,
but odds are against it. Not even Kudrin always succeeded in his
efforts to spare the budget additional expenditures, but at least
he tried. He was fired for the temerity to disagree with the
proposed increase of budget expenditures. Whoever is promoted to
the finance minister now cannot help knowing it. This person is
therefore unlikely to defend the budget because this course has
cost his predecessor his job."
Sergei Ignatiev of the Central Bank said that this structure
might in theory go to the highest bidder before the end of the
year but he himself thought that caution was the best policy under
the circumstances. According to Ignatiev, the Central Bank is too
valuable an asset to be sold for a song.
[return to Contents]
RIA Novosti
September 29, 2011
Alexei Kudrin: Debating controversial legacy of a veteran minister
By RIA Novosti economic commentator Vlad Grinkevich, Anna Kurskaya
Alexei Kudrin's deputy Anton Siluanov was appointed Acting Finance Minister on
Tuesday. Since Siluanov is only known in expert circles, he will likely be an
interim minister, unlike his former long-serving boss.
Analysts are divided over the ex-minister's legacy. There is both praise and
sharp criticism for the projects he has pursued over the years. And there are
reasonable economic arguments to be made on both sides of the debate.
Kudrin's failures and achievements
The list of Kudrin's achievements includes Russia's early repayment of its debts
to the Paris Club, creating the Stabilization Fund, and the tax reform of
2000-2001, which included, inter alia, replacing the progressive taxation system
with a flat tax rate, reducing the value-added tax from 20% to 12%, and repealing
the 5% sales tax.
Foreign debt repayment and the accumulation of stabilization reserves are
elements of the strict budget discipline which Kudrin always insisted on during
his time as finance minister.
"[Kudrin] was keenly aware of the country's need to have a balanced budget," said
Vyacheslav Senchagov, head of the Center for Financial and Banking Studies at the
Russian Academy of Science's Economics Institute. "And so he applied his
administrative weight to resist numerous attempts to lobby for increased
However, many argue that Kudrin's fight for budget discipline and the
sterilization of revenues in the Reserve Fund incapacitated the use of earnings
from high world prices of raw materials to stimulate the real economy.
"He has a somewhat narrow understanding of what a balanced economy is," Senchagov
said. "He thought that if he balanced the budget this would automatically balance
the entire economy. In this, Kudrin differed from Witte [a Russian finance
minister in the late 19th century. - Ed.], who knew that finance was only part of
the economy and that balanced budgets must be accompanied by incentives for
Underinvesting in the economy resulted in the depreciation of infrastructure and
fixed assets in key industries, such as the machine-tool industry, without which
"any retooling, new industrialization and, in fact, even modernization are
possible," the analyst said.
Save or spend?
The expediency of government investment in the economy is subject to debate, to
say the least. "Kudrin has been accused of neglecting Russia's economic
development," said Yevgeny Yasin, the Academic Supervisor of the Higher School of
Economics. "Some argue that the economy needed more investment and that this
should have been the objective of budgetary policy. I don't think this must be
the objective of a budgetary policy, because there are special development
institutions, for example Vnesheconombank, for this."
Yasin believes that economic development should come from private investment, and
that government investment should be minor and made "only to fulfill government
functions." A lavish budgetary policy can lead to an excess of money in the
market without proportionate demand. The main result of this would be a surge in
Kudrin preferred using windfall profits from oil production to resolve the most
painful problem of post-Soviet Russia - the huge foreign debt. In the early
1990s, its foreign debt exceeded 100% of the GDP but started to shrink rapidly in
the early 2000s thanks to growing oil prices.
In 2006, the Russian authorities allocated over $21 billion for the early
repayment of debts to the Paris Club. As a result, Russia's sovereign debt is now
among the lowest in the world.
"Our current rating in the global economy is largely based on the fact that we
have a very small sovereign debt," Yasin said.
The Stabilization Fund was another way to remove surplus money from the economy.
The fund was split into the Reserve Fund and the National Wealth Fund in 2008.
"The idea was initially proposed by Andrei Illarionov, but it was realized at
Kudrin's insistence," said Sergei Guriev, rector of the New Economic School. In
his view, this helped Russia weather the economic crisis without sustaining
catastrophic losses.
Size matters
Not surprisingly, some have criticized Kudrin for establishing the Stabilization
Fund. "Kudrin invested all the oil and gas revenues, as well as revenues gained
thanks to an incredibly favorable market situation, in other countries," said
Oksana Dmitriyeva, a member of the State Duma Budget and Tax Committee. "This is
probably why he is praised as the best finance minister abroad." The thing is
that a considerable part of the Reserve Fund has been invested in U.S. and
European securities.
This is not entirely true. Most economists agree that every country needs
reserves, and that it is their size that matters. "In Russia, reserves often
exceeded many macroeconomic indicators," Senchagov said.
The accumulation of huge reserves meant that this money could not be used for
industrial retooling.
Furthermore, these huge reserves tempted the authorities to increase social and
military spending, which Kudrin vigorously opposed, says Igor Nikolayev, chief
strategist at private audit company FBK.
But is government investment really bad for the economy? It is worth recalling
that government funds provided the basis for the rapid growth of Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan and several other Asian economies. Their governments made up for
the shortage of private capital, investing in key industries that subsequently
became the drivers of their economic growth.
Analysts say that infrastructure development is almost always the government's
responsibility. Government investment in roads, bridges and communications
generates a good multiplier effect without spurring inflation.
And lastly, the Finance Ministry's rigid budgetary policy did not rule out lavish
spending on bureaucrats and on support for ineffective enterprises, says Yevgeny
Gavrilenkov, Managing Director of Troika Dialog. This made the budget more
dependent on oil revenues and created an unfavorable macroeconomic environment
that frightened off potential investors.
There is an argument against government investment in the economy rooted in
specific features of today's Russia: the money accumulated in the Reserve Fund is
not squandered and can even grow. "This money can be invested in Russia, but
remember that it costs approximately $10-$15 million to build one kilometer of a
road here, and that half of it, if not more, will be stolen," Yasin said. "In
Europe, it costs $2.5 million."
But this is a question of the quality of the government. Unless we address this,
both government and private investment will go down the drain and private
investors (except for stock market speculators) will not invest in the Russian
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
September 29, 2011
Damage Control
Top Russian Officials Are Scrambling to Minimize the Economic Fallout of the
Finance Minister's Ouster
By Tai Adelaja
The Russian White House switched to damage-control mode this week, in a bid to
prevent any negative consequences to the economy stemming from the forced
departure of the country's well-respected Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin. Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appointed one of the outgoing minister's
little-known deputies, Anton Siluanov, as acting finance minister. Siluanov is a
low-profile choice, experts say, who is unlikely to have the kind of professional
outbursts that had become something of a trademark for the outspoken Kudrin.
The Central Bank also waded in on Tuesday to calm nerves, weeks after the
national currency registered a downward slide amid volatility in financial
While announcing his choice, Putin, who is all but certain to return to the
Kremlin next year, advised his ministers to show restraint ahead of the
parliamentary elections in December, as well as the presidential elections in
March. "I ask you all to perform your duties until the moment when the new
government is formed, to show discipline and responsibility," Putin said in
televised comments, the first since the announcement that he will run for
president next year.
The prime minister also appointed his First Deputy Igor Shuvalov to take over
Kudrin's duties as deputy prime minister, which includes overseeing public
finance, taxation and the treasury. President Dmitry Medvedev dismissed Kudrin on
Monday for insubordination and for publicly airing comments that the ruling
tandem would prefer to keep under wraps. Putin appeared ready to go the extra
mile on Tuesday to explain that president Medvedev had indeed approved of his
choices. "He is a good specialist," Putin said of Siluanov. "His candidacy was
obviously agreed with Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev. This is our joint decision."
Forty-four year old Shuvalov, who will split Kudrin's job with Siluanov, is an
old hand in financial circles. He was the head of the government's anti-crisis
commission at the height of the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis, managing the state
bailout of struggling enterprises. In October of last year he assumed the added
role of the federal investment ombudsman for foreign investors. Shuvalov is
expected to take on the overall responsibility for running the Finance Ministry
while day-to-day operations will fall to Siluanov, who until now oversaw the
budgets of Russia's 83 regions.
The decision to pick Siluanov, who lacks the international clout of his
predecessor, could be linked to President Dmitry Medvedev's drive to decentralize
the country's fiscal system, giving more financial autonomy to the regions,
Reuters reported on Tuesday. Kudrin had consolidated enormous power at the
Finance Ministry, with the State Treasury and Federal Tax Service reporting to
the minister, the agency said. He also sat on the National Banking Council, a
body which oversees the Central Bank's operations.
Central Bank Chairman Sergei Ignatyev showered praise on Kudrin on Tuesday,
describing him as "a very strong finance minister who did much that was needed
for our country." "In the nine and a half years I have worked here, the
cooperation between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry was always close,"
Ignatyev said. The Central Bank chairman also sought to reassure investors
alarmed by Kudrin's dismissal, predicting a rebound for the ruble. The Central
Bank sold more than $6 billion of currency since the start of the month, hitting
a peak of $2.37 billion Monday as it tried to shore up the slumping currency.
Russia's ruble-denominated MICEX stock index gained 2.5 percent on Tuesday, the
second day of gains since Kudrin's exit. The benchmark RTS index rose 4.2 percent
to 1,369. The ruble strengthened to 31.69 to the dollar on the MICEX exchange on
Tuesday, compared with 32.42 late Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported.
Ignatyev blamed the ruble's long decline on capital flight due to global market
turmoil. "If the current level of oil prices holds, the probability of the ruble
strengthening in the coming weeks is much higher than of it weakening," Ignatyev
said, adding that he keeps his own savings in Russian currency.
However, such a positive spin did not prevent the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) from calling on Russia on Tuesday to refrain from heavy government
spending, which it said could threaten Russia's economic stability if global
conditions worsen. The international organization echoed Kudrin's concerns that
over-extending military spending could throw the country fiscally off-balance and
create a gaping hole in the budget.
President Medvedev dismissed such concerns on Tuesday, while vehemently defending
plans to increase the country's military spending. "However deplorable this is
for the budget, we will always have high spending to maintain defense and
security," Medvedev said while addressing a panel of officers in the Ural
Mountains. Russia "would not exist if we were weak and if our armed forces had
fallen apart." Medvedev, who was watching military exercises, said in televised
remarks that an efficient army is Russia's "mission toward its citizens and
neighbors alike." The president also said Russia needs to spend more on its army
than "a banana republic" because it is "a Security Council member with nuclear
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
September 29, 2011
Gazprom Vows to Fully Comply in EU Raids
By Roland Oliphant
Gazprom promised to "fully comply" with European Commission antitrust
investigators amid a series of raids of the company's European offices in several
EU countries on Wednesday.
While the raids are ostensibly related to syndicate behavior, industry sources
say they are really part of a strategy to curb Europe's reliance on Russian gas.
"The commission has been much concerned about Gazprom for quite a while," an
unidentified European Commission official told Reuters on Wednesday.
Russia supplies about 25 percent of Europe's gas, and Gazprom has set its sights
on raising that to 30 percent.
"Within the limits of legal requirements, Gazprom will provide all possible
support in conducting the inspections," the company said in a statement Wednesday
afternoon. "Gazprom has already instructed the managers of its affiliates on the
necessity to cooperate and comply with legitimate requests of the inspecting
European Commission inspectors who had arrived unannounced at Gazprom Germania's
Berlin office on Tuesday morning were still going through documents and computers
late Wednesday.
Gazprom's offices in the Czech Republic and Germany were among several Central
European energy firms raided by EU officials Tuesday as part of an investigation
into how the companies are divvying up markets.
The commission said its inspectors swooped down on companies in 10 member states
but did not provide details.
By Wednesday evening, a slew of firms based in Eastern Central Europe
acknowledged to being targeted, including German utility RWE's offices in Essen
and the Czech Republic, E.On's Ruhrgas, Poland's Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe I
Gazownictwo, Slovakia's SPP, Austria's OMV, Lithuania's natural gas supplier AB
Lietuvos, and Estonia's Eesti Gaas.
The EU commission said in a statement released Wednesday that it was
investigating allegations that the companies had colluded to divide markets,
hinder access to distribution networks, stymie efforts to widen supply sources
and indulged in overcharging.
The commission said its inspectors are looking into restriction of competition in
the area of upstream supply. But few details have emerged of the specific
infractions believed to have been committed.
The inspection was still ongoing when The Moscow Times reached Gazprom Germania,
a 100 percent subsidiary of Gazprom Export, at nearly 5 p.m. German time
"They are looking at documents and computers, and we are cooperating," said
Burkhard Woelki, head of corporate communication at the Russian gas giant's
German subsidiary. "But at the same time we are continuing to work."
"There is no explaining to be done," Woelki said, when a Moscow Times reporter
asked whether the inspectors had explained the nature of the investigation or
what they were looking for.
"They show you a paper exactly the same thing as if the police or a magistrate
issues a warrant and you are obliged to cooperate," he said by telephone from
the company's Berlin headquarters.
The inspectors were not backed by police and used official documents to enter the
building when they arrived unannounced early Tuesday morning, Woelki said.
Meanwhile on Wednesday, the commission began inspections of several Bulgarian
companies: state-owned Bulgargz and Bulgartransgaz, as well as Overgas a private
company 50 percent controlled by Gazprom. Each said antitrust officials visited
their Sofia offices Wednesday, Reuters reported.
Bulgarian Energy Minister Traicho Traikov, one of the only government figures to
comment on the situation, told reporters in Sofia on Wednesday that the
investigation is looking at companies with long-term natural gas supply contracts
with Gazprom and was being used as "a way to circumvent confidentiality clauses"
that prevent regulators from getting data on capacity, Bloomberg reported.
That confirmed suspicions aired earlier by executives at raided companies that
they were being targeted because of their links to Russia.
"Companies that get Russian gas" are being investigated, OMV chief Gerhard Roiss
said at a news conference Wednesday, Bloomberg reported.
Analysts at Citibank said in a note that the inspections could be focused on
"destination clauses" in upstream contracts, the Platts energy industry news
service reported.
Gazprom defended its record in Europe, saying its contracts were based on "legal
norms" and that it would continue to "fulfill contractual obligations" while the
probe was ongoing.
Woelki in Berlin echoed that. "We have absolutely nothing to hide," he said.
Mikhail Korchemkin of East European Gas Analysis said the only surprise was that
Gazprom and its customers were just now being subjected to antitrust inspections
which major European players like E.On and Gaz de France have already endured.
Putting the delay down to "political sensitivities" concerning European relations
with Russia, he said Gazprom could face serious financial consequences if it is
found to have violated European antitrust law.
Gazprom has complained in the past about what it called excessively stringent
restrictions the EU placed on its plans to buy a stake in Central European Gas
Hub in Austria.
"The gas market is in the process of liberalizing, and its difficult for the 'old
boys' including people like E.On and Gazprom to adjust quickly," Korchemkin
Europe is trying to make it easier for companies without distribution networks to
gain access to the market by forcing companies to unbundle their supply and
infrastructure operations.
Last month, Gazprom was reported to have requested consultations with the
Lithuanian government over the Baltic state's plans for separating the delivery
network from the supply company.
Valery Golubev, deputy chairman of Gazprom's board, wrote to the Lithuanian prime
minister that a proposed law would lead to "implementation of the [EU] directive
in such a way that it would have the most negative effect on our investments."
Gazprom would not be the first company to fall foul of the liberalization moves.
RWE was compelled to sell its gas-transmission network and E.On to give up its
German power grid.
In 2009, E.On and Gas de France were fined 553 million euros each for carving up
gas markets between them.
"The commission fines people for violations, and they are not small fines. The
fine for a short-term violation is 10 percent of annual turnover in the country
where the violation took place," he explained.
"In Germany, that would amount to about $900 million," he said. More serious
violations can push the fine up to 30 percent of national turnover, which would
cost Gazprom $2.7 billion in Germany, he added.
The raids will have little if any impact on Gazprom's core business of producing
and selling gas, said Maria Yegikyan, an analyst at Alfa Bank, though the probe
would inevitably damage sentiment toward the companies involved.
Calls to Gazprom's Moscow press office went unanswered Wednesday evening.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Russian late-night talk show looks at origins of Russophobia abroad
September 25, 2011
The 25 September edition of the "NTVshniki" talk show on Gazprom-owned NTV
channel was entitled "Why do they hate Russia" and looked at the issue of
According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Russians have
ended up among the top three most harassed people in Europe, along with Africans
and gypsies, presenter Anton Khrekov said, offering further statistics pointing
to the mistreatment of Russians in other countries.
"One gets the feeling that everybody hates us and wants to play a dirty trick on
us," Khrekov said, wondering if there was a world-wide conspiracy or if Russians
were to blame themselves.
Presenter Anton Krasovskiy used a video link-up to interview Klara
Sitnova-Toivonen, captioned as a sufferer of discrimination of Russians in
Finland and described as a person who was accused of abduction for taking her
grandchild, a Russian citizen, to Russia. This happened because we are Russian,
Sitnova-Toivonen said.
Johan Backman, introduced as the chairman of the Finnish Anti-Fascist Committee,
an associate professor at Helsinki university and a human rights activist, said
that "there is Russophobia in Finnish social services" and that people working
there "believe that everything connected to Russia is dangerous".
Asked whether this was an organized campaign of Russophobia, Margarita Simonyan,
editor in chief of Russia Today channel, said that a Finnish director of a TV
channel had told her that she lived in a rotten country.
Marat Gelman, a member of the Public Chamber, said that half of the Russian
population were to blame for the negative view about Russians abroad.
Vladimir Medinskiy, a State Duma MP and writer, suggested that some people in
Europe dislike Russia because of its size.
Artem Skoropadskiy, a journalist of Kommersant newspaper in Ukraine, said that
"today's Russia and today's Russians are a half-witted rabble, who in reality
shame the country where I was born".
In response, Margarita Simonyan, RT editor in chief, told Skoropadskiy that, if
she were a man, she would do to him what businessman Aleksandr Lebedev did to
businessman Sergey Polonskiy, referring to a recent scuffle between the two that
took place during the recording of a previous "NTVshniki" show. A little later
she added that if he spoke English, Skoropadskiy would be one of the most beloved
commentators of English-language media outlets.
Writer Viktor Yerofeyev said that Russophobia, just as Xenophobia, was part of an
international problem.
Using a video link-up, presenter Anton Khrekov also interviewed actresses of the
US reality show "Russian Dolls", who said that they were representing Russia for
"Middle America". Most studio guests responded negatively. Journalist Dmitriy
Shtokolov said he was ashamed to travel to the USA because of them.
Alena Kuznetsova, a beauty queen who was beaten up on a beach in Turkey with her
husband, agreed that she had been attacked because she was from Russia.
Nerdun Hacioglu, correspondent of the Hyrriyet newspaper in Moscow, expressed his
regret at the incident with Kuznetsova but added that Russians needed to change
their perception of the world. He was greeted with dissatisfied comments by
several of the guests. Simonyan said that Russians did not need to change
When asked to vote on who was to blame for the fact that Russians are disliked,
two-thirds of the audience (67 per cent) chose the "We ourselves" option, whereas
21 per cent saw "historical factors" and 12 per cent, "a conspiracy of Western
secret services".
[return to Contents]
September 28, 2011
Obama team facing new Russian leader
By Mary Beth Sheridan
They've dined at Dmitry's country house outside Moscow, and relaxed at Barack's
favorite burger joint in Virginia. The presidents of Russia and the United States
"have built an outstanding relationship, and as a consequence, we've been able to
reset relations," President Obama declared in May.
Now, Obama is going to have to get used to a new partner--Vladimir Putin--after
Medvedev announced he would support his mentor's return to the presidency. Putin,
now prime minister, is expected to easily win the March election.
Early in his presidency, Obama sought to focus on Medvedev, a young lawyer who
presented himself as a moderate. The men met numerous times at summits and in
Washington and Moscow. In contrast, Obama met only once with Putin, in July
2009--days after declaring the former KGB chief had "one foot" in the Cold War.
Administration officials say that the lack of contact reflects the fact that
Medvedev, as president, was in charge of foreign policy. And while senior
officials have had limited contact with Putin, they say, the encounters have gone
fairly well.
On her March 2010 trip to Moscow, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was
lectured in public by Putin about trade issues. But Clinton was able to crack
Putin's famously icy reserve in their one-on-one meeting, by raising the subject
of the endangered Siberian tiger, one of his passions, officials say. Putin later
led Clinton into his private study to show her a map he keeps there of tiger
territory in Russia.
When Vice-President Joe Biden met Putin during a trip to Moscow in March,
administration officials expected a chilly session. Biden, after all, has close
ties to President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, whose nation fought a brief war
with Russia in 2008.
Instead, "they had a very constructive and substantive meeting that went on very
long," said a senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity
because of diplomatic sensitivities. While the two men disagreed about some
things--like Georgia--"we expected a different kind of meeting," he said.
U.S. officials, of course, weren't unaware of Putin's outsized behind-the-scenes
influence on the Russian government. And they say there is little daylight
between Putin and Medvedev on the two major issues that Washington is working on
with Moscow at the moment--cooperation on missile defense, and Russia's accession
to the World Trade Organization.
But they may have to get used to a sharper tongue from the Russian leader. Putin,
for example, recently criticized Americans for living with such a large national
debt. "To a certain extent, they are parasites on the global economy and their
own monopoly on the dollar," he told pro-Kremlin activists.
[return to Contents]
Valdai Discussion Group
September 29, 2011
A change in Russia-U.S. relations is unlikely
By Andrew Kuchins
Andrew Kuchins is Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The possible election of Putin as the President of Russia will not signify a
fundamental change in the direction of U.S.-Russia relations. The main reason for
this is the fact that no major decisions on foreign or domestic policy during the
period of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency have been made without implicit or
explicit support from Mr. Putin. There has been some progress, whether some
version of rapprochement, or the so-called "reset" in U.S.-Russia relations. Mr.
Putin supports this and in principle he will continue to support it, assuming
there is no major change in U.S. policy, and this is where the larger factor of
uncertainty lies. What is going to happen in the U.S. elections in November of
2012? It's obvious that the fact that the Obama administration has pursued a set
of policies that have taken into consideration to a greater extent some of
Russia's core interests has considerably helped facilitate the improvement in our
relationship. But the short answer is that Mr. Putin as president will not make a
huge difference. However, one thing worth mentioning is that Mr. Obama has
certainly developed a strong personal chemistry with Mr. Medvedev, and it's
likely that this has facilitated some of the success they had in their relations.
Mr. Obama will face the challenge of developing a personal relationship with Mr.
Putin, as did his predecessor, George W. Bush.
Needless to say, there has been progress in the discussions between the United
States, Russia and NATO in the past year. It's true that we didn't reach as full
an agreement by the NATO summit in June as one might have liked. But my
prediction is that the discussions will continue and cooperation on missile
defense is probably the biggest challenge in the near term of our security
relationship. Once again, in this respect Putin's presidency will not lead to any
drastic changes. It's clear that it was always going to be difficult for the
United States and Russia to reach an agreement on cooperation in this area. This
has been a very difficult issue that goes back more than three decades in
U.S-Soviet and U.S.-Russia relations. So I suppose that despite the unlikelihood
of any change in foreign policy, the real answer is somewhat unsatisfying: nobody
can be sure, and we'll have to wait and see what happens next.
[return to Contents]
Financial Times
September 29, 2011
Europe urgently needs a new Ostpolitik
By Thomas de Waal
The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington DC
With their southern neighbourhood still in ferment and the eurozone in ever
deeper crisis, few European leaders have much time to think about their eastern
borderlands. They should. This is one region where the collective European Union
can make a difference. Indeed, the much heralded return of Vladimir Putin as
Russian president should focus minds on how to present an alternative to Russia's
increasingly authoritarian model.
Troubling smoke-signals are quickly rising from the six European post-Soviet
countries outside Russia: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan. Twenty years after they became independent, with the end of the
Soviet Union, they form an arc of disappointment.
Tiny Moldova is probably the brightest spot and has the most progressive
government, but is also the poorest and its reformist agenda is mostly on paper.
Belarus suffers under Europe's most repressive leader, Alexander Lukashenka, and
is close to bankruptcy. Ukraine has squandered the chance of transformation
promised by the 2004 Orange Revolution and is wracked by permanent political
Elsewhere, the current Georgian elite has made some impressive modernising
reforms, but its democratic record is more patchy. Georgia is also currently a
one-party state with few checks and balances. Armenia and Azerbaijan are still
crippled by their perpetual and intractable conflict over the disputed territory
of Nagorny Karabakh.
Today in Warsaw, the EU re-launches its worthy but faltering eastern partnership
programme for these six countries. If ever there was a project to energise it,
this should be it. In eastern Europe, far more than in the Arab world, the EU is
a guiding star for millions of people, who feel European but are frustrated by
inadequate governments and persistent poverty.
The issue is not a Russian imperial threat. With the exception of a few sensitive
spots, such as Abkhazia and Crimea, Moscow is in long-term retreat from its
former colonial space, and is mostly pre-occupied with domestic problems, such as
the volatile north caucasus. Russia had concerns about Nato expansion into
Georgia and Ukraine, but that ill-conceived project has now run out of steam. The
EU, by contrast, is just a fact of life to the west. Russia's challenge is more
of an economic one: a re-elected Mr Putin is likely to be more aggressive in
pushing an agenda of cross-border crony capitalism via for example a customs
union with Ukraine.
The EU can offer a brighter vision than that if it tries. Currently the default
policy is to withhold the big carrot, a membership perspective for these
countries, while being softer on day-to-day issues, such as conditionality on
reform and conduct of elections, in order to keep up a dialogue with governing
In fact, it should be the other way round. The leaders of the EU should make a
general commitment that in theory and in the future these six countries could
eventually join the union, if and it is a big if they raise their standards to
meet it. Offering the hope of eventual EU membership should not be a taboo.
Turkey has been in the EU waiting-room since the 1960s, but, more by good luck
than planning, the long wait has helped reform the Turkish state and now,
arguably, outgrow its EU ambitions.
However, it would be a big mistake for the EU to cut corners on issues such as
elections or trade agreements. Calling a bad election a bad election sends a
clear signal that some governments are more legitimate than others. Negotiations
on a deep and comprehensive free trade area with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
promise eventual privileged access to the EU single market and Brussels should
use all the leverage that it has on this issue. All of these countries have
opaque and monopolistic corners in their economies that need more light shone
into them. If they want better access to the EU, they should get it without
bending the rules.
One principle should guide all others, in a new Ostpolitik: ordinary citizens are
often more pro-European than their leaders. That means anything that can be done
to lift visa restrictions and make travel easier for students or professionals
could pay big dividends in the future. Leave aside the debt crisis for a moment.
Presenting a vision of a bigger freer Europe is a project that even Germany and
Greece should be able to get behind.
[return to Contents]
Russia Beyond the Headlines
September 29, 2011
Civil unrest on the agenda
Events in the Middle East force Russia and the former Soviet Republics to
consider reforming the CSTO, which was set up in another era.
By Roman Vorobyov
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) was formed in 1992 with the
main aim of protecting its members, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, against external threats and international
Nearly 20 years on, experts say it no longer fully satisfies any of the
organisation's member countries.
The issue of reform has been on the agenda at every CSTO summit. But following
last year's revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the discussions have gained momentum. The
main question is whether, in the event of a similar uprising, the organisation
should defend the existing regime and intervene directly in the conflict. But the
organisation does not have such powers.
Leaders of the CSTO were reminded of the need for reform in the midst of the Arab
spring. At the August summit, Belorussian president Alexander Lukashenko, who is
the current CSTO chair, confirmed to journalists that the leaders had spent most
of the time discussing how the CSTO might help them avoid the experience of their
colleagues in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
The chair of the CSTO rotates but Russia has always been the real leader. Which
is why the Russian Institute of Contemporary Development (Insor) has produced a
report dedicated to the reform of the CSTO.
The head of the institute's board of trustees is President Dmitry Medvedev, and
this is by no means the first report that the organisation has delivered to the
Insor's 66-page document boils down to three key points. First, it proposes
reforming the decision-making process at the CSTO. At the moment, decisions are
made by consensus. Insor suggests that decisions should be made by a simple
majority. As the Institute's head, Igor Jurgens, told the newspaper Kommersant:
"The CSTO will be worthless if it remains just a club where people go to babble.
In Russia, we understand this and our partners are beginning to understand this
as well. That is why we need a new decision-making system."
Second, Insor proposes radically transforming the CSTO's relationship with Nato.
Initially, the organisation was set up as a counterweight to Nato. But now the
CSTO should be seeking actively to rebuild relations with the West. "An important
task is to provide at least partial interoperability between CSTO and Nato Rapid
Reaction Forces," the report says.
Finally, the CSTO should endeavour to become the main peace force in Central Asia
and its neighbouring regions.
The Insor report notes that the CSTO "should have systems in place to monitor
potential conflicts that might threaten the security of its member states". This
includes "taking into account the colour revolutions (civil resistance) in former
Soviet states, the events in northern Africa and the Middle East, and the likely
rise of extremism when coalition troops withdraw from Afghanistan".
Experts note that it is the events in the Middle East that have hastened talks on
reforming the CSTO and the leaders of the union are not, in this case, detached
observers. Half of the organisation's heads of state have been in power for a
long time which gives them something in common with the former Tunisian
president Ben Ali, deposed Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, who is now awaiting
trial, and the former Libya leader Col Gaddafi, who is believed to be seeking
refuge from Nato bombs in a bunker.
Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakh president, has been in power for 20 years;
Emomalii Rahmon has ruled Tajikistan for 19 years, and Alexander Lukashenko has
headed Belarus for 17 years. The parallels are obvious enough to make the leaders
of the former Soviet republics think hard, a source in diplomatic circles told
Kommersant . "In the past, some members perceived the CSTO almost as a burden,
then the events in Africa sobered them up", the paper reported.
It is possible that Moscow might also have an interest in this case, says the
Moskovskiy Komsomolets columnist Mikhail Rostovsky. In his opinion, reform of the
CSTO would strengthen Moscow's influence in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other
Central Asian republics. The leaders of these countries have always been
interested in maintaining and strengthening their power, and, if Moscow gives
them the tools to do this, local leaders will be tied to Russia even more
tightly, Mr Rostovsky believes.
However, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs , Fyodor Lukyanov, is
not convinced that this will be the case. "If the Collective Rapid Reaction
Forces of the CSTO are able to intervene in internal conflicts, the CSTO will be
just like the Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf led by Saudi
Arabia, which acted as the main fire extinguisher of the revolutionary movement.
But it is a double-edged sword and many Central Asian countries, as well as
Belarus, are unlikely to want to give Russia an opportunity to interfere in their
internal affairs."
At the moment, the CSTO is commenting only cautiously about the forthcoming
reforms. According to the organisation's secretary general, Nikolai Bordyuzha:
"Nobody is talking about a profound reform to the CSTO". He says that the
documents just need to be adjusted slightly by changing "one or two sentences".
A fast and effective reaction
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation consists of seven states: Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The
Collective Rapid Reaction Forces in the CSTO total about 20,000. According to the
charter of the organisation, the CSTO may use force to repel direct military
aggression, for counter-terrorist operations, and to combat drug trafficking and
organized crime. From September 21 to 26, CSTO forces conducted large-scale
strategic exercises, involving armoured vehicles, aircraft and warships.
Commenting on the training exercises, Russian chief of general staff Nikolai
Makarov said that the CSTO forces were working with crisis situations similar to
the recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.
Dmitry Rogozin
Permanent representative of the Russian Federation to NATO on the challenge the
CSTO is expected to face after american troops leave Afghanistan
"We will be ready for any eventuality. Russia understands it must not only
protect itself but also extend the scope of this protection to the countries of
Central Asia. It is precisely in these countries that Islamic radicals need to be
stopped, so they do not come to Russia and commit more atrocities. I think it
will be a 'moment of truth' for the CSTO."
[return to Contents]
28 September 2011
Vladimir Putin meets with Russian writers attending the Russian Book Union's
Transcript of the beginning of the meeting:
Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, again. I am glad to be attending your conference.
I know that there are many problems in your field and that you depend, one way or
another, on the decisions taken at the government level. This concerns, above
all, business elements, auctions, which I have discussed before, the organisation
of publishing business, and the provision of paper, etc. In a word, there are the
problems as usual, but they are being resolved in one way or another.
I'd like to know which problems are the most important and acute to you and what
you can propose regarding their solution. In short, what would you like the
bodies of authority and government do for you, above all at the federal level?
Who will be the first to speak?
Mikhail Veller: May I?
Vladimir Putin: Of course, Mikhail Iosifovich.
Mikhail Veller: I know from my experience and general practice that writers
mostly talk with the authorities about three things in Russia. First, writers ask
for money. Second, writers ask the authorities to publish and promote their
books. And third, writers want the authorities to listen to them about how they
should govern the country, even though writers themselves are not ready to assume
this responsibility. These are the three things I'd like to avoid talking about
today because we often forget although this is assumed that people become
writers not to take, but to give.
In this sense, politically, writers are liberals because they don't need anything
from the state other than properly functioning law enforcement agencies and to be
left alone. If they have these two things, the rest does not matter. In this
regard, everyone in this audience is probably a separate molecule because writers
are always individualists in civil society, and because each of them has his or
her own opinion and each thinks about what to do next and is doing what he or she
In this respect, everything seems to be good and well in modern literature, which
may even be the second most successful industry after the mining and commodity
exporting industry. Since 1991, or probably some time before that, when
absolutely all of the hindrances were removed, literature both commercial,
elite, traditional and post-modernistic (elite) literature maintained high
standards, which I, personally, do not recall happening since 1917.
It is another matter I can understand businessmen and politician failing to see
the difference, but not when the creative intelligentsia do when people
associate their personal welfare with that of the country, the nation, the
power... This is in fact not one and the same at all because the people gathered
here are successful people one way or another. They are accomplished people who
have done it. But the majority cannot do this.
Taking into account that Russian literature started with "The Tale of Igor's
Campaign", everything that happens in the country and everything that writers do
are inseparable from each other. This brings me to the logical question: "Is it
admissible for writers' opinions to differ from official views"? Stalin said in
such cases: "I think this is admissible". Some advocate a more rigid policy,
while others think it should be more liberal. There will never be harmony. But
such things as sorry for starting with this as unpardonably soft punishment for
trafficking hard drugs or violent murder is absolutely wrong. Understandably, a
writer has a mercenary interest in the prosperity of his country because when the
people have no money, they don't buy books, which is a shame.
And one more thing. It has been said more than once that a writer is a function
of literature and language, and that language is a function of the nation. In
principle, all successful people can leave the country and continue working and
realise themselves elsewhere. This concerns musicians, artists, farmers, workers
and everyone else, possibly with the exception of two categories politicians,
who cannot function outside their country and writers, who cannot exist as
writers outside their country because language is a virtual portrait, a virtual
form of the nation's existence.
Once journalists I used to work for a newspaper said that the decline began at
the turn of the 1990s when Almaty officially replaced the traditional Alma-Ata
and Tallin was written as Tallinn. The general acquiescence started at the level
of language and continued when we started saying "in Ukraine," although for 300
years we said "in the Ukraine". If Ukrainians think this is how it should be
said, let them say so, but why should we change the Russian language?
Why have we changed "vocational schools" to "colleges"? Tell me, why? All of this
will have grave consequences because first the Gnessins School was renamed the
Gnessins State Musical College and 10 days ago Avdeyev (Culture Minister
Alexander Avdeyev) signed an order dissolving the Gnessins College and
subsequently merging it with the Gnessins Academy of Music. I see this as a
tragic mistake because the Gnessins Academy is one of many conservatory-type
schools, while the Gnessins School is a global brand on par with the Mariinsky or
Bolshoi theatres, or the Soviet circus, and the liquidation of that brand will
have a negative impact on the country's international recognition.
Speaking about this recognition... I don't think anyone could imagine that in the
Soviet period, Jack London, the best selling foreign author and the only author
published in the Soviet Union who was not included in the school programme, was
apparently the main figure exercising US influence on the Soviet Union. In a
similar way, there is no one who promoted such a negative image of the Soviet
Union as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was sent into exile and Joseph Brodsky, who
got expelled.
But here and now, when we speak about shaping the country's image, we must not
replace the Gnessin School. They should have established something else instead.
This is basically what I would like to say to start. Finishing my speech, I want
to admit that for many years for about 10 years I have had a dream to invite
the entire government for an hour or two and speak about the way things are in
the country and what can be done about it, very much like in Martin Luther King's
"I have a dream".
Remark: You can still do it.
Mikhail Veller: I haven't done it yet, but thank you very much for this
opportunity to speak in a smaller format.
Vladimir Putin: Thank you, Mr Veller. I had a similar intention about four years
ago. I wanted to show the Security Council and its permanent members not the
whole government how the things are. First of all, I invited the scientists from
the Academy of Sciences who are competent in the structure of the Universe. But
we can step further and discuss the structure of the world in its moral and
ethical sense.
Speaking of persons exercising influence, such as Jack London, we have our own
figures of influence. They are Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, and Fyodor
Dostoyevsky, which means our countries influence each other. The East can
influence the West as much as the West can influence the East. We have an equally
strong basis.
If I may, I will briefly comment on what you have said. First, I have to
disappoint you. Asking for money and giving advice on how to rule the country is
not a prerogative of writers and publishers. Everyone does that. Everybody knows
how to play football. Everybody knows how to play ice hockey. Everybody knows how
to rule the country, to manage the economy and the social sphere. Everybody likes
giving advice. I think that it is in fact a positive sign when everyone wants to
give advice. It means that people care. I am particularly glad to hear the
opinion of the intellectual elite, which clearly comprises people who have their
own viewpoints and can formulate them so well that other people want to hear
them. It is a good sign when these people want to give advice on how to rule the
country. We are always willing to hear it.
Furthermore, it is natural that everybody asks for money. One of the government's
tasks is to dispose of the federal resources wisely. Therefore, there is nothing
shameful about this. So, if our colleagues comment on the management of this
industry... Clearly, writing poems and fiction is not an industry, but organising
this work is. I will be glad to hear any suggestions and recommendations.
I have already said this in my greeting and I will repeat this once more. Mr
Veller, you said that the law enforcement agencies must operate properly. It is
the most pressing problem today. With the emergence of the Internet and other
modern mass media, the protection of intellectual property comes to the fore.
This problem exists not only in our country, but also elsewhere in the world.
There is no ultimate solution to copyright infringement. I have recently met with
the managers of an international organisation that protects intellectual property
rights. They too are struggling to find an efficient remedy, especially since the
idea to give everything away for free has consumed the world and it is hard to
resist. Therefore, we can see certain parties emerge and win the support of the
masses. But we need to get this done nonetheless. And we will try to find a
civilised solution. As for whether criticisms regarding the authorities should be
more or less harsh, I just don't think there is any point in criticising
leadership simply for the sake of criticism. Wouldn't you agree?
Remark: Of course.
Vladimir Putin: First of all, criticism is able to produce the desired effect
only if it is done so deftly. In my view, the most important thing is for those
who engage in criticism not to do so and I don't mean to offend anybody just to
satisfy their own vanity. They should instead be motivated by a sincere drive to
improve things. Then the odds of receiving a positive reaction will be much
Now on to your point that politicians, as well as writers, cannot emigrate
because they are too firmly bound to their native soil. As a matter of fact,
self-imposed exile is not an uncommon phenomenon within politics. There's even
the notion of a "government in exile." Quite often, politicians are simply
compelled to leave their country and settle abroad.
Many authors do the same, and for them it's harder to work away from their native
land, of course, because they cannot feels its pulse.
Emigration can be tragic for politicians as well. At any rate, it is something to
be avoided. Both politicians and people involved in creative writing need to feel
the "chemistry" of their nation from the inside. I hope that in the future, we
won't fall into situations in which our fellow countrymen have to leave [Russia]
in order to be able to pursue their literary or political activities.
As for the practice of renaming things, this troubles me a great deal as well. If
we rename our schools using foreign conventions, this indicates a lack of
self-esteem on our part. It means we don't think our own standards are good
enough. And so we try to "fix" the problem by changing the title to make them
seem better, instead of changing their substance in order to improve them. This
is obviously not the right approach. But if you bring up this issue before a wide
audience every now and then, the situation could eventually improve.
Street signs and billboards are the first things that catch my eye during visits
to regional capitals. I notice that for whatever reason, the names of local
restaurants, cafes and shops are all written using the Latin alphabet. Why is
this? I believe this is due to a lack of self-esteem and an inferiority complex.
It will take time for us to become aware of our own value as a great nation, a
nation that has developed a great culture it can be rightfully proud of.
Of course, we have problems, but we are trying to address them, and we are often
no less successful in finding adequate solutions than our opponents are.
I agree about the need for dialogue between the authorities and the artistic
community. I hope none of my fellow countrymen will feel that they have to
emigrate, and that when engaging in criticism, we will do so in a meaningful way,
in a way that seeks to make a real difference, not just for the sake of showing
Zakhar Prilepin: Then allow me to say a few words in support of Mikhail Veller's
Vladimir Putin: What about supporting my remarks? Are you planning to attack me
Zakhar Prilepin: My point will also echo your words. I believe that Russian
literature is quite competitive, and authors, just like oilmen, make up one of
this country's most important groups in society.
The current situation in Russia's literary scene is more or less clear to me. One
of the most acute problems seems to be the demise of the distribution network
that we had in the Soviet era. As a result, new releases remain beyond the reach
of the provinces. As a child, I grew up in rural communities in the Ryazan and
Lipetsk regions, and the villages there had excellent bookshops in those days.
Now the nearest bookshop is a hundred kilometres or more away. It's clear to me
that this problem exists and that it has to be resolved somehow.
But I have absolutely no idea what sorts of problems are facing the oil industry,
or some other sector. And there is no one else for me to turn to for an
explanation other than you, Mr Putin.
As a Russian author, my attention was caught by your recent remark that Russia
now sells as much oil as Saudi Arabia, or maybe more. As I understand it, one of
the officials involved in the oil trade is Gennady Timchenko, chief of Gunvor
Inc. He made a fortune for himself by selling petroleum, and subsequently applied
for Finnish citizenship. He is now a Finnish national. I find this situation
somewhat bizarre.
My second question was inspired by Sergei Stepashin's remarks. I remember that
Transneft found itself at the centre of a big scandal last year, when its
executives were accused of misappropriating $4 billion. Almost one year has
passed since then, yet not a single suspect has been identified and no legal
proceedings seem to be underway. So I find myself wondering whether that $4
billion simply never existed, or the story was invented by some people who wished
Russia ill. If we were offered that kind of money, my fellow writers and I would
be happy to carry our books from Moscow to the doorstep of our readers in the
provinces ourselves.
Vladimir Putin: Which company are you talking about?
Zakhar Prilepin: Transneft.
Vladimir Putin: In response to the first part of your question, I can say that
I've known Mr Timchenko for some time now, since my service in St Petersburg. In
those days, he worked for a Kirishi oil refinery, Kirishinefteorgsintez. When the
privatisation campaign was launched in the early 1990s, his team, which was
involved in oil exports, broke away from the rest of the company in order to
start a private business of their own. This new enterprise has gradually been
Timchenko is no stranger to the business; he's been involved in it since the very
beginning of the privatisation campaign. Let me assure you that, contrary to
allegations in the press, they set up and developed the company all on their own,
without any involvement on my part.
But at some point, the turnover became so large that one of their executives had
to be sent to arrange work from the other side of the border. And the management
chose him for this role.
As far as I know, he has applied for and has been granted Finnish citizenship,
but also remains a Russian national. The current visa regulations with Europe
make it impossible for our businesspeople to organise exports properly. Many of
them have to apply for foreign citizenship to facilitate their operations. Ninety
percent simply hide the fact that they hold foreign passports but not him.
Zakhar Prilepin: Are you saying that holding double citizenship is a normal
Vladimir Putin: I believe it's normal that in the modern world a person can
choose to live outside his or her native country, yet remain attached to it.
That's a perfectly civilised position. For someone such as myself, this would be
completely impossible. The same is true for you, I think. But there are people
out there, artists or otherwise, who consider themselves to be citizens of the
world, and insist that they should be able to live wherever they choose. Many
members of the business community, youth and even religious organisations believe
they should not be constrained by any borders or visa regulations.
I believe that this is a civilised approach. Let me emphasise once again: as far
as I know, Mr Timchenko remains a Russian citizen; everything having to do with
his business interests falls into his private affairs, and I have never tried,
nor ever will, to interfere. And I hope he will not try to meddle in my affairs
As for Transneft and other companies I was at one time chief of the presidential
staff's oversight department, and I had to carry out inspections similar to those
that Mr Stepashin currently organises. Not all wrongdoings are the same, you know
there are offenses, and then there are offenses. Those that have to do with the
violation of effective legislation such as theft, robbery, bribe-taking, and
embezzlement are punishable under the criminal code.
There are also violations that are not criminal offences, such as improper use of
funds. I'm not referring to Transneft specifically but to any region... Let say,
the governor was supposed to spend money on housing construction but invested it
in improving healthcare instead. He didn't use it appropriately but he didn't
steal anything. In principle, this may be the case of Transneft. They were
supposed to spend money on one thing but used it differently. This is the first
part of Le ballet de la Merlaison and there is also the second one. The Audit
Chamber by law must check and is checking budget expenditures. Transneft is a
commercial company. They may check it and say: "Look guys, something is wrong
with your finances." If they find criminal offenses, they will submit the case to
the Prosecutor's Office. Believe me, if there had been such offenses, these
people would have been put behind bars a long time ago.
Roman Zlotnikov: Mr Putin, I have a question. Is this meeting a campaign
Vladimir Putin: No, the elections are still a ways off.
Roman Zlotnikov: Really? But the election campaign has already begun.
Vladimir Putin: No, I simply hold such meetings from time to time.
Roman Zlotnikov: I asked you this question because if it has to do with the
elections, it is simply a waste of time.
Vladimir Putin: You see, Mr Zlotnikov, I don't want to seem impolite, but I don't
need such meetings to campaign. I have agreed to it because questions were
raised, primarily about book publishing. They are absolutely specific and some of
them are commercial. I'd like to make sure that by taking certain decisions to
help some players on the market we would not violate the interests of others. It
is important to maintain a balance of interests. This is the first point.
Second, our famous writers also have some questions, for instance questions about
copyrights or library services, distribution etc. I'm very interested in all
these issues and it would be useful for us to discuss them. I could listen to you
and do what I can to set things right.
Roman Zlotnikov: In that case I have a suggestion. I suggest that you stop your
no-one-is-left-out method of awarding funds.
Vladimir Putin: I haven't yet given anything to anyone.
Roman Zlotnikov: Are you sure? We have programmes to support reading, regional
theatres, libraries you name it.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, in this sense.
Roman Zlotnikov: Indeed. I think this is waste of money. Take writers, for one.
They are long-term people, so to speak. There is no way we can help you win the
coming elections but maybe we can help in five years, definitely in 10 or 15
years. I met with guys from the fifth directorate of the Federal Agency for
Government Communications and Information. They invited me to their veteran
organisation I'm an officer myself. I came there and thought to myself: "My God!
I'm a sci-fi writer. What shall I tell them?" We started talking. There were five
young officers lieutenants and senior lieutenants, the others were much older.
All of them were looking at me here's a sci-fi writer, a kind of clown, let's
listen to him and tick the box. A young lieutenant stood up and said: "And do you
know that at our college we passed your books from one nightstand to another?
Could you please sign this book for me?" But it had black endpapers.
I'm telling you that we have a tool for working with the future of Russia. This
tool is the image of the future. Unfortunately, we don't have a common image of
the future in this country every stratum has its own. The simplest idea is "we
want to live like they do in Europe or America". But by the time people have the
potential to live like Europeans or Americans, they ask: and why just "like"
Europeans and Americans? Why not live in Europe or America?
The second issue is the hierarchy of values and motivation. To keep this "like"
we must work with people, probably with those who have the potential, I'm not
sure. But we should work with those who will become officers, experts, aides to
top managers in 10 years (these people make up the reading public). They will
become leaders themselves in 20 years and then we will help you build Russia.
Vladimir Putin: What is your question or suggestion?
Roman Zlotnikov: I think that the no-one-is-left-out policy is wrong. It is
important to understand that literature, libraries and theatres are tools and to
establish a system for using them rather than spending money on collapsing
theatres. We must understand how everything works and create a system and only
then allocate funds for filmmaking, theatres, libraries and publishing.
There is, for example, a very interesting instrument: the army. We have a strange
perception of it, for some reason we view it either as a prison, or as something
that will die for us if necessary, when in fact it is a serious social mechanism
that half the nation passes through at some point. This is a training camp. There
needs to be a sufficient quantity of men that serve in the army (sorry, ladies,
for better or worse, the course of politics in Russia is still determined mostly
by men). Occasionally, women complain during elections that there are no worthy
candidates to vote for. During their 52 weeks of service, servicemen watch 104
films. They have libraries. There is a crowd in the audience here that I'm sure
would be glad to visit these troops, if there were an army support programme in
place, and people will read these books. You might say, oh books, people don't
read books these days. Let them read books there. Let them pinch books from the
libraries and take them home.
Vladimir Putin: And what? What are you proposing? That they steal books?
Remark: Allow soldiers to steal?
Darya Dontsova (penname of Agrippina Dontsova): Mr Putin, may I ask you a
Vladimir Putin: Please excuse me. As for women in Russia not participating in
politics, there aren't many women in the government, but that doesn't mean they
don't participate in politics.
Roman Zlotnikov: No, I'm not saying that they don't participate at all.
Vladimir Putin: In terms of voting, women are more active voters than men, and
this is a statistical fact. Therefore, in this sense, they do show interest in
who is elected and whom they can trust. And their participation in this area of
government formation is significant.
Now, as for supporting all areas of culture, you know that if you forget about
one of them, it will just wither away. You said that we don't need theatre,
cinema, libraries... What do we need then?
Roman Zlotnikov: We need them to be functional.
Vladimir Putin: But how do we make them functional, Roman?.. Many things annoy
and disturb me as well. So, if we just sit down together and try to figure out
how to organise this single system... I can assure you that everyone will have
their own opinions, perhaps even more than one. Defining priorities amounts to a
very complicated process.
Roman Zlotnikov: But it needs to be done.
Remark: May I, Mr Putin?
Vladimir Putin: Just a moment. We are in the middle of a discussion with Mr
Roman Zlotnikov: It will not come about all by itself. We are now living with the
results of what happened to us.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, of course.
Roman Zlotnikov: We don't like it. I'm telling you honestly...
Mikhail Veller: May I put in my two cents? Two cents exactly. Comrade Stalin, a
wise man and a strong politician, understood quite well the ways in which
literature should be used. And when writers who aren't being watched over, thank
God because the issue, let me repeat, is not a matter of what writers want from
the government, but rather, what writers can do for their country. So, when a
writer shouts, "go on, rule over us with a stronger hand," stop and think for a
moment about what you are actually saying.
Vladimir Putin: As for organising this work I think you are aware that we have
always found ourselves in the same situation as we do now in other words, we
have always had our fair share of problems. However, we still manage to stand
more or less firmly on our feet. Mr Zlotnikov, dear friends and colleagues, you
understand as no one else does that not long ago, the situation we were in and
the problems we faced were quite different. We were on the brink of collapse as a
nation. This was our absolute reality. We were facing the danger of the
yugoslavisation of Russia. This was on the verge of happening. This is certainly
not the case now we have managed to head this scenario off. The economy has
almost doubled since then, and we are dealing with different challenges and
issues now.
Certainly, if we want there to be a future for our nation, we should think about
the things that you mentioned: ethical support, and the intellectual and ethical
foundations of society. The question has to do with how to engrain them in the
mass conscience. This is not as simple as it may seem. We have had many disputes
and ideas about different ways to support Russian cinema. We have established the
Cinematography Board, a new financing system (I don't know whether it will work
effectively or not), and saw orders starting to flow in. The VTB Bank is
financing some films. There are other, quasi-governmental sponsors. There is
certainly a need to come up with some sort of government order, including in the
Armed Forces, if we want there to be modern, patriotic education in our country,
so that people will be raised to love their Motherland. I'm not talking about
some kind of jingoism, but we want our people to have a deep understanding of our
nation, to feel proud of it, to be willing to live here and to want to...
Andrei Konstantinov: Mr Putin, may I comment briefly regarding patriotism?
Vladimir Putin: Of course, but I certainly agree with you that this needs to be
dealt with.
Andrei Konstantinov: I wanted to buy a toy tank for my son, since both of his
grandfathers went to war. They started as lieutenants and ended the war as
lieutenant colonels. My son asked me questions about the war, so I wanted to buy
him a Soviet tank with a red star on it, and so on. I couldn't find any. Here is
what a friend of mine brought me from Nice in France. It says in Russian, "Kill
the Nazi vermin," and is made in China. I also wanted to show him what his
grandfather looked like during the Great Patriotic War. This officer figurine is
nicely made, featuring a bag, a pistol and decorations just like his grandfather
had... It costs 350 euros, and is sold in Russia at the Grand Hotel Evropa in St
Petersburg. However, there are no plain toys like that that would be ... In fact,
there is a similar situation with patriotic literature.
Vladimir Putin: Listen, Andrei, this is a question that requires ongoing
attention. You just mentioned China. It's simply more cost-effective to make them
in China. That means we need to proceed in such a way as to make it
cost-effective to produce them in Russia. In order to do so, we need to suppress
inflation, which was at around 34%-40% some time ago. We now have single-digit
inflation of 8%...
Andrei Konstantinov: I understand, Mr Putin.
Vladimir Putin: These things, toy tanks and so on, are being manufactured in
China for sale not only in Russia; the entire world is flooded with Chinese-made
products and consumer goods. The United States is drowning on Chinese-made goods
and they can't do anything about it. The Italian shoe outlets don't carry
Italian-made shoes, even though their shoes are of superior quality. These are
the realities of economic life today.
Andrei Konstantinov: Mr Putin, what I want to say is that it's all right that it
was made in China, but it's unfortunate that you can't find it in stores in St
Petersburg. This one was brought from France. And one more thing. I would like to
speak about...
Vladimir Putin: These are private stores; we don't have state-owned stores in
Andrei Konstantinov: I understand. I'm just bringing up a problem, I'm not
blaming anyone.
Vladimir Putin: We are aware of this problem.
Andrei Konstantinov: Here is what I wanted to say. We could all benefit from one
simple move that could be carried out by senior officials and all government
leaders. Not long ago, President Medvedev was asked what he was reading at the
time. He smiled charmingly and said he was reading Stieg Larsson (a fine Swedish
author, now deceased). We would very much like to hear Russian officials and
government leaders talking often about what they are reading from modern Russian
literature, and they should talk about their preferences with their subordinates,
because this sharing of information is often perceived as instruction. On our
part, we...
Vladimir Putin: I will read Zlotnikov. I will read The Empire with pleasure.
Remark: Don't forget to mention it.
Vladimir Putin: I just did.
Remark: Gentlemen, let's give the floor to the ladies.
Darya Dontsova: It's very difficult to shout over men. I would like to add
something to what Andrei has just said. I have two points to make.
The first is that, Mr Putin, I have seen you at the controls of a submarine, with
a rifle and with a fishing pole, but I have never seen you at the opening
ceremony of a bookstore, not ever.
Vladimir Putin: I have been to such ceremonies.
Darya Dontsova: I just haven't seen you. I made a specific search on the
Internet. I found one short interview where you said that you liked Turgenev and
Hemingway, if I can remember correctly, and that's it. You were at a Moscow Book
Fair once. I believe that if our top officials take their cues from you, and I'm
sure they will even if only to please you, and finally grab a book...
Vladimir Putin: Why do you think that way about everybody?
Darya Dontsova: You can't force people to read, but if the boss is reading then
perhaps they will start reading books as well. It doesn't matter whether these
are Soviet or Russian authors. Just read any book, grab a book and start reading.
As for my second point we have here Tatyana Ustinova, Alexandra Marinina, Sergei
Lukyanenko and Sergei Minayev (who is not exactly in the same category as the
rest, but close enough) who write what are called entertainment books.
Alexandra Marinina (penname of Marina Alexeyeva): The ones that you called light
Darya Dontsova: Exactly. We were offended by this. I was hurt, frankly, because
there are millions of people who read our books. To heck with the feelings of the
girl writers: no big deal, we'll get over them, no problem. But when you talk
about us, you're talking about our readers too.
Alexandra Marinina has 1.2 million copies printed each month, and same goes for
Tatyana Ustinova and myself. I'm not sure about Lukyanenko and Minayev, but I
assume their numbers are about the same. We are talking about a vast readership.
You know, someone may start with Dontsova and switch to Pushkin later when he or
she grows accustomed to holding a book. This is already good progress. You divide
readers into black and white, clean and unclean, good literature and easy
reading. Is that not the case?
Vladimir Putin: No. In his time, people considered Alexander Dumas to be a writer
of easy fiction, but that does not mean that his name will be forgotten tomorrow.
We all read his books when we are young. I adored his Three Musketeers, I almost
went out of my mind as I was reading it. But I didn't mean to say that this is
bad literature. What I meant is that we need to make sure that our readers don't
lose interest in the Russian classics, books that are in their nature deep and
philosophical reading. That was the point. I didn't mean to offend you when I
referred to "easy reading". Why did you decide that this is something degrading?
Darya Dontsova: That's the way it sounded. That was my impression...
Vladimir Putin: If it sounded that way, then please accept my apologies.
Darya Dontsova: You may be aware that characters in Marinina's books often read
Russian classics.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, yes.
Darya Dontsova: Ustinova's characters also read classical Russian literature.
People who read our books know a thing or two about the classics.
Vladimir Putin: As I said, if it sounded that way to you then I apologise. As for
the media taking pictures of Mr Medvedev or me with a book during a bookstore
opening ceremony or at a book fair, I think it's a good idea that we should move
ahead with. Let me assure you that dairy producers ask me to appear in public
holding a glass of milk. Meat producers want to see me publicly eating
Russian-made meat products, and so on. In all seriousness, that's what they say
and what they ask me to do. We need to think about other things, although this is
also important. Any positive example is always good, but we should be focusing on
the economic aspects. A printed book costs around 400 roubles, while an e-book
costs between 70 and 80 roubles, 100 at the most. These proportions are about the
same in the United States, the only difference is in the currency. What we need
to do is make printed books even cheaper than their electronic counterparts,
which will make the book business a sound economic endeavour. These are the
realities. They will no doubt buy even more of your books.
We have to think about how we can accomplish this. Today, this can be done only
in the condition of direct subsidies from the government. Is this possible under
the current budget? Perhaps not, but we need to think about how we can get there.
We will need to subsidise the industry that manufactures the necessary quality of
printing paper, as well as some other things. There are many levers that can be
engaged. These are things that we all, especially the government, need to focus
Oleg Novikov (General Director of Eksmo publishers): Mr Putin, may I say a few
words about the industry? Subsidies are exactly what the industry does not need.
The industry has a VAT break, which has been quite effective during the past 20
Remark: It should be set at 10% for electronic products, because 18% is...
Oleg Novikov: Thank you for that alone. Let them allow us to work and not
interfere with what we do. As soon as they try to help, things only get worse. Mr
Putin, please don't do too much to help us. We will cope on our own. Only don't
Vladimir Putin: Fine. We won't any longer.
Oleg Novikov: Let them comply with the laws. The industry is at a point of major
change. We have been effectively growing for the past 20 years, have joined the
ranks of the top five global publishers in terms of titles, the market was up
until 2008 and reached 3 billion roubles in turnover without any outside help.
Our national authors are the most popular...
Vladimir Putin: I believe it's 2 billion. Six billion now, I think.
Oleg Novikov: It's down now... However, national writers are most popular in two
countries: the United States and Russia. The industry should receive due credit
for preserving our national literature during the 1990s. Yes, there were certain
tax breaks provided by the government, and that's all we need. Indeed, there are
requirements today that seek to protect the industry and comply with regulations,
and the industry will do fine on its own. Internet piracy is a global threat to
the market. It may be that the authors present here today will stop writing
tomorrow, because they won't be able to make any money from it. Western writers
enjoy real protection, and they are not facing this global threat. Internet
piracy accounts for 10% of the market, while the legal market in the United
States is more than 10% of the overall market. In Russia, the legal market is 10%
of the illegal market.
There are laws in place, but these laws are weak and they are poorly enforced.
Regardless of how much we talk with officials about it... Yes, the Federal Agency
for Press and Mass Media supports us, but in reality, they tend to bring things
to a standstill. In the West, responsible parties include both the manufacturer
and the consumer, the copyright holder. Things tend to be very tough in Germany:
they summon you to a prosecutor's office or tax office the next day to ask if you
used a piece in question. Then they will cut you off and issue a warning... Of
course, Russia is not prepared to do this, and we don't need it right now. What
we really need is to have at least a political directive, because people lately
keep talking about how information needs to be open. No one is saying that there
is no need to pay for it, but then people realise that protection is not
mandatory, because they will simply open their Internet browsers tomorrow;
information should be accessible, but there is no law enforcement there, which
makes things difficult for us... And so on, and so forth you are well aware of
the situation. It's very important that we at least have a political declaration
about the need for copyright protection.
Vladimir Putin: Mr Novikov, that's exactly how I formulated my position when I
spoke today. I fully agree with you we need protection.
more to be posted soon...
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