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[OS] 2011-#188-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-12 10:00 GMT
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Johnson's Russia List
18 October 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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In this issue
1. New York Times: Warming Revives Dream of Sea Route in Russian Arctic.
2. Nezavisimaya Gazeta editorial: About the supreme mission of Vladimir Putin.
Without setting tens of millions of Russians free from alcohol addiction, Russia
has no future.
3. Interfax: Putin Dislikes Being Compared to Soviet Leaders.
4. Moscow Times: Putin Says He Could Lose the Election.
5. Izvestia: PREPARING THE POPULATION. VLADIMIR PUTIN AND DMITRY MEDVEDEV AGREED
6. ITAR-TASS: RUSSIAN PRESS REVIEW. Vladimir Putin tells the country why he is
returning to the Kremlin.
7. Russia Profile: The Bully Pulpit. Experts See Signals to the Party and to the
Public in Putin's First Interview Since Announcing His Presidential Ambitions.
8. Moscow Times: Medvedev Approves Federation Council Reform.
9. BBC Monitoring: Russia's Medvedev warns against use of nationalist card in
10. Kommersant: Medvedev Seen To Have Won Over United Russia Members.
11. Izvestia: NEW STRUCTURE MIGHT BE FORMED. THE DMITRY MEDVEDEV SUPPORT
12. Le Monde diplomatique: Tony Wood, Who rules Russia? What has really mattered
in Russia in the past 20 years has been the rise of a new elite who control the
government and the money, and do not care about democracy.
13. Moscow News: Anna Arutunyan, To the kitchen, comrades!
14. Russia Beyond the Headlines: Ian Pryde, Occupy Russia. Is Russia immune to
Occupy Wall Street because its disaffected young people have the possibility to
15. Interfax: Disregard For Social Policy Issues Leads to Protests Such as in The
West Today - Putin.
16. Financial Times: Charles Clover, Russia: decline and fall. (re population)
17. Sergey Slobodyan: Thoughts on Russian demography.
18. RIA Novosti: Russia set to fight brain drain.
19. www.russiatoday.com: Presidential Human Rights Council wants amendments to
law on political prisoners.
20. Moscow Times: Aleander Golts, Battle Unreadiness. (re military)
21. RBC Daily: WITHOUT PUTIN. FOREIGN INVESTORS WILL MISS VLADIMIR PUTIN THE
22. Moscow Times: Smiles Greet the Status Quo at FIAC.
23. RIA Novosti: Kudrin slates Russia's risky economic policy.
24. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Stanislav Belkovskiy Disputes 'Progressive Public's'
Praise for Aleksey Kudrin.
25. Interfax: Putin: Russia Is Not After Role of "world Policeman"
26. Interfax: Russians More Positive About EU Than About US - Poll.
27. ITAR-TASS: RUSSIAN PRESS REVIEW. Russia has new suggestions on how to get
talks on ABM out of impasse.
28. Valdai Discussion Club: Russia-U.S. disagreements on missile defense won't
overturn the "Reset." (interview with Steven Pifer)
29. Moscow News: Litvinenko, revisited.
30. http://premier.gov.ru: Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
New York Times
October 18, 2011
Warming Revives Dream of Sea Route in Russian Arctic
By ANDREW E. KRAMER
ARKHANGELSK, Russia Rounding the northernmost tip of Russia in his oceangoing
tugboat this summer, Capt. Vladimir V. Bozanov saw plenty of walruses, some pods
of beluga whales and in the distance a few icebergs.
One thing Captain Bozanov did not encounter while towing an industrial barge
2,300 miles across the Arctic Ocean was solid ice blocking his path anywhere
along the route. Ten years ago, he said, an ice-free passage, even at the peak of
summer, was exceptionally rare.
But environmental scientists say there is now no doubt that global warming is
shrinking the Arctic ice pack, opening new sea lanes and making the few
previously navigable routes near shore accessible more months of the year. And
whatever the grim environmental repercussions of greenhouse gas, companies in
Russia and other countries around the Arctic Ocean are mining that dark cloud's
silver lining by finding new opprtunities for commerce and trade.
Oil companies might be the most likely beneficiaries, as the receding polar ice
cap opens more of the sea floor to exploration. The oil giant Exxon Mobil
recently signed a sweeping deal to drill in the Russian sector of the Arctic
Ocean. But shipping, mining and fishing ventures are also looking farther north
than ever before.
"It is paradoxical that new opportunities are opening for our nations at the same
time we understand that the threat of carbon emissions have become imminent,"
Iceland's president, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, said at a recent conference on
Arctic Ocean shipping held in this Russian port city not far south of the Arctic
At the same forum, Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia offered a
full-throated endorsement of the new business prospects in the thawing north.
"The Arctic is the shortcut between the largest markets of Europe and the
Asia-Pacific region," he said. "It is an excellent opportunity to optimize
This summer, one of the warmest on record in the Arctic, a tanker set a speed
record by crossing the Arctic Ocean in six and a half days, carrying a cargo of
natural gas condensate. The previous record was eight days.
Scientists say that over the last 10 years the average size of the polar ice
sheet in September, the time of year when it is smallest, has been only about
two-thirds the average during the previous two decades. The Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Program, a Norwegian group studying the Arctic, forecasts that within
30 or 40 years the entire Arctic Ocean will be ice-free in the summer.
And so business plans are being drawn up to capitalize on changes in a part of
the world that for much of seafaring history was better known for grim final
entries in diaries of explorers like Hugh Willoughby of England. He died with his
crew in 1553 trying to navigate this shortcut from Europe to Asia, known as the
Northeast Passage.
The Russians, by traveling near the coast, have been sailing the Northeast
Passage for a century. They opened it to international shipping in 1991, after
the breakup of the Soviet Union. But only recently have companies begun to find
the route profitable, as the receding polar ice cap has opened paths farther
offshore allowing larger, modern ships with deeper drafts to make the trip,
trimming days off the voyage and saving fuel.
In 2009, the first two international commercial cargo vessels traveled north of
Russia between Europe and Asia. This year, 18 ships have made the now mostly
ice-free crossing.
The voyages included a scenic cruise through the Northeast Passage, departing
from Murmansk and arriving in Anadyr, a Russian port in the Pacific Ocean across
the Bering Sea from Alaska. "The voyage offered attractions such as abandoned
Russian polar stations," the Australian operator, Aurora Expeditions, noted in
its promotional literature.
On some routes, the trip over the top of Russia is now competitive with the
passage from Europe to Asia via the Suez Canal. The voyage from Rotterdam to
Yokohama, Japan, via the Northeast Passage, for example, is about 4,450 miles
shorter than the currently preferred route through the Suez, according to
Russia's Transportation Ministry. (Of course, the Arctic route has a way to go
before catching up to the 18,000 ships a year sailing through the Suez Canal.)
But the primary use of Arctic Ocean shipping has been to support other industries
heading farther north, like mining and oil drilling, according to participants at
the Russian conference.
Tschudi, a Norwegian shipping company, has bought and revived an idled iron ore
mine in the north of Norway to ship ore to China through the Northeast Passage.
The voyage to Lianyungang in China took 21 days in 2010, compared with the 37
days typically required to sail to China through the Suez. Tschudi executives
estimate they save $300,000 a trip.
"Very few people in the shipping community know about this route," Felix Tschudi,
the chairman, said in an interview.
The Russian company Norilsk's nickel and copper mine can now ship its metals
across the Arctic Ocean without chartering ice breakers, as in the past, saving
millions of rubles for shareholders. In northwest Alaska, the Red Dog lead and
zinc mine moves its ore through the Bering Strait, which is less often clogged
with packed ice than in past decades.
Citigroup's Moscow office has identified five Russian companies as well
positioned to benefit from global warming in the north, where temperatures are
rising about twice as fast as the global average.
Besides Norilsk, they included Sovcomflot, the state shipping company, and the
nation's two largest natural gas companies, Gazprom and Novatek. The fifth is
Rosneft, the state oil company that has entered the joint venture with Exxon
Mobil to drill in the Kara Sea, a part of the Russian sector of the Arctic Ocean.
Russia is retooling a military shipyard outside Arkhangelsk that built the Soviet
Union's nuclear submarines to make ice-capable oil and gas drilling platforms.
For the international fishing industry, the target is the so-called Arctic Ocean
doughnut hole the millions of square miles in the ocean's center that are beyond
the 200-mile exclusive economic zones of the coastal nations. Until 2000, the
entire doughnut hole was frozen year round. Now, large portions north of Alaska
and eastern Siberia are usually ice-free in the summer.
The specter of hungry southern nations fishing the newly navigable doughnut hole
prompted a recent report by the Pew Environment Group to warn that without a new
set of regulations for the region, Arctic cod populations might be decimated.
Meanwhile, because ice floes still menace shipping even in the otherwise open sea
lanes, authorities in the United States, Russia and Norway are studying the
business potential of overhauling ports on both sides of the Northeast Passage to
transfer containers from ordinary freighters to ice-class vessels that would ply
the Arctic Ocean, serving Asia, Canada, the United States West Coast and Europe.
Under this plan, now hopelessly remote ports like Kirkenes in Norway or Adak in
Alaska, south of the Bering Strait, might be transformed into bustling logistics
hubs for Arctic shipping.
Alaska's lieutenant governor, Mead Treadwell, was among those who attended the
Russian conference. He noted that about $1 billion worth of goods passed through
the Bering Strait last year. "The ships," he said, "are coming."
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
October 18, 2011
About the supreme mission of Vladimir Putin
Without setting tens of millions of Russians free from alcohol addiction, Russia
has no future
Vladimir Putin's decision to return to the presidential post after 12 years in
power has sparked a widescale public reaction in the country and abroad. Dmitry
Medvedev has been the biggest advocate of the decision, citing the prime
minister's higher ratings. There is no doubt that, unless something unpredictable
happens, Putin will assume presidency for another six years starting in May
The biggest question is: why? The motives of the elite are understandable they
have adapted, and believe that "if it's not broke, there's no need to fix it."
But why does Putin need to be the responsible person for the entire country? Even
if the economy is doing well, ignoring the factor of psychological fatigue of the
voters is impossible. People are getting tired of seeing the same leaders time
and time again, even if they are objectively successful.
The reason is simply because we live in a time when everything around us is
quickly changing: TV models, cars, mobile phones and the internet. Even a slow
computer could be a cause of aggravation. Of course, it works 10 times faster
than 10 years ago, but slower than it could today. A paradox. It's hard to find
the words to explain it. But everyone understands. People need change, progress,
new faces and new heroes. Incidentally, it's not a fact that Dmitry Medvedev
would be perceived as "young blood" for the next six years. He has been at the
very top of the power structure for a long time. People have grown accustomed to
So what is the reason for the return? What is the hero's supreme mission, as
Stanislavsky liked to ask? Could Putin's supreme mission be uncovered in the
captivity of ratings, albeit rapidly changing?
One would assume that the reason for Putin's return can be found in his mission.
What is Putin's mission? To increase the mileage of paved roads? To build a
couple more streams in addition to the Nord and South? To make sure Russia hosts
the Summer Olympics or the Rugby World Cup?
There is no newness to these goals. It seems that Putin's mission should deal
with solving some fundamental, qualitative problem in Russia a problem of
historic proportions, part of a global challenge. This problem is, certainly, the
problem of drinking and alcoholism in the Russian population.
Total annual alcohol consumption in Russia equals 18 liters of pure spirits
(according to the WHO experts, 8 liters of per capita ethanol consumption a year
indicates a nation's decline). According to WHO data, alcohol-related health
problems are the reason for 750,000 premature and preventable deaths in Russia
each year (Pskov regional population). That is roughly 30 percent of all male
deaths and 15 percent of female deaths in Russia.
Our country has one of the top rates of divorce in the world the main reason for
which is alcoholism: 39 percent of men and 50 percent of women believe that
alcohol abuse could destroy their marriage.
Russia ranks first in the world for the number of abandoned children and children
without parental care. The most common reason for child neglect and deprivation
of parenting rights is alcoholism.
The suicide rate in Russia has, in recent years, stably remained in second place
among more than 200 countries (about 30 incidents per 100,000 people). About half
of all people committing suicide do so while intoxicated.
According to the Ministry of Interior, about 80 percent of homicides are
committed in an intoxicated state. Half of all victims are also intoxicated when
killed. The homicide rate in Russia is the highest in Europe 18 cases per
100,000 people.
Fifty-seven percent of the population believes that alcoholism and drug addiction
are the country's main threat. And 47 percent believe that alcoholism and drug
abuse among adolescents is the main problem children face today.
In most cases, saving people from drunkenness and alcoholism will mean returning
to these people a reason to exist giving them back their sense of identity,
citizenship, being a subject of politics, and not only preserving but increasing
the Russian population.
Unless Putin formulates a mission of a similar scale, then it could, with utmost
confidence, be predicted that he will face turbulence, fatigue, frustration, lack
of understanding, and suspicion for the next six years. In short, it could happen
just as it always does. As a popular American saying goes: the services provided
are not worth a dime.
[return to Contents]
Putin Dislikes Being Compared to Soviet Leaders
MOSCOW. Oct 17 (Interfax) - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin disagrees with those
who associate his possible return to the presidency with the Brezhnev-era
"They say that the stagnation of Brezhnev times will be back soon. Firstly, both
in Soviet times and even in the early 90s - I do not want this to look like
indiscriminate criticism - there was much positive, but I cannot recall post-war
Soviet leaders working as intensively as I do or as President Dmitry Anatolyevich
Medvedev does," Putin said in an interview with federal TV chancels.
"They (Soviet leaders) were unable, because of their physical condition or
because they did not understand what had to be done. Perhaps, they could have
stirred themselves into action, but the problem was they did not understand. Nor
did they have the will to do it," he said.
Asked why he though the West thought him to be a "hawk", Putin said called for
abandoning stereotypes.
"First, a hawk is a good birdie... ... but I am against any cliches," he said.
"In former times and now we pursued and will continue to pursue a balanced policy
aimed at creating favorable conditions for our country's development," Putin
"This means that we want to have good-neighbor and friendly relations with all
our partners. Naturally, we have defended and will continue to defend most
actively our national interests, but we always did it in an appropriate way and
will do so in the future," he said.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 18, 2011
Putin Says He Could Lose the Election
By Alexander Bratersky
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said the public has a chance to vote him out of
office in the presidential election in March, and promised a huge reshuffle in
the ruling United Russia party.
The statements were made in a joint interview to the heads of the country's top
three television channels, Channel One, Rossia-1 and NTV, recorded Saturday and
broadcast Monday evening.
The interview saw Putin encroaching on the turf of outgoing President Dmitry
Medvedev, who regularly gave such interviews to the same channels. Putin's
spokesman Dmitry Peskov, however, played down the similarity, saying Putin's
interview was meant as a sequel to Medvedev's late last month.
Putin, looking energetic and speaking in calm, self-assured tone, said he wanted
to return to the presidency because of his habit to "see things through to their
logical end."
Putin cited U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served four terms in
office, to justify his return an example he has raised before and said he and
Medvedev agreed on a 2012 job swap four years ago, when Medvedev, a longtime
Putin ally, replaced him in the Kremlin.
But they only thought it possible to propose their plan to the public if they
"successfully passed through this period of pretty serious hardship," he said.
Putin, who was interviewed at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow, was
asked whether his candidacy rendered the election a formality in absence of
strong competition. "There's always a choice for the ordinary citizen," Putin
He said the only people who believe there is no political choice are opposition
activists, and their job is to convince the populace through grassroots work that
they are a better alternative than the ruling establishment.
He echoed Medvedev, who said in his interview that any presidential candidate
might lose the vote. "Nobody is insured. What kind of predetermination are you
talking about?" Medvedev told the same three TV channel heads on Sept. 29.
Neither Medvedev nor Putin has named any potential rival to dethrone them.
Putin's approval rating stood at 68 percent in September, according to the
independent Levada Center pollster. The rating for Medvedev, who said he would
not run for re-election because Putin is a more popular politician, stood at 62
Putin also said United Russia, which is poised to win the State Duma vote in
December, "must remain the leading political force in the country and in the
But he reiterated his previously voiced promise to revamp party leadership after
the elections. He did not elaborate, but the promise, again, echoed Medvedev's
pledge to revamp the party, made at a meeting with his supporters last week.
Putin, who is a leader but not a member of the United Russia, headed its party
list in the previous vote in 2007. This year, the honor went to Medvedev, whom
Putin promised in September to make prime minister after the elections.
Putin was more cautious when asked about a government revamp, saying the
"ministerial leapfrog" is a sign of weakness, but promising to bring in new
people with new ideas after the elections while providing unspecified cushy jobs
for the veteran officials.
He also fielded a question about the U.S.-Russian "reset," cautiously telling an
interviewer who spoke about his reputation as a "hawk" that could threaten the
reset that "the hawk is a nice birdie" and that Russia would continue to look for
its own interests, but would do so "correctly."
The interview was Putin's first television appearance after he decided to run for
president for the third term. His spokesman Peskov said it was "no new format"
for his patron, but a follow-up to Medvedev's interview, Kommersant reported
Putin has spoken in the past to foreign television channels, including CNN and
CCTV, but in Russia his preferred format is a live televised call-in show. Peskov
said the new installment of the conference, held annually since 2001, will take
place "this winter."
[return to Contents]
October 18, 2011
Author: Anastasia Novikova
[Excerpts from Premier Vladimir Putin's interview.]
Premier Vladimir Putin's interview became a sequel to the
recent meeting between Premier Vladimir Putin with the same
interviewers - Konstantin Ernst (Channel One), Oleg Dobrodeyev
(Russian State TV and Radio Broadcasting Corporation), and
Vladimir Kulistikov (NTV). Predictably, most questions to the
premier concerned the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential
Putin admitted that he had deliberately refrained in the
course of his presidency from amending the Constitution and
removing restrictions on the number of terms of office for chief
"Can't say that I've been clinging to presidency," said Putin
soon to be nominated for president. He recalled that FDR in the
United States had been elected the president four times. Putin
said, "He was the president during the Great Depression and WWII.
He was elected four times because he was always efficient...
[Helmut] Kohl in Germany ruled sixteen years."
Putin said that Medvedev and he had agreed to execute a
painless castling four years ago.
Putin said, "We decided years ago that it might actually come
to that... And no, we did not announce it as a settled matter.
That's something we decided, and it is the Russians who ought to
decide now."
The premier even answered the skeptics convinced that his
decision to run for president again all but cancelled a bona fide
presidential election in Russia. He said that the opposition
lacked a program of its own.
As for Medvedev in the premier's capacity, Putin said that he
would continue implementation of Strategy'2020. "Doing so from
within the government will be more convenient."
Putin was also asked about the forthcoming staff shuffles in
the Cabinet. He explained that his penchant for keeping people in
their jobs without replacing them stemmed from the conviction that
whenever something untoward happened, all of the Cabinet had to
bear responsibility for it whereas the minister in question
deserved a chance to put his act together.
Putin said, "Regular stuff shuffles within the Cabinet are an
indication of weakness. As for the willingness and readiness to
part company with incompetents, well, it's a duty of every
Interviewers reminded Putin that very many in the West
regarded him as a "hawk" and asked if it bothered him. Putin said,
"Hawk is a fine bird."
Kulistikov said, "The future government needs a special
program, something short, like a miniskirt... something promising
and alluring." Putin replied, "Miniskirts are great, but some
people had better wear something else."
[return to Contents]
October 18, 2011
Vladimir Putin tells the country why he is returning to the Kremlin
MOSCOW, October 18 (Itar-Tass) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gave an interview
to heads of three federal TV channels on Monday. The recent settlement of the
problem of power was the main topic of the conversation. The journalists asked
Putin why he is returning to the Kremlin. In the opinion of the mass media,
Putin's interview is in line with the recent interview, given by President Dmitry
Medvedev to the same TV channels.
Putin and Medvedev openly declare that they will fight for power (both of them
stress that the final decision will be made by the electors) until the country
gets ready for the change of power, The Kommersant writes. Putin describes as "a
period of stable development" the time, when he and his associates run the
country. Accordingly, the stable period will need stable power, which, in the
opinion of Putin, should rely not only on the upper circles (which is also very
important, he believes), but also on the support of the population. This permits
Putin not to pay attention to the fact that "there are people in the so-called
elites, who act as his opponents."
Any personnel changes should be well grounded, and "a frequent reshuffling of
ministers is evidence of the weakness of the top leaders," Putin said, responding
to the question on whether the ministers, who work ineffectively for a long time,
should be sacked. According to Putin, "before anyone is sacked, all possible
measures should be taken for making him work." On this issue there are
differences between Putin and Medvedev, The Kommersant writes.
The Kommersant points to the fact that Putin expressed his opinion of Medvedev's
performance on the post of president for the first time. He admitted that at some
moment "Medvedev found it necessary to make some aspects of our public life more
humane." Putin is not going to change radically what has been done, because he
wishes "to see how this is going to work." In other words, the incumbent Prime
Minister will not object to the incumbent President taking over his post and to
working in the same way as in the Kremlin.
The Komsomolskaya Pravda calls attention to Putin's words about the coming
changes in the top echelons of the United Russia Party (UR).
In the opinion of experts, the tandem is following two purposes, The Nezavisimaya
Gazeta writes. On the one hand, the President and the Prime Minister are going to
support UR and to keep regional elites from hasty and ill-considered actions. On
the other hand, they intend to convince the electorate that changes are possible
among the UR leaders.
Andrei Ryabov, member of the scientific council of the Moscow Carnegie Centre,
believes that uncertainty about UR was growing during the past week. "Their
electoral campaign is not going smoothly with Medvedev as the leader of the
Party. Many people get the impression that the national leader does not actually
need the Party very much... The impression is that belief in the unshakeable
strength of UR has been eroded, and not only among the public, but also among a
great number of Russian officials. Most probably, an open information
intervention of the tandem was needed for reiterating once again that nothing has
been changed," he said.
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
October 18, 2011
The Bully Pulpit
Experts See Signals to the Party and to the Public in Putin's First Interview
Since Announcing His Presidential Ambitions
By Andrew Roth
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appeared last evening on Russian national
television in a 30-minute interview with the heads of three leading television
stations in Russia, giving his first interview since his announcement to run for
(and win) the presidency in 2012. Critics say that Putin far outclassed his
junior Dmitry Medvedev in terms of political presence and confidence; yet they
disagree on how much of the content of the interview was actually new, and how
much is simply the same rhetoric that has been recycled in other major interviews
since the United Russia conference last month.
Strolling smartly through an office at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside
Moscow, Putin brusquely greeted his interviewers from Channel One, Rossia-1 and
NTV television stations, telling them: "I'm listening!" The first question, of
course, was why Putin had decided to return to the Kremlin in 2012. "I never
sought this post," replied Putin humbly, though unbelievably. "Moreover, at the
time when it was suggested to me, I even expressed my doubts about whether it was
worth doing, keeping in mind the enormous amount of work and the colossal
responsibility for the fate of the country," said Putin. But, he continued, "if I
set myself to a task, I try to carry the issue through either to its logical
conclusion, or to its maximal effect."
What the interview lacked in tight answers to criticism of the Kremlin or Putin's
future plans for Russia the premier made up for with reminders of the historical
precedents for his third presidency (Franklin D. Roosevelt and Helmut Kohl), as
well as ominous warnings of where Russia would be without him. "It's enough to
make two or three missteps and everything that happened before [in the 1990s] can
catch up with us so quickly that we won't even realize it," said Putin.
"Everything in our politics and in our economy has been done as a tailor tack."
Did the interview present anything new about what Russia should expect from Putin
after the March elections? Nikolai Petrov, an analyst on local politics at the
Carnegie Endowment, said that the speech held several important moments: firstly,
in Putin's explanation of why he felt he had to return to the Kremlin, and
secondly in expanding on the government's decisions between moving toward reforms
of its economic and political programs and then backing away from them.
While Putin's speech was described by his spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, as a
follow-up to Medvedev's interview with the same television stations earlier this
month, Putin came off looking far superior, noted Petrov. "To compare this
interview with the recent one with Medvedev and his supporters, Putin is much
more professional, much more confident, much more sincere. I would not say that
it was empty, unlike Medvedev's," Petrov said.
Medvedev's highly anticipated pressers and interviews have turned into banal
affairs recently. When he was asked the same question as Putin, namely why the
tandem had decided that Putin should return to the Kremlin, Medvedev told the
same television stations that Putin's ratings were "somewhat higher," and that he
should lead the party forward into the next presidential elections. This month,
in anticipation of another press-conference, Medvedev tweeted: "To those who are
interested in my plans watch Vesti-24 at two o'clock today." Little came out of
the interview, except that Medvedev affirmed he would stay in politics.
Those hoping to see journalists finally stick it to an authority figure had a
little more luck with Dmitry Peskov's recent interview on Dozhd television, when
he was cornered by five rather more independent journalists. But the great
revelation from the interview was firstly that Putin's dive at Fangoria earlier
this year was a fake, and the sixth century urns he dredged up there were
planted, and secondly that, if we're headed into a period of Leonid Brezhnev's
stagnation, then overall the Brezhnev period was not so bad.
Putin continued in that vein last night, similarly taking on the stability of the
Brezhnev era while discounting the stagnation with which many now associate it.
Yet the very repetitiveness of the recent interviews is a signal from Putin to
the United Russia party and party loyalists, said Mikhail Vinogradov, the head of
the St. Petersburg Political Fund think tank. "There was little new or revelatory
in the interview, but rather what Putin was doing is framing what the major
events will look like through the upcoming election. It can be seen in particular
as a signal to many of those functionaries in the party," said Vinogradov. "This
was an interview that would be interesting to those who are loyal to the party. I
would guess that those not interested would probably discount it," he added.
Petrov, meanwhile, said that Putin's appeal in the interview would likely rebuild
interest among the former party faithful, at a time when due to increasing
financial difficulties the government could no longer afford to buy loyalty by
simply spending cash on social programs. "Legitimacy is of major importance to
the authorities today," said Petrov. "He's saying a lot more about direct
democracy here, and in many ways he's switching his political approach to focus
on popularity."
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 18, 2011
Medvedev Approves Federation Council Reform
By Nikolaus von Twickel
President Dmitry Medvedev on Monday approved a delicate reform of the Federation
Council that makes it easier for senators to keep their posts during changes in
regional leaderships.
The reform stipulates that sitting senators need not pass through any additional
procedures if they seek reappointment after their governor leaves office or their
regional parliament dissolves, Medvedev said during a meeting with Federation
Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko.
Each region currently sends two senators to the upper house of parliament, one
being appointed by the regional parliament, the other by the governor.
Senators' terms are bound to their appointing organs' terms, meaning that they
automatically lose office if their governor's or regional legislature's term
Under a reform initiated under Medvedev earlier this year, in order to become a
senator, candidates need to have been elected to a legislature. Monday's reform
does away with this requirement for sitting senators.
Medvedev argued that "often enough" governors' or parliaments' terms end early.
"This makes life easier and optimizes the work of the council," he said,
according to a transcript on the Kremlin's web site.
The new law was lobbied by Matviyenko, who assumed the speaker's post last month
after being appointed senator following a stint since 2003 as the governor of St.
The move drew protests after it became known that she would run as councilwoman
in two St. Petersburg city districts for the ruling United Russia party only on
the last day that parties could put forward candidates, prompting the opposition
to complain that the elections, both of which she won with more than 95 percent,
were deeply unfair.
Medvedev also said he wants the Federation Council and Matviyenko to work on a
sweeping overhaul of financial relations between regional governments and the
federal government.
The new delineation of competences should increase local authorities' motivation
to increase their regions' own income, he said.
Matviyenko promised to carry out the reforms and said the Federation Council
should become "a lift for regional legislative initiatives," explaining that the
regions often could not achieve this because of "complicated bureaucratic
decision-making machineries."
She also promised to radically reduce the number of parliamentary committees to
10. "Twenty-seven committees and commissions that is a lot for 166 Federation
Council members," she said.
The reduction plan has been met with opposition from some senators bound to lose
influential committee positions, national media reported last week.
Sergei Mironov, founder of the Just Russia party, who was ousted from his post as
Federation Council speaker earlier this year, said Monday that the real reason
for reducing committees was to make it easier for Matviyenko to rule over the
lawmakers. It would be simpler to rule over 10 committee chairmen than the
current 27, he said, Interfax reported.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Russia's Medvedev warns against use of nationalist card in election
Text of report by Russian Defence Ministry-controlled Zvezda TV on 17 October
(Presenter) (Russian President) Dmitriy Medvedev has called the use of
nationalist slogans during the election campaign unacceptable. During a meeting
with the leadership of the Federation Council, the president noted that
xenophobia is a big problem not only for Russia but also for many other
countries. Interethnic relations become strained when life becomes more
difficult. It is a consequence of the global economic crisis and some are trying
to use this for their political aims.
(Medvedev) At present it is a very busy period in our country: the campaign for
the State Duma election is taking place and then there will be the presidential
campaign. All political forces are obliged to refrain from using the nationalist
card and fanning xenophobic sentiments. And not only voluntarily. The use of the
nationalist card and fanning interethnic conflicts and religious discord are
crimes as well. And even if it is committed during the election campaign, it will
be given the appropriate legal assessment, without reductions for democracy or
freedom of speech. It is necessary to fight this.
[return to Contents]
Medvedev Seen To Have Won Over United Russia Members
October 17, 2011
Irina Granik report: "Explanation on a Set Topic: Why Dmitriy Medvedev Deemed it
Necessary To Meet With His Supporters"
Dmitriy Medvedev urged his supporters to stay with him, regardless of his office
Dmitriy Medvedev attempted on Saturday to dispel the so-called cognitive
dissonance that had arisen among the community of his sympathizers on 24
September following the United Russia congress, on account, included, of the fact
that he himself, not, for example, the participants in the congress, had
nominated as presidential candidate Vladimir Putin. It appeared to your
Kommersant columnist Irina Granik that the attempt was only partially successful.
Nonetheless, Dmitriy Medvedev managed to offer the community suffering, and also
not suffering, from dissonance, and at the same time, party members also, a form
in which they can help him. Many participants liked this idea of "enlarged
After 24 September, Dmitriy Medvedev, leader of the United Russia party's
election slate, could not have failed to have had a problem: how to retain the
support of the part of the community that has supported him as president, but
that in no way associates itself with this (or, altogether, with any) party, and
on the other, to have the party members take him seriously, and further, build
all together into the party's election campaign. It was for this that party
members, members of the ONF (All-Russia Popular Front), and those who had
previously supported the president's initiatives in this form or the other were
invited to the meeting with the president. It was the last category that involved
the most nuanced aspect. The function was to have been accommodated within the
election campaign and it was to have been called nothing less than a "meeting
with supporters". But it was obvious that half of those that they wanted to see
at the meeting (representatives of the field of culture, the news media, the
internet community, science, business) would not come to a meeting of "party
supporters". And to a meeting of the "president's supporters" one-half of this
half would not be coming either because it is not accustomed to relating to
itself the word "supporter".
Ultimately, Kommersant learned, the organizers acted simply: the particularly
sensitive were invited to a "meeting with the president," some, to a "meeting of
the president's supporters," some, to a meeting with the president's supporters
and United Russia. There was, naturally, an exchange of information, and there
were blunders--the well-known blogger @drugoi did not understand the entire tact
and sagacity of the organizers and turned down the meeting. He decided for some
reason or other that he had been deceived and put down as a supporter of United
Although this was not the case. When almost all the invitees from the 185-person
list arrived on Saturday at Digital October, they found that they had come to a
meeting of "RF President D.A. Medvedev and supporters". As we can see, the
wording permitted almost everyone (aside from those that absolutely cannot bear
to hear spoken about them the word "supporter") to preserve their principles and
peace of mind.
"We support all that is good," Ashemez Pkheshkhov, a member from
Karachay-Cherkessia and anchor of the republic's television and radio
broadcasting company, answered a question from Kommersant.
"I am a supporter of Medvedev's projects. I like them, they are first-class. When
I was involved in natural resources and power industry, I could not have imagined
that I would begin to invest in projects of the high-tecch sector. I did not know
what this was. Today we have built the first private technopark," Mikhail Abyzov,
chairman of the board of directors of the RU-COM group, told Kommersant.
Some guests, having seen the lists of invitees, found salvation in jokes:
"Are these hit lists or prize lists, I wonder?"
Natalya Timakova, the president's press spokesman, provided in an interview with
Kommersant the wording that was the most acceptable to everyone:
"All who have supported and continue to support the president are here. Those
that have in some form or other met him, worked with him, executed some projects
that he initiated. So there are pra ctically no chance people here."
Opening the meeting, Dmitriy Medvedev explained that "people that want to see
ours as a changing country, those that advocate the modernization of our society,
our state, that is," were gathered here.
"Consequently, you are my supporters. This is the reason for my wish to get
together and, perhaps, your wish to clarify some things for yourselves," he
The president then explained to the supporters who after 24 September had "felt
some disappointment" and had expressed on internet publications a "slight degree
of tension" the "motives" that had guided him when "making the decision on my
future plans."
"I never dissembled when I said that we had discussed our political configuration
long before the United Russia congress. Both myself and Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin are responsible people," Dmitriy Medvedev said and gave the assurance:
"This is, in fact, the result of quite a lengthy analysis."
He made it understood here that he is familiar with certain rumors that were
circulating prior to the congress: "Therefore, when they say that they met in the
forest somewhere, at a fishing spot, there they traded everything...." Continuing
to explain his motives, the president hinted at some possible development of
events where "points could be forfeited very quickly, and then there'd be no
questions at all: either about the presidency or about heading the campaign list,
Then came explanations which Dmitriy Medvedev has already given repeatedly:
Vladimir Putin has a higher approval rating, it was decided, therefore, that he
would be the party's presidential candidate. Mr Medvedev recalled that the
premier and he had been friends for 20 years now and acknowledged: "I would
otherwise have had no political career in Moscow." He stated his principles of
friendship as follows: "Many people believe for some reason or other that any
person that has become president has to thrash around, wiping out those that
helped him in his political career, in life. But I was not raised this way, and I
believe that this is right."
At the same time, Dmitriy Medvedev explained that his "potential has not been
fully realized" and that he "does not have the right to let down millions of
people" who voted for him in 2008 and who link with him "hopes for the future"
and he switched to an explanation of his modernization plans. Their description
ended with the proposition concerning the need to "really change the system of
public administration." After which Dmitriy Medvedev invited his supporters to
"think about the formation of a so-called greater government or, as is sometimes
said, enlarged government." He proposed the formation of a greater government
together with "the main party, which can form such a government, with civil
society, with experts, and with regional and municipal authorities." "With all
constituents who are prepared to vote for us and even with those that disagree
with us," he continued.
As far as the party is concerned, he explained that it is United Russia, which
will be renewed and de-bureaucratized, that is the political force that could
focus all efforts on the country's modernization. And he announced in the course
of the meeting: "I am now of the flesh and blood of United Russia."
The meeting lasted two and a half hours. All those that spoke supported, on the
whole, the idea of an enlarged government. The general mood was expressed by the
writer Sergey Minayev: "We want to work. And the idea of a greater government is
important for the added reason that your decisions will be our decisions and your
victories will be our victories, that is, we want to feel that we are involved
and not simply to discuss this on Twitter and in blogs, we want to be heard." Mr
Abyzov approached the issue more specifically and proposed the formation of a
committee to craft a uniform program of enlarged government then and there.
Many proposals for a "greater government" were heard. Thanks for the president
were heard also. S teel founder Dmitriy Chervyakov thanked him not only for all
the improvements in the life of his plant that had occurred as a result of the
president's visit but also for the "changes in his personal life." Embarrassed,
the steel founder announced that his family was expecting a third child. This had
happened thanks to the fact that it had been able this year for the first time to
travel on a subsidized holiday-homes voucher to the seaside.
Conditions were set also. The producer Fedor Bondarchuk announced that, as
distinct from this present meeting, he was "very depressed" by the United Russia
congress and demanded renewal of the party. Then he gave the assurance: "I
support not only your policy, I support you personally, despite your being a
tough leader, drive them all further away, but don't stop taking photos, writing
on Twitter about the difference between the Leica and the Mark II, and don't stop
dancing either." Dmitriy Medvedev liked this: "You are the first to have
appreciated these capabilities."
There were gaffes as well. Tina Kandelaki, television anchor and member of the
Public Chamber, heatedly explaining to those assembled that "we need to value the
president, who "reads (on the internet--Kommersant) and hears everything," and to
the president that we need to take into the new government, and not only a
"greater" one, only people "with inner drive," made an irritating slip from the
bureaucratic perspective. She said at one point: "When you were president," but
quickly corrected this to "when you began your presidency."
The main idea could be traced in all the president's responses and explanations:
I agreed with the configuration that Vladimir Putin and I crafted because only by
remaining in office do you have an opportunity to do anything.
It was with this that Dmitriy Medvedev concluded the meeting: "I'll say to you as
candidly as possible: don't give up power, continue your work. I don't know who
will in 10, 15 years be replacing the managerial team in office, I hope they will
be better and smarter than us, stronger than us. But I see it as my duty, a
personal obligation, at this time to continue to work, to continue to work for
the good of our country, our people."
It is hard to say how many supporters disenchanted with the president that he
managed to bring back on Saturday, but he brought back the pragmatists for a
fact. Marat Gelman, director of the Modern Art Center, told Kommersant that the
meeting "secures all the previous understandings, with us, at least." He said
that the president once proposed the formation of a Cultural Alliance, and
several of its members were at the meeting. "If there is a greater-government
situation, to which I also am invited, this would be interesting," he said. The
president definitely won the good will of United Russia members. "The leader of
the slate formulated the idea of an enlarged government--this is modern,
topical," Andrey Vorobyev, head of the United Russia Executive Committee, said in
an interview with Kommersant. Mr Vorobyev was not about to say on what he might
not agree with the party leader.
[return to Contents]
October 18, 2011
Author: Olga Tropkina
[Another structure is to be established in Russia. Experts are skeptical.]
The Dmitry Medvedev Support Committee might be formed in
Russia soon. What information is available at this point indicates
that this permanent structure will become an element of the so
called "larger government".
This idea was first suggested during President Medvedev's
meeting with his supporters and followers at the industrial park
Digital October in Moscow. Up to 150 people were present - from
bohemians to academicians to workers to activists of public
Medvedev addressed those present in the capacity of the
politician elected to lead United Russia to the Duma.
As a matter of fact, how many United Russia members had
attended the meeting was a question that even stymied Andrei
Vorobiov of the Central Executive Committee.
"Whoever supports Medvedev who is number one on United
Russia's ticket, automatically supports United Russia as well,"
said party activist Robert Shlegel.
The tone of the dialogue at the meeting was quite affable.
Critic of United Russia at the convention last month, film
director Fyodor Bondarchuk exuded bonhomie this time. He said,
"So, you are with United Russia now?" - "Yes, I am," replied
TV journalist Nikolai Svanidze gave an account of the
problems facing the country: unbelievable corruption, bureaucratic
tyranny, and lack of genuinely impartial judiciary.
Medvedev said in his turn that all of that required
betterment of the system of public administration in general. "I
suggest that we give a thought to establishment of the so called
larger government that will function together with United Russia,
experts, society, and regional administrations." The president
explained that this "larger government" ought to include "new
faces". It should be focused on economic modernization, betterment
of living standards in Russia, and the war on corruption.
Mikhail Abyzov of RU-COM, one of the participants in the
meeting, suggested establishment of a special committee that would
analyze and process various programs and compose a common
platform. He said that this platform would serve as a bearing
point for society and power structures at all levels.
Medvedev said, "Well, we just might form a structure such as
this. You all are welcome to join it."
Another participant in the meeting explained that the Dmitry
Medvedev Support Committee ought to focus on the "larger
government" concept, its agenda and priorities.
The participant said, "As a matter of fact the [Dmitry
Medvedev Support] Committee ought to both handle priorities and
tackle strategic issues. Say, it ought to try and reorganize the
public administration system, install a system enabling people to
Abyzov later added that he only wished to see the future
structure as "non-bureaucratic" as possible.
Experts took the news of the Dmitry Medvedev Support
Committee with a grain of salt.
Political Techniques Center President Igor Bunin said, "If
the matter concerns expert aid to the powers-that-be, then I'd say
that the latter already have it. It is common knowledge after all
that Nikolai Fyodorov drew an exhaustive program. All seventeen
volumes of the program were scrapped the moment he finished
working on it... The Institute of Contemporary Development has a
program as well. There is also the Public House, a structure that
is never at a loss when it comes down to offering advise..."
According to the expert, this would-be structure was going to be
just like that - no better and no worse than any other expert
Bunin said, "All of these structures are kind of virtual. On
the other hand, some of them might eventually evolve into a
genuine instrument."
This correspondent approached Aleksei Chesnakov of the
General Council of United Russia and asked to be explained the
difference between the [Dmitry Medvedev Support] Committee and the
structures Bunin had mentioned. Chesnakov said, "The former might
completely rearrange the relations between the executive branch of
the government and society... It will be like this.. People will
suggest something or other because they want to solve this or that
problem and not because they need an office, government support or
anything like that."
What information is available to this newspaper indicates
that the meeting between the president and the activists willing
to set up the Dmitry Medvedev Support Committee without delay
might take place in the near future.
[return to Contents]
Le Monde diplomatique
October 2011
Who rules Russia?
What has really mattered in Russia in the past 20 years has been the rise of a
new elite who control the government and the money, and do not care about
Tony Wood is deputy editor of the New Left Review and author of Chechnya: the
Case for Independence, Verso, London, 2007
The 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought many books
about the demise of regimes east of the Iron Curtain (1). But there have been
relatively few attempts to come to terms with the Russian experience since the
unravelling of the Soviet Union in 1991. Daniel Treisman's The Return seeks to
fill that gap by charting "Russia's journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev" (2).
Treisman was co-author of a polemical article "A Normal Country" (3), which
argued that post-Soviet Russia, rather than being afflicted with unique
historical burdens (the legacy of autocracy, deep-rooted bureaucratic
tendencies), has a range of developmental problems shared by many middle-income
countries: corruption, weak institutions, economic vulnerabilities. The
post-Soviet transition was a gradual process of alignment with patterns common to
other states in Russia's income bracket.
The ideological underpinnings of this approach are clear: the liberalising
reforms of the 1990s should be judged a success, since Russia now stood roughly
where it belonged in the international economic hierarchy. Treisman's approach
had the merit of trying to make discussion of Russia less prone to cold war
stereotypes or appeals to the Russian soul. In The Return, Treisman seeks to give
an accurate portrait of Russia as it is, rather than as western policy- and
opinion-makers imagine it. He positions himself between neoliberal ideologues who
ascribe Russia's problems to the idea that market reforms were not pursued
vigorously enough and those who blame the reforms for the country's ills (4). Yet
though this stance is designed to lend his arguments the authority of an
independent observer, his narrative ultimately lines up with the mainstream of
western liberal opinion.
He begins with a political history of the last two decades, with chapters on the
personalities and trajectories of Russia's presidents: Mikhail Gorbachev,
"history's most successful failure"; Boris Yeltsin, represented as a flawed hero,
intuitively navigating the political and economic crisis; Vladimir Putin, the
dubious beneficiary of a favourable economic climate; and Dmitri Medvedev, "the
understudy", whose programme and prospects remain unclear. Treisman then covers
the same chronological ground again, but attempts broader analytical syntheses:
the dynamics driving the Soviet collapse, the economic transformations of the
1990s, the wars in Chechnya, and Russia's relations with the West. Many of his
conclusions are unexceptional - a chapter is dedicated to the discovery that a
president's popularity correlates closely with the economic cycle - although
there are some contrarian moments: he gives a sympathetic hearing to Russian
grievances about Nato expansion and the hypocrisies of US foreign policy.
'Accidents and bungling responses'
Treisman portrays the disintegration of the USSR as a contingent process. While
the mismanaged economic reforms of the 1980s - and the reluctance of previous
Soviet leaders to overhaul the decaying industrial base - pushed the Soviet Union
towards the abyss, it was "accidents and bungling responses to them" that tipped
it over the edge. Treisman seeks to counter the idea that upsurges of nationalism
pulled the USSR apart: its citizens only turned to support newly formed
nationalist forces after it became clear that the Soviet system was beginning to
break down.
But with the market reforms of the 1990s this sense of contingency all but
disappears: he argues that there was no realistic alternative to the course
adopted by Yeltsin, who had inherited a "disaster" that was "worse than most
people realised", but managed to improvise policies that held the country
together. The outcome, he insists, was not as bad as is often supposed: the steep
drop in GDP is an unreliable indicator, and many people's quality of life, as
measured by purchases of televisions and domestic appliances, improved over the
decade. The loss of public goods such as health care, education, employment, and
the atrophying of social solidarity, are not mentioned.
In the end, Treisman vindicates Yeltsin's reforms, repeating the standard story
of lonely visionaries pushing the boulder of liberal democracy up the slope of
Russian reality. Like many mainstream accounts of Russia since 1991, Treisman's
book is premised on the idea that under Yeltsin, liberal democracy was being
consolidated, however tenuously; while under Putin, the country seems to have
taken a step backwards into the authoritarian past. Any sense of the deeper
ideological drive behind the transformations of the 1990s is missing. For what
was being consolidated in Russia was not democracy but capitalism. The
"reformers" were content to force through their "shock therapy" without a
democratic mandate, and to support Yeltsin's repeated subversions of the
constitution - most notably when he bombed parliament in 1993. Indeed democracy
has finished a distant second in Russia whenever the fate of capitalist property
relations has been at stake.
An alternative reading of Russia's post-Communist metamorphoses would place these
capitalist interests at its centre, focusing on the ways in which the country's
course has been shaped by the class project of its new elite. This would require
a picture of the composition and character of that elite - who rules Russia?
Rising entrepreneurs
In the maelstrom of the 1990s the emerging elite was composed of former members
of the Communist Party nomenklatura and rising entrepreneurial layers. For much
of the decade, the fortunes of the entrepreneurs were linked to high-value
exports - metals, minerals - or secured through financial machinations or
asset-stripping the old Soviet industrial base.
The rouble crash of 1998 shifted the foundations of this elite structure,
weakening banking and finance while strengthening producers oriented to the
domestic market. But the decisive influence, on the elite and the country, has
been the persistence of high oil and gas prices since 2000, which has led to
massive profits not only for large state corporations such as Rosneft and
Gazprom, but also for private operations such as Surgutneftegaz and, until its
dismantling in 2003, Yukos.
This has created a new elite that outshines its 1990s predecessor in wealth: in
the words of the Washington-based political scientist Lilia Shevtsova, "the old
Yeltsin oligarchy looks like a group of dilettantes in comparison to the new
cohort of bureaucrat-oligarchs" (5). Shevtsova's hyphenated term points to the
distinctive character of this new elite, which embraces both public and private
sectors, and spans business and government. But perhaps the best portrait comes
from the sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaia, who has traced the shifting membership
and fortunes of the elite since the early 1990s (6). Her account points to the
rising weight of industry after 2000, as well as the increasing overlap between
the worlds of business and political rule.
The western press has focused attention on the expanding role of the Russian
state in the economy, seen as a symptom of re-nationalisation - the economic
counterpart of the increasing presence of security service personnel in
government under Putin. But what is striking about the Russian elite today is not
any dominance of capital by the state, but the interpenetration of the two.
Government personnel are recruited from business, and vice versa; administrative
power provides crucial tools for business success, while commercial
considerations often dictate the allocation of state assets and offices. This is
true at all levels, but especially in Russia's regions, where large corporations
- whether private or state-owned - have a proportionally greater weight in the
local economy. While many large corporations in key sectors are majority
state-owned, they are run as profit-maximising ventures - not so much vehicles
for redistributing national wealth as instruments for the enrichment of a
particular member or section of the elite.
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections this December, and especially the
presidential succession next year, we can expect intensified competition over
these resources within Russia's elite. The populace will only be summoned to
endorse the division of spoils, unless Russia experiences a popular awakening to
match that in the Arab world. While there are few signs of this at present, the
fates of Gorbachev and Mubarak should teach us to mistrust any illusion of
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
October 17, 2011
To the kitchen, comrades!
By Anna Arutunyan
Political columns are generally supposed to opine on whether a particular
development is right or wrong, good or bad. But how are we to judge yet another
string of excuses from President Dmitry Medvedev this weekend on why he didn't
run for a second term ("Putin has a higher rating!"), or his acknowledgement that
people were disappointed with his decision?
Like the weather, these developments happen above and beyond us, and just like
the rain, there is very little we can do about them but buy an umbrella.
Much like last election season, it has become increasingly difficult to pass
judgment on politics given that the one person in the country who has been
delegated that right has already done so, privately.
People who should give a damn are reduced to writing inane jokes on Twitter, or
urging a boycott of the elections. The popular liberal writer Dmitry Bykov has
turned to poetry to comment ironically on current events, while graying rocker
Andrei Makarevich has written a new song about a problem far older than even his
30-year-old band, Mashina Vremeny: Potemkin villages.
"Our path to greatness is infinitely hard," he sang in a video that made a splash
on YouTube last week. "We're either beating our heads against the wall or the
other way around. And Putin is coming to Kholuyovo."
Kholuyovo, a made-up provincial town, doesn't just rhyme with Pikalyovo, a real
single-industry town that Putin visited in 2009, rescuing hundreds of laid-off
plant workers from starvation. It's derived from the Russian word "kholuy" a
lackey or someone who grovels.
"Kholuyovo" is also just one syllable away from an expletive adjective for how
bad things are. In Kholuyevo local officials are scrambling to finish the train
station on time, painting the grass green and the sky blue. And United Russia
functionaries are beating each other up to a pulp over who gets to greet Putin
Makarevich, who has complained that Russians are being taken for idiots by rulers
who decided "years ago" which one of them would rule, is struggling to be an
active citizen the only way he can: by writing satirical songs poking fun at a
political system that he feels helpless to change.
Makarevich's tongue-in-cheek dig at the authorities reflects the behavior of many
of the Russian intelligentsia today we retreat to Facebook and Twitter and post
acerbic one-liners, or wax lyrical about stuff that has little to do with policy
and very much to do with power and history.
The Russian intelligentsia, disenchanted after billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov got
kicked out of the Right Cause party and Medvedev's nonchalant announcement that
he and Putin had "already decided," have retreated back to the proverbial
kitchen, where we whine about democracy over roast duck and Pedro Ximenez. It's
just like the Brezhnev era, but far cozier with expensive comfort foods and
sherry instead of cheap port.
So what exactly is the intelligentsia complaining about?
In Russia's divided society, one part, the elite, was passively waiting for a
Mikhail Gorbachev-type leader to launch reforms from the top, while the other
part the so-called "populace" was bracing for upheavals that could easily
disenfranchise them.
Now the elites have gone back to their kitchens and the populace to its habitual
apathy. Ultimately, neither group seems to be capable of initiating real social
change. That realization, I think, is what is making the intelligentsia so bitter
that there is no one else to blame.
Except, maybe, for Vladimir Putin a savior for one part of society and a
bogeyman for the other. He is returning to the Kremlin, Saturday saw the season's
first snow, and all is right with the world.
[return to Contents]
Russia Beyond the Headlines
October 18, 2011
Occupy Russia
Is Russia immune to Occupy Wall Street because its disaffected young people have
the possibility to emigrate?
By Ian Pryde
Ian Pryde is Founder and C.E.O. of Eurasia Strategy & Communications in Moscow.
In recent days, the Occupy Wall Street movement has spread to some 80 countries
all over the world as hundreds of thousands of people protest against corporate
greed and the global financial system.
But the movement remains rather incoherent, with the usual collection of
anarchists, anti-globalists and the like, which are all too typical of rallies
outside G20 and other major "establishment" meetings.
Equally typically for such events, none of the protesters seems to have thought
through their anger they have put forward no new economic ideas or any
alternatives, let alone viable policy solutions. Indeed, they show no real
understanding of wealth creation in the first place. If not by the major
corporations, whose products they all use and enjoy, then by whom? The state?
This alternative was tried in the 20th century, usually with catastrophic
It is ironic, that among many of the protesters, multi-billionaire businessmen
such as Britain's Richard Branson of the Virgin Group or the late Steve Jobs of
Apple enjoy iconic status, in no small measure due to their image and trendy
services or products. It's a tough trick to pull off, but one which other
companies and CEOs ought to try emulating.
The current crop of Western protesters are a far cry from their predecessors of,
say 1968, who were mostly well-off and well-educated university students very
familiar with philosophy, the Frankfurt School and Herbert Marcuse's critique of
both American capitalism and Soviet communism. In his 1964 book "One Dimensional
Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society," Marcuse argues that
each system had developed new repressive techniques and fostered false needs,
aided and abetted by "Mad Men" in the West, where revolutionary fervor had
But today, despite Western military involvement in three countries Iran,
Afghanistan and Libya there is nothing comparable to the antiwar and
anti-nuclear sentiment characteristic of the 1960s.
That the young are frustrated at their poor prospects is understandable, but
Western economies are changing profoundly, with countless jobs being outsourced
to India and China and it is not just low-wage manufacturing labor that is
going, but also expensive and high-tech services such as IT and back office
Western countries desperately need to comes up with new models of doing business,
but they will find it increasingly hard to remain high up the value chain and
ahead of emerging markets if they continue incompetent educational policies and
continue to cut research funding. The risk of a long-term decline in jobs in the
West looks very real.
So far, the Occupy Wall Street movement has not reached Russia, but there is no
doubt that the government is rightly very concerned. Long before the current
protests began, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin often claimed that against the
background of street unrest in Europe, and especially in Greece, Russia's own
stimulus and rescue package was wholly justified and the right policy response.
At a meeting of the consultative committee for foreign investment this weekend,
Putin said that Russians should feel that things were changing for the better in
the country, otherwise they too would be out on the streets as in Europe and the
U.S., where "hundreds of thousands are making demands that the governments of
those countries are not in a position to meet."
Nevertheless, Putin assured the investors, the government had no intention of
changing its economic policy, claiming: "We understand the importance of
sustainability and predictability."
This has led some Russian observers to detect a change in Putin's message from
increasing spending, especially in the run-up to the parliamentary and
presidential elections, which he said would not happen, to a more cautious
approach which seems to contradict President Medvedev's aim to increase
expenditures, especially on the military.
There are several likely reasons why Occupy Wall Street has not reached Russia
so far. Most obviously, Russia's financial position is, on the face of it, much
stronger than in most developed countries, with a big trade surplus and the
third-biggest gold and foreign currencies in the world.
But this is, of course, largely a function of its export-oriented,
commodities-based economy. Oil and gas employ relatively few people, but in
recent years have made possible state largesse in the form of considerable social
spending increases good news for the economically naive who remain largely
unaware of Russia's deep structural problems and lack of diversification and
resulting vulnerability to a collapse in commodity prices in the event of a
global slowdown or recession.
Another reason is that while "social conscience" and awareness among the current
protesters might be much lower than among the 1960s generation, they are even
less developed in Russia, whose population is notoriously passive and cynical,
believing that they can do nothing against "the system" anyway.
Russians are far more used to far more blatant abuses of the politics-money nexus
than people in the West where, until recently, increasingly nominal wealth
diverted attention from the huge build-up of debt .
Russia is also a "new" and emerging economy, so its financial system is still
poorly developed, and mortgage and consumer debt has not reached anywhere the
proportion it has in countries such as the U.S., UK, Ireland and Spain. As a
result, people are much more "debt proof" than the Western public.
In addition, well-qualified young Russians have a convenient outlet they can
always emigrate to West, an option not available to their counterparts in London,
New York, Madrid and Rome.
It remains to be seen whether Occupy Wall Street will continue extending its
reach and whether it will represent a real challenge to the status quo.
It also remains to be seen whether it will reach Russia at all. For the moment,
Russia's oil, gas, trade surplus and currency reserves give it a big safety
But as history has often shown, systems that have looked stable for years or
decades can collapse very quickly and the trigger is by no means always economic
[return to Contents]
Disregard For Social Policy Issues Leads to Protests Such as in The West Today -
MOSCOW. Oct 17 (Interfax) - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said that ignoring
social policy issues is fraught with massive protest actions such as those that
are now taking place in several industrialized nations.
"Economics is science, of course, but science bordering on art. Therefore, we
should very clearly and definitely understand all socioeconomic and, in this
case, economic-social processes that are taking place in the country," he said at
a Monday session of the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC).
"The population, Russian citizens should feel in their budget, in their pocket,
their health and the education of their children that something is changing for
the better in the country. Only then is it possible to count on the support of
the people and enjoy their confidence," Putin said.
If this doesn't happen, "things may reach the state which we now observe in some
countries with an advanced economy where hundreds of thousands of people take to
the streets - not groups of radicals - but hundreds of thousands and demand what
the governments of those countries are actually unable to do," Putin said.
"When socio-political issues reach a full scale, they start overwhelming the
economy and causing real damage to it. Therefore, decisions in the social sphere
should be well-timed," he said.
He said that the Russian government is taking steps to increase social spending
carefully but consistently.
"We are determined to continue acting in the same way. Therefore, we have always
said and I want to repeat once more - we will definitely fulfill all of our
social obligations to the citizens of the Russian Federation," Putin said, adding
that "this is a factor of social, economic and political stability."
[return to Contents]
Financial Times
October 18, 2011
Russia: decline and fall
By Charles Clover
When trying to explain Russia's declining population, Yuri Krupnov gives the
example of the birth of his two children.
The first time his wife gave birth, in 1988, there was almost no room in the
crowded maternity ward, and his wife was kept instead on a cot in the hallway.
The second time, four years later, "she had the ward almost to herself. There was
no one there," says the chairman of the Moscow-based Institute for Demography,
Migration and Regional Development.
The end of communism in Russia and the economic chaos that engulfed the country
in the 1990s, led to a sharp slide in birth rates and a surge in death rates; a
"real catastrophe" in the words of Vladimir Putin, Russia's former president and
now its prime minister. Indeed, Putin devoted the bulk of his 2006 yearly address
to both houses of parliament to the theme of the decline of Russia's population.
Since then, the government has announced a raft of policies designed to address
this with mixed success. The decline appeared to stabilise after the government
implemented the "mother capital" reform that paid mothers roughly $10,000 to have
more than one child.
Then in 2009, Rosstat, the government statistics agency, measured a small uptick
at last: the population rose by 23,000 compared with a year earlier, the first
annual rise since 1992.
This statistic was, however, controversial among professionals. Igor Beloborodov,
director of the Demographic Research Institute in Moscow, is one of a number of
experts who believe the increase was arrived at by a statistical sleight of hand
the rules on the registration of immigrants were changed prior to the study.
"They relaxed a number of criteria, and voila!, there was growth," he says.
"It was [politically] impossible that so many policies could be announced and
they would have no effect," he says, "so they had to make some effect happen."
Rosstat denied the charge, insisting its methodology was credible. Since then the
population has resumed its downward trend. Figures released last month revealed
that the population of the Russian Federation declined by 80,000 in the first
eight months of the year, to 142.8m, and births fell from 1.27m over the same
period to under 1m.
While Russia's population began to fall in absolute terms in 1992, the seeds of
the decline were planted two decades earlier. In the mid-1960s, when Stalin-era
policies to promote childbirth ended, birth rates began to decline and death
rates edged up.
Indeed, the birth rate today of 12.5 per 1,000 people is less than half the
Stalin-era high of 26.9 in 1950. The death rate, at 14.2 per 1,000 people, is
also almost double that of 1960, when the figure was 7.4.
Krupnov believes the total number of premature deaths that can be attributed to
the collapse of the economic system is in the order of 10m-20m people. This
compares with the figure of roughly 22m deaths in the second world war.
The problem is not just confined to Russia. Serious population decline is also
affecting other eastern European countries, including Ukraine, Bulgaria and
Most strikingly, the death rate for Russian men in the age group of 22-45 has
risen sharply to a rate that is three to five times that of western Europe.
Alcohol-related accidents and disease account for a large proportion, though
Krupnov says the reasons for this lie deeper. "If you suddenly plunge a knife
into your heart, the cause of your death is the knife. But that is not the
reason. The reason for all these deaths among males is not alcohol that is just
a symptom."
He blames the structure of the economy for a surge in male depression which has
caused death rates to soar. "There are simply fewer career paths, fewer ways for
men to realise themselves, fewer chances to be a professional and gain respect
and recognition," he says.
"Today, the biggest problem we are facing is male mortality."
Another culprit is the high abortion rate an average of 53 abortions per 1,000
women, the highest in the world. There were 2m abortions in Russia last year. "If
we cut this in half, suddenly we'd have a baby boom," Beloborodov says.
He does not advocate banning abortions, but "lowering this figure does depend on
addressing the reasons why people have abortions", he says.
"We've had 70 years of communism, where the two enemies of the party were the
family and the church. This has led to moral degradation. Now we have a consumer
society where everything is judged by price and people judge their happiness as
paramount. The level of egoism is catastrophic. People don't want to have
children because it is a sacrifice and people do not want to sacrifice," he says.
Moscow has set a target of lifting the country's population to 145m by 2025 (from
the current level of 142.8m). Most experts, however, believe this to be
unrealistic. Indeed, many believe that if the population is to grow, this can be
achieved only through immigration.
Russia has already begun to take in migrants on an unprecedented scale, with both
recorded and unrecorded migrants swelling the population of Moscow alone by 8m in
the past decade, according to estimates.
However, immigration presents problems for stability, as demonstrated by ethnic
riots in Moscow between Russians and migrant youths in December, which were
barely contained by the police.
Further migration which is being driven by a booming Russian economy attracting
labour from the comparatively poor central Asia and Caucasus regions could lead
to radical shifts in the country's ethnic make up. This is helping to fuel
tensions which just 20 years ago caused the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Beloborodov believes that taking into account illegal that is, unregistered
migrants, Russia's population could already be 25 per cent Muslim, well above the
official figure of 14 per cent.
This could increase further in future, due to immigration from Muslim-dominated
former Soviet republics. Birth rates in Russia's mainly Muslim south are the
highest in the country, with war-torn Chechnya topping the list.
More immigration could also come from overpopulated China. The entire eastern
third of Russia, the vast region of Siberia, is home to fewer than 10m people,
and the solution is obvious to many more Chinese immigrants.
This is something that Russian politicians dread. Beloborodov estimates that by
2080, as many as 70 per cent of Russia's population could be immigrants or the
children of immigrants. "It will be a very different country, that's for sure,"
he says.
For Beloborodov, the danger level is if the population falls below 80m that is
the point at which Russia as a country stops being viable.
"At this level Russia becomes unstable politically. Such a vast expanse of
territory needs a certain population density," he points out. Below that level
and "we could see the break up of Russia into five or six regional state," he
[return to Contents]
From: "Sergey Slobodyan" <email@example.com>
Subject: Thoughts on Russian demography
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2011
(Absence of) Smog and Heat waves
July 2011 was the second hottest in history (after July 2010) in Moscow, with
average temperature anomaly of +5.2DEG. There were no new temperature records,
however, in contrast to July 2010 which saw 10 of them. The effect on mortality
was immediate: 8906 deaths vs. 14340 in July 2010, almost 40% drop. The 2011
number for Moscow is even lower than in July 2009! What I don't have is the
information on the number of "heat wave" days, when the temperature is higher
than the long-run average by 5 degrees for at least five consecutive days. Still,
the numbers are very suggestive it's the fact that July 2010's heat wave was so
extreme (average monthly temperature anomaly of +7.8DEG) plus smog from fires
that killed a number of people. If the fires are kept under control, we won't see
such a disaster in the near future.
Another place where July 2011 was extremely hot is in Volgograd 2011 was even
hotter than 2010, with 9 temperature records. In the region, deaths in July fell
by 8% relative to 2010. It's the smog that kills, not the heat wave itself.
Data for August 2011 confirms this conclusion. Moscow saw another almost 40% drop
in number of deaths relative to the previous year. No smog no catastrophe.
Expectations and Outcomes.
As was widely reported, August 2011 saw more births than any other month since
1991. The month was so successful that the whole summer 2011 (June to August) saw
a natural population increase: about 476.5 thousand born and 475.9 thousand died
during this time. And this despite the fact that August 2011 was not exactly
stellar on the mortality front: at 162.4 thousand deaths, it is worse than
Augusts of 2008 and 2009. This could be due to natural variability, of course:
all other months of 2011 but May had mortality lower than in corresponding months
of the previous years.
As two thirds of the year are already behind us, it's possible to be more certain
in projections. With deaths running about 3.5-5% lower than in 2009, it's hard to
see the 2011 total above 1950 thousand barring widespread natural calamities such
as once-in-a-lifetime cold November. Most probably, it will be somewhat below
1950. Number of births was about 2.8% lower than in 2010 before August but is
just 1.3% below when the August data got in; for the whole year, something
between 1740 and 1760 thousand could be expected, then. Both numbers, if
realized, would fit very nicely with middle scenario Rosstat's forecast for 2011:
1747 thousand births and 1952 deaths. Which, given that 2011 Russian population
was higher than the estimate used in Rosstat's demographic projections, would
result in something like 1.55-1.56 for TFR and life expectancy (for both genders)
crossing 70 years. It would have been easier if we knew TFR and life expectancy
for 2010 already typically, these numbers are available since middle of the next
year's summer but this year the data was delayed, probably because of the extra
workload related to the Census. It is also possible that the life expectancy
won't change much in 2012 relative to 2011, as Russia switches to the full WHO
definition of life births which might increase measured infant mortality by up to
25% to above 9 per 1000 live births, which would then subtract several months
from life expectancy at birth.
Counting the migrants.
The year 2011 so far has seen a dramatic decrease in the degree to which
migration increase compensates for the natural population loss. For example,
there was +51325 net migration in the first half of 2011 vs +89574 in 2010H1. The
true situation, however, might be very different.
In general, Rosstat uses two sources for counting the migrants: people receiving
, or permit for temporary stay (for 1 year or longer), and those registered at
the abode ( ). It does seem that back in 2010, Rosstat was using the first number
as a measure of international migration: the number for 'migration increase' in
Table 3 for 2010H1 (51850) is essentially the number one could glean from the
figure showing 'International migration' in the standard monthly demographic
report, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_01/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d04/4-0.htm. However,
starting from 2011, it started to distinguish the two numbers. For example, in
2011H1 the total net international migration equals 60697 while the number of
those registered at the abode is just +24800. The latter number is then cited as
a significant decrease in the number of migrants. The justification for the
switch is that from 2011, those obtaining a temporary permit for 9 months or more
are counted in the total number. At a stroke of a pen, the migration numbers
between 2010 and 2011 are made incompatible.
If I were to take the data at the face value, there are huge numbers of
international migrants who obtain permit for temporary stay for a term that is
higher than 9 months and less than a year in 2010, there was no visible gap. One
would need a thorough understanding of the propiska system to see if this makes
sense is it easier to spend 11 months rather than a year in Russia for a
An alternative explanation is simpler. On the one hand, Rosstat has undercounted
migrants, as evidenced by the preliminary results of the 2010 Census when almost
a million extra Russian residents were suddenly found on the territory. Rosstat
was then subjected to a withering critique from many circles, including
demographers, who claimed that in particular Moscow population was over-counted.
In addition, nationalist tensions are increasing in Moscow to the point when
according to some polls hostile intentions towards migrants are almost twice as
prevalent as in the regions, and all parties including United Russia are using
nationalistic card to a larger or smaller extent in the 2011 elections. I cannot
exclude political pressure being put on Rosstat to artificially reduce the
migrant numbers, at least for the time being (until the elections).
Non-transparent and very vague way in which this switch is described by Rosstat
(or, rather, not described) and by Demoscope.ru, makes me strongly suspicious
that this assumption is correct.
Some numbers to confirm my suspicions. About 15 thousand kids in schools and
kindergartens of Moscow can't speak Russian, as was reported by a number of media
outlets including Lenta.ru on Sep 29, 2011. Most of those kids are recent
arrivals otherwise, they would speak Russian already (in my personal experience,
not more than a year is needed for children at age 12 and below for picking up a
language, and parents are trying to let older kids finish the school in the place
where they do know the language). But there should be anything between 30 and 100
thousand parents of those kids, all arriving to Moscow in very recent years, and
all long-term migrants (not many parents in their right mind will bring a kid to
a school for less than a year). Somehow, these 15 thousand non-Russian speaking
kids in Moscow alone don't square with just 25 thousand migrants newly arrived to
Russia as a whole in 2011. Therefore, I'm awaiting for a new switch in
methodology some time after the elections, when we would learn that migration
flows are in fact much larger than reported now.
Misleading data watch: The Atlantic
It is almost funny watching efforts of certain unnamed circles which purport to
show that Russian demographic situation is uniquely dire. Remember an 'abortion
epidemics' story in early 2009? Fake data generated by a single software robot,
the story killed immediately by bloggers but revived through fake 'Live Journal
user's stories' and selectively quoted interviewees? And then washing over the
Russian media as tsunami? Or the events of last summer, when the Population
Reference Bureau had a press-conference to announce the release of the 2010 World
Population Data Sheet? Somehow, the press-release that went into Russian media
cited the correct date for the event, but incorrect data which was taken from an
older Data Sheet after all, what's a year or two between gentlemen?
Ben W. Heineman Jr., writing for The Atlantic, "Russia's Worsening Demographic
Crisis", (JRL 2011-#183, 4) makes a titanic effort to continue the noble
tradition of lying by (almost) telling the truth. Consider these passages:
"Male life expectancy in Russia today is approximately 60 years". Yes, at 62.8
years it should be rounded down to 60 rather than up to 70, but it's about the
first time in my life I see such a coarse grid for this important number. In
fact, you could fit the whole remarkable history of Russian males' life
expectancy since 1990 (63.8 years in 1990, 57.6 in 1994, 58.6 in 2003, 62.8 in
2009) into this definition. Why not say "somewhat more than 50" for a more
dramatic effect fifty being such a nice round number?
"Together these have led to a decline in Russian population from 148.6 million in
1993 after the breakup of the Soviet Union, to 146 million at the beginning of
the 21st century, to somewhere between 139 and 143 million today." You have to
really, really enjoy the symphony with which these guys are working. Just a day
before, Moscow News reported that as of July 2011, CIA World Factbook has put
Russian population at 138.7 million (JRL 2011-#182, 5). One has to remember that
CIA, as opposed to World Bank, IMF, Population Reference Bureau, or UN Population
Division, never reports its methodology. Occasionally, they simply forget to
update their database: for example, in 2008 they forgot to list the number for
Russian GDP measured in current USD (1,660 billion) and let the previous year's
number (1,299 billion) hang out there for the whole year. One has to congratulate
Mr. Heineman for a judicious choice of his data sources.
It gets only better. "Putin's policy initiatives in 2006 were aimed at increasing
the average birth rate by providing incentives and subsidies... The result
appears to be an increase in the birth rate from 1.34 to 1.42" Amazing. Should I
say it's again the CIA which reports the number 1.42 as "2011 estimate" when in
fact the number reported by Rosstat is 1.54 for 2009?
"The Russia Balance Sheet (published in 2009 by the Peterson Institute for
International Economics and the Center for Strategic and International
"The UN Population Division estimated several years ago that Russian population
in the year 2025 -- one year after President Putin would complete two six-year
terms -- would continue to decline dramatically, settling in a range from 121
million to 136 million. The U.S. Census Bureau, in another study several years
old, estimated that the Russian population would be 128 million in that year.
However, according to published reports, Russian state statistical authorities
say that the 2025 population could be in the high 130 millions (lower than
present, but not much lower), while the Ministry of Economic Development
optimistically states (hopes) that population decline will stop in about 10 years
and return to current levels by 2025."
Exactly why one should be using such an old data and comparing the forecasts
made at different points in time without really saying this - escapes me. I hope
Mr. Heineman Jr. is not basing his investment decisions on advices his broker has
produced "several years ago". Yes, it is true that UN Population Division used to
produce highly pessimistic forecasts for Russian population in 2025. The latest
report (World Population Prospects: 2010 Revision) gives 139 million as Russian
population in 2025 in its medium variant and 133.6 in the low one; the data is
freely available. I fail to see the difference between UN and Rosstat's
projections maybe, I wouldn't get into The Atlantic with my obsolete data
Mentions of outdated demographic numbers for Russia in English speaking press
clearly violate stochastic independence. These birdies do flock together. I've
got more popcorn and will be watching for other places where the magic number
'139' makes its appearance in the near future. (I'm afraid I'm getting overweight
from all this watching, alas!)
[return to Contents]
Russia set to fight brain drain
MOSCOW, October 18 (RIA Novosti)-The Russian government has adopted a new program
aimed at involving Russian immigrants in the modernization processes in Russia.
According to federal statistics, more than 300,000 Russians leave the country to
work abroad and about 40,000 emigrate every year. Many of those leaving are
bright, young and educated professionals - exactly the sort of people Russia
needs to build a democratic society with an advanced economy.
The new program for 2012-2014 is set to provide Russian professionals and
innovators living and working abroad with good incentives to take part in the
modernization of the Russian society and economy.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who portrays himself as a young and
technologically savvy leader, has repeatedly expressed concern over the growing
brain drain in the recent years and instructed the government to create a
favorable environment for Russian professionals in the country.
According to recent opinion polls, at least 13% of Russians would want to
emigrate because of discontent with the economic and political regime, widespread
corruption and inadequate social services.
[return to Contents]
October 18, 2011
Presidential Human Rights Council wants amendments to law on political prisoners
The Presidential Council on Human Rights and Civil Society Development believes
more efforts should be taken in the rehabilitation of victims of political
The meeting was dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the law on rehabilitation of
victims of political repressions. Members of the council noted that the
legislation works poorly. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the discussion of
necessary amendments was the focus of the meeting. Its participants proposed to
formally secure the right of former political prisoners to compensation for moral
damages, which the current law does not provide for. Another suggestion was to
cancel the three-year term for filing a request for compensation for the
confiscated property of the repressed person. As for practical issues, council
members also call for the provision of social support to those rehabilitated from
the federal budget rather than on the regional level, as it is now.
"The state has withdrawn itself from solving problems of those victims of state
terror who are still alive," stated head of the Moscow Helsinki Group Ludmila
Alekseeva. She added that it is unacceptable to shift this obligation on regional
authorities because "it was the state which started those repressions."
The council also touched upon the instructions president Dmitry Medvedev gave to
council members during a visiting session in Nalchick in July. Among the most
important of them are migration issues and finding those missing in action during
Chechen campaigns.
According to the estimates of the Prosecutor General's office, around 32 million
people were subjected to political repressions during Soviet times, 13 million of
which were during the Civil War of 1918-1920.
The Commission on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression has been
leading constant work to establish the identities of those repressed. The names
of the victims are published in The Book of Memory of the Victims of Political
Repressions, which exists both in electronic and print forms. It is updated on a
regular basis and serves as the main reference work for human rights activists.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 18, 2011
Battle Unreadiness
By Alexander Golts
Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny Zhurnal.
The severe problems in the Russian army go much deeper than the military reforms
implemented by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. General Vasily Smirnov, deputy
head of the General Staff, announced two weeks ago that the fall draft would
deliver a little more than 135,000 conscripts. At the same time, however, Smirnov
said this number will completely satisfy the army's current demand, apparently on
the grounds that the program to attract professional soldiers will be successful.
Unfortunately, Smirnov, who is responsible for fulfilling the draft quotas, is
accustomed to stretching the truth. He has been the point man in the conflict
between army generals and the public for 10 years now. Based on his reports,
Defense Ministry chiefs announced one year ago that the program for partially
shifting the armed forces to contract service had been halted and that the army
would henceforth rely primarily on conscripts. In fact, Smirnov had promised to
round up as many as 200,000 draft dodgers to make up for the shortage of
He used the same tricks during the fall 2010 and spring 2011 conscript drives,
with army officials trying to press everyone from musicians to dancers into
service. Of course, those pretending to have heart problems and other
health-related exemptions were among the first on their list. Even illegal Tajik
immigrants were reportedly detained and conscripted into service. Draft methods
got so out of hand that President Dmitry Medvedev and Serdyukov were forced to
publicly rein in overly zealous recruitment officers who were going to extremes
to make their conscription numbers.
But even extreme measures did not help. Russia is rapidly falling into a
demographic chasm. Scholars at the Gaidar Institute have been warning for the
past five years that even if every last draft dodger is put in uniform, the
reserves of young men eligible for the draft will be exhausted within two years.
And now, it seems, the top brass is waking up to this unpleasant reality that
after 300 years the regular army is running out of able or even unable bodies
to fill the ranks.
Military chiefs continue to insist that Russia should have a million-man army.
But under current circumstances, that is a physical impossibility. If the spring
call-up is no larger than last year's, by summer, the Russian army will consist
of about 220,000 officers, 180,000 contract personnel, 30,000 to 35,000 military
academy cadets and 270,000 conscripted soldiers a total of roughly 710,000
Claims that large numbers of professional soldiers will sign contracts in the
next year are dubious at best. There is no ironclad guarantee that the military
will be able to fulfill its obligation to triple officers' salaries starting in
January for the simple reason that there may not be enough money in the federal
budget to fund these increases, particularly if oil prices drop significantly
below $100 per barrel. Nor is it likely that the army will be able to meet its
obligation to raise salaries of professional sergeants and privates to at least
30,000 rubles ($961) per month.
In general, Serdyukov's goal of recruiting 425,000 contract soldiers by 2017 is
largely a response to a bitter interagency rivalry. The Defense Ministry has been
decreasing the number of officers to help raise the salaries for the officers
that remain. But no sooner had the decision been made to distribute those savings
than other siloviki agencies, including the Interior Ministry, Federal Guard
Service and Federal Security Service, tried to get a piece of the salary pie.
After all, they reasoned, they provide an equally important security function as
the army does only they defend the country from internal enemies, not external
ones. And their message got through. Salaries for most members of the army and
the Interior Ministry's troops are expected to be raised in 2012, and the rest of
the siloviki's salaries are scheduled to be raised in 2013.
Russia's authorities have finally acknowledged that they can maintain an army of
no more than 500,000 to 600,000 soldiers. Thus, the shortage amounts to more than
250,000 soldiers. Only recently it was announced that one of the main
achievements of Serdyukov's reforms was bringing all units and troop bodies into
a constant state of battle readiness. In reality, that meant using mostly
conscripts to fill the ranks in war time. But the difference between the declared
level of troops 1 million and the real number closer to 750,000 means that
the armed forces are far from battle ready.
[return to Contents]
RBC Daily
October 18, 2011
Author: Inga Vorobiova, Anna Reznikova
[An update on the jubilee meeting of the Advisory Council for Foreign
Foreign investors already regard Vladimir Putin as the president
of Russia. They are not exactly pleased and admit that they will
miss Putin the premier. Advisory Council for Foreign Investments
meeting in Moscow was quite complimentary. Top executives of 43
foreign companies operating in Russia rebuked Putin for
bureaucracy and investment climate but did so mildly and in
passing. They focused instead on praise of the Customs Union which
was hailed as Putin's major accomplishment.
This meeting of the Advisory Council for Foreign Investments
was way better than a year ago. The European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development was less critical of Russia for a
change. Its President Thomas Mirow only said that Russia could do
better. James S. Turley of Ernst & Young said, "We support your
nomination of course but we are going to miss you as the premier."
Paul Bulcke of Nestle showered Putin's pet project of the
Customs Union with praise. Lafarge Group President Bruno Lafont
was kind of aggressive. He demanded simplification of the
legislation pertaining allocation of land plots for industrial
objects. Even Lafont, however, complimented the government of
Russia and called 2011 "a crucial year in debureaucratization." It
was never said out loud at the meeting that obtaining a permit for
construction in Russia took twice the time required in Europe or
Kinross Gold Corporation President Tye Burt spoke of the
difficulties investors in the mining sector encountered in Russia.
"Potential of this sector is truly colossal but investors' hands
are tied... unlike in Canada, Australia, or Chile." Putin agreed,
"Sure, and we are aware of the problem. But have no fears. We are
not going to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs."
Putin in his turn kept telling foreign businesses how safe
and reliable a haven Russia was. "Far-seeing investors have always
known it," he said. It was clearly a compliment to Siemens and
Nestle (the latter is building its 13th factory in Russia). Putin
estimated the growth of direct investments this year at 20% but
admitted that capitals were withdrawn as well. "We all know why it
happens. When the global economy is in trouble, emerging markets
end up in the risk zone. Trouble is the last thing investors
Independent experts meanwhile doubt that things with foreign
investments are as fine and dandy as the powers-that-be like to
pretend. "Most investments in Russia are investments in the
sectors dealing with raw materials and in local markets. It is
investments in skills that we ought to aspire to but that's where
Russia is bested by the rest of BRIC countries. Russia enjoys
three advantages at this point - market size as well as human
resources and natural wealth. Unfortunately, weak institutions,
corruption, restrictions imposed by inadequate infrastructure, and
problems with personnel training... all of that frightens
potential investors," said Aleksei Prazdnichnykh of Strategy
Partners Group.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
October 18, 2011
Smiles Greet the Status Quo at FIAC
By Howard Amos
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin impressed a gathering of heavyweight foreign
investors with charm and statistics Monday, at a set-piece annual discussion
between government officials and foreign chief executives.
Opening the 25th meeting of the Foreign Investment Advisory Council, or FIAC,
with a welcoming smile directed at all sides of the rectangular table, Putin told
investors that unemployment in Russia had fallen, foreign direct investment was
growing and that Russia would not have a budget deficit in 2011.
Despite recent political upheaval, including the firing of internationally
respected Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin on Sept. 26, Putin stressed that there
would be no changes to government economic policy.
"On the threshold of any big political event, especially parliamentary and
presidential elections, investors are interested in how the economy will
develop," Putin said, according to a transcript on the prime minister's web site.
"We do not intend to change the economy's orientation."
Putin told his guests that he welcomed criticism as well as praise. "That was all
very pleasant for me to hear," Putin told Paul Bulcke, head of Nestle, who had
just made a speech, "including the critical observations."
Putin said unemployment had dropped by 1 million people since January, Russia's
trade surplus was $147.7 billion in the first three quarters of 2011, and
agriculture will grow by a minimum of 14 percent this year.
Investors present at the meeting were quick to compliment Putin. "I had
skepticism about investment in Russia, but I walked away with quite another
impression," said George Buckley, chief executive of 3M, in remarks released by
his press service after the gathering.
"I was very pleased with this meeting," Buckley said. "Mr. Putin was very
impressive, strong and intelligent. He is extraordinarily well informed."
Making a keynote speech at the meeting, James Turley, chairman of Ernst & Young,
criticized the time required for construction in Russia and the effectiveness of
its legislation in today's global business environment. But he told Putin that
FIAC was in favor of his decision to run for a third term as president in 2012.
"We support your candidacy for the post of president, but we will miss your
leadership here in your capacity as prime minister," Turley said.
Klaus Kleinfield, president of aluminum-miner Alcoa, told The Moscow Times that
the meeting was, "as always, a frank and direct conversation."
"Topics ranged from customs to taxes, to easing visa regulations, to welcoming
the creations of a new ombudsman to help foreign investors navigate the Russian
system more efficiently," he said.
Russian ministers present at FIAC in addition to Putin included Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Shuvalov, Economic Development Minister Elvira Nabiullina, Energy
Minister Sergei Shmatko and acting Finance Minister Andrei Siluanov.
Pledging to commit an additional $20 billion to health care and education over
the next three years, Putin also looked to reassure investors during the
televised gathering that Russia was able to keep a lid on any social protests
linked to economic problems. Russians should be able to count on the fact that
their country was changing for the better, Putin said. Otherwise, "things may
reach the state that we now observe in some countries with an advanced economy
where ... hundreds of thousands demand what the governments of those countries
are actually unable to do."
Chaired by the Russian prime minister, FIAC was created in 1994 to channel the
expertise of foreign companies into the improvement of Russia's investment
climate. It includes 42 chief executives from international companies and banks.
During the committee's meeting on Oct. 18, 2010, Putin emphasized the
government's privatization program as an important opportunity for foreign
investors. Despite ambitious plans, the program has failed to get off the ground,
and there was no discussion of privatization Monday.
The expected sale by the Central Bank of a 7.6 percent stake in Russia's biggest
lender, Sberbank, this fall has been postponed because of market turmoil.
Putin also focused less on the importance of high-technology transfer in foreign
investment than in 2010. "Although our main aim is diversification, the infusion
of our economy with an innovative character, we do not, of course, intend to kill
the chicken that currently lays the golden egg on the contrary, we care about
her health and will think about how to attract investment in the sphere of
mineral resource extraction," Putin said.
Noting that the companies represented by the executives sitting around the table
which included BP, Deutsche Bank, Kraft Foods, PepsiCo, Siemens and Unilever had
contributed about $100 billion to the economy, Putin said foreign direct
investment, or FDI, had risen 20 percent in the first nine months of this year.
Nabiullina, the economic development minister, said Russia attracted $31 billion
in FDI that in the first nine months of 2011.
According to figures from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
cited by Frank Schauff, head of the Association of European Businesses in Russia,
FDI stood at $41 billion last year and $36 billion in 2009 indicating that this
year's figure has yet to show any substantive growth.
"The investment climate is more or less stable," Schauff told The Moscow Times.
"Things are pretty much the same as a year ago."
[return to Contents]
Kudrin slates Russia's risky economic policy
MOSCOW, October 18 (RIA Novosti)-A complex mixture of internal political
motivations and favorable, but volatile prices for the country's key export, oil,
have prompted the Russian government to pursue a risky economic policy, former
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said in an article he contributed to Kommersant
business daily on Tuesday.
"(The Russian government) has all the instruments to change this course, but it
is necessary to determine priorities. But there is not much time for this,"
Kudrin warned.
The government wants to increase budget spending by raising teachers' wages and
pensions and modernizing the military, which is estimated will consume up to 20
trillion rubles in the next decade alone .
Kudrin said meeting all the goals would produce a budget deficit, while Russia,
as a G20 group member, had vowed to cut its deficit by half by 2013.
He also said that although oil prices had recently been at historic record
levels, it was very volatile, while Russia's surplus revenues were spent, with
nothing left to replenish the country's safety cushion.
If oil prices fall to $60 per barrel, the budget deficit will amount to 5.5
percent of gross domestic product and the rest of the country's oil wealth
Reserve Fund would be depleted within a year.
Kudrin said there were several options to cut the budget deficit - to cut
spending, raise taxes or start up the printing press, with the last two options
raising the prospect of setting back the business climate needed for economic
modernization by from five to seven years.
To balance the budget, Kudrin recommended ensuring a balanced budget with oil
prices at $90 a barrel in 2015 and setting rules for spending surplus oil
revenues, which seriously affect inflation, the exchange rate and the country's
The government also has to revise its military spending and decide on a 2012
social strategy to invest in growth programs, he said. Finally, Kudrin urged
spending cuts without tax increases to reduce pressure on GDP.
Kudrin said that Russia needed to create a new economic model, based not on
demand spurred by oil revenues, but on private investment growth, accompanied by
low inflation and a competitive credit rate.
[return to Contents]
Stanislav Belkovskiy Disputes 'Progressive Public's' Praise for Aleksey Kudrin
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
October 14, 2011
Article by Stanislav Belkovskiy: "Kudrin Left the Casino at the Right Time.
Leaving Putin and Medvedev There"
What I was afraid of ("Putin Is Back: All Is Well!"
orosho.html) has indeed happened. Bitterly disappointed with Dmitriy Medvedev,
who could not find within himself the inner strength for a second term, our
progressive public has quickly erected a new idol for itself -- former Finance
Minister Aleksey Kudrin. Who has just been forced to leave all the posts that he
held: vice premier, Finance Ministry head, National Banking Council chairman, and
so forth -- allegedly because of a refusal to work under the leadership of that
same Dmitriy Anatolyevich.
Kudrin is being bidden farewell with assiduously suppressed sobs. His own theory
is being disseminated everywhere: The former minister of finance allegedly wanted
state money, to the extent that it was affordable, to be channeled into the
development of human capital, primarily education and healthcare. But the as yet
still president of the Russian Federation and future government chairman turned
out to be a terrible militarist hawk and demanded that military expenditure be
increased as much as possible. (For apparently this is necessary! And we had
thought that Medvedev was a dove in favor of detente and "resets").
Kudrin's financial conscience could not stand it, and on the noteworthy day of
the United Russia "reshuffle" congress (24 September 2011), he spilled the beans
to journalists in Washington. And Medvedev (again, who might have thought it!)
turned out to be spiteful and indicative. And is now expelling Kudrin from every
possible post.
Second, it is currently the done thing to describe the former finance minister's
fall from grace in tragic tones, as if he had been sentenced to 10 years
incommunicado. Yet, for example, it was Kudrin's birthday (he is 51) a few days
ago, on 12 October. And Sberbank President German Gref congratulated him on this
date through a newspaper. The following kinds of comment can be heard in this
connection: Superhero Gref was not afraid (!) to say a few affectionate words to
the unfortunate expellee. And after all military hawks (headed by Medvedev) are
the kind of people that it is best not to encounter in dark alleys....
In general, if the progressive public is to be believed, Kudrin's dismissal is
absolutely terrible. And there is only one worse phenomenon, which falls into the
"terrible-terrible-terrible" category: Vladimir Putin's imminent return to the
Kremlin with all its momentous inevitability.
At this point a total muddle starts instead of the sweet music. Because if you
try to look at things in Russia even if slightly soberly it is absolutely
impossible to understand why Kudrin is good if Putin is bad. And vice versa.
Let us analyze things in order.
Aleksey Kudrin has been a long-standing friend, associate, and sympathizer of
Vladimir Putin for 20 years now. Since their joint responsible work in the
Petersburg Mayor's Office named for Anatoliy Sobchak.
Kudrin is the acknowledged ideologist of Vladimir Putin's economic, financial,
and -- to a large extent -- social policy. Partially since 2004 and fully since
the spring of 2004, when then Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was dismissed. What
is conventionally described, with a degree of tension in the voice, as
"Putinomics" can be regarded equally successfully as "Kudrinomics." And vice
To put it crudely, this policy boils down to the following: Grabbing all the toys
in the sandpit and denying them to anyone else although you yourself can no
longer play with them: If there is an abundance of toys they are routinely
grabbed. (This applies to both money and, strictly speaking, to powers).
Kudrin's economic ideology, which Putin repeatedly singled out as the only
correct and eternally living doctrine, presupposes that:
-- money has to be earned where it earns itself (primarily in the energy sector);
-- what has been earned has, where possible, to be removed from the economy
because otherwise it will all get stolen.
It is clear that with such an ideology no replacement of the economic model or
breaking of the "raw material habit" and so forth is possible in principle.
Because specifically Kudrin should be recognized as the most reliable and most
effective guardian of the "pipeline economy."
People are highly praising the outgoing Finance Ministry head for the fact that
Russia comfortably negotiated the 2008 crisis thanks to the Stabilization Fund
that he created. Forgetting that it was precisely Kudrin's economic policy that
consolidated Russia's dependence on two external factors:
a) world crude oil prices;
b) the level of the presence of foreign speculative capital in the financial
As a result of which the Russian Federation economy is so vulnerable to foreign
crisis phenomena. If, God forbid, Greece was to default if it would have little
to teach us.
People are also highly praising Kudrin for the fact that Russia has almost gotten
rid of its foreign debt. Forgetting that it has been converted from state into
corporate debt. With implicit state undertakings to bail out the corporations "if
anything should happen" (see, again, the anticrisis scenario of the fall of
On the subject of inflated military expenditure Kudrin explained to us: Dmitriy
Medvedev wants to spend money (up to 20 trillion rubles) that the budget does not
Kudrin is partially right: Such expenditure is senseless without a prior
technological/personnel inventorization of the Russian military-industrial
complex. It is necessary to be clear from the beginning whether the feed will get
to the horse -- that is, whether our defense industry is capable of making
effective use of the 20 trillion. Or whether it will all boil down to arms
imports in the image and likeness of Mistrals.
But at the same time the outgoing Finance Ministry head does not even venture to
believe that military expenditure is the most important lever for the
modernization that we hear so much about. Since if this expenditure is managed
competently and skillfully it initiates a sequential "high-tech production --
science -- education" process. Such things have no significance for
Apart from everything else, Aleksey Kudrin did everything possible to avoid
naming one of the key problems of our budget policy. Corruption.
Last year Dmitriy Medvedev personally admitted that 1 trillion rubles -- that is,
something like 10 percent of federal budget revenues and approximately the entire
Pension Fund deficit in 2011 -- is stolen from state purchases every year. Most
likely this figure is significantly understated, as otherwise the future prime
minister would not have cited it. So if a solid proportion of the budget is being
ringfenced for use for corrupt purposes, it is no longer still available for
social needs. Taxes or the pension age need to be increased. Or both.
Because corruption is something sacred and must not be touched.
The progressive public is fond of describing Kudrin as the "most decent" of the
members of the current government. It is perfectly possible that this is indeed
the case. That Aleksey Leonidovich Kudrin is a very decent man, a fine family man
who has a modest lifestyle and so forth.
But a future investigation of the "Aleksey Kudrin Business" would nevertheless
show many interesting things. About, for example, the legendary ALROSA company's
commodity and money streams. And about who during the 2008 crisis was the first
to be rescued with state money (for example, a whole $4 billion was given without
a squeak to the KIT Finans bank, which -- who knows! -- may not have anything to
do with Kudrin). And about individuals with names like "Otar Marganiya," who for
many years had a strange reputation as the personal cashier of the best and most
talented Finance Ministry head of our era. And it cannot be ruled out, either,
that the conflict surrounding unaffordable military expenditure is linked not so
much with some sudden concern about human capital as with resisting business
So Kudrin is an absolutely typical major official of the era of the ROZ economy
(ROZ stands for raspil, otkat, zanos, meaning carve-up, kickback, drift). I would
not worry about the financial well-being of the man himself and the next dozen or
so generations of his descendents. It is no coincidence that in 2010 Aleksey
Leonidovich made a mild slip of the tongue when he said literally the following:
"On the whole I consider that the fight against corruption is today the main
But for all that, it is also necessary to praise Mr Kudrin. Whatever you might
think about his economic policy, he is certainly a very smart and wise person.
My heart feels that he has not simply walked away. He jumped, so to speak. Having
realized in time that "Kudrinomics" -- which is the same as "Putinomics" -- was
heading toward collapse. A skillful player, Kudrin spotted the moment when it was
necessary to walk away from this glittering casino of the 2000s. Taking away his
winnings -- in financial and image terms. Now, should everything actually
collapse, the progressive public will say: Look, they removed Kudrin, and that is
But in Putin, Medvedev, and others like them this gambler's instinct appears to
be atrophied. They do not realize that if the ball has landed on red 125 times,
on the 126th occasion it could very well land on zero. It is no coincidence that
our second/fourth president firmly prohibited the gambling business -- it cannot
be ruled out that at some time he spent too long at the table and lost heavily.
The ability to walk away at the right time is a supreme art, is it not?
[return to Contents]
Putin: Russia Is Not After Role of "world Policeman"
MOSCOW. Oct 17 (Interfax) - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in a television
program on Monday, warned that Russia will defend its interests staunchly but
that the country does not seek to be a "superpower" or a "world policeman."
"Russia is not the kind of country that can be pushed back somewhere. But we
don't make any frantic attempts to get anywhere - if there's somewhere that
somebody who doesn't want us to see, okay. Why would we insist? Our main task is
to ensure the development of our own country and raise the living standards of
our people - that is the main goal," Putin told three Russian national television
In foreign policy as well, Russia "must feel confident and always see where our
national interests are," he said.
"Russia is a kind of country that can't of course, exist in any other way. We
have, our people have, a certain attitude about this, but let me repeat: it would
be a great mistake for us to try to pull on the robes of a some kind of
superpower and to try to dictate our demands, our rights to someone of that has
nothing to do with us," Putin said,
However, as regards Russia's interests, "we will, of course, defend to the end
all that we are interested in," he said.
"But it makes no sense to pretend to be a world policeman. If there's anyone who
likes to be that, let them be. We can see now what is happening in the world, and
we can analyze it. I don't think there would be anything else than harm to those
countries," Putin said.
"One of the tasks is to create a stable political system that would develop on
its own basis and not on the basis of any advice or bullying from abroad. Our
state cannot exist as a satellite," he said.
Russia "needs a political system that is internally stable, a system that is
modern, flexible and up to the requirements of today, but one that rests on our
national traditions," the premier said.
"We cannot exist the way some of the countries of the former so-called Eastern
bloc, Soviet bloc, Warsaw Treaty do, - I know some such countries, - when they
cannot even appoint a defense minister or chief of the general staff without
consulting the ambassador of a foreign state," he said.
"To be independent and to safeguard our sovereignty we need both an economy that
is developing effectively and a stable political system," Putin said.
However, a political system "can only be stable if people feel that they have a
voice in forming bodies of power and government and in the policies of such
bodies," he said. "We need to find optimum political structures and mechanism for
forming bodies of power."
"We'll see how the instruments that Dmitry Anatolyevich (Medvedev) has proposed
will work," Putin said. "They have been approved, they will be implemented, they
will operate. And we'll see together - both within the United Russia party and
within the Russian Popular Front - how it all works. If necessary, we'll be
making some amendments."
"We will always be in dialogue with the public, with society," Putin said.
[return to Contents]
Russians More Positive About EU Than About US - Poll
Moscow, 17 October: Russians are currently better disposed towards the EU than
towards the United States.
According to findings of a poll conducted in 45 regions of the country at the end
of September, some 67 per cent of respondents have a positive attitude towards
the EU and 61 per cent towards the US (the figures for negative attitudes are 18
per cent and 27 per cent, respectively). The Levada Centre public opinion
research agency told Interfax today that Russians' attitudes towards the US and
the EU had hardly changed since July.
A total of 75 per cent of Russians are today positive about neighbouring Belarus,
against 68 per cent three months ago. The proportion of positive responses with
regard to Ukraine has grown by 6 per cent (from 65 per cent to 71 per cent).
Asked if respondents considered Ukraine and Belarus to be foreign countries, 60
per cent of Russians said they were not. In contrast, 56 per cent of respondents
said they saw Georgia as foreign (some 37 per cent said they did not).
The majority of Russians (65 per cent) disagreed with the statement that Russia
should try to control former Soviet republics by any means, even by force if
required. More than one-quarter of respondents (27 per cent) said that such a
policy would be correct.
Asked to evaluate Russia's relations with CIS countries in the past 12 years, 30
per cent of Russians said that the relations had improved and 28 per cent said
they had not. Some 33 per cent of respondents said that these relations had not
As regards relations with the West, about one-half of respondents (49 per cent)
believe that there has been progress. Another 11 per cent of respondents said the
relations had deteriorated and 33 per cent said that they had stayed unchanged.
[return to Contents]
October 18, 2011
Russia has new suggestions on how to get talks on ABM out of impasse
MOSCOW, October 18 (Itar-Tass) Despite the U.S. refusal to provide legally
binding guarantees that the ABM facilities in Europe will not be aimed at the
Russian nuclear forces, Russia is trying to get the talks on the problem out of
the impasse, The Kommersant writes. According to the information of the
newspaper, a new initiative is being discussed in Moscow, which is codenamed
Strategic Defence of the Earth. It envisages the creation of a system jointly
with the United States and NATO, which could protect the Earth not only against
missiles, but also against asteroids and other threats coming from outer space.
The idea was put forward by Dmitry Rogozin, special representative of the Russian
President on problems of ABM. Sources of The Kommersant report that Dmitry
Medvedev showed a lively interest in the idea.
Several diplomats taking part in the discussion of the project told The
Kommersant that Russia was drafting a new package of proposals on ABM, which
could remove Moscow's concern over the EuroABM system, which is being created by
Americans. According to one of the sources, the new proposals have not been
finally formulated and are known so far as Strategic Defence of the Earth,
similar to the famous defence programme, put forward during the presidency of
Ronald Reagan, which was named Strategic Defence Initiative. In the opinion of
the diplomats, it really resembles in a way the U.S. project of "star wars."
The essence of the idea consists in the transfer of the emphasis of the ABM
system, created by the U.S. and its NATO partners, from the warding off of
missile threats to the warding off of space threats. "At present the U.S. ABM
system is aimed exclusive at fighting missiles launches somewhere in the Middle
East. The new approach envisages the bringing together of the anti-aircraft,
anti-missile and anti-space defences," said the diplomat who knows the project.
"So, the new system will be directed not so much against missiles, as against
possible threats to the Earth coming from outer space, including asteroids,
fragments of comets and other stellar bodies."
According to Russia, the new system should be put under the control of the United
Nations Organization, which is one of the key elements of the new proposal. The
meaning of the demand is obvious. Russia, as one of the five permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council, has the right of veto there. This is why Moscow will
keep under control the development of the project and will be able to prevent its
transformation in the direction, which does not suit Russia, at any stage.
[return to Contents]
Valdai Discussion Club
October 18, 2011
Russia-U.S. disagreements on missile defense won't overturn the "Reset"
Valdaiclub.com interview with Steven PIFER, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center
on the United States and Europe Director, Arms Control Initiative.
What is the main reason behind the decision to deploy four U.S. Aegis ships in
The Obama administration announced in September 2009 that it would reconfigure
U.S. missile defense plans for Europe, adopting the "Phased Adaptive Approach"
that would provide increasing capability to defend Europe against ballistic
missiles, particularly against an Iranian ballistic missile threat. Phase I of
this approach, which the administration said would start in 2011, involves the
deployment of U.S. Aegis ships equipped with Standard SM-3 missile interceptors
in the region, particularly the eastern Mediterranean Sea.
The reason for deploying four ships in Spain is straight-forward: in order to
have two ships at sea and on station, the U.S. Navy needs to base four ships in
Spain (the other two would normally be in port or training). Bear in mind that
missile defense is not the sole mission of these ships. Given the lengthy time
required to transit the Atlantic Ocean, the U.S. Navy would likely need six-eight
ships based in the United States in order to have two ships on station in or near
the eastern Mediterranean. Deploying ships out of Spain means the U.S. Navy
needs fewer ships to carry out its mission.
The agreement marks "an important step forward to protect NATO territories
against missile threats". What threats the sides of the agreement meant?
In part due to Russian and Turkish sensitivities, NATO tries to avoid citing Iran
as the source of concern when it talks about ballistic missile threats to
Europe. But there is little doubt that the U.S. "Phased Adaptive Approach" and
the NATO decision to embrace territorial defense against ballistic missiles are
driven by worry about the threat posed by Iranian ballistic missiles,
particularly given Iran's parallel effort to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability. Were Iran to halt is ballistic missile program that might well have
an impact on NATO missile defense plans.
As far as I can see, the decision to deploy the Aegis ships to Spain has nothing
to do with the "Arab spring." Had the upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
elsewhere not taken place, I suspect this agreement would still have been
concluded. It lets the U.S. Navy take on its missile defense mission in Europe
with four ships instead of six or eight no small consideration, given the cost
of Aegis-class warships.
How would you assess this decision, taking into account the agreement reached at
Lisbon summit last year between Russia and NATO to cooperate on building a
U.S.planned anti-missile network in Europe?
There is a disconnect between, on the one hand, meeting the timeline laid out for
the deployment of missile defenses in Europe and, on the other hand, the desire
for NATO and Russia to find agreement on missile defense cooperation. The
"Phased Adaptive Approach" was laid out in 2009, and steps are now being taken to
implement it, such as the Spain basing decision, Turkey's agreement to host a
missile defense radar, and the agreement with Romania on future basing of
land-based Standard SM-3 missile interceptors there. The plan is moving forward,
as it has to if it is going to meet the timeline, which is shaped in part by
concern that the Iranian ballistic missile threat is growing. Unfortunately,
because NATO and Russia have not yet agreed on missile defense cooperation,
Russia has no opportunity to shape the proposed missile defense system. But it is
unrealistic for Moscow to expect that NATO will freeze everything until it agrees
to a cooperation plan.
The source of the problem is Russian concern that U.S. missile defense systems
could weaken the Russian strategic missile force. The Pentagon says that U.S.
missile defenses, as planned, would have little or no capability against Russian
missiles. I personally am persuaded by the Pentagon's arguments, but the Russian
military is not. So, more work and discussions are needed.
In the meantime, Russia has said that it would not enter a cooperation agreement
without "legal guarantees" that U.S./NATO missile defenses would not be pointed
at Russian ballistic missiles. Even if it wished to, there is no way the Obama
administration could provide this; a legal agreement would require Senate
ratification, and the current Senate will approve nothing that looks even
remotely like a limitation on missile defense. That's simply a reality. What
the Obama administration says it is prepared to offer is a political assurance at
the highest level.
Hopefully, the United States, NATO and Russia will find a solution to the current
impasse. When it comes to practical cooperation questions such as a defense
technical cooperation agreement, transparency, joint exercises and the creation
of two joint centers to share data and plan further integration there reportedly
is considerable convergence of views between the sides. A cooperative missile
defense would provide a great window for the Russian military to view and
understand U.S. and NATO missile defense capabilities; hopefully, that would
allay any concerns that those systems could threaten the Russian strategic
How will the deployment of U.S. ships in Spain and an early warning system in
Turkey affect the prospects for further "reset" in Russia-U.S. relations?
The deployment of U.S. ships in Spain and a warning radar in Turkey are steps to
implement a plan announced more than two years ago, a plan that initially seemed
to be welcome in Russia, because the "Phased Adaptive Approach" posed less of a
potential threat to Russian strategic missiles than the Bush administration's
plan. That plan would have deployed ground-based interceptors which have a much
longer range than Standard SM-3 missiles in Poland and an associated radar in
the Czech Republic that had a 360 degree field of view.
Rather than focusing on these implementing steps, the principal question is
whether Washington and Moscow, followed by NATO and Russia, can find agreement on
missile defense cooperation. That would be a big plus for U.S.-Russian and
NATO-Russian relations; it could even help to erase the Cold War stereotypes that
linger. If there is no agreement on cooperation, the missile defense issue could
become more contentious on the bilateral U.S.-Russia agenda and will require
careful management. But it seems to me that the "reset" has done a lot to
develop a broader, more positive and hopefully sustainable U.S.-Russia
relationship. I don't believe that disagreement on missile defense could
overturn all of that.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
October 17, 2011
Litvinenko, revisited
By Lidia Okorokova, Anna Arutunyan
A new inquest has begun in London into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, a
former FSB agent and a British citizen, who died five years ago after being
poisoned by radioactive polonium-210. The inquest looks likely to produce fresh
evidence in a case that has been souring Russia- UK relations since 2006.
This is the second time coroners and British officials launched an inquest to
find possible suspects in the case.
A British court named another former FSB official, Andrei Lugovoi, as the chief
suspect in 2007, requesting an extradition that Moscow has repeatedly refused.
For four years, British officials remained quiet on the case, but on October 2,
The Sunday Times reported that Lord Ken Macdonald, former head of Britain's Crown
Prosecution Service, said he suspected Russia of carrying out a "state-directed
Andrei Lugovoi, who is currently a Duma deputy for the nationalist LDPR party,
has refused to come to the UK but said he would agree to give an explanation via
a video link up, if necessary, since he has been calling for an additional
inquest for many years, he told The Moscow News Monday.
"I have always said that we can't rule out an accident [in handling polonium].
I've proposed several versions based only on who could have benefited [from the
murder], there could have been careless handling of polonium in case he had it,"
Lugovoi said. "If it was in fact a murder it could have been convenient for
[exiled tycoon Boris] Berezovsky, the Russian mafia, or British intelligence to
discredit Russia."
Media have cited Lugovoi as suggesting Litvinenko may have committed suicide, but
Lugovoi denied ever having made such allegations.
"This inquest will not raise questions about who the suspects are," Lugovoi, who
is currently the only suspect named in the case, told The Moscow News. "It is to
determine what caused his death." He added that he has been calling for a
coroner's hearing for years but that it was a surprise for him when he learned
about it two weeks ago.
"We've been suggesting a video link-up, it came from us," he said. "If they ask
questions, I am ready to give an explanation."
Fresh evidence
Fresh evidence may yet emerge in the new inquest, with ex-wife Marina Litvinenko
telling the media that Alexander Litvinenko was in fact involved with British
intelligence a charge made by Lugovoi soon after the death.
"He worked as a consultant for them over a year in an operation to combat Russian
organized crime in Europe," Marina Litvinenko was quoted as saying by the The
Mail on Sunday.
Lugovoi said he was not surprised, since he made similar allegations after
Litvinenko's death.
"They are being clever, because they knew in advance this would surface during
the inquest," Lugovoi told The Moscow News. But he added that Litvinenko's
alleged consultations on organized crime were "nonsense."
"This is an attempt to whitewash him. They are lying. But this strengthens my
position because I said [he worked for British intelligence] and that he had
received money from them," Lugovoi said.
Marina Litvinenko has also been pressing for another inquest for years to help
solve her husband's murder.
"I can't say it didn't make me feel emotional but I am glad we will have a full
inquest to see all the evidence, see the truth," Marina Litvinenko said outside
the courtroom Friday, The Daily Telegraph reported.
Marina Litvinenko's lawyer, Ben Emmerson, said it was in the public interest that
the question of whether Russia was involved into the murder will be answered
after the inquest, The New York Times reported.
Emmerson's law firm said that he was instructed not to give any comments to the
press, a person who answered the phone told The Moscow News.
Five years on
Experts believe the second inquest could affect relations between Moscow and
The new developments come just a month after British Prime Minister David Cameron
visited Moscow, the first official visit by a PM in six years.
"A British citizen was poisoned by a radioactive substance which can be called an
act of nuclear terrorism from the point of view of law and common sense," Yury
Fyodorov, a security analyst at Chatham House, told The Moscow News.
"For the British government and public opinion it's unacceptable to leave this
problem unsolved. This is all the interest that the British government and
British court system have in this case."
Fedorov said that this inquest will not ease tensions in relations between Russia
and the UK.
"The reaction of the Russian authorities, who have a very unhealthy attitude
towards this type of investigation, provokes ideas that some Russian citizens or
even officials could have been involved in this murder. There is no direct
evidence of that, but there is circumstantial evidence that makes everyone ask
questions," Fyodorov said.
Russia seeks cooperation
Russian authorities have many times said that there is no evidence in that could
suggest that Lugovoi played any role in the death of Alexander Litvinenko.
Lugovoi, whom Litvinenko met for lunch in November 2006, was the last Russian he
had seen before falling ill.
This time, however, the Russian Embassy in London said that they would like to
cooperate as much as possible, requesting that the inquest to be made open to the
"Dr. Andrew Scott Reid, following Embassy's request, agreed to a representative
of our Consular section to be present at the hearings. We welcome the fact that
the hearings were open, including to the media, and hope it will continue to be
the case," the embassy said in a statement Friday.
But according to Fyodorov, Russia's point of view overall has not changed and
will likely remain the same.
"Russian officials want to forget about this case and make everyone else forget
it too as there is no direct evidence," he said.
"But if there was no evidence, there would have been no trial and investigation
in the first place," Fyodorov added.
[return to Contents]
October 17, 2011
Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon.
Remarks: Good afternoon.
Vladimir Putin: Go right ahead.
Konstantin Ernst (Channel One CEO): Mr Putin, following the recent United Russia
convention, a great deal has become clear in Russian politics. We discussed this
just two weeks ago with President Medvedev. Today we would like to ask you
questions that we believe to be of concern for our fellow citizens. One of these
questions, which both your supporters and skeptics have been asking is: What for
are you returning to the Kremlin?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, I know that there are a good deal of questions and comments
concerning this issue that are floating around on the Internet, in online and
print media. What I would like to say about this first of all is something that
everybody knows and that Boris Yeltsin mentioned in his time, which is that I
have never sought this post. Moreover, when I received an offer many years ago I
had a lot of doubt as to whether I should accept it, considering the amount of
work and the huge responsibility for the country's future that come along with
the office. But when I undertake something, I carry it through to the very end,
or at least to its maximum result.
As for the critical opinions of our opponents which I suppose is at the root of
your question I can tell you that of our supporters, as you have said (and I
hope that they form a majority), many people ordinary people whom I meet when I
visit various regions are hoping for the situation to develop in this way.
But as you said, there are also critics who criticise me and Mr Medvedev, and who
believe that if it is your faithful servant who goes to the polls, then
ultimately, there will be no election at all. Well, perhaps these people have no
choice, but an ordinary citizen always does. Perhaps there will be no elections
for those who believe this. But our opponents need to take it upon themselves to
propose their own programme instead, and moreover, to prove that they can do
better. There is another claim that I often hear in relation to this: "Things are
so bad that they cannot possibly get worse." It's certainly true that there are
many problems and unresolved tasks that exist in this country. Things can be done
better than they have been up until now. But as for the idea that "things cannot
get any worse" you'll have to excuse me. For our left-wing opponents the
Communist Party and the left radical wing I would remind the late 1980s. Do you
remember how many jokes were going around at that time? For instance: some people
invite their friends to come over for a visit. When they arrive, the hosts ask,
"Would you wash your hands with soap?" They say that they do. The hosts reply,
"Then you'll be having your tea without sugar." The idea is that one could not
afford to have both. People could only get the essentials basic food products.
There was rationing for everything, to say nothing of the monopoly in ideology
and politics. That political power led to the downfall and collapse of the
country. It created the circumstances that were behind the country's dissolution.
People lost their sense of self-preservation and their conception of consequence.
It was in this way that we threw out the baby with the bath water the dirty
water of an inadequate political system and an inefficient economy. We allowed
the country to collapse. This was also a time when people said that things could
not get any worse. But then the 1990s: a total collapse of the social sphere,
when we saw not only single enterprises but entire industries coming to a halt,
along with delays in pensions, all kinds of benefits, military pensions and
salaries (which were delayed by months), and rampant crime. We truly came close
to a civil war. We shed blood in the Caucasus, where we sent air troops, heavy
equipment and tanks. We are still dealing with the problems that remain there
crime and terrorism but thank God, the situation has changed. So, I would
caution against saying that things cannot get worse. If we take two or three
steps in the wrong direction, everything that has happened then could return in
the blink of an eye. The situation is very tenuous with everything in politics
and the economy.
There is another argument: people are saying that the stagnation of the Brezhnev
era will return. First of all, this does not deserve sweeping criticism, because
there were positive aspects in both the Soviet times and the early 1990s. But I
cannot recall any Soviet leader who was at the helm after the war who worked as
hard as me or President Medvedev. I cannot recall such a thing.
Remark: They couldn't.
Vladimir Putin: Precisely. They had neither the proper physical capacity nor the
awareness what needed to be done. They surely would have done something if they
had known what to do. They also did not have the will to do what was needed.
Finally, we should seek answers in the experience of other countries. You are
well aware that I did not hold on to my post when it came time, although I easily
could have! There was a constitutional majority among United Russia, the ruling
party, which would have been able to change the Constitution. But I did not go
down that road for my own benefit, in order to show people that there is no
tragedy in the natural succession of power.
If we look at other countries, the United States did not restrict the number of
presidential terms for a single person until the end of World War II.
Konstantin Ernst: Yes, Roosevelt was elected three times...
Remark: Four times.
Vladimir Putin: There were several presidents before him who tried to get elected
three times. As far as I know, none of them succeeded, but Roosevelt managed to
get elected four times. He led the country through the harsh times of the Great
Depression and World War II, and he got elected four times because he acted
effectively. The issue is not about the number of terms or the number of years in
power. [Helmut] Kohl was chancellor of Germany for 16 years. Yes, this is not the
same thing as being president, but he was essentially the top official of the
state and its executive power. The same was true of one of the former Canadian
prime ministers. In France after World War II, the presidential term was seven
years with no restriction to the number of terms. Changes were made to the
constitution only recently, the term was shortened to five years and restricted
to two consecutive terms. They created what is in fact the same procedure that
now exists in Russia. What does this mean? When the country faces hard times and
is steering itself out of crisis, political stability is essential.
Our country, too, experienced a collapse the fall of the Soviet Union. What was
the Soviet Union? It was essentially Russia, under a different name, though. We
survived a very difficult period in the 1990s. Only in the 2000s did we begin to
rise up and establish internal peace. The situation is now more stable. Of
course, we need this period of steady development. In speaking about our plans,
and my personal plans for the future, this is what we need to do. We must
strengthen the foundations of our political system and our democratic
institutions. We must create the conditions for the gradual development and
diversification of our economy on a new, modern basis, and we must create the
conditions to improve the quality of life of our citizens. This is what we intend
to do.
As for talk about the possibility that your faithful servant may return, this is
not guaranteed, because it is the people who will vote. Positive statements and
proposals concerning this from the people in certain regions are one thing, but
if the whole country comes out to vote, this is a completely different matter.
The citizens must come out and express their attitude toward what we have been
doing until now.
One of the most essential elements is of course the most active part of the
political spectrum, the one that speaks about democracy and its institutions.
There are fears that they may be forgotten. This of course will not happen. I
cannot see this country developing without a corresponding development of its
democratic institutions.
It goes without saying that this is what I intend to do in the future. Again,
these goals are the strengthening of the country's political system and its
foundations, the development of democratic institutions and the strengthening of
the market economy with a focus on its social aspects.
Oleg Dobrodeyev (General Director of the VGTRK State Television and Radio
Broadcasting Company): Let's get back to the United Russia convention held on
September 24. This issue concerns and worries many, and is a crucial element.
Dmitry Medvedev said on Saturday that the decisions were taken before the
convention. Can you tell us when and under what circumstances this happened?
Vladimir Putin: Yes, I can. It's not a secret at all. In fact, it is a normal
thing, not a conspiracy between two or three people in this case two. It is
absolutely normal in politics and practice when people form political alliances
and agree on some principles of joint operation and conduct. We agreed years ago
four years ago, in fact that this scenario is quite possible if both of us
manage to survive this period of trials and tribulations.
Of course, we did not know that there would be a crisis, but we saw that
processes underway in the global economy could lead to a crisis; we saw and felt
that this could be so. And we proceeded from the assumption that if we got
through the next four-year period, and if we did so successfully, then we would
be in a position to offer the public our ideas regarding the structure of power
who would do what, our guiding principles and where we plan to lead the nation.
And so when the time came and we announced our decision, we presented it not as a
settled matter but as an issue which our compatriots must decide. We proposed the
structure, but it is the Russian people who must support or reject it at the
elections. Elections are the ultimate gauge!
Oleg Dobrodeyev: Can you disclose the circumstances of your conversation before
September 24?
Vladimir Putin: There were no specific circumstances; we have been speaking about
it for the past four, no three and a half years. We met regularly, had our
vacations together, went skiing or did some other sport, or worked on routine
political or economic tasks. We've always had it in mind and often discussed it
in one way or another, speaking about the details in light of the emerging
situation, but we have not fundamentally changed our decision.
Vladimir Kulistikov (Director General of the NTV Channel): I wonder if you and
President Medvedev discussed the following detail: the president has positioned
himself as a proponent of, what I would describe as, efforts to humanise our
"monstrously inhuman" state in terms of how it treats individual citizens. That
policy has been reflected in a number of his initiatives, including changes in
our penal system, criminal law and political structure. You say that these
changes should be continued, yet you are generally seen as a proponent of a
government with a "strong hand." So this is what I'd like to ask you: Are these
initiatives by President Medvedev something you could continue?
Vladimir Putin: We are on the same page on strategic matters matters related to
the country's strategic development. But we are not the same person, we are two
different people, and at some stage Dmitry Medvedev decided that it would be
sensible to humanise some spheres of life in Russia. He has a right to do so as
the head of state. If the voters, the citizens, the public accept the structure
of power we have proposed, I will not dramatically alter the things Mr Medvedev
has done as president. We need to see how these changes will work out. Frankly
speaking, I don't see anything revolutionary in this either. As president, Dmitry
Medvedev acted in accordance with his personal understanding of what's good and
what's bad, and in accordance with circumstances as they developed. But I repeat
that I don't see anything revolutionary in this. Mr Kulistikov?
Vladimir Kulistikov: Yes?
Vladimir Putin: You currently head one of the largest media outlets, the NTV
channel, which broadcasts across Russia. But if memory serves, you had worked for
Radio Liberty.
Vladimir Kulistikov: Yes, I had.
Vladimir Putin: So.
Remark: A dark chapter in his CV.
Vladimir Putin: Dark or light, what does it matter?
Vladimir Kulistikov: I didn't say that. It was someone else.
Vladimir Putin: Anyway, you worked there. And when I worked for the KGB, Radio
Liberty was thought to work for the CIA granted, as a propaganda outfit, but
still. And there were reasons for thinking so. Apart from being financed through
CIA channels, it in fact did intelligence work in the former Soviet Union. The
situation has changed, but Radio Liberty is still a media outlet that expresses
the views of a foreign state in this case the Untied States of America. So you
worked for it in the past, and now you head how long ago did it happen? Quite
long ago a nationwide TV channel. Isn't this liberalism? Not that we never had
it before, I mean liberalism. But it's true that at a certain stage in our
history we faced formidable threats, which were so formidable that the very
existence of the Russian state was put in question, and so we had to tighten the
screws I openly admit this and to introduce certain harsh regulatory
mechanisms, first of all in the political sphere. But what else could we do if
the Russian regions, their charters and constitutions had many things but lacked
one essential element they did not state that they are entities of the Russian
Federation. Of course, we had to take harsh measures. The situation is different
now, and so Mr Medvedev made these decisions to liberalise, as you said, public
life, including criminal punishment and criminal courts. And now we will see
together if this will work. Personally, I consider this as steps in the
development of our political system.
Konstantin Ernst: Mr Putin, what was the reason behind your joint decision that
President Medvedev should head the United Russia election list?
Vladimir Putin: Here is why we did it. While working as Russian president, Dmitry
Medvedev has integrated certain fundamental things from theory and documents into
public thinking and practice, things that have been included in the country's
development strategy to 2020, about which you know. That programme also envisages
the development of democratic institutions and economic diversification and
modernisation. But it remained at the level of documents and discussions, whereas
President Medvedev has moved these goals from the level of debates, lobbies and
studies to the sphere of public thinking and practical actions. It is very
important to have the tools to carry on this work. I'd like to remind you that
under the Russian Constitution, the Russian government is the chief executive
authority. It has the main levers and mechanisms, the instruments necessary for
implementing real policy, for everyday work in the economy and social policy. So
it is logical that Mr Medvedev should head the United Russia list. If the people
vote for that list and we form a competent parliament in which United Russia
maintains its leading position, Mr Medvedev will be able to rely on the
parliament and the party's victory to form a competent government, so that we
will be able to jointly implement the programme he has put on the practical
Oleg Dobrodeyev: Going back to United Russia, during the summer you often pointed
out the need to get new names on the party's ticket. This is when the Popular
Front was set up. In September you said that new deputies would make up over 50%
of the United Russia party in the next Duma. But it's clear that most of
candidates at least in the party's leadership are the same as before. Now that
some time has passed, how do you assess the summer campaign?
Vladimir Putin: I'm not sure, and maybe I should not be saying this, but I will
say it. As the saying goes, nothing should be done in haste except killing fleas.
We need to act rationally and with stability. I don't deny what I said, and I
would even go further and say that everything that we said would happen is
happening in reality and things will continue going this way.
I'm referring to the following: first, the election has not taken place yet. I
will remind you that elections to the State Duma are scheduled for December 4. We
were to draw up the United Russia ticket and I was saying that we would try to
use the Popular Front to attract new people who have fresh ideas and are capable
of implementing them. What do we have? More than a half of the 600-candidate
ticket includes people who have never before taken part in federal elections.
This means we did renew the ticket by more than 50%. Moreover, a third of those
included in the United Russia ticket before I mentioned between 20% and 25%, and
now it's a third of the candidates are people who are not United Russia members,
they don't belong to any party. These are people who have been nominated to the
United Russia ticket by various non-governmental organisations, including youth,
women's, professional organisations, and trade unions. I know that most of them
are on the first part of the ticket and run a good chance to be elected to the
State Duma. I believe that this objective our main objective will be reached
I'm referring to a significant renewal of the parliament through the United
Russia parliamentary party. As for the party's leadership, I believe some changes
will take place there, too. But first we need to go through the election.
Konstantin Ernst: Mr Putin, you mentioned stability and it is crucial. But there
is a dark side to it stagnation. What do you think of the staff stagnation in
the government? Some ministers have not been performing well for a long time or
have even made serious mistakes. Isn't this a stagnation that these ministers do
not step down?
Vladimir Putin: First, we need to clarify what is a mistake and what is a series
of failures. Indeed, mistakes can and do occur in various industries. Sometimes
the minister is to blame but not always. A negative event often results from the
overall state of the economy or the social sphere rather than the state of
affairs in a particular sector even though this is sometimes the case. It would
be wrong to unfoundedly pin the responsibility on one person. That's my first
point. Certainly, if an official is personally responsible for an error, he must
be responsible. This is my first point.
Second, a government reshuffle only unveils the weakness of the country's
leadership. This means that the leaders are either unable or unwilling to take
responsibility and always shift it to someone else. They say Petrov, Ivanov or
Sidorov is to blame, or say Gurevich. You are to blame and I am not. This is not
helpful; the responsibility should be shouldered by everyone. If we are to blame
for something, people should know it. And the entire team should make the
appropriate conclusions.
My final point will be as follows. Reshuffles and a leader's attempt to hide
behind someone else usually does little to improve the performance of an
administrative body. Before you dismiss someone you need to do your best to work
it out. Finally, we only appoint an official to a position after a certain
selection process. Naturally, some errors can happen and then we have to get rid
of such an official, this is true.
Oleg Dobrodeyev: But the best cure for stagnation in one's own team is divesting
ineffective players, even though they have been on the team for a long time. Your
predecessors Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were pleased to jettison the
ballast once in a while. In fact, this is the reason why they say that a
politician is doomed to solitude. Politicians of great caliber such as Winston
Churchill and Charles de Gaulle often said so. Do you feel ready to relinquish
many of those who you worked with over the years? Or, if things work out as
easily for you as they can, will your staff move to the Kremlin, while those
working there now will move to the government house?
Vladimir Putin: Well, about top echelon politicians being lonely. This is a
widespread concept, and I partly agree with it, although I do not believe it
entirely depends on having to replace the people on your team. When you fire
someone, that person will certainly not like you for it, but you hire someone at
the same time, which means you have a new friend. Top echelon politicians'
loneliness has nothing to do with firing or hiring someone. They are lonely
because they cannot afford to let anyone be too close. They can't show
favouritism, and they can't afford to make important decisions based on their
personal preferences or dislikes. They must perform a professional and impersonal
analysis of the situation, so as to be ready to undertake full responsibility for
the decisions they make. And we might as well admit that well, we're only human
that people usually seek personal gain while dealing with top officials.
Unfortunately, this is the truth. Well, not all people. There are some people who
I know who have very strict rules for themselves and never make any personal
requests, but just live their own lives and handle their own problems. But for
most, it is highly tempting to ask a big boss for help, which suggests that a big
boss should always keep his or her distance. Hence, the loneliness you described.
As for having the resolution to fire ineffective staff this is an important
point that should be made it is the direct responsibility of any official, not
necessarily the president or prime minister, every minister or corporate
executive must be able to do this. If we want the system to function effectively,
then we will have to do this. This is what we are discussing now that the
parliament and the government should both be renewed.
At the same time, one shouldn't stretch this rule to the extreme. Some continuity
needs to be ensured, and we should certainly not play any games here. I mean if
someone shouts something on TV or in printed media that the government is
ineffective and should be dumped it doesn't mean that we should immediately do
what they said. This would be ridiculous. One should look to identify the
officials who seem to be doing the same thing over and over again they must be
bored themselves. However, if they do a good job, then they should be given a
different outlet to apply their talent, skill and experience. Other people should
be found to replace them, those with new ideas and an eagerness to implement
ideas. This is the tactic we are going to use.
As for the distinguished politicians who you were talking about, we should
certainly take a note of their vast political experience. They were state
officials and philosophers, I should say. There are a lot of brilliant De Gaulle
quotes. I like him very much. You are an expert on France, aren't you? You must
know this quote that sounds like: "Always choose the hardest way, for you will
never find rivals there."
Konstantin Ernst: Mr Putin, you have just made a working visit to China. Many
note that it was your first foreign trip after you unveiled your plan to seek
reelection. Those who enjoy following politics immediately recalled that Dmitry
Medvedev also visited China in a similar situation in 2007. Does this mean that
China has become or is becoming our key foreign partner?
Vladimir Putin: No. It is a mere coincidence. If you look at the government's
work schedule, which is not a confidential document, you will see that we hold
regular intergovernmental meetings between Russia and China, and Chinese Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao visited Russia earlier. This means that it was my turn to go
there now. It was a routine trip. The fact that we have a very tight schedule of
high-level meetings China's leader Hu Jintao visited Russia in June indicates
that China is certainly one of Russia's key partners, and can be justly referred
to as a strategic partner. This is not only because we share the world's longest
border. The most important thing is that bilateral trade is growing rapidly.
China is growing at a high pace, too. It is certainly becoming a good partner, a
market for Russian products, and a major investor in Russia's economy.
Vladimir Kulistikov: So it's a "partner" rather than a "threat", isn't it, Mr
Vladimir Putin: You know, I have said many times to those who try to scare us
with the Chinese threat mainly our Western partners that the modern world is
not exclusively focused on fighting for the mineral riches of Siberia and the Far
East, attractive though they are. They are vying for global leadership, and
Russia is not going to race China to it. It has other rivals in that business, so
let them settle it between themselves. For Russia, China is a highly reliable
partner. We can see that the Chinese leadership and people are eager and willing
to develop good, neighbourly relations with us and to reach compromises on the
most complicated issues. We can see this attitude and mirror it, which usually
helps us find some common ground. I am sure that we will continue to do so in the
Oleg Dobrodeyev: As for the topic of global leadership in an article in
Izvestia, you write about the creation of a Eurasian Economic Space that could
link Europe to the quickly-growing Asia-Pacific region. However, we all remember
you saying that the fall of the Soviet Union was the worst geopolitical tragedy
of the 20th century. With this in mind, how would you respond to people who
perceive this article as a plot to create a new empire, or at least as an
indication of imperial ambitions?
Vladimir Putin: Are you talking about people from post-Soviet space or people
from other countries?
Oleg Dobrodeyev: Responses are coming in from everywhere. But I'm talking
primarily about those who perceive this threat from the outside.
Vladimir Putin: If we're talking about the post-Soviet space and assessments
coming from foreign countries... This is what I'd like to say about post- Soviet
space. If you just grab a calculator (there used to be a calculating device
called Feliks, where you had to rotate a handle in order for the result to show
on its face), or just take a pen to paper and crunch the numbers. Determine what
the economic outcome or economic dividends would be if we combined our strengths.
By the way, as for the current processes that I mentioned in my article I am not
the only one who came up with these proposals and plans. And Russia is not the
only country to make such proposals. In fact, it was Kazakh President Nazarbayev
who initiated this discussion. During his visit to Russia, he came to see me in
Novo-Ogaryovo and made these proposals. We were already moving towards these
goals, but...
Vladimir Kulistikov: When was this?
Vladimir Putin: This was in 2002, if memory serves. We discussed these issues at
my home, not far from here in a building next to this one. There were four of us:
Nazarbayev, Lukashenko, former Ukrainian President Kuchma and myself. I suggested
that we wait for Kuchma to join us, and so there were four of us discussing these
issues. That's the way it was. It doesn't take an expert to realise that
combining our capabilities in such areas as technology, infrastructure,
transport, energy, mineral resources, labour and territory, in addition to our
shared language, which is also important for the economy, will result in a sharp
increase in our competitiveness. It will increase dramatically. We will put to
use the competitive advantages that we inherited from previous generations, and
we will transfer them to a new modern base. We will do away with various
limitations between our countries, including customs, currency rates and multiple
approaches toward technical regulations. And so on, and so forth. We will remove
bureaucratic hurdles in the economy and form a single, essentially shared market
for the free movement of goods, human resources and capital; we will introduce
standard economic regulations, enhance the security of our outer borders,
primarily the economic security, and will become more efficient and more
attractive to our foreign partners. If we introduce the rules and regulations of
the WTO into our internal procedures, we will become more transparent for our
foreign partners.
In fact, we are doing this already, but of course, the final decision is up to
each sovereign state. We are not talking about a political association or the
revival of the Soviet Union. Russia is not interested in this. We are not
interested in taking on excessive risk or creating extra work for countries that
are lagging somewhat behind for various reasons. However, Russia is prepared to
make these calculations and take on part of the work, considering the shared
interest of all countries involved, including Russia, in expanding this economic
space. This is what I wanted to say about our CIS partners.
Now, as for our foreign-based critics they are indeed "critics," who talk about
our imperial ambitions. What can I say? We see what's going on in Europe:
European integration has reached levels unheard of even in the Soviet Union. As
you are probably aware, the number of mandatory decisions adopted by the European
Parliament is greater than the number of binding decisions that were ever adopted
by the USSR Supreme Soviet for the Soviet republics. Now they've started talking
about a single government in the true sense of the word, and a single
inter-currency regulator. These plans generate no objections, and no one talks
about imperial ambitions. Integration processes are underway in Northern America
between the United States, Canada and Mexico. The same thing is happening in
Latin America and Africa. It's fine for these countries to do whatever they want,
whereas in our case these critics see imperial ambitions. To these critics, to
the obviously unfair ones, I say: mind your own business, deal with inflation,
with the increasing government debt or with obesity ultimately, just do
something useful.
Konstantin Ernst: Mr Putin, the West seems to have reacted rather indifferently
to your decision to run for president. Angela Merkel said that this was an
internal affair of Russia, and they would work with any legitimately elected
president. However, you understand that the West views you as a hawk. What do you
think about this portrayal of you, and in general, what do you think about the
reset, which exists as an idea, but which we don't see much of in real life?
Vladimir Putin: First of all, the hawk is a good bird.
Konstantin Ernst: Well, you're certainly not a dove.
Vladimir Putin: I'm just a human being. But I'm against all cliches. We always
have and always will carry out a deliberate policy that seeks to facilitate
Russia's development. This means that we want to maintain neighbourly and
friendly relations with all our partners. Certainly, we have always protected our
national interests and we will continue to do so. But we have always done it in a
civil manner, and will continue to act accordingly. We will always strive for
compromise in our solutions, that are acceptable to our partners and to our own
country whenever we run into critical or controversial issues. We are not
interested in confrontation. On the contrary, we seek cooperation and ways of
joining our efforts. I have mentioned on many occasions that... Not only I, but
our European friends and partners have done so as well. I have many friends in
Europe, good friends and comrades in the true sense of the word, who are working
or have previously worked at the top level of government. They, too, believe that
Europe does not have a sustainable future without Russia.
Europe is not just a geographical term. It is also a cultural notion. We share
many values with Europe, many of which are based primarily on Christian values,
but there's more to it than that. Even people who consider themselves atheists
are brought up on Christian values. However, Russia is a country of many faiths.
There are many among us who practice Islam, Judaism, and a fourth traditional
religion in Russia. You see, such a varied cultural background and such varied
traditions as Russia possesses make it possible for us to establish harmonious
relations with virtually every country in the world. And this is exactly how we
intend to act.
Vladimir Kulistikov: Mr Putin, you said, "friends in Europe". But your personal
and sound relations with many world leaders seem to be the only Russian foreign
policy achievement to date. What do we see right now? Russia is being vigorously
pushed into the background. Attempts are being made to deprive it of its world
power status, as is evident at various international conferences where we are not
even invited to the presidium. We are given seats in the second row and soon are
likely to be sent to the balcony. The G8 is being transformed into the G20 to
dilute this undesirable thing or shall we say ferment? called Russia. And this,
incidentally, is affecting our domestic life, as people at home are morally
unprepared to live in a second-rate country on par with Andorra. Do you see these
dangerous tendencies vis-`a-vis Russia? And if you do, how are you going to
oppose them?
Vladimir Putin: In the first place, I would like to warn you against displaying
such a haughty attitude towards anyone, including small countries. Showing a
haughty attitude towards, say, Andorra, or towards any other small country, is
inadmissible. I have been practising the Asian martial arts for my entire life,
and I have a philosophy for relating to a partner. No matter who he is, he must
be treated with respect. This philosophy is based on both general human
considerations and pragmatism. If we think that we are surrounded by some small
fries that are not worthy of our attention, we may take some unexpected hits, and
very painful ones at that. Generally, we should treat our partners with respect
regardless of their territory, economic might or economic status.
Not so long ago, if you remember, China was in a state of dislocation during the
Cultural Revolution. But what is China now, just a short period later? Recall the
early 1990s. Many people in Europe many began looking down on Russia, but many
other clever, thoughtful and forward-looking people and politicians always
treated us with respect. I know their names, and I am quite thankful to them
because they inspired confidence in me. So, we must act and think precisely in
this way. As for those who are trying to push Russia into a corner, they are
mistaken. Russia is not a country to be pushed around. Besides, we are not
overeager to be accepted anywhere. If someone is reluctant to see us somewhere,
well, we don't insist on that either. Why? Our main task is to ensure this
country's development and to improve people's living standards. This is the most
important thing. With a stable political situation at home, with an efficient and
growing economy, with a fully secured defense capability, we will rise to a
stature where the choosing will be ours.
However, I repeat, we must do a great deal in the economic sphere and in the
social area. Where foreign policy is concerned, we should feel confident and
always know precisely where our national interests are. Russia is a country that
cannot exist in any other way, I do agree with you on this score. It is in the
public mentality. But let me repeat it once again. It would be a big mistake for
us to give ourselves superpower airs or try to impose our will where a business
in hand is of no concern for us. If, on the contrary, it is, then we will
certainly do our utmost to defend our interests. But it is no good posing as a
world policeman. If someone likes it, let him do it. We can see what is going on
in the world and we are able to analyse it. To my mind, these countries will only
do themselves much harm.
Vladimir Kulistikov: I accept your criticism and will henceforth be respectful
not only to Konstantin (Ernst) and Oleg (Dobrodeyev), but also to the heads of
smaller channels.
I have another question. Take, for example, the Arab region, where Russia the
Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has traditionally been
very strong. We saw revolutions rip throughout the Arab region not so long ago.
It is quite possible that those countries were headed by "sons-of-a-bitch", but
they were our "sons-of-a-bitch"! And now it looks like our positions have been
weakened and no one wants to see us there. How do you assess those Arab
revolutions and Russia's political prospects in the region?
Vladimir Putin: You are right in saying that this region is one of our
traditional interests. We have stable and profound ties with them. The political
forces and business interests in many countries of the region would like to
promote relations with Russia. But there is nothing new happening over there.
Take Egypt as it was in the past decades. Don't you know there was a honeymoon in
its relations with the Soviet Union after which it unexpectedly turned to the
West and the United States? It's all on record.
Oleg Dobrodeyev: A personal question: The recent past has been characterised by
many as a period of certain political uncertainty. This is an open secret. Every
period of political uncertainty in Russia is accompanied by growing discontent
among the elites. There have been rumours of a split in the tandem. Individuals,
especially bureaucrats, have begun to wonder and calculate what will happen. In
this situation, during this period, did you feel let down on a personal level?
This is the first question.
And the second one: Have you had the feeling during this period that some of the
people close to you, some that you may have helped gain positions of power,
stopped looking up to you, and maybe even stopped respecting you?
Vladimir Putin: You certainly know that among the so-called elites there are
always people who, and this may sound crude, try to wheel and deal and take
advantage of the situation for personal gain. But I cannot say that I noticed
these things nor took them seriously. My colleagues, those close to me, in
particular, did not change their attitude to me for the worse or showed any
disrespect. Nothing of the sort. I am convinced that the most important thing for
politicians in today's world is not the office or the post but the trust of the
people. This is the foundation that allowed me to be effective. Despite the
economic crisis, I believe that the government of the Russian Federation
functioned fairly effectively throughout all these years. All of this allowed me
to work with confidence. Others sensed that as well. I am very grateful to
Russia's citizens for this support perhaps not always vocal, even muted, but at
the same time, very clearly articulated. I felt this support. And I am very
grateful for it. I must add that it allowed me to implement coherent and, in
general, effective policies to deal with the crisis. Certainly many things could
have been done differently, some things could have been done better; but I
believe that we acted more effectively and more rapidly than the governments of
other countries.
Not only did we save individual businesses, we saved whole industries that were
on the brink of collapse; for example, car manufacturing, and the financial and
banking sectors.
We prevented a repeat of the 1998 crisis, when people lost all of their savings
in the blink of an eye. I promised that we would not allow this to happen and we
kept our promise. We have re-established pre-crisis level at the labour market.
Today there are fewer unemployed than there were before the crisis hit. Yes,
there were certain mistakes and shortcomings, but in general we addressed the
issue effectively and took the necessary decisions fairly rapidly. Again, this
was all based on the support of the average citizen. So, I cannot say...
Remarks: What about the top echelon?
Vladimir Putin: The top echelon is also very important, but again, they realised
that there was this foundation of support that was decisive.
Vladimir Kulistikov: You just mentioned economy and the crisis. The world economy
is in turmoil once more, stock markets are dropping. There is talk that stock
brokers' own potency is waning fast; substantial amounts of investors' capital in
developing markets', including Russia, is being lost. I have read somewhere that
in order to withstand these setbacks brought on by the second wave of the crisis
the government will need to elaborate a special programme. It should be as short
as a woman's skirt and open up equally inviting opportunities. That would inspire
confidence among entrepreneurs and the crisis would be over. Could you please
comment on this. Does your government have such a programme? Moreover, since our
budget is based on the assumption that a barrel of oil will not fall below $100,
and yet the price is falling, will the budget be reviewed?
Vladimir Putin: Well, you know, if we constantly focus on the fact that
everything is falling, things may never go up again. This year we will see 4%
growth, which is satisfactory, while in China it is at 9%, which is good. We need
to strive for 6-7% growth, similarly to pre-crisis years. That is our goal, as I
mentioned before.
As I have already said we will strive for an open economy. There are certain
concerns, especially with regard to Russia joining the World Trade Organisation,
that excessive openness may be harmful to us. As for the woman's skirt it may
benefit some to wear a short skirt, while others may opt for something else...
Vladimir Kulistikov: Something longer.
Vladimir Putin: Yes, other clothing. It seems to me that we have insured
ourselves against all contingencies during the negotiation process with the World
Trade Organisation. In effect, Russia's transitional period has been really quite
long for entire economic sectors. Still, we will strive to facilitate a
competitive environment for national enterprises and whole industries, in order
to ensure their cost-effective performance and ultimately, their competitiveness,
so that Russian citizens will have access to high-quality goods and services for
reasonable prices. In fact, this is the main incentive for joining the World
Trade Organisation. But I would like to repeat once again that we will make the
final decision only if all parameters associated with the need to protect our
national economic interests at any given stage are discussed and formalised.
My colleagues and I perceive these threats, of which there are indeed many, that
are being generated by the so-called industrial economies, rather than by the
Russian economy. So, what can be said? On the whole, we had prepared quite well
for the crisis that arose in late 2008 and early 2009. Today, we are keeping a
close watch on global economic developments and those on leading exchanges. Of
course, the diversity of the Russian economy is still insufficient. Sales and
prices of traditional Russian products plunge when Western markets begin to
shrink. In all, there are just four or five, perhaps seven of these sectors. The
blow that Russia receives as a result of this is heavy and substantial. The
balance in this situation would be better if we had 50-100 sectors, rather than
7-8. In that case, we could switch over to the floating rate of the national
currency. Right now, we, along with the Central Bank, are forced to make certain
adjustments. For this reason, we will be able to safely say that we are prepared
for any changes in the situation on the domestic market only in the event that we
can overhaul the internal state of the Russian economy, and if we can diversify
In comparison to late 2008, we currently have some advantages and some drawbacks.
As for the drawbacks, I would like frankly to point out that during the crisis,
we managed to expend our resources and reserve funds to some extent. Still, we
did not use them up completely during the past 12 months. On the contrary, we
have started to expand them. The government's Reserve Fund will total 1.7
trillion roubles. The country's National Wealth Fund will total about 2.8
trillion roubles. That's two reserve funds, plus the Central Bank's gold and
foreign-currency reserves, which total $550 billion. That is to say, we have a
rather large safety cushion. I repeat, the government's reserve funds are
slightly smaller than they were prior to the crisis, and of course, we need to
keep this in mind.
In terms of the advantages, we have perfected specific mechanisms, and we know
what has to be done in certain situations. We have perfected these mechanisms and
improved the legal framework. We don't even have to address parliament another
time. We know what to do, and how to do it. We are aware of the instruments that
need to be used to ensure the stability of the financial system, various
material-production sectors and the social sphere. This, of course, is a plus. In
summary, considering our reserves and our experience in coping with the crisis of
2008-2010, on the whole, I'm confident that we are fully equipped to deal with
any contingencies.
Regarding the budget, as you know, we have calculated it using the rate of $100
per barrel of crude oil. This information is open. Indeed, we rely heavily on the
oil and gas sector, which accounts for over 40% of budgetary revenues. On the
contrary, other proceeds made up over two-thirds of additional revenues this
year. This is indication that to some extent, a restructuring of the economy is
taking place in the necessary direction. I repeat, the 2012 budget was calculated
according to the rate of $100 per barrel. The average 2011 prices will amount to
$110 per barrel. We believe that oil prices will not plummet next year, but we
have calculated the budget using the rate of $100 per barrel, rather than the
current $110. This is quite a pragmatic approach. But even if oil prices fall to
$95, we will not have to borrow substantially and place an additional burden on
the country's financial system.
Incidentally, speaking of additional 2011 revenues, we will have spent over 320
billion roubles on financing the budget deficit, without taking out any
additional loans on the global market. This means that these resources will
remain at the disposal of financial institutions and the Russian economy. This is
yet another positive factor. By the way, our current accumulated inflation totals
4.7%, an all-time low in modern Russian history. Our expenses will peak at the
end of the year, that is, in late October, November and December. Although
inflation is bound to increase, I believe that the 2011 accumulated inflation
will be the lowest in the entire history of Russia.
Vladimir Kulistikov: I am sorry I have to ask this question, but if I don't the
shareholders will sack me.
Mr. Putin, Gazprom is having a bad time in Western Europe with all the searches
in Gazprom offices in Germany. How do you see the situation surrounding this
major Russian company?
Vladimir Putin: It's all very simple. I have spoken publicly about it many times:
every seller wants to sell his product at a higher price, and every buyer wants
to purchase it at a lower price or to get it for free. Naturally, nobody is going
to hand over their product for free. But the buyer wants to purchase it at a
lower price. So they are making a unilateral decision: they have adopted The
Third Energy Package and made it retroactive, which is unprecedented. This might
seem unacceptable in the civilised world and yet they have done it. We think
their only objective is to reduce the price, to disrupt the market price
formulation which is linked to the oil price in Russia. We do not dictate this
price; the price is pegged to oil: oil prices go up and gas prices go up, oil
prices go down and gas prices go down. I believe this approach lacks foresight
because although the price of oil is strong at the moment, it can go down
tomorrow and then Gazprom will suffer losses and vice versa, the buyers will get
rate preferences. I do not think this is well-founded. In addition, the gas
market is a very specific market. It is largely linked to a specific supplier.
Our partners have proposed a third link, or to have a third buyer and seller...
In this case, when our gas reaches Western Europe's borders, they will tell us to
sell it on the exchange to a third legal entity, it will purchase our gas and
will sell it again. And what will this lead to? Somebody will be taking an extra
margin. And it is not certain at all that the price will go down. And this is the
first thing.
The second is innovation: They have proposed separating the ownership of the gas
pipeline system from the gas owner. Give away your pipeline systems! And
currently some Baltic nations are seeking to take away Russian and German
property that we have legally purchased. How will this affect the gas industry?
Without the organisation owning the product it produces and sells, the transport
system it uses could suffer because the transport system itself is unprofitable
as a rule. So this could make it necessary to raise pumping rates, which
obviously would not lower the price for the final consumer but on the contrary,
result in a higher price or a degradation of the transport system.
Is it possible to reduce gas prices for the final European consumer and
simultaneously supply gas under a long-term contract? Yes, it is possible. But it
would be necessary to eliminate the current mediators. Some major companies, our
European partners, are purchasing Russian gas, and then they supply it to their
own power plants and take the margin at the first step. Let Gazprom be a direct
gas supplier to those power plants, without mediators, and the gas price will
drop. Let Gazprom supply gas to the final consumer and more mediators will drop
out. Finally, there is one more component: the social tax burden on energy
resources is very heavy including on Russian gas, and these taxes are going to
the budgets of our partner nations. Well, who is forcing you to collect such high
taxes? Reduce them. Why is it only us who must pay the price for this cost
burden? But all of these problems can be resolved in the short term despite their
complexity, and I hope that a partnership-based dialogue will ease these
Konstantin Ernst: Mr Putin, getting back to the election, will the know-how
you've gained through the Russian Popular Front help United Russia in the
Vladimir Putin: As you know, I would like United Russia to win the election.
First, the incumbent president heads the party ticket, and if voters respond
favourably to the power arrangement we proposed, we will be able to form a
durable and effective government with Dmitry Medvedev at the helm. This is my
first point. Second, for us and for me the rationale behind setting up the
Russian Popular Front was not only to reinforce United Russia, although this is
very important since we need a parliament that is capable of performing its
functions. This is very important but this is not the only important thing. It is
important to make mechanisms of direct democracy work, and make sure that people
feel connected to the authorities. Since the times of Peter the Great, we have
grown accustomed to putting a Western product or sample on display, pointing to
it and telling people to copy it. In some cases this is good, but in others it
isn't because you can tumble into a pitfall and make mistakes. In this respect,
and with regard to the development of democratic institutions, we are speaking of
an economic crisis in Western countries but it already has a political dimension.
Many Western experts speak of a crisis in authority and in people's trust for the
Western multi-party parliamentary system. They say that this Western multi-party
parliamentary democracy fails to offer the people a leader that will enjoy the
trust of the majority of the population. Meanwhile, the Russian Popular Front and
the primaries are, to my mind, the tools that should help expand the foundation
of real direct democracy in this country. I believe that this will also reinforce
Russia's political system as a whole.
Oleg Dobrodeyev: I would like to expand on what Mr Ernst has just asked about. Do
you expect any problems for United Russia in the upcoming election? There is less
than eight weeks left and the election campaign looks completely different from
the campaigns ahead of the 2003 and 2007 State Duma elections. Proposed by Dmitry
Medvedev, significant amendments have been made to the election legislation to
liberalise it. The minimum threshold for the State Duma was decreased and the
main thing is that the law on parties' equal access to the media has come in
effect. As a result, political competition at least judging by what we see on TV
is much tougher than it used to be. Will the current situation make things more
difficult for United Russia in its struggle for the number of seats it expects to
get in the State Duma?
Vladimir Putin: It certainly will. The competition will become tougher, which I
don't think is a bad thing; in fact, it's a good thing. The question is how we
should develop these democratic institutions. We must always think critically. We
must ask ourselves do we really need 10-15 political parties in parliament? Do
we need to end the eligibility barrier entirely? We have seen that happening in
Ukraine. Do we need a Ukrainian-style parliament where it is next to impossible
to discuss anything? Look at the United States. Do they have many parties? And no
eligibility threshold? But they have other instruments that ensure that there
only two major parties in parliament. They have strong competition within their
parties before elections. And democracy is growing there, supported, among other
things, by this practice of primary voting. It helps bring to the top the most
effective and popular politicians who compete among themselves. The same happens
in parliament.
Russia has an emerging political system. We are not going to rely on voluntarism
in our decision-making. We will always maintain dialogue with the public and
society. We will seek formats that ensure the sustainability of our political
system. This is one of the goals I will work to achieve that is, I mean, if
people elect me, and if the voting goes well and people support United Russia's
list with Dmitry Medvedev at the top, and then we can form an effective
government. One of the key goals will be to build a sustainable political system,
which would use its own resources rather than act on advice and orders from
abroad. Our country cannot live as a satellite. It needs a strong political
system with a sustainable internal structure modern, flexible, and reflecting
modern challenges and realities, and at the same time relying on our national
traditions. It is unacceptable for Russia to do as some of the countries from the
former Warsaw Pact, or Eastern Bloc, or Soviet Bloc, do and I know that some of
them do so: they can't even appoint a defence minister or a head of the general
staff without consulting a foreign ambassador. Russia could not live like this.
But, to preserve our independence and sovereignty, we need both a growing economy
and a sustainable political system. It can be sustainable only if people feel
that they make a difference and influence state policies as well as the formation
of government agencies. We'll see how the instruments proposed by Mr Medvedev
fare. I want you to understand that we are doing this together. But, while Mr
Medvedev was president, he certainly had the final say here. I have great respect
for this. His proposals have been adopted and will be implemented. We'll see how
they work in United Russia and the Russian Popular Front and make corrections
as we go, if needed.
Oleg Dobrodeyev: What would you consider a respectable election result for United
Vladimir Putin: You're trying to get me to make political predictions.
Oleg Dobrodeyev: Not at all. No figures please. I just asked about an outcome you
would consider respectable.
Vladimir Putin: United Russia should remain the leading political force in Russia
and in the State Duma. That would be a respectable outcome.
Konstantin Ernst: Thank you for this interview, Mr Putin. On that let's call it a
day. Good luck!
Vladimir Putin: Thank you.
[return to Contents]
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