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[OS] 2011-#202-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-12 10:00 GMT
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Johnson's Russia List
9 November 2011
A World Security Institute Project
JRL homepage: www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
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In this issue
1. www.russiatoday.com: Playing Orcs is normal - Medvedev.
2. RIA Novosti: Medvedev opens account on Russia's top social network.
3. Vedomosti: CASTLING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. THE FORTHCOMING CASTLING DID
4. Vedomosti: 200 BILLION RUBLES FOR PUTIN. The draft budget is to be amended
again, this time in order to help Vladimir Putin win the presidential election.
5. Reuters: Putin return ends hope of Russian reform - economist. (Mikhail
6. Financial Times: Russian elections: pork and the oil price.
7. Vedomosti: PLUMMETING RATING. RATINGS OF THE RULING PARTY AND THE TANDEM DROP
8. Russia Profile: Bad Press. Will a Series of Recent Public Snafus Damage United
Russia's Image Ahead of the Duma Elections?
9. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Control of Federal Television Key Factor in United Russia
10. Interfax: Russian Communists complain about violations in election campaign
to ODIHR, PACE delegations.
11. Deutsche Welle: Russia's Communists gain momentum in run-up to elections.
12. Interfax: Russian Orthodox Church Will Continue Crafting "symphony" With
State - Priest.
13. New York Times: Grigory Yavlinsky and Alexander Shishlov, Time to Think, and
Not to Lean on Russia.
14. Novaya Gazeta: Yavlinskiy Calls on Voters To Turn Out in 'Historic' Election.
15. RIA Novosti: Former mayor Luzhkov returns to Moscow.
16. BBC Monitoring: Russian state TV debate speakers in rare criticism of
17. RIA Novosti: Valdai experts eye Russia's near future.
18. RIA Novosti: Political Changes In Russia Can Only Come From The Top -
Discussion Club.
19. Moscow Times: Natalya Bubnova, Russia Shows the World What Doesn't Work.
20. Moscow Times: Khodorkovsky Warns of a Revolution.
21. Moscow News: Language tests and museums for migrants.
22. ITAR-TASS: Average wage in Russia barely enough to survive.
23. Reuters: Russian deal with Georgia opens way to WTO.
24. Russia Beyond the Headlines: Chris Weafer, Russia's accession to the WTO
creates incentives and timetables. Russia's membership in the WTO will be a
powerful catalyst to raise its economic and industrial record.
25. New York Times: Dominic Fean, Can the W.T.O. Change Russia?
26. Moscow Times: Lagarde Says Russia Can Bolster IMF Funding.
27. Interfax: Russia Willing to Help Bail Out Euro Zone Nations - Putin.
28. Moscow News editorial: Can Russia avoid a new crisis?
29. Moscow Times: Ben Aris, The Coming Flood of Capital.
30. Moscow TImes: Martin Gilman, Signs of an Island of Stability for Now.
31. ITAR-TASS: Launch of Nord Stream spells economic, political benefits for
32. Vedomosti: SOFT STRENGTH. NORD STREAM AS VLADIMIR PUTIN'S PERSONAL TRIUMPH.
33. Valdai Discussion Club: Russia's foreign policy after 2012. (interview with
Fyodor Lukyanov)
34. Moscow Times: Dmitry Trenin, Putin's Vision to Become a Post-Imperial Leader.
35. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: SCO Not To Be Counterbalance to NATO, More Concerned
With Economics.
36. BBC Monitoring: State TV feature on UN criticizes West's handling of
international crises.
37. www.russiatoday.com: Minds need 'reset' in Russia-US relations. (Arkady
38. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: SOVIET TRACE IN IRANIAN NUCLEAR FOLDER. ESCALATING
39. RFE/RL: Russian Support for Iran Seen as Bargaining Chip.
40. Moscow News: Mark Galeotti, Viktor Bout in the big picture.
41. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: TBILISI THAW. THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN MIGHT IMPROVE...
November 9, 2011
Playing Orcs is normal - Medvedev
At a meeting with Internet activists, tech-savvy President Medvedev said that
while he knew little about the popular game 'Warcraft' he felt it was perfectly
normal to be an Orc.
When one of the meeting participants reminded the President that a year ago he
had cited the need for a 'Russian Warcraft' game, the president acknowledged it
was an interesting possibility but that he really knew very little about the
game, unlike his teenage son.
The young man then told the President that he was a comic book artist and
produced a first issue featuring Medvedev and Vladimir Putin as World of Warcraft
characters. The president, obviously impressed by the young man's initiative,
signed the comic, but was pushed on who he would play in a Warcraft game finally
admitting that in his opinion, playing an Orc was normal. Medvedev said that the
issue was interesting as it practically allowed the users to live in a new
separate world. He even promised to start playing if Russian programmers succeed
in creating their own Warcraft version possibly on the basis of the comic book.
During the Wednesday meeting with Internet activists, Medvedev also said the
topic of the Internet is of great interest to him and will remain so in the
future. He also said he would keep up his activities on the Internet in order to
set a good example, to make life more interesting and also promised to broaden
his online presence. In particular, Medvedev said he plans to open an account
with the Russian social network, Vkontakte.
Medvedev pointed out that the Internet is a pioneering way for politicians to
receive unedited feedback from the public. The president said any news reports or
digests presented through official channels are subjective and the Internet is
very valuable because it offers a multi-faceted and unbiased picture.
"Sometimes it is unpleasant, sometimes it is very interesting, but in any case
this is a good demonstration. In general, the authorities must look for allies on
the Internet to be modern and up-to-date. If the authorities do not have such
allies, most probably there is a gap between them and the vast majority of
people. This is bad. I try to set an example in this regard," the Russian
President said.
Moreover, the president said that computer literacy and internet use should
become a qualification requirement for Russian civil servants. "I hold that if a
civil servant cannot use the computer and is not aware of how one should behave
in the Internet, he must simply be fired because he is not matching the
requirements for his profession," the President said.
At the meeting, Russian bloggers and journalists presented various projects to
the president and asked for support, both personal and official.
At the end of the meeting, Medvedev reiterated his belief that the Internet is
bringing to fruition the concept of "digital democracy" government based on the
public will via wide use of polls and referenda by means of special online
[return to Contents]
Medvedev opens account on Russia's top social network
MOSCOW, November 9 (RIA Novosti)-President Dmitry Medvedev on Wednesday set up an
account at Russia's largest social networking site, Vkontakte.
Vkontakte, Russia's most popular website, has more than 100 million registered
"I will remain on the internet; moreover...I will expand my presence on the
internet. To prove this, I'll now open my own official page on Vkontakte,"
Medvedev said at a meeting with Russian internet activists.
The president's profile at Vkontakte [http://vk.com/dm]says that his interests
are: "work, family, sports, internet" and favorite music is "hard-rock, Black
Sabbath, Led Zeppelin, Deep Purple, classical." Medvedev has created two photo
albums one with images of landscapes he captured with his professional camera
and another with photographs, featuring his everyday life as president.
The president's first post: "Hi, here I am at Vkontakte!" gathered more than
6,000 'likes' in less than one hour.
At the meeting, Medvedev also admitted that "almost everybody in the presidential
administration has the Angry Birds game [on his or her computer]."
State officials who are unable to get to grips with modern technology should lose
their jobs, Medvedev said. "If state officials do not know how to use computers
and the internet, they must be immediately fired."
Medvedev, who styles himself as a technologically savvy leader, is registered on
Twitter, has a blog on LiveJournal and an account on YouTube and Facebook.
He initially opened his Twitter account in June 2010 during a visit to Silicon
Valley. More than 270,000 people are currently following him at MedvedevRussia on
the micro-blogging site, while the English version, MedvedevRussiaE, has almost
100,000 followers.
In his Twitter blog, the president shares his views of events in Russia and
abroad, posts photographs that he takes, and responds to questions asked by other
Twitter users.
Medvedev's twittering has, however, been mercilessly parodied at the
@KermlinRussia Twitter account.
[return to Contents]
November 9, 2011
Author: Mikhail Dmitriyev, Sergei Belanovsky
[Analysis of the effect the forthcoming castling is having on political brands in
There is much more to the forthcoming castling in the upper
echelons of state power in Russia than a mere exchange of formal
positions. General public is but formulating its attitude at this
point but asymmetric nature of the corollaries of the castling is
already noticeable. It already did irreparable damage to the so
called tandem and, broader, to this political brand.
From the social standpoint, formation of the tandem was an
exceptionally successful move. It happened almost inadvertently
just when society was splitting into two camps with polar and
therefore incompatible ideological values and political
expectations. Establishment of the tandem solved the problem of
appealing to both camps.
Putin and Medvedev appealed to different social poles. Their
individual brands complemented each other, camouflaging at the
same time the accumulating conflict of interests of these very
poles. Medvedev's brand appealed to the part of society longing
for overdue modernization. Putin's in the meantime appealed to the
traditionalists and conservatives within society.
Opinion polls showed a rapid weakening of Medvedev's
individual brand. Even though it was weakening, the brand retained
certain consolidating potential for promoters of modernization
within the establishment and society at large. It had a positive
effect on the power vertical, making it more flexible and slowing
down the erosion of its political basis.
The forthcoming castling exposed Medvedev as a political
tagalong lacking the qualities and traits expected in a national
leader playing the part of a consolidator. It is logical to assume
therefore that Medvedev's personal brand is devalued as a
political asset. Instead of being an asset for the regime as such,
it is a liability.
Damage to the image of the tandem is irreparable because the
support lost by Medvedev does not go over to Putin. It follows
that the aggregate political basis of the tandem is weakened. It
is particularly noticeable on the right flank of the political
spectrum that has nobody in the upper echelons of the state power
to appeal to and regard as its potential leader.
Damage done to Putin's brand seems to be less serious but
serious all the same. This brand is all alone now, face to face
with the problems of its political ageing and inability to appeal
to both social poles. The castling cannot help making changes
within the upper echelons of state power less probable and
weakening the chances of an adequate dialogue between the powers-
that-be and society.
Like practically everything else, political brands know
different phases of the life cycle - peak of popularity,
stabilization, and decline. These phases are quite clear in the
ratings of Putin, Medvedev, United Russia, and, say Yuri Luzhkov.
When decline phases in, a politician in a competitive milieu
inevitably finds himself under attack. Political struggle becomes
active, and this political struggle may end in one of only two
outcomes. Either the politician uses a rebranding to restore his
positions or his decline becomes so marked and finally
irreversible as to force him to resign altogether.
Whenever political competition is lacking, it is different of
course. This state of affairs eventually generates the necessity
to use law enforcement agencies against protesters. These latter
are few at first but eventually become more and more numerous.
No law enforcement agencies can boost one's rating. The
rating starts going down. This is when the so called anti-
electorate appears, i.e. people who would not vote the politician
in question because of the lack of alternatives and not on account
of their own passiveness. As for the politicians' followers who
keep voting him because of the lack of alternatives, their motives
become less and less pronounced and finally reach a point where
the politician can no longer trust them.
Let us consider Luzhkov. According to Levada-Center
sociologists, his rating among the Muscovites dropped from 60-65%
to 30-35% in the second half of the 2000s. When Luzhkov had been
popular, any attempt to sack him would have fomented mass protests
- at least in the capital. The federal authorities knew it and
therefore chose to bide their time. When Luzhkov's rating dropped,
however, the federal powers-that-be pounced on him in no time at
all. Luzhkov was ousted and nobody made a fuss.
Putin's personal brand cannot help following the same
pattern. His fanatical supporters disappeared from focus-groups
long ago (circa 2005). Putin's rating kept creeping up after that
on account of there being no alternatives but motives of his
voters kept weakening. The rating dropped in summer 2010. United
Russia's rating followed suit which was absolutely predictable.
Pro-Putin electorate kept dwindling and anti-Putin electorate kept
becoming more and more noticeable. Noticeable from the standpoint
of numerical strength and strength of its motives.
In theory, the ageing of Putin's brand might be stopped by
rebranding but there are too many impediments here that make
rebranding nearly impossible.
[return to Contents]
November 8, 2011
The draft budget is to be amended again, this time in order to help Vladimir
Putin win the presidential election
Author: Maxim Tovkailo, Lilia Biryukova, Olga Kuvshinova
Vladimir Putin is not going to approach the presidential election
next March empty-handed. The government drew amendments to the
2012 budget, one of them enabling the premier to parcel out 200
billion rubles as social aid and government support to
The Cabinet drew several amendments for the second reading of
the 2012-2014 federal budget scheduled for November 18. One of the
amendments allowed for redistribution of 200 billion rubles among
different articles of the budget. In other words, this is the
money the powers-that-be will be spending on social aid and
government support before very long. Moreover, it will be possible
to parcel it all out without amending the law on the budget and
therefore notifying the parliament. Alexander Kogan of the Duma
Committee for Budget and Taxes pointed out that lawmakers usually
backed all financial suggestions made by the government.
A government official admitted that this was the first time
when the federal budget enabled the government to reroute money
into the social sphere. He said, "It is the government that
retains the right to decide how to use the money. The Budget Code
permits it..."
The Anti-Crisis Fund comprised 300 billion rubles (nearly 30%
of all anti-crisis expenditures) in 2009 and 195 billion rubles
(about 45%) in 2010. The money was used to support enterprises and
banks and to fight unemployment.
Oksana Dmitriyeva of the Fair Russia faction of the Duma
warned that redistribution of even meager sums might and actually
would be used in the political wars preceding the presidential
The government official admitted, "By and large, this is
going to be a war chest... But whether or not to use the money is
something for the government alone to decide." Another functionary
added, "Yes, the money might be used to promote a candidate for
president but formally it is about something entirely different.
It is a safety cushion. After all, the threat of another crisis
does exist and this money is only to be used to counter
deterioration of the socioeconomic situation."
IMF Director Christine Lagarde meanwhile said that Russia
should know better than boost its social expenditures again.
Yevgeny Gavrilenkov of Troika Dialog pointed out that the federal
budget was social already. "Considering that the next year
expenditures amount to 12 trillion rubles, these 200 billion
rubles are but a paltry sum indeed," he said. "And yet, any pay-
rise accelerates inflation..."
Political scientist Mikhail Vinogradov said, "Putin's rating
is reported declining but he will probably win the election all
the same... I mean, even without these additional social
spendings. Unless he is out to win the election in the very first
round or beat his own performance last time, that is. In any
event, the powers-that-be in Russia regard the election as the
time to hand out carrots. They seem to forget that the higher the
population's income, the more critical of the regime the
population becomes."
[return to Contents]
Putin return ends hope of Russian reform - economist
By Darya Korsunskaya
November 9, 2011
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin's plan to return to the Kremlin increases the
chances of a 'grave political crisis' in Russia and scuppers hopes of genuine
economic reform, one of the architects of his first presidential economic
programme said.
Mikhail Dmitriyev said Prime Minister Putin's planned job swap with President
Dmitry Medvedev after a presidential election next March would cement an
inflexible political system that leaves little room for a reform of the economy.
His comments highlight the fears of many free-market economists that Putin's
return, announced at a party congress in September, increases the long-term risks
of Arab Spring-style turmoil in the world's biggest energy producer.
"The prospect of a grave political crisis has become more likely after what
happened in September," Dmitriyev, a 50-year-old economist who heads the Centre
for Strategic Research, told Reuters in an interview.
"In this situation, it is hard to expect any purposeful efforts at institutional
structural reform."
With German Gref, now chief executive of state bank Sberbank, Dmitriyev crafted
Putin's economic programme in 2000. His institute provides research for the
Dmitriyev said Russia's economy was likely to grow at about 3 to 4 percent a year
if prices of oil -- its main export - remained high.
A sharp and sustained fall in oil prices was unlikely but the dismissal of
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin in September after a public disagreement with
Medvedev had increased the risks to Russian fiscal stability, he said.
"Without Kudrin it is difficult to imagine a figure who could counter the wave of
populism so the risks of budgetary irresponsibility and instability rise
significantly," he said.
Dmitriyev said Russia's economy had the potential to grow 6 percent a year if the
authorities introduced major reforms of regulation, infrastructure and property
"This would be a possible scenario if there was a political window for carrying
out structural reforms. But no such window is in sight yet," he said.
The authorities would continue to tinker with what he said were ultimately
unsustainable social policies for fear of undermining popular support.
Some investors fear Putin could be repeating the mistakes of European leaders now
engulfed in the euro zone crisis by putting off much-needed reforms for fear of
upsetting voters.
Putin, 59, helped steer Medvedev into the Kremlin in 2008 and became prime
minister himself to get round a constitutional limit on two successive terms as
Putin remains Russia's most influential and popular leader, crafting an image of
a macho leader who has brought economic and political stability after the chaos
brought by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
But the Kremlin is sensitive to Putin's popularity rating which an opinion poll
released this week put at its lowest level in more than a decade.
Kremlin supporters dismiss concerns about instability, citing gold and foreign
exchange reserves worth more than $500 billion (312 billion pounds) and sovereign
debt of just 10 percent of gross domestic product as evidence of Russia's
But Dmitriyev said discontent was rising.
"If this trend is maintained, then the risk of conflictual political turmoil
increases," he said. "Although this is by far not the only likely scenario, the
authorities understand that it is possible."
[return to Contents]
Financial Times
November 9, 2011
Russian elections: pork and the oil price
By Stefan Wagstyl and Catherine Belton
The Kremlin is preparing to crank up public spending in advance of parliamentary
elections next month and a presidential vote next spring that is almost certain
to see prime minister Vladimir Putin return as president.
But opinion polls suggest that, while there's no doubt about a Putin victory, a
spending splurge won't necessarily be popular with voters. And the payola comes
at a serious cost Alfa Bank estimates the break-even oil price for the 2012
budget will be $126 a barrel. That's more than three times the 2007 level.
Vedomosti, the paper part-owned by the FT, reported in its main story on Tuesday
that Putin would have an opportunity to hand out 200bn roubles (US$6.6bn) ahead
of the presidential elections.
Vedomosti reports that it has seen amendments to the budget for 2012-14 ahead of
its expected second reading in the Duma and spotted that the government is
seeking authorisation for 200bn roubles to be redistributed for social aid and
support for enterprises.
The story isn't clear where the money is coming from. But it cites a government
official as saying that this is the first time the government would be given the
right to redistribute spending for social needs, and that the 200bn roubles could
be called a "pre-election fund".
However, the official is quoted as saying that it's not yet a forgone conclusion
the money will actually be spent, and another official is cited as saying that
the funds could be used "only if there is a worsening of the socio-economic
All this comes as Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund managing
director, is visiting Moscow, and has warned that Russia should not raise social
spending, especially not in the run-up to elections.
The 200bn rouble plan comes on top of a 400bn rouble boost to military salaries,
announced on Monday by president Dmitry Medvedev, who said pay would rise 2.7
times next year, instead of 1.6 times as previously planned. That raises the cost
of the proposed increases to 900bn roubles. That's real money.
Alfa Bank said in a note: "This suggests that the 2012 breakeven [oil price] may
be close to $126/bbl vs. $118/bbl previously projected and $108/bbl this year."
As well as inflating public spending, the proposals will put pressure on
inflation. While this now stands at 7.2 per cent, near its lowest levels since
Soviet times, it will struggle to fall much further. Alfa is sticking to a 7.2
per cent inflation target for 2012.
Meanwhile, the promise of extra spending does not have the same appeal to voters
as it did a decade ago when Putin first took power in an impoverished country. As
political analyst Mikhail Vinogradov told Vedomosti "the higher the incomes of
the people, the more critical they are of the authorities."
The Levada Center, a respected polling agency, on Monday released survey results
showing Putin's approval rating falling to its lowest level in more than a decade
and support for his ruling party dropping.
Some 61 per cent of respondents expressed approval for Putin, down from 66 per
cent a week earlier and the lowest since 2000. President Medvedev's approval
rating also plunged, to 57 per cent from 62 percent the previous week.
Reuters reported that Levada deputy director Alexei Grazhdankin said the declines
may be a delayed reaction after Putin and Medvedev revealed on September 24 that
they plan to swap jobs next year.
The poll results suggest the ruling United Russia party might lose its two-thirds
majority in the Duma's lower parliament house on December 4.
Putin remains a racing certainty for the presidency. But it could be more
difficult for him to keep control than it has been in the past 10 years. And
that's with oil at around $115 a barrel. If oil prices were to plunge, there
could be trouble.
[return to Contents]
November 8, 2011
Author: Irina Novikova, Lyudmila Sergeyeva
[Results of opinion polls indicate...]
Active propaganda was permitted political parties running for the
Duma in late October. It did not help United Russia whose rating
dropped 9 points in the last week, according to the opinion poll
Levada-Center sociologists conducted between October 28 and
November 1. They approached 1,601 respondent in 45 Russian
regions. Sociologists discovered that 51% of the Russians who knew
already what party they intended to cast their votes for would
vote United Russia. A week ago, these Russians had numbered 60%.
(Considering United Russia's rating in October 2007 when it had
hovered in the vicinity of 68%, the latest 51% turned out to be
the all-time low in two parliamentary campaigns.) All things
considered, the ruling party might count on 55% seats on the Duma
with Fair Russia being able to scale the 7% barrier and 60% seats
without Fair Russia in the next Duma.
Levada-Center sociologists reported ratings of other parties
grown over the last week: CPRF's from 17% to 20%, LDPR's from 11%
to 14%, Fair Russia's from 5% to 7%, and Yabloko's from 2% to 4%.
The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) and Public
Opinion Foundation also reported a dent in the rating of the
ruling party. VCIOM sociologists approached 1,600 respondents in
46 Russian regions on October 29 and 30. They evaluated United
Russia's rating at 43% (45%, a week ago). The Public Opinion
Foundation conducted an opinion poll in 64 regions on October 29
and 30. Its sociologists approached 3,000 Russians and reported
United Russia's rating down to 40% from 42%.
Levada-Center sociologists meanwhile reported President
Dmitry Medvedev's rating down from 62% to 57% and Premier Vladimir
Putin from 66% to 61%.
Levada-Center Assistant Director General Aleksei Grazhdankin
said that the dent in the ratings could be chalked off to
statistical error or else the ratings could be actually dropping
on account of objective factors. The sociologist admitted that the
population was coming to after learning of the forthcoming
castling in the upper echelons of state power and that results of
opinion polls could be showing it.
Aleksei Chesnakov of the General Council of United Russia
meanwhile said that the ruling party was taking reports from
sociologists in stride. Chesnakov said, "Ratings go up and down,
that's inevitable. It does not matter as long as United Russia
retains leadership that will enable it to control the future
Political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin confirmed that the fall
of the ratings was really predictable. Oreshkin explained that
United Russia had undergone degradation on account of having no
political competition (permitting no competitors, actually),
society was irritated and learning to dislike whatever the ruling
party was doing.
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
November 8, 2011
Bad Press
Will a Series of Recent Public Snafus Damage United Russia's Image Ahead of the
Duma Elections?
By Dan Peleschuk
As the country moves ever closer to the December 4 Duma elections, politics are
beginning to heat up. And with a string of recent public embarrassments, coupled
with United Russia's potentially decreasing popularity, the Kremlin seems wedged
in a tight spot. Will it be able to overcome its PR wounds and achieve its
expected electoral results? Experts suggest that while the regime needn't stress
the small stuff, it should instead worry more about legitimizing its continued
grip on power.
The past few weeks have been particularly rough on the ruling party. In short
order, it absorbed several hits that seemed sure to do at least some damage to
the image it has constantly and meticulously sought to maintain. First, there was
former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's public denouncement of United Russia (UR) in
an interview with Radio Liberty, claiming it was stocked with weak, irresponsible
and generally "gray" individuals. This, of course, has long remained an open
secret, though Luzhkov's insider commentary he is a UR co-founder seemed to add
a dose of credibility to the charge.
Then came public proof that the party is out to buy votes ahead of the elections.
Izhevsk City Manager and prominent UR member Denis Agashin was caught in late
October offering an increase in public funding for veterans' organizations in
exchange for their votes. Once again, the news isn't quite groundbreaking, but it
was among the only instances in which a UR representative has been caught
red-handed. In a similar event, Kommersant reported on November 7 that regional
officials in Voronezh have asked their subordinates to confirm their vote for UR
in a written statement.
But perhaps the most unsettling recent event for the Kremlin was the Russian
March on November 4, which brought thousands of nationalists to the streets to
not only protest the influx of Muslim immigrants into Russia, but to decry the
government's perceived neglect of the ethnic Russian population. Among the most
popular slogans was "Stop feeding the Caucasus!" in reference to the Kremlin's
disproportionate spending to rebuild the impoverished and unruly North Caucasian
republics, where observers say much of the money flows into the pockets of local
elites. Joining forces with the nationalists was noted anti-corruption crusader
Alexei Navalny, who has more than once irked the authorities with his personal
investigations and further fueled the anti-establishmentarian rhetoric in this
year's march.
These events have unraveled in the midst of what seems to be a steady drop in the
party's popularity. According to a survey conducted by state polling agency
VTsIOM from November 2010 to August 2011, the party has lost nearly ten percent
of its potential electoral support (from about 63 percent in November 2010 to
about 55 percent in August 2011). The Fund for Public Opinion offers more
troubling figures for UR: as of October, it has a 41 percent approval rating.
Both survey results arrived shortly after UR announced a mandate last month that
the party must secure at least 65 percent of the vote nationwide.
What does this mean for United Russia ahead of the elections? Experts suggest
it's a mixed bag: while the party may be winning small battles by dampening
unflattering stories, it's losing the war in justifying its rule. Ben Judah, a
Russia expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said smaller stories
which seem likely to damage the regime are often spun to its advantage and
neutralized. "You frequently see problems appear in the regions, and Putin flies
in and solves them," he said. "So the problem reinforces the perception of Putin,
or any number of ministers, as a fireman."
Indeed, the regime seems to already have taken steps to diffuse what it sees as
potentially troublesome hurdles. Shortly after the YouTube video depicting
Agashin offering to buy votes was leaked, the Kremlin quickly distanced itself
and cast him as a lone wolf in the matter. After the Luzhkov incident, the
prosecutor summoned the former mayor for questioning in a case involving a
fraudulent Bank of Moscow loan given to his billionaire wife's company. The
Kremlin, meanwhile, broke its silence on the matter and stepped up accusations of
corruption during Luzhkov's tenure. Yet the biggest news broke on November 8,
several days after the Russian March, when Vedomosti reported that the government
is preparing an amendment to the federal budget that would allocate 200 billion
rubles or about $6.6 billion for social spending.
Yet it may prove to be too little too late, at least in terms of winning back any
popular support the party may have already lost. According to Judah, the bigger
dilemma lies not in deflecting potentially bad press, but in controlling the
greater political narrative a far more nuanced and difficult process the Kremlin
seems to be seriously mismanaging. "Putin doesn't have a clear policy agenda, so
his stability narrative has, by default, become a stagnation narrative," he said.
Judah pointed to an interview shortly after Putin announced his candidacy, in
which his spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, sought to disarm the popular comparison of
Putin with Leonid Brezhnev by drastically downplaying the Soviet leader's
failures. "What a tragic loss of control over the narrative when you're actually
now talking in 'counter-Putin' terms within the leadership," said Judah.
.[return to Contents]
Control of Federal Television Key Factor in United Russia Rating
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 3, 2011
Report by Denis Volkov, sociologist at the Levada Center, under the rubric
Politics: Electoral Protest Strategies -- The Federal Television Channels as
Agents of the Corrupt Deal Between the State and the Voter
Most of Russia's citizens would support the return of the line "against all" to
the election ballot -- in September 73% of the respondents surveyed by the Levada
Center held this view while 12% were opposed. In fact, the population is more
likely unhappy with the work of the parliament: 64% of Russia's citizens would
like its membership to be changed significantly or even completely. Sixty-nine
percent think that the deputies do not fulfill their campaign promises. The level
of trust for political parties is one of the lowest figures compared with other
political institutions in the last 15-20 years.
At the same time more than half of the citizens of Russia are planning to go to
the polls in December. But a significant share will stay home because the
political situation that has come about does not suit them. More than one-fourth
of the population (28%) say directly that among the seven parties that have been
allowed to participate in the elections there is none that would represent their
interests. However, the ratings of the political parties, which are published by
the sociologists, are usually calculated from those who are intending to
participate in the elections.
The high level of support for United Russia among persons who intend to vote is
secured by a set of factors. The situation takes shape long before the elections
-- when far from all parties are allowed to participate in the election campaign.
The People's Freedom Party, the ROK (Russian United Workers) Front, and others
are denied registration. The situation is such that new players cannot appear in
the political arena today without the approval of the government. The opposition
parties allowed in the election race have been weakened on a planned basis from
election to election by the appearance of duplicate parties. For example, Just
Russia, which took in several parties, took away part of the Communists'
traditional voters. The main function of the principal rivals of United Russia is
really to absorb and manage part of the protest sentiment.
By maintaining control over the principal federal television channels, the
Russian state has a way to shape a practically uncontested picture of what is
happening for the largest part of the country's population. Each day about 90% of
Russia's citizens watch news broadcasts on television, around one-third learn the
news from newspapers, and no more than 18% follow the news on the Internet.
People and events that do not get on the federal television channels remain
unknown to the overwhelming majority of the population. The average statistical
Russian does not hear about the death of Magnitskiy, the Khodorkovskiy trial, the
organizers of the "Forbidden Art" exhibition, the murders of journalists, or
actions by the opposition. By contrast, according to studies, United Russia is
mentioned on TV far more than any other party.
All this creates the conditions for what Yuri Levada called the "corruptive deal
with the voter." Campaign promises act as a lure, a temptation pointing to a
situation of bribery that launches the mechanism of corrupt relations between the
state and the little person, who is greatly dependent on the government. This is
not direct bribery of particular social groups, but rather creating a public
atmosphere in which people are highly likely to follow the variant of behavior
that is demanded of them. One side "from above" with signs of attention, while
the other ("from below") tries to pay off by going to the polls. Only the
vacillating ones without clear sympathies yield to such bribery; they constitute
the so-called electoral swamp. But that is enough for the government. For victory
they need to mobilize supporters and the vacillating ones and at the same time
disqualify their opponents, depriving them of an alternative.
Up to one quarter of the population does not accept the political order that has
taken shape in the country. Above all, these are inhabitants of the large cities
who use several information channels, have higher ed ucation, and are well-off
and therefore less dependent on the state. They are the ones who view the return
of Vladimir Putin to the presidency skeptically. Among them there are three times
as many, compared to the entire population, who could consider the possibility of
leaving the country. But even in this group of dissenters about one-third think
that "it is best to express our protest against the current political system" by
not going to elections -- they do not want superfluous gestures. One quarter
think that in this case they should vote for another party (not United Russia).
Another group of similar size holds the opinion that it is best "to spoil the
Opposition politicians (Nemtsov, Ryzhkov, and others) who would like to persuade
the population to come (to the polling place) and spoil the ballot or take it
away with them do not have access to television. What is more, they are
consistently discredited from the television screen by people who speak on behalf
of the state. However, this is not just a matter of television censorship. Even
on the free Internet, even among well-informed Muscovites, the oppositionists
will not secure the support of those who are unhappy with the government
(25%-28%) because these politicians "do not represent my interests." In the eyes
of the population, the opposition is more concerned about criticizing the
government than improving the life of the ordinary individual. But there is no
need to explain to people that the government is corrupt -- up to 80% of Russia's
citizens hold that opinion. The phenomenon of new public movements such as the
Blue Buckets and the Defenders of Khimki Forest, which at the peak of their
popularity enjoyed the support of more than half of the population, permits the
following conjecture. Public initiatives that are ready to consistently defend
citizens' interests have every chance of attracting supporters even in Russia's
difficult conditions. It is obvious that not even the non-system political
parties are ready for this yet today.
As a result, the protest strategy in the current elections will most likely go
unrealized. The majority of dissenters will stay home as usual. In 2007 the
proportion of Russian citizens who came to battle and spoiled their ballots
comprised about 3%. The government, by contrast, has all the resources to
mobilize the needed part of the voters, which will then ensure that it receives
the results that are essential to it in the elections.
[return to Contents]
Russian Communists complain about violations in election campaign to ODIHR, PACE
MOSCOW. Nov 8 (Interfax) - Russian Communist Party Central Committee First Deputy
Chairman and State Duma deputy speaker Ivan Melnikov met on Tuesday with Heidi
Tagliavini, the head of an OSCE Office for the Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) mission, and a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE)
delegation led by Tiny Kox, which is monitoring the upcoming parliamentary
elections in Russia.
"Both conversations were proposed by our guests. I am content with the
conversation. We felt that our position is understood," Melnikov said following
the meetings.
"The Communists' position is simple: the law should be the same for all, and this
should not allow the ruling party to do anything it wants," he said.
"But what we want above all is that this should reach the conscience of the
voters, not only international observers," said Melnikov, who leads the Communist
Party's central election campaign staff.
Meeting with Tagliavini, Melnikov "gave a detailed account of the Communist
Party's election campaign, problems that have arisen during it, and a spectrum of
violations of the law that have been uncovered," Melnikov's press service said.
"Melnikov also passed a number of pieces of evidence, including copies of fake
newspapers as if printed by the Communist Party, and also those proving
similarity between United Russia's campaign posters and the Central Elections
Commission posters," it said.
Melnikov, a member of the Russian delegation to PACE, focused the foreign
visitors' attention on "specifics of the ongoing election campaign in Russia,"
expressed the hope for constructive interaction with international observers, and
also answered numerous questions from the PACE delegation members, it said.
[return to Contents]
Deutsche Welle
November 7, 2011
Russia's Communists gain momentum in run-up to elections
With Russia's December parliamentary elections approaching, many discontent
voters are turning to the Communist Party in their search for an alternative to
Prime Minister Putin's conservative United Russia.
Gennady Zyuganov appears with a clenched fist and resolute face on a campaign
poster for his Communist Party. In the background, industrial complexes can be
seen and next to them stands the slogan: "We will make sure to give back what has
been stolen!" That is the campaign platform with which Russia's Communists hope
to score political points in the parliamentary elections on December 4.
In their campaign program, the Communists call for a "new union of brother
nations," a bid to resurrect the "stolen homeland." In addition, they want to
"give the people their stolen wealth back." Entire branches of the economy should
be nationalized again, they say. The Communists also want to return to Soviet
social policies - they are promising free education and health care, among other
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was founded in 1990 by
members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) who opposed Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. After the attempted coup in August 1991
against Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin banned both Communist parties.
In 1993, Russia's Communist Party was re-established and until 2003 they
represented the biggest force in the Duma. Since then, the Russian parliament has
been dominated by parties affiliated with Vladimir Putin's leadership in the
Lone opposition
The Communists' promises are resonating with Russian voters. According to opinion
polls, the CPRF could win as much as 17 percent of the vote, a five point
improvement over their showing in 2007. That would make the party the second
largest force in the Duma. Alexei Grazhdankin, who works for independent pollster
Levada, sees several reasons for the popularity of the Communists.
"The general mood in the country is not as optimistic as it was during the last
Duma elections in late 2007," Grazhdankin told Deutsche Welle.
The economic crisis had an impact on Russia too. Opposition parties, not just the
Communists, have gained momentum, he said. In addition, fewer parties are
participating in the December elections.
"The Agrarian Party, which has a similar base as the Communists, is not in the
running," Grazhdankin said. The party's voters are likely to support the
A growing number of voters plan to cast their ballots for the Communists as a
form of protest against Putin's incumbent United Russia. For years the CPRF has
been the only real opposition party in the Russian parliament. Other parties,
like the right-wing and populist Liberal Democrats, maintain their loyalty to the
Soviet nostalgia
The Communists core base of supporters can be seen every year on November 7, the
anniversary of the October Revolution. It's mostly pensioners who take to the
streets with red flags.
The party's base will actually shrink over time since those who look back on the
Soviet era with nostalgia die out, Grazhdankin said. Yet the party is attracting
more followers for now.
"Every year more people go into retirement, and for most Russians that means
social decline," he explained.
Many Russians who grew up in the Soviet Union view the communist era as having
been more socially just than the present. Russia's current Communists are
convinced that socialism is not dead. They see their criticism of capitalism
confirmed by the current economic crisis and want to learn from nations like
On the other hand, party chief Zyuganov gave reassurances during a recent trip to
Berlin that the Communists have adapted to the realities of the 21st century.
"I don't believe that there's any reason to fear us," he said. "There won't be
any expropriation of property. We live in a different era."
The Communists integrated themselves into post-Soviet Russia long ago. Wealthy
business people appear on the party's ticket, and they are driven more by
commercial interests than ideological ones. So Zyuganov can clench his fist all
he wants on campaign posters.
"The Communists would have major difficulties implementing their campaign
promises," Grazhdankin said.
[return to Contents]
Russian Orthodox Church Will Continue Crafting "symphony" With State - Priest
MOSCOW. Nov 7 (Interfax) - A high-ranking Russian Orthodox Church priest has
highly commended President Dmitry Medvedev's meeting with representatives of the
Orthodox public, saying that the Russian Orthodox Church will continue its policy
of crafting a "symphony" in the relationship between the church and state.
"An important event has occurred at the exhibition and forum - the president has
met with representatives of various strata of our church body for an essential,
serious and committed discussion," the head of the Moscow Patriarchate's
Department for Church and Society, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, told a roundtable
at the 10th exhibition and forum, Orthodox Rus, in Moscow, devoted to the 20th
anniversary of the revival of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Father Vsevolod was commenting on President Dmitry Medvedev and Patriarch Kirill
of Moscow and All Russia's visit to the exhibition and their subsequent meeting
with representatives of the Orthodox public.
It was the first meeting, which was devoid of "pomposity and formal rigor, but
was a serious dialogue between the state leader and the Orthodox public," he
"In my opinion, the meeting helped the president move closer to the people, make
his position clearer to them, and speak his mind and share his innermost feelings
with them. The words spoken by the president were heard and appreciated," he
It is important, said Father Vsevolod, that the president used the word
"symphony" to describe the relationship between the church and state.
"We must not and we will not lay this word aside. We do live in a secular state,
which is normal, but our society is largely made of Orthodox Christians.
Therefore, the symphony of the church, state and society is a natural thing. It
is a relationship within one body, not between things of differing nature - the
body that largely belongs at once to the people and to the Church, which is Jesus
Christ's body," he said.
A "symphony is as possible, as a Christian policy, economy and culture is
possible and needed," Father Vsevolod said.
During the meeting, the president made several statements. He said the values
traditional for the state must be further promoted. "The Orthodox Church is the
keeper of these values and truths of monumental importance for our state," he
said. Medvedev also spoke about the role the Orthodox community is playing in
Russia's development, describing it as "people with an extremely powerful inner
energy and strong moral values." Hopefully, the state will rely on them, he said.
Medvedev also announced that he would ask the Defense Ministry to increase the
corps of military clergy and he supported the idea of expanding theologian
culture and secular ethics programs at schools, if the parents do not object.
[return to Contents]
New York Times
November 9, 2011
Time to Think, and Not to Lean on Russia
By GRIGORY YAVLINSKY and ALEXANDER SHISHLOV
Grigory Yavlinsky, a former vice prime minister of Russia, is the founder of the
Yabloko party and member of its political council. Alexander Shishlov is a member
of Yabloko Bureau and vice president of the Liberal International.
On Oct. 25 the Views pages published an article by our colleagues in the group of
European Liberal and Democrats parties (ELDR), Guy Verhofstadt and Mikhail
Kasyanov, under the headline "Time to lean on Russia." Their categorical
assessments and their recommended actions in the run-up to parliamentary
elections in Russia compel us, leaders of the electoral list of the Russian
United Democratic Party Yabloko - a member of the ELDR since 2006 - to respond
with equally categorical objections.
Verhofstadt and Kasyanov write: "Whatever credibility these elections still had
was erased," and "Russians are being presented with a stage-managed campaign
between political forces loyal to the Kremlin." This could not be further from
the truth when it comes to Yabloko - unfortunately, the only opposition
democratic party to participate in the elections.
By the logic of Verhofstadt and Kasyanov, Poland's Solidarity and the People's
Fronts of the Baltic States were also "loyal" to Communist regimes, and Andrei
Sakharov was "loyal" to the Soviet regime. In fact, they all fought, as does
Yabloko, for peaceful change. And in the end they won.
Yabloko has been active in Russian politics for almost 20 years. Fully aware of
our responsibility to Russian citizens, who aspire to liberty and justice, our
party has managed to survive and retain its potential against continuous and
severe administrative pressure. Our work has been not only difficult, it has been
dangerous, and in some cases fatal. Larisa Yudina, leader of the Yabloko branch
in Kalmykia and a journalist, was killed; so were Farid Babayev, leader of
Yabloko in Dagestan, and Yuri Shchekochikhin, a Duma deputy and investigative
journalist who was investigating corruption in the secret services.
It is true that elections in Russia today are not free and fair. But this is due
not only to the fact that Kasyanov's party was denied registration and thus
cannot take part in the elections. Russian elections ceased being free and fair
after the presidential elections in 1996. Unfortunately, back then European
liberals did not protest as loudly as they are doing now. (In fact, the electoral
system was similarly defective in 2003 when Kasyanov was prime minister under
President Vladimir Putin).
Today, however, this is how Russian elections are held and there are no other
means for a peaceful, nonviolent change in political course and change of
government. Liberals at Yabloko proceed from the premise that an outright
rejection of all opportunities for peaceful change and the adoption of actions
based on the principle that "it has to get worse before it gets better" is
irresponsible and leads to a dead-end.
We believe that we should leverage all legal options for opposing Putin's
authoritarian regime. That is why Yabloko is participating in the elections. At
the December parliamentary elections, only Yabloko will offer voters a liberal
and democratic alternative to the present authoritarian-oligarchic system.
Moreover, today the public mood in Russia differs qualitatively from the mood in
2003 and 2007. Many people want to see change. And we should use every
opportunity to start implementing such change. But Verhofstadt and Kasyanov
propose, without even waiting until the elections have taken place, to reject
them as illegitimate.
In effect, while invoking the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, they are calling for
further confrontation, and propose measures that are unrealistic given the
current climate in Europe, when E.U. member states are preoccupied with the
resolution of domestic issues.
It would be a grave error to attempt to "lean on Russia" without taking into
account the current mood in Russian society and arrogantly disregarding the
opinion of millions of Russian voters. Russians do not like to be leaned on. For
the liberal faction in the European Parliament to adopt so shallow an approach
would be an admission that Europe cannot understand the real problems or offer
appropriate solutions.
Only Russian citizens can make elections free and fair. This may require help,
but it cannot be done through the application of external pressure.
[return to Contents]
Yavlinskiy Calls on Voters To Turn Out in 'Historic' Election
Novaya Gazeta
November 7, 2011
Inerview with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the Yabloko party, by Andrey Lipskiy
and Andrey Kolesnikov, under the rubric "Number One on the List": "Grigoriy
Yavlinskiy: Someone Said to Me Once: 'Let Them Elect You First, and Then We Will
Vote.' That Is a Bad Principle. People Must Go and Vote!"
In mid-October Novaya Gazeta sent out letters to the politicians heading the
federal party lists for the State Duma elections coming up on 4 December,
inviting them to give an interview to the newspaper. ("No sweeteners, no
advertising.") The first to respond was Grigoriy Yavlinskiy -- Yabloko's "number
(Novaya Gazeta ) Grigoriy Alekseyevich, there is an obvious contradiction in your
recent remarks. On the one hand you say that since approximately 2007 the Russian
system of power has become "set in concrete" and nothing fundamentally new is
happening within it. At the same time you say that right now, on the eve of the
2011-2012 elections, some kind of unique situation has taken shape in Russia,
which Yabloko and the entire "democratic public" should exploit. Please explain
in what way the situation is unique and what kind of opportunities are opening
(Yavlinskiy) There are many people who are unhappy about many things. And
practically no one is asking: "Who is Mr Putin?" And now the situation is taking
shape whereby these people can display their views. Not on the Internet, not in
their own kitchens or in jokes with their friends -- they can come out and
declare their political existence. That is to say -- vote for the alternative:
the Yabloko party.
There is United Russia. That is the party of business and officialdom and
therefore it has no ideology of its own other than personal self-interest. It has
two ideological wings, a mixture of which makes up the party's ideology --
Zhirinovskiy and the Communists.
And then there are the democrats. They provide an opportunity for everyone who
has even so much as a sense of disagreement with what is happening or who would
like to change something, to show that there are many such people in the country.
Another peculiarity of the situation lies in the fact that if a great many people
come out to vote the scale of the vote-rigging will be considerably smaller than
if very few people turn out. That is the first thing. And second, if a lot of
people come out and vote for Yabloko, three months before the presidential
election the authorities will not want to provoke a scandal that carries the risk
of the emergence of a large number of dissatisfied people.
So what might this mean? Literally: that in Russia and its capital there are, for
instance, 30% of people who really disagree with the existing policy.
(Novaya Gazeta ) But by no means everyone who disagrees is willing to turn out in
the elections.
(Yavlinskiy) That is their problem. Later they will be told -- by Putin, among
others: You are simply not here, you do not exist.
If you do not want to turn out in the elections, that is your business. My
business is to give you the opportunity -- here it is. You may argue with Yabloko
over minor points, that is not the issue here. What is Yabloko saying? One law
for all, the separation of powers, independent courts not susceptible to money or
orders, inviolability of private property -- that is what our party says. It also
says a great many other things, but that is the crux of it. You can argue later,
there will be a special place for you. But right now -- vote.
(Novaya Gazeta ) So those few points are capable of bringing together the
protest-democratic electorate?
(Yavlinskiy) More than that, they are actually for everyone. Even for the
non-democrats. Because it is impossible to live in modern-day society without
them. We are not talking here about Yabloko's traditional electorate. This is an
entirely different story.
(Novaya Gazeta ) But will the non-democratic protest electorate not vote for the
Communists and the LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia)?
(Yavlinskiy) Yes, they will. They certainly will, and that is the problem. Open
the Radio Liberty website. There is a poll: "Whom would you vote for next
Sunday?" It goes approx imately like this: 30% for Yabloko, 28% "I will not
vote," but 20% for the Communists.
(Novaya Gazeta ) The picture is approximately the same on our website.
(Yavlinskiy) That is the way it is going...
(Novaya Gazeta ) What is the nucleus of Yabloko's electorate today and what
additions can you count on from among other political forces?
(Yavlinskiy) We can count on all those who are really against what is being done
in the country. Apart from the nationalists and the Communists, because they
certainly will not vote for Yabloko, that is obvious and normal. Conversely,
unfortunately, you can find people who are really democrats but will vote for the
Communists. Or for the party of power. As someone said to me once: "Let them
elect you first, and then we will vote for you." I heard that at Sverdlovsk
But after 7 May it will be payback time -- for laziness, for reluctance, for
stupidity, for self-indulgence, for being comfortable, for Nakh-Nakh ("vote
against all" movement)...
(Novaya Gazeta ) Will it be even worse than now?
(Yavlinskiy) Remember the year 2000. NTV, then Yukos...
(Novaya Gazeta ) And so it began...
(Yavlinskiy) What else? It is nothing, yet: A month ago the whole of Rublevka
(elite residential area of Moscow) was decked with billboards advertising
"Citizen Poet" (actor Mikhail Yefremov's satirical poetry project) at Barvikha
Luxury Village (theater). Do you think that will continue? I very much doubt it.
(Novaya Gazeta ) We will have just one poet.
(Yavlinskiy) (He smiles.) And writer. And composer. And only a month is left.
(Novaya Gazeta ) Actually, after those remarks it is ridiculous to ask this
question: Why should people turn out to vote?
(Yavlinskiy) Because they will say that you simply renounced everything yourself.
(Novaya Gazeta ) But possibly the main topic of discussion about the elections is
how not to turn out.
(Yavlinskiy) That is a mistake. People should turn out in the elections and vote
for Yabloko! And not for just anyone as long as it is not United Russia.
(Novaya Gazeta ) That is to say, not following Navalnyy's formula (referring to
oppositionist blogger Navalnyy's call to vote for anyone except United Russia)?
(Yavlinskiy) Look, Zyuganov (leader of the CPRF, Communist Party of the Russian
Federation) describes the idea of de-Stalinization as madness. What is that
about? Why is this phrase so important? This phrase is important because he
senses that everyone will be behind him now -- everyone who is not behind Putin.
And he is gaining courage. He is not shamefully concealing this subject, he is
using it as a threat. What does he say? "This madness was stopped following the
mass intervention of practically all the citizens of the country, who showed that
the country's citizens categorically reject this idea." And now, most important:
"Although there was an attempt by the authorities." So now he is prosecutor, now
he is saying: They raised their hands against something sacred!
That is where I began: Those two parties constitute the ideological content of
United Russia. And if their rating rises, if these two wings are sublimated,
their influence on what will happen in the country will become even greater.
(Novaya Gazeta ) The following logic operates in Russia: We vote for those who
are sure to get in. Do you think there is a significant number of people who
might vote for Yabloko but, in this situation, will vote for United Russia?
(Yavlinskiy) Look at what Channel One does when it shows the parties' ratings and
you will see that this is an effective instrument. Yabloko has 0.56%. What kind
of research this is, who did it, is not known. But it answers the question of
what the authorities think about you. How many of you there should be. W e think,
the authorities say, that you should be fewer than 1%, so go and sit in that
niche. Maybe you think differently, but you should be afraid or ashamed. People
write to me: We are afraid to vote for Yabloko, we do not believe that nobody
knows who votes for whom, and where we live we are frightened. And people are
even more afraid to provide signatures (in support of would-be candidates). After
all, then you have to show your passport and give your name.
(Novaya Gazeta ) There is a view that to take part in such elections is to
legitimize the regime.
(Yavlinskiy) That view had a certain meaning in Soviet times. It was a closed
country and the regime had a principled way of putting the question: You must not
only support us and be loyal, you must love us. Legitimacy consisted in our
loving the regime.
The present-day regime is not in the least interested in this. You need not love
it at all, the main thing is that you do not get in its way. That is the first
thing. Second. The Soviet Union was a closed country. It could be assumed that
there was a need to show certain foreigners that everyone, as one man, turned out
to vote in the elections. But Russia is an open country. Everything you write can
be read anywhere on the planet, in every language. Everyone knows everything, at
any moment any journalist could come to Novaya Gazeta and ask you anything they
So what is more important? Simply not to turn out in these conditions? Or to turn
out and vote for those who say frankly: "We are against this policy"?
Politics begins when an alternative appears. When there is no alternative there
is no politics. Four weeks remain until the elections. If no alternative is
realized during those four weeks, then everything you have been writing all these
years has gone down the drain.
(Novaya Gazeta ) About the middle-class electorate. There is a thing called the
Lipsett hypothesis, formulated in the late 1950s: With the growth of income and
education, the demand for democracy grows. In an interview for Novaya Gazeta
Mikhail Dmitriyev, president of the Center for Strategic Developments, said,
drawing on important work by the sociologists Inglehart and Welzel, that in the
next few years the demand for democracy will also be displayed by young people
for whom all channels of fulfillment are closed. And he compared the situation
with late Soviet times. What do you think about that?
(Yavlinskiy) I do not need to tell you what the Soviet middle class, which
accomplished changes, grew up with. I will not tell you what the theater was
like, I will not tell you what the movies were like, but there was Solzhenitsyn,
there was Sakharov, there was samizdat, tamizdat. My family was very poor, we had
children very early, we earned very little, and my wife made a little extra by
typing. And then, one time, she received a 500-page manuscript to type for
someone. She typed 200 pages, she came to me and she said: "I will have to send
it back, I am not going to type that kind of thing for any money." And she threw
out what she had already typed.
What am I trying to say? You and I, our generation, grew up in those conditions.
But the generation that Mikhail Dmitriyev is talking about grew up in today's
conditions, with a different system of criteria, with different ideas as to what
is good and what is bad, with different opinions, different idols. What they read
-- excuse me. What they watched -- again, excuse me. The education is of a
different nature, the evaluations of prestige or success are different.
For instance, I deliver lectures at the university. There are 200 people sitting
there, third-year students in the economics faculty. I ask a question: "Which of
you kids is going to set up your own business?" Two hands go up. "What about the
rest of you?" "We want to work in the government." Not in the state sector, note,
but in the government. Ther e are three main options -- the government, Gazprom,
and foreign companies. So there will be no demand for democracy from them.
So you want to be involved in politics? No problem. Go to Nashi (pro-Kremlin
youth group) -- there are your social elevators. You can go into politics if you
want, you can go into business if you want. We are dealing with a serious
opponent, a serious adversary, not a joke.
After 2012 there will be a great many economic problems, since they were not
resolved before. The situation will be like this: If nothing is done, everyone
will be dissatisfied because everything is collapsing. But if they start to
really do something, everyone will be dissatisfied because it is too tough. And
they will begin with those who get in their way.
(Novaya Gazeta ) It is hopeless.
(Yavlinskiy) No, why? In the next four weeks there is a ray of hope. Let us play
for it. Why do you want to bury everything beforehand?
(Novaya Gazeta ) What can we do to try to get rid of the sense of hopelessness?
(Yavlinskiy) This is not the time for anything else, but if, by voting for
Yabloko, you show that people like you account for 30% or 20% of the country, the
entire atmosphere will change. Think what will happen. By voting for Yabloko you
will give the party's candidates for deputy the opportunity for five years, in
every region of the country, to participate in various elections without having
to collect signatures, which is impossible. You will create the opportunity to
convene a congress in December this year and decide the question of nominating a
candidate for president.
(Novaya Gazeta ) But what if it is not 20% but "just enough" to get in (to the
(Yavlinskiy) Then it means 37-40 people in the Duma, 40 people like Mitrokhin.
Well, all 40 will not be like Mitrokhin, but they will be like Arbatov or
Yablokov. What is wrong with that? You will be represented there -- you and us,
your readers.
Incidentally, about the mood. Six months ago, in the spring, there were regional
elections. Picture to yourself -- Vladimir Oblast. They exclude us from the
elections in Vladimir city but let us stay in Kolchuginskiy Rayon in Vladimir
Oblast, and we get 22% -- 25% in the city and 13% in the countryside. On average,
22%. And our man is elected head of the administration. The same in Pskov, the
same percentages. That is where we are starting from. So these things are
perfectly possible.
Yet we are in an information ghetto and we cannot do anything about it. All that
fuss that they are discussing about how to go into the elections -- it is not a
question of going, it is a question of putting your cross. What else is to be
Surely you have noticed that the so-called international community has already
recognized Putin's elections. Many big businessmen have already taken the oath.
Admittedly companies that are seeking IPOs write about the political risks in a
very different way from what they say at meetings. Because if they fail to
describe those risks and they later come true, they will have to pay big money to
the investors. That is where you should read the political predictions.
Abramovich, for instance. His Yevraz is currently changing its jurisdiction and
he is writing a new share prospectus. He has written in detail about what things
will be like after 2012. Everyone is asking him: "Roma, friend, what are you
writing?" He replies: "This is not what I think, but just suppose!"
(Novaya Gazeta ) During the next presidential and parliamentary term, what are
the main economic risks, in your view as an economist?
(Yavlinskiy) Let me list them. Urbanistics. Everything connected with big cities.
Look at Moscow. The cities are simply not prepared for what is happening to them.
Second -- the environment. Nothing is being done.
Transport. After last summer, what can we say about transport?
The in formation-communication space. Surprising as it may seem, the quality of
cell phone communications even in Moscow is getting worse all the time. The same
is true of the information space in broad terms: how the news is structured, how
information is structured.
Medicine. The quality of medicine, the quality of medical services.
Housing and utilities -- no comment, it has all been said long ago.
Pensions. At the moment there are 600 pensioners per 1,000 workers. And labor
productivity is four times lower than in the United States. Like in Soviet times.
And why does the pensions saving system not work? Distrust. And the distrust goes
far beyond the bounds of what you call these funds. Nobody believes that you can
put money in and make use of it in 20-30 years' time.
(Novaya Gazeta ) But that applies not only to the pension system, it applies to
any project connected with the state.
(Yavlinskiy) You must understand, in the modern world, in modern economics, no
problem can be resolved without what is called "society," and therefore without
confidence mechanisms. Because now I will move on from this problem to
investments, and I do not think I even need to explain that in these conditions
nobody wants to invest in anything. There is no confidence in the institution of
What will be the main problem for all countries? The quality of brains and ideas.
If it is true, as people are currently writing, that everyone is planning to
leave, what do we do? Is this not a challenge? Even if a person is simply
thinking about where to go. And incidentally, thinking is not safe. If a person
is thinking about leaving, he is thinking even less about doing something good
Some 2-3% of GDP should be spent annually on each of the above problems. Nobody
has done anything about this.
The crux of the matter is that the gulf between people and the state is gradually
becoming insuperable. And in Russia that is the sole cause of revolution and
collapse. Not hunger, not difficulties, not life problems. That was the case in
1917, it was the case in 1991. And in 1917 the talk was very similar to today's
and the Russian intelligentsia did not support the Whites. Why did it not support
them? It said: Russia must outgrow the suffering. Well, it suffered for 80 years
and is still suffering.
But today what is the middle class, reckoned by income? Instead of engineers,
doctors, teachers, journalists, skilled workers, officers -- it is restaurants,
taxis, girls, the service sphere. And the information service staff try to tell
people that they should not turn out in the elections! This is an entire culture
that is growing. They do not say to them: "You must struggle." No, an entire
culture is growing that says there is no need to bother with this. No need to
bother with your own state, no need to bother with your own life, your own
country. Take Mr Freeman -- are you familiar with this hero of Internet movies?
What he says? Eat -- the opposite -- and onto the Internet, eat -- the opposite
-- and onto the Internet. That is all. The entire lifecycle. And he is pleased
with himself. This suits everyone. Because nowadays nobody needs you to go to the
construction sites of communism, to dig the White Sea Canal. There is no need --
we will manage without you.
(Novaya Gazeta ) We will arrange to discredit the elections...
(Yavlinskiy) Absolutely. They do not want a lot of people to turn out for the
elections, they want everything to be measured, there should be no exaltation, no
agitation, everything under control.
(Novaya Gazeta ) And "a lot" of voters -- that really changes the picture?
(Yavlinskiy) "A lot" -- that will be an entirely different story. When we vote,
we show how many there are of us, whose position we are expressing. But if we do
not express anything, it means: That's all, the game is up. And this, my friends,
is for 12 years...
Previously there were children's games: Who is better -- the SPS (Union of
Right-Wing Forces) or Yabloko. I don't like Yavlinskiy, say. But this is not
about love. There was Mikhail Prokhorov -- they opened the faucet then they
closed it. But nobody created Yabloko, we made it ourselves.
I have seen a great many people who regretted that they voted for Yeltsin in
1996. But nobody regretted voting for him in 1991, because voting has to have a
historic meaning. There was no historical meaning when Medvedev was elected, it
was more of the same. But now a moment is coming that will have historic meaning.
And, to be frank, I am very glad that I have done my work and done it in such a
way that there is something in politics for which one can and should vote. I do
not know whether or not I will be able to convince you. But this election has
historical meaning.
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Former mayor Luzhkov returns to Moscow
MOSCOW, November 9 (RIA Novosti)-Former Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov has returned to
Moscow and begun work at the International University in Moscow as head of the
City Management Department, a university spokesperson said.
"He is at work today. All other questions should be directed to the head of the
university," she added.
Luzhkov was dismissed last autumn by President Dmitry Medvedev over a lack of
"trust." The weeks leading up to his dismissal had seen allegations of massive
corruption aired on state TV channels.
It was earlier reported that Luzhkov had been summoned for questioning in a
corruption inquiry regarding a Moscow bank, but he had failed to appear because
he was outside Russia.
Russian investigators said that Yelena Baturina, Luzhkov's wife and founder of
the Inteco real estate empire, had also ignored summons for questioning.
In 2010, investigators launched an inquiry into a deal under which Bank of Moscow
lent 13 billion rubles ($413 million) to an obscure real estate firm, Premier
Estate. The firm used the money to buy land for a construction company owned by
Baturina at above-market prices.
Investigators will question Luzhkov over the purchase of Bank of Moscow shares
during an additional issue. Most of the money the bank received from the Moscow
government was later lent to the Premier Estate firm.
Luzhkov said that he was not afraid of being questioned. "I will answer all the
questions honestly. I have nothing to hide," he added.
He said there were no legal grounds to accuse him of any wrongdoing.
"Despite the saying 'If there is a person, there will be a reason to sue him,' I
have always defended and will defend my reputation and the reputation of my
family," Luzhkov said.
Luzhkov recently said that he had been summoned for questioning in connection
with an interview in which he criticized the Russian government and the ruling
party, United Russia.
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BBC Monitoring
Russian state TV debate speakers in rare criticism of government
Rossiya 1
November 6, 2011
The Russian government has been criticized on official state television channel
Rossiya 1 for failing to take decisive action against corruption.
The 6 November edition of the "Special Correspondent" programme examined the
causes of Russia's poor road safety record, which presenter Mariya Sittel said
was among the worst in the world.
The first part of the programme featured Arkadiy Mamontov's documentary showing
graphic details of road accidents in Russia as well as secretly filmed footage of
an authentic Russian driving licence being issued in return for a bribe of
R25,000 (815 dollars). The documentary appeared to link what Sittel called "hell
on Russian roads" to the country's rampant corruption.
This was followed by a studio debate, moderated by Sittel and involving Mamontov,
popular broadcaster Vladimir Solovyev, Avtorevyu (Autoreview) newspaper editor in
chief Mikhail Podorozhanskiy and Aleksandr Shumskiy, a prominent campaigner
against traffic congestion in Moscow.
Of all the speakers, Solovyev was the most vocal in his criticism of the Russian
authorities. They only "need us when they need our votes", he remarked while
suggesting lack of government commitment in the fight against corruption. He said
that instead of President Dmitriy Medvedev "expressing outrage about everybody
stealing", the Russian authorities should start "observing standards". One way to
go about it, he continued, was to "invite foreign specialists". "We should not be
shy to draw on the best Western experience and bring experts here. That is the
path we followed in sport by bringing managers to Russia. Perhaps it is time to
bring in ministers? Perhaps it is time to bring administrators to Russia. At
least they are not yet as good at stealing as we are," he said.
Sittel commented that this was an "original idea", but she was "not sure" about
When Mamontov said that he would pass the evidence of police corruption he had
gathered during his investigation to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Solovyev
told him not to expect the minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, to react by "crying and
resigning". Solovyev went on to challenge Nurgaliyev over the declared success of
Russian police reform. "The certification of police officers is complete. Have
they become honest? Have they become sensible? Have they started working well? Of
course, Rashid Gumarovich (Nurgaliyev) has said that they have sorted everything
out," Solovyev said.
In an apparent suggestion that corruption in Russia spread from the top of
government, Solovyev recalled Kaluga Region governor Anatoliy Artamonov telling
him that there was "no corruption" in his region because, in Artamonov's words,
"I do not take bribes myself and do not allow others to do so".
Discussing the continuing failure to ease Moscow's notorious traffic jams,
Solovyev said that the government would only be spurred into action if its top
officials stopped using special lanes and started "living the lives of ordinary
people". This comment prompted laughter in the studio, with Podorozhanskiy
calling Solovyev a "fantasist".
Podorozhanskiy recalled his experience of being issued with a driving licence in
Georgia "two minutes and 20 seconds" after applying for it. "Why don't we do it
the way it is done in Georgia" and cut the bureaucracy associated with the
process, he asked. Solovyev quickly switched the subject away from Georgia, a
country rarely mentioned on Russian TV in a positive context, and started
discussing how quickly he had managed to obtain a driving licence in the United
Shumskiy was also critical of the Russian authorities, saying that "elites" who
routinely break the law should not expect ordinary people to behave differently.
He said that a sense of "impunity" was at the root of Russia's corruption
[return to Contents]
Valdai experts eye Russia's near future
KALUGA, November 9 (RIA Novosti)-Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union,
Russia is at a major strategic crossroads and the choices its leaders make in the
next few years will determine what kind of state it will be in for generations to
come, political analysts said this week.
"A real multipolar world is emerging," said Andrew Kuchins, director of the
Russia and Eurasia program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies. "Russia's biggest challenge is to make itself an
attractive pole."
Kuchins was among around 100 experts on Russia policy from the United States,
Europe, Asia and Russia itself who are members of the Valdai Discussion Club,
which is meeting this week outside Moscow to analyze scenarios for Russia's
development in the next five to eight years.
After reviewing several scenarios for the country's development, the experts
largely agreed that whatever modernization takes place in Russia it will be
orchestrated from the Kremlin. In the meantime, they ruled out the possibility of
a democratic revolution in Russia.
In the meantime, several analysts believe that the country's leadership has only
vague ideas about what should be done in order to boost Russia's development,
while Russia's bureaucracy is the most hated part of the country's ruling class.
While most of the public anger reveals itself in the blooming Russian
blogosphere, the majority of the population, including those discontented with
the Russian authorities, choose to support them because they don't want any
revolutions, the experts concurred.
Meanwhile, Russia's emergence as of an attractive actor of the global arena
depends upon how effective it will be in addressing some issues on the domestic
agenda and having a foreign policy that is based on consensus rather than
intimidation and coercion, Kuchins said.
Thomas Gomart, another Valdai club expert and vice-president for strategic
development with the Paris-based French Institute of International Relations,
agreed with Kuchins' assessment.
The biggest challenge in the coming years for Vladimir Putin, the current prime
minister and Russia's top leader who is expected to return to the post of
president next year, will be to build trust among the Russian people in the state
that he has been instrumental in shaping since the late 1990s, Gomart said.
"Observing from the outside, the decision-making elites seem very sure of
themselves," he said. The challenge now is to give this confidence to the Russian
people... and to find the right posture in relations with the outside world."
Russia's development will almost certainly be tied closely to Putin, who
announced earlier this year that he would again run for president in elections
next March and which he is set to win.
Putin served two consecutive terms as president from 2000 to 2008.
Russia has since extended presidential terms to six years, making it possible in
theory for Putin to hold the top job until 2024.
The Valdai experts were due to meet face to face with Putin later this week to
discuss Russia's development with him directly.
[return to Contents]
Political Changes In Russia Can Only Come From The Top - Discussion Club
Kaluga, 8 November: If there are changes in Russia following the (State Duma and
presidential) elections they will be initiated by the Kremlin, members of the
Valday discussion club have said. They are meeting in Kaluga. At another sitting
held today, members of the club tried to forecast scenarios for Russia's
development and ended up with five to six possibilities.
According to the majority of members of the club, Russia is highly likely to face
authoritarian modernization in the future, that is to say that changes will be
proposed "at the top" - by the Kremlin. Those in favour of this theory are
confident that other options such as a democratic revolution are simply not
possible because of the current domestic political situation in the country. Some
analysts in the club attribute this to the fact that Russian society has grown
tired of revolutions. In addition to this, despite a large number of discontent
people, a paradoxical situation is evolving in Russia with citizens not feeling
loyal towards the authorities they are nevertheless continuing to support. Those
opposing the authorities are mostly investing their effort in critical blog
postings on the internet, those at the meeting observed.
Russian society has become tired of corruption, family nepotism and the influence
of clans in the economy, some speakers said. According to the Valday club, it is
totally evident that bureaucrats are the most despised part of the Russian
society elite. People have long been laughing at oligarchs and telling jokes
about them while simply hating bureaucrats on all levels.
According to those at the club meeting, if the authorities fail to resolve a
number of urgent problems in the next few years, the outlook for Russia will be
less than rosy. However, some of the experts believe that the authorities do not
know at present what they are going to do and how the country will develop.
(passage omitted)
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
November 8, 2011
Russia Shows the World What Doesn't Work
By Natalya Bubnova
Natalya Bubnova is Carnegie Moscow Center's deputy director for communications
and editor and co-author of the recent book "20 Years Without the Berlin Wall: A
Breakthrough to Freedom."
Karl Marx in his 1848 "Communist Manifesto" wrote, "The specter is wandering
around Europe, the specter of communism." According to Marx, the communist
revolution was to take place in the most advanced countries of Europe. So how did
that specter overtake Russia in 1917?
Before the beginning of World War I, Russia had become the second-fastest growing
economy in the world and had been on the winning side in that war, until it
unilaterally withdrew after the Bolshevik Revolution. To be sure, Russia had
widespread poverty, flawed governance and largely feudal inequalities that were
aggravated by war all of which Vladimir Lenin called the "objective
preconditions of the revolution." At the same time, however, the country might
have overcome these conditions, if it were not for what Lenin coined the
"subjective preconditions": the purposeful subversive activities of the Bolshevik
Party that he led.
The well-organized party of professional revolutionaries came to power in Russia
under Marxist slogans. The idea unlike that of Nazism, the other totalitarian
regime of the 20th century was not evil. On the contrary, its ideological basis
was appealing to many Russians end the cruel exploitation of the masses by a
small class of wealthy capitalists and aristocrats, let working people own the
land and factories and give everyone access to education, health care and
culture. For Russians, with their eternal soul-searching and aspiration for
ultimate truth, the revolution's ideals of justice and equality seemed to promise
answers to eternal questions.
Alas, instead there were four years of bloody civil war, which together with
hunger and illness took away about 18 million lives. After this, Stalin's regime
ruined agriculture through forced collectivization, chopped off whole layers of
society that were seen as destructive for building communism and installed fear
and hypocrisy for decades.
Unlike Americans, Russians do not joyfully trace their families' histories back
to their roots, since many of their family lines were interrupted in 1917. What's
more, in the Soviet days it was dangerous to look back. The enormous tragedy
caused by the Bolshevik Revolution could not be offset by any of its
achievements, such as a more egalitarian society, the abolition of illiteracy,
rights for women and quantum leaps in science and heavy industry.
Marx's contribution to economic and political history, class struggle and labor
theory was akin to Charles Darwin's contribution to biology or Sigmund Freud's to
psychology. They were all founders of new schools of thought. Freud was the
first to draw attention to the subconscious and the significance of sex, even if
he was a bit off with the sex-related defining features of human behavior that he
proposed or the specific treatments he prescribed. Marx was the first to focus on
the role of economic factors in history and to propose the theory of a
stage-by-stage development of society from tribes to feudalism to capitalism
and, finally, to communism. Yet his dangerous prescription of revolution and
unrealistic promise of communism as the most progressive society with no
government or police and where people would work as much as they want to and
consume as much as they needed caused real havoc in Russia.
It is too bad for Russia that Marx did not foresee the opportunity that was
already dawning within the capitalist economies to create through technological
revolution, efficiency and high productivity enough goods for the entire society,
including a large and stable middle class. In the middle of the 19th century,
Marx believed that the impoverishment of the working class was inevitable. Half a
century later, Lenin also failed to see that the technical revolution was already
creating surplus goods in the West that were available and affordable for most
citizens. At the same time, however, higher wages and better social benefits did
not automatically appear. Rather, they were the result of the long struggle of
the working class and labor unions against management abuse. Oddly enough, the
working class in the West benefitted from the Bolshevik Revolution in the sense
that Western politicians and business leaders took unilateral steps to improve
the labor conditions of workers to avert similar social unrest or even
revolutions in their own countries.
Marx believed that the laborers the proletariat were the main production force
and the most advanced class. He belittled the role of the manager, the owner and
intellectual involvement in creating added value by organizing processes and
inventing machinery. Marx and later Lenin thought that the proletariat was the
"avant-garde" that would eventually install a new, just order. In reality, of
course, these poor laborers were the most unprepared class for ruling the country
because of their lack of experience of ownership and control. In their name, and
in the absence of institutions, a small group of power-hungry, tyrannical
opportunists seized power.
The Russian 19th-century philosopher and writer Pyotr Chaadayev once said
Russia's historical role is to teach the world a great lesson after failing
miserably in one of its great social, political or economic experiments so that
other countries don't repeat Russia's mistakes. This country tried out a theory
that had been invented in Europe and washed itself with blood before most other
countries rightfully decided to take paths other than the Marxist-Leninist one.
Like 90 percent of the Russian population, I did not celebrate National Unity Day
on Friday. We should over and over again, with tears of penitence, apologize to
the Poles because they more than any other nationality, except, of course,
Russians themselves suffered most from Stalin's bloody regime.
United or not, it is time to collect the stones. German philosopher Immanuel Kant
said life's two biggest wonders are the starry sky and the moral feeling in a
man. Russian poet Alexander Blok wrote in addressing his words to Russia: "Let
them mislead you and deceive you, you will not vanish, will not die."
Any talk of the decreased human potential and spoiled Russian gene pool caused by
the losses of the 20th century is unscientific. Since so many people were killed
or expelled from the country in the 20th century, we must be thankful that people
have retained their spirit and compassion. We did not succeed in obtaining a
guilty verdict against the Communist Party during a court case in the first half
of the 1990s, and, thus, we must learn to live with them.
But we must bury Lenin, as well as rebury others whose graves remain on Red
Square. That old, haunting specter should be locked in the closet or better,
chased out of Russia, just like in Russian Orthodox churches, where they chant
and chase out the evil spirit during baptism ceremonies.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
November 9, 2011
Khodorkovsky Warns of a Revolution
By Alexey Eremenko
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's government will be toppled by a revolution,
jailed former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky said in remarks released Tuesday, a
day after he decided not to seek parole on the grounds that Putin's government
would block it.
Khodorkovsky, once Russia's richest businessman, fielded dozens of questions
dealing with matters from the liberal reforms of the 1990s to whistleblower
Alexei Navalny, collected on Ekho Moskvy radio's web site and passed to him in
his Karelian prison.
Putin "has passed the point of no return" and will stay in power as long as he
can, facilitating stagnation that will erupt in a revolution, Khodorkovsky said,
the radio station reported.
Russia is lagging some 50 years behind Western European countries in terms of
development but could catch up within two decades, if the government stops
rebuilding an authoritarian empire that is putting the country on the brink of
"national suicide," he said.
Navalny, who exposes government corruption on his blog, and other activists like
opposition politician Boris Nemtsov and Khimki forest defender Yevgenia Chirikova
play a vital role in changing the current public climate, Khodorkovsky said. But
he admitted that he could not comment on Navalny's agenda at length because he
does not have access to the Internet.
He again denied accusations that he ordered rivals killed during his tenure at
Yukos. Putin accused Khodorkovsky, jailed until 2016, of having "blood on his
hands" last year.
Khodorkovsky on Monday announced that he would not seek parole even though he has
served two-thirds of his sentence, which qualifies him for early release. He
spoke after a district court in Karelia upheld a decision by prison officials to
slap him with a formal reprimand for sharing his cigarettes with inmates, a
violation of penitentiary rules. The reprimand gives the authorities a valid
pretext to deny him parole.
Khodorkovsky, however, seems resigned to remaining in prison for the foreseeable
One question that Ekho Moskvy submitted to Khodorkovsky asked: "Mikhail, so does
woe come from wit or money?" a paraphrase of the title of Alexander Griboyedov's
classic 1823 play, "Woe from Wit."
"Who am I to argue with Griboyedov?" Khodorkovsky replied.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
November 7, 2011
Language tests and museums for migrants
By Nathan Toohey
United Russia members have submitted a bill to the State Duma calling for
language tests for foreigners wanting to receive work permits for Russia.
The bill's authors say that working migrants' lack of Russian "leads to tensions
in society and creates a potential threat to interethnic harmony," Kommersant
reported on Monday.
The proposed changes, submitted by State Duma first deputy-speaker Oleg Morozov,
chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Legislation, Vladimir Pligin, head of
the Education Committee, Grigory Balykhin, and deputy Nikolai Bulayevo, would not
apply to all foreigners seeking work permits, however.
Only those applying to work in retail, housing and public utilities and the
services industries would be required to provide documentation confirming their
Russian language skills.
Elementary Russian
The bill calls for foreign workers in these fields to have "at least an
elementary" level of Russian, Kommersant reported. Acceptable documentation would
be a high school certificate issued in the USSR prior to September, 1991 or
similar education documentation issued in Russia after 1991.
Those without a formal Russian education would be required to sit an exam at
special testing centers located in higher education institutes.
Pligin told Kommersant that testing centers may also be established in those
countries which provide large numbers of migrant workers. Sitting a
Russian-language exam currently costs 3,000-6,000 rubles, the newspaper reported.
One in five speak no Russian
The head of the Federal Migration Service's department to facilitate integration,
Tatyana Bazhan, told Rossiiskaya Gazeta in September that 20 percent of migrants
from Central Asia did not speak Russian and that 50 percent could not fill out a
simple form.
Bazhan said that migrants' lack of Russian skills played into the hands of
unscrupulous employers, allowing migrants to "practically be lead into a system
of slave labor and sold to unconscientious employers," Rossiiskaya Gazeta quoted
Bazhan as saying.
Previous bill
In 2007, a similar bill was submitted to parliament by A Just Russia. The bill
called for employers to pay for migrants' testing, however, and bill failed to
"At the time the organizational conditions were not at the right level, now it is
a different matter," Pligin told Kommersant.
Migration and the Law informational rights center head Gavkhar Dzhurayeva did not
agree that the new legislation was necessary.
"Compulsory Russian-language knowledge is necessary when you apply for Russian
citizenship," Kommersant quoted Dzhurayeva as saying. "As for migrants involved
with physical heavy labor, they don't have time to go to language courses and if
the law is accepted it will create a new basis for corruption. One more
certificate that you can buy will be added to the list."
Museums for Migrants
Meanwhile, Moscow's new culture department head Sergei Kapkov was taking a
different approach to helping migrants integrate. The Museums for Migrants
program is to be launched next year, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on Sunday.
The program, run in conjunction with the Federal Migration Service, will take
working migrants to the city's museums, with the aim of educating migrants in the
cultural values of Moscow.
"We are trying to catch up with the [migration] process that is already taking
place and which is at its beginning stages. It is a very difficult stage, but we
need to move towards one another," Komsomolskaya Pravda quoted Kapkov as saying.
[return to Contents]
November 8, 2011
Average wage in Russia barely enough to survive
By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW, November 8 (Itar-Tass) On the eve of the elections in Russia the
authorities have announced an increase in the wages and salaries of certain
categories of citizens. However, the average wage remains low and it is enough
only to pay the utility bills and buy food and clothes. A majority of Russians
are pessimistically-minded.
As of January 1, 2012 the military's cash allowances will be increased 2.5 - 3
times, and military pensions, 1.5 - 1.7 times, as follows from a bill President
Dmitry Medvedev signed into law on Monday.
The monthly earning of a rank-and-file contractor in the Armed Forces will be 25
thousand rubles (surpluses and bonuses included), the remuneration of sergeants
on contract, about 34 thousand rubles, of lieutenants, about 50 thousand rubles,
and of colonels, over 60 thousand. ($ 1 = 30 rubles).
Meanwhile, according to the statistics service Rosstat, in September the average
monthly salary of Russians amounted to 23.6 thousand rubles, and incomes per
capita, to 20.1 thousand. According to sociologists, more than half of Russia's
population (53%) have enough money only for food, clothing and utilities. Then
one has to choose: leisure and entertainment or something more or less
substantial. For both people will have to save for a long time. Really expensive
purchases, which include housing in the first place, are affordable to less than
1% of Russians.
For daily needs (food, utilities, transportation and other expenses, which are
simply impossible to avoid), Russians spend about 70% of their revenues, says
Novyie Izvestia. It is believed that the share of food expenditures in the family
budget is the clearest indicator of its prosperity. The richer the person, the
less the share of spending on food, and the other way round. In developed
countries families spend on food by about 25% of the monthly income. The
situation in Russia is different.
The Levada-Center says that to buy food 23% of Russians spend two-thirds of
income, another 20% spend a little less than half, and 10% have to spend all
their money on food.
According to Novyie Izvestia estimates, the minimum monthly set of foods for one
Russian costs 7 thousand rubles. Clearly, such costs include no delicacies. Then
there follow the house rent and the utilities, travel expenses, purchases of
medicines, repairs, dry cleaning, and the hair dresser. Domestic pets take away
about one thousand rubles a month.
Even if one does not buy any clothing or household items, very little will be
left for culture and leisure. In the provinces the price of theater tickets
ranges from 250 rubles to 350 rubles. Ticket prices at Moscow's theaters start at
600 rubles. The average bill in a Moscow cafe per person is 500-600 rubles, and
in the regions, from 150 rubles to 250 rubles. The average price of one book -
300-350 rubles.
The remaining money can be spent on the purchase of household appliances. But in
this case a new small TV set will have to be saved for no less than six months.
The incomes as they are, it is clear: despite the fact that the "iron curtain"
fell long ago, most Russians have never been abroad and will never have a chance
to go there, the newspaper says. The prices of a week-long tour to Europe without
excursions range from 35 thousand rubles to 45 thousand.
Buying an apartment with one's own money in a major city is still an unattainable
goal for most Russians. To purchase a standard one-room apartment the people with
an average wage will have to forget about all expenses, including meals, for
decades. For the purchase of one-room apartment in the capital an employed
Muscovite will have to save 100% of the earnings for about 12 years, says
Nezavisimaya Gazeta with reference to the realtors.
In order to buy a one-bedroom apartment on the secondary market in a large
Russian city the average earner who has only one's own wage to rely on would have
to save money for at least six years, or at the most, for 40 years. The newspaper
says if the researchers took into account the fact that Russians can afford to
set aside only a half or one-third of their salary, then the result would be even
more disappointing.
But the real luxury for the average Russian is not an apartment or a car, but
children. The average family spends on one child 15-17 thousand rubles a month.
And what if there are two children, and the mother has to rear them alone? This
is precisely the case of 29-year-old Yulia Sergeyeva. "I have two children, one
is seven and the other, five," she told Noviye Izvestia. "On each I spend 14-15
thousand a month."
Irina Vlasova spends on her five-year-daughter a little more.
"I have to spend roughly 15-20 thousand rubles a month," she said.
"An income of 20 thousand rubles is only enough to make ends meet," said a senior
researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Leonty Byzov. "Of course, one cannot say that the money is enough to survive, it
would be an exaggeration. After all many Russians go on living and still manage
to somehow rear children. But that's pretty tight. You cannot save anything, you
have to abandon pay education and medicine, and quite often, rest and leisure."
The scientist says that over the past two decades Russia has seen a radical
change in the structure of expenditures, however, citizens' opportunities have
remained at the same level, and for some categories they have significantly
The last opinion poll by VTSIOM showed that 16% of the population fear that next
year they will live a worse life than they do now.
The network agency Amitel has conducted a survey of readers by asking them one
question: "Do you think that next year you (your family) will live a better life
or a worse life than now?" Of the 611 respondents 246 people believe that their
life will be slightly or significantly worse.
140 respondents think that the situation will not change. Optimists, who think
that their life will be much or somewhat better numbered 119.
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Russian deal with Georgia opens way to WTO
November 9, 2011
GENEVA - Russia signed a Swiss-brokered deal with Georgia on Wednesday that
removes the last big obstacle to Russia joining the World Trade Organization
after 18 years of negotiations.
Russia's accession will be the biggest step in world trade liberalisation since
China joined the WTO a decade ago, sealing Moscow's integration into the world
economy two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The breakthrough after three years of stalemate with Georgia came at the last
possible moment, one day before the WTO meets to finalise overall terms for
Russia's entry.
"The whole Russian-Georgian package is now ready," said Russia's chief negotiator
Maxim Medvedkov.
"It's over. We've signed the document," said Sergi Kapanadze, Georgian deputy
foreign minister and senior negotiator. "There are no more obstacles from Georgia
to Russia to becoming a member of the WTO."
Both sides had hailed a compromise deal last week, after shuttle diplomacy by
Swiss President Micheline Calmy-Rey, whose government brokered the deal.
Lingering mistrust meant that many trade officials had been wary of saying the
obstacle was cleared until both sides had signed a final agreement.
One participant said the negotiation had been like a game of chess throughout,
with tiny Georgia using its WTO veto to claw back some leverage over Russia,
which routed Georgian forces in a war over a border region three years ago.
Georgia had been under strong pressure from the United States and European Union
to let Russia into the WTO, widely seen as a prize not worth sacrificing because
of a border dispute between Russia and its tiny southern neighbour.
The United States has been a strong backer of Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili, whose government sent troops to fight alongside U.S. forces in Iraq,
and the EU is offering a free trade agreement, details of which are not yet
Georgian negotiators have denied they were swayed by diplomatic lobbying and say
the EU trade deal has no link with the Russian talks, always maintaining they
felt no pressure to let Russia join the WTO.
Russian accession, adding its $1.9 trillion economy to the vast bulk of the world
that is already subject to WTO trade rules, will force Moscow to accept
international standards and scrutiny and could add 3 percent to its gross
domestic product in the short term, according to the World Bank.
It will also be a big morale-booster for the WTO, the guardian of the world
trading system, which has suffered a deep crisis of confidence over the failure
of ten years of talks on deepening world trade, the so-called Doha round.
"We are delighted that agreement has been reached between Georgia and the Russian
Federation. We congratulate them and we congratulate the Swiss mediators," WTO
spokesman Keith Rockwell told Reuters.
A WTO committee is expected to finalise and publish Russia's membership terms
later this week, handing it on to a meeting of trade ministers in December for
final approval.
After that it only remains for Russia itself to ratify its membership. Approval
by parliament is likely before an election next March that is expected to return
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to the presidency.
Accession will send a signal to companies and investors that Russia, the world's
largest energy producer, is starting to move closer to a rule-based system of
doing business.
It should boost investment as foreign firms see Russia as a more stable place. In
2010, $41.2 billion of foreign direct investment entered Russia, but $51.7
billion left Russia for opportunities elsewhere, a net outflow of more than $10
billion, according to U.N. figures.
The Swiss Foreign Ministry said the deal between Georgia and Russia had
established a mechanism to regulate customs administration and supervision of
commercial goods, with a private company monitoring trade and Switzerland acting
as a neutral thrid party in case of disputes.
"With this agreement, the parties have paved the way for Russia to join the WTO
in the near future," the ministry said in a statement.
"Switzerland is convinced that this measure will lead to improved economic
development for Russia and for Georgia."
[return to Contents]
Russia Beyond the Headlines
November 9, 2011
Russia's accession to the WTO creates incentives and timetables
Russia's membership in the WTO will be a powerful catalyst to raise its economic
and industrial record.
By Chris Weafer, Troika Dialog
Russia finally looks set to conclude its WTO entry negotiations, which began in
June 1993, and gain admittance as a full member at the WTO Council meeting in
December. Membership, while not offering any quick fix to the generally poor
business environment or the high level of investor skepticism toward investment
risk in Russia, will nevertheless be a very important step in the government's
efforts to force industries to become more efficient and to attract larger
volumes of foreign and domestic-sourced investment capital.
WTO membership will have no immediate impact either on economic growth, the
day-to-day operations of Russia's corporations or the risk premium investors
apply to investment in the country. But membership will establish a powerful
catalyst for a more serious approach to economic reform and industrial
efficiency. As the benefits of those changes materialize, sustainable incremental
economic growth may reach between 1 percent and 3 percent annually (according to
the World Bank), while a gradual reduction in the risk premium will significantly
cut the discount at which Russian equities have consistently traded against
global market peers.
Membership will therefore create a framework for the next government's agenda to
create greater efficiency and diversification in the economy, just as World Cup
2018 will provide a timetable for improvements in key parts of the nation's
infrastructure. Such timelines and external pressures can, of course, be ignored
or missed. That is something investors will only find out over the next few
years. But the greater government support for WTO membership this year, after
more than 17 years of indifference, does at least confirm that the long period of
domestic preparation is at an end, and now it is time for openness and
European companies are initially better placed to benefit from Russia's WTO
entry. Trade with the EU dominates Russia's external trade, and industry
relationships have been more integrated for longer. Opportunities for U.S.
companies will be constrained because of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, but because
the terms of that amendment are specifically in violation of the terms of WTO
membership, Russia will have to be removed from the provisions very quickly once
it has been admitted to the global trade organization. For all the political
blustering in the U.S. Congress, Jackson-Vanik will go almost by default given
Russia's entry to the WTO. Otherwise, U.S. companies would lose out.
Economic sector specifics
Each of our sector analysts has looked at the potential impact of WTO entry on
their sectors. The conclusion is the same in almost all cases: There will not be
any immediate change, and/or the industry has already adopted international best
practices and is in the process of changing to meet greater international
competition, both at home and abroad. But, of course, membership will keep the
pressure for change and set a definite timeline.
In terms of big-picture changes:
Consumer goods: Domestic producers will face greater competition from cheaper
imports. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has already singled out this sector for
protection and measures to help it become more efficient.
Monopolies: WTO membership will require greater liberalization on the domestic
energy market and an end to what are perceived as state subsidies in the gas
sector. In effect, this should mean a more competitive domestic gas market,
albeit with prices moving closer to the net export price, and greater access for
independent producers. It should also mean an end to Gazprom's export monopoly.
But none of this is new or unexpected, and investors are already largely
factoring in these changes to their stock views.
Manufacturing: Expect a lengthy period of transition before companies in the
manufacturing sector across the board face competition from imports. Putin has
made that very clear on a number of occasions.
Exporters: These will face fewer export obstacles in terms of import tariffs and
quotas (which are currently mainly affecting the steelmakers). These tariffs and
quotas will also only be phased out gradually, rather than overnight with
The experience of other countries in the WTO is that, far from negatively
impacting domestic industry as some critics claimed, WTO membership has led to
accelerated development, as local companies have had no choice but to raise their
game to compete with established international operators.
[return to Contents]
New York Times
November 9, 2011
Can the W.T.O. Change Russia?
By DOMINIC FEAN
Dominic Fean is a junior research fellow at the Russia/New Independent States
Center at the French Institute of International Relations.
If Vladimir Putin returns as planned to the presidency in 2012, he will once
again face the challenge of modernizing the Russian economy. This is something
both he and his seat-warmer, Dmitri Medvedev, have failed to achieve during three
consecutive presidential terms. On Thursday, a meeting of the working group on
Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization is expected to end 18 years of
negotiations by finalizing terms of membership for Russia, the largest economy
outside of the trade body. Even Georgia, which fought a war with Russia in 2008,
is now onboard. Once the few remaining issues are overcome, Russia should become
a member during a ministerial meeting on Dec. 15.
W.T.O. membership will offer Russia some of the tools to rebalance its economy,
which relies heavily upon selling the nation's oil. Yet it presents challenges
too. While membership promises increased market access for Russian exports,
Moscow will have to open Russia to foreign imports. Agreements will need to be
implemented as a means to attract investment, stimulate trade and increase
competition. However, previous actions by the Russian authorities give ample
cause for concern.
The current political elite is little inclined toward economic liberalism. The
coercion of foreign investors in favor of national economic champions,
protectionism during the 2009 economic crisis and Russia's willingness to engage
in trade wars with neighboring states have demonstrated this. They have long seen
W.T.O. accession as a political rather than technical process: For them, tariff
reductions are concessions to trade partners, rather than a means to stimulate
trade and competition.
They also tend to view membership as an entitlement. During bilateral
negotiations with Georgia, Putin stated that it was down to the United States and
European Union to secure Russia's accession. As such, Russian authorities at the
highest level have demonstrated little affinity for W.T.O. principles.
A customs union among Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus is another constraint: It
has little economic justification and a 2009 plan for all three to join the
W.T.O. as one bloc nearly delayed Russian accession further. Moves have been
taken to reconcile customs union obligations with Russia's W.T.O. accession;
nevertheless, the project shows Russia's use of trade for political ends, aiming
to preserve Soviet era trade patterns that W.T.O. market access would likely
Industrial and agricultural lobbies have opposed entry, claiming that Russian
companies require more time before facing global competition. However, little has
been done to make Russian industry more efficient in the last 18 years, even
without unfettered competition.
The challenges of membership are not limited to economic policy; they also
undermine the political model that has come to define Russia since 2000. Under
Putin, Russian citizens accepted reduced political freedoms in exchange for
stability and economic growth. Within the W.T.O., Moscow will have fewer means to
support inefficient industries against competition from abroad. This could cause
problems for the 460 monotowns, which rely on one factory or industry for jobs
and public utilities.
Certainly, Russia does not stand to reap immediate rewards from membership. World
Bank studies stress that while all households will benefit in the long run, some
will confront initial challenges of retraining or relocation. The government will
struggle to maintain its legitimacy if it does not provide ample means for these
costs to be met.
As a major oil exporter, over 50 percent of its foreign trade is already tariff
free. However, the metallurgy and chemicals industries stand to gain from
increased market access and protection from antidumping measures. In time, other
industries will benefit from restructuring and increased productivity stimulated
by increased competition.
Russia needs foreign capital in order to affect its modernization and is aware of
the need to project a more positive investment image. World Bank analysis also
stresses that the largest gains from W.T.O. membership will come from increased
foreign investment in the Russian market for services. Clearly, W.T.O. membership
alone will not convince cautious investors, but opening the Russian economy to
international practices can only have positive benefits for the business climate.
Still, to become a truly open economy, Russia will need to use W.T.O. membership
as a springboard for wider economic change. It is Putin who will face the tough
realities of implementing W.T.O. commitments, leading an elite that has long
favored protectionism and subsidy over serious reform. However, the long-term
benefits of membership should outweigh the initial costs. Russia will first have
to make courageous decisions on which industries are truly sustainable and take
measures to protect the population from the upheaval of adjustment.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
November 9, 2011
Lagarde Says Russia Can Bolster IMF Funding
By Irina Filatova
The International Monetary Fund welcomes Russia's commitment to bolster financing
of the organization as part of measures to bail out the European economy,
managing director Christine Lagarde said Tuesday.
"Russia, like other BRICS countries, has indicated its willingness to reinforce
the funding and financing of the IMF. ... Certainly, the IMF would welcome
additional funding," she told a news conference in Moscow.
She did not provide any details on the possible size or time frame for the
investment, saying only that the IMF is "the vehicle that is preferred by
countries like Russia."
"Whatever the country whether it is Russia or the [United Kingdom] or a Latin
American country when they invest in the fund, they know that they invest for
the entire community and for their own benefit as well, because it is their money
and they get a return on it," said Lagarde, who met with President Dmitry
Medvedev and government officials during her three-day visit.
Russia has indicated that it is ready to provide additional support to the
indebted euro zone through the IMF beyond the country's existing commitment of
$10 billion, but is seeking greater weight in the organization in return.
Kremlin economic adviser Arkady Dvorkovich said Friday that Russia and its BRICS
peers will make a decision on their contribution to the fund in the next several
The specific size of additional funding is unlikely to be under discussion at the
moment, said Vyacheslav Smolyaninov, a strategist at UralSib Capital. More
important is that Russia has indicated its commitment to support the European
economy and got an encouraging response from the IMF, he said by telephone.
"There's undoubtedly understanding on the side of the Russian government that we
are interdependent," Smolyaninov said.
Russia, which has the world's third-largest international reserves, is well
positioned among emerging economies to help the euro zone, but it is crucial for
the country to understand bailout mechanisms, he said.
Russia, as well as other BRICS countries, has been hesitant to contribute
directly to the European Financial Stability Facility a rescue fund aimed at
fighting the debt crisis and Lagarde said this is because potential investors
like the emerging economies need more clarity on how the fund will work.
"The EFSF guidelines and operational functions are not yet sufficiently defined
for many investors to really make their determination and decide to invest," she
Russia is reluctant to invest directly into the fund because it is unclear who
could provide guarantees to investors that would buy the EFSF bonds and "how the
situation will evolve in a year," Smolyaninov said.
"From this point of view, one can understand countries that refrain from being
the first to invest into the EFSF," he said.
[return to Contents]
Russia Willing to Help Bail Out Euro Zone Nations - Putin
ST. PETERSBURG. Nov 7 (Interfax) - Russia would be willing to help bail out the
trouble-stricken euro zone countries, but would in return expect a higher status
in the International Monetary Fund "and other structures of this kind," Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said.
"Recently Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev spoke about this at the G20 meeting. He
said that we as members of the IMF would be able to take part in this joint work
via IMF instruments. It is in our interest that there should be no problems in
the euro zone, that problems should be minimized," Putin told a news conference
after a prime minister-level meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in
St. Petersburg.
"We won't link this to energy or to anything else," he said, but "we, of course,
expect that, if countries such as Russia and the People's Republic of China take
an active part in global efforts to improve the situation, it will affect our
status in organizations such as the IMF and other structures of this kind."
Putin said euro zone problems had not received much attention at the SCO meeting.
The meeting had focused on problems facing SCO member states, he said.
"But, of course, what happens in the euro zone affects us, and does so very
directly as well. In any case, we, neither Russia nor China - these are, after
all, the main SCO countries from the point of view of economic potential - have
none of the problems the euro zone has," Putin said.
Neither Russia nor China have "astronomical" sovereign debts such as some euro
zone countries, he added.
The sovereign debts are on average 85% to 87% of gross domestic product in
stricken euro zone countries and more than 100% of GDP in some of them, Putin
said. "We have nothing of the kind, in Russia there is 10% sovereign debt, and
only 3% of that - virtually zero - is foreign borrowings," he said.
This means Russia has a sound financial system, Putin said.
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
November 7, 2011
Can Russia avoid a new crisis?
By Tim Wall , editor
With the United States and Europe plunged into a second wave of debt, economic
crisis and austerity, can Russia avoid the same fate?
That's one of the key questions we'll be asking this Wednesday at The Moscow
News' public debate: 'Is Wall Street to blame?'
The question of whether the contagion will spread to Russia is one that has been
vexing the country's leaders, who have so far come up with different analyses and
President Dmitry Medvedev, speaking at last week's G20 summit in Cannes, urged
European leaders to act forcefully to tackle the debt crisis effectively backing
the EU-IMF policy of tough austerity measures, job cuts and slashing social
In contrast, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin odds-on to return to the Kremlin next
year has taken a more critical stance toward Western governments' cuts programs,
expressing sympathy with 'Occupy Wall Sreet' protesters in the U.S. and Europe.
While Medvedev appears to be backing cuts, Putin is insisting that maintaining
spending programs and investment in jobs is the way to avoid social unrest
erupting here in the future.
The differences within Russia's government mirror the splits internationally,
where bankers and the IMF are demanding that ordinary citizens pay for the
crisis, while other economists warn of the dangers of a recessionary spiral if
austerity is pushed through too strongly.
But the differences between the Kremlin and the White House are probably more
tactical nuances than firm policy differences.
No one in the tandem is suggesting the more radical steps proposed by the
'Occupy' protesters such as making the big banks and speculators pay for a
crisis that many argue was of their own making.
Which approach Russia takes, and whether it can stop the global crisis spreading
here, remains to be seen.
With Greece's crisis pushing the eurozone ever nearer to collapse, one thing is
for sure: the debate over Lenin's 'What is to be done?' is just as important as
Russia's other perennial question: 'Who's to blame?'
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
November 9, 2011
The Coming Flood of Capital
By Ben Aris
Ben Aris is editor/publisher of Business New Europe.
A flood of capital is headed toward Russia, and the water is already rising fast.
This may seem a funny time to be predicting booms in borrowing, given that the
West is teetering (yet again) on the edge of the abyss. At time of writing, Italy
was due to vote on expelling Silvio Berlusconi and possibly precipitating a
European-wide meltdown thanks to the country's gigantic sovereign debt of well
over $1 trillion.
But the fund managers we talk to are getting excited. Clearly there is still a
lot of rubbish to deal with in the short term, and a major meltdown in the EU
would hurt everyone, but at the same time, the East is looking well prepared to
deal with this possibility: Debt is low, reserves have recovered to $525 billion
as of Nov. 1, and in Russia, the consumer spending that drives growth is
recovering faster than anyone expected, which is the most stable form of growth
that Russia has.
Fund managers are saying this crisis will convince investors in the West that
they no longer have a choice: Allocations to emerging markets in general, and
Russia in particular, will have to increase.
"We've been arguing for a while now that emerging markets would attract a flood
of cash as investors despaired of developed markets ... eurobond issuance by
region and type of issuer confirms this," Charles Robertson, chief economist at
Renaissance Captial, wrote in a note this morning. "International securities
issued by emerging market banks, corporates and sovereigns have been running at a
total of around $80 billion per quarter since the third quarter of 2009. ... We
have never seen such huge ability to borrow by emerging markets via eurobonds."
Indeed, we have already seen the vanguard arrive. Over the summer, several
strategic retail investors committed themselves to expanding in Russia. Just the
deals and pledges in the last year from PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Unilever, KFC, Burger
King, Wendy's and Dunkin' Donuts add up to about $9 billion. Add Siemens, Auchan,
Jones Lang LeSalle, BP, Kraft Foods, Tele2, Danone and Disney, and that amount
Why is all this investment coming now if things are so unstable? The world has
been turned upside down by this crisis. Western debt and deficit figures and
nearly all of the "developed" markets have emerging market-like problems, while
"emerging" markets for the most part have very robust fundamentals.
A more explicit illustration: The new IMF head Christine Lagarde was in Moscow
this week to drum up support for a rescue package, and the rest of the world is
hoping against hope that Russia and especially China will step in to bail them
out. That means the United States and Europe, with per capita incomes on the
order of 30,000 euros per year, are hoping that countries with per capita incomes
of between 3,000 euros and 14,000 euros will rescue them.
Russia's strong position is thanks to former Finance Minister Alexei "Mr.
Prudence" Kudrin, and despite all this new money on offer, the Russians have
remained prudent: From the major emerging markets, Russian companies are
borrowing the least.
It was the "bonanza borrowing" in the run-up to the 2008 crisis that caused so
much damage in the worst of the meltdown (a classic cause of financial crises, as
described by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their recent book "This Time
Is Different"). Russia's hesitance to borrow only improves the country's position
should it come to another Italy-inspired crunch. It seems that Russians are
suffering from the "once bitten, twice shy" syndrome.
[return to Contents]
Moscow TImes
November 9, 2011
Signs of an Island of Stability for Now
By Martin Gilman
Martin Gilman, a former senior representative of the International Monetary Fund
in Russia, is a professor at the Higher School of Economics.
Upon leaving Cannes this past weekend after two days of fruitless discussions at
the Group of 20 Summit, President Dmitry Medvedev was no doubt in good company.
Along with Chinese President Hu Jintao and U.S. President Barack Obama, they were
all probably wondering why they had even bothered to come. As it turned out, the
singular focus of the summit, chaired by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, was
the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone.
Instead of dealing with urgent issues to redress global imbalances that are
fostering politically unsustainable levels of unemployment and dangers of
recourse to trade and capital controls, the unfortunate non-European powers in
attendance were put in the embarrassing position of being asked to contribute
money to help forestall the contagion of the euro-zone crisis from Greece to
Italy, Portugal and Spain. The assembled leaders failed to agree on even the easy
issues such as increasing the resources of the International Monetary Fund,
dashing the hopes of European governments keen to tap the world's new creditors
to buttress their crisis-fighting efforts.
Put on the spot about his contribution, Medvedev, like his Chinese counterpart,
did say money could be considered later, once the Europeans have implemented a
credible plan to resolve the euro-zone crisis.
Prior to the G20 meeting of finance ministers, scheduled for February, the
Russian leadership should perhaps refocus its attention on a smaller group of
like-minded creditor countries that share a common interest in protecting their
assets. Russia should take the lead. Medvedev laid down the appropriate marker at
Cannes by noting that the BRICS nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa expect more voting rights at the IMF in exchange for their support.
Fortunately for Russia, the inconclusive meetings in Cannes entail no immediate
risks at least in the short-run.
Lost in the Greek tragedy and the subsequent flight to safety to U.S. dollar
assets, Russia's performance has continued to improve. Despite growing pessimism
over the prospects of the global economy, the most recent statistics suggest that
growth remains robust in Russia. The Economic Development Ministry has raised its
estimate for third-quarter 2011 real gross domestic product growth to 5.1
percent. Moreover, according to Troika Dialog, there is increasing evidence that
growth has been stronger than officially reported, especially earlier in the year
and even in 2010. The numbers for some sectors have just recently been revised
upward such as construction, investment and wholesale trade, though the aggregate
national accounts remain unrevised and puzzling.
From the perspective of the G20, one of the main economic policy concerns is
unemployment. In Russia, the monthly unemployment rate decreased further to 6
percent in September, from 6.6 percent a year earlier and 7.6 percent in
September 2009. Meanwhile, gross monthly wages are growing by 14 percent this
year, which means that, even after average annual inflation of just over 7
percent, there is a real gain of around 7 percent. With real disposable income
buoyant, it is not surprising that retail sales recorded a 9.2 percent real
increase in September over a year earlier.
Another main concern globally is whether there is a banking sector that can
support this growth. In Russia, both the supply side and the demand side of the
banking sector look benign relative to many other countries. On the supply side,
the country's banking sector actually does not have any net foreign financing.
Commercial banks on the whole are actually net creditors to the rest of the
world, unlike many banks in the Baltic states or Eastern Europe that have to
worry about refinancing wholesale funding or shrinking their balance sheets.
Furthermore, because household income is actually growing rapidly, Russia also
has strong growth in bank deposits so strong that the savings rate has moved to
record levels.
On the demand side, Central Bank data show that retail and corporate loan growth
has recovered from the impact of the early 2009 global crisis.
In terms of the sustainability of growth, a third issue in many countries
especially in Europe, Japan and the United States is the fear that budgets will
have to be curtailed because public finances are inherently unsustainable. But
this is not the case in Russia; at least not while oil prices are high. Most
important, there are no spending cuts. Government expenditures have increased
during 2011, and this has provided crucial support for the economy. As a whole,
the expected balanced budget for the year is driven by higher-than-expected
revenues and is a sign of robust growth.
Since Russia has less than 10 percent of GDP of public foreign debt and more than
$500 billion in foreign exchange reserves, of which $140 billion are in sovereign
funds, it does not have any problem financing itself. From a classic
sustainability perspective, there is no need for concern.
On the whole, macroeconomic performance is strong, and growth is reasonable in
the short-run. Thus, annual GDP growth could easily reach 4.5 percent or higher
this year.
If the political leadership is prepared to slash budgetary spending should oil
prices start to slump, the country's financial future will be still be in better
shape than many other countries. In any event, its relatively robust growth will
serve as a modest driver of the global economy.
The risk is that Russia's politicians may succumb to the usual temptation to
bloat spending, as if high oil prices were a permanent and stable feature of the
global economy. This is the country's Achilles' heel in the medium term.
Understandably, both Russian and foreign investors view the country as risky from
a macroeconomic standpoint not to mention the country's other institutional
weaknesses, such as substandard rule of law, poor protection of property rights
and the general weak legal framework.
Some tough political decisions after the elections will be needed to control
budgetary spending, and the country's future prospects will depend more than ever
on structural measures to diversify the economy away from its high dependence on
natural resource exports. Membership in the World Trade Organization should
support this process.
Russians may not appreciate it yet, but they are enjoying a sweet spot, which
stands in sharp contrast to the immediate austerity and decline facing Greece and
other heavily indebted countries.
[return to Contents]
November 9, 2011
Launch of Nord Stream spells economic, political benefits for Russia
By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW, November 9 (Itar-Tass) The launch of the gas pipeline Nord Stream, which
took place in the German city of Lubmin on Tuesday to herald the start of
straight Russian gas traffic to Europe bypassing Ukraine and Belarus, will spell
both economic benefits and big political dividends for Russia, analysts say.
Although many will feel offended, especially Ukraine, for which the launch of the
gas pipeline means a loss of 700 million dollars of annual revenues from transit.
Europe also continues to express concern about its growing energy dependence on
The 1,224-kilometer-long gas carrier, which began to be laid in April 2010,
consists of two parallel pipes with a throughput of 27.5 billion cubic meters
each. On Tuesday, one of the two lines went operational. The construction of the
other is to be completed by the end of 2012. Today it is ready more than 70%.
When commissioned, Nord Stream will be able to deliver to the EU 55 billion cubic
meters of Russian gas per year. In other words, this will allow Gazprom to
control a third of the European gas market.
Nord Stream's shareholders are Gazprom (51%), Germany's Wintershall Holding and
E. ON Ruhrgas (15.5% each), France's GDF Suez and the Netherlands' Gasunie (9%).
According to the Russian side, Nord Stream cost 8.8 billion euros to lay. As
Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov said, Nord Stream will not pay off soon. The
intention is it will stay in operation for 30-50 years.
The target markets for Nord Stream are Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands,
France, Denmark and some other countries.
One of the reasons that prompted Moscow to come up with North Stream and South
Stream projects was the dependence of the transit of Russian gas to Europe on
Kiev and Minsk, and the reluctance of the transit countries to share with Gazprom
control of the gas transit system. Whereas the question of gaining control over
Beltransgaz is to be resolved with Minsk before the end of the year, Kiev is
still stubborn.
Gazpromexport CEO Alexander Medvedev has made some soothing statements addressed
to Belarus. He said there was no risk of a reduction of Russian gas transit
through its territory via the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline even when the new
pipeline achieves capacity operation.
At the same time the launch of the pipeline is an extremely unpleasant news for
Ukraine, which risks losing part of the revenues from the transit of Russian gas.
Alexander Medvedev said yesterday that cuts would affect transit precisely
through Ukraine.
Last year, the Ukrainian gas pipeline system transited to Europe 95.4 billion
cubic meters of Russian gas, that is, two-thirds of the amount Gazprom exports to
destinations outside the CIS. On this transit Naftogaz Ukrainy earned 1.3 billion
dollars of net profit.
The international rating agency Fitch has already decided that the launch of a
new pipeline could adversely affect the development of Naftogaz Ukrainy.
According to Fitch experts, the gas traffic and the revenues will fall by about
The launch of the pipeline actually means the weakening of Ukraine's stance at
the negotiations on the most controversial issue in bilateral relations with
Russia: gas prices. According to Kiev, Russia abuses its position of a monopoly
supplier, demanding for its gas "an excessive and unfair" price.
There is a way out, though, experts say. Moscow is still interested in the
Ukrainian pipeline system. And the launch of Nord Stream will surely become one
of the means of putting pressure on Kiev to achieve Gazprom's long-sought goal.
This has been confirmed by a high-ranking source in the Russian delegation to the
daily Kommersant. According to the official, Moscow and Kiev "continue to conduct
highly secret negotiations on a formula of sharing the Ukrainian gas pipeline
For Europe, the exclusion of Ukraine as a transit country from the scheme of gas
supplies is positive news, pointing to a reduction of transit risks, the
newspaper quotes Vitaly Kryukov, of the IFD Kapital, as saying.
However, no rapid warming of the gas relationship between Europe and Russia
followed the launch of the gas pipeline. The European commissioner for energy,
Guenther Oettinger, whom the Russian side sees almost as a chief opponent of
Gazprom in Europe, alongside very complimentary statements about Nord Stream also
said the cultural contradictions of the EU and Russia still remain, which means
that Europe will still be looking for ways of reducing dependence on Russian gas
supplies, primarily those in Asia.
For this reason, while supporting Nord Stream, the EU keeps a negative attitude
to South Stream, which is still embryonic. The new southern route will take away
additional gas from the Ukrainian gas transportation system, but it will not
reduce transit risks for Europe. Meanwhile, the EU has its own plans for southern
pipelines bypassing Russia, the main of which - Nabucco - is a direct competitor
of the South Stream.
In Russia there is now an excess pipeline capacity that can be manipulated with,
says Vedomosti. Many will feel offended and angry: the Baltic countries, Poland
and Ukraine, which will lose the transit gas flows, and which will now have to
change much in their energy and fiscal policies. Europe, too, is full of fears.
Newspapers have been writing about growing energy dependence on Russia, which
already provides nearly a quarter of gas the EU consumes. There has been much
speculation about the dangers of gas-based friendship between Russia and Germany.
"Russia's political gains from the launch of Nord Stream will be huge," says the
periodical. "The most obvious advantage is that the reliability of Russian gas
supplies to Europe will objectively increase. Which is important in the highly
competitive European market and Gazprom's reputation, spoiled by gas wars
The other advantage is Nord Stream significantly expands the capabilities of
Russia for political and economic bargaining with Belarus and Ukraine, the
newspaper says. The excess pipeline capacity will completely outperform
Belarusian transit. For instance, it may be used as a punishment for Belarus's
bad behavior and an encouragement for Ukraine's good conduct, or to minimize
transit through Ukraine, the general director of East European Gas Analysis,
Mikhail Korchemkin explains.
[return to Contents]
November 9, 2011
Author: not indicated
[Nord Stream was finally launched, yesterday.]
At long last, Russian gas is taking a direct route to Europe now.
Russia, Germany, France, and the Netherlands launched Nord Stream,
a gas pipeline that connected Russia with Germany across the
Baltic Sea. It became Vladimir Putin's personal triumph. It was
Putin who had the gas pipeline constructed in the first place
despite the cost and risks.
Nord Stream will change a great deal. What with Nord Stream
up and running, Russia has a choice of what gas pipeline across
what country to use. Some neighbors are bound to feel slighted.
The Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine will stop being transit
countries now (or at least stop being them to the usual extent).
These countries will have to change their energy and budget
policies accordingly. Newspapers are having a field day already on
what they call Europe's increasing energy dependance on Russia. As
matters stand, Russia meets almost one fourth of Europe's gas
demands. Newspapers speculate on the dangers of gas friendship
between Russia and Germany (implying that Nord Stream might serve
as a foundation for a dangerous alliance resembling the Molotov-
Ribberntrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in
1939). Gazprom the bugaboo is even more frightening now. Launch of
Nord Stream strengthened its repute of "Putin's energy weapon",
one Putin is using to promote his imperial ambitions.
Political benefits of the Nord Stream start-up for Russia are
enormous indeed. Reliability of gas deliveries to Europe will
increase. Gazprom's European customers may rest assured now that
no political conflicts or technological catastrophes will
interfere with gas export to Europe. It is important, considering
fierce competition in the European market and Gazprom's own repute
kind of smeared in gas wars with Ukraine.
Nord Stream greatly strengthens Russia's positions in the
political and economic dialogue with Belarus and Ukraine. It is
possible now for Russia to bypass Belarus altogether and greatly
reduce transitirector General Mikhail Korchemkin reckoned that
Moscow would be certainly doing so in the relations with its
neighbors, as a reward or warning.
Also importantly, it is possible for Russia to leave Poland
or Slovakia without gas - and do so without compromising gas
export to other European countries.
In a word, the fears of European politicians are not entirely
The cost of all these benefits is considerable as well. The
cost of the whole system amounts to nearly 20 billion euros and
Gazprom is supposed to cover more than 50% of the whole sum.
Getting this money back will certainly take time. It requires that
European customers go on buying the same volumes of gas from
Russia in the future. And that is not assured in the least. The
energy-saving policy might affect the demand for gas throughout
Europe. It follows that it is Russian consumers who will have to
pay for the investments in the gas pipeline.
There is always the danger that Nord Stream will find itself
short of gas. With the second pipeline constructed, Gazprom's
export capacities will increase to 225 billion cubic meters a
year. As things stand, however, it only has contracts for 158
billion cubic meters a year... Gazprom might find it necessary to
re-route gas from other directions and first and foremost from
Ukraine. New political troubles await Russia with Ukraine.
According to the Russian-Ukrainian transit agreement, at least 110
billion cubic meters of gas ought to be exported to Europe via
Ukraine every year until 2019. Where Gazprom will get all this gas
for Ukrainian transit remains to be seen yet.
[return to Contents]
Valdai Discussion Club
November 8, 2011
Russia's foreign policy after 2012
Valdaiclub.com interview with Fyodor Lukyanov, participant of the VIII summit of
the Valdai International Discussion Club, EditorinChief of the Russia in Global
Affairs journal.
Is Russia likely to face abrupt changes in its foreign policy after the elections
in 2012?
No, it isn't. First, there are no abrupt changes underway in Russia in general.
On the contrary, continuity prevails across the board. President Dmitry Medvedev
and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will only switch positions. Both will remain in
power. Medvedev has pursued the tandem's line rather than his own in 2008-2011.
Putin's return may change the style or shift some accents but that's about it.
Second, the window of opportunity is narrow. Russia is facing many urgent
development problems and the main goal of foreign policy is to create favorable
conditions for their resolution. This goal allows for broad interpretation and
can be achieved in different ways but the restrictions are obvious to preserve
freedom of action without allowing its relations with major partners to
deteriorate too much.
Third, policy today and especially in the next few years will be determined by
constantly changing external circumstances, which are so unpredictable that no
strategy is possible at all. All you can do is react and stay flexible.
Many Russian and foreign experts believe that the Russian-American reset will go
nowhere after 2012 and Russia will reorient its foreign policy to China and the
new Asia. Do you share this view?
The two countries have successfully completed the reset. They have normalized
relations and ended the deadlock that had resulted by the end of the George W.
Bush administration. The reset had a limited agenda and was achieved. New
elements are required in any event, but they may not appear before the spring of
2013 after the elections in Russia and the United States when an empowered
administration takes office and formulates its proposals.
Even if Russia reorients its foreign policy to China and the new Asia, which is
not guaranteed, it will not regard America less important, as the U.S. is a major
player in the Pacific.
The shifting of attention to this region may in fact renew Russian-U.S. relations
by ending their fixation on the Euro-Atlantic space. The future of U.S. missile
defense not only in Europe but also probably in Asia will remain an unavoidable
irritant. As for Asia, this project will be a major factor with respect to China,
although without threatening Russia's strategic potential.
What will Russia gain from its Eurasian project? Do you think China will join
this project? Is it a threat to the European countries?
If you are referring to the Eurasian Union proclaimed by Vladimir Putin, there is
one country, Ukraine that will determine whether this project will produce a
serious and promising association or will remain just an interesting idea. Russia
and the European Union (EU) will be competing, first and foremost, over Ukraine,
to the extent to which the EU will be able to divert itself from its urgent
internal issues.
The EU's nervous reaction to this idea shows its apprehensions about the
emergence of an integration alternative for post-Soviet countries, though it is
not yet convinced that this alternative will be successful.
China will never join projects proposed by other countries because it is a
project in itself. Beijing does not like the Eurasian Union idea because it wants
to create a vast Eurasian free trade zone where China would be able to freely
sell its goods, manpower and capital. Integration centered on another power,
Russia, may restrict this goal.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
November 9, 2011
Putin's Vision to Become a Post-Imperial Leader
By Dmitry Trenin
Dmitry Trenin is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.
Russia's 2012 presidential election is already effectively over since Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin has decided to reclaim his old Kremlin office. By all
indications, Putin plans to stay in the Kremlin for two more presidential terms
another 12 years as he is enabled to do by the recently amended Constitution. So
who will be the country's next president is now a certainty. Less obvious is what
he hopes to achieve.
One issue, however, has now shot to the top of Russia's political agenda:
Eurasian integration. In early October, Putin wrote an article in Izvestia that
proclaimed what appears to be his reigning foreign policy goal: a "Eurasian
Union" of former Soviet states. Two weeks later, in St. Petersburg, he hosted a
meeting of Commonwealth of Independent States prime ministers, eight of whom
signed an agreement establishing a free trade area among their countries. On Jan.
1, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, which now form a customs union, will join a
single economic space.
And Putin wants even more: a Eurasian Schengen free movement of people among the
three countries, built on the example of the European Union by 2015, followed by
a currency union and, ultimately, full economic integration. Indeed, Putin wants
to restructure Russia's relations with the former Soviet states to create not
merely a bigger market, but eventually an economic bloc-cum-security alliance.
The feasibility of this plan is not to be taken for granted. Ever since the
Soviet Union collapsed 20 years ago, there has been much talk about reintegrating
the successor states. Little has come of it, owing mainly to Russia's reluctance
to support the other countries financially. At the same time, the other CIS
countries have maintained an overriding focus on their own state-building and
independence vis-a-vis Russia. Both factors, however, may now be changing at
least somewhat.
Russia, which six years ago abruptly ended its energy subsidies to Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova and others, is now expressing interest in supporting some of its
struggling neighbors, in exchange for some of their most lucrative assets. During
the 2008-09 global crisis, Moscow began to strengthen its regional economic
standing and promote the establishment of the customs union with Belarus and
Kazakhstan, even at the risk of complicating its own bid for membership in the
World Trade Organization.
For Russia's partners, too, the current forms of integration, such as the customs
union and the forthcoming single economic space, are pragmatic arrangements that
serve their interests. In Belarus and Kazakhstan combined, Russia has gained 25
million potential new consumers; Belarus and Kazakhstan, for their part, have
widened their access to the 140-million-strong Russian market.
The Russian market is also attractive to many others, from tiny Kyrgyzstan to
sizable Ukraine. In Ukraine's case, for example, the prospects of closer
association with the EU have dimmed recently, owing to the EU's internal
difficulties, as well as to the Ukrainian authorities' politically motivated
prosecution of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
In his much-quoted Izvestia piece, Putin denied that his new integration plans
are aimed at restoring the Soviet Union under another name. This is a credible
claim for three basic reasons: the complete evaporation of Russia's imperial
elan, its unwillingness to pay other countries bills and the new countries
unwillingness to cede too much sovereignty to the former hegemon.
Consequently, Russia has been strict about the terms of its financial assistance
to Belarus, pressing its government to open up its economy to Russian businesses.
And for all their interest in the Russian market, neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan
has acceded to the Kremlin's desire that they recognize the independence of
Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.
Putin is ambitious, but he is also cautious. He probably sees that only mutual
economic interest can do the trick. Creating a new Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance or COMECON, the Soviet-era trade bloc or a new Warsaw Pact is as
impossible as a latter-day Soviet Union. Eurasian economic integration, if it
stands a chance, must follow a different path.
If all parties concerned join voluntarily and proceed in a step-by-step manner
as with the EU or the North American Free Trade Agreement Eurasian integration
will benefit all of those involved. Rather than behaving like an empire secretly
trying to reinvent itself, Russia has an opportunity to become a regional leader.
But Eurasian integration will fail if Russia's partners see the process as the
Kremlin's attempt at political domination.
All of this has geopolitical implications. In Eastern Europe, Russia is clearly
drawing Belarus closer and is competing with the EU over Ukraine's future
economic orientation. Meanwhile, in Central Asia, Russia, having built strong
economic ties with Kazakhstan, is now reaching out to Kyrgyzstan, thus competing
more actively with neighboring China. Rather than choosing between Brussels and
Beijing, Moscow now seeks to turn Russia's post-imperial neighborhood into a
community. And as a long-term goal, Putin envisions a close economic relationship
between his Eurasian Union and the EU in what he calls a Greater Europe.
In the West, Putin's best-remembered statement about the Soviet Union described
its end as the "greatest catastrophe of the 20th century." But Putin's other
comments, less familiar to Western readers, refer to the Soviet system as
"unviable." In his ruthless judgment, those who want the Soviet Union back "have
no brains."
Twenty years after the loss of its 20th-century empire, Russia is ready to move
toward a new kind of integration with its former provinces. This is not intended
as a threat to others. Rather, economic integration is a test of how much Russia
has learned about the world since 1991 and of how much more modern it has become
as a result.
[return to Contents]
SCO Not To Be Counterbalance to NATO, More Concerned With Economics
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 8, 2011
Report by Vladimir Skosyrev, under the rubric "Today: In the World": "The SCO
Will Not Become a Counterweight to NATO -- The Participants in the Summit Meeting
Concentrated on Economics"
A meeting of the heads of the governments of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) took place in Strelnya near St. Petersburg yesterday. The six
states are creating an energy club where projects that are for now stalled will
be discussed. This topic was discussed by Vladimir Putin and Wen Jiabao, who
headed the delegations of the Russian Federation and the PRC. At the conference
there was also talk of protection from the crisis in the eurozone.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan are represented along with Russia and China, was created 10 years
ago. The session in the Konstantinovskiy Palace near St. Petersburg, which almost
coincided with the anniversary date, demonstrated that the SCO has acquired
definite influence in the international arena. There is reason that Pakistan,
which Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani represented as an observer, wants to join the
SCO. Iran expressed the very same desire. India and Mongolia also have the status
of observers.
In that way, together with the observers, the SCO represents almost two-thirds of
the Earth's population. An AFP Agency commentator, just like other Western
commentators, claims that Russia considered this alliance "as a regional
alternative to NATO." And so it promoted the idea of expanding the SCO by
including other countries of Central and South Asia in it.
During the meeting, Vladimir Putin, the head of the Russian government, spoke out
in favor of signing the list of measures of the program of trade and economic
cooperation of the SCO countries as quickly as possible. "I am certain that the
future belongs to stronger multilateral trade and economic relations, expanded
production and scientific-technical cooperation, and the buildup of reciprocal
investment flows," he said.
Putin also took a positive attitude toward the question of including other
countries in cooperation with the SCO. "Russia would welcome a positive
examination of the applications of states to be included in one form or another
in the activities of our organization from those states that are interested in
that," the Russian premier said. Earlier it was reported that notably the United
States and Turkey are interested in obtaining the status of a partner in a
dialogue with the SCO.
In a conversation with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Andrey Karneyev, the deputy director
of the Institute of the Countries of Asia and Africa of MGU (Moscow State
University), noted that "In reality the organization in the early stage played a
positive role in stabilizing the situation in Central Asia. If we use the wording
that China uses, the SCO countered the 'three forces of evil' in the region:
terrorism, separatism, and trans-border crime. Joint military exercises on
combating terrorists were conducted."
According to the expert, "Now the threat to the security of the members of the
SCO comes above all from Afghanistan. However, the problem of the legitimate
change in power in the states of Central Asia also represents a serious
challenge. On this level the SCO may become a suitable platform for reconciling
interests among the participants in the group."
But it is in no condition to be an alternative to NATO.
"The question of the expansion of the alliance has been discussed for a long
time," the expert noted. The question of direct membership in the organization
represents the biggest difficulty, in his opinion. At the same time, offering the
status of observer or partner can be more easily accomplished.
In connection with the anniversary aspect of the session, the expert believes
that no fundamental decisions should be expected. But emphasis is increasingly
being placed in the group's activities on economic and cultural cooperation. Here
the atmosphere is by no means cloudless. According to the expert, "China, judging
from press reports, was more and more persistently mentioning the slogan of
multilateral cooperation. That meant the creation of a free trade zone. Russia,
to my knowledge, was hindering the implementation of this idea, understanding
that such a zone would not be beneficial for all participants." The balance of
forces is not in its favor, after all.
As for the energy club, this proposal is very timely. The formation of the club
could combine suppliers and consumers of energy. There is now competition among
Russia and Kazakhstan and several other countries of Central Asia because of
deliveries of energy media to China. The club would be useful to settle
In conclusion Karneyev pointed out that "Oil has been moving from Russia to China
through the pipeline for 11 months now. The volume of deliveries is 10 million
tonnes a year. As for gas prices, haggling is going on. We could hardly have been
counting on the differences of opinion being resolved during the anniversary
session of the SCO."
Naturally, the participants in the conference could not ignore the consequences
of the financial crisis in Europe. The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
countries are trying to coordinate their actions. In Strelnya three members of
BRIC were represented -- Russia, China, and India. The meeting gave them the
opportunity to once again exchange opinions on this topic that affects the
interests of the developing countries.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
State TV feature on UN criticizes West's handling of international crises
Rossiya 24
Monday, November 6, 2011
Russian state-owned news channel Rossiya 24 has broadcast a feature about the UN
in which its criticized Western nations' handling of international affairs in
recent months and years.
Reporter Yevgeniy Popov's 26-min-long feature, which was first monitored on the
evening of 4 November, Russian National Unity Day, and was rebroadcast at least
once, on the morning of 6 November, hailed the UN's "unique legitimacy" which, he
said, stems from every country's right to make its views known to the
international community and lamented frequent "violation" of the organization's
Charter by Western nations.
Popov's scorn was mainly aimed at the United States. "It is no secret who the
main violator is", he said, citing the bombing of Yugoslavia, the invasion of
Iraq, on "forged" grounds, and the war in Afghanistan. His criticism of NATO's
use of "Tomahawk missiles and aviation bombs to defend global values" in Libya
was accompanied by video of ruins and a motionless child on a stretcher in
Through contributions from Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin, Moscow's use of veto
was said to be serving "the rights of the minority" and "facilitating democracy"
internationally. An example of this was the use of veto to block a "one-sided"
resolution on Syria, which triggered an "angry reaction" from US envoy Susan
Rice, said Popov. In general, he said, as video showed Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in a UN meeting followed by footage of Russian, Iranian and Palestinian
leaders addressing the United Nations, it is understandable that "Washington
hawks" find it hard to listen to criticism in their own country.
Through contributors, British diplomat and former Undersecretary-General Brian
Urquhart and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon among them, the film praised
Russia's UN envoys from Andrey Gromyko to Sergey Lavrov and Vitaliy Churkin, and
Russia itself, for being one of the "most important member-states" facilitating
"peace and security" in the world.
Russia's "diplomatic victory" over "Georgia and its patrons" in the wake of the
Georgian "aggression" against South Ossetia in 2008 was mentioned as a recent
The feature included excerpts from an old interview with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov in which he discussed his views on Libya and proposals for UN
[return to Contents]
November 9, 2011
Minds need 'reset' in Russia-US relations
Moscow and Washington have managed to "reset" their relations at the highest
political level, but that reset has yet to penetrate the minds of all interested
players in the arena, Russian presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich says.
"We often hear negative signals from the American Congress and other circles. We
(in Russia) also have people who don't completely approve of such an intensive
dialogue with the US," Dvorkovich noted at a media briefing on Wednesday.
Therefore, he went on, it is early to speak about a full reset. But nevertheless,
at a high political level it has occurred and yielded results.
The Kremlin aide stressed that it is now time to work on a new agenda in
Russia-US relations, including the missile defense problem.
"The European defense issue is certainly a serious challenge for all of us.
Indeed, we are hoping to achieve progress on the matter within the coming months.
There won't be a rollback in this case," he stated as cited by Interfax.
The missile defense project has lately been a major bone of contention in
relations between Moscow and Washington. During the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon
in November last year, Moscow accepted the invitation to co-operate with the West
in the creation of a missile defense shield in Europe. However, Russia insisted
it would only participate in the project as an equal partner and not as a passive
observer. Negotiations on the issue have been deadlocked since the US refused to
provide legally-binding guarantees that the system would not be targeted against
Russia. To make matters worse, the American side has failed so far to explain
what role exactly Russia would play in the project.
Since the differences have not been ironed out, it is now not clear whether the
Russian president will participate in the Russia-NATO summit in Chicago scheduled
for May 2012.
Dvorkovich said that it is very likely that the Russian head of state will fly to
Chicago for the G8 summit which will also be held there in May, shortly after the
March presidential vote in Russia.
"It is premature to talk about whether [the new president] will take part in the
NATO summit or not," he stressed.
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 8, 2011
Author: Nikolai Surkov
[Tension over the Iranian nuclear program is escalating.]
According to knowledgeable sources, the latest IAEA report implies
that Tehran owes the progress made by the Iranian nuclear program
to foreign specialists, some of them from the erstwhile Soviet
Union. In fact, this progress is thought to be so considerable as
to provide an excuse for the United States and European Union to
introduce "traumatic" sanctions. Disturbed by the escalating
tension in the Persian Gulf, Moscow reminded the international
community of the crisis resolution plan it had formulated.
The IAEA documents referred to in the Western media mentioned
a scientist from the former U.S.S.R. who had spent years in Iran
helping the Iranians design fuses. (This is a key element of a
nuclear device because there is no way to cause a chain reaction
without a synchronous detonation of conventional explosives.)
Experts from Pakistan and China were mentioned as well.
It was thought until recently that the Iranians had curtailed
their nuclear program in 2003 under international pressure. The
latest IAEA report, however, stated that Tehran had gone on
working on the nuclear program after 2003.
According to ex-IAEA functionary David Albright, the Iranians
reactivated their nuclear program after a short break. They even
laid hands on some key technologies enabling them to produce and
test a warhead that might be carried by a long-range ballistic
missile. Albright said that the IAEA knew nothing about the sums
the Iranians had poured into the project. All it knew was that the
Iranian military had used civilian covers in its work on nuclear
Nobody is saying anymore that Iran is out to produce a
nuclear device at the earliest opportunity, the way the DPRK did.
Western experts believe that Iran is after the status of a
threshold state. It means possession of the potential that enables
a country to produce nuclear weapons within 6-12 months. The DPRK
is a vivid example that availability of nuclear weapons is a
guarantee of non-aggression from the West and simultaneously an
argument in the debates with the Western community.
Publication of the latest news on the Iranian nuclear program
automatically escalated tension in the relations between Iran and
Israel. The latter implied that it just might send its aircraft
across the border to blast Iranian nuclear sites out of existence.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said yesterday that a
strike at Iran would be a mistake, one with consequences that
could not be accurately predicted. Lavrov emphasized that there
were but two excuses for a country to go to war: when this country
was attacked or when this move was authorized by the UN Security
Lavrov recalled the Russian plan of the Iranian nuclear
crisis resolution formulated over a year ago. The plan stipulated
gradual abolition of sanctions in return for close interaction
between Tehran and the IAEA so as to allay fears of the
international community.
Military solution to the crisis in the meantime remains a
subject of political debates and even speculations both in Israel
and in the United States. Some U.S. politicos canvassing for votes
already said that America must back Israel if and when it decided
to bomb Iranian nuclear sites. It is known actually that the
threat of war in the Persian Gulf will inevitably send oil prices
soaring sky-high. Considering the approaching winter and economic
difficulties already experienced, it will badly smear the image of
Barack Obama already known as an "anti-Israeli" president.
Bombardment of Iranian nuclear sites is probably a threat at
this point but "traumatic" sanctions just might become a reality.
Observers say that new sanctions authorized by the UN
Security Council are out of the question because Russia and China
will veto any such resolution like they already did.
The United States and European Union may and probably will
come up with unilateral sanctions. Washington already suggested a
petroleum embargo. (Almost 40% of the petrol annually consumed in
Iran are imported.) The United States just might go for it and
force foreign companies depending on the American market to join
the sanctions.
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November 9, 2011
Russian Support for Iran Seen as Bargaining Chip
By Gregory Feifer
Ties between Russia and Iran appeared to be unraveling only last year, when the
two traded barbs over Russian support for UN sanctions over Tehran's nuclear
Now Moscow appears to be squarely back on Tehran's side. On November 7, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sternly condemned an Israeli statement that
military action against Iran was more likely than a diplomatic solution to the
nuclear issue.
"It would be a very serious mistake fraught with unpredictable consequences,"
Lavrov said. "There's no military solution to the Iranian nuclear problem or any
other problem in the world today."
Then on November 8, a new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
reinforced Western suspicions Tehran is secretly building a nuclear weapon by
saying the Islamic republic carried out tests "relevant to the development of a
nuclear explosive device."
French and U.S. lawmakers responded by calling for new sanctions against Iran.
But Russia sharply condemned the report, saying it was "gravely disappointed and
bewildered." It said the report could be meant to sink chances for a diplomatic
"We have serious doubts about the justification for steps to reveal contents of
the report to a broad public, primarily because it is precisely now that certain
chances for the renewal of dialogue between the 'sextet' of international
mediators and Tehran have begun to appear," the Foreign Ministry said in a
Russia is one of six world powers -- including Britain, China, France, Germany,
and the United States -- in stalled negotiations with Iran. Moscow is also a
member of the UN Security Council, where it has veto power over any resolutions.
A Question Of Politics
Experts say the Kremlin is now seeking to use that leverage to boost its presence
in the world after largely standing on the sidelines while Arab Spring
revolutions toppled regimes it had supported.
Defense expert Aleksandr Golts calls Moscow's actions part of a "19th-century
game of realpolitik," saying the Kremlin's real priority in its dealings with
Tehran are relations with the West.
"At every moment, Russia is deciding what it wants to be," Golts says. "Either a
country that cooperates with the West in pressuring Iran, or a spoiler to all
Western initiatives."
Although Russia has profited from building a nuclear power reactor in Iran that
recently went online, Golts says business interests aren't a main driver of
Russian policy this time.
Viktor Kremenyuk of Moscow's USA and Canada Institute agrees Moscow's latest
stance over Iran represents a "flexing of muscles." He says the Kremlin "is
displeased with recent criticism in Washington, including [U.S.] disappointment
in [President Dmitry] Medvedev and disapproval of [Prime Minister Vladimir]
Putin's presidential candidacy. It may be the beginning of a new soft cold war."
Kremenyuk says Russia's future response to new proposals for sanctions against
Iran will depend on their seriousness. "Politics is a negotiation," he says, "It
will depend on what Moscow gets in return for its support."
Golts says Russia's recent statements don't signal anything new from Moscow.
"Russia always opposes any military action against Middle East countries," he
says. "It said the same thing about Libya."
Despite Russia's seeming rapprochement with Iran, Golts says their relations will
continue to be complicated. "Even though Russia's main use for Iran is bargaining
with the West," he says, "at the end of the day, it isn't interested in Tehran
possessing nuclear weapons."
[return to Contents]
Moscow News
November 7, 2011
Viktor Bout in the big picture
By Mark Galeotti
Mark Galeotti is Clinical Professor of Global Affairs at New York University's
SCPS Center for Global Affairs. His blog, "In Moscow's Shadows," can be read at:
http://inmoscowsshadows. wordpress.com
Last week, a jury in a downtown New York court convicted Russian arms dealer
Viktor Bout on four counts of selling illegal weapons to Colombian FARC
terrorists, including anti-aircraft missiles, with the express purpose of killing
Americans. Bad news for Bout, who faces a potential life sentence, but how
significant is this in the big picture?
It's already causing some tensions in the Moscow-Washington relationship.
Russia's Foreign Ministry has questioned the fairness of the trial and pledged
itself to "return him to the motherland," while Leonid Slutsky, the first deputy
chairman of the State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, dismissed the verdict as
"a typical American propaganda ploy."
It's unlikely that this will have a long-term impact, however. As last year's
Russia-U.S. spy scandal showed, there is a big difference between the overt
theatrics and the underlying practical reasons both powers have to work together.
But it does introduce one more irritant, which will last at least until Bout's
sentencing in February.
A recurring allegation has been that Bout was either an agent or at least an
occasional ally of elements of the Russian state. Whether he is (or was) a spy is
unknown, although if he were, I'd suggest it would be for the GRU, military
intelligence. After all, they work more in the rough-and-ready developing world
war zones where Bout plied his trade and also recruited heavily from the Military
Institute of Foreign Languages, where he studied. If he were linked with the GRU,
then that would be yet more bad news for that already-troubled service.
Bout might also have been a semi-official arms dealer. He had access to large
amounts of not just Soviet-vintage but Russian-made weapons. He offered the FARC
hundreds of Igla anti-aircraft missiles, and even anti-tank rockets and
helicopters. In the past he has sold everything from tanks to Kalashnikovs, some
sourced from Ukraine, but others from Russia, including the Kornet laser-guided
missiles he reportedly offered Libya's Gaddafi.
The implications are uncomfortable. Either for a long time Bout was able to
siphon weapons out from Russian arms company stocks, using corruption and
connections without Moscow noticing, or else he was being used as a "deniable"
way of bolstering arms exports into markets Russian companies legally could not
touch. Hopefully, though, his access ended when the government established the
new Commission on Export Control in 2005, but if he were a spy or
state-sanctioned black marketeer, that might help explain Moscow's eagerness to
get him home, not least given what he could tell the Americans.
Does that mean that Bout's conviction is bad news for the world's terrorists and
gun-hungry dictators? There are many other arms dealers eager to step into his
shoes, and huge "floating stockpiles" of weapons flowing from one conflict zone
to the next. Bout was just one player amongst many, so the sad truth is the
global illegal arms market will endure.
That said, though, Bout's operation was unusual. He brought an astonishing and
probably unique range of connections, organizational capacity, flair and
attention to detail. By his absence, the global arms black market is degraded,
even if only a little. And every little helps.
Bout's conviction may be bad news for US and Russian diplomats as their squabble
their way through this latest obstacle to the "reset," and also for arms
companies happy to unload their excess stocks. But as illegal small arms kill
about 1,000 people each day around the world, this may be good news for the
millions living in conflict zones, where wars and banditry become more violent
and bloody thanks to the easy supply of illegal weaponry.
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 9, 2011
Author: not indicated
[Will Russia and Georgia restore the relations before very long?]
The Russian-Georgian WTO talks will end in Geneva, Switzerland,
today. The negotiators managed to come up with a mutually
acceptable compromise for the first time since August 2008. With
help from Switzerland the intermediary and pressure applied to
Georgia by the Western community and first and foremost by the
United States which stands by Tbilisi but nevertheless needs
Russia in the WTO. What is it going to be? Just a single episode
without any developments or a prelude to normalization of the
Russian-Georgian relations?
The impression is that Georgian society itself needs the
normalization of the relations with Russia. Official Tbilisi went
too far, blaming Russia for absolutely everything including
Georgia's own troubles. In a word, efforts of the Georgian
authorities backfired. Barely making ends meet, the Georgians
decided that it was time to restore the relations with Russia
particularly since the United States had failed to replace Russia
as a partner. The opposition saw it right away and started
clamoring for the normalization - which would have earned it the
status of Moscow's agents, traitors, "public enemies", and
whatever else but a year ago. The West kept telling Georgia to
begin negotiations with Russia. In fact, even fiercely anti-
Russian President Mikhail Saakashvili said the other day that he
was ready for talks with Moscow. Whether Saakashvili meant it or
not does not matter. What matters is that the Georgian leadership
cannot help knowing that re-absorption of the runaway provinces
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia) is impossible without help from
Russia - iffy as it is even with it.
Moscow in the meantime remains adamant. It refuses to have to
do anything with Georgia as long as Saakashvili is calling the
tune in Tbilisi. The catch is, Saakashvili may remain the head of
Georgia for a long time yet. His term of office expires in 2013
and the Constitution does not permit Saakashvili to run for
president for the third time. There is nothing, however, to
prevent Saakashvili from becoming the premier whose powers will
soon exceed the president's due to the recent amendment of the
Georgian Constitution. The ability of the opposition to prevent
this turn of events is questionable. All of that undermines the
Russian official attitude which comes down to the willingness to
be friends with the Georgian population and not with the Georgian
authorities. Actually, as far as the Georgians are concerned,
sincerity of this attitude is already suspect. Every Georgian who
ever tried to obtain a Russian entry visa will say so.
Paradoxical as it might appear, but restoration of the
Russian-Georgian seems possible after the presidential election in
Russia which everybody knows will be won by Vladimir Putin. That
there is no love lost between the Georgian president and the
Russian premier is common knowledge. It is known as well that it
is Putin that the Georgian authorities blame their territorial
problems on. And yet, it was actually Medvedev the president who
gave the orders to the Russian army when the Georgians went too
far. It was Medvedev who recognized the runaway autonomies as
sovereign states. Sure, Medvedev and Putin made it plain on more
than one occasion that they were of one and the same mind on the
matter of Georgia. And yet, it seems that Putin will stand a
better chance to restore the Russian-Georgian relations that
Medvedev stands nowadays.
[return to Contents]
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