text: Utilities Law - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/utilities-law/ 2014-12-20T04:16:32-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://law.justia.com/sites/law.justia.com/files/justia_law_theme_logo.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2014/12-wap-2013.html Alderwoods (PA), Inc. v. Duquesne Light 2014-12-15T14:05:22-08:00 2014-12-15T20:03:06-08:00 On Friday, January 9, 2009, after business hours, an unidentified motor vehicle crashed into and felled a utility pole carrying electric lines owned and operated by Duquesne Light. Several wires were connected to Burton L. Hirsh's Funeral Home, and at least one was stripped from the attachment point to the building's electrical system located on the structure. In addition to the funeral home, a number of other local buildings lost power as a result of the incident, although no structure other than Hirsh's was connected directly to the downed pole. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review, as framed by appellant, was "[w]hether the Superior Court erred in imposing upon electric utilities a burdensome and unprecedented duty to enter customers' premises and inspect customers' electrical facilities before restoring power after an outage" The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, finding that Duquesne Light failed to adequately confront the common-law duties invoked by Hirsh or the warnings dynamic tempering the Superior Court's ruling. The Superior Court did not err to the extent that it recognized a duty, on the part of an electric service provider, to take reasonable measures to avert harm in a scenario in which the utility has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition impacting a customer's electrical system, occasioned by fallen and intermixed electrical lines proximate to the customer's premises. The Court offered no opinion as to whether Duquesne Light had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk in this scenario, since the electric company's summary judgment effort was not staged in a manner which would have elicited an informed determination on such point.View "Alderwoods (PA), Inc. v. Duquesne Light" on Justia Law 2014-12-15 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Thomas G. Saylor 12 WAP 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2013-229.html Langlois v. Town of Proctor 2014-12-05T08:07:21-08:00 2014-12-05T20:11:23-08:00 Plaintiff Kathleen Langlois owned a building with commercial space on the first floor and an apartment on the second. She failed to pay the water bill for the property. Plaintiff alleged that she arranged with a representative of the Town of Proctor to disconnect the water service so she would not incur further water expenses, but that the Town failed to do so. In reliance on the Town's promised undertaking, plaintiff discontinued heating the building, causing the pipes containing water to freeze and split under the first floor of the building, which, in turn, flooded the first floor and basement, causing extensive damage to the building. Plaintiff brought this action with four counts: negligence, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. With respect to the negligence count, the Town argued that it had no duty to disconnect the water service or to disconnect the service with reasonable care or, alternatively, that any duty was based on its contractual obligations and could not give rise to tort liability. With respect to the contract claim, the Town argued that it had no contractual obligation to disconnect the water service and that it was exercising its right under a statutory delinquency collection procedure. It further argued that the contractual relationship between plaintiff and the Town was terminated when plaintiff failed to pay her water bill. The case was then tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff. In answering the special interrogatories, the jury found that there was a contract between plaintiff and the Town "regarding the turning off of her water service," but that the Town had not breached that contract. It found that the Town was negligent, that its negligence was a proximate cause of harm to plaintiff, and that plaintiff's damages were $64,918.44. Among the things the Town argued on appeal, it argued that the court should have instructed the jury to apply comparative negligence, and that the instructions on damages were erroneous because the proper measure of damages was the diminution in value of the building and, in any event, there was no evidence of that diminution. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the jury instructions improperly failed to allow the jury to find that the Town breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court rejected the Town's argument on appeal that it had no tort duty to properly turn off plaintiff's water. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury: "the instructions as a whole did not contain the spirit of the law. If we could determine from the damages award or the interrogatories that the jury found that plaintiff was not negligent and was not obligated to mitigate damages, we could find an absence of prejudice. We cannot do so here; the damages awarded by the jury were less than plaintiff claimed." On remand, the trial court was ordered to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. Because of the defect in the jury instructions, the Court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.View "Langlois v. Town of Proctor" on Justia Law 2014-12-05 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court John A. Dooley 2013-229 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1155/13-1155-2014-12-05.html Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FERC 2014-12-05T07:31:06-08:00 2014-12-05T16:31:11-08:00 LaPSC sought review of FERC's order denying refunds to certain Louisiana-based utility companies for payments they made pursuant to a cost classification later found to be unjust and unreasonable. In denying LaPSC's refund request, the Commission relied on precedent it characterized as a policy to deny refunds in cost allocation cases, yet the precedent on which it relied is based largely on considerations the Commission did not find applicable. The Commission otherwise relied on the holding company's inability to revisit past decisions, a universally true circumstance. Because the line of precedent on which the Commission relied involved rationales that it concluded were not present in LaPSC's case, and because the existence of the identified equitable factor is unclear and its relevance inadequately explained, the court granted the petition and remanded for the Commission to consider the relevant factors and weigh them against one another.View "Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-12-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judith Ann Wilson Rogers 13-1155 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1184/13-1184-2014-12-02.html Midland Power Cooperative v. FERC 2014-12-02T07:31:27-08:00 2014-12-02T08:48:02-08:00 Petitioners sought review of an order issued by FERC directing Midland, an Iowa electric utility, to reconnect to a wind generator within its territory. Because FERC never purported to adopt a general rule on disconnections by utilities whose customers refused to pay their bills, and because prior decisions addressing jurisdiction to review FERC's orders under section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act , 16 U.S.C. 824a-3, have repeatedly emphasized Congress's decision to leave section 210's enforcement to the district court, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the orders.View "Midland Power Cooperative v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-12-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Stephen Fain Williams 13-1184 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/116844.html Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. 2014-11-20T08:02:10-08:00 2014-11-20T14:34:50-08:00 Pusateri, a former employee of Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (PG) filed a complaint under the False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1, alleging that PG used falsified gas leak response records to justify a fraudulently inflated natural gas rate before the Illinois Commerce Commission. As a customer, the State of Illinois would have paid such fraudulently inflated rates,. The Cook County circuit court dismissed with prejudice, finding that as a matter of law, there was no causal connection between the allegedly false reports and the Commission-approved rates. The appellate court reversed, construing the complaint's allegations liberally to find PG could have submitted the safety reports in support of a request for a rate increase, despite not being required to do so under the Administrative Code. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction to order relief. The legislature did not intend the False Claims Act to apply to a Commission-set rate. The Commission has the duty to ensure regulated utilities obey the Public Utilities Act and other statutes, except where enforcement duties are "specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal."View "Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co." on Justia Law 2014-11-20 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Rita B. Garman 116844 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/116642.html Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n 2014-11-20T08:02:09-08:00 2014-11-20T14:51:37-08:00 In 2009, IAWC petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission under the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. The state was granted leave to intervene. In 2012, the Commission approved the reconciliation with modifications and denied the state's request for rehearing. Under the Public Utilities Act, the state had 35 days to appeal, placing the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at October 16. Notice of appeal was filed on that date. The record and briefs were filed. The appellate court entered a summary order, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the notice had not been timely filed, reasoning that under Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1), the notice should have been filed within the 30-day deadline specified in Rule 303(a). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; the appellate court erred in concluding that separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the notice to be judged by Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the period specified by the legislature in the Public Utilities Act.View "Madigan v. IL Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-11-20 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Lloyd A. Karmeier 116642 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-60874/13-60874-2014-11-18.html Louisiana Public Svc. Cmsn. v. FERC 2014-11-19T16:00:26-08:00 2014-11-20T14:08:10-08:00 LPSC sought review of FERC's orders relating to the allocation of production costs among Entergy's six operating companies. LPSC argued that certain revenues and expenses should be removed from the bandwidth calculation for 2008 because they were not incurred in that test year and that the production cost formula should account for the mid-year acquisition of generation facilities by Entergy Gulf States Louisiana and Entergy Arkansas on a partial-year basis. The court concluded that FERC reasonably excluded challenges to the "justness and reasonableness" of formula inputs from annual bandwidth implementation proceedings where FERC reasonably interpreted the System Agreement and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, and FERC's reversal of its initial interpretation of the scope of bandwidth implementation proceedings was not arbitrary. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably required Entergy to include casualty loss Net Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (ADIT) in its third bandwidth calculation where LPSC had notice of the casualty loss ADIT issue, and FERC's decision to include casualty loss ADIT in the bandwidth formula was rational. Accordingly, the court denied LPSC's petition for review.View "Louisiana Public Svc. Cmsn. v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-11-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Edith Brown Clement 13-60874 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/a139429.html Guerrero v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 2014-10-10T12:02:49-08:00 2014-10-10T13:26:50-08:00 In 2010, a PG&E natural gas pipeline exploded in San Bruno, CA, causing death, great physical injuries, and extensive property damage. Governmental entities investigated the incident and PG&E's business practices. The Public Utilities Commission retained an independent firm, Overland, to review PG&E's gas transmission safety-related activities from a financial and regulatory audit prospective. Plaintiffs sued, seeking redress for PG&E's alleged misappropriation of over $100 million in authorized rates that it should have used for safety-related projects. According to the complaint, PG&E misrepresented and concealed material facts when it used money collected from ratepayers to pay shareholders and provide bonuses to its executives instead of spending the money on infrastructure and safety measures. The complaint alleged that PG&E's negligent handling of the pipe that exploded in San Bruno was unlawful and arose from PG&E's corporate culture that valued profits over safety and that PG&E's actions constituted an unlawful business practice under California Business and Professions Code section 17200. The superior court dismissed without leave to amend, finding the action barred by Public Utility Code section 1759 because it would interfere with the California Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction." The appeals court affirmed.View "Guerrero v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law 2014-10-10 state California California Court of Appeal http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/2014/s061517.html Gearhart v. PUC 2014-10-02T08:09:38-08:00 2014-10-06T11:45:08-08:00 At issue in this case was an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) that addressed Portland General Electric's (PGE) recovery of its capital investment in the Trojan nuclear generating facility after that facility was retired from service. To determine whether a legal error that the PUC had made in an earlier rate case had affected rates that the PUC had authorized PGE to charge, the PUC reexamined those earlier rates. In that reexamination, the PUC determined that PGE had been required to recover its capital investment over time, and that the rates therefore should have included interest to account for the time value of money. Despite the legal error, the rates that the PUC authorized for 1995 to 2000 were just and reasonable, but that to make the post-2000 rates just and reasonable, it was required to order a refund to the post-2000 ratepayers. In affirming the PUC order, the Court of Appeals concluded the PUC had not erred in making those three determinations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the PUC's order.View "Gearhart v. PUC" on Justia Law 2014-10-02 state Oregon Oregon Supreme Court Thomas A. Balmer S061517 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-4458/13-4458-2014-09-26.html Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp 2014-09-26T09:30:08-08:00 2014-10-01T16:36:40-08:00 Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), seeks to replace a portion of a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement will not track the original line but will be outside the existing right of way. To obtain easements necessary to complete construction of the replacement, in 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in Condemnation against four Landowners in federal court. The district court held that Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required to condemn the easements, reasoning that 18 C.F.R. 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation clearly anticipates replacement outside the existing right of way and contains no adjacency requirement. The district court erroneously adopted its own definition of "replace" and concluded that a "notice" of "proposed rulemaking" for "Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities" promulgated by FERC after 9/11 was relevant. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp" on Justia Law 2014-09-26 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Rendell 13-4458 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1074/13-1074-2014-09-26.html Smith Lake Improvement v. FERC 2014-09-26T08:01:32-08:00 2014-10-01T16:36:51-08:00 Smith Lake filed suit against FERC and others, alleging claims related to the Commission's issuance of a license order. Alabama Power intervened and moved to dismiss the petition for review based on lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because the appeal was untimely, concluding that Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC and Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC stand for the proposition that the court will not hear a case if the petitioner has a rehearing petition pending before the Commission at the time of filing in this court, whether it was required or not. Consequently, a party must choose whether to seek an optional petition for rehearing before the Commission, or a petition for review to the court; it cannot proceed simultaneously. View "Smith Lake Improvement v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-09-26 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Laurence Hirsch Silberman 13-1074 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2014/62-map-2013.html Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al 2014-09-24T13:09:56-08:00 2014-10-01T16:36:19-08:00 The primary question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a municipal authority could exercise its eminent domain powers to condemn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision. "While this determination may seem to interfere with the ability of municipal water and/or sewer authorities to expand their operations under circumstances where, as here, there is an overarching nexus between the taking and private development, it is not this Court's function to ameliorate such difficulties by departing from the statutory text. [. . .] The Legislature's decision to exempt regulated public utilities, but not municipal authorities, from the preclusive rule set forth in Section 204(a) demonstrates that it intended to allow – within constitutional limitations – the continued use of eminent domain for the provision of public services such as water and sewer access in tandem with private development for a limited, defined class of condemnors. As RAWA is not within that class, its condemnation of the drainage easement is in violation of PRPA." View "Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al" on Justia Law 2014-09-24 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Thomas G. Saylor 62 MAP 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-71368/11-71368-2014-09-18.html ICNU v. BPA 2014-09-18T10:09:26-08:00 2014-10-01T16:33:49-08:00 In consolidated appeals, two groups challenged the BPA's decision to forgo refunds after the court invalidated three sets of contractual arrangements in which BPA agreed to subsidize certain longtime industrial customers rather than sell them power directly. The court held that these subsidy arrangements were unreasonable and were contrary to BPA's authority. The court remanded to BPA regarding whether it could or should seek refunds of the improper subsidies. BPA concluded that it was contractually barred from seeking refunds as to some of the invalidated contracts; it had no legal or equitable basis for seeking refunds as to the others; and if it did pursue recovery of the subsidies, it might become mired in counterproductive, protracted litigation. Petitioners' core argument is that their power costs have been impermissibly raised by BPA's decision because, if BPA did seek refunds of the subsidies, it could pass the recovered funds to its customers as lower rates. The court rejected petitioners' contention that BPA has a duty, under either the Constitution's Appropriations Clause or BPA's governing statutes, to seek all refunds to which it may be entitled. The court concluded that BPA's decisions in most respects sufficiently and reasonably balanced its competing obligations to merit the court's deference, except in one respect. The court denied the petition for review with regard to the decision not to seek refunds with respect to the 2007 Block Contracts and the Port Townsend Contract. The court granted the petition and remanded to BPA for further proceedings with regard to recovery of subsidies paid under the Alcoa Amendment.View "ICNU v. BPA" on Justia Law 2014-09-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Marsha Siegel Berzon 11-71368 11-71396 11-71401 11-71419 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-4288/13-4288-2014-09-16.html Metro. Edison Co. v. PA Pub. Util. Co. 2014-09-16T09:30:22-08:00 2014-10-01T16:32:58-08:00 The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a., authorizes federal regulation of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce and grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) jurisdiction over transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The "filed rate doctrine" requires that interstate power rates filed with or fixed by FERC be given binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates. The electric companies suffered $250 million in "line losses," energy lost when electricity travels over power lines, and interest related to those costs. Their line losses had increased under a mandate by FERC relating to calculation. The companies attempted to recover those costs on their customers' utility bills. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) rejected their proposal to classify line-loss costs as a cost of transmission (as opposed to a cost of electricity generation), preventing them from passing those costs through to their customers. The companies lost in Pennsylvania state courts; the U.S. Supreme Court denied review. The companies then sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in federal court against the PUC. The district court held that their unsuccessful state efforts precluded relief in federal court under the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Metro. Edison Co. v. PA Pub. Util. Co." on Justia Law 2014-09-16 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Jordan 13-4288 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/131872.html Attorney Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n 2014-09-12T07:10:57-08:00 2014-10-01T16:32:26-08:00 In 2012, Dominion Virginia Power filed an application with the State Corporation Commission seeking approval of a power station and transmission interconnection facilities associated with the generation plant. Dominion's application also sought approval of a rate adjustment clause (RAC) to recover the costs of the power station and the associated transmission infrastructure. As part of the RAC, Dominion sought an enhancement on its general rate of return on common equity (ROE) for a certain period and proposed applying the enhanced ROE to the costs of the power station and associated transmission infrastructure. The Commission approved the power station and associated transmission infrastructure and allowed Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly interpreted Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(6) to allow Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure associated with the power station and included in the subsection (A)(6) RAC for that facility.View "Attorney Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-09-12 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Elizabeth A. McClanahan 131872 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/a139481.html Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. 2014-09-11T16:01:31-08:00 2014-10-01T16:31:56-08:00 In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview's diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board's finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview's arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview's claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law 2014-09-11 state California California Court of Appeal Margulies A139481 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-4330/13-4330-2014-09-11.html PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon 2014-09-11T09:30:20-08:00 2014-10-01T16:31:50-08:00 Dissatisfied with the stock and reliability of power-generating facilities in New Jersey, the state adopted the Long Term Capacity Pilot Program Act (LCAPP), instructing New Jersey's Board of Public Utilities to promote construction of new power-generating facilities in the state. Rather than pay for the construction of these plants directly, the Board of Public Utilities crafted a set of contracts, called Standard Offer Capacity Agreements, which assured new electric energy generators 15years of revenue from local utilities and, ultimately, New Jersey ratepayers. LCAPP guaranteed revenue to new generators by fixing the rates those generators would receive for supplying electrical capacity, that is, the ability to make energy when called upon. The district court found LCAPP invalid. The Third Circuit affirmed. With the Federal Power Act, Congress placed "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" under federal control, 16 U.S.C. 824(a). When New Jersey arranged for LCAPP generators to receive preferential capacity rates, the state entered into a field of regulation beyond its authority. Federal law preempts, and invalidates, LCAPP and the related Standard Offer Capacity Agreements. View "PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon" on Justia Law 2014-09-11 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Julio M. Fuentes 13-4330 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-51228/12-51228-2014-09-08.html Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C., et al. v. Nelson, et al. 2014-09-09T05:00:41-08:00 2014-10-01T16:31:14-08:00 This appeal concerns the Texas PUC's interpretation and implementation of a federal statutory and regulatory scheme governing the purchase of energy between public utilities and certain energy production facilities known as Qualifying Facilities. Exelon, qualifying wind generation facilities, challenged a state rule and order which prohibited it from forming Legally Enforceable Obligations when selling power. The court vacated the portion of the judgment regarding Exelon's challenge to the PUC's order and directed the district court to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reversed as to the remaining challenges to the rule and remanded because PUC acted within its discretion and properly implemented the federal regulation at issue.View "Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C., et al. v. Nelson, et al." on Justia Law 2014-09-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Jennifer Walker Elrod 12-51228 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11526.html Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 2014-09-04T16:08:42-08:00 2014-10-01T16:30:20-08:00 After electrical outages arising from Tropical Storm Irene on August 28, 2011 and a snowstorm two months later, the Department of Public Utilities entered orders against three utility companies - National Grid, NSTAR Electric Company (NSTAR), and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMEC) - that imposed monetary penalties for the utilities' failure to restore service to their customers "in a safe and reasonably prompt manner." The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Department applied the appropriate reasonableness standard in finding that the utilities violated their duty to restore service in a safe and reasonably prompt manner; (2) the Department's findings regarding National Grid and WMEC were supported by substantial evidence, but its finding that NSTAR failed timely to respond to priority two and three wires-down calls was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) with two exceptions, the Department made the necessary findings and did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of monetary penalties. Remanded.View "Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law 2014-09-04 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Ralph D. Gants SJC-11526 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2014/2012-1484.html In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co. 2014-09-03T06:27:16-08:00 2014-10-01T16:29:48-08:00 This appeal stemmed from the Public Utilities Commission's first annual review of the fuel-adjustment clause (FAC) mechanism that was part of the first electric security plan (ESP) for two American Electric Power operating companies, Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company. The FAC allowed the companies to recover fuel costs for providing generation service as those costs were incurred without being required to file a new rate case. An auditor found that the companies had underrecovered fuel costs through the FAC in 2009. After review, the Commission concluded (1) all of the proceeds that AEP had received from a 2008 contract settlement agreement with a coal supplier should be offset against Ohio Power's FAC underrecovery; and (2) only the share of the settlement proceeds allocable to Ohio retail customers must be credited. Ohio Power appealed, and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's orders, holding that Ohio Power and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission's orders.View "In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law 2014-09-03 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio O'Connor 2012-1484 http://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2014/sc13-144.html Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2014-08-28T08:05:37-08:00 2014-10-01T16:27:45-08:00 Florida Power & Light (FPL) filed an application for a rate base increase. Three intervenors to the proceedings and FPL reached a negotiated settlement agreement. After evidentiary hearings pertaining exclusively to the settlement agreement, the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) approved the settlement agreement, finding that it established fair, just, and reasonable rates and that it was in the public interest. Citizens of the State of Florida (Citizens) appealed the decision of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not violate the essential requirements of the law or commit a material error in procedure by approving the negotiated settlement agreement over Citizens' objection; (2) the procedures followed by the Commission did not violate Citizens' due process rights; and (3) the Commission's findings and conclusions were support by competent, substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Citizens of the State of Fla. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-08-28 state Florida Florida Supreme Court Jorge Labarga SC13-144 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-4422/12-4422-2014-08-27.html Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., Inc. 2014-08-27T07:30:14-08:00 2014-10-01T16:27:16-08:00 Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and New York statutory and common law. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants obtained unauthorized attorneys' fees and costs in connection with actions to foreclose liens on plaintiffs' properties arising out of unpaid municipal property taxes and water and sewer charges. The court held that liens for mandatory water and sewer charges imposed by New York City as an incident to property ownership, which are treated as akin to property tax liens, are not subject to the FDCPA because they do not involve a "debt" as that term is defined in the statute. The court also held that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., Inc." on Justia Law 2014-08-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 12-4422 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1340/12-1340-2014-08-26.html West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC 2014-08-26T07:32:36-08:00 2014-10-01T16:26:55-08:00 The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824d(c), requires regulated utilities to file with the Commission, as a matter of open and accessible public record, any rates and charges they intend to impose for sales of electrical energy that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Consequently, utilities are forbidden to charge any rate other than the one on file with the Commission, a prohibition known as the "filed rate doctrine." At issue on appeal was, when a utility filed more than one rate with the Commission during the time it was negotiating an agreement with a prospective customer, which of the two filed rates governs: the rate at the time negotiations commenced or the rate at the time the agreement was completed? The Commission is of the view that it can pick and choose which rate applies on a case-by-case basis. Because the Commission has provided no reasoned explanation for how its decision comports with statutory direction, prior agency practice, or the purposes of the filed rate doctrine, the court vacated the Commission's orders in part and remanded.View "West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-08-26 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Patricia Ann Millett 12-1340 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1033/13-1033-2014-08-22.html Southwestern Power Admin., et al. v. FERC 2014-08-22T07:31:42-08:00 2014-10-01T16:26:09-08:00 The Corporation, asserting its power under section 215(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16U.S.C. 824o, assessed a monetary fine against Southwestern, a federal government entity that markets hydroelectric power. The Commission upheld the penalty. The court held that section 215(b)(1) generally subjects federal government entities to the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce compliance. But to authorize a monetary award against the federal government, the statute must do more than generally bring the government within the Commission's enforcement jurisdiction - it must unequivocally subject the government to monetary liability. Neither section 215(b) nor section 215(e), nor the two consolidated in combination, speaks with the requisite clarity to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from monetary penalties. Therefore, the court vacated the Commission's order.View "Southwestern Power Admin., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-08-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Srikanth Srinivasan 13-1033 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/supreme-court/2014/424a13.html State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper 2014-08-20T09:18:39-08:00 2014-10-01T16:25:08-08:00 Duke Energy Progress filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting authority to increase its retail electric service rates and that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.25 percent. The Commission entered an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent. The Attorney General, who had intervened in the proceedings, appealed the Commission's order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission made sufficient findings of fact regarding the impact of changing economic conditions upon customers and that these findings were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record.View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper" on Justia Law 2014-08-20 state North Carolina North Carolina Supreme Court Barbara Jackson 424A13 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0218.html Montana-Dakota Utils., Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2014-08-19T08:24:58-08:00 2014-10-01T16:24:32-08:00 Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU) was ordered by the Wyoming Public Service Commission to make refunds of the amounts MDU had overcharged its customers because of improper calculations and adjustments to its commodity balancing account. MDU filed a petition for review, challenging the legal authority of the Commission to order refunds. The district court affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rule against retroactive ratemaking did not preclude the Commission from ordering the refund; (2) the Commission's refund order did not violate the file rate doctrine; (3) the Commission was not subject to a statute of limitations in this case; (4) MDU failed to show that the Commission was equitably estopped from ordering a refund; and (5) the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unlawful.View "Montana-Dakota Utils., Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-08-19 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court E. James Burke S-13-0218 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1481/12-1481-2014-08-15.html Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC 2014-08-15T08:12:10-08:00 2014-10-01T16:23:33-08:00 Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review.View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-08-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Wilkins 12-1481 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1232/12-1232-2014-08-15.html South Carolina Public Service v. FERC 2014-08-15T08:12:02-08:00 2014-10-01T16:23:34-08:00 This case involves challenges to the most recent forms of electric transmission planning and cost allocation adopted by the Commission under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791 et seq. In Order No. 1000, as reaffirmed and clarified in Order Nos. 1000-A and 1000-B (together, the Final Rule), the Commission required each transmission owning and operating public utility to participate in regional transmission planning that satisfies the specific planning principles designed to prevent undue discrimination and preference in transmission service, and that produces a regional transmission plan. The court held that the Commission had authority under Section 206 of the Act to require transmission providers to provide in a regional planning process; there was substantial evidence of a theoretical threat to support adoption of the reforms in the Final Rule; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require removal of federal rights of first refusal provisions upon determining they were unjust and unreasonable practices affecting rates, and that determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; the Mobile-Sierra objection to the removal is not ripe; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require the ex ante allocation of the costs of new transmission facilities among beneficiaries, and that its decision regarding scope was not arbitrary or capricious; the Commission reasonably determined that regional planning must include consideration of transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and the Commission reasonably relied upon the reciprocity condition to encourage non-public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule.View "South Carolina Public Service v. FERC" on Justia Law 2014-08-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 12-1232 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2014/2012-2117.html In re Application of E. Ohio Gas Co. 2014-07-16T06:06:29-08:00 2014-10-01T16:12:14-08:00 Upon its implementation of an automated-meter-reading ("AMR") program, the East Ohio Gas Company, d/b/a Dominion East Ohio ("Dominion"), sought to recover costs associated with its AMR program. The Public Utilities Commission ("Commission") reduced Dominion's proposed customer charge from $0.54 per customer per month to $0.42 per customer per month because Dominion had allegedly failed to timely implement the AMR program. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the Commission's order was substantively unreasonable because its reduction of Dominion's AMR charge was not rationally tied to Dominion's alleged failure to meet certain deadlines. Remanded.View "In re Application of E. Ohio Gas Co." on Justia Law 2014-07-16 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Paul E. Pfeifer 2012-2117 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/10-174/ American Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Connecticut, et al. 2014-07-15T01:41:11-08:00 2014-07-15T02:56:11-08:00 Plaintiffs, several states, the city of New York, and three private land trusts, sued defendants, four private power companies and the federal Tennessee Valley Authority, alleging that defendants' emissions substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights in violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or in the alternative, of state tort law. Plaintiffs sought a decree setting carbon-dioxide emissions for each defendant at an initial cap to be further reduced annually. At issue was whether plaintiffs could maintain federal common law public nuisance claims against carbon-dioxide emitters. As a preliminary matter, the Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits. The Court held that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the Environmental Protection Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 7411, action the Act authorized displaced any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants. The Court also held that the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depended, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. Because none of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law, the matter was left for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "American Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Connecticut, et al." on Justia Law 2011-06-20 federal U.S. Supreme Court Ruth Bader Ginsburg 10-174 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/130642.html SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd. 2014-07-11T07:04:47-08:00 2014-10-01T16:10:24-08:00 Eagle Point Solar proposed to enter into a long term financing agreement with the City of Dubuque that would provide the City with renewable energy. Under the agreement, Eagle Point would construct a solar energy system, and the City would purchase all of the electricity generated by the system. However, if Eagle Point was a "public utility" under Iowa Code 476.1 or an "electric utility" under Iowa Code 476.22 it would be prohibited from serving customers, such as the City, who were located within the exclusive service territory of Interstate Power and Light Company, another electric utility. The Iowa Public Utilities Board (IUB) concluded that Eagle Point would be a public utility under the proposed business arrangement. The district court reversed, concluding that Eagle Point's proposed arrangement with the City did not make it an electric utility for purposes of the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Point was not a public utility under section 476.1 or section 476.22.View "SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law 2014-07-11 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Brent R. Appel 130642 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-2052/13-2052-2014-06-25.html IL Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 2014-06-25T14:05:47-08:00 2014-10-01T16:03:42-08:00 A Regional Transmission Organization is a voluntary association primarily of utilities that either own electrical transmission lines that comprise a regional electrical grid or generate electricity that is transmitted to the customers in the region. Members of a Regional Transmission Organization and the Illinois Commerce Commission, on behalf of the largest electrical utility in Illinois, (collectively PJM) obtained a remand of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 2009. That order allocated costs for certain new high‐voltage network transmission lines that are part of a regional grid that includes the western utilities, but are all located in PJM's eastern region and primarily benefit that region. Unhappy with the order issued on remand, PJM returned to court. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, acknowledging that the benefits of new facilities to the utilities may be unquantifiable because they depend on the likelihood and magnitude of outages and other contingencies. The order should not shift a grossly disproportionate share of costs to western utilities, given that the projects will confer only future, speculative, and limited benefits to those utilities. View "IL Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-06-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 13-2052 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/supreme-court/2014/234a13.html State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen. 2014-06-12T09:13:33-08:00 2014-10-01T15:57:50-08:00 Dominion North Carolina filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission requesting an 11.25 percent return on equity (ROE), among other things. During the course of public hearings, the Commission received evidence that Dominion made certain adjustments to a study of the costs of providing retail electric service to a large industrial customer. The Commission ultimately issued an order approving an ROE of 10.2 percent and approving of Dominion's adjustments to the cost-of-service study. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err by approving Dominion's adjustments to the cost-of-service study; but (2) the portion of the Commission's order in which it authorized a 10.2 percent ROE for Dominion did not contain sufficient findings of fact to demonstrate that it was supported by competent and substantial evidence. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law 2014-06-12 state North Carolina North Carolina Supreme Court Barbara Jackson 234A13 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/13-0744.html Holt v. W. Va. Am. Water Co. 2014-06-11T13:15:31-08:00 2014-10-01T15:57:23-08:00 Petitioner filed a complaint against West Virginia-American Water Company (Respondent) seeking damages and penalties for alleged violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) regarding Respondent's business policies and practices regarding leaks in Petitioner's water line. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that Petitioner's claims arose from transactions encompassed by W. Va. Code 46A-1-105(a)(3) and thus were statutorily excluded from the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 46A-1-105(a)(3) applied to exclude Petitioner's WVCCPA claims, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Petitioner's complaint.View "Holt v. W. Va. Am. Water Co." on Justia Law 2014-06-11 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 13-0744 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-48.html In re Proceedings to Establish a Contact Voltage Detection & Repair Program 2014-05-30T09:38:24-08:00 2014-10-01T15:53:58-08:00 Power Survey Company sought a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court contending that the Public Utilities Commission improperly interpreted and applied the Contact Voltage Statute when it approved the portion of the Narragansett Electric Company's (NEC) contact voltage program providing for the issuance of a request for proposal for the purpose of choosing a vendor to provide the technology for the NEC's contact voltage testing. The Supreme Court issued the writ. Respondents, the NEC and the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, moved to quash the writ on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court granted Respondents' motions, holding that, under the facts of this case, Power Survey's petition was untimely.View "In re Proceedings to Establish a Contact Voltage Detection & Repair Program" on Justia Law 2014-05-30 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court William P. Robinson, III 13-48 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/130146.html Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd. 2014-05-23T07:03:38-08:00 2014-10-01T15:51:56-08:00 The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) allowed an independent transmission company, ITC Midwest, to use the pay-and-go procedure of Iowa Code 476.27, the railroad-crossing statute, to run electrical power lines across a railroad at three locations, at the objection of the Hawkeye Land Company. Hawkeye Land owned the railroad-crossing easement but did not own or operate a railroad. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the use of the pay-and-go procedure and denied compensation beyond the $750 standard per crossing fee the utility pays to the owner of the railroad right-of-way under the crossing statute. After concluding that it had interpretive authority over the crossing statute, the IUB issued a final order that reached the same conclusions as the ALJ. The district court affirmed on judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the IUB lacked interpretive authority over the terms of the crossing statute; and (2) the crossing statute applied to Hawkeye Land, but because ITC Midwest was not a public utility, it was not allowed to use the pay-and-go procedure.View "Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law 2014-05-23 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Thomas D. Waterman 130146 http://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supreme-court/2014/102630.html Prairie Land Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Kan. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. 2014-05-16T08:05:59-08:00 2014-10-01T15:50:25-08:00 Prairie Land Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Prairie Land), which purchases wholesale electricity from various suppliers and distributes that electricity to retail customers, entered into temporally overlapping, long-term all-requirements contracts with two different wholesale electricity suppliers, Sunflower Electric Power Corporation (Sunflower) and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (KEPCo). After a dispute arose regarding which supplier had the right to serve a certain pumping station delivery point, Prairie Land filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the district court to determine which supplier was entitled to serve the new delivery point. The district court ruled in favor of Sunflower, which entered into the first all-requirements contract with Prairie Land. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that under the facts of this case, Prairie Land must meet its obligations under its contract with Sunflower, the first supplier, before it may comply with any obligations under its contract with KEPCo, the second supplier.View "Prairie Land Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Kan. Elec. Power Coop., Inc." on Justia Law 2014-05-16 state Kansas Kansas Supreme Court Moritz 102630 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2014/2012-0668.html In re Complaint of Buckeye Energy Brokers v. Palmer Energy Co. 2014-04-15T15:33:48-08:00 2014-10-01T15:40:16-08:00 Buckeye Energy Brokers, a certified provider of competitive retail electric service a competitive retail natural-gas service, filed an amended complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio against Palmer Energy Company, an energy-management and consulting firm. Buckeye claimed that Palmer, one of its alleged competitors, violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.08 and 4929.20 by acting without a certificate as a broker in arranging for the supply of competitive retail electric and natural-gas services in Ohio. The Commission held that Buckeye failed to prove its allegations, concluding that Palmer had provided services to clients as a consultant, not as a broker. The Supreme Court dismissed Buckeye's appeal without reaching the merits, holding that Buckeye failed to show that it suffered prejudice or harm from the Commission's orders. View "In re Complaint of Buckeye Energy Brokers v. Palmer Energy Co." on Justia Law 2014-04-15 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Judith Ann Lanzinger 2012-0668 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11397.html Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 2014-04-14T08:09:05-08:00 2014-10-01T15:39:59-08:00 The Department of Public Utilities imposed on Petitioners, electric companies, monetary assessments for the Storm Trust Fund ("assessment") pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 12P, 18, which specifically prohibited Petitioners from seeking recovery of the assessment in any rate proceeding. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the recovery prohibition, both as required by the statute and impose by the Department's order, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Department's order, holding (1) the mere obligation to pay the assessment, regardless of whether recovery was permitted or precluded, did not rise to the level of a compensable per se taking; (2) Petitioner's claim that the assessment constituted a taking by way of a confiscatory rate was inadequate on the facts as presented to the Court; and (3) the Department's order imposing the assessment and articulating the recovery prohibition did not constitute a regulatory taking because the order simply required Petitioners to pay an assessment that served a legitimate public purpose and did not interfere with Petitioners' overall property rights.View "Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law 2014-04-14 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Robert J. Cordy SJC-11397 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/13-3061/13-3061-2014-04-08.html Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, et al 2014-04-08T09:01:15-08:00 2014-10-01T15:37:53-08:00 Plaintiff-appellee Randy Howard sought to bring a class action suit against Ferrellgas Partners, LP in federal district court for allegedly overcharging him and other customers. Ferrellgas moved to force plaintiff to pursue his individual claim alone, in arbitration, arguing that arbitration was the procedure the parties had agreed to. The district court was unable to conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate. Rather than proceed to trial as the Federal Arbitation Act required, the district court entered an order denying arbitration outright. The Tenth Circuit concluded that denial was error: "When it's apparent from a quick look at the case that no material disputes of fact exist, it may be permissible and efficient for a district court to decide the arbitration question as a matter of law through motions practice and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing arbitration. . . . Parties should not have to endure years of waiting and exhaust legions of photocopiers in discovery and motions practice merely to learn where their dispute will be heard. The Act requires courts process the venue question quickly so the parties can get on with the merits of their dispute in the right forum. It calls for a summary trial — not death by discovery." View "Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, et al" on Justia Law 2014-04-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Neil M. Gorsuch 13-3061 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-56.html Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 2014-04-08T08:15:05-08:00 2014-10-01T15:37:42-08:00 The Public Utilities Commission found that, from 2008 to 2010, Central Maine Power Company (CMP) had applied approximately $2.6 million worth of customer deposits to debts owed on its own transmission-and-distribution services when that portion of the deposits should have been applied to debts owed for standard-offer service. Accordingly, the Commission ordered CMP to remedy its misallocation of deposits between its separate receivables accounts. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding (1) the Commission correctly interpreted the governing statutes and regulations; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the Commission's retroactive application of its new interpretation did not offend concepts of due process or reasonable notice; and (3) the Commission's decision did not constitute improper retroactive ratemaking.View "Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-04-08 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Leigh Ingalls Saufley http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-733.html Hopkins v. City of Brinkley 2014-04-03T09:01:45-08:00 2014-10-01T15:36:14-08:00 Jon Hopkins submitted multiple requests to Brinkley Water & Sewer Department ("BW&S") for the home address and payment history of Kathryn Harris, a municipal-utility ratepayer and resident of the City of Brinkley. BW&S provided a redacted history of Harris's account history but did not disclose her home address. The circuit court found that BW&S was not required to provide Hopkins with Harris's home address, a "public record" as defined by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the ratepayer's home address was exempt from disclosure, as (1) the Federal Trade Commission's Red Flags Rule does not preempt the FOIA's disclosure requirements; (2) BW&S failed to offer proof that any customer's home address qualifies as a "personal matter" and thus was "constitutionally protectable" under McCambridge v. City of Little Rock; and (3) Harris's home address was available for inspection by Hopkins, irrespective of his purpose in seeking access.View "Hopkins v. City of Brinkley" on Justia Law 2014-04-03 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court James Hannah CV-13-733 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2014/sc19107.html Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council 2014-03-17T05:01:06-08:00 2014-10-01T15:30:34-08:00 The Connecticut Siting Council approved a proposed project of the Connecticut Light and Power Company. Plaintiffs appealed the siting counsel's decision while the power company's motion for reconsideration of the decision, with regard to the denial of a second project, was still pending. The siting council subsequently granted the motion for reconsideration and approved the second project. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs had not appealed from a final decision of the siting council. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in its judgment.View "Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law 2014-03-25 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court SC19107 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-38.html Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 2014-03-04T08:04:33-08:00 2014-10-01T15:26:31-08:00 The Public Utilities Commission (Commission) approved, with multiple conditions, two petitions for reorganization filed by two regulated electrical utilities in Maine. The reorganization would allow changes in the corporate ownership of specific entities that transmit and distribute electricity in Maine such that they would be held in common ownership with generators of electricity in Maine, primarily, generators of electricity from wind power. Several intervenors appealed the Commission's approval of the petitions, arguing that the proposed union under a single ownership of transmission-and-distribution utilities and electricity generators was prohibited by the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commission, holding that the Commission incorrectly interpreted the Act in making its determination. Remanded for reexamination of the proposals to determine whether the Act permits the reorganization proposed in this case.View "Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n " on Justia Law 2014-03-04 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Leigh Ingalls Saufley http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-212.html Bruno v. Metro. Utils. Dist. 2014-02-28T07:06:13-08:00 2014-10-01T15:25:41-08:00 Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) distributes water and natural gas to businesses and residents in the Omaha metropolitan area. MUD contracts with Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) to provide natural gas pipelines transportation services. In November 2012, MUD and Northern entered into an amendment to a contract providing that Northern would provide interstate natural gas transportation service to MUD for twenty years. Jason Bruno, an Omaha ratepayer and taxpayer who obtained gas and water services from MUD, sought a declaratory judgment that the 2012 amendment to the contract between MUD and Northern was void or voidable on the grounds that Neb. Rev. Stat. 14-2121 requires MUD to seek competitive bids for all contracts for work not performed by MUD employees. The district court determined that the statute does not require competitive bidding, but rather, grants MUD the discretion whether or not to go through the bidding process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that there was no statutory competitive bidding requirement with respect to the contract at issue. View "Bruno v. Metro. Utils. Dist." on Justia Law 2014-02-28 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Kenneth C. Stephan S-13-212 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/11-4245/11-4245-2014-02-20.html NJ Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n 2014-02-20T10:05:46-08:00 2014-10-01T15:22:18-08:00 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a federal agency that, under the Federal Power Act, regulates rates charged by public utilities for transmission and sale of energy in interstate commerce, and rules pertaining to such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824d. In 2006, FERC approved a new tariff (rules governing interstate sale of electricity and electric capacity) for the PJM market, covering 13 states and the District of Columbia, as a result of an extensively negotiated settlement between power providers, utility companies, government authorities and others. The order required that load serving entities (LSEs) in the market procure a certain amount of energy capacity for access during peak load; included a rule that offers for the sale of capacity in the markets at artificially low prices would, with some exceptions, be required to be raised to a competitive level (mitigation). In 2011, FERC altered the 2006 Order: eliminating a mitigation exemption for resources built under state mandate; eliminating a provision that guaranteed that LSEs would be able to use "self-supply" to satisfy capacity obligations; and changing factors used in determining whether an offer was subject to mitigation. Objectors argued that the changes amounted to direct regulation of power facilities in violation of the FPA, and that FERC arbitrarily eliminated the mitigation exemption for state-mandated resources. Electric utilities challenged elimination of self-supply assurances for LSEs. Others challenged new rules governing calculation of a resource's net cost of new entry (for determining whether an offer for sale of capacity will be mitigated) and FERC's determination that a new generation resource must clear only one capacity auction to avoid further mitigation. The Third Circuit rejected all of the challenges.View "NJ Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-02-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Rendell 11-4245 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2014/2012-0187.html In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co. 2014-02-13T06:14:20-08:00 2014-10-01T15:20:20-08:00 The Public Utilities Commission ("PUCO") approved of the first electric security plan of American Electric Power operating companies (collectively, "AEP"). The Supreme Court held that the Commission committed reversible error on three issues, including (1) approving the recovery of carrying costs associated with environmental investments without proper statutory authority, and (2) authorizing the provider-of-last-resort ("POLR") charge without sufficient evidence. On remand, the Commission determined that the environmental-investment carrying costs were lawful but determined that the AEP had not presented evidence of its actual POLR costs and directed the company to deduct that charge from its tariff schedules. Following rehearing, the Office of Consumers' Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) filed an appeal raising several challenges to the Commission's remand orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Commission, holding that OCC and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission's remand orders.View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law 2014-02-13 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Judith Ann Lanzinger 2012-0187 http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2014/12-0102-0.html Tex. Coast Utils. Coal. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. 2014-01-17T10:58:13-08:00 2014-10-01T15:12:40-08:00 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation, a gas utility that distributes natural gas, sought to raise its rates. CenterPoint's proposed rate schedule included a "cost of service adjustment" (COSA) clause. The Railroad Commission of Texas approved a rate increase, including a revised COSA clause that provided for automatic annual adjustments based on increases or decreases in CenterPoint's cost of service. On judicial review, the district court held that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to adopt the COSA clause as part of CenterPoint's rate schedule. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission had the authority to enter the final order in this case, including the COSA clause. Remanded.View "Tex. Coast Utils. Coal. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex." on Justia Law 2014-01-17 state Texas Supreme Court of Texas Jeffrey S. Boyd 12-0102 http://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2014/sc11-1830.html Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Graham 2014-01-09T09:01:22-08:00 2014-10-01T15:10:03-08:00 At issue in this case was a territorial dispute between two utilities, Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Gulf Power Company, both of which sought the right to serve Freedom Walk, a proposed multi-purpose development. The Florida Public Service Commission resolved the dispute in favor of Gulf Power, concluding that because the multiple factors it considered were substantially equal, customer preference, which favored Gulf Power, would determine the outcome of the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order granting Gulf Power the right to serve the Freedom Walk development, holding that the Commission's findings and conclusions were supported by competent substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous.View "Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Graham" on Justia Law 2014-01-09 state Florida Florida Supreme Court Jorge Labarga SC11-1830 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2013/scwc-28948-0.html Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. 2013-12-18T14:01:25-08:00 2014-10-01T15:05:06-08:00 Pacific Lightnet, Inc. (PLNI) brought claims against Time Warner, asserting that it had been wrongfully billed by Time Warner for services that it had never received and that it was owed credits to its account from Time Warner based on assets PNLI had purchased, called Feature Group D claims. The circuit court entered judgment for Time Warner on all claims, notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of PLNI on certain claims. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Feature Group D claims based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and vacated the jury verdict on those same claims. PLNI appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the ICA erred in vacating the jury's verdict because it violated the filed-rate doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss this case; and (2) inasmuch as the filed-rate doctrine applied, the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Appellant could not recover for any claims involving charges not filed within 120 days of receipt of billing in accordance with the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission and Federal Communications Commission filed tariffs.View "Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-12-18 state Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii Acoba SCWC-28948 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2013/39151-2011.html Idaho Power v. Grouse Creek 2013-12-18T12:01:50-08:00 2014-10-01T15:05:11-08:00 The Idaho Power Company appealed an order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission that denied approval of contracts between the utility and two wind farms on the ground that the contract rate for purchasing the power was contrary to public policy because it exceeded the utility's avoided costs. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Power v. Grouse Creek" on Justia Law 2013-12-18 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Daniel T. Eismann 39151-2011 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2013/da-13-0044.html Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co. 2013-12-03T16:11:28-08:00 2014-10-01T15:00:54-08:00 NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court.View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law 2013-12-03 state Montana Montana Supreme Court James A. Rice DA 13-0044 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2013/1115106.html People v. IL Dep't of Labor 2013-11-21T08:02:37-08:00 2014-10-01T14:57:35-08:00 The Village of Bement, Piatt County, has a five-year contract, under which E.R.H. Enterprises operates and maintains the Village's potable water facility and parts of its water delivery infrastructure. The Department of Labor issued a subpoena to E.R.H.'s attorney seeing employment records as part of an investigation under the Prevailing Wage Act, 820 ILCS 130/0.01. E.R.H. asserted that it was exempt from the Act as a public utility. The trial court ruled in favor of the Department and ordered E.R.H. to provide the requested documents, noting that the company was not regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that E.R.H. is simply an outside contractor. View "People v. IL Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law 2013-11-20 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Lloyd A. Karmeier 1115106 http://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2013/09s00-1307-pl-476.html Kitchell v. Franklin 2013-11-13T11:03:54-08:00 2014-10-01T14:55:04-08:00 Plaintiff was a resident of the City of Logansport and a ratepayer to the municipal utility that supplied her electricity. Plaintiff filed a petition against the City of Logansport, including the City's mayor and common council, seeking a declaration that Ordinance 2013-07, which gave the mayor the authority to enter into a public-private partnership and to negotiate an agreement with an entity that could construct, operate, and maintain a public electric facility and transfer it back to the City, was invalid because the City lacked the authority to pass the ordinance. The trial court dismissed the petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Indiana's Public-Private Agreements Act, which authorizes and provides guidelines for the implementation of public-private partnerships, does not require a local legislative body to first adopt the statute before it may issue a request for proposals or begin contract negotiations as provided for under the statute; and (2) the City complied with the Act in every particular, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to relief.View "Kitchell v. Franklin" on Justia Law 2013-11-13 state Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana Robert D. Rucker 09S00-1307-PL-476 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2013/sc92581.html Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. 2013-11-12T11:10:03-08:00 2014-10-01T14:54:47-08:00 After the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) implemented a stormwater user charge without prior voter approval, William Zweig and other named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated ratepayers (Ratepayers), filed a complaint against MSD, claiming MSD's action violated Mo. Const. art. X, 22(a), which prohibits political subdivisions from levying any new or increased tax, license or fees without prior voter approval. The trial court (1) declared MSD's action unconstitutional, enjoined future collection of the charge, and ordered MSD to pay the Ratepayers' attorneys' fees and expenses; and (2) refused to order MSD to pay damages or refund charges already collected. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) concluding that MSD levied the stormwater usage charge without prior voter approval in violation of section 22(a) and in awarding Ratepayers' attorneys' fees and expenses; and (2) refusing to enter a money judgment against MSD for the amounts already collected.View "Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist." on Justia Law 2013-11-12 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Paul C. Wilson SC92581 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2013/2012-0027.html OHIOTELNET.COM, INC. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc. 2013-10-29T06:08:40-08:00 2014-10-01T14:50:16-08:00 Appellant purchased telephone and other telecommunications services from (intervening) Appellee at wholesale rates and resold the services to end-user consumers at retail rates. Appellant filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission (PUCO) alleging that Appellee had overcharged for its services and submitted inaccurate billing invoices to Appellant, among other things. PUCO denied the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to submit sufficient credible evidence that Appellee had refused to issue credits for valid billing disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to carry its burden on appeal of demonstrating that PUCO's orders were unreasonable or unlawful.View "OHIOTELNET.COM, INC. v. Windstream Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-10-29 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Maureen O'Connor 2012-0027 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2013/s-12-0194-3.html Gosar's Unlimited Inc. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2013-10-11T09:26:09-08:00 2014-10-01T14:45:51-08:00 Appellant owned and operated two mobile home parks. In 2000, Appellant changed its practice of including in the rent it charged tenants the cost of water it purchased from the City for the tenants' use. Instead, Appellant installed water meters on each trailer lot and began charging tenants for water usage separately from their rent. In 2008, the Public Service Commission (PSC) determined that Appellant was a public utility and therefore subject to regulation by the PSC. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant metered a commodity utility to its tenants, it was a public utility under Wyoming law and therefore subject to PSC regulation; and (2) PSC's regulation of Appellant did not violate Appellant's equal protection rights.View "Gosar's Unlimited Inc. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2013-07-19 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court William U. Hill S-12-0194 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2013/62-map-2012.html Norfolk Southern Railway v. PUC 2013-10-02T14:07:13-08:00 2014-10-01T14:43:39-08:00 The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the limits of the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) authority to allocate costs associated with a rail-highway crossing project. The Commonwealth Court held that the Commission could not allocate costs to a transportation utility that regularly uses a railroad-crossing site and does not own real estate or properties there. The Commission and Intervenors argued that the PUC has broad discretion not only to determine the allocation of costs to "concerned parties," but also to determine which parties are "concerned" in the first instance. Counterbalancing the Commission's and Intervenors' remarks about equities, Norfolk Southern Railway questioned why it should contribute to the remediation of deteriorating infrastructure over which it had no control. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a transportation utility need not own facilities at a rail-highway crossing to be a concerned party for purposes of the PUC's cost-allocation jurisdiction and authority, at least where the utility conducts regular operations at the crossing and may enforce an easement-based right of way.View "Norfolk Southern Railway v. PUC" on Justia Law 2013-10-02 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Thomas G. Saylor 62 MAP 2012 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2013/2011-1828.html Smith v. Ohio Edison Co. 2013-09-26T06:05:27-08:00 2014-10-01T14:41:26-08:00 Appellant filed a complaint and amended complaint against the Ohio Edison Company, a public utility, alleging that Ohio Edison had unlawfully removed the electric meter from his property and disconnected his electric service. The Public Utilities Commission found that Ohio Edison was justified in removing the meter and terminating electric service where (1) Appellant had never made an application for new service under Ohio Edison's tariff and therefore was not a customer of Ohio Edison, and (2) Ohio Edison properly removed the electric meter without prior notice because the meter had been tampered with and was a safety hazard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission erred in finding that (1) Appellant was not a customer of Ohio Edison at the property in question; and (2) Ohio Edison had lawfully disconnected electric service to the property.View "Smith v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law 2013-09-26 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Maureen O'Connor 2011-1828 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2013/a11-352.html In re Application of Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv. in Minn. 2013-09-18T10:06:38-08:00 2014-10-01T14:38:43-08:00 In 2009, Minnesota Power sought an increase in service rates of approximately 18.9 percent. As part of its submission to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Minnesota Power also requested an interim rate increase of approximately $73.3 million. The Commission decided to set the interim rate increase at approximately $48.5 million after finding exigent circumstances existed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Commission did not err in finding exigent circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in setting interim rates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision to set Minnesota Power's interim rate increase at $48.5 million.View "In re Application of Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv. in Minn." on Justia Law 2013-09-18 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court Lorie Skjerven Gildea A11-352 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-mexico/supreme-court/2013/33-393.html NMAG v. NMPRC 2013-08-29T10:08:59-08:00 2014-10-01T14:33:44-08:00 Appellants, the New Mexico Attorney General and New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers, asked the Supreme Court to vacate and annul the final order in PRC Case No. 11-00308-UT (Case 308 Final Order) because it permitted Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to earn returns on the operating expenses incurred from energy efficiency programs. Appellants argue that such returns are inconsistent with New Mexico law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Case 308 Final Order was consistent with the PRC's ratemaking authority under the New Mexico Public Utility Act, the New Mexico Efficient Use of Energy Act, and with the Court's holding in "Attorney General v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission" (258 P.3d 453). Furthermore, the Court held that Case 308 Final Order was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Case 308 Final Order.View "NMAG v. NMPRC" on Justia Law 2013-08-29 state New Mexico New Mexico Supreme Court Charles W. Daniels 33,393 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2013/2011-1758.html Cameron Creek Apartments v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. 2013-08-29T06:10:38-08:00 2014-10-01T14:33:35-08:00 Appellant, a public utility (Utility), provided natural gas to intervening Appellee, an apartment complex. In 2008, Utility informed Appellee that it would disconnect gas service to the entire complex if Appellee did not bring all apartment units into compliance with the National Fire Protection Association's National Fuel Gas Code (NFG Code) within two months. Appellee subsequently filed a complaint against Utility with the Public Utilities Commission (Commission), alleging that Utility had unreasonably and unlawfully threatened to disconnect gas service to all units if Appellee refused to retrofit the ventilation system in each apartment to meet NFG Code requirements. The complaint requested that the Commission prohibit Utility from terminating service and requiring expensive remedial construction. The Commission found in favor of Appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Utility's six propositions of law had merit.View "Cameron Creek Apartments v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-08-29 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio William M. O'Neill 2011-1758 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-707/12-707-2013-08-14.html Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin 2013-08-14T07:30:08-08:00 2014-10-01T14:27:47-08:00 Entergy, owner and operator of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, filed suit against Vermont, raising claims challenging Vermont statutes governing Vermont Yankee (Acts 74, 160, and 189) and other claims related to Vermont's attempt to condition its grant of permission to operate Vermont Yankee on the execution of a power purchase agreement that favored Vermont retail consumers. The court affirmed the district court's grant of declaratory judgment that Act 74 and Act 160 were facially preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2011-2281; reversed the district court's determination that Vermont's efforts to condition a new Certificate of Public Good for Vermont Yankee on the execution of a favorable power purchase agreement violated the dormant Commerce Clause; affirmed the district court's determination that Entergy's challenge under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791-828c, was unripe; affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing sections 6522(c)(2) or 6522(c)(4) in title 10 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 74, or sections 248(e)(2), 248(m), or 254 in title 30 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 160; and vacated the district court's permanent injunction enjoining defendants from conditioning the issuance of a Certificate of Public Good on the execution of a below-wholesale-market power purchase agreement between Entergy and Vermont utilities or otherwise requiring Vermont Yankee to sell power to Vermont utilities at preferential rates. View "Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin" on Justia Law 2013-08-14 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Droney 12-707 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2013/s194121.html Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization 2013-08-12T10:00:49-08:00 2014-10-01T14:27:15-08:00 In assessing the value of electric power plants for purposes of property taxation, assessors may not include the value of intangible assets and rights in the value of taxable property. An electric company purchased "emission reduction credits" (ERCs), which the company had to purchase to obtain authorization to construct an electric power plant and to operate it at certain air-pollutant emission levels. These ERCs constituted intangible rights for property taxation purposes. In assessing the value of the power plant using the replacement cost method, the State Board of Equalization (Board) estimated the cost of replacing the ERCs. In also using an income approach in assessing the plant, the Board failed to attribute a portion or the plant's income stream to the ERCs and to deduct that value from the plant's projected income stream prior to taxation. In analyzing the Board's valuation of the power plant, the Supreme Court held (1) the Board improperly taxed the power company's ERCs when it added their replacement cost to the power plant's taxable value; and (2) the Board was not required to deduct a value attributable to the ERCs under an income approach. Remanded.View "Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law 2013-08-12 state California Supreme Court of California Ming Chin S194121 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2013/sc92964.html Office of Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2013-07-30T11:08:22-08:00 2014-10-01T14:22:48-08:00 Atmos Energy Corporation, a local distributing company, contracted with independent gas marketing companies to purchase natural gas then delivered gas to customers through local pipelines. Following an audit, Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) staff indicated that Atmos had failed to comply with affiliate transaction rules by failing to document properly the fair market value and fully distributed cost of its transactions with its affiliate, Atmos Energy Marketing LLC (AEM). The staff then proposed a disallowance regarding Atmos' transactions with AEM. After an evidentiary hearing, the PSC found compliance with the affiliate transaction rules and rejected the proposed disallowances. The Office of Public Counsel (OPC) appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC erred in relying upon a presumption of prudence in rejecting staff and OPC's proposed disallowance regarding Atmos's transactions with AEM. Remanded.View "Office of Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2013-07-30 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Laura Denvir Stith SC92964 http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/2013/s060584.html PGE v. Ebasco Services, Inc. 2013-07-25T08:17:45-08:00 2014-10-01T14:21:38-08:00 Portland General Electric Company (PGE) appealed a Court of Appeals decision that reversed and remanded a trial court order that denied Lexington Insurance Company's motion to set aside a default judgment entered in PGE's favor. Specifically, the issues were: (1) whether a default judgment awarding monetary relief violated ORCP 67C if the complaint did not specify amount of damages sought; and (2) if so, whether that omission rendered the judgment voidable or void. The Supreme Court held the judgment in question here did not violate ORCP 67C and that the judgment was not void. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.View "PGE v. Ebasco Services, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-07-25 state Oregon Oregon Supreme Court David V. Brewer S060584 http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2013/2012ap000840.html Waller v. Am. Transmission Co. 2013-07-16T06:08:04-08:00 2014-10-01T14:18:10-08:00 Defendant condemned a pair of easements on the residential property of Plaintiffs to facilitate the placement of high-voltage transmission lines. Plaintiffs filed a right-to-take action, arguing that because the proposed easements would cover more than half of their property and render their residential improvements obsolete, they would be left with an "uneconomic remnant" under Wis. Stat. 32.06(3m). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Plaintiffs' property, after the taking of the easements, was an uneconomic remnant, and ordered Defendant to acquire the entire property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after Defendant took two easements for transmission lines, Plaintiffs' property was an uneconomic remnant because its condition was such that it was of substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an industrial parcel.View "Waller v. Am. Transmission Co." on Justia Law 2013-07-16 state Wisconsin Wisconsin Supreme Court David T. Prosser, Jr. 2012AP000840 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2013/2012-0169.html Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio 2013-07-16T06:05:49-08:00 2014-10-01T14:18:05-08:00 In 2005, a limited liability company and its owners (plaintiffs), on behalf of other similarly situated telephone customers, filed a complaint seeking to certify a class action lawsuit against United Telephone Company of Ohio (UTO), which provided Plaintiffs with telephone service. Plaintiffs claimed that their phone bills from UTO contained unauthorized charges from third parties. The trial court ultimately denied Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the order of the trial court, holding (1) a trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis to ensure the prerequisites of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23, under which plaintiffs must establish seven prerequisites in order to certify a class action, are satisfied; and (2) even though the trial court's consideration of the merits in this case was improper, its order denying certification of the class was correct because Plaintiffs' proposed amended class did not satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23.View "Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio" on Justia Law 2013-07-16 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Sharon L. Kennedy 2012-0169 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-1022/12-1022-2013-07-12.html GenOn REMA LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2013-07-12T09:30:06-08:00 2014-10-01T14:16:44-08:00 Portland Generating Station is a 427-megawatt, coal-fired, electricity generating plant in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, directly across the Delaware River within 500 feet of Warren County, New Jersey. The EPA found that Portland emits sulfur dioxide in amounts that significantly interfere with control of air pollution across state borders. In response to a petition under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408, 7409)), the EPA imposed direct limits on Portland's emissions and restrictions to reduce its contribution to air pollution within three years. The Third Circuit upheld the EPA actions. It was reasonable for the EPA to interpret Section 126(b) as an independent mechanism for enforcing interstate pollution control, giving it authority to promulgate the Portland Rule. The contents of the Portland Rule are not arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of the EPA's discretion.View "GenOn REMA LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law 2013-07-12 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Julio M. Fuentes 12-1022 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-1026/12-1026-2013-07-08.html United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC 2013-07-08T07:31:22-08:00 2014-10-01T14:15:00-08:00 Between 1994 and 1999 Commonwealth Edison modified five Illinois coal-fired power plants that had been operating on August 7, 1977, and were, therefore, grandfathered against a permitting requirement applicable to any "major emitting facility" built or substantially modified after that date in parts of the country subject to the rules about prevention of significant deterioration, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), until the modification. The permit requires installation of "the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation." Commonwealth Edison did not obtain permits. There was no challenge until 2009, a decade after completion of the modifications. The district court dismissed a challenge as untimely. After finishing the modifications, Commonwealth Edison sold the plants to Midwest. The federal government and Illinois (plaintiffs) argued that the district court allowed corporate restructuring to wipe out liability for ongoing pollution. Midwest and its corporate parent (Edison Mission) filed bankruptcy petitions after the appeal was argued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Midwest cannot be liable because its predecessor would not have been liable had it owned the plants continuously. Commonwealth Edison needed permits before undertaking the modifications. The court rejected arguments of continuing-violation and continuing-injury.View "United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-07-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Hoover Easterbrook 12-1026 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-17199/11-17199-2013-07-01.html Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior 2013-07-01T10:01:46-08:00 2014-10-01T14:13:12-08:00 The Canal Authority appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Interior, Bureau, San Luis, and Wetlands, in a suit to establish priority water rights under Central Valley Project (CVP) water service contracts. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that all claims arising before February 11, 2004 were time-barred and that Canal Authority was not entitled to priority water allocation under the CVP contracts. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the alternative basis that California Water Code 11460 did not require the Bureau to provide CVP contractors priority water rights, because contracts between the Canal Authority and Bureau contained provisions that specifically address allocation of water during shortage periods. View "Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law 2013-07-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 11-17199 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-1633/11-1633-2013-06-28.html Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc. 2013-06-28T07:01:04-08:00 2014-10-01T14:12:08-08:00 The 1987 Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1, was intended to encourage development of power plants that convert solid waste to electricity. Local electric utilities were required to enter into 10-year agreements to purchase power from such plants designated as "qualified" by the Illinois Commerce Commission, at a rate exceeding that established by federal law. The state compensated electric utilities with a tax credit. A qualified facility was obliged to reimburse the state for tax credits its customers had claimed after it had repaid all of its capital costs for development and implementation. Many qualified facilities failed before they repaid their capital costs, so that Illinois never got its tax credit money back. The Act was amended in 2006, to establish a moratorium on new Qualified Facilities, provide additional grounds for disqualifying facilities from the subsidy, and expand the conditions that trigger a facility's liability to repay electric utilities' tax credits. The district court held that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment does not clearly indicate that the new repayment conditions apply to monies received prior to the amendment and must be construed prospectively. View "Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-06-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane Pamela Wood 11-1633 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2013/1111558.html Utilities Board of the City of Opp v. Shuler Brothers, Inc. 2013-06-21T09:00:19-08:00 2014-10-01T14:09:55-08:00 The Utilities Board of the City of Opp appealed a circuit court's order that denied its motion to dismiss a third-party complaint filed by Shuler Brothers, Inc. The Alabama Electric Company (AEC) had filed suit against Shuler Brothers seeking recovery for services performed and for breach of contract when Shuler Brothers refused to pay an invoice for repairs AEC made to some equipment. Shuler Brothers argued that the repairs did not solve its equipment issue. Shuler Brothers alleged the Utilities Board was negligent in maintaining power lines going to its facility that was part of its equipment troubles. In its motion to dismiss, the Utilities Board argued that a two-year statute of limitations applied to Shuler Brothers' claim, and that the alleged negligence was not discovered until AEC served Shuler Brothers with its complaint. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment to deny the Utilities Board's motion to dismiss; reversed the circuit court's decision denying Shuler Brothers' breach-of-contract claim; and reversed the circuit court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss Shuler Brothers' negligence claim.View "Utilities Board of the City of Opp v. Shuler Brothers, Inc. " on Justia Law 2013-06-21 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama 1111558 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3620/11-3620-2013-06-07.html Am. Mun. Power, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 2013-06-07T13:01:27-08:00 2014-10-01T14:04:05-08:00 Control of most of the U.S. electrical grid is divided among Regional Transmission Organizations, voluntary associations of utilities that own interconnected transmission lines. Power plants and other electrical companies involved with the regional grid can also be RTO members. An RTO sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to impose a tariff on its members to pay for construction of new high-voltage power lines that will primarily transmit electricity generated by remote wind farms. Every state in the region, except Kentucky, encourages or mandates that utilities obtain a percentage of their electricity supply from renewable sources. The cost of the project is to be shared by utilities drawing power from the grid according to each utility's share of the region's total wholesale consumption of electricity. The RTO previously allocated the cost of expanding or upgrading the grid to utilities nearest a proposed transmission line, on the theory that they would get the most benefit. FERC approved the rate design and pilot projects. The RTO negotiated a rate with another RTO to share the costs of some upgrades with mutual benefits. Members of the RTO challenged the approval and the agreement and some announced their departure from the RTO. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the orders, but dismissed as premature the claims of departing members concerning their liability and remanded with respect to export pricing in connection with the agreement.View "Am. Mun. Power, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law 2013-06-07 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 11-3620 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2013/a11-1116.html N. States Power Co. v. Aleckson 2013-05-29T09:16:01-08:00 2014-10-01T14:00:43-08:00 Appellants were landowners who elected to require a utility to condemn their property in fee after Respondents sought to acquire easements through their property by eminent domain in order to construct a high-voltage electric transmission line. After making this election, Appellants requested that Respondents provide them with minimum compensation and relocation assistance. Respondents moved the district court for an order clarifying whether such benefits are available to property owners making an election under Minn. Stat. 216E.12. The district court concluded that such benefits were available to Appellants, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants satisfied the statutory criteria for receiving minimum compensation and relocation assistance and were therefore entitled to such benefits. Remanded. View "N. States Power Co. v. Aleckson" on Justia Law 2013-05-29 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court Alan C. Page A11-1116 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-5095/12-5095-2013-05-28.html Sierra Club v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, et al 2013-05-28T08:32:22-08:00 2014-10-01T14:00:13-08:00 Intervenor, Sunflower Electric Power Corporation, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Sierra Club based on violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by the USDA's Rural Utilities Services. The district court ruled that the Service unlawfully failed to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) before granting approvals and financial assistance to Sunflower's expansion of its coal-fired power plant, and remanded the matter to the Service, enjoining it from granting further approvals until it completed an EIS. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because Sunflower appealed a non-final remand order that was not immediately appealable by a private party and under section 1292(a)(1) because the injunction served no purpose beyond the remand.View "Sierra Club v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, et al" on Justia Law 2013-05-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judith Ann Wilson Rogers 12-5095 http://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2013/sc11-2465.html Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham 2013-05-02T09:01:35-08:00 2014-10-01T13:52:46-08:00 In 2008, the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) granted the petitions for determination of need for new nuclear power plants proposed by Florida Power & Light company (FPL) and Progress Energy Florida (PEF). The PSC subsequently issued orders granting the utility companies' annual petitions for recovery of their associated preconstruction costs through customer rates. Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE) opposed FPL and PEF's most recent cost recovery petitions, arguing that Fla. Stat. 366.93 unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the PSC and, alternatively, the PSC's order authorizing the utility companies to recover preconstruction costs was arbitrary and unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that authorizing recovery of preconstruction costs through customer rates in order to promote utility company investment in new nuclear power plants, even though those plants might never be built, is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the Court.View "Alliance for Clean Energy v. Graham" on Justia Law 2013-05-02 state Florida Florida Supreme Court SC11-2465 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2013/s-12-0119.html Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyo. v. Qwest Corp. 2013-04-25T09:09:04-08:00 2014-10-01T13:50:37-08:00 The manager of the Wyoming Universal Service Fund (WUSF) filed confidential reports with the Wyoming Public Service Commission (PSC) containing his recommendations for the WUSF assessment level for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Upon notice from the PSC that public hearings would be held to consider the manager's reports, Qwest asked for contested case hearings. The PSC denied Qwest's requests, concluding that WUSF proceedings are legislative in nature. The PSC subsequently issued orders establishing the WUSF assessment levels as recommended by the manager. The Office of Consumer Advocate and Qwest filed petitions for review of the PSC order. The district court held that the PSC erred in denying Qwest's requests for contested case hearings, reversed the administrative orders, and ordered portions of the 2009 data to be provided to Qwest but denied the request for 2010 data. Four notices of appeal from the district court's order were filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Qwest was entitled to contested case hearings before the PSC. Remanded for contested case hearings.View "Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyo. v. Qwest Corp." on Justia Law 2013-04-25 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Marilyn S. Kite S-12-0119 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/12-2755/12-2755-2013-04-25.html Laclede Gas Co. v. St. Charles County 2013-04-25T08:31:32-08:00 2014-10-01T13:50:08-08:00 This dispute involved the rights of the County and the rights of a public utility, Laclede, in shared easements. On appeal, the County challenged the district court's grant of Laclede's motion for preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the County from, among other things, constructing any additional portion of retaining wall on top of gas lines on the Pitman easement; removing, or hiring another entity to remove any portion of the Pitman Hill Road gas lines located on the Pitman easement; and removing any portion of the gas lines from the Ehlmann Road easement. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction under the Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 60101-60137, a federal statute that specifically authorized the district court to enjoin threats to damaged pipelines. The issuance of a preliminary injunction in those circumstances was not error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Laclede Gas Co. v. St. Charles County" on Justia Law 2013-04-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Kopf 12-2755 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-mexico/supreme-court/2013/32-968.html Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc. 2013-04-18T10:05:57-08:00 2014-10-01T13:48:21-08:00 A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-04-18 state New Mexico New Mexico Supreme Court Edward L. Chavez 32,968 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/supreme-court/2013/268a12.html State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen. 2013-04-12T09:07:18-08:00 2014-10-01T13:46:35-08:00 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) filed an application with the North Carolina Utilities Commission (Commission) to increase its state retail electric service rates approximately 15.2 percent over current revenues. The application requested that rates be established using a return on equity (ROE) of 11.5 percent. The Commission approved a 10.5 percent ROE for Duke. The attorney general appealed the Commission's order, arguing that the order was legally deficient because it was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence and did not include sufficient conclusions and reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to make the necessary findings of fact to support its ROE determination. Remanded to the Commission to enter sufficient findings of fact.View "State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law 2013-04-12 state North Carolina North Carolina Supreme Court Barbara Jackson 268A12 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-6215/11-6215-2013-04-05.html KY Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecommunications Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. 2013-04-05T08:01:05-08:00 2014-10-01T13:43:17-08:00 TracFone provides prepaid wireless phone service primarily through third-party retailers. The Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, created by the Kentucky General Assembly to develop an emergency 911 system for wireless customers, sued to collect unpaid fees from TracFone. KRS § 65.7635 requires wireless providers to collect a fee from their customers and remit the money to the CRMS for the cost of maintaining the 911 system. The district court ruled in favor of the Board with respect to the interpretation of the statute but declined to award prejudgment interest on TracFone's unpaid fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument concerning ambiguity in the statute. TracFone was required to remit fees from the effective date of the statute, regardless of what method it chose.View "KY Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecommunications Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-04-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Keith 11-6215 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-16042/11-16042-2013-04-03.html Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E 2013-04-03T10:01:32-08:00 2014-10-01T13:42:30-08:00 Defendants, PG&E and Pacific Bell, own and maintain utility poles throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. Plaintiff filed this action against both companies, alleging that the poles discharged wood preservative into the environment in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CWA because discharges of stormwater from the utility poles were neither a "point source discharge" nor "associated with industrial activity" and where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the RCRA because wood preservation that escaped from the utility poles was not a "solid waste." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend.View "Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E" on Justia Law 2013-04-03 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Consuelo Maria Callahan 11-16042 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-2328/11-2328-2013-03-28.html United States v. DTE Energy Co. 2013-03-28T07:00:42-08:00 2014-10-01T13:40:16-08:00 The Clean Air Act New Source Review program forbids construction of new pollution sources without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475. Operators of major pollutant-emitting sources who plan construction must make a preconstruction projection of the increase in emissions following construction, to determine whether the project constitutes a "major modification," requiring a permit. DTE planned on replacing 2,000 square feet of tubing, the economizer, and large sections of reheater piping; installing a new nine-ton device that provides voltage that creates the electromagnetic field needed for the rotor to produce electricity; and refurbishing boiler feedwater pumps at its power plant. The project required 83 days and $65 million. DTE performed required calculations and projected an emissions increase of 3,701 tons per year of sulfur dioxide and 4,096 tons per year of nitrogen oxides. Under the regulations, an increase of 40 tons per year of either substance is significant. DTE determined that the increase fell under the demand growth exclusion. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality took no action and construction began. The U.S. EPA filed notice of violation. The district court granted DTE summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While the regulations allow operators to undertake projects without having EPA second-guess their projections, EPA is not categorically prevented from challenging blatant violations until after modifications are made.View "United States v. DTE Energy Co." on Justia Law 2013-03-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit John M. Rogers 11-2328 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-3145/12-3145-2013-03-28.html OH Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils Comm'n of OH 2013-03-28T07:00:41-08:00 2014-10-01T13:40:18-08:00 AT&T and Intrado, rival telecommunications carriers, submitted to an arbitration conducted by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to determine how to interconnect their networks to service 9-1-1 calls. AT&T insisted that all points of interconnection be on its network, relying on the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C 251(c), a provision only applicable to incumbent carriers like AT&T. The Commission rejected this request, relied on the general provisions of Section 251(a), and ordered the carriers to establish interconnection points on both AT&T's and Intrado's networks. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Commission exceeded its arbitral authority by applying Section 251(a) because Intrado had petitioned for interconnection only under Section 251(c). The Commission properly interpreted an incumbent carrier's interconnection duties under the Act. View "OH Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils Comm'n of OH" on Justia Law 2013-03-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Alan Eugene Norris 12-3145 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/12-5033/12-5033-2013-02-27.html Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States 2013-02-27T08:01:57-08:00 2014-10-01T13:30:50-08:00 Casitas Water District operates the Ventura River Project, which is owned by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and provides water to Ventura County, California, using dams, reservoirs, a canal, pump stations, and many miles of pipeline. In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the West Coast steelhead trout as an endangered species and determined that the primary cause of its decline was loss of habitat due to water development, including impassable dams. Casitas faced liability if continued operation of the Project resulted in harm to the steelhead, 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1), 1540(a)–(b). In 2003, NMFS issued a biological opinion concerning operation of a fish ladder to relieve Casitas of liability. Casitas opened the Robles fish ladder, then filed suit, asserting that the biological opinion operating criteria breached its 1956 Contract with the government or amounted to uncompensated taking of Casitas's property. The Claims Court dismissed, citing the sovereign acts doctrine. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract claim, but reversed dismissal of Casitas's takings claim. The court again dismissed, holding that Casitas had failed to show that the operating criteria had thus far resulted in any reduction of water deliveries, so a takings claim was not yet ripe. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States" on Justia Law 2013-02-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Alvin Anthony Schall 12-5033 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2013/sc92469.html State ex rel. St. Charles County v. Circuit Court 2013-02-26T11:08:01-08:00 2014-10-01T13:30:13-08:00 In 2008, St. Charles County and Laclede Gas Company entered into litigation disputing which party would bear the expense of relocating Laclede Gas' lines due to the County's road project. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. The County then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its litigation under Mo. R. Civ. P. 67.02. The circuit court overruled the County's motion, reasoning that a voluntary dismissal was improper under Rule 67.02 because the case was previously resolved by summary judgment. The County subsequently sought a writ of prohibition, claiming that the circuit court acted outside its jurisdiction by denying the County's motion to voluntarily dismiss its 2008 action against Laclede Gas. The Supreme Court quashed its preliminary writ, holding that the circuit court did not err in overruling the County's motion to dismiss, as the motion was not filed prior to the introduction of evidence at trial, and allowing the County to dismiss its case after it was reviewed by the Court would result in the County achieving an undue advantage in that it would circumnavigate the Court's prior opinion.View "State ex rel. St. Charles County v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law 2013-02-26 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri George W. Draper, III SC92469 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2037/12-2037-2013-02-22.html NE Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Assoc. 2013-02-22T07:00:57-08:00 2014-10-01T13:29:06-08:00 Wabash is a power generation cooperative. Northeastern purchases electricity from Wabash and resells it. In 1977, they entered into a contract: Northeastern agreed to purchase electricity from Wabash for 40 years at rates to be set by the Wabash board of directors "[s]ubject to the approval of the Public Service Commission of Indiana." Revised rates would not be effective unless approved by the "applicable regulatory authorities," and the federal Rural Electrification Administration. In 2012 Northeastern sought a state court declaratory judgment that Wabash breached the contract by taking action in 2004 that had the effect of transferring regulation of its rates from the Indiana Commission to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Wabash removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), arguing that the claim arises under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a. The district court denied remand and granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. Northeastern's claim is limited to construction of the contract and does not necessarily raise a question of federal law. While Northeastern may eventually use a favorable state court judgment to seek permission to terminate its obligations under the tariff filed with FERC,that cannot be achieved in this suitView "NE Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Assoc." on Justia Law 2013-02-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HAMILTON 12-2037 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2013/12-1023.html Larry V. Faircloth Realty, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2013-01-24T12:06:39-08:00 2014-10-01T13:20:00-08:00 In 2004, the Berkeley County Water District and Sewer District filed requests with the Public Service Commission (PSC) to charge capacity improvement fees (CIFs) due to rapid population growth in the county. The PSC approved the requested CIFs. Petitioners subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court, seeking relief from paying the CIFs. The circuit court found that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to establish the CIFs. However, the Supreme Court found Petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the PSC and reversed. Subsequently, the PSC discontinued the CIFs, finding that the Sewer District and Water District no longer satisfied the criteria for charging the CIFs. Thereafter, the PSC granted Petitioners' motion to deny the Water and Sewer Districts' petitions for reconsideration. Petitioners appealed to challenge errors they alleged were contained in the PSC's final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners were judicially estopped from challenging the errors.View "Larry V. Faircloth Realty, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2013-01-24 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 12-1023 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2013/2013-me-11.html N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 2013-01-24T08:04:05-08:00 2014-10-01T13:19:51-08:00 In 2008, the Public Utilities Commission approved a merger between FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint) and Verizon Maine (Verizon). The merger order committed FairPoint to expanding DSL availability in Maine to certain percentages within certain periods of time. The merger order incorporated an amended stipulation presented by FairPoint and other parties. Approximately twenty months later, FairPoint filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Commission agreed to reduce FairPoint's ultimate broadband buildout obligations from ninety percent addressability to eighty-seven percent. Fairpoint subsequently notified the Commission that it had expanded broadband buildout to the level of eighty-three percent. The Commission disagreed, concluding that FairPoint had used the wrong measure of addressability and therefore overstated its results. At issue on appeal was how "addressability" would be measured when calculating FairPoint's broadband buildout commitments in Maine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the merger order was an order of the Commission and not a consent decree, and therefore, the Commission did not err by failing to interpret the merger order in a manner consistent with the intent and understanding of the parties to the stipulation; and (2) the Commission did not err in its definition of "addressability."View "N. New England Tel. Operations LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2013-01-24 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Ellen A. Gorman http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1258/11-1258-2013-01-22.html TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC 2013-01-22T07:33:43-08:00 2014-10-01T13:19:06-08:00 Petitioner objected to an order of the FERC that allowed certain rates to be reduced as a corrective to the exercise of "supply-side" market power, but which declined to resolve petitioner's call for a parallel intervention to protect suppliers from what petitioner called "buy-side" market power. Concluding that the court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments, the court concluded that it had no reason to think that "the total effect of the rate order" was unjust and unreasonable, but the court had affirmative reason to believe that petitioner would have an adequate opportunity to pursue remedies for possible uneconomic entry. The court further concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion; in struggling to address the complexities posed by regional integration and independent systems operators, the Commission has pursued an iterative process with the court's explicit approval at least in one case, TC Ravenswood v. FERC; the specific context of the mitigation orders here exemplified the iterative process; and the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Commission violated due process and other obligations by neglecting to answer petitioner's arguments and proposals. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law 2013-01-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Stephen Fain Williams 11-1258 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/12-5040/12-5040-2013-01-09.html Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States 2013-01-09T08:32:08-08:00 2014-10-01T13:16:07-08:00 In its tax return for the year 1997, ConEd claimed multiple deductions pertaining to a lease-in/lease-out (LILO) tax shelter transaction under which a Dutch utility, EZH, a tax-indifferent entity because it is not subject to U.S. taxation, conveyed to ConEd a gas-fired cogeneration plant that delivers power to customers in the Netherlands, then leased it back, followed by a reconveyance to EZH and a sublease. The stated purpose of the arrangement was tax avoidance. LILO transactions accelerate losses to the taxpayer and defer gains. The transaction provided several upfront deductions that allowed ConEd to pay lower taxes in 1997 (and in later years) than it otherwise would have. The IRS disallowed these claimed deductions and assessed a deficiency of $328,066. ConEd paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim; when this claim was denied, ConEd filed suit. The Claims Court awarded ConEd a full refund. The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the substance-over-form doctrine to conclude that ConEd's claimed deductions must be disallowed. There was a reasonable likelihood that EZH would exercise its purchase option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, thus rendering the master lease illusory.View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States" on Justia Law 2013-01-09 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Timothy B. Dyk 12-5040 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2013/sc92401.html 801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue 2013-01-08T11:05:35-08:00 2014-10-01T13:15:49-08:00 801 Skinker Boulevard Corporation (801), a corporation operating as a residential cooperative, sought a refund for sales taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2, which indicates that utilities purchased for residential units for common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be for domestic use. The refund request concerned state sales tax charged and paid on electric and natural gas utilities purchased from 2006 through 2009. 801 filed for a refund of sales tax on its Union Electric (Ameren) and Laclede Gas Company (Laclede) bills. Ameren and Laclede also filed for refunds on behalf of 801. Ameren and Laclede's applications were denied. 801, Ameren, and Laclede (Taxpayers) subsequently filed a request for a refund of sales tax with the Administrative Hearing Commission, alleging that the utilities were purchased for domestic use by the individual owners and residents of 801 in accordance with section 144.030.2. The Commission denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a full refund of the sales tax paid, holding that Taxpayers were entitled to the exemption and refund of their sales taxes pursuant to section 144.190.2, as 801's utility purchases were deemed by statute to be for "domestic use" and, thus, were exempt from sales tax. View "801 Skinker Boulevard Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law 2013-01-08 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Zel M. Fischer SC92401 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2012/da-12-0317.html Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2012-12-20T13:06:47-08:00 2014-10-01T13:12:25-08:00 Petitioners filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC), alleging that Northwestern Energy had been overcharging consumes for its street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions to remand the case to the PSC for a redetermination of whether to allow the filing of an amended complaint. On remand to the district court, Petitioners filed a motion seeking $1,137 in costs incurred while responding to objections before the PSC and courts. Petitioners also renewed a motion asking the district court to initiate an immediate rate reduction pending the PSC's final decision. The district court denied both of the Petitioners' requests and remanded to the PSC. The Supreme Court affirmed that order, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Petitioners their costs for the initial proceedings in district court and first appeal to the Supreme Court, and (2) denying Petitioners' request for a temporary rate decrease, pending the PSC's decision on remand. View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2012-12-20 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 12-0317 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2012/2011-0751.html In re Columbus S. Power Co. 2012-12-06T07:07:41-08:00 2014-10-01T13:07:35-08:00 Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law 2012-12-06 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Cupp 2011-0751 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2012/2011-2025.html DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp. 2012-11-28T06:08:41-08:00 2014-10-01T13:05:14-08:00 Two public utilities (the companies) were wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant FirstEnergy Corporation. Appellees were residential customers of the companies. The customers filed a class-action complaint against FirstEnergy and the companies in the county court of common pleas. The complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, fraud, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted FirstEnergy's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects except with regard to the customers' fraud claim. The appellate court determined on two separate grounds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim and remanded that claim to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) the customers' fraud claim was not a pure tort action, but rather, was a claim that the companies were overcharging the customers for electric service; and (2) because the complaint was challenging the rates charged for utility service, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. View "DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law 2012-11-28 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio McGee Brown 2011-2025 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2012/2011-1274.html In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg 2012-11-15T06:08:28-08:00 2014-10-01T13:02:06-08:00 The City of Reynoldsburg was a municipal corporation governed by a charter. Intervening appellee, Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP), was a public utility and provided electric power to the City and its residents. At issue in this case was whether the City or CSP bore the cost to relocate overhead power lines underground. Specifically, the City sought a ruling that its right-of-way ordinance requiring all overhead power lines to be relocated underground at the sole cost of the public utility took precedence over CSP's commission-approved tariff, which provided that municipalities shall pay the costs whenever they required CSP to relocate overhead electrical distribution lines underground, in this particular aspect. The City filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission, contending that its ordinance superseded CSP's tariff and that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful. The commission found in favor of CSP. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's orders, holding that the commission correctly found that the City was required to pay CSP's entire costs for relocating the power lines underground.View "In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg " on Justia Law 2012-11-15 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Terrence O'Donnell 2011-1274 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2012/120519.html Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n 2012-11-01T07:14:07-08:00 2014-10-01T12:58:40-08:00 These consolidated appeals arose from a final determination of the State Corporation Commission in a mandated biennial review of the rates, terms, and conditions for the provision of generation, distribution and transmission services of an electric utility. As pertinent here, commencing in 2011, the Virginia Electric Utility Regulation Act required the Commission to conduct biennial reviews of an electric utility's performance during the two successive twelve-month periods immediately prior to such reviews pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 56-585.1(A). At issue in this appeal was whether in the 2011 biennial review of the performance of Virginia Electric and Power Company in the 2009-2010 test period the Commission erred in determining that the utility's authorized fair rate of return on common equity of 10.9 percent would apply to the entire 2011-2012 test period in the next biennial review in 2013. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's construction of Code 56-585.1 was based upon the proper application of legal principles, and the Commission did not abuse the discretion afforded to it under that statute. View "Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2012-11-01 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr. 120519 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2012/120394.html Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n 2012-11-01T07:14:05-08:00 2014-10-01T12:58:58-08:00 In this appeal, Appalachian Power Company (APCO) sought rate adjustment clause recovery of $33.3 million in environmental compliance costs that the State Corporation Commission denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) APCO was entitled to a rate adjustment clause for recovery of actual costs it directly incurred for environmental compliance in 2009 and 2010 but did not recover through its base rates, and the portion of the Commission's decision denying recovery of environmental compliance costs on the basis that those costs were connected with projects included in APCO's base rates which APCO had the opportunity to recover was reversed; and (2) the portion of the Commission's decision denying APCO recovery of environmental compliance costs alleged to be embedded in the capacity equalization charges APCO paid to its affiliates in 2009 and 2010 was affirmed. Remanded. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2012-11-01 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Elizabeth A. Lacy 120394 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2012/12-0527.html State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Lackawann Transp. Co. 2012-10-23T12:09:11-08:00 2014-10-01T12:55:55-08:00 Petitioners, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia and the Wetzel County Solid Waste Authority, sought to compel Respondents, Lackawanna Transport Company and Solid Waste Services, Inc., to comply with an order entered by the Public Service Commission requiring them to produce certain information and financial records pertinent to an ongoing investigation concerning the Wetzel County Landfill. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus, holding (1) a writ of mandamus is appropriate in this case, as Respondents were legally required to produce the requested information; and (2) while arguably there was another remedy available in this instance through the circuit court, that remedy was not adequate given the unique circumstances given here.View "State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Lackawann Transp. Co." on Justia Law 2012-10-23 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 12-0527