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[OS] 2011-#135-Johnson's Russia List
Released on 2012-10-10 17:00 GMT
|2011-07-28 17:18:27
Johnson's Russia List
28 July 2011
A World Security Institute Project
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In this issue
1. Wall Street Journal: Aides Urge Medvedev to Run Again.
2. Vedomosti: Igor Yurgens and Yevgeniy Gontmakher, Fork in the Road 2012 -- It
Is Time for Medvedev To Cross the Rubicon.
3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: TANDEM DISALIGNED. Vladimir Putin is rumored to be
resolved to run for president in 2012.
4. ITAR-TASS: Split Russian elites press Medvedev, Putin to run for president.
5. BBC Monitoring: Russian pundits comment on Putin's possible bid to return to
6. Interfax: Russian Premier Recalls Language Difficulties During Spy Days In
East Germany.
7. Novaya Gazeta: Andrey Kolesnikov, Putin dresses up as Medvedev. United
People's Front is prepared to give even more freedom than lack of freedom.
8. Politkom.ru: Putin's Front Project Comes up with 'Unexpectedly Liberal'
Campaign Proposals.
9. BBC Monitoring: Russian president says 'trust in government' depends on
parliamentary election.
10. Kommersant: MEDVEDEV AND CENTRAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION. DMITRY MEDVEDEV
11. Interfax: Russians Not Confident Of Honest Elections In December - Poll.
12. www.russiatoday.com: Russians want protest vote to be returned.
13. Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor: Pavel Baev, What Has Happened to
the Russian Elections?
14. ITAR-TASS: RF ombudsman says Lebedev should be released under economic
15. RFE/RL: As Moscow Renovates Sidewalks, Corruption Suspicions Abound.
16. Russia Profile: A Nationalist Epidemic. Although the Russian Government's
Attitude Toward Ultra Nationalists Seems to Be Changing, Containing Nationalist
Sentiment in Russia Is a Difficult Balancing Act.
17. Russia Beyond the Headlines: Russian women equal, but only on the surface.
Although more Russian women than men have university degrees, women on average
make less money and hold less prestigious. positions.
18. Valdai Discussion Club: Alexei Pushkin, "De-Stalinization" program means
complete revision of the Russian history.
19. ITAR-TASS: Putin supports frightening pictorial health warnings on cigarette
20. The Chronicle of Higher Education: Anna Nemtsova, Corruption in Russian
Medical Schools Triggers Uproar.
21. RBC Daily: PUTIN'S ANTI-GLAMOUR AGENCY. THE PREMIER NAMED TOP MANAGERS OF THE
22. Interfax: Putin warns against new ecological standards being too costly for
23. Interfax: Russia plans to complete talks on WTO accession by December 2011 -
chief negotiator.
24. Politkom.ru: Privatization Plans May Change Power Balance Within Russian
25. Oilprice.com: John Daly, Something Extraordinary is Happening in the Russian
Federation. (re privatization)
26. ITAR-TASS: Russia to be a leading grain exporter - view.
27. Moscow Times: U.S. Report Sees Big Role for Shale Gas.
28. Interfax: Russian Deputy Finance Minister Urges Calm On US Default Risks.
29. Business New Europe: Renaissance Capital, Russia: What if the US defaults?
30. Novaya Gazeta: Dmitriy Travin, If America collapses, it will be no picnic. A
US default may lead not only to economic problems in Russia, but also to a
political crisis in China.
31. Moscow Times: Russia Gives U.S. Warning on Magnitsky Case.
32. Kommersant: The US gambit. The US State Department tries to help Russia with
sanctions against individuals from the "Magnitsky list"
33. RIA Novosti: Russian Experts Split On How Sanctions Will Affect Relations
With USA.
34. Moscow Times: Sergei Karaganov, Look East.
35. Moscow Times: 15 Months Later, Boy Rejected by U.S. Mother Lives in
36. www.russiatoday.com: Georgia using US media as a "propaganda instrument" -
Russian diplomat.
37. Moscow Times: Peter Rutland, War Clouds Gathering Again in the Caucasus.
38. RFE/RL: Thomas de Waal, Can The 'Medvedev Moment' Be Saved For Karabakh?
Wall Street Journal
July 28, 2011
Aides Urge Medvedev to Run Again
By GREGORY L. WHITE
MOSCOWTwo prominent advisers to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev publicly called
on him on Wednesday to end the intrigue and announce he plans to seek re-election
next year, warning that the alternativethe return of Vladimir Putinwould bring
"national catastrophe."
The unusually direct and public appeal highlighted the growing tensions within
Russia's ruling elite over a question that is at once the most important and the
most taboo in politics here: who will take over the Kremlin when Mr. Medvedev's
term ends in the spring. There is virtually no doubt that whichever candidate the
ruling party backs will win the March 4 election, given the Kremlin's tight
control over the political system.
Former President Putin, 58 years old, is still widely viewed as Russia's
paramount leader despite his official role as prime minister. He picked longtime
protege and aide Mr. Medvedev, now 45, as his successor in the 2008 elections,
and both men regularly insist they are ideological allies.
But signs of frictions between the men, as well as their camps, have intensified
in recent months, according to political insiders, fueling talk of growing
conflict. "There's obvious competition between them," said a senior official.
"Before it was a positive thing, but now it's turned negative."
Mr. Putin has dramatically stepped up his public profile in the last two months,
traveling the country promising higher wages, pensions and benefits. Pro-Kremlin
business and civic groups have flocked to join his new United Popular Front, an
umbrella group formed to help broaden support for his ruling United Russia party.
Mr. Medvedev, meanwhile, has stepped up calls for political and economic
liberalization, implicitly criticizing the rigid, state-dominated system created
by his predecessor and patron. Spokespeople for both leaders deny any split.
For months, Messrs. Putin and Medvedev have been dodging the question of who will
run for president, saying they will decide when the time is right. Senior
officials and Kremlin advisers say the announcement could come only after the
parliamentary elections, set for early December. Showing their hand earlier would
run the risk of making one of them a lame duck and weakening the ruling duo.
Diplomats and opposition leaders say the Kremlin is likely to rig the upcoming
votes as they claim it has in the past. Authorities deny those allegations, but
international observers have criticized past Russian votes as unfair.
This time, the stakes are higher than in 2008, when Mr. Putin was banned from
serving a third consecutive term by the constitution. Under changes brought by
Mr. Medvedev, the next president will serve a term of six years instead of the
current four, meaning Mr. Putin could rule until 2024 if he were re-elected.
That would bring a "large-scale crisis," according to the advisers, Igor Yurgens
and Yevgeny Gontmakher, who run a reformist think-tank where Mr. Medvedev is
chairman of the advisory board.
"Dmitry Medvedev must cross his personal Rubicon and appeal directly to society
with a call to take up together the difficult task of pulling the country out of
the swamp into which we've fallen," they wrote in the Vedomosti business daily on
In an interview, Mr. Gontmakher said the article wasn't coordinated with the
Kremlin and doesn't reflect any inside knowledge of succession discussions.
Spokesmen for Messrs. Putin and Medvedev weren't available to comment on the
"We want clarity," he said. "We represent the views of a broad range of people
who share our opinions but are scared to write them."
Political analysts say Mr. Putin's rising political activity in recent weeks is
an effort to ensure a commanding victory for his United Russia party in the
parliamentary vote, a result that they say would give him a mandate to make the
presidential selection. Party officials say United Russia's goal is to win at
least a two-thirds majority in parliament, as it currently enjoys.
But support for the Kremlin has faded over the last year amid sluggish economic
growth and stagnant incomes. Mr. Medvedev's pledges to clean up corruption and
tame the bureaucracy have drawn attention to problems without yielding visible
results, pollsters say.
Some senior officials say they are confident that Mr. Putin will return as
president. "Medvedev will try to talk Putin into keeping him, but he won't
succeed," said one. Others insist the decision hasn't been made. Some suggest Mr.
Putin could offset the negative impact of a decision to return to power by naming
a liberal prime minister, such as Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin. So far,
however, Mr. Putin isn't giving hints.
"Putin doesn't seek counsel with anyone, he never has," said a top businessman
with close ties to the leadership.
Mr. Gontmakher said the decision remains up to Mr. Putin, but Mr. Medvedev could
marshal support from business and regional leaders to "influence the choice."
"All isn't lost yet," the adviser said.
[return to Contents]
Experts Call on Mededev To Announce Presidential Candidacy
July 27, 2011
Commentary by Igor Yurgens and Yevgeniy Gontmakher: "Fork in the Road 2012 -- It
Is Time for Medvedev To Cross the Rubicon"
The fact that our ways are far from democratic is obvious even to the designers
of the current political regime. But that in no way justifies the current
situation with the procedure for the appearance of the 2012 presidential
candidate from the ruling tandem. Talk such as "When the time comes, we will sit
down and decide" and - most importantly -- the submissive consent to this by our
political elite only emphasizes the profound lag in the development of modern
social institutions in Russia.
At the same time, in fact one of the parties of the "tandem" is conducting
vigorous political agitation for continuing the course of stability, which in our
concrete conditions has become a synonym not even for stagnation (we went through
that stage in the pre-crisis 2000s) but rather for obvious deterioration in all
areas of Russian life. This is the origin of the idea of forming the All-Russian
People's Front (the analogy with the German "Democratic" Republic, may it rest in
peace, thrusts itself upon us) with social promises being given out right and
left, not backed up by any economic foundation.
But what about the other side, the president? We see attempts to move the
situation from deterioration toward progress in the fight against corruption, in
improving the business climate, and in shaping effective foreign policy. But
there is still no decisive turning point. The impression is created that even the
most elementary actions by Dmitriy Medvedev on the path to modernization are not
simply talked to death but are directly sabotaged and even devalued by
We are enemies in principle of any cult of personality or deification of the
leader. Therefore we do not want to fall loyally at the feet of one member of the
current ruling tandem simply because he persistently asserts the need for
modernization and is chairman of the board of trustees of the Institute for
Contemporary Development. But we must help him resolve to take real steps to save
the country, despite the bitter resistance of the "guards" and simply corrupt
officials who privatized without waiting for some supposed decisive conversations
inside the "tandem."
A question arises: what will happen if Dmitriy Medvedev, because of some factors
unknown to society, refuses to contend for the presidency in 2012? It can be
assumed with confidence that the very fact that the current president refuses to
continue his functions would cause a major crisis in the country. The well known
Mechela case would seem minor in comparison with the decline in Russian security
exchanges. And we will add a sharp step-up in the processes of capital outflow
and emigration from Russia, which are underway in any case. The sense of
fairness, which has long been trampled by inexcusable corruption and the state's
contemptuous attitude toward its own population, can be transformed into any,
even the most extreme act on the Manezh model. The collapse of the already weak
economy will undermine the material base of existence of the social sphere once
and for all. The processes, which have already begun, of paid services squeezing
out free delivery of services in education and public health will become
widespread. There will also have to be harsh limits on spending for pension
support. In this situation, to preserve the status quo the authorities will have
to tighten the political regime in the style of our partners in the Union State.
That is the price of preserving the policy of maintaining "stability." It is not
even necessary for Vladimir Putin to return to the office of president for this
kind of economic, social, and political disaster to occur. It will suffice to
nominate some third candidate who will inevitably come out of the premier's
woodwork in the case where Dmitriy Medvedev resigns.
Therefore the political fate of our president is not just a personal matter, and
not just a problem "within the tandem." He in fact holds the key to our country's
entering the real 21st century, not the calendar one. It is precisely in this
context that we, the citizens of Russia, are not indifferent to who becomes the
next president. We demand not just any answer to the question that everyone has
come to hate, and we want it in the near future, not in December. We demand that
Dmitriy Medvedev in particular take on the political responsibility for the fate
of the country as its president in 2012-2018.
A question arises: maybe someone else could be found for the role of Russian
reformer? Unfortunately, our political system is built in such a way that we face
a choice not between leaders with different modernization programs, but instead
just two rigidly personified courses: "stabilization" as a synonym for stagnation
and deterioration, and modernization as a very risky but still not hopeless
project. It is indeed realization of the second course that should lead to the
formation of a competitive environment among those who want progress for their
country, not just a profitable business for themselves, their family, and
Another question arises: suppose Dmitriy Medvedev does decide on the step being
demanded -- who will be able to support him? We are talking, of course, not just
about specific figures, even the most highly respected ones -- although this is
important -- but rather about the formation of a public coalition for
modernization. And here, it appears to us, the situation is not as bad as it
seems on first glance.
The danger of an economic collapse in case the party of "stability" wins, which
we have already mentioned, may make an ally out of big business, which has been
keeping quiet until the right time. Decisive steps to reduce administrative
pressure on medium-sized and small business (they are even possible this year)
will draw the sympathies of this stratum. There is one more reserve -- the most
advanced universities and research centers, where our intellectual elite and the
best part of our youth are concentrated; they are systemically concerned about
the situation in the country. Moreover the course of modernization with a precise
program of concrete steps may find a response from many ordinary people who do
care, and polls show these people are at least 15%-20% of the adult population.
One small thing holds us back. Dmitriy Medvedev must set his mind and cross his
personal Rubicon, turning directly to society with a call to undertake together
the difficult job of pulling the country out of the swamp we all have fallen
into. In order to see that this call does not go unanswered, we need to urgently
start building mechanisms for partnership between the government and society.
Very relevant here are decentralization of the state and ensuring real freedom of
media (including establishing Public Television), a cardinal liberalization of
the laws on party development and NGOs, and much more that will come out in
Dmitriy Medvedev's equal, candid dialogue with society.
We believe in Russia's successful future.
[return to Contents]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 28, 2011
Vladimir Putin is rumored to be resolved to run for president in 2012
Author: Alexandra Samarina, Roza Petrova
Reuters quoted its sources within the Kremlin as saying that
Vladimir Putin planned to run for president in 2012. Putin was
reported entertaining doubts with regard to his protege Dmitry
Medvedev in the capacity of the head of state. Enjoying vast
support within society, the premier knew better than leaving the
political Olympus. What experts this newspaper approached for
comments attributed the leak to the article in Vedomosti yesterday
whose authors set out to persuade Medvedev to run for re-election.
Experts emphasized the dangers inherent in the continue
uncertainty in connection with the forthcoming presidential
Reuters refused to identify its sources in political and
diplomatic circles on account of the importance of the matter at
hand. "I reckon that Putin will be running for president... and
that his mind is set," said one of the sources. Putin was
reputedly disturbed by the fact that Medvedev had failed to secure
broad support within the political establishment, business elites,
and electorate in general. The premier suspected that this lack of
support might undermine stability in Russia in the course of the
future political reforms. "Support for Putin throughout the
country is much broader than support for Medvedev. Medvedev kind
of overestimated his weight within the system." The source also
suggested that Medvedev lacked moxie.
Another source told Reuters that "Putin does want to come
back. And he means to come back." He added that the premier was
seriously upset by Medvedev's recent efforts to gain independence.
The source said, however, that the relations between the two
leaders remained quite friendly.
According to this source, Putin might decide to run for
president and if and when he did and became elected, he would
appoint a reformist premier in order to dispel the fears that his
new term of office would spell another period of stagnation.
As far as investors are concerned, there is practically no
difference between Putin and Medvedev but the latter is more prone
to continue the reforms.
The impression is that the piece of news reported by Reuters
became a response to the article in Vedomosti where Igor Yurgens
of the Institute of Contemporary Development and Yevgeny
Gontmakher of the Institute of Global Economy and International
Relations appealed to Medvedev to openly proclaim presidential
aspirations. The article in question gave a brief account of what
was going to happen to Russia if Medvedev refused.
Approached for comments, Yurgens said that he was but an
analyst and suggested the following. "I guess Putin's team-mates
keep telling him that he should run for president and make the
announcement after the United Russia convention in late September.
Some of them probably advise him to take his time and make the
announcement after the triumph in the parliamentary election in
December because United Russia will be in the position then to say
that it wields nationwide support and thus ought to nominate the
president..." Yurgens said that he would not trust Reuters
entirely because he knew "ways and means to generate this reaction
even from the forces that would dearly like to elicit some sort of
decision from the premier." Said Yurgens, "I will take Reuters'
report with a grain of salt... pending premier's Press Secretary
Dmitry Peskov's statement on the subject. As for Medvedev, his
latest statements on international affairs all but prepared
general public for the idea that a presidential program should be
put together."
Said Peskov, "I'm not here to comment phantoms you know, and
the report you are talking about is just that. The premier is
working, that's all I can say. He is too busy to think about
Presidential Press Secretary Natalia Timakova was quite
sharply- worded too, particularly in connection with the words
about how Putin was unsure of his protege. "I never comment on
reports from anonymous sources or even on the opinions of
prominent individuals," she said. "Medvedev answered the question
on his plans for the future at the press conference in Skolkovo
this May."
Said Gleb Pavlovsky of the Effective Politics Foundation,
"What happened yesterday was but another exchange of blows on
account of the growing tension within the tandem. This tension
already became a problem for participants in the tandem... They
cannot even settle principal issues and work out a common
political program in order to alleviate uncertainty... That's why
Putin and Medvedev are ever on a lookout for ways to expand the
room for maneuver, that's why they choose all sorts of quixotic
means for that - Chinese media outlets, Reuters..."
Pavlovsky said that "... all these indirect signals indicate
existence of illusions both politicians entertain. They think that
they themselves will choose the moment of making the rest of the
country happy with the announcement everyone's has been waiting
for. That's an illusion. They do not see how the situation is
changing. Six month ago all of the country was waiting for this
announcement with trust and impatience. These days, the country is
waiting with distrust, irritation, and apprehension. Natural
coalitions that formed around participants in the tandem
disintegrated and deteriorated into teams of neurotics..."
The political scientist said that all of that should have
been anticipated and that abatement of the danger to continuity
was the least the tandem should have accomplished. "Participants
in the tandem never bothered to do so, and the risks we are facing
are enormous. Capitals are being withdrawn from the country... It
does not even matter that Putin and Medvedev cannot work out a
common program. What matters is that they seem to like this state
of uncertainty. They regard it as a convenient tool."
Aleksei Malashenko of the Carnegie Moscow Center would not
exaggerate the importance of the Reuters' report either. "It was
announced on countless occasions already that Medvedev must run
for president. It was also denounced more than once that he would
remain the president..." Malashenko said, "There is no way to say
what it will be in any event. All of that is guesswork."
Asked if his patron intended to return to the Kremlin, Peskov
said, "Putin is working, and working hard. He has no time for idle
[return to Contents]
Split Russian elites press Medvedev, Putin to run for president.
By Itar-Tass World Service writer Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW, July 28 (Itar-Tass) As the Russian 2012 presidential election approaches
and it is still unclear who of the ruling tandem President Dmitry Medvedev or
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will run, a wave of speculations is on the rise.
As Medvedev, 45, and Putin, 58, continue to keep the intrigue, the elites are
split and each group works to lobby its candidate.
On Wednesday two political scientists called in a Russian daily for Medvedev to
run while three anonymous officials said in an interview with Reuters that Putin,
who ruled the country as president from 2000 to 2008, was definite to return to
the Kremlin.
"I think Putin is going to run, that he has already decided to," Reuters quoted a
"highly placed source" as saying on condition of anonymity. "Putin has much more
support from the people than Medvedev. Medvedev has overestimated his weight
inside the system," he said.
Reuters quoted the source as saying Putin had been troubled by the perception
that his prot.g. did not have sufficient support among the political and business
elite or the electorate to ensure stability if he pushed ahead with plans for
political reform.
Two other sources also said Putin wants to run and could appoint a reformist
prime minister in an apparent attempt to dispel fears that his return would usher
in a period of stagnation.
Russian observers believe Reuters report appeared to balance an article published
in the Vedomosti daily the same day. Head of the Institute of Modern Development
(InSoR) Igor Yurgens and Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations Yevgeny Gontmaher called on Medvedev to run for the
second term of office which this time will last six years.
Medvedev "has to cross the Rubicon and declare his decision to run for
president." Otherwise "the very fact of the refusal of incumbent president will
trigger a large-scale crisis in the country," they said.
The Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily said Reuters publication was likely a response to
the article by Yurgens and Gontmaher. In an interview with the newspaper Yurgens
recommended not to trust Reuters information hundred percent as he is well aware
"how such a reaction can be generated by the forces who simply want to push the
prime minister to certain decision."
"Until the spokesman of the prime minister, Dmitry Peskov, clearly speaks out on
the issue I am not inclined to trust the information of the news agency," he
Peskov however was evasive. "Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin) is working, working
hard, rather than thinking about whether to run in the election," he told
Medvedev's spokeswoman Tatyana Timakova refused to comment both the statements of
anonymous officials and the article by "respected people."
As Medvedev and Putin continue to keep mum about who will run, Russian and
foreign media actively discuss political prospects of tandem members. In late May
the Sunday Times, The Times, and The Australian quoted anonymous top-tier sources
in the Russian establishment as saying Putin had already decided to run in 2012.
The Wall Street Journal was of a similar opinion in September 2010.
Political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky told RBC daily "we shall quite a lot of
times hear about Putin's wish to run approximately until December 2011" when
Russia is to elect a new State Duma. "Informed sources will again say that Putin
has made the final decision to become the president."
Belkovsky believes such statements are necessary to ensure success of Putin's
ruling United Russia Party and the All-Russia Popular Front at the parliamentary
election. "There will be no success without the utmost mobilization of the
administrative resource which is possible only in case the bureaucracy at all
levels knows that Putin is likely to return to the Kremlin," he said.
Head of the Efficient Policy Foundation Gleb Pavlovsky believes Wednesday
publications were due to growing tensions in the tandem which "developed into a
problem for its participants."
"Within the tandem they cannot resolve the main problems and even draft a common
political program to lift uncertainty in the country," he told the Nezavisimaya
Gazeta. Therefore, Putin and Medvedev are looking for a possibility to maneuver
"in the most strange way: either through Chinese media or Reuters news agency,"
he said.
Pavlovsky believes the tandem does not see how the situation is changing. "Half a
year ago people waited for the announcement (about running for president) with
trust and impatience, today they experience mistrust, irritation and alarm.
Natural coalitions that emerged around the men have collapsed and turned into
neurotic groups. Their members are running around with screams of horror and
despair," he said.
Alexander Malashenko from the Moscow Carnegie Center said Reuters report could be
a result of the work of "a certain literary-political get-together." "If we
mathematically divide all opinions on that matter we shall get 50:50. Therefore
it would be inappropriate to consider every puck rush and every hint as the final
decision. It is simply guess work. So far I do not see which billiard ball is
going to pocket," he said.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Russian pundits comment on Putin's possible bid to return to Kremlin
Ekho Moskvy Radio
July 27, 2011
Russian pundits have commented on a statement by a high-level source, according
to whom Prime Minister Putin has doubts about support for President Dmitriy
Medvedev among the political and business elite as well as ordinary people, which
means that in essence Putin has put himself forward as the presidential
candidate. Political analyst Stanislav Belkovskiy thought that the business elite
actually preferred Medvedev while the bureaucracy would make full effort for Duma
elections only if it expected Putin's return. Opposition politician Boris Nemtsov
said that Putin was already conducting a full-blown presidential election
campaign and noted that his return to the Kremlin would be the worst scenario for
the country. Political analyst Yevgeniy Gontmakher cautiously hoped that Medvedev
may represent a breakthrough for the better. The following is an excerpt from a
report by Gazprom-owned, editorially independent Russian radio station Ekho
Moskvy on 27 July, subheadings have been inserted editorially:
(Presenter) Vladimir Putin has essentially decided to put forward his candidature
for the forthcoming presidential election in 2012. A high-ranking political
source told Reuters news agency that the prime minister has doubts about Dmitriy
Medvedev and is concerned that he does not have sufficient support among the
political and business elite, as well as among people. Naturally, no comment has
been received on the matter from Vladimir Putin himself. However, his position is
known: he has announced on more than one occasion that so far it is too early to
speak of the candidate and noted that the decision would be taken jointly by him
and Dmitriy Medvedev.
However, leaks about Putin being elected in 2012 are perfectly justified on the
event of the State Duma election, political analyst Stanislav Belkovskiy thinks.
He disagrees with the version voiced by Reuters's source regarding Putin being
more popular in business circles.
(Belkovskiy) For the Russian elite the most important thing today is to gain
legitimacy in the West and this process could be conducted much more effectively
and skilfully by Dmitry Medvedev, however weak a ruler he is. There, Medvedev's
image is very important as an alternative to Putin's image. It is a different
matter that until Duma election scheduled for 4 December this year the talk about
the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin will be whipped up in every way
because for the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin himself it is very important to ensure
the victory of One Russia at this Duma election. However, a victory of this kind
for a party that should receive nearly 60 per cent while its current rating does
not exceed 30 per cent is possible only on the condition of maximum consolidation
and mobilization of administrative resources at all levels. The bureaucracy will
work for One Russia in full only if it expects Putin's return. (Passage omitted:
One Russia deputy, chairman of the State Duma Labour and Social Policy Committee,
Andrey Isayev, thinks that a candidate from the All-Russia People's Front will
win the presidential election.)
(Presenter) Opposition politician Boris Nemtsov is against either Medvedev or
Putin running for president. However, in the view of Nemtsov, the return of
Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin is the worst scenario for our country.
(Nemtsov) This is a road to ruin, this is road to corruption and to total capital
flight. This is even greater dependence on raw materials, even greater
impoverishment (of the population) and the enrichment of oligarch close to Putin.
All the patriots of the country must become united to prevent this from
I cannot regard Medvedev as an independent person and also cannot regard him as
an independent political figure. However, the task of all decent people is not to
allow Putin to the Kremlin, otherwise this is an end to Russia.
It is obvious that Putin is already conducting a full-blown presidential
campaign. It is obvious that he does not trust absolutely anyone and it is
obvious that all the lousiness and nastiness that we see in him will only get
(Presenter) Nemtsov is convinced that with Putin's presidency Russia will follow
the route of Belarus with inevitable repressions, attacks on journalists and
illegitimate court verdicts. (Passage omitted: One Russia deputy in the State
Duma, film director Stanislav Govorukhin, said he would prefer Putin to Medvedev
as a presidential candidate)
It is necessary for President Dmitiry Medvedev to announce his intention to run
for president, according to the former head of the social development department
of the Russian government, a member of the board of the Institute of Contemporary
Development, Yevgeniy Gontmakher.
(Gontmakher) I don't know about their personal relationship, I cannot say about
this, they know about it. However, what is visible, lets put it like this, the
policy and the course shaped by Putin - from the year 2000 at that - and lets be
frank, all the recent years when Putin was only prime minister, everything
followed mainly Putin's line anyway and not Medvedev's line - this is absolutely
We also see some weak attempts and indicators - maybe I am mistaken but one would
like to believe - which Medvedev is demonstrating quite frequently. Yes, we are
criticizing him, including for not being very decisive and not doing much and so
on but there are some indicators that could be described as a breakthrough for
the better. In this sense we do not have a choice.
(Presenter) Yevgeniy Gontmakher suggests that a possible refusal (to run) by
Dmitriy Medvedev could cause a large-scale crisis in the country.
Russia is an irrational country and therefore certainty about the candidate at
the presidential election would remove the only intrigue, journalist Dmitiry
Bykov suggests.
(Bykov) I am not one of these people who see Dmitriy Anatolyevich (Medvedev) as a
chance of come kind. Then again, simply in terms of the atmosphere in the
society, it would be little more pleasant to live because I don't particularly
like the stylistics of the father's return, in which, of course, Vladimir
Vladimirovich (Putin) would return, completely tighten many screws and say many
pearls about "we will cut it off so nothing would grow there" - he likes this and
now he knows how to do this.
I have a feeling that at this stage the choice for us is very simple: between a
blowup from the bottom and a blowup from the top. (Passage omitted)
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Russian Premier Recalls Language Difficulties During Spy Days In East Germany
Moscow, 27 July: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin regrets saying that he
mastered German after just a two-month stay in Germany.
"I probably shouldn't have blurted that out. Now it'll stick," Putin said during
a meeting with the core group of the Strategic Initiatives Agency.
A woman speaking at the meeting noted that in the aircraft-building industry they
have to retrain candidates for filling vacant posts over two years, rather than
the two months in which "you, Vladimir Vladimirovich, mastered German in
In response to this remark Putin noted that it was typical for all new arrivals
for a foreign posting to Germany to get to grips with the language environment in
this way, and they did this in a comparatively short time because the arrivals
had received decent training.
"It was the same for everyone. And I have to say that I wasn't the dumbest one
there. There was even a concept which we called 'the telephone disease'. It was
when the telephone rang, and we cooperated and worked very closely with our
German colleagues from all institutions, not only from the Stasi, the Ministry
for State Security," Putin said.
He said that this is how it went: "You picked up the phone, you heard
'bla-bla-bla', and you hung up. Then they (the Germans) already knew that we were
new arrivals, and all arrivals acted in pretty much the same way. And they asked
the resident agent to pass on to the people who had just arrived that they should
call somebody over and not just hang up". However, Putin stressed that, "all this
passes, as long as you have the foundations".
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Political Component of 'People's Program' Examined
Novaya Gazeta
July 27, 2011
Article by Andrey Kolesnikov: Putin dresses up as Medvedev. United People's
Front is prepared to give even more freedom than lack of freedom.
As it turns out, the People's Program, which is being prepared by the Institute
for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (ISEPI) under the leadership of former
Minister of Justice and President of Chuvashiya Nikolay Fedorov, contains some
entirely free-thinking points about political liberalization for the United
People's Front (ONF). The election of mayors and heads of municipal formations,
easing of the burden of registration requirements for parties, and a return to
the mixed electoral system - that is, to the institution of single mandate
candidates. A sensation? A revolution? Has Putin taken to the barricades?
Everything that is being proposed in the political section of the People's
Program has in the past 6 months become a generality, triteness, a minimally
necessary set of measures that should be taken so that the system does not
collapse. It is no accident that the list of institute experts working on this
set of problems is listed under the section entitled, "Effective Management." An
understanding of the fact that there cannot be effective management without
democracy, that democracy is not a signboard, but an instrument, has assumed a
firm place in the minds of even Putin's experts. Furthermore, there are some
professional people among them: Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Vyacheslav Glazychev,
Vladimir Pligin, and Yuriy Baturin.
Everything that is promised in the People's Program -- which they are promising
to officially publicize any time now -- has been written and re-written by
experts and research institutes, which even recently were being accused of
rocking the boat of Putin's stability. Let us take even the document of the
Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR), "Attaining the Future," or the
report by Dmitriyev-Belanovskiy from the Center for Strategic Developments. (The
concept of an "Image of the future" is also present in the People's Program,
thoughtlessly borrowed from INSOR: Why invent the atom bomb, if you can simply
borrow its blueprints from your ideological enemy?).
In short, there is expert accord about what must be done with the political
system. And therefore, there is no sensation in the fact that individual (far
from all) proposals on stimulating political competition have found their way
into the program, whose compilation is organizationally overseen by a fragile and
bespectacled young man by the name of Andrey Chibis, who was born in 1979. Being
a graduate of the Moscow Consumer Cooperative University, he managed to work as
adviser to Ryazan Oblast Governor Shlak, the head of the expert subsection of the
President of Chuvashiya's Administration, the head of a Minregion (Ministry of
Regions) department (he accompanied the national project, "Affordable Housing"),
and the head of administration at the Federal Agency for Construction and the
ZhKKh (Housing-Municipal Services Management). He is also the executive director
of ISEPI, vice-president of the National Union of Waterways, chairman of the
board of directors, member of the board and director on legal and corporate
questions of the OAO (joint-stock company of the open type) Russian Communal
Systems. Ohhh! These are the type of people who today promote democracy in our
What does all this mean from the standpoint of big politics? It is, after all,
petty nomenklatura Byzantinism.
This means that the "force and arms" (V. V. Mayakovskiy) of the People's Front,
Vladimir Putin, has entered the PR field of Dmitriy Medvedev: The place where
"freedom is better than lack of freedom." And he has assumed strategic command
heights in it. That is, the prime minister is now also the main democrat in the
country, ready to share responsibility with the people for the troubles that the
6 years of the next presidential term may bring. He intends to give the people
even more freedom than Medvedev.
Anti-Medvedev motifs are clearly heard i n the People's Program. And the most
terrible blow is dealt by the point according to which we should return the
minimally allowable blood alcohol level for motorists. With such a program, one
cannot help but be victorious in the elections. Aside from that, if Medvedev
remains president after all, Putin's Front is preparing to move him out of the
Kremlin beyond the MKAD (Moscow ring highway): Where the supreme leader sat,
there must now be a museum.
That is, Medvedev's place is in the museum. The Kremlin museum, the museum of
political history. And Vladimir Putin will himself somehow establish democracy.
With the aid of the chairman of the board of directors of OAO Russian Communal
[return to Contents]
Putin's Front Project Comes up with 'Unexpectedly Liberal' Campaign Proposals
July 25, 2011
Article by Olga Bolotova: "Going to the People -- People's Program of People's
Front Will Have to Appeal to the Right-Wing And Even the Communists"
The return of single seat constituencies at all electoral levels, complete
abandonment of the appointment of mayors, reduced monitoring of parties, the
transition to the election of court chairmen, and the relocation of Presidential
Staff and the head of state himself from the Kremlin are among the ideas included
in the draft electoral program for Vladimir Putin's People's Front.
The draft campaign program of Vladimir Putin's All-Russia People's Front (ONF),
which Gazeta.Ru has seen, suggests unexpectedly liberal policy initiatives for
United Russia, and traditional paternalism and statism in the economy and
international relations.
The foundation the Institute for the Socio-Economic and Political Studies, headed
by Nikolay Fedorov, the senator and former president of Chuvashia, is currently
working on the document. By the beginning of August, the experts should be
submitting a final version of this document. This document does not have the
status of master draft: the institute does not have any "official drafts" of the
program, Andrey Chibis, the executive director of the foundation and Fedorov's
deputy, told Gazeta.Ru, it is still at the preparatory stage. He said "virtually
all the well-known experts" had sent in suggestions for the document and they
were now being organized and brought together.
The draft that Gazeta.Ru has obtained is more than 100 pages long. It consists of
eight sections encompassing all aspects of the country's life from living
standards to a description of the requirements for the country's defense
capability, and it starts with an introductory campaign statement - the section
"the People's Program", in which the authors sum up the results of the past
decade and talk about the new element in the Russian Federation's political
system - the People's Front.
The policy of constructing a vertical power structure in the country "has on the
whole vindicated itself", the authors of the document believe, since "it has
enabled political unity and territorial integrity to be maintained". However, "we
have not avoided certain costs in implementing it"- such as the weakening
citizens' real control over the government.
In the opinion of the authors, this has led to an increase in corruption, the
domination of the bureaucracy, and a tyranny and lack of responsibility among
officials. "Experience has shown that these ailments cannot be fought only
through efforts at the top" - the authors of the document think, noting
particularly that channelling the current state and political system in the
direction of "genuine democracy" is one of the very important tasks behind the
creation of the ONF.
The political section in the program describes the ideological framework, which
must be close not only to United Russia members but also to members of Right
Cause who have declared their intention to become the "second ruling party".
"In a democratic state, politics are the result of competition between people and
ideas. In recent years, opportunities for society to influence the regime have
diminished in Russia," the authors of the document admit, but "there are
objective reasons for this". "History has set Russia the task of consolidating
society, fighting regional separatism, and individual unpunished oligarchs. It
was necessary to ensure rapid economic growth. It can be said that during the
last ten years we have been living according to the laws of mobilization
development," the authors of the document think. "For that time, such a model was
effective and suited the majority of Russians," they admit, but since then things
have changed. "Today we face new tasks, which require the development of private
initiative and the additional development of political competition," the authors
Another point in common with the program announced at the Right Cause party
congress by its leader Mikhail Prokhorov is the return of elected mayors and
heads of municipalities. "The heads of municipalities must only be elected on the
basis of universal suffrage (the institution of 'city manager' can only be
retained for a transitional period). As a result, the diarchy that is developing
and leading to paralysis in the management of the municipalities will be
eliminated, the spreading of responsibility between government representatives
will stop, and citizens will really be able to make those they voted for answer
to them," the authors of the text think.
The election of deputies solely via party lists should be abandoned and there
should be a return to the mixed system, the authors of the document think, and
the procedure for parties' participation in the elections needs to be simplified
- requirements for the collection of signatures should be reduced, registration
with a deposit should be restored, and a minimal list of grounds for the
cancellation of the registration of parties and candidates should be drawn up.
Another section in the program that refers to Right Cause's manifesto statements
describes proposals to fight corruption: the authors of the document effectively
approve of the tactics and practices of the fight against corrupt figures chosen
by Aleksey Navalnyy. The document states that currently, instead of punishing
corrupt officials, higher-ranking officials try to protect them and "protect the
esprit de corps". "Sanctions only occur if corruption cannot be hidden from the
public" - the authors of the text acknowledge and they call for "such
manifestations of corporate solidarity" to be dealt with severely.
It is necessary to "make officials prove the legality of their income and
expenditure", moreover, both their own and those of their families. "Russia has
ratified the UN Convention against Corruption, but without the relevant point in
the convention. The time has come to fill in the blanks," the draft states.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has already asked for the preparation of a draft
law, which would enable state officials' expenditure to be monitored. However,
the document was not yet been made public.
Moreover, it would be useful to launch a "People's Control" program, within the
framework of which constant monitoring of the work of the state power bodies and
local government bodies would be carried out by the ONF "with the involvement of
citizens, public organizations, and political parties". The second step in this
direction is supporting the media and "citizens who disclose cases of
The work of bureaucrats should not cost the country so much, the authors of the
document state. It is necessary "to reduce spending on the upkeep of the power
bodies at all levels with regard to the construction of expensive offices, the
acquisition of expensive company cars and equipment, and superfluous and
excessive material expenditure".
Officials should be modest in everything, focusing "in their professional
activities on the most essential federal standards for material consumption",
which nip in the bud "the ever-growing appetite of officials of different ranks
to outdo one another with prestigious offices and cars, and create comfort and
opulence at the expense of the public coffers".
"All the federal departments, including the Presidential Staff, the government,
the State Duma and the Federation Council, should be moved from Moscow and
located in the same complex. It should not take more than 15 minutes to walk on
foot between the departments' buildings. The Moscow Kremlin should be declared a
world public cultural-historical center, and the area around it should be turned
into a pedestrian zone. This project will be a historic decision of global
importance and popularity both for Muscovites, and for all Russians," the draft's
authors are radical.
Other sections of the program are full of social promises, they must appeal to
the electorate that is much more traditional for United Russia. One of the
largest sections in the program addresses the problem of the affordability of
There are proposals in the draft to solve it by methods already spoken about many
times both by experts and officials - developing the institution of social
housing, this means providing shelter, in line with Article 40 of the
constitution, to the poor who need better housing, free of charge or for a
reasonable price, from the state and municipal housing stock. However, the
document's authors remind us, "this article is not working anywhere apart from in
individual component parts of the Russian Federation".
"The All-Russia People's Front demands that Russian legislators pledge they will
create such housing everywhere!" the authors of the text demand categorically.
Another large section in the document is also devoted to describing standards of
living and ways of increasing them.
"Working people in Russia should not be poor!" the authors of the draft program
They list the necessary steps to eradicate poverty, which experts have been
repeating for years: the need to develop local government, switching from
"unitary federalism to a federalism based on the optimal balance of powers
between the federal center and the component parts", the need to spend oil and
gas revenues not only on replenishing the reserves but also on the development of
the country ("since only a dynamic and versatile development of the country's
economy will produce additional, not only oil and hydrocarbon, strategically
reliable resources for surmounting possible difficulties"). They also specify
that "civilized competition" needs to be developed between people, ideas, and
social initiatives.
To promote sport, the authors suggest "creating Healthy Region and Healthy Town
social movements in each region". "A healthy and sporty way of life, and a
rejection of bad habits, must become fashionable!" - the writers plan.
In some places, the authors of the draft also resort to the rhetoric of the LDPR
(Liberal Democratic Party of Russia). "The current tension in the sphere of
inter-ethnic relations are, on the one hand, a consequence of errors in ethnic
policy, and on the other - the result of single-minded and externally funded
activities by forces of a radical-nationalist and extremist orientation," it says
in one section.
A separate section is devoted to car enthusiasts. The ONF is demanding a complete
revision of traffic signs and the return of a legally permitted level for blood
alcohol content.
"The total ban on alcohol in the blood that exists today has only led to an
increase in abuses by the traffic police and the infringement of drivers' rights,
but not to a decrease in the number of offenses," it is asserted in the document.
A government official and a United Russia representative said that they were not
familiar with the ONF draft electoral program and they were unable to confirm
that this document might be close to the final version.
[return to Contents]
BBC Monitoring
Russian president says 'trust in government' depends on parliamentary election
Rossiya 24
July 27, 2011
Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev has said this year's parliamentary election is
very important for public trust in the authorities and called on election
officials to ensure that it is held in a lawful and open manner. He was talking
to members of the Russian Central Electoral Commission on 27 July.
The Rossiya 24 state TV news channel showed Medvedev saying to the meeting
participants: "Parliamentary elections - of any parliament, including in our
country - are always a serious and often very tough political battle. And here,
all of you will need a firm civic position and sometimes, on occasion, human
courage. People's trust in our electoral system is directly contingent upon your
professionalism and honest. And thus so do the results of the elections. In the
end, this means trust in government as a whole. Particularly given that in March
next year, we will have presidential elections."
"You and thousands of your colleagues have a special responsibility to ensure the
lawfulness and openness of the preparations for and conduct of the elections and
of summing up their results," the Interfax news agency quoted Medvedev as saying.
Interfax also quoted him as saying that "this will be the largest and most
significant election campaign of the last years... its results will determine the
distribution of political powers in the country for the nearest future".
Medvedev recalled that the upcoming campaign "will take place amid new
conditions: in the past years we have significantly improved the electoral
system, with a legislative framework that facilitates more transparent
implementation of election procedures," which, he said, factored in the opinions
of political parties and the Electoral Commission, Interfax reports.
Medvedev also called for introducing the latest technology at this year's
parliamentary elections, RIA Novosti said. "Electronic vote-counting systems
should ultimately rule out any outside interference and be the main guarantee of
lawfulness," Medvedev said.
To this end, he cited plans to install modern voting equipment in all 83 Russian
regions, at around 5 per cent of the total number of polling stations, as well as
polling stations abroad for the upcoming Duma elections this year, with a full
technical overhaul of the election instruments due to be completed by 2015.
The head of the Russian Electoral Commission, Vladimir Churov, recalled the
commission's plans to hold a three-day training session in preparation for the
December elections on August 15 with the participation of international
On 27 July, the RIA Novosti news agency reported on three laws regulating various
procedural aspects of elections signed by Medvedev on the same day. These laws
unify requirements with respect to lists of signatures in support of candidates
at regional and local elections as well as referendums; introduce tighter
requirements as regards the procedures for voting outside polling stations; and
allow parties to decide which candidates will fill vacant spots in regional
parliaments and municipal assemblies.
[return to Contents]
July 28, 2011
Author: Irina Granik, Maxim Ivanov
[The president met with the heads of electoral commissions.]
President Dmitry Medvedev met with the heads of electoral
commissions yesterday and warned them that political struggle in
the course of the parliamentary election was bound to be fierce.
The president demanded from electoral commissions an active civil
position and courage. Central Electoral Commission Chairman
Vladimir Churov demonstrated symbol of the forthcoming election
(image of the so called Happiness Bird).
Medvedev reminded those present that culmination of the
campaign come December was extremely important on account of it
being election of the federal Duma as well as regional and
municipal elections. "The outcome of the election will determine
the correlation of political forces in the country for years to
come," said Medvedev. "It is up to you therefore to make sure that
the election is legitimate and transparent." The president
recalled the latest changes in the electoral legislation which he
said promoted fair political competition and transparency of
electoral procedures.
Said Medvedev, "Parliamentary election is always fierce
political fighting. We will all need an active civil position and
courage. People's trust in the electoral system, in the outcome of
the election, an even in the powers-that-be as such will directly
depend on your professionalism and integrity. Which is no laughing
matter, considering the forthcoming presidential election."
Churov displayed a sketch of the symbol of the forthcoming
election. What the president thought of the symbol and of how
Churov presented it remained unclear.
Churov informed the president that elections of parliaments
in 27 regions simultaneously with election of the federal Duma on
December 4 would involve upwards of 50,000 candidates for
Central Electoral Commission Secretary Nikolai Konkin said
that the president was informed of the necessity of personnel
training for electoral commissions. Another idea suggested at the
conference concerned formation of local electoral commissions for
five-year terms so as to obviate the necessity to form them in
time for every new election.
[return to Contents]
Russians Not Confident Of Honest Elections In December - Poll
Moscow, 27 July: Russians do not believe that December's elections to the State
Duma will be honest, and are in favour of electoral law being liberalized,
according to an opinion poll conducted by the Levada Centre in July.
Slightly more than one-third of Russians (35 per cent) are expecting a genuine
contest between the parties for seats in December, while the majority (53 per
cent) are confident that "there will simply be a simulation of elections, while
the authorities will determine the distribution of places in the Duma",
sociologists from the Levada Centre told Interfax on Wednesday (27 July) as they
presented the results of the poll.
According to their data, 54 per cent of those who replied predict that "dirty
techniques" will be used during the State Duma elections in December (defamation,
pressuring voters, sharp practices with ballot papers). Half as many are
expecting honest and lawful elections (29 per cent).
Fifty-nine per cent of Russians see the parliamentary elections overall as "a
struggle between bureaucratic clans for access to the state budget", and only 28
per cent of those who replied see the elections as a national event.
The Levada Centre poll also showed that Russia's citizens are in favour of
electoral law being liberalized.
There are significantly more Russians who favour the threshold for entry into
parliament being reduced (46 per cent against 28 per cent) and elections to
single-seat constituencies being restored (the first-past-the-post system) (49
per cent against 16 per cent).
At the same time, an absolute majority of those surveyed - 73 per cent - would
like to see the "against all" line restored to ballot papers. Eleven per cent are
opposed to that.
During the poll it emerged that Russians still prefer a multi-party system in the
State Duma to a situation where every decision is taken by one victorious party
(43 per cent and 36 per cent respectively).
[return to Contents]
July 28, 2011
Russians want protest vote to be returned
A poll conducted by the independent Levada-Center has revealed that most Russians
support the return of the "against all" option on the election ballot.
The vast majority of those surveyed (73%) have said they agree that the option
should be included on the ballot along with the candidates. Only 11% of
respondents do not support this kind of protest vote. The line "against all" was
eliminated from the ballot in 2006, before the 2007 parliamentary election. This
followed a Constitutional Court decision which ruled it was in violation of the
constitution, as the "virtual" candidate appeared on the list along with real
Another question sociologists asked was whether Russians believe the forthcoming
parliamentary election this December will be transparent. According to the study,
54% expect that "dirty technologies" such as mudslinging and voter pressure will
be used in the run-up to the election. However, 29% are convinced the election is
going to be free and fair.
As for the election campaign, about a third of respondents (35%) think there will
actually be real competition, while 53% believe that it will be "an imitation of
an election and seats in the State Duma will distributed as the authorities
59% consider the parliamentary election to be "a struggle of bureaucratic clans
for access to the state budget". About half as many (28%) believe it to will be a
real democratic undertaking.
The poll has also revealed that Russian citizens want the liberalization of
election legislation. 46% are in favor of lowering the vote threshold, as well as
a return to single-seat election districts (49%).
Last week, a group of opposition leaders have called on all those who disagree
with the incumbent authorities policies to "actively ignore" the election. Under
the current law, there is no voter turnout threshold for the election to be
recognized as valid. So their suggestion is either to "ruin" the ballots by
ticking the names of multiple candidates, or simply taking them home from the
polling station.
Another poll, released by the All-Russia Public Opinion Study Center (VTSIOM)
last week, showed that protest sentiment is not so important and wide spread as
to significantly impact the election. According to its results, almost half of
Russians (49%) would vote for the majority United Russia party if elections took
place this July.
[return to Contents]
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor
July 27, 2011
What Has Happened to the Russian Elections?
By Pavel K. Baev
The parliamentary elections in Russia are some 18 weeks away, but the campaign
that appeared lively earlier this year has all but exhausted itself. One of the
three minor parliamentary parties, Spravedlivaya Rossiya, has been effectively
dismantled by orders from the Kremlin, presumably because by its very name it has
to focus upon the issue of social justice, which is too politically sensitive
(www.lenta.ru, July 21). The Communist Party, which has traditionally tried to
make a colorful show, this time around is barely going through the motions
(Kommersant, July 26). Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who for two decades kept his one-man
party alive by playing on nationalist issues, now treads very carefully over this
minefield. A new electoral project launched by the billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov
is struggling to get off the ground as he is instructed to steer his Pravoe Delo
proto-party off the hot issues like corruption in the almighty bureaucracy
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 22).
The only pseudo-political activity that is going on with unmistakably Soviet
falsity is the mobilization of the so-called Popular Front around the dominant
United Russia party under the leadership of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. He now
and again holds meetings with representatives of the general population in order
to distribute money for resolving some local problems and to communicate his
closeness to people's needs while sitting in a circle of common workers on a
rotating chair specially delivered from his Moscow office (Ezhednevny Zhurnal,
July 19). This tactic works only to a degree as the generosity of gifts cannot
begin to the cut into the mountain of accumulated neglect, first of all in
communal infrastructure and transport (www.gazeta.ru, July 22). Even Mikhail
Gorbachev, always careful with his words, argues that United Russia cannot be
trusted because it pulls the country back, which suits Putin just fine (Ekho
Moskvy, July 23). Only about one third of Muscovites are prepared to vote for
this party, which about another third of Russians find fair to call a party of
"swindlers and thieves" (www.levada.ru, July 25).
President Dmitry Medvedev prefers not to associate himself with this passe
front-building, but cannot find a place for himself in this torpid campaign,
which would decide his political future. He held a meeting with the "captains" of
big business and came close to asking for their support for his program to secure
a second presidential term; his message, however, remained elliptic, and the
shrewd billionaires saw no reason to commit themselves (Vedomosti, July 13;
www.forbes.ru, July 14). Hesitant voices from the liberal intelligentsia call for
rallying around Medvedev's banner of modernization, but skeptics who are by no
means embittered radicals counter that Putin's junior partner is perfectly aware
that Putinism cannot be modernized (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, July 26). Analysts find
good entertainment value in comparing the discourses of the two co-rulers, but
the conclusion that neither has a clue about how to guide the country out of
stagnation to a track of sustainable growth has turned from a heresy into a
platitude (Novaya Gazeta, July 24).
The deep indifference in society to the elections is not a symptom of
disappointment in democracy but a rational reaction to the fact that the ruling
bureaucracy is not prepared to address the real issues that are revealed, or find
a solution (www.gazeta.ru, July 15). Putin is staying on the message of stability
and trickling-down prosperity, which is exactly what the self-serving bureaucracy
wants to hear and the society finds easy and pleasant to digest. In both
audiences, nevertheless, there is a growing feeling that "more-of-the-same" is
not a sustainable strategy. The elites are not deaf to the persistent warnings
from mainstream economists that the industrial base is too dilapidated, the
petro-dependency too entrenched and that the pension system is plainly ruinous
for the budget (Vedomosti, July 25). The public may be less attentive to expert
alarmism, but feels the falling income and the deteriorating habitat, hence the
very strong reaction to the Bulgaria tragedy, in which this old and overloaded
ship became a symbol of a deeply troubled Russia (Kommersant-Vlast, July 18).
These unarticulated feelings create a latent demand for a new political force
that would be able to break the constraints of political correctness Putin-style,
and challenge the existing monopoly on power in a meaningful way. The Party of
People's Freedom (or PARNAS) is not quite able to tap into this demand but is
nevertheless recognized as a threat and excluded from participating in the
elections, though it is trying to reverse this ban in the courts
(www.svobodanaroda.org, July 15).
What might help in expanding the space for new politics is the crude manipulation
of the coming elections that will inevitably demonstrate the gross inadequacy of
the Byzantine-court political system (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 26). There is
probably a strong dose of wishful thinking in experts' musing that a
challenger-force must escape from the simplistic taxonomy of pro-Western or
jingo-patriotic, but it is clear that this coalition of groups and networks would
have to make its case outside the parliament, relying on a combination of street
and blogosphere power (Vedomosti, July 26).
The key question in transforming the deep pool of discontent into a coherent
political force is about new leaders who would step in front rather than elbow
aside the too familiar faces from the 1990's like Grigory Yavlinsky, Boris
Nemtsov or Mikhail Kasyanov. Speculating about where such leaders might come
from, Moscow commentators look to independent business, Western universities and,
not least, Russian prisons, which provide a high education of a very particular
kind (Vedomosti, July 22). An answer to this question could only come as a
forceful surprise. It will make Putin's efforts at reinvigorating his stale image
by unleashing a fan-club of teenage girls and Medvedev's attempts at
demonstrating loyalty to his senior partner by causing a scene in Germany about
the Quadriga scandal not just petty but ridiculously pathetic. After each
political implosion, experts ponder how the ruling clique could be so blind to
foster its own downfall; the Russian elections on December 2011 are shaping up as
a case for such examination.
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RF ombudsman says Lebedev should be released under economic amnesty.
MOSCOW, July 28 (Itar-Tass) Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman Mikhail Fedotov said
former MENATEP CEO Platon Lebedev, whose appeal for parole was rejected on
Wednesday, July 27, should be released under economic amnesty.
"I think the question with regard to Lebedev should be raised not under parole
but under broad amnesty for entrepreneurs who were faced criminal charges and
were sentenced for economic crimes over the last 10 years," Fedotov said.
Russia needs modernisation, and "if we speak about liberalisation of laws and
economic life in general, it's high time we announced economic amnesty", he said.
Fedotov noted that a draft document declaring economic amnesty to be timed to
coincide with the 20th anniversary of Russia's independence had already been
handed over to President Dmitry Medvedev.
"It's not a secret that many entrepreneurs faced criminal charges under
fabricated accusations as there are no injured parties in 90 percent of economic
crimes," he said.
At the same time, Fedotov said that the court ruling on Lebedev did no surprise
him because the latter had reprimands. "If there are reprimands, this may provide
the grounds for denying parole, but if the lawyers contest them and the
reprimands are lifted, Lebedev can appeal fro parole again," he explained.
The judge of the Velsk City Court in the Arkhangelsk region, Nikolai Raspopov,
denied he had made his decision under pressure.
"This is an absolutely objective decision and [it was] made by my conviction,"
the judge said.
He stressed that Lebedev had been denied parole not only because he had failed to
repent, but "for a number of reasons" and in accordance with the law.
After two-day hearings, the court came to the conclusion that Lebedev "did not
repent for his doings", had breached regulations during his entire term, "was
never rewarded, and his behaviour gives no indication that he does not need
incarceration for further correction".
"The purpose of punishment has not been achieved, whereby parole would be
unadvisable," the judge said.
Lebedev's lawyers intend to appeal. "We will certainly appeal," Lawyer Alexei
Miroshnichenko said.
An appeal can be filed with the Arkhangelsk Region Court within 10 days.
On May 24, the Moscow City Court commuted the sentence for Lebedev and his
business partner, former YUKOS CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky within the second
criminal case to 13 years.
The court changed the verdict handed down by Moscow's Khamovniki Court on
December 30, 2010, which sentenced Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to 14 years in jail
for theft of oil and money laundering.
The verdict became effective.
The Moscow City Court also upheld the prosecutor's petition, cutting the amount
of stolen oil by 130 million tonnes and its value by more than 68 billion
Moscow's Khamovniky Court Judge Viktor Danilkin said at the trial that "the guilt
of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev is borne out by the proof examined during the
judicial investigation."
The judge proclaimed Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty of stealing oil from a
producing company and of laundering ill-gotten funds.
At the same time, the court dropped certain criminal charged against the
defendants due to the statute of limitation. Lebedev's lawyer Konstantin Rivkin
referred particularly to the episode concerning the theft of Eastern Oil Company
(VNK) shares.
In May 2005, Moscow's Meshchansky Court found Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty
under several articles of the Russian Criminal Code, including fraud and tax
evasion and sentenced them to nine years in prison.
Later the Moscow City Court reduced the term to eight years.
Since the prison term begins from the time a person has been put in custody,
Lebedev's term will end in July 2011, and Khodorkovsky's in October 2011.
In February 2007, the Prosecutor General's Office brought new charges against
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, accusing them of having legalised 450 billion roubles
and 7.5 billion U.S. dollars in 1998-2004 by stealing state-owned shares as well
as embezzling oil and legalising earnings from its sale.
[return to Contents]
July 28, 2011
As Moscow Renovates Sidewalks, Corruption Suspicions Abound
By Tom Balmforth
MOSCOW -- The acrid odor of drying tarmac and the judder of jackhammers that
accompanies road construction is a nuisance for pedestrians and motorists in any
But for Moscow residents, the sight of road crews on nearly every downtown street
corner has additional undertones -- it is widely viewed as a harbinger of
Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has earmarked 4 billion rubles ($145.4 million) for
resurfacing vast swathes of central Moscow's sidewalks with expensive and fancy
brickwork. The move has raised eyebrows because his wife has been linked to a
brick and curbing business.
Andrei Dukhonin, a real estate agent, is one Muscovite who is suspicious. "I
think more than likely it's corruption," he said. "It is a way of getting money
from the budget."
There has thus far been no evidence of graft. But in a city where former Mayor
Yury Luzhkov's wife, Yelena Baturina, amassed a multibillion-dollar construction
empire that got rich off of municipal contracts, the frenzied construction taking
place in the Russian capital this summer means one thing for Muscovites -- here
we go again.
'Ira The Curber'
Not long after Sobyanin announced in February that the city would replace 4
million square meters of downtown sidewalks, local media noted that his wife,
Irina Sobyanina, allegedly owned a brick and curbing business called
According to the respected newsweekly "Dengi," while Sobyanin served as mayor of
the Siberian city of Tyumen from 2001 to 2005, the company received a series of
lucrative municipal contracts. In Tyumen, the rumor mill had gone so far that she
allegedly won the nickname "Ira Bordyur" -- which translates roughly as "Ira the
When Sobyanin was appointed to replace Luzhkov in October, the anticorruption
watchdog Transparency International warned him about the "conflicts of interest"
implied by these allegations.
Yelena Panfilova, head of Transparency International's Russia office, said there
was no evidence of wrongdoing in Sobyanin's project to refurbish the city's
sidewalks. She added, however, that she had suggested that Sobyanin establish a
body to provide impartial oversight, allowing him and his wife to elude potential
"People can have wives and husbands who are in different business positions and
there is nothing wrong with that, but in order to avoid [problems] there should
be proper procedures for declaring conflicts of interests and doing business
transparently," Panfilova said.
Panfilova said she was puzzled that the mayor did not follow her advice,
especially given the allegations surrounding Luzhkov and his spouse. "Sometimes
people in public office believe that all this talk about conflict of interest and
nepotism is just a nuisance," she said. "Sometimes they do get better but I think
there is some kind of lack of the culture of transparency."
In Public's Interest?
Sobyanin has said Moscow's harsh weather conditions are bad for the asphalt
previously used to pave sidewalks.
Real estate agent Dukhonin said he questioned the project's aims because the
asphalt being replaced had only been recently resurfaced itself. He said the
previous pavement was "new, fresh asphalt."
"Then when I passed by again, I saw that they were laying down bricks, which came
as a really big surprise," he added. "I was immediately struck by an element of
The project has also come under fire for reasons unrelated to the corruption
It's creating a major inconvenience for pedestrians, who are being forced to
constantly dodge dusty construction sites by walking perilously in the city's
chaotic and clogged streets. And the headaches will continue until the
construction is due to be completed in November.
Some opponents also point out that cheap labor is being used to fit the brickwork
and that Moscow has more serious problems the authorities should be tending to.
New Mayor, Just Like The Old One...
Last week, a small group of about half a dozen people gathered to protest outside
City Hall holding banners that read: "Sergei Sobyanin, stop wasting money from
the budget!"
Yury Zotev, a Moscow pensioner, attended the meeting and told RFE/RL's Russian
Service: "I believe that we have to tell the authorities that before embarking on
these large actions, some kinds of research and testing must be carried out
first. And then, according to the results of this research, they could work out
what modifications need to be made based on experience."
The head of the Left Front opposition group, Sergei Udaltsov, also attended the
demonstration. "We know that this brings in good profits for the business that is
in charge of these bricks," Udaltsov said. "But it is absolutely not fine for
Sobyanin, a 53-year-old, gray-haired apparatchik, has been eager to set himself
apart from his predecessor. He began his term as mayor by permitting moderate
opposition groups to legally conduct an antigovernment rally -- a move
unthinkable under Luzhkov.
But a Levada Center poll in May found that only 27 percent of Muscovites believe
Sobyanin is working "in the interest of the city and its citizens." Thirty-nine
percent think he serves the federal authorities and 19 percent that he serves his
own interests.
Dukhonin for one was less than enthused with Sobyanin. "Put simply, before there
was Luzhkov's team," the real estate agent said. "They got rid of him and now
there is Sobyanin's team, which is doing exactly the same as Luzhkov's team did."
[return to Contents]
Russia Profile
July 28, 2011
A Nationalist Epidemic
Although the Russian Government's Attitude Toward Ultra Nationalists Seems to Be
Changing, Containing Nationalist Sentiment in Russia Is a Difficult Balancing Act
By Justin Lyle
The massacre that shook Norway last week raised some difficult questions about
the extreme right in Europe and in Russia. Anders Behring Breivik's slaughter of
teenagers at a political summer camp near Oslo shocked the world, not only by the
extraordinary scale and brutality of the act, but because it took place in the
famously prosperous and calm country that hosts the Nobel Peace Prize. The
massacre lent support to claims that ethno-nationalist extremism is an inevitable
phenomenon of today's multicultural wider Europe, an inescapable local-level
"clash of civilizations."
However, this convenient explanation hides the socio-economic causes of
ultra-right activism and obscures the role that state policy plays in encouraging
or alleviating ethnic tensions. With Russian ethno-nationalist extremism a
prominent feature of the country's social landscape, understanding the roots of
the ultra-right phenomenon is crucial to curbing unrest.
Less than a fortnight before the Norway massacre, Russia had seen some 13 of its
own ultra-rightist killers convicted in an unprecedented court case. On July 11,
the Moscow Region Military Court sentenced five members of the neo-Nazi
National-Socialist Organization (NSO) North to life imprisonment, and the
remaining eight individuals tried received between ten and 23-year sentences.
This tough verdict seems to mark a major change in the government's attitude
toward the ultra-right.
Between January 2008 and early 2009, the ultra-rightists attacked more than 50
people and murdered 27, mostly on the basis of their "non-Slavic appearance." On
January 1, 2008, Lev Molotkov, a 27-year-old computer programmer and leader of
this northern division of the neo-Nazi group, declared a year of "white terror."
The participants in that terror campaign convicted this month included a
17-year-old schoolboy, a female student of the Moscow State University journalism
faculty, and 11 men in their early and mid-20s.
The NSO North branch became semi-independent in autumn of 2007, when the umbrella
organization NSO, founded by Dmitry Rumyantsev, a former assistant to a State
Duma deputy in 2004, decided to divide into regional groupings. Members received
training in the use of firearms, in hand-to-hand and knife combat and in
terrorist techniques such as uprooting train tracks.
The neo-Nazis' victims were mostly dark-skinned people from the North Caucasus
and Central Asia, but the group also killed an anti-fascist activist and a
"traitor" from within their own ranks the latter was tortured on camera for
several hours, to a sound track of music from Russian children's films and the
German group Rammstein.
Observers have criticized the limited scope and closed nature of the court
proceedings, arguing that powerful figures in the background of nationalist
extremism, not least among them the organization's founder Rumyantsev, are not
being sniffed out. The fact that the case was heard behind closed doors by a
military court and without a jury raised suspicion. Critics have pointed to
Rumyantsev's political connections, arguing that he must have enjoyed the
blessing of members of the political establishment. Certainly, he made a timely
exit from the NSO, just a month before the neo-Nazi activists were arrested.
According to monitoring by the Moscow-based Sova Center on xenophobia, this
spring has seen only one third of the number of racist attacks down from 97 to
34 incidents witnessed during the same period of 2010. St. Petersburg and the
surrounding region saw more attacks (17 victims) than Moscow and the Moscow
Region (11 victims) for the first time, and incidents were also registered in
Vologda, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Saratov and Bashkiria. Central Asians and enemy
youth activists bore the brunt of these assaults, and people from the North
Caucasus were also attacked. Since the start of 2011, 64 people have suffered
hate-crime, and 11 were killed a significant year on year drop.
More moderate nationalist sentiment is widespread in Russia, and polls earlier
this year suggested that 15 percent of the population thinks that the slogan
"Russia for the Russians" should be brought into effect immediately, while 40
percent support it "within reasonable bounds." Statements and willingness to vote
or act are very different, however, and there is no evidence of widespread
support for racist violence.
The annual Russian March on November 4, bringing together nationalists from
various organizations, was unusually well attended last year. It was followed in
December by rioting by 6,000 protesters on Manezh Square near the Kremlin. The
December unrest followed close on the heels of the killing of Yegor Sviridov, a
Russian football fan, allegedly by opposition fans from the Caucasus. The success
of this event prompted a wave of optimism among right-wing extremist groups about
their growing political prospects. But it also seemed to awaken the authorities
to the potential threat posed by the far right.
Alexei Panin, the deputy director of the Moscow-based Center for Political
Information, argues that the ultra-right phenomenon is a typical element of
today's political landscape, irrespective of state policies. "Just look at the
events in Germany, France or even Norway any country with a mix of cultures has
this problem. Theoretically, you could connect it with youth or migration policy,
but in practice it's not really connected. You could point to the lack of social
mobility for young people in Russia, but countries that do have social mobility
still face this problem."
In contrast, Maksim Rokhminstrov, the deputy leader of the Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia, the leading far-right mainstream political party, blames
government policy for the violence of the extreme right. "The policy of Russia
and other countries, including in the European Union, has been to buy off the
national minorities in the state. By giving these people more social benefits
than the national majorities in the countries, the government provokes distrust
and inter-ethnic conflicts." High state expenditure in Chechnya is a central
topic of criticism for right-wing actors.
In a recent Levada Center report, sociologist Denis Volkov argued that the rise
in nationalist activism reflects deep and growing frustration with the
authorities. In his view this frustration centers on systemic corruption and the
resulting lack of responsiveness on the part of the authorities to the concerns
of the electorate. More specifically, the perceived failure of law enforcement
bodies and judicial authorities to address crimes committed by people from the
Caucasus and to protect the interests of ethnic Russians produce unrest.
Participants of the protests reportedly also explained their activism as a
response to the lack of opportunities for self-advancement and the dim prospects
for an improvement of this situation.
The Vladimir Putin-Dmitry Medvedev administrations have been accused of
encouraging nationalist ideas in order to secure political consolidation. The
pro-government youth organization Nashi, set up under Putin, began to recruit
nationalist skinheads to its ranks actively in 2005, in an effort to contain and
redirect nationalist sentiment. These skinheads were reportedly used to break up
opposition protests, including attacking activists campaigning against the
construction of a new highway through the Khimki Forest north of Moscow in July
of 2010. The authorities have also been linked to radical right-wing groups, such
as Russian Image, which despite being banned managed to secure a prime location
for a demonstration in November of 2009. At least one United Russia member of
Parliament has admitted promoting youth education projects with the ultra-right
Government attitudes seem to be changing, however. In the wake of the Manezh
Square unrest, 2,000 gang members were arrested. The government has also moved to
ban ultra-right groups. The controversial 2008 law against extremism has been
used to ban several right wing organizations, including the prominent Slavic
Union, and most recently the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI). Both
organizations enjoy relatively large support and have been responsible for racist
An increase in convictions in prominent racist murder cases has also contributed
to the drop in attacks. The most high-profile case was the sentencing of Yevgeny
Tikhonov, a founding member of Russian Image, to life imprisonment for the
January 2009 murders of lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasia
Baburova. In May members of ultra-right groups Lincoln 88 in St. Petersburg and
the White Legion in Dzerzhinsk were convicted for killings.
According to Maria Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center, the leadership is trying
to contain nationalist activism, but has a difficult balancing act to perform.
"The Russian demographic crisis means the country needs migrant labor, but this
brings the risk of ethnic conflict," she said. Government rejection of other
forms of independent social activism is also part of the problem. "The
government's drive for control has entailed distrust of any independent source of
authority, so it hasn't supported societal organizations that could help to deal
with this problem, which, after all, lies in the consciousness of society at
large, and which cannot be resolved through formal politics alone."
The leading ultra-right groups, such as DPNI, the Slavic Union and the Russian
Social Movement (ROD), on the other hand, are trying to avoid total
marginalization and to capitalize on the nationalist gains of last December's
unrest to win seats at this year's parliamentary elections. The groups have
looked to integrate into a new overarching united nationalist front. The Sova
Center has reported that from February onward, three separate integration
projects developed. The most significant of these was led by DPNI and the Slavic
Union, and resulted in the formation in April of the new Ethnopolitical
Association Russians, whose membership was based mainly on the organizations
that participated in the Russian March. In April, three minor far-right parties
signed an agreement to form a coalition under the name "Our Motherland."
The political impact of these projects will be limited, however. The fact that
the major groups behind the Ethnopolitical Association Russians are officially
classed as extremist is a barrier to legitimacy. Also, while some leaders are
totally unfamiliar to the public, others are (accurately) seen as neo-Nazis, and
are thus not acceptable to the wider electorate. The absence of substantive
policy programs among these groups, and their lack of access to influential media
resources, such as television, will also limit their impact. There is a major gap
between the older generation of the far right, which is interested in legal
politics, and the younger generation which continues to reject systemic politics
in favor of street war.
The failure of these groups like that of their democratic opponents either to
find their own niche in the political system or to attract mainstream political
party support will ensure that core conflicts of interest within the state are
not resolved through politics. The irresponsible stance of the authorities toward
nationalism in the context of high labor migration, coupled with the indifference
of the government and systemic opposition to grass-roots social concerns
(whatever their nature) will ensure that social frustrations continue to find
their expression in popular unrest and in racial hatred.
[return to Contents]
Russia Beyond the Headlines
July 27, 2011
Russian women equal, but only on the surface
Although more Russian women than men have university degrees, women on average
make less money and hold less prestigious positions.
By Marina Darmaros
Since the Soviet era, more Russian women than men have received university
degrees, yet their earnings and position in the job market are far lower than
those of men.
According to a 2010 report into gender research by the Russian Federation
Statistics Service Rosstat, in 1989 there were 6.73 million women who had studied
in institutions of higher learning compared with 6 million men. In 2002, the
difference was even more striking: there were 10.76 million women who had studied
at universities compared with 8.61 million men.
"It is a vicious circle: Without completing their studies, men receive higher
salaries than better-educated women, and as a result there is no incentive for
the men to study. For their part, women, already realizing they are at a
disadvantage, try to make up ground and specialize more and more," said Zoya
Khotkina, a specialist in the study of female employment placement at the Moscow
Center for Gender Research. According to her, Russian women's salaries are 40
percent of men's.
Following a Western trend
According to sociologist Marilia Moschkovich, who researches gender in education
at the University of Campinas in Brazil, such disparities reflect a general trend
in Western countries such as Brazil, the United States, France and Germany.
"In the words of the French sociologist Christian Baudelot, it is as if schools
have created the feeling that there is more equality of opportunity, therefore
women manage to go to school and succeed, but it seems that society does not
support such equality of opportunities outside the institutions," said
"There are two factors which go hand in hand: the horizontal concentration of
women in highly-specialized, but less prestigious and less well paid areas; and
vertical concentration, where, within each field, there are very high and very
low positions, with women tending to hold the latter, even where they are better
educated than the men," Moschkovich added.
With the recent global financial crisis and resulting unemployment, the unequal
treatment received by women in the employment market has been even more apparent.
In 2008, 416,800 women held executive positions compared with 645,640 men; by
2009, however only 33.7 percent of these positions were held by women compared
with 66.3 percent of positions held by men.
In Russia, equality between men and women is guaranteed by Paragraph 19 of
Article 3 of the Constitution, according to which "men and women enjoy equal
rights and freedoms and have equal possibilities to exercise them." However,
Article 253 of the Russian Employment Code lists approximately 600 jobs "where
the use of female labor is prohibited."
"Included in those are really strenuous jobs such as mining and other underground
work, but where something is prohibited, there is then the possibility to
restrict to jobs where there is no danger whatsoever. This results in a scenario
where, underground, a woman cannot work as a machine operator, which is a highly
skilled and well-paid job, but she can clean the dirt from the floor," said
In 2009, Anna Klevets, then 22, brought an lawsuit in St. Petersburg challenging
the ban on women working as machine operators underground, after she was not
allowed to do so the previous year by a state-run company. The court, referring
to the Russian Employment Code, found against Klevets.
[return to Contents]
Valdai Discussion Club
July 28, 2011
"De-Stalinization" program means complete revision of the Russian history
By Alexei Pushkov
Alexei Pushkov is anchor and author, Postscriptum political show, "TV Center"
Company, professor of the MGIMO University.
Problems of today are not derived from the Stalin's time
The program "On perpetuation of memory of victims of the totalitarian regime"
prepared by the Working Group on Historical Memory of the Presidential Council
for Civil Society Development and Human Rights is an artificial one.
Russia doesn't need a complete revision of its history and its past; we need to
deal with problems of today and tomorrow. These problems are not derived from the
Stalin's time, they are generated by the dissolution of a previously united
country, by corruption and criminal capitalism. Russia's dependence on oil and
gas industry is not to be blamed on Stalin, neither Yeltsin and the reformers
oversaw the creation of a highly peculiar form of capitalism in Russia. It has
been defined in various ways over the years: being called everything from crony
capitalism to corrupt capitalism and even gangster capitalism but always in
negative terms.
Whatever definition you choose for it, that form of capitalism was completely
unrelated to Stalin and our totalitarian past. Therefore, this program is
artificial it is basically sending Russia backwards to fight the ghosts of the
past instead of tackling the problems of today and of the future. These are
problems that appeared after Russia had already made the transition to a market
economy and a new political system. As such they are qualitatively new problems,
and the so-called "struggle against our totalitarian heritage" has very little to
do with what needs to be done today.
It is important to note that the Council on Human Rights did not back the program
unanimously: 35 out of 40 people supported it.
A liberal dictatorship
What was then the motivation of the authors of this program? Well, perhaps some
of them wanted to make their name in politics, get quoted in the press and on the
Internet. So they seek out the opportunity to be associated with a showy program
or a high-profile set of recommendations so that they can position themselves as
being at the centre of public debate. The "de-Stalinization program" has enabled
some of its authors to take part in a number of TV debates and talk shows, and in
that sense it has attained its goal.
A more important reason seems to be a strong desire of those council members who
backed this program to start a reappraisal of Russian and Soviet history that
reflects their own views.
They want to establish a number of politically correct definitions which will be
accepted and asserted in Russian society, becoming an inviolable set of norms and
rules. For instance, this program includes a recommendation that civil servants
should be banned from defending Stalinist practices. That is a very peculiar
First, there is the issue of what exactly constitutes the defense of Stalinist
practices. If you describe Stalin as having led the Soviet Union successfully in
the period 1941- 1945, when the Soviet Union won the Second World War, does that
count as defending Stalin and his practices or not?
It becomes largely a matter of definition, and essentially this norm is intended
to create a climate in which you will not be able to say anything positive about
Russian foreign and domestic policy of that era. Even though it saw numerous
achievements, and the victory in the Second World War is one of the most glaring
achievements of that period.
Hence, these suggestions smell of what I would call a liberal dictatorship.
Usually when people talk about dictatorship, they have in mind some kind of right
wing or communist dictatorship, but paradoxically, a liberal dictatorship is also
possible. One of the elements of such dictatorship is when you are forbidden to
say certain things which do not correspond to the liberal thinking.
George Orwell, in his famous novel "1984", described this as a "thoughtcrime."
The crime was to think something in a manner that is not accepted in your
society's political system.
But we lived already through the communist era. When we parted with communism,
one of our biggest achievements was that we were finally able to speak and think
as we liked and to have whatever views we wanted. I for one have no desire to
have a new set of people, now liberally minded, telling me what to think and what
to say.
Essentially, this program aims to assert a strictly liberal view of Soviet and
Russian history. It is to become dominant, unquestionably dominant, in the
Russian mind. Such a design has to be opposed because it reeks of dictatorship.
Russia does not need an iron fist, but it does need a responsible state
Some still argue that Russia needs to be ruled with a firm hand. Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin is sometimes accused of trying to implement this kind of "iron
fist" policy. However it is clear that the vertical power structure that Putin
created helps cure Russia of the malady of un-governability that took root under
Yeltsin, when Russia had an anarchic political regime. While this power vertical
has played a very important role, it remains inefficient in a number of important
Look at the tragedy on the Volga in which about 100 people, about 50 children,
perished because all the norms and all the regulations governing the use of
riverboats were violated. These violations took place at all levels: by the state
authorities, by the owner, and also by the tourist companies that were busy
peddling those Volga tours.
The fact remains that this power vertical is a very far away from being an iron
fist, rather it prevents Russia from falling apart. But it can not prevent dramas
and tragedies, because the Russian state machine is very inefficient. Russia does
not need an iron fist, but it does need a responsible state, and for the time
being that remains a very distant prospect.
[return to Contents]
Putin supports frightening pictorial health warnings on cigarette packaging.
MOSCOW, July 28 (Itar-Tass) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin supported the idea of
placing frightening pictorial health warnings on cigarette packaging in order to
reduce smoking in Russia.
"This may in fact be effective. There were some ugly commercials last year,
anti-alcohol ones, I think, and I've heard this works," Putin said at a meeting
with members of the Expert Council of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, on
Wednesday, July 27.
Yekaterina Chistova, Director of the Children's House of Creativity, said at the
meeting, "We are advocating frightening pictorial warnings on cigarette packaging
as some 10 million people may quick smoking. They will live 10 years longer, they
will work for business and won't have to pay for the treatment of oncology
According to the Ministry of Health and Social Development, at least 400,000
people die in Russia annually from smoking-related diseases.
Official statistics indicate that 45 percent of Russian citizens have smoked, and
34 percent of them smoke all the time.
Having noted that a sharp growth of tobacco excises was a global trend, the
lawmaker expressed regret that Russia lags behind.
The number of smokers continues to grow as more women and children take to
smoking. Currently, the average age when a person starts smoking in Russia is 11
years. Mortality among Russian smokers is three times higher than abroad due to
high tar and nicotine contents.
The scale of tobacco smoking and the spread of tobacco-related diseases in Russia
continue to grow. Despite the annual decrease in the population, cigarette
consumption grows every year. From 2000 to 2005 cigarette consumption increased
by 30 percent from 287 billion in 2000 to 375 billion in 2005. This causes
serious damage to the health of the population since tobacco consumption is one
of the main factors leading to the development of cardiovascular,
bronchopulmonary and gastrointestinal diseases. For example, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, the main cause of which is smoking, has risen in the structure
of mortality in Russia over the past five years from 12th to 4th place. Lung
cancer, which is caused by smoking in 90 percent of cases, affects about 50,000
men annually.
In 2008 the Duma passed the technical regulation on tobacco to bring the federal
law "On the Limitation of Tobacco Smoking" in line with the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control of 2003 in terms of preventing the spread of smoking.
The document seeks to increase governmental control and supervision over
compliance by tobacco producers with tobacco product requirements, improve public
awareness of tobacco hazards, reduce the negative effects of tobacco on smokers,
and prevent the adverse impact of passive smoking on non-smokers.
The law defines tobacco products as "products that are made, in full or in part,
of tobacco leaves as prime material prepared in such a way as to be fit for
smoking, sucking, chewing or sniffing".
The technical regulation calls for a gradual reduction of hazardous substances in
tobacco products: for filter cigarettes: 10 milligrams of tar, 1 milligram of
nicotine (current levels are 14 and 1.2 milligrams); and for non-filter
cigarettes: 13 milligrams of tar and 1.1 milligrams of nicotine (current levels
are 16 and 1.3 milligrams). These requirements will apply three years after the
enactment of the law. Initially, a five-year transitional period was planned, but
it was reduced on the initiative of the pro-presidential United Russia party.
Viktor Zvyagelsky of United Russia, a member of the Duma Committee for Economic
Policy and Entrepreneurship, said that "the level of smoking in our country is,
on the contrary, abnormally high by world standards".
He said tobacco excises in Russia were unacceptably low. While the least
developed EU countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, have a
minimum excise of 1.28 euros (56 roubles) per pack, Russia' s excise in 2009 was
3.54 roubles per pack of filter cigarettes and 1.77 roubles per pack of
non-filter cigarettes on the average, which is 16-32 times lower. Turkey, China,
Transcaucasian countries, and even Ukraine have much high tobacco excises than
The lawmaker believes that higher tobacco excises are the most effective way to
fight smoking and generate more budget revenue.
"The measure will reduce the scale of smoking in Russia considerably, minimise
the smuggling of cigarettes from the country and may generate an additional
budget revenue of about 45-52 billion roubles," he said.
However the Russian government said it would not raise tobacco and alcohol excise
duties next year.
"Certainly not next year," Russian presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich said
He said the excise duties would not be raised "more than was announced".
At the same time, Dvorkovich could not say whether tobacco and alcohol excise
duties would be raised in 2013 and 2014.
[return to Contents]
The Chronicle of Higher Education
July 12, 2011
Corruption in Russian Medical Schools Triggers Uproar
By Anna Nemtsova
Moscow - An expose in the Russian edition of Esquire has roiled education and
health officials here by detailing the corruption at six medical schools. The
magazine in April published nine short articles by medical students describing
the various ways they can pay professors in exchange for passing tests.
It is not exactly breaking news that bribery exists at Russian universities.
According to a May poll of 17,500 people by the Public Opinion Foundation, an
independent group in Russia, respondents identified higher education as the most
corrupt sector of public life, with traffic cops coming in second. But the news
that future doctors, dentists, and surgeons often buy grades instead of actually
learning the material triggered an immediate uproar.
Perhaps no institution has been embarrassed more than the I.M. Sechenov First
Moscow State Medical University, one of Russia's best-known medical schools. In
Esquire and in discussions with The Chronicle, students described an environment
where bribery runs rampant. It is so common at the university, known as First
Medical, that students aren't surprised to see a peer casually hand a professor
of histology a thick wad of 1,000-ruble bills.
Vladimir, a third-year student who asked that only his first name be used, given
the sensitive nature of the topic, told The Chronicle that before exams, his
mother helps him pay $200 to $450 in under-the-table payments to faculty members.
In exchange, professors help students "survive the brain-crashing number of tests
and exams," he said.
After the Esquire article appeared, First Medical received a letter from the
Ministry of Health that ordered university administrators to meet with the
ministry. "Our rector and the rector of three other Moscow medical universities
were invited to the Ministry of Health last week to discuss ways of fighting
corruption," First Medical's deputy rector, Igor N. Denisov, said. He did not
specify any concrete proposals put forward at the meeting to curb bribery.
One thing the medical schools did not do is deny the corruption. Mr. Denisov said
he and the university's rector, Petr V. Globychko, have been actively trying to
fight the tradition of paying bribes. They have asked students to inform the
administration when it happens. During the last two years, two professors
resigned after being confronted with accusations of taking bribes, Mr. Denisov
said. "We let professors with a reputation for taking bribes know that they are
not welcomed at our campus, so they prefer to quit voluntarily," he said.
'An Epidemic of Ignorance'
But relying on students to come forward may be a faulty strategy.
During his first year of studies, anatomy seemed absolutely incomprehensible,
Vladimir said. His fellow student, Anna, said pharmacology "is threatening to
drive me crazy." For both, the problem of passing difficult courses was easy to
solve: The medical students paid $400 for a good grade or $500 for an excellent
grade at the anatomy department. Last year some professors in the department
switched from U.S. dollar to Euro rates, the students said. "Corruption is like
an epidemic of ignorance," Anna said. "As a result of it, our poor skills will be
dangerous for our future patients' health, of course."
The degree to which the students openly discuss giving bribesand their
willingness to acknowledge their lack of learningdoes concern the university's
administrators. "If I were there to witness a professor taking cash from a
student, I would have fallen though the ground from shame," Mr. Denisov said in
an interview at his office.
Mr. Denisov said the core issue was low salaries for professors: 50,000 rubbles
($1,800) is an average monthly salary for a professor at First Medical, which
enrolls 13,000 to 14,000 students a year. "That is not enough for those
supporting their families," Mr. Denisov said. He also blames parents for spoiling
their children "by stuffing their pockets with cash for bribes," and schools for
poorly educating students, who he compared to Raskolnikov, the Dostoevsky
character ready to commit a crime without expecting to be punished.
Most mornings, Mr. Denisov arrives by his modest Suzuki at the university parking
lot where students park their Infinity or Bentley luxury cars; some even have
drivers waiting in the car until the end of lectures. "I do not understand what
else but empty thirst for prestige inspires parents to pay so much money for
their students to go to First Medical," the deputy rector said. "A surgery room
is not going to be fun if they fear making a mistake, blood, pain, or emotional
Corrupt Students Become Corrupt Doctors
Not every student can learn all required information, the deputy rector said with
a sigh. First Medical has tried to screen applicants for those who may be unable
to handle the difficult course load, but some students say they paid bribes to
get into the school.
For those with poor learning skills, the university invented a system of extra
private classes. To get a credit, a student has to take about 10 private lessons
in a subject and pay the professor for those sessions. Instead of curbing bribes,
the system quickly led to corrupt practices. To pass the anatomy exam last year,
Misha, another student who prefers anonymity, and eight of his second-year
classmates had to take extra classes from their professor. Officially, classes
cost about 1,000 rubles, but the professor charged students 2,500 rubles, or $89
per class. "She did not give us any knowledge, just asked us questions for about
half an hour, then opened the pocket on her white medical gown, so we could slip
in our 50-euro or 1,000-ruble bills," Misha said. He said he was disappointed
that the university management did not fire the professor after Misha and his
friends reported her to the university management.
Mr. Denisov said that it is the responsibility of the federal security service to
prosecute corrupt professors. The service "has its office on our campusit is
their job to check the evidence of crime," he said. The leader of the
nongovernmental National Anti-Corruption Committee and a member of President
Dmitry Medvedev's Human Rights Council, Kirill Kabanov, said the seeds of
cheating and abusing rules are planted in Russian students' mind by the time they
reach universities; as a result, "corruption in medical service is literally
killing Russia." Corrupt medical students grow into corrupt doctors. "The health
and social-development ministry has been repeatedly involved in scandals where
hundreds of millions of dollars disappear from government purchases each year,"
Mr. Kabanov said.
Russia's Ministry of Health says it does not have data on the extent to which
corruption is hurting the nation's health service, but it says it is trying to
fix the problem. Sofiya Maliavina, an aide to the minister of health, said the
government is pushing medical schools to provide more practical training to
students. What's more, in February the ministry invested 1 million rubbles
($35,624) to establish a telephone hot line to report corruption in the state
medical system. The ministry reports receiving an average of 50 calls a day.
[return to Contents]
RBC Daily
July 28, 2011
Author: Inga Vorobiova
Vladimir Putin named winners of the contest for the positions of
top executives of the Agency of Strategic Initiatives. A
businessman who began his career with production of gas pipes for
Gazprom became director general. Everyone involved promised to
make sure that the Agency of Strategic Initiatives would never
become glamorous or hierarchic.
Director general and three directors of the Agency of
Strategic Initiatives had been handpicked out of a thousand
candidates, Putin said. Candidates included prominent businessmen
and former deputy ministers. The government, however, chose "young
and bold".
Andrei Nikitin of UK Ruskompozit became the director general.
Never a public person, Nikitin finally said that he had begun his
career with production of gas pipes for Gazprom.
Artyom Avetisjan of NEO Tsentr became director in charge of
New Businesses. Vladimir Yablonsky was put in charge of Social
Projects. Dmitry Peskov (namesake of the premier's press
secretary) became director in charge of Young Professionals.
All four are successful businessmen. All of them claim
willingness and readiness to serve the Russian state and society.
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Putin warns against new ecological standards being too costly for companies
MOSCOW. July 27 (Interfax) - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has advocated the use
of tighter environmental standards but has warned that an excessively quick
transition to more ecological technology would mean expenditure that might ruin
"When our partners and competitors in other countries introduce new ecological
standards, business begins to use new technology. And this technology as a rule
turns out to be more competitive," Putin said at a meeting with nominees for
senior positions at the Strategic Initiatives Agency (ASI), a body that chiefly
represents small- and medium-scale businesses.
"It is important to avoid mistakes in introducing new ecological standards. They
must stimulate businesses to use new ecologically clean technologies, but at the
same time the pace at which these new standards are introduced must be comparable
to the financial and investment resources of our companies in order not to ruin
their businesses," Putin said.
"There is permanent infighting" between the Ministry of Natural Resources and the
Environment and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. "The Natural Resources
Ministry wants the strictest possible ecological standards to be introduced and
as soon as possible as well, while industry says we can't do it so quickly or we
may ruin our enterprises," he said.
"It's a very subtle thing indeed. We have to pass between Scylla and Charybdis,
find the golden mean," Putin said.
He expressed hope that the ASI would actively collaborate with government "so
that there are additional expert assessments."
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Russia plans to complete talks on WTO accession by December 2011 - chief
MOSCOW. July 28 (Interfax) - A plan for negotiations on Russia's accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) envisions its completion by the time of the WTO
General Council meeting scheduled for December 14-16, Maxim Medvedkov, the chief
of the Russian delegation at the WTO talks, has told Interfax in a comment on the
Wednesday multilateral consultations in Geneva.
"During the consultations, the chair of the working group on Russia's accession
to the WTO, Stefan Johannesson, proposed that the timeline envision a technical
opportunity for completing the talks by the end of the year, so that Russia's
accession to the WTO will be on the agenda of the General Council meeting to take
place on December 14-16," Medvedkov said.
The participants in the consultations considered another three sections of the
working group's final report regarding technological regulations, mechanisms of
administration of tariff quotas and registration requirements on Wednesday.
Hence, 43 out of the 46 sections of the final report have been cleared by now, he
Final informal multilateral consultations should take place on October 24, and
the working group's final formal meeting is scheduled for November 10-11. Hence,
the participants should finish the talks on a consolidated list of obligations on
access to the market by mid-October, Medvedkov said.
The next multilateral consultations are scheduled for mid-September to consider
veterinary and phyto-sanitary measures and rules of investment, which includes
aspects of industrial assembly of cars. Consultations on the latter issue are
continuing, and "we are close to agreement with some countries," he said.
The participants will have also to consider subsidies in the agricultural sector,
but this issue will be discussed after consultations on meat import quotas are
completed, Medvedkov said.
"Negotiations on meat have been continuing uninterruptedly over the past two
weeks. There has been significant progress. About ten countries are involved in
the discussions," Medvedkov said.
This issue should be settled by the end of August, he said.
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Privatization Plans May Change Power Balance Within Russian Elites
July 26, 2011
Article by Tatyana Stanovaya: "Privatization in Interests"
The government has fulfilled the instruction of Russian Federation President
Dmitriy Medvedev and prepared a more extensive privatization plan. As Vedomosti
has learned, First Vice-Premier Igor Shuvalov sent the president a report with
proposals on expanding the privatization program, as several federal official
explained and Shuvalov's representative confirmed. The first vice-premier is
proposing to fully privatize 14 state companies and to partially privatize
another four by the year 2017. If the government's plans really begin to be
implemented, then the main struggle may develop between three groups of
investors: Foreign companies, private Russian investors, and structures close to
the state that are acting in the interests of the so-called "state oligarchs."
As Vedomosti was told, the state will totally withdraw from the capital of
Rosneft, VTB, Rusgidro, Zarubezhneft, OZK, Inter RAO, Sovkomflot, Sheremetyevo,
Aeroflot, Alrosa, the united Rostelekom, Rosselkhozbank, Rosagrolizing, and the
State Transport Leasing Company. It will retain the controlling packet of shares
in OAK and OSK, 75.1 percent of the shares in Uralvagonzavod, and 90 percent in
Rosnano. Also, the decision has been made to retain the "gold share" in Rosneft,
Rusgidro, Zarubezhneft, and the United Grain Company (OZK).
The state intends to retain control only in infrastructure-related monopolies: In
RZhD (Russian Railroads), Transneft, and FSK the state will retain 75.1 percent
of the shares. Moreover, as the newspaper recalls, Transneft had spoken out
against the sale of even 3.1 percent of its shares (today, the state owns 78.1
percent), and had gained the upper hand until the president intervened in the
situation, demanding a more large-scale privatization.
In fact, the topic of privatization today has great political importance, since
it may significantly alter the arrangement of forces within the Russian elites.
The privatization of the 90's created a class of "oligarchs," which became a sort
of result of the compromise between the weak and poor state and the strata of
"new Russians" who were not yet especially rich at that time and between whom the
assets were distributed "for a pittance," one might say. This time, the situation
is principally different: The state is strong and is resisting privatization, and
the assets are managed by prominent public officials for whom it poses a big
problem to legitimize their financial resources and capacities. A system of
"feeding" has been formed, when officials received the opportunity for real
management of companies and access to the resources passing through them by means
of the institution of boards and directors' councils.
A powerful class of "state oligarchs" has been formed, who are in fact "steering"
major state companies and for whom privatization is a rather dangerous process,
if... If it is not managed. It is specifically around this that a powerful
struggle may develop. It is enough to recall just one example: How in December of
2004 a certain Baykal Finance Group purchased the largest YUKOS oil drilling
enterprise - Yuganskneftegaz - for the sum of R261 billion. Then, the middleman
company was purchased by Rosneft. As the then-President of Russia Vladimir Putin
once said, the owners of Baykalfinansgrup are "individuals who have been doing
business in the field of energy for a long time." Vladimir Putin also said: "As
far as I am informed, they intend to build some kind of relations with other
energy companies of Russia, which have an interest in this asset."
But at that time, Rosneft was simply trying to avoid lawsuits from YUKOS
shareholders, thereby buying the company supposedly on the secondary market. But
in the situation with privatization, everything may turn out to be much simpler:
And certain "individuals who have been engaged in business for many years" may
quite probably act already in their own interests, or in the interests of those
who today really manage the major state assets. And good ties with China may also
play their role here, edging out all other aspirants to attractive Russian assets
that are subject to privatization.
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July 28, 2011
Something Extraordinary is Happening in the Russian Federation
By John Daly
Nine decades after Lenin and his Bolsheviks imposed Communism on the Russian
empire and two decades after the implosion of the USSR, some of the country's
largest industrial conglomerates retained by the state are to be privatized.
Lenin must be twirling wildly in his mausoleum on Red Square.
The government has fulfilled the instruction of Russian Federation President
Dmitrii Medvedev and prepared a more extensive privatization plan, with First
Vice-Premier Igor Shuvalov sending Medvedev a report with proposals on expanding
the country's privatization program.
Shuvalov is proposing to fully privatize 14 state companies and to partially
privatize another four by the year 2017. According to Shuvalov's proposal, the
Russian government will completely divest itself of VTB, OZK, Inter RAO,
Sovkomflot, Sheremetyevo, Aeroflot, Alrosa, Rostelekom, Rosselkhozbank,
Rosagrolizing, and the State Transport Leasing Company.
The government will retain the controlling packet of shares in OAK and OSK, 75.1
percent of the shares in Uralvagonzavod, and 90 percent in Rosnano and retain an
as yet indeterminate "gold share" in Rosneft, Rusgidro, Zarubezhneft, and the
United Grain Company (OZK). The state intends to retain control only in
infrastructure-related monopolies, which include RZhD (Russian Railroads),
Transneft, and FSK, where the Russian government will retain 75.1 percent of the
The screaming of Russian apparatchiks over the Shuvalov plan can already be heard
from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.
Pipeline monopoly Transneft had already vociferously spoken out against the sale
of even 3.1 percent of its shares (the state currently owns 78.1 percent), and
had gained the upper hand with the solid backing of Ministry of Energy until
Medvedev intervened, demanding more large-scale privatization.
Russian economist analysts are already predicting that if the government's plans
really begin to be implemented, then the main struggle may develop between three
groups of investors: foreign companies, private Russian investors, and structures
close to the state that are acting in the interests of the so-called "state
What is clear at this point is that the topic of further privatization has
immense political significance, as it may fundamentally alter the balance of
power within Russia's elites. The uneven and hugely corrupt privatization
policies of President Yeltsin's administration during the 1990s created a class
of "oligarchs," who took advantage of the disorganized nature of the newly
post-Soviet state to provide cash to acquire state property at fire-sale prices
while extending political support to the embryonic regime. These oligarchic "new
Russians," bitterly resented by the mass of the population for their obscene
wealth, have spent the last two decades attempting to legitimize the profits from
their thievery.
The situation now is fundamentally different, as the state is strong and its
assets are managed by prominent public officials, who face major problems in
"legitimizing" their financial resources and capacities. A system of "feeding"
was formed whereby officials received opportunities for the real management of
companies and access to their resources by means of the institution of boards and
directors' councils. Accordingly, a powerful class of "state oligarchs" has
arisen, who "steer" major state companies and for whom privatization is a fearful
So, why has Medvedev embarked upon this path? No one knows for certain, but many
of the state companies, the last vestiges of the Soviet industrial base, have
proven remarkably resistant to change and the efficiencies that a free market and
private investment inevitably entail.
It is also a truism that mammoth Soviet-era industrial dinosaurs like Transneft
are not only in need of massive infusions of investment cash, but that many of
the new Russia's customers, most notably China, are increasingly unwilling to let
business go on as before, and now want "a piece of the action" with their
While it remains to be seen whether Medvedev can overcome opposition to his
progressive privatization program, one thing seems certain this round of
privatization will be conducted very different from the first round of state
divestment of property in the early 1990s, and if the oligarchs are allowed to
participate, it will be on a playing field very different from their "Snatch and
grab" tactics of two decades ago. Their primary concern now is to legitimize
their loot, and having the example of Mihkail Khodorkovsky and Yukos in front of
them, moderation will most likely be the watchword as Privatization Pt.2 unfolds.
It is worth remembering that Prime Minister Putin has a massive stick with which
to keep them in line the tax police. Over the past two decades it was simply
impossible to become a Russian billionaire legitimately, and for the oligarchs,
those seedy fiscal rocks concealing their shady business practices underneath are
best left unturned.
So, who knows? In this next round of privatization, perhaps Ivan Sixpack will
finally get a chance to own a piece of the Russian Dream. Don't expect Medvedev's
plan to become reality without some fierce behind the scenes struggles twenty
years after Communism expired, "Kremlinology" remains a most useful word.
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Russia to be a leading grain exporter - view.
MOSCOW, July 28 (Itar-Tass) Russia's Minister of Agriculture Elena Skrynnik is
adamant that Russia will regain very soon its position in export of grain and
will even become a leader.
Over less than a month, from July 1 Russia "has supplied 1.5 million tonnes,
which is by 30 percent more against the past year," she said in an interview to
the Rossiiskaya Gazeta on Thursday. "Our major consumers are Turkey, Egypt,
Azerbaijan, Israel, the EU," she said.
Russia's government has "made a decision on humanitarian supplies to Nicaragua
and the DPRK," she added.
From July 1, Russia's government lifted the temporary ban on export of grain,
which had been introduced in August of the past year following the low crops
caused by the drought in the country's several districts. In 2010, the grain
crops dropped by 37 percent against the level of 2009 - to 60.9 million tonnes.
"As of today, we have threshed over 27 million tonnes of grain," she said and
forecasted the level of export at 18-20 million tonnes, should everything go
She stressed that she is forecasting with care, but mentioned, that the country
"has done everything to produce 85-90 million tonnes of grain over the current
"The South and the North Caucasus federal districts are finalising gathering
crops, and the information from there is positive," she said. "The average
production is 36 hundredweight per a hectare, while last year it was 32
Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev also expressed optimism at the meeting devoted
to the situation in the grain market.
"Should everything develop at the present pace, we shall get the expected 90
million tonnes and even slightly more," he said.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 28, 2011
U.S. Report Sees Big Role for Shale Gas
By Howard Amos
A study funded by the U.S. Department of Energy has found that the widespread
commercial exploitation of shale gas will weaken Russia's "energy weapon" and
lessen its political influence in Europe.
The report by the Baker Institute of Rice University states that the impact of
shale gas which is extracted from solid rock through horizontal drilling and
high-pressure fluid injection known as "fracking" will increase diversification
in world gas supplies and reduce the importance of fixed pipelines.
It predicts that Moscow's share of the gas market in European countries outside
the former Soviet Union will drop to about 13 percent in 2040, from 27 percent in
"Europe's high dependence on Russian pipeline natural gas supplies made it
difficult for certain European leaders to engage in diplomacy objecting to
Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008," the study reads. "A more energy
independent Europe will be better positioned to join with the United States in
global matters that might not have the full support of Russia."
Shale gas production in the United States which was virtually non-existent 10
years ago is expected to quadruple from current levels through 2040, reaching
1.13 billion cubic meters per day. Thanks to this growth, the United States
overtook Russia as the world's largest gas producer in 2009.
Though the successful commercial exploitation of shale gas in Europe is likely to
be hindered by land-holding law and ecological concerns, exploration is under way
in countries as far apart as Britain and Romania. More than 70 drilling licenses
have been granted in Poland.
International companies have also committed significant amounts of money to shale
gas development in Ukraine, currently heavily dependent on Russia for its natural
gas supplies.
Oil major Shell is looking to invest more than $1 billion in shale gas in the
Kharkiv region of Ukraine, Interfax reported Monday, and TNK-BP, Russia's
third-largest oil company, which is keen to expand its gas arm, announced last
month that it would spend $1.8 billion on Ukrainian shale gas through 2020.
The report further contends that the diversification of global gas supplies means
that Russia's South Stream pipeline will never be built and that the country's
Arctic gas resources, including the enormous offshore Shtokman field and
liquefied natural gas capacity on the Yamal Peninsula, will not be developed
until after 2030. The European-sponsored Nabucco pipeline, the report adds, could
be diverted away from Caspian producers to tap Iraqi gas resources.
Despite these dramatic predictions, however, there are many who think that the
potential impact of shale gas is exaggerated not least of these is Gazprom,
which has a monopoly on Russian gas exports.
Gazprom deputy chief executive Alexander Medvedev compared the U.S. shale gas
boom in February to a "bubble."
[return to Contents]
Russian Deputy Finance Minister Urges Calm On US Default Risks
July 26, 2011
Russia's Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Storchak says that the US debt issue is
solely the country's domestic political problem, the Interfax news agency
reported on 26 July following Storchak's press conference.
"I suggest that the situation be looked at strictly from the point of view of
domestic political cooking (developments) in the USA, and neither (used to)
frighten ourselves, nor others," he said. Storchak predicted that ultimately "the
US state debt ceiling will be raised once again".
He said that there would not be a significant drop in investments in US
government bonds. "US debt instruments themselves are not at risk of being
replaced on the scale that they exist, no-one is ready to offer an alternative,"
Storchak said.
In an earlier report, the RIA Novosti news agency quoted Storchak as describing
the debate between the US administration and Congress as "a political spectacle".
He said that members of the US House of Representatives had privately told him
that such situations presented "an opportunity for two branches of government to
show their competence, their interest, their ambitions to achieve particular
political goals".
Interfax reported that when asked about the likelihood that the USA and various
European countries would default on their debt by autumn this year, Storchak said
he was sure that there would be "no need to call in a funeral team" this
[return to Contents]
Business New Europe
July 28, 2011
Russia: What if the US defaults?
By Renaissance Capital, Russia
[DJ: Figures not here]
How important is the US to Russia? Last week we argued (see our research alert,
Silver linings amid rising vulnerabilities of 22 July) that Russia is not immune
to intensifying external shocks, although some increased policy flexibility and a
lengthening maturity structure of external debt will provide useful cushions to a
sudden-shock scenario, in our view. However, with only a patchy solution to the
US debt-ceiling debate likely, we offer more quantitative answers to how higher
interest rates and a growth slowdown in the US will impact Russia.
. US GDP matters to Russian GDP. To investigate this issue, we use statistical
methods to estimate the relationship between outputs in Russia and the US. In
particular, we forecast the dynamic impact on Russian GDP of an adverse shock to
US GDP in a system that also includes other relevant macroeconomic variables,
like Russian and US inflation, Russia's policy rate, US 10-year bond yields and
the $/RUB exchange rate. Figure 1 depicts the relative importance for Russia's
GDP of a variation in the remainder of variables for 10 consecutive quarters.
While its own random innovation accounts for around half the variability of
Russia's GDP, US GDP growth plays a significant role (about 25%) in explaining
the variation in Russia's output.
. A 1% decline in US GDP growth lowers Russia's GDP growth by a maximum of 2%.
While most discussions on the US debt-ceiling debate focus on the potential
upward effects on US bond yields, the realisation of a default (or downgrade)
will certainly entail downward revisions to GDP growth. Figure 2 shows the
response of Russia's GDP growth to a 1% decline in US GDP growth: as shown in the
figure, economic activity in Russia responds negatively and the impact of the
shock is maximised after three quarters, when the shock shaves close to 2% off
growth. The size of the effect is significant, as a worsening US economic outlook
is likely to be associated with a general global growth slowdown and, to the
extent that Russia is still perceived as a high-beta location, the knock-on
effect on Russia's GDP may be sizeable.
. Higher US bond yields may add up to 60 bpts to domestic OFZ yields. Even if a
solution is reached in the US (as we still expect), we think it will most likely
be only a patchy one, leading to an increase in US bond yields. To calculate the
potential spillover effects onto Russian bond yields, we examine a separate
econometric model that relates longer-term OFZ yields to Russia's GDP growth,
public debt-to-GDP levels, policy rates and the 10-year US bond yield.
Figure 3 shows that, while the model has erred on the high side up to the crisis,
it did very well in explaining the crisis period and its aftermath. In the
baseline forecasting scenario, we assume broadly constant policy rates of 8%, a
gradual increase in the debt level from 10% of GDP in June 2011 to 14% in
December 2012, and a constant 3.2% 10-year US bond yield. This results in a
modest pick-up in OFZ yields, from 7.13% in December 2011 to 7.5% in 2012.
However, if the 10-year US yield were to rise to 4.00% by December 2011 (vs
Bloomberg consensus of 3.56%) and to 4.50% by December 2012 (consensus: 4.24%),
OFZ yields would reach 7.54% by end-2011 and 8.10% by end-2012. Another scenario
of higher Russian policy rates, reaching 8.75% by end-2012, also pushes up
domestic yields, but by less than in the event of a US default.
. The impact of a potential default could be big for Russia if the US effects
spread from mere yield increases to a more marked economic slowdown. While the
results for the econometric exercise are only indicative, they underscore the
spillover mechanisms that Russia could be exposed to. We do not believe Russia
will be immune if this tail risk materialises.
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US Default Could Trigger Worldwide Economic Problems, Political Crisis in China
Novaya Gazeta
July 27, 2011
Article by Dmitriy Travin, scientific head of the Center for Study of
Modernization, European University in St. Petersburg: If America collapses, it
will be no picnic. A US default may lead not only to economic problems in Russia,
but also to a political crisis in China.
Barack Obama still cannot see eye to eye with Congress on the question of
increasing the American debt ceiling. The probability of a technical default and
downgrading of the US credit rating is growing. "The progressive world community"
is surely jumping for joy. After all, it perceives any dollar issued by the
Federal Reserve as a personal affront, in the manner of the noble swindler from
the stories of O. Henry.
But in fact, the default - if it should happen - would force not only the
Americans to cry a bit, but everyone else as well. Including the citizens of
Russia. The interests in the modern global economy are much too closely
intertwined. When a neighbor loses his cow, this is not so much a cause for joy,
as for pondering the question of who will pay for the hay tomorrow, by which you
earn your living.
Up until now, America borrowed money throughout the world on favorable
conditions. At a low interest rate. The solvency of the borrower did not evoke
the slightest doubt. Therefore, everyone who could - from the Central Bank of
China to the investor in Nebraska - purchased US Treasury bonds as the most
reliable asset.
But if doubts about the solvency of the US appear on the market, the activity of
creditors will decline. They will begin seeking alternative options for investing
their funds: Gold, oil contracts, mortgage securities, bonds of other countries,
etc. Demand for the dollar will decline. At the same time, there will be
increased apprehension by speculators that America will begin solving its
problems by means of the printing press. And these inflationary expectations may
accelerate the flight from the dollar that is beginning.
American currency will decline even faster than has happened in recent years. The
solvency of US citizens will decline, and this, in turn, will deal a hard blow to
the entire world market. It would be practically impossible to avoid a new wave
of global crisis.
Russia would immediately feel this wave, because with decline in production, oil
prices would once again drop. We already know by recent experience that, with
cheap oil, the Russian economy immediately demonstrates a strong decline.
However, most likely, the recent decline provoked by specific mortgage problems
will seem like "flowers" as compared to the "berries" that would grow in case of
a sharp decline in US solvency on the whole. The fact is that it would surely
affect not only America, but also China as the world's workshop. After all, if
the richest country in the world becomes poor, then the main producer would
inevitably begin closing down its plants.
On one hand, curtailment of production would become an additional factor in the
decline in demand for oil and gas. On the other hand - and this, I am afraid, is
the most frightening - a serious industrial decline in China, which has never
happened in the past 30 years, may provoke an acute socio-political crisis in
that country. I will not try to predict anything, but if we judge by past
experience, dangerous revolutions arose in a number of countries specifically
when, after successful growth and expansion of production, huge numbers of people
suddenly found themselves out of work and without a piece of bread.
Beijing, we might add, understands these dangers perfectly well. It is no wonder
that it is so concerned about the current series of revolutions in the Arab
world, which are so tempting also for the semi-impoverished Chinese masses.
To have a political crisis in China (at the southern border of Russia) in
addition to an economic crisis in the US and a tumultuous "Arab rebirth" - this,
in essence, is Armageddon. However, it would be just as imprudent to have an
extreme fear of Armageddon, as it is to be overjoyed at American problems. First
of all, Congress and Obama still have a little bit of time l eft - almost a week.
Secondly, the President has legal mechanisms for a short-term solution to the
problem, even in the absence of agreements. Thirdly, the state of the American
economy, for the most part, is not so bad as to evoke the strong disillusionment
of creditors. After all, the US does not have such a big debt, if we figure not
in the absolute expression, but in relation to the GDP. It is smaller than the
Japanese, Greek, or even Italian.
The degree of the crisis situation in America is often overly exaggerated in our
country. Either because of a specific dislike of that country by the average
Russian. Or because this average man admires the American way of life, and then
gives America much more attention in his thoughts than any other world country.
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Moscow Times
July 28, 2011
Russia Gives U.S. Warning on Magnitsky Case
By Nikolaus von Twickel
The Foreign Ministry issued a stern warning to Washington on Wednesday that U.S.
entry bans for officials implicated in the prison death of lawyer Sergei
Magnitsky posed a serious irritant for efforts to improve ties.
The ministry condemned the "arbitrary punishment" of people who have not been
proven guilty in court.
"Attempts to interfere in the investigation and to pressure the judiciary are
absolutely unacceptable," it said in a statement on its web site.
The ministry promised that Moscow would retaliate.
"Clearly we won't let such hostile steps happen without a response and will take
adequate measures to protect our country's sovereignty and our citizens from such
wrongful actions by foreign states," it said.
The terse statement came a day after U.S. media reported that Washington had
quietly issued entry bans on dozens of Russian officials accused by human rights
activists of torturing and killing Magnitsky.
Magnitsky, a lawyer for Hermitage Capital, once the country's biggest foreign
investment fund, died in a Moscow prison in November 2009. His supporters are
campaigning among Western governments to impose sanctions against those
European governments have been hesitant to act on those demands, arguing that
sanctions would jeopardize the Kremlin's efforts to investigate the case.
Washington is the first to take any measures, casting a shadow on its much-touted
reset of relations with Moscow.
The administration of President Barack Obama, in a commentary to U.S. senators
that became fully public Wednesday, said current U.S. law "already bars admission
... of aliens who have engaged in torture and extrajudicial killings."
"Secretary [Hillary] Clinton has taken steps to ban individuals associated with
the wrongful death of Sergei Magnitsky from traveling to the United States,"
according to the document, which was published by a Washington-based blogger for
Foreign Policy magazine, Josh Rogin.
That line of argument was angrily rejected as "absolutely cynical" by a senior
United Russia official.
Andrei Klimov, deputy chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs
Committee, told The Moscow Times that the United States was in violation of
international agreements by punishing people who have not been convicted in
court. "They ignore the principle of innocent until proven guilty," he said,
adding that the decision "destroys the atmosphere of trust" that built up since
Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev embarked on their reset policy.
Paradoxically, the move is actually an attempt to save the reset from greater
damage looming in a Senate bill that envisages much wider and tougher sanctions.
The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act also includes asset freezes
and would affect not only 60 law enforcement officers accused in the Magnitsky
case, but also officials implicated in the killings of reporter Anna
Politkovskaya and human rights worker Natalya Estemirova.
The Obama administration's written commentary addresses that bill, trying to
convince senators to abandon it.
The memorandum stresses that there is no need for additional legislation after
Clinton's decision.
It goes on to argue that "the threshold for naming names is ambiguous and would
set a precedent for how the U.S. deals with human rights cases around the world,"
and that it imposes "quasi judicial requirements" on visa officers having to
judge on applicants' eligibility.
It was unclear Wednesday whether senators would heed the arguments brought
forward by the White House and the State Department.
But Democratic Senator Benjamin Cardin, the bill's main sponsor, seemed to
backtrack significantly by suggesting in an interview with Foreign Policy
magazine that the bill's future was up in the air.
"I'm working with the administration, working with the committee, and working
with my fellow senators to determine how to proceed," he was quoted as saying.
"Two things can change strategy: One is what happens in Russia, one is what
happens in the State Department. Both are fluid at this point," he said.
What makes Obama's position further uncomfortable is that U.S. lawmakers have in
the past linked a repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the passage of
Cardin's bill.
The White House has made lifting Jackson-Vanik, a Cold War-era set of trade
sanctions, a policy priority because it would put the United States in violation
of international law once Russia joins the World Trade Organization.
Obama has said he supports Moscow's goal to achieve WTO entry by the end of this
Observers doubt that the White House, currently locked in a dramatic standoff
with Congress about how to raise the U.S. debt ceiling and avoid a default, has
enough clout to move both Jackson-Vanik and Cardin's bill out of the way.
"The Magnitsky act's value as a bargaining chip may be minimal. Either way, it's
clear that the Obama administration places great value on maintaining the gains
of the reset and doesn't want anything to get in the way," Rogin wrote on his
blog Wednesday.
Andrei Piontkovsky, a veteran political analyst and a visiting fellow at the
Hudson Institute in Washington, warned that an escalation of the affair could
also jeopardize the confirmation of Washington's next ambassador to Moscow.
White House sources said earlier this year that Michael McFaul, currently Obama's
top Russia adviser, would become the new ambassador, but no official announcement
has been made and the Senate has yet to set a date for his confirmation.
"If the reset is in tatters, why should the Senate confirm McFaul, who is the
architect of the reset?" Piontkovsky said.
[return to Contents]
July 28, 2011
The US gambit
The US State Department tries to help Russia with sanctions against individuals
from the "Magnitsky list"
By Elena Chernenko and Vladimir Solovyev
Yesterday it was discovered that, by imposing visa sanctions on Russian officials
from the "Magnitsky list", the US State Department is not punishing Russia, but
is instead trying to take the heat off Moscow.
That is, it is trying to dissuade Congress from adopting a bill provisioning much
tougher sanctions against a large number of Russian officials. Fearing that
adoption of such a piece of legislation will lead to a major setback in its
relations with Russia, the White House turned to lawmakers with detailed
arguments why the adoption of the bill will harm US national interests. It
appears that in Moscow, however, this delicate game was unappreciated.
Yesterday the US State Department confirmed The Washington Post's report about
the introduction of sanctions against a number of Russian officials, included in
the "Magnitsky list"."In accordance with the law, the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the State Department is obliged to deny visas to persons related to human
rights violations such as torture and extrajudicial killings," a State Department
representative told RIA Novosti.
The fact that the State Department had "quietly" imposed visa sanctions on people
included on the "Magnitsky list" was reported by The Washington Post on Tuesday
(read yesterday's Kommersant issue). At the same time, the publication did not
name the exact number of Russian citizens who are now not allowed into the United
States, instead, specifying that their number is less than 60 (the "Magnitsky
list" includes a total of 60 people).
The State Department introduced the sanctions without waiting for a congressional
hearing on the bill, provisioning a US entry ban and a freeze on their US bank
accounts. This document, entitled "Sergey Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
Act of 2011", was introduced in Congress by Sen. Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) and Sen.
John McCain (R-Ariz.) in May. It's noteworthy that the bill proposes further
expansion of the list of those "subject to the penalties" in the event of other
"flagrant human rights violations" in Russia. In particular, it mentions the
murder of Anna Politkovskaya and Natalia Estemirova, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and
Platon Lebedev's trial, and the beatings of Mikhail Beketov and Oleg Kashin.
The fact that the State Department punished Russian officials without waiting for
the lawmakers' decision has been regarded by Moscow's observers as "Obama's
attempt to appeal to Congress" and "a blow to the reset."
However, apparently the situation is precisely the opposite of what it looks
like. As it turns out, The Washington Post journalists learned about the State
Department's sanctions from the Obama administration's accompanying note to the
Cardin-McCain bill.
In the note's preamble it is stated that the US presidential
administration"shares the Congress members' concerns over the tragic death of
Sergey Magnitsky."
It lists the steps that have been taken to address this issue: public criticism
and requests for the Russian authorities to inquire into the incident and punish
the responsible parties, meetings with Russian officials, the lawyer's relatives
and his former colleagues. It is emphasized that the secretary of state, Hillary
Clinton, has already "taken steps to ban individuals associated with the wrongful
death of Sergey Magnitsky from traveling to the United States." After which the
main phrase follows: "The administration, therefore, does not see the need for
this additional legislation."
Subsequently, the document cites six reasons why Congress should not so much as
consider the bill. In particular, the White House does not quite understand under
what principle these individuals were included in the list of offenders, and does
not want the US to similarly react to future incidents of human rights violations
abroad. Officials in the Obama administration believe that sanctions and the
targeting of specific persons whose guilt has not been proven are illegal.
Moreover, the document asserts that the bill will overburden US financial
institutions, as they will be forced to continuously engage in the identification
of the assets of the sanctioned Russian nationals. White House officials believe
that the bill is ambiguous when it comes to specifying the people, against whom
these sanctions may be imposed whether it is only those whose names appear in
the "Magnitsky list" or all other malicious violators of human rights. The note
also states that the Cardin-McCain bill does not allow the people under financial
sanctions to make an appeal, which is illegal.
And finally, most importantly, the document states that the White House has been
warned by the Russian government that if Congress adopts the bill, Washington can
forget about Moscow's support of US policy on Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The
agreement with Russia on the transit of US military cargo to Afghanistan will
also be threatened.
According to the note, by imposing sanctions against Russia, the Obama
administration was hoping to prevent a breakdown in relations with Russia.
However, Moscow failed to see Washington's good intent. The Russian president's
press secretary, Natalia Timakova, told Kommersant that Dmitry Medvedev had
instructed Russia's Foreign Affairs Ministry to prepare analogous measures
against American citizens. "We were perplexed by the State Department's position,
which chose not to wait for the final investigation results and a decision by the
Russian court, and instead took on atypical functions. Even in the most difficult
years of the Cold War, such measures were not taken," said Ms. Timakova.
The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry promptly complied with the presidential
order. Yesterday a rather harsh comment regarding the State Department's decision
appeared on its webpage. In particular, it reads: "The Russian side will not
leave such unfriendly measures unanswered and will take adequate measures to
protect the sovereignty of our stateand the rights of Russian citizens from
illegal actions by foreign states."
Meanwhile, US Senate sources of The New York Times are saying that it's too early
to put the Cardin-McCain bill to rest. According to the newspaper's interlocutor,
some of the senators have found the measures taken by the State Department to
have been too soft.
[return to Contents]
Russian Experts Split On How Sanctions Will Affect Relations With USA
Moscow, 27 July: Russian experts interviewed by RIA Novosti today believe that
the visa sanctions introduced the US Department of State against several Russian
officials involved in the death of Hermitage Capital Management lawyer Sergey
Magnitskiy are a blow to the policy of resetting relations between Washington and
"Some of Washington's actions, including the imposition of sanctions against
Russian officials show that the 'reset' has been frozen in fact,"
director-general of the International Institute of Political Expert Studies
Evgeniy Minchenko believes.
In his view, the introduction of sanctions is nothing but interference in
Russia's internal affairs. "It is clear that this is interference in a country's
sovereign affairs, because there are accusations against several employees of the
law-enforcement system and government agencies, but they have not been
substantiated, nor has the law have its say," the expert said, adding that the US
Department of State's decision looks a little hasty.
However, Minchenko said that Russia itself had given the USA a reason to
intervene, as the investigation into the Magnitskiy case was very slow.
Director of the Institute of Political Studies Sergey Markov shares this view.
"Russia will not look passively at this rather gross violation of the presumption
of innocence ... because people's rights have been violated without any court
decision... This is a prime example of how the rights of Russian citizens are
extrajudicially limited. I think that Russia should come up with a clear answer
to this decision," Markov told RIA Novosti.
However, not all analysts see the situation as an unambiguous threat to the
"reset". Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy Karaganov is
confident that the US Department of State's sanctions will not affect relations
between the USA and Russia. "The relations will not be affected because the
'reset' meets Russian and American interests. And there are much more significant
issues that affect US-Russian relations," Karaganov said.
According to the expert, the only bad thing about the USA's intervention in the
Magnitskiy case is that the Russian authorities should have introduced similar
sanctions against those involved in the case earlier. "It is obvious that all
these people ... should at least be under investigation and banned from leaving
the place of residence. It is very sad that we concede the protection of our own
law to the Americans," Karaganov said.
Director of the Institute of Strategic Assessments Sergey Oznobishchev also
believes that the US Department of State's sanctions will have no fatal
consequences for bilateral relations between Russia and the USA, even though the
Russian Foreign Ministry will inevitably complain to Washington about
interference in Russia's internal affairs.
"Today this does not affect our relations, because ... relations at the highest
level are most favourable," the expert said. (passage omitted)
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 28, 2011
Look East
By Sergei Karaganov
Sergei Karaganov is dean of the School of World Economics and International
Affairs at National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow.
Over the past 18 months, Russia's relations with Asia have begun to improve. Both
President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have repeatedly
pointed to the need for an economic turn to Asia. Dozens of protocols and
agreements on new projects have been signed with China. Some are already up and
Nevertheless, Russia has yet to devise a long-term and comprehensive Asian
strategy. The main force holding Russia back is, to put it bluntly, ignorance.
Indeed, for some Russians, any economic movement toward Asia is tantamount to a
departure from a European path of development.
There is, of course, no Asian alternative to Russia's cultural and political
orientation toward Europe. But a partial economic reorientation toward Asia does
not pose any real risk of disengagement from Europe. On the contrary, over the
past two years, Russia has officially made a decisive turn in favor of closer
integration with the European Union.
Europe currently accounts for more than 50 percent of Russia's trade turnover.
But the European market will not grow to any significant extent for the
foreseeable future. Europe's retained wealth and accrued cultural resources will
allow the old continent to live in relative comfort in the decades ahead, even if
it gradually cedes its position in the production of goods and services. Indeed,
Europe is likely to become a tourist and leisure destination for hardworking
While Russia needs to integrate itself with Europe's remaining islands of
innovation Germany, above all it is the growth potential of the Asia-Pacific
region that will determine the country's future. Here, the main partner is China,
which Russia now supplies with fertilizers, seafood, timber, nonferrous metals
and increasing volumes of crude oil. Unlike the West, Russia imports from China
not so much consumer goods as engineering products. In most industries,
head-to-head competition with Asia would be senseless, given Russia's higher
labor costs.
But if current trends persist, Russia east of the Urals and later the entire
country will become an appendage of China. Russia could become a warehouse of
resources and then an economic and political vassal. No "aggressive" or
unfriendly effort by China will be needed; Russia will be subdued by default.
There is no immediate geopolitical threat in this situation. Territorial
expansion is not a Chinese historical trait, and the two countries have excellent
political relations.
But the Chinese are already offering Russia projects that are similar to those
that they promote in African states: the development of resources with Chinese
money and Chinese labor. Russia must act now to secure a more dignified and
beneficial place in a future world order.
That goal requires that Russia rely on its real competitive advantages. Consider
basic foodstuffs. Rising food prices plague most of Asia, while Russia's
potential for expanding grain output is enormous. According to some estimates,
the country could increase its arable area by 10 million hectares and its crop
yields by 250 percent, thereby boosting grain exports dramatically.
But an even larger vision is needed. A modern Asian strategy for Russia call it
"Project Siberia" should combine Russian political sovereignty with foreign
capital and technologies. Investment should come not only from China, but also
from the United States, Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN countries and the EU, all
of which are keen to prevent China's exclusive dominance east of the Urals.
The work force can be found to undertake the development projects in Russia's
east, including clusters of high-yielding agricultural production for grain,
fodder, meat, poultry, pork and possibly beer. There are still a few million
surplus workers in Central Asia. Seasonal workers can be brought in from India
and Bangladesh. And, yes, some will have to be brought in from China.
Of course, such a strategy will require highways, bridges, railways and seaports.
(There are practically no grain-export terminals in Russia's eastern regions, for
example.) Some Russians fear that if China is allowed to build these projects,
crowds of Chinese will flock into the country. My answer is this: If we stay
where we are, like the proverbial dog in the manger, the hay Russia's economy
will rot.
The strategy should be to transform Russia's eastern regions into one of rising
Asia's resource and food bases. The east should become a provider of relatively
high value-added goods, rather than just an exporter of timber, oil, ore and
seafood, as is the case now. Such a scenario would reverse the gloomy demographic
and economic trends in the country's eastern territories and would strengthen
Russia's geopolitical position in the process.
What makes Project Siberia so efficient is that it benefits everyone. Russia
would maintain effective sovereignty over its eastern territories while creating
a new platform for development. China, Asia and the world would get a new
resource and food-supply base, easing emerging shortages. And, last but not
least, the vision of peaceful global integration would receive a powerful boost.
[return to Contents]
Moscow Times
July 28, 2011
15 Months Later, Boy Rejected by U.S. Mother Lives in Orphanage
By Alexander Bratersky
Seven-year-old Artyom Savelyev will find a new family in Russia in no time,
children's ombudsman Pavel Astakhov said last year after his adoptive U.S. mother
shipped him home unaccompanied on a plane.
The rejection of Artyom in April 2010 prompted threats to ban the adoption of
Russian children by American parents and ultimately an adoptions treaty signed by
the top U.S. and Russian diplomats in Washington this month.
The treaty should have been named in Artyom's honor, Astakhov said in an
interview Wednesday. But the boy, now 9, remains in an orphanage, more than a
year after he was promised new parents.
Savelyev's adoption has been delayed by red tape and worries about his
psychological condition, not over a lack of willing adoptive parents, his
caretakers said. But these are the same factors that keep any Russian from
adopting one of the country's 150,000 parentless children.
Other similar causes celebres have resulted in mixed success as well: Of two
children brought back from abroad in recent years, one was taken back by her
biological mother, but the other remains in an orphanage.
Artyom Savelyev was adopted from an orphanage in the Primorye region town of
Partizansk in September 2009 by single mother Torry Hansen of Shelbyville,
Tennessee. On April 8, 2010, the boy arrived in Moscow on a plane, alone and with
a note from Hansen saying he was psychologically unfit.
Astakhov said in May 2010 that several Russian families were prepared to take in
Artyom and most likely a diplomat family who spoke English and Russian would be
selected to ease the boy's re-adaptation to Russian life. Astakhov said the boy
would be adopted within a month.
But the prediction proved overly optimistic, in part because a Moscow court only
formally canceled the boy's U.S. adoption last month, Astakhov said Wednesday.
"I have no doubts that Artyom will find parents," Astakhov said by telephone.
But Alexei Shnykin, who works at the Moscow orphanage caring for Artyom, said he
was not so sure.
The boy has learned to love several adoptive families, including Hansen, but all
have abandoned him, causing lasting psychological damage, Shnykin said.
"We are afraid that the situation might be repeated in a new family, and we don't
want to traumatize the boy," he said by telephone.
He could not predict how long it would take for Artyom to be ready for
re-adoption, but added that Savelyev is treated well and went to summer camp
Another Russian child, Denis Khokhryakov, now 13, made headlines last September
when the authorities brought him back from the Dominican Republic, where he had
lived since 2004.
Denis' story is anything but a happy childhood. The son of an alcoholic single
mother, he was adopted in 2003 by a Russian couple who left him the next year in
the care of a Dominican taxi driver. Media reports said he might have been traded
for cocaine a plausible story, given that his Russian adoptive parents were
later jailed for drug trafficking.
Denis had lived in a Dominican orphanage since 2008 and forgotten Russian.
Astakhov said last fall that Denis would get a new family, but he has remained in
an orphanage outside Moscow.
"No one has expressed a desire to adopt the boy," said orphanage director Sergei
Denis' biological mother, Natalya, sought to have the boy returned to her but was
denied custody, Albertov said by telephone. He added that the boy has mastered
Russian again and made many friends at the orphanage.
Astakhov, who visited Denis in the orphanage after his return, said the boy needs
more time to adapt to Russia.
But teens have less chance of being adopted in Russia, said Natalya Panina, a
blogger and a mother of an adopted child.
Moreover, the adoption process is notoriously cumbersome, which causes many
families interested in adopting a child to drop the idea, scared off by the
Some 150,000 children are available for adoption nationwide in 2009, the
Education and Science Ministry said in October, citing statistics from the latest
year available. Of them, 8,900 were adopted and 77,000 were placed in foster
families, who receive 11,000 rubles ($400) a child every month from the state.
But some 8,300 foster and adoptive families were stripped of children in 2009,
ministry official Alina Levitskaya said in October. In 105 cases, families were
charged with abuse, including 24 instances in which the children died or suffered
permanent injuries, she said.
By comparison, U.S. families have adopted 60,000 Russian children since 1995, and
15 of them died at the hands of their adoptive parents, Astakhov said earlier.
President Dmitry Medvedev addressed the matter in 2007, when he served as first
deputy prime minister in charge of social issues, urging parents to adopt more
actively. Last month, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called for the introduction
of parental classes for Russians and foreigners who adopt Russian children.
But leading by example is a powerful teaching tool in any society, and neither
Medvedev, who has a 15-year-old son, nor Putin, the father of two adult
daughters, have adopted children themselves.
The majority of children available for adoption have living parents who have lost
custody for various reasons. Not all biological parents are lost causes, as
evidenced by the example of Natalya Zarubina, whose young daughter, Alexandra,
was adopted by a Portuguese family in 2005.
Zarubina gave birth to the girl in 2003 while working in Portugal as an illegal
migrant. She was later deported, while the girl, renamed Sandra, remained with a
local couple whom she had been living with full-time.
In 2009, Zarubina sued to have the girl returned to her and won the lawsuit
despite reports that she had a drinking problem.
Alexandra could not speak Russian when she returned but has since forgotten
Portuguese, said Tatyana Bondareva, the children's ombudswoman in the Yaroslavl
region, where the family lives.
Her mother has found a steady job, overcome her drinking problem and become more
"reasonable," Bondareva said by phone. Alexandra, who is also cared for by her
grandmother, finished first grade in May in the village of Prechistoye.
"It's not New York and it's not Europe, of course, but you can live there,"
Bondareva said.
[return to Contents]
July 28, 2011
Georgia using US media as a "propaganda instrument" - Russian diplomat
By Robert Bridge
Washington appears to have accepted Georgia's account of a bombing incident last
September at the US Embassy in Tbilisi, while one Russian diplomat says it is
more political intrigue aimed at undermining Russia's international reputation.
According to The Washington Times, US intelligence agencies concluded in a
classified report that "Russia's military intelligence was responsible for a bomb
blast that occurred at an exterior wall of the US Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia, in
The classified report about the Sept. 22 incident was described to The Washington
Times by two US officials who were said to have read it. According to these
unidentified individuals, the report echoes the findings of the Georgian Interior
Ministry, which has pointed a finger of blame at a Russian military intelligence
The Washington newspaper reported last week that Shota Utiashvili, director of
information and analysis for the Georgian Interior Ministry, said the embassy
blast was the work of a Russian military intelligence officer named Maj. Yevgeny
Yevgeny Khorishko, a spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Washington, dismissed
the Georgian charges last week.
"All these rounds of allegations are absolutely false and baseless," he said.
But this has not put a stop to the finger-pointing. Several US lawmakers have
picked up the story and are running with it, hoping to score as many political
points as possible.
Senator John Kyl of Arizona, for example, the chamber's Republican whip, said he
sent a letter in June to the House and Senate intelligence committees asking them
to investigate the incident.
"Congress should investigate through the intelligence committees what has
occurred and make the findings known to Congress," Kyl said, as quoted by the
Moscow slams "propaganda wave"
"It looks like the aim of the publication in The Washington Times is to trigger
a second propaganda wave around issues that have already been discussed with
American and Georgian representatives at the beginning of this year," Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin told Interfax.
"Considering the sensitivity of the matter and the hints suggesting that Russian
special services could be involved in terrorist acts in Georgia, we have
conducted a professional investigation. Both the American and Georgian sides
have been informed of the results," he said.
Meanwhile, another Russian diplomat, who formerly worked at the Russian embassy
in Tbilisi, called the accusations "outlandish, but not surprising."
"Of course we should expect such outlandish claims from the (Georgian)
government," the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told RT in a
telephone conversation. "But what I cannot understand is why the US government
and the media supports these claims, which have no basis whatsoever in reality.
They (US media) are simply being used as a propaganda instrument."
The diplomat, who has since been relocated to a European embassy following the
closure of the Russian embassy in Georgia in 2008, asked rhetorically who stood
to gain from the detonation of an explosive device near the US Embassy.
"I can tell you for sure, Russia would gain nothing from such a (expletive)
thing," he said. "Now Georgian officials are barking about "Russian terrorism" on
their territory," the diplomat said, "which is the vilest and most unacceptable
of accusations."
On Thursday, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze accused Russia of
"participating in international terrorism at the official level."
Meanwhile, observers are questioning the timing of the attack on the US embassy,
which occurred just months before the US Senate was set to vote on a historic new
strategic arms control treaty with Moscow, thus cementing the "reset" between the
two countries.
"What better way for Georgia to ruin relations between Moscow and Washington than
to rig an explosive device to a wall at the US embassy and blame Russia," the
diplomat asked rhetorically.
The Russian diplomat said he would hope that US lawmakers and the US media
reconsider the lack of objectivity and obvious conflict of interest when "airing
Georgia's dirty laundry in public," he added.
In August 2008, Russian peacekeepers were caught unawares as Georgia launched a
large-scale military offensive against Tskhinvali, the capital city of South
Ossetia. Hundreds of Ossetians were displaced by the attack, and over 100 killed.
Ironically, the government of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, much like
the present scandal, enjoyed 24-hour Western media exposure for the duration of
the blotched military operation, while the Russian side of the story was rarely
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Moscow Times
July 28, 2011
War Clouds Gathering Again in the Caucasus
By Peter Rutland
Peter Rutland is professor of government at Wesleyan University in Middletown,
Three years after the Russia-Georgia armed conflict, war clouds are again
gathering in the Caucasus.
Already deadlocked for years, the peace negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan hit a brick wall on June 24 in Kazan, when a much-anticipated peace
summit broke up without agreement. President Dmitry Medvedev had put his personal
authority behind the talks, having personally convened nine previous meetings
between the two leaders over the past two years.
Now, there is increasing talk of war a war that would be presumably started by
Azerbaijan in a bid to regain the province of Karabakh and the surrounding
districts that were seized by Armenian forces during the war from 1992 to 1994.
Armenia argues that the Armenian residents of Karabakh have a right to
independence and that it is unrealistic to expect Armenians to live as a minority
under Azerbaijan's rule given the history of animosity between the two sides.
Each side cites atrocities against civilians committed by their adversary during
a conflict that erupted in 1988.
It has become common to describe the standoff as a clash between two competing
principles "self-determination" for Karabakh versus "territorial integrity" for
Azerbaijan. This makes the dispute sound like a technical difference of opinion,
one that a few good lawyers could easily resolve.
In reality, there is no difference over moral or legal principles between the two
sides. Rather, as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is a question of "two
peoples one land." The disagreement is over who owns a specific piece of real
estate: Karabakh, a land-locked mountain region having no particular economic or
strategic value and with a population of just over 100,000.
Karabakh has come to have deep symbolic significance for both parties. For
Azerbaijan, it is a question of erasing the humiliation of military defeat and
seeking justice for the 600,000 refugees that fled into the remainder of
Azerbaijan as a result of the war. The refugees are roughly equal to the number
of Palestinians who fled Israel in 1948, yet they have been virtually ignored by
the international community. For Armenia, it is about holding on to territory
after a century during which Armenian residents have been progressively driven
from their lands. That process culminated in the massacres or genocide that
occurred during World War I, a tragedy that still overshadows and immeasurably
complicates the conflict over Karabakh.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe proposed some basic
principles for a peace settlement back in 2007. The core idea is temporary
recognition of Karabakh's self-rule in return for the withdrawal of Armenian
forces from the other occupied districts. These Madrid Principles fudge the
question of sovereignty by allowing for a referendum on self-determination in
Karabakh at some point in the future. Armenia is being asked to give up something
concrete occupied territories in return for something ephemeral promises about
a future referendum.
The main carrot being offered Armenia in return for leaving the occupied
districts around Karabakh is the opening of the border with Turkey, which was
closed by Ankara in solidarity with Azerbaijan in 1993. The 2008 Russia-Georgia
war threatened Armenia's land transit route through Georgia, leaving them
dependent on access from Iran. A concerted international effort to persuade
Turkey to open the border narrowly failed in October 2009, when domestic
political opposition caused Turkey to retreat from an agreement to open the
border that was signed with great fanfare in Zurich.
Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliyev, has repeatedly stated that independence for
Karabakh is non-negotiable, so Armenia's reticence about moving ahead with the
peace process is understandable. Why is Aliyev continuing to negotiate in the
face of Armenian intransigence? If Aliyev can convince the international
community that Armenia is blocking the Madrid Principles, that could give him
some political cover for launching a war. Aliyev claims that time is on Baku's
side, since Armenia's population is shrinking due to its stagnant economy, while
Azerbaijan is booming thanks to its oil wealth. But Aliyev faces re-election in
2013, and keeping the lid on the opposition will be more difficult absent some
progress on Karabakh. In addition, starting in 2014, Azerbaijan's oil production
will be past its peak, and revenues will start to fall.
Even some liberals are saying that a short war a war in which neither side would
probably achieve victory could clear the way for real negotiations. The model is
the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which Egyptian President Anwar Sadat claimed as a
victory and which opened the door to the Camp David peace talks.
More important, an indecisive war would discredit the hawks on both sides,
enabling peacemakers to strike a bargain without facing a coup when they returned
home. Azerbaijan's gross domestic product is five times that of Armenia, and Baku
spent $3 billion in 2010 on its military, more than Armenia's entire budget. But
Armenia has taken delivery of sophisticated Russian hardware, including the S-300
air defense system and is home to a Russian military base housing 5,000 troops,
whose tenure was extended last year through 2044.
Thus, an attack on Armenia by Azerbaijan could well trigger Russian intervention,
just like Russia's response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia in 2008.
Aliyev has been trying to maintain good relations with Russia in the hope that
Moscow will press Armenia to agree to a settlement and will stay on the sidelines
in a future conflict.
The main factor preventing a war is that none of the great powers want to see a
resumption of hostilities. The West does not want to see a disruption of oil
supplies, and for Russia a war would trigger a wave of refugees and possibly
increased Western intervention in their Caucasus backyard. But the Russia-Georgia
war of 2008 was a reminder that the major powers cannot always control their
smaller allies and client states. If war were to break out, Russia would probably
back Armenia because it must be seen as standing up for its main ally in the
region. The mere threat of Russian intervention serves as a deterrent to Turkey
entering the war in support of Azerbaijan. At the same time, however, Azerbaijan
is arguably a more valuable ally for Russia than Armenia because of its important
strategic location on the Caspian. Winning Azerbaijan away from the United States
would be a substantial strategic gain for Moscow.
In any event, given the large and influential Armenian diaspora in the West,
Armenia should not be placed indefinitely in the Russia camp. A few years down
the road and a color revolution in Yerevan could see a pro-Western government
there. Hopefully, cool heads will prevail, and the existing situation of neither
war nor peace will stagger on through another hot summer.
[return to Contents]
July 28, 2011
Can The 'Medvedev Moment' Be Saved For Karabakh?
By Thomas de Waal
Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own
and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
Always tortuous, the peace process over Nagorno-Karabakh is entering an unusually
difficult phase. High hopes were raised ahead of the June 24 meeting in Kazan
between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham
Aliyev, chaired by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, that an accord would
finally be struck on the framework agreement, the long-discussed Document on
Basic Principles.
But nothing came of it.
What exactly happened at Kazan, and what happens now?
Many sources, including ones in Baku, confirm that it was the Azerbaijani side
that blocked agreement in Kazan. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who had
worked intensively on the latest draft of the agreement with both sides,
evidently believed a deal would be done; one witness described him as looking
"crushed" after the meeting.
Washington officials were encouraged by the tone of telephone calls U.S.
President Barack Obama had with both the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on the
eve of the summit.
It seems that Aliyev came to the meeting with a list of nine or 10 amendments to
the latest draft document, the Armenian side raised objections to them, and the
meeting, although it lasted almost four hours, was pretty much over as soon as it
The Armenian side signaled that it accepted the latest draft to be discussed at
Kazan -- a turnaround from the situation in late 2009 and early 2010, when it was
Baku that was telling the outside world that it accepted the latest draft agreed
in Athens, while the Armenians played the role of blockers. This time, Yerevan
signed up to the latest draft. The only (not insignificant) caveat was that
Sarkisian said that he would have to secure the consent afterward of the Karabakh
Armenian leadership.
Azerbaijan's objections could be described as forming three radiating circles.
The first circle of objections consists of specific concerns about the latest
draft of the Basic Principles document prepared by Foreign Minister Lavrov. The
chief one, according to Baku, is that the status of "non-corridor Lachin" was not
made clear.
The issue here is the linkage between two of the six main Basic Principles. One
is the return of the seven regions, which were ordinary Azerbaijan territories in
Soviet times and not part of the autonomous Armenian-majority of
Nagorno-Karabakh, but which were captured by the Armenians during the 1991-94
war. The document stipulates that five of these regions will be returned to
Azerbaijani control immediately -- or as soon as de-mining and reconstruction
allows, which is in fact a matter of several years -- while the two western
regions of Kelbajar and Lachin situated in between Armenia and Karabakh will be
returned five years later. At the same time, it is proposed that a corridor
connecting Armenia and Karabakh through the town of Lachin will be established in
an as-yet-unclear arrangement that recognizes both Armenian security concerns and
Azerbaijani sovereignty (perhaps a long-time lease under international
Official Baku's objection to the draft under discussion at Kazan was that, as it
did not set the limits of the "Lachin Corridor," it was too vague on the status
of "non-corridor Lachin" and did not promise the right of return to the
inhabitants of 39 villages from that district. It therefore only explicitly
ensured the return of six of the seven Azerbaijani regions surrounding
Nagorno-Karabakh, not all seven, and would be viewed as a defeat in Azerbaijan.
To a lesser degree, the Azerbaijani side also objected to the idea that "interim
status" for Nagorno-Karabakh would allow it to join international organizations.
The Lachin question in particular is a legitimate point of concern. The question
for Aliyev, however, is why he did not seek to settle these issues in the run-up
to Kazan but instead raised them only on June 24, thereby blowing up the meeting?
This leads us to the "second circle" of Azerbaijani objections to Kazan, which is
that the Baku leadership appears uncomfortable about agreeing to -- or more
exactly, being seen to agree to -- a Pax Russica. They appear to esteem Medvedev
and speak highly of his initiative. The Russian president has been scrupulous in
consulting the other two countries that are the co-chairs of the Minsk Group,
France and the United States. Both foreign ministries have been fully engaged in
his initiative, and the French and U.S. co-chairs have been briefed by Lavrov
after each trilateral meeting between the Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani
However, Azerbaijanis still regard Russia as Armenia's main ally and are
suspicious of the role of Lavrov, whose Armenian parentage they distrust.
Although Medvedev has apparently never brought up the subject, there is a fear
that Russia has a secret agenda of wanting to insert its peacekeepers into the
Karabakh conflict zone as a way of shaping the peace in a Russian way. For years,
there has been a "gentleman's agreement" that "no neighbors and no co-chairs"
would be involved in peacekeeping but this has never been codified.
Moreover, the Baku leadership is fully aware that Medvedev's tenancy of the
Kremlin may not last much longer and therefore want extra guarantees that his
peace plan would be implementable. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
has referred to the example of the Russian-Japanese dispute over the Kurile
Islands, where an outline agreement was made in the 1950s but a full peace treaty
has never been signed.
The stalling tactics in Kazan could therefore be seen as an attempt by Baku to
get Washington and Paris (and, by extension, the European Union) more involved in
writing the next draft of the document, underwriting it with their support, and
(this part applies most to Brussels) making informal pledges that the eventual
peacekeeping force will come from the EU.
If the Azerbaijani side only wanted greater international engagement, however, we
would probably be seeing greater urgency on its part to use what might be called
the "Medvedev moment" -- not to mention the positive frame of mind on the
Armenian side that cannot be assumed to be permanent. In a few months' time,
election season will begin in Armenia and in all three co-chair countries. In
Russia, it is quite likely that Vladimir Putin will reclaim the presidency.
Aliyev and Medvedev have a much better relationship than do Aliyev and Putin,
ever since the two clashed over Georgia in 2006. Putin has never displayed any
interest in the Karabakh issue. Unlike Medvedev, he appears to believe that it is
not worth wasting effort on resolving it and that the status quo is acceptable
for Russia. When it comes to Washington, the worry is that the U.S. leadership
will simply lose interest and devote much less effort to the process than it has
done over the past year.
This leads us to the "third circle" of why the Azerbaijani side did not agree at
Kazan, which is that they emanate the impression that they believe time is on
their side and that they are not in a hurry.
A recent visit to Baku confirms the impression that there is less talk of war
than for some time -- and Aliyev did not strike a strongly belligerent tone at a
military parade in Baku two days after the Kazan meeting. The message is
implacable in a different way. Azerbaijani officials say that they believe the
Caucasus arms race is bankrupting Armenia and that in a few years' time, the
Armenian side will be much weaker and more inclined to compromise over the status
of Karabakh.
On July 13, for example, Aliyev told a cabinet meeting: "The financial
capabilities and political weight of Azerbaijan is growing, its regional position
is growing, its army is getting stronger, and its demographic indicators are
rising. Our population is growing and [the Armenians'] is shrinking. In five or
10 years, our population will be 11 million and theirs will be 1 million.
Everyone understands full well what this means. In this way, we can resolve the
issue in our favor."
To any seasoned observer of the Karabakh conflict, this is a misreading of the
Armenian position. As far as the Armenians are concerned, possession of the
ancient land of Karabakh is a far greater prize than the offer of Azerbaijani
riches, which may run out within a couple of decades. Besides, Armenians would
argue, Armenia is a far stronger state than it was 20 years ago, is as wealthy as
Georgia in GDP-per capita terms, and can still rely on strong diaspora support to
bail it out in a crisis. A small de facto Armenian statelet now exists in
Nagorno-Karabakh itself and gets more entrenched as the years pass, in which most
people under 30 have never met an Azerbaijani. This being case, it would surely
make sense for the Azerbaijani government to spend its massive oil and gas
revenues on a peace settlement, rather than waiting several more years for a
better deal.
Can this knot be untied? On the Azerbaijani side, that means trying to
disentangle legitimate concerns from delaying tactics stemming from completely
other factors, some related to the opaque domestic politics of the Azerbaijani
If the Azerbaijani leadership is worried about specific issues, these could
probably be sorted out in the next few months. A new formula could be worked out
on the Lachin Corridor. More explicit commitments could be made on the "no
neighbors, no co-chairs" formula for peacekeeping.
More work could be done on setting out a timetable to move toward a full peace
treaty, and each side could begin that process with a concrete step on the ground
that signals its new willingness to work with the other: perhaps the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from one section of occupied territory in return for an
agreement by Baku to a tangible sign of Nagorno Karabakh's new "interim status"
(for example, an explicit change of policy by Baku on the issue of foreigners
visiting Karabakh or the opening up of a UN agency there).
If this was the heart of the matter, it would justify a stronger concerted
diplomatic effort by Washington and Paris to help Moscow bridge the gap, while
the "Medvedev moment" is still open.
If, however, the issue goes deeper and for whatever reason the Azerbaijani
government simply wants to play for more time, then a different approach is
needed. There would be a strong case for the three co-chair countries to take a
step back. They could say that they will continue to monitor the cease-fire and
are ready to guarantee a peace settlement if one is reached but declare that for
now their mediation capacity has been exhausted.
[return to Contents]
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