text: Trusts & Estates - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/estate-planning-probate/ 2014-11-25T23:34:50-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://law.justia.com/sites/law.justia.com/files/justia_law_theme_logo.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/117696.html In re Edmonds 2014-11-20T08:02:12-08:00 2014-11-20T12:49:44-08:00 Edmonds was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1975. He became a member of St. Mark Church. In1998, Sloan asked Edmonds to rewrite Sloan's will to benefit St. Mark's. Edmonds knew Hannah, a lawyer who, in 1992, was suspended for neglecting and misrepresenting client matters, failing to maintain a client trust account, and commingling. In 1994, Hannah was suspended until further order; he never sought reinstatement. Edmonds was unaware of Hannah's disciplinary status and believed that Hannah was an estate planning expert. Edmonds introduced Hannah to Sloan, who transferred some assets to American Express for Hannah's management. Sloan's trust held $3.36 million at one point. Sloan died in 2000. Edmonds acted as executor and trustee. At his direction, the trust and estate bought Range Energy stock recommended by Hannah. Hannah eventually became president and CEO of Range, which, by 2001, held all of Sloan's personal assets and most of the trust assets. In 2003, the British Columbia Securities Commission suspended trading of Range stock, which ultimately became worthless. Edmonds did not inform St. Mark's about the situation. The church eventually filed suit. In 2009, the successor trustee closed the trust with a balance of $1,149. The ARDC Hearing Board found that Edmonds breached fiduciary duties, engaged in dishonest conduct, neglected an estate matter associated with the trust, and commingled his funds with client or third-party funds. The Review Board reversed the findings of breach of fiduciary duty and dishonest conduct and recommended that Edmonds be suspended for 60 days. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed a three-month suspension.View "In re Edmonds" on Justia Law 2014-11-20 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Charles E. Freeman 117696 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-20804/12-20804-2014-11-10.html United States v. Marshall, et al. 2014-11-19T16:55:04-08:00 2014-11-20T14:08:16-08:00 This case stemmed from an indirect gift made by J. Howard Marshall to various family members. After J. Howard's Estate failed to pay gift taxes pursuant to I.R.C. 6324(b), the IRS tried to collect the unpaid gift tax from the donees. The Government subsequently filed suit against the donees, seeking to recover the unpaid gift taxes and to collect interest from the beneficiaries. The Government also sought to recover from two individuals (E. Pierce Jr. and Hilliard), who, as representatives of various estates and trusts, allegedly paid other debts before paying those owed to the Government. The court rejected appellants' argument that the district court erred in finding that the donees incurred an independent interest liability as a result of the donor's unpaid gift tax and held that interest accrues on donee's liability for the unpaid gift taxes and that interest is not limited to the extent of the value of the gift. The court concluded that res judicata barred Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens from arguing that J. Howard did not make a gift to her because the court determined that Stevens was a donee. Finally, the court held that Hilliard and E. Pierce Jr. knew of the potential liability to the Government and the Federal Priority Statute applies; Hilliard and E. Pierce Jr. are liable under the Federal Priority Statue for the amount of the charitable set-aside; E. Pierce Jr. is individually liable for the value of the personal property he distributed from Stevens's Estate; Hilliard is personally liable for the amount he caused the Living Trust to pay for accounting and legal services on behalf of other charitable organizations; and E. Pierce Jr. did not breach his state law fiduciary duties because E. Pierce Jr. did not owe Stevens's Estate's creditors a fiduciary duty under Texas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.View "United States v. Marshall, et al." on Justia Law 2014-11-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Edward C. Prado 12-20804 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-1010.html Manon v. Orr 2014-11-14T07:03:18-08:00 2014-11-14T13:07:39-08:00 At issue in this appeal were certain parcels of land included in the corpus of a trust established by Virginia Waechter. In 2010, Virginia sold the parcels as trustee of the trust to her daughter Peggy Orr and her daughter's husband, Jeff Orr. Plaintiffs, Virginia's son and other contingent beneficiaries of the trust filed a complaint asking that a constructive trust be placed on the real estate and alleging that Virginia was not competent to sell the land to Peggy and Jeff and that the sale showed indications of fraud. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to seek a constructive trust and that Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-3855(a) bars a cause of action for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to impose a constructive trust because, under case law and section 30-3855(a), they had only a mere expectancy; and (2) state law does not recognize a tort for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift.View "Manon v. Orr" on Justia Law 2014-11-14 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Michael G. Heavican S-13-1010 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2013-064.html In re Estate of Muriel R. Mills 2014-11-13T07:03:33-08:00 2014-11-13T21:18:53-08:00 At the time of her death, decedent Muriel Mills she owned property in Manchester. She had granted a "home equity conversion mortgage" on the property to Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation. The mortgage deed was recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. The terms of the mortgage included a statutory power of sale that allowed Financial Freedom to foreclose upon the property under certain enumerated circumstances, including the death of the borrower. The terms also provided that the "Borrower shall have no personal liability for payment of the debt secured by this Security Instrument" and that the "Lender may enforce the debt only through the sale of the Property." Petitioner was appointed executor of the estate. By letter, counsel for petitioner notified Financial Freedom of the decedent's death and of the opening of the administration of her estate. Counsel also requested the current balance due on the mortgage debt as well as any information regarding "any assignment of the mortgage." Thereafter, Financial Freedom did not file notice of a claim or present a demand to the petitioner pursuant to RSA 556:1, :3 (2007). Later that year, counsel for Financial Freedom sent a letter to the estate explaining that she had been instructed to foreclose on the mortgage in the name of respondent under the power of sale contained in the mortgage. The letter also informed the estate that the note had been accelerated and the entire balance was "due and payable forthwith," and included the total amount of the balance due on the debt. In response, petitioner's counsel wrote to Financial Freedom claiming that it, "or any of its related entities, abandoned any interest[] that it may have had in the property" because it failed to file a claim within six months after the grant of administration of the estate. The next month, the mortgage was assigned to respondent and thereafter recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. Petitioner then filed a petition to quiet title in the circuit court, asserting that Financial Freedom had "waived, lost, or abandoned any interest that it would have had in the property" and, therefore, the circuit court could issue an order quieting title to the property so that the beneficiary named in the decedent's will could receive the property. Financial Freedom appeared at the hearing and moved to dismiss the quiet title action. The trial court ruled in Financial Freedom's favor, and petitioner appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision to dismiss, the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal.View "In re Estate of Muriel R. Mills " on Justia Law 2014-11-13 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Carol Ann Conboy 2013-064 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0044.html Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel 2014-11-12T15:02:05-08:00 2014-11-12T19:38:39-08:00 The Northland Royalty Corporation purchased mineral rights from the personal representative of two estates and subsequently brought a quiet title action naming certain beneficiaries ("Devisees") as defendants. The district court quieted title in favor of Devisees, but the Supreme Court remanded to consider the applicability of Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-618. On remand, Northland moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 72-3-618 offered Northland protection against Devisees' claims to the minerals. The district court denied summary judgment on the basis that Northland failed to act in good faith as required by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Northland's favor, holding that section 72-3-618 protected Northland's purchase.View "Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law 2014-11-12 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 14-0044 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2013-ca-00707-sct.html Truddle v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc. 2014-11-06T11:50:15-08:00 2014-11-06T20:50:41-08:00 Diane Truddle, as mother and wrongful-death beneficiary of Eric Carmichael, sued Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc., and Dr. Sunil Malhotra after Carmichael committed suicide upon being discharged from Baptist. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Baptist and Dr. Malhotra and entered a final judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Truddle appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Truddle v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-11-06 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi William L. Waller, Jr. 2013-CA-00707-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ct-01299-sct-0.html In the Matter of the Estate of Boyce Elmore, Deceased 2014-11-06T11:50:13-08:00 2014-11-06T20:50:35-08:00 Boyce Elmore died on November 5, 2000. More than ten years later, Cedric Williams (claiming to be Boyce's son) filed a paternity action in an effort to recover under Boyce's estate. After the chancellor held that Cedric's action was timely, Boyce's estate appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the chancellor's decision should have been reversed.View "In the Matter of the Estate of Boyce Elmore, Deceased" on Justia Law 2014-11-06 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Jess H. Dickinson 2012-CT-01299-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-01229-sct.html In the Matter of the Administration of the Estate of Norma Allene Cloud Crowell 2014-11-06T11:50:11-08:00 2014-11-06T20:44:51-08:00 This case involves a familial dispute between two sisters. Jackie charged her sister Caron with unduly influencing their mother to obtain a greater share of the family property. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's sua sponte award of an additional $100,000 post-judgment, was reversed. The trial court's judgment was otherwise supported by substantial evidence on all other issues and was affirmed.View "In the Matter of the Administration of the Estate of Norma Allene Cloud Crowell" on Justia Law 2014-11-06 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Michael K. Randolph 2012-CA-01229-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-1063/14-1063-2014-11-05.html MN Life Ins. Co. v. Jones 2014-11-05T08:30:48-08:00 2014-11-05T10:03:00-08:00 Jones was murdered, leaving no will. He owned a life insurance policy through his employer. He did not designate a beneficiary. The policy provided that the proceeds ($307,000) would go first to a surviving spouse (Jones never married), second to surviving children, third to surviving parents, and fourth to his estate. Quincy claimed to be Jones's son; Moore, claimed to be his daughter. The insurance company filed an interpleader action. After paying $24,000 for funeral expenses and $137,000 to Quincy, the company deposited the remainder with the court. Jones's biological sister also claimed the proceeds, arguing that Jones was homosexual and had not fathered children. Jones's income tax returns showed that he had claimed various children as dependents, sometimes omitting Quincy. A DNA test established that Moore was not his daughter. The district judge declined to order a test for Quincy because Jones had held Quincy out as his biological son and had signed an order in 1996 acknowledging Quincy (then six years old) as his son. The judge awarded Quincy the deposited funds.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 35 would have allowed, but did not require, the judge to order a DNA test, given the presumption of paternity under Illinois law.View "MN Life Ins. Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law 2014-11-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 14-1063 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/12-2354/12-2354-2014-11-04.html Aguayo-Cuevas v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth. 2014-11-04T10:30:12-08:00 2014-11-04T18:08:02-08:00 The decedent died from electrocution while working on a telephone pole that was the purported partial responsibility of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Appellants, the decedent's sisters, filed a wrongful death suit against PREPA and others in federal district court. PREPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that an additional, non-diverse member of the decedent's estate, who was not made a party to the action, was indispensable, and his joinder destroyed the parties' complete diversity. The district court agreed and dismissed the entire action, including the decedent's estate survivorship action as well as individual actions by estate members and Appellants, who were not the decedent's heirs. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Appellants' personal actions, as the non-diverse absent party was not required to adjudicate the action because the members of the estate requested voluntary dismissal of their claims, which eliminated the survivorship action, leaving only Appellants' claims, which were jurisdictionally sound.View "Aguayo-Cuevas v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth." on Justia Law 2014-11-04 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Gelpi 12-2354 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/140112.html Jimenez v. Corr 2014-10-31T07:04:52-08:00 2014-11-01T12:49:18-08:00 This case concerned a dispute over the disposition of shares of stock in a family held business after the death of the business's founding generation. Plaintiff, one of the founder's children and a stockholder, filed suit after the death of her mother, Norma, to whom shares in the business were transferred upon the founder's death. Plaintiff alleged that a shareholders' agreement controlled disposition of Norma's shares and that the business was required to purchase those shares. Defendants argued that Norma's estate planning documents controlled the disposition of Norma's stock, and accordingly, those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust. The circuit court concluded that the shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by Norma's estate planning documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shareholders' agreement governed disposition of Norma's shares of the business's stock.View "Jimenez v. Corr" on Justia Law 2014-10-31 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia LeRoy F. Millette, Jr. 140112 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/g048906.html Aulisio v. Bancroft 2014-10-30T13:00:53-08:00 2014-10-31T04:32:39-08:00 Anthony Aulisio, Jr., appealed a jury verdict that found defendants, consisting of his homeowner association's management company (Optimum Professional Property Management and Debra Kovach), the patrol service it employed (BLB Enterprises, Inc., dba Patrol One, and Bill Bancroft), and a towing company (PD Transport, dba Southside Towing, and John Vach), did not wrongfully tow and convert his Jeep vehicle, nor convert the personal property it contained. CAAJ Leasing Trust (CAAJ), which Aulisio created as sole grantor, trustee, and trust beneficiary, owned legal title to the Jeep and also appeals. CAAJ appeals the trial court's ruling at the outset of trial that CAAJ "can't participate in the proceedings" with Aulisio appearing in propria persona as the trust's sole trustee and sole beneficiary. The trial court relied on precedent that an executor or personal representative may not appear in propria persona in court proceedings outside the probate context on behalf of a decedent's estate because representing another person or entity's interest in a lawsuit constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. But if a sole trustee is also the trust's sole settlor and beneficiary, the rationale of these cases ceases to apply: no interests are at stake except those of one person. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that a sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. The judgment as to CAAJ was reversed, and the case remanded so Aulisio may appear in propria persona to assert his interest as the sole beneficial owner of the Jeep as a trust asset. The Court affirmed the judgment against Aulisio in his individual capacity concerning his personal property in the Jeep.View "Aulisio v. Bancroft" on Justia Law 2014-10-30 state California California Court of Appeal Richard M. Aronson G048906 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-119.html In re Estate of Gray 2014-10-30T09:02:16-08:00 2014-10-30T14:12:32-08:00 Margaret Gray died in 2007, leaving a will that devised her estate to her surviving children, Ernest Gray and Elizabeth Tasker. In 2011, Elizabeth filed a claim against the estate seeking reimbursement for payments she made to maintain her mother's properties since 2007. The probate court ordered that the estate pay Elizabeth $45,419. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to apply 18-A Me. Rev. Stat. 3-803(b), the applicable statute of limitations. On remand, Elizabeth argued that the court should allow her claim against the estate based on a theory of unjust enrichment, which, she argued, would fall outside of the scope of the statute. The court concluded that Elizabeth's claim was time-barred pursuant to section 3-803(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time limitations established in section 3-803(b) for a claim against an estate apply to a claim for unjust enrichment, and therefore, Elizabeth's claim was time-barred.View "In re Estate of Gray" on Justia Law 2014-10-30 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Ellen A. Gorman Pen-14-56 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26948.html In re Estate of Lester 2014-10-30T06:03:26-08:00 2014-10-30T15:35:22-08:00 Steven C. Lester died on August 17, 2011. Pamela Lester, the personal representative of Steven's estate, published a Notice to Creditors advising them to file claims within four months of the notice. On a later date, Pamela mailed a notice directly to Michelle Lamphere, which provided a later deadline by which Lamphere was required to file her claim. Lamphere met that deadline, but Pamela denied the claim. Lamphere subsequently filed a petition to allow the claim. Pamela moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations provided for creditors' claims. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Lamphere's claim was time-barred because it was not filed within four months after the publication of the Notice to Creditors. Lamphere appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was an unknown, known, or reasonably ascertainable creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it resolved a disputed question of material fact regarding Lamphere's status as a creditor and granted judgment to Steven's estate. Remanded.View "In re Estate of Lester" on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Glen A. Severson 26948 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27460.html Fabian v. Lindsay 2014-10-29T07:03:46-08:00 2014-10-29T08:59:42-08:00 Appellant Erika Fabian brought this action for legal malpractice and breach of contract by a third-party beneficiary, alleging respondents attorney Ross M. Lindsay, III and his law firm Lindsay & Lindsay made a drafting error in preparing a trust instrument for her late uncle and, as a result, she was effectively disinherited. Appellant appealed the circuit court order dismissing her action under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP for failing to state a claim and contended South Carolina should recognize a cause of action, in tort and in contract, by a third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against a lawyer whose drafting error defeats or diminishes the client's intent. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Fabian v. Lindsay" on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Donald W. Beatty 27460 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0043.html Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust 2014-10-28T14:41:35-08:00 2014-10-28T18:25:41-08:00 The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda's sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot.View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 14-0043 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2014/149.html Matter of Lawrence 2014-10-28T08:03:38-08:00 2014-10-28T18:35:40-08:00 Beginning in 1983, Defendant law firm represented Alice Lawrence and her three children in litigation arising from the death of her husband and their father, a real estate developer. For over three decades, Lawrence and Seymour Cohn, the decedent's brother and business partner, litigated issues surrounding the sale of the decedent's properties and the distribution of the proceeds. After Cohn and Lawrence settled the matter, this dispute followed between Lawrence and Defendant with respect to the law firm's fee and the validity of gifts made by Lawrence to three law firm partners. Lawrence died in 2008. Thereafter, the Lawrence estate argued that a revised retainer agreement between the parties was void procedurally and substantively and made claims for refund of the gifts. The Court of Appeals held (1) the revised retainer agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and was therefore enforceable; and (2) the Lawrence estate's claim for return of the gifts was time-barred.View "Matter of Lawrence" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state New York New York Court of Appeals Susan Phillips Read 149 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11651.html Bank of Am., N.A. v. Babcock 2014-10-28T07:02:10-08:00 2014-10-28T12:58:44-08:00 The trustees of the Hollis W. Plimpton, Jr. Family Trust filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the trust as drafted correctly expressed the intent to the settlor that his estate be eligible to obtain the optimal benefit of allowable federal and state estate tax marital deductions. Alternatively, the trustees sought an order rewording a portion of the trust to ensure that it accomplished the settlor's intent. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that a judgment enter in the county court declaring that this was not a suitable occasion for the type of relief sought and dismissing the complaint, as the apparent objective of the parties - to insure by declaration or reformation that no person in the future misconstrues the document - is not something that justifies judicial involvement.View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Babcock" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Per Curiam SJC-11651 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11698.html Connell v. Houser 2014-10-28T07:02:09-08:00 2014-10-28T12:57:55-08:00 George C. Houser established the George C. Houser Trust, which established two trusts for the benefit of Mary R. Houser during her lifetime and gave her a power of appointment over one of the trusts (the marital trust). Upon Mary's death in 1993, the principal remaining in the George C. Houser Trust was divided into two share trusts, one for each of the Housers' sons. After George's death in 1983, Mary established the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 and exercised her power of appointment over the marital trust property by appointing it to the trustees of the Mary Houser Trust. The trustees filed a complaint seeking reformation the trust established under Article Fourth of the Mary R. Houser Trust - 1991 to correct a drafting error that they contended frustrated the intent of Mary and George to provide for their descendants in an efficient and tax-advantageous manner. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that the family trust be reformed by correcting the mistake in drafting, which inadvertently frustrated Mary's estate planning objectives.View "Connell v. Houser" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Per Curiam SJC-11698 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/f067812.html First CA Bank v. McDonald 2014-10-27T13:01:42-08:00 2014-10-27T13:26:31-08:00 The Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action to collect a loan secured by two parcels of real estate which had been made to a husband and wife. After the husband died, the loan went into default. The Bank and wife agreed to a private sale of one of the parcels that was her separate property and Bank filed the foreclosure action on the remaining parcel to obtain a deficiency judgment. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary adjudication of its judicial foreclosure cause of action and determined that the Bank was entitled to obtain a deficiency judgment against the representatives of the husband's estate (appellants). The court concluded that, because the Bank failed to show the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 726 for creditors seeking deficiency judgments by disposing of the property at issue outside of judicial foreclosure and without appellants' consent or waiver, the Bank has waived any right to a deficiency against them. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court.View "First CA Bank v. McDonald" on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state California California Court of Appeal Donald R. Franson, Jr. F067812 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/e059692.html Jenkins v. Teegarden 2014-10-23T14:01:03-08:00 2014-10-24T04:49:27-08:00 In 2007, Robert (Bob) Perry quitclaimed a house to defendant Charlotte (Jeanne) Teegarden, who was his friend and one of his caregivers. Teegarden prepared the quitclaim deed. In her deposition, Teegarden admitted that the only consideration that she gave for the quitclaim consisted of one dollar and her friendship. At trial, however, she testified that, pursuant to an oral agreement with Perry, she also gave $100,000 (for improvements to the house), her $45,000 equity in a different house, and her services. Plaintiff Merilou Jenkins is Perry's stepdaughter and, since Perry's death, the trustee and beneficiary of his trust. Jenkins contended that the quitclaim was invalid under Probate Code former section 21350, which, at the time, provided that a "donative transfer" was invalid under specified circumstances, including when the recipient drafted the instrument that effected the transfer. Jenkins also contended that the quitclaim deed was ineffective because it was executed by Perry in his individual capacity instead of as trustee and because it had an erroneous legal description. The trial court found that the quitclaim was not a donative transfer because Teegarden gave good consideration for it. It then reformed the quitclaim deed so as to fix the mistakes in it regarding the grantor's capacity and the legal description. Jenkins appealed. The Court of APpeal held that, though Probate Code former section 21350 et seq. has been repealed and replaced by Probate Code section 21380 et seq., the former section 21350 et seq. still governed an instrument executed before January 1, 2011. The issue concerning a "donative transfer" for purposes of Probate Code former section 21350 was a question of first impression. The Court held that a transfer is a donative transfer if it is for inadequate consideration; the mere fact that the recipient gave good consideration, sufficient to support a contract, does not prevent the transfer from being donative. Finally, the Court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the quitclaim was a donative transfer under this definition as a matter of law. Hence, the quitclaim was invalid.View "Jenkins v. Teegarden" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state California California Court of Appeal Betty Ann Richli E059692 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-2446/13-2446-2014-10-23.html Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe 2014-10-23T09:30:08-08:00 2014-10-23T10:59:56-08:00 Multi-sport Olympic gold medalist Jim Thorpe died in California in 1953 without a will. His estate was assigned to his third wife, who, over the objections of children from his previous marriages, buried him in Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania, a new borough that was created by merging the boroughs of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk. Thorpe was a Native American of Sauk heritage and a member of the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma. Some of Thorpe's children want him reburied on Sac and Fox tribal land. In 1990 Congress enacted the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which requires museums and federal agencies possessing or controlling holdings or collections of Native American human remains to inventory those remains, notify the affected tribe, and, upon the request of a known lineal descendant of the deceased Native American or of the tribe, return such remains, 25 U.S.C. 3005. In 2010, Thorpe's son sued the Borough for violation of NAGPRA. The district court held that the Borough was a "museum," required to disinter Thorpe's remains and give them to the tribe. The Third Circuit reversed. Congress could not have intended the "patently absurd result" of a court resolving a family dispute by applying NAGPRA to Thorpe's burial. .View "Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Theodore Alexander McKee 13-2446 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/13-1244.html Graham v. Asbury 2014-10-22T12:04:49-08:00 2014-10-22T19:09:27-08:00 After eighty-six-year-old Helen Graham died, Graham's estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against a hospital. One of Graham's adult children, Betty Asbury, died before a settlement agreement was reached with the hospital. The circuit court approved the settlement agreement and awarded equal shares of the settlement proceeds to Graham's six surviving children. Asbury's estate subsequently argued that because Asbury was alive at the time of her mother's death, Asbury's estate was entitled to share in the proceeds of her mother's wrongful death settlement. The circuit court ruled in favor of Asbury's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the West Virginia wrongful death act, Asbury's estate was entitled to a share of the wrongful death settlement proceeds because Asbury's right of action vested upon Graham's death, rather than at the time the wrongful death settlement proceeds were distributed.View "Graham v. Asbury" on Justia Law 2014-10-22 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Menis E. Ketchum, II 13-1244 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40615.html Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Peterson 2014-10-21T15:48:07-08:00 2014-10-25T03:53:56-08:00 Melvin Peterson died in 2007. Prior to his death, he owned some residential real property. In 2001, Peterson executed a Gift Deed of his real property to his daughter, Cathie Peterson, retaining for himself a life estate in the property. Shortly thereafter, he applied for Medicaid and began receiving Medicaid benefits in March 2003. At the time of his death, Melvin Peterson had received a total of $171,386.94 in Medicaid benefits. Cathie was appointed personal representative. IDHW filed a timely Claim Against Estate and later an Amended Claim Against Estate in the amount of $171,386.94. Cathie disallowed the claims without stating a reason. In response, IDHW filed a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim. After a hearing, the court granted IDHW's petition. After receiving no response to its claim against the estate, IDHW filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, setting forth its demand for payment of the value of Melvin Peterson's life estate. After a hearing, the magistrate court entered an order requiring payment of IDHW's claim. The Order held that the life estate was an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to add the life estate interest to the estate's inventory and assign it an appropriate value. However, the personal representative instead filed and was granted a motion to hire an appraiser to determine the fee simple value of the residential real property. After the personal representative failed to file an appraisal, IDHW filed various motions relative to the appraisal, sale of the property, and payment of its claim. The magistrate court granted IDHW's motions to compel appraisal, sale of the property, and payment of the Medicaid claim, which the personal representative subsequently appealed. The district court vacated the magistrate's Order and remanded the matter for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Shortly after the ruling on appeal was entered, Cathie Peterson sought permission from the magistrate court to sell the property, liquidate an escrow account, and pay counsel for the personal representative of the estate. On the same day, she also filed an Amended Personal Representative's Inventory assigning the life estate zero value. Attorney Brent Featherston filed a Demand for Notice and Special Appearance on behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually,"stating that he was seeking to vacate and dismiss all orders entered by the magistrate court regarding her real property. IDHW responded by filing a petition to remove Cathie Peterson as personal representative of the estate, which the magistrate court granted. Following a court trial, the magistrate court held that the life estate remainder interest was an estate asset of value for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement and that its value was to be determined in accordance with IDAPA 16.03.05.837.01. On appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate court. Cathie Peterson appealed. The Supreme Court found that both the magistrate court and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case and personal jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson individually, and that the entire residential property that Cathie Peterson received from her father was an asset of his estate and subject to Medicaid recovery. Thus, the district court erred to the extent it held that only the remainder interest in the estate was subject to Medicaid recovery. Furthermore, the Court held that Cathie Peterson failed to show that the district court's decision denying her claim for offsets was unsupported by the evidence.View "Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Peterson" on Justia Law 2014-08-13 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Roger S. Burdick 40615 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s14a0767.html Ray v. Stevens 2014-10-20T06:01:21-08:00 2014-10-20T07:30:37-08:00 In 2008, decedent Grady Williams Stevens was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and was given approximately four weeks to live. He began a strenuous regimen of pain medications to provide him relief during his last weeks, and his daughter, Sherry Ray, began caring for him at her home. On September 17, 2008, the decedent signed a will naming Ray as executrix and sole beneficiary and signed two deeds conveying certain real property to the decedent's brother, Propounder Thomas Stevens and his sister. The decedent died in October. The attorney who had prepared the decedent's will and the two deeds subsequently filed the will with the probate court. Ray never submitted the will for probate because she believed it to be the result of Propounder's undue influence over her father, that her father lacked the requisite mental capacity to understand what he was signing, and that her father would have wanted his estate, including the property he conveyed by the two deeds he signed before his death, to pass equally to her and her only sibling, Shane Stevens. Approximately nine months after the decedent died, Propounder submitted the will for probate and sought appointment as administrator of the estate. Ray and Shane Stevens filed caveats to the petition. Caveators claimed that Propounder Stevens exerted a predominant and undue influence on their father to induce him to sign the will and deeds and that their father lacked testamentary capacity at the time he signed the will because he was heavily medicated and possessed insufficient mental capacity. The probate court issued an order denying Propounder's petition to probate, finding that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. Propounder appealed to the superior court, which denied Caveators' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of fact remained. Caveators then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Propounder lacked standing to probate the will, which the court denied. After a bench trial, the court issued an order finding that the will was valid, the decedent did not lack testamentary capacity, and Propounder did not exert an undue influence over the decedent. After the court denied their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the court erred by denying their motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found the Propounder did not have standing to offer the will for probate because he was not an "interested person" as required by OCGA 53-5-2. Accordingly, the Court reversed.View "Ray v. Stevens" on Justia Law 2014-10-20 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Carol W. Hunstein S14A0767 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/a137679.html Stine v. Dell'Osso 2014-10-17T12:00:53-08:00 2014-10-17T14:18:12-08:00 In 2002, David hired the Attorneys to represent him in petitioning for his appointment as probate conservator of the person and estate of his mother, Donna. In his petition, David represented there were no conservatorship assets and that all of Donna's assets were held in her Trust, so that no bond was required. Donna actually owned significant assets, including real property and several individual retirement accounts (IRAs), individually and not as assets of her Trust. The probate court appointed David as conservator of both Donna's person and estate and waived bond. The Attorneys continued to represent David and allegedly "knew that Donna . . . had assets in her name that under California law were assets of the conservatorship," but never informed the probate court of their existence nor petitioned the court to require or increase a bond. David subsequently misappropriated over one million dollars. Stine, a subsequently-appointed licensed professional fiduciary sued David for financial elder abuse and conversion and the Attorneys for legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed the Attorneys. The court of appeal reversed holding that the successor trustee is not subject to any defense that can be interposed against David and David's malfeasance.View "Stine v. Dell'Osso" on Justia Law 2014-10-17 state California California Court of Appeal Kathleen M. Banke A137679 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130902.html Kraselsky v. Calderwood 2014-10-17T09:00:13-08:00 2014-10-17T18:09:44-08:00 Steven Kraselsky, personal representative of the estate of his deceased mother Marcia Kraselsky, sued Dr. Calderwood and Dr. Calderwood's employer, Huntsville Clinic, alleging that Marcia died as a result of Dr. Calderwood's order that Marcia be given Demerol in spite of the fact that Dr. Calderwood knew she had previously professed to having an allergy to Demerol. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Calderwood and Huntsville Clinic, and Steven appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. "Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Calderwood breached the standard of care by ordering that Demerol be administered to Marcia, and, noting again that Dr. Calderwood strongly contests that fact, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is nevertheless due to be affirmed because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the administration of the Demerol to Marcia proximately caused the decline in her health leading to her death."View "Kraselsky v. Calderwood" on Justia Law 2014-10-17 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Lyn Stuart 1130902 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130385.html Kirksey v. Johnson et al. 2014-10-17T09:00:08-08:00 2014-10-17T09:22:43-08:00 Bessie Kirksey appealed a probate court order vacating its order discharging Kirksey as administrator ad litem of the estate of Kirksey's sister, Willie Mae Graves, deceased. Iris Johnson, Darryl Thomas, Dorothy McLemore, John McLemore, Jr., Jerrick McLemore, Frederick Pryor, Jr., Rafeal Santece Powell, Nyya Nicole Marshall, Brandon LeMar Marshall, and Jeffrey Sams (alleged heirs of Graves) cross-appealed the probate court's order insofar as it denied their motion to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court based on the alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the probate court. The Supreme Court treated the cross-appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, styled the case accordingly, dismissed the appeal, granted the petition and issued the writ.View "Kirksey v. Johnson et al." on Justia Law 2014-10-17 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Tom Parker 1130385 1130403 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/11-262.html In re Estate of Picillo 2014-10-15T16:52:04-08:00 2014-10-15T19:38:51-08:00 Decedent died less than two weeks after executing her last will and testament. The will bequeathed nothing to Decedent's heirs-at-law. After a lengthy contest that challenged the validity of the will, the will was admitted to probate. The contestant in this case, along with the remaining heirs-at-law, appealed, arguing that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed the instrument and that the will was procured by undue influence. The superior court concluded that the contestant and remaining heirs-at-law failed to prove their claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) failing to state specifically that the will was executed in compliance with statutory requirements; (2) concluding that the will was not the product of undue influence; (3) finding that Decedent possessed the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will; and (4) making factual findings and conclusions of law.View "In re Estate of Picillo" on Justia Law 2014-10-15 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Maureen McKenna Goldberg http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93679.html Rouner v. Wise 2014-10-14T11:03:16-08:00 2014-10-14T12:16:16-08:00 This dispute surrounded the inter vivos trust of K.R. Conklin. Conklin's children (the "Children") became trustees of Conklin's trust upon his death in 2009. Conklin's stepchildren (the "Stepchildren") sued the Children in their individual capacities, seeking, among other things, a declaration that they were beneficiaries of the trust. The circuit court entered judgment for the Children on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in holding (1) the Stepchildren were not beneficiaries under the trust; (2) Conklin did not amend the trust with a letter he wrote; and (3) the Children did not violate the trust's no-contest provision by resisting the Stepchildren's claims and subsequent lawsuit.View "Rouner v. Wise" on Justia Law 2014-10-14 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Paul C. Wilson http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0281.html In re Estate of Scherer 2014-10-14T08:07:36-08:00 2014-10-14T18:57:50-08:00 From Lilyanna Knudson's birth until Ronald Scherer's (Decedent) death, Knudson believed and considered the Decedent to be her father. After learning that he was not, Knudson filed a petition seeking a determination that she was the Decedent's heir. Specifically, Knudson argued that, pursuant to the judicially-created doctrine of equitable adoption, she was the daughter and heir of the Decedent. The district court dismissed Knudson's petition, concluding that Wyoming law does not recognize equitable adoption and that equitable adoption would be contrary to Wyoming's probate code. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the Court's interpretation of Wyoming's probate code, Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption, and therefore, Knudson was not an heir.View "In re Estate of Scherer" on Justia Law 2014-10-14 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court E. James Burke http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/89419-1.html In re Estate of Hambleton 2014-10-02T08:55:38-08:00 2014-10-06T11:45:11-08:00 In 2013, the legislature amended the Estate and Transfer Tax Act in response to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "In re Estate of Bracken," 290 P.3d 99 (2012), in which the Court narrowly construed the term "transfer." The amendment allowed the Department of Revenue (DOR) to tax qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) as part of a surviving spouse's estate. A QTIP trust is created by a deceased spouse and gives the surviving spouse a life interest in the income or use of trust property. In consolidated cases, the estates of Hambleton and Macbride challenged the amendment on a variety of grounds. The Supreme Court rejected the Estates' challenges, reversed summary judgment in In re Estate of Hambleton, and affirmed the summary judgment in In re Estate of Macbride. View "In re Estate of Hambleton" on Justia Law 2014-10-02 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Charles Wiggins 89419-1 89500-7 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-13-0772.html In re Estate of Mead 2014-09-30T14:47:34-08:00 2014-10-01T16:37:33-08:00 Robert Mead died in 2011, survived by his daughters, Roberta Jean Mead and Bobbi Jo Harr. Roberta initiated intestate proceedings, but Bobbi Jo petitioned for formal probate of Robert's purported will. Roberta and Bobbi Jo filed cross-motions for summary judgment about the will's validity and enforceability. The district court concluded that the will was valid and enforceable and granted judgment in favor of Bobbi Jo. Roberta appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the will was valid and enforceable because it was properly executed and not the result of undue influence.View "In re Estate of Mead" on Justia Law 2014-09-30 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 13-0772 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130587.html In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper 2014-09-26T12:00:24-08:00 2014-10-01T16:36:58-08:00 The decedent died in Monroe County in Spring, 2013. She had three adult children who survived her: Alice Harper-Taylor, William C. Harper, and James R. Harper. The decedent's husband died in 2002. Alice filed in Monroe County a petition to probate a 1995 will allegedly executed by the decedent. In her petition, Alice acknowledged that there was in existence a 2007 will that purported to be the will of the decedent, but she challenged the validity of the 2007 will on several grounds, including lack of mental capacity and the existence of a reciprocal will by the decedent's husband that had been admitted to probate in 2002. The Monroe County probate judge recused himself from hearing the petition, and the Supreme Court appointed a special probate judge to hear the proceedings in Monroe County. Meanwhile, in early 2014, William filed a petition in Escambia County to probate a 2007 will allegedly executed by the decedent. Alice filed a motion to dismiss and/or to stay the proceeding in Escambia County until the proper venue for the probate proceeding was determined. The Escambia Probate Court admitted the 2007 will to probate and issued letters testamentary to William, as the personal representative named in the 2007 will. Alice appealed the Escambia Court's decision, while William filed a motion to dismiss Alice's petition to probate the 1995 will in Monroe County. The Monroe Probate Court granted William's motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Alice appealed the Monroe Probate Court's grant of the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will (case no. 1130884). In case no. 1130587, Alice appealed the Escambia Probate Court's admission to probate the 2007 will, and in case no. 1130884, she appealed the Monroe Probate Court's order granting the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that venue in this case was proper in the Monroe Probate Court, therefore, the Court reversed the Escambia Court's judgment admitting the 2007 will. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Monroe Court erred in dismissing Alice's petition. The case was remanded to Monroe County for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper" on Justia Law 2014-09-26 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Michael F. Bolin 1130587 1130884 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-670-s-13-671.html In re Trust Created by Nabity 2014-09-26T07:08:23-08:00 2014-10-01T16:36:53-08:00 In 1998, a trust was established for the care of Evelyn A. Nabity. In 2011, Evelyn amended the trust agreement that changed the identity of the trustees. In 2012, Evelyn's son, Robert, petitioned for the appointment of a guardian, conservator, and guardian ad litem for Evelyn and for registration and administration of the trust. Robert argued that Evelyn had not been competent to amend the trust agreement and requested a determination of the proper trustees. In the trust administration proceeding, the county court found that Evelyn was not competent to execute the trust amendment and entered an order declaring Robert and his brother cotrustees. In the guardianship proceeding, the county court set aside a health care power of attorney Evelyn executed in 1998 and ordered Robert to serve as Evelyn's permanent guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Evelyn was incompetent to execute the amendments to the trust agreement; and (2) the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator for Evelyn did not deny her the benefit of a valid health care power of attorney.View "In re Trust Created by Nabity" on Justia Law 2014-09-26 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court John F. Wright S-13-670, S-13-671 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0150.html In re Estate of Kelly 2014-09-23T16:07:53-08:00 2014-10-01T16:35:31-08:00 After executing her last will and testament in Montana, Laura Jean Kelly, who neither married nor had children, died at age sixty-two. Laura's siblings petitioned the district court for a determination that Laura's interest in a family partnership was not part of her residuary estate. The district court concluded that Laura's interest in the family partnership was a non-probate asset and did not constitute part of the residue of Laura's estate. As such, Laura's partnership interest passed to Laura's siblings, her "heirs-at-law." Laura's niece appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its interpretation of the term "heirs," its application of Montana law, and its conclusions of law.View "In re Estate of Kelly" on Justia Law 2014-09-23 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Patricia O'Brien Cotter DA 14-0150 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s14a0620.html Barzey v. City of Cuthbert 2014-09-22T05:01:19-08:00 2014-10-01T16:34:48-08:00 Appellant Louise Shorter Barzey challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act that precluded her, as a non-dependent parent, from recovering benefits for the death of her son, Deron Shorter, from his employer, the City of Cuthbert. Shorter was killed in 2010 while acting in the course of his employment with the City. He was 37 at the time of his death, was not married, and had no dependents. His mother Barzey was his only heir at law. After Shorter's death, Barzey filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking a judgment declaring that she has the right to sue the City. Barzey acknowledged that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy of an employee's heirs for the employee's death during the course of his employment. She also acknowledged that the Act expressly said that the compensation for a deceased employee "shall be payable only to dependents and only during dependency." After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the Act's limitation on the recovery of nondependent heirs did not violate Barzey's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. View "Barzey v. City of Cuthbert" on Justia Law 2014-09-22 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia David E. Nahmias S14A0620 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130890.html Willingham v. Matthews 2014-09-19T10:00:21-08:00 2014-10-01T16:34:38-08:00 Brandy Matthews and Joshua Taylor Matthews were married in 2004. In 2011, Brandy died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by Joshua. Brandy's death was determined to be a homicide. On the same date, Joshua died as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Brandy and Joshua both died intestate. Deborah Willingham (Brandy's mother) was appointed by the Probate Court as the administrator of Brandy's estate. Rodney Matthews (Joshua's brother) was appointed as the administrator of Joshua's estate. Willingham filed for a declaratory judgment, stating that there was a justiciable controversy between Brandy's estate and Joshua's estate as to their respective rights, duties, and liabilities based on Willingham's interpretation of section 43-8-253 ("the Slayer's statute). She contended that, upon application of the statute, Joshua would have been unable to inherit from Brandy, and that his property was to pass as if he had predeceased Brandy. Matthews filed a response to Willingham's motion for a summary judgment, arguing that the statute only addressed how Brandy's estate would pass but not how Joshua's estate would pass, and that it therefore would have no bearing on the administration of Joshua's estate. The trial court entered a summary judgment declaring that 43-8-253 applied to the passing of Brandy's estate but not to the passing of Joshua's. Willingham appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that Willingham did not establish that the trial court erred in finding that 43-8-253 was not applicable to the administration of Joshua's estate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Willingham v. Matthews" on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Alisa Kelli Wise 1130890 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130486.html Ferguson v. Critopoulos 2014-09-19T10:00:14-08:00 2014-10-01T16:34:39-08:00 Edward "Tiger" Ferguson, V. appealed a probate court's judgment awarding an omitted-spouse share of his stepfather's estate to Katina Critopoulos. Dimitrios Critopoulos (the decedent) died in 2012. The decedent had no children. His parents predeceased him, and he had no siblings. At the time of his death, the decedent was married to Katina. The couple had wed less than a year earlier. The decedent had a valid will at the time of his death, but the will, which was executed prior to their marriage, made no provision for Katina. The decedent's first wife, Dorothy Marie Hayes Critopoulos, had been married to the decedent for 35 years when she predeceased him in 2009. Dorothy had three children from a prior marriage: Crystal M. Hanawalt, Tiger, and Timothy Ferguson ("Tim"). Although the decedent did not adopt Crystal, Tiger, and Tim, it was undisputed that the three enjoyed a parent-child relationship with the decedent. Crystal, Tiger, and Tim were named as the residual legatees under the decedent's will. When the will was probated, Katina filed a petition for an omitted-spouse share. The probate court granted Katina's request. Tiger appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the record showed that the amount of the transfers made during the marriage, along with the testimony that the decedent considered the terms of his will, the fact that Katina was not included in the will, the fact that the decedent did not change his will, and the fact that the will ultimately benefited Dorothy's children provided reasonable proof to satisfy Tiger's burden of proving an exception to the omitted-spouse share under the facts of this case. "[I]t was the main role of the probate court in this case to apply the law to the largely undisputed material facts." View "Ferguson v. Critopoulos " on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Michael F. Bolin 1130486 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-60472/13-60472-2014-09-15.html Estate of James A. Elkins, Jr., et al. v. CIR 2014-09-16T05:00:42-08:00 2014-10-01T16:33:13-08:00 Petitioners sought review and eventually eliminate the federal estate tax deficiency assessed against the Estate by the Commissioner. The deficiency resulted solely from the Commissioner's disallowance of the "fractional-ownership discount" applied by the Estate in determining the taxable values of decedent's pro rata shares of the jointly stipulated fair market values of 64 original works of art in which decedent owned only fractional interests at his death. The court affirmed and agreed in large part with the Tax Court's underlying analysis and discrete factual determinations, including its rejection of the Commissioner's zero-discount position. The court reversed, however, the Tax Court's analysis that led it not only to reject the quantums of the Estate's proffered fractional ownership discounts but also to adopt and apply one of its own without any supporting evidence. The court held that the taxable values of decedent's fractional interests in the works of art are the net amounts reflected for each on Exhibit B of the Tax Court's opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rendered judgment in favor of petitioners for a refund of taxes overpaid in the amount of $14,359,508.21, plus statutory interest.View "Estate of James A. Elkins, Jr., et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law 2014-09-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Jacques Loeb Wiener, Jr. 13-60472 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0116.html In re Estate of Benjamin 2014-09-09T16:17:39-08:00 2014-10-01T16:31:19-08:00 After Norman Benjamin, the father of Delmar and Cecil, passed away, Cecil, who was named personal representative in Norman's will, filed a petition for determination of testacy, for determination of devisees and for settlement and distribution of a testate estate. After a hearing, the probate court entered a decree approving the petition, which designated Norman's wife, Joyce, as the sole devisee under the will. Delmar filed an action against Cecil and Joyce, alleging that Cecil violated his fiduciary duty by distributing Norman's tangible personal property by distributing it among Norman's other children, but not to Delmar. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Delmar's claim. Subsequently, Delmar filed a petition to reopen probate, alleging that Cecil misrepresented the extent of Norman's tangible personal property and engaged in self-dealing with regard to this property and that there was newly discovered tangible personal property that needed to be distributed. The district court sua sponte denied Delmar's petition under principles of res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that res judicata did not bar Delmar's fraud and newly discovered tangible personal property claims in this case.View "In re Estate of Benjamin" on Justia Law 2014-09-09 state Montana Montana Supreme Court James A. Rice DA 14-0116 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/89788-3.html Anderson v. Dussault 2014-09-04T08:44:42-08:00 2014-10-01T16:30:10-08:00 When Rachel Anderson (formerly Rachel Rodgers) was six years old, a horse kicked her in the face and she sustained serious injuries. Her many fractures and lacerations required multiple surgeries and she suffered severe cognitive and emotional trauma. Rachel's family hired respondent Richard McMenamin to pursue a personal injury action against the owner of the horse. In 1997, the Superior Court approved a personal injury settlement of $3 00,000.00 and the creation of the "Rachel Marguerite Rodgers Trust." McMenamin hired respondent attorney William Dussault to draw up the trust agreement. After attorney's fees and other costs, a net amount of$187,160.66 entered the trust. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, NA served as trustee. The agreement also created a trust advisory committee (T AC) composed of petitioner's mother, Andrea Davey (formerly Andrea Rodgers) and McMenamin, were tasked with making distribution decisions for Rachel's benefit. Rachel later took issue with how her trust has been administered, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice. Rachel questioned several purchases with trust money that she said were never used for her benefit - a vehicle, computers and software and a house (which was purchased in the name of her mother's boyfriend). Furthermore, Rachel questioned the trustee and legal fees that were charged to the trust as excessive and at above market rates. Rachel sued her mother, McMenamin, Wells Fargo, and Dussault, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and malpractice. Motions for summary judgment were filed by Dussault, McMenamin, and Wells Fargo. The court granted their motion. The superior court then dismissed all of Rachel's remaining claims, including claims against her mother. Rachel appealed as to McMenamin, Dussault, and Wells Fargo, but chose not to appeal her claim against Andrea. The appellate court affirmed. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the superior court's approval of annual accountings of Rachel's trust under the Trustees Accounting Act (TAA), chapter 11.106 RCW, barred this suit, which was timely under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), chapter 11.96A RCW. The Supreme Court found that because Rachel was not represented by a guardian ad litem when the court approved the trust's annual accountings, she did not have notice of these proceedings and accordingly could bring a breach of trust action under TEDRA. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated its award of attorney's fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Dussault" on Justia Law 2014-09-04 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Barbara Madsen 89788-3 http://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2014/68s05-1404-tr-296.html Old Nat'l Bancorp v. Hanover College 2014-09-03T13:08:49-08:00 2014-10-01T16:29:44-08:00 Hanover College, the beneficiary of two trusts, filed petitions requesting that the trusts be terminated. Old National Bancorp, d/b/a Old National Trust Company, as trustee for both trusts, filed responses to Hanover's petitions. The trial court granted the petitions and ordered the two trusts dissolved and the trust assets distributed to Hanover. Rather than seek a stay of the trial court's dissolution orders, Old National appealed. The court of appeals dismissed Old National's appeal, concluding (1) Old National lacked standing in its representative capacity because it failed to obtain a stay of the trial court's termination orders and was therefore no longer the trustee of the trusts; and (2) because Old National did not intervene in its individual capacity at trial it could not be an aggrieved party on appeal. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed Old National's appeal, holding that the trustee lacked standing to pursue the appeal in its representative capacity and did not appeal in its individual capacity.View "Old Nat'l Bancorp v. Hanover College" on Justia Law 2014-09-03 state Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana Steven H. David 68S05-1404-TR-296 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130372.html Krueger v. Grand Forks County 2014-08-28T13:21:08-08:00 2014-10-01T16:28:51-08:00 After a jury trial, Faith Krueger appealed and Grand Forks County cross-appealed a judgment in favor of the County in Krueger's action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision of a public administrator. In July 2012, Krueger sued the County alleging she lost over $300,000 in property and assets after Barbara Zavala, the Grand Forks County Public Administrator, was appointed her guardian and conservator. Krueger claimed the County was liable for Zavala's actions under N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03 because Zavala was a county employee. Krueger argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying her motion to compel discovery, denying her motion for a continuance, denying her claim for damages for mental anguish, erred in its evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and by allowing certain statements by the County's attorney during closing arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.View "Krueger v. Grand Forks County" on Justia Law 2014-08-28 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Dale V. Sandstrom 20130372 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-02010-sct.html Parker v. Benoist 2014-08-28T12:14:55-08:00 2014-10-01T16:28:13-08:00 Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. In 2010, B.D. executed a will which granted significantly more property to William and consequently, less to Bronwyn than did a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn has sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will was reversed, and granted judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father's 2010 will. The Court affirmed the chancellor's decisions to permit William to pay attorneys with funds obtained from his father's estate and to permit William to continue as executor, and the chancery court's decision to deny attorney fees to the estate.View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law 2014-08-28 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi James W. Kitchens 2012-CA-02010-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2012-074.html In re Theresa Houlahan Trust 2014-08-22T06:11:30-08:00 2014-10-01T16:26:20-08:00 In 1993, John Houlahan and his wife, Theresa, established the "Theresa M. Houlahan Revocable Trust of 1993" containing the marital home. John was named successor trustee of, and granted certain powers over, the Theresa Trust. Upon the deaths of Theresa and John, the real property was to be distributed to their son, petitioner Thomas Houlahan. Theresa died in 1996. In 1997, John established the "John F. Houlahan 1997 Revocable Trust." John named his daughter (respondent) as successor trustee. In November 2002, John conveyed the real property by deed to himself, as trustee of the John Trust. John died in 2009. Under the terms of the John Trust, "[a]ny interest this trust may have in any real estate" was to be distributed in equal shares to four of his children: petitioner, respondent, John F. Houlahan, Jr., and Terrence B. Houlahan. In 2011, petitioner filed a "Petition for Injunction" seeking, among other things, an order that the property be returned to the Theresa Trust and that respondent, as successor trustee of the John Trust, be enjoined from making any attempt to dispose of the property. In late 2011, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" that John's "actions in his capacity as Trustee violated the terms of [the Theresa Trust] and specific provisions of the Uniform Trust Code." Following a hearing, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were many disputed factual issues that could not be decided on the pleadings. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the transfer of the real estate in 2002 effectively terminated the trust and the petitioner's interest in the trust. He asserted that "[w]hen John breached his fiduciary duties, the trust gained an additional asset– a cause of action against John or his estate," and, thus, "[n]either [the petitioner's] beneficial interest nor the trust was terminated by John's conveyance." After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Theresa Trust did not terminate in 2002, and neither did the petitioner's interest therein. The trial court's finding, that there were "many disputed issues of material fact" that could not be decided on the pleadings, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed its denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Theresa Houlahan Trust" on Justia Law 2014-08-22 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court James P. Bassett 2012-074 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ct-00075-sct-0.html Strait v. McPhail 2014-08-21T13:00:23-08:00 2014-10-01T16:25:42-08:00 In 1987, Joseph Bagley purchased a cancer and dread-disease policy through his friend and insurance agent, Jackie McPhail. The policy was issued by American Heritage Life Insurance Company. McPhail worked as an independent insurance broker, and she was a registered agent with American Heritage at the time the policy was written. The policy indicated that Bagley purchased coverage concerning cancer and dread disease, a home-recovery rider, and a hospital intensive-care rider. Bagley also had an option to purchase life insurance; however, McPhail testified that Bagley did not purchase life insurance under this policy because he had purchased a separate life-insurance policy. In 2008, Bagley was diagnosed with cancer. Bagley contacted McPhail to file a claim under the policy and to "change the beneficiary" of the policy from his estate to Michael and Betty Strait. McPhail testified that she had ceased writing policies for American Heritage; however, she still retained the authority to service Bagley's policy, and she acquired his written consent to receive information regarding his policy from the insurance company. While Bagley was in the hospital, McPhail presented an American Heritage change-of-beneficiary form, which Bagley ultimately signed. The signature was witnessed by Bagley's physician, a nurse, and McPhail. Bagley orally communicated that he wished for the beneficiary to be changed from his estate to the Straits. At the time that Bagley signed the form, the Straits had yet to be listed as beneficiaries on the form. McPhail met with the Straits after the form was signed to confirm their correct legal names to be placed on the change-of-beneficiary form at a later time. McPhail provided that she did not fully complete the form because she was attempting to contact American Heritage to confirm the correct procedure for completing the process; however, American Heritage's office was closed because of Hurricane Fay, and McPhail never succeeded in speaking with American Heritage regarding the matter. Bagley's physician, who witnessed Bagley signing the form, later communicated to Betty Strait that his attorney advised that the form could not be used because the Straits' names were not listed on the form prior to Bagley's signature. Betty Strait relayed this to McPhail, who then attempted to contact American Heritage's legal department. McPhail called the company on multiple occasions, but she never received a return phone call. Soon thereafter, Bagley passed away, and the form was never completed. The estate was probated and the Straits did not contest the passage of the policy proceeds to the estate at the time that the estate was being settled. The executor of Bagley's will, William Kinstley, petitioned for the approval of the estate's final accounting, which included the policy proceeds. The Straits initiated legal action against McPhail and American Heritage in Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing that Bagley intended for them to receive the proceeds from the cancer policy. The Straits alleged breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, negligence and gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, bad-faith refusal to pay benefits and to promptly and adequately investigate the claim, misrepresentation and/or failure to procure, promissory and/or equitable estoppel, and they sought a claim for declaratory relief. McPhail filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court found that the issue had been previously litigated and resolved in chancery court, and that no appeal had been taken from the chancery court judgment. Likewise, the circuit court granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that genuine issues of material fact did exist and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the Straits' claims. Because the Straits failed to raise any issues upon which relief may be granted, the circuit court's grant of McPhail's motion to dismiss was proper. However, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the circuit court properly granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment: the Straits were never eligible to be third-party beneficiaries under the policy, and they have failed to show any equitable entitlement to reimbursement. For those reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment. View "Strait v. McPhail " on Justia Law 2014-08-21 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Randy G. Pierce 2012-CT-00075-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27438.html Malloy v. Thompson 2014-08-20T07:19:52-08:00 2014-10-01T16:24:59-08:00 This action stems from a dispute between plaintiff James Robert Malloy and Swain R. Thompson, regarding assets of Robert L. Chamblee (Decedent). The complaint alleged that Thompson, with the assistance of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., acted to disrupt Decedent's estate plan and divert Decedent's assets from Malloy to Thompson. Malloy characterized his claims against Merrill Lynch as: (1) intentional interference with inheritance; (2) aiding and abetting intentional interference with inheritance; (3) and civil conspiracy. Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss and compel arbitration arguing that its only connection to this dispute was through its contractual duties under the client relationship agreements (CRAs) entered into between Decedent and Merrill Lynch, which contained mandatory arbitration clauses. Merrill Lynch argued that although Malloy was a non-signatory to the agreements, any duty, if any, owed by Merrill Lynch to Malloy derives from the CRAs, and therefore, he is bound by the arbitration clauses. The circuit court denied the motion and found that while non-signatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under common law principles of contract and agency law, none of those principles applied in this case, and therefore, there was no basis to compel Malloy to arbitrate. Merrill Lynch appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Malloy v. Thompson" on Justia Law 2014-08-20 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Costa M. Pleicones 27438 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27435.html Williams v. GEICO 2014-08-20T06:26:50-08:00 2014-10-01T16:24:49-08:00 Delores Williams, the personal representative of the Estate of Edward Murry, and Matthew Whitaker, Jr., the personal representative of the Estate of Annie Mae Murry (PRs), brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a GEICO motor vehicle insurance policy issued to the Murrys provided $15,000 or $100,000 in liability proceeds for bodily injury for an accident in which both of the Murrys were killed. The circuit court concluded coverage was limited to the statutory minimum of $15,000 based on a family step-down provision in the policy that reduced coverage for bodily injury to family members from the stated policy coverage of $100,000 to the statutory minimum amount mandated by South Carolina law during the policy period. The PRs appealed, contending the step-down provision was ambiguous and/or violative of public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the circuit court that GEICO's policy is not ambiguous, but concluded the family step-down provision, which reduced the coverage under the liability policy from the stated policy amount to the statutory minimum, was violative of public policy and was, therefore, void. "The provision not only conflicte[d] with the mandates set forth in section 38-77-142, but its enforcement would be injurious to the public welfare." View "Williams v. GEICO" on Justia Law 2014-08-20 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Donald W. Beatty 27435 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93760.html Ellison v. Fry 2014-08-19T11:13:04-08:00 2014-10-01T16:24:36-08:00 In this family dispute over the inheritance of money and property, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff Arthur Fry's claims and some of the claims of Plaintiffs Mary Ellison, Susan Sleeper, and David Fry. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Mary, David and Susan on three of their claims that J.D. Fry committed frauds and other wrongs that resulted in J.D.'s pecuniary gain. J.D. Fry died after suit was filed but before trial, and the trial court substituted J.D.'s wife, Linda Fry, in her capacity as trustee of J.D.'s trust. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the jury verdicts for Mary, Susan and David, holding that Susan and David's claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations and that Mary's claims were barred because the trial court erred in substituting Linda upon J.D.'s death. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' other claims.View "Ellison v. Fry" on Justia Law 2014-08-19 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Laura Denvir Stith SC93760 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130609.html Stephens v. Colley 2014-08-15T11:00:15-08:00 2014-10-01T16:23:27-08:00 Defendant Franklin Stephens appealed a circuit court order granting an injunction to plaintiff Hazel Colley. Franklin is nephew to Sara Dees and Colley. In late 2011, Dees was residing at Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center. On approximately January 15, 2012, Stephens checked Dees out of the center and moved her back into her house in Troy. Stephens and an unidentified female companion also moved into the house and began caring for Dees. Colley alleged that Stephens thereafter began restricting access to Dees, preventing Colley and Dees's friends from speaking with her on the telephone or visiting with her outside his or his female companion's presence. Colley, who lives in Opelika, alleged she had previously had a close relationship with her sister and had stayed with her for weeks at a time to help with her medical needs; however, she alleged once Stephens moved into Dees's house Stephens would no longer allow her to stay with Dees overnight. Throughout 2012, Stephens took steps to "assist" Dees: (1) in executing a durable power of attorney; drafting a new will (replacing Colley as executor of Dees' estate and naming himself sole heir); and adding himself to all of Dees' bank accounts. Dees died in early 2013; Stephens thereafter began exercising control of her accounts. As executor, Stephens submitted Dees' will to probate. Colley moved the probate and circuit courts to set aside the power of attorney and will executed in 2012 alleging Stephens procured them via fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. The circuit court granted Colley's request for injunctive relief. On appeal, Stephens argues both that Colley failed to establish by competent evidence the four elements set forth in Alabama case law and that the circuit court's preliminary-injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2). In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "clear on its face" that the circuit court's order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) because the circuit court failed to state its reasons for entering the preliminary injunction. "This noncompliance obviates the need to consider Stephens's other argument that there was insufficient evidence before the circuit court to merit the entry of a preliminary injunction." The injunction order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.View "Stephens v. Colley " on Justia Law 2014-08-15 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Lyn Stuart 1130609 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-105.html In re Estate of Snow 2014-08-14T10:12:55-08:00 2014-10-01T16:22:28-08:00 After Harold Forest Snow died, Linda Moulton, as personal representative, filed a civil action against Susan Snow, alleging that one of the transfers identified in Harold's codicil was an improvident transfer and a product of undue influence. During discovery, the parties' attorneys announced that they had settled the case. Neither side, however, would agree to sign the other's proposed settlement documents. Linda subsequently filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The probate court granted Linda's motion to enforce, finding that the record contained an "unequivocal stipulation by the parties' attorneys that the matter was settled" and that the material terms of the agreement were clearly defined in the transcript. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was ample evidence that the parties intended to enter into an enforceable settlement agreement and that the terms placed on the record reflected all of the material terms of the contract; and (2) the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement without holding a trial or an evidentiary hearing.View "In re Estate of Snow" on Justia Law 2014-08-14 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Warren M. Silver http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b243061.html Vance v. Bizek 2014-08-12T14:01:46-08:00 2014-10-01T16:21:40-08:00 Don Bizek obtained a judgment against Sally Gordon, a trustee and beneficiary of the WPB Trust, and sought to execute his judgment against Gordon's beneficial interest in the WPB Trust. If the disclaimer is valid, it caused Gordon's beneficial interest to descend to Cyndi Vance, Gordon's daughter and successor beneficiary. If the disclaimer is void, Bizek may attach Gordon's beneficial interest in the WPB Trust. The trial court ruled that Gordon's disclaimer was void. However, the court concluded that the presumption created by section 16004 of the Probate Code that a trustee who commingles trust funds with her own funds violates her fiduciary duty to the trust applies only to the relationship between a trustee and trust beneficiaries. In this case, the trial court applied the presumption for the benefit of a creditor of the trustee, not a beneficiary of the trust. Therefore, the trial court committed error and the court reversed and remanded. Bizek was not entitled to the section 16004 presumption and thus had the burden to prove that Gordon's use of WPB Trust funds demonstrated acceptance of her beneficial interest in the Trust.View "Vance v. Bizek" on Justia Law 2014-08-12 state California California Court of Appeal O'Donnell B243061 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-1879/13-1879-2014-08-11.html Griswold v. Coventry First LLC 2014-08-11T09:30:11-08:00 2014-10-01T16:21:36-08:00 In 2006, Lincoln T. Griswold purchased an $8.4 million life insurance policy. Griswold established a Trust for the sole and exclusive purpose of owning the policy and named Griswold LLP as the Trust's sole beneficiary. In 2008, the Trust sold its policy to Coventry First LLC. The written purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause. After learning that the policy was sold for an allegedly inflated price that included undisclosed kickbacks to the broker, Griswold sued. Coventry moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that both Griswold and the LLP had standing and that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as to the plaintiffs, who were non-signatories. Coventry appealed. The Third Circuit (1) concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of Coventry's motion to dismiss; and (2) affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration against the plaintiffs, as they never consented to the purchase agreement.View "Griswold v. Coventry First LLC" on Justia Law 2014-08-11 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Hardiman 13-1879 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/13-1708/13-1708-2014-08-11.html Brown v. Brown-Thill 2014-08-11T08:31:17-08:00 2014-10-01T16:21:25-08:00 Richard L. Brown and Susan Brown-Thill, co-trustees of the EDB Trust, signed an Arbitration Agreement for resolving a broad range of disputes. These consolidated appeals concern two awards following an initial arbitration. The March 14 award authorized distributions from family-owned limited partnerships to family trusts. The December 12 award declared invalid Brown's attempt to resign as co-trustee and name his successor, and removed Brown as co-trustee, applying the Uniform Trust Code's standards for the statutory removal of a trustee as adopted in Missouri, the situs of the controversy, and Florida, the situs of the EDB Trust. The district court denied Brown's attempt to vacate both awards and Brown-Thill's request for a contractual award of attorneys' fees in both suits. The court concluded that the March 14 award cannot be vacated on the ground of procedural irregularities and the arbitrator's procedural errors did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2), (3), and (4). In regards to the December 12 award, the district court did not err in interpreting the EDB Trust Agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation of the Trust Agreement's removal provision is not a ground for vacating the award; the court concluded that Brown-Thill properly submitted the removal issue under the Arbitration Agreement, the arbitrator then had power to construe and apply the Trust Agreement's removal provision and to make findings regarding the statutory standards for removal which Brown-Thill could present in a judicial proceeding, but the arbitrator exceeded his powers by exercising the exclusively judicial function of removing Brown on statutory standards; however, this decision is of no practical importance because of Brown's unconditional resignation as co-trustee; and the court rejected Brown's FAA challenge. Finally, the court concluded that Brown-Thill was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed except with a modification and denied Brown's motion to take judicial notice.View "Brown v. Brown-Thill" on Justia Law 2014-08-11 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 13-1708 13-1795 13-1710 13-1797 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-14495.html Moffitt v. Moffitt 2014-08-08T10:00:53-08:00 2014-10-01T16:21:07-08:00 Linda Moffitt filed suit as her mother's guardian and conservator and the successor trustee of her parents' living trusts, seeking to rescind or reform a deed they executed in 1995 and a contract they signed in 1998. The superior court dismissed Linda's claims, concluding that the statutes of limitations had run before Linda filed her lawsuit in 2005. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the superior court properly applied the statutes of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded that Linda's mostly equitable claims were subject to the defense of laches, and the statutes of limitations did not apply to these claims.View "Moffitt v. Moffitt" on Justia Law 2014-08-08 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Joel H. Bolger S-14495 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2013-039.html In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty 2014-08-08T08:17:31-08:00 2014-10-01T16:21:03-08:00 Appellant Kerry McCarty, as executrix of the Estate of Ruth C. McCarty, appealed a circuit court order denying her motion to dismiss the claim of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for repayment of medical assistance provided to the decedent through the State's Medicaid program. She argued the court erred by concluding that DHHS's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty" on Justia Law 2014-08-08 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Robert J. Lynn 2013-039 http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2014/62160.html In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979 2014-08-07T11:13:14-08:00 2014-10-01T16:20:25-08:00 Daisy Monzo gifted a condominium that she owned to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her daughter, Charron Monzo. Daisy subsequently signed another deed transferring the condo back into her own name. Charron filed a petition seeking an order requiring Daisy to transfer the condo back to the trust. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Daisy, concluding that Daisy's execution of the deed transferring title to the condo into the trust was based on unilateral mistakes. Charron then filed this original writ petition challenging the district court's partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) a donor may obtain relief from an erroneous gift if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that her intent was mistaken and not in accord with the donative transfer; (2) remedies available to correct such mistakes depend on the nature of the unilateral mistake in question; and (3) because it was uncertain what Daisy's donative intent was at the time of the donative transfer, genuine issues of fact remained as to whether unilateral mistakes affected Daisy's execution of the deed transferring the condo into the trust, and therefore, partial summary judgment was improper.View "In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979" on Justia Law 2014-08-07 state Nevada Supreme Court of Nevada James W. Hardesty 62160 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9685-vcl.html In re Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust 2014-08-06T08:02:26-08:00 2014-10-01T16:19:45-08:00 During divorce proceedings between Daniel Kloiber (Dan) and Beth Ann Kloiber the Kentucky Family Court issued status quo orders that restricted Dan in his capacity as a human being over whom the Kentucky Family Court had personal jurisdiction, thereby restricting Dan's actions as special trustee of the Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust and sole manager of three LLCs. Dan subsequently resigned from his positions and appointed Nick Kloiber as special trustee. Nick proceeded to take action contrary to the status quo orders, and the Kentucky Family Court issued a rule to show cause why Nick should not be held in contempt. PNC Delaware Trust Company (PNC), the trustee of the Dynasty Trust, and Nick filed petitions seeking instructions and declarations from the Court of Chancery, arguing that the Kentucky Family Court improperly asserted jurisdiction over the trustee, special trustee and trust and was requiring them to take actions contrary to their fiduciary duties. The Court of Chancery denied Nick's application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Beth from seeking to enforce the status quo orders, including the pending rule to show cause, holding that, because the Kentucky Family Court was not interfering with the Court's jurisdiction, Nick lacked a colorable claim on which to base a TRO.View "In re Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust " on Justia Law 2014-08-06 state Delaware Delaware Court of Chancery Laster CA 9685-VCL http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b245202.html Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Parker 2014-08-04T13:00:35-08:00 2014-10-01T16:19:02-08:00 Creditor sought to collect an exemplary damages award from a tortfeasor who was placed under a conservatorship after he was sued for his wrongdoing. The court held that a conservator's debts incurred before creation of the conservatorship must be paid from his estate. In this case, the court concluded that the debt was incurred when the conservatee committed the tort, not when the jury rendered its verdict awarding damages for the wrongful conduct. Therefore, the conservator must pay the punitive damages awarded to the creditor from the conservatee's estate.View "Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Parker" on Justia Law 2014-08-04 state California California Court of Appeal Boren B245202 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-4521-vcg.html In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litigation 2014-08-04T11:04:27-08:00 2014-10-01T16:19:52-08:00 At issue in this case was a trust ("the Raiff Trust") that had expired under the terms of the trust instrument that established the trust. The trust was funded with shares of Jenzabar, Inc. At the time of this litigation, the Raiff Trust continued to hold shares of Jenzabar stock on behalf of its beneficiary. Plaintiff, trustee of a trust holding stock in Jenzabar, brought derivative claims related to a bonus payment for Jenzabar's CEO and Chairman. The Raiff Trust moved to intervene in the litigation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trust lacked the capacity to prosecute this action on behalf of Jenzabar because it had no beneficial or economic interest in Jenzabar. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the trust could take only actions related to preserving its assets for purposes of distribution and wind-up, together with those actions for which the trust instrument specifically provided, which did not include the maintenance of the derivative litigation contemplated in this action.View "In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law 2014-07-30 state Delaware Delaware Court of Chancery Glasscock CA 4521-VCG http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/13-3232/13-3232-2014-07-31.html Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen 2014-07-31T10:12:01-08:00 2014-10-01T16:17:58-08:00 Brooklyn Coons (called "Brook" by her estate) died from being shaken and possibly struck on the head while in the care of her father's girlfriend. Her estate, the remaining plaintiff in this case, alleged that Defendant Linda Gillen, a social worker, knew that Brook was in danger and subject to abuse but did not respond to reports of the abuse, increasing Brook's vulnerability to danger. The estate sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating Brook's right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, holding that she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not take any affirmative action that increased the child's vulnerability to danger and because there was no clearly established law that her alleged conduct violated Brook's due-process rights. Finding that Defendant's conduct was not a violation of clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.View "Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law 2014-07-31 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Harris L. Hartz 13-3232 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-13-0642.html Gibbs v. Altenhofen 2014-07-29T16:10:36-08:00 2014-10-01T16:16:53-08:00 James Altenhofen was the trustee of the Gibbs' family trust and Delwin Nordtvedt was the successor trustee. Nordtvedt filed an action requesting that the court determine whether any restrictions existed in the trust agreement limiting the trustee's power to sell the real and personal property included in the trust estate. The Gibbs filed cross-claims against Nordtvedt. The district court granted summary judgment for Nordtvedt, concluding that the prudent investor rule called for the sale of certain property. The Gibbs then filed a complaint against Nordtvedt and Altenhofen, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court concluded (1) the claims against Nordtvedt were barred by the doctrines of issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, and claim preclusion; and (2) the claims against Altenhofen were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in finding that some of the Gibbs' claims against Nordtvedt were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion; (2) did not err in finding that some of the Gibbs' claims were barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and issue preclusion; and (3) did not err in concluding that the claims against Altenhofen were time-barred.View "Gibbs v. Altenhofen" on Justia Law 2014-07-29 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Patricia O'Brien Cotter DA 13-0642 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-15230.html Harris v. Millennium Hotel 2014-07-25T10:00:05-08:00 2014-10-01T16:16:02-08:00 The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker's "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law 2014-07-25 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Joel H. Bolger S-15230 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2014/510-2013.html R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al. 2014-07-25T05:01:01-08:00 2014-10-01T16:15:34-08:00 Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law 2014-07-24 state Delaware Delaware Supreme Court 510, 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26870.html In re Estate of Ricard 2014-07-24T06:10:49-08:00 2014-10-01T16:15:22-08:00 Ella Richard died leaving a will naming her son, Kelly Ricard, as personal representative of the estate and the sole devisee. The circuit court entered an order for complete settlement declaring the will valid. Thereafter, Renee Laas, another of Ella's children, filed a petition to set aside informal probate and determine intestacy, alleging undue influence. The circuit court denied the petition, determining that the order for complete settlement was final and appealable and that Laas failed to appeal the order. Laas appealed the denial of her petition, arguing that the will was never formally probated and that S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-108 and 29-3-401 allow an interested person to file a petition for formal administration of a will any time within three years of the decedent's death, even after a complete settlement of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the estate in this case was completely settled and closed in a formal probate proceeding, that Laas had notice of this proceeding, and therefore, the circuit court did not err when it denied Lass's petition to set aside informal probate and declare intestacy.View "In re Estate of Ricard" on Justia Law 2014-07-23 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court David Gilbertson 26870 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11390.html Woodward School for Girls, Inc. v. City of Quincy 2014-07-23T08:04:45-08:00 2014-10-01T16:14:55-08:00 The City of Quincy (Quincy) served as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund and the Charles Francis Adams Fund (together, the Funds) through two boards. The Woodward School for Girls, Inc. (Woodward) has been the sole income beneficiary of the Funds since 1953. In 2007, Woodward filed suit against Quincy seeking an accounting and asserting that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties in several respects. A probate and family court judge concluded that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties by failing to invest in growth securities and failing to heed certain investment advice, removed Quincy as trustee, and ordered Quincy to pay a nearly $3 million judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, reversed with respect to the calculation of damages on the unrealized gains, and remanded, holding (1) Woodward's claims were not barred on the grounds of sovereign immunity, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, or laches; (2) the judgment against Quincy for committing a breach of its fiduciary duties to the Funds was proper; (3) the award of damages was erroneous in the calculation of unrealized gains on the investment portfolio; and (4) the judge did not err in including prejudgment interest. View "Woodward School for Girls, Inc. v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law 2014-07-23 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Robert J. Cordy SJC-11390 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0227.html Meyer v. Miller 2014-07-22T08:22:59-08:00 2014-10-01T16:14:44-08:00 Evelyn Carlsen, a settlor of the 1999 Carlsen Family Living Trust who also served as trustee, amended the trust on two separate occasions before she died. After Mrs. Carlsen's death, Appellant Catherine Meyer, a beneficiary of the trust who stood to receive less because of the amendments, brought an action against Appellee, the successor trustee, challenging the validity of the amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that the amendments were valid because their terms did not constitute a repayment of a debt, which might invoke the Statute of Frauds; and (2) properly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Appellant's claim that Mrs. Carlsen was unduly influenced to amend the trust by other beneficiaries.View "Meyer v. Miller " on Justia Law 2014-07-22 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Michael K. Davis S-13-0227 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2014/13-wap-2012.html Dorsey v. Redman 2014-07-21T14:17:56-08:00 2014-10-01T16:14:34-08:00 Andre Leonti, a resident of Fayette County, died intestate in 2006. Thereafter, Cheryl Keefer, a purported friend of Decedent, filed a petition with the Register for the grant of letters of administration which listed the heirs and personal assets of Decedent as "unknown" and indicated that there was no real estate. The Register refused to grant letters to Keefer because she did not have Decedent's death certificate, was not his next of kin, and, therefore, was not a person entitled to letters. Keefer, through her attorney, filed a petition to authorize the Register to issue letters to her without producing a death certificate and further directing the Mon Valley Hospital to release the Decedent's remains for a funeral and burial. Keefer attached a purported copy of a power of attorney executed by Decedent. No one contested this petition, and, on the same day the petition was filed, the orphan's court issued an order authorizing and directing the Register to issue letters "without the necessity of requiring a death certificate," and further ordering and directing the Hospital to release Decedent's remains to Keefer for funeral and burial. In compliance with this order, the Register issued letters to Keefer, but did not secure a bond from her. Several months later, Keefer filed with the Register an inventory of the estate. One month later, Appellee Elvira Dorsey, a resident of Texas who claimed to be Decedent's niece, became aware of Decedent's estate, and alleged she was the sole surviving heir of Decedent. Appellee petitioned for Keefer's removal as administratrix. The orphan's court granted Appellee's petition, issued an order, and required Keefer to deliver to Appellee the custody and possession of Decedent's estate's assets. Keefer, however, did not deliver the assets of the estate to Appellee. The orphan's court issued an order holding Keefer in contempt, sentencing Keefer to six months imprisonment, and directing that a verdict be entered in favor of Appellee and against Keefer in the amount of $192,769.19. Appellee filed praecipes for entry of judgment with the Fayette County Prothonotary and the Register to enter judgment against Keefer. Appellee then filed a complaint against the Register, individually, and Western Surety Company, alleging that the Register and Surety were liable for damages resulting from the Register's failure to secure bonding, which, Appellee asserted, was required by law. In this appeal by allowance, the primary issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the applicability of governmental and official immunity with respect to a claim alleging a violation of bonding requirements mandated under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code ("PEF Code"). Ultimately, the Court held that the General Assembly intended that 20 Pa.C.S.A. 3172 created a targeted form of accountability for such registers, resting outside the scope of governmental and official immunity. Therefore, the Fayette County Register of Wills was not immune under the Tort Claims Act from liability for an alleged violation of Section 3172. The case was remanded back to the orphan's court for an assessment of the applicability of the the immunity defense, and for a more developed factual record. View "Dorsey v. Redman" on Justia Law 2014-07-21 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Debra McCloskey Todd 13 WAP 2012 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130161.html Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling 2014-07-17T14:14:59-08:00 2014-10-01T16:13:04-08:00 Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor were married and lived most of their lives together in Minnesota. Ragna Mesling, a widow and Carolyn Vizenor's mother, owned real estate outside of New England, in Hettinger County. The Stechers were long-time renters of the Mesling farmland. The Vizenors sued Mesling and the Stechers, seeking to avoid a deed executed in 2006, in which Mesling, as Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, transferred certain real estate to the Stechers. The Vizenors alleged the transaction directly resulted from improper conduct by the Stechers. The Estates of Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Clifford and Linda Stecher and orders denying their post-judgment motions. The Stechers cross-appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court concluded Ragna Mesling, as her daughter Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, was authorized under a power of attorney to transfer real estate to the Stechers and sufficient evidence supported the district court's findings the transfer was not the product of undue influence. Because the court did not err in dismissing the action and denying the post-judgment motions, the Court therefore affirmed. View "Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling" on Justia Law 2014-07-17 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Daniel J. Crothers 20130161 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/h038826.html Conservatorship of G.H. 2014-07-17T13:01:22-08:00 2014-10-01T16:12:38-08:00 In 1998, the superior court established a conservatorship over G.H.'s person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000. G.H. has been under continuous conservatorship since that time. In 2012, the Santa Clara County Public Guardian sought to be reappointed G.H.'s conservator, alleging that G.H remained gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. G.H.'s counsel requested t an evidentiary hearing. On the date of the hearing G.H. was not present in court. The Public Guardian explained that G.H. had refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian's doctor, and that it did not intend to transport G.H to court unless G.H. submitted to the mental examination. At a second hearing, the Public Guardian explained that G.H. had again refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian's doctor. G.H. was not present at a third hearing. The court granted the reappointment petition, reasoning that G.H.'s failure to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian's doctor authorized the court to impose an evidence sanction or a terminating sanction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.410. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the court erred in imposing a terminating, as opposed to an evidence sanction. View "Conservatorship of G.H." on Justia Law 2014-07-17 state California California Court of Appeal Rushing H038826 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/g047495m.html Hasso v. Hapke 2014-07-15T16:01:14-08:00 2014-10-01T16:11:55-08:00 In August 2007, the initial trustee of two family trusts invested millions in the Rockwater American Municipal Fund, LLC (RAM Fund), a hedge fund engaged in municipal arbitrage. The RAM Fund was managed by Rockwater Municipal Advisors, LLC (RMA), its managing member. In November 2007, Charles Fish Investments, Inc. (CFI) transferred its assets to Rockwater CFI, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of RMA, in exchange for a 15 percent interest in RMA. CFI had an option to unwind the transaction, if its interest in RMA did not meet certain benchmark values. The RAM Fund was devastated by the stock market crash and the trust investments were largely wiped out by 2008. CFI exercised its option to unwind the transaction with RMA and Rockwater CFI, LLC, and obtained a return of the assets originally belonging to it. The successor trustee of the trusts sued the RAM Fund, RMA, Bryan Williams (founder of the RAM Fund and the chief executive officer of RMA), John Hapke (the chief financial officer of the RAM Fund), CFI, and Charles Fish (the chairman and chief executive officer of CFI). After it had seen clips from the movie Wall Street 2 (Twentieth Century Fox 2010) and a power point presentation with eight screens captioned "Greed," a jury awarded the successor trustee a $4.6 million judgment against the RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke. The successor trustee was unsuccessful in obtaining a judgment against CFI and Fish. The RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke, on the other hand, have each filed an appeal claiming the RAM Fund was simply the victim of the market crash. The successor trustee appealed too, seeking to hold liable CFI and Fish, the defendants who "got away." After review, the Supreme Court: reversed the judgment in favor of RAM, RMA and Willians, and affirmed the judgment against CFI and Fish on actual and constructive fraudulent transfer; to the extent the judgment held the Rockwater Defendants and Hapke liable on the causes of action for fraud by intentional misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, and/or negligent misrepresentation, it was reversed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment against the RAM Fund and Hapke for breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence was reversed. However, the judgment against RMA and Williams on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was affirmed. The ruling that CFI was not liable for the debts of RMA was affirmed. The ruling that Fish was not liable for the debts of CFI was moot, and the judgment in favor of CFI on all causes of action is affirmed. View "Hasso v. Hapke" on Justia Law 2014-07-15 state California California Court of Appeal Moore G047495M http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/11-1518/ Bullock v. BankChampaign, N. A. 2014-07-15T02:04:52-08:00 2014-07-15T02:56:34-08:00 Petitioner's father established a trust for the benefit of petitioner and his siblings, and made petitioner the nonprofessional trustee. The trust's sole asset was the father's life insurance policy. Petitioner borrowed funds from the trust three times; all borrowed funds were repaid with interest. His siblings obtained a state court judgment for breach of fiduciary duty, though the court found no apparent malicious motive. The court imposed constructive trusts on petitioner's interests, including his interest in the original trust, to secure payment of the judgment, with respondent serving as trustee for all of the trusts. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy. Respondent opposed discharge of debts to the trust. The Bankruptcy Court held that petitioner's debts were not dischargeable under 11 U. S. C. 523(a)(4), which provides that an individual cannot obtain a bankruptcy discharge from a debt "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." The district court and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. The term "defalcation" in the Bankruptcy Code includes a culpable state of mind requirement involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the fiduciary behavior. The Court previously interpreted the term "fraud" in the exceptions to mean "positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong." The term "defalcation" should be treated similarly. Where the conduct does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or other immoral conduct, "defalcation" requires an intentional wrong. An intentional wrong includes not only conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper but also reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent. Where actual knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, conduct is considered as equivalent if, as set forth in the Model Penal Code, the fiduciary "consciously disregards," or is willfully blind to, "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct will violate a fiduciary duty. View "Bullock v. BankChampaign, N. A." on Justia Law 2013-05-13 federal U.S. Supreme Court Stephen G. Breyer 11-1518 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/10-382/ United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation 2014-07-15T01:41:25-08:00 2014-07-15T02:56:09-08:00 The Jicarilla Apache Nation's ("Tribe") reservation contained natural resources that were developed pursuant to statutes administered by the Interior Department and proceeds from these resources were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. The Tribe filed a breach-of-trust action in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") seeking monetary damages for the Government's alleged mismanagement of the Tribe's trust funds in violation of 25 U.S.C. 161-162a and other laws. During discovery, the Tribe moved to compel production of certain documents and the Government agreed to the release of some documents but asserted that others were protected by, inter alia, the attorney-client privilege. At issue was whether the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to the general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. The Court held that the fiduciary exception did not apply where the trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes were established and governed by statute rather than the common law and, in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acted not as a private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law. The reasons for the fiduciary exception, that the trustee had no independent interest in trust administration, and that the trustee was subject to a general common-law duty of disclosure, did not apply in this context. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation" on Justia Law 2011-06-13 federal U.S. Supreme Court Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 10-382 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/10-179/ Stern v. Marshall 2014-07-15T01:41:13-08:00 2014-07-15T02:56:12-08:00 This case stemmed from the long-running dispute between Vickie Lynn Marshall and E. Pierce Marshall over the fortune of J. Howard Marshall II, a man believed to have been one of the richest people in Texas. Vickie married J. Howard, Pierce's father, approximately a year before his death. Shortly before J. Howard died, Vickie filed a suit against Pierce in Texas state court asserting that J. Howard meant to provide for Vickie through a trust, and Pierce tortiously interfered with that gift. The litigation worked its way through state and federal courts in Louisiana, Texas, and California, and two of those courts, a Texas state probate court and the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, reached contrary decisions on its merits. The Court of Appeals subsequently held that the Texas state decision controlled after concluding that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the authority to enter final judgment on a counterclaim that Vickie brought against Pierce in her bankruptcy proceeding. At issue was whether the Bankruptcy Court Judge, who did not enjoy tenure and salary protections pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, had the statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie's counterclaims and, if so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy Court was constitutional. The Court held that the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie's counterclaim as a core proceeding under section 157(b)(2)(C). The Court held, however, that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the constitutional authority under Article III to enter final judgment on a state law counterclaim that was not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.View "Stern v. Marshall" on Justia Law 2011-06-23 federal U.S. Supreme Court Owen Josephus Roberts 10-179 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/88045-0.html In re Estate of Toland 2014-07-10T08:18:32-08:00 2014-10-01T16:09:30-08:00 The estate of Etsuko Futagi Toland appealed a Court of Appeals decision upholding summary judgment that denied registration of a Japanese divorce decree awarding Etsuko Toland a monetary award against her former husband, Peter Paul Toland. The question to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying recognition of the divorce decree under comity principles because Paul was not given notice of a Japanese guardianship proceeding involving the couple's daughter. The Washington Court reversed: the 2008 guardianship had no effect on Paul's legal obligations under the 2006 divorce decree. The divorce decree was valid, and whether it should have been recognized as a matter of comity did not depend on whether Paul had notice of the guardianship proceeding. The Washington Court held that the trial court abused its discretion, and remanded this case back to the trial court for registration of the divorce decree. View "In re Estate of Toland" on Justia Law 2014-07-10 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Barbara Madsen 88045-0 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0226-4.html In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bratton 2014-07-09T11:19:06-08:00 2014-10-01T16:09:13-08:00 Seventy-six-year-old William suffered from a lifelong mental disability. William's brother Robert and sister Jeanne were the sole trustees of a trust established by William's mother to support William. Because Williams had fallen prey to financial scammers, Robert and Jeanne took steps to prevent William from trust money. Thereafter, Robert petitioned for appointment as William's guardian, and Jeanne cross-petitioned seeking to be appointed as William's guardian and conservator. The district court dismissed Robert's petition as a sanction for his failure to appear at a pretrial conference and temporarily appointed Jeanne as William's guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Robert's guardianship petition; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in disposing of Robert's motions to submit the case to mediation and to quash the proposed order dismissing Robert's petition; and (3) the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Robert's petition to disqualify the presiding judge. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bratton" on Justia Law 2014-07-08 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Michael K. Davis S-13-0226 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93872.html Ivie v. Smith 2014-07-08T11:11:13-08:00 2014-10-01T16:08:52-08:00 In 2002, three months after she married her fourth husband, Patricia Watson created a trust that left substantially all of her property to her half siblings. The trust expressly stated that Watson's husband, Arnold Smith, would not receive any part of the trust estate. Thereafter, Watson's mental health began deteriorating, and in 2007, Watson began making changes to her trust. Watson signed two trust amendments, signed changes to several of her bank and retirement accounts, and signed documents retitling several of her accounts and vehicles. The effect of the changes was that almost all of Watson's personal property passed to Smith when Watson died. After Watson's death, the half siblings filed this action seeking to set aside the trust amendments, beneficiary designations, and property transfers. The circuit court ruled that the changes to the estate plan were void due to a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the circuit court's judgment that Watson lacked testamentary capacity to make the changes to her estate plan and that the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence.View "Ivie v. Smith" on Justia Law 2014-07-08 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Zel M. Fischer SC93872 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2014/s209376.html In re Conservatorship of McQueen 2014-07-07T10:01:13-08:00 2014-10-01T16:08:20-08:00 Plaintiff prevailed at trial in an action for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. After judgment, Plaintiff brought a separate action seeking to prevent or reverse Defendant's transfer of real property to third persons. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to an agreement with Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for costs and attorney fees incurred both on appeal from the elder abuse judgment and in the fraudulent transfer action. The court of appeals concluded that the fees and costs motion was untimely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 685.040. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to attorney fees on appeal from the elder abuse judgment, the motion was not subject to section 685.080 because Plaintiff's efforts in opposing Defendant's appeal were not undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification; and (2) Plaintiff's motion was untimely as to fees incurred enforcing the judgment through the separate fraudulent transfer action because the fees incurred in that action could only be recovered under section 685.040.View "In re Conservatorship of McQueen" on Justia Law 2014-07-07 state California Supreme Court of California Kathryn Werdegar S209376 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130051.html Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. 2014-07-03T14:00:15-08:00 2014-10-01T16:08:03-08:00 The Boys and Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("BGCSA"), sought a writ of mandamus to order the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action filed against it and The Community Foundation of South Alabama by the attorney general of Alabama, Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and Ruff Wilson Youth Organizations, Inc. ("Wilson Inc.") In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators and a principal benefactor of BGCSA, executed a deed transferring to BGCSA approximately 17 acres of real estate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Wilson gave a letter to BGCSA that stated Wilson's intentions and stipulations concerning his gift of the property. The letter stated that BGCSA was "'free to ultimately dispose of this property,'" but that it was Wilson's "'desire and understanding that [BGCSA] will use the proceeds from any such disposition for [BGCSA's] facilities and/or activities in the Fairhope–Point Clear area.'" Wilson died in 1997. In 2010, the Eastern Shore Clubs filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BGCSA. The Eastern Shore Clubs alleged that BGCSA "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds from the sale of the property for its own operations, rather than for the benefit of the Eastern Shore Clubs. In 2012, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered a judgment concluding Wilson's intent was that the Wilson funds should be used for the "exclusive benefit of the Fairhope and Daphne Clubs." The Baldwin Circuit Court ordered the disbursal of the remainder of the Wilson funds. This case was the third action that has come before the Supreme Court arising out the dispute between BGCSA and the Eastern Shore Clubs over the Wilson funds. The Supreme Court concluded Section 6-5-440 compelled dismissal of this case because another action involving the same cause and the same parties ("the Mobile action") was filed first. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its most recent order in this case, and to enter an order dismissing this case. View "Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-03 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Glenn Murdock 1130051 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1110057.html Campbell et al. v. Taylor et al. 2014-07-03T14:00:11-08:00 2014-10-01T16:08:02-08:00 A series of appeals before the Alabama Supreme Court involved a challenge to the disposition of the estate of A.V. Campbell, Sr., who died in 1977. He had at least four children: A.V. Campbell, Jr., William J. Campbell, Sr., Ethel C. Taylor, and Archie Paul Campbell. His will was admitted to probate in 1977; those proceedings languished in the probate court until 2005. During this time, A.V., Jr., and Archie Paul Campbell died. Ethel was ultimately named the executrix of the estate. In 2005, Gladys Campbell, one of Archie Paul Campbell's descendants, filed a petition to remove the probate proceedings to the Baldwin Circuit Court. She alleged, among other things, that Ethel, as the executrix, had failed to have the estate's property devised under the terms of the will. After several hearings, in 2006, the circuit court issued a judgment that, among other things, distributed property according to the testator's will. Specifically, certain property was awarded separately to (1) Ethel, (2) to Paula and Gladys, and (3) to "the heirs at law of William J. Campbell[, Sr.]." Jewel appealed that judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed without issuing an opinion. In 2009, the underlying action was filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court: plaintiffs purported to be the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr. Some plaintiffs participated in the 2005 circuit court action; others did not. This new action was described as a "complaint to set aside judicial decree" and was alleged to be filed "pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action to set aside the 2006 judgment. The plaintiffs contended that, as the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr., they were also heirs of A.V. Campbell, Sr., and were thus entitled to certain ownership interests in the property distributed in the 2005 circuit court action. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that they had not all been "named as parties" in the 2005 circuit court action at the time of the final adjudication," and "not subject to" and "not bound by" the 2006 judgment, and they asked that it be set aside. After various motions and after granting a motion by the defendants to strike certain affidavit testimony filed by plaintiffs, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ethel. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. Proceedings resumed in the trial court; Ethel and the remaining defendants moved for a summary judgment. In case no. 1110057, plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In case no. 1110104, Paula and Gladys cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to strike. In case no. 1110057, Jewel Campbell, Acie A. Campbell, William J. Campbell, Jr., Roy J. Campbell, Eva Campbell, William C. Campbell, Kelly Calvert, and Amanda Givens appealed summary judgment in favor of Ethel C. Taylor, Paula Buettner, Gladys A. Campbell, Jason Bennett, and Mendi Bennett. In case no. 1110104, Paula Buettner and Gladys A. Campbell cross-appealed the denial of their motion to strike certain affidavits filed by plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in case no. 1110057; its holding in case no. 1110057 rendered moot the cross-appeal in case no. 1110104. View "Campbell et al. v. Taylor et al. " on Justia Law 2014-07-03 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama 1110057 1110104 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-1614/13-1614-2014-06-30.html Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. 2014-06-30T08:00:07-08:00 2014-10-01T16:05:48-08:00 Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against four trusts to which their loans and mortgages were assigned in transactions involving the mortgagee bank, and against those trusts' trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that plaintiffs were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the assignment agreements and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims. It is undisputed that in 2009 or 2010, each plaintiff was declared to be in default of his mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings were instituted in connection with the institution of said foreclosure proceedings, the trustee claimed to own each of plaintiff's mortgage and that plaintiffs are not seeking to enjoin foreclosure proceedings. Assuming that these concessions have not rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to defendants' ownership of the loans and entitlement to payments. Plaintiffs neither established constitutional nor prudential standing to pursue the claims they asserted.View "Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law 2014-06-30 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Amalya Lyle Kearse 13-1614 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-12-1029.html In re Rolf H. Brennemann Testamentary Trust 2014-06-27T07:14:24-08:00 2014-10-01T16:05:07-08:00 After Kim Abbott, a beneficiary of her grandfather's trust, learned that the trust had become "non-economical," she filed a complaint against the trustees, alleging that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties to maintain trust records, to properly inform and report to the beneficiaries, and to administer the trust in good faith. The county court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trustees had breached their duty to inform and report but the breach was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Court of Appeals (1) did not err in ultimately concluding that the trustees' breach of their duty was harmless; but (2) erred in concluding that the annual schedule K-1 tax reports were sufficient to reasonably inform beneficiaries of the trust and its administration. Remanded.View "In re Rolf H. Brennemann Testamentary Trust " on Justia Law 2014-06-27 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court William M. Connolly S-12-1029 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130365.html Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust 2014-06-26T13:15:22-08:00 2014-10-01T16:04:30-08:00 Timothy Betz appealed an amended judgment awarding the trustees of the Emelia Hirsch Trust $5,000 plus interest for attorney fees and costs, and an order denying his post-judgment objection to costs and his request for a hearing. In 1994, the "Emelia Hirsch June 9, 1994, Irrevocable Trust" was created, whose beneficiaries were Emelia Hirsch's three children, Carolyn Twite, Marlene Betz, and Duane Hirsch, and Emelia Hirsch's ten grandchildren, including Timothy Betz. The trust became the source of protracted litigation and has divided the family into two factions, with Emelia Hirsch, Carolyn Twite and her children, and Duane Hirsch and his children contending Emelia Hirsch did not intend to create an irrevocable trust and give up control of her property during her lifetime. Marlene Betz and her children, including Timothy Betz, claimed the trust was irrevocable and they were entitled to benefits under the terms of the trust. In 2003, Emelia Hirsch petitioned to dissolve the trust. After further proceedings, Carolyn Twite and Duane Hirsch moved in April 2008 to reform the trust from an irrevocable trust to a revocable trust, with Emelia Hirsch retaining control over the trust property. The district court thereafter granted reformation of the trust after allowing the Betz faction further opportunity to comment or object to the reformation. Upon review of Timothy Betz's appeal of the district court decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment and the order denying Betz's objection. The Court directed him to pay attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 plus double costs for his frivolous appeal. View "Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust" on Justia Law 2014-06-26 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Carol Ronning Kapsner 20130365 http://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2014/111492-consol-w-111961.html In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry 2014-06-25T12:15:17-08:00 2014-10-01T16:03:50-08:00 A daughter was appointed special guardian for her parents. Two lawyers entered an appearance on behalf of the parents and alleged that the parents had selected them as nominated counsel. The daughter sought to be named guardian and then a nephew and niece of the parents sought to be named guardians. Upon agreement of the parties an independent guardian was named. Hearings were held and an order issued that: (1) rejected the two lawyers as nominated counsel for the parents; and (2) denied a motion to reconsider a previous denial of a motion for unsupervised visitation by the nephew and niece and change of guardian to the nephew and niece. The allegedly nominated attorneys commenced an appeal which the Supreme Court retained. The trial court also denied a motion for emergency relief to change supervised visitation. A request for extraordinary relief from supervised visitations was filed during the appeal and the request was consolidated with the appeal. Subpoenas duces tecum were quashed relating to the wards' trusts. An additional request for extraordinary relief was filed during the pendency of the appeal based upon the order quashing the subpoenas, and we treat that proceeding as a companion case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision that nominated counsel had a conflict of interest and were not independent, and that Petitioners failed to show that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its authority when it denied an emergency motion to modify the supervised visitation, and that while the trial court incorrectly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to issue subpoenas duces tecum to a trustee of a ward's trust, it must hold a hearing on the objections to the discovery request and adjudicate which parties are entitled to participate in the discovery and determine whether a sustainable objection to discovery exists pursuant to the Discovery Code. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry" on Justia Law 2014-06-24 state Oklahoma Oklahoma Supreme Court James E. Edmondson 111492 (Consol. w/111961) http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-3954/13-3954-2014-06-25.html Asarco LLC v. Goodwin 2014-06-25T07:30:09-08:00 2014-10-01T16:03:32-08:00 Asarco appealed from the district court's dismissal of its Second Amended Complaint. As part of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved two settlement agreements related to the environmental contamination of the Everett Smelter and the Monte Cristo Mining area in Washington State. Asarco paid the United States as a result of those settlements and the Port of Everett $50.2 million for costs related to the remediation of the sites. Asarco then sought contribution, directly and as a purported subrogee, from the Trustees of the residuary trust created by the will of John D. Rockefeller Sr. in 1937. At issue was whether, in 2014, the Trustees may be made to contribute to cleanup costs of environmental contamination allegedly caused by corporations controlled by Rockefeller in Washington State between 1892 and 1903. Assuming arguendo that New York law permitted the imposition of liability on testamentary beneficiaries in this instance, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Asarco's contribution claims because they were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and its subrogation claims because Asarco was not a subrogee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Asarco LLC v. Goodwin" on Justia Law 2014-06-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Lynch 13-3954 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-543.html In re Estate of Greb 2014-06-20T06:11:54-08:00 2014-10-01T16:01:41-08:00 Ralph Greb died in 2010. At issue in this case was the distribution of Ralph's estate in kind to two beneficiaries, his son, Richard, and his daughter, Nanette. The county court overruled Richard's and Nanette's objections and approved the proposed distribution of the estate. Nanette appealed and Richard cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court's order of distribution, holding (1) two multiple-party bank accounts were correctly excluded from the probate estate because Nanette failed to meet her burden of proving a lack of survivorship rights; (2) because a corporation dissolved by the state for failure to pay taxes continued as a de facto corporation, Ralph's gifts of corporate stock during his lifetime were not part of his probate estate; and (3) because Nanette was not obligated to pay indebtedness owed to the estate by her spouse, the county court did not err in ordering distribution of the asset in kind to both Richard and Nanette.View "In re Estate of Greb" on Justia Law 2014-06-20 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court William B. Cassel S-13-543 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/115997.html In re the Estate of Powell 2014-06-19T08:04:41-08:00 2014-10-01T16:00:36-08:00 Powell was adjudicated a disabled adult due to severe mental disabilities in 1997. His parents, Perry and Leona, were appointed as co-guardians of Powell's person, but were not appointed as guardians of his estate. In 1999, Perry died following surgery. Leona engaged the Wunsch law firm to bring a claim against the doctors and hospital, Leona was appointed special administratrix of Perry's estate. Wunsch filed a complaint under the Wrongful Death Act on behalf of Leona individually and as administratrix estate. The estate's only asset was the lawsuit. A 2005 settlement, after attorney fees and costs, amounted to $15,000, which was distributed equally between Leona, Emma (the couple's daughter) and Powell. The settlement order provided that Powell's share was to be paid to Leona on Powell's behalf. Leona placed both shares into a joint account. The probate court was not notified. Wunsch had referred the action to attorney Webb, for continued litigation. Emma waived her rights under a second settlement, Leona and Powell each received $118,000. A check was deposited into the joint account. The order did not provide that Powell's was to be administered under supervision of the probate court and Powell did not have a guardian of his estate. Wunsch purportedly advised that it was "too much trouble" to go through the probate court for funds every time Leona needed money for Powell. In 2008, Emma petitioned to remove Leona as guardian of Powell's person. The probate court appointed Emma as guardian of Powell's person and the public guardian as guardian of his estate. Leona had withdrawn all but $26,000 and provided no accounting. The public guardian sued the attorneys and Leona. The trial court dismissed as to the attorneys, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege defendants owed Powell a duty and to allege proximate cause. The appellate court determined that an attorney retained by a special administrator of an estate to bring a wrongful death action for the benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin owed a fiduciary duty to those beneficiaries and remanded, with respect to the second settlement. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re the Estate of Powell" on Justia Law 2014-06-19 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Charles E. Freeman 115997 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27401.html Dean v. Heritage Healthcare 2014-06-18T07:15:39-08:00 2014-10-01T15:59:59-08:00 Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law 2014-06-18 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Jean H. Toal 27401 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/13-5103/13-5103-2014-06-10.html Liftin v. United States 2014-06-10T08:31:39-08:00 2014-10-01T15:56:42-08:00 Liftin died in 2003, survived by his wife, then a citizen of Bolivia, and his son, John, who became the executor of the estate. Although John is an attorney, he retained his former law partner, who practiced tax planning. The executor had to file a federal estate-tax return, Form 706, 26 U.S.C. 6018(a), within nine months after the date of death. The statute authorizes an extension for no more than 6 months, 26 U.S.C. 6081(a). The executor obtained an extension so that the new deadline to file and to pay the tax was June 2, 2004. There were uncertainties regarding the marital deduction, 26 U.S.C. 2056(a), which is available if a surviving spouse is a citizen or becomes a citizen before the day on which the return is made. Mrs. Liftin began the process of applying for citizenship in February 2004. The estate was also engaged in litigation with Mrs. Liftin relating to her rights under a prenuptial agreement. Neither uncertainty had been resolved as of June 2, 2004. In January 2004 John made an estimated payment of $877,300, sufficient to cover the taxes due even if the estate could not claim the marital deduction. John relied on his attorney's advice that "a late Form 706 could be filed after the extended due date" without identifying any basis for delaying filing. In 2005, Mrs. Liftin became a citizen. John, did not file the estate-tax return until 2006, when Mrs. Liftin and the estate settled their litigation. The return stated a tax liability of $678,572.25, entitling the estate to a refund of $198,727.75. The IRS assessed a $135,714.45 late-filing penalty under 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1). The Claims Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Liftin v. United States" on Justia Law 2014-06-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Richard Gary Taranto 13-5103 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-75.html Estate of O'Brien-Hamel 2014-06-10T08:10:26-08:00 2014-10-01T15:56:46-08:00 Ruth married Donald on the same day that she executed a will. Ruth died the following day. Donald was appointed personal representative, and the will was informally admitted to probate. Jennifer, Ruth's daughter, filed a petition for a formal adjudication of intestacy and for her appointment as personal representative, alleging that Ruth lacked the capacity to execute the will. The probate court denied Jennifer's petition and admitted the will to probate, concluding that Donald sustained his burden of showing due execution of the will and that Jennifer failed to prove the absence of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and did not err in finding that Ruth had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will.View "Estate of O'Brien-Hamel" on Justia Law 2014-06-10 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Warren M. Silver http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/13-1900/13-1900-2014-06-06.html Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC 2014-06-06T11:30:40-08:00 2014-10-01T15:55:54-08:00 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal with prejudice of their Maryland quiet title claim. Where, as here, a property is encumbered by a deed of trust and its release is conditioned on a party's performance under a note, determining who holds title to the property necessarily involves determining whether the party has performed under the note. Therefore, the court could not decouple the questions of plaintiffs' personal liability and the security interest in the property. In this case, plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of a quiet title action because they are not authorized by statute to resolve clouds on a legal title which they do not own. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court also held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-06-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Allyson Kay Duncan 13-1900 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130114.html Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough 2014-06-06T09:00:27-08:00 2014-10-01T15:56:12-08:00 The State of Alabama, the Alabama Department of Finance, and the Comptroller of the State of Alabama, nonparties to the underlying action, appealed a circuit court order denying the State's motion to intervene as of right. Mrs. Frances Ann Yarbrough died intestate with no heirs that were in the line of descendant distribution. As a result, her assets escheated to the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court ordered the Estate to pay certain expenses of the Estate, and then to pay the balance of the Estate's funds to the State of Alabama. In that same order, the Court ordered the State of Alabama to pay the escheated funds to the St. Clair County's Circuit Clerk's office to be used by the Clerk 'to rehire some of the employees lost to proration.' The State, through its counsel Mr. Bledsoe, stated that the Estate's escheated funds must be used or applied in furtherance of education in accordance with the Alabama Constitution.Through counsel, Mr. Bledsoe, declared that there was no objection to disbursing the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. Based on that representation, the Estate moved the Supreme Court to Alter, Amend, or Vacate its earlier order to direct the State to pay the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. The State objected to the Supreme Court's order. In turn, the Supreme Court treated the objection as a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, filed it with the circuit clerk, and set the matter for a hearing. Because the State was not a party to this matter, the State did not receive direct notice of the hearing. The Estate's counsel, Ms. Williams, however, provided the State notice of the hearing by e-mail to Mr. Bledsoe. The State did not appear at the hearing, and the Supreme Court denied the relief requested by the State. The circuit court then denied the State's motion to intervene. Because the circuit court failed to follow the Supreme Court's order, it reversed the circuit court's order denying the State's motion to intervene. "The circuit court exceeded its authority in attempting to appropriate the escheated funds." All issues having been decided on both the motion to intervene and the underlying action, a judgment was rendered for the State. View "Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough" on Justia Law 2014-06-06 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Tom Parker 1130114 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/120800.html In re Estate of Waterman 2014-06-06T07:03:30-08:00 2014-10-01T15:55:49-08:00 The administrators of Decedent's estate listed residential real estate for sale. Decedent's common law spouse objected to the proposed sale, claiming it was her marital home. The district court recognized the surviving spouses's common law rights but nonetheless approved the sale. The buyers took possession and made improvements to the home. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for consideration of the homestead interest of the spouse. On remand, the district court gave the surviving spouse the option of taking possession of the home upon paying the buyers a substantial part of the cost of their improvements to the home or receiving the proceeds from the estate's sale of the real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the surviving spouse could retake possession upon payment of the approximate value of the home before the improvements were made less any credit to which she was entitled from the buyers for rent during the period the spouse had been dispossessed; and (2) the spouse could transfer title to the buyers and receive the proceeds from the estate's sale of the home plus credit for rent from the date of the conveyance to the buyers until the date of judgment.View "In re Estate of Waterman" on Justia Law 2014-06-06 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Daryl L. Hecht 120800 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/12-1541.html Cyfers v. Cyfers 2014-06-05T12:17:55-08:00 2014-10-01T15:55:30-08:00 Before she died, Decedent executed a Will. The Will had an "Exhibit A" attached to it at the time the Will was submitted to probate. The exhibit set forth bequests made by Decedent to various relatives. Both Exhibit A and the Will contained handwritten notices. After a dispute arose between the co-executors of the Will and some of the beneficiaries of the Will concerning the administration of Decedent's estate, the co-executors filed a petition for declaratory relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the beneficiaries, concluding (1) Exhibit A to the Will was properly incorporated by reference into the Will; (2) the handwritten notations found on the Will and Exhibit A that were made after the date the Will was executed were "surplusage" and could be disregarded; and (3) Decedent intended Exhibit A to be incorporated into the Will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to allow Exhibit A to be incorporated by reference into the Will.View "Cyfers v. Cyfers" on Justia Law 2014-06-05 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Margaret L. Workman 12-1541 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/131283.html Bartee v. Vitocruz 2014-06-05T07:15:23-08:00 2014-10-01T15:55:26-08:00 After Tonia Begley died, Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley qualified as co-administrators of Begley's estate. Wiley Begley subsequently died. Thereafter, Bartee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against an emergency department physician. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that Bartee lacked standing to sue alone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bartee had standing to file the action under the doctrine of survivorship because the power of appointment given to Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators of the estate to prosecute a wrongful death action could be exercised by Bartee as the sole remaining survivor. Remanded.View "Bartee v. Vitocruz" on Justia Law 2014-06-05 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Elizabeth A. Lacy 131283 http://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2014/82s01-1305-ct-363.html Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc. 2014-06-03T07:03:46-08:00 2014-10-01T15:54:45-08:00 In November 2006, The Good Samaritan Home, a nursing home where Venita Hargis was living, told Hargis's family that Hargis had suffered a fall. Hargis died later that month as a result of the injury she sustained in the alleged fall. In November 2009, Hargis's family discovered that Hargis's injury had been caused by an attack from another resident and not by a fall. In October 2011, Hargis's Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against Good Samaritan, alleging that Good Samaritan negligently caused Hargis's death and then fraudulently concealed its negligence. Good Samaritan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to the Estate's failure to file the action within two years of Hargis's death. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that fraudulent concealment does not extend or delay the two-year statutory period to file a wrongful death action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a plaintiff makes the necessary factual showing, the fraudulent concealment statute may apply to toll the Wrongful Death Act's two-year filing period.View "Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-06-03 state Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana Mark S. Massa 82S01-1305-CT-363 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1110353.html Beasley v. Poellnitz 2014-05-30T10:00:12-08:00 2014-10-01T15:54:02-08:00 Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer and the estate of Emma Glass Beasley appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages on mismanagement-of-trust and conversion claims in an action by William Poellnitz, as administrator of the estate of Edwin Glass Young, Adele Young Sommers, and Willard Young. The Beasleys raised five issues on appeal: (1) it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on the mismanagement-of-trust claim; (2) it was entitled to a JML on the conversion claim; (3) punitive damages were not warranted, or in the alternative, the trial court improperly apportioned the punitive damages and that they were excessive and must be vacated or remitted; (4) it was entitled to a JML on the Youngs claim to a one-half ownership interest in the furnishings and heirlooms from the estate or to a reduction of the value of those furnishings and heirlooms; and (5) it was entitled to a JML on all of its counterclaims for moneys loaned to the Youngs. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the Beasleys motions for a JML as to the mismanagement-of-trust claim. The Court also reversed the award of punitive damages with respect to that claim. The trial court also erred in denying the motion for a JML filed by Emma's estate as to the conversion claim. The Court affirmed as to the conversion claim against Mary, including the amount of the compensatory damages awarded the Youngs on that claim. However, because there was no clear and convincing evidence that Mary "consciously and deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice," the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages on the conversion claim against Mary, as well as against Emma's estate. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the Young branch's one-half interest in the furnishings and heirlooms in the house and on the Beasleys counterclaims for money loaned. View "Beasley v. Poellnitz" on Justia Law 2014-05-30 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama James Allen Main 1110353 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-22.html Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni 2014-05-30T09:38:25-08:00 2014-10-01T15:53:59-08:00 Decedent established a Trust that required, upon Decedent's death, the trustee to distribute a parcel of land to the trustee and to distribute the remainder of the land to Decedent's children. The Trust filed a complaint for eviction for unlawfully holding over after the termination of tenancy against Defendants, Decedent's children. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Trust. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Trust was not a landlord and Defendants were not tenants, but rather, tenants in common with the trustee. Therefore, Defendants argued, an action for eviction could not lie. The superior court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the Trust lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court did have jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment matters, and therefore, the motion justice erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the issue of standing.View "Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni" on Justia Law 2014-05-30 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court 13-22 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-73.html In re Estate of Weatherbee 2014-05-29T08:10:03-08:00 2014-10-01T15:53:27-08:00 Michael Weatherbee brought litigation to recover money misappropriated by his sister, Peggy McPike, while she was handling their parents' money before their deaths. The superior court entered judgment in favor of the parents' estates in the amount of $92,400 in restitution. The probate court subsequently directed that Weatherbee be compensated of the estates for attorney fees and expenses. McPike appealed, claiming, among other things, that the probate court erred in applying the common fund doctrine to require that attorney fees be paid by the estates. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that neither the common fund doctrine nor the Probate Code nor any other equitable exception to the American Rule provided a basis for the award of attorney fees out of the estates.View "In re Estate of Weatherbee" on Justia Law 2014-05-29 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Leigh Ingalls Saufley