text: Real Estate & Property Law - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/real-estate-property-law/ 2014-11-28T21:07:19-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://law.justia.com/sites/law.justia.com/files/justia_law_theme_logo.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/c073173.html Van Horn v. Dept. Toxic Substances Control 2014-11-26T12:00:53-08:00 2014-11-26T21:11:41-08:00 Plaintiff/Petitioner owned a 64-acre site in Jackson, California (comprised of five assessor parcel numbers), which included an 11-acre portion of (historical) arsenopyrite mine tailings, known as "Tim's Corner" (the property is also known as the Argonaut Mine Tailings Site). In 1998, the Department of Toxic Substances Control, after testing, constructed a fence around plaintiff's property and posted a lien for $245,306.64. In November 2007, the Department made an imminent or substantial endangerment determination concerning the property. Plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing to contest this determination; no hearing was provided, but the Department sent plaintiff a letter explaining the basis of this determination. Without notice to plaintiff, the Department secured two property inspection warrants, one in 2008 and another in 2010. In early February 2011, the Department advised plaintiff that it intended to update and increase its lien from $245,306.64 to $833,368.19. The Department also advised plaintiff, for the first time, of a right to a hearing concerning the placement of the lien on her property. On February 17, 2011, plaintiff, in a letter to the Department, requested a hearing on four issues, the propriety of the lien increase, the amount of the lien increase, the properties covered by the lien and additional information the Department obtained to justify the work performed. The Department did not provide a hearing as requested. Plaintiff then sued, seeking a writ of mandate to require the Department to hold the hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded that the procedure the Department used to deny plaintiff's appeal violated due process; its lien procedure failed to allow an affected landowner to dispute the amount of the lien, the extent of the property burdened by the lien and the characterization of the landowner as the responsible party.View "Van Horn v. Dept. Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law 2014-11-26 state California California Court of Appeal M. Kathleen Butz C073173 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b250709.html People v. $2,709 U.S. Currency 2014-11-26T12:00:50-08:00 2014-11-26T13:20:04-08:00 Defendant was charged with two felony counts of possessing cocaine for sale and the People filed a petition to forfeit the $2,709 in cash found in her possession. Defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the civil forfeiture order because the forfeiture action was "tried" more than two years after she entered her plea, in violation of the statutory mandate that the two actions be "tried in conjunction" with each other; and the trial court's grant of summary judgment violated her constitutional and statutory right to trial by jury. The court rejected defendant's arguments, holding that a civil action to forfeit less than $25,000 cash need not be tried or otherwise settled at the same time that the criminal defendant enters a plea on the "underlying or related" criminal drug charges. Further, defendant's right to a jury trial was not violated where, in this civil forfeiture action, defendant did not raise any procedural improprieties in the trial court's handling of the summary judgment motion, or its earlier order deeming admitted the People's requests for admission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "People v. $2,709 U.S. Currency" on Justia Law 2014-11-26 state California California Court of Appeal Brian M. Hoffstadt B250709 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1131078.html Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. First Tuskegee Bank 2014-11-26T10:00:11-08:00 2014-11-27T04:37:40-08:00 Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. ("TCVH"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of First Tuskegee Bank on breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims stemming from a construction loan TCVH received from First Tuskegee in September 2004. The gravamen of those claims was that TCVH was injured by First Tuskegee's alleged insistence that TCVH use PJ Construction as the general contractor on the project although PJ Construction was not licensed as a general contractor in Alabama, that PJ Construction's work product was below what one would expect from a properly licensed general contractor, and that using PJ Construction resulted in delays, cost overruns, and, TCVH argued, the ultimate failure of its business. However, because TCVH's claims accrued in approximately July 2005 and TCVH did not formally assert them until after it initiated this action in April 2009, those claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that governed them. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of First Tuskegee was affirmed.View "Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. First Tuskegee Bank " on Justia Law 2014-11-26 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Lyn Stuart 1131078 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130480.html Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. 2014-11-26T10:00:09-08:00 2014-11-27T04:37:34-08:00 In 2004, Paint Rock Turn, LLC purchased a sod farm and related farm equipment. To partially finance the purchase, Paint Rock borrowed $1,706,250 from First Jackson Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the sod farm and a security interest in the equipment used on the farm. By February 2009, reflecting in part a drop in demand for sod caused by the collapsing market for new homes, Paint Rock had defaulted on the loan. In early 2009, Paint Rock filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The filing of the petition operated as an automatic stay and precluded First Jackson from foreclosing on the sod farm or retaking the equipment. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed later that year, and a few months later, First Jackson moved forward with its intent to foreclose by publishing the first of three notices of a foreclosure sale on the Paint Rock property. On the morning of the scheduled sale, Paint Rock filed a second bankruptcy petition, which stayed the sale. This second petition was dismissed a month later for failure to file the proper schedules and statements. First Jackson published another notice that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled for December 30, 2009. December 26, Paint Rock filed a third bankruptcy petition. Four days later, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, expressly finding that Paint Rock misused the bankruptcy process to "hinder and delay First Jackson's efforts to foreclose its mortgage and security agreement." First Jackson was the high bidder at the sale, purchased the property, and sent Paint Rock a letter demanding possession of the sod farm. In early 2010, First Jackson filed an ejectment action. The same day, Paint Rock demanded access to the farm to recover "emblements in the form of sod which is being grown on the real property recently foreclosed upon ...." Paint Rock also requested the return of its equipment. First Jackson denied Paint Rock's request. Paint Rock, relying on a section of the Alabama Code that permits a tenant at will to harvest its crop, counterclaimed for damages for harm suffered as the result of being unable to harvest the sod. Paint Rock also sought damages for conversion of "plats of sod" contained on the sod farm. First Jackson sold the sod farm to Mrs. Goodson, subject to any claim Paint Rock may have to the emblements growing on the property. Paint Rock filed a joint third-party complaint against First Jackson and Mr. and Mrs. Goodson, alleging conversion and detinue, as well as the emblements claim. After the trial court denied motions for a summary judgment filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Paint Rock and Jones's case, the trial court granted a motion for a JML filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons on Paint Rock's counterclaim for emblements on the ground that Paint Rock was not an at-will tenant. After Paint Rock withdrew its detinue claims and the trial court granted a JML on the wantonness claims, leaving only the conversion and negligence claims. The jury awarded Paint Rock damages against First Jackson for conversion of a sod cutter and cut sod that had been loaded on a tractor-trailer when First Jackson took possession of the property. The jury also awarded Paint Rock damages against the Goodsons for conversion of business property and equipment. Paint Rock appealed the JML in favor of the defendants on the emblements claim; First Jackson cross-appealed the judgment awarding Paint Rock damages for conversion of the cut sod. The Supreme Court affirmed with regard to Paint Rock's emblements claim, but reversed on the conversion of the cut sod claim.View "Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. " on Justia Law 2014-11-26 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Roy S. Moore 1130480 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0022.html City of Helena v. Svee 2014-11-25T16:02:22-08:00 2014-11-25T19:30:31-08:00 Section 11-41-2 of the Helena City Code (the Ordinance) places limitations on roofing materials used on structures located within the wildland-urban interface (WUI) district. The City filed suit against homeowners whose property was situated within the WUI zoning district (Homeowners), alleging violation of the Ordinance. Homeowners answered the complaint and petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeowners, concluding that the Ordinance was a building regulation, and the City was not authorized to adopt building regulations under the guise of a zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that the Ordinance was an impermissible building code and not a zoning ordinance; (2) erred by concluding that Homeowners were ineligible for an award of attorney fees; and (3) did not err by denying and dismissing Homeowners' constitutional arguments.View "City of Helena v. Svee" on Justia Law 2014-11-25 state Montana Montana Supreme Court James A. Rice DA 14-0022 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0161.html Wohl v. City of Missoula 2014-11-25T16:02:20-08:00 2014-11-25T19:01:02-08:00 After the City decided to undertake road improvements along South Avenue in Missoula, Montana, Plaintiffs, a group of landowners who owned property along South Avenue, contested the City's assessment of the width of the right-of-way on a section of the street. The district court concluded that the City's actions constituted a taking. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a redetermination of damages. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing asking the Court to award both attorney's fees and costs incurred for the appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On remand, Plaintiffs agreed to reduce their "taken property" value and asked the district court to assess both attorney's fees and costs against the City for the appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal and awarded them appellate attorney's fees and costs. The City appealed, arguing that the Court's refusal to award fees in its order on rehearing constituted "law of the case." The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award of appellate attorney's fees and costs, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be made whole through an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law 2014-11-25 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Patricia O'Brien Cotter DA 14-0161 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2014/scap-13-0000091.html DW Aina Le'a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC 2014-11-25T14:02:17-08:00 2014-11-26T05:48:10-08:00 In 1989, land in Waikoloa on Hawai'i Island was reclassified from agricultural to urban to allow for the development of a residential community. The reclassification was made subject certain conditions. The land changed hands several time over the years. In 2009, the landowner, Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC (Bridge), informed the Land Use Commission (LUC) that it intended to assign its interest in the land to DW Aina Le'a Development, LLC (DW). DW subsequently invested approximately $20 million in developing the site. Nevertheless, the LUC voted to revert the land to its former agricultural land use classification on the basis that Bridge and its predecessors in interest had failed to perform according to the conditions imposed. Bridge and DW each sought judicial review of the LUC's decision and order. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that the LUC erred in reverting the property without complying with the requirements of Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-4; and (2) erred in concluding that Bridge's and DW's procedural and substantive due process rights and equal protection rights were violated.View "DW Aina Le'a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-11-25 state Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii Mark E. Recktenwald SCAP-13-0000091 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b244652.html Regent Alliance v. Rabizadeh 2014-11-25T14:01:01-08:00 2014-11-25T20:13:28-08:00 Regent filed suit against buyer defendants, alleging that they purchased and resold converted property - children's clothing - from other defendants, against which the complaint also alleged conversion. The trial court granted buyer defendants' motions for summary judgment. Buyer defendants concede that they purchased converted goods, of which Regent was the true owner. Buyer defendants argue that the general rule of strict liability does not exist and that, to the contrary, innocent purchasers of converted goods cannot be held liable for conversion. The court held that bona fide purchasers of converted goods are ordinarily liable for conversion; the cases cited by buyer defendants and the Superior Court do not support buyer defendants' contention that innocent purchasers of converted goods cannot be liable for conversion; and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded.View "Regent Alliance v. Rabizadeh" on Justia Law 2014-11-25 state California California Court of Appeal Frances Rothschild B244652 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/14-1043/14-1043-2014-11-25.html Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc. 2014-11-25T12:30:02-08:00 2014-11-25T22:39:35-08:00 Plaintiff and his wife purchased a home in Massachusetts that was encumbered by a mortgage. The mortgage was eventually assigned to Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Defendant ultimately invoked its statutory power of sale and sent a notice of foreclosure sale to Plaintiff's home address. Plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all counts and denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, holding that none of the grounds advanced by Plaintiff for reversal of the district court's denial of reconsideration warranted relief.View "Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-11-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Stahl 14-1043 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2014/86-2014.html Black v. Justice of the Peace Court 13, et al. 2014-11-25T11:01:54-08:00 2014-11-25T15:28:47-08:00 In late 2013, when Paul Taylor filed a complaint seeking back rent and possession of a home he rented to James David and Elisabeth Black. Justice of the Peace Court 13 ordered an expedited summary possession trial under 25 Del. C. 5115. The Blacks appealed a Superior Court order denying their petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that Justice of the Peace Court 13 proceeded contrary to law and denied the Blacks due process of law when it issued a forthwith summons under 25 Del. C. 5115 absent satisfaction of the statutory requirements for issuance of that summons. Furthermore, the Blacks argued the record showed that Justice of the Peace Court 13 proceeded irregularly because it created no record regarding the basis for its issuance of the forthwith summons. The Supreme Court concluded that both of the Blacks' contentions were meritorious, and reversed the Superior Court. The case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Black v. Justice of the Peace Court 13, et al." on Justia Law 2014-11-25 state Delaware Delaware Supreme Court Randy J. Holland 86, 2014 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b250728.html Ben-Shahar v. Pickart 2014-11-24T12:00:44-08:00 2014-11-24T12:40:13-08:00 After defendants purchased the building where plaintiff was living in a rent-controlled apartment, defendants served plaintiff with a 60-day notice to quit. Plaintiff subsequently initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against defendants and then filed a complaint alleging several state claims. Plaintiff sought an order restoring him to his apartment, restitution, damages, and attorney fees. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16 special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint because their conduct was protected litigation activity. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees in defending the motion. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint was not directed at protected activity. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendants' motion was frivolous, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and if so, the amount of such fees.View "Ben-Shahar v. Pickart" on Justia Law 2014-11-24 state California California Court of Appeal Johnson B250728 B251417 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-79.html Breggia v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. 2014-11-21T08:47:36-08:00 2014-11-21T21:39:43-08:00 Plaintiffs executed a promissory note in order to purchase certain real property. To secure payment obligations under the note, Plaintiffs executed a mortgage on the property. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for the original lender, assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), which was then authorized to service the note for Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). When Plaintiffs failed to make timely payments, OneWest initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs filed an action against MERS and OneWest seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to OneWest was invalid and to quiet title to the property. OneWest eventually held a sale, and the property was sold to Fannie Mae. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) MERS validly assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest, and therefore, OneWest had the statutory power of sale; (2) Plaintiffs defaulted under the terms of the note; and (3) Fannie Mae, as the buyer at the foreclosure sale, held the record title to the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed such that granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants was appropriate.View "Breggia v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law 2014-11-21 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Gilbert V. Indeglia 13-79 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2013-419.html Ring v. Carriage House Condominium Owners' Association 2014-11-21T08:07:44-08:00 2014-11-22T04:11:24-08:00 This appeal ended a longstanding feud stemming from plaintiff David Ring's renovation of his condominium units, resulting in multiple legal proceedings and several superior court decisions. Ring argued in this appeal that the superior court erred in awarding him only a fraction of his requested attorney's fees after determining, after a lengthy bench trial, that defendants the condominium owners' association and some of its individual members had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the parties' earlier settlement agreement. He also argued that the court erred in denying his request for pre-litigation attorney's fees and prejudgment interest. Defendant Donna Beck cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in assessing punitive damages against defendants and holding her liable for punitive damages attributable to her deceased husband, defendant Edward Morrison, based on her real estate partnership with him. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the superior court's decisions.View "Ring v. Carriage House Condominium Owners' Association" on Justia Law 2014-11-21 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Marilyn S. Skoglund 2013-419 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2013-277.html Hayes v. Town of Manchester 2014-11-21T08:07:43-08:00 2014-11-22T04:11:21-08:00 The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved the power of a court to require an estate to create a trust to satisfy potential future claims against the estate, as well as the proper application of the dead man's statutes. Developers of a residential subdivision died, triggering various claims by and against their estates relating to the estates' responsibilities for the subdivision's private roadway, water, and sewer infrastructure. The Town of Manchester appealed a superior court decision denying the Town's request that the court create a trust from the assets of the estates to pay for repairs, maintenance, and improvements to the subdivision's sewer system to protect the Town's water supply. A group of homeowners separately appealed the trial court's denial of their request for a ruling that the estates had a legal obligation to dedicate the infrastructure to the Town and, until that happened, to maintain the infrastructure at their expense. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments and the applicable statutes and Vermont case law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's refusal to create the trust requested by the Town, but reversed the court's denial of the homeowners' request for a ruling on their claims. The case was remanded for reconsideration of those claims based on the evidence, including evidence that the trial court previously excluded under the dead man's statute, to determine whether an enforceable promise was made concerning maintenance of the infrastructure pending its dedication to the Town.View "Hayes v. Town of Manchester" on Justia Law 2014-11-21 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Beth Robinson 2013-277 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2014-102.html Goodrum v. Vermont Department of Taxes 2014-11-21T08:07:41-08:00 2014-11-22T04:11:18-08:00 Petitioners Garfield and Lucille Goodrum owned 41.54 acres in Reading; all but two acres of land surrounding their home was enrolled in the UVA Program as undeveloped forest land. The Goodrums formed Turtle Hill Farm of Vermont Animal Sanctuary, Inc. (THF), a non-profit corporation whose mission is to rescue, rehabilitate, foster, and adopt out animals, including horses, chickens, rabbits, and guinea pigs. The Goodrums leased four barns and two sheds to THF. THF is funded almost exclusively by donations, which it uses to cover its operating expenses. Most of the donations come from the Goodrums. In 2010, the Goodrums applied to enroll the barns and sheds leased to THF in the UVA Program, which would exempt the buildings from property taxation, but the Department of Taxes Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) determined that the buildings were ineligible. The Goodrums appealed to the Director of PVR, who also determined that the buildings were ineligible. The Goodrums then appealed to the superior court, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted PVR's motion, concluding that the buildings are not eligible for enrollment because THF did not operate for gain or profit and is therefore not a farmer under 32 V.S.A. 3752(7). The Goodrums appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Goodrum v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law 2014-11-21 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court John A. Dooley 2014-102 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2014-049.html In re Goddard College Conditional Use, Goddard College Act 250 Reconsideration 2014-11-21T08:07:08-08:00 2014-11-22T04:11:16-08:00 This case raised the issue of whether Act 250 required consideration of alternative siting in every case in which a party objects to a proposed land-use project on aesthetic grounds, pursuant to 10 V.S.A. 6086(a)(8), without regard to the presence of competent evidence supporting alternative siting as a reasonable mitigating measure. Goddard College obtained an Act 250 permit from District Environmental Commission No. 5 in 2012, authorizing it to replace individual oil-fired systems in each of twenty-three campus buildings with a new central woodchip boiler system on its campus in Plainfield. Appellant-neighbor Karen Bouffard challenged the Superior Court's grant of the Act 250 permit, arguing that the court failed to properly consider measures to mitigate the aesthetic impact of the project by siting it elsewhere on the college property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "In re Goddard College Conditional Use, Goddard College Act 250 Reconsideration" on Justia Law 2014-11-21 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Beth Robinson 2014-049 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2013-346.html In re Carrigan Conditional Use and Certificate of Compliance, Certificate of Occupancy, Certificate of Compliance 2014-11-21T08:07:07-08:00 2014-11-22T04:11:14-08:00 Neighbors Barbara Supeno and Barbara J. Ernst appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the Town of Addison Development Review Board's (DRB) grant of certificates of occupancy for two detached decks and a conditional use permit for an enclosed deck to applicants Linda and John Carrigan for improvements to applicants' seasonal camp on Lake Champlain. At the heart of this dispute was a series of decks that applicants constructed on their property and the efforts of the Town to bring the decks into compliance with the current zoning bylaws. Applicants' seasonal camp was located on Lake Champlain in the Town of Addison's Shoreland Residential (SR) District. Applicants purchased their property in 1984 and shortly thereafter built an attached, uncovered deck on the west side of the camp, facing Lake Champlain, adding ten feet in length to the footprint of the camp. Applicants then replaced an existing concrete platform, retaining wall, and set of stairs located on a slope down to the lakeshore, and added some decking behind the wall. As a result, applicants arguably had two decks within the setback area. In 2003, applicants applied for and received a permit to build a roof over the uncovered deck that was attached to the west side of the camp. Applicants also enclosed the deck by adding walls. In 2010, applicants applied for and received a permit to construct a detached, "standalone deck" on the west side of the camp, abutting the now-enclosed attached deck. The permit application did not disclose the presence of the decking that applicants had placed behind the retaining wall when they reconstructed the concrete platform and stairs in the 1980s. In 2011, neighbors notified the ZA that the standalone deck violated section 2.3(F)(7)(a) of the bylaws, which limited the number of detached decks an applicant could construct within the SR District. They argued that the decking behind the retaining wall constituted a "deck" and that therefore the standalone deck on the west side of the camp was not allowed under the bylaws. Applicants removed the decking from behind the retaining wall to comply with the bylaws. The ZA later discovered that, when constructed, the standalone deck was in fact attached and advised applicants to cut through the connecting boards to create a freestanding structure. The DRB then granted a certificate of occupancy for this deck (the environmental court's affirmance of this certificate of occupancy was another issue on appeal). Neighbors filed this appeal, arguing that the environmental court erred in affirming the DRB's grant of certificates of occupancy for the detached decks and a conditional use permit for the enclosed deck. Neighbors also argued the actions of the ZA and DRB directly contravened state and local policies protecting sensitive shoreland areas and lakes. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the certificates of occupancy and reversed on the grant of the conditional use permit.View "In re Carrigan Conditional Use and Certificate of Compliance, Certificate of Occupancy, Certificate of Compliance" on Justia Law 2014-11-21 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court John A. Dooley 2013-346 2013-347 2013-348 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/14-1195/14-1195-2014-11-20.html Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon 2014-11-20T13:30:04-08:00 2014-11-20T19:01:32-08:00 At issue in this case was whether New Hampshire law requires a foreclosing entity to hold both mortgage and note before it can exercise a power of sale under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 479:25, which authorizes a mortgagee to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure where, as in this case, the mortgage document contains a clause allowing them. Plaintiff executed a promissory note and a mortgage. The note and mortgage document and the note were subsequently assigned to different entities. After Plaintiff failed to make mortgage payments, Defendant, the mortgagee, moved to foreclose. Defendant removed the case from New Hampshire state court to federal court. The district court allowed Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the parties' intent to separate the mortgage and note at the beginning of the transaction trumped any common law rule requiring unity, and thus, Defendant could proceed with the foreclosure under section 479:25. Plaintiff appealed. Because controlling state precedent did not provide definitive guidance on how to resolve the questions of whether the common law or state statute mandates the unity of a mortgage and note, and if so, whether parties can override that rule by agreement, the First Circuit certified the questions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.View "Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law 2014-11-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Jeffrey R. Howard 14-1195 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/88575-3.html Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston 2014-11-20T09:07:28-08:00 2014-11-20T19:09:03-08:00 In the 1980s, Charles Spencer and George Livingston formed a partnership to develop and sell property in rural Lincoln County near the confluence of Lake Roosevelt and the Spokane River. Over the next 20 years, the partnership and its successors built the Deer Meadows Golf Course Complex (including a golf course, restaurant, hotel, store, and club), platted several nearby parcels of property into subdivisions, and sold lots to private land owners for homes and vacation properties. A plat identifying the golf course was recorded. A local newspaper quoted Spencer as saying he built the golf course complex "so it would help sell the residential lots around here," and the lots were advertised accordingly. Ownership of the unsold lots and the golf course changed forms and hands over time. After Spencer passed away and after most of the lots were sold, Livingston closed down the golf course complex and began the process of platting the course into new residential lots. Many of those who had bought homes in the various subdivisions developed by Spencer and Livingston believed they had been promised that the golf course complex would remain a permanent fixture of their community, and relied on that promise when they made the decision to purchase their respective homes. Some of those homeowners formed the Riverview Community Group, which filed this lawsuit seeking to bar the defendants from selling off the former golf course as individual homes. Riverview sought to impose an equitable servitude on the golf course property that would limit its use to a golf course or, if that was untenable, for other equitable relief. It also sought injunctive relief. The trial judge issued a memorandum decision granting the Livingstons' motion under CR 12(b )(7) for failure to join indispensable parties. The following month, the trial court issued an order stating that "the legal issue of whether an equitable servitude can be created by implication is a question of first impression in the State of Washington" and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants to expedite review. The Court of Appeals largely reversed the trial court's legal rulings, finding that Riverview had organizational standing and the individual property owners were not essential parties, and concluding that Washington recognized equitable covenants. However, it affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that it would be "irrational to require the defendants to rebuild and operate a failing business." The Washington Supreme Court granted Riverview's petition for review, affirming most of the Court of Appeals' legal rulings but finding dismissal was based on facts not found in the record. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston" on Justia Law 2014-11-20 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Steven González 88575-3 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2014/180.html Matter of Santiago-Monteverde 2014-11-20T07:02:47-08:00 2014-11-20T14:39:19-08:00 Debtor lived in a rent-stabilized apartment for over forty years. Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her unexpired rent-stabilized lease as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate under N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law 282(2) as a "local public assistance benefit." The bankruptcy court struck the claimed exemption, concluding that the value of the lease did not qualify as an exempt local public assistance benefit. The district court affirmed. Debtor appealed, arguing that the value of her lease was a local public assistance benefit that was exempted from her bankruptcy estate. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the issue. The Court of Appeals answered that section 282(2) exempts a debtor-tenant's interest in a rent-stabilized lease.View "Matter of Santiago-Monteverde" on Justia Law 2014-11-20 state New York New York Court of Appeals Sheila Abdus-Salaam 180 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2014/46-map-2013.html Pennsylvania v. All That Certain Lot et al (Palazzari) 2014-11-19T14:58:25-08:00 2014-11-19T20:18:09-08:00 In 2009, following a joint investigation by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and the Centre County Drug Task Force into cocaine trafficking by appellee Gregory Palazzari, appellee was arrested and charged with multiple drug trafficking offenses under the Controlled Substances, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act). The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the Attorney General's Office petitioned the trial court for forfeiture of Appellee's property located at 605 University Drive, State College pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, alleging that appellee had used the property for the storage and sale of cocaine, as well as a place to meet his drug supplier. In a discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the general applicability of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, specifically, the availability of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2, Pa.R.C.P. in such proceedings. Although the trial court granted forfeiture of the property to the Commonwealth upon its motion for summary judgment, the Commonwealth Court reversed, broadly holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure generally and Rule 1035.2 in particular were inapplicable to forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to forfeiture proceedings where they do not conflict with the Forfeiture Act, and that there was no conflict between the entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2 and the Act. As such, the Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.View "Pennsylvania v. All That Certain Lot et al (Palazzari)" on Justia Law 2014-11-19 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Max Baer 46 MAP 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-302.html Nye v. Brousseau 2014-11-19T08:04:14-08:00 2014-11-19T13:48:59-08:00 In Nye I, before final judgment entered awarding a judgment parcel to Plaintiff, Defendants transferred via quitclaim deed to their family trust a property that the judgment parcel was located within. In Nye II, the Court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's motion to set aside the transfer of the disputed property. In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the transfer of the disputed property to the trust before final judgment entered in Nye I served to render the final judgment a nullity. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's negligence and fraud claims and dismissed Plaintiff's quiet title claim on the basis that Plaintiff was ordered to, and failed to, comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 34-16-2 by submitting an abstract of title or similar report concerning the status of the title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court justice was correct in granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's fraud and negligence claims and in dismissing Plaintiff's quiet title claim.View "Nye v. Brousseau" on Justia Law 2014-11-19 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Maureen McKenna Goldberg 13-302 http://law.justia.com/cases/michigan/supreme-court/2014/147647.html Dupree v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company 2014-11-19T05:02:12-08:00 2014-11-19T06:31:26-08:00 Michele Dupree sued Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking to recover, under her homeowners' insurance policy, the full cost of repair or replacement for the personal property that was destroyed in a fire at her home. Because the parties did not agree on the extent of the personal property loss, the parties submitted separate appraisals to an umpire under the process set forth in the insurance policy. The umpire issued an appraisal award that set forth the full replacement cost, the applicable depreciation, and the actual cash value loss of the property. Defendant paid plaintiff the actual cash value of the property but refused to pay the full replacement cost on the ground that plaintiff had failed to submit proof, in accordance with the replacement-cost provision of her insurance policy, that she had actually replaced the damaged property. The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam. On appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff's appraisal award entitled her to only the actual cash value of her damaged personal property or whether defendant was liable for the full replacement cost of that property, i.e., actual cash value plus the applicable depreciation amount. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that plaintiff was not entitled to the full replacement cost of her property because she did not submit proof of actual loss in accordance with her policy. Defendant was liable for only the actual cash value of plaintiff's damaged personal property.View "Dupree v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law 2014-11-18 state Michigan Michigan Supreme Court Per Curiam 147647 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/f066581.html Gwartz v. Weilert 2014-11-18T11:00:59-08:00 2014-11-18T13:25:45-08:00 This appeal stemmed from an underlying fraudulent real estate sale. Plaintiffs, purchasers of the property, obtained a judgment for $1,553,800, which included $850,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to collect the judgment and moved for various postjudgment orders. The trial court granted these motions and issued orders enjoining defendants and their agents from selling, spending, transferring or dissipating any of their assets, which included money in any deposit account. When plaintiffs learned that defendants violated the orders, they filed a motion to dismiss the appeal under the doctrine of disentitlement. Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court concluded, based on the court's review of the motion and opposition papers, including a declaration from defendant Michael Weilert that did not deny any of the 47 transactions at issue, and argument by counsel, the court concluded that the balance of the equitable considerations relevant to the disentitlement doctrine favor dismissal. The court concluded that it would be unjust to allow defendants to seek the benefits of an appeal while willfully disobeying the trial court's valid orders and frustrating plaintiffs' legitimate efforts to enforce the judgment. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss.View "Gwartz v. Weilert" on Justia Law 2014-11-18 state California California Court of Appeal Donald R. Franson, Jr. F066581 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2014/201.html Matter of Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, Inc. v. Assessor of City of Auburn 2014-11-18T08:04:15-08:00 2014-11-18T12:04:38-08:00 Petitioner Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, a not-for profit theater corporation, owned real property that it used to house its staff and summer stock actors. Petitioner filed applications for real property tax exemptions under N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 420-a. The Assessor of the City of Auburn denied the applications. Supreme Court upheld the denial, determining that Petitioner failed to establish that its summer theater was an exempt purpose and that the use of apartment buildings to house its employees was reasonably incidental to its primary purpose. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner established its entitlement to the tax exemption because the use of the property to provide staff housing was reasonably incidental to Petitioner's primary purpose of encouraging appreciation of the arts through theater.View "Matter of Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, Inc. v. Assessor of City of Auburn" on Justia Law 2014-11-18 state New York New York Court of Appeals Jonathan Lippman 201 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2014/2013-1432.html Diley Ridge Med. Ctr. v. Fairfield County Bd. of Revision 2014-11-18T06:03:12-08:00 2014-11-18T18:45:16-08:00 Canal Winchester MOB, LLC ("MOB"), the ground lessee of a medical office building, filed a complaint challenging the tax-year-2010 valuation of the building. The Board of Revision retained the auditor's valuation. MOB, together with the record owner of the property, appealed. In its decision, the Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") sua sponte considered the jurisdictional validity of the complaint and held that MOB did not have standing to file the complaint. Accordingly, the BTA ordered dismissal. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA's decision, holding that the BTA should have afforded MOB the opportunity to plead and prove its standing. Remanded.View "Diley Ridge Med. Ctr. v. Fairfield County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law 2014-11-18 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Per Curiam 2013-1432 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b248848.html Lin v. Coronado 2014-11-17T15:00:46-08:00 2014-11-17T16:09:01-08:00 Plaintiff alleged that she "pooled" her $150,000 with $100,000 provided by River Forest and Elevation "in partnership for the purchase" of a residential property at a foreclosure auction for the purchase price of $250,000. The trustee's deed that was executed and recorded omitted plaintiff's name, which had been included in the unrecorded, original trustee's deed; River Forest subsequently quitclaimed the property to Elevation; and without plaintiff's knowledge, Elevation then sold the property to Coronado. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to the property. The court held that the alteration of the deed to omit plaintiff's name was not material because the original version of the deed showed she had no interest in the property. Consequently, Coronado, as purchaser, has title to the property.View "Lin v. Coronado" on Justia Law 2014-11-17 state California California Court of Appeal Richard M. Mosk B248848 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s14a1680.html Crane Company v. Wayne Farms, LLC 2014-11-17T06:01:22-08:00 2014-11-17T18:14:20-08:00 Wayne Farms owned and operated a chicken processing plant in Oakwood. A fire broke out at the plant in 2003. Roughly three years later, Wayne Farms and its insurers filed suit against Crane Composites, Inc., which manufactured interior panels used in the plant, alleging Crane's negligence caused the fire to spread extensively. In the meantime, the legislature enacted OCGA 9-11-68 (b) (1). The question for decision in this case is whether OCGA 9-11-68 (a tort reform, fee-shifting statute) could be applied to a negligence action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, but in which the action was filed after that date. The Supreme Court concluded that it could, and in so doing, overruled the case law set forth in "L. P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v. Burch," (701 SE2d 602) (2010)).View "Crane Company v. Wayne Farms, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-11-17 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Hugh P. Thompson S14A1680 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2527/13-2527-2014-11-14.html Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2014-11-14T15:00:28-08:00 2014-11-14T20:57:28-08:00 With the threat of foreclosure looming on his home, Plaintiff sued Bank for failing to consider him for a mortgage loan modification, which a California class action settlement agreement required Bank to do before attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff's home. The complaint alleged breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 35A and 35B, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding (1) Plaintiff's statutory causes of action fell short of stating a cognizable claim; but (2) the district court improperly converted Bank's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's contract-based claims into a motion for summary judgment, warranting a remand of those claims.View "Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law 2014-11-14 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson 13-2527 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40514.html Stanley Consultants v. Integrated Financial Associates 2014-11-14T14:02:05-08:00 2014-11-14T19:07:12-08:00 This case consolidated several individual cases dealing with claims for nonpayment against the developer of the Summer Wind at Orchard Hills residential and golf course development in Canyon County. Stanley Consulting, Inc. appealed the district court's decision as to the priority date for Stanley's engineer's lien. Integrated Financial Associates, Inc. ("IFA") cross-appealed the district court's decision granting Knife River's summary judgment motion based on the court's decision that Knife River had a valid priority lien for paving work it did on roadways and golf cart paths without having to designate the lien between the two projects. After its review of the claims, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it determined an engineer's priority under Idaho Code section 45-506 for rendering professional services dates back to when the first on-site professional services were rendered. Furthermore, the Court held the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Knife River on its lien claim priority. Accordingly, the district court's judgments were vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.View "Stanley Consultants v. Integrated Financial Associates" on Justia Law 2014-11-13 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Roger S. Burdick 40514 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/14-0246.html Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc. 2014-11-14T13:08:47-08:00 2014-11-14T19:00:33-08:00 The underlying case involved oil and gas wells owned and operated by four separate partnerships. The partnerships owned mineral interests in the form of leases to extract oil and gas from real estate. The partners themselves, however, owned no part of the mineral interests. Plaintiff alleged that he owned an interest in the partnerships. A federal district court determined that Plaintiff's assertion of an interest in the four "mining partnerships" failed because he could not produce a written instrument in conformance with the Statute of Frauds showing his ownership interest in the partnerships. Plaintiff appealed. Because of the vagaries of West Virginia law on this issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that (1) the Statute of Frauds requires the partners of a "mining partnership" to show their membership through a deed, will, or other written instrument establishing they are co-owners of the mineral interest being mined; but (2) because the real property of a general partnership belongs to the partnership entity and not to the individual partners, no written instrument is required to establish a partnership interest in a general partnership.View "Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-11-14 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Menis E. Ketchum, II 14-0246 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2014-066.html Highridge Condominium Owners Assoc. v. Killington/Pico Ski Resort Partners, LLC 2014-11-14T08:06:07-08:00 2014-11-14T08:18:21-08:00 This case stemmed from a dispute between developer Killington/Pico Ski Resort Partners, LLC ("K/P") and the Highridge Condominium Owners Association regarding developer's proposal to construct additional units in the Highridge condominium development in Killington. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted declaratory relief to the Association on the ground that the declaration of condominium did not authorize the original developer to add additional units unilaterally, and thus the alleged successor to the original developer's rights, K/P, also had no such right. After its review of the dispute, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that K/P was the successor in interest to the original developer with respect to development rights, and was entitled to construct the proposed additional units under the declaration of condominium.View "Highridge Condominium Owners Assoc. v. Killington/Pico Ski Resort Partners, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-11-14 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Beth Robinson 2014-066 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2014/scwc-11-0000151-0.html Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay v. Mitchell 2014-11-13T11:01:49-08:00 2014-11-13T19:32:33-08:00 Ralph Mitchell, a condominium owner in the Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay ("AOAO"), submitted a petition to the AOAO to conduct a special meeting of the AOAO to remove one or more of the AOAO Board members. The AOAO filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the petition did not contain at least twenty-five percent of the owners' signatures, and therefore, there was no basis for conducting a special meeting. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the AOAO. The AOAO subsequently sought fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-157(a) and (b). The circuit court granted the motion. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the AOAO's refusal to mediate the dispute precluded it from an entitlement of any fees and costs under Haw. Rev. Stat. 514B-161(a). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded for a determination of whether section 514B-161(a) applies in this case and, if so, directed the circuit court to take into consideration such refusal in determining whether to award attorneys' fees and costs.View "Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay v. Mitchell" on Justia Law 2014-11-13 state Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii Sabrina S. McKenna SCWC-11-0000151 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2013-064.html In re Estate of Muriel R. Mills 2014-11-13T07:03:33-08:00 2014-11-13T21:18:53-08:00 At the time of her death, decedent Muriel Mills she owned property in Manchester. She had granted a "home equity conversion mortgage" on the property to Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation. The mortgage deed was recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. The terms of the mortgage included a statutory power of sale that allowed Financial Freedom to foreclose upon the property under certain enumerated circumstances, including the death of the borrower. The terms also provided that the "Borrower shall have no personal liability for payment of the debt secured by this Security Instrument" and that the "Lender may enforce the debt only through the sale of the Property." Petitioner was appointed executor of the estate. By letter, counsel for petitioner notified Financial Freedom of the decedent's death and of the opening of the administration of her estate. Counsel also requested the current balance due on the mortgage debt as well as any information regarding "any assignment of the mortgage." Thereafter, Financial Freedom did not file notice of a claim or present a demand to the petitioner pursuant to RSA 556:1, :3 (2007). Later that year, counsel for Financial Freedom sent a letter to the estate explaining that she had been instructed to foreclose on the mortgage in the name of respondent under the power of sale contained in the mortgage. The letter also informed the estate that the note had been accelerated and the entire balance was "due and payable forthwith," and included the total amount of the balance due on the debt. In response, petitioner's counsel wrote to Financial Freedom claiming that it, "or any of its related entities, abandoned any interest[] that it may have had in the property" because it failed to file a claim within six months after the grant of administration of the estate. The next month, the mortgage was assigned to respondent and thereafter recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. Petitioner then filed a petition to quiet title in the circuit court, asserting that Financial Freedom had "waived, lost, or abandoned any interest that it would have had in the property" and, therefore, the circuit court could issue an order quieting title to the property so that the beneficiary named in the decedent's will could receive the property. Financial Freedom appeared at the hearing and moved to dismiss the quiet title action. The trial court ruled in Financial Freedom's favor, and petitioner appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision to dismiss, the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal.View "In re Estate of Muriel R. Mills " on Justia Law 2014-11-13 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Carol Ann Conboy 2013-064 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2013-068.html Dembiec v. Town of Holderness 2014-11-13T07:03:05-08:00 2014-11-13T07:08:45-08:00 Petitioners Daryl and Marcy Dembiec appealed a superior court order dismissing their petition for equitable relief. In October 2011, petitioners obtained a permit from the respondent, the Town of Holderness to construct a single family home. Before the permit was issued, the only structure on the property was a two-story boathouse with living quarters on the second floor. In April 2012, when construction of the home was substantially completed, the Town's compliance officer advised the petitioners that he would not issue a certificate of compliance for their new home because the existing boathouse contained a dwelling unit, and the applicable zoning ordinance allowed two dwellings on a lot only when they are in the same structure, such as in a duplex. The compliance officer informed petitioners that, before he could issue a certificate of compliance, they would need either to obtain a variance or remove "all plumbing" from the boathouse. Petitioners then applied to the zoning board of adjustment for an equitable waiver from the ordinance. Two intervenors objected to the petitioners' request. The board originally granted the waiver, but on rehearing, denied it. Petitioners later sought a variance. The board denied their application. The superior court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' municipal estoppel claim because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over their claim because they were not required to first raise it before the zoning board of adjustment. The Supreme Court was persuaded that appealing the compliance officer's decision to the zoning board would have been useless because the zoning board lacked the authority to grant the requested relief. Thus, exhaustion is not required. "The plain language of the pertinent statutes does not confer general equitable jurisdiction upon a zoning board. Nor could the zoning board have granted any relief to the petitioners under the applicable statutes or the Town's ordinance because their new home violated the ordinance, and they failed to meet the requirements for either a variance or an equitable waiver from dimensional requirements. Under those circumstances, we conclude that further pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile, and, therefore, exhaustion of remedies is not required." Accordingly, petitioners' assertion of a municipal estoppel claim for the first time in the trial court was not barred by the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. The superior court's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.View "Dembiec v. Town of Holderness" on Justia Law 2014-11-13 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court James P. Bassett 2013-068 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0044.html Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel 2014-11-12T15:02:05-08:00 2014-11-12T19:38:39-08:00 The Northland Royalty Corporation purchased mineral rights from the personal representative of two estates and subsequently brought a quiet title action naming certain beneficiaries ("Devisees") as defendants. The district court quieted title in favor of Devisees, but the Supreme Court remanded to consider the applicability of Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-618. On remand, Northland moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 72-3-618 offered Northland protection against Devisees' claims to the minerals. The district court denied summary judgment on the basis that Northland failed to act in good faith as required by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Northland's favor, holding that section 72-3-618 protected Northland's purchase.View "Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law 2014-11-12 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 14-0044 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/14-0143.html Sostaric v. Marshall 2014-11-12T12:07:10-08:00 2014-11-12T12:43:51-08:00 Defendants defaulted on their obligation to Plaintiff, who had loaned them $200,000 secured by a first deed of trust on real property they owned. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the subject property at a trustee's sale and then filed the instant lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of Defendants' promissory note. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and awarded Plaintiff post-judgment interest on this award. Defendants appealed, arguing that the deficiency judgment was too high and should have been adjusted to reflect the fair market value of their property when it was sold at the trust deed sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trust deed grantor may assert, as a defense in a lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment, that the property was sold for less than its fair market value at the trust deed foreclosure sale. Remanded.View "Sostaric v. Marshall" on Justia Law 2014-11-12 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Menis E. Ketchum, II 14-0143 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93848.html Mo. Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Mo. 2014-11-12T11:02:55-08:00 2014-11-12T12:05:07-08:00 In 2012, St. Louis County adopted an ordinance that implemented a foreclosure mediation program requiring lenders to provide residential borrowers an opportunity to mediate prior to foreclosure. Two bankers filed suit against the County seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the ordinance was invalid. The circuit court sustained the County's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County possessed the charter authority to enact the ordinance, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the County's police power, the ordinance was not preempted by state law, and the fees associated with the ordinance did not violate the Hancock Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was void and unenforceable ab initio because the County exceeded its charter authority in enacting the ordinance.View "Mo. Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, Mo." on Justia Law 2014-11-12 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri George W. Draper, III SC93848 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc94152.html Binkley v. Am. Equity Mortgage, Inc. 2014-11-12T11:02:54-08:00 2014-11-12T11:52:21-08:00 Property Owners filed a lawsuit against a Mortgage Company, claiming that, by preparing deeds of trust and promissory notes for the Property Owners, the Mortgage Company (1) violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.010.2 and 484.020 by engaging in the "law business"; (2) committed an unlawful practice in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act; and (3) was unjustly enriched because it charged for services it did not perform or did not perform lawfully. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Mortgage Company. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Property Owners did not dispute that the Mortgage Company did not charge a separate fee or vary its customary charges for preparation of legal documents, there were no disputed material facts, entitling the Mortgage Company to summary judgment as a matter of law.View "Binkley v. Am. Equity Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-11-12 state Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri Mary R. Russell SC94152 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2014/2014-139.html Guntlow v. Town of Pownal Board of Abatement 2014-11-07T08:06:15-08:00 2014-11-07T11:35:52-08:00 Two taxpayers appealed a trial court judgment affirming a decision of the board of abatement of the Town of Pownal, which denied their request for tax abatement. The taxpayers sought abatement of the property taxes on several contiguous properties for the years 2005 through 2011. First, taxpayers argued that the Town's delinquent-tax collector erred in assessing interest and fees on the entirety of an overdue tax bill after refusing to accept a partial payment that taxpayers had proffered in 2011. Second, taxpayers argued that the listers had erroneously and without notice to taxpayers reclassified their property for several years, resulting in improperly inflated tax bills. Third, the taxpayers argued that one sewer-bond payment is applied to each parcel. Fifth, taxpayer Guntlow explained that a house site up to two acres around a house was subject to an exemption in the taxation calculus that was unavailable to taxpayers during the years when their property was misclassified. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case the trial court with instructions to remand to the Board of Abatement, for a more detailed explanation of the reasons for its denial of taxpayers' request for abatement on the ground that the misclassification of their property over a course of years amounted to a manifest error or mistake, and its request for abatement on the ground that taxation of their .66-acre leach field from 2005 to 2010 as an individual property amounted to manifest error or mistake. In the alternative, the Board could hold a new hearing on those two issues. The Court affirmed in all other respects.View "Guntlow v. Town of Pownal Board of Abatement" on Justia Law 2014-11-07 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Beth Robinson 2014-139 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0239.html Platt v. Platt 2014-11-06T08:06:49-08:00 2014-11-06T17:23:35-08:00 Disagreements as to the operation of a family ranch led to this partition action. The district court found that the parties were entitled to partition and ordered the construction of a new ditch to carry the water Appellant received to her parcel of land. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's order was not sufficiently complete to establish that a partition in kind could be made without manifest injury to the value of the property and that the division was equitable to all parties. Remanded for a determination whether the land can be partitioned in kind without manifest injury to its value.View "Platt v. Platt" on Justia Law 2014-11-06 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Michael K. Davis S-13-0239 S-14-0053 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b242864.html Union Pacific Railroad v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines 2014-11-05T16:00:48-08:00 2014-11-05T18:01:02-08:00 This appeal arose out of a declaratory relief action where the Railroad sought a determination of the rent due from the Pipeline for the continued use of its easements from 2004 to 2014. The Railroad obtained a declaration that the rent due was in excess of $14 million per year. The trial court entered judgment reflecting the total back rent due, plus interest, up to the date of entry of judgment. The Pipeline appealed. The court addressed the law relating to railroad rights-of-way in an effort to resolve the legal issues that apply to property interests in the land and, by extension, the Railroad's right to grant and lease subsurface easements to the Pipeline. The court reversed and remanded the trial court's finding as to the "total fee value" for purposes of its ATF calculation; directed the trial court to determine the total fee value of those parcels of land in which the Railroad had sufficient interest to entitle it to collect rent on the Pipeline's easements between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2013; concluded that the trial court committed no error with respect to its determinations regarding issue preclusion, use of the ATF method, - calculations of the rental rate, the enhancement factor, and the use factor -, and the dates of abandonment of certain easements by the Pipeline; and reversed and remanded that part of the judgment awarding prejudgment interest under Civil Code 3287(a) in order for the trial court to determine whether the Pipeline was liable for the payment of rent on the reserved easements, the abandoned easements, or Line Section 101, which rent it unilaterally withheld.View "Union Pacific Railroad v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines" on Justia Law 2014-11-05 state California California Court of Appeal Kussman B242864 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-41153/13-41153-2014-11-03.html Holt Texas, Ltd., et al. v. Zayler 2014-11-04T05:00:46-08:00 2014-11-04T12:31:40-08:00 Holt and TAUG, subcontractors of the bankrupt Seiber, appealed the district court's affirmance of a prior bankruptcy court order, holding that the funds of an interpleader action, filed by EnCana, were property of the bankruptcy estate of Seiber, not EnCana, because the interpleader action extinguished the earlier construction liens of Holt and TAUG. The court upheld the validity of TAUG's chapter 56 lien where TAUG had a valid mineral lien against EnCana's property at the time EnCana was discharged from further liability to Seiber; as to Holt, the district court did not err in holding EnCana's interpleader and its deposited funds automatically satisfied its liability to Seiber, thus transferring legal possession of the funds to Seiber and the bankruptcy estate; the district court and bankruptcy courts erred in failing to draw the distinction between the act of depositing funds into the district court registry and the judicial act of discharging the depositor of any further liability; simply depositing interpleader funds does not automatically mean that the funds have been legally accepted, ownership thereof transferred, and the interpleader relieved of further duty to the court or further obligation to the parties of the dispute; the court need not address whether chapter 56 allows the liens to extend to the funds because the bankruptcy court entered an order, separate from this appeal, ruling on the interpleader and discharging EnCana; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.View "Holt Texas, Ltd., et al. v. Zayler" on Justia Law 2014-11-03 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit E. Grady Jolly 13-41153 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/c073530.html Aspen Grove Condo. Assn. v. CNL Income Northstar 2014-11-03T13:00:54-08:00 2014-11-03T17:27:42-08:00 The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a water retention basin that was dug in 2004 as part of an expansion project for ski resort Northstar Village. The resort was owned by CNL Income Northstar LLC and operated by Trimont Land Company. Downhill from the retention basin are 180 condominium units owned by Aspen Grove Condominium Association. Water from the retention basin began to overflow and seep onto Aspen Grove's property starting in December 2004 despite remediation efforts. After several years of attempts to solve the water problems with the retention basin, CNL communicated to Aspen Grove in 2008 that it would not perform any further remedial modification or remove the retention basin. Aspen Grove responded by suing various entities involved in the Northstar Village expansion project, including CNL. The first phase of the bifurcated trial resulted in the trial court's granting a permanent injunction that required CNL to remove the retention basin. The Court of Appeal addressed only the first phase of the bifurcated trial, in which CNL challenged the mandatory injunction, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of damage to the trees on Aspen Grove's property; (2) the trial court should have excluded evidence gathered after the discovery cutoff date; (3) Aspen Grove was not entitled to a mandatory injunction because it has an adequate remedy at law in the form of monetary damages and the option of building a trench on its own property to divert the water overflowing from the retention basin; and (4) the mandatory injunction was overbroad in requiring removal of the retention basin. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded CNL did not preserve its evidentiary arguments because CNL did not include them as issues for appeal when designating a partial reporter's transcript. The trial court did not err in concluding Aspen Grove had no adequate remedy at law because only removal of the retention basin would alleviate the continuing damage to Aspen Grove's property. "To hold otherwise would grant a private property owner the right to condemn his or her neighbor's property by limiting the legal remedy for continuing trespass to monetary compensation. The trial court's injunctive relief, rather than being overbroad, rests on credible evidence that removal of the retention basin would prevent irreparable harm to Aspen Grove's property. As a result, we affirm."View "Aspen Grove Condo. Assn. v. CNL Income Northstar" on Justia Law 2014-11-03 state California California Court of Appeal Andrea Lynn Hoch C073530 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20140110.html Capps v. Weflen 2014-10-31T14:04:05-08:00 2014-10-31T18:44:50-08:00 Patricia Capps and others appealed, and Colleen Weflen and others cross-appealed a judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County mineral interests in the Capps and the heirs of Ruth Nelson's estate. Because the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the Weflens did not comply with the notice requirements in the abandoned mineral statutes, and because those requirements were constitutional, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment quieting title to the subject mineral interests in the Weflens.View "Capps v. Weflen" on Justia Law 2014-10-31 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Dale V. Sandstrom 20140110 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/13-2249/13-2249-2014-10-31.html Susquehanna Bank v. United States/Internal Revenue 2014-10-31T12:00:13-08:00 2014-10-31T13:25:37-08:00 The Bank commenced this adversary proceeding in Restivo's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, seeking a judgment declaring that the security interest it acquired on January 4, 2005, had priority over the IRS's tax lien filed on January 10, 2005, regardless of the fact that it did not record its security interest until after the IRS had filed notice of its tax lien. The district court granted the Bank priority. The court rejected the district court's holding that Md. Code. Ann., Real Prop. 3-201 gives the Bank retroactive priority over the IRS, concluding that 26 U.S.C. 6323(h)(1)(A)'s use of the present perfect tense precludes giving effect to the Maryland statute's relation-back provision. However, the court affirmed the judgment based on the ground that under Maryland common law, the Bank acquired an equitable security interest in the two parcels of real property on January 4, regardless of recordation, because its interest became protected against a subsequent lien arising out of an unsecured obligation on that date and that therefore its security interest had priority over the IRS's tax lien under sections 6323(a) and 6323(h)(1).View "Susquehanna Bank v. United States/Internal Revenue" on Justia Law 2014-10-31 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Niemeyer 13-2249 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/d064261.html Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club 2014-10-31T11:01:22-08:00 2014-10-31T18:48:21-08:00 When he was five years old, plaintiff Michael Lawrence fell from a window in his family's second story hotel room at the La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club and suffered serious head and brain injuries. Michael's parents, Nan Lawrence and Jeff Lawrence, filed a first amended complaint against La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. and La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club Partners, L.P. seeking damages sounding in negligence: "Negligence," "Dangerous Condition of Property," and "Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress." Michael, through his mother as guardian ad litem, later filed a separate complaint alleging the same causes of action. After the court consolidated the cases, defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment on the two complaints. The court granted both motions and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs contended on appeal that the court erred in ruling: (1) defendants had no duty and breached no duty to install a fall prevention device on the window from which Michael fell; and (2) the accident was not caused by defendants' failure to install a fall prevention device on the window. The Court of Appeal reversed. On the record presented, the Court concluded defendants failed to carry their burden on summary judgment to establish they owed no duty to take measures to prevent the type of accident that occurred in this case. Based on the facts in record, a trier of fact could have reasonably found that defendants breached their duty to take measures to prevent an accident like Michael's. Because a trier of fact could have reasonably found defendants were negligent in failing to take reasonable measures that would have prevented Michael's accident, it could have also reasonably found that defendants' negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident.View "Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club" on Justia Law 2014-10-31 state California California Court of Appeal Richard D. Huffman D064261 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/131974.html DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback 2014-10-31T07:04:50-08:00 2014-11-01T10:59:20-08:00 DHRI, Inc. entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land from William Hanback. DHRI later sued Defendant for specific performance of the land purchase contract. On June 9, 2004, the trial court entered a decree providing that Hanback should sell the property to DHRI and DHRI should pay to Hancock certain sums. On November 21, 2012, Hancock filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that after closing on the property, DHRI refused to pay funds owed him under the June 9, 2004 order. After a hearing, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause to DHRI. The court then determined that DHRI had not paid Hancock the required amount of $350,000, found DHRI in contempt of the June 9, 2004 order, and entered judgment for Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the rule to show cause, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion because the June 9, 2004 order did not contain definite terms as to the total amount DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due.View "DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback" on Justia Law 2014-10-31 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Per Curiam 131974 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/131569.html Synchronized Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Prav Lodging, LLC 2014-10-31T07:04:45-08:00 2014-11-01T09:41:41-08:00 Construction Manager subcontracted with Subcontractor to do work on a construction project. After the project was substantially complete, Subcontractor recorded a mechanic's lien for unpaid work on the project. Subcontractor then filed a complaint against Construction Manager as the general contractor of the project, the owner of the property (Landowner), and the bank that financed the project (Bank) to enforce its mechanic's lien. Construction Manager did not enter an appearance in the case. The circuit court subsequently granted an application filed by Landowner and Bank and released the real estate that had been subject to Subcontractor's mechanic's lien. Bank filed a motion to dismiss the mechanic's lien claim on the basis that Subcontractor failed to timely serve Construction Manager, who it alleged to be a necessary party to the mechanic's lien enforcement action. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the mechanic's lien claim with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Construction Manager, as the general contractor, was not a necessary party to Subcontractor's mechanic's lien enforcement action. Remanded.View "Synchronized Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Prav Lodging, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-10-31 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia LeRoy F. Millette, Jr. 131569 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2014/58-map-2013.html Miller v. SEPTA 2014-10-30T13:03:47-08:00 2014-10-30T13:51:51-08:00 The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the viability of the historic police power of the state in validating and regulating riparian rights and remedies where it was alleged that a downstream landowner subject to federal rail-safety regulations obstructed a natural watercourse causing upstream flooding and significant damage as a result. Hotel owner David Miller and his hotel (appellants) sought to hold the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") liable for water damage allegedly resulting from the negligent construction and/or maintenance of a nearby SEPTA-owned railroad bridge. Appellants purchased hotel property in 1996, and they claimed that the bridge thereafter obstructed the flow of a creek which ran under the bridge, causing the creek to flood appellants' upstream hotel on three separate occasions of extreme weather conditions. On each occasion, appellants experienced flooding that filled the hotel basement and first floor. In 2001, the hotel closed and appellants declared bankruptcy. "As this is an area of law that has been regulated by the Commonwealth for centuries," the Pennsylvania Court concluded that there was no clear and manifest federal congressional intention to preempt Pennsylvania law central issue of this case. The Court declined to "invalidate the rights and remedies afforded to appellants under the laws of this Commonwealth." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded this case for further proceedings.View "Miller v. SEPTA" on Justia Law 2014-10-30 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Ronald D. Castille 58 MAP 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/g048906.html Aulisio v. Bancroft 2014-10-30T13:00:53-08:00 2014-10-31T04:32:39-08:00 Anthony Aulisio, Jr., appealed a jury verdict that found defendants, consisting of his homeowner association's management company (Optimum Professional Property Management and Debra Kovach), the patrol service it employed (BLB Enterprises, Inc., dba Patrol One, and Bill Bancroft), and a towing company (PD Transport, dba Southside Towing, and John Vach), did not wrongfully tow and convert his Jeep vehicle, nor convert the personal property it contained. CAAJ Leasing Trust (CAAJ), which Aulisio created as sole grantor, trustee, and trust beneficiary, owned legal title to the Jeep and also appeals. CAAJ appeals the trial court's ruling at the outset of trial that CAAJ "can't participate in the proceedings" with Aulisio appearing in propria persona as the trust's sole trustee and sole beneficiary. The trial court relied on precedent that an executor or personal representative may not appear in propria persona in court proceedings outside the probate context on behalf of a decedent's estate because representing another person or entity's interest in a lawsuit constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. But if a sole trustee is also the trust's sole settlor and beneficiary, the rationale of these cases ceases to apply: no interests are at stake except those of one person. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that a sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. The judgment as to CAAJ was reversed, and the case remanded so Aulisio may appear in propria persona to assert his interest as the sole beneficial owner of the Jeep as a trust asset. The Court affirmed the judgment against Aulisio in his individual capacity concerning his personal property in the Jeep.View "Aulisio v. Bancroft" on Justia Law 2014-10-30 state California California Court of Appeal Richard M. Aronson G048906 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/89132-0.html Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n 2014-10-30T09:01:31-08:00 2014-10-31T04:21:51-08:00 In August 2007, Winnie Lyons signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering her real property in Burien. The property served as Lyons' primary residence and was also where she operated an adult family home (AFH). Wells Fargo Bank NA was the lender and beneficiary; Northwest Trustee Services LLC (NWTS) was the trustee. In October 2009, an employee of Wells Fargo executed a beneficiary declaration identifying Wells Fargo as trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006. In June 2010, another beneficiary declaration was executed by an employee of Wells Fargo naming Wells Fargo Bank as the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation evidencing the above-referenced loan "or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said obligation." In 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo. While Lyons was waiting for a response regarding her application for a modification, she received a notice of trustee's sale from NWTS informing her that her property was scheduled to be sold. Wells Fargo told Lyons' attorney that the modification had been approved, the terms of which were that Lyons had to pay $10,000 by a set deadline. Wells Fargo informed Lyons they would discontinue the sale upon receipt of this payment. Lyons made the payment as requested, however, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons' loan to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3 with Carrington Mortgage Services LLC as the new servicer of the loan (to be effective May 1, 2012). NWTS received notice of the sale and service release; Lyons received notice of this sale. Lyons' attorney was informed that Wells Fargo no longer had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, Lyons had received a loan modification, so she was no longer in default. Lyons' attorney again called NWTS to inform them of the loan modification and the sale of the loan. A NWTS employee informed her that Carrington had directed NWTS to continue with the foreclosure sale as scheduled. Lyons' attorney called Carrington and an employee indicated that Carrington did not show the property in foreclosure status. Another employee further indicated that Carrington had not told NWTS to go forward with the sale. Lyons' attorney then sent a cease and desist letter to NWTS and Carrington. Lyons' attorney followed up with NWTS; NWTS acknowledged receipt and informed her the sale was still on but that the matter had been referred to an attorney. Lyons' attorney again spoke with NWTS' attorney, who refused to discontinue the sale. Lyons' attorney filed the complaint. NWTS then executed and recorded a notice of discontinuance of the trustee's sale. Lyons alleged that this situation the foreclosure sale created had serious emotional and economic impacts on her. In addition to the sense of humiliation Lyons felt, Lyons alleged she lost business as a result of the foreclosure process. Lyons asserted that she experienced constant nausea from the stress and continuously worried about losing her business and the subsequent homelessness of herself, her son, and the elderly clients she cared for. NWTS moved for summary judgment. After argument, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to all claims against NWTS. Subsequently, Lyons and the remaining defendants (Stanwich, Carrington, and Wells Fargo) entered a stipulated order of dismissal. Lyons' motion for reconsideration of the order of summary judgment was denied. We granted Lyons' petition for direct review. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the alleged violations of the deed of trust act (DTA) and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but the Court reversed and remanded as to Lyons' Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim.View "Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law 2014-10-30 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Mary Fairhurst 89132-0 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-5560/13-5560-2014-10-30.html Bennett v. CMH Homes, Inc. 2014-10-30T07:30:48-08:00 2014-10-30T07:44:41-08:00 In 2004, the plaintiffs' Rockvale, Tennessee home burned down. They replaced it with a 2180-square-foot, "triple-wide" manufactured home purchased from the defendant for $160,230. Defendant was responsible for "normal delivery and installation" on the plaintiffs' land and warranted that, "[f]or new homes, installation at the initial homesite will be completed in accordance with applicable governmental requirements." Defendant delivered and installed the home in March 2005, but only one member of the installation crew was identified. He was not licensed to install manufactured homes as required by T.C. 68-126-404(a). Plaintiffs immediately began noticing defects that suggested the home was not level when installed and notified the defendant before they closed the purchase. Defendant assured plaintiffs that it would repair and level the home. After several years of inspections and repair efforts, defendant never levelled or repaired the home to the plaintiffs' satisfaction. Plaintiffs sued, claiming breach of contract and federal breach of warranty under15 U.S.C.A. 2304, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, "and/or other applicable law." The district court held that an arbitration clause was invalid and awarded $39,238.29. The Sixth Circuit remanded, concluding that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the home is not a "consumer product" under the Magnuson-Moss Act.View "Bennett v. CMH Homes, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-10-30 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr. 13-5560 13-5423 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26950.html Gartner v. Temple 2014-10-30T06:03:25-08:00 2014-10-30T15:24:53-08:00 Appellant Merle Temple and Appellee Bradley Gartner owned 3,375 acres of land as tenants in common. After relations between Temple and Gartner deteriorated, Gartner brought an action for partition. After appointing three referees and adopting the referees' report, the circuit court ordered a partition in kind and ordered Gartner to make a compensatory payment to Temple. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a partition in kind, as Temple did not show that partition in kind would cause great prejudice to the owners; (2) the circuit court did not err in adopting the referees' report; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to reduce the compensatory payment in favor of allocating additional land to Temple.View "Gartner v. Temple" on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court David Gilbertson 26950 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26859.html Hanson v. Minnehaha County Comm'n 2014-10-30T06:03:24-08:00 2014-10-30T15:01:00-08:00 Eastern Farmers Cooperative (EFC) applied for and was granted a conditional use permit to build and operate an agronomy facility on sixty acres of land near Colton, South Dakota. Appellants' residence was directly across a county road from the proposed facility. Appellants appealed. The Minnehaha County Commission upheld the decision to grant the conditional use permit to EFC, as did the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County Commission's decision to uphold the approval of the permit was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of Appellants' due process rights; and (2) any alleged due process concerns arising out of a certain commissioner's participation in the County Commission's action were remedied by invalidating that commissioner's vote.View "Hanson v. Minnehaha County Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court David Gilbertson 26859 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40865.html Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs v. Franklin County 2014-10-29T15:01:59-08:00 2014-10-29T21:30:06-08:00 Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, LLC appealed a judgment entered in favor of Franklin County dismissing Spirit Ridge's complaint which had requested abatement of a private nuisance and for an injunction against a gun range operated by Franklin County adjacent to its property. In a bench trial, the district court ruled that Spirit Ridge had failed to demonstrate that there was an ongoing and continuing nuisance at the time of the trial. Spirit Ridge appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: the district court record reflected a lack evidence to show that a nuisance existed after 2008.View "Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs v. Franklin County" on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Warren E. Jones 40865 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/41188.html Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher 2014-10-29T15:01:56-08:00 2014-10-29T21:31:51-08:00 Margaret Butcher and her former husband purchased property in 2005 with a loan secured by the property from Home Federal Bank. Butcher received the property in their divorce in 2009, and she subsequently defaulted on the loan. Wells Fargo Bank, the indorsee of the loan, foreclosed on the property. At the foreclosure sale, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) purchased the property with a credit bid. FHLMC then filed a post-foreclosure eviction complaint for ejectment and restitution of the property. The magistrate court granted FHLMC's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment in favor of FHLMC. Butcher appealed. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision. Butcher appealed again, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too.View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Butcher" on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Walters 41188 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/41252.html U.S. Bank National Association N.D. v. Citimortgage, Inc. 2014-10-29T15:01:56-08:00 2014-10-29T21:31:49-08:00 In 2005, Herbert and Julie Thomas opened a $2,000,000.00 home equity line of credit (the HELOC) with U.S. Bank. To secure the obligation, the Thomases executed a deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank to their property in Sun Valley. A few months later, the Thomases approached Citimortgage, Inc. seeking refinancing. Blaine County Title Associates (BCT) issued a Commitment for Title Insurance under which Stewart Title Guarantee Company agreed to issue a policy to CitiMortgage so long as all prior deeds of trust, including the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust, were released so that CitiMortgage would be in first lien position with regard to the Thomas Property. To that end, BCT contacted the local branch of U.S. Bank in Ketchum to determine the HELOC payoff amount. In response, U.S. Bank faxed BCT a screen shot of an account inquiry reflecting the balance owed on the HELOC. The Thomases closed with Citimortgage a few weeks later, and the Citimortgage loan was secured by a deed of trust on their property. The Citimortgage deed of trust was recorded days later. This appeal arose from a lien priority dispute between U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage. The district court concluded that U.S. Bank lost its first priority position on the Thomas property after finding that CitiMortgage delivered a demand for reconveyance and U.S. Bank failed to release its deed of trust as required by Idaho Code section 45-1514. U.S. Bank appealed, contending that the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that testimony offered by CitiMortgage was inadmissible, and that CitiMortgage failed to prove delivery of the demand for reconveyance. CitiMortgage cross-appealed the district court's decision that CitiMortgage was not entitled to attorney fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court misallocated the burden of proof, that the district court did not err in admitting Citimortgage's proffered testimony, and that it could not determine whether the district court's findings of fact were supported by substantial and competent evidence because the court failed to evaluate certain evidence. As such, the Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "U.S. Bank National Association N.D. v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-10-29 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Joel D. Horton 41252 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0043.html Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust 2014-10-28T14:41:35-08:00 2014-10-28T18:25:41-08:00 The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda's sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot.View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 14-0043 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20140066.html Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson 2014-10-28T13:03:47-08:00 2014-10-28T14:04:49-08:00 Desert Partners IV, L.P., and Family Tree Corporation ("Desert Partners") sued to quiet title to certain mineral interests in McKenzie County to Desert Partners. Numerous parties were included in the action. Self-represented litigants John Benson and Brian Benson answered, counterclaiming ownership of the disputed mineral interests. Desert Partners and Benson both moved for summary judgment. No other parties responded to the motions for summary judgment. Desert Partners did not request a hearing on its motion. Benson requested a hearing on the summary judgment motions and then filed a notice of hearing. Benson's notice of hearing stated oral arguments would be heard "on October 30, 2013 at 10:00 am, or as soon as counsel may be heard." On December 3, 2013, the district court ordered summary judgment in favor of Desert Partners, noting there was no dispute as to material facts and no one had appeared for the hearing on November 1, 2013. The judgment was entered December 5, 2013. Benson emailed an unsigned notice of appeal and faxed a signed notice of appeal on February 3, 2014. The next day, the clerk of district court sent Benson an email stating the clerks' offices are unable to file documents submitted by email or fax. Further, the email stated the original documents could be mailed to the office. Benson mailed the notice of appeal on February 4, 2014. According to documentation submitted by Benson, the clerk of district court received the mailed noticed of appeal on February 7, 2014, and recorded the notice of appeal as filed on February 12, 2014. Upon receiving the notice of appeal from the district court, the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court emailed Benson informing him the timeliness of his appeal was in question, as the deadline for filing was February 6, 2014. Further, the Chief Deputy Clerk advised Benson he may seek an extension of time from the district court to file the notice of appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a)(4), if he could show excusable neglect or good cause. Benson did not move for an extension to file the notice of appeal. Desert Partners petitioned the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal as untimely and Benson responded. In response, Benson argued his appeal should be treated as timely, and that summary judgment was improperly granted because he requested a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, but did not receive one. Desert Partners did not file a brief in response. The Supreme Court denied Desert Partners' motion to dismiss. Further, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Benson and remanded for a hearing on the motions, concluding the district court did not properly notice the hearing it held.View "Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Lisa K. Fair McEvers 20140066 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b250089.html RNT Holdings v. United Gen. Title Ins. 2014-10-28T13:00:48-08:00 2014-10-28T13:51:43-08:00 RNT appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on its claim for breach of insurance contract against RNT, arguing that the trial court erroneously determined that the claim failed in light of the terms of RNT's policy. The court concluded that summary judgment on RNT's claim for breach of insurance contract was properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts; condition 10(b) of the policy, which terminates an insurer's liability when the loan is paid off or the related mortgage is released; and exclusion 3(a) of the policy, which precludes coverage for defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by RNT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "RNT Holdings v. United Gen. Title Ins." on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state California California Court of Appeal Nora M. Manella B250089 http://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2014/111786.html Marshall County v. Homesales, Inc. 2014-10-28T12:04:01-08:00 2014-10-29T05:09:15-08:00 Appellants Homesales, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Jason L. Howell, appealed the district court's order certifying this case as a class action at the request of Appellee Marshall County. This case centered on the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, and its applicability to a sheriff's deed granted to Homesales in a mortgage foreclosure action prosecuted by JPMorgan. Homesales claimed that the transaction was exempt from documentary tax. The County disagreed and sued to collect the tax it claimed was due. The County also moved to certify the case as a class action in which all Oklahoma counties would join as plaintiffs. The district court granted the County's motion and certified the case pursuant to Title 12 O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 2023 (B)(3) and the defendants appealed. Because the County was precluded by the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in "Murray Cnty. v. Homesales, Inc.," (330 P.3d 519) from suing to collect unpaid taxes allegedly due pursuant to the DSTA, the district court's class certification order was reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Marshall County v. Homesales, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Oklahoma Oklahoma Supreme Court Fischer 111786 Consol. w/111870 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2014/2013-1506.html Olentangy Local Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Delaware County Bd. of Revision 2014-10-28T06:03:33-08:00 2014-10-28T20:23:21-08:00 This case involved the tax-year-2009 value of a parcel of property and presented the question of whether an auction sale price can ever be regarded as evidence of a property's value and, if so, under what circumstances. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) found that the auction sale in this case was a voluntary, arm's-length transaction, and therefore, that the sale price was the best evidence of the true value of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 5713.04, read in conjunction with former Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03, requires the taxing authorities to presume that an auction sale price is not a voluntary, arm's-length transaction, but that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that a particular sale was in fact voluntary and did occur at arm's length; and (2) the record supported the BTA's finding that this particular auction sale was voluntary and occurred at arm's length.View "Olentangy Local Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Delaware County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Per Curiam 2013-1506 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/f067812.html First CA Bank v. McDonald 2014-10-27T13:01:42-08:00 2014-10-27T13:26:31-08:00 The Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action to collect a loan secured by two parcels of real estate which had been made to a husband and wife. After the husband died, the loan went into default. The Bank and wife agreed to a private sale of one of the parcels that was her separate property and Bank filed the foreclosure action on the remaining parcel to obtain a deficiency judgment. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary adjudication of its judicial foreclosure cause of action and determined that the Bank was entitled to obtain a deficiency judgment against the representatives of the husband's estate (appellants). The court concluded that, because the Bank failed to show the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 726 for creditors seeking deficiency judgments by disposing of the property at issue outside of judicial foreclosure and without appellants' consent or waiver, the Bank has waived any right to a deficiency against them. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court.View "First CA Bank v. McDonald" on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state California California Court of Appeal Donald R. Franson, Jr. F067812 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-15163.html Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc. 2014-10-27T13:01:09-08:00 2014-10-27T13:27:30-08:00 In 1992, Robert Farmer and his wife, Kathy, bought Wolverine Lodge in Glennallen from Peggy Jo Watson. The purchase price of $365,000 was secured by a deed of trust on the property. Farmer defaulted on the mortgage for the first time in 1996, but he cured before the foreclosure sale occurred. In 2012 Farmer defaulted again. Farmer was almost five months late on the payments, had not paid the real estate taxes or room taxes, and had no insurance on the property. Watson paid all of these expenses herself in order to keep the property up-to-date and insured. She testified that "Farmer promised many times that he would bring the loan current and obtain insurance," but "[h]e never did." In March 2012 Watson commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Watson's attorney recorded a notice of default and a notice of sale, and distributed them to Farmer by mail and personal service. Notice of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was published in the Alaska Journal of Commerce and posted at various locations in Anchorage. The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was postponed six times. It was initially set for July 25, but Watson postponed it until August 29. On August 28 Farmer filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and Watson again postponed the sale, this time at Farmer's request, until September 26. Because of the ensuing automatic bankruptcy stay, the sale was postponed until October 31, then until November 28, then again until December 19, and finally until December 27, when the sale actually took place. Watson's attorney was the only attendee at each of the scheduled sales. Each of these postponements was announced publicly on the sale date, and the trustee signed the notice of postponement every time. Farmer was not otherwise notified of any of the postponements, and, at the time of the actual sale, he alleged that neither "[he], [his] wife, nor [his] bankruptcy attorney knew . . . that a deed of trust foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 27, 2012." Farmer argued that equity required re-notice after each postponement and that the lack of re-notice violated his due process rights. The superior court granted summary judgment to Watson. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: equity does not require re-notice after postponement of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and notice of a postponement by public announcement satisfies due process.View "Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Craig F. Stowers S-15163 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130150.html America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey 2014-10-27T13:00:12-08:00 2014-10-28T07:51:26-08:00 America's Home Place, Inc. ("AHP") appealed a Circuit Court order denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiff below, Gregory Rampey. In August 2012, Rampey and AHP entered into a contract, the terms of which provided that AHP would construct a house for Rampey in Chambers County. AHP constructed the house; however, after he took possession of the house, Rampey began to notice "settlement and sinking of the foundation," which, according to Rampey, resulted in significant structural and other damage to the house. AHP attempted to stabilize the foundation and to repair the damage to the house that had occurred as a result of the unstable foundation; those efforts were unsuccessful. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to enter an order granting AHP's motion to compel arbitration.View "America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey" on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama James Allen Main 1130150 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130098.html Givianpour v. Curtain, Sr. 2014-10-27T13:00:10-08:00 2014-10-28T07:49:32-08:00 At a March 1, 2011 foreclosure sale, Thomas Curtain, Sr. purchased a parcel of real property in Mountain Brook, for $295,000. The foreclosed mortgagors were Charles and Concetta Givianpour, Cameron Givianpour's parents. During their ownership of the property, the Givianpours leased the property to Amy Newell. After Curtain foreclosed on the property, he filed a complaint against Newell in the Jefferson Circuit Court in which he demanded possession of the property, as well as "damages for wrongful retention of said real property." Newell filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Curtain filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking relief from the automatic stay; the bankruptcy court granted the motion and lifted the stay. The Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of Curtain, awarding him possession of the property and damages. The bankruptcy court discharged Newell's debt, including any rent owed for continued possession of the property. Cameron Givianpour presented Curtain with a demand for lawful charges for the purpose of redeeming the property. Curtain presented Givianpour a statement which included the purchase price, interest, insurance, and ad valorem taxes on the property. The statement also included a charge for payment of rent on the property for tenant Newelll. Givianpour did not tender the redemption funds to Curtain. Instead, Givianpour filed a complaint against Curtain seeking to redeem the property. In his complaint, Givianpour alleged that the rent charge constituted an illegal or exaggerated charge for which no legal basis existed. Givianpour stated that because of the allegedly unlawful charge he was "unable to ascertain the true amount of the lawful charges owed" and that he "need[ed] the Court's assistance to determine the amount of lawful charges properly owed." Givianpour did not pay any of the redemption funds to the circuit court. Curtain moved to dismiss, alleging that, among other things, that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Givianpour had failed either to tender the amount for redemption or to pay the amount for redemption to court with the filing of his complaint. The circuit court entered an order denying Curtain's motion for a judgment on the pleadings but granting his motion to dismiss Givianpour's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Givianpour filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, emphasizing that the parties disagreed as to whether the rent charge was a "lawful charge." The Supreme Court concluded that the rent charge on Curtain's statement for redemption constituted an unlawful charge, that such an unlawful charge, over which there was a bona fide disagreement, constituted a valid excuse for failure to tender the redemption amount or to pay it into court, and that payment of the amount not in dispute is not required to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court to settle the disputed amount. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Givianpour v. Curtain, Sr." on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Tom Parker 1130098 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2013-006.html Lynch v. Town of Pelham 2014-10-24T07:03:51-08:00 2014-10-25T04:07:35-08:00 Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law 2014-10-24 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court James P. Bassett 2013-006 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2014/scwc-12-0000867-0.html Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi 2014-10-23T15:01:20-08:00 2014-10-23T19:54:35-08:00 This appeal arose from a property title dispute between Defendant, who purchased the property in 2007, and Plaintiff, which later acquired a quitclaim deed to the property following a judicial foreclosure. After Defendant refused to vacate the property, Plaintiff filed the underlying action, requesting a judgment for immediate and exclusive possession of the property and a writ of possession. The circuit court entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and issued a writ of possession. Defendant filed post-judgment motions and then filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment. The circuit court denied Defendant's post-judgment motions. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the summary judgment and remanded based on Defendant's post-judgment declaration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded, holding that the ICA erred in relying upon Defendant's post-judgment motion as a basis to find disputed facts with regard to the motion for summary judgment.View "Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state Hawaii Supreme Court of Hawaii Richard W. Pollack SCWC-12-0000867 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/e059692.html Jenkins v. Teegarden 2014-10-23T14:01:03-08:00 2014-10-24T04:49:27-08:00 In 2007, Robert (Bob) Perry quitclaimed a house to defendant Charlotte (Jeanne) Teegarden, who was his friend and one of his caregivers. Teegarden prepared the quitclaim deed. In her deposition, Teegarden admitted that the only consideration that she gave for the quitclaim consisted of one dollar and her friendship. At trial, however, she testified that, pursuant to an oral agreement with Perry, she also gave $100,000 (for improvements to the house), her $45,000 equity in a different house, and her services. Plaintiff Merilou Jenkins is Perry's stepdaughter and, since Perry's death, the trustee and beneficiary of his trust. Jenkins contended that the quitclaim was invalid under Probate Code former section 21350, which, at the time, provided that a "donative transfer" was invalid under specified circumstances, including when the recipient drafted the instrument that effected the transfer. Jenkins also contended that the quitclaim deed was ineffective because it was executed by Perry in his individual capacity instead of as trustee and because it had an erroneous legal description. The trial court found that the quitclaim was not a donative transfer because Teegarden gave good consideration for it. It then reformed the quitclaim deed so as to fix the mistakes in it regarding the grantor's capacity and the legal description. Jenkins appealed. The Court of APpeal held that, though Probate Code former section 21350 et seq. has been repealed and replaced by Probate Code section 21380 et seq., the former section 21350 et seq. still governed an instrument executed before January 1, 2011. The issue concerning a "donative transfer" for purposes of Probate Code former section 21350 was a question of first impression. The Court held that a transfer is a donative transfer if it is for inadequate consideration; the mere fact that the recipient gave good consideration, sufficient to support a contract, does not prevent the transfer from being donative. Finally, the Court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the quitclaim was a donative transfer under this definition as a matter of law. Hence, the quitclaim was invalid.View "Jenkins v. Teegarden" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state California California Court of Appeal Betty Ann Richli E059692 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2013-ia-01291-sct.html Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey 2014-10-23T12:02:55-08:00 2014-10-24T04:30:37-08:00 A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Randy G. Pierce 2013-IA-01291-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ct-01441-sct-0.html Prestenbach, Jr. v. Collins 2014-10-23T12:02:53-08:00 2014-10-24T04:43:21-08:00 In 2011, Gerald Collins granted Garrett Prestenbach a one-year option to purchase about 150 acres of Collins's farm and pasture land for $500,000. Prestenbach agreed to make a $25,000 down payment on the property and finance the remaining $475,000 through a combination of a $225,000 USDA loan and $250,000 financing agreement with Collins. The option contract included the following details: (1) a recital of $100 consideration; (2) a township-and-range description of the property; (3) a reference to the buyer's intent to obtain a USDA loan; (4) the total purchase price; and (5) a recital that the option was irrevocable for the first three months and, after three months, the option could be revoked by giving ten days' written notice. The parties also agreed that Collins would allow the USDA to inspect the property before closing. About a month after giving Prestenbach the option to purchase his land, another buyer offered to buy Collins's property immediately. Collins attempted to persuade Prestenbach to give up his option so he could sell to the other party, but Prestenbach refused and quickly recorded the option contract to prevent the sale. By early December, relations between Collins and Prestenbach had deteriorated. Collins's attorney sent Prestenbach a letter attempting to terminate the one-year option "upon the latter to occur of December 15th, its date of expiration, or ten (10) days after receipt of this notice." Prestenbach responded by hand-delivering a letter exercising his option to purchase. At that time, the USDA loan process was nearly complete, and on December 22, 2011, the USDA conditionally approved Prestenbach's loan. Prestenbach tried to set a closing date for the loan, but Collins refused to move forward with the closing. Claiming that the option to purchase had been terminated, Collins denied the USDA's request to inspect the property. He then filed a quiet-title action against Prestenbach. Prestenbach filed an answer and a counterclaim for specific performance, stating he was "ready, willing, and able" to close the deal. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The chancellor granted Collins's motion for summary judgment and denied Prestenbach's motion, finding that Prestenbach was not entitled to specific performance because, at the time he exercised his option, he could not pay the entire purchase price. Prestenbach appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case "to correct a fundamental misunderstanding of the law on option contracts and specific performance." The option holder timely exercised his option to purchase and is entitled to specific performance, so the Court reversed and remanded.View "Prestenbach, Jr. v. Collins" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Jess H. Dickinson 2012-CT-01441-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ct-00763-sct-0.html Crowell v. Butts 2014-10-23T12:02:52-08:00 2014-10-24T04:43:25-08:00 In this replevin action, a tenant sued his landlord and a towing company, alleging wrongful possession of several vehicles towed from the property he leased from the landlord. The County Court granted the defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal, and also found that the landlord's use of self-help was lawful. The Circuit Court affirmed. Finding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to maintain the replevin action, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the replevin action for a trial de novo between the plaintiff and the towing company. It also found the landlord's use of self-help to be unlawful, and reversed and rendered that issue in favor of the plaintiff. Because the Supreme Court find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly addressed the issue of the landlord's use of self-help, it reversed the judgments and remanded the replevin action to the trial court for a trial de novo.View "Crowell v. Butts" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state Mississippi Supreme Court of Mississippi Leslie D. King 2012-CT-00763-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b243015a.html Bowman v. Cal. Coastal Commission 2014-10-23T12:00:47-08:00 2014-10-23T13:17:23-08:00 This case stemmed from Walton Emmick's application to the County for a coastal development permit (CDP) to make improvements to his property. After Emmick died, the SDS Family Trust succeeded to the property. The County subsequently approved the CDP, which was conditioned upon SDS's offer to dedicate a lateral easement for public access along the shorefront portion of the property (CDP-1). SDS did not appeal. Nine months later, SDS applied for another CDP (CDP-2) and the application was approved. The Sierra Club, the Surfrider Foundation, and two coastal commissioners appealed the County's approval of the CDP-2 to the Commission. The Commission determined that the easement condition contained in CDP-1 is permanent and binding on the landowner, and removal of the easement condition would violate the policy favoring public access to coastal resources. The Commission conditioned its permit on the implementation of the easement condition contained in CDP-1. The court reversed the judgment denying SDS's petition for a writ of administrative mandate to eliminate a public access condition from the permit where it could be inequitable to apply collateral estoppel to require a party to dedicate a coastal easement as a condition of obtaining a coastal development permit.View "Bowman v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state California California Court of Appeal Gilbert B243015A http://law.justia.com/cases/kentucky/supreme-court/2014/2012-sc-000716-dg.html Kircheimer v. Carrier 2014-10-23T07:02:14-08:00 2014-10-23T14:21:57-08:00 Plaintiffs, several lot owners in Sandy Beach Subdivision, filed a petition for declaration of rights seeking a declaration that Sandy Beach Lane, a subdivision roadway, was a private roadway. Plaintiff also sought to enjoin Defendants, the developers of two separate subdivisions, or other lot owners in those subdivisions from installing driveways or culverts onto Sandy Beach Lane. The trial court concluded that Sandy Beach Lane was a private road for the sole use and benefit of the lot owners in Sandy Beach Subdivision. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Sandy Beach Lane was a public roadway dedicated by estoppel involving plat. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Sandy Beach Lane is a private roadway for the use and benefit of lot owners in the Sandy Beach Subdivision; and (2) the easement for use of Sandy Beach Lane may not be extended or enlarged by allowing property owners in nearby, more recently-developed subdivisions to build driveways or culverts opening onto the road because this increased access to the road by adjacent landowners was not contemplated by the parties.View "Kircheimer v. Carrier" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state Kentucky Kentucky Supreme Court Lisabeth Hughes Abramson 2012-SC-000716-DG http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2014/2-14.html Burson v. Capps 2014-10-23T06:02:03-08:00 2014-10-23T14:56:48-08:00 At issue in this case was whether a borrower may rescind a loan that has not been consummated pursuant to the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Prior to closing on a home refinancing loan, Respondent submitted to the lender a notice of rescission of the loan. Thereafter, Respondent signed a note and deed of trust consistent with the negotiated terms of the loan. The loan proceeds were distributed as previously agreed to by the parties, and Respondent made payments on the note for approximately two years. Respondent subsequently defaulted on the loan, and the home was sold at a foreclosure public auction. Respondent filed exceptions to the foreclosure sale, arguing that he had rescinded the loan. The circuit court overruled the exceptions and ratified the sale. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the rescission notice was timely because there was no language in 15 U.S.C. 1635 or TILA's implementing regulation prohibiting a borrower from rescinding a loan prior to consummation of the transaction, and therefore, such an action was supported by statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under TILA, a loan may not be rescinded before it is consummated.View "Burson v. Capps" on Justia Law 2014-10-23 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. 2/14 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2014/sc19084.html One Country, LLC v. Johnson 2014-10-23T06:00:50-08:00 2014-10-24T13:29:00-08:00 Plaintiff, the named Defendant in this action, and others formed a limited liability company (the LLC) to purchase and redevelop certain property. After the LLC acquired the property, Plaintiff guaranteed the payment of two loans from a Bank. In the meantime, Plaintiff, Defendant, and others entered into backstop guarantee agreements that provided protection to Plaintiff in the event he was required to honor his personal guarantees to the Bank. The Bank later commenced foreclosure proceedings against the LLC and Plaintiff as guarantor. The court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and the Bank sought a deficiency judgment against the Plaintiff. The Bank and Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced the present action against Defendants to enforce the backstop guarantee agreements. The trial court concluded that the backstop guarantee agreements were unenforceable. The Appellate Court reversed. Defendant appealed, claiming that Plaintiff's tax treatment of the debt that Defendant guaranteed effectively divested Plaintiff of his interest in the debt, and therefore, Plaintiff had no standing to enforce the backstop guarantee agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff had standing to enforce the agreement.View "One Country, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Peter T. Zarella SC19084 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b254259.html Blueberry Properties v. Chow 2014-10-22T12:00:53-08:00 2014-10-22T12:25:35-08:00 This case arose when defendant entered into a settlement agreement to sell her property to Blueberry and then refused to consummate the sale. The trial court entered judgment pursuant to the terms of the agreement and ordered defendant to complete the sale. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's post-judgment order appointing the clerk of the court as an elisor to execute the escrow agreement on behalf of defendant. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court's order was proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(4), which empowers the court to compel obedience to its judgments.View "Blueberry Properties v. Chow" on Justia Law 2014-10-22 state California California Court of Appeal Kitching B254259 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40368.html Pierce v. McMullen 2014-10-21T15:48:19-08:00 2014-10-23T08:30:27-08:00 In 2009, Joseph Pierce filed this action against Steven McMullen and Highland Financial, LLC, seeking damages for various violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and for breach of contract, all based upon an alleged scam in which defendants represented that they could protect Pierce from losing his equity in real property that was facing foreclosure. He alleged that the defendants obtained title to his real property pursuant to a promise to assume the loans secured by the property, to market and sell the property, and to pay him at least $50,000 or more from the sale proceeds, depending upon the sale price. He claimed that he deeded the property to defendants, they failed to make the payments on the loans, and that the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The complaint also alleged that Highland Financial was the alter ego of McMullen. Only McMullen appeared in the action, but he did not deny the allegations of wrongdoing in the complaint. When McMullen failed to appear at the trial, the district court ordered that he was in default, that Pierce prevailed on his complaint, and that he could present evidence of his damages. Pierce did so, but the district court later dismissed the action on the ground that Mr. Pierce had failed to prove liability. Finding that decision was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Pierce v. McMullen" on Justia Law 2014-06-17 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Daniel T. Eismann 40368 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40992.html NW Farm Credit Svcs v. Lake Cascade Airpark 2014-10-21T15:48:17-08:00 2014-10-25T03:45:38-08:00 Northwest Farm Credit Services recovered a deficiency judgment against the Appellants following the foreclosure of two mortgages on property located in Valley County. Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC, Donald Miller, and Candace Miller appealed the judgment, contending that the reasonable value of their foreclosed property was substantially more than the value determined by the district court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "NW Farm Credit Svcs v. Lake Cascade Airpark" on Justia Law 2014-07-31 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Jim Jones 40992 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40738.html DAFCO v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 2014-10-21T15:48:17-08:00 2014-10-25T03:52:48-08:00 DAFCO LLC sought recovery against Stewart Title Guaranty Co. on a lender's title insurance policy and against AmeriTitle, Inc., the closing agent for the lending transaction, claiming that it sustained injury as a result of a defective deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stewart and AmeriTitle, resulting in this appeal by DAFCO. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "DAFCO v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co" on Justia Law 2014-07-31 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Jim Jones 40738 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40566.html Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor 2014-10-21T15:48:14-08:00 2014-10-25T04:05:11-08:00 This appeal stemmed from a 1983 Ground Lease of over four acres of property in Pocatello which Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC leased from Pocatello Hospital, LLC (d/b/a/ Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PMC)). Quail Ridge appealed a declaratory judgment which held that PMC was entitled to an adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge from $9,562.50 annually to $148,500 annually, and that Quail Ridge was obligated to pay PMC $416,812.50 in rent for the period of 2010 to 2012. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor" on Justia Law 2014-08-01 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Joel D. Horton 40566 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/41023.html J&M Cattle Co v. Farmers National Bank 2014-10-21T15:48:13-08:00 2014-10-28T04:41:30-08:00 This appeal stemmed from the sale of dairy cattle that were subject to Appellant Farmers National Bank's (FNB) perfected security interest and Respondent J&M Cattle Company's (J&M) agister's lien. The net sale proceeds received from the sale of the dairy cattle were insufficient to satisfy both FNB's perfected security interest and J&M's agister's lien. J&M filed an action for declaratory relief to resolve FNB's and J&M's competing interests. Although FNB's perfected security interest had a priority date that predates J&M's lien, the district court determined that J&M's lien had priority over FNB's perfected security interest. The district court entered a final judgment in favor of J&M, and FNB appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.View "J&M Cattle Co v. Farmers National Bank" on Justia Law 2014-08-01 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Warren E. Jones 41023 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40573.html ABC Agra v. Critical Access Group 2014-10-21T15:48:09-08:00 2014-10-25T04:06:13-08:00 At the center of this appeal was ABC Agra, LLC's action seeking a declaratory judgment against Critical Access Group, Inc. ("CAG") regarding the enforceability of a real property use restriction. Because there were no existing or proposed uses that implicated the restriction, the district court determined that the claim was not ripe and granted CAG's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed this dismissal.View "ABC Agra v. Critical Access Group" on Justia Law 2014-08-06 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Roger S. Burdick 40573 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/41306.html Hull v. Giesler 2014-10-21T15:48:08-08:00 2014-10-25T04:00:09-08:00 Richard Giesler and Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC appealed a district court's judgment declaring the rights and obligations on a contract. This case arose out of several oral and written agreements between Giesler and Gregory Hull that related to purchasing and subdividing property. After a bench trial, the court found that Hull sold the property to Giesler, but the parties had a later oral contract where Hull promised to pay off Giesler's loans in exchange for half of the subdivision's net profits. The court held that neither party materially breached the contract and ordered Hull to timely pay Giesler's loans and Giesler to complete the subdivision within certain deadlines. On appeal, Giesler argued Hull failed to prove damages and the district court's remedies were erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the district court's findings of fact, but that the district court erred in its remedies. The Court vacated the portions of the district court's decision regarding: (1) the conversion payment of half the irrigation equipment's value; (2) the deadlines for completing Parcels 2 and 3; and (3) the provisions that order consequences to encourage performance under the contract.View "Hull v. Giesler" on Justia Law 2014-08-06 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Roger S. Burdick 41306 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40375.html Camp Easton Forever, Inc v. Inland NW Council Boy Scouts of Amierica 2014-10-21T15:48:06-08:00 2014-10-23T08:30:14-08:00 Camp Easton Forever, Inc., ("CEF") and Daniel and Matthew Edwards appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Inland Northwest Council Endowment Properties, LLC, and Inland Northwest Council of the Boy Scouts of America (collectively "INWC"). CEF and the Edwardses filed an action to declare the parties' rights to property INWC owned on Lake Coeur d'Alene that had been used as a Boy Scout camp since 1929. The district court held CEF and the Edwardses lacked standing because CEF lacked a legally recognizable interest and the Edwardses were not certified as class representatives. The district court also held no trust existed because all prior agreements merged into an unambiguous deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to INWC on grounds that the deed was an unambiguous fee simple transfer.View "Camp Easton Forever, Inc v. Inland NW Council Boy Scouts of Amierica" on Justia Law 2014-08-15 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Roger S. Burdick 40375 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/h038382.html Jones v. Wachovia Bank 2014-10-21T15:00:47-08:00 2014-10-21T15:06:32-08:00 Plaintiffs sought damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel after losing their home in a foreclosure sale which they understood from a phone conversation with the bank would be postponed to a date 10 days after the actual sale date. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding detrimental reliance or injury under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. They did not relinquish any legal right to stay the bank's foreclosureView "Jones v. Wachovia Bank" on Justia Law 2014-10-21 state California California Court of Appeal Adrienne M. Grover H038382 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40581.html Frontier Development Grp v. Caravella 2014-10-21T11:55:25-08:00 2014-10-24T08:08:18-08:00 In 2006, Richard Myers owned the property at issue in this case. At the time, the property was subject to a deed of trust in favor of First Horizon Home Loans. Myers enlisted Michael Horn and his company, Frontier Development Group (FDG) to build a residence on the property, which First Horizon financed. However, in April of 2007, Myers filed for bankruptcy, and First Horizon rescinded the construction loan and instructed FDG to halt construction when the project was only fifty percent complete. The structure was left exposed to the elements for fourteen months. Following Myers' bankruptcy, foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and Myers hired Kathleen Horn (Michael Horn's wife), of Windermere Real Estate/Teton Valley to list the property for sale. The Caravellas, who were Ohio residents, looking for property in the Teton Valley, contacted their real estate agent who put them in touch with Kathleen Horn who provided them with information on the stalled Myers project. Kathleen Horn eventually put the Caravellas in touch with Michael Horn. The Caravellas traveled to Idaho, met with Kathleen Horn, and spent two days inspecting the property. The Caravellas testified that Kathleen Horn minimized issues with the house, telling them that it was "in good shape,""structurally sound,"and a "great house."The Caravellas chose not to have a professional inspection performed and closed on May 5, 2008. After closing, the Caravellas and Michael Horn agreed that Horn would complete construction on the house in accordance with Myers' original plans. In reaching this agreement, the Caravellas testified that they believed they were dealing with Horn as an individual. The total contract price for the first phase of work that the Caravellas authorized was $88,500. However, the Caravellas paid FDG $138,097.24 for the first phase before refusing to pay any more. Much of the money that the Caravellas paid to FDG was for unauthorized work or work that was completed in a nonconforming or substandard manner. The Caravellas hired a second builder to complete the first phase and to remedy the substandard work. FDG initiated this action by filing a complaint to foreclose on a lien for construction services and building materials provided to, but not paid for by, the Caravellas. The Caravellas filed an amended counterclaim alleging that FDG and Horn: (1) breached the parties' contract; (2) breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (4) breached the implied warranty of habitability; (5) committed slander of title; (6) committed fraud and misrepresentation; (7) engaged in a civil conspiracy; and (8) acted negligently. The district court held that FDG's lien was defective and dismissed it. The district court also held that FDG breached its contract with the Caravellas by: (1) failing to complete agreed upon work in conformity with the plans and in a workmanlike manner; (2) charging the Caravellas for unauthorized and defective work; and (3) substantially overbilling the Caravellas for work and materials that were not authorized and never provided. As to the Caravellas' fraud counterclaim, the district court concluded that the Caravellas failed to establish all nine elements of fraud and dismissed the claim. The district court also concluded that Horn was not personally liable. The district court awarded the Caravellas $113,775.45 in attorney fees, $5,484.83 in costs as a matter of right, and $200.00 in discretionary costs. The Caravellas timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by applying the incorrect evidentiary standard to the Caravellas' fraud counterclaim, but that error was harmless. The Court affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment dismissing the Caravellas' fraud claim, and reversed that portion of the judgment dismissing the Caravellas' claims against Michael Horn personally. In all other respects, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.View "Frontier Development Grp v. Caravella" on Justia Law 2014-08-28 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Joel D. Horton 40581 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/40793.html Cummings v. Stephens 2014-10-21T10:52:31-08:00 2014-10-21T19:52:14-08:00 Roger and Barbara Stephens owned a parcel of real property consisting of about 270 acres on the west side of the highway and another parcel consisting of about 83 acres on the east side of the highway. They hired a realtor to sell the parcel on the west side of the highway. The realtor asked Northern Title Company of Idaho, Inc., to begin the initial title work for a sale of the property, including preparing a legal description for the sale of the parcel on the west side of the highway. Stephen Cummings noticed a "For Sale" sign on the Stephenses' property. Cummings negotiated to purchase the Stephens' property. He was faxed a copy of the commitment for title insurance issued in connection with the transaction. The legal description in the document included the Stephenses' property on both sides of the highway and two additional parcels they did not own. Based upon the legal description in those documents, Cummings believed that the property being sold included both parcels of the Stephenses' property. Northern Title discovered that the legal description it had prepared for use in the real estate contract and its title commitment for that transaction erroneously included the Stephenses' real property located east of the highway and two parcels of land they did not own. The legal description consisted of five paragraphs, each describing a separate parcel of real property. In an effort to correct that error, Northern Title created a revised legal description by inserting between the first and second paragraphs the words, "Except all of that portion of the following described land lying easterly of U.S. Highway 30." That change excluded the two parcels of property not owned by the Stephenses, but it did not exclude their land lying east of the highway because it was described in the first paragraph. On the date of closing, Northern Title recorded a warranty deed (Original Deed) granting to Cummings the real property described in the revised legal description, which was attached to the deed as Exhibit A. The legal description included the Stephenses' property on the east side of the highway. Mr. Stephens went to the county courthouse to pay the real estate taxes on the 83 acres of land east of the highway and was informed that he no longer owned that property. Cummings filed this action against Mr. Stephens over the erroneous deed. Stephens answered, denying Cummings's claims, and filed a third-party claim against Northern Title. He later dropped his third-party claim in exchange for Northern Title agreeing to indemnify him from any losses. Stephens then filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that there was a mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake in the legal description of the real property being sold. The district court held that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding mutual mistake, but it granted the motion on the ground that the undisputed evidence showed a unilateral mistake. One of the realtors had filed an affidavit stating that prior to the sale he had told Mr. Cummings that only the land west of the highway was being sold, and Mr. Cummings did not deny that fact. Cummings successfully moved for reconsideration, with the district court finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to what Cummings had been told about what property he was purchasing. Cummings then amended his complaint, adding Northern Title as a defendant and alleging that by recording the Correction Deed, Stephens and Northern Title breached the warranties of title in the Original Deed, converted the 83 acres lying east of the highway, and slandered Cummings's title to the real property. The district court granted Stephens's motion for involuntary dismissal as to all of the claims against him. And in its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court denied all of Cummings's claims against Northern Title except one. It found that Northern Title acted negligently as a title and abstract company, and it awarded Cummings damages in the sum of $50,000, which was the sum he had paid to obtain an assignment of its contract to purchase the Stephenses' property. The court awarded Mr. Stephens costs and attorney fees against Cummings, and it awarded Mr. Cummings costs and attorney fees against Northern Title. Mr. Cummings appealed and Northern Title cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Cummings' claims against Stephens, and reversed claims against Northern Title on the ground that it assumed the duty of being an abstractor of title.View "Cummings v. Stephens" on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Daniel T. Eismann 40793 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/41256.html Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada County Bd of Equalization 2014-10-21T10:52:29-08:00 2014-10-21T19:54:32-08:00 In August 2006, Nagel Beverage Company approached the Youth Ranch and the Idaho Youth Ranch Foundation, Inc., about the sale of the real property. Nagel was looking to sell the property as part of a 1031 exchange and offered it to the Youth Ranch for $1,136,000 below the appraised value as a noncash donation. The Youth Ranch wanted to purchase the property and began to explore financing options with Key Bank. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied an application for a property tax exemption that the Youth Ranch and Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC asked for resulting from the donation. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals affirmed that decision. The Youth Ranch and the LLC appealed. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the property was not exempt from taxation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada County Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Joel D. Horton 41256 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2014/41889.html Brown v. Greenheart 2014-10-21T10:52:28-08:00 2014-10-21T19:56:45-08:00 The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the reformation of a deed to real property. Appellant Augusta Greenheart challenged a district court decision that determined a warranty deed conveying a portion of land "with their appurtenances" did not transfer a water right to Greenheart as the purchaser of the property. The district court ordered the warranty deed reformed due to mutual mistake, and grounds of quasi-estoppel and waiver, and granted the sellers of the property, respondents Jay and Christine Brown, full water rights to the property. The district court entered a judgment reforming the deed accordingly and awarded attorney fees to the Browns as prevailing parties. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Brown v. Greenheart" on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Walters 41889 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2014/sc19099.html Hartford v. McKeever 2014-10-21T06:00:52-08:00 2014-10-21T12:00:38-08:00 Defendant borrowed $143,065 in two separate loans from a Corporation. The Corporation assigned its interest in the notes to a Bank, which assigned the second loan (loan two) to Plaintiff, a municipality. Defendant had fully paid off the first loan (loan one), but determining that Defendant had defaulted on his payment obligations as to loan two, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant to foreclose on the property. Defendant counterclaimed, arguing, among other things, that he made an overpayment on loan two. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff was liable to Defendant for the total amount Defendant claimed to have overpaid on loan two to Plaintiff and all other prior holders of the note. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that, in the absence of an express contract provision, "an assignee generally does not assume the original responsibilities of the assignor." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly determined that Plaintiff, "as the most recent assignee and current holder of Defendant's note, could not be held liable to repay Defendant for sums that were overpaid on the note before it was assigned to Plaintiff."View "Hartford v. McKeever" on Justia Law 2014-10-28 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Christine S. Vertefeuille SC19099 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-59.html Leone v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. 2014-10-20T09:03:50-08:00 2014-10-20T11:14:33-08:00 A mortgage deed designated Desmond Leone as the mortgagor of his home and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee, acting as nominee for the lender, Equity One, Inc. MERS later assigned its interest in the mortgage to Assets Recovery Center Investments, LLC (ARC). When Leone failed to make timely payments to the lender, ARC, which Equity One had authorized to act on its behalf, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Leone subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to ARC was invalid and also sought to quiet title to the property. A hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants - MERS, Equity One, and ARC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly found that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the matter was ripe for summary judgment in favor of Defendants.View "Leone v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys." on Justia Law 2014-10-20 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Francis X. Flaherty 13-59 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-179.html Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Malinou 2014-10-20T09:03:49-08:00 2014-10-20T11:14:41-08:00 In 2003, the Supreme Court held that Seattle Savings Bank had the right to foreclose on certain property that Defendant inherited from his mother. In 2007, the Bank executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Because Defendant refused to vacate the property, Fannie Mae filed a trespass and ejectment complaint. Defendant, in turn, argued that Fannie Mae was not entitled to possession of the property. The trial court awarded Fannie Mae possession of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly found that Fannie Mae had the right to possess the property.View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Malinou" on Justia Law 2014-10-20 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Francis X. Flaherty 13-179 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s14a1049.html Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Cp., LLC 2014-10-20T06:01:21-08:00 2014-10-20T07:25:02-08:00 East Georgia Land and Development Company, LLC sued Newton County and several of its officers for a writ of mandamus, arguing that a zoning ordinance adopted by the County in May1985 was invalid. The trial court agreed that the zoning ordinance is invalid, it awarded summary judgment to East Georgia. The County appealed. The zoning ordinance at issue referred to (and purported to incorporate by reference) a set of maps identified in the ordinance as the "Official Zoning District Maps for Newton County." These maps are an integral part of the zoning ordinance. The only such maps that appeared in the record, however, were adopted by the County on July 2, 1985, and nothing in the record showed that those maps even were in existence in May 1985. "A map not yet in existence cannot have been 'made a public record' and certainly is not 'accessible to members of the public who are, or may be, affected by it.'" The trial court found, and as a result, concluded that the ordinance was void at the moment of its enactment. The Supreme Court saw no error in the findings of the trial court on this point, nor in its conclusion that the ordinance was void from its inception.View "Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Cp., LLC" on Justia Law 2014-10-20 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Keith R. Blackwell S14A1049 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130698.html Cooper v. MTA, Inc. 2014-10-17T09:00:12-08:00 2014-10-17T18:09:41-08:00 In 1999, Cooper and Robert L. Flowers formed C&F Enterprises, LLC. C&F owned a parcel of property in Huntsville, upon which it built a shopping center known as College Plaza. Pursuant to an "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement," MTA, Inc. became a member of C&F. The operating agreement provided that MTA, Flowers, and Cooper each owned a one-third interest in C&F. C&F borrowed $650,000 from the Southern Development Council, Inc. ("SDC"), a community-development program; that debt was memorialized by a promissory note. On the same day, SDC assigned the note to the Small Business Administration ("the SBA"). Cooper and Flowers personally guaranteed the indebtedness owed under the note. A few years later, C&F received a foreclosure letter with respect to the note. Counsel for MTA sent Cooper a letter informing him of MTA's intent to exercise its right of first refusal pursuant to section 16 of the operating agreement. In 2012, MTA filed a complaint against Cooper and Flowers, alleging multiple issues, but of pertinence for this appeal, the complaint alleged a count of contribution and "demand[ed] judgment in [MTA's] favor and against Cooper in the amount of $270,902.00, and Flowers in the amount of $270,902.00." In the alternative, "[MTA] demand[ed] judgment in its favor and against Cooper and Flowers for their individual pro rata contribution shares as determined at trial." Cooper filed a motion to dismiss; the trial court denied the motion. Cooper then answered the complaint. Thereafter, MTA filed a motion for a summary judgment against Cooper and Flowers. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting MTA's summary-judgment motion. Because genuine issues of material fact still remained at the time the trial court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in this respect. The trial court's order was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.View "Cooper v. MTA, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-10-17 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama James Allen Main 1130698 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-929.html Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Marcuzzo 2014-10-17T07:02:30-08:00 2014-10-17T12:47:47-08:00 A court is required to dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action upon receiving evidence of the existence of a title dispute. In this case, Plaintiff filed a forcible entry and detainer complaint against Defendants in the county court. Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the county court, alleging that they had filed an action in the district court challenging title in Plaintiff. After the district court action had been dismissed as to Plaintiff, the county court overruled Defendants' motion to dismiss, found in favor of Plaintiff, and ordered a writ of restitution to be issued. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendants failed to present to the county court evidence of a question of title until after that question had been resolved, the county court was not divested of jurisdiction.View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Marcuzzo" on Justia Law 2014-10-17 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court William B. Cassel S-13-929 http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2014/59319.html D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Betsinger 2014-10-16T11:03:11-08:00 2014-10-16T18:35:37-08:00 Plaintiff sued Defendants for fraud and deceptive trade practices in connection with a real estate purchase and loan arrangement. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages consisting of actual damages and emotional distress damages, as well as punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to consequential damages and remanded for a redetermination of punitive damages. On remand, the district court instructed the jury that it was to decide "what amount, if any, [Plaintiff] was entitled to for punitive damages." After punitive damages were awarded, Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(3) requires a second jury on remand to reassess whether punitive damages are warranted before that jury may determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded; and (2) because the jury instruction did not require the jury to make the threshold determination of whether punitive damages could be awarded, the case must be remanded for a new trial on punitive damages.View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Betsinger" on Justia Law 2014-10-16 state Nevada Supreme Court of Nevada Michael A. Cherry 59319 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-114.html Remmel v. City of Portland 2014-10-16T09:02:28-08:00 2014-10-16T13:29:59-08:00 32 Thomas Street, LLC applied to the Portland City Council for conditional rezoning of its property in Portland's West End. The City Council ultimately approved the conditional zoning agreement (CZA) for the reuse and rehabilitation of the property. The superior court determined that the rezoning did not comply with the City's comprehensive plan and state statutes limiting conditional rezoning. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction to affirm the decision of the City Council, holding that the record before the City Council supported its legislative determination that the CZA was consistent with the comprehensive plan and therefore did not violate relevant state statutes.View "Remmel v. City of Portland" on Justia Law 2014-10-16 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Donald G. Alexander Cum-14-42 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2014/150.html Matter of Colin Realty Co., LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead 2014-10-16T08:03:41-08:00 2014-10-16T11:36:54-08:00 Applicants sought approval from the Town of North Hempstead Board of Zoning and Appeals (the Board) to place a full-service restaurant in a storefront that had most recently housed a retail gift shop. Restaurants in this area were permitted subject to the issuance of a conditional use permit. The Board granted the conditional use permit and an area variance from the Town's parking and loading/unloading restrictions. Colin Realty, LLC (Colin), the owner of a multi-tenant retail building next to the property at issue, commenced this action seeking to annul the Board's determination and obtain a declaration that the proposed restaurant required a use rather than an area variance from the Town's parking and loading/unloading restrictions. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the action. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board properly considered the application as a request for an area variance rather than a use variance.View "Matter of Colin Realty Co., LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead" on Justia Law 2014-10-16 state New York New York Court of Appeals Susan Phillips Read 150