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FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTINNo. 09-50822.
ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER; RACHEL MULTER MICHALEWICZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN; DAVID B. PRYOR, Executive Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs in His Official Capacity; BARRY D. BURGDORF, Vice Chancellor and General Counsel in His Official Capacity; WILLIAM POWERS, JR., President of the University of Texas at Austin in His Official Capacity; BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM; R. STEVEN HICKS, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; WILLIAM EUGENE POWELL, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JAMES R. HUFFINES, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JANIECE LONGORIA, as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; COLLEEN McHUGH, as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; ROBERT L. STILLWELL, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JAMES D. DANNENBAUM, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; PAUL FOSTER, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; PRINTICE L. GARY, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; KEDRA ISHOP, Vice Provost and Director of Undergraduate Admissions in Her Official Capacity; FRANCISCO G. CIGARROA, M.D., Interim Chancellor of the University of Texas System in His Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN; DAVID B. PRYOR, Executive Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs in His Official Capacity; BARRY D. BURGDORF, Vice Chancellor and General Counsel in His Official Capacity; WILLIAM POWERS, JR., President of the University of Texas at Austin in His Official Capacity; BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM; R. STEVEN HICKS, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; WILLIAM EUGENE POWELL, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JAMES R. HUFFINES, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JANIECE LONGORIA, as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; COLLEEN McHUGH, as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; ROBERT L. STILLWELL, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JAMES D. DANNENBAUM, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; PAUL FOSTER, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; PRINTICE L. GARY, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; KEDRA ISHOP, Vice Provost and Director of Undergraduate Admissions in Her Official Capacity; FRANCISCO G. CIGARROA, M.D., Interim Chancellor of the University of Texas System in His Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Filed: January 18, 2011.
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
We consider a challenge to the use of race in undergraduate admissions at the University of Texas at Austin. While the University has confined its explicit use of race to the elements of a program approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,
Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz, both Texas residents, were denied undergraduate admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the class entering in Fall 2008. They filed this suit alleging that UT's admissions policies discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights statutes.
The procedural posture of this case defines the scope of our review. There are no class claims and both students deny intention to reapply to UT.
Our focus will be upon the process employed by UT to admit freshmen when Fisher and Michalewicz applied for the class entering Fall 2008, looking to earlier and later years only as they illuminate the rejection of these two applicants.
We begin with Grutter v. Bollinger because UT's race-conscious admissions procedures were modeled after the program it approved. In rejecting constitutional challenges to the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program, Grutter held that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit a university's "narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."
Grutter embraced the diversity interest articulated twenty-five years earlier by Justice Powell, who wrote separately in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
The Law School's policy also reaffirmed its "longstanding commitment" to "one particular type of diversity, that is, racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in [the] student body in meaningful numbers."
In an effort to ensure representation of minorities, the Law School sought to enroll a "critical mass" of minority students, which would result in increased minority engagement in the classroom and enhanced minority contributions to the character of the School. The Grutter Court endorsed this goal, holding that diversity, including seeking a critical mass of minority students, is "a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions."
That the concept of critical mass bears a simple but deceptive label is evidenced by the division of the Justices over its meaning. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist saw critical mass as only the minimum level necessary "[t]o ensure that the[] minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race; to provide adequate opportunities for the type of interaction upon which the educational benefits of diversity depend; and to challenge all students to think critically and reexamine stereotypes."
In contrast, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, explained that critical mass must be "defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce."
Recognizing the pursuit of diversity, including racial diversity, to be a compelling interest in higher education, Grutter endorsed the right of public universities to increase enrollment of underrepresented minorities. Grutter also cautioned that, while it accepted diversity as a compelling interest, any sorting of persons on the basis of race must be by measures narrowly tailored to the interest at stake.
As we read the Court, a university admissions program is narrowly tailored only if it allows for individualized consideration of applicants of all races.
Because a race-conscious admissions program is constitutional only if holistic, flexible, and individualized, a university may not establish a quota for minority applicants, nor may it evaluate minority applications "on separate admissions tracks."
Both Bakke and Gratz firmly rejected group treatment, insisting that the focus be upon individuals and that an applicant's achievements be judged in the context of one's personal circumstances, of which race is only a part. So deployed, a white applicant raised by a single parent who did not attend high school and struggled paycheck to paycheck and a minority child of a successful cardiovascular surgeon may both claim adversity, but the personal hurdles each has cleared will not be seen to be of the same height.
Finally, Grutter requires that any race-conscious measures must have a "logical end point" and be "limited in time."
Justice O'Connor's vision may prove to be more aspirational than predictive. Regardless, universities will construct admissions programs wedded to their missions, which include bringing both meritorious and diverse students to campus. Each year, UT receives applications from approximately four times more students than it can enroll.
Until 1996, UT selected students using two metrics. The first measure, still employed today, is the Academic Index ("AI"), a computation based on the student's high school class rank, standardized test scores, and the extent to which the applicant exceeded UT's required high school curriculum.
There were then no clear legal limits on a university's use of race in admissions. The Supreme Court decided Bakke in 1978 but its guidance came in a fractured decision, leaving a quarter century of uncertainty.
Race-conscious admissions ended in 1996 with Hopwood v. Texas, when a panel of this court struck down the use of race-based criteria in admissions decisions at UT's law school.
Beginning with the 1997 admissions cycle, UT deployed a Personal Achievement Index ("PA I") to be used with the Academic Index. In contrast to the mechanical formulas used to calculate the AI, the PAI was meant "to identify and reward students whose merit as applicants was not adequately reflected by their class rank and test scores."
UT also implemented other facially "race-neutral" policies that, together with the AI and PAI, remain in use today. It created targeted scholarship programs to increase its yield among minority students, expanded the quality and quantity of its outreach efforts to high schools in underrepresented areas of the state, and focused additional attention and resources on recruitment in low-performing schools.
Despite these efforts, minority presence at UT decreased immediately. Although the 1996 admissions decisions were not affected by Hopwood, the publicity from the case impacted the number of admitted minorities who chose to enroll. In 1997, fewer minorities applied to UT than in years past. The number of African-American and Hispanic applicants dropped by nearly a quarter, while the total number of University applicants decreased by only 13%.
In 1997, the Texas legislature responded to the Hopwood decision by enacting the Top Ten Percent Law, still in effect.
In its first year, the Top Ten Percent Law succeeded in increasing minority percentages at UT. African-American enrollment rose from 2.7% to 3.0% and Hispanic enrollment rose from 12.6% to 13.2% . However, the absolute number of minorities remained stable as a result of a smaller freshman class. Over time, both the number and percentage of enrolled Hispanics and African-Americans increased. The entering freshman class of 2004, the last admitted without the Grutter-like plan, was 4.5% African-American (309 students), 16.9% Hispanic (1,149 students), and 17.9% Asian-American (1,218 students) in a class of 6,796 students.
The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of race, but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if not primary, purpose. In 2004, among freshmen who were Texas residents, 77% of the enrolled African-American students and 78% of the Hispanic students had been admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, compared to 62% of Caucasian students.
Hopwood's prohibitions ended after the 2004 admissions cycle with the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter.
As part of its examination, UT commissioned two studies to explore whether the University was enrolling a critical mass of underrepresented minorities. The first study examined minority representation in undergraduate classes, focusing on classes of "participatory size," which it defined as between 5 and 24 students. UT analyzed these classes, which included most of the undergraduate courses, because they offered the best opportunity for robust classroom discussion, rich soil for diverse interactions. According to the study, 90% of these smaller classes in Fall 2002 had either one or zero African-American students, 46% had one or zero Asian-American students, and 43% had one or zero Hispanic students.
The University incorporated the findings of these two studies in its June 2004 Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions.
Citing the classroom diversity study, the 2004 Proposal explained that UT had not yet achieved the critical mass of underrepresented minority students needed to obtain the full educational benefits of diversity. Accordingly, the 2004 Proposal recommended adding the consideration of race as one additional factor within a larger admissions scoring index. This recommendation was presented as "an acknowledgment that the significant differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the University's undergraduate population and the state's population prevent the University from fully achieving its mission."
After more than a year of study following the Grutter decision, UT adopted a policy to include race as one of many factors considered in admissions. UT has no set date by which it will end the use of race in undergraduate admissions. Rather, it formally reviews the need for race-conscious measures every five years and considers whether adequate race-neutral alternatives exist. In addition, the district court found that the University informally reviews its admissions procedures each year.
The current policy has produced noticeable results. One magazine dedicated to diversity in higher education ranked UT "sixth in the nation in producing undergraduate degrees for minority groups."
Because of the myriad programs instituted, it can be difficult to attribute increases in minority enrollment to any one initiative. In addition, demographics have shifted in Texas, so increases in minority enrollment likely in part reflect the increased presence of minorities statewide.
UT's consideration of race is one part of the complex admissions process operating when Appellants were rejected. Given Appellants' challenge, we must examine the whole of the process.
UT is a public institution of higher education, authorized by the Texas Constitution and supported by state and federal funding. Accordingly, it begins its admissions process by dividing applicants into three pools: (1) Texas residents, (2) domestic non-Texas residents, and (3) international students. Students compete for admission only against other students in their respective pool. Texas residents are allotted 90% of all available seats, with admission based on a two-tiered system, beginning with students automatically admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law and then filling the remaining seats on the basis of the Academic and Personal Achievement Indices.
Texas applicants are divided into two subgroups: (1) Texas residents who are in the top ten percent of their high school class and (2) those Texas residents who are not. Top ten percent applicants are guaranteed admission to the University, and the vast majority of freshmen are selected in this way, without a confessed consideration of race. In 2008, for example, 81% of the entering class was admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, filling 88% of the seats allotted to Texas residents and leaving only 1,216 offers of admission university-wide for non-top ten percent residents.
The remaining Texas applicants, who were not within the top ten percent of their high school graduating class, compete for admission based on their Academic and Personal Achievement Indices.
The Personal Achievement Index is based on three scores: one score for each of the two required essays and a third score, called the personal achievement score, which represents an evaluation of the applicant's entire file. The essays are each given a score between 1 and 6 through "a holistic evaluation of the essay as a piece of writing based on its complexity of thought, substantiality of development, and facility with language."
This personal achievement score is designed to recognize qualified students whose merit as applicants was not adequately reflected by their Academic Index. Admissions staff assign the score by assessing an applicant's demonstrated leadership qualities, awards and honors, work experience, and involvement in extracurricular activities and community service. In addition, the personal achievement score includes a "special circumstances" element that may reflect the socioeconomic status of the applicant and his or her high school, the applicant's family status and family responsibilities, the applicant's standardized test score compared to the average of her high school, and—beginning in 2004—the applicant's race.
None of the elements of the personal achievement score—including race—are considered individually or given separate numerical values to be added together. Rather, the file is evaluated as a whole in order to provide the fullest possible understanding of the student as a person and to place his or her achievements in context.
Although the process for calculating AI and PAI scores is common to all parts of the University, each offer of admission to UT is ultimately tied to an individual school or major. Texas residents in the top ten percent of their high school class are guaranteed admission to the University, but they are not assured admission to the individual school or program of their choice.
Most majors and colleges in the University provide automatic admission to Top Ten Percent Law applicants, but certain "impacted majors"—including the School of Business, the College of Communication, and the Schools of Engineering, Kinesiology, and Nursing—are obligated to accept only a certain number of Top Ten Percent Law applicants.
Top Ten Percent Law applicants who do not receive automatic entry to their first choice program compete for admission to the remaining spaces, and if necessary to their second-choice program, on the basis of their AI and PAI scores. The admissions office places students into matrices for each preferred school or major, with students grouped by AI score along one axis and PAI score along the other axis. Liaisons for the majors then establish a cutoff line, which is drawn in a stair-step pattern. Applicants denied admission to their first-choice program are considered for their second choice, with cutoff lines readjusted to reflect the influx of those applicants. Any top ten percent applicants not admitted to either their first- or second-choice program are automatically admitted as Liberal Arts Undeclared majors. All other applicants not yet admitted to UT compete, again according to AI and PA I scores, for any remaining seats in the Liberal Arts Undeclared program .
Although this completes the admissions process for the fall portion of the freshman class, no Texas resident who submits a timely application is denied admission. Instead, those residents not admitted to the entering fall class are offered admission to either the summer program or the Coordinated Admissions Program (CAP). Marginal applicants who missed the cutoff for the fall class are offered admission to the summer program, which permits students to begin their studies at UT during the summer and then join the regularly admitted students in the fall. About 800 students enroll in the summer program each year. All remaining Texas applicants are automatically enrolled in CAP, which guarantees admission as a transfer student if the student enrolls in another UT system campus for her freshman year and meets certain other conditions, including the completion of thirty credit hours with a cumulative grade point average of 3.2 or higher.
The Academic Index and Personal Achievement Index now employed by UT have been in continuous use since 1997. The lone substantive change came in 2005, following the Grutter decision, when the Board of Regents authorized the consideration of race as another "special circumstance" in assessing an applicant's personal achievement score.
Race—like all other elements of UT's holistic review—is not considered alone. Admissions officers reviewing each application are aware of the applicant's race, but UT does not monitor the aggregate racial composition of the admitted applicant pool during the process. The admissions decision for any particular applicant is not affected—positively or negatively— by the number of other students in her racial group who have been admitted during that year.
UT undoubtedly has a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits of diversity, and its reasons for implementing race-conscious admissions—expressed in the 2004 Proposal—mirror those approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter. The district court found that both the UT and Grutter policies "attempt to promote `cross-racial understanding,' `break down racial stereotypes,' enable students to better understand persons of other races, better prepare students to function in a multi-cultural workforce, cultivate the next set of national leaders, and prevent minority students from serving as `spokespersons' for their race."
Considering UT's admissions system in its historical context, it is evident that the efforts of the University have been studied, serious, and of high purpose, lending support to a constitutionally protected zone of discretion. That said, the use of race summons close judicial scrutiny, necessary for the nation's slow march toward the ideal of a color-blind society, at least as far as the government can see.
It is a given that as UT's Grutter-like admissions program differentiates between applicants on the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny with its requirement of narrow tailoring.
Judicial deference to a university's academic decisions rests on two independent foundations. First, these decisions are a product of "complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university," far outside the experience of the courts.
Yet the scrutiny triggered by racial classification "is no less strict for taking into account" the special circumstances of higher education.
With a nod to Grutter's command that we generally give a degree of deference to a university's educational judgments, Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend such deference to a university's decision to implement a raceconscious admissions policy. Instead, they maintain Grutter deferred only to the university's judgment that diversity would have educational benefits, not to the assessment of whether the university has attained critical mass of a racial group or whether race-conscious efforts are necessary to achieve that end.
As an initial matter, this argument in its full flower is contradicted by Grutter. The majority held that, like the examination into whether the University has a compelling interest, "the narrow-tailoring inquiry . . . must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education."
Appellants would have us borrow a more restrictive standard of review from a series of public employment and government contracting cases, in which the Supreme Court "held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are them selves based on race— are constitutional only where there is a `strong basis in evidence' that the remedial actions were necessary."
In Ricci, white firefighters from New Haven, Connecticut sued under Title VII, challenging the city's decision to disregard a promotions test after the results showed that white candidates significantly outperformed minority candidates.
The city had argued it only needed to show a fear of liability based on a good-faith belief— a rough analogy to the university admissions standard. Yet the Court found that an intent-based standard could not be squared with the statutory text. The Ricci Court turned to the strong-basis-in-evidence standard "as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII."
Although Ricci did not address the firefighters' equal protection claim, the Court derived its standard from Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
This recitation of history, quick as it is, makes plain that the cases Appellants cite have little purchase in this challenge to university admissions. The high standard for justifying the use of race in public employment decisions responds to the reality that race used in a backward-looking attempt to remedy past wrongs, without focus on individual victim s, does not treat race as part of a holistic consideration. In doing so, it touches the third rail of racial quotas. Wygant and Croson both involved explicit quotas; in Ricci, the Court was concerned that the city's use of race threatened to devolve into a de facto quota.
By contrast, Grutter recognized that universities are engaged in a different enterprise. Their holistic approach is part of a forward-looking effort to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. The look to race as but one element of this further goal, coupled with individualized consideration, steers university admissions away from a quota system . Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 further supports this understanding.
In short, the Court has not retreated from Grutter's mode of analysis, one tailored to holistic university admissions programs. Thus, we apply strict scrutiny to race-conscious admissions policies in higher education, mindful of a university's academic freedom and the complex educational judgments made when assembling a broadly diverse student body.
Appellants do not allege that UT's race-conscious admissions policy is functionally different from, or gives greater consideration to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter. Rather, Appellants question whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy. As their argument goes, the University's race-conscious admissions program is unwarranted because (1) UT has gone beyond a mere interest in diversity for education's sake and instead pursues a racial composition that mirrors that of the state of Texas as a whole, amounting to an unconstitutional attempt to achieve "racial balancing"; (2) the University has not given adequate consideration to available "race-neutral" alternatives, particularly percentage plans like the Top Ten Percent Law; and (3) UT's minority enrollment under the Top Ten Percent Law already surpassed critical mass, such that the additional (and allegedly "minimal") increase in diversity achieved through UT's Grutter-like policy does not justify its use of race-conscious measures. We will consider each of these arguments in turn.
Again, diversity is a permissible goal for educational institutions, but "outright racial balancing" is not. Attempting to ensure that the student body contains some specified percentage of a particular racial group is "patently unconstitutional."
Looking to the details of UT's race-conscious admissions policy, it is clear that administrators knew a quota system would not survive judicial review, and they took care to avoid this fatal mistake. UT's system was modeled after the Grutter program, which the Supreme Court held was not a quota. UT has never established a specific number, percentage, or range of minority enrollment that would constitute "critical mass," nor does it award any fixed number of points to minority students in a way that impermissibly values race for its own sake.
Further, there is no indication that UT's Grutter-like plan is a quota by another name. It is true that UT looks in part to the number of minority students when evaluating whether it has yet achieved a critical mass, but "[s]ome attention to numbers, without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota."
UT has not admitted students so that its undergraduate population directly mirrors the demographics of Texas. Its methods and efforts belie the charge. The percentage of Hispanics at UT is less than two-thirds the percentage of His panics in Texas, and the percentage of African-Americans at UT is half the percentage of Texas's African-American population, while Asian-American enrollment is more than five times the percentage of Texan Asian-Americans.
Appellants nevertheless argue that UT's program amounts to racial balancing because it supposedly evinces a special concern for demographically underrepresented groups, while neglecting the diverse contributions of others. These arguments do not account for the operation of UT's admissions system or the scope of the diversity interest approved by the Court in Grutter.
The district court expressly found that race can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any racial background, including whites and Asian-Americans.
The summary judgment record shows that demographics are not consulted as part of any individual admissions decision, and UT's admissions procedures do not treat certain racial groups or minorities differently than others when reviewing individual applications. Rather, the act of considering minority group demographics (to which Appellants object) took place only when the University first studied whether a race-conscious admissions program was needed to attain critical mass. Appellants' objection therefore must be directed not to the design of the program, but rather to whether UT's decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.
Appellants contend that UT revealed its true motive to be outright racial balancing when it referenced state population data to justify the adoption of race-conscious admissions measures. They insist that if UT were truly focused on educational benefits and critical mass, then there should be no reason to consult demographic data when determining whether UT had sufficient minority representation.
We disagree. The University's policies and measured attention to the community it serves are consonant with the educational goals outlined in Grutter and do not support a finding that the University was engaged in improper racial balancing during our time frame of review. Both Grutter and Bakke recognized that "there is of course `some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body.'"
Grutter recognized that racial and ethnic backgrounds play an influential role in producing the diversity of views and perspectives which are paramount to a university's educational mission. As Justice O'Connor explained, the "unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters" can have a significant impact on a student's views.
Preparing students to function as professionals in an increasingly diverse workforce likewise calls for some consideration of a university's particular educational mission and the community it serves. For instance, a nationally renowned law school draws upon a nationwide applicant pool and sends its graduates into careers in all states; therefore it is appropriate for such a school to consider national diversity levels when setting goals for its admissions program. In contrast, UT's stated goal is to "produce graduates who are capable of fulfilling the future leadership needs of Texas."
The need for a state's leading educational institution to foster civic engagement and maintain visibly open paths to leadership also requires a degree of attention to the surrounding community. A university presenting itself as open to all may be challenged when the state's minority population grows steadily but minority enrollment does not. Indeed, the 2004 Proposal expressed concern that UT appeared "largely closed to nonwhite applicants" and did not "provide a welcoming supportive environment" for minority students.
Finally, Grutter's structure accepts that a university's twin objectives of rewarding academic merit and fostering diversity can be complementary rather than competing goals; that students rising to the top of underrepresented groups demonstrate promise as future leaders. These students' relative success in the face of harmful and widespread stereotypes evidences a degree of drive, determination, and merit not captured by test scores alone. Insofar as Appellants complain that the University's limited attention to demographics was inconsistent with the legitimate educational concerns recognized in Bakke and Grutter, we conclude that their contention cannot be sustained.
Appellants argue that a broad approach to educational diversity is improper because "critical mass" must be an "inward-facing concept . . . that focuses on the functioning of the student body," encompassing only that level of minority enrollment necessary to ensure that minority students participate in the classroom and do not feel isolated. While Appellants' view may comport with one literal interpretation of the "critical mass" label, it is not the view that prevailed in Grutter. The Grutter majority defined critical mass "by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce,"
Grutter is best read as a path toward the moment when all race-conscious measures become unnecessary. To that end, Grutter requires universities that employ race-conscious admissions to seriously consider race-neutral alternatives. But "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative," especially if the proffered alternatives would require the University to sacrifice other important interests, like its academic selectivity and reputation for excellence.
The parties devote significant attention to the Top Ten Percent Law.
Appellants put forward the Top Ten Percent Law as a facially race-neutral alternative that would allow UT to obtain a critical mass of minority enrollment without resorting to race-conscious admissions. As the argument goes, if the Top Ten Percent Law were able to serve the University's interests "about as well" as race-conscious admissions, without differentiating between students on the basis of race, then it would render UT's current admissions program unconstitutional.
UT is correct that so-called "percentage plans" are not a constitutionally mandated replacement for race-conscious admissions programs under Grutter, although—as will become apparent—this realization alone does not end our constitutional inquiry. The idea of percentage plans as a viable alternative to race-conscious admissions policies was directly advocated to the Grutter Court by the United States, arguing as amicus curiae.
That the Top Ten Percent Law is not a constitutionally-mandated alternative does not make it irrelevant. By now it is clear that the Law is inescapably tied to UT's Grutter plan, as Grutter does its work with the applicants who remain after the cut of the Top Ten Percent Law . In 2008, top ten percent applicants accounted for 8,984 of the 10,200 Texas admittees.
The reality is that the Top Ten Percent Law alone does not perform well in pursuit of the diversity Grutter endorsed and is in many ways at war with it. While the Law may have contributed to an increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of educational diversity.
Focusing narrowly on geographic diversity, in part as a proxy for race, the Top Ten Percent Law crowds out other types of diversity that would be considered under a Grutter-like plan. By ignoring these other diversity contributions, the Top Ten Percent Law restricts the University's ability to achieve the maximum educational benefits of a truly diverse student body.
Justice Ginsburg pointed out in Grutter's companion case that percentage plans create damaging incentives to the education system . She observed that "[p]ercentage plans depend for their effectiveness on continued racial segregation at the secondary school level." These measures "encourage parents to keep their children in low-performing segregated schools, and discourage students from taking challenging classes that might lower their grade point averages."
Texas applicants falling outside the top ten percent group face extreme competition to gain admittance to the University. There are approximately 16,000 students competing for only 1,216 fall admissions slots. The competition is so great that, on average, students admitted from outside the top ten percent of their high school class, regardless of race, have even higher SAT scores than those granted automatic admission under the Top Ten Percent Law.
The Top Ten Percent Law was adopted to increase minority enrollment. That it has done, but its sweep of admissions is a polar opposite of the holistic focus upon individuals. Its internal proxies for race end-run the Supreme Court's studied structure for the use of race in university admissions decisions. It casts aside testing historically relied upon, admitting many top ten percent minorities with significantly lower scores than rejected minorities and nonminorities alike. That these admitted minorities are academically able to remain in the University does not respond to the reality that the Top Ten Percent Law eliminated the consideration of test scores, and correspondingly reduced academic selectivity, to produce increased enrollment of minorities. Such costs may be intrinsic to affirmative action plans. If so, Grutter at least sought to minimize those costs through narrow tailoring. The Top Ten Percent Law is anything but narrow.
In short, while the Top Ten Percent Law appears to succeed in its central purpose of increasing minority enrollment, it comes at a high cost and is at best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits that diversity is intended to achieve. We cannot fault UT's contention that the Top Ten Percent Law is plainly not the sort of workable race-neutral alternative that would be a constitutionally mandated substitute for race-conscious university admissions policies. We are keenly aware that the University turned to the Top Ten Percent Law in response to a judicial ruling. Yet we cannot agree that it is irrelevant. To the contrary, that the Top Ten Percent Law, accounting for the vast majority of in-state admissions, threatens to erode the foundations UT relies on to justify implementing Grutter policies is a contention not lacking in force. "Facially neutral" has a talismanic ring in the law, but it can be misleading. It is here.
Appellants contend that UT's decision to reintroduce race-conscious admissions was unconstitutional because minority enrollment already met or exceeded "critical mass" when this decision was made, and thus any further facial consideration of race was neither warranted nor constitutional. Appellants claim the best measure of whether UT had attained the benefits of diversity is the raw percentage of minorities enrolled. As a result of the combined effects of changing demographics, targeted high school programs, and the Top Ten Percent Law, total minority enrollment had increased over the years. When the decision was made to reintroduce race-conscious admissions in 2004, underrepresented minorities made up 21.4% of the incoming class (4.5% African-American and 16.9% Hispanic).
Although Texas was not constitutionally required to enact the Top Ten Percent Law, Appellants are correct that the decision to do so—and the substantial effect on aggregate minority enrollment at the University—places at risk UT's race-conscious admissions policies. We are confident, and hold, that a Grutter-style admissions system standing alone is constitutional. That said, whether to overlay such a plan with the Top Ten Percent Law and how to calibrate its flow presents a Hobson's choice between the minority students it contributes and the test of constitutional bounds it courts. True enough, the Top Ten Percent Law is in a sense, perhaps a controlling sense, a "facially" race-neutral plan. But it was animated by efforts to increase minority enrollment, and to the extent it succeeds it is because at key points it proxies for race.
Appellants propose various baseline levels of diversity which, they suggest, would fully satisfy the University's interest in attaining critical mass. They first argue that if "from 13.5 to 20.1 percent" minority enrollment was adjudged to be great enough diversity each year by Michigan's Law School in Grutter, then the 21.4% minority enrollment that UT had achieved prior to reintroducing race-conscious admissions must already have achieved critical mass. We find this comparison inapt for numerous reasons.
Appellants' comparison presumes that critical mass must have some fixed upper bound that applies across different schools, different degrees, different states, different years, different class sizes, and different racial and ethnic subcomposition. It is based on Appellants' continued insistence that the concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority students to have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race. As we have discussed, Grutter firmly rejects that premise and defines critical mass by reference to a broader view of diversity.
At oral argument, Appellants qualified this insistence and wisely conceded that what constitutes critical mass in the eyes of one school might not suffice at another. Grutter concerned a law school, whereas Appellants challenge UT's undergraduate program. Michigan's Law School operates on a national level, while UT focuses on recruiting and producing future leaders for Texas. The law school enrolled approximately 350 students in its first-year class, few enough students that diversity in the student body readily approximates diversity in the classroom. In contrast, UT enrolls approximately 7,000 undergraduates in its first-year class and has data showing diversity rates vary widely across individual classrooms. African-Americans and Hispanics never represented more than a combined 14.8% of the Michigan Law School's applicant pool during the examined time period,
Appellants point to the Supreme Court's observation in United States v. Virginia that the Virginia Military Institute "could achieve at least 10% female enrollment—a sufficient critical mass to provide the female cadets with a positive educational experience."
Appellants lastly note that minority enrollment at UT now exceeds the level it had reached in the mid-1990s, pre-Hopwood, when the University was free to obtain any critical mass it wanted through overtly race-based decisions. UT responds that it has consistently maintained, both in the 2004 Proposal and before this Court, that even before Hopwood it had never reached critical mass.
Grutter pointedly refused to tie the concept of "critical mass" to any fixed number. The Grutter Court approved of the University of Michigan Law School's goal of attaining critical mass even though the school had specifically abjured any numerical target.
None of this is to say that Grutter left "critical mass" without objective meaning. Rather, the legally cognizable interest—attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students— "is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce."
As we have observed, benchmarks aside, UT's claim that it has not yet achieved critical mass is less convincing when viewed against the backdrop of the Top Ten Percent Law, which had already driven aggregate minority enrollment up to more than one-fifth of the University's incoming freshman class before less subtle race-conscious admissions were reintroduced.
The chief difficulty with looking to aggregate minority enrollment is that it lumps together distinct minority groups from different backgrounds who may bring various unique contributions to the University environment. African-American and Hispanic students, for example, are not properly interchangeable for purposes of determining critical mass, and a university must be sensitive to important distinctions within these broad groups. In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court specifically faulted two school districts for employing "only a limited notion of diversity" that lumped together very different racial groups.
On this record, we must conclude that the University has acted with appropriate sensitivity to these distinctions. Although the aggregate number of underrepresented minorities may be large, the enrollment statistics for individual groups when UT decided to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions decisions does not indicate critical mass was achieved. Further, we recognize that some year-to-year fluctuation in enrollment numbers is inevitable, so statistics from any single year lack probative force; the University needs to maintain critical mass in years when yield is low just as it does when yield is high.
It is also apparent that UT has given appropriate consideration to whether aggregate minority enrollment is translating into adequate diversity in the classroom. Through two separate studies, the 2004 Proposal reached a serious and good faith determination that the aggregate number overstates the University's true level of diverse interaction. UT sought to obtain the full educational benefits of diversity as approved in Grutter and properly concluded that race-conscious admissions measures would help accomplish its goals.
Appellants argue that even if UT had not yet achieved critical mass under race-neutral policies, it had come close enough that the reintroduction of race-conscious measures was unwarranted. Pointing to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Parents Involved, they argue that the University's use of race is unnecessary, and therefore not narrowly tailored, because it has only a "minimal effect." The district court thought this was an attempt "to force UT into an impossible catch-22: on the one hand, it is well-established that to be narrowly tailored the means `must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish' the compelling interest, but on the other hand, according to [Appellants], the `narrowly tailored' plan must have more than a minimal effect."
Parents Involved does not support the cost-benefit analysis that A ppellants seek to invoke. Rather, Parents Involved was primarily a critique of the school districts' "extreme approach" that used binary racial categories to classify schoolchildren.
Mindful of the time frame of this case, we cannot say that under the circumstances before us UT breached its obligation to undertake a "serious, good faith consideration" before resorting to race-conscious measures; yet we speak with caution. In this dynamic environment, our conclusions should not be taken to mean that UT is immune from its obligation to recalibrate its dual systems of admissions as needed, and we cannot bless the university's race-conscious admissions program in perpetuity. Rather, much like judicial approval of a state's redistricting of voter districts, it is good only until the next census count—it is more a process than a fixed structure that we review. The University's formal and informal review processes will confront the stark fact that the Top Ten Percent Law, although soon to be restricted to 75% of the incoming class, increasingly places at risk the use of race in admissions. In 1998, those admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law accounted for 41% of the Texas residents in the freshman class, while in 2008, top ten percent students comprised 81% of enrolled Texan freshmen.
A university may decide to pursue the goal of a diverse student body, and it may do so to the extent it ties that goal to the educational benefits that flow from diversity. The admissions procedures that UT adopted, modeled after the plan approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter, are narrowly tailored— procedures in some respects superior to the Grutter plan because the University does not keep a running tally of underrepresented minority representation during the admissions process. We are satisfied that the University's decision to reintroduce race-conscious admissions was adequately supported by the "serious, good faith consideration" required by Grutter. Finally, it is neither our role nor purpose to dance from Grutter's firm holding that diversity is an interest supporting compelling necessity. Nor are we inclined to do so. The role of black athletes in the southern universities forty years ago presents diversity's potential better than can we, although at that early juncture, it was ability overcoming a barrier of race.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
KING, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment and in the analysis and application of Grutter in Judge Higginbotham's opinion. No party challenged, in the district court or in this court, the validity or the wisdom of the Top Ten Percent Law. We have no briefing on those subjects, and the district court did not consider them. Accordingly, I decline to join Judge Higginbotham's opinion insofar as it addresses those subjects.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
Whenever a serious piece of judicial writing strays from fundamental principles of constitutional law, there is usually a portion of such writing where those principles are articulated, but not followed. So it goes in Grutter, where a majority of the Court acknowledged strict scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for race-based preferences in university admissions, but applied a level of scrutiny markedly less demanding. To be specific, race now matters in university admissions, where, if strict judicial scrutiny were properly applied, it should not.
Today, we follow Grutter's lead in finding that the University of Texas's race-conscious admissions program satisfies the Court's unique application of strict scrutiny in the university admissions context. I concur in the majority opinion, because, despite my belief that Grutter represents a digression in the course of constitutional law, today's opinion is a faithful, if unfortunate, application of that misstep. The Supreme Court has chosen this erroneous path and only the Court can rectify the error. In the meantime, I write separately to underscore this detour from constitutional first principles.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. One of the Amendment's "core principles" is to "do away with all governmentally imposed discriminations based on race," Palmore v. Sidoti,
In Grutter, the majority acknowledged these fundamental principles, see Grutter v. Bollinger,
The Grutter majority asserts that "[s]trict scrutiny is not `strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
In those rare cases where the use of race properly furthered a compelling state interest, the Court has emphasized that the means chosen must "work the least harm possible," Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (opinion of Powell, J.), and be narrowly tailored to fit the interest "with greater precision than any alternative means." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quotation omitted). Moreover, the failure to consider available race-neutral alternatives and employ them if efficacious would cause a program to fail strict scrutiny. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (plurality opinion) (the "term `narrowly tailored' .. . requires consideration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used."); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237—38; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507; Fullilove v. Klutznick,
Beyond the use of race-neutral alternatives, the Court, pre-Grutter, had considered several other factors in determining whether race-conscious programs were narrowly tailored. Programs employing a quota system would fail this inquiry, as would programs of unlimited duration. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315—18; Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. The Court looked to a program's flexibility and its capacity for individualized consideration. See United States v. Paradise,
Grutter changed this. After finding that racial diversity at the University of Michigan Law School ("Law School") was a compelling governmental interest, the Court redefined the meaning of narrow tailoring. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents."); see generally Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007). The Court replaced narrow tailoring's conventional "least restrictive means" requirement with a regime that encourages opacity and is incapable of meaningful judicial review under any level of scrutiny. Courts now simply assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that university administrators have acted in good faith in pursuing racial diversity, and courts are required to defer to their educational judgments on how best to achieve it. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328—29. What is more, the deference called for in Grutter seems to allow universities, rather than the courts, to determine when the use of racial preferences is no longer compelling. See id. at 343 ("We take the Law School at its word that it would `like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program like the University of Michigan in Grutter, and the University of Texas here, can get away with something less.
Setting aside for a moment Grutter's finding that racial diversity within the Law School was a compelling state interest, see infra Sections I.D and III, I find troubling the Court's treatment of whether the Law School's chosen means—using race as a "plus" factor—was narrowly tailored to achieving that end. The Court discussed five hallmarks of a narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions program in answering this question: (1) the absence of quotas; (2) a program that does not unduly harm any racial group; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives; (4) a program that contains a sunset provision or some logical end point; and (5) individualized consideration of all applicants. See 539 U.S. at 335—43. The Court's opinion effectively emptied at least three of these criteria of their probative content, leaving the first and fifth as determinative in any narrow tailoring inquiry. See Ayres & Foster, 85 TEX. L. REV. at 543.
First, Grutter defined a quota as reserving a fixed number or percentage of opportunities for certain minority groups, and insulating individuals from those groups from competition with all other candidates for available seats. Id. at 333—36. These prohibitions were clear well before Grutter. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317; Croson, 488 U.S. at 496. Only those programs with overt numerical set-asides or separate minority admissions tracks would fail this requirement.
Next, the Court found that race-conscious admissions programs do not unduly burden innocent third parties so long as they provide individualized consideration. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 ("[I]n the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."). Here, the Court collapsed the second narrow tailoring criterion into the fifth.
Grutter also held that there were no workable race-neutral alternatives at the Law School, such as "using a lottery system" or "decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores." Id. at 340. The Court likewise rejected the United States' argument that the Law School's plan was not narrowly tailored because race-neutral alternatives that had proven effective elsewhere (i.e., the percentage plans utilized in California, Florida, and Texas) were available and would deliver the educational benefits the Law School was seeking. Id. The Court held that "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. . . . Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks." Id. at 339. After Grutter, universities are no longer required to use the most effective race-neutral means. So long as admissions officials have given "serious, good faith consideration" to such programs, they are free to pursue less effective alternatives that serve the interest "about as well." Id. (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (plurality opinion)). Thus, this third criterion is now essentially without meaning. Given the deference that universities' educational judgments are to be afforded post-Grutter, "serious, good faith consideration" is a peculiarly low bar that will be satisfied in most every case. Compare id. at 339 (narrow tailoring "require[s] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives"), with id. at 329 ("[G]ood faith on the part of a university is `presumed' absent a showing to the contrary.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, while the Court acknowledged that race-conscious admissions programs must be limited in time, such as by sunset provisions or periodic reviews to determine whether the preferences remain necessary, the Court suspended application of this criterion for twenty-five years. Id. at 343 ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."). In doing so, the Grutter majority simply accepted the Law School's promise that it would terminate its race-conscious policies as soon as possible. See id. at 343 ("We take the Law School at its word that it would `like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable."). The Court's approval here is remarkable given the constitutional gravity of this experiment (i.e., the Law School's allocation of preferences along racial lines). This fourth criterion will now be considered satisfied with little or no showing on the part of university administrators, at least until 2028.
And thus, all that truly remains of strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring inquiry post-Grutter is the requirement of "individualized consideration." But what does this term mean specifically? Grutter never tells us. Moreover, the weight given to race as part of this individualized consideration is purposefully left undefined, making meaningful judicial review all but impossible.
In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School sought to achieve a student body that was both academically strong and diverse along several dimensions, including race. There, the Court endorsed the Law School's "highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment." Id. at 337. The Court noted approvingly that the Law School had "no policy . . . of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single `soft' variable." Id. The Grutter majority permitted the use of race and ethnicity as "plus" factors within the Law School's holistic review, but this simply raises the question: how much of a plus?
Instead, the Court implicitly forbade universities from quantifying racial preferences in their admissions calculus. Contrasting the admissions system found unconstitutional in Gratz, the Grutter majority noted that "the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity `bonuses' based on race or ethnicity." Id. (citing Gratz v. Bollinger,
But it is not clear, to me at least, how using race in the holistic scoring system approved in Grutter is constitutionally distinct from the point-based system rejected in Gratz.
Grutter's new terminology like "individualized consideration" and "holistic review" tends to conceal this result. By obscuring the University of Michigan's use of race in these diffuse tests, the Court allowed the Law School to do covertly what the undergraduate program could not do overtly. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76. This much is clear and has been discussed elsewhere.
Traditionally, strict scrutiny required that the overall benefits of programs employing racial classifications justified the overall costs.
Even assuming the Court's "educational benefits of diversity" justification holds true, see infra Section I.D, there are far more effective race-neutral means of screening for the educational benefits that states like Michigan and Texas ostensibly seek. To the degree that state universities genuinely desire students with diverse backgrounds and experiences, race-neutral factors like specific hardships overcome, extensive travel, leadership positions held, volunteer and work experience, dedication to particular causes, and extracurricular activities, among many other variables, can be articulated with specificity in the admissions essays.
Finally, the Court's unusual deference to educators' academic judgments that racial diversity is a compelling interest, coupled with the deference allegedly owed to their determination of when the use of race is no longer necessary, see id. at 343, would appear to permit race-based policies indefinitely. For example, notwithstanding that a university's race-conscious policies had achieved 25% African-American and 25% Hispanic enrollment in the student body generally, that university could still justify the use of race in admissions if these minority students were disproportionately bunched in a small number of classes or majors. In fact, the majority's application of Grutter today reaches just such a result.
Despite Top Ten Percent's demonstrable impact on minority enrollment at the University of Texas, the majority opinion holds that the University's use of race in admissions can be justified by reference to the paucity of minority students in certain majors:
Given the "large-scale absence of African-American and Hispanic students from thousands of classes" at the University of Texas, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 607, today's decision ratifies the University's reliance on race at the departmental and classroom levels, and will, in practice, allow for race-based preferences in seeming perpetuity. Such a use of race "has no logical stopping point" and is not narrowly tailored. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275). Allowing race-based social engineering at the university level is one thing, but not nearly as invasive as condoning it at the classroom level. I cannot accept that the Fourteenth Amendment permits this level of granularity to justify dividing students along racial lines.
The same imprecision that characterizes Grutter's narrow tailoring analysis casts doubt on its discussion of racial diversity as a compelling state interest. Grutter found that the Law School had a compelling interest in "securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body," and that achieving a "critical mass" of racially diverse students was necessary to accomplish that goal. Id. at 333. The Law School defined "critical mass" as "a number that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated . . . or like spokespersons for their race." Id. at 318—19. The Court clarified: "critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce." Id. at 330. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion identified three such constitutionally relevant benefits: (i) increased perspective in the classroom; (ii) improved professional training; and (iii) enhanced civic engagement. Id. at 330—33. The first element is based on Justice Powell's focus in Bakke on the campus-level benefits of diversity. The second two are new.
My difficulty with Grutter's "educational benefits of diversity" discussion is that it remains suspended at the highest levels of hypothesis and speculation. And unlike ordinary hypotheses, which must be testable to be valid, Grutter's thesis is incapable of testing. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion rests almost entirely on intuitive appeal rather than concrete evidence.
The first constitutionally relevant benefit that makes up Grutter's compelling interest is racial diversity's direct impact in the classroom . Here, the Court concluded that diverse perspectives improve the overall quality of education because "classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting when students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds." Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted). This rationale conforms to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that universities should pursue "[t]he atmosphere of speculation, excitement and creation" that is "promoted by a diverse student body." 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Nonetheless, assuming a critical mass of minority students could perceptibly improve the quality of classroom learning, how would we measure success? By polling students and professors, as the University of Texas has done?
My concern with allowing view point diversity's alleged benefits to justify racial preference is that viewpoint diversity is too theoretical and abstract. It cannot be proved or disproved. Sure, the Grutter majority cited to expert reports and amicus briefs from corporate employers as evidence that student body diversity improves educational outcomes and better prepares students for the workforce. Id. at 330. But this support can be easily manipulated.
Grutter and Bakke err by simply assuming that racial diversity begets greater viewpoint diversity. This inference is based on the assumption that members of minority groups, because of their racial status, are likely to have unique experiences and perspectives incapable of expression by individuals from outside that group. But as the Court has recognized elsewhere, the Constitution prohibits state decisionmakers from presuming that groups of individuals, whether classified by race, ethnicity, or gender, share such a quality collectively. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 914 (the Equal Protection Clause forbids "the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain `minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens.") (citation omitted). There is no one African-American or Hispanic viewpoint,
Grutter sought to have it both ways. The Court held that racial diversity was necessary to eradicate the notion that minority students think and behave, not as individuals, but as a race. At the same time, the Court approved a policy granting race-based preferences on the assumption that racial status correlates with greater diversity of view points.
Grutter's second asserted educational benefit of diversity relates to improved professional training. Here, Justice O'Connor writes that diversity "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of different races." Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Such training is essential, the argument goes, for future leaders who will eventually work within and supervise a racially diverse workforce. Id. at 330-31.
State universities are free to define their educational goals as broadly as needed to serve the public interest. We defer to educators' professional judgments in setting those goals. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally proscribed limits."). My concern, discussed throughout this opinion, is not that Grutter commands such deference, but that it conflated the deference owed to a university's asserted interest with deference to the means used to attain it. See id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal.").
There is, however, one aspect of the Court's "improved professional training" rationale that I find especially troubling. While Grutter made much of the role that educational institutions play in providing professional training, see id. at 331 ("We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship"), the cases the Court relied on involved primary and secondary schools. See id. (citing Plyer v. Doe,
Finally, Grutter articulated a third benefit of racial diversity in higher education: enhancing civic engagement. Here, the Court wrote that:
Id. at 332-33.
Unlike the first two "educational benefits of diversity," which focused on improving classroom discussion and professional training, this third claimed benefit plainly has nothing to do with the university's core education and training functions. Instead, Grutter is concerned here with role that higher education plays in a democratic society, and the Court suggests that affirmative action at public universities can advance a societal goal of encouraging minority participation in civic life.
If a significant portion of a minority community sees our nation's leaders as illegitimate or lacks confidence in the integrity of our educational institutions, as Grutter posits in the block quote above, see id., 539 U.S. at 332, I doubt that suspending the prevalent constitutional rules to allow preferred treatment for as few as 15-40 students, see infra Section II, is likely to foster renewed civic participation from among that community as a whole.
Grutter replaced Bakke's emphasis on diversity in educational inputs with a new emphasis on diversity in educational outputs. By expanding Justice Powell's original viewpoint diversity rationale to include diversity's putative benefits in the workforce and beyond (i.e., inspiring a sense of civic belonging in discouraged minority communities), the Court has endorsed a compelling interest without bounds. Post-Grutter, it matters little whether racial preferences in university admissions are justified by reference to their potential for improved discussion in individual classrooms, or even at the university generally. Now such preferences can be justified based on their global impact. By removing the focus of attention from diversity's educational value at the campus level, the Court has ensured that the "educational benefits of diversity" will accommodate all university affirmative action plans as compelling.
Finally, by using metaphors, like "critical mass," and indefinite terms that lack conceptual or analytical precision, but rather sound in abject subjectivity, to dress up constitutional standards, Grutter fails to provide any predictive value to courts and university administrators tasked with applying these standards consistently. And notwithstanding the Court's nod to federalism, Grutter's ambiguity discourages States from experimenting or departing from the one accepted norm . See id. at 342 (citing United States v. Lopez,
As mentioned at the outset, I concur in the opinion because I believe today's decision is a faithful application of Grutter's teachings, however flawed I may find those teachings to be. I am compelled to follow the Court's unusual deference towards public university administrators in their assessment that racial diversity is a compelling interest, as well as the Court's refashioned narrow-tailoring inquiry. See 28 U.S.C. § 453. My difficulty is not necessarily with today's decision, but with the one that drives it. Nonetheless, there is one aspect of Judge Higginbotham's thoughtful opinion that gives me pause about whether Grutter compels the result we reach today. Ultimately, and regrettably, I recognize that the deference called for by Grutter may make this concern superfluous.
As today's opinion notes, the University of Texas's race-conscious admissions policy is nearly indistinguishable from the program approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.
The plaintiffs here argue that the University of Texas's interest in obtaining a racially diverse student body is not compelling because the University has already achieved critical mass by way of Texas's Top Ten Percent law. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.803 (1997). The University disagrees. This claim is difficult to evaluate. The University refuses to assign a weight to race or to maintain conclusive data on the degree to which race factors into admissions decisions and enrollment yields. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09 ("At no point in the process is race considered individually or given a numerical value; instead, the file is evaluated in its entirety in order to provide a better understanding of the student as a person and place her achievements in context."). Whether the University of Texas's use of race is narrowly tailored turns on whether its chosen means—using race as a plus factor in the University's holistic scoring system —are effective, not just in theory, but also in practice.
If, apart from the Top Ten Percent law, the University of Texas's raceconscious admissions program added just three-to-five African-American students, or five-to-ten Hispanic students, to an entering freshman class of 6,700, that policy would completely fail to achieve its aims and would not be narrowly tailored. See Ayres & Foster, 85 TEX. L. REV. at 523 n.27 ("At least as a theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not only that the preferences not be too large, but also that they not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government interest."). The marginal benefit of adding just five or ten minority students to a class of this size would be negligible and have no perceptible impact on the "educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 ("[C]ritical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.").
In the 2008 admissions cycle, 29,501 students applied to the University of Texas. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 590. Less than half, 12,843, were admitted and 6,715 ultimately enrolled.
Of the 363 African-American freshmen from Texas high schools that were admitted and enrolled (6% of the 6,322-m ember enrolling class from Texas high schools), 305 (4.8%) were a product of Top Ten Percent, while 58 (0.92% ) African-American enrollees had been evaluated on the basis of their AI/PA I scores.
We do not know, because the University does not maintain data, the degree to which race influenced the University's admissions decisions for any of these enrolled students or how many of these students would not have been admitted but-for the use of race as a plus factor. But assuming the University gave race decisive weight in each of these 58 African-American and 158 Hispanic students' admissions decisions, those students would still only constitute 0.92% and 2.5%, respectively, of the entire 6,322-person enrolling in-state freshman class. And this is assuming a 100%, unconstitutional use of race, not as a plus factor, but as a categorical condition for guaranteed admission. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329—30 (making race an automatic factor in admissions would "amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.").
Assume further, that such a prohibited use of race was employed in only half of the University's admissions decisions. This would still only yield 29 (0.46%) African-American and 79 (1.25%) Hispanic students.
Now assume that the University's use of race is truly holistic; that given the multitude of other race-neutral variables the University considers and values sincerely, race's significance is limited in any individual application packet. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608 ("UT considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor. As described in exhaustive detail above, race is one of seven "special circumstances," which is in turn one of six factors that make up an applicants personal achievement score."). Lastly, assume that in this system, the University's use of race results in a but-for offer of admission in one-quarter of the decisions. A twenty-five percent but-for admissions rate seems highly improbable if race is truly limited in its holistic weighting, but the unlikelihood of the assumption proves my point. Even under such a system, the University's proper use of race holistically would only yield 15 (0.24%) African-American and 40 (0.62%) Hispanic students. African-American students, for example, admitted and enrolled by way of this holistic system would still only constitute two-tenths of one percent of the University of Texas's 2008 entering freshman class. Such a use of race could have no discernable impact on the classroom-level "educational benefits diversity is designed to produce" or otherwise influence "critical mass" at the University of Texas generally. Such a plan exacts a cost disproportionate to its benefit and is not narrowly tailored. This is especially so on a university campus with, for example, 4,448 classes (out of 5,631) with zero or one African-American students, and 1,689 classes with zero or one Hispanic students. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
More importantly, if the figures above are reasonably accurate, the University's use of race also fails Grutter's compelling interest test as a factual matter. See 539 U.S. at 333 ("[D]iminishing the force of [racial] stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students."). From its inception immediately following Grutter, the University's race-conscious admissions policy was described as essential to the University of Texas's educational mission:
Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (citing Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions, June 25, 2004 at 24). If the University's use of race is truly necessary to accomplish its educational function, then as a factual matter, the University of Texas's race-conscious measures have been completely ineffectual in accomplishing its claimed compelling interest.
In contrast, Top Ten Percent was responsible for contributing 305 and 1,164 African-American and Hispanic students, respectively, to the entering 2008 freshman class using entirely race-neutral means. These students represent 4.8% and 18.4% of the entering in-state freshman class. In addition, of the 58 African-American and 158 Hispanic enrolled students evaluated on the basis of their AI and PAI scores, if the University's use of race was truly holistic, the percentage of these students for whom race was a decisive factor (i.e., but-for admits) should be minimal. In other words, the vast majority of these 58 and 158 students were admitted based on objective factors other than race. That is, the University was able to obtain approximately 96% of the African-American and Hispanic students enrolled in the 2008 entering in-state freshman class using race-neutral means. And although the University argues that this number still does not qualify as critical mass, one thing is certain: the University of Texas's use of race has had an infinitesimal impact on critical mass in the student body as a whole. As such, the University's use of race can be neither compelling nor narrowly tailored.
I do not envy the admissions officials at the University of Texas. In 1997, in response to our decision in Hopwood v. Texas,
The Supreme Court's narrow tailoring jurisprudence has been reliably tethered, at least before 2003, to the principle that whenever the government divides citizens by race, which is itself an evil that can only be justified in the most compelling circumstances, that the means chosen will inflict the least harm possible, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (opinion of Powell, J.), and fit the compelling goal "so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
My disagreement with Grutter is more fundamental, however. Grutter's failing, in my view, is not only that it approved an affirmative action plan incapable of strict scrutiny, but more importantly, that it approved the use of race in university admissions as a compelling state interest at all.
The idea of dividing people along racial lines is artificial and antiquated. Human beings are not divisible biologically into any set number of races.
When government divides citizens by race, matters are different.
For the most part, college admissions is a zero-sum game. Whenever one student wins, another loses. The entire competition, encouraged from age five on, is premised on individual achievement and promise.
Yesterday's racial discrimination was based on racial preference; today's racial preference results in racial discrimination. Changing the color of the group discriminated against simply inverts, but does address, the fundamental problem: the Constitution prohibits all forms of government-sponsored racial discrimination. Grutter puts the Supreme Court's imprimatur on such ruinous behavior and ensures that race will continue to be a divisive facet of American life for at least the next two generations. Like the plaintiffs and countless other college applicants denied admission based, in part, on government-sponsored racial discrimination, I await the Court's return to constitutional first principles.
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FL Carbonell Awards Given April 2; Hairspray, Light in the Piazza, Michael McKeever Among Nominees
By Kenneth Jones
The Carbonell Awards, celebrating South Florida professional theatrical productions from 2011, will be handed out at an April 2 ceremony at Broward Center for the Performing Arts in Fort Lauderdale. Maltz Jupiter Theatre in Jupiter, FL, received the most nominations — 25.
The evening will feature entertainment from shows of the year.
Actors' Playhouse earned 14 nominations followed by Broward Stage Door Theatre with 11 and Palm Beach Dramaworks with 10. Actor Avi Hoffman was nominated in two categories — Actor in a Play for Superior Donuts and Supporting Actor in a Musical in Hairspray.
In a category that indicates the health of community, suggesting adventurousness on the part of producers and audiences, the nominees for Best New Work are David Michael Sirois for his play Brothers Beckett (Alliance Theatre Lab) in Miami Lakes; Michael McKeever for his play Stuff (Caldwell Theatre Company in Boca Raton); Christopher Demos Brown, who won the award last year, for his play Captiva (Zoetic Stage in Miami); and Carter W. Lewis for his play The Cha-Cha of a Camel Spider (the final production at Florida Stage in Palm Beach County; the theatre folded in 2011).
Here is the complete list of 2011 Carbonell Award nominees:
Best New Work
Best Production of a Play
Best Director of a Play
Best Actor in a Play
Best Actress in a Play
Best Supporting Actor in a Play
Best Supporting Actress in a Play
Best Production of a Musical
Best Director, Musical
Best Actor in a Musical
Best Actress in a Musical
Best Supporting Actor in a Musical
Best Supporting Actress in a Musical
Best Musical Direction
Best Choreography
Best Scenic Design (Play or Musical)
Best Lighting Design (Play or Musical)
Best Costume Design (Play or Musical)
Best Sound Design (Play or Musical)
Best Ensemble
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subset: commoncrawl


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main index
-> Some sentence, part of my Inner MonologueHi! Sayuri Yamada welcomes you! First of all, I just want to say that I'm a crazy fangirl who changes personalities as many times she blinks. Getting serious: I'm a seventeen years old Mexican college student, anime and manga fan, writer-wannabe, and the strangest girl you'll ever meet.
Works that Sayuri likes (but don't want people around her to know):
Tropes present in Sayuri's life (or that she thinks are present in her life):


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Noticed recently a couple of fighters planning ahead or calling other fighters out when they already got big fights coming up. We just saw very recently with Evander not getting the W over the weekend who already had fight with Nielson signed.
I may have left some fighters outs but here a five fighters that I'm aware of that have already got more than 1 fight scheduled..
ADAMEK - McBride/Klitchkos? (it's official Adamek is fighting a Klitschko but it's not confirmed on which brother apparently??)
W.KLITSCHKO - Chisora/Adamek?
V.KLITSCHKO - Solis/Adamek?
ABRAHAM - Bozic/Ward
COTTO - Mayorga/Margarito
Does anyone see an upset loss appearing before any of these fighters have the 2nd scheduled bout? With the Klitschkos/Ademak triangle now that leaves a lot of opportunities.
I think all 5 fighters will get past their first fights.
Any spoilers?


text:
The former Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation talked with News 2 about Saturday afternoon's plane crash.
The Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 plane crashed as it landed into the San Francisco airport around 3:30 p.m. Eastern time Saturday.
Two people were killed in the crash and hundreds were injured.
Mary Schiavo said it looks like the plane was too close to the ground as it attempted to land and slammed into the seawall sending the tail of the plane spinning.
No emergency alert from the pilots on board the plane were sent out.
The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating the accident.
210 W. Coleman Blvd.Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
Telephone: 843.216.4875
Fax: 843.881.3410
Email: firstname.lastname@example.com


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Now Available - Library Discovery Tool!
The Discovery Tool is a new customized searching experience that allows users to simultaneously search all of our EBSCO databases, our full library catalog, and other electronic resources, including those from other publisher packages.
We have also customized the Discovery Tool interface with direct links to our catalog, journals, databases, subject guides, and Ask-A-Librarian!
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For more information, contact a librarian using Ask-A-Librarian.
Posted By: Megan Smith
Date: Tue Sep 24 16:56:45 EDT 2013


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Greetings All,
First of all, I would like to say thank you to all of you who sent emails and well wishes while I was in Iraq for the last 14 months. I am glad to be back in Germany with my family. I am even more excited that I soon will be leaving Germany to head back to the USA after 7 years. I can't wait to get Direct TV with NFL Sunday ticket and get to watch every game at normal times and not at night.
Can anyone tell me about training Camp this year? I will be in the North Iowa area from the middle of June until the end of July and would love to get up to Mankato to see some of the Training Camp. When does the camp start this year and how hard is it to get in to see some of the training.
Thanks for any info!!


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Red Bob Wig
School Color Bob Wig RedWIGBOB RED
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Your Price: $9.99 each
Minimum Order Quantity: 1
Go in disguise or add to your everyday attire with a funky Red Bob Wig!
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Club Training Australia
Club Training Australia (also known as CTA Training) is the leading Registered Training Organisation (RTO) in the Queensland club and hospitality industry. CTA Training has been operating since 1993 and employs over thirty five (35) professional trainers, consultants, analysts, IT specialists and administration support officers. Our Registered Training Organisation (RTO) Number is 31607 and ABN: 50 113 985 247.
Online Training Courses
CTA Training specialises in online hospitality training courses. Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA), Responsible Service of Gambling (RSG), Hygiene for Food Handlers and Food Safety Supervisor (FSS) are some of the regulatory online short-courses available for students.
Many of our courses are Nationally Accredited under the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA), unless stated otherwise.
Industry Short Course
Responsible Management of Licensed Venues (RMLV) is a key industry short-course and is delivered face-to-face by CTA Training all over Queensland. The RMLV training course is OLGR Approved and certifies Approved Managers working on licensed premises in Queensland. Other hospitality industry short courses include Gaming, Marketing and Duty Manager Development Programs.
Traineeships &
Government Funding
CTA Training deliver traineeships to students all over regional Queensland in hospitality, business, commercial cookery and occupational health and safety. Training is conducted on-the-job so students are able to learn in the familiarity of their own workplace. Many traineeships attract Government funding for eligible candidates, this means that many students can have their training costs covered by the Government.
DWS Hospitality Specialists
DWS Hospitality Specialists, also known as Dickson-Wohlsen Strategies, is the consulting arm: a specialist consulting firm, delivering a range of services to the tourism, leisure and hospitality sectors. Clients include casinos, hotel chains, clubs, hotels, gaming and hospitality corporations, tourism operators and government departments.
DWS Hospitality Specialists and Club Training Australia are a part of the one organisation. Together, DWS and CTA deliver quality training to over 30,000 student lessons in hospitality each year and deliver over 200 consulting assignments to a wide range of hospitality clients.
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The Bolton News
All the latest news from Bolton
Petrov diagnosed with leukaemia (From The Bolton News)
National Sport News RSS Feed
Petrov diagnosed with leukaemia
2:57pm Friday 30th March 2012 in National Sport News © Press Association 2014
Aston Villa captain Stiliyan Petrov has been diagnosed with acute leukaemia, the club have said.
The condition was diagnosed following tests after the Bulgaria international, 32, developed a fever following last Saturday's defeat to Arsenal.
A statement from the club said: "We expect to learn more about Stiliyan's situation in due course and we have moved quickly to support him and his family. During this time we ask that Stiliyan's privacy is placed ahead of all inquiries and trust that we will share information as we receive it."
The statement continued: "Stiliyan is cherished by many and he will get from Villa every ounce of love and support that we have to help bring this to a positive conclusion."
Support poured in for Petrov from his Villa team-mates on Twitter.
Striker Darren Bent said: "Really sad news to hear about our captain Stan Petrov. hopefully he'll be back fighting fit soon. Thoughts are with him and his family. KTF."
Goalkeeper Shay Given tweeted: "In shock about Stiliyan Petrov acute leukaemia but we are all here for him and his family. Please God he makes a full recovery.#prayforstan."
Petrov's former Celtic team-mate and current Hoops manager Neil Lennon revealed his "absolute devastation" at the news.
Petrov spent seven years and won four Scottish Premier League titles at the Glasgow giants.
Lennon tweeted: "Absolutely inconsolable here regarding Stiliyan. He will overcome this like all the other barriers he faced in his life."


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We prolly are at 6-8 right now with Rattay if you ask me.
No matter what Gruden does, someone will criticize him for it. Rattay has just proven that Gruden's schemes can be successful with a competent QB running them. That's great, but it makes no sense to start Rattay in the last two games, when there is little or no chance he will be here next year. The smart thing to do would be to evaluate McCown. Simms and Gradkowski regressed this season. The longer they played, the worse they performed.
This season for Bucs' QB's shows that experience clearly has value. Even if Rattay stunk in practice he has extensive real time experience in this offense. That alone should have earned him at least a chance before yesterday. Gradkowsi was in a death spiral from the Giants game to yesterday with the exception of two series against the Saints.


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August 22, 2014
Bill Clinton on 'The Daily Show'
Posted on Sep 21, 2007
The former president tells Jon Stewart about his new book, his wife's quest to get back to "the best public housing in America," why he might slit his throat if she's successful, and how naps can save our democracy.
Part One:
Part Two:
Check out Chris Hedges' take on Clinton's new book, "Giving."
Square, Site wide
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By David, October 15, 2007 at 12:26 pm Link to this comment
Why is it that Hillary Clinton is the front-runner? It has to be simple nostalgia for the pre-Bush years. Or maybe its based on something more Pavlovian, like name recognition. Either way, we desparately need someone as left-leaning as Bush is right. Kucinich personifies everything the left wants.
By Kevin James, September 25, 2007 at 2:22 pm Link to this comment
Read a TD article on his book
By Lily Maskew, September 22, 2007 at 2:27 pm Link to this comment
You know you've got a problem, don't you?
By DennisD, September 22, 2007 at 2:17 pm Link to this comment
Enough with the so called "front" runners already. Let's hear more about Paul, Gravel, Kucinich and anyone else with a brain that has realistic ideas rather than empty promises the cartoon characters we call our politicians belch up every now and then to grab a headline.
By wagonjak, September 22, 2007 at 11:12 am Link to this comment
Unfortunately Bill Clinton doesn't give any more of a damn about the working man then does Bush. His NAFTA and free trade policies were a betrayal of his Democratic base and the common man in this country.
His silence on the immoral and illegal Iraq war until very recently has been deafening, and the only reason we're hearing from him now is to push his book and support his corporatist-leaning wife's bid for the presidency.
Until he is willing to stand up and tell the American people the real story about corporate domination of the government he is nothing but a loose-flyed hypocrite…
Just go away and STFU Bill!


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Newcastle United defender Ryan Taylor will potentially miss the whole of the 2013-14 season after suffering a massive injury setback, the club have revealed.
Taylor picked up his injury against Atromitos in August in a Europa League qualifier, and has not played since. Yet, after just returning to training after eight months out, the defender has suffered further ligament damage.
Newcastle revealed the news of Ryan Taylor's injury on their official website, with Magpies boss Alan Pardew adding: "He has been a model patient and has given his all to ensure he could return to full training in the best condition possible. Clearly everyone at the Club is deeply saddened by this news.
"Ryan has, and will continue to, receive the full support of everyone at Newcastle United during this difficult time for him."
The club also revealed that goalkeeper Tim Krul will have surgery on Monday after the Dutchman dislocated his shoulder during Newcastle's heavy 3-0 defeat to rivals Sunderland last Sunday. It is not yet known how long he will be out for.


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The wait is over! Download the BeerAdvocate app on iTunes or Google Play now.
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Sour #6 - Bootlegger's Brewery
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On tap at the Bootlegger's 5th Anniversary Celebration held at The Muckenthaler Cultural Center in Fullerton, CA.
Billed as a sour ale aged for 12+ months in Hungarian oak barrels.
Pours a hazy orange with a foamy bone head that settles to a partial film on top of the beer. Small dots of lace slowly drip into the remaining beer on the drink down. Smell is sour and tart with vinegar and fruit aromas. Taste is much the same with a raspberry vinaigrette flavor on the finish. There is a medium amount of acidity on the palate with each sip. This beer has a good level of carbonation with a crisp mouthfeel. Overall, this is a pretty good beer with a pretty good balance between fruit and sour aspects.
04-30-2013 02:30:50 | More by UCLABrewN84
Sour #6 from Bootlegger's Brewery
- out of 100 based on 1 ratings.


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This class has some elite prospects that are just so enticing including Clowney, Watkins, Robinson, and Matthews
At 13, we're sitting just outside of the range of blue chip players in my opinion. I'd honestly say there are 9-10 blue chippers, and we're JUST outside of that range.
The Rams should say screw it, and trade up into the #3-#5 range with either Jacksonville or Oakland.
How awesome would it be to walk away with Clowney AND Robinson?
I think the Rams could trade up into the #3-#5 range for their #13 pick, their 2nd, and their 3rd
Yeah, the Rams wouldn't get a top safety prospect, but in my opinion, McLeod was adequate enough and we would be fine for another season with him starting. If the Rams got both Clowney and Robinson, then whenever the Rams held a 2 touchdown lead they'd be unbeatable. Why? Because the pass rush with Quinn, Long, Hayes, and Clowney would be impossible to overcome, and on offense with Long and Robinson, it would be super hard to stop Stacy.
Drafting Robinson and Clowney would allow the Rams to retain leads and hardly ever be overtaken. The only problem would be getting ahead of opponents fast.