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Opening statements
On balance, carbon offsets are neither good for the climate nor for emissions trading. Carbon offsets or credits are, in theory, a great idea for reducing a firm's or an individual's emissions.
We need to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, which come from a wide variety of sources. Unlike most pollutants, the main GHG (greenhouse gas)—carbon dioxide—does little damage close to the source of its emission.
This debate is (deliberately) timed to coincide with the UN's Poznan climate change conference (December 1st-12th) and the European Union heads of government meeting (December 11th-12th). The first will set the framework for next year's crucial Copenhagen conference; the second may determine the fate of the EU's efforts to curb emissions. Arguments about carbon offsets will be rife at both of these occasions, for although offsets currently play an important part in the world's attempts to cut its emissions, their use is controversial.
Carbon offsets are financial instruments which represent a reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions. A company which cuts its emissions can sell that reduction to another company, often on the other side of the world. In theory, this should be efficient, because the first company must be able to reduce emissions at a lower cost than the second. Companies and individuals use offsets voluntarily to reduce their carbon footprints; and countries may use them to meet the emissions-reduction targets they have agreed to under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, designed to allow lower-cost emissions reductions in developing countries to be sold to rich countries. They are, thus, widely used in the world's biggest carbon-trading mechanism, the European Emissions-Trading Scheme.
Carbon offsets raise all sorts of questions, both theoretical and practical. Are offsets really efficient? Don't they let rich-country companies off the hook and thus undermine incentives to create cleaner technology? Can we really create a certification process we can rely on, particularly if offsetting is scaled up as it needs to be if cuts are to go deeper? If we can't, don't we risk undermining the entire effort to combat climate change? On the other hand, can we really afford not to use offsets? Surely the costs of cutting climate change in rich countries without recourse to emerging-market reductions will be so high as to be politically unacceptable? Shouldn't we accept a certain level of abuse of the system? If we give up offsets, aren't we making the best the enemy of the good?
We are very lucky to have these issues debated by the two people in the world best qualified to do so, who also happen to be sharp, concise, clear writers. Michael Wara, proposing the motion, is assistant professor at Stanford Law School, an expert in environmental law and policy, and has done the most interesting empirical work I have seen on the subject. Henry Derwent, opposing the motion, is president and chief executive of the International Emissions Trading Association, which is dedicated to making carbon trading work. Gentlemen: over to you.
On balance, carbon offsets are neither good for the climate nor for emissions trading. Carbon offsets or credits are, in theory, a great idea for reducing a firm's or an individual's emissions. In practice they have proved impossibly difficult to successfully implement without fraud. My work and the work of others who look critically at the existing markets for carbon offsets strongly suggest that in far too many cases it is impossible to separate fraudulent offsets from true reductions.
Carbon offsets are a type of carbon currency. They are a medium of exchange by which one activity that reduces emissions at a higher cost can be swapped for another that does so at lower cost. But this carbon currency has been watered by counterfeit credits that are very difficult in practice to distinguish from the genuine article. This generates three risks: fraud on consumers; increased uncertainty about the value of other carbon currencies; and lower public confidence in emissions trading systems. All this puts the viability of using market mechanisms, the lowest-cost solutions to climate change, in political jeopardy. For that reason alone, and despite their potential benefits, we should steer clear of carbon offsets in our climate policy.
The problem with carbon offsets is that many of them are counterfeit. Carbon offsetting is a zero-sum game. Offsets allow a company or an individual, rather than reducing their own emissions, to pay for others to do the same. If all goes well, 1 tonne is emitted by the purchaser for every tonne reduced by the seller of a carbon offset, and the atmosphere does not know the difference. For this trade to work, there has to be some certainty that the purchased reduction represents an actual change in behaviour. If credit is given for activity that would have occurred anyway, then 2 tonnes are emitted, the first from the buyer, who believes his emissions will be reduced by the seller; the second from the seller, who carries on as he would have, albeit slightly richer from the sale of the offset. The atmosphere then has to absorb both the emission from the buyer and from the seller of the offset.
How to tell the difference between changed behaviour and the "anyway" credit is the crux of carbon offset regulation. This characteristic of an offset, called additionality, has been the focus of intense debate and controversy since the first carbon offsetting schemes were established. Today, it remains the greatest challenge and the source of most criticisms, including many of my own, regarding the use of carbon offsets. Typically, an offset producer (or project developer as they are called in the business) must produce evidence in the form of a report that argues that the offset it would like to sell is truly an additional reduction.
There are strong incentives to fudge the details in these reports to create additionality, since this is what creates value in the offset, Offsets are created in literally hundreds of countries with different tax and environmental regulations, and business conditions making evaluation of any claim very difficult. The complexity does not end there. Additionality determination also requires assessment of the alternative investments and consequent returns that a business might make. The information required to make a well-informed, if still subjective, call on additionality is massive. As a consequence, and even in the presence of a tough regulatory system such as the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, that is working hard to get things right, lots of bad decisions get made, that is, lots of counterfeit carbon currency is making it into the system. All this indicates that the problem of additionality is so intractable and so information-intensive that there is no effective way of evaluating just how many offsets are real and how many are anyway credits.
This flow of counterfeit carbon currency has consequences. Offsets serve two roles: first, they allow consumers and businesses to voluntarily reduce their carbon footprint; second, they allow firms within cap-and-trade systems like Europe's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to reduce the costs of their compliance by purchasing offsets in lieu of allowances, the currency of cap-and-trade.
Incentives in the voluntary market are actually better, even with less stringent regulation, than in the compliance market because at least consumers are concerned that they do not purchase anyway credits. They derive the utility of offsets from the fact that their emissions really are offset and want to know that that behaviour actually was altered by their payments. In the voluntary market, quality matters to consumers.
In compliance markets like the ETS, the only motivation buyers have is to be seen by their regulator to have purchased and retired a sufficient number of offsets or allowances. There is no incentive to ensure that offsets in their portfolio are real, only that they have been certified by the regulator. The consequence of counterfeit credits making it into these markets is that power plants and factories are allowed to claim credit for, and so emit pollution equal to, their purchases of counterfeit offsets. This removes any certainty regarding the level of pollutant emissions within the cap, eliminating one of the major benefits of a cap-and-trade over a tax on carbon. Offsets of dubious quality also lead to a divergence between on-paper compliance with a cap-and-trade's objectives and its real-world accomplishments. Publics who bear the costs of these programmes in the form of higher energy costs should and will care.
Carbon offsets damage public confidence in the market for carbon. The long-run and potentially most damaging impact of carbon offsets is that growing public distrust for these assets is contaminating the wider project of emissions trading and other market-based approaches to climate change. Market-based regulation is expected to dramatically lower the cost of reducing emissions, perhaps by as much as a factor of 10. If approaches such as a carbon tax or cap and trade are abandoned because of suspicions created by a slew of stories regarding anyway offsets, then we are far less likely to be able or willing to afford, especially in the current economic climate, the costs of fixing our climate change problem.
We need to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, which come from a wide variety of sources. Unlike most pollutants, the main GHG (greenhouse gas)—carbon dioxide—does little damage close to the source of its emission. It is distributed around the global atmosphere very quickly, where it does its damage to the earth as a whole. This means that, from the atmosphere's perspective, it really does not matter at all where, or from what sort of source, the GHGs come. The only issue is reducing the total sum of them.
Reducing GHGs is expensive. Nowhere, in the absence of a price for carbon, is it the economically optimal thing to do, otherwise people would be doing it without needing to be incentivised, regulated or hectored. Some GHG reduction activity, like improving energy efficiency and therefore cutting fuel bills, is surprisingly cheap. Unfortunately, the cheap activities are not enough. Some GHG reduction activity is very expensive, for instance abandoning recently built fossil fuel power plants and building windmills instead. But the costs vary dramatically from sector to sector, and from economy to economy. Much of the problem we have is the GHG consequences of growth, particularly in developing countries, that has yet to occur. Making that growth low-carbon, rather than retrofitting low-carbon solutions, is on the whole cheaper and yet just as effective.
Anyone who has an obligation to reduce carbon is going to pay a cost. It makes sense to reduce that cost wherever it can be done without compromising the carbon reduction achieved. The more the cost is reduced, the more likely a given level of carbon reduction ambition—individual, national or global—is going to be regarded as affordable and therefore politically achievable. The wider the range of potential emissions reduction options, the more likely it is that the cost can be reduced. One person's, company's or country's range of options may all be comparatively high-cost compared with what is available across the whole world. Since reducing GHGs in one part of the world is exactly as effective as reducing them in another, there is no good reason to limit reduction options to what is on the territory or in the direct control of the individual or country. There is a make or buy decision to be made every time. And that is what offsetting is: deciding to buy rather than make. Hardly something to be ashamed of.
And the benefits of trade apply to trade in this new commodity, too. Many developing countries have, at least at this point in time, a comparative advantage in producing emissions reductions. It benefits their growth, as well as reducing developed-country costs, if it is their reductions that are bought.
So what is the problem? There are some lofty moral ones. Radical development theorists tend to disapprove in principle of the unequal power game in trade involving developing countries. Critics of environmental markets dislike the idea of turning the common property of the environment into private rights. Moralists believe that it is not right to buy indulgences; developed countries should suffer the full domestic price for their past (though unconscious) sins of emission, and people with unsustainable lifestyles ought to be punished by being made to pay the maximum price. But in this case the indulgences actually work, and people will still be paying—they just won't be paying so much as to risk them rebelling against the whole idea.
Then there are suspicions of whether the offsets are actually properly calculated: do they—particularly the ones in faraway places—actually deliver the emissions reductions they claim? But whether reductions are made at home or abroad, at national economy level or at project level, against past levels or future projections, monitoring, reporting and verification is the same basic issue and needs to be dealt with by painstakingly creating a rulebook. Enormous efforts have gone into developing the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) national accounting protocols, the Kyoto project mechanisms and the verification schemes used by the various voluntary market certification schemes. Many people complain that the Kyoto controls are now actually too strict and burdensome; there is obviously much more that can be done to improve these systems, which have only operated for a few years. But there is no more reason to say that foreign reductions are impossible to believe than there is to say that financial accounts of companies with foreign operations are inherently suspect. The press is always alert for scams, and more than one company has changed its offset systems to avoid any taint of suspicion.
There is a better argument for limiting the amount you emit rather than offset: if you believe that over time the cost of offsetting is going to go up, and that you are going to have to live in a changed environment where the net price of emissions will increase radically, you should rationally alter your assets and activities to avoid being stranded paying the higher costs. That means that you should start learning to do without emissions-producing activities now, and you should put a limit on the cost-reduction options that you take, so as to be incentivised earlier by the higher average price you will be paying. The Kyoto negotiations have been over this problem in great depth, and come up with the simplest control: over a commitment period, a country can only offset up to half its emissions reduction target. But there is no reason for everyone to adopt exactly 50% every year. Offsetting, backed by a flourishing market (which we already have), provides immense flexibility which should be used to keep costs down. Higher costs will mean less emissions reduction, however much we might wish it otherwise.
Far from undermining the effort to tackle climate change, offsetting makes the effort go further.
Equally, the damage to the earth translates into problems for people all round the earth, whether from sea level rise, increased storm intensities, or changes to rainfall patterns. On the whole everyone suffers, directly or indirectly. So everyone has an interest in contributing to GHG reduction.
Intel is the world leader in silicon innovation and a leader in environmental sustainability. We have been recognized by third party organizations such as Innovest, Dow Jones and the US EPA for our efforts to responsibly manage operations and our dedication to designing products with the environment in mind. Intel also joins forces with industry, business and governments to find and promote ways that technology can be used as a tool to combat climate change. Additional information is available at www.intel.com/go/environment
Comments from the floor
Dear Madam,
Offsets are the life-blood, the ultimate tool inherited and offered to all participating citizens and stakeholders in our society to curb the effect of global warming on our planet. For that reason alone offsets shall be an ever-increasing share of all GHG policy frameworks as this war on our changing climate is taking place. Quite simply, no other equivalent exists. An allowance-exlusive market would not bring less financial risks to the GHG curbing system once all citizens and businesses would be obligated to enrole in such a market as net emitters or net suppliers of tradable carbon units. Yet, a regressive tax administered by governments can simply not be discussed here neither, unless another layer of endemic inefficacy is what your looking for. If conventionnal non-carbon assets verification and management is really what would steer us away from all that carbon offset elusiness, then just think that we could simply adjust a carbon-mortgage to any net emitter's global emissions and resell those carbon-based mortgages say as...subprimes. Pardon me all this cynism, but is there one single participant in our debate that thinks that conventionnal non-carbon assets evaluation and verification carry more thrustwothyness than the one inherited by those emerging tradabe offset-based carbon units ? Hopefully none. All that, not withstanding the fact that all those offset-based carbon units are by in large, adressing and improving notoriously the governance and social responsability of entities that produce them. A feature that as dramatically eluded our conventionnal non-carbon markets lately.
Dear Madam,
Have the markets really been operating long enough for us to determine that the problem of additionality is "intractable." In the last 18 months alone, huge strides have been made with offset standards and registries. This should help to reduce counterfeit carbon currencies greatly.
Dear Madam,
I see no divorce between the two propositions since they both fail to clearly limit the boundaries for their cases. In addition, Voluntary markets and credits, for which many of the negative comments are addressed, should not be mixed in this debate in order to keep a clean debate storyline.
Mr.Wara states that "it is impossible to separate fraudulent offsets from true reductions". In NO BUSINESS one is able to make this separation. In the real world unlike the academic world, one does not separate things, one manages it.
Any professional working on forward markets knows that fraudulent or fake future supply, (e.g. GHG reductions, mineral ores, or probable oil reserves used to increase company value) are a risk that has to be properly leveraged through screening, contracting and regulation compliance. Even in the case of Oil (as in the case of carbon) uncertainty and reliability is always something to play with.
I am of the opinion that we should support the improvement of current carbon offset mechanisms (not to discard them) and simultaneously develop a complementary compliance path (progressive cap-and-trade, sectoral targets, etc) to make sure that Countries (and their companies) have several cost effective and feasible options to comply with their climate commitments.
Dear Madam,
The arguments both for and against the proposition have concentrated on Carbon Emissions Reductions Credits as financial instruments designed for the purpose of offsetting alone. However, the Clean Development Mechanism is aptly named, and embeds an expectation of a flow of funding from developed to emerging economies that will facilitate more sustainable economic development in the latter in return for pollution rights transferred to the former. That there is no real net reduction in global emissions from this "offsetting" aspect of the trade is obvious, whatever one thinks of additionality. However - and in spite of disappointments and abuse to date - should a post-Kyoto agreement embed effective and auditable sustainable development objectives, then it will be these that deliver real and long lasting climate change benefits. The proposition should therefore be opposed, not because offsets are ineffective in reducing emissions, but because an admirable objective has not yet been implemented effectively.
Dear Madam,
The pro-offset argument seeks to suggest that there is no practical economic alternative to buying cheap offsets in emerging economies. This is not true. Most developed economy emissions arise from waste, inefficiency and non-adoption of new technologies. Use of heavy emitting plant ; insufficient heating insulation ; flying to see a customer when a video-conference (freely available in the company I work for) would work just as well. Innovation and adoption of new technologies reduce costs and increase profit in the long term thus enhancing the performance of the economy - the barriers to implementation are only those of short-term thinking. My major concern with carbon offsets is that businesses think they can buy their way out of the problem completely rather than grasping the nettle of their own emissions. It is a practical not a theoretical concern: I have witnessed precisely this behaviour taking place in a large multinational company.
The pro-offset argument also seeks to belittle the examples of 'fraudulent' or 'anyways' offsets to bucket shops and guilty-feeling personal consumers. This is far from the case. Self-deception (and deception) pervades the industry. The UN is regarded as the highest standard in approving offset projects. But there are not enough projects to meet demand, due presumably to lack of resources, so new voluntary 'rating agencies' (those mentioned in some responses here) are set up, which essentially are there to give backing to projects which otherwise would NOT get approved by the UN. Why should such ratings make people feel more comfortable about carbon offsets? (My company has invested in such rated projects which were explicitly rejected by the UN on additionality grounds). Even if one focuses purely on UN approved schemes, there is false accounting in carbon neutrality. If I steal 5 sheep today in Hampshire why should my conscience be clear if I promise over the next 5 years to deliver one sheep per year in Rajasthan? - and what happens if I don't keep that promise?
It is necessary at all times to consider the motivations of the different institutions. Businesses that emit carbon seek a PR benefit (if voluntary) or an economic benefit (if part of a mandatory scheme). They basically want the problem to go away with a simple declaration of 'carbon neutrality'. Profit-maximising carbon consultants simply want, like estate agents, to boost the amount of trading activity - a respondent to this blog suggested that firms should buy offsets 7x the value of their emissions .. what was the driving force for that suggestion?
A mandatory cap and trade system such as ETS is fine: it allows under-polluters in the EU to benefit at the expense of over-polluters in the EU. The problem arises when a loophole is introduced allowing the over-polluters to buy their requirements through carbon offsets in emerging economies, something that the EU has absolutely no regulatory control over. These are the carbon offsets (whether voluntary or as used within a mandatory cap and trade scheme) that we are talking about.
The supposed 'cheapness' of carbon offsets espoused by some on these pages really is too good to be true.
Dear Madam,
It is not at all clear whether we are debating carbon offsets within the mandatory carbon compliance framework (i.e the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol) or whether we are discussing voluntary offsets.
I have focussed on the former.
The issue is one of perception.
The environmental objective is reducing global GHG Emissions.
If we take this objective in isolation, then the best course of action is to close down all polluting business. Emissions drop as a consequence and the environmental problem is solved. However, this wouldn't be too good for the economy.
It follows that we need look at the broader picture rather than taking this issue in isolation. In doing so we will see that the environmental objective needs to be considered along side other equally critical objectives, not least of which is the economy.
The question then becomes, "What system do we deploy to achieve the optimal result in respect of both the environment and the economy". In order to solve this problem, we need to achieve the requisite emission abatement (as defined by the Kyoto Protocol) at the lowest unit cost to industry.
This solution to our problem is the very premise of emission trading and naturally extends to carbon offsets. Low cost emission abatement opportunities are exploited to the full wherever they exist and the achievment, in terms of emission reductions, are shared throughout the economy through the trading mechanism.
There are two additional benefits of using carbon offsets:
1) If we use carbon offsets to lower the cost of carbon compliance, then it makes it more economically viable to increase the targets over time and to achieve more than would have otherwise been reasonable for the economy;
2) Carbon offsets encourage those with carbon abatement opportunities, who are not otherwise subject to carbon constraints (e.g. business in India and China), to invest in those opportunities;
In conclusion, the use of carbon offsets achieves a benefit to the environment (the reductions of GHG emissions that wouldn't otherwise occur) together with a benefit to the economy (access to lowest cost compliance with carbon constraints).
It appears to be a win-win situation.
Dear Madam,
I believe it is necessary to clarify the difference between emissions trading and carbon offsetting. Carbon offsetting has picked up a bad name for itself in recent times due to numerous unscrupulous projects marketed to guilty holiday makers taking flights abroad. I would like to ask whether we are addressing carbon offsetting in the context of the domestic carbon market, or the heavily regulated CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] or EU ETS [Emissions Trading Scheme]?
I would also ask respondents to recall that in emissions trading schemes, carbon offsetting works within a framework of carbon emissions caps and trading.
Dear Madam,
The carbon trading is "theoretically" the best option, but it simply isn't practical.
The pro-offset lobby should address these issues instead of trying to trivialize the pro-tax side as "moralists".
The opening remarks by Mr Derwent have no substance.
Dear Madam,
However we don't exactly know the mechanism and the relation between GHG and global warming, there is definitely something behind those.
Dear Madam,
My inclination is to vote yes. However, this leaves me in a quandary. The debate is based on the assumption that man-made greenhouse gases cause dangerous global warming. The evidence against this hypothesis gets stronger every day that the world temperatures do not increase above the 1998 peak and the definite cooling trend that has set in since 2002 continues. Most of the so-called evidence for manmade GW consists of the output of computer models that failed to predict this cooling trend. For that reason, and for many others, they are worthless. Evidence based on sunspots predicts continued cooling.
If the hypothesis was true, then I would strongly oppose carbon trading because, as we have seen already, it is an open invitation to massive fraud. It is the only "trade" that I know of where it is impossible to accurately measure the "good" being traded and if the quantities traded are fraudulently increased by the auditor, both parties (and the auditor) benefit. The good being traded is a certificate that is no different from a Papal indulgence. It the global warming house of cards collapses, they will be worthless overnight.
Dear Madam,
It occurs to me that this form of free market approach fails as a mechanism for reducing CO2 emissions--namely, it is, as far as I can see, impossible to verify. Nor is there any regulatory body responsible for following up. Finally, it moves the responsibility away from the political process.
Dear Madam,
While my sympathies lie more strongly on the side of using offsets there is one major thing ...
The unquestioned faith that companies are, at any instant in time, carrying out economically optimal decisions is quite simply false.
Numerous companies have found, and will continue to find, significant cost savings through efficiency-enhancing changes that reduce greenhouse gases.
Too true though, that new rules to the game are needed for profit-maximizing companies to make sizable enough changes. There must be a price on carbon. Offsets are, in theory, an incredibly efficient way to achieve this goal.
Practice, of course, is always a completely different story.
One question for Mr Wara, though, that I hope he might touch on in his next comments. ... presuming that "anyways offsets" are carbon efficiency measures that would have been put into place whether or not there were offsets.
What exactly is wrong with "anyways offsets?" These will naturally get priced into market by the magic of supply and demand in a one-off manner that will smooth out after baselines are established for each actor in offset markets. Sectors that are most suited towards gains in carbon efficiency will gain the most from "anyways offsets" (not a problem in my mind), while sectors that can make further gains in efficiency for the cheapest price will gain the most from additional changes. Two goals are simultaneously accomplished, 1) a shift of economic resources to corporate entities that are most suited towards low-emission production, and 2) accomplishing greenhouse gas reductions for the cheapest possible price.
Also, carbon offsets are only zero sum if there is a genuine fraud, where a company pays offsets to a company who doesn't reduce their emissions whatsoever. It's not clear to me whether his argument frames previously planned reductions as 'counterfeit' or whether this term is used to describe completely fraudulent transactions that all observers would agree undermines the integrity of the system. I think he's only talking about the first of these.
If I understand Wara's argument correctly, I think it points to the need for good public relations and communication on behalf of offsets, along with well-designed regulations that ensure that companies who can reduce emissions for the lowest price are on the receiving end of the offset scheme.
On another note - I know that "voluntary compliance" really does work better sometimes because it avoids enforcement costs, but doesn't it ring a little too strongly of wishful thinking?
Dear Madam,
The proposal on Carbon Offsets is a great theoretical idea. A more active and simplistic approach is required at the grass root level for the proposal to be effective. There is no such system in place for this to happen. The accountability of the whole system remains questionable.
Dear Madam,
I work for a large respected multinational company that voluntarily neutralises all its annual business air travel via carbon offsets in emerging economies.
While I applaud the intention behind this policy, I note:
- there has been very little obvious attempt on the part of my company to reduce business air travel, even though a large percentage of that travel (indeed much business air travel) is unnecessary
- the 'full neutralisation' of business air travel emissions in a given year involves taking out carbon offsets which promise to reduce emissions over a number of years into the future ie it is not a like for like offset, it is false accounting
- when I have reviewed prior year carbon offset projects, I note that in some cases the promised future reductions in emissions were not actually realised in practice (full neutralisation was not delivered)
- while my company only invests in 'accredited' carbon offset projects, I have subsequently discovered that some of these projects were rejected by CDM for various reasons (eg insufficient additionality)
- when I have raised these objections within my company, they have gone unanswered, suggesting that the public external message of 'carbon neutrality' was the paramount concern of the company, rather than addressing the reality
- the carbon offset intermediary industry markets itself as being an eco-friendly not-for-profit industry whereas it appears to be entirely profit-focused, and the opportunities for fraud and self-deception are manifest
I have no doubt that my company and the intermediary involved believed that they were operating to the highest standards within the carbon offset market. I have to conclude that purchasing carbon offsets is, as has been noted elsewhere, equivalent to the medieval practice of 'buying indulgences' for one's sins, allowing large companies to continue sinning in an ecological sense without further thought or inconvenience on the matter.
I nevertheless support the mandatory cap and trade system, which is somewhat different from the voluntary carbon offset market. Instead of purchasing cheap carbon offsets, international companies should do more to 'stigmatise' unnecessary business travel eg by awarding mandates and contracts to those companies that do NOT travel to see them, rather than (in the current business model) those that do.
I wholeheartedly support the motion.
Dear Madam,
Carbon offsets will not work. A good idea on paper that unfortunately will fail in the real world. Complications, corruption, costs, greed and the like will all work against this idea. Like many tax codes that were once proposed and enacted for a good reason, this awkward and bulky system of trading will ultimately complicate the mater and add to the confusion and difficulty of managing the requirement to reduce emissions (which equates in large part to reduced consumption). Kyoto itself was one big shell game that tried to bite off more than it could chew while not being fair in setting baselines and emission reduction goals. Future success lies in better technology to reduce emissions for a given amount of work and populations that choose to consume less (developed world), conserve and recycle more (all), and give birth to fewer children (developing world). Our world leaders should try to minimize the red-tape, equations, and schemes and support these basic tenets.
Dear Madam,
I agree with the proposition put forward. It is a difficult matter to deal with the problem of increasing green house gasses . The idea of Carbon Offsetting reminds me of a child who it desperately trying to make it look like they have eaten their vegetables by moving them around the plate.
Allowing offsetting in my view is hiding from the truth of the problem. The emissions need to be reduced, this is unlikely to happen with offsetting. I would believe that they would be far more likely to increase thus adding to the problem.
It is a difficult matter which will take difficult negotiation to achieve, but is achievable, if all parties are willing to comprise a little.
Dear Madam,
Carbon Setting would work given time, though it is probably the least effective way to achieve our long term goal of significantly reducing Green house Gases (GHG). In lieu of Governmental transparency establish global regulatory commission, and judiciary system, arm with effective enforcement mechanisms, meeting our mandatory goals in the prescribe time frame will in all likelihood fail.
Further Carbon Setting is a very noble and creative idea indeed! The idea of trading carbon emission in order to preserve a cap and stimulate reduction while still preserving world wide economic viability would be successful if not for the inherent nature of market base forces, national interest, and the (dringlichkeit) significant need for prompt action!
As far as the issue of corruption there will always be those who would try to subvert the system in order to gain and unfair advantage and unfortunately this is a part of the inherent Nature of Man.
In agreeing with Mr. Wara, that SElF INTEREST would render this initiative ineffective, is not to say that it can not work but with all matters, the proof lies in the pudding.
Dear Madam,
Let me clarify-- my proposed solution would be a dual system-- one standard to continue to improve upon the Kyoto protocol, lowering the absolute amount of greenhouse gas emissions coming from the developed world right now. This would ideally convert the developed world to a carbon-free economy over the next decade or two. However, a second system is needed to address the numerous decades in which we have already been releasing unregulated greenhouse gasses, and deforesting significant chunks of the globe. The second system would require all multinational companies selling carbon-related products in participating countries to purchase carbon offsets equal to seven times the current emissions of all their operations, including subsidiaries and suppliers. These additional carbon offsets would be to a slightly stronger standard than the level of the current voluntary carbon standards, and could use more unconventional means of getting carbon credits, including land reclamation, ocean fertilization, or renewable energy projects. These offsets would also assist in helping the developing world to grow in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner.
Thank you,
Dear Madam,
Dear Madam,
I do agree with the proposal and with Mr. Wara's argument. Besides, have not we, Europeans, learnt enough of market mismanagement and corruption at local (country) levels with agricultural goods (CAP & Co)?
And now we are fostering another beast, for trading goods, which are even more difficult to account for...and this at a global scale!
One thing is important, carbon emission should have some cost for those producing it, but it is better handled at local (country) levels to avoid the conflict of interests generated by multinational systems like CAP, where each county is interested in maximizing the net flows of common funds to its own country, at any price (huge mismanagement), without taking into account the common interests of the Union.
I was hoping, trade in Carbon Offsets like it looks today, was a fashion trend like the "Nuclear energy, no thanks" campaigns in earlier decades.
Let short-term trends for fashion, energy policy needs a market oriented long-term policy.
Dear Madam,
I do agree with the proposal and with Mr. Wara's argument. Besides, have not we, Europeans, learnt enough of market mismanagement and corruption at local (country) levels with agricultural goods (CAP & Co)?
And now we are fostering another beast, for trading goods, which are even more difficult to account for...and this at a global scale!
One thing is important, carbon emission should have some cost for those producing it, but it is better handled at local (country) levels to avoid the conflict of interests generated by multinational systems like CAP, where each county is interested in maximizing the net flows of common funds to its own country, at any price (huge mismanagement), without taking into account the common interests of the Union.
I was hoping, trade in Carbon Offsets like it looks today, was a fashion trend like the "Nuclear energy, no thanks" campaigns in earlier decades.
Let short-term trends for fashion, energy policy needs a market oriented long-term policy.
Dear Madam,
We cannot afford to neglect the exploration of all available options, including reforestation and CO2 mineralization. We also need to require companies to offset seven times their emissions, so that on net carbon is being removed from the atmosphere every year. This is both possible and necessary. Offset projects will be profitable much more quickly with a market mechanism and a required offset scheme. Voluntary offsets are simply too small in scope at the moment.
"Pros" claim that additionality cannot be proved, and that some companies claiming credits are simply receiving more money to continue emitting. But creating a methane capture project for a pig farm in Thailand would be hard to finance without the positive incentives of carbon credits. It would be much slower if we had to wait for Thailand to implement and enforce its own carbon reduction laws (which could very well involve its own corruption and enforceability problems), and all during the waiting period methane would continue being released. EcoSecurities is one top rated company that provides wholesale offset services similar to this. (http://www.ecosecurities.com/Home/Creating_emission_reductions/VER_Proje...)
In response to the point that there is too much fraud and not enough regulation, independent non-profit companies have already begun rating voluntary carbon offset providers. Government standards could be established in a similar way.
We need to include carbon credits outside the current Clean Development Mechanism in the next phase of climate policy. This includes Climos's proposed method of returning concentrations of iron in the ocean to 1980 levels to absorb CO2 (http://www.climos.com/ ), and Las Gaviotas's effort to reforest and protect a previously deforested tract of land (http://www.gaviotasoffsets.org/ ). Since land use change and deforestation accounts for almost 20% of current greenhouse gas emissions, it needs to be included in our strategy for addressing climate change (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI08_sectio... )
Greenhouse gas emitters need to be given a competitive incentive to reduce through required offset purchases. This "required offset" would make companies doing carbon capture or sequestration profitable as well. This includes companies like Skyonic (http://www.skyonic.com/ ) and other companies improving sequestration methods (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleipner_gas_field ).
My crucial point is that we need companies to be required to purchase offsets for more than they release—say three or even seven times their emissions now, so that in the next ten years we can compensate for the emissions society has released in the last 30 or 70 years. Obviously a required purchase of seven times the emissions levels would be preferred, but how much would it cost? According to calculations at the bottom of this note, the cost at current voluntary carbon market prices would only be US $0.70 per gallon. We've seen gas prices increase even more than seventy cents in the past year. Although the adjustment to this price increase will be challenging, it will be less expensive than the costs of global warming with rising sea levels, increasing droughts, more floods, more hurricanes, etc.
Even if carbon prices were to somehow double, this would still only be $1.40 increase in the price of gasoline. This is not only affordable, it would also be an economically efficient incentive. Prof. Nordhaus, an environmental economist at Yale, talks about how a stable carbon price would be much more efficient economic incentive than a cap-and-trade scheme because it would avoid any wild swings in the price of carbon. In the market for SO2 reduction credits under a cap and trade scheme, we saw prices increase eightfold. Unstable carbon prices would be much more costly for companies, in addition to being less economically efficient worldwide (http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/WorldBank_091108_post.ppt#6 ).
Why not offset seven times the amout we are emitting now and take care of our emissions for the last 70 years in the next ten? Greenhouse gasses need to be taken out of the atmosphere very rapidly in order for carbon concentrations to return to pre-industrial levels. We need to slow the rate of global destabilization so that we can avoid agricultural catastrophe.
Thank you,
ps. Calculations for the cost of offsetting 7 gallons of gasoline:
2000 pounds = 1 short (US) ton
1 gallon gasoline (burned)= 19.6 lbs CO2
19.6 lbs/ 2000 lbs per ton = 0.0098 tons
(Source: http://www.rprogress.org/energyfootprint/energy_footprint/?id=1b )
Cost of offsetting 0.0098 tons in voluntary offset market (assume $10 per ton) = US $0.098, or ten cents. Cost of offsetting seven times the amount of emitted carbon would still only be around US $0.70, or seventy cents per gallon.
Dear Madam,
It is possible to have it both ways. While simplicity and purity might make one lean away from offsets, there is a grand bargain between the developed and developing worlds occuring in this negotiation. Luring China and India in through a system that does some good (albeit with defects), ultimately gets these major emitters on the hook for a genuine cap. Yes the UNFCCC ought to be tough as hell on ensuring that buyers are paying for real reductions, but we'd be foolish to believe some phoneys wont slip through. There will be righteous public outcry, which is appropriate, and part of the process of keeping people and the system honest. But, lets keep our eye on the big game here, which is getting all the major emitters, not just the OECD signed up to being part of the solution.
Dear Madam,
As recent events in the financial world have demonstrated to us yet again, there is a value in simplicity and transparency. The Cap and Trade schemes (I intend both the British and the American meanings of this word) cry out for abuse and the cry is answered. The only significant development that will occur in poor nations under Cap and Trade is in the Swiss Bank accounts of their elites. Nationally based carbon taxes are much surer, simpler and more effective. They have the disadvantage however of requiring us to truly be serious about the problem. In my opinion, this is why they are not used.
John Lunde
Dear Madam,
I would be happier with the credit system if it was internal to each country. In other words, a way to encourage each country to internally motivate their industry and consumers, within the same regulatory environment.
This system should not be about reallocating wealth between countries, particularly since the regulatory system is not consistent and the integrity of the system is uncertain and inconsistent.
I also prefer that governments of each country create an internal incentive system for all companies to reduce carbon emissions, rather than simply allowing them to buy carbon credits.
Accordingly, I support the proposition that carbon offsets undermine the effort to tackle climate change.
Dear Madam,
I think it sais a great deal that this debate focuses narrowly on one part of the off-set issues, especially in relation to the CDM. The original mandate was to off-set GHG emissions and create sustainable development (SD) - something which I find no reference to here. Fairly so perhaps, only I think that if you understand what the problem with GHG is and why you need to reduce them, then you will understand that abating them, without turning to SD is a bit like putting out a fire in one room, while dousing another in kerosene and is exactly why the original Kyoto mechanism included it. We have a population problem, an energy consumption problem in one part of the world, but energy poverty virtually everywhere else and when you do the simple sums, this means we have a really big problem, emission abatement or not. Off-sets are meaningless unless they incorporate SD and SD is about changing the way we produce, consume and dispose of our technical and natural resources. I think Mr Derwant's 'cost' focused defense speaks volumes about why we off-setting is no more a solution than trying to place mirrors in the hemisphere is.
Dear Madam,
I've always thought with financial markets that a system similar to options could be used to prevent misleading financial reporting. If a firm's reporting turns out to be bogus (under or overvalued) then they would be forced to buy or sell their own shares at the bogus rate (to cover mislead investor's losses) when the market readjusts to the correct valuation. Perhaps a similar strategy could be used to prevent bogus claims of reducing emissions.
At any rate, throwing out the market because someone is calling apples oranges is just stupid.
Dear Madam,
The comment that "the main GHG...does little damage close to the source..." is accurate but immaterial. Atmospheric gas mixing is obviously homogeneous in time, and is the reason why we have ~380 ppm CO2 in general and not 400 ppm in some regions and 200 ppm in others. The fact is that the effect of GHG exacerbates climate forcing at higher latitudes do to polar amplification (so in theory, yes it does little damage close to the source, but some areas are impacted more than others).
Off sets and "early reductions" as they are referred to in the Western Climate Initiative are complex and will be extremely difficult to monitor and substantiate with precision. Be that as it may, the scientific community has made progress in that direction. For example, in terms of off- setting with afforestation, reforestation and soil amendments, the aggregate data from carbon flux towers locally and regionally is made public by ameriflux (if they receive funding by ameriflux), and is publicly available after 3 years. This data will provide some leverage for estimate sink/source dynamics based on relatively easy acquired data such as climate and stand density.
Dear Madam,
Mr Ware makes a very strong case - both in terms of practicality and in terms of the potential for discrediting the whole idea of cap and trade.
I would like to see more discussion of how the incidence of counterfeits could be reduced. It will never be zero but if we could be confident that they are small, then the positive aspects of offsets would come into play.
What would happen, for example, if companies buying offsets were required to satisfy themselves through all reasonable steps that the offsets were real? And this work became a reporting item in annual reports having been audited?
Paul G
Dear Madam,
I fail to see how a tax would result in a more effective distribution of cash to companies in developing countries that are seeking to reduce emissions.
Leaving aside the not insignificant issue of who would manage the funds (a la Mr. Wara), I'd question how a project owner would be able to such a fund for a project without making similar arguments about additionality.
In any application to a fund, the fund manager will be required to look at the case that a project developer is making and try and allocate funds accordingly. If the money is to be effectively spent, such a review will necessarily be based on whether a project would happen anyway and the consequent reduction in emissions. Sounds like a similar beast to the one people are hunting in much of this debate.
Unless of course Mr. Wara is suggesting that we use the tax revenues to go and tell people how to run their countries? That could work, seriously, there'd be a lot of money there.
Oh, and Mr. Wara, I'm not sure of your calculations:
>If credit is given for activity that would have >occurred anyway, then 2 tonnes are emitted,
Hmmm, so if I write down the words CER on the back of a fag packet, and somehow [forgive me this for the sake of argument] convince people that it's a valid credit so that I can sell it to a European compliance buyer, I understand that one tonne of CO2 will be emitted when it shouldn't/wouldn't have been if the CER was genuine.
Where exactly do you get the second tonne from?
Dear Madam,
While in principle it could be healthy to allow the reduction of emissions where the costs are the least, the prime instrument devised to this end, the CDM, does not bring us there. The fact is that close to all CDM projects are financed by local developers (I did the research). They seem willing to put up investment capital for the type of projects that emitting entities in developed countries require the offsets to avoid having to do. Ask yourself if the uncertain extra 5-10% revenue delivered 3-4 years after the investment is what triggers these investments? There is no such thing as a 'proof' of non-additionality, but I'd say that there is a reasonable doubt that these developing country investments would have happened regardless. If we want a real reduction, we need to keep the investor constant - allow the developed country emitters to invest in projects wherever they want, but don't allow shifting the investment responsibility to those that have no reason to invest - and then believe that they do so. That is just fooling ourselves. Let's have a clean investment mechanism instead - and then allow off-setting. You would see that the option suddenly would appear quite unattractive.
Dear Madam,
Creating a credible offsets trading mechanism is a sure way to get started and achiving results in reducing GHG emissions.
The problem is a complicated one. So any effort in that direction, is welcome. Right now, we don't have much of an alternative.
There can be any number issues related with these - but tell me if there is something better ?
Trying to perfect a system is easier than trying to start a perfect system.
In any economy, there will be generators and consumers of GHGs. a system to trade this WILL move society to reduce GHGs. This is not an end in itself. But tell me, where otherwise can we develope the technologies needed to create a greener world. Just becasue something is purported to be ineffficient is no excuse for getting started.
In my circles, I have seen people take steps to reduce GHGs merely because of the trading possibilities. This will spawn technologies that will provide the ultimate solution, hopefully before time runs out on all of us.
Dear Madam,
Kritik. I like your attitude and the principle is worth exploring. The point that you ar making is that the market needs incentives and that these need to be financial. We will only get so far by relentlessly hitting people and campanies with a 'reduction stick'. People are too short sighted and get annoyed by the cosntant preaching- the y need a carrot or two! We need to make the process positive and pay - Let's promote Planet Positive world carbon fund that supports anything that reduces our reliance on fossil fuel. The more it reduces against the norm the greater the incentive! What do you reckon?
Dear Madam,
The point to a carbon reduction system, be it a simple tax or a cap and trade market, is to get carbon emitters to invest in technology to reduce their emissions. The point is not to punish emitters, nor is it to transfer wealth from rich nations to poor nations, or from big emitters to small emitters. One should examine offsets in that light alone.
Investment requires a prediction of the future, and that future much show a sizable return on one's investment. To invest in carbon emission reduction, a corporation (or an individual) must estimate the future price of carbon emissions, and compare the costs and benefits of his investment choices. A carbon tax has the benefit of providing a definite price for carbon going into the future, particularly if the rate of carbon tax is set for many years (hopefully decades) in advance, as it should be. Cap and trade suffers from the disadvantage that it sets a total emissions target, and lets the carbon price float. This makes carbon investments more risky, and thus a higher return is needed to justify investment. Because the price of emissions will be pro-cyclical, the risk is even stronger, as in poor economic periods, the carbon price will drop, making the investment even worse, and in good economic times, the price will rise, making the investment pay off more.
Carbon offsets, because they are individual projects, are further unknowns in the equation determining the price of carbon. In a cap and trade system, every new wheeze and fraud (attempted or otherwise), every new developing country scheme, every new judgment by the arbitrators, will send the spot market for carbon permits fluctuating wildly. It is hard to imagine a conservative CFO recommending a carbon reduction investment when the future price is so unknowable.
Carbon offsets reward creative accounting. They reward clever fraud. They transfer wealth from productive corporations making useful goods to unproductive developing economies which cannot otherwise attract investment, thus making the world a poorer place.
Carbon offsets, in short, take everything that is stupid and short-sighted about cap and trade systems relative to a carbon tax, and make it much worse. My vote is a hearty YES.
Dear Madam,Trading is nice, trading is fun. But, with the politics of this matter, an awful lot of fraud and flummery will be involved -- China will insist that its steel refinery doesn't produce any more CO2 than does my cigarette, but they will still try to sell you 300 carbon trading units (that they don't have) to offset my 1/1000 unit, and they'll want to make you charge me the retail price for my carbon.
The real goal should be the elimination of emission above the number of animals (humans included) involved in the enterprise -- stop burning things. If there is a tax on all CO2 trade transactions, applied to the replacement of less-than-best technology, some good might be achieved. But with the trading systems in place, likeliest similar to the currency, debt, insurance, equity, and commodity markets, i.e. full of corruption and the devil take the hindmost, we'll all need breather masks by the end of this century.
Dear Madam,
Imagine a Parent Company (P) with two wholly owned Subsidiary Companies (S1 and S2).
P performs a conversion process emitting 5 pollution units (5 PU). S1 performs a conversion process emitting 5 pollution units (5 PU) while S2 performs a conversion process emitting 0 pollution units (0 PU).
Assume S2 receives 10 PU Credits (10 PUC) for emitting 0 PU. Imagine that there is taxation such that every PU above 0 is taxed by the Government.
What is the likely behaviour? Just as Parent and Subsidiary Companies use transfer pricing to move profits to low taxation locations to pay less tax, to manage "tax risk", think what P will have S2 do with PUC trade.
S2 will transfer 5 PUC to P to offset 5 PU and 5 PUC to S1 to offset 5 PU.
What is the REPORTED net result? 10 PU - 5 PUC - 5 PUC = 0 net PU. However, we know that if you have $1 in your pocket and you transfer that $1 to your other pocket you still have $1.
The same can be said in this scenario. That is, 10 PU still EXISTS for the consolidated Company, however 10 PUC has been APPLIED. Also, taxation revenue above 0 PU has been lost. Finally and most importantly, there is no overall incentive for Companies P and S1 to not generate pollution with a combined 10 PUC from S2 to offset the combined 10 PU.
This is the consolidated entity asymmetry of emission credits with cap and trade. The environment suffers a 10 PU loss while the Company realizes a 10 PUC gain at the marginal tax rate on 1 PU and above from application.
Thus, any law that requires trading of PUC for offsets of PU must be written such that cross owned Companies cannot trade WITHIN the business entity.
Even further, does the cap and trade system create a real incentive to lower pollutant emissions even if the trade is external to the consolidated Company? It does create a trading market but the overall pollutant emissions are not technically lowered. Rather, there is application of credits amongst even non-related Companies by shifting of profits to purchase those credits. The overall net result is a market laid over polluters to trade with lesser polluters and a loss of taxation revenue from polluters who then fall below the cap level. The environment sees no benefit and in fact sees a loss, and this ignores the human ethical duty of non-malfeasance towards the environment thereby circumventing sustainable long term production.
Dear Madam,
I disagree with Wara that the voluntary markets will lead to more legitimate offsets. There are many people on the voluntary markets who buy offsets simply for the sake of image; they do no investigation whatsoever, and the regulations are much less stringent than for the regulated market offsets. That's also why they are cheaper offsets to buy, than those created through domestic regulations for cap and trade, or emission intensity reductions.
Dear Madam,
The credibility of offsets is certainly the issue. If offsets are properly and correctly calculated, then they are valid and valuable. If not, then they are obviously bogus. It's a good reason for only trading offsets within one's own country, or perhaps within a province, because offsets have certain policy assumptions attached to them, as well as certain levels of regulatory confidence. Plus, if offsets are given for buisness as usual, or "anyway" credits, then it will be an added cost to the country, which policy makers and legislators will be able to influence or control. If the bogus stuff happens in another country, they will have no control of it. Besides, a lot of money can leave a country for nothing more than worthless paper, which is probably not in the national interest.
Petrus_Hoff, we don't have to aim for zero emissions, just the level that can be sustainably re-absorbed by natural and artificial sinks.
AJ in Houston, there is a third downside to the carbon tax: not only is the tax revenue going to the government (which may or may not spend it wisely, including tax cuts), it is NOT going to those who reduce emissions, leading that particular good (emissions cuts) to be underprovided. A related point is that offsets make transfers to net-reducing developing countries automatic, while tax revenue won't necessarily find its way to the aid budget, nor be distributed accordingly (this is a positive if you believe too big a transfer would spur domestic opposition to the system).
Nobody, under more perfect market conditions it would be in the farmers' interest to "unclaim" their wetlands and sell the service of keeping them that way (and managing mosquitoes). We can try to approximate those conditions.
Jumping Jack, adjusting will certainly involve economic dislocation, but not adjusting can be even more devastating, especially in poorer regions of the world. Besides, learning to adjust to global warming this time around would hopefully make it easier to adjust to future ecological crises.
Dear Madam,
I agree with springfordo and Sally in Spain that trading in counterfactuals can easily turn into blackmail, with alternative "business-as-usual" scenarios seemingly from the Industrial Revolution. A related concern is that such gloomy alternatives could lead to huge hypothetical savings, and still leave us short of the necessary emissions reductions.
The counterfactual scenario against which savings are measured can't be static – it must stay in step with the development of technology and environmental standards. Developing country standards should converge in time with those of the developed world (offset transfers serving as enticement and compensation for such a higher bar), until they fully join the cap-and-trade system. HDR 2008's "sustainable carbon budget" is of 15 gigatons of CO2 equivalent per year.
Dear Madam,
If the concept of additionality is so intractable, which I think is a fair, if not arguable, perspective then why not reconsider it's place in the overall scheme of cap and trade, rather than throw out the entire scheme itself? For instance, given current levels of CO2, we have a global inventory. Given mandates for reductions, there will be a difference between present levels and prescribed levels. What this tells me is that if we set the cap at an aggressive enough level, then we must, through sheer logic alone, reach a point where the only tradeable offsets available will be derived from new, additional, projects. That is, there aren't enough available projects right now to achieve the reductions we need or we wouldn't be in this problem to begin with. We need more, additional, reductions to hit our target of stabilizing PPM in the atmosphere. The concept of additionality as currently applied, not only makes the cap and trade process more bureaucratic and inefficient, it also stymies the business case for connecting clean technologies to the carbon markets(which will ultimately be our saving grace if we are to deal with this issue effectively). Since a good clean tech product will need a strong business case, by the time it becomes available to the general public, offsets won't be allowed because of "additionality". Phooey! Put some gravy on top of these clean tech innovations (via offset revenue) and watch the planet chill out to a nice, comfortable, stable temperature. Otherwise, let the academics like Wara, dance on our collective graves in celebration that they have, once again, criticized real-world solutions in favor of some Platonic notion of the perfect form.
Dear Madam,
As a country we have become good procrastinators; witness our recent credit crisis that has become an equity markets crisis. The signs of this were apparent a year ago when we (the SEC) instituted a ruinous change in accounting policy.
We have been sweeping our environmental dirt under the rug for years and carbon offsets are just a continuation of that policy.
It's time we stand up and solve this problem and the others that confront us.
Dear Madam,
Its the classic tussle between practicality and idealism. The answer however would be to tax heavily fossil fuels, create an Oil Fund in each economy that will give the world the required funds to compensate those who decrease their emissions at the cost of production losses. This can be quantified in a manner to be determined so the oil tax is distributed. The Oil tax will reduce consumption besides encouraging alternative energy fuel research and use, thereby achieving the twin objects of reducing carbon emissions today while creating a fund to compensate the industrial producers who have to endure losses or use more expensive alternative energy. Global warming is all three; a political, economic and a technological challenge. I would be glad to expand on this if somebody is interested.
Furthermore I would takei issue with Mr. Derwent's argument that "there is no more reason to say that foreign reductions are impossible to believe than there is to say that financial accounts of companies with foreign operations are inherently suspect."
This is a straw man. Offset reductions are unreliable not because they come from foreign countries, but because they are premised on a counter-factual.
Having said that, there is something rather sweet about Mr. Derwent's notion of unscrupulous Chinese CDM developers being chastised into environmental integrity by the prospect of a scathing Guardian editorial.
Dear Madam,
I used to work as a carbon offset consultant, developing the reports that demonstrated the additionality of CDM projects. It was my view, and the view of the majority of my colleagues, that additionality is a near-impossible condition to prove, and that the art of successful CDM registration lay in cherry-picking selected facts, to create a narrative that was suggestive of additionality. I suspect this attitude is representative of most CDM developers.
Now of course CDM developers are in a sense professionally obliged to test the limits of the system, just as lawyers who represent guilty clients are professionally obliged to try for a verdict of acquittal. It is the job of the system's regulators to enforce additionality. Yet what I have seen does not inspire me with confidence. Particularly suspicious is the fact that many CDM projects - a majority, even - started construction before they obtained CDM registration. It is simply not credible that developers of large projects like hydroelectric power plants, if they were truly reliant on carbon ofsetting as a financing stream, would green-light construction of those projects at a point in time when that financing stream was still uncertain. People who build power-plants don't make that kind of gamble. CDM auditors know this too, yet many turn a blind eye and submit early-start projects (successfully) for registration.
It has long been the industry position that the CDM is bound to have teething problems. Though there may be abuses now, runs the argument, in time the system will improve. I think this attitude has a certain sunny optimism to it. What is true is that at the moment the CDM's regulatory structure is in chaos. The largest project auditor, DNV, has had its licence suspended as a result of an audit by the Executive Board, the CDM's governing body. While this could be seen as an encouraging sign that the Board is finally getting serious about regulation, it does suggest that at present auditors are finding themselves swamped by the complexity of the CDM system, and that a slew of non-additional projects are achieving accreditation.
It could be that the CDM will get its house in order within the near future, but I'm not hopeful. The central underpinning concept of additionality will always be unknowable, and as the CDM grows I suspect it will only grow more byzantine in its complexity. I think Michael Wara has it exactly right: offsetting will continue to contaminate the environmental integrity of the emissions trading concept.
In fact I think I would go one further, by suggesting that complexity in general is damaging to climate change policy. What is needed is simple, easy to understand legislation that has no loopholes and that the layperson can understand. For this reason I would suggest a simple carbon tax as being more effective than cap-and-trade schemes, which tend to devolve into back-room lobbying and over-allocation of credits to industry. The more complicated climate change policy becomes, the further it drifts from accountability to the public, the more ridden with loopholes. And the CDM is a Swiss cheese of loopholes.
Dear Madam,
I agree with Mr Wara. The current offset system appears to be a mechanism for business to 'duck out' of actual emissions reduction.
Free market mechanisms are excelent for a number of functions, but are not a 'one-size fits all' solution. The wrong sort of instincts are promoted such as seeking to profit, managing risk and competition. These are instincts apt for financial trading but not a 'common good' agenda such as emissions reduction.
Dear Madam,
I have to agree with the Pro side, the corruption that will occur with this highly un-market mechanism will only benefit those willing to commit very easy to do fraud.
Dear Madam,
I think that carbon offsets will do nothing to reduce carbon emissions unless the money raised (which is essentially a license to emit carbon) is invested in specific technologies to be deployed in ALL economies. If not then its a tax - and thats all..
Dear Madam,
I agree with the comment made by Michael Gillenwater. It is easy to throw dispersions at the offset market although it is certainly true that in the past the 'Carbon Cowboys' have brought the practice of offsetting into doubt.
However for every cowboy project there are 100 worthwile projects that have delivered real reductions. It also seems to me that this market is no different from any other market - where there is money to be made you are always going to get the disreputable trying to make a fast buck. But let's not throw the baby out with the bath water. (Perhaps some of your debaters would care to look at The Climate Group proposals for setting a new standard in project development (VCS). A great start supported by many)
For those who are saying NO to offsetting what other solutions do you have to financially support poorer nations to deliver the utopia of a low carbon economy. Whilst it is essential that we all reduce, we cannot expect these nations to wallow in the depths of poverty and suffer for all of our bad habits of the past. Yes we must reduce, reduce, reduce, but then we must put our hands in our pockets and help those less well off to follow a different path than we all have.
One of the problems could be the terminology. Offsetting implies that someone else is doing our dirty work. Perhaps a better term to use would be 'Carbon Investment'. This implies that we are investing into our future and the economes of the poor to help them, help us.
In summary I believe that there is no one silver bullet that will solve the problem that is facing us. We will need a multi-faceted approach and 'Carbon Investment' is an essential weapon in our armoury.
Vote NO
Dear Madam,
I cant help but wonder the impact the international financial crisis will have on the climate policies that the governments of the world adopt in the months leading up to Copenhagen. Would they be ready to increase the cost of economic activity in such times? This question is especially relevant for the US, which based its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol on this very ground.
Furthermore, a scenario where the negotiations shift focus from quantified emission reduction commitments to policy based commitments cannot be ruled out. A case in point is India, which recently released a national action plan based on policy commitments and has rejected calls for accepting binding obligations.
Emissions trading market is now worth US$30 billion. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows trade in carbon offsets generated in developing countries, is the second largest component of this market after the European trading scheme with a market valuation of US$5 billion. This market has fostered a great deal of expertise in design, execution and administration of carbon offset projects. It only seems prudent to build upon this exercise, instead of rejecting it outright. Without doubt, there are serious problems that have arisen from this effort among them, as Mr. Wara points out is the problem of anyway credits. The flaws, though serious, are not fatal and in my view, can be remedied through better regulatory rules and structures.
To substantiate my claim, I draw attention to the HFC 23 based projects, which are a commonly cited example of misuse of the CDM. When the CDM was initiated, the largest share of offsets came from HFC 23 capture and destruction activities. HFC 23 is an industrial by-product and is very cheap to destroy. The market opportunity created by HFC 23 destruction and led to some instances of factories being built for the sole purpose of production of HFC 23, a greenhouse gases, so that carbon traders in the would pay to clean them up. This led to the system being subverted and did lead to concerns about the viability of a market based approach. The rules were altered and provisions were made to discourage such behaviour. Today, most CDM offsets come from clean energy generation activities like wind and hydro projects.
Carbon Trading and CDM are innovative policy instruments, which have over the past years have at least demonstrated that a market based approach can be used to tackle climate change. There are problems and it can certainly be made to work better. But to me, the most important lesson that we learn from the Kyoto experiment is that it can work.
Dear Madam,
Dear Madam,
Reduction is delay
The concept of 'reduction' is used in every publication by CO₂ experts and government. First let's start analyzing this concept.
'Reduction' implies that something is 'reduced' = 'decreased'. The most important question is whether CO₂ emissions are really demonstrably 'reduced' by current governments' obligatory measures. The answer to that is flat out 'no'.
The final total quantity of CO₂ emissions of the Kyoto Protocol measures like efficiency improvement or application of alternative energy will not be reduced, nor decreased, nor lowered but solely delayed.
In general it is said that we strive for a 'reduction' of CO₂ emissions by means of two processes. They are: efficiency improvement and alternative energy sources. These measure have no effect whatsoever on the final total quantity of CO₂ emissions. They will only delay the emissions over a longer period of time, as shown by these two examples:
• Efficiency improvement: Suppose the global supply of gasoline is 5 liters and there is one car in the world. This car, an SUV (Sports Utility Vehicle), will go 10 kilometers on 1 liter of gasoline and the owner drives 10 kilometers a year. It will use 1 liter of gasoline a year and after 5 years all the gasoline will be depleted. In order to reduce CO₂ emissions, the government prohibits the owner to drive and park his SUV in the city. The owner gets rid of it and buys a smaller, more fuel efficient car that can go 12 kilometers on one liter of fuel. The owner uses 20% less gasoline for the same distance. It seems as if this efficiency improvement reduces CO₂ emissions by 20% but that is just appearance. Because of the efficiency improvement there is now enough gasoline for 6 years instead of only 5. The owner of the car does not stop driving it after 5 years but continues to drive it to the end of the 6th year when the gasoline supply is depleted. This means that the final total quantity of CO₂ emissions has not been reduced: the same 5 liters was used. The emitted quantity of CO₂ pollution is just delayed over a longer period – 6 years instead of 5 years - of time.
• Alternative energy sources: Governments are promoting alternative energy production by means of wind power or solar power for example. This too, will not reduce the final total quantity of CO₂ emissions. As long as mankind continues to consume the entire supply of fossil fuels until they are depleted, the CO₂ emissions will come from this entire supply. Using alternative energy sources also delays the CO₂ emissions over a longer period of time.
Let me make a comparison with water here as well. Strychnine is a lethal toxin at a dose of 200 milligram (mg). Suppose one individual drinks 1 glass of water with 200 mg of strychnine and another individual drinks 2 glasses of water, each containing 100 mg of strychnine in 2 days. Do you see that both are taking in 200 mg of strychnine? It just takes slightly longer (= delay) for the strychnine to take effect. Do you think the result will be any different? Do you understand now that this process thing that we accept as logical with CO₂ , suddenly becomes very illogical if you follow the same process with water and a toxin? The delayed emission of eventually the same amount of CO₂ , means that eventually the same amount of pollution is released into the atmosphere.
It leads to misinformation when we don´t speak of 'delayed' emission but of 'reduced', 'decreased' or 'lowered' emission.
Dear Madam,
What has been forgotten here is the mental prepration of the populace. Carbon credits also brings this service to the table.
Dear Madam,
I am the owner of a 230+ acre all grass sheep and cattle operation, with 160 acres of timber. In the United States, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCF) is trying to get farmers and ranchers to join this exchange so that carbon credits can be traded. I would under this program receive a payment from businesses/emitters for keeping my pastures in grass and wood lot in timber to trap carbon in the soil and wood. I have a problem with this ethically as you cannot raise good meat on anything but grass so all I am providing is a place for businesses who emit carbon to make a feel good payment for doing something I would be doing anyway. I have not added more fields or taken a black top parking lot and converted it to pasture. All I see this doing is raising prices on goods to the consumer resulting in them having less money to buy my very tasty lamb and beef.
Maybe you could have the debaters address this and the ethics of getting paid for something that is a by-product of my business. Also, and this is partly said tongue-in-check, will I have to pay into the program some day in the future for running a tractor or when my animals emit gas.
Dear Madam,
Offsets are certainly based on a difficult foundation. Additionality is difficult to determine, without a doubt. There are transaction costs involved, and the determinations will not be perfect.
But I argue that Wara is willing to throw out the good in search of the perfect. Yes, it would be nice to put everything under a cap or other regulatory mechanism. But this is not feasible for political and technical reasons. The offset market harnesses entrepreneurial energy to find low cost emission reductions, no matter where they are, in a way that few if any other mechanisms do. The CDM market is a massive search function that no other policy can match. There are transaction costs, but serious studies (see work by J. Sathaye) have shown that they are are small in relation to the value of the credit.
Wara states, as if he knows for a fact, that many offset projects are "counterfeit". I would argue that this is only speculation on his part. The voluntary offset market has certainly been full of snake oil, and the CDM market has had a learning curve, but that is not to mean that the use of offsets as a serious regulatory tool should be thrown out. I have been one to criticize offsets and argue for real improvements. But that is different from claiming the entire endeavor should be given up on.
We should remember, that the use of offset originated back in the U.S. Clean Air Act many years ago for other pollutants before greenhouses were even on the radar screen. The invention is not offset, but the creation of a market for them that is new.
Dear Madam,
Carbon Offsets are the environmental version of financial derivatives. With enough circuitous and complex math equations it will be possible to make money on some value of the tradable offsets. I'm certain we have clever people who will find a way. Is fraud possible? Yes. Is fraud likely? You betcha.
Carbon Offsets provide a neat way to avoid actual carbon reduction and appear to be environmentally sanctimonious. With Caron Offsets, we can simultaneously pollute and be "green." Wow! What a superb way to be truly irresponsible.
The actuality of our Global challenge has past the time of Carbon Offsets. Perhaps if this was proposed in 1978, it might have been more tempting. Today is not 1978.
It is too late. Reality needs to take precedence over theory.
Blue World
Dear Madam,
If you start with the assumption that greenhouse gases must be reduced dramatically and quickly, it seems to me that a direct carbon tax will work much better than a cap and trade system. A cap and trade system requires a tight regulatory system and significant trust between the regulator and the participants. As Mr. Wara points out, that is often lacking now, and would only get worse as the amount of money at stake increases. Are you willing to trust the participants in China, India and elsewhere, not to mention their government regulators, to be honest and forthcoming? I don't even trust US or EU based participants or their regulators.
A second point for a direct carbon tax is that it can have immediate impact on people's behavior because it gives them a direct market indication of their cost to the environment. Just look at the impact that $4 gasoline had on US driving habits. Politicians like a cap and trade system because they can 'hide' the cost from the individual because some big bad company is paying it instead. But don't be fooled, everyone will pay because the cost will be passed along. Plus, the cost will be higher because there will be middle men taking their cut along the way when the offsets are traded.
There are two big downsides to a direct carbon tax. The first is that of perceived fairness when the tax is set at different levels in different countries. Maybe so, but those countries that take advantage by charging a lower tax will most likely game the cap and trade system as well. Besides, we will really be able to see who is serious about reducing GHG emissions and who is only pretending. The second is the huge amount tax of revenue that will be placed in the hands of the politicians. Heaven only knows what they will waste the money on once they get their hands on it, but at least in my country (the US) I will at least have some input through the ballot box (at least I like to think I will.
One last point, Mr. Derwent's argument so far seems to address the need for GHG reductions more than why carbon offsets are the best way to do that. The need for GHG reductions must already be agreed for this debate to be meaningful. I await further discussion on his part to sell his case.
Dear Madam,
In my view an offset is an activity that removes CO2. Offsets based on avoided emissions remind me of the advice that to save $2, run home behind a bus, to save $20 run home behind a taxi.
Only forestry removes CO2 without offending the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics.
In September NZ passed a law setting up an all gas, all sectors, emissions trading scheme (ETS). In the short time between this and the new government icing the scheme, huge momentum had built up with emitters, investors and land owners looking to carbon offset forestry.
This gives me the belief that an ETS will unleash waves of innovation and improved land management that will drive a stake through the heart of the fossil energy sector.
Dear Madam,
What if it is found that something as simple as rewetting reclaimed wetlands would reduce carbon dioxide emissions far better than forests. (someone has) How would you propose that society convince farmers to flood their livelihood. Emminent domain, tax sponsered initiative? How would you pay for the resulting additional expense of keeping the wetlands wet and managing mosquitos?
Trading Co2 credits will be another financial mess. You can already see it in how REC's are being traded.
Dear Madam,
Evidence of a high scientific quality mounts that the human contribution to global C2 increases is specious. Considering the enormity of the economic dislocation that must surely ensue from presently proposed solutions, it is prudent and pragmatic to ascertain with greater clarity and certainty that the "warming" trend, which is presently in retreat, is attributable to the causes that those solutions intend to alter or eliminate. It is increasingly possible that the 'alarm' over the matter is a punishment of the messenger (i.e., humans) and not the message. It could well turn out that the actual message is that modification, not alteration, for the greater probability of long term good is the right path and is consistent with the very long arcs of change that the earth naturally conducts.
Thank you.
I've been working on climate change and carbon offseting since I started my PhD back in 2001. I agree with Mr Wara's view on the "Zero sum" game which characterizes this practice. However, one should also acknowledge that there are still very few studies on the actual additionality of offset projects. Thus, it may be worth waiting one or two years before reaching a conclusion on that front. Another aspect which should not be ignored are offseting likely additional benefits, both from the consumer to the producer site. These benefits can be easily contested if one looks at the bigger picture and realises that such benefits are often just a few and only associated with specific technologies and project options. However, my experience in a CDM energy efficiency project has also taught me that carbon finance can become the seed for new jobs, local capacities, and improved human health. In conclusion, I still have days when I see the glass full, and others in which I see it empty. Much more research needs to be done...
Dear Madam,
As some countries insist on keeping the offset scheme, other initiatives to reduce emissions are undermined. For example, REDD negotiations under UN will hardly go forward without Brazil's participation and this country refuses to admit offsets from reduced deforestation.
It seems that as long as offsets are on the table of negotiations, Brazilian delegation will keep adding problems for advancing an agreement for REDD, although all they will say in the open sessions (at least in Poznan) is that the reason why they don't want to move forward is the uncertainty in the methodologies to account for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (which is at least unacceptable coming from a country that clearly have the most advanced systems for doing so at governmental level and also at civil society level with indenpendent monitoring of deforestation emissions made by national NGOs).
Thus, I agree with Mr. Wara.
Dear Madam,
I have just returned from the world economic forum in Dubai where the issues of climate change and finance were at the top of the agenda. During the conference it became clear to me that all countries recognise the urgent need to move into the low carbon economy both to save costs and to save the planet. The catch is that poorer nations cannot afford to implement low carbon technologies because of their high cost compared to traditional fossil fuelled solutions. Responsible carbon investment(i.e. offsetting done well) by rich nations in support of poorer nations is the only way that this will happen quickly. BUT this cannot be done in lieu reductions - a responsible business and individual must do both!
Dear Madam,
The original idea of trading carbon offsets was to help developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions to some level related to 1990's gross emissions. Most of them did not do it, and aren't likely to do it in the near future. But the market of offsets has become in the meantime a business in itself (particularly for middlemen), every time farther away from it original purpose. Let's finish it off for the health of climate's sake.
Dear Madam,
Market participants have for too long convinced themselves that a tonne of carbon reduced is the same in Brussels as in Bangalore. It is not. The tonne of carbon reduced from Banglore (as it is under no cap) must be calculated through an entirely hypothetical exercise as to "what would have otherwise occured." We do not need to look very hard for recent evidence that our capability in forecasting is quite limited. It seems incredibly nieve therefore to assume that one can simultaneously predict the pace of the Indian economy, the evolution of its industrial sectors, and the rate of return required by investors in those sectors. All of these are required for offset determinations.
I side with Mr. Wara. The concept of offsets sits on poor foundations. There is no logical argument to make (no matter how large the market has already grown) that offsets make solving the climate problem cheaper, if in fact they do nothing to solve the problem. Money going to projects that would have occured anyway is just a waste.


text:
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subset: commoncrawl


text:
A&em 8A Thai Van Lung Hotel
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Bananas, strawberries and peanut butter stuff this French toast in style.
In New York City, Aarti samples America's favorite date-night food: pizza.
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text:
Strímre (57)
Kategória mušiek napodobňujúce živé rybky , As with most forms of sexual activity, anal sex participants risk contracting sexually transmitted infections . The higher pay scale and profile within a production often leads to group scenes where a straight actor only tops. Such films continued to be produced but could only be distributed by underground channels. Some do not use the diapers at all, for arousal, or bladder and bowel movements. Homi Bhabha defined the idea of a racial fetish in contrast to the idea of the Freudian sexual fetish which he describes a denial of difference, where the male sees the naked milf female as a castrated male, seeing missing parts rather than a different anatomy. Reflective of its views on sexuality and culture, Japanese pornography delves into a wide spectrum of heterosexual, homosexual, and transgender sexual acts in addition to unique fetishes and philias. In addition to mainstream pornography, the popularity of facials has led to creation of its own niche market, like video series that specialize in showing the act. A female dominant in a master/slave relationship is often termed a Mistress, not to be confused with the colloquial usage of mistress as a kept sexual partner without a similarly formalized power relationship. Some productions are noted for sophisticated and/or experimental storytelling and animation techniques. Sexual scenarios may involve male domination, female submission, exhibitionism and erotic entertainment. Since at least 1973, it has also been used to refer to a sexually attractive young woman. It may involve sexual attraction to women who are pregnant or appear pregnant, attraction to lactation, or attraction to particular stages of pregnancy such as impregnation or childbirth. Fisting pornography features the insertion of an entire hand into a performer vagina or anus. He talked to them extensively on camera so that both he and the viewer can come to know them before any sex scenes. Gloryhole pornography features women performing fellatio on unidentified men through a small hole made in a bathroom divider. myši, pijavice a podobne.
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text:
Four months ago (such a long time!), on day 7 of our Easter cruise, we were travelling down the Staffs and Worcs. A quick recap on the journey so far:
Day 1 (Sat 2nd April 2011): Wigram's Turn Marina to Lower Shuckburgh
Day 2: Lower Shuckburgh to Sutton Stop
Day 3: Sutton Stop to Polesworth
Day 4: Polesworth to Curdworth
Day 5: Curdworth to Ocker Hill Tunnel Branch via Perry Barr locks
Day 6: Ocker Hill Tunnel Branch to Aldersley Junction via Walsall and Wyrley & Essington Canal
In the Compton area we came across a BW team dredging the canal. Is this what's known as "spot dredging"?
The dredgings are dumped on the bank in the narrow strip between the towpath and the canal. One man's job is to level the spoil with a rake.
Another load comes up from the bottom. How does he know how far down to go? Too far and he'll bring up the puddled clay, and if that happens the canal could leak. How thick is the clay puddle lining? I imagine it's about a foot or one foot six inches. Am I right?
The digger operator needs to be accurate with his positioning of the dumped spoil!
Day 31: Lower Heyford- Northampton Marina - 10 miles 17 locks We set off down the Northampton Arm at 10 am after an hours cruising from our overnight mooring on the GU. In contrast to our stressful a...
6 hours ago