text:
Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine
Board on Life Sciences
500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 Phone: 202-334-2187 Fax: 202-334-1289
November 29, 2007
Ian A. Bowles
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs
100 Cambridge Street, Suite 900 Boston, MA 02114
Dear Secretary Bowles,
At your request, the National Research Council (NRC)1 established an expert Committee2 to provide technical input on the document Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University (hereafter referred to as the Draft Supplemental Environmental Report, or DSER) to the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The DSER stated that it was prepared by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in response to concerns raised in a federal court proceeding to address aspects of the construction of a proposed National Biocontainment Laboratory containing a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facility in the South End of the City of Boston, Massachusetts (the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, or NEIDL).
As developed with your office, the Committee's Statement of Task is as follows3:
The Committee will review the NIH Study [Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University] and meet to discuss the methodologies and analyses therein and to address specific questions provided by officials of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs. The questions addressed by the Committee will solely pertain to the scientific adequacy of the NIH Study. The specific questions to be addressed are as follows:
Determine if the scientific analyses in NIH Study are sound and credible;
Determine whether the proponent has identified representative worst case scenarios;
Determine, based on the study's comparison of risk associated with alternative locations,
1 |
The principal operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering |
2 |
Committee on Technical Input on the National Institutes of Health's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University. Committee members and their backgrounds can be found in Attachment A. |
3 |
The full Statement of Task can be found in Attachment B. |
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Board on Life Sciences 500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-334-2187
Fax: 202-334-1289
November 29, 2007
Ian A. Bowles
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs
100 Cambridge Street, Suite 900
Boston, MA 02114
Dear Secretary Bowles,
At your request, the National Research Council (NRC)1 established an expert Committee2
to provide technical input on the document Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site
Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston
University (hereafter referred to as the Draft Supplemental Environmental Report, or DSER) to
the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. The DSER stated that it was prepared by the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
in response to concerns raised in a federal court proceeding to address aspects of the construction
of a proposed National Biocontainment Laboratory containing a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4)
facility in the South End of the City of Boston, Massachusetts (the National Emerging Infectious
Diseases Laboratory, or NEIDL).
As developed with your office, the Committee's Statement of Task is as follows3:
The Committee will review the NIH Study [Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and
Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston
University] and meet to discuss the methodologies and analyses therein and to address
specific questions provided by officials of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and
Environmental Affairs. The questions addressed by the Committee will solely pertain to the
scientific adequacy of the NIH Study. The specific questions to be addressed are as follows:
§ Determine if the scientific analyses in NIH Study are sound and credible;
§ Determine whether the proponent has identified representative worst case scenarios;
§ Determine, based on the study's comparison of risk associated with alternative locations,
The principal operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering
Committee on Technical Input on the National Institutes of Health's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and
Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University. Committee
members and their backgrounds can be found in Attachment A.
The full Statement of Task can be found in Attachment B.
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whether there is a greater risk to public health and safety from the location of the facility in
one or another proposed location;
The parties acknowledge and agree that the Committee's report will be limited to a technical
review of the NIH Study, and the Contractor [NRC] will make no findings or
recommendations regarding the adequacy of any determinations or decisions made by any
agency or department of the U.S. Government or the State Massachusetts under NEPA
[National Environmental Policy Act] or MEPA [Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act],
and Contractor shall not be responsible in any way for any such decisions or determinations.
The Committee will author a letter report that addresses the foregoing questions and submit
this letter report to the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office prior to the end of the
public comment period.
Thus, the questions addressed by the Committee will solely pertain to the scientific
adequacy of the risk assessment and other analytical methodologies used in the DSER and
whether the report responds to the state's questions in a scientifically sound and credible manner.
The Committee makes no findings or recommendations regarding the original Risk Assessment
and Site Suitability Analysis document Biosquare Phase II, Boston Massachusetts. Final Project
Impact Report/Final Environmental Impact Report (Fort Point Associates, 2004; hereafter
referred to as FEIR) although the Committee refers to the FEIR because it provides a foundation
for the DSER. This letter report addresses the foregoing questions and is submitted to you in
fulfillment of the contract with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Committee's answers to the three tasking questions are as follows:
1. Are the scientific analyses in the DSER sound and credible? Overall, the Committee
believes that the DSER as drafted is not sound and credible.
2. Has the NIH identified representative worst case scenarios? The DSER as drafted has not
adequately identified and thoroughly developed worst case scenarios.
3. Based on the comparison of risk associated with alternative locations, is there a greater risk
to public health and safety from the location of the facility in one or another proposed
location? The DSER does not contain the appropriate level of information to compare
the risks associated with alternative locations.
It is important to recognize that these conclusions are based solely on the Committee's technical
review of the DSER, and thus they should not be viewed as statements about the risks of
proposed biocontainment facilities in Boston, or in cities more generally. The Committee
acknowledges the need for biocontainment laboratories in the United States, including BSL-4
laboratories, and recognizes that BSL-4 facilities are being operated in other major urban areas.
The Committee's view is that the selection of sites for high containment laboratories, whether in
urban or rural areas, be supported by detailed analyses summarizing the available scientific
The Committee provides more detailed answers to the three task questions and
recommendations that you and the NIH may wish to consider in the document that follows.
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In 2003, the Boston University Medical Center was awarded a $128 million grant from
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to build one of two National Biocontainment
Laboratories. The National Biocontainment Laboratory is designed to support the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases' biodefense research agenda and will include a
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) containment laboratory housed in a 223,000 square foot building.
The BSL-4 component of the laboratory is designed to study the most dangerous infectious
diseases and pathogens, including hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Marburg) and Lassa fever.
According to the FEIR (2004), the facility will also house BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories.
There are at least five BSL-4 laboratories that are currently operational in the United
States. Although the NEIDL BSL-4 laboratory space will account for only 13 percent of the
building's total space, it accounts for virtually all of the community concern. The location of the
facility on Albany Street in Boston's South End has been extremely controversial and there have
been numerous contentious public meetings over the plans for the facility.
The building and BSL-4 laboratory is part of the BioSquare Phase II project. Under the
MEPA, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs4 issued a certificate stating that the BioSquare II project required the
preparation of an Environmental Impact Report. In August 2004, the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs issued a certificate stating that the FEIR adequately and properly
complied with MEPA. This determination was challenged in court, and in July 2006 the
Superior Court of Massachusetts vacated Massachusetts' certification of the FEIR and remanded
the matter to the Secretary of Environmental Affairs for further administrative action5. In
response, the Secretary in September 2006 issued a scope for the preparation of a supplemental
FEIR (SFEIR) in which the applicant was asked to address a set of additional issues:
• Biocontainment Building: Although the FEIR provided a "worst case" safety analysis
involving the loss of the physical integrity of the containment systems using a release of
anthrax spores, Massachusetts asked for at least one additional "worst case" scenario
analysis arising from an accidental or malevolent release. Smallpox6, SARS, and Ebola
were suggested as potentially representative "worst case" pathogens.
• Alternative sites: Massachusetts asked for analyses of feasible alternative locations for
the biocontainment building, including at least one in an area less densely populated than
the proposed location in Boston's South End. The supplemental analyses should also
evaluate whether the potential public impacts of a pathogen release, including a "worst
case" scenario, would be materially different if the biocontainment building were
constructed in a feasible alternative location in a less densely populated area.
• Mitigation: Massachusetts asked the applicant to demonstrate that environmental and
public health impacts have been avoided to the maximum extent feasible, identify
As of April 11, 2007, organized and named as the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs.
Ten Residents of Boston v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, No. 05-0109-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440043
(MassSuper.) August 2, 2006.
The Smallpox virus, Variola, could not be used in the Boston facility by international law. This is why the DSER
did not address smallpox, although it did address Monkeypox, which may be considered a surrogate for smallpox.
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measures to mitigate unavoidable impacts, and identify any appropriate mitigation for
impacts that may be identified through the worst case scenarios described above.
The project has also undergone review under the NEPA, and the NIH completed a Final
Environmental Impact Statement and issued a Record of Decision in February, 2006. In
response to issues raised in a federal court proceeding regarding the NIH Final Environmental
Impact Statement, the NIH completed additional reviews of the potential impacts of the BSL-4
laboratory. This report, published by NIH as the Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site
Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston
University (hereafter referred to as the Draft Supplemental Environmental Report, or DSER), is
designed, in part, to address the state requirement that the SFEIR provide additional worst case
scenario analysis and evaluate the comparative levels of risk associated with alternative locations
for the BSL-4. Thus, the DSER will form the scientific basis of the SFEIR, which Boston
University has not yet filed for state review. The Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and
Environmental Affairs has asked that the Committee evaluate only the DSER, which does not
evaluate mitigation. Therefore, the Committee did not directly address the mitigation issue.
In reviewing the DSER, the Committee held an open session on October 19, 2007 in
which presentations were made by representatives of the State of Massachusetts, Boston
University, NIH, and two scientists identified by opponents of the NEIDL. The list of speakers
and their affiliations is in Attachment D. NIH legal counsel determined that the presenting NIH
scientist and the scientists contracted to work on the DSER could not answer any questions from
the Committee during the open meeting because of restrictions imposed by the NEPA process.
Although the NIH did respond in writing to questions submitted by the Committee, the
Committee was unable to engage in a meaningful scientific discussion with the scientists
contributing to the DSER.
It is important to note that the Committee was asked to provide only a technical review of
the DSER. The Committee did not carry out an independent assessment of the risks associated
with the proposed facility or possible alternative locations. The Committee also did not review
the FEIR. However, as noted below, the Committee did refer to the FEIR for a definition.
1) The Committee was asked to determine if the scientific analyses in the DSER are sound and
credible. The Committee used several criteria for judging whether the DSER was "sound and
credible". For example,
• Was the investigation framed in such a way that it does indeed constitute an adequate
supplementary assessment of the issues raised by the Superior Court of Massachusetts?
• Did the DSER convey information in a transparent fashion so that it is clear how the
analyses were conceptualized, constructed, and applied?
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• Did the DSER contain sufficient information that the analyses performed could be
replicated and confirmed by others?
• Were the assumptions used reasonable and justified by reference to the relevant
• Was the methodology well chosen?
The Committee finds that the DSER is not sound and credible. By this, the
Committee means that the conclusions reached in the report are not adequately supported
by the analyses nor are they credible for the reasons set out in greater detail below. The
Committee is concerned with the pathogens selected for modeling and had numerous
reservations about the modeling work and the specifics of the worst case scenarios
developed. The Committee also finds a lack of transparency in the DSER, which made
evaluating some aspects of the DSER difficult.
2) The Committee was asked to "[d]etermine whether the proponent has identified representative
worst case scenarios."
In order to answer this question, the Committee first had to develop a sense of what
constitutes a "worst case scenario" given that this term was not specifically defined in the DSER.
To explore the meaning of the term worst case scenario, the Committee first consulted the FEIR
(2004), which defined worst case scenario according to the maximum possible risk model. This
approach uses extreme scenarios that are barely conceivable, but consistent with the environment
of risk assessment since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
While this definition provided some information, the Committee did not find it fruitful to
identify any particular set of events in developing a sense for the term worst case scenario
because as soon as a particular set of events is set, it is usually possible to construct an "even
worse" case scenario, generating an escalating chain of situations to evaluate. The Committee
thus focused its efforts on preparing relevant questions that would be most useful in analyzing
the worst case scenarios set out in the DSER, recognizing that the DSER was intended to be used
in decision-making. The Committee viewed the relevant questions as: 1) Do the scenarios in
the document suffice to adequately evaluate the comparative risks to the communities in the
DSER? 2) Do the scenarios represent those needed to appropriately characterize the risks of the
Overall, the Committee believes the DSER has not adequately identified and
thoroughly developed worst case scenarios. The DSER appears to have examined some of
the agents identified by the community, but did not effectively examine highly infectious
agents that would be of greater relevance to comparing the risks at the three sites. In this
and other ways, the DSER did not provide a representative worst case scenario. The DSER
also misses the opportunity to present a more refined analysis of the risks presented by a facility
like the one under examination and to evaluate comprehensively the impact of a worst case
scenario event on public health and safety.
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3) The Committee was asked to determine, based on the comparison of risk associated with
alternative locations, whether there is a greater risk to public health and safety from the location
of the facility in one or another proposed location.
The DSER does examine three sites with different characteristics – inner city, suburban,
rural. The Committee endorses the approach of examining sites with different characteristics as
a useful aid for decision-making, and endorses the concept of modeling scenarios. Determining
whether risks may differ at urban versus rural sites is an important task to assist in decision-
making on siting facilities such as the NEIDL.
However, the DSER does not contain the appropriate level of information to
compare the risks associated with alternative locations. In judging the information that is
presented in the DSER, the Committee expects that the risks of laboratory-acquired infections
and releases that would cause infections in the community surrounding the laboratory might be
low for all three sites. However, the Committee notes that the conclusions of the DSER are
insufficiently supported. Specifically, the Committee lacks confidence that the scenario for Rift
Valley Fever Virus (RVFV), the one agent the DSER claims to pose a greater risk to rural
populations, was appropriately developed to inform decisions on site selection. To address the
question of how risks to public health and safety depend on location, the risk assessment should
consider agents with greater transmissibility. In addition, models should produce results
consistent with what is known about the impact of population density and address factors such as
location of vectors and hosts and the ecology and microenvironment involving vectors and hosts.
The Committee was also dissatisfied with the depth of exploration of public health and
safety concerns about environmental justice communities impacted by the alternative site
considerations. The DSER does not adequately consider the public health and safety impact of
the NEIDL on Boston's South End, an environmental justice community, in comparing the risk
associated with alternative locations for the laboratory.
The DSER addresses the Boston University Medical Center Albany Street site and two
alternative sites, Tyngsborough, Massachusetts and Peterborough, New Hampshire. The DSER
contains a comprehensive set of characteristics examined for each site, including zoning and
noise (DSER, pages V-1 to V-164). The consideration of these three sites for the Boston
University NEIDL is apparently based on the fact that they are urban, rural and suburban
properties owned by Boston University. Further rationale for site selection was not provided,
and the Committee did not further address the selection of alternative sites.
The Committee appreciates that the development of the DSER was a challenging task
that was undoubtedly subject to substantial time and resource constraints. Unfortunately, the
Committee finds serious problems with the DSER. Because a number of the concerns impact the
Committee's answers to more than one of the charge questions, they are discussed here by topic
rather than by question in the charge. The Committee is concerned about the agent selection.
However, as described in the modeling section, more than substitution of a new agent is needed.
Even with a different agent, similar assumptions without justification about very low
transmission, lack of variable number of contacts, and lack of population density-dependence
would have the same effect of shutting down human-to-human transmission in any location. In
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addition to the concerns raised in the body of this document, a list of apparent discrepancies
noticed by the Committee is compiled in Attachment E.
Scenarios Described in the DSER
The DSER examined scenarios that begin with the assumption that a release has already
occurred. According to the DSER, a consultative process with concerned citizens contributed to
the selection of these scenarios. This process involved three public meetings and the
establishment of an e-mail address and a telephone number by which citizens could provide
further comments and suggestions. The list of possible scenarios generated by this means
• A transportation accident with subsequent release of an infectious agent
• A release of a vector-borne disease
• A release of an infected arthropod
• A laboratory incident concerning mislabeling of a specimen or stock culture
• A release of a recombinant organism
• A laboratory incident involving Ebola virus
• A laboratory incident involving a poxvirus
• An incident involving a school or school-aged children
• An incident requiring transport of an infected patient
The four scenarios examined in the DSER contained many of the elements in this list of
public concerns. The Committee commends NIH for taking account of input from concerned
citizens in its development of supplemental analyses, but this consultative process apparently led
to the selection of agents that did not fully address the issues raised by the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs. The NIH selected two BSL-3 agents and two BSL-4 agents (all
considered Class A agents by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention select agent
program), set artificial criteria for forcing an infection outside of the laboratory, and developed
scenarios based in part on expert opinion and published information about these microbial
pathogens (CDC, 2007b).
The chosen scenarios in the DSER are not sufficient to adequately evaluate the
comparative risks to the communities, nor are they sufficient to appropriately describe a worst
case scenario for the NEIDL. A more suitable analysis would have included the selection of
agents that are more transmissible and thus might have created a greater risk of urban outbreaks,
as well as an explanation or justification of rationale for the release scenarios.
Selection of Agents
The agents selected were Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever Virus (Ebola), Monkeypox Virus,
Sabia Hemorrhagic Fever Virus (Sabia), and Rift Valley Fever Virus (RVFV). The DSER
provides inadequate rationale for why these agents were appropriate to describe a worst case
scenario or to investigate how risk to public health and safety depends on urban, suburban, or
rural location for a biocontainment laboratory. The NEIDL includes the BSL-4 laboratory and
lower level BSL-3 laboratories. Agents such as Yersinia pestis (pneumonic plague), influenza
virus (including virulent strains), SARS virus, and highly pathogenic avian influenza virus are
often studied in BSL-3 and other lower-level containment facilities. The selection of agents for
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the worst case scenario was appropriately not limited to BSL-4 agents as some agents handled in
BSL-3 facilities may present more serious potential risks than BSL-4 agents. Agents are
categorized for BSL-4 containment because they cause deadly disease for which there is no
treatment, not because they are highly infectious and cause widespread disease.
Both Ebola and Sabia Hemorrhagic Fevers have high mortality rates and require BSL-4
containment. However, Ebola virus is transmissible as a blood-borne pathogen, and experience
to date suggests that while theoretically possible, it is extremely unlikely to be spread through the
routes of transmission included in the scenario (CDC, 2007a). Thus it is not an agent that is
likely to spread widely in any of the communities selected. Sabia virus may be spread by
aerosols or droplets, but because very little is known about the epidemiological and clinical
aspects of Sabia virus, parameters included in the model had to be based on speculation or
extrapolation from other agents. Monkeypox requires BSL-3 containment. Monkeypox is spread
by contact, with the opportunity to be transmitted from certain small mammals, such as gerbils
(referred to in the DSER as "pocket pets"). RVFV, a zoonotic agent that is primarily a disease of
ruminant animals, is handled in a BSL-3 facility and is easily transmissible through mosquito
Selected Agents Should Have Higher Transmission Probabilities
The DSER would have been more useful in supporting decision-making had it
considered candidate infectious agents that have the potential to lead to large infection
rates in an exposed human population. The three scenarios involving directly transmitted
diseases (Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever, Monkeypox and Sabia Hemorrhagic Fever) each dealt with
infections characterized by low probabilities of person-to-person transmission (i.e., those
infections with a basic reproduction ratio (R0) that approaches or is actually below one) and thus
could not lead to a major epidemic or community outbreak. The final epidemic sizes that were
generated by the model for these three scenarios were so small that it is unlikely that differences
between Boston, Tyngsborough, and Peterborough could have been detected even if they did
exist. A worst case scenario should include an agent with a higher person-to-person transmission
rate, represented by a basic reproduction number (R0) greater than one. A complete scenario
could also consider transmission via aerosol droplets and/or fomites (inanimate objects).
Diseases should also include those with different latent and infectious periods. These factors
will affect the number of subsequent infections, as well as the opportunity for timely response or
treatment during an outbreak or epidemic.
A Vector-Borne Agent with More Likely Urban Reservoirs Should Have Been Selected
The vector-borne agent selected was dependent on a ruminant reservoir, which could
have been anticipated to generate minimal risk in an urban setting. There are vector-borne
diseases with more likely urban reservoirs, and these should be considered. For example,
diseases with characteristics of dengue hemorrhagic fever virus, if dengue-competent mosquitoes
are found in the site areas. See also the section on vector selection in the Other Considerations in
Site Comparisons section below.
Novel Pathogens
The potential for accidents involving novel or poorly characterized pathogens was not
considered in the DSER.
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Selection of Release Events
Each of the scenarios in the DSER starts with an assumption that an index case occurs, to
ensure subsequent introduction of the pathogen agents to the community. This introduction
includes causation by accident and subsequent contacts in family and community settings. The
assessment included stakeholder-suggested release scenarios, but this may not have captured an
appropriate range of anticipated worst case scenarios. The DSER provides no rationale for why
the release scenarios were appropriate to describe "worst cases".
It would be useful to include an analysis of documented probabilities (qualitatively if not
quantitatively) of occurrence for several categories of events such as:
• Equipment failure (e.g., containment failure due to maintenance, power outages,
or other issues)
• Site personnel security failure
• Procedures (inadvertent infection of one or more laboratory staff)
• Malevolent action
Such data would be useful in selecting the biological agents, operating conditions, and
circumstances to generate an appropriate range of release scenarios and their consequences for
A base of literature describing the incidence of laboratory-acquired infections7 does exist
(Sulkin and Pike, 1951a; Sulkin and Pike 1951b; Harding and Byers, 2006; Sewell, 1995).
Although laboratory-acquired infections may be underreported, the data should be considered in
a risk assessment framework. Statements like "so low as to be essentially zero" related to
laboratory-acquired infections in a BSL-4 environment are not supported by systematic
quantitative or qualitative risk assessments in the DSER8. It would be more useful to limit the
statements to a description of BSL-4 safety history, or to characterize the known rate of
laboratory worker infection in the U.S. and Canadian BSL-4 operations as "less than one in X
operating hours", or "less than one in X facility-years". In addition, while it is fair for the DSER
to point to and rely to some degree on the record of BSL-4 laboratories when considering the
likelihood of non-malevolent infection, the safety records of BSL-3 laboratories would also be
Again, the DSER scenarios all begin with a single infected individual or, in the case of
Sabia, a small number of infected lab workers. While such incidents are possible, there are other
ways to initiate infection and disease, such as inadvertent laboratory release or malevolent
action. These other modes of release can have far more serious consequences than those modeled
in the DSER. Malevolent actions were not explicitly discussed in the scenarios examined in the
DSER. Even if malevolent action is improbable, an appropriate range of malevolent action
scenarios should be considered in the selection of credible worst case events.
The cited Rotz document focuses on qualitative attributes of bioterrorism agents, not the incidence of laboratory-
acquired infections. The references cited above provide information about laboratory-acquired infections.
See also discussion about comments like this in the Risk Communication section below.
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Concerns About the Modeling
Modeling is a useful approach to describe worst case scenarios and in this case to
compare scenarios among sites. With respect to the modeling work in the DSER, the Committee
had a number of concerns. Some of these concerns stemmed from what was described about the
modeling and others stemmed from a lack of transparency about the input data, assumptions, and
how the model worked.
Insufficient Description of Model Architecture
The one-paragraph statement on page VIII-16 of the DSER, which describes the
development and architecture of the model, falls short of adequately describing the assumptions
contained in the model and their impacts on model predictions. At a minimum, a fuller
description of the model architecture is needed so that the work in the DSER can be replicated
and evaluated.
The A-BEST Model and Multilayer Agent Based-Simulation Tool (MLAB-ST) seem too
basic for modeling a mosquito-borne disease such as RVF. It was not apparent that the model
developers had considered, or were familiar with, the epidemiology of mosquito-borne diseases.
The DSER has a section on validation (page VIII-15), but the models did not appear to have been
appropriately validated by comparing them to other disease models in the literature on insect-
borne and other infectious diseases.
Outcome May Not Have Been Sufficiently Influenced by Important Biological Factors
Most importantly, the Committee was concerned that the model did not appear to
recognize biological complexities and reflect what is known about disease outbreaks and other
biological parameters. The Committee was also uncomfortable with the notion that an attempt to
include "true-life complexity" in and of itself increases the value of a model. The DSER dwelt
in great detail on the geographical data sets used to generate the synthetic populations that were
the basis of the simulations, but the DSER did not explain adequately why this complexity
improved the modeling exercise with respect to the questions being asked. More importantly,
the DSER used only simplistic methods to deal with biological factors. As explained below, the
Committee believes that the modeling would have benefited by recognizing other complexities,
including population characteristics and different contact patterns and opportunities. In these
areas, epidemiologic and public health data could have been useful for adding relevant
conditions associated with life complexity.
Transmissibility can depend on population density, presence of susceptible human
subpopulations, characteristics of microenvironments (residences, areas where people are in
close physical contact, such as on a bus or subway car), ecology of vectors (mosquitoes, other
insects) and hosts (cows, rodents, others), and the interdependence of microenvironments and
ecological systems on the geographic characteristics. Selecting the appropriate scope and
assumptions for analysis will depend on the characteristics of the disease agent.
The DSER states as a conclusion that only for the RVF scenario is there a difference in
risk among the three locations: "The key to the generation of a RVF outbreak is the obligatory
presence of flood conditions and large numbers of mosquitoes. Both of these conditions exist in
Tyngsborough and Peterborough and the added presence of amplification hosts boosts the risk of
disease outbreak even higher" (DSER, page VIII-16). The rationale is that in this scenario,
mosquitoes act as the vector and more mosquitoes (and ruminants such as bovine hosts for the
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Vector Selection
The worst case scenarios did not consider the presence of relevant disease vectors in the
environmental justice community, such as insects and rodents. The worst case scenario chosen to
consider vector spread of disease in the DSER only highlighted the potential dangers of cows as
reservoirs in a rural community.
In its charge, the Committee was asked to discuss the methodologies and analysis in the
DSER and address three specific questions posed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. As
part of this review of methodologies, the Committee considered the risk communication aspects
of the DSER. Several Committee members are individuals experienced in risk communication,
and the Committee is compelled to comment on several aspects of communication that could be
improved by following risk communication criteria outlined in several NRC reports (e.g.,
Improving Risk Communication, NRC, 1989; Understanding Risk: Improving Decisions in a
Democratic Society, NRC, 1996) and other resources.
Particularly in the case of strong public interest, including this siting decision, it is
important to develop presentations and documents that are transparent, complete, and clearly
address the concerns of interested and affected parties. As explained in the Committee's review,
the DSER's methodology and analysis is not transparent, is not complete, and may not address
the fundamental concerns of the community, particularly regarding environmental justice.
In light of this inadequacy, statements in the DSER that the risks are "negligible" and
"vastly overstated" can appear unfounded and dismissive of public concerns.
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John Ahearne (chair) is Executive Director Emeritus of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research
Society, and Emeritus Director of the Sigma Xi Ethics Program. Prior to working at Sigma Xi,
Dr. Ahearne served as Vice President and Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future and as
Commissioner and Chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He worked in the White
House Energy Office and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy. He also worked on weapons
systems analysis, force structure, and personnel policy as Deputy and Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense. Serving in the U.S. Air Force (USAF), he worked on nuclear weapons
effects and taught at the USAF Academy. Dr. Ahearne's research interests include risk analysis,
risk communication, energy analysis, reactor safety, radioactive waste, nuclear weapons,
materials disposition, science policy, and environmental management. He was elected to the
National Academy of Engineering in 1996 for his leadership in energy policy and the safety and
regulation of nuclear power. Dr. Ahearne has served on many NRC Committees in the past
twenty years, and has chaired a number of these, including the current Committee on Evaluation
of Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty Methodology Applied to the Certification of the
Nation's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and the Committee on the Internationalization of the Civil
Nuclear Fuel Cycle. In 1966, Dr. Ahearne earned his PhD in Physics from Princeton University.
Thomas W. Armstrong is Senior Scientific Associate in the Exposure Sciences Section of
ExxonMobil Biomedical Sciences, Inc., where he has been working since 1989. Dr. Armstrong is
also working with the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center as the lead investigator on
exposure assessment for epidemiological investigations of potentially benzene-related
hematopoietic diseases in Shanghai, China. Dr. Armstrong also spent nine years working for the
Linde Group, as both the manager of loss control in the gases division and as a manager of safety
and industrial hygiene. Dr. Armstrong recently conducted research on quantitative risk
assessment models for inhalation exposure to Legionella. He is currently a member of both the
Society for Risk Analysis and The American Industrial Hygiene Association, and he has been
certified as an Industrial Hygienist by the American Board of Industrial Hygiene. Dr. Armstrong
has an MS in Environmental Health and a PhD in Environmental Engineering from Drexel
Gerardo Chowell is an Assistant Professor at the School of Human Evolution and Social
Change at Arizona State University. Prior to joining ASU, Dr. Chowell was a Director's
postdoctoral fellow with the Mathematical Modeling and Analysis group (Theoretical Division)
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He performs mathematical modeling of emergent and re-
emergent infectious diseases (including SARS, influenza, Ebola, and Foot-and-Mouth Disease)
with an emphasis in quantifying the effects of public health interventions. His research interests
include agent-based modeling, model validation, and social network analysis. Dr. Chowell
received his PhD in Biometry from Cornell University and his engineering degree in telematics
from the Universidad de Colima, Mexico.
Margaret E. Coleman is a Senior Microbiologist at Syracuse Research Corporation (SRC) in
the Environmental Science Center, an independent not-for-profit research and development
organization. Ms. Coleman leads multi-disciplinary teams in SRC's Microbial Risk Assessment
Center of Excellence (M-RACE) and is a founding member and councilor of the new Upstate
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NY Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) chapter. From 1996 to present, she served in various
leadership roles in SRA: chair of symposia and workshops in quantitative microbial risk
assessment (QMRA); program committee member for domestic and international conferences;
and offices in the Biostressors Specialty Group and Dose-Response Specialty Group. Also an
active member of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM), she recently contributed an
article to ASM's Microbe magazine (Microbial Risk Assessment Scenarios, Causality, and
Uncertainty). Ms. Coleman contributes to peer review processes in QMRA for several journals,
including SRA's journal Risk Analysis. She served as a reviewer for the NRC Report Reopening
Public Facilities After a Biological Attack and as a committee member on the Review of Testing
and Evaluation Methodology for Biological Point Detectors. Prior to her work in SRC, Ms.
Coleman contributed to development of QMRA methodology for foodborne and waterborne
hazards at USDA and with member agencies of the federal Risk Assessment Consortium. Ms.
Coleman earned her BS degree from SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry at
Syracuse and MS degrees from Utah State University and the University of Georgia in
Biology/Biochemistry and Medical Microbiology.
Gigi Kwik Gronvall is a Senior Associate at the Center for Biosecurity of University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) and Assistant Professor of Medicine at the University of
Pittsburgh. An immunologist by training, Dr. Gronvall's work addresses how scientists can
diminish the threat of biological weapons and how they can contribute to an effective response
against a biological weapon or a natural epidemic. She is a term member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and also serves on the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. Dr. Gronvall is a founding
member of the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC and, prior to joining the faculty in 2003, she
worked at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies. From 2000-
2001 she was a National Research Council Postdoctoral Associate at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. Dr. Gronvall
earned a PhD from Johns Hopkins University for her work on T cell receptor/MHC I
Eric Harvill is an Associate Professor of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases at the
Pennsylvania State University. His primary research interest is in the interactions between
bacterial pathogens and the host immune system, and his group investigates both bacterial
virulence factors and host immune functions at the molecular level using the tools of bacterial
genetics and mouse molecular immunology. These studies investigate the effects these
molecular-level activities may have on the population-level behavior of infectious diseases. Dr.
Harvill has served on several NRC committees, including the Committee on Methodological
Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security's Biological Agent Risk Analysis. He
has reviewed for more than 20 scientific journals and serves on the Editorial Board for Infection
and Immunity. Dr. Harvill has reviewed proposals for six different NIH study sections, the
USDA and multiple international funding organizations. He has organized international and
local meetings and chaired sessions at annual meetings of both the American Association of
Immunologists and the American Society for Microbiology. He earned his PhD at the University
of California, Los Angeles.
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Barbara Johnson has over 15 years of experience in the U.S. government in the area of
biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity, and currently owns the consulting company Barbara
Johnson & Associates, LLC. Dr. Johnson has managed the design, construction and
commissioning of a BSL-3 Aerosol Pathogen Test Facility, and she launched the U.S.
government's first chemical and biological counterterrorism training facility. Research areas
include biological risk assessment and mitigation, testing the efficiency of respiratory protective
devices, and testing novel decontamination methods against biological threat agents. In the
private sector she pioneered the development of the first joint biosafety and biosecurity programs
between the U.S. and institutes in the former Soviet Union, and founded and directed a Center
for Biosecurity in association with this work. She has served as the President of the American
Biological Safety Association, and is the Co-editor of the journal Applied Biosafety. Dr.
Johnson earned a PhD in Microbiology and is a registered biosafety professional.
Paul A. Locke is an Associate Professor in the Department of Environmental Health Sciences at
the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. He is a public health scientist and
attorney with expertise in risk assessment and risk management, radiation protection law and
policy, and alternatives to animals in biomedical testing. Dr. Locke serves on the Environmental
Protection Agency's Clean Air Act Advisory Committee and is a member of the Board of
Councilors of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. In 2004 he was
appointed to, and remains a member of, the NRC Nuclear and Radiation Study Board, and has
participated on two NRC Committees that evaluated the risks associated with the disposal of
high level radioactive waste. Dr. Locke has received several awards, including the Yale School
of Public Health Alumni Service Award, and the American Public Health Association
Environment Section Distinguished Service Award. He holds an MPH from Yale University
School of Medicine, a JD from Vanderbilt University School of Law, and a DrPH from the Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Warner North is President of NorthWorks, Inc., a consulting firm in Belmont, California. Dr.
North is also a consulting professor in the Department of Management Science and Engineering
at Stanford University. Over the past thirty years, Dr. North has carried out applications of
decision analysis and risk analysis for electric utilities in the U.S. and Mexico, for petroleum and
chemical industries, and for government agencies with responsibility for energy and
environmental protection. He has served as a member and consultant to the Science Advisory
Board of the Environmental Protection Agency since 1978, and as a Presidentially appointed
member of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. Dr. North currently serves as a
member on the NRC's Panel on Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision
Making and has chaired NRC Committees. Dr. North is a past president of the International
Society for Risk Analysis, a recipient of the Frank P. Ramsey Medal from the Decision Analysis
Society for lifetime contributions to the field of decision analysis, and a recipient of the
Outstanding Risk Practitioner Award from the Society for Risk Analysis.
Jonathan Richmond is CEO of Jonathan Richmond and Associates, a biosafety consulting firm
with a global clientele. Prior to starting his own firm, Dr. Richmond was the director of the
Office of Health and Safety at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta,
Georgia. He is an international authority on biosafety and laboratory containment design. Dr.
Richmond was trained as a geneticist, worked for ten years as a research virologist, and has been
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involved in the field of biosafety for the past 25 years. He has authored many scientific
publications in microbiology, chaired many national symposia, edited numerous books, and is an
international consultant to ministries of health on laboratory safety and training. He served as
President of the American Biological Safety Association.
Gary Smith is Chief of the Section of Epidemiology and Public Health in the School of
Veterinary Medicine at University of Pennsylvania. He has a secondary appointment in the
Department of Biostatistics and Epidemiology at Penn's School of Medicine and is an Associate
Scholar in the Center for Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics. He is also an affiliated faculty
member of Penn's Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response. His research deals with
the epidemiology and population dynamics of infectious disease in humans as well as wild and
domestic animal species. He has extensive experience of mathematical modeling in the context
of infectious and parasitic disease control strategies (including the evolution of drug resistance)
and has published case-control studies on a range of infectious diseases of animals and humans.
Dr. Smith served on an FAO/WHO Expert Committee on the implementation of farm models in
the developing world; he served on the Pennsylvania Food Quality Assurance Committee, and he
was a member of a European Union Expert Committee on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
risk. He has served on the editorial boards of Parasitology Today, The International Journal of
Parasitology, The Veterinary Quarterly, and Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment. Dr.
Smith earned Bachelors degrees in Zoology and Education from the Universities of Oxford and
Cambridge respectively and a D.Phil in Ecology from the University of York.
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The Committee will review the NIH Study [Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and
Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston
University] and meet to discuss the methodologies and analyses therein and to address specific
questions provided by officials of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and
Environmental Affairs. The questions addressed by the Committee will solely pertain to the
scientific adequacy of the NIH Study. The specific questions to be addressed are as follows:
§ Determine if the scientific analyses in NIH Study are sound and credible;
§ Determine whether the proponent has identified representative worst case scenarios;
§ Determine, based on the study's comparison of risk associated with alternative locations,
whether there is a greater risk to public health and safety from the location of the facility in
one or another proposed location;
The parties acknowledge and agree that the Committee's report will be limited to a technical
review of the NIH Study, and the Contractor [NRC] will make no findings or recommendations
regarding the adequacy of any determinations or decisions made by any agency or department of
the U.S. Government or the State Massachusetts under NEPA or MEPA, and Contractor shall not
be responsible in any way for any such decisions or determinations. The Committee will author
a letter report that addresses the foregoing questions and submit this letter report to the
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office prior to the end of the public comment period.
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The chair thanks the Committee members for working extremely hard on a very tight
schedule to produce this report and for their willingness to adjust personal schedules to convene
in Washington, DC on short notice. He also thanks Rebecca Walter for handling the complicated
logistics required for the Committee to be successful and notes the most valuable contribution
was made by the study director, Dr. Marilee Shelton-Davenport, whose knowledge and patient
leadership was instrumental in producing a quality report.
The Committee also thanks those who participated in the open session October 19, 2007
(Attachment D) and those who submitted comments and documents to the Committee in writing.
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National
Research Council's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to
provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published
report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for
objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft
manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We thank the
following individuals for their review of this report:
John Applegate, Indiana University
John Bailar, The National Academies
Kenneth Berns, University of Florida Genetics Institute
David Franz, Midwest Research Institute
Charles Haas, Drexel University
Marc Lipsitch, Harvard University
Stephen Ostroff, Pennsylvania Department of Health
Peter Palese, Mount Sinai School of Medicine
Bailus Walker, Howard University
Catherine Wilhelmsen, The United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and
suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they
see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Ed
Perrin, University of Washington, and John Samet, Johns Hopkins University. Appointed by the
National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent
examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all
review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report
rests entirely with the authoring Committee and the institution.
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Technical Input on the NIH's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability
Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University
Friday, October 19, 2007
Keck Room 101, 500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20901
8:30 Presentation of Charge by Sponsor
Deerin Babb-Brott
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Impact Review, Executive
Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, Commonwealth of
9:00 NIH Comments
Deborah E. Wilson, Dr. P.H.
Director, Division of Occupational Health and Safety, ORS, NIH
9:45 Boston University Comments
Mark S. Klempner, M.D.
Associate Provost for Research
Boston University Medical Campus
Director, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories
10:15 Questions for Boston University
10:45 Break
11:00 Stakeholder Representative Comments
David Ozonoff, MD, MPH (by telephone/ videoconference)
Professor of Environmental Health, Chair Emeritus, Department of
Environmental Health
Boston University School of Public Health
11:30 Stakeholder Representative Comments
Marc Lipsitch, PhD
Professor of Epidemiology
Harvard School of Public Health
12:00 Questions for Stakeholders
12:45 End of open session
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The Committee believes that undertaking to simulate scenarios for four additional agents
at three proposed sites was very ambitious given the time constraints for this project. There is
internal evidence that the section on modeling was hurriedly assembled (including numerous
typographical errors, apparently contradictory statements, abbreviated and incomprehensible
summaries of data from the literature, references to "influenza" which were not analyzed, and the
discussion of parameter values that appear to refer to pathogens not considered in the four
scenarios). Some examples of errors include:
• On page VI-10, the DSER states as an assumption that "0.9% of individuals will develop
hemorrhagic disease [attributable to Rift Valley Fever] of whom 50 % will die. 0.003%
fatality rate for the remaining infected individuals." Yet in the "rationale for inclusion" of
Rift Valley Fever on Page IV-20 it is stated that a recent outbreak of this disease has
"caused at least 1065 confirmed human cases and 315 deaths". No attempt is made to
reconcile or explain this discrepancy or why the lower dose fatality rate was selected for
use in the Rift Valley Fever scenario.
• On page VI-24, the biting rate of Aedes Canadensis, "an aggressive biter", was recorded
as ">260 bites per minute". Is this a typographical error?
• On page VI 19, the model flow for the MLAB-ST model contains the statement that "If
there is a ruminant present it gets bitten [and] if the mosquito is infectious the virus is
transmitted to the ruminant. By contrast, on page VI-25, it is assumed that the "mosquito-
ruminant infectivity is 21% at 7 days and 15% at 14 days".
• Page VI-16 contains the sentence, "If they survive, the individual obtains life long
immunity, except for influenza because new strains may be introduced". An influenza
outbreak is not one of the depicted scenarios. On the same page, it is stated that "An
infection rate of 0.1 is used for adults and a rate of 0.15 is used for children and seniors".
Again, this seems to apply to influenza and not any of the selected scenarios.
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Bian, L., and D. Liebner. 2007. A network model for dispersion of communicable diseases.
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Bieber, D., S.W. Ramer, C.Y. Wu, W.J. Murray, T. Tobe, R. Fernandez, and G.K. Schoolnik.
1998. Type IV pili, transient bacterial aggregates, and virulence of enteropathogenic
Escherichia coli. Science 280(5372):2114-8.
Bridges, C.B., M.J. Kuelnert, and C.B. Hall. 2003. Transmission of influenza: Implications for
control in health care settings. Clinical Infectious Diseases 37:1094-1101.
Burmaster, D.E., and P.D. Anderson. 1994. Principles of good practice for the use of Monte
Carlo techniques in human health and ecological risk assessments. Risk Analysis
CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 2005. Surveillance for illness and injury
after Hurricane Katrina -- New Orleans, Louisiana, September 8 -- 25, 2005. Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report 54(40):1018-21. Accessed on October 30, 2007 at
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Committee on Methods of Analysis and Sampling: 19th session, Budapest, Hungary,
Criteria for evaluating acceptable methods of analysis for Codex purposes.
Codex Alimentarius Commission. 1999. Committee on Food Hygiene. Principles and guidelines
for the conduct of microbiological risk assessment. CAC/GL-30. Accessed on November
19, 2007 at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y1579e/y1579e05.htm.
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anthracis. A1/CF-TR-1997-0078. This document is unclassified, with limited distribution
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Fort Point Associates, Inc. 2004. BioSquare Phase II, Boston, Massachusetts. Final Project
Impact Report/Final Environmental Impact Report.
Eubank, S., H. Guclu, V.S. Kumar, M.V. Marathe, A. Srinivasan, Z. Toroczkai, and N. Wang.
2004. Modelling disease outbreaks in realistic urban social networks.
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Geisbert, T.W., L.E. Hensley, T. Larsen, H.A. Young, D.S. Reed, J.B. Geisbert, D.P. Scott, E.
Kagan, P.B. Jahrling, and K.J. Davis. 2003. Pathogenesis of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in
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infection. American Journal of Pathology 163(6):2347-2370.
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The Resource Center has all the info you'll need From content to user feedback, the resource center has the information you need for every level of the entrepreneurial process.
Businesses should strive to project their image in all components of their marketing strategy, including advertisements, printed media, customer services, location, and more.
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You can not be creative in a vacuum. Understanding your industry and marketplace requires consistent study habits.
Resource Abstract
The power to make a difference comes when you look inside to find what you have to give.
Although sometimes costly and time-consuming, conducting your own primary research can deliver specific results that are usually the most timely and relevant to your business.
As the entrepreneur, you have to give your support to change efforts, whether you are the project champion or not. This article will help you communicate your support widely and regularly, providing resources and time to help the effort succeed.
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McKee Billings is an Augusta-based premier law firm with one focus, and one focus alone – to provide nothing short of the very best representation in every single case it handles. The firm's principal attorney, Walter McKee, has been recognized as one of Maine's elite attorneys and is listed in Best Lawyers in America and New England Super Lawyers. He is AV-Rated in Martindale-Hubbell. He can bring his vast experience and talent to bear in your case, large or small, just like he has done for the past 19 years in thousands of cases. Attorney Jim Billings has a deep and extensive background in a variety of areas and has a wealth of experience in litigation.
McKee Billings' day starts early – Mr.McKee is in the office every day by 3:15 a.m. - and this means that there are few if any who can outwork McKee Billings' nearly round the clock operation. McKee Billings specializes in criminal defense, personal injury and general litigation and also handles family law, appellate and professional licensing matters.
In criminal law, there is no type of criminal case that McKee Billings hasn't handled. We have represented people accused of nearly every criminal offense in Maine, felony or misdemeanor, as well as civil and criminal motor vehicle offenses including Operating Under the Influence (OUI). Personal injury cases have long been a specialty and include all types of cases including automobile accidents; trucking accidents; motorcycle accidents; premises liability; under-insured or uninsured motorist cases; and dog and animal bites, just to name a few. Family law and all types of general civil litigation are also handled at McKee Billings. There is just no area of litigation that McKee Billings can not handle for you.
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text:
There is no such thing as a dangerous fullcourt press in the nba. The guards are just too good as ballhandlers. The only presses are mere efforts to delay the start of the offensive plays in the halfcourt--THAT'S IT.
Dangerous fullcourt presses would bring more excitement to the game: More open court steals, more breakaway dunks. A little more quick back-and-forth possesion of the ball. Also, more tension in the early stages of the shot clock.
Anybody remember how nerve-racking it was to watch your favorite college team try bringing the ball up the court against '85-86 Georgetown or '89-90 UNLV? Wasn't that fun, though?
Imagine, for a second that you only had 3 seconds to get the ball past halfcourt, instead of 8. I'm not proposing THIS, but hear me out. The inbounds pass would become more like a Quarterback pass in football, with the guards "running routes" like Wide Receivers to receive the ball closer to halfcourt. But there would be more element of risk, more possibilities of interception, and more open court plays generated on those inbounds passes.
NOW, like I said, I am not proposing lowering the 8 second count to 3, but what about 5-7 seconds? Somewhere in there is a happy medium between the tranquility of getting the ball upcourt that we have now and the exciting, over-the-top mayhem we would have with a 3 second halfcourt count.
My proposal is simple: Lower the 8-second count to 7 next year. If we see no discernable change, drop it to 6 seconds the year after that. At some point coaches will start to employ fullcourt pressure as a TRUE WEAPON instead of the minimal weapon it is now.
Take the boredom out of guards walking the ball up the court!
(Oh, and having two miniature, press-breaking point guards like DJ and Kemba would give us a great advantage under these new rules....)
Thank you for reading.


text:
Xye is a puzzle game in which the objective is to get all the gems in each level. The mission is not as easy as it sounds: there are traps, monsters, and very hard puzzles everywhere. The player can interact with objects in the game in a lot of ways, and some of the objects can also interact with other objects.
Berusky is a logic game that is based on an ancient puzzle named Sokoban. The old idea of moving boxes in a maze has been expanded with new logic items such as explosives, stones, special gates, and so on. In addition, up to five bugs can cooperate and be controlled by the player.
A Web-based document management system with a Google-like search engine.


text:
For the past two weeks I have been cooking within strict boundaries. Because I am leaving for a month-long trip to the US, and giving up my current apartment, I have not only been restraining myself from buying any new bottles of sauces, spices, and cooking oils, but also trying desperately to use up what I have left. Which is easier said than done. How many meals of basil-cumin pasta must I eat while fighting the urge to buy more dried oregano? Or chili garlic noodles, while convincing myself any new sauces will just end up in the garbage?
One item I desperately wanted to use up with an almost-full bottle of vegetable oil that I simply did not feel like packing. And what's an easier way to use up oil than frying? Fortunately, there was one dish I could make without buying anything except chicken and leeks. And whenever I teach it in my Sichuan cooking classes, all traces of crispy chicken are gone within 5 minutes.
Lazi jiding (辣子鸡丁) is like a more sophisticated version of kung pao chicken. It's smokier, spicier (a lot spicier if you chop up the chilis), and only a bit more complex in its preparation. (The way I make it is more like shallow-frying. I use about 1 1/2 cups of oil, and dredge the chicken in a cornstarch-salt-pepper mixture beforehand.) Few fried chicken entrees are enveloped by such a succulent tongue-tingling sauce.
Spicy Wok-Fried Chicken with Chilis
Serves 4
- 1 pound chicken breast, diced
- 1 1/2 cups cornstarch
- 2 teaspoons salt
- 1 teaspoon freshly ground black pepper
- 1 1/2 cup peanut oil
- 8 to 10 dried red chilis
- 2 teaspoons Sichuan peppercorn
- 3 garlic cloves, minced
- 1 leek, white part only, thinly sliced
- 1 small piece ginger, minced
- 2 tablespoons dark soy sauce
- 2 tablespoons Chinese rice wine, or substitute dry sherry
- 2 teaspoons Chinese black vinegar
- 1/2 teaspoon sesame oil
- 2 tablespoons chili garlic sauce
- 1 tablespoon soy sauce
- 1 tablespoon chicken stock or water
- 1 teaspoon cornstarch
- In a medium-sized bowl, mix together the marinade ingredients: soy sauce, rice wine, rice vinegar, and sesame oil. Marinate the chicken in the mixture for 15 to 20 minutes.
- Mix together the ingredients for the sauce: chili garlic sauce, soy sauce, chicken stock or water, and cornstarch. Set aside.
- In a large bowl or plate, mix together the cornstarch, salt, and pepper. Dredge chicken in cornstarch mixture and shake off excess cornstarch. Heat about 1 cup of oil in a wok over medium-high heat. When the oil starts to smoke, work in batches and fry chicken until golden brown on all sides. Transfer to a plate lined with paper towels. Repeat with remaining batches.
- Pour out all but 1 tablespoon of oil, and keep wok heated over medium-high heat. Add the chilis and Sichuan peppercorn and stir-fry until just fragrant and the chilis start to blister, about 30 to 60 seconds. Add the leeks, garlic, and ginger and stir-fry for 2 minutes. Stir in sauce mixture and simmer until slightly thickened, about 1 minute. Add the fried chicken, toss to combine, and remove from heat. Serve immediately.


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Name | Description | APIs |
Berlin Gay Maps Maps of gay bars, clubs, hotels, shops etc. in Berlin Sch�neberg, Kreuzberg, Friedrichshain and Prenzlauer Berg. See under the GayMap link on the main menu. | GoogleMaps | |
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Marg |
Position: |
Intramural Sports and Sport Clubs Coordinator |
(850) 474-2539 |
Hometown: |
Fall Creek, Wisconsin | |
Education: |
B.S. in Sports Management, M.Ed. in College Student Personnel Administration - 2012 |
UWF Recreation: |
since August 2008 |
Jake got involved with Recreation at the University of Wisconsion-Superior as an Intramural Sports official and has been hooked ever since. He has been at UWF for two years as an Undergraduate, two as a Graduate Assistant and now as the new Intramural Sports and Sport Clubs Coordinator. In his spare time he enjoys playing any sort of sport, especially golf. He also enjoys spending time with friends and family, especially his wife.


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Friday Poll: Do you like Facebook's redesigned chat?
Imagine designing the user experience for Facebook, where even the slightest change has the potential to irritate millions of users. Not a job for the weak-minded.
Facebook recently altered the appearance of its chat feature for those viewing the site in a Web browser--and not everybody is happy about it. Previously, the simple chat system would show a list of online friends in a small box on the lower right side of the browser window. It was easy to use and unobtrusive.
In contrast, the new chat sidebar stretches from top to bottom on the right side of the window. The social area no longer is a small list of only those who are online, but rather a group of people the popular social-networking site thinks you'll want to speak to, regardless of whether they're online.
There is no option to edit the list of people in this area. If those predetermined "top" friends aren't online, the chat box has an option to send them a message. Online friends not on this list must be searched for manually, which is slightly frustrating. … Read more


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- You are here:
- ford jeep
ford jeep
Fans of old military vehicles might want to pay extra close attention to the Greenwich Concours d'Elegance coming up this weekend. Crossing the Bonhams auction block on Sunday are a pair of seemingly flawless World War II Jeeps, which are both expected to fetch serious dollars. Lot Number 305 at ...


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Fourchu: Ice Conditions
Ice Forecasts
Issued 10:00 AM EDT 12 March 2014 Today Tonight and ThursdayIce Edge
Ice edge estimated from Nova Scotia near 4515N 6100W to 4435N 5740Wto 4450N 5700W to 4725N 5745W to Newfoundland near 4720N 5515W. Sea
ice west and north of the ice edge.
Ice Coverage
4 tenths of new ice including a trace of first-year ice except 8tenths of first-year ice in eastern section.
Iceberg Bulletin
Issued 11:00 AM EDT 11 March 2014Iceberg Limit
Iceberg limit at 0000 UTC 11 Mar estimated from Newfoundland near4655N 5555W to 4530N 5315W to 4430N 4800W to 4530N 4130W to 4600N
4015W to 4915N 4115W to 6000N 5630W.
Western iceberg limit at 0000 UTC 11 Mar estimated from Labrador near
5135N 5645W to Newfoundland near 5120N 5635W.
Iceberg Count
No confirmed icebergs.- Date modified:


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B&Bs in Nusa Penida, Indonesia
Choose from our range of B&B's in Nusa Penida. View photos of B&B's in Nusa Penida and read bed and breakfast reviews. To find a B&B in Nusa Penida in the right location for you, view all of the Nusa Penida B&B's on the map and book online.
Ring Sameton Inn
Ped, Nusa Penida IslandThe Hotel Fasilities are: 12 Air conditioned rooms single bedroom (200cmX200cm) and double bedroom (200cmX120cm) with hot-cold water shower room, wastafel, smart washer toilet, Restaurant, Postal Service, Internet Service, Wide Parking area, Taxi
More Details about Ring Sameton Inn- From:
- price per room per night


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We live in a small two-bedroom house. One bedroom is for our DD (18 months), the other is ours. I'm looking for tips or tricks on how to transition them to sharing a room. I imagine the new baby will sleep in bed with us for awhile (DD did until about 11 months), but after that - how do you make this work? And, we intend to have all the "baby stuff" in their shared room. Advice from mamas who've BTDT?
or Connect
May 2013 Due Date Club
Welcome to the July 2013 Due Date Club! Consider adding information about yourself in the Welcome thread. All expecting parents and their partners for babies due late April through early June 2013... » More


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Harissa-spiked houmous
By Xanthe Clay
Cooking time
Prep: 10 minsSkill level
Serves 10A breeze to whip up, streets ahead of shop-bought versions, plus it's lower in fat, too
Nutrition and extra info
Additional info
- Vegetarian
- Vegan
Nutrition info
Nutrition per serving
- kcalories
- 111
- protein
- 4g
- carbs
- 8g
- fat
- 7g
- saturates
- 1g
- fibre
- 2g
- sugar
- 1g
- salt
- 0.33g
- 2 x 400g cans chickpeas, rinsed and drained
- 5 tbsp olive oil
- 1 garlic clove, crushed
- lemon juice, to taste
- 2 tbsp harissa paste (see TIP below)
- 1 tbsp tomato purée
Buy Ingredients
Buy the ingredients for this recipe now via:
Want to know how this works? Read all about it here.
- Put three-quarters of the chickpeas in a food processor with 3 tbsp olive oil, garlic and half a cupful of water. Blitz until smooth, adding a little more water if necessary to make a thick cream consistency. Add the rest of the chickpeas, then whizz again for a few secs until nobbly. Season with salt and a good squeeze of lemon juice.
- Mix together the harissa and tomato purée with the rest of the olive oil. Drizzle over the houmous to serve.
Recipe from Good Food magazine, June 2009
Comments, questions and tips
Sign in or create your My Good Food account to join the discussion.
Show comments
I used only 1 can of chick peas - a light lunch for 2 - plenty for us. I used North African harissa from a tube - added a little to taste as it is very strong. Only other thing added were toasted cumin seeds. Think of this as a "Chick Pea Dip" rather than houmous. I can't buy tahini in shops where I live so I'm used to chick pea dips without it.


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President Barack Obama is meeting this a.m. with a physician from each state. My assumption is that this meeting is designed to demonstrate that physicians are very much in favor of the public option to health care reform.
LETTER: Not all doctors support Obama's public option plan
Monday, October 5, 2009 | 3:51 p.m. CDT;
updated 6:17 p.m. CDT, Monday, October 5, 2009
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Items where Division is "Faculty of Education" and Year is
Number of items: 2.
HHamdan, A.; Fadzil, M.; Abou-El-Hossein, K.A.; Hamdi, M. Performance evaluation of different types of cutting fluid in the machining of aisi 01 hardened steel using pulsed jet minimal quantity lubrication system. Journal of Aerospace Engineering. PPulatkhon , Lutfullayev Research on benchmarking in higher education: An overview. In: Regional conference on quality in higher education "Quality driven initiatives: sharing good practices in higher education", 10-11 Dec 2007, Hilton Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. (Unpublished) |


text: Juan Antonio Puyol, Is the owner-operator of Proud Line Pictures. He is a cinematographer and director of photography (Rolling, One Camera One Life, Helix, Chasity, Making Moments) and has worked for numerous feature and documentary films released theatrically and screened internationally. He is able to draw from a diverse experience that includes narrative features, journalism, music videos, commercials and industrials, while developing the appropriate visual and narrative style for any project. His work has received awards including best documentary work-in-progress (Rolling – IFP) and best film (Making Moments – Exploding Cinema). Educated at Stanford, with a background in Urban Planning and advocacy, his principal emphasis has been in the arena of documentary film. His interests include stories of human growth and achievement, of the relation between people and their environment, and of epic adventure.


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Definition of waitperson in English:
Syllabification: wait·per·sonPronunciation: /ˈwātˌpərsən
( plural waitpersons)
chiefly North American - A waiter or waitress (used as a neutral alternative).More example sentences
- Can you negotiate with the sushi chef, or must everything go through a waitperson?
- Disarming as beauty is when paired with charm, the waitpersons are also as informed as they are informal.
- And the waitperson explained that shrimp and bacon are not an exchangeable menu item - it would have to be one or the other.


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Currently Watching: -Operation Proposal -The King 2 Hearts I've Seen: -We Got Married -Princess Hours -The Vineyard Man -The 1st Shop of Coffee Prince -Boys Over Flowers -The Man Who Can't Marry -My Fair Lady -You're Beautiful -IRIS -Oh! My Lady -Personal Preference -My Girlfriend is a Gumiho -Playful Kiss -Mary Stayed Out All Night -Secret Garden -Dream High -My Princess -Lie to Me -The Greatest Love -2PM Show -Heartstrings -Can't Lose -City Hunter -Vampire Prosecutor -City Hunter -Sungkyunkwan Scandal I don't own any images. Most are from their official site.
Theme by Andrew of UT


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In the wake of closely contested elections, calls for laws that require voters to present photo identification as a condition to cast a ballot have become pervasive. Advocates tend to rely on two rhetorical devices: (1) anecdotes about a couple of elections tainted by voter fraud; and (2) "common sense" arguments that voters should produce photo identification because identification is required to board airplanes, buy alcohol, and engage in other activities. This Article explains the analytical shortcomings of anecdote, analogy, and intuition, and applies a cost-benefit approach generally overlooked in election law scholarship.
Keeping the Door Ajar for Foreign Plaintiffs in Global Cartel Cases after Empagran
In many ways, the Supreme Court's opinion in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. raised more questions than it answered. Growing out of the massive international vitamins cartel uncovered in the 1990s, Empagran presented a scenario in which all parties were foreign and all conduct occurred abroad. Although it is "well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States," Empagran presented the Court with the first truly foreign antitrust case. It involved not only foreign conduct, but also foreign plaintiffs complaining of injuries suffered abroad at the hands of foreign defendants. The case therefore appeared to present thorny questions about the proper construction of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA") and the extent of the Sherman Act's extraterritorial application.


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Thyroid Problems (cont.) Medical Author:
Stephanie L Lee, MD, PhD, FACE
Medical Editor:
Melissa Conrad Stöppler, MD, Chief Medical Editor
Melissa Conrad Stöppler, MD, Chief Medical EditorMelissa Conrad Stöppler, MD, is a U.S. board-certified Anatomic Pathologist with subspecialty training in the fields of Experimental and Molecular Pathology. Dr. Stöppler's educational background includes a BA with Highest Distinction from the University of Virginia and an MD from the University of North Carolina. She completed residency training in Anatomic Pathology at Georgetown University followed by subspecialty fellowship training in molecular diagnostics and experimental pathology. Medical Editor:
Jerry R. Balentine, DO, FACEP
Jerry R. Balentine, DO, FACEPDr. Balentine received his undergraduate degree from McDaniel College in Westminster, Maryland. He attended medical school at the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine graduating in1983. He completed his internship at St. Joseph's Hospital in Philadelphia and his Emergency Medicine residency at Lincoln Medical and Mental Health Center in the Bronx, where he served as chief resident. IN THIS ARTICLE
Hypothyroidism in PregnancyNewly diagnosed hypothyroidism in pregnancy is rare because most women with untreated hypothyroidism do not ovulate or produce mature eggs in a regular manner, which makes it difficult for them to conceive. It is a difficult new diagnosis to make based on clinical observation. The signs and symptoms of hypothyroidism (fatigue, poor attention span, weight gain, numbness, and tingling of the hands or feet) are also prominent symptoms of a normal pregnancy. Undiagnosed hypothyroidism during pregnancy increases the chance of stillbirth or growth retardation of the fetus. It also increases the chance that the mother may experience complications of pregnancy such as anemia, eclampsia, and placental abruption. Probably the largest group of women who will have hypothyroidism during pregnancy are those who are currently on thyroid hormone replacement. The ideal thyroxine replacement dose (for example, levothyroxine [Synthroid, Levoxyl, Levothroid, Unithroid]) may rise by 25% to 50% during pregnancy. It is important to have regular checks of T4 and TSH blood levels as soon as pregnancy is confirmed; and frequently through the first 20 weeks of pregnancy to make sure the woman is taking the correct medication dose. It is recommended that the levothyroxine dose be adjusted to keep the TSH level < 2.5 mIU/L during the first trimester of pregnancy and < 3 mIU/L during the last two trimesters of pregnancy. Usually the increase in thyroid hormone needed during pregnancy disappears after the delivery of the baby and the pre-pregnancy dose of levothyroxine can be resumed immediately post-partum. Next Page: Must Read Articles Related to Thyroid Problems
Hashimoto's Disease
Hashimoto's disease (also referred to as Hashimoto's thyroiditis, chronic autoimmune thyroiditis, or chronic lymphocytic thyroiditis) is a disease affecting the...learn more >>
Hyperthyroidism refers to a condition in which the thyroid gland produces too much thyroid hormone. Causes of hyperthyroidism include Graves' disease, thyroid a...learn more >>
Hypothyroidism is a condition in which the thyroid gland does not produce enough thyroid hormone. Causes of hypothyroidism include Hashimotot's thyroiditis, sub...learn more >>
Patient Comments & ReviewsThe eMedicineHealth doctors ask about Thyroid Problems: |
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Find out what women really need.
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Read What Your Physician is Reading on Medscape
Thyroid Disease »
The thyroid gland plays an important role in tissue metabolism and development.


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Stella Rosa Sweet Wine Assortment
Stella Rosa produces two of America's favorite semi-sweet, lightly carbonated wines, are nestled along side gourmet snacks and a wine stopper to keep their libations fresh. More
The Best Value in Gift Giving. Free Personalized Gift Card with every Gift. Great Values -- Every Day!$79.95 | MORE DETAIL |
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Personalized Barware
For beer, wine, champagne and more. We have it all, shop now!


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New Customer ? Start Here.
Can't find what you're looking for? Shop all ink and toner cartridges by brand
Item: 942754 Model: 850005
MBI Allstars Sports Postbound Album is a handsome album that is the perfect complement to any sports-themed layout. The front cover features a variety of general sports-themed sayings and a 6 x 4 inches opening for showcasing a special photograph. Inside are (10) 12 x 12 inches top-loading page protectors each with a white paper insert. This imported package contains one Red album, and is acid-free and photo safe.
This Web site is intended for use by US residents only. See International Sites. See our delivery policy for full details. Copyright 2013, Staples, Inc., All Rights Reserved.


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Happy Hedgehog™
› View More Collections
Glider Premier Gliding Swing
DuetSoothe Swing + Rocker
Glider Elite Gliding Swing
The best moments in the day are the ones spent with baby, so make the most of precious time with Graco's DuetSoothe™ Swing + Rocker. This ingenious swing has a seat that doubles as a rocker, giving you the flexibility to move around the house while keeping baby cozy and close-by. In swing mode, three seating positions give baby the option to sway side-to-side or swing back-and-forth – whatever he prefers! With added features such as a plug, vibration, and music, the Graco DuetSoothe™ Swing + Rocker has all the options baby will love.
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< Return To Hearing
The Honorable Randall NewsomeDecember 6, 2006
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, I am honored to appear before you to discuss the implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter referred to as BAPCPA). By way of introduction, I have been a United States Bankruptcy Judge in the Northern District of California since May of 1988, and chief judge of the district since January of 2004. From October, 1982 until May, 1988, I was a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of Ohio. From October of 1998 until October of 1999, I was the president of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. However, I want to make it clear from the outset that I am appearing before this Subcommittee representing myself only, and not the NCBJ or any of its members. This and many other "puzzlers" in BAPCPA should be revamped to avoid further inefficient expenditures of time for both the bench and bar. |


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No Expedia Cancellation Fee
Book, change, or cancel almost any hotel without paying an Expedia fee.
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Book, change, or cancel almost any hotel without paying an Expedia fee.
Discover non-stop shopping, famous landmarks, and world-class museums (from art to science) in Tsim Sha Tsui. Serious shoppers should try the Harbour City shopping complex. Nathan Road's Golden Mile offers more of the local scene. Canton Road offers designer labels, and Granville and Cameron roads boast bargain clothing. Head harborside to the promenade for the nightly Symphony of Lights show.
Pack your bags, grab your itinerary, and get ready for the getaway of a lifetime; with the hotels in Tsim Sha Tsui, Hong Kong, you'll be on your way to a budget-friendly vacation faster than you can say cheap deal. Browse Expedia's specials and secure yourself a great deal today.


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LED TVs
Reviews & hands-on
Televisions 5 out of 5
Sony KDL-40W905A smart 3D TV review
Sony seems determined to improve its image. While rival TV manufacturers tout voice recognition systems and play tuner Top Trumps, Sony's latest flagship is all about picture quality. Indeed with its groundbreaking wide colour Triluminos backlight and...
Home Cinema 3 out of 5
Hannspree SE40LMNB review
Can a telly that lacks Freeview HD, 3D and any semblance of a 'smart' platform really be considered suitable for modern living? That depends on what you're after, but we're sure Hannspree's latest bargain basement edge LED-backlit LCD TV has enough to...
Home Cinema
Samsung 55ES8000 LED TV pictures and hands-on
Samsung's 55-inch Super OLED TV quite rightly grabbed the CES headlines but the Korean company also used this year's Vegas expo to go live with its "ultra-slim bezel" range with the Samsung UNES8000 leading the way. The edge lit LED line ranges in size...
Home Cinema 4 out of 5
Toshiba 47VL863 review
Toshiba deserves its reputation as a click-teaser. SED, Cell TV, Full-array LED: all mouth-watering TV technologies that it's promised that have come to nought. But there is hope. This year the company appears determined to be cutting-edge and not just...


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They were among the youngest at the Sikh temple near Milwaukee that deadly Sunday – and some of the bravest. Amanat Singh, 9, and her brother, Abhay Singh, 11, were playing outside when they heard gunshots that sounded like fireworks. It was the start of the...
Read more http://feeds.abcnews.com/click.phdo?i=505f1d79106effc4ee955861b7a0df40
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An adult 21 years or over must be present to sign for delivery of alcoholic beverages. Order tracking numbers will be emailed to you upon shipment, so you'll know when to expect delivery. We offer the following options for your convenience:
Ground: Delivery generally between 1 and 7 business days once the package leaves our warehouse.
3 Day: Delivery to businesses by 4:30 pm and to residences by 7:00 pm in 3 business days once the package leaves our warehouse.
2 Day: Delivery to businesses by 4:30 pm and to residences by 7:00 pm in 2 business days to most areas once the package leaves our warehouse.
Overnight p.m.: Next business day delivery by 3:00 pm to most U.S. addresses ( by 4:30 p.m. to rural areas) once the package leaves our warehouse.
Overnight a.m.: Next business day delivery by 10:30 am to most U.S. addresses once the package leaves our warehouse; Remote areas by noon, 4:30 pm or 5:00 pm; Saturdays by noon, 1:30 pm or 4:30 pm. In extreme heat, ice-packs will be added.
Note: Saturday delivery available to most locations. Please click to change "delivery method" and check the adjacent calendar to see if Saturday shipping is available.
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Origin: Santa Maria, California Description: Light, refreshing, with a touch of sweetness. Excellent accompaniment for cocktails. Best Served With: Full-flavored Fish, Salads, Cheeses, Pizza, Meat, Veal & Chicken
Tucked away amongst the strawberry fields and row crops of industrial Oxnard lies Herzog Wine Cellars. Headed by winemaker Joe Hurliman, the winery combines the future of high-quality California wines with the stringencies of kosher supervision, and the Herzog family heritage of perfection. These three elements have produced unique wines that are being noticed in the kosher and...Read More About Baron Herzog
California has nearly 100 American Viticulture Areas (AVAs) and accounts for almost 90% of wine production in the United States. In our section of Other California, we include wines from smaller AVAs as well as wines from the California AVA. Here are a few smaller AVAs you may see on the label: Livermore Valley AVA, located right outside of San Francisco and home to...Read More About Other California
Rose(roe-ZAY) A Rose by Any Other Name Technically, a rose is an unfinished red wine, but the term seems so- secondary. Rose is a different sort of wine, with all the refreshing qualities of a white wine mixed with some characteristics of a red. It can be made from many different grape varietals and in many different regions, the most popular and successful being Southern France,...Read More About Rose
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New day. New Daily Deal. Get it before it is gone.
New Customer ? Start Here.
Can't find what you're looking for? Shop all ink and toner cartridges by brand
Item: IM1QZ8973 Model: GSM7226LP-100NES
NETGEAR ProSafe ethernet switch is of 24-port Layer 2 with power 192W has fast gigabit ethernet technology. Switch includes redundant power supply option for uninterruptible operation and advanced multicast filtering.
Switch Form Factor | Desktop/Rack Mount |
Network Management Type | Managed Switch |
Ports | 26 |
Performance Class | Gigabit Ethernet |
Data Rate Performance | Up to 10/100/1000 Mbps |
This Web site is intended for use by US residents only. See International Sites. See our delivery policy for full details. Copyright 2013, Staples, Inc., All Rights Reserved.


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Avoca Surf Cam & Surf Report
@ 7 sec
H 3:16 AM (1.5m)
L 10:06 AM (0.7m)
8/03/2014 6:35 AM | Report
The winds are up from the NNE early and it's still only small along coast with 1-2ft at best of SE swell with ordinary conditions early. Try the sheltered N corners early but it's only average and ENE winds are forecast for later in the day. Upgrade to Coastalwatch PLUS and never miss a session with advanced surf forecasts - just 99c the first 8 weeks.
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The best board for today is :
Tomorrow's Surf Forecast
Marine Outlook
Forecast for Saturday 8 March until midnight
Winds: East to northeasterly 15 to 20 knots.
Seas: 1 to 1.5 metres, decreasing
below 1 metre during the morning.
Swell: Southeasterly below 1 metre. Weather:
The chance of thunderstorms.
Winner Announced - Win A Jayco Toy Hauler Competition
We are pleased to announce the winner of our recent competition -Win a Jayco Toy Hauler Caravan.
Video: Before The Webcast, Quiksilver Pro Free-surfs – Snapper Rocks, March 3-4, 2014
Standout Sessions: When Parko said the bank was good, he sure wasn't kidding.
Gallery: Snapper Rocks Super Session, March 4, 2014
A Divine Comedy takes place with the world greatest and a pumping superbank.
Video: The Joy South of Sydney, NSW – February 25, 2014
Standout Sessions: Garrett Parkes, some friends and locals had a hell time on the South Coast of NSW this week.
Weekend Surf Forecast 7- 9 March 2014
It's shaping up as another wave filled weekend around the continent. Check out the weekend forecast.


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Wiha Product Finder The fastest route to the right product
Find the right tool for the right job quickly with Wiha Product Finder. When you click on the desired properties, the Product Finder selects the results from within the selected product groups and displays them together. Click again and the selection screen is refreshed. You are free to select again.
Go to the Product Finder for: