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THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON. - James Madison, The Writings, vol. 7 (1803-1807) [1908]Edition used:The Writings of James Madison, comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence, including his numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed, ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900). Vol. 7.
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THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON.TO CHARLES PINCKNEY.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, Jany 10 1803. Sir,Since my letter of November 27th on the subject of what had taken place at New Orleans, a letter has been received from the Governor of Louisiana to Governor Claiborne, in which it is stated that the measure of the Intendant was without instructions from his Government, and admitted that his own judgment did not concur with that of the Intendant. You will find by the printed documents herewith transmitted that the subject engaged the early and earnest attention of the House of Representatives, and that all the information relating to it, possessed by the Executive, prior to the receipt of that letter, was reported in consequence of a call for it. The letter itself has been added to that report; but being confidentially communicated, it does not appear in print: a translation of it however is herewith inclosed. You will find also that the House has passed a resolution explicitly declaring that the stipulated rights of the United States on the Mississippi will be inviolably maintained. The disposition of many members was to give to the resolution a tone and complexion still stronger. To these proofs of the sensation which has been produced, it is to be added, that representations, expressing the peculiar sensibility of the Western Country, are on the way from every quarter of it, to the Government. There is in fact but one sentiment throughout the union with respect to the duty of maintaining our rights of navigation and boundary. The only existing difference relates to the degree of patience which ought to be exercised during the appeal to friendly modes of redress. In this state of things it is to be presumed that the Spanish Government will accelerate by every possible means, its interposition for that purpose; and the President charges you to urge the necessity of so doing with as much amicable decision as you can employ. We are not without hopes, that the Intendant will yield to the demands which have been made on him, and to the advice which he will have received from the Spanish Minister here. But it will be expected from the justice and good faith of the Spanish Government, that its precise orders to that effect will be forwarded by the quickest conveyance possible. The President wishes also, that the expedient suggested in the letter above referred to, for preventing similar occurrences and delays, may also be duly pressed on that ground. The deposition of George Lee, respecting the forgery of our Mediterranean passport, with copies of my last letters are inclosed. The short notice given of the present opportunity leaves me time to add nothing more than assurances of the esteem and respect with which I remain, etc. TO CHARLES PINCKNEY.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, January 18th 1803. Sir,My letters of Nov. 27th and Jany 10th communicated the information which had been received at those dates, relating to the violation at New Orleans of our Treaty with Spain; together with what had then passed between the House of Representatives and the Executive on the subject. I now inclose a subsequent resolution of that branch of the Legislature. Such of the debates connected with it, as took place with open doors, will be seen in the Newspapers which it is expected will be forwarded by the Collector at New York, by the present opportunity. In these debates, as well as in indications from the press, you will perceive, as you would readily suppose, that the Cession of Louisiana to France has been associated as a ground of much solicitude, with the affair at New Orleans. Such indeed has been the impulse given to the public mind by these events, that every branch of the Government has felt the obligation of taking the measures most likely, not only to re-establish our present rights, but to promote arrangements by which they may be enlarged and more effectually secured. In deliberating on this subject, it has appeared to the President, that the importance of the crisis, called for the experiment of an Extraordinary Mission, carrying with it the weight attached to such a measure, as well as the advantage of a more thorough knowledge of the views of the Government and the sensibility of the public, than could be otherwise conveyed. He has accordingly selected for this service, with the approbation of the Senate Mr. Monroe formerly our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, and lastly Governor of the State of Virginia, who will be joined with Mr. Livingston in a Commission extraordinary to treat with the French Republic, and with yourself in a like Commission, to treat, if necessary with the Spanish Government. The President has been careful on this occasion to guard effectually against any possible misconstruction in relation to yourself by expressing in his message to the Senate, his undiminished confidence in the ordinary representation of the United States, and by referring the advantages of the additional mission to considerations perfectly consistent therewith. Mr. Monroe will be the bearer of the instructions under which you are to negotiate. The object of them will be to procure a Cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States, and consequently the establishment of the Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana. In order to draw the French Government into the measure, a sum of money will make part of our propositions, to which will be added, such regulations of the commerce of that river and of the others entering the Gulph of Mexico as ought to be satisfactory to France. From a letter received by the President from a respectable person, it is inferred with probability that the French Government is not averse to treat on those grounds, and such a disposition must be strengthened by the circumstances of the present moment. Though it is probable that this Mission will be completed at Paris, if its objects are at all attainable, yet it was necessary to apprize you thus far of what is contemplated both for your own satisfaction and that you may be prepared to co-operate on the occasion as circumstances may demand. Mr. Monroe will not be able to sail for two weeks or perhaps more. Of the letters to you on the infraction of our rights at New Orleans, several copies have already been forwarded. Another is now inclosed. It is of the deepest importance that the Spanish Government should have as early an opportunity as possible of correcting and redressing the injury. If it should refuse or delay to do so, the most serious consequences are to be apprehended. The Government and people of the United States, are friendly to Spain, and know the full value of peace; but they know their rights also, and will maintain them. The Spirit of the nation is faithfully expressed in the resolution of the House of Representatives above referred to. You will make the proper use of it with the Spanish Government in accelerating the necessary orders to its officer at New Orleans, or in ascertaining the part it means to take on the occasion. The Convention with Spain is now before the Senate who have not come to a decision upon it. As soon as its fate is known I shall transmit you the necessary information. TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, January 18th 1803. Sir,My letters of December 23 and January 3 communicated the information which had been received of those dates, relating to the violation at New Orleans of our Treaty with Spain; together with what had then passed between the House of Representatives and the Executive on the subject. I now inclose a subsequent resolution of that branch of the Legislature. Such of the debates connected with it, as took place with open doors, will be seen in the newspapers which it is expected will be forwarded by the Collector at New York by the present opportunity. In these debates as well as in indications from the press, you will perceive, as you would readily suppose, that the Cession of Louisiana to France, has been associated as a ground of much solicitude, with the affair at New Orleans. Such indeed has been the impulse given to the public mind by these events that every branch of the Government has felt the obligation of taking the meassures most likely, not only to re-establish our present rights, but to promote arrangements by which they may be enlarged and more effectually secured. In deliberating on this subject it has appeared to the President that the importance of the crisis, called for the experiment of an extraordinary mission carrying with it the weight attached to such a measure, as well as the advantage of a more thorough knowledge of the views of the Government and the sensibility of the people, than could be otherwise conveyed. He has accordingly selected for this service, with the approbation of the Senate, Mr. Monroe formerly our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, and lately Governor of the State of Virginia, who will be joined with yourself in a Commission extraordinary to treat with the French Republic and with Mr. Pinckney in a like Commission, to treat, if necessary, with the Spanish Government. The President has been careful on this occasion to guard effectually against any possible misconstruction in relation to yourself, by expressing in his message to the Senate, his undiminished confidence in the ordinary representation of the United States, and by referring the advantages of the additional Mission to considerations consistent therewith. Mr. Monroe will be the bearer of the instructions under which you are jointly to negotiate. The object of them will be to procure a Cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States, and consequently the establishment of the Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana. In order to draw the French Government into the measure, a sum of money will make part of our propositions, to which will be added such regulations of the commerce of that river, and of the others entering the Gulph of Mexico, as ought to be satisfactory to France. From a letter received by the President from the respectable person alluded to in my last, it is inferred with probability, that the French Government is not averse to treat on those grounds. And such a disposition must be strengthened by the circumstances of the present moment. I have thought it proper to communicate this much to you, without waiting for the departure of Mr. Monroe, who will not be able to sail for two weeks or perhaps more. I need not suggest to you, that in disclosing this diplomatic arrangement to the French Government and preparing the way for the object of it, the utmost care is to be used, in expressing extravagant anticipations of the terms to be offered by the United States; particularly of the sum of money to be thrown into the transaction. The ultimatum on this point will be settled before the departure of Mr. Monroe, and will be communicated by him. The sum hinted at in the letter to the Presiident above referred to is —livres. If less will not do, we are prepared to meet it: but it is hoped that less will do, and that the prospect of accommodation will concur with other motives in postponing the expedition to Louisiana. For the present I barely remark that a proposition made to Congress with shut doors is under consideration which if agreed to will authorize a payment of about ten Millions of livres under arrangements of time and place, that may be so convenient to the French Government, as to invite a prompt as well as a favorable decision in the case. The sum to which the proposition is limited, and which will probably not be effectually concealed, may at the same time assist in keeping the pecuniary expectations of the French cabinet. Your letter of Nov. 10 with one from Mr. Sumter of — have been received. As no mention is made of the disastrous state of St. Domingo, we conclude that it was not then known at Paris; and ascribe to that ignorance the adherence to the plan of sending troops to take possession of Louisiana. If the French Government do not mean to abandon the reduction of that Island, it is certain that troops cannot be spared for the other object. The language held by Genl. Hector, as communicated to you, claims attention, and would be entitled to much more, if the imputation to the French Government, of views which would force an unnecessary war with the United States, could be reconciled with any motive whatever sufficient to account for such an infatuation. TO RUFUS KING.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, January 29th 1803. Sir,My letter of the 23d Ult, with a postscript of the 3d of this month, communicated the information which had been received at those dates relating to the violation at New Orleans of our Treaty with Spain; together with what had then passed between the House of Representatives and the Executive on the subject. I now inclose a subsequent resolution of that branch of the Legislature. Such of the debates connected with it, as took place with open doors, will be seen in the newspapers. In these debates, as well as in indications from the press, you will perceive, as you would readily suppose, that the Cession of Louisiana to France, has been associated as a ground of much solicitude, with the affair at New Orleans. Such indeed has been the impulse given to the public mind by these events, that every branch of the Government has felt the obligation of taking the measures most likely not only to re-establish our present rights, but to promote arrangements by which they may be enlarged and more effectually secured. In deliberating on this subject, it has appeared to the President that the importance of the crisis, called for the experiment of an extraordinary mission; carrying with it the weight attached to such a measure, as well as the advantage of a more thorough knowledge of the views of the Government and of the sensibility of the public, than could be otherwise conveyed. He has accordingly selected for this service with the approbation of the Senate, Mr. Monroe, formerly our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, and lately Governor of the State of Virginia, who will be joined with Mr. Livingston in a Commission extraordinary to treat with the French Republic; and with the Spanish Government. Mr. Monroe is expected here tomorrow, and he will probably sail shortly afterwards from New York. These communications will enable you to meet the British Minister in conversation on the subject stated in your letter of May 7th 1802. The United States are disposed to live in amity with their neighbours whoever they may be, as long as their neighbours shall duly respect their rights, but it is equally their determination to maintain their rights against those who may not respect them; premising, where the occasion may require, the peaceable modes of obtaining satisfaction for wrongs, and endeavouring by friendly arrangements, and provident stipulations, to guard against the controversies most likely to occur. Whatever may be the result of the present Mission Extraordinary, nothing certainly will be admitted into it, not consistent with our prior engagements. The United States and Great Britain have agreed each for itself to the free and common navigation by the other, of the River Mississippi; each being left at the same time to a separate adjustment with other nations, of questions between them relative to the same subject. This being the necessary meaning of our Treaties with Great Britain, and the course pursued under them, a difference of opinion seems to be precluded. Any such difference would be matter of real regret; for it is not only our purpose to maintain the best faith with that nation, but our desire to cherish a mutual confidence and cordiality, which events may render highly important to both nations. Your successor has not yet been named, and it is now possible that the time you may have fixed for leaving England, will arrive before any arrangements for the vacancy, can have their effect. Should this be the case the President, sensible of the inconveniency to which you might be subjected by an unexpected detention, thinks it would not be reasonable to claim it of you. It may be hoped that the endeavours to prevent an interval in the Legation will be successful; and as it cannot be more than a very short one, no great evil can well happen from it. TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, March 2d, 1803. Gentlemen,You will herewith receive a Commission and letters of credence, one of you as Minister Plenipotentiary, the other as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, to treat with the Government of the French Republic, on the subject of the Mississippi and the Territory eastward thereof, and without the limits of the United States. The object in view is to procure by just and satisfactory arrangements a cession to the United States of New Orleans, and of West and East Florida, or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with. The French Republic is understood to have become the proprietor by a cession from Spain in the year NA of New Orleans, as part of Louisiana, if not of the Floridas also. If the Floridas should not have been then included in the Cession, it is not improbable that they will have been since added to it. It is foreseen that you may have considerable difficulty in overcoming the repugnance and the prejudices of the French Government against a transfer to the United States of so important a part of the acquisition. The apparent solicitude and exertions amidst many embarrassing circumstances, to carry into effect the cession made to the French Republic, the reserve so long used on this subject by the French Government in its communications with the Minister of the United States at Paris, and the declaration finally made by the French Minister of Foreign relations, that it was meant to take possession before any overtures from the United States would be discussed, shew the importance which is attached to the territories in question. On the other hand as the United States have the strongest motives of interest and of a pacific policy to seek by just means the establishment of the Mississippi, down to its mouth as their boundary, so these are considerations which urge on France a concurrence in so natural and so convenient an arrangement. Notwithstanding the circumstances which have been thought to indicate in the French Government designs of unjust encroachment, and even direct hostility on the United States, it is scarcely possible, to reconcile a policy of that sort, with any motives which can be presumed to sway either the Government or the Nation. To say nothing of the assurances given both by the French Minister at Paris, and by the Spanish Minister at Madrid, that the cession by Spain to France was understood to carry with it all the conditions stipulated by the former to the United States, the manifest tendency of hostile measures against the United States, to connect their Councils, and their Colosal growth with the great and formidable rival of France, can never escape her discernment, nor be disregarded by her prudence, and might alone be expected to produce very different views in her Government. On the supposition that the French Government does not mean to force, or Court war with the United States; but on the contrary that it sees the interest which France has in cultivating their neutrality and amity, the dangers to so desirable a relation between the two countries which lurk under a neighbourhood modified as is that of Spain at present, must have great weight in recommending the change which you will have to propose. These dangers have been always sufficiently evident; and have moreover been repeatedly suggested by collisions between the stipulated rights or reasonable expectations of the United States, and the Spanish jurisdiction at New Orleans. But they have been brought more strikingly into view by the late proceeding of the Intendant at that place. The sensibility and unanimity in our nation which have appeared on this occasion, must convince France that friendship and peace with us must be precarious until the Mississippi shall be made the boundary between the United States and Louisiana; and consequently render the present moment favorable to the object with which you [are] charged. The time chosen for the experiment is pointed out also by other important considerations. The instability of the peace of Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, the languishing state of the French finances, and the absolute necessity of either abandoning the West India Islands or of sending thither large armaments at great expence, all contribute at the present crisis to prepare in the French Government a disposition to listen to an arrangement which will at once dry up one source of foreign controversy, and furnish some aid in struggling with internal embarrassments. It is to be added, that the overtures committed to you coincide in great measure with the ideas of the person thro' whom the letter of the President of April 30-1802 was conveyed to Mr. Livingston, and who is presumed to have gained some insight into the present sentiments of the French Cabinet. Among the considerations which have led the French Government into the project of regaining from Spain the province of Louisiana, and which you may find it necessary to meet in your discussions, the following suggest themselves as highly probable. 1st. A jealousy of the Minister as leaning to a coalition with Great Britain and consistent with neutrality and amity towards France; and a belief that by holding the key to the commerce of the Mississippi, she will be able to command the interests and attachments of the Western portion of the United States; and thereby either controul the Atlantic porttion also, or if that cannot be done, to seduce the former with a separate Government, and a close alliance with herself. In each of these particulars the calculation is founded in error. It is not true that the Atlantic states lean towards any connection with Great Britain inconsistent with their amicable relations to France. Their dispositions and their interests equally prescribe to them amity and impartiality to both of those nations. If a departure from this simple and salutary line of policy should take place, the causes of it will be found in the unjust or unfriendly conduct experienced from one or other of them. In general it may be remarked, that there are as many points on which the interests and views of the United States and of Great Britain may not be thought to coincide as can be discovered in relation to France. If less harmony and confidence should therefore prevail between France and the United States than may be maintained between Great Britain and the United States, the difference will be not in the want of motives drawn from the mutual advantage of the two nations; but in the want of favorable dispositions in the Governments of one or the other of them. That the blame in this respect will not justly fall on the Government of the United States, is sufficiently demonstrated by the Mission and the objects with which you are now charged. The French Government is not less mistaken if it supposes that the Western part of the United States can be withdrawn from their present Union with the Atlantic part, into a separate Government closely allied with France. Our Western fellow citizens are bound to the Union not only by the ties of kindred and affection which for a long time will derive strength from the stream of emigration peopling that region, but by two considerations which flow from clear and essential interests. One of these considerations is the passage thro' the Atlantic ports of the foreign merchandize consumed by the Western inhabitants, and the payments thence made to a Treasury in which they would lose their participation by erecting a separate Government. The bulky productions of the Western Country may continue to pass down the Mississippi; but the difficulties of the ascending navigation of that river, however free it may be made, will cause the imports for consumption to pass thro' the Atlantic States. This is the course thro' which they are now received, nor will the impost to which they will be subject change the course even if the passage up the Mississippi should be duty free. It will not equal the difference in the freight thro' the latter channel. It is true that mechanical and other improvements in the navigation of the Mississippi may lessen the labour and expence of ascending the stream, but it is not the least probable, that savings of this sort will keep pace with the improvements in canals and roads, by which the present course of imports will be favored. Let it be added that the loss of the contributions thus made to a foreign Treasury would be accompanied with the necessity of providing by less convenient revenues for the expence of a separate Government, and of the defensive precautions required by the change of situation. The other of these considerations results from the insecurity to which the trade from the Mississippi would be exposed, by such a revolution in the Western part of the United States. A connection of the Western people as a separate state with France, implies a connection between the Atlantic States and Great Britain. It is found from long experience that France and Great Britain are nearly half their time at War. The case would be the same with their allies. During nearly one half the time therefore, the trade of the Western Country from the Mississippi, would have no protection but that of France, and would suffer all the interruptions which nations having the command of the sea could inflict on it. It will be the more impossible for France to draw the Western Country under her influence, by conciliatory regulations of the trade thro' the Mississippi, because regulations which would be regarded by her as liberal and claiming returns of gratitude, would be viewed on the other side as falling short of justice. If this should not be at first the case, it soon would be so. The Western people believe, as do their Atlantic brethren, that they have a natural and indefeasible right to trade freely thro' the Mississippi. They are conscious of their power to enforce their right against any nation whatever. With these ideas in their minds, it is evident that France will not be able to excite either a sense of favor, or of fear, that would establish an ascendency over them. On the contrary, it is more than probable, that the different views of their respective rights, would quickly lead to disappointments and disgusts on both sides, and thence to collisions and controversies fatal to the harmony of the two nations. To guard against these consequences, is a primary motive with the United States, in wishing the arrangement proposed. As France has equal reasons to guard against them, she ought to feel an equal motive to concur in the arrangement. 2d. The advancement of the commerce of France by an establishment on the Mississippi, has doubtless great weight with the Government in espousing this project. The commerce thro' the Mississippi will consist 1st of that of the United States, 2d of that of the adjacent territories to be acquired by France. The 1st is now and must for ages continue the principal commerce. As far as the faculties of France will enable her to share in it, the article to be proposed to her on the part of the United States on that subject promises every advantage she can desire. It is a fair calculation, that under the proposed arrangement, her commercial opportunities would be extended rather than diminished; inasmuch as our present right of deposit gives her the same competitors as she would then have, and the effect of the more rapid settlement of the Western Country consequent on that arrangement would proportionally augment the mass of commerce to be shared by her. The other portion of commerce, with the exception of the Island of New Orleans and the contiguous ports of West Florida, depends on the Territory Westward of the Mississippi. With respect to this portion, it will be little affected by the Cession desired by the United States. The footing proposed for her commerce on the shore to be ceded, gives it every advantage she could reasonably wish, during a period within which she will be able to provide every requisite establishment on the right shore; which according to the best information, possesses the same facilities for such establishments as are found on the Island of New Orleans itself. These circumstances essentially distinguish the situation of the French commerce in the Mississippi after a Cession of New Orleans to the United States, from the situation of the commerce of the United States, without such a Cession; their right of deposit being so much more circumscribed and their territory on the Mississippi not reaching low enough for a commercial establishment on the shore, within their present limits. There remains to be considered the commerce of the Ports in the Floridas. With respect to this branch, the advantages which will be secured to France by the proposed arrangement ought to be satisfactory. She will here also derive a greater share from the increase, which will be given by a more rapid settlement of a fertile territory, to the exports and imports thro' those ports, than she would obtain from any restrictive use she could make of those ports as her own property. But this is not all. The United States have a just claim to the use of the rivers which pass from their territories thro' the Floridas. They found their claim on like principles with those which supported their claim to the use of the Mississippi. If the length of these rivers be not in the same proportion with that of the Mississippi, the difference is balanced by the circumstance that both Banks in the former case belong to the United States. With a view to perfect harmony between the two nations a cession of the Floridas is particularly to be desired, as obviating serious controversies that might otherwise grow even out of the regulations however liberal in the opinion of France, which she may establish at the Mouth of those rivers. One of the rivers, the Mobile, is said to be at present navigable for 400 miles above the 31° of latitude, and the navigation may no doubt be opened still further. On all of them, the Country within the Boundary of the United States, tho' otherwise between that and the sea, is fertile. Settlements on it are beginning; and the people have already called on the Government to procure the proper outlets to foreign Markets. The President accordingly, gave some time ago, the proper instructions to the Minister of the United States at Madrid. In fact, our free communication with the sea thro' these channels is so natural, so reasonable, and so essential that eventually it must take place, and in prudence therefore ought to be amicably and effectually adjusted without delay. A further object with France may be, to form a Colonial establishment having a convenient relation to her West India Islands, and forming an independent source of supplies for them. This object ought to weigh but little against the Cession we wish to obtain for two reasons, 1st. Because the Country which the Cession will leave in her hands on the right side of the Mississippi is capable of employing more than all the faculties she can spare for such an object and of yielding all the supplies which she could expect, or wish from such an establishment: 2d. Because in times of general peace, she will be sure of receiving whatever supplies her Islands may want from the United States, and even thro' the Mississippi if more convenient to her; because in time of peace with the United States, tho' of War with Great Britain, the same sources will be open to her, whilst her own would be interrupted; and because in case of war with the United States, which is not likely to happen without a concurrent war with Great Britain (the only case in which she could need a distinct fund of supplies) the entire command of the sea, and of the trade thro' the Mississippi, would be against her, and would cut off the source in question. She would consequently never need the aid of her new Colony, but when she could make little or no use of it. There may be other objects with France in the projected acquisition; but they are probably such as would be either satisfied by a reservation to herself of the Country on the right side of the Mississippi, or are of too subordinate a character to prevail against the plan of adjustment we have in view; in case other difficulties in the way of it can be overcome. The principles and outlines of this plan are as follows viz. Ist.France cedes to the United States forever, the Territory East of the River Mississippi, comprehending the two Floridas, the Island of New Orleans and the Island lying to the North and East of that channel of the said River, which is commonly called the Mississippi, together with all such other Islands as appertain to either West or East Florida; France reserving to herself all her territory on the West side of the Mississippi. II.The boundary between the Territories ceded and reserved by France shall be a continuation of that already defined above the 31st degree of North Latitude viz, the middle of the channel or bed of the river, thro' the said South pass to the sea. The navigation of the river Mississippi in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, and in all its passages to and from the same shall be equally free and common to citizens of the United States and of the French Republic. III.The vessels and citizens of the French Republic may exercise commerce to and at such places on their respective shores below the said thirty first degree of North Latitude as may be allowed for that use by the parties to their respective citizens and vessels. And it is agreed that no other Nation shall be allowed to exercise commerce to or at the same or any other place on either shore, below the said thirty first degree of Latitude. For the term of ten years to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications hereof, the citizens, vessels and merchandizes of the United States and of France shall be subject to no other duties on their respective shores below the said thirty first degree of latitude than are imposed on their own citizens, vessels and merchandizes. No duty whatever shall, after the expiration of ten years be laid on Articles the growth or manufacture of the United States or of the ceded Territory exported thro' the Mississippi in French vessels, so long as such articles so exported in vessels of the United States shall be exempt from duty: nor shall French vessels exporting such articles, ever afterwards be subject to pay a higher duty than vessels of the United States. IV.The citizens of France may, for the term of ten years, deposit their effects at New Orleans and at such other places on the ceded shore of the Mississippi, as are allowed for the commerce of the United States, without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of stores. V.In the ports and commerce of West and East Florida, France shall never be on a worse footing than the most favored nations; and for the term of ten years her vessels and merchandize shall be subject therein to no higher duties than are paid by those of the United States and of the ceded Territory, exported in French vessels from any port in West or East Florida, [and] shall be exempt from duty as long as vessels of the United States shall enjoy this exemption. VI.The United States, in consideration of the Cession of Territory made by this Treaty shall pay to France — millions of livres Tournois, in the manner following, viz, They shall pay — millions of livres tournois immediately on the exchange of the ratifications hereof: they shall assume in such order of priority as the Government of the United States may approve, the payment of claims, which have been or may be acknowledged by the French Republic to be due to American citizens, or so much thereof as with the payment to be made on the exchange of ratifications will not exceed the sum of — and in case a balance should remain due after such payment and assumption, the same shall be paid at the end of one year from the final liquidation of the claims hereby assumed, which shall be payable in three equal annual payments, the first of which is to take place one year after the exchange of ratifications or they shall bear interest at the rate of six p Cent p annum from the date of such intended payments; until they shall be discharged. All the above mentioned payments shall be made at the Treasury of the United States and at the rate of one dollar and ten cents for every six livres tournois. VII.To incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision, which cannot now be made, it is to be expected, from the character and policy of the United States, that such incorporation will take place without unnecessary delay. In the meantime they shall be secure in their persons and property, and in the free enjoyment of their religion. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN.1st As the Cession to be made by France in this case must rest on the Cession made to her by Spain, it might be proper that Spain should be a party to the transaction. The objections however to delay require that nothing more be asked on our part, than either an exhibition and recital of the Treaty between France and Spain; or an engagement on the part of France, that the accession of Spain will be given. Nor will it be advisable to insist even on this much, if attended with difficulty or delay, unless there be ground to suppose that Spain will contest the validity of the transaction. 2d The plan takes for granted also that the Treaty of 1795 between the United States and Spain is to lose none of its force in behalf of the former by any transactions whatever between the latter and France. No change it is evident will be, or can be admitted to be produced in that Treaty or in the arrangements carried into effect under it, further than it may be superseded by stipulations between the United States and France, who will stand in the place of Spain. It will not be amiss to insist on an express recognition of this by France as an effectual bar against pretexts of any sort not compatible with the stipulations of Spain. 3d The first of the articles proposed, in defining the Cession refers to the South pass of the Mississippi, and to the Islands North and East of that channel. As this is the most navigable of the several channels, as well as the most direct course to the sea, it is expected that it will not be objected to. It is of the greater importance to make it the boundary, because several Islands will be thereby acquired, one of which is said to command this channel, and to be already fortified. The article expressly included also the Islands appertaining to the Floridas. To this there can be no objection. The Islands within six leagues of the shore are the subject of a British proclamation in the year 1763 subsequent to the Cession of the Floridas to Great Britain by France, which is not known to have been ever called in question by either France or Spain. The 2d Article requires no particular observations. Article 3d is one whose import may be expected to undergo the severest scrutiny. The modification to be desired is that, which, whilst it provides for the interest of the United States will be acceptable to France, and will give no just ground of complaint, and the least of discontent to Great Britain. The present form of the article ought and probably will be satisfactory to France; first because it secures to her all the commercial advantages on the river which she can well desire; secondly because it leaves her free to contest the mere navigation of the River by Great Britain, without the consent of France. The article also, in its present form violates no right of Great Britain, nor can she reasonably expect of the United States that they will contend beyond their obligations for her interest at the expense of their own. As far as Great Britain can claim the use of the river under her Treaties with us, or by virtue of, contiguous territory, the silence of the Article on that subject, leaves the claim unaffected. As far again as she is entitled under the Treaty of 1794 to the use of our Bank of the Mississippi above the 31st degree of N. Latitude, her title will be equally entire. The article stipulates against her only in its exclusion of her commerce from the bank to be ceded below our present limits. To this she cannot, of right object, 1st because the Territory not belonging to the United States at the date of our Treaty with her is not included in its stipulations, 2dly because the privileges to be enjoyed by France are for a consideration which Great Britain has not Given and cannot give 3dly because the conclusion in this case, being a condition on which the Territory will be ceded and accepted, the right to communicate the privilege to Great Britain will never have been vested in the United States. But altho' these reasons fully justify the article in its relation to Great Britain, it will be advisable before it be proposed, to feel the Pulse of the French Government with respect to a stipulation that each of the parties may without the consent of the other admit whomsoever it pleases to navigate the river and trade with their respective shores, on the same terms, as in other parts of France and the United States; and as far as the disposition of that Government will concur, to vary the proposition accordingly. It is not probable that this concurrence will be given; but the trial to obtain it will not only manifest a friendly regard to the wishes of Great Britain, and if successful, furnish a future price for privileges within her grant; but is a just attention to the interests of our Western fellow citizens, whose commerce will not otherwise be on an equal footing with that of the Atlantic States. Should France not only refuse any such change in the Article; but insist on a recognition of her right to exclude all nations, other than the United States, from navigating the Mississippi, it may be observed to her, that a positive stipulation to that effect might subject us to the charge of intermeddling with and prejudging questions existing merely between her and Great Britain; that the silence of the article is sufficient; that as Great Britain never asserted a claim on this subject against Spain, it is not to be presumed that she will assert it against France on her taking the place of Spain; that if the claim should be asserted the Treaties between the United States and Great Britain will have no connection with it, the United States having in those treaties given their separate consent only to the use of the river by Great Britain, leaving her to seek whatever other consent may be necessary. If, notwithstanding such expostulations as these, France shall inflexibly insist on an express recognition to the above effect it will be better to acquiesce in it, than to lose the opportunity of fixing an arrangement, in other respects satisfactory; taking care to put the recognition into a form not inconsistent with our treaties with Great Britain, or with an explanatory article that may not improbably be desired by her. In truth it must be admitted, that France as holding one bank, may exclude from the use of the river any Nation not more connected with it by Territory than Great Britain is understood to be. As a river where both its banks are owned by one Nation, belongs exclusively to that Nation; it is clear that when the Territory on one side is owned by one Nation and on the other side by another nation, the river belongs equally to both, in exclusion of all others. There are two modes by which an equal right may be exercised; the one by a negative in each on the use of the river by any other nation except the joint proprietor, the other by allowing each to grant the use of the river to other nations, without the consent of the joint proprietor. The latter mode would be preferable to the United States. But if it be found absolutely inadmissible to France, the former must in point of expediency, since it may in point of right be admitted by the United States. Great Britain will have the less reason to be dissatisfied on this account as she has never asserted against Spain, a right of entering and navigating the Mississippi, nor has she or the United States ever founded on the Treaties between them, a claim to the interposition of the other party in any respect; altho' the river has been constantly shut against Great Britain from the year 1783 to the present moment, and was not opened to the United States until 1795, the year of their Treaty with Spain. It is possible also that France may refuse to the United States, the same commercial use of her shores, as she will require for herself on those ceded to the United States. In this case it will be better to relinquish a reciprocity, than to frustrate the negotiation. If the United States held in their own right, the shore to be ceded to them, the commercial use of it allowed to France, would render a reciprocal use of her shore by the United States, an indispensable condition. But as France may, if she chuses, reserve to herself the commercial use of the ceded shore as a condition of the cession, the claim of the United States to the like use of her shore would not be supported by the principle of reciprocity, and may therefore without violating that principle, be waved in the transaction. The article limits to ten years the equality of French citizens, vessels and merchandizes, with those of the United States. Should a longer period be insisted on it may be yielded. The limitation may even be struck out, if made essential by France; but a limitation in this case is so desirable that it is to be particularly pressed, and the shorter the period the better. Art IV. The right of deposit provided for in this article, will accommodate the commerce of France, to and from her own side of the river, until an emporium shall be established on that side, which it is well known will admit of a convenient one. The right is limited to ten years, because such an establishment may within that period be formed by her. Should a longer period be required, it may be allowed, especially as the use of such a deposit would probably fall within the general regulations of our commerce there. At the same time, as it will be better that it should rest on our own regulations, than on a stipulation, it will be proper to insert a limitation of time, if France can be induced to acquiesce in it. Art. V. This article makes a reasonable provision for the commerce of France in the ports of West and East Florida. If the limitation to ten years of its being on the same footing with that of the United States, should form an insuperable objection, the term may be enlarged; but it is much to be wished that the privilege may not in this case, be made perpetual. Art VI—The pecuniary consideration, to be offered for the territories in question, is stated in Art. VI. You will of course favor the United States as much as possible both in the amount and the modifications of the payments. There is some reason to believe that the gross sum expressed in the Article, has occurred to the French Government, and is as much as will be finally insisted on. It is possible that less may be accepted, and the negotiation ought to be adapted to that supposition. Should a greater sum be made an ultimatum on the part of France, the President has made up his mind to go as far as fifty — million of livres tournois, rather than lose the main object. Every struggle however is to be made against such an augmentation of the price, that will consist with an ultimate acquiescence in it. The payment to be made immediately on the exchange of ratifications is left blank; because it cannot be foreseen either what the gross sum or the assumed debts will be; or how far a reduction of the gross sum may be influenced by the anticipated payments provided for by the act of Congress herewith communicated and by the authorization of the President and Secretary of the Treasury endorsed thereon. This provision has been made with a view to enable you to take advantage of the urgency of the French Government for money, which may be such as to overcome their repugnance to part with what we want, and to induce them to part with it on lower terms, in case a payment can be made before the exchange of ratifications. The letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of State, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, will explain the manner in which this advance of the ten Millions of livres, or so much thereof as may be necessary, will be raised most conveniently for the United States. It only remains here to point out the condition or event on which the advance may be made. It will be essential that the Convention be ratified by the French Government before any such advance be made; and it may be further required, in addition to the stipulation to transfer possession of the ceded territory as soon as possible, that the orders for the purpose, from the competent source, be actually and immediately put into your hands. It will be proper also to provide for the payment of the advance, in the event of a refusal of the United States to ratify the Convention. It is apprehended that the French Government will feel no repugnance to our designating the classes of claims and debts, which, embracing more equitable considerations than the rest, we may believe entitled to a priority of payment. It is probable therefore that the clause of the VI article referring it to our discretion may be safely insisted upon. We think the following classification such as ought to be adopted by ourselves. 1st. Claims under the fourth Article of the Convention of Sept. 1800. 2ndly. Forced contracts or sales imposed upon our citizens by French authorities; and 3rdly. Voluntary contracts, which have been suffered to remain unfulfilled by them. Where our citizens have become creditors of the French Government in consequence of Agencies or Appointments derived from it, the United States are under no particular obligation to patronize their claims, and therefore no sacrifice of any sort, in their behalf ought to be made in the arrangement. As far as this class of claimants can be embraced, with [out] embarrassing the negotiation, or influencing in any respect the demands or expectations of the French Government, it will not be improper to admit them into the provision. It is not probable however, that such a deduction from the sum ultimately to be received by the French Government will be permitted, without some equivalent accommodation to its interests, at the expence of the United States. The claims of Mr. Beaumarchais and several other French individuals on our government, founded upon antiquated or irrelevant grounds, altho' they may be attempted to be included in this negotiation have no connection with it. The American Government is distinguished for its just regard to the rights of foreigners and does not require those of individuals to become subjects of Treaty in order to be admitted. Besides, their discussion involves a variety of minute topics, with which you may fairly declare yourselves to be unacquainted. Should it appear however, in the course of the negotiation, that so much stress is laid on this point, that without some accommodation, your success will be endangered, it will be allowable to bind the United States for the payment of one Million of livres tournois to the representatives of Beaumarchais, heretofore deducted from his account against them; the French Government declaring the same never to have been advanced to him on account of the United States. Art. VII is suggested by the respect due to the rights of the people inhabiting the ceded territory and by the delay which may be found in constituting them a regular and integral portion of the Union. A full respect for their rights might require their consent to the Act of Cession; and if the French Government should be disposed to concur in any proper mode of obtaining it, the provision would be honorable to both nations. There is no doubt that the inhabitants would readily agree to the proposed transfer of their allegiance. It is hoped that the idea of a guarantee of the Country reserved to France may not be brought into the negotiation. Should France propose such a stipulation it will be expedient to evade it if possible, as more likely to be a source of disagreeable questions, between the parties concerning the actual casus federis than of real advantage to France. It is not in the least probable that Louisiana in the hands of that Nation will be attacked by any other whilst it is in the relations to the United States on which the guarantee would be founded; whereas nothing is more probable than some difference of opinion as to the circumstances and the degree of danger necessary to put the stipulations in force. There will be less reason in the demand of such an Article as the United States would [put] little value on a guarantee of any part of their territory and consequently there would be no great reciprocity in it. Should France notwithstanding these considerations make a guarantee an essential point, it will be better to accede to it than to abandon the object of the negotiation, mitigating the evil as much as possible by requiring for the casus federis a great and manifest danger threatened to the Territory guaranteed, and by substituting for an indefinite succour, or even a definite succour in Military force, a fixed sum of money payable at the Treasury of the United States. It is difficult to name the proper sum which is in no posture of the business to be exceeded, but it can scarcely be presumed that more than about — dollars, to be paid annually during the existence of the danger, will be insisted on. Should it be unavoidable to stipulate troops in place of money, it will be prudent to settle the details with as much precision as possible, that there may be no room for controversy either with France or with her money, on the fulfillment of the stipulation. The instructions thus far given suppose that France may be willing to cede to the United States the whole of the Island of New Orleans, and both the Floridas. As she may be inclined to dispose of a part or parts, and of such only, it is proper for you to know that the Floridas together are estimated at ¼ the value of the whole Island of New Orleans, and East Florida at ½ that of West Florida. In case of a partial Cession, it is expected, that the regulations of every other kind so far as they are onerous to the United States, will be more favorably modified. Should France refuse to cede the whole of the Island, as large a portion as she can be prevailed on to part with, may be accepted; should no considerable portion of it be attainable, it will still be of vast importance to get a jurisdiction over space enough for a large commercial town and its appurtenances, on the Bank of the river, and as little remote from the mouth of the river as may be. A right to chuse the place, would be better than a designation of it in the Treaty. Should it be impossible to procure a complete jurisdiction over any convenient spot whatever, it will only remain to explain and improve the present right of deposit, by adding thereto the express privilege of holding real estate for commercial purposes, of providing hospitals, of having Consuls residing there, and other Agents who may be authorized to authenticate and deliver all documents requisite for vessels belonging to and engaged in the trade of the United States to and from the place of deposit. The United States cannot remain satisfied, nor the Western people be kept patient under the restrictions which the existing Treaty with Spain authorizes. Should a Cession of the Floridas not be attainable your attention will also be due to the establishment of suitable deposits at the mouths of the rivers passing from the United States thro' the Floridas, as well as of the Free navigation of the rivers by Citizens of the United States. What has been above suggested in relation to the Mississippi and the deposit on its Banks is applicable to the other rivers; and additional hints relative to them all may be derived from the letter of which a copy is inclosed from the Consul at New Orleans. It has been long manifest, that whilst the injuries to the United States so frequently occurring from the Colonial offices scattered over our hemisphere and in our neighbourhood can only be repaired by a resort to their respective Governments in Europe, that it will be impossible to guard against the most serious inconveniences. The late events at New Orleans strongly manifest the necessity of placing a power somewhere nearer to us, capable of correcting and controuling the mischievous proceedings of such officers toward our citizens, without which a few individuals not always among the wisest and best of men, may at any time threaten the good understanding of the two Nations. The distance between the United States and the old continent, and the mortifying delays of explanations and negotiations across the Atlantic on emergencies in our neighborhood, render such a provision indispensable, and it cannot be long before all the Governments of Europe having American Colonies must see the necessity of making it. This object therefore will likewise claim your special attention. It only remains to suggest that considering the possibility of some intermediate violence between citizens of the United States and the French or Spaniards in consequence of the interruption of our right of deposit, and the probability that considerable damages will have been occasioned by that measure to citizens of the United States, it will be proper that indemnification in the latter case be provided for, and that in the former, it shall not be taken on either side as a ground or pretext for hostilities. These instructions, tho' as full as they could be conveniently made, will necessarily leave much to your discretion. For the proper exercise of it, the President relies on your information, your judgment, and your fidelity to the interests of your Country. TO JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, March 2d, 1803.1 Sir,You will herewith receive two Commissions with the correspondent instructions, in which, you are associated as Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary to the French Republic and to His Catholic Majesty, together with the respective letters of credence to those Governments. The allowance for the service will be a salary at the rate of nine thousand dollars a year. The general rule which dates the commencement of the salary at the time of leaving home being inapplicable to your case, inasmuch as your appointment was notified and accepted at this place; your salary will commence on the — day of January on which it was understood you accepted the appointment; and will cease with the termination of the business of your Mission; a quarter's salary being however added, as an allowance for the expences of your return home. The distinction between the circumstances of an extraordinary and temporary mission and those of a mission requiring a fixed establishment, is the ground on which no outfit is allowed. But you will be allowed your expences in repairing to Paris, including those of a Journey from your home to this place; and your expences in travelling between the places where you are or may be required to attend. In adopting this mode of allowance in lieu of the outfit, the President presuming your expences will not exceed a year's salary, has thought proper to make that the limit. In addition to the above, you will have a right to charge for postages and Couriers, should the latter prove necessary. Your Mission to Madrid will depend on the event of that to Paris, and on the information there to be acquired. Should the entire Cession in view be obtained from the French Republic as the assignees of Spain, it will not be necessary to resort to the Spanish Government. Should the whole or any part of the Cession be found to depend, not on the French, but on the Spanish Government you will proceed to join Mr. Pinckney in the requisite negotiations with the latter. Altho' the United States are deeply interested in the complete success of your Mission, the Floridas, or even either of them, without the Island of New Orleans, on proportionate terms, will be a valuable acquisition. The President will expect, that the most punctual and exact communication be made, of the progress and prospects of the negotiations; and of the apparent dispositions of the Governments of France and Spain towards the United States. Should either of them, particularly the former, not only reject our proposition but manifest a spirit from which a determined violation of our rights, and its hostile consequences, may be justly apprehended, it will become necessary to give ulterior instructions abroad as well as to make arrangements at home, which will require the earliest possible notice. The inclosed letters to our Bankers at Amsterdam and London, authorize them to pay your drafts for expences, as above referred to, and as you shall find it most convenient to draw upon the one or the other. Your experience will suggest to you the necessity of taking exact vouchers in all cases of expenditure, in order to the settlement of your accounts. Should you find it necessary to appoint a private Secretary on your arrival in Europe, you are authorized to do so, allowing him for his service at the rate of 1350 dollars p annum. If he should live in your family, the expences of his maintenance and travelling will be included in your accounts; but he cannot be allowed any thing separately for expenses and his salary will cease when the three months allowed for your return commence. As he will have been found in France or Spain it will not be unjust to leave him there without an extra allowance for returning. I have the honor to be, &c.TO CHARLES PINCKNEY.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, March 8th—1803. Sir,My last letter was of January 18. Yours since received are of 6th and 28th of November. Our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of January 20. At that date, the Edict of the Intendant against our right of deposit had not been revoked, altho' the letters to him and the Governor from the Spanish Minister here had been previously received. And it appears that the first outrage had been followed by orders of the most rigid tenor against every hospitable intercourse between our Citizens navigating the river, and the Spanish inhabitants. This continuation of the obstruction to our trade, and the approach of the season for carrying down the Mississippi the exports of the Western Country, have had the natural effect of increasing the Western irritation, and emboldening the advocates for an immediate redress by arms. Among the papers inclosed you will find the propositions moved in the Senate by Mr. Ross of Pennsylvania. They were debated at considerable length and with much ardour; and on the question had eleven votes in their favour against fourteen. The resolutions moved by Mr. Breckenridge, and which have passed into a law, will with the law itself be also found among the inclosed papers. These proceedings ought more and more to convince the Spanish Government that it must not only maintain good faith with the United States, but must add to this pledge of peace, some provident and effectual arrangement, as heretofore urged, for controuling or correcting the wrongs of Spanish Officers in America, without the necessity of crossing the Atlantic for the purpose. The same proceedings will shew at the same time that with proper dispositions and arrangement on the part of Spain, she may reckon with confidence, on harmony and friendship with this Country. Notwithstanding the deep stroke made at our rights and our interests, and the opportunity given for self redress in a summary manner, a love of peace, a respect for the just usages of Nations, and a reliance on the voluntary justice of the Spanish Government, have given a preference to remonstrance, as the first appeal on the occasion, and to negotiation as a source of adequate provisions for perpetuating the good understanding between the two nations; the measures taken on the proposition of Mr. Breckenridge being merely those of ordinary precaution and precisely similar to those which accompanied the mission of Mr. Jay to Great Britain in 1794. Should the deposit however not be restored in time for the arrival of the Spring craft, a new crisis will occur, which it is presumed that the Spanish Government will have been stimulated to prevent by the very heavy claims of indemnification to which it would be otherwise fairly subjected. The Marquis de Casa Yrujo does not yet despair of receiving from New Orleans favourable answers to his letters; but the remedy seems now to be more reasonably expected from Madrid. If the attention of the Spanish Government should not have been sufficiently quickened by the first notice of the proceeding from its own affairs; we hope that the energy of your interpositions will have overcome its tardy habits, and have produced an instant dispatch of the necessary orders.1 Mr. Monroe was to sail from New York for Havre de Grace on yesterday. He carries with him the instructions in which you are joined with him, as well as those which include Mr. Livingston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, April 18th—1803. Gentlemen,A month having elapsed since the departure of Mr. Monroe, it may be presumed that by the time this reaches you, communications will have passed with the French Government sufficiently explaining its views towards the United States, and preparing the way for the ulterior instructions which the President thinks proper should now be given. In case a conventional arrangement with France should have resulted from the negotiations with which you are charged; or in case such should not have been the result, but no doubt should be left that the French Government means to respect our rights and to cultivate sincerely peace and friendship with the United States, it will be expedient for you to make such communications to the British Government as will assure it that nothing has been done inconsistent with our good faith, and as will prevent a diminution of the good understanding which subsists between the two Countries. If the French Government instead of friendly arrangements, or views should be found to meditate hostilities or to have formed projects which will constrain the United States to resort to hostilities, such communications are then to be held with the British Government as will sound its dispositions and invite its concurrence in the War. Your own prudence will suggest that the communications be so made as on one hand, not to precipitate France into hostile operations, and on the other not to lead Great Britain from the supposition that war depends on the choice of the United States and that their choice of war will depend on her participation in it. If war is to be the result, it is manifestly desirable that it be dedelayed, until the certainty of this result can be known, and the Legislative and other provisions can be made here; and also of great importance that the certainty should not be known to Great Britain who might take advantage of the posture of things to press on the United States disagreeable conditions of her entering into the war. It will probably be most convenient in exchanging ideas with the British Government, to make use of its public Minister at Paris; as less likely to alarm and stimulate the French Government, and to raise the pretensions of the British Government, than the repairing of either of you to London, which might be viewed by both as a signal of rupture. The latter course however, may possibly be rendered most eligible by the pressure of the crisis. Notwithstanding the just repugnance of this Country to a coalition of any sort with the belligerent policies of Europe, the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of Great Britain in a war of the United States, at this period, against France and her allies, are too obvious and too important to be renounced. And notwithstanding the apparent disinclination of the British councils to a renewal of hostilities with France, it will probably yield to the various motives which will be felt to have the United States in the scale of Britain against France, and particularly for the immediate purpose of defeating a project of the latter which has evidently created much solicitude in the British Government. The price which she may attach to her co-operation cannot be foreseen, and therefore cannot be the subject of full and precise instructions. It may be expected that she will insist at least on a stipulation, that neither of the parties shall make peace or truce without the consent of the other, and as such an article cannot be deemed unreasonable, and will secure us against the possibility of her being detached in the course of the war, by seducing overtures from France, it will not be proper to raise difficulties on that account. It may be useful however to draw from her a definition, as far as the case will admit, of the objects contemplated by her, that whenever with ours they may be attainable by peace she may be duly pressed to listen to it. Such an explanation will be the more reasonable, as the objects of the United States will be so fair and so well known. It is equally probable that a stipulation of commercial advantages in the Mississippi beyond those secured by existing treaties, will be required. On this point it may be answered at once that Great Britain shall enjoy a free trade with all of the ports to be acquired by the United States, on the terms allowed to the most favored nation in the ports generally of the United States. If made an essential condition, you may admit that in the ports to be acquired within the Mississippi, the trade of her subjects shall be on the same footing for a term of about ten years with that of our own citizens. But the United States are not to be bound to the exclusion of the trade of any particular nation or nations. Should a mutual guarantee of the existing possessions, or of the conquests to be made by the parties, be proposed, it must be explicitly rejected as of no value to the United States, and as entangling them in the frequent wars of that nation with other powers, and very possibly in disputes with that nation itself. The anxiety which Great Britain has shown to extend her domain to the Mississippi, the uncertain extent of her claims, from North to South, beyond the Western limits of the United States, and the attention she has paid to the North West coast of America, make it probable that she will connect with a war on this occasion, a pretension to the acquisition of the Country on the West side of the Mississippi, understood to be ceded by Spain to France, or at least of that portion of it lying between that River and the Missoury. The evils involved in such an extension of her possessions in our neighborhood, and in such a hold on the Mississippi, are obvious. The acquisition is the more objectionable as it would be extremely displeasing to our western citizens: and as its evident bearing on South america might be expected to arouse all the jealousies of France and Spain, and to prolong the war on which the event would depend. Should this pretension therefore be pressed, it must be resisted, as altogether repugnant to the sentiments, and the sound policy of the United States. But it may be agreed, in alleviation of any disappointment of Great Britain that France shall not be allowed to retain or acquire any part of the territory, from which she herself would be precluded. The moment the prospect of war shall require the precaution you will not omit to give confidential notice to our public Ministers and Consuls, and to our naval commanders in the Mediterranean, that our commerce and public ships may be as little exposed to the dangers as possible. It may under certain circumstances be proper to notify the danger immediately to the Collectors in the principal ports of the U. States. Herewith inclosed are two blank plenipotentiary Commissions and letters of credence to the French and British Governments. Those for the British Government are to be filled with the name of Mr. Monroe, unless his Mission to France should have an issue likely to be disagreeable to Great Britain; in which case the President would wish Mr. Livingston inserted if the translation be not disagreeable to him, and the name of Mr. Monroe to be inserted in the Commission for the French Republic. To provide for the event of Mr. Livingston's translation, a letter of leave is inclosed. A separate letter to you is also inclosed, authorizing you to enter into such communications and conferences with British Ministers as may possibly be required by the conduct of France. The letter is made a separate one that it may be used with the effect, but without the formality of a commission. It is hoped that sound calculations of interest as well as a sense of right in the French Government, will prevent the necessity of using the authority expressed in the letter. In a contrary state of things the President relies on your own information, to be gained on the spot, and on your best discretion to open with advantage the communications with the British Government, and to proportion the degree of an understanding with it, to the indications of an approaching war with France. Of these indications you will be best able to judge. It will only be observed to you that if France should avow or evince a determination to deny to the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi, your consultations with Great Britain may be held on the ground that war is inevitable. Should the navigation not be disputed, and the deposit alone be denied, it will be prudent to adapt your consultations to the possibility that Congress may distinguish between the two cases, and make a question how far the latter right may call for an instant resort to arms, or how far a procrastination of that remedy may be suggested and justified by the prospect of a more favorable conjuncture. These instructions have thus far supposed that Great Britain and France are at peace, and that neither of them intend at present to interrupt it. Should war have actually commenced, or its approach be certain, France will no doubt be the more apt to concur in friendly accommodations with us, and Great Britain the more desirous to engaging us on her side. You will, of course, avail yourselves of this posture of things, for avoiding the necessity of recurring to Great Britain, or if the necessity cannot be avoided, for fashioning her disposition to arrangements which may be the least inconvenient to the United States. Whatever connection indeed may be eventually formed with Great Britain, in reference to war, the policy of the United States requires that it be as little entangling as the nature of the case will permit. Our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of the 25th of February. At that date the port had been opened for provisions carried down the Mississippi, subject to a duty of 6 p Cent, if consumed in the province, and an additional duty if exported; with a restriction in the latter case to Spanish bottoms, and to the external ports permitted by Spain to her colonial trade. A second letter written by the Spanish Minister here, had been received by the Intendant, but without effect. On the 10th of March his interposition was repeated in a form, which, you will find by his translated communication to the Department of State, in one of the inclosed papers, was meant to be absolutely effectual. You will find in the same paper the translation of a letter from the French charge d'Affaires here, to the Governor of Louisiana, written with a co-operating view. A provisional letter to any French Agents, who might have arrived, had been previously written by him, in consequence of a note from this Department founded on a document published at New Orleans shewing that orders had been given by the Spanish Government for the surrender of the province to France; and he has of late addressed a third letter on the subject to the Prefect said to have arrived at New Orleans. It does not appear however, from any accounts received, that Louisiana has yet changed hands. What the result of the several measures taken for restoring the right of deposit will be, remains to be seen. A representation on the subject was made by Mr. Graham, in the absence of Mr. Pinckney, to the Spanish Government on the 3d of February. No answer had been received on the 8th, but Mr. Graham was led by circumstances to make no particular inference from the delay. The silence of the French Government to Mr. Livingston's representation as stated in his letter of the NA day of NA is a very unfavorable indication. It might have been expected from the assurances given of an intention to observe the Treaty between Spain and the United States, and to cultivate the friendship of the latter, that the occasion would have been seized for evincing the sincerity of the French Government: and it may still be expected that no interposition that may be required by the actual state of things will be witheld, if peace and friendship with the United States be really the objects of that Government. Of this the Mission of Mr. Monroe, and the steps taken by you on his arrival, will doubtless have impressed the proper convictions. During this suspense of the rightful commerce of our Western Citizens, their conduct has been and continues to be highly exemplary. With the just sensibility produced by the wrongs done them, they have united a patient confidence in the measures and views of their Government. The justice of this observation will be confirmed to you by manifestations contained in the Western Newspapers herewith inclosed; and if duly appreciated, will not lessen the force of prudential as well as of other motives, for correcting past, and avoiding future trespasses on American rights. April 20th. The letter from the Marquis D'Yrujo, of which you will find a translated copy in the inclosed newspaper of this date, was yesterday received. The letters to which it refers, as containing orders for the reestablishment of our deposit at New Orleans were immediately forwarded. They will arrive in time we hope, to mitigate considerably the losses from the misconduct of the Spanish Intendant; and they are the more acceptable as they are an evidence of the respect in the Government of Spain for our rights and our friendship. From the allusion in this communication from the Spanish Minister to a future agreement between the two Governments on the subject of an equivalent deposit, it would seem that the Spanish Government regards the Cession to France as either no longer in force, or not soon to be carried into execution. However this may be, it will not be allowed, any more than the result of our remonstrance to Spain on the violation of our rights, to slacken the negotiations for the greater security and the enlargement of these rights. Whether the French or the Spaniards or both are to be our neighbours, the considerations which led to the measures taken with respect to these important objects, still require that they should be pursued into all the success that may be attainable. With sentiments of Great respect, &c.TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROEd. of s. mss. instr.Department of State April 18th—1803. Gentlemen,The reasonable and friendly views with which you have been instructed by the President to enter into negotiations with the French Government, justify him in expecting from them an issue favorable to the tranquility and to the useful relations between the two countries. It is not forgotten however that these views, instead of being reciprocal, may find on the part of France, a temper adverse to harmony, and schemes of ambition, requiring on the part of the United States, as well as of others, the arrangements suggested by a provident regard to events. Among these arrangements, the President conceives that a common interest may recommend a candid understanding and a closer connection with Great Britain; and he presumes that the occasion may present itself to the British Government in the same light. He accordingly authorizes you, or either of you in case the prospect of your discussions with the French Government should make it expedient, to open a confidential communication with Ministers of the British Government, and to confer freely and fully on the precautions and provisions best adapted to the crisis, and in which that Government may be disposed to concur, transmitting to your own without delay, the result of these consultations. With sentiments of high respect, &c.TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTONd. of s. mss. instr.Department of State May 25th, 1803. Sir,Your several letters of March 3, 11, 18, & 24 with their inclosures have been duly received; as has been that of March 12, to the President. According to the request in this last, I now acknowledge also, or perhaps repeat the acknowledgment of the two papers inclosed, the one in your letter of Feby. 26, the other in that of August 10-1802. The assurances given by the Chief Consul on the subject of our claims, cannot but be acceptable, altho' they amount to less than justice; because no more than justice would have been done, if the claims had been satisfied without the delay which has intervened, and according to the example of good faith and punctuality in executing the Treaty given by the United States. It is to be hoped that the sincerity of these assurances will be verified by the success of the measures you are taking for a final and favorable settlement in behalf of our Citizens, who have never doubted, as far as I know, your solicitude or your exertions to obtain justice for them. The assurances given at the same time, by the Chief Consul of his regard for the United States, and of his personal esteem for their Chief magistrate, are entitled also to favorable attention as an indication that a juster value begins to be placed on our friendly relations to the French Republic. Whether this language of the French Government be the effect of the political crisis in which it finds itself, or of a growing conviction of the important destinies and honorable policy of the United States, or, as is probable, of both these considerations, you will in return, communicate the assurances with which you are charged by the President, of his disposition to cherish a reciprocity of these sentiments, and that sincere amity between the two nations which is prescribed to both, by such weighty advantages. The persevering evasion of your demands on the subject of the deposit at New Orleans, and generally of the rights of the United States as fixed by their Treaty with Spain, is not a little astonishing. It is as difficult to be reconciled with the sincerity of the late professions of the French Government and with the policy which the moment dictates to it, as with any other rational motives. It is the more extraordinary too, as it appears by a late communication from the Spanish Government to Mr. Pinckney, of which he says he forwarded a copy to Paris, and of which another is herewith inclosed, that the Treaty of Cession expressly saves all rights previously stipulated to other nations. A conduct so inexplicable is little fitted to inspire confidence, or to strengthen friendship; and rendered proper the peremptory declaration contained in your note of the 16th of March. The negotiations succeeding the arrival of Mr. Monroe, cannot fail to draw out the views of France on this important subject. You were informed in my letters of the 18th and 20th of April that orders had been transmitted by the Spanish Government for restoring the deposit. The answers from New Orleans to the Spanish and French Ministers here, shew that their successive interpositions, including the peremptory one from the Marquis D'Yrujo of the 11th of March, were all unavailing. The orders of the King of Spain will no doubt be obeyed, if they arrive before possession be given to the French authority; nor is it presumable that in the event they would be disregarded. Still it is possible that the French Agents may chuse to wait for the French construction of the Treaty, before they relinquish the ground taken by the Intendant, and the more possible as the orders to the Intendant may contain no disavowal of his construction of it. Under these circumstances it will be incumbent on the French Government to hasten the orders necessary to guard against a prolongation of the evil, and the very serious consequences incident to it. It cannot be too much pressed that the justice and friendship of France, in relation to our rights and interests on the Mississippi, will be the principal rules by which we shall measure her views respecting the United States, and by which the United States will shape the course of their future policy towards her. Your answer to the complaint of a traffic of our Citizens with the negroes of St. Domingo, and of subscriptions in Philada. in behalf of the latter, was founded in just observations. You may now add, with respect to the subscriptions, the positive fact, that no such subscriptions have ever been instituted; and with respect to the other complaint, that no such traffic is known or believed to have taken place; or if it has taken place, that it must have been from foreign ports, and not from ports of the United States. You will find by the memorial herewith inclosed from three citizens of the United States now imprisoned at Jackmel, that whilst we repel unfounded complaints, on the part of France, the best founded ones exist on ours. The letter written to Mr. Pichon, on this occasion, of which a copy is inclosed, will suggest the proper representation to the French Government. It is to be wished that his answer to me, may be a type of that which will be given to you. The case of Capts. Rogers and Davidson will connect itself with that now committed to your attention. We are still ignorant of the result of the armed negotiations between Great Britain and France. Should it be war, or should the uncertainty of the result, be spun out, the crisis may be favorable to our rights and our just objects; and the President assures himself that the proper use will be made of it. Mr. Monroe's arrival has not yet been mentioned in any accounts which have not been contradicted.1 TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, May 28th 1803. Gentlemen,Since my last which was of April 18th the tenor of our information from France and Great Britain renders a war between these powers in the highest degree probable. It may be inferred at the same time from the information given by Mr. Livingston and Mr. King, that the importance of the United States is rising fast in the estimation both of the French and the British Cabinets, and that Louisiana is as much a subject of solicitude with the latter, as it has been an object of acquisition with the former. The crises presented by this jealous and hostile attitude of those rival powers has doubtless been seen in its bearings on the arrangements contemplated in your Commission and instructions; is hoped, tho' we have not yet heard, that the arrival of Mr. Monroe will have taken place in time, to give full advantage to the means of turning the actual state of things to the just benefit of the United States. The solicitude of England with respect to Louisiana is sufficiently evinced by her controuling the French expedition from Holland to that Country. But her views have been particularly unfolded to Mr. King by Mr. Addington, who frankly told him that in case a war should happen, it would perhaps be one of their first steps to occupy New Orleans, adding that it would not be to keep it, for that England would not accept the Country were all agreed to give it to her, but to prevent another power from obtaining it, which in his opinion would be best effected by its belonging to the United States; and concluding with assurances that nothing should be done injurious to their interests. If the Councils of France should be guided by half the wisdom which is here displayed on the part of her rival, your negotiations will be made easy, and the result of them very satisfactory. Altho' the immediate object of Great Britain in occupying New Orleans may be that of excluding France, and altho' her prudence may renounce the fallacious advantage of retaining it for herself, it is not to be presumed that she will yield it to the United States without endeavouring to make it the ground of some arrangement that will directly or indirectly draw them into her war, or of some important concessions in favour of her commerce at the expence of our own. This consideration necessarily connects itself with the explanation, and friendly assurances of Mr. Addington, and so far leaves in force the inducement to accomplish our object by an immediate bargain with France. In forming this bargain however, the prospect held out by the British Minister, with the nature of the crisis itself, authorizes us to expect better terms than your original instructions allow. The President thinks it will be ineligible under such circumstances that any Convention whatever on the subject should be entered into, that will not secure to the United States the jurisdiction of a reasonable district on some convenient part of the Bank of the Mississippi. He is made the more anxious also by the manner in which the British Government has opened itself to our Minister as well as by other considerations, that as little concession as possible should be made in the terms with France on points disagreeable to Great Briatin, and particularly that the acknowledgment of the right of France as holding one shore of the Mississippi to shut it against British vessels, should be avoided, if not essential to the attainment of the great objects we have in view, on terms otherwise highly expedient. It is desirable that such an acknowledgement should not even be admitted into the discussion. The guarantee of the Country beyond the Mississippi is another condition, which it will be well to avoid if possible, not only for the reasons you already possess, but because it seems not improbable from the communications of Mr. King that Great Britain is meditating plans for the emancipation and independence of the whole of the American Continent, South of the United States, and consequently that such guarantee would not only be disagreeable to her, but embarrassing to the United States. Should War indeed precede your Conventional arrangements with France, the guarantee, if admitted at all, must necessarily be suspended and limited in such a manner as to be applicable only to the state of things as it may be fixed by a peace. The proposed occupancy of New Orleans by Great Britain, suggests a further precaution. Should possession be taken by her, and the preliminary sum of 2 Millions or any part of it be paid to France, risks and disputes might ensue, which make it advisable to postpone the payment till possession shall be given to the United States, or if this cannot be done, obtain possible security against eventual loss. As the question may arise, how far in a state of War, one of the parties can of right convey territory to a neutral power, and thereby deprive its enemy of the chance of conquest incident to war, especially when the conquest may have been actually projected, it is thought proper to observe to you 1st That in the present case the project of peaceable acquisition by the United States originated prior to the War, and consequently before a project of conquest could have existed. 2dly That the right of a neutral to procure for itself by a bona fide, transaction property of any sort from a belligerent power ought not to be frustrated by the chance that a rightful conquest thereof might thereby be precluded. A contrary doctrine would sacrifice the just interests of peace to the unreasonable pretensions of war, and the positive rights of one nation to the possible rights of another. A restraint on the alienation of territory from a nation at War to a nation at peace is imposed only in cases where the proceeding might have a collusive reference to the existence of the War, and might be calculated to save the property from danger, by placing it in secret trust, to be reconveyed on the return of peace. No objection of this sort can be made to the acquisitions we have in view. The measures taken on this subject, were taken before the existence or the appearance of war, and they will be pursued as they were planned, with the bona fide purpose of vesting the acquisition forever in the United States. With these observations, you will be left to do the best you can, under all circumstances, for the interest of your Country; keeping in mind that the rights we assert are clear, that the objects we pursue are just, and that you will be warranted in providing for both by taking every fair advantage of emergencies. For the course of information relating to the deposit at New Orleans, I refer you to my letter of the 25th inst; to Mr. Livingston. TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTONd. of s. mss. instr.Department of State July 29th 1803. Sir,Since the date of my last which was May 24 I have received your several letters of April 11, 13 & 17 & May 12th. As they relate almost wholly to the subject which was happily terminated on the 30th of April a particular answer is rendered unnecessary by that event, and by the answer which goes by this conveyance to the joint letter from yourself and Mr. Monroe of the 13th of May. It will only be observed first that the difference in the diplomatic titles given to Mr. Monroe from that given to you, and which you understood to have ranked him above you was the result merely of an error in the Clerk who copied the document and which escaped attention when they were signed. It was not the intention of the President that any distinction of grade should be made between you. Indeed, according to the authority of Vattell the characters of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary are precisely of the same grade, altho' it is said that the usage, in France particularly, does not correspond with this idea. Secondly, that the relation of the First Consul to the Italian Republic, received the compliment, deemed sufficient in the answer to a Note of Mr. Pichon, communicating the flag, of that Nation. A copy of the communication and of the answer are now inclosed. The boundaries of Louisiana seem to be so imperfectly understood and are of so much importance, that the President wishes them to be investigated wherever information is likely to be obtained. You will be pleased to attend particularly to this object as it relates to the Spanish possessions both on the West and on the East side of the Mississippi. The proofs countenancing our claim to a part of West Florida may be of immediate use in the negotiations which are to take place at Madrid. Should Mr. Monroe have proceeded thither as is probable, and any such proofs should after his departure have come to your knowledge, you will of course have transmitted them to him. You will find by our Gazettes that your memorial drawn up about a year ago on the subject of Louisiana, has found its way into public circulation. The passages in it which strike at G. Britain have undergone some comments, and will probably be conveyed to the attention of that Government. The document appears to have been sent from Paris, where you will be able no doubt to trace the indiscretion to its author. No answer has yet been received either from you or Mr. Monroe to the diplomatic arrangement for London and Paris. The importance of shortening the interval at the former, and preventing one at the latter, makes us anxious on this point. As your late letters have not repeated your intention of returning home this fall, it is hoped that the interesting scenes which have since supervened may reconcile you to a longer stay in Europe. I have the honor, &c.TO JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State July 29, 1803. Sir,The communication by Mr. Hughes including the Treaty and Convention signed with the French Government, were safely delivered on the 14 instant. Inclosed is a copy of a letter written in consequence of them to Mr. Livingston and yourself. On the presumption, which accords with the information given by Mr. Hughes, that you will have proceeded to Madrid in pursuance of the instructions of the 17th February last, it is thought proper to observe to you, that altho' Louisiana may in some respects be more important than the Floridas, and has more than exhausted the funds allotted for the purchase of the latter, the acquisition of the Floridas is still to be pursued, especially as the crisis must be favorable to it. You will be at no loss for the arguments most likely to have weight in prevailing on Spain to yield to our wishes. These Colonies, separated from her other territory on this Contient, by New Orleans, the Mississippi, and the whole of Western Louisiana, are now of less value to her than ever, whilst to the United States, they retain the peculiar importance derived from their position, and their relations to us thro' the navigable rivers running from the U States into the Gulph of Mexico. In the hands of Spain they must ever be a dead expence in time of war, and at all times a source of irritation and ill blood with the United States. The Spanish Government must understand in fact that the United States can never consider the amicable relations between Spain and them as definitively and permanently secured, without an arrangement on this subject, which will substitute the manifest indications of nature, for the artificial and inconvenient state of things now existing. The advantage to be derived to your negotiations from the war which has just commenced, will certainly not escape you. Powerful, and it might be presumed, effectual use may be made of the fact, that Great Britain meant to seize New Orleans with a view to the anxiety of the United States to obtain it;—and of the inference from the fact, that the same policy will be pursued with respect to the Floridas. Should Spain be [engaged?] in the war it cannot be doubted that they will be quickly occupied by a British force, and held out on some condition or other, to the United States. Should Spain be still at peace, and wish not to lose her neutrality, she should reflect that the facility and policy of seizing the Floridas, must strengthen the temptations of G. Britain to force her into the war. In every view, it will be better for Spain, that the Floridas should be in the hands of the United States, than of Great Britain; and equally so, that they should be ceded to us on beneficial terms by herself, than that they should find their way to us thro' the hands of Great Britain. The Spanish Government may be assured of the sincere and continued desire of the United States to live in harmony with Spain; that this motive enters deeply into the solicitude of their Government for a removal of the danger to it, which is inseparable from such a neighborhood as that of the Floridas; and that having, by a late Convention with G. Britain, adjusted every territorial question and interest with that Nation, and the Treaty with France concerning Louisiana having just done the same with her, it only remains that the example be copied into an arrangement with Spain, who is evidently not less interested in it than we are. By the inclosed note of the Spanish Minister here, you will see the refusal of Spain to listen to our past overtures, with the reasons for the refusal. The answer to that communication is also inclosed. The reply to such reasons will be very easy. Neither the reputation nor the duty of his Catholic Majesty can suffer from any measure founded in wisdom, and the true interests of Spain. There is as little ground for supposing, that the maritime powers of Europe will complain of, or be dissatisfied with a Cession of the two Floridas to the United States, more than with the late cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, or more than with the former cessions thro' which the Floridas have passed. What the Treaties are subsequent to that of Utrecht, which are alleged to preclude Spain from the proposed alienation, have not been examined. Admitting them to exist in the sense put upon them, there is probably no maritime power who would not readily acquiesce in our acquisition of the Floridas, as more advantageous to itself, than the retention of them by Spain, shut up against all foreign commerce, and liable at every moment to be thrown into the preponderant scale of G. Britain. Great Britain herself would unquestionably have no objection to their being transferred to us; unless it should be drawn from her intention to conquer them for herself, or from the use she might expect to make of them, in a negotiation with the United States. And with respect to France, silence at least is imposed on her by the Cession to the United States, of the Province ceded to her by Spain; not to mention, that she must wish to see the Floridas, like Louisiana kept out of the hands of Great Britain, and has doubtless felt that motive in promising her good offices with Spain for obtaining these possessions for the United States. Of this promise you will of course make the proper use in your negotiations. For the price to be given for the Floridas, you are referred generally to the original instructions on this point. Altho' the change of circumstances lessens the anxiety for acquiring immediately a territory which now more certainly than ever, must drop into our hands, and notwithstanding the pressure of the bargain with France on our Treasury; yet for the sake of a peaceable and fair completion of a great object, you are permitted by the President in case a less sum will not be accepted, to give two Millions and a quarter of dollars, the sum heretofore apportioned to this purchase. It will be expected however, that the whole of it, if necessary be made applicable to the discharge of debts and damages claimed from Spain, as well those not yet admitted by the Spanish Government, as those covered by the Convention signed with it by Mr. Pinckney on the 11th day of Augt. 1802, and which was not ratified by the Senate because it embraced no more of the just responsibilities of Spain. On the subject of these claims, you will hold a strong language. The Spanish Government may be told plainly, that they will not be abandoned any farther than an impartial Tribunal may make exceptions to them. Energy in the appeal to its feelings, will not only tend to justice for past wrongs, but to prevent a repetition of them in case Spain should become a party to the present war. In arranging the mode, the time, and the priority of paying the assumed debts, the ease of the Treasury is to be consulted as much as possible: less is not to be done with that view, than was enjoined in the case of the French debts to our Citizens. The stock to be engaged in the transaction is not to be made irredeemable, without a necessity not likely to arise; and the interest as well as the principal should be payable at the Treasury of the United States. The only admissible limitation on the redemption of the stock is, that the holder shall not be paid off in less than about one fifth or one fourth of the amount in one year. Indemnifications for the violation of our deposit at New Orleans have been constantly kept in view, in our remonstrances and demands on that subject. It will be desirable to comprehend them in the arrangement. A distinction however is to be made between the positive and specific damages sustained by individuals, and the general injuries accruing from that breach of Treaty. The latter could be provided for by a gross and vague estimate only, and need not be pressed, as an indispensable condition. The claim however, may be represented as strictly just, and a forbearance to insist on it, as an item in the valuable considerations for which the Cession is made. Greater stress may be laid on the positive and specific damages capable of being formally verified by individuals; but there is a point beyond which it may be prudent not to insist even here; especially as the incalculable advantage accruing from the acquisition of New Orleans, will diffuse a joy throughout the Western Country that will drown the sense of these little sacrifices. Should no bargain be made on the subject of the Floridas, our claims of every sort are to be kept in force. If it be impossible to bring Spain to a Cession of the whole of the two Floridas, a trial is to be made for obtaining either or any important part of either. The part of West Florida adjoining the territories now ours, and including the principal rivers falling into the Gulph, will be particularly important and convenient. It is not improbable that Spain, in Treating on a Cession of the Floridas, may propose an exchange of them for Louisiana beyond the Mississippi, or may make a serious point of some particular boundary to that territory. Such an exchange is inadmissible. In intrinsic value there is no equality; besides the advantage, given us by the Western Bank, of the entire jurisdiction of the river. We are the less disposed also to make sacrifices to obtain the Floridas, because their position and the manifest course of events guarantee an early and reasonable acquisition of them. With respect to the adjustment of a boundary between Louisiana and the Spanish territories, there might be no objection to combining it with a Cession of the Floridas, if our knowledge of the extent and character of Louisiana were less imperfect. At present any arrangement, would be a step too much in the dark to be hazarded, and this will be a proper answer to the Spanish Government. Perhaps the inter-communications with the Spanish Government on this subject with other opportunities at Madrid, may enable you to collect useful information, and proofs of the fixt limits, or of the want of fixt limits to Western Louisiana. Your enquiries may also be directed to the question whether any and how much of what passes for West Florida, be fairly included in the territory ceded to us by France. The treaties and transactions between Spain and France will claim particular attention in this enquiry. Should no cession whatever be attainable, it will remain only, for the present, to provide for the free use of the rivers running from the United States into the Gulph. A convenient deposit is to be pressed as equally reasonable there as on the Mississippi; and the inconveniency experienced on the latter from the want of a jurisdiction over the deposit, will be an argument for such an improvement of the stipulation. The free use of those rivers for our external commerce, is to be insisted on as an important right, without which the United States can never be satisfied, and without an admission of which by Spain they can never confide either in her justice or her disposition to cultivate harmony and good neighborhood with them. It will not be advisable to commit the U States into the alternative of War or a compliance on the part of Spain; but no representation short of that, can be stronger than the case merits. The instruction to urge on Spain some provision for preventing, or rectifying, by a delegated authority here, aggressions and abuses committed, by her Colonial officers, is to be regarded as of high importance. Nothing else may be able to save the U States from the necessity of doing themselves justice. It cannot be expected that they will long continue to wait the delays and the difficulties of negotiating, on every emergency, beyond the Atlantic. It is more easy and more just, that Spain and other European nations, should establish a remedy on this side of the Atlantic where the source of the wrongs is established, than that the complaints of the United States should be carried to the other side, and perhaps wait till the Atlantic has moreover been twice crossed, in procuring information for the other party without which a decision may be refused. The navigation of the Bay of St. Mary's is common to Spain and the United States; but a light house and the customary water marks can be established within the Spanish jurisdiction only. Hitherto the Spanish Officers have refused every proper accommodation on this subject. The case may be stated to the Government of Spain, with our just expectation that we may be permitted either to provide the requisite establishments ourselves, or to make use of those provided by Spain. This letter will be addressed to Madrid; but as it is possible that you may not have left Paris, or may have proceeded to London, a copy will be forwarded to Paris, to be thence, if necessary, sent on to London. In case it should find you either at Paris or London, it must be left to your own decision how far the call for you at either of those places, ought to suspend these instructions. Should you decide to go to Madrid, it may be proper first to present your credence to the French or British Government, as the case may be; and to charge a fit person with the public business during your absence. Should you even be at Paris and your Commission filled up for London, it may be best to proceed first to London, if the call to Madrid be not very urgent. I shall write to Mr. Pinckney and inform him that this letter is intended for his use jointly with yours; tho' addressed to you alone, because in part not applicable to him. Should you suspend or have suspended your visit to Madrid, you will please write to him also, giving him your ideas as to the expediency of prosecuting the object of the joint instructions or not, until you can be with him. TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON AND JAMES MONROE.1d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State July 29th—1803. Gentlemen,Your dispatches, including the Treaty and two conventions signed with a French Plenipotentiary on the 30th of April, were safely delivered on the 14th by Mr. Hughes, to whose care you had committed them. In concurring with the disposition of the French Government to treat for the whole of Louisiana, altho' the western part of it was not embraced by your powers, you were justified by the solid reasons which you give for it, and I am charged by the President to express to you his entire approbation of your so doing. This approbation is in no respect precluded by the silence of your Commission and instructions. When these were made out, the object of the most sanguine was limited to the establishment of the Mississippi as our boundary. It was not presumed that more could be sought by the United States either with a chance of success, or perhaps without being suspected of a greedy ambition, than the Island of New Orleans and the two Floridas, it being little doubted that the latter was or would be comprehended in the Cession from Spain to France. To the acquisition of New Orleans and the Floridas, the provision was therefore accommodated. Nor was it to be supposed that in case the French Government should be willing to part with more than the Territory on our side of the Mississippi, an arrangement with Spain for restoring to her the territory on the other side would not be preferred to a sale of it to the United States. It might be added, that the ample views of the subject carried with him by Mr. Monroe and the confidence felt that your judicious management would make the most of favorable occurrences, lessened the necessity of multiplying provisions for every turn which your negotiations might possibly take. The effect of such considerations was diminished by no information or just presumptions whatever. The note of Mr. Livingston in particular stating to the French Government the idea of ceding the Western Country above the Arkansa and communicated to this Department in his letter of the 29th January, was not received here till April 5 more than a month after the Commission and instructions had been forwarded. And besides that this project not only left with France the possession and jurisdiction of one bank of the Mississippi from its mouth to the Arkansa, but a part of West Florida, the whole of East Florida, and the harbours for ships of war in the Gulph of Mexico, the letter inclosing the note intimated that it had been treated by the French Government with a decided neglect. In truth the communications in general between Mr. Livingston and the French Government, both of prior and subsequent date, manifested a repugnance to our views of purchase which left no expectation of any arrangement with France by which an extensive acquisition was to be made, unless in a favorable crisis of which advantage should be taken. Such was thought to be the crisis which gave birth to the extraordinary commission in which you are joined. It consisted of the state of things produced by the breach of our deposit at New Orleans, the situation of the French Islands, particularly the important Island of St. Domingo; the distress of the French finances, the unsettled posture of Europe, the increasing jealousy between G Britain and France, and the known aversion of the former to see the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the latter. These considerations it was hoped, might so far open the eyes of France to her real interest and her ears to the monitory truths which were conveyed to her thro' different channels, as to reconcile her to the establishment of the Mississippi as a natural boundary to the United States; or at least to some concessions which would justify our patiently waiting for a fuller accomplishment of our wishes under auspicious events. The crisis relied on has derived peculiar force from the rapidity with which the complaints and questions between France and Great Britain ripened towards a rupture, and it is just ground for mutual and general felicitation, that it has issued under your zealous exertions, in the extensive acquisition beyond the Mississippi. With respect to the terms on which the acquisition is made, there can be no doubt that the bargain will be regarded as on the whole highly advantageous. The pecuniary stipulations would have been more satisfactory, if they had departed less from the plan prescribed; and particularly if the two millions of dollars in cash, intended to reduce the price or hasten the delivery of possession had been so applied, and the assumed payments to American claimants on the footing specified in the instructions. The unexpected weight of the draught now to be made on the Treasury will be sensibly felt by it, and may possibly be inconvenient in relation to other important objects. The President has issued his proclamation convening Congress on the 17th of October, in order that the exchange of the ratifications may be made within the time limitted. It is obvious that the exchange, to be within the time, must be made here and not at Paris; and we infer from your letter of NA that the ratifications of the Chief Consul are to be transmitted hither with that view. I only add the wish of the President to know from you the understanding which prevailed in the negotiation with respect to the Boundaries of Louisiana, and particularly the pretensions and proofs for carrying it to the River Perdigo, or for including any lesser portion of West Florida. With high respect, &c.TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.1d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State October 6th-1803. Sir,My last was of July 29 written a few days before my departure for Virginia, whence I returned, as did the President, ten or twelve days ago. Your letters received since that date are May 20, June 3 and 25, July 11, 12 & 30th. In the reply to the communication made by the French Government on the subject of the war, you are charged by the President to express the deep regret felt by the United States at an event so afflicting to humanity. Deploring all the calamities with which it is pregnant, they devoutly wish that the benevolent considerations which pleaded in vain for a continuance of the peace, may have their due effect in speedily restoring its blessings. Until this happy change shall take place the French Government may be assured that the United States will forget none of the obligations which the laws of neutrality impose on them. Faithful to their character they will pay to every belligerent right the respect which is due to it; but this duty will be performed in the confidence that the rights of the United States will be equally respected. The French Government will do justice to the frankness of this declaration, which is rendered the more proper, by the irregularities, of which too many examples have been heretofore experienced. The President does not permit himself to doubt that the French Government, consulting equally its own honor and the true interests of France, will guard by effectual regulations against every abuse under colour of its authority, whether on the high seas, or within French or foreign jurisdiction, which might disturb the commerce or endanger the friendly relations so happily subsisting, and which the United States are so much disposed to cherish, between the two nations. Your interposition against the arrette of the 1st Messidor an 11 was due to the just interests of your fellow citizens. It is to be hoped that the strong views which you have presented of the subject, will lead the French Government to retract or remodify a measure not less unjust than injurious to the interests of France. Regulations which by their suddenness, ensnare those who could not possibly know them, and who meant to observe those naturally supposed to be in force, are to all intents retrospective, having the same effect and violating the same privileges, as laws enacted subsequent to the cases to which they are applied. The necessity of leaving between the date and the operation of commercial regulations, an interval sufficient to prevent surprize on distant adventurers, is in general too little regarded, and so far there may be room for common complaint. But when great and sudden changes are made, and above all, when legal forfeitures as well as mercantile losses are sustained, redress may fairly be claimed by the innocent sufferers. Admitting the public safety, which rarely happens, to require regulations of this sort, and the right of every Government to judge for itself, of the occasions, it is still more reasonable that the losses should be repaired than that they should fall on the individuals innocently ensnared. Your suggestion as to commercial arrangements of a general nature with France, at the present juncture has received the attention of the President; but he has not decided that any instructions should be given you to institute negotiations for that purpose; especially as it is not known on what particular points sufficiently advantageous to the United States, the French Government would be likely to enter into stipulations. Some obscurity still hangs on the extra duty exacted by the Batavian Government. The state of our information leaves it doubtful, whether the interests of the United States will be promoted, by the change authorized by our Treaty with that Republic. Mr. Pinckney will doubtless have communicated to you his conversation with Mr. Cevallos, in which the latter denied the right of France to alienate Louisiana, to the United States; alleging a secret stipulation by France not to alienate. Two notes on the same subject have lately been presented here by the Marquis D'Yrujo. In the first dated Sept. 4 he enters a caveat against the right of France to alienate Louisiana, founding it on a declaration of the French Ambassador at Madrid in July 1802 that France would never part with that Territory, and affirming that on no other condition Spain would have ceded it to France. In the second note dated Sept. 27, it is urged as an additional objection to the Treaty between the United States and France, that the French Government had never completed the title of France, having failed to procure the stipulated recognition of the King of Etruria from Russia and Great Britain which was a condition on which Spain agreed to cede the Country to France. Copies of these Notes of the Spanish Minister here, with my answer, as also extracts from Mr. Pinckney's letter to me, and from a note of the Spanish Minister at Madrid to him, are also enclosed. From this proceeding on the part of Spain, as well as by accounts from Paris, it is not doubted that whatever her views may be in opposing our acquisition of Louisiana, she is soliciting the concurrence of the French Government. The interest alone which France manifestly has in giving effect to her engagement with the United States, seems to forbid apprehensions that she will listen to any entreaties or temptations which Spain may employ. As to Spain it can hardly be conceived that she will unsupported by France, persist in her remonstrances, much less that she will resist the Cession to the United States, by force. The objections to the Cession, advanced by Spain, are in fact too futile to weigh either with others or with herself The promise made by the French Ambassador, that no alienation should be made, formed no part of the Treaty of retrocession to France; and if it had, could have no effect on the purchase by the United States, which was made in good faith, without notice from Spain of any such condition, and even with sufficient evidence that no such condition existed. The objection drawn from the failure of the French Government to procure from other powers an acknowledgment of the King of Etruria, is equally groundless. This stipulation was never communicated either to the public, or to the United States, and could therefore be no bar to the contract made by them. It might be added that as the acknowledgment stipulated was, according to the words of the Article, to precede possession by the King of Etruria the overt possession by him was notice to the world that the conditions on which it depended had either been fulfilled or been waved. Finally, no particular powers, whose acknowledgment was to be procured, are named in the article; and the existence of war between Great Britain and France at the time of the stipulation, is a proof that the British acknowledgment, the want of which is now alleged as a breach of the Treaty, could never have been in its contemplation. But the conduct of the Spanish Government, both towards the United States and France, is a complete answer to every possible objection to the Treaty between them. That Government well knew the wish of the United States to acquire certain territories which it had ceded to France, and that they were in negotiation with France on the subject; yet the slightest hint was never given that France had no right to alienate, or even that an alienation to the United States would be disagreeable to Spain. On the contrary the Minister of his Catholic Majesty, in an official note bearing date May 4 last, gave information to the Minister of the United States at Madrid, that the "entire province of Louisiana, with the limits it had when held by France, was retroceded to that power, and that the United States might address themselves to the French Government in order to negotiate the acquisition of the territories which would suit their interest." Here is at once a formal and irrevocable recognition of the right as well of France to convey as of the United States to receive the Territory, which is the subject of the Treaty between them. More than this cannot be required to silence forever the cavils of Spain at the titles of France now vested in the United States; yet for more than this, she may be referred to her own measures at New Orleans preparatory to the delivery of possession to France; to the promulgation under Spanish authority at that place, that Louisiana was retroceded and to be delivered to France; and to the orders signed by His Catholic Majesty's own hand, now ready to be presented to the Government of Louisiana for the delivery of the Province to the person duly authorized by France to receive it. In a word, the Spanish Government has interposed two objections only to the title conveyed to the United States by France. It is said first, that the title in the United States, is not good, because France was bound not to alienate. To this it is answered, that the Spanish Government itself referred the United States to France, as the power capable and the only power capable, of conveying the territory in question. It is said next that the title in France herself was not good. To this, if the same answer were less decisive the orders of the King of Spain for putting France into possession, are an an swer which admits of no reply. The President has thought proper that this view of the case should be transmitted to you, not doubting that you will make the proper use of it with the French Government, nor that that Government will feel the full force of its stipulated obligations to remove whatever difficulties Spain may interpose towards embarrassing a transaction, the complete fulfilment of which is as essential to the honor of France, as it is important to the interests of both Nations. In the mean time we shall proceed in the arrangements for taking possession of the Country ceded, as soon as possession shall be authorized; and it may be presumed that the provisions depending on Congress, will be sufficient to meet the discontents of Spain in whatever form they may assume. The United States have obtained, by just and honorable means, a clear title to a territory too valuable in itself and too important to their tranquility and security not to be effectually maintained, and they count on every positive concurrence on the part of the French Government which the occasion may demand from their friendship and their good faith. The rightful limits of Louisiana are under investigation. It seems undeniable from the resent state of the evidence that it extends Eastwardly as far as the river Perdido, and there is little doubt that we shall make good both a western and northern extent highly satisfactory to us. The considerations which led Mr. Monroe to decline his trip to Madrid, having the same weight with the President, the mission is suspended until other instructions shall be given, or until circumstances shall strongly invite negotiations at Madrid for completing the acquisition desired by the United States. The American citizens detained at Jacmel have been restored to their liberty and returned to the United States as you will find by a letter from one of them, of which a copy is inclosed. Permit me to request your particular attention to the inclosed communication from the Secretary of the Treasury, respecting a balance due from Mr. Joseph Miller to the United States. Should there be danger of his assigning the award, so as to require the Bills to be issued by you in the name of another person it will deserve your consideration how far it is practicable to have recourse to the authority competent to give the award, that they may modify the terms of it in such manner as to secure the public claim. If no such danger exists and Mr. Miller is yet unwilling to enter into a proper arrangement, it seems best that the sett off claimed by the United States should be endorsed by you upon the Bills previously to their delivery, in order to prevent a transfer without notice. With great respect & consideration &c. &c., P. S. October 14. Since the above was written, I have received a third Note from the Marquis D'Yrujo, in reply to my answer to his two preceding. A copy of it is herewith added. It requires no comment beyond what may be applicable in the above observations on his two first notes; being probably intended for little more than a proof of fidelity to his trust, and of a zeal recommending him to the favor of his Sovereign. Be pleased to cause the books referred to in the inclosed slip from the Moniteur of the 29th of July last to be purchased and transmitted to this office. They may doubtless be had at Paris or Amsterdam. You may add to them any other reputable and valuable treatise and also collection of modern treaties you think proper. It having been thought proper to communicate to Mr. Pichon the French charge D'Affairs here, the tenor of the Notes from the Marquis D'Yrujo, he has presented in a note just received, a vindication of his Government and its treaty with the United States against the objections proceeding from the Spanish Government. A copy of this note is herewith inclosed. TO CHARLES PINCKNEY.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State October 12th—1803. Sir,Since my last of July 29, I have received your several letters of April 12 & 20 May 2d & 4th June 12 and July 18th. Mr. Monroe has already informed you of his having proceeded to London, and of his intention not to repair to Madrid, for the present. He will have since received instructions given on a contrary supposition; but it is probable he will wait where he is for the determination of the President on the reasons which kept him from proceeding to Madrid. I have just informed him that the President approves the course he has taken, so that he is not to be expected to join you at Madrid, until he shall be so instructed, or until a change of circumstances, shall in his view clearly invite him to do so. My last letter to you having provided for the case of Mr. Monroe's postponing this trip, I need not repeat the instructions and observations then made to you. I shall only add, that it is more proper now than ever that you should not be in haste without the concurrence of your colleague, to revive the negotiation jointly committed to you. Among the reasons which weighed with the President as well as with Mr. Monroe, against attempting at present, to procure from the Spanish Government the residuum of territory desired by the United States, is the ill humour shewn by that Government at the acquisition already made by them from France; and of which the language held to you by M. Cevallos as communicated in your letter of NA is a sufficient proof. A still fuller proof of the same fact, is contained in three letters lately received from the Spanish Minister here, copies of which with my answer to the two first, are herewith inclosed. I inclose also a copy of a letter written on the occasion to Mr. Livingston, which was rendered more proper, by the probability as well as by information from Paris, that efforts would be used with Spain to draw the French Government into her views of frustrating the Cession of Louisiana to the United States. In these documents you will find the remarks by which the objections made by the Spanish Government to the Treaty of Cession between the U. S. and France are to be combated. The President thinks it proper that they should without delay be conveyed to the Spanish Government, either by a note from you, or in conversation, as you may deem most expedient; and in a form and stile best uniting the advantages of making that Government sensible of the absolute determination of the United States to maintain their right, with the propriety of avoiding undignified menace, and unnecessary irritation. The conduct of Spain on this occasion is such as was in several views little to be expected, and as is not readily explained. If her object be to extort Louisiana from France as well as to prevent its transfer to the U States it would seem that she must be emboldened by an understanding with some other very powerful quarter of Europe. If she hopes to prevail on France to break her engagement to the United States, and voluntarily restore Louisiana to herself, why has she so absurdly blended with the project the offensive communication of the perfidy which she charges on the First Consul? If it be her aim to prevent the execution of the Treaty between the United States and France, in order to have for her neighbor the latter instead of the United States, it is not difficult to shew that she mistakes the lesser for the greater danger, against which she wishes to provide. Admitting as she may possibly suppose, that Louisiana as a French Colony, would be less able as well as less disposed than the United States, to encroach on her Southern possessions, and that it would be too much occupied with its own safety against the United States, to turn its force on the other side against her possessions, still it is obvious, in the first place, that in proportion to [as] the want of power in the French Colony would be safe for Spain, compared with the power of the United States, the Colony would be insufficient as a barrier against the United States; and in the next place, that the very security which she provides would itself be a source of the greatest of all dangers she has to apprehend. The Collisions between the United States and the French would lead to a contest in which Great Britain would naturally join the former, and in which Spain would of course be on the side of the latter; and what becomes of Louisiana and the Spanish possessions beyond it, in a contest between powers so marshalled? An easy and certain victim to the fleets of Great Britain and the land armies of this Country. A combination of these forces was always and justly dreaded by both Spain and France. It was the danger which led both into our revolutionary war, and [as] much inconsistency as weakness is chargeable on the projects of either, which tend to reunite for the purposes of war, the power which has been divided. France returning to her original policy, has wisely by her late Treaty with the United States, obviated a danger which could not have been very remote. Spain will be equally wise in following the example and by acquiescing in an arrangement which guards against an early danger of controversy between the United States, first with France then with herself, and removes to a distant day the approximation of the American and Spanish settlements, provide in the best possible manner for the security of the latter and for a lasting harmony with the United States. What is it that Spain dreads? She dreads, it is presumed, the growing power of this country, and the direction of it against her possessions within its reach. Can she annihilate this power? No.—Can she sensibly retard its growth? No.—Does not common prudence then advise her, to conciliate by every proof of friendship and confidence the good will of a nation whose power is formidable to her; instead of yielding to the impulses of jealousy, and adopting obnoxious precautions, which can have no other effect than to bring on prematurely the whole weight of the Calamity which she fears. Reflections, such as these may perhaps enter with some advantage into your communications with the Spanish Government, and as far as they may be invited by favorable occasions, you will make that use of them. Perhaps after all this interposition of Spain it may be intended merely to embarrass a measure which she does not hope to defeat, in order to obtain from France or the United States or both, concessions of some sort or other as the price of her acquiescence. As yet no indication is given, that a resistance by force to the execution of the Treaty is prepared or meditated. And if it should, the provisions depending on Congress, whose Session will commence in two days, will, it may be presumed, be effectually adapted to such an event. With sentiments of great esteem and consideration &c &c. P. S. Mr. Graham has signified his wish to resign the place he holds at Madrid. The President leaves it to himself to fix the time when it may be most convenient that the resignation should take effect. Whenever this shall arrive, you have the permission of the president to name a private Secretary. TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.1d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, November 9th 1803. Sir,In my letter of the 22 ult. I mentioned to you that the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty and Conventions with France had taken place here, unclogged with any condition or reserve. Congress have since passed an act to enable the President to take possession of the ceded territory and to establish a temporary Government therein. Other Acts have been passed for complying with the pecuniary stipulations of those instruments. The Newspapers inclosed will inform you of these proceedings. By the post which left this City for Nachez on Monday last, a joint and several Commission was forwarded to Governor Claiborne and Genl Wilkinson authorizing them to receive possession and occupy those territories, and a separate Commission to the former as temporary Governor. The possibility suggested by recent circumstances that delivery may be refused at New Orleans, on the part of Spain, required that provision should be made as well for taking as receiving possession. Should force be necessary, Governor Claibone and Genl Wilkinson will have to decide on the practicability of a Coup de Main, without waiting for the reinforcements which will require time on our part and admit of preparations on the other. The force provided for this object is to consist of the regular troops near at hand, as many of the Militia as may be requisite and can be drawn from the Mississippi Territory, and as many volunteers from any Quarter as can be picked up. To them will be added 500 mounted Militia, from Tennessee, who it is expected will proceed to Nachez with the least possible delay. Mr. Pichon has in the strongest manner pressed on Mr. Laussat the French Commissary appointed to deliver possession, the necessity of co-operating in these measures of compulsion should they prove necessary by the refusal of the Spanish Officers to comply without them. On the 8th of October it was not known, and no indications had been exhibited at New Orleans, of a design on the part of Spain to refuse or oppose the surrender of the Province to France, and thereby to us.1 With high respect & consideration &c.TO JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, January 5, 1804.1 Sir,The information and observations which you have as yet, received from me since your arrival in London, on the impressment of our seamen, and other violations of our rights, have been in private letters only. The delay in making these injuries the subject of official communications, proceeded, first, from an expectation that the British Government would have notified formally to the United States as a neutral power, the state of War between Great Britain and France; which would have been an apt occasion, for combining with assurances of the fairness with which our neutral obligations would be fulfilled, our just claims on a correspondent respect for our neutral rights, and particularly of those which had been least respected during the last war: secondly, from the expected arrival of Mr. Merry, which, if he should not be charged with such a notification, might be a favorable opportunity for commencing the explanations and discussions which must precede a thorough correction of the wrongs which we experience. Since the arrival of Mr. Merry, accordingly, no time has been lost in calling his attention to the subject; and in preparing both it and him, for the negotiation which is now to be committed to you. If appearances are to be trusted, his impressions and representations will be friendly to it. In my conversations with him, which have been free and full, he has expressed the best dispositions, has listened with candor to the appeals made as well to the considerations of justice, as of the solid interest of his nation; and altho' he suggests serious difficulties on certain points, he will, I believe, sincerely co-operate in lessening them, and in bringing about an arrangement which will be acceptable to this country. The only topic on which any thing has passed in writing between the Department of State and him, is that of the pretended blockade of St. Domingo. Copies of my letter to him and of his answer, are herewith inclosed; as also of the letter written to Mr. Thornton some time before, and referred to in that to Mr. Merry, in relation to a like blockade of Martinique and Guadaloupe. Altho' there are many important objects which may be thought to invite conventional regulations between the United States and Great Britain, it is evidently proper to leave for subsequent consideration, such as are less urgent in their nature or more difficult in their adjustment; and thereby to render the way plainer and shorter to an agreement with respect to objects which cannot be much longer delayed without danger to the good understanding of the two nations. With this view the plan of a Convention contemplated by the President, is limited to the cases of impressments of our seamen, of blockades, of visiting and searching our vessels, of contraband of War, and of the trade of hostile Colonies, with a few other cases affecting our maritime rights; embracing however, as inducements to Great Britain to do us justice therein, a provision for the surrender of deserting seamen and soldiers, and for the prevention of contraband supplies to her enemies. The plan digested for your use is subjoined. The first column contains the articles which are to be proposed in the first instance, and which are considered as within our just expectations: The second modifies the articles into the concessions which the British Government may possibly require, and which it may be expedient for us ultimately to admit. A Convention between the United States and Great Britain. First Proposal.Second and Ultimatum.Article I.No person whatever shall, upon the high seas and without the jurisdiction of either party be demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to citizens or subjects of one of the other parties, by the public or private armed ships belonging to or in the service of the other, unless such person be at the time in the Military service of an enemy of such other party. Article I.No seaman, seafaring or other person shall upon the high seas and without the jurisdiction of either party be demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to the citizens or subjects of one of the parties by the public or private armed ships belonging to or in the service of the other party and strict and effectual orders shall be given for the due observance of this engagement: but it is to be understood that this article shall not exempt any person on board the ships of either of the parties from being taken therefrom by the other party in cases where they may be liable to be so taken according to the laws of nations, which liability however shall not be construed to extend in any case to seamen or seafaring persons, being actually part of the crew of the vessel in which they may be, nor to persons of any description passing from one port to another port of either of the parties. Article II.The same. Article II.No person being a subject or citizen of one of the parties and resorting to or residing in the dominions of the other, shall in any case be compelled to serve on board any vessel whether public or private belonging to such other party: and all citizens or subjects whatever of the respective parties at this time compulsively serving on board the vessels of the other shall be forthwith liberated, and enabled by an adequate recompence to return to their own country. Article III.The same. Article III.If the ships of either of the parties shall be met with sailing either along the coasts or on the high seas by any ship of war or other public or private armed ships of the other party, such ships of war or other armed vessels shall for avoiding all disorder in visiting and examining the same, remain out of cannon shot, unless the state of the sea or the place of meeting render a nearer approach necessary, and shall in no case compel or require such vessel to send her boat, her papers or any person from on board to the belligerent vessel, but the belligerent vessel may send her own boat to the other and may enter her to the number of two or three men only who may in an orderly manner make the necessary inquiries concerning the vessel and her cargo; and it is agreed that effectual provision shall be made for punishing violations of any part of this article. Article IV.The same. Article IV.Contraband of war shall consist of the following articles only: Salt petre, sulphur, cuirasses, pikes, swords, sword belts, knapsacks, saddles and bridles, cannons, mortars, fire arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, bullets, fire locks, flints, matches and gun powder; excepting however the quantity of the said articles which may be necessary for the defence or use of the ship and those who compose the crew, and no other articles whatever not here enumerated shall be reputed contraband or liable to confiscation, but shall pass freely without being subjected to the smallest difficulty unless they be enemy's property, and it is to be particularly understood that under the denomination of enemy's property, is not to be comprized the merchandise of the growth, produce or manufactures of the countries or dominions at war which shall have been acquired by the citizens or subjects of the neutral power, and shall be transported for their account, which merchandise cannot in any case or on any pretext be excepted from the freedom of the neutral flag. Article V.The same. Article V.In all cases where the prize courts of either party shall pronounce judgment against any vessel or property claimed by citizens or subjects of the other, the sentence or decree shall mention the reasons or motives in which the same shall have been founded and an authenticated copy of the sentence or decree and of all the proceedings in the case, shall, if demanded be delivered to the commander or Agent of the said vessel, without any delay, he paying the legal fees for the same. Article VI.The same. Article VI.In order to determine what characterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given only to a port where there is by the disposition of the power which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently near an evident danger of entering. Article VII.Omit the preamble. Article VII.(In consideration of the distance of the ports likely to be blockaded by either party from the ports of the other party and of other circumstances incident to their relative situations), it is agreed that no vessel sailing from the ports of either shall, altho' cleared or bound to a blockaded port be considered as violating in any manner the blockade, unless on her approach towards such port she shall have been previously warned against entering the same. Article VIII.Omit, "captains, officers." Article VIII.It is agreed that no refuge or protection shall be afforded by either party to the "captains, officers," mariners, sailors or other persons not found to be its own citizens or subjects who shall desert from a vessel of the other party, of the crew whereof the deserter made a part, but on the contrary all such deserters shall be delivered up on demand to the commanders of the vessels from which they shall have deserted, or to the commanding officers of the ships of war of the respective nations, or to such other persons as may be duly authorized to make requisition in that behalf; provided that proof be made within two years from the time of desertion by an exhibition of the ships papers or authenticated copies thereof, and by satisfactory evidence of the identity of the person, that the deserters so demanded were actually part of the crew of the vessels in question. And for the more effectual execution of this article adequate provision shall be made for causing to be arrested on the application of the respective consuls or vice consuls to the competent authorities all deserters as aforesaid, duly proved to be such in order that they may be sent back to the commanders of the vessels to which they belonged or removed out of the country and all due aid and assistance shall be given in searching for as well as in seizing and arresting the said deserters who shall even be detained and kept in the prisons of the country at the request and expence of the said consuls or vice consuls until they shall have found an opportunity of sending them back or removing them as aforesaid. But if they be not so sent back or removed within three months from the day of their arrest they shall be set at liberty and shall not again be arrested for the same cause. Article IX.Omit "officers or." Article IX.It is further agreed that no refuge or protection shall be afforded by either of the parties to any officers or soldiers not found to be its own citizens or subjects who shall desert from the military service of the other; but that on the contrary effectual measures shall be taken in like manner and under like regulations and conditions as with respect to sailors, for apprehending any such deserting soldiers and delivering them to the commanding officers of the military posts, forts or garrisons from which they shall have deserted, or to the consuls or vice consuls on either side or to such persons as may be duly authorized to demand their restitution. Article X.Omitted. Article X.It is however understood that no stipulation herein made shall be construed to empower the civil or military officers of either of the parties to enter forcibly into any of the forts, garrisons posts or other places or to use violence of any sort within the jurisdiction of the other party or be construed in any manner to contravene or derogate from the stipulation contained in the first of the above articles against demanding or taking any persons out of vessels on the high seas and without the jurisdiction of either of the parties. Article XI.The same. Article XI.Each party will prohibit its citizens or subjects from clandestinely carrying away from the territories or dominions of the other, any seamen or soldiers belonging to such other party. Article XII.The same. Article XII.Neither party shall permit any of the articles above enumerated as contraband of War to be cleared out from its ports to any place within the jurisdiction of an enemy of the other party and in order to enforce this regulation due proof and security shall be given that all such articles of contraband as may be exported from the ports of either of the parties have been actually destined elsewhere than within the jurisdiction of an enemy of the other party. Article XIII.The same. Article XIII.This Convention shall be in force for the term of five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications. It shall be ratified on both sides within NA months from the day of its signiture or sooner if possible, and the ratifications exchanged without delay in the United States at the City of Washington. Observations on the preceding plan.The first article relates to impressments from American vessels on the high seas. The Commanders of British armed vessels, have as is well known, been long in this practice. They have indeed not only continued it, under the sanction of their superiors, on the high seas; but have, with impunity, extended it to our own coasts, to neutral ports, and to neutral territory; and, in some instances to our own harbours. The article does not comprehend these latter cases, because it would not be very honorable in Great Britain to stipulate against the practice of such enormities, nor in the United States to recur to stipulations as a security against it; and because it may be presumed that such particular enormities will not be repeated or unpunished after a general stop shall have been put to impressments. The article in its first form renounces the claim to take from the vessels of the neutral party, on the high seas any person whatever not in the military service of an enemy; an exception which we admit to come within the law of nations, on the subject of contraband of war. With this exception, we consider a neutral flag on the high seas as a safeguard to those sailing under it. Great Britain on the contrary asserts a right to search for and seize her own subjects; and under that cover, as cannot but happen, are often seized and taken off, citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries, navigating the high seas, under the protection of the American flag. Were the right of Great Britain in this case not denied the abuses flowing from it, would justify the United States in claiming and expecting a discontinuance of its exercise. But the right is denied and on the best grounds. Altho' Great Britain has not yet adopted in the same latitude with most other nations, the immunities of a neutral flag, she will not deny the general freedom of the high seas, and of neutral vessels navigating them, with such exceptions only as are annexed to it by the law of nations. She must produce then such an exception in the law of nations in favor of the right she contends for. But in what written and received authority will she find it? In what usage except her own will it be found? She will find in both, that a neutral vessel does not protect certain objects denominated contraband of war, including enemies serving in the war, nor articles going into a blockaded port, nor as she has maintained, and as we have not contested, enemy's property of any kind. But no where will she find an exception to this freedom of the seas, and of neutral flags which justifies the taking away of any person not an enemy in military service, found on board a neutral vessel. If treaties, British as well as others, are to be consulted on this subject, it will equally appear, that no countenance to the practice can be found in them. Whilst they admit a contraband of war, by enumerating its articles, and the effect of a real blockade by defining it, in no instance do they affirm or imply a right in any sovereign to enforce his claims to the allegiance of his subjects, on board neutral vessels on the high seas. On the contrary, whenever a belligerent claim against persons on board a neutral vessel, is referred to in treaties, enemies in military service alone are excepted from the general immunity of persons in that situation; and this exception confirms the immunity of those who are not included in it. It is not then from the law or the usage of nations, nor from the tenor of treaties, that any sanction can be derived for the practice in question. And surely it will not be pretended that the sovereignty of any nation extends in any case whatever, beyond its own dominions, and its own vessels on the high seas. Such a doctrine would give just alarm to all nations, and more than any thing would countenance the imputation of aspiring to an universal empire of the seas. It would be the less admissible too, as it would be applicable to times of peace as well as to times of war, and to property as well as to persons. If the law of allegiance, which is a municipal law, be in force at all on the high seas, on board foreign vessels, it must be so at all times there, as it is within its acknowledged sphere. If the reason alleged for it be good in time of war, namely that the sovereign has then a right to the service of all his subjects, it must be good at all times, because at all times he has the same right to their service. War is not the only occasion for which he may want their services, nor is external danger the only danger against which their services may be required for his security. Again;—if the authority of a municipal law can operate on persons in foreign vessels on the high seas, because within the dominion of their sovereign they would be subject to that law, and are violating that law by being in that situation, how reject the inference that the authority of a municipal law may equally be enforced on board foreign vessels on the high seas, against articles of property exported in violation of such a law, or belonging to the country from which it was exported? And thus every commercial regulation in time of peace too, as well as of war, would be made obligatory on foreigners and their vessels, not only whilst within the dominion of the sovereign making the regulation, but in every sea, and at every distance where an armed vessel might meet with them. Another inference deserves attention. If the subjects of one sovereign may be taken by force from the vessels of another, on the high seas, the right of taking them when found implies the right of searching for them, a vexation of commerce, especially in time of peace, which has not yet been attempted, and which for that as well as other reasons, may be regarded as contradicting the principle from which it would flow. Taking reason and justice for the tests of this practice, it is peculiarly indefensible; because it deprives the dearest rights of persons, of a regular trial, to which the most inconsiderable article of property captured on the high seas, is entitled; and leaves their destiny to the will of an officer, sometimes cruel, often ignorant, and generally interested by his want of mariners, in his own decisions. Whenever property found in a neutral vessel is supposed to be liable on any grounds to capture and condemnation, the rule in all cases is that the question shall not be decided by the captor, but be carried before a legal tribunal, where a regular trial may be had, and where the captor himself is liable to damages, for an abuse of his power. Can it be reasonable then or just, that a belligerent commander who is thus restricted and thus responsible in a case of mere property of trivial amount, should be permitted without recurring to any tribunal whatever to examine the crew of a neutral vessel, to decide the important question of their respective allegiances, and to carry that decision into instant execution, by forcing every individual he may chuse, into a service abhorent to his feelings, cutting him off from his most tender connections, exposing his mind and his person to the most humiliating discipline, and his life itself to the greatest dangers? Reason, justice and humanity unite in protesting against so extravagant a proceeding. And what is the pretext for it? It is that the similarity of language and of features between American citizens and British subjects are such as not easily to be distinguished; and that without this arbitrary and summary authority to make the distinction British subjects would escape, under the name of American citizens from the duty which they owe to their sovereign. Is then the difficulty of distinguishing a mariner of one country from the mariner of the other, and the importance of his services a good plea for referring the question whether he belongs to the one or to the other to an arbitrary decision on the spot, by an interested and irresponsible officer? In all other cases, the difficulty and the importance of questions, are considered as reasons for requiring greater care and formality in investigating them, and greater security for a right decision on them. To say that precautions of this sort are incompatible with the object, is to admit that the object is unjustifiable; since the only means by which it can be pursued are such as cannot be justified. The evil takes a deeper die when viewed in its practice as well as its principles. Were it allowable that British subjects should be taken out of American vessels on the high seas, it might at least be required that the proof of their allegiance should lie on the British side. This obvious and just rule is however reversed; and every seaman on board, tho' going from an American port, and sailing under the American flag, and sometimes even speaking an idiom proving him not to be a British subject, is presumed to be such, unless shewn to be an American citizen. It may safely be affirmed that this is an outrage and an indignity which has no precedent, and which Great Britain would be among the last nations in the world to suffer if offered to her own subjects, and her own flag. Nor is it always against the right presumption alone, which is in favor of the citizenship corresponding with the flag, that the violence is committed. Not unfrequently it takes place in defiance of the most positive proof, certified in due form by an American officer. Let it not be said that in granting to American seamen this protection for their rights as such, the point is yielded, that the proof lies on the American side, and that the want of it in the prescribed form justifies the inference that the seaman is not of American allegiance. It is distinctly to be understood, that the certificate usually called a protection to American seamen, is not meant to protect them under their own or even any other neutral flag on the high seas. We maintain, and can never admit, that in such a situation any other protection is required for them, than the neutral flag itself, on the high seas. The document is given to prove their real character, in situations to which neither the law of nations nor the law of their own country are applicable; in other words to protect them within the jurisdiction of the British laws, and to secure to them, within every other jurisdiction, the rights and immunities due to them. If in the course of their navigation even on the high seas, the document should have the effect of repelling wrongs of any sort, it is an incidental advantage only of which they avail themselves, and is by no means to be misconstrued into a right to exact such a proof, or to make any disadvantageous inference from the want of it. Were it even admitted that certificates for protection might be justly required in time of war, from American seamen, they could only be required in cases, where the lapse of time from its commencement had given an opportunity for the American seamen to provide themselves with such a document. Yet it is certain that in a variety of instances seamen have been impressed from American vessels, on the plea that they had not this proof of citizenship when the dates and places of the impressments, demonstrated the impossibility of their knowing, in time to provide the proof, that a state of war had rendered it necessary. Whether therefore, we consult the law of nations, the tenor of treaties, or the dictates of reason and justice, no warrant, no pretext can be found for the British practice of making impressments from American vessels on the high seas. Great Britain has the less to say in excuse for this practice as it is in direct contradiction to the principles on which she proceeds in other cases. Whilst she claims and seizes on the high seas, her own subjects voluntarily serving in American vessels, she has constantly given, when she could give as a reason for not discharging from her service American citizens, that they had voluntarily engaged in it. Nay, more. Whilst she impresses her own subjects from the American service, altho' they may have been settled and married and even naturalized in the United States, she constantly refuses to release from hers, American citizens impressed into it, whenever she can give for a reason that they were either settled or married within her dominions. Thus, when the voluntary consent of the individual favors her pretensions, she pleads the validity of that consent. When the voluntary consent of the individual stands in the way of her pretensions it goes for nothing! When marriage or residence can be pleaded in her favor, she avails herself of the plea. When marriage & residence and even naturalization are against her, no respect whatever is paid to either! She takes by force her own subjects voluntarily serving in our vessels. She keeps by force American citizens involuntarily serving in hers. More flagrant inconsistencies cannot be imagined. Notwithstanding the powerful motives which ought to be felt by the British Government to relinquish a practice which exposes it to so many reproaches; it is foreseen that objections of different sorts will be pressed on you. You will be told first, of the great number of British seamen in the American trade and of the necessity for their services in time of war and danger. Secondly—Of the right and the prejudice of the British nation with respect to what are called the British or narrow seas, where its domain would be abandoned by the general stipulation required. Thirdly—Of the use which would be made of such a sanctuary as that of American vessels, for desertions and traitorous communications to her enemies, especially across the channel to France. 1st. With respect to the British seamen serving in our trade it may be remarked, first, that the number tho' considerable, is probably less than may be supposed; secondly, that what is wrong in itself cannot be made right by considerations of expediency or advantage; thirdly, that it is proved by the fact that the number of real British subjects gained by the practice in question, is of inconsiderable importance even in the scale of advantage. The annexed report to Congress on the subject of impressments, with the addition of such cases as may be in the hands of Mr. Erving, will verify the remark in its application to the present war. The statement made by his predecessor during the last war, and which is also annexed, is in the same view still more conclusive. The statement comprehends not only all the applications made by him in the first instance, for the liberation of impressed seamen, between the month of June 1797 and September 1801, but many also which had been made previous to this Agency, by Mr. Pinckney and Mr. King and which it was necessary for him to renew. These applications therefore may fairly be considered as embracing the greater part of the period of the war; and as applications are known to be pretty indiscriminately made, they may further be considered as embracing if not the whole the far greater part of the impressments, those of British subjects as well as others. Yet the result exhibits 2,059 cases only, and of this number, 102 seamen only detained as being British subjects, which is less than 1/20 of the number impressed; and 1142 discharged or ordered to be so, as not being British subjects, which is more than half of the whole number, leaving 805 for further proof, with the strongest presumption that the greater part, if not the whole were American or other aliens, whose proof of citizenship had been lost or destroyed, or whose situation would account for the difficulties and delays in producing it. So that it is certain, that for all the British seamen gained by this violent proceeding, more than an equal number who were not so were the victims; it is highly probable that for every British seaman so gained, a number of others not less than 10 for one must have been the victims, and it is even possible that this number may have exceeded the proportion of twenty to one. It cannot therefore be doubted that the acquisition of British seamen, by these impressments, whatever may be its advantage, is lost in the wrong done to Americans ignorantly or wilfully mistaken for British subjects; in the jealousy and ill will excited among all maritime nations by an adherence to such a practice; and in the particular provocation to measures of redress on the part of the United States not less disagreeable to them, than embarrassing to Great Britain, and which may threaten the good understanding which ought to be faithfully cultivated by both. The copy of a Bill brought into Congress under the influence of violations committed on our flag, gives force to this latter consideration. Whether it will pass into a law, and at the present session, is more than can yet be said. As there is every reason to believe that it has been proposed with reluctance, it will probably not be pursued into effect, if any hope can be supported of a remedy by an amicable arrangement between the two nations. But such is the feeling thro' this country, produced by the reiterated and atrocious cases of impressments and other insults on our flag, that a remedy of some kind will ere long be called for in a tone not to be disregarded. A copy of the Bill referred to is herewith inclosed. There is a further consideration which ought to have weight in this question. Altho' the British seamen employed in carrying on American commerce, be in some respects lost to their own nation, yet such is the intimate and extensive connection of this commerce, direct and circuitous, with the commerce, the manufactures, the revenue and the general resources of the British nation, that in other respects its mariners, on board American vessels, may truly be said to be rendering it the most valuable services. It would not be extravagant to make it a question, whether Great Britain would not suffer more by withdrawing her seamen from the merchant vessels of the United States, than her enemies would suffer from the addition of them to the crews of her ships of war and cruizers. Should any difficulty be started concerning seamen born within the British dominions, and naturalized by the United States since the Treaty of 1783, you may remove it by observing; first that very few if any such naturalizations can take place, the law here requiring a preparatory residence of five years with notice of the intention to become a citizen entered of record two years before the last necessary formality; besides a regular proof of good moral character; conditions little likely to be complied with by ordinary seafaring persons: secondly, that a discontinuance of impressments on the high seas will preclude an actual collision between the interfering claims. Within the jurisdiction of each nation and in their respective vessels on the high seas, each will enforce the allegiance which it claims. In other situations the individuals doubly claimed will be within a jurisdiction independent of both nations. 2d. The British pretensions to domain over the narrow seas are so obsolete, and so indefensible, that they never would have occurred as a probable objection in this case, if they had not actually frustrated an arrangement settled by Mr. King with the British Ministry on the subject of impressments from American vessels on the high seas. At the moment when the articles were expected to be signed an exception of the "narrow seas" was urged and insisted on by Lord St. Vincent; and being utterly inadmissible on our part, the negotiation was abandoned. Mr. King seems to be of opinion however, that with more time than was left him for the experiment, the objection might have been overcome. This is not improbable if the objection was not merely an expedient for evading a relinquishment of a favorite practice. The objection in itself has certainly not the slightest foundation. The time has been indeed when England not only claimed but exercised pretensions scarcely inferior to full sovereignty over the seas surrounding the British Isles, and even as far as Cape Finisterre to the south and Nanstaten in Norway to the north. It was a time however, when reason had little share in determining the law and the intercourse of nations, when power alone decided questions of right and when the ignorance and want of concert among other maritime countries facilitated such an usurpation. The progress of civilization and information has produced a change in all those respects; and no principle in the code of public law is at present better established than the common freedom of the seas beyond a very limited distance from the territories washed by them. This distance is not indeed fixed with absolute precision. It is varied in a small degree by written authorities, and perhaps it may be reasonably varied in some degree by local peculiarities. But the greatest distance which would now be listened to any where, would make a small proportion of the narrowest part of the narrowest seas in question. What are in fact the prerogatives claimed and exercised by Great Britian over these seas? If they were really a part of her domain, her authority would be the same there as within her other domain. Foreign vessels would be subject to all the laws and regulations framed for them, as much as if they were within the harbours or rivers of the country. Nothing of this sort is pretended. Nothing of this sort would be tolerated. The only instances in which these seas are distinguished from other seas, or in which Great Britain enjoys within them, any distinction over other nations, are first, the compliment paid by other flags to hers; secondly the extension of her territorial jurisdiction in certain cases to the distance of four leagues from the coast. The first is a relic of ancient usurpation, which has thus long escaped the correction which modern and more enlightened times have applied to other usurpations. The prerogative has been often contested however, even at the expence of bloody wars, and is still borne with ill will and impatience by her neighbors. At the last treaty of peace at Amiens, the abolition of it was repeatedly and strongly pressed by France; and it is not improbable that at no remote day it will follow the fate of the title of "King of France" so long worn by the British monarchs and at length so properly sacrificed to the lessons of a magnanimous wisdom. As far as this homage to the British flag has any foundation at present, it rests merely on long usuage and long acquiescence, which are construed, as in a few other cases of maritime claims, into the effect of a general tho' tacit convention. The second instance is the extension of the territorial jurisdiction to four leagues from the shore. This too, as far as the distance may exceed that which is generally allowed, rests on a like foundation, strengthened perhaps, by the local facility of smuggling, and the peculiar interest which Great Britain has in preventing a practice affecting so deeply her whole system of revenue, commerce and manufactures: whilst the limitation itself to four leagues necessarily implies that beyond that distance no territorial jurisdiction is assumed. But whatever may be the origin or the value of these prerogatives over foreign flags in one case, and within a limited portion of these seas in another, it is obvious that neither of them will be violated by the exemption of American vessels from impressments which are nowise connected with either; having never been made on the pretext either of withholding the wonted homage to the British flag, or of smuggling in defiance of British laws. This extension of the British law to four leagues from the shore is inferred from an Act of Parliament passed in the year 1736 (9 G. 2. C. 35) the terms of which comprehend all vessels, foreign as well as British. It is possible however, that the former are constructively excepted. Should your enquiries ascertain this to be the case, you will find yourself on better ground, than the concession here made. With respect to the compliment paid to the British flag, it is also possible that more is here conceded than you may find to be necessary. After the peace of 1783, this compliment was peremptorily withheld by France, in spite of the remonstrances of Great Britain; and it remains for your enquiry, whether it did not continue to be refused, notwithstanding the failure at Amiens to obtain from Great Britain a formal renunciation of the claim. From every view of the subject, it is reasonable to expect that the exception of the narrow seas, from the stipulation against impressments, will not be inflexibly maintained. Should it be so, your negotiation will be at an end. The truth is, that so great a proportion of our trade direct and circuitous passes thro' those channels, and such is its peculiar exposure in them to the wrong practised, that with such an exception, any remedy would be very partial. And we can never consent to purchase a partial remedy, by confirming a general evil, and by subjecting ourselves to our own reproaches, as well as to those of other nations. 3d. It appears, as well by a letter from Mr. Thornton, in answer to one from me, of both which copies are inclosed, as from conversations with Mr. Merry that the facility, which would be given, particularly in the British channel, by the immunity claimed for American vessels, to the escape of traitors, and the desertion of others whose services in time of war may be particularly important to an enemy, forms one of the pleas for the British practice of examining American crews, and will be one of the objections to a formal relinquishment of it. This plea, like all others, admits a solid and satisfactory reply. In the first place, if it could prevail at all against the neutral claim, it would authorize the seizure of the persons described only, and in vessels bound to a hostile country only; whereas the practice of impressing is applied to persons few or any of whom are alleged to be of either description, and to vessels whithersoever bound, even to Great Britain herself. In the next place, it is not only a preference of a smaller object on one side to a greater object on the other; but a sacrifice of right on one side to expediency on the other side. Considering nevertheless, the possible adherence of the British Government to this last objection, and the extreme importance to our seafaring citizens and commerce, of a stipulation suppressing a practice flagrant in its nature, and still more so in the abuses inseparable from it, you are left at liberty to concur, if necessary in the modification as it stands in the second column. You will observe that this guards in all cases the crews of our vessels from being meddled with, and in referring, for an exception to the immunity on board our vessels, to the law of nations, yields no principle maintained by the United States; inasmuch as the reference will be satisfied by the acknowledged exception of enemies in military service. Should persons, therefore, other than such, be taken, under pretext of the law of nations, the United States will be free to contest the proceeding; and there is the less difficulty in leaving the stipulation on this footing, as the case may never happen, and will be pretty sure to happen but rarely. You will observe also, that in the passage from one port to another of the respective countries, the vessels of the neutral parties are to protect all persons without exception. Independently of the general principle asserted by the United States, this respect is due to the peculiar character of the coasting trade, and the utter improbability that it will at any time be a vehicle to persons of any obnoxious description. On Article II.The reasonableness of this article is manifest. Citizens or subjects of one country residing in another, tho' bound by their temporary allegiance to many common duties, can never be rightfully forced into military service, particularly external service, nor be restrained from leaving their residence when they please. The law of nations protects them against both; and the violation of this law, by the avowed impressment of American citizens residing in Great Britain, may be pressed with the greater force on the British Government as it is in direct inconsistency with her impressment of her own subjects bound by much stronger ties to the United States, as above explained, as well as with the spirit of her commercial laws and policy, by which foreigners are invited to a residence. The liberation of the persons comprehended by this article therefore, cannot be justly or honorably refused, and the provision for their recompence and their return home, is equally due to the service rendered by, and the wrong done to them. On Article III.This regulation is comformable to the law of nations, and to the tenor of all treaties which define the belligerent claim of visiting and searching neutral vessels. No treaty can be cited in which the practice of compelling the neutral vessel to send its boat, its officers, its people or its papers to the belligerent vessel, is authorized. British treaties, as well as those to which she is not a party, in every instance where a regulation of the claim is undertaken, coincide with the article here proposed. The article is in fact almost a transcript of the NA article of the Treaty of 1786 between Great Britain and France. The regulation is founded in the best reasons—1st. It is sufficient for the neutral, that he acquiesces in the interruption of his voyage, and the trouble of the examination, imposed by the belligerent Commander. To require a positive and active co-operation on his part in behalf of the latter, is more than can be justified on any principle. 2d. The belligerent party can always send more conveniently to the neutral vessel, than this can send to the belligerent vessel; having neither such fit boats for the purpose, especially in a rough sea, nor being so abundantly manned. 3d. This last consideration is enforced by the numerous and cruel abuses committed in the practice of requiring the neutral vessel to send to the belligerent. As an example you will find in the documents now transmitted a case where neither the smallness and leakiness of the boat, nor the boisterous state of the weather, nor the pathetic remonstrances of the neutral commander had any effect on the imperious injunctions of the belligerent, and where the task was performed at the manifest peril of the boat, the papers, and the lives of the people. The limitation of the number to be sent on board the neutral vessel is a reasonable and usual precaution against the danger of insults and pillage. On Article IV.This enumeration of contraband articles is copied from the Treaty of 1781 between Great Britain and Russia. It is sufficiently limited, and that treaty is an authority more likely than any other, to be respected by the British Government. The sequel of the article, which protects the productions of an hostile colony converted into neutral property, is taken from the same model, with the addition of the terms "in any case or on any pretext." This addition is meant to embrace more explicitly, our right to trade freely with the colonies at war with Great Britain, and between them and all parts of the world in colonial productions, being at the time not enemy's but neutral property; a trade equally legitimate in itself with that between neutral countries directly and in their respective vessels, and such colonies, which their regulations do not contest. In support of this right, in opposition to the British doctrine, that a trade not allowed by a nation in time of peace, cannot be opened to neutrals in time of war, it may be urged, that all nations are in the practice of varying more or less in time of war their commercial laws, from the state of these laws in time of peace, a practice agreeable to reason as well as favorable to neutral nations; that the change may be made in time of war, on considerations not incident to a state of war, but on such as are known to have the same effect in time of peace; that Great Britain herself is in the regular practice of changing her navigation and commercial laws, in time of war, particularly in relation to a neutral intercourse with her colonies; that at this time she admits a trade between neutral countries and the colonies of her enemies, when carried on directly between, or between the former and herself, interrupting only a direct trade between such colonies and their parent state, and between them and countries in Europe, other than those to which the neutral trade may respectively belong; that as she does not contest the right of neutrals to trade with hostile colonies, within these limitations the trade can be and actually is carried on indirectly between such colonies and all countries, even those to which the colonies belong; and consequently that the effect of her doctrine and her practice, is not to deprive her enemy of their colonial trade but merely to lessen the value of it in proportion to the charges incident to the circuitous course into which it is forced; an advantage to her which if just in itself, would not be sufficiently so to balance the impolitic vexations accruing to neutral and friendly nations. These views of the subject have entered into my conversations with Mr. Merry. He expresses, notwithstanding, a belief that Great Britain will turn an unfavorable ear to any proposition calculated to give her enemies the resources of their colonial trade, beyond the degree in which her present regulations permit. This is doubtless to be apprehended; but considering the proposition as an article which may find a balance in the general bargain, it may not be inadmissible; or if inadmissible in the extent proposed, a middle ground may perhaps be accepted. The colonial trade in question consists of four branches; first between the colonies and Great Britain herself; secondly, between the colonies and the neutral countries carrying on the trade; thirdly between the colonies and neutral countries not themselves carrying on the trade; fourthly, between the colonies and the countries to which they belong or which are parties to the war with Great Britain. The first and second branches are those with which her own regulations accord. The last is that to which her aversion will of course be the strongest. Should this aversion be unconquerable, let it be tried then, and then only, whether on our yielding or rather omitting that point, she will not yield to us in return the direct trade between hostile colonies and neutral colonies generally. You will be careful, however, so to modify the compromise as will mark as little as may be, a positive relinquishment of the direct trade between the belligerent nations and their colonies. Should such a compromise be altogether rejected, you will limit the article to the simple enumeration of contraband, it being desirable that without a very valuable consideration, no precedent should be given by the United States of a stipulated acknowledgment that free ships do not make free goods. And you will omit the article altogether, if a proper list of contraband cannot be agreed on, particularly one that excludes money, provisions and naval stores. On Article V.This article taken from the Convention of 1800 between the United States and France, is conformable to the general practice of the prize Courts in the latter, and is the more worthy of adoption every where as it would contribute so much to the consistency and stability of the rules of Admiralty proceedings. Without a single objection justly lying against it, it will have the important advantages, of being a check on the inferior tribunals, of enabling the superior tribunal where a faulty reason appears on the face of the sentence, to correct the wrong without delay or expense, and of being a check moreover on the decision of the superior tribunal itself. As prize causes also are tried by courts not of a third party, but of one of the parties interested, it is but reasonable that the ground should be known to the other on which judgment has passed against its citizens or subjects; in order, if deemed proper, that negotiations may be employed for redressing past or guarding against future injustice. On Article VI.The fictitious blockade proclaimed by Great Britain and made the pretext for violating the commerce of neutral nations, has been one of the greatest abuses ever committed on the high seas. During the late war they were carried to an extravagance which would have been ridiculous, if in their effects they had not inflicted such serious and extensive injuries on neutral nations. Ports were proclaimed in a state of blockade, previous to the arrival of any force at them, were considered in that state without regard to intermissions in the presence of the blockading force, and the proclamations left in operation after its final departure; the British cruizers during the whole time seizing every vessel bound to such ports, at whatever distance from them, and the British prize courts pronouncing condemnations wherever a knowledge of the proclamation at the time of sailing could be presumed, altho' it might afterwards be known that no real blockade existed. The whole scene was a perfect mockery, in which fact was sacrificed to form, and right to power and plunder. The United States were among the greatest sufferers; and would have been still more so, if redress for some of the spoliations proceeding from this source, had not fallen within the provisions of an article in the Treaty of 1794. From the effect of this and other arbitrary practices of Great Britain, on the temper and policy of neutral nations towards her; from the spirit of her Treaty made near the close of the late war with Russia; from the general disposition manifested at the beginning of the present, towards the United States, and the comparative moderation observed in Europe with respect to blockades (if indeed the two cases of the Weser and Elbe are not to be excepted) it was hoped that the mockeries and mischiefs practised under the name of blockades, would no where be repeated. It is found however that the West Indies are again the Theatre of them. The three entire and extensive Islands of Martinique, Guadaloupe and St. Domingo have been published as in a state of blockade, altho' the whole naval force applied to the purpose is inconsiderable, altho' it appears that a part of this inconsiderable force is occasionally seen at the distance of many leagues at sea; altho' it does not appear that more than one or two ports at most, have at any time been actually blockaded; and although complaints are heard that the British ships of war do not protect their own trade, against the numerous cruizers from the Islands under this pretended blockade. Inclosed herewith are three letters on this subject, two from me, the first to Mr. Thornton, the second to Mr. Merry, and the third from Mr. Merry to me. You will observe that he does not pretend to justify the measures pursued in the West Indies; but on the contrary wishes them to be regarded as proceeding from an officer who does not pursue the intentions of his Government. Still such measures prove that no general regulations or orders have been yet issued by that Government against the evil, as might reasonably have been expected; and that a stipulated security against it, is an object as important as it is just. In the two letters to Mr. Thornton and Mr. Merry, the ground is marked out on which you will be able to combat the false blockades, and to maintain the definition of a real one, contained in the proposed article which is a literal copy from the 4th article of the Russian Treaty above cited. In addition to these letters, you will find enclosed a letter of the NA of NA to Mr. Pinckney, in which some views are taken of the subject, which may also be of use in your discussions with the British Government. On Article VII.This article is due, if not to all neutrals, at least to the United States, who are distinguished by the distance of their situation. Decisions of the British Court of Admiralty, have so far respected this peculiarity as to admit a want of information as a plea for going to a blockaded port, where such a plea would be refused to less remote countries. But more than this may fairly be claimed. A vessel, knowing that a particular blockade existed two months before, may well conjecture that before her arrival at the port, which will require two months more, the blockade will have ceased; and may accordingly clear and steer for such a port with an honest intention, in case of finding on her approach, the fact otherwise, not to attempt an unlawful entrance. To condemn vessels under such circumstances would be manifestly unjust; and to restrain them from a distant voyage to a port once in a state of blockade until information of a change shall have travelled a like distance, must produce a delay and uncertainty little short of an absolute prohibition of the commerce. To require them even to go out of their course, to seek at other ports information on the subject would be an unreasonable imposition. The British Government can have little objection to this article, after defining blockades as is agreed with Russia and as is here proposed; since our distance is of itself, a security against any concert with the blockaded, for surreptitious entries, which might be attempted by nearer adventurers; and since in the case of blockades by a force actually present, a preliminary notice may be required without impairing their efficacy as might be the case with blockades, such as the preceding article guards against. The only difference between the articles as standing in the different columns, consists in the preamble to that which is to be admitted, if the proposition of the other should not succeed. The article is preferable without the recital of any reason particular to the United States, because as a naked stipulation, it strengthens instead of weakening a general principle friendly to neutral and pacific nations. On Article VIII, IX, and X.These are articles which are known to have been long wished and contemplated on the part of Great Britain, and together with the justice and in many views the expediency to Great Britain herself of the articles desired on our part, may induce her to accede to the whole. The articles are in substance the same with a project offered to the American administration in the year 1800 by Mr. Liston, who appears to have borrowed it from corresponding stipulations in the Convention between the United States and France in the year —. The project was at that time dropped, owing perhaps in part to the change in the head of the Department of State, between whom and Mr. Liston it had been discussed, and principally, to the difficulty of combining with it proper stipulations against British impressments on the high seas. Without such an equivalent, the project had little to recommend it to the United States. Considered by itself it was too the less admissible as one of its articles, under some obscurity of expression, was thought to favor the British pretension to impress British seamen from American vessels on the high seas. A copy of this document is inclosed, as it may be not without use in shewing the ideas of the British Government at that time; so far at least as its Minister here was an organ of them. The terms in which these articles are to be proposed, differ but slightly from those in which they may be admitted. In the former the delivery of deserters is confined to soldiers and seamen, without requiring a delivery of officers, whose desertion will not be from the service of their country; but on account of offences for which it might sometimes be more agreeable to the United States to be unbound to give them up for trial and punishment. At the same time this consideration ought not to be a bar to an arrangement, which in its general character will be so important to the interests of the United States. On Article XI.This is a stipulation which is not to be yielded but in the event of its being made an indispensable condition. It cannot be essential for the object of it, whilst the British Government is left free to take the precautions allowable within its own jurisdiction for preventing the clandestine departure of its seamen or its soldiers in neutral vessels. And it is very ineligible to the United States, inasmuch as it will be difficult to enforce the prohibition, whether we regard the embarkation of such persons in British ports, or their landing on the American shores; and inasmuch as the inefficacy of regulations for such purposes tho' made with due sincerity and care, may become a source of secret jealousy and dissatisfaction, if not of controversy and reproach. The article is copied from that in the arrangement (of which you have a copy) discussed and brought near to a conclusion between Mr. King and the British Ministry and you are authorized to accede to it, on the supposition, that it may again be insisted on. It is to be recollected however that the article was then understood to be the only price given for relinquishing the impressment of American seamen. The other offers now substituted will justify you in pressing the omission of the original one. On Article XII.The law of nations does not exact of neutral powers the prohibition specified in this article. On the other hand it does not restrain them from prohibiting a trade which appears on the face of the official papers proceeding from the custom house to be intended to violate the law of nations, and from which legitimate considerations of prudence may also dissuade a Government. All that can be reasonably expected by belligerent from neutral powers, is that their regulations on this subject be impartial, and that their stipulations relative to it, when made in time of war at least, should not preclude an impartiality. It is not certain what degree of value Great Britain may put on this article, connected as it essentially is with the NA article which limits the list of contraband. It will at least mitigate her objection to such a limitation. With the range given to contraband by her construction of the law of nations, even as acquiesced in by the United States, a stipulation of this sort would be utterly inadmissible. The last article, in making this City, the place for exchanging the ratifications, consults expedition in putting the Treaty into operation, since the British ratification can be forwarded at the same time with the instrument itself. And it is otherwise reasonable that as the negotiation and formation of the Treaty will have taken place at the seat of the British Government, the concluding formality should be at that of the Government of the United States. In addition to these articles, which with the observations thereon, I am charged by the President to communicate to you as his instructions, he leaves you at liberty to insert any others which may do no more than place British armed vessels with their prizes on an equality within our ports and jurisdiction, with those of France. This would only stipulate what would probably be done by gratuitous regulations here, and as it would no doubt be acceptable to Great Britain, it may not only aid in reconciling her to the principal objects desired by the United States, but may induce her to concur in the further insertion of articles, corresponding with those in the Convention of 1800 with France, which regulate more precisely and more effectually the treatment of vessels of the neutral party on the high seas. The occasion will be proper also, for calling the attention of the British Government to the reasonableness of permitting American Consuls to reside in every part of her dominions, where, and so long as, she permits our citizens to trade. It is not denied that she has a natural right to refuse such a residence, and that she is free by her treaty with us, to refuse it in other than her European dominions. But the exception authorized with respect to the residence of Consuls elsewhere, having reference to the refusal of our trade elsewhere, the refusal of the one ought manifestly to cease with the refusal of the other. When our vessels and citizens are allowed to trade to ports in the West Indies, there is the same reason for a contemporary admission of Consuls to take care of it, as there is for their admission in ports where the trade is permanently allowed. There is the juster expectation of your success on this point, as some official patronage is due to the rights of our citizens in the prize courts established in the West India Islands. Should the British Government be unwilling to enter into a stipulated provision, you may perhaps obtain an order to the Governors for the purpose: or if consuls be objected to altogether, it is desirable that agents may be admitted, if no where else, at least in the Islands where the Vice Admiralty Courts are established. It has been intimated that the articles as standing in the different columns, are to be considered, the one as the offer to be made, the other as the ultimatum to be required. This is however not to be taken too strictly, it being impossible to forsee the turns and the combinations, which may present themselves in the course of the negotiation. The essential objects for the United States are the suppression of impressments and the definition of blockades. Next to these in importance, are the reduction of the list of contraband, and the enlargement of our neutral trade with hostile colonies. Whilst you keep in view therefore those objects, the two last as highly important, and the two first as absolutely indispensable, your discretion, in which the President places great confidence, must guide you in all that relates to the inferior ones. With sentiments of great respect and esteem, I remain sir, Your most Ob Sert.TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.1d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State, January 31, 1804. Sir,The two last letters received from you bear date on the NA and 30th of September, so that we have been now four months without hearing from you. The last from me to you was dated on the 16th day of January, giving you information of the transfer of Louisiana on the 20th of December by the French Commissioner Mr. Laussat to Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson, the Commissioners appointed on the part of the United States to receive it. The letters subsequent to that date from Governor Claiborne who is charged with the present administration of the ceded territory shew that the occupancy by our troops of the military posts on the Island of New Orleans and on the Western side of the Mississippi was in progression, and that the state of things in other respects was such as was to be expected from the predisposition of the bulk of the inhabitants and the manifest advantages to which they have become entitled as citizens of the United States. A bill providing for the Government of the territory has been some time under the deliberation of the Senate, but has not yet passed to the other branch of the Legislature. The enclosed copy shews the form in which it was introduced. Some alterations have already been made and others may be presumed. The precise form in which it will pass cannot therefore be foreknown; and the less so as the peculiarities and difficulties of the case give rise to more than the ordinary differences of opinion. It is pretty certain that the provisions generally contemplated will leave the people of that District for a while without the organization of power dictated by the Republican theory; but it is evident that a sudden transition to a condition so much in contrast with that in which their ideas and habits have been formed, would be as unacceptable and as little beneficial to them as it would be difficult for the Government of the United States. It may fairly be expected that every blessing of liberty will be extended to them as fast as they shall be prepared and disposed to receive it. In the mean time the mild spirit in which the powers derived from the Government of the United States will under its superintendence be administered, the parental interest which it takes in the happiness of those adopted into the general family, and a scrupulous regard to the spirit and tenor of the Treaty of Cession, promise a continuance of that satisfaction among the people of Louisiana which has thus far shewn itself. These observations are made that you may be the better enabled to give to the French Government the explanations and assurances due to its solicitude in behalf of a people whose destiny it has committed to the justice, the honor and the policy of the United States. It does not appear that in the delivery of the Province by the Spanish authorities to Mr. Laussat any thing passed denoting its limits either to the East, the West or the North; nor was any step taken by Mr. Laussat, either whilst the province was in his hands or at the time of his transferring it to ours, calculated to dispossess Spain of any part of the territory East of the Mississippi. On the contrary in a private conference he stated positively that no part of the Floridas was included in the Eastern boundary; France having strenuously insisted to have it extended to the Mobille, which was peremptorily refused by Spain. We learn from Mr. Pinckney that the Spanish Government holds the same language to him. To the declaration of Mr. Laussat however we can oppose that of the French Minister made to you, that Louisiana extended to the River Perdido; and to the Spanish Government as well as to that of France we can oppose the Treaties of St. Ildefonso, and of September 30, 1803, interpreted by facts and fair inferences. The question with Spain, will enter into the proceedings of Mr. Monroe, on his arrival at Madrid, whither he will be instructed to repair, as soon as he shall have executed at London, the instructions lately transmitted to him in relation to the impressment of seamen from American vessels, and several other points which call for just and stipulated arrangements between the two countries. As the question relates to the French Government, the President relies on your prudence and attention for availing yourself of the admission by Mr. Marbois, that Louisiana extended to the River Perdido, and for keeping the weight of that Government in our scale, against that of Spain. With respect to the Western extent of Louisiana, Mr. Laussat held a language more satisfactory. He considered the Rio Bravo or Del Norde as far as the 30° of North latitude, as its true boundary on that side. The Northern boundary we have reason to believe was settled between France and Great Britain by Commissioners appointed under the Treaty of Utrecht, who separated the British and French territories west of the Lake of the Woods by the 49° of Latitude. In support of our just claims in all these cases, it is proper that no time should be lost in collecting the best proofs which can be obtained. This important object, has already been recommended generally to your attention. It is particularly desirable that you should procure an authenticated copy of the commercial charter granted by Louis XIV. to Crozat in 1712, which gives an outline to Louisiana favorable to our claims, at the same time that it is an evidence of the highest and most unexceptionable authority. A copy of this charter is annexed to the English translation of Joutel's Journal of La Salle's last voyage, the French original not containing it. A record of the charter doubtless exists in the archives of the French Government, and it may be expected that an attested copy will not be refused to you. It is not improbable that the charter or other documents relating to the Mississippi project a few years after, may afford some light and be attainable from the same source. The proceedings of the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht, will merit particular research; as they promise not only a favorable Northern boundary, but as they will decide an important question involved in a convention of limits now depending between the United States and Great Britain. To those may be added whatever other documents may occur to your recollection or research, including maps &c. If the secret Treaty of Paris in 1762-3 between France and Spain, and an entire copy of that of St. Ildefonso in 1800 can be obtained, they may also be useful. An authentication of the precise date at least of the former, is very important. You will be sensible of the propriety of putting Mr. Monroe in possession of all the proofs and information which you may obtain. Should he take Paris in his way to Madrid, you will have the best of opportunities for the purpose. . . .1 TO JAMES MONROE.mad. mss.Washington, Feby 16, 1804. Dear SirIn a private letter by Mr. Baring I gave you a detail of what had passed here on the subject of etiquette.1 I had hoped that no farther jars would have ensued as I still hope that the good sense of the British government respecting the right of the government here to fix its routes of intercourse and the sentiments and manners of the country to which they ought to be adapted will give the proper instructions for preventing like incidents in future. In the mean time a fresh circumstance has taken place which calls for explanation.2 The President desirous of keeping open for cordial civilities whatever channels the scruples of Mr. My might not have closed asked me what these were understood to be and particularly whether he would come and take friendly and familar dinners with him I undertook to feel his pulse thro' some hand that would do it with the least impropriety. From the information obtained I inferred that an invitation would be readily accepted and with the less doubt as he had dined with me (his lady declining) after the offence originally taken. The invitation was accordingly sent and terminated in the note from him to me & my answer herewith inclosed. I need not comment on this display of diplomatic superstition, truly extraordinary in this age and in this country. We are willing to refer it to the personal character of a man accustomed to see importance in such trifles and over cautious against displeasing his government by surrendering the minutest of his or its pretensions What we apprehend is, that with these causes may be mingled a jealousy of our disposition towards England and that the mortifications which he has inflicted on himself are to be set down to that account. In fact it is known that this jealousy particularly since the final adjustment with France exists or is affected in a high degree and will doubtless give its colour to the correspondence of the legation with its government. To apply an antidote to this poison will require your vigilant and prudent attention. It can scarcely be believed that the British Govt will not at once see the folly committed by its representative especially in the last scene of the farce and that it will set him right in that respect. But it may listen with a different ear to suggestions that the U. S. having now less need of the friendship of Britain may be yielding to a latent enmity towards her. The best of all proofs to the contrary would be the confidential communications you possess, if it were not an improper condescension to disclose them for such a purpose. Next to that is the tenor of our measures, and the dictates of our obvious policy; on an appeal to both of which you may found the strongest assurances that the Govt of the U. S. is sincerely and anxiously disposed to cultivate harmony between the two Nations. The President wishes you to lose no oppory and spare no pains that may be necessary to satisfy the British Administration on this head and to prevent or efface any different impressions which may be transmitted from hence. I collect that the cavil at the pele mele here established turns much on the alledged degradation of ministers and envoies to a level with chargés d'affaires. The truth is, and I have so told Mr. Merry that this is not the idea; that the President did not mean to decide anything as to their comparative grades or importance; that these would be estimated as heretofore; that among themselves they might fix their own ceremonies, and that even at the President's table they might seat themselves in any subordination they pleased. All he meant was that no seats were to be designated for them, nor the order in which they might happen to sit to be any criterion of the respect paid to their respective commissions or Countries. On public occasions, such as an Inaugural speech &c. the Heads of Depts, with foreign Ministers, and others invited on the part of the Govt. would be in the same pêle mêle within the space assigned them. It may not be amiss to recollect that under the old Congress, as I understand, and even in the ceremonies attending the introduction of the new Govt the foreign ministers were placed according to the order in which their Govt acknowledged by Treaties the Independence of the U. States. In this point of view the pêle mêle is favorable both to G. B. and to Spain. I have, I believe already told you that the President has discountenanced the handing first to the table the wife of a head of department applying the general rule of pele mele to that as to other cases. The Marquis d'Yrujo joined with Merry in refusing an invitation from the Prest & has throughout made a common cause with him not however approving all the grounds taken by the latter. His case is indeed different and not a little awkward; having acquiesced for nearly three years in the practice agst which he now revolts. Pichon being a chargé only, was not invited into the pretensions of the two Plent. He blames their contumacy but I find he has reported the affair to his government which is not likely to patronize the cause of Merry & Yrujo. Thornton has also declined an invitation from the Prest. This shews that he unites without necessity with Merry. He has latterly expressed much jealousy of our views founded on little and unmeaning circumstances. The manners of Mr. M. disgust both sexes and all parties. I have time to add only my affecte. respects. Mr. Merry has the honor to present his respects to Mr. Madison. He has just had that of receiving a note from the Presidt of the U S of which the following is a copy. Thomas Jefferson asks the favor of Mr. Merry to dinner with a small party of friends on monday the 13th at half past three Feb: 9, 04. It so happens that Mr. Merry has engaged some company to dine with him on that day. Under other circumstances however he would have informed himself whether it is the usage as is the case in most countries for private engagements of every kind to give way to invitations from the chief magistrate of the U. S. and if such were the usage he would not have failed to have alleged it as a just apology for not receiving the company he has invited. But after the communication which Mr Merry had the honor to receive from Mr. Madison on the 12th of last month respecting the alteration which the Presidt. of the United States had thought proper should take place in regard to the treatment to be observed by the Executive government towards foreign ministers from those usages which had been established by his predecessors and after the reply which Mr Merry had the honor to make to that notice stating that notwithstanding all his anxiety to cultivate the most intimate and cordial intercourse with every of the government he could not take upon himself to acquiesce in that alteration on account of its serious nature, which he would therefore report to his own government and wait for their instructions upon it, it is necessary that he should have the honor of observing to Mr. Madison that combining the terms of the invitation above mentioned with the circumstances which have preceded it Mr. Merry can only understand it to be addressed to him in his private capacity and not as his Britannic Majestys minister to the United States. Now, however anxious he may be, as he certainly is, to give effect to the claim 1424. 12931above expressed of conciliating personally and privately the good opinion and esteem of Mr Jefferson he hopes that the latter will feel how improper it would be on his part to sacrifice to that desire the duty which he owes to his Sovereign and consequently how impossible it is for him to lay aside the consideration of his public character. If Mr. Merry should be mistaken as to the meaning of Mr. Jefferson's note and it should prove that the invitation is designed for him in his public capacity he trusts that Mr. Jefferson will feel equally, that it must be out of his power to accept it without receiving previously, through the channel of the Secretary of State the necessary formal assurances of the President's determination to observe towards him those usages of distinction which have heretofore been shewn by the executive government of the U. S. to the persons who have been accredited to them as his majesty's ministers. Mr. Merry has the honor to request of Mr. Madison to lay this explanation before the President and to accompany it with the strongest assurances of his highest respect and consideration. Washington, February 9, 1804. Mr Madison presents his compliments to Mr. Merry. He has communicated to the President Mr. Merry's note of this morning and has the honor to remark to him that the President's invitation being in the stile used by him in like cases had no reference to the points of form which will deprive him of the pleasure of Mr Merry's company at dinner on Monday next. Mr. Madison tenders to Mr Merry his distinguished consideration. Washington, Febv 9, 1804. TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State March 31st 1804. Sir,Since my acknowledgment of yours of Oct. 20 & 31, I have received those of 2d, 15 & 23d November and 11th December. In mine of January 31 I informed you that Louisiana had been transferred by the French Commissioner to our Commissioners on the 20th of December—that nothing had officially passed on the occasion concerning the boundaries of the ceded territory1 ; but that Mr. Laussat had confidentially signifiedthat it did not comprehend any part of West Florida; adding at the same time that it extended westwardly to the Rio Bravo otherwise called Rio del Norde. Orders were accordingly obtained from the Spanish authorities for the delivery of all the posts on the West side of the Mississippi as well as on the Island of New Orleans. With respect to the posts in West Florida, orders for the delivery were neither offered to, nor demanded by our Commissioners. No instructions have in fact been ever given them to make the demand. This silence on the part of the Executive was deemed eligible first because it was foreseen that the demand would not only be rejected by the Spanish authority at New Orleans which had in an official publication limited the Cession Westwardly by the Mississippi and the Island of New Orleans, but was apprehended as has turned out, that the French Commissioner might not be ready to support the demand, and might even be disposed to second the Spanish opposition to it; secondly because in the latter of these cases a serious check would be given to our title, and in either of them a premature dilemma would result between an overt submission to the refusal and a resort to force; thirdly because mere silence would be no bar to a plea at any time that a delivery of a part, particularly of the Seat of Government, was a virtual delivery of the whole; whilst in the mean time, we could ascertain the views and claim the interposition of the French Government, and avail ourselves of that and any other favorable circumstances for effecting an amicable adjustment of the question with the Government of Spain. In this state of things it was deemed proper by Congress in making the regulations necessary for the collection of Revenue in the Ceded territory and guarding against the new danger of smuggling into the United States thro' the channels opened by it, to include a provision for the case of West Florida by vesting in the President a power which his discretion might accommodate to events. This provision is contained in the 11th taken in connection with the 4th Section of the Act herewith inclosed. The Act had been many weeks depending in Congress with these Sections word for word in it; the Bill had been printed as soon as reported by the Committee for the use of the members, and as two copies are by a usage of politeness always allotted for each foreign Minister here it must in all probability have been known to the Marquis D'Yrujo in an early stage of its progress. If it was not, it marks much less of that zealous vigilance over the concerns of his Sovereign than he now makes the plea for his intemperate conduct. For some days even after the Act was published in the Gazette of this City, be was silent. At length however he called at the Office of State, with the Gazette in his hand, and entered into a very angry comment on the 11th Section, which was answered by remarks (some of which it would seem from this written allusion to them were not well understood) calculated to assuage his dissatisfaction with the law, as far as was consistent with a candid declaration to him that we considered all of West Florida Westward of the Perdido as clearly ours by the Treaty of April 30, 1803, and that of S'Ildefonso.1 The conversation ended as might be inferred from his letters which followed it on the 7th and 17th inst., of which copies are herewith enclosed, as are also copies of my answer of NA and of his reply of NA. You will see by this correspondence, the footing on which, a rudeness which no Government can tolerate has placed him with this Government, and the view of it which must be unavoidably conveyed to our Minister at Madrid. It may be of some importance also that it be not misconceived where you are. But the correspondence is chiefly of importance as it suggests the earnestness with which Spain is likely to contest our construction of the Treaties of Cession, and the Spanish reasoning which will be employed against it; and consequently as it urges the expediency of cultivating the disposition of the French Government to take our side of the question. To this she is bound no less by sound policy, than by a regard to right. She is bound by the former; because the interest she has in our friendship interests her in the friendship between us and Spain, which cannot be maintained with full effect, if at all, without removing the sources of collision lurking under a neighbourhood marked by such circumstances and which, considering the relation between France and Spain cannot be interrupted without endangering the friendly relations between the United States and France. A transfer from Spain to the United States of the territory claimed by the latter, or rather of the whole of both the Floridas on reasonable conditions, is in fact, nothing more than a sequel and completion of the policy which led France into her own treaty of Cession; and her discernment and her consistency are both pledges that she will view the subject in this light. Another pledge lies in the manifest interest which France has in the peaceable transfer of these Spanish possessions to the United States as the only effectual security against their falling into the hands of Great Britain. Such an event would be certain in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain, and would be particularly disagreeable to France, whether Great Britain should retain the acquisition for the sake of the important harbours and other advantages belonging to it, or should make it the basis of some transaction with the United States, which notwithstanding the good faith and fairness towards France (which would doubtless be observed on our part) might involve conditions too desirable to her enemy, not to be disagreeable to herself. It even deserves consideration that the use which Great Britain could make of the Territory in question, and the facility in seizing it, may become a casting motive with her to force Spain into War, contrary to the wishes and the policy of France. The territory ceded to the United States is described in the words following "the Colony or province of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, that it had when France possessed it, and such as it ought to be according to the Treaties subsequently passed between Spain and other States." In expounding this three-fold description, the different forms used must be so understood as to give a meaning to each description, and to make the meaning of each coincide with that of the others. The first form of description is a reference to the extent which Louisiana now has in the hands of Spain. What is that extent as determined by its Eastern limits? It is not denied that the Perdido was once the Eastern limit of Louisiana. It is not denied that the Territory now possessed by Spain extends to the river Perdido. The river Perdido we say then is the limits to the Eastern extent of the Louisiana ceded to the United States. This construction gives an obvious and pertinent meaning to the term "now" and to the expression "in the hands of Spain" which can be found in no other construction. For a considerable time previous to the treaty of peace in 1783 between Great Britain and Spain, Louisiana as in the hands of Spain was limited Eastwardly by the Mississippi, the Iberville &c. The term "now" fixes its extent as enlarged by that Treaty in contradistinction to the more limited extent in which Spain held it prior to that Treaty. Again the expression "in the hands or in the possession of Spain" fixes the same extent, because the expression cannot relate to the extent which Spain by her internal regulations may have given to a particular district under the name of Louisiana, but evidently to the extent in which it was known to other nations, particularly to the nation in Treaty with her, and in which it was relatively to other nations in her hands and not in the hands of any other nation. It would be absurd to consider the expression "in the hands of Spain" as relating not to others but to herself and to her own regulations; for the territory of Louisiana in her hands must be equally so and be the same, whether formed into one or twenty districts or by whatever name or names it may be called by herself. What may now be the extent of a provincial district under the name of Louisiana according to the municipal arrangements of the Spanish Government is not perfectly known. It is at least questionable whether even these arrangements had not incorporated the portion of Louisiana acquired from Great Britain with the Western portion before belonging to Spain under the same Provincial Government. But whether such be the fact or not, the construction of the Treaty will be the same. The next form of description refers to the extent which Louisiana had when possessed by France. What is this extent? It will be admitted that for the whole period prior to the division of Louisiana between Spain and Great Britain in 1762-3 or at least from the adjustment of boundary between France and Spain in 1719 to that event, Louisiana extended in the possession of France to the river Perdido. Had the meaning then of the first description been less determinate and had France been in possession of Louisiana at any time with less extent than to the Perdido, a reference to this primitive and long continued extent would be more natural and probable than to any other. But it happens that France never possessed Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido; because on the same day that she ceded a part to Spain, the residue was ceded to Great Britain, and consequently as long as she possessed Louisiana at all, she possessed it entire that is in its extent to the Perdido. It is true that after the cession of Western Louisiana to Spain in the year 1762-3, the actual delivery of the Territory by France was delayed for several years, but it never can be supposed that a reference could be intended to this short period of delay during which France held that portion of Louisiana, without the Eastern portion, in the right of Spain only, not in her own right, when in other words she held it merely as the Trustee of Spain; and that a reference to such a possession for such a period should be intended rather than a reference to the long possession of the whole territory in her own acknowledged right prior to that period. In the order of the French King in 1764 to Monsieur D'Abbadie for the delivery of Western Louisiana to Spain, it is stated that the Cession by France was on the 3d of November and the acceptance by Spain on the 13th of that month, leaving an interval of ten days. An anxiety to find a period during which Louisiana as limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville was held by France in her own right may possibly lead the Spanish Government to seize the pretext into which this momentary interval may be converted. But it will be a mere pretext. In the first place it is probable that the Treaty of Cession to Spain which is dated on the same day with that to Great Britain was like the latter a preliminary treaty, consummated and confirmed by a definitive treaty bearing the same date with the definitive treaty including the Cession to Great Britain, in which case the time and effect of each Cession would be the same whether recurrence be had to the date of the preliminary or definitive treaty. In the next place, the Cession by France to Spain was essentially made on the 3d of November 1762 on which day the same with that of the cession to Great Britain the right passed from France. The acceptance by Spain ten days after, if necessary at all to perfect the deed, had relation to the dates of the Cession by France and must have the same effect and no other, as if Spain had signed the deed on the same day with France. This explanation which rests on the soundest principles nullifies this interval of ten days so as to make the Cession to Great Britain and Spain simultaneous on the supposition that recurrence be had to the preliminary Treaty and not to the definitive treaty; and consequently establishes the fact that France at no time possessed Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido; the alienation and partition of the Territory admitting no distinction of time. In the last place conceding even that during an interval of ten days the right of Spain was incompleat, and was in transitu only from France, or in another form of expression that the right remained in France, subject to the eventual acceptance of Spain, is it possible to believe that a description which must be presumed to aim at clearness and certainty, should refer for its purposes to so fugitive and equivocal a state of things, in preference to a state of things where the right and the possession of France were of long continuance and susceptible of neither doubt nor controversy. It is impossible. And consequently the only possible construction which can be put on the second form of description coincides with the only rational construction that can be put on the first; making Louisiana of the same extent that is to the River Perdido, both "as in the hands of Spain" and "as France possessed it." The third and last description of Louisiana is in these words "such as it ought to be according to the Treaties subsequently passed between Spain and other States." This description may be considered as an auxiliary to the two other and is conclusive as an argument for comprehending within the cession of Spain territory Eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville, and for extending the cession to the river Perdido. The only treaties between Spain and other nations that affect the extent of Louisiana as being subsequent to the possession of it by France are first the Treaty in 1783 between Spain and Great Britain and secondly the Treaty of 1795 between Spain and the United States. The last of these Treaties affects the extent of Louisiana as in the hands of Spain, by defining the northern boundary of that part of it which lies East of the Mississippi and the Iberville. And the first affects the extent of Louisiana by including in the Cession from Great Britain to Spain, the Territory between that River and the Perdido; and by giving to Louisiana in consequence of that reunion of the Eastern and Western part, the same extent eastwardly in the hands of Spain as it had when France possessed it. Louisiana then as it ought to be according to treaties of Spain subsequent to the possession by France is limited by the line of demarkation settled with the United States and forming a Northern boundary; and is extended to the River Perdido as its Eastern boundary. This is not only the plain and necessary construction of the words; but is the only construction that can give a meaning to them. For they are without meaning on the supposition that Louisiana as in the hands of Spain is limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville; since neither the one nor the other of those treaties have any relation to Louisiana that can affect its extent, but thro' their relation to the limits of that part of it which lies Eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville. Including this part therefore, as we contend within the extent of Louisiana and a meaning is given to both as pertinent as it is important. Exclude this part, as Spain contends from Louisiana and no treaties exist to which the reference is applicable. This deduction cannot be evaded by pretending that the reference to subsequent treaties of Spain was meant to save the right of deposit and other rights stipulated to the commerce of the United States by the Treaty of 1795; first because, altho' that may be an incidental object of the reference to that Treaty, as was signified by His Catholic Majesty to the Government of the United States, yet the principal object of the reference is evidently the territorial extent of Louisana: secondly, because the reference is to more than one treaty, to the Treaty of 1783 as well as to that of 1795, and the Treaty of 1783 can have no modifying effect whatever rendering it applicable, but on the supposition that Louisiana was considered as extending Eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville into the Territory ceded by that Treaty to Spain. In fine the construction which we maintain gives to every part of the Description of the Territory ceded to the United States, a meaning clear in itself and in harmony with every other part, and is no less conformable to facts, than it is founded in the ordinary use and analogy of the expressions. The construction urged by Spain gives, on the contrary, a meaning to the first description which is inconsistent with the very terms of it; it prefers in the second a meaning that is impossible or absurd; and it takes from the last all meaning whatever. In confirmation of the meaning which extends Louisiana to the River Perdido, it may be regarded as most consistent with the object of the First Consul in the Cession obtained by him from Spain. Every appearance, every circumstance pronounces this to have been, to give lustre to his administration and to gratify natural pride in his nation, by reannexing to its domain possessions which had without any sufficient considerations, been severed from it; and which being in the hands of Spain, it was in the power of Spain to restore. Spain on the other side might be the less reluctant against the Cession in this extent as she would be only replaced by it, within the original limits of her possessions, the Territory East of the Perdido having been regained by her from Great Britain in the peace of 1783 and not included in the late cession. It only remains to take notice of the argument derived from a criticism on the term "retrocede" by which the Cession from Spain to France is expressed. The literal meaning of this term is said to be that Spain gives back to France what she received from France; and that as she received from France no more than the territory West of the Mississippi and the Iberville that no more could be given back by Spain. Without denying that such a meaning, if uncontrouled by other terms would have been properly expressed by the term "retrocede" it is sufficient and more than sufficient to observe 1st that with respect to France the literal meaning is satisfied; France receiving back what she had before alienated. Secondly that with respect to Spain, not only the greater part of Louisiana had been confessedly received by her from France, and consequently was literally ceded back by Spain as well as ceded back to France; but with respect to the part in question Spain might not unfairly be considered as ceding back to France what France had ceded to her; inasmuch as this Cession of it to Great Britain was made for the benefit of Spain, to whom on that account Cuba was restored. The effect was precisely the same as if France had in form made the Cession to Spain and Spain had assigned it over to Great Britain; and the Cession may the more aptly be considered as passing thro' Spain, as Spain herself was a party to the Treaty by which it was conveyed to Great Britain. In this point of view, not only France received back what she had ceded, but Spain ceded back what she had received, and the etomology even of the term "retrocede" is satisfied. This view of the case is the more substantially just as the territory in question passed from France to Great Britain for the account of Spain but passed from Great Britain into the hands of Spain in 1783, in consequence of a War to which Spain had contributed but little compared with France, and in terminating which so favorably in this article for Spain, France had doubtless a preponderating influence. Thirdly, that if a course of proceeding might have existed to which the term "retrocede" would be more literally applicable, it may be equally said that there is no particular term which would be more applicable to the whole proceeding as it did exist. Fourthly, Lastly, that if this were not the case, a new criticism on the etimology of a single term can be allowed no weight against a conclusion drawn from the clear meaning of every other term and from the whole context. In aid of these observation, I enclose herewith two papers which have been drawn up with a view to trace and support our title to Louisiana in its extent to the Perdido. You will find in them also the grounds on which its Western extent is maintainable against Spain, and its northern in relation to Great Britain. On the whole we reckon with much confidence on the obligations & disposition of the French Government to favor our object with Spain, and on your prudent exertions to strengthen our hold on both, not only in relation to the true construction of the Treaty, but to our acquisition of the Spanish Territory Eastward of the Perdido on convenient and equitable conditions. You will find herewith inclosed, copies of another correspondence sufficiently explaining itself, with the Marquis D'Yrujo on the commerce from our ports to S' Domingo, to which is added a letter on that subject from Mr. Pichon. The ideas of the President, as well to the part which the true interest of France recommends to her, as to the part prescribed both to her and to the United States by the law of Nations were communicated in my letter of the 31st of January last. It is much to be desired that the French Government may enter into proper views on this subject. With respect to the trade in articles not for War there cannot be a doubt that the interest of France concurs with that of the United States. With respect to articles for War it is probably the interest of all nations that they should be kept out of hands likely to make so bad a use of them. It is clear at the same time that the United States are bound by the law of Nations to nothing further than to leave their offending citizens to the consequence of an illicit trade; and it deserves serious consideration how far their undertaking at the instance of one power to enforce the law of nations by prohibitory regulations to which they are not bound, may become an embarrassing precedent and stimulate pretensions and complaints of other powers. The French Government must be sensible also that prohibitions by one nation would have little effect, if others including Great Britain, should not follow the example. It may be added that the most which the United States could do in the case, short of prohibiting the export of contraband articles altogether, a measure doubtless beyond the expectations of France, would be to annex to the shipment of these articles a condition that they should be delivered elsewhere than in S' Domingo and that a regulation of this kind would readily be frustrated by a reshipment of the articles after delivery elsewhere, in the same or other vessels in order to accomplish the forbidden destination. If indeed the prohibitory regulation on the part of the United States were the result of a stipulation and recommended by an equivalent concession, the objection to it as an inconvenient precedent would be avoided. If, for example, France would agree to permit the trade with S'. Domingo in all other articles, on condition that we would agree to prohibit contraband articles, no objection of that sort would lie against the arrangement; and the arrangement would in itself be so reasonable on both sides and so favorable even to the people of S' Domingo, that the President authorizes you not only to make it, if you find it not improper, the subject of a frank conference with the French Government, but to put it into the form of a conventional regulation. Or, should this be objectionable, the object may be attained perhaps by a tacit understanding between the two Governments, which may lead to the regulations on each side respectively necessary. Altho' a legal regulation on our part cannot be absolutely promised, otherwise than by a positive and mutual stipulation, yet with a candid explanation of this constitutional circumstance, there can be little risk in inspiring the requisite confidence that the Legislative authority here would interpose its sanction. It is more important that something should be done in this, and done soon, as the pretext founded upon the supposed illegality of any trade whatever with the negroes in S' Domingo, is multiplying depredations on our commerce not only with that Island but with the West Indies generally, to a degree highly irritating, and which is laying the foundation for extensive claims and complaints on our part. You will not fail to state this fact to the French Government in its just importance; as an argument for some such arrangement as is above suggested, or if that be disliked as requiring such other interposition of that Government as will put an end to the evil. It is represented that a part of the depredations are committed by French armed vessels without Commissions, or with Commissions from incompetent authorities. It appears also that these lawless proceedings are much connected with Spanish ports and subjects, probably Spanish Officers also, in the West Indies, particularly in the Island of Cuba. So far as the responsibility of Spain may be involved, we shall not lose sight of it. An appeal at the same time to that of France is as pressing as it is just, and you will please to make it in the manner best calculated to make it effectual. In one of your letters you apprehended that the interest accruing from the delay of the Commissioners at Paris may be disallowed by the French Government, and wish for instructions on the subject. I am glad to find by late communications from Mr. Skipwith that the apparent discontent at the delay had subsided. But whatever solicitude that Government might feel for dispatch in liquidating the claims, it would be a palpable wrong to make a disappointment in that particular, a pretext for refusing any stipulated part of the claims. In a legal point of view, the Treaty could not be in force until mutually ratified; and every preparatory step taken for carrying it into effect however apposite or useful, must be connected with legal questions arising under the Treaty. In other parts of your correspondence you seem to have inferred from some passage in mine that I thought the ten millions of livres in cash over which a discretion was given, ought to have been paid rather to France than to our creditor citizens. If the inference be just, my expressions must have been the more unfortunate as they so little accord with the original plan communicated in the Instructions to yourself and Mr. Monroe; the more unfortunate still as they not only decide a question wrong, but a question which could never occur. The cash fund of 10 millions was provided on the supposition that in a critical moment and in a balance of considerations the immediate payment of that sum as a part of the bargain might either tempt the French Government to enter into it or to reduce the terms of it. If wanted for either of these purposes, it was to be paid to the French Government: if not wanted for either it was made applicable to no other. The provision contemplated for the creditors had no reference to the fund of ten millions of livres; nor was it even contemplated that any other cash fund would be made applicable to their claims. It was supposed not unreasonable that the ease of our Treasury and the chance and means of purchasing the territory remaining to Spain Eastward of the Mississippi, might be so far justly consulted, as to put the indemnification of the claims against France on a like footing with that on which the indemnification of like claims against Great Britain had been put. And it was inferred that such a modification of the payments would not only have fully satisfied the expectations of the creditors; but would have encountered no objections on the part of the French Government, who had no interest in the question, and who were precluded by all that happened from urging objections of any other sort. Mr. Merry has formally complained of the expressions in your printed memorial which were construed into ill will towards Great Britain, and an undue partiality to the French Government. He said that he was expressly instructed by his Government to make this complaint; that the memorial was viewed by it in a very serious light, and that it was expected from the candor of the American Government and the relations subsisting between the two nations, that the unfriendly sentiments expressed in the memorial, if not authorized by instructions, as was doubtless the case, would be disavowed. He admitted that the memorial might not be an official paper, or an authenticated publication, but dwelt on the notoriety of its author, and on its tendency as an ostensible evidence of the spirit and views of so important and maritime a power as the United States, to excite animosity in other nations against Great Britain, and to wound her essential interests. He mentioned several circumstances known to himself whilst at Paris, among others conversations with you on the subject of the memorial which established the fact that it was written by you. If I did not mistake him he said that the fact was informally acknowledged to him by yourself, altho' you disowned it in an official point of view. In reply it was, on the day following, observed to him, by the direction of the President, that the sentiments of the United States and of their Government towards Great Britain were sincerely friendly, according to the assurances which had been given to him, and otherwise communicated, that we wished to cultivate the friendship between the two countries, as important to our as well as to his; that altho' we wished to maintain friendship at the same time with France and with all other Nations, we entertained no sentiments towards her or any other Nation, that could lessen the confidence of Great Britain in the equal sincerity of our friendship for her or in our strict impartiality in discharging every duty which belonged to us as a neutral nation; that no instruction could therefore have been given to any functionary of the United States to say or do anything unfriendly or disrespectful to Great Britain; that the memorial in question if written by you was a private and not official document, that the reasoning employed in it could have been intended merely to reconcile the French Government to the objects of the writer, not to injure or offend Great Britain; that as far as the memorial could be supposed to have a tendency to either, it resulted solely from its publication, a circumstance which there was every reason to believe had been without your sanction, and must have been followed by your disapprobation and regret. Mr. Merry, after repeating the sensibility of his Government to the incident of which he complained, and the importance attached to it, expressed much satisfaction at the explicit and friendly explanation he had heard, and his confidence that the favorable report which he should make of it, would be equally satisfactory to his Government. From this view of the matter you will be sensible of the regret excited by your permission to the French Government mentioned in your letter of Decr 11 to publish the memorial as attributed to you. A publication of it by the French Government with a reference to you as the author, and without any denial on your part will doubtless be represented by the British Government as having all the authenticity and effect of a direct publication by yourself, as well as the appearance moreover of some sort of collusion with the French Government against the British Government; and it may be fairly suspected that one object at least of the former in endeavoring to connect your name with the publication has been to engender or foster in the latter a distrust and ill humour towards the United States. You will infer from these observations the wish of the President, that if no irrevocable step should have been taken in the case, the French Government may be induced, in the manner you may find most delicate to withdraw its request, and thereby relieve the Government of the United States from the necessity of further explanations to the British Government which will be more disagreeable as it may be the more difficult to make them satisfactory. Congress adjourned on tuesday the 27th of March to the first monday in November next. Copies of their laws will be forwarded to you as soon as they issue from the press. For the present, I inclose herewith a list of all their acts, and copies of a few of them; particularly of the acts providing for the Government of Louisiana and for the war in the Mediterranean. The former it is hoped will satisfy the French Government of the prudent and faithful regard of the Government of the United States to the interest and happiness of the people transferred into the American family. The latter was thought a proper antidote to the unfortunate accident to the ship and men under Capt. Bainbridge before the harbour of Tripoli. The addition which it will enable the President to make to our force in the Mediterranean, will more than regain the ground lost with that regency, at the same time that it will impress on the others respect for our resources, and in a more general view be advantageous at the present crisis. It is probable that three or four frigates will soon proceed to join Commodore Preble. I have the honor to be, &c.,TO JAMES MONROEd. of mss. instr.Department of State, April 15, 1804. Sir,It being presumed that by the time of your receiving this communication, the negotiation with which you were charged by my letter of 5th January last, will no longer require your presence in London, the President thinks it proper that you should now proceed to Madrid, and in conjunction with Mr. Pinckney open a negotiation on the important subjects remaining to be adjusted with the Spanish Government. You will understand however that besides the consideration how far your immediate departure may be permitted by the state of our affairs with the British Government or by events unknown at this distance, you are at liberty to make it depend in a due degree on the prospect of active co-operation or favorable dispositions from quarters most likely to influence the Counsels of Spain. It will be of peculiar importance to ascertain the views of the French Government. From the interest which France has in the removal of all sources of discord between Spain and the United States, and the indications given by her present Government of a disposition to favor arrangements for that purpose, particularly in relation to the Territory remaining to Spain on the Eastern side of the Mississippi, and from the ascendency which the French Government has over that of Spain, of which a recent and striking proof has lately been given in the prompt accession of the latter, on the summons of the former to the transfer of Louisiana to the United States, notwithstanding the orders which had been transmitted to the Spanish Envoy here, to protest against the right to make the transfer; much will depend on and much is expected from the interposition of that Government in aid of your negotiations. Mr. Livingston has been instructed to cherish the motives to such an interposition, as you will find by the extract from my letter to him herewith inclosed; and if you should take Paris on your way to Madrid, as is probable, you will not only be able to avail yourself of all his information, but will have an opportunity of renewing the personal communications which took place during your joint negotiations. The objects to be pursued are 1st an acknowledgment by Spain that Louisiana as ceded to the United States extends to the River Perdido; 2d A cession of all her remaining territory Eastward of that River including East Florida. 3d. A provision for Arbitrating and paying all the claims of citizens of the United States not provided for by the late Convention, consisting of those for wrongs done prior to the last peace by other than Spanish subjects within Spanish responsibility; for wrongs done in Spanish Colonies by Spanish subjects or officers; and for wrongs of every kind for which Spain is justly responsible, committed since the last peace. On the part of the United States it may be stipulated that the territory on the Western side of the Mississippi shall not be settled for a given term of years, beyond a limit not very distant from that river, leaving a spacious interval between our settlements and those of Spain, and that a sum of — dollars shall be paid by the United States in discharge of so much of the awards to their citizens. It may also be stipulated or rather may be understood that no charge shall be brought by the United States against Spain for losses sustained from the interruption of the deposit at New Orleans. The subjoined draught puts into form and into detail the arrangement to which the Pesident authorizes you to accede, relying on your best efforts to obtain better terms, and leaving to your discretion such modifications as may be found necessary, and as will not materially affect the proportion between the gains and the concessions by the United States. ARTICLE I.Sec. 1. Spain acknowledging and confirming to the United States the cession of Louisiana in an extent eastwardly to the River Perdido, cedes to them forever all the Territory remaining to her between the Mississippi the Atlantic and the Gulph of Mexico; together with all the Islands annexed thereto, either whilst the Floridas belonged to G. Britain or after they became provinces of Spain. Or, if the article be unattainable in that form, Spain cedes to the United States forever all the Territory with the Islands belonging thereto, which remain to her between the Mississippi, the Atlantic and the Gulph of Mexico. Sec. 2. Possession of the said territory shall be delivered to a person or persons authorized by the United States to receive the same within NA days or less if practicable, after the exchange of the ratifications of this convention. With the said Territory shall be delivered all public property excepting ships and military stores as also all public archives belonging to the provinces comprehending the said Territory. Sec. 3. Within ninety days after delivery of possession or sooner if possible, the Spanish troops shall evacuate the territory hereby ceded; and if there should be any Spanish troops remaining within any port of the Territory ceded by France to the United States, all such troops shall without delay be withdrawn. Sec. 4. Spanish subjects within the ceded territory who do not choose to become citizens of the United States shall be allowed 18 months to dispose of their real property and to remove or dispose of their other property. Sec. 5. The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be entitled to the same incorporation into the United States and to the same protection in their religion, their liberties and their property as were stipulated to the inhabitants of the Territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of the 30 April 1803 with the French Republic. ARTICLE II.Sec. 1. It is agreed that for the term of NA years no lands shall be granted, nor shall persons who may have settled since October 1—1800 on lands not granted prior thereto, be permitted to continue within the space defined by the following limits, to wit, by a limit consisting on one side of the River Sabine or Mexicano from the sea to its source, thence a straight line to the confluence of the Rivers Osages and Missouri; and from the said confluence a line running parrellel with the Mississippi to the latitude of its northernmost source, and thence a maredian to the Northern boundary of Louisiana and by a limit on the other side consisting of the River Colorado (or some other river emptying into the Bay of St Bernard) from its mouth to its source, thence a straight line to the most Southwestwardly source of the red River with such deflections however as will head all the waters of that river, thence along the ridge of the highlands which divide the waters belonging to the Missouri and Mississippi from those belonging to the Rio Bravo to the latitude of the northernmost source of that river, and thence a maredian to the Northern boundary of Louisiana. Sec. 2. Such of the settlements within the foregoing limits not prohibited by Article II Sec. 1 as were not under the authority of the Government of Louisiana shall continue under the authority of Spain. Such as were under that authority shall be under the authority of the United States. But the parties agree that they will respectively offer reasonable inducements, without being obliged to use force, to all such settlers to retire from the space above limited and establish themselves elsewhere. Sec. 3. The Indian tribes within the said limits shall not be considered as subject to or exclusively connected with either party. Citizens of the United States and Spanish subjects shall be equally free to trade with them, and to sojourn among them as far as may be necessary for that purpose; and each of the parties agrees to restrain by all proper and requisite means its respective citizens and subjects from exciting the Indians, whether within or without the said limits, from committing hostilities or aggressions of any sort on the subjects or citizens of the other party. The parties agree moreover, each of them, in all public transactions and communications with Indians to promote in them a disposition to live in peace and friendship with the other party. Sec. 4. It shall be free for Indians now within the territories of either of the parties to remove to and settle within the said limits without restraint from the other party; and either party may promote such a change of settlement by Indians within its territories; taking due care not to make it an occasion of war among the Indians, or of animosities in any of them against the other party. Sec. 5. The United States may establish Garrisons sufficient as security against the Indians and also trading Houses at any places within the said limits where Garrisons existed at any time under the Spanish Government of Louisiana. And Spain may continue Garrisons for the like purpose at any places where she now has them, and establish trading Houses thereat. Either party may also cause or permit any part of the Country within the said limits to be explored and surveyed, with a view to commerce or science. Sec. 6. It shall be free for either of the parties to march troops within the said limits against Indians at War with them for the purpose of driving or keeping out invaders or intruders. ARTICLE III.It is agreed that within NA years previous to the expiration of the aforesaid term of NA years due provision shall be made for amicably adjusting and tracing the boundary between the territories of the United States Westward of the Mississippi and the territories of his Catholic Majesty, which boundary shall then be established according to the true and just extent of Louisiana as ceded by Spain to France and by France to the United States; uninfluenced in the smallest degree or in any manner whatever by the delay, or by any arrangement or circumstance contained in or resulting from this Convention. ARTICLE IV.Whereas by the 6th article of the Convention signed at Madrid on the 11th day of August 1802 it is provided, that as it had not been possible for the Plenipotentiaries of the two powers to agree upon a mode by which the Board of Commissioners to be organized in virtue of the same should arbitrate the claims originating from the excesses of foreign cruizers, agents, Consuls or tribunals in their respective territories, which might be imputable to their two Governments, &c; and whereas such explanations have been had upon the subject of the Article aforesaid as have led to an accord: It is therefore agreed that the Board of Commissioners to be organized as aforesaid shall have power for the space of eighteen months from the exchange of the ratifications hereof to hear and determine in the manner provided as to other claims in the said Convention all manner of claims of the Citizens and subjects of either party for excesses committed or to be committed by foreign cruizers, Agents, Consuls or tribunals in their respective territories which may be imputable to either Government according to the principles of justice, the law of the nations or the treaties between the powers, and also all other excesses committed or to be committed by officers or individuals of either nation, contrary to justice, equity, the law of nations or the existing treaties and for which the claimants may have a right to demand compensation. ARTICLE V.It is further agreed that the respective Governments will pay the sums awarded by the said Commissioners under this Convention and also those which have been or may be awarded under that of the 11th of Augt. 1802, in manner following. The Government of the United States will pay all such sums not exceeding in all NA dollars, which may be awarded as compensation to citizens of the United States from his Catholic Majesty, in three equal annual instalments at the City of Washington, the first instalment to be paid in eighteen months after the exchange of the ratifications hereof, or in case they shall not be so paid, they shall bear an interest of six pCent p annum from the time when they become due until they are actually discharged, and in case the aggregate of the said sums should not amount to the said sum of NA dollars the United States will pay to his Catholic Majesty within one year after the final liquidation of the claims cognizable by the said Board, at the City of Washington so much as the said aggregate may fall short of the sum above mentioned; but on the other hand, if the whole amount of the sums awarded to Citizens of the United States should exceed the said sum of NA dollars, His Catholic Majesty shall pay the surplus without deduction, to such of the claimants and at such times and places as the said Commissioners shall appoint. The Government of the United States will also pay without deduction, at the City of Washington, all such sums as may be awarded against them by the said Commissioners for compensation due to Spanish subjects at such times as shall be appointed in the awards respectively. This Convention shall be ratified within NA days after the signing thereof, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within NA days after the ratification by the United States, at the City of Washington. Observations.The first form of the first Article (paragraph 1) is preferred because it explicitly recognizes the right of the United States under the Treaty of St Ildefonso and of April 30, 1803, to the river Perdido, which is constructively provided for only, in the second form. It is indispensable that the United States be not precluded from such a construction; first because they consider the right as well founded; secondly and principally, because it is known that a great proportion of the most valuable lands between the Mississippi and the Perdido have been granted by Spanish Officers since the cession was made by Spain. These illicit speculations cannot otherwise be frustrated than by considering the Territory as included in the cession made by Spain, and thereby making void all Spanish grants of subsequent date. It is represented that these grants have been extended not only to citizens of the United States but to others, whose interest now lies in supporting the claim of Spain to that part of Louisiana in opposition to that of the United States. It is conjectured that Mr. Laussat himself has entered into the speculations, and that he felt their influence in the declaration made confidentially to our Commissioners at New Orleans, that no part of West Florida was included in Louisiana. In supporting the extent of Louisiana to the Perdido, you will find materals for your use in the extract above referred to and the other documents annexed; to which you will add the result of your own reflections and researches. The secret Treaty between France and Spain ceding Louisiana West of the Mississippi to Spain and which has never been printed may doubtless be obtained at Paris if not at Madrid, and may be of use in the discussion. From the references in the French orders of 1764 for the delivery of the Province, it is presumed to be among the archives of New Orleans and Governor Claiborne has been requested to send a copy of it; but it may not be received in time to be forwarded for your use. In an English work "The Life of Chatham" printed in 1793 for I. S. Gordon, London No. 166 Fleet street, I find a memorial referred to but not there printed with the other negotiations preceding the peace of 1762-3 expressly on the subject of the limits of Louisiana; and as sufficiently appears, with a view to give the province its extent to the Perdido. You will perhaps be able to procure in London or Paris a sight of this document. It probably contains most of the proofs applicable to the question; and will be the more important; as proceeding from France it will strengthen our lien on her seconding our construction of the Treaty. The memorial will be the more important still if it should be found to trace the Western limits also of Louisiana, and to give it a corresponding extent on that side. In page 416 & seq of Vol 1 you will see that fact established that the Floridas including the French part were ceded to Great Britain as the price for the restoration of Cuba, and that consequently the French part now claimed by the United States was a cession purely for the benefit of Spain. The reasons, beyond the advantages held out in the arrangement itself, which may be addressed to Spain, as prompting a cession of her remaining territory Eastward of the Perdido, will be found in the remarks on the extract aforesaid in the instructions to Mr. Pinckney and yourself of the 17th day of February last, and in those which have from time to time been given to Mr. Pinckney. The Spanish Government cannot but be sensible that the expence of retaining any part of that Territory must now more than ever exceed any returns of profit; that being now more than ever indefensible, it must the more invite hostile expeditions against it from European enemies, and that whilst in her hands, it must be a constant menace to harmony with the United States. The arrangement proposed in Art. II supposes that Louisiana has a very great extent Westwardly and that the policy of Spain will set much value on an interval of Desert between her settlements and those of the United States. In one of the papers now transmitted you will see the grounds on which our claim may be extended even to Rio Bravo. By whatever river emptying into the gulph Eastward of that, Spain may with any plausibility commence the Western boundary of Louisiana, or however continue it thence to its Northern limit, she cannot view the arrangement in any other light than that of a concession on the part of the United States to be balanced by an equivalent concession on her part. The limit to the interval on our side is to be considered as the ultimatum, and consequently not to be yielded without due efforts to fix a limit more distant from the Mississippi. It is highly important also, or rather indispensable, that the limit on the Spanish side should not be varied in any manner that will open for Spanish occupancy any part of the waters connected with the Missouri or Mississippi. The range of high lands separating these waters from those of the Rio Bravo and other waters running Westward presents itself so naturally for the occasion, that you will be able to press it with peculiar force. To enable you the better to understand the delineations contained in this Article and any others which may be brought into discussion, I forward herewith copies of two Maps and refer you to others, viz- that of Danville which you will find either in London or Paris and if no where else in Postlewaits Dictionary, and a Map by Mr. NA in 1768 referred to in one of those forwarded. The latter you will doubtless be able to procure at Madrid. The blank for the term of years is not to be filled with more than NA years nor with that number if a shorter term can be substituted The IV and V Articles relate to claims against Spain not provided for by the Convention already entered into and the payment to be assumed by the United States. For the reasoning in support of the claims founded on wrongs proceeding from other than Spanish subjects, I refer you to the letters and instructions of Mr. Pinckney. Your communications with him will also furnish the grounds on which the claims resulting from injuries done to our citizens in the Spanish Colonies are to be maintained. The reasonableness of a residuary provision for all just claims, is implied by the concurrence of Spain in establishing a Board of Commissioners for the cases already submitted to it. You will not fail to urge on the Spanish Government the VI Article of the Treaty of 1795 as particularly applicable to cases where other than Spanish subjects have committed spoliations on our vessels and effects within the extent of Spanish jurisdiction by sea or by land. To justice and the law of nations, this adds the force of a positive stipulation which cannot be repelled without proving what cannot be proved, that the Spanish Government used all the means in its power to protect and defend the rights of our citizens; and which cannot be resisted without pleading what self respect ought not to permit to be pleaded, that the sovereignty of His Catholic Majesty was under duress from a foreign power within his own dominions. The sum of money to be paid by the United States is in no event to exced NA dollars in cash at the Treasury of the United States not in public stock; and is to be applied towards the discharge of awards to our citizens and it is hoped that a much smaller sum will be found sufficient. If Spain should inflexibly refuse to cede the territory Eastward of the Perdido, no money is to be stipulated. If she should refuse also to relinquish the territory Westward of that river no arrangement is to be made with respect to the Territory Westward of the Mississippi, and you will limit your negotiations to the claim of redress for the cases of spoliation above described. If Spain should yield on the subject of the Territory Westward of the Perdido and particularly if a comprehensive provision for the claims should be combined therewith, you may admit an arrangement Westward of the Mississippi on the principle of that proposed, with modifications however if attainable varying the degree of concession on the part of the United States according to the degree in which Spain may concur in a satisfactory provision for the cases of the territory westwards of the Perdido, and of the claims of indemnification. The United States having sustained a very extensive tho' indefinite loss by the unlawful suspension of their right of deposit at New Orleans, and the Spanish Government having admitted the injury, by restoring the deposit it will be fair to avail yourself of this claim in your negotiations, and to let Spain understand that if no accommodation should result from them it will remain in force against her. The term of years during which the interval between the settlements of the United States and of Spain, are to be prohibited, is a consideration of great importance. A term which may appear a moment to a nation stationary or slowly advancing in its population will appear an age to a people doubling its population in little more than 20 years, and consequently capable in that time of covering with an equal settlement double the territory actually settled. This reflection will suggest the expediency of abridging the continuance of the prohibition as much as the main objects in view will permit. NA years are a limit not to be exceeded. Fifteen or even ten, if the space between the Mississippi and the interval territory be not enlarged, seem to be as much as Spain can reasonably expect. She cannot but be sensible, and you will make use of the idea, if you find it prudent so to do, that before a very long term will elapse, the pressure of our growing population with events which time does not fail to produce, but are not foreseen will supersede any arrangements which may now be stipulated, and consequently that it will be most prudent to limit them to a period susceptible of some certain calculations. No final cession is to be made to Spain of any part of the Territory on this side of the Rio Bravo; but in the event of a cession to the United States of the Territory East of the Perdido and in that event in case of absolute necessity only, and to an extent that will not deprive the United States of any of the waters running into the Missouri or Mississippi, or of the other waters emptying into the Gulph of Mexico between the Mississippi and the river Colorado emptying into the Bay of St Bernard. No guarantee of the Spanish possessions is to be admissible. This letter is intended for Mr. Pinckney as well as yourself, and as containing the instructions by which the execution of your joint commission is to be guided. April 18—The President being absent, and it being most proper to wait his return which may be shortly expected, before any final instructions be given as to your immediate destination, after closing your mission to Spain, I recommend that you do not actually leave London until you hear again from me. The moment the President arrives I will communicate to you his views by multiplied conveyances, that you may receive them with as little delay as possible. In the meantime you will make such preparations as will enable you to come directly from Spain to the United States, in case a call for your services on this side of the Atlantic should lead him to that decision, instead of your return to London. I have the honor to be, &cTO JAMES MONROE AND CHARLES PINCKNEY.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State July 8th—1804. Gentlemen:Since the instructions given you on the 15th of April last, further views have been obtained with respect to the interior of Louisiana, and the value which Spain will probably put on such a limitation of our settlements beyond the Mississippi as will keep them for some time at a distance from hers. The President has accordingly become the more anxious that in the adjustment authorized by those instructions the terms may be made favorable to the United States. He does not indeed absolutely restrain you from yielding to the Ultimatum therein fixt, in case it be required by the inflexibility of the Spanish Government and particularly by the posture and prospect of affairs in Europe. But he is not a little averse to the occlusion for a very long period of a very wide space of territory westward of the Mississippi; & equally so to a perpetual relinquishment of any territory whatever Eastward of the Rio Bravo. If this river could be made the limit to the Spanish settlements and the river Colorado the limit to which those of the United States may be extended; and if a line North West or West from the source of whatever river may be taken for the limit of our settlements, could be substituted for the ultimatum line running from the source of the Sabine to the junction of the Osages with the Missouri and thence Northward parallel with the Mississippi, the interval to be unsettled for a term of years would be defined in a manner peculiarly satisfactory. The degree however in which you are to insist on these meliorations of the arrangement must be regulated by your discretion and by the effect which the probable course of events will have on the temper and policy of Spain. Should she be engaged in the War, or manifestly threatened with that situation, she cannot fail to be the more anxious for a solid accommodation on all points with the United States; and the more willing to yield for that purpose to terms, which, however, proper in themselves might otherwise be rejected by her pride and misapplied jealousy. According to the latest accounts from Great Britain a revolution in the Ministry if not a change on the throne was daily expected, and from either of those events, an extension of the war to Spain, if not precluded by the less probable event of a speedy peace with France would be a very natural consequence. It is to be understood that a perpetual relinquishment of the Territory between the Rio Bravo and Colorado is not to be made nor the sum of NA dollars paid without the entire cession of the Floridas; nor any money paid in consideration of the acknowledgment by Spain of our title to the Territory between the Iberville and the Perdido. But a proportional sum out of the NA dollars may be stipulated for a partial cession of territory Eastward of the Perdido. If neither the whole nor part of East Florida can be obtained, it is of importance that the United States should own the Territory as far as the Apalachicola, and have a common, if not exclusive right to navigate that stream. I must repeat that great care is to be taken that the relinquishment by Spain of the Territory Westward of the Perdido be so expressed as to give to the relinquishment of the Spanish title, the date of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. The reason for this was before explained, and is strengthened by recent information as you will find by the annexed extract of a letter from Governor Claiborne. Other proofs might be added. In any further cession of Territory, it may be well so to define it, as to guard as much as possible against grants irregular or incomplete, or made by Spanish Officers in contemplation of such a cession. On entering into conferences with the Spanish Ministry, you will propose and press in the strongest manner an agreement that neither Spain nor the United States shall during the negotiation strengthen their situation in the Territory between the Iberville and the Perdido, and that the navigation of the Mobille shall not be interrupted. An immediate order from the Spanish Government to this effect, may be represented as of the greatest importance to the good understanding between the two countries, and that the forbearance of the United States this long is a striking proof of their sincere desire to maintain it. If such an order should be declined you will not fail to transmit the earliest information of it; as well as to keep up such representations to that Government on the subject as will impress it with the tendency of so unreasonable and unfriendly a proceeding, to drive the United States into arrangements for balancing the military force of Spain in that quarter and for exerting their right of navigation thro' the Mobille. This navigation is become important or rather essential, and a refusal of Spain to acquiesce in it must commit the peace of the two nations to the greatest hazard. The posture of things there is already extremely delicate and calls for the most exemplary moderation and liberality in both the Governments. As a proof of it, I enclose a correspondence between Governor Claiborne and the Spanish Government, at Pensacola, on the same subject with that of mine with the Marquis D'Yrujo already transmitted to you.1 I have the honor to be &cTO JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State July 20th 1804. Sir,Since my last acknowledgment of your letters I have received those of I enclose herewith several correspondences with Mr. Merry, Mr. Pichon and the Mayor and Marshal of New York, on certain proceedings of the British frigates Cambrian and Boston, and the sloop of war Driver within and without the harbour of New York. Copies of the documents attached to these correspondences are also enclosed, and therewith a protest stating a subsequent irregularity of a strong complexion committed by the Cambrian on several passengers in an American vessel just before her arrival within the harbour of New York. No answer having been yet received from Mr. Merry to the two last letters from the Department, I cannot pronounce with certainty on the degree of interposition, which he will employ on the occasion. It cannot be doubted, that he will transmit the case to this Government and it is to be hoped that he will place it in a light favorable to a proper result. It is not the less proper, however, that the sentiments and expectations of this Government should be spoken thro' the Organ of the United States at London, and the President accordingly charges you to make the case, as you will collect it in all its features and colours from the papers above referred to, the subject of a strong tho' temperate representation. It is but justice to the British Government to suppose that it will be struck with the series of enormities which have been committed by its officers against the unquestionable and essential rights of a friendly nation; and will be not only ready to disavow them, but to render all the satisfaction which is due to the United States. In this view it is particularly proper that the appeal to its justice should be in a spirit, temperate, respectful and friendly. On the other hand it is not less due to the United States and to the universal sensibility, which has been excited by the complicated and violent insults received, that the complaint should be presented in its true character, and the claim of ample satisfaction be expressed in terms of becoming dignity and energy. It is the more necessary that this tone should be given to the representation as in several preceding instances of great offence to the national rights and honor, the result of the best founded representations has so little corresponded with our just expectations. The documents of which copies are also inclosed will explain two instances, in one of which one of the frigates in question, the Boston, was the aggressor. The least that can be required in the present instance is that those who have so grossly violated our laws, and eluded the punishment of their guilt, should either be given up to the authority of the United States, or receive from their own Government a punishment which will have the same salutary effect: and the least punishment that can be relied on for the purpose, is that of a bona fide and permanent degradation of the offenders from every public honor or authority. It must be understood that a dismission from their particular offices, accompanied with a translation to any others, as, it is said, has sometimes been done, will not be considered as either just or candid; and the British Government must also understand, as indeed has been sufficiently intimated to Mr. Merry, that a refusal or failure to make on this occasion, so reasonable an amends to the United States for the outrages offered to them, must be followed by precautions, which, however disagreeable or inconvenient cannot be either blamed or wondered at by those on whom the necessity of them is chargeable. With these observations the whole subject is committed to your prudent attention; on which the President relies with full confidence for an effectual pursuit of the object of your Government, and a dignified vindication of the rights of your country. Your answer to the circular communication of Lord Hawksbury was a very proper one. If the lapse of time or other circumstances should render unnecessary any thing further on the part of this Government, it may be best to let the subject remain in silence. Should the omission of a formal reply, be likely to be received as disrespectful, or to be in any degree injurious to subsisting relations, the President authorizes you to assure the British Government that the communication has been received with that sincere and just interest which the United States takes in whatever concerns the British nation, and that the communication, considered as the effect of an honourable solicitude in the British Government to maintain the esteem and confidence of neutral and friendly nations, affords an occasion, of which this Government avails itself with satisfaction, for expressing the unremitted disposition of the United States to cherish all the relations which happily subsist between the two nations; sincerely regretting at the same time every indication of new sources of animosity in addition to the spirit of hostility so unhappily prevailing between Great Britain and France. I enclose an extract of the instructions to Genl. Armstrong who goes as Successor to Mr. Livingston, containing the reply authorized to be given to the French Communication. He expects to embark in a few days. I remain Sir &cTO JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State September 12th, 1804. Sir,My letter of 20th July made you acquainted with the irregularities committed by British ships of War in and adjoining the harbour of New York, and with the correspondence which had ensued between Mr Merry and myself. I now add copies of the letters which have since passed between us on that subject, with copies of documents since received relating to the same or to subsequent violations of our national rights.1 From the letter of Mr Merry and its inclosures, you will discover that instead of promoting a redress of the injuries represented to him, he makes himself an advocate of the authors; and from my reply, that finding such to be the case, it is not proposed to protract the discussion with him. It rests consequently altogether with you to place the subject in the proper light before the British Government, and to press in a proper manner the satisfaction due to the United States from its justice and its friendly policy. In doing this, it need not be repeated that regard is to be had equally to a manly tone in stating the complaints, and to a conciliatory respect, in appealing to the motives from which a satisfactory interposition is expected. Mr. Merry has endeavored to construe a candid and friendly intimation of the dilemma to which the United States will be exposed by a continuance of such outrages, into an offensive threat, and will no doubt so present it to his Government. Should the language to which he refers not sufficiently otherwise explain itself, you are authorized to disclaim any intention on our part inconsistent with the respect which the United States owe and profess for the British Government, and which in this case best coincides with the respect which they owe to themselves. It must be recollected at the same time, that the expediency of some provisions against aggressions on our commerce and our harbours was a subject of very interesting deliberation with Congress at their last Session; that it was postponed under a hope that such provisions would be rendered unnecessary by the just and amicable regulations of the belligerent powers; and that it is more than probable that a disappointment in this particular can scarcely fail to revive the subject at the next Session. These considerations are too important not to be brought into view in your communications with the British Government; and you will know how and when to do it with the least risk of irritation, and consequently with the greatest probability of useful effect. I have the honor to be &cTO JAMES MONROE.d. of s. mss. instr.Department of State October 11th 1804. Sir,I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a letter from Thomas Manning with the document it inclosed, respecting the capture of the Brig Camillus and what appears to be a most unprovoked outrage committed on the person of Thomas Carpenter, a native of the United States, then a seaman on board, by order of Lieutenant Sutton, commanding the British armed schooner L'Eclair or Leclerc. Mr. Manning has been informed that recompence for the loss he has sustained must be attempted by his pursuing the judicial remedy against Mr. Sutton, if he thinks it advisable. But the reparation demanded by the honor of our flag whose immunities have been so grossly violated in the person of Carpenter by an officer of the King of Great Britain is the serious concern of the Government, and you will therefore apply for satisfaction in that decided yet friendly manner which is warranted by the highly aggravated conduct of the British officer. The circumstances of the occurrence, though almost incredible from their nature, are as fully supported as can be done by ex parte evidence, which nevertheless Mr. Manning assures me is free from colouring and exaggeration. It will therefore not be a satisfactory answer to the complaint to be presented with the bare denial of Mr. Sutton if he should hazard one; for if the British Government think the harmony of the United States worth preserving they ought to scrutinize with care and punish with rigor misconduct which has such an irritating tendency. I have the honor to be &cTO NOAH WEBSTER.1Washington, Oct. 12, 1804. Sir—I received, during a visit to my farm, your letter of Aug. 20, and hoped that I should, in that situation, find leisure to give it as full an answer as my memory and my papers would warrant. An unforeseen pressure of public business, with a particular one of private business interesting to others as well as to myself, having disappointed me, I find myself under the necessity of substituting the few brief remarks which return to the occupations of this place, and the absence of my papers, will admit. I had observed, as you have done, that a great number of loose assertions have at different times been made with respect to the origin of the reform in our system of federal government, and that this has particularly happened on the late occasion which so strongly excited the effusions of party and personal zeal for the fame of Gen. Hamilton. The change in our government like most other important improvements ought to be ascribed rather to a series of causes than to any particular and sudden one, and to the participation of many, rather than to the efforts of a single agent. It is certain that the general idea of revising and enlarging the scope of the federal authority, so as to answer the necessary purposes of the Union, grew up in many minds, and by natural degrees, during the experienced inefficacy of the old confederation. The discernment of Gen. Hamilton must have rendered him an early patron of the idea. That the public attention was called to it by yourself at an early period is well known. In common with others, I derived from my service in the old Congress during the latter stages of the Revolutionary war, a deep impression of the necessity of invigorating the federal authority. I carried this impression with me into the legislature of Virginia; where, in the year 1784, if my recollection does not fail me, Mr. Henry co-operated with me and others in certain resolutions calculated to strengthen the hands of Congress. In 1785, I made a proposition with success in the legislature of the same state, for the appointment of commissioners to meet at Annapolis such commissioners as might be appointed by other states, in order to form some plan for investing Congress with the regulation and taxation of commerce.1 This I presume to be the proceeding which gave you the impression that the first proposal of the present constitution was then made. It is possible that something more might have been the subject of conversation, or may have been suggested in debate, but I am induced to believe that the meeting at Annapolis was all that was regularly proposed at that session. I would have consulted the journals of it, but they were either lost or mislaid. Although the step taken by Virginia was followed by the greater number of the states, the attendance at Annapolis was both so tardy and so deficient, that nothing was done on the subject immediately committed to the meeting. The consultations took another turn. The expediency of a more radical reform than the commissioners had been authorized to undertake being felt by almost all of them, and each being fortified in his sentiments and expectations by those of others, and by the information gained as to the general preparation of the public mind, it was concluded to recommend to the states a meeting at Philadelphia, the ensuing year, of commissioners with authority to digest and propose a new and effectual system of government for the Union. The manner in which this idea rose into effect, makes it impossible to say with whom it more particularly originated. I do not even recollect the member who first proposed it to the body. I have an indistinct impression that it received its first formal suggestion from Mr. Abraham Clark of New Jersey. Mr. Hamilton was certainly the member who drafted the address. The legislature of Virginia was the first I believe, that had an opportunity of taking up the recommendation, and the first that concurred in it. It was thought proper to express its concurrence in terms that would give the example as much weight and effect as possible; and with the same view to include in the deputation, the highest characters in the state, such as the governor and chancellor. The same policy led to the appointment of Gen. Washington, who was put at the head of it. It was not known at the time how far he would lend himself to the occasion. When the appointment was made known to him, he manifested a readiness to yield to the wishes of the legislature, but felt a scruple from his having signified to the Cincinnati, that he could not meet them at Philadelphia, near about the same time, for reasons equally applicable to the other occasion. Being in correspondence with him at the time and on the occasion, I pressed him to step over the difficulty. It is very probable that he might consult with others, particularly with Mr. Hamilton, and that their or his exhortations and arguments may have contributed more than mine to his final determination. When the convention as recommended at Annapolis took place at Philadelphia, the deputies from Virginia supposed, that as that state had been first in the successive steps leading to a revision of the federal system, some introductory propositions might be expected from them. They accordingly entered into consultation on the subject, immediately on their arrival in Philadelphia, and having agreed among themselves on the outline of a plan, it was laid before the convention by Mr. Randolph, at that time governor of the state, as well as member of the convention. This project was the basis of its deliberations; and after passing through a variety of changes in its important as well as its lesser features, was developed and amended into the form finally agreed to. I am afraid that this sketch will fall much short of the object of your letter. Under more favorable circumstances, I might have made it more particular. I have often had it in idea to make out from the materials in my hands, and within my reach, as minute a chronicle as I could, of the origin and progress of the last revolution in our government. I went through such a task with respect to the declaration of independence, and the old confederation, whilst a member of Congress in 1783; availing myself of all the circumstances to be gleaned from the public archives, and from some auxilliary sources. To trace in like manner a chronicle or rather a history of our present constitution, would in several points of view be still more curious and interesting; and fortunately the materials for it are far more extensive, Whether I shall ever be able to make such a contribution to the annals of our country, is rendered every day more and more uncertain. I will only add that on the slight view which I have taken of the subject to which you have been pleased to invite my recollections, it is to be understood, that in confining myself so much to the proceedings of Virginia, and to the agency of a few individuals, no exclusion of other states or persons is to be implied, whose share in the transactions of the period may be unknown to me. With great respect and esteem, I remain, sir,