text:
20-home project rezoning gets final approval in Dickson County
Rezoning for the development of a 20-home subdivision in southern Dickson County was recently approved by the Dickson County Commission. The vote followed a public hearing last month in which neighbors in the rural area spoke for and against the development.
All commissioners present approved rezoning the area along Highway 46 near the Hickman County line except for Commissioner Becky Spicer who represents the area.
The rezoning request was made by Derrick Gann who plans to redevelop 11 acres on the nearly 50-acre site with homes. The land sits just off Highway 46 South on Abiff Road. Gann plans to build 20 homes on half-acre lots that would sell for about $260,000 each.
Gann pointed out that he also owns other land nearby.
"I am from that area, too. I've got interest in that area," Gann said. I am not going to do anything that would jeopardize my interest there."
At the February public hearing, three neighbors spoke for the development, and two against.
Taunya Rivers, who is a neighbor of the proposed development, said several area residents contacted all the commissioners asking the commission to leave the zoning in place. She said this would still allow Gann to build 10 houses on 1-acre lots. She said 100 people signed a petition opposing the zoning change.
Rivers, in an email to The Herald, asked, "Why do we even have representative local government if they are not representing the actual voices of the people?"
Gann previously told the commission that a community meeting about the development took place at the Porter Community Center. He said some neighbors who were previously against the development changed their minds after hearing Gann's plans.
"It will be top notch stuff," Gann said.
Also at the February meeting, neighbor Patti Corbitt spoke, stating that all the Abiff Road neighbors "are friends" and "family."
"No matter how this turns out, we are going to stay that way," Corbitt said.
Related:Dickson Co. Abiff Road rezoning for 20-home development approved first vote


text:
Hi, you are logged in as , if you are not , please click here
You are shopping as , if this is not your email, please click here
On-Site Exam Fees
Examination fee for third-party examinations (non-University of London students and private students).
£80 per examination, per student.
Managed by University of London Finance - Telephone 020 7862 8255 - [email protected]
The University of London is an exempt charity in England and Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (reg. no. SC041194), VAT Number GB 222 7971 03

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Are ideal for achieving the lowest temperatures that our customers' specific process require. With a focus on industrial applications, we offer a wide range of machines, suitable to achieve optimal process refrigeration.
From chillers to rooftops, we provide our customers high quality standards, best ESEER values and a low energy consumption. We carefully select the most adequate equipment and model that fits the specific needs of each project
- Industrial and commercial HVAC applications
- High quality standards
- Low energy consumption
Discover our chillers and roof-tops that guarantee high qualtiy standards, best ESEER values and a low energy consumption.
Get in touch with us now or give us a call+40 0371 152 998


text:
To listen to RTÉ.ie's radio and podcast services, you will need to disable any ad blocking extensions or whitelist this site.
Episode Notes
This week Joseph E.A. Connell on his new book 'The Terror War: The Uncomfortable Realities of the War of Independence'; plus Liz Evers and Niav Gallagher talk about about some of the people profiled in their book 'Irish Lives in America'.
The Terror War
British Field Marshal Henry Wilson said of the Black and Tans: "It was the business of the Government to govern. If these men ought to be murdered, then the Government ought to murder them". He was of course talking about members of the IRA being murdered.
Michael Collins could equally chillingly say: "Careful application of terrorism is also an excellent form of total communication".
We're going to explore now how the actions of the Irish mirrored one another in their intentions and their strategy. That's the subject of a new book from Wordwell called The Terror War: The Uncomfortable Realities of the War of Independence. The author, Joseph E.A. Connell joins Myles in studio.
Irish Lives in America
The Irish stuck out across America's frontiers, they built its railroads, policed the nation's streets, set up its banks, educated its masses – we could of course go on and on about what the Irish did in America. We're going to open up a new book now, which documents fifty Irish people who made an indelible mark on American society.
It's called Irish Lives in America – it's the latest in a series from the Royal Irish Academy, which collects together life stories from the Dictionary of Irish Biography.
Joining Myles to discuss some of the very interesting people profiled in the book are the editors, Liz Evers and Niav Gallagher.


text:
WWE Seth Rollins Black Leather Jacket with Shawl Collar
Seth Rollins leather jacket is prepared from the high quality genuine leather. Inside the jacket viscose lining is present. The jacket has faux shearling shawl collar with zipper closure front which gives stunning look. It comes in sophisticated black color. The jacket has quilted designing it makes the outfit appealing. WWE Seth Rollins leather jacket has zipper and buttoned pockets on waist for your essentials. The sleeves are full in length with rib knitted cuffs. You can wear it on night out with friends.


text:
I remember breathing a sigh of relief at the end of 2020. After all, a COVID vaccine was just around the corner and Trump was voted out of office. I mean, how bad could it possibly get, right? But now it's over 380,000 COVID deaths and one attempted coup d'état later and I realize just how fucking naïve I was. So, in the spirit of another godawful year almost gone, I'd like to raise a glass and say "Fuck you" to everyone who made it so bad.Continue reading "The 40 Most Rotten People Of 2021"
Category: Ron DeSantis
Headlines — 7/01/21
Tucker Carlson claims the NSA is spying on him, how Michael Flynn profited from QAnon, a Massachusetts double-murder appears to be a hate crime, and more.Continue reading "Headlines — 7/01/21"


text:
Recently I've worked with a lot of people with strong Achiever talents. Naturally driven and hard-working, people with this particular CliftonStrengths theme thrive when they have a clear picture of a team's or organization's goals. They can easily see the next milestone and are always striving to reach that milestone so they can move on to the next. They can even help set the pace for their team through their own energy and by monitoring the team's progress. But what happens during times of uncertainty?
Many of the people I've coached with high Achiever talents work in the education field, where the pandemic has led to daily, sometimes hourly, changes. Adjusting to sudden moves back and forth between in-person and virtual learning, changing quarantine guidelines, and being tasked to take on new (and sometimes unrelated) responsibilities, while being short-staffed and under-resourced has taken a toll on the entire system. For those with high Achiever, these changes have been especially frustrating because they are regularly being asked to take on new assignments and set aside the milestones that keep them motivated.
Two things have been particularly helpful for people navigating times of uncertainty and change, especially those with high Achiever talents:
- Reframe Success–When there is a chance that goals will shift or even change completely, it's important to be clear on what success looks like from one day to the next rather than setting your sights only on long-term goals. The beauty of Achiever is that every day feels like starting at zero with opportunities to fill your own bucket with each accomplishment. Use that by reframing your thinking to what it will mean to be successful each day.
- Celebrate Success–Those with high Achiever can have a habit of running to the next step without recognizing what has been accomplished. This means when goals keep shifting, they can feel as though their efforts were in vain. By taking the time to celebrate what you've done under your current set of circumstances, you will recognize the significance of small steps and better appreciate your accomplishments.
While we are hopeful that the pandemic will end soon, we are all also probably familiar with Greek philosopher Heraclitus' saying, "The only constant in life is change." In times of uncertainty, knowing your own strengths and how you can use them to adapt will help bring a sense of stability to your own life and those you lead.


text:
After five days of play at the Bicycle Casino in Los Angeles, California, the final table of the World Poker Tour's Legends of Poker event has been determined.
21 players stepped up for Day 4 play in the tournament, with the eyes of most Canadian fans firmly fixed on Shawn Buchanan's attempt at making another WPT final table. Starting the day with 1.343 million in chips, Shawn was in good position to make that run to the final table, but there were several obstacles in the way. Chip leader Jeff Vertes (2.712 million) was sitting to Shawn's immediate right, while other tough pros such as Will "The Thrill" Failla, Ray Henson, Matt "ch0ppy" Kay, Dan Heimiller, David Daneshgar and Christina Lindley were arranged around the other two tables.
Heimiller would be one of the first players eliminated from the day's action after getting his chips to the center with K-J. He was behind Adam Aronson's A-8 and, although the A-10-8 flop Dan a chance at a gut shot straight draw, it also gave Adam two pair. Once the turn and river blanked, Heimiller was out of the tournament in 20th place.
Buchanan, for his part, was apparently the victim of some bad fortune. In a hand against Ken Aldridge, Shawn saw an A-7-2 flop. After Shawn bet out, Aldridge check raised him and Shawn made the call. The turn brought a Queen into the mix and, this time, Aldridge bet 100K into Shawn. Shawn made the call and, before the river card came, Aldridge checked in the dark. Another Queen came on the river and Shawn checked behind Aldridge's dark check. Once Aldridge turned up Q-J for runner-runner trips, Shawn pushed his cards to the muck.
That hand set Shawn on a downward spiral from which he wouldn't return. Once the tournament was down to eighteen players, Buchanan was sitting on slightly more than one million in chips. A battle with Joshua Pollock would take another chunk of Shawn's chips as, on a 9-5-2-A-9 board, Shawn's 335K bet was met by an all in from Pollock. Shawn reluctantly released his hand and was left with 450,000 in chips.
A few moments later, the end would come for Shawn in the Legends event. He pushed his remaining 350K to the center sitting on A-10, but was looked up Pollock's pocket Queens. A Queen on the flop virtually sealed the hand and, even though the turn brought a third diamond for hopes of a flush, Shawn's ten of diamonds was trumped by Pollock's Queen of diamonds, eliminating him without the river being seen. Once the river was dutifully dealt, Shawn Buchanan was out of the tournament.
Even though his thirteenth place finish wasn't as deep as he would have liked, Shawn was the final WPT champion left standing in the tournament. His payday for thirteenth – $24,415 – pales in comparison to the first place prize of $758,085, but it does drive him over the half million mark in earnings for 2011 ($516,374).
After Buchanan's departure, it took slightly more than an hour to work to the unofficial final table of ten players. At this point, Pollock held over four million in chips, but Daneshgar, Kay, Failla and Henson were still in contention. It would be a battle for the remaining ten men to work their way down to the official WPT six handed table.
It would be 94 hands before Daneshgar was eliminated in ninth place and another 73 hands before James Carroll's departure in eighth. Through these hands, Failla began to seize control of the tournament, moving into the chip lead. By the time Henson was eliminated on the TV bubble, Failla was in firm control of the chip lead.
Seat 1: Joshua Pollock – 5,315,000
Seat 2: Owais Ahmed – 1,720,000
Seat 3: Will Failla – 6,775,000
Seat 4: Adam Aronson – 2,185,000
Seat 5: Ken Aldridge – 3,640,000
Seat 6: Jeff Vertes – 4,005,000
The final table of the WPT Legends of Poker will play out this afternoon at 4PM (Pacific Time) and will mark the first time that a WPT final table will be streamed on the internet. With a thirty minute delay, fans will be able to see the entirety of the action at the WPT website, worldpokertour.com, including the hole cards. It should be an exciting table as the veteran Failla looks to take down his first ever WPT championship.


text:
Democratic Processes in SlovakiaThursday, March 11, 1999
Mr. Speaker, this week a distinguished delegation from the Slovak parliament visited Washington to meet with congressional leaders and other officials. I regret that, because of a hearing on urgent developments in Kosovo, I was unable to meet with them. Nevertheless, the occasion of their visit prompts me to reflect on some of the developments in Slovakia since the elections there on September 25 and 26, 1998. Since a new government was installed on October 30, there has been a sea change in Slovak political life. The very fact that a peaceful transition of power occurred is something we could not have taken for granted, given the increasingly authoritarian rule of Vladimir Meciar manifested by, for example, the refusal of the parliament he controlled to seat two duly elected members. Today, the situation is very different. The formation of a new government has included key changes that were much needed and will foster greater confidence in Slovakia's renewed process of democratization. In particular, the appointment of a new head of the intelligence service, the resolution of competing claims to the position of chief of the armed forces, and the selection of a new general prosecutor help address many of the concerns that arose during Meciar's tenure. The new government's efforts to hold previous officials accountable for their violations of the rule of law and manipulation of parliamentary and constitutional democracy is also a positive sign. During local elections in the fall, non-governmental monitors were permitted to observe the counting of the vote, further fostering public and international confidence in Slovakia's democratic structures. Direct presidential elections are scheduled to be held in May, which will fill a constitutional lacuna. The decision to permit, once again, the issuance of bi-lingual report cards restores common sense to the discussion of issues of concern to the Hungarian minority. The government's stated intent to address the concerns of the Romani minority, concerns which have led many Slovak Roma to seek asylum in other countries, is a welcome step in the right direction. In short, Mr. Speaker, the new government is Slovakia has already undertaken important steps towards fulfilling the promises made when communism collapsed. Slovakia is now at a critical juncture, having succeeded by a slim electoral margin in peacefully removing Vladimir Meciar after 4 years of increasing authoritarian rule. The new government must struggle to restore Slovakia's good name, repair the economy, and get Slovakia back on track for NATO and EU membership. If Slovakia is to succeed in this effort, it is critical that the current coalition hold together long enough to implement real reforms. As it seeks to do so, the new government will be aided by a wellspring of credibility with the internationally community and certainly in Washington, where as the Meciar government, in the end, had none. That wellspring of credibility, however, is not bottomless and time is truly of the essence in Slovakia's reform process. I hope all of the parties participating in the ruling coalition will quickly address some of the issues that have been of special concern to the international community, including the adoption in the first half of this year of a minority language law. Such a step would be a concrete demonstration of the differences between this government and the last. Mr. Speaker, I wish this new coalition government of Slovakia every success in their resolve to make lasting reforms.
The Ombudsman in the OSCE: An American PerspectiveWednesday, December 02, 1998
This briefing assessed the role of ombudsmen institutions in the countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from an American perspective. The ombudsman institution was described as a flexible institution; adaptable to national and local government structures in a wide variety of countries, and a brief evaluation of the evolution of this institution was presented. Dean M. Gottehrer, a consultant on ombudsmen in human rights institutions for the United Nations Development Program, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, and the United States Information Agency, presented a personal analysis of the role of ombudsmen institutions in protecting human rights in OSCE participating states.
Concerning Properties Wrongfully Expropriated by Formerly Totalitarian GovernmentsTuesday, October 13, 1998
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, and the ranking member of my subcommittee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), for working with me and with my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) to help bring this resolution to the floor. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 562 addresses the difficult subject of claims arising from uncompensated property confiscation by totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. House Resolution 562 stemmed from a Helsinki Commission hearing that I held in 1996 that examined the efforts underway to restore plundered properties in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the witnesses at that hearing explained that under the international law and practice, the U.S. government is only able to seek compensation from foreign governments on behalf of property claimants who were American citizens at the time that their property was taken. In contrast, claimants who were not American citizens when their property was taken have at their disposal only the domestic law of their former country, even if they later became naturalized American citizens. Mr. Speaker, this resolution urges countries to pass laws that will commit their governments to return plundered properties to their rightful owners, or, when actual return of property is not possible, to provide prompt, just, and effective compensation. This compensation language derives from the Bonn agreement on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in which the participating states, including those in Central and Eastern Europe, recognized the `right to prompt compensation in the event private property is taken for public use.' This resolution also urges countries that have adopted restitution and compensation laws to implement those laws effectively and expeditiously. By adopting this resolution, Mr. Speaker, the Congress will lend its voice and persuasive power to that of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, which have both passed strongly-worded and similarly-worded resolutions calling on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to adopt legislation for the restitution of plundered properties. I hope this will have the full support of the body. Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman, and the Ranking Member of my Subcommittee, Representative Tom Lantos, for working with me to bring this resolution to the floor. Similar legislation was introduced in the 104th Congress, reintroduced in this Congress, and offered as an amendment to the foreign relations authorization bill which has not been passed by the Congress. H. Res. 562 is co-sponsored by my colleagues Mr. Gilman, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Rohrabacher, and Mr. Fox, and by my fellow members of the Helsinki Commission: Mr. Christensen, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Salmon, and Mr. Markey. Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 562 addresses the difficult subject of claims arising from uncompensated property confiscations by totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Throughout much of this century, individuals and religious communities in Central and Eastern Europe saw their private property plundered by totalitarian regimes. In particular, Communist regimes expropriated real property, personal property, financial property, business property, and religious property in fulfillment of a main tenet of communism: the abolition of private property. Moreover, Communist-era expropriations often compounded Fascist-era wrongs. The restitution of property in Central and Eastern Europe today has a multitude of possible effects: restitution will demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law, will advance these countries in the establishment of free market economies, will encourage foreign investment, will help the newly-democratic regimes distance themselves from their totalitarian predecessors, and will provide a measure of justice to the victims of fascism and communism. H. Res. 562 stemmed from a 1996 Helsinki Commission hearing that examined the efforts underway to restore plundered properties in Central and Eastern Europe. Our witnesses at that hearing, Stuart Eizenstat, then the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade and the U.S. Special Envoy for Property Claims in Central and Eastern Europe, and Delissa Ridgway, the then-Chairwoman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, explained that under international law and practice, the United States Government is only able to seek compensation from foreign governments on behalf of property claimants who were American citizens at the time their property was taken. Under one common scenario, the United States obtains payment of such claims by having the Secretary of State, on behalf of the President, negotiate a government-to-government settlement agreement that settles a block of claims by American citizens against the foreign government in exchange for a lump-sum payment from the foreign government to the United States. Before or after such a settlement is reached, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), an independent, quasi-judicial Federal agency within the Department of Justice, determines the validity and valuation of property claims of U.S. nationals against that foreign government. The FCSC informs the Secretary of the Treasury of the results of the FCSC's adjudications and the Secretary of the Treasury then distributes funds from the lump-sum settlement on a pro rata basis to the U.S. nationals that obtained awards from the FCSC. In contrast, claimants who were not American citizens when their property was taken have at their disposal only the domestic law of their former country, even if they later became naturalized American citizens. Considering these realities, Congress has a role in helping enable these dispossessed property owners to file claims in their former homelands with a real possibility of achieving a just resolution. Since that 1996 hearing, the Helsinki Commission has actively encouraged the governments in Central and Eastern Europe to adopt nondiscriminatory property restitution laws and has sought to intervene on behalf of several claimants whose rights under existing restitution and compensation laws are not being respected. While some progress has been made, the Helsinki Commission nonetheless continues to receive hundreds of letters from American and foreign citizens with unresolved property claims in Central and Eastern Europe. The writers plead for help from the Helsinki Commission and from Congress. Many have been struggling for seven or eight years to regain possession of their family properties. Many are elderly and are losing hope that they will ever recover their property. The issues addressed by this resolution are timely and, Mr. Speaker, they demand our attention. Some countries in the region have not yet adopted restitution or compensation laws. In those that have, certain requirements imposed on claimants involve so many conditions and qualifications that something just short of a miracle seems necessary for the return of any property. In Communist countries, expropriated properties were often given to Communist party officials or collaborators. In many cases, these former officials still live in the properties. Regrettably, a number of the democratic governments now in place are stalling and delaying the return of those properties to their rightful owners. Worse yet, some governments are offering meager compensation to the rightful owners and then allegedly reselling the properties for a profit that the State then pockets. The resolution urges countries to pass laws that will commit their governments to return plundered properties to their rightful owners or, when actual return of property is not possible, to provide `prompt, just and effective compensation.' This compensation language derives from the Bonn Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe) in which the participating States, including those in Central and Eastern Europe, recognized the `right to prompt compensation in the event private property is taken for public use.' The resolution also urges countries that have adopted restitution or compensation laws to implement those laws effectively. Several examples help illustrate the state of affairs in Central and Eastern Europe with respect to property restitution. The Helsinki Commission staff met recently with a group known as the Committee for Private Property that has collected information from more than fifteen hundred people with outstanding restitution claims in Romania. Most of these claimants are American citizens, hundreds of whom filed legal claims in Romania and followed the proper judicial process to obtain decrees reinstating their property titles. After obtaining what they believed to be final and irrevocable decrees, the property owners began paying taxes on their properties or, in at least one case, thousands of dollars due on an old mortgage, only to have the Romanian Special Prosecutor appeal the cases to the Supreme Court and win reversals of the judicial decisions. On the other hand, some positive advancements have been made in regard to communal property restitution in Romania. In April 1997, the Romanian Government adopted a resolution restoring Jewish community ownership rights over six buildings, including the National Jewish Theater, and issued a May 1997 decree that established a committee with joint government and community participation to review communal property claims. This past June, the Romanian Government pledged to return an additional seventeen buildings to several minority ethnic communities. These efforts are positive steps forward in the restitution of more than three thousand communal properties, such as orphanages, cultural centers, apartment buildings, ethnic community centers, and houses of worship, lost by religious and minority communities under communism. Regrettably, however, legislation to return properties to the Greek Catholic Church was blocked in Romania's parliament last year and has yet to be enacted. Another group, American Owners of Property in Slovenia, has also contacted the Commission about property claims. This group estimates that at least 500 emigres from the former Yugoslavia are now American citizens with property claims in Slovenia. Despite clear mandates in Slovenia's restitution and compensation law requiring action on filed claims within one year, government officials have not implemented the law; the vast majority of claims remain pending without resolution seven years after the law was passed and five years after the filing deadline. Of the approximately 40,000 applications filed by the 1993 deadline, only 35 percent of the individual claims filed had been resolved by the end of 1997; sixty-five percent of the claims had received no action or only dilatory action. The Slovenian Government has not shown the political will to return property and has failed to take the administrative measures needed to implement the legislation. Moreover, it is of particular concern that this past September, the Slovenian parliament adopted amendments to its restitution law that contain numerous provisions that may further restrict the ability of victims of the Communist regime to regain ownership and access to their properties. Similarly, in Lithuania, despite enactment of a restitution and compensation law, Lithuanian Government officials also appear disinclined to return properties. Property claimants there encounter a variety of roadblocks to restitution, including citizenship requirements, unreasonable bureaucratic delays, and the sudden, suspicious inclusion of claimed properties on an official `Register of Immovable Cultural Properties' as the basis for non-restitution. In one case, Mr. Vytautas Sliupas, an American with dual Lithuanian citizenship, has struggled for seven years to regain ownership and possession of inherited property in Palanga, Lithuania. One building is controlled by the Ministry of Culture and Education and is reportedly used by the National Museum of Lithuania primarily as a vacation site for Museum personnel. The second property is controlled by the City of Palanga and is rented to a commercial entity. These properties belong to Mr. Sliupas' family and were nationalized, without compensation, by the Communist regime. In 1993, the Minister of Culture and Education issued an official letter stating that the Ministry agreed to return the first property to Mr. Sliupas. In 1997, the City of Palanga passed a resolution to return the second property to Mr. Sliupas. Nonetheless, the groups occupying the properties have failed to comply with the orders to vacate. Mr. Sliupas has sought unsuccessfully to obtain the assistance of various government entities, including the courts, in enforcing his right to regain possession of these properties. The Lithuanian Government recently informed the Helsinki Commission that the property has been placed on the Register of Immovable Cultural Properties and, therefore, cannot be restituted to Mr. Sliupas. In Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and other countries, the existing restitution and compensation laws only allow people who are currently residents or citizens of the country to apply for restitution. The Czech Republic's citizenship requirement discriminates almost exclusively against individuals who lost their Czech citizenship because they chose the United States as their refuge from communism; as many as 8,000-10,000 Czech-Americans are precluded from even applying for restitution or compensation because of this requirement. Citizenship and residency requirements have been found to violate the nondiscrimination clause of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, an international agreement that these countries have voluntarily signed onto, and yet the countries mentioned have been unwilling to eliminate the restrictions. The resolution calls on these countries to remove citizenship or residency requirements from their restitution and compensation laws. Mr. Speaker, the examples given only begin to show the obstacles faced by property claimants in formerly totalitarian countries. This past August, Stuart Eizenstat, now the Under Secretary of State or Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs and the U.S. Special Envoy for Property Claims in Central and Eastern Europe, testified before the International Relations Committee about the need for Congress to pass a resolution that encourages Central and East European countries to return wrongfully expropriated property. While that hearing focused on Holocaust-era assets, in reality many Holocaust victims who suffered the loss of their property at the hands of the Nazis were victimized again by Communist regimes. I comment Under Secretary Eizenstat for his tireless efforts on behalf of Holocaust victims and I hope that the United States Government will make property restitution and compensation a priority in Central and Eastern Europe, as it has done in Cuba, Nicaragua and other countries.
Deterioration of Religious Liberty in EuropeWednesday, July 22, 1998
This briefing addressed the persisting question of problems of religious liberty and the patterns of discrimination against religious minorities and other belief groups that had developed in a number of countries in the OSCE region in the aftermath of the Cold War. Efforts of improving religious liberty in former communist countries were discussed, as well as the need for spending time and attention on countries farther west, like France, Belgium, and Austria, in which concern for religious minorities was also expressed. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Willy Fautre, Director of Human Rights without Frontiers and James McCabe, Assistant General Counsel of Watchtower Bible and Tract Society – examined the multi-tiered system that European countries employ regarding religion, and the different statuses and treatment of citizens based on where their religion falls within this system. The issues faced by minority religious associations, like being targeted by fiscal services, were also topics of discussion.
Romani Human Rights in EuropeTuesday, July 21, 1998
Commission Co-Chairman Christopher H. Smith presided over this hearing that discussed the rights of the Romani population in Europe. While ostensibly of Central and Eastern European descent, Romani, or Roma, individuals have existed in almost every European state. The Roma consist of a dispersed minority that, at the time of this hearing, was the fastest growing European population, numbering between 8 million and 10 million people. Unfortunately, their numbers did not protect the Roma from being the only population whose situation had actually worsened since the fall of Communism. From the first signs of anti-Romani discrimination in Romania to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation in January of 1994, the reasons to justify holding this hearing to discuss the plight of the Romani were many. At this hearing, besides Commissioner Chris Smith, were Commission Chairman Steny Hoyer, and witnesses James Goldston of the European Roma Rights Center, Livia Plaks of the Project on Ethnic Relations, and Drs. David Crowe and Ian Hancock, professors at Elon and the University of Texas-Austin, respectively.
What's Next, Mr. Prime Minister? Democracy Hangs in the Balance in Slovakia on Constitution's Fifth BirthdayMonday, September 29, 1997
Mr. President, 5 years ago, the speaker of the Slovak Parliament, Ivan Gasparovic, described his country's new constitution as `an expression of centuries-old emancipation efforts of the Slovak people to have a sovereign state of their own.' He also spoke of its `supreme binding force.' Since then, the people who present themselves as the guardians of Slovakia's statehood have undermined Slovakia's constitution. This is what they have done. This May, the Ministry of Interior ignored the Constitutional Court's ruling and altered an important referendum on NATO and on the direct election of the President, effectively denying the people of Slovakia their constitutionally guaranteed right to register their views through a referendum. Defending its actions, members of the Prime Minister's party insisted that they acted in conformity with the constitution--as they interpreted it--and that they were justified in placing their views ahead of the ruling of the highest court in the land. The actions of the ruling coalition in the case of Frantisek Gaulieder makes clear that the Meciar government has a profound and fundamental disregard for the constitution of Slovakia. Then there is the case of Frantisek Gaulieder. Frantisek Gaulieder is a member of the Slovak Parliament who was removed from office because he renounced his membership in Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. On July 25, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the ruling coalition's action which deprived Gaulieder of his seat was unconstitutional and violated Gaulieder's rights. But members of the Prime Minister's coalition again claimed that they, and not the Constitutional Court, have the right to determine what the constitution means, and have declined to act to restore Gaulieder to his seat in Parliament. In short, the `supreme binding force' that Ivan Gasparovic spoke of 5 years ago no longer flows from the constitution, but from the will of Vladimir Meciar. When there are differences of opinion as to what a constitution means, whether those differences arise between branches of government or between the government and its citizens, in a state operating under the rule of law, it is the job of a constitutional court to interpret what the constitution means, not the Prime Minister or Parliament. Although this principle is taken for granted in many parts of Europe, and was established early in American history by the famous Supreme Court case of Marbury versus Madison, it has apparently not yet been accepted in Slovakia. Mr. President, the Slovak Democratic Coalition has moved, four times, to convene a special session of the Parliament in order to implement the decision of the Constitutional Court and restore Frantisek Gaulieder to his seat. Four times, however, Prime Minister Meciar's coalition has boycotted their own Parliament rather than face the following dilemma: restore Gaulieder to his seat--consistent with the Constitutional Court's decision--and risk the chance that others will follow Gaulieder's example and defect from the Prime Minister's party, or vote down the Slovak Democratic Coalition's proposal to restore Gaulieder to his seat and confirm that whatever form of government exists in Slovakia, it is not constitutional democracy, at least not as we understand it. Sooner or later, the Slovak Parliament will reconvene. When it acts, or fails to act, on the Gaulieder question, we will know whether Slovakia is committed to becoming a functioning constitutional democracy. If it is not, what it will become is an isolated State under constant international pressure and scrutiny, cut off from a promising and prosperous future by the arrogance and greed of its own leaders. As Vladimir Meciar is asked in his weekly news show, what next, Mr. Prime Minister?
Report on Human Rights and the Process of NATO EnlargementSunday, June 01, 1997
The Commission held a series of three public hearings on Human Rights and the Process of NATO Enlargement in anticipation of the summit of Heads of State and Governments of Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be held in Madrid, Spain, on July 8 and 9, 1997. The emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Pact created a security vacuum in the territory between the current eastern frontier of NATO and the Russian border. The first attempt to address the new security realities in the region occurred at the end of 1991 with the establishment of NATOs North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for the evolution of a new relationship based on constructive dialogue and cooperation. In early 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched with the aim of providing a practical program to transform the relationship between NATO and states participating in PfP, moving beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a genuine security partnership. (All 27 states of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) are OSCE participating States.) Simultaneously, NATO began to consider the possibility of enlarging the Alliance. The result was the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement which addressed practical steps and requirements candidates for membership would have to satisfy. In December 1996, NATO foreign ministers called for a NATO summit at which one or more countries that wanted to join NATO would be invited to begin accession negotiations. The U.S. Congress was instrumental in stimulating the debate through several legislative initiatives. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (PL 103-447) provided a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about NATO enlargement, consistent with U.S. interests in ensuring stability in Europe. The law lists a variety of criteria, such as respect for democratic principles and human rights enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, against which to evaluate the suitability of prospective candidates for NATO membership. The Act stipulates that participants in the PfP should be invited to become full NATO members if they... remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens.... Under section 203, a program of assistance was established to provide designated emerging democracies with the tools necessary to facilitate their transition to full NATO membership. The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (PL 104-208) included an unqualified statement that the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The law also makes clear that the human rights records of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe interested in joining NATO should be evaluated in light of the obligations and commitments of these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.
Slovakian Human Rights IssuesTuesday, April 22, 1997
Mr. President, I rise today to call to my colleagues' attention to human rights developments in Slovakia. These developments point Slovakia in the opposite direction from the road their neighbors have been traveling. Their neighbors accept western values and seek integration into western institutions, developments leading to individual freedom, political democracy, and economic prosperity in a free market system. In stark contrast, Slovakia is not in compliance with some important Helsinki process commitments and is showing signs of regression toward authoritarian, if not totalitarian relations between the state and its citizens. This country, which showed so much promise upon gaining independence in 1993, has failed to press ahead with vitally needed democratic reforms, in contrast with so many other countries in the region, including other newly independent countries. While the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have worked hard to qualify for EU membership and NATO accession, Slovakia has lagged behind. While states like Lithuania and Slovenia have emerged from repressive empires to bring prosperity and hope to their peoples, Slovakia has not. Even Romania, which has struggled profoundly with the transition from totalitarianism, has managed to undertake significant reforms in the past few months. From the outset, members of the Helsinki Commission have supported the democratic transformation in Slovakia. We believe that a strong, democratic Slovakia will enhance stability and security in Europe. Unfortunately, human rights and democratization in Slovakia have taken a severe beating, both literally and figuratively, in recent months. The hopes raised by free and fair elections and by the passage of a democratic constitution have been dashed. Last month, I understand some officials in Bratislava criticized a congressional report on NATO enlargement and complained that the discussion of Slovakia's progress toward democracy was too superficial. Well, I will provide a little more detail for those who genuinely want to know what worries us here in Washington. Parliamentary democracy in Slovakia took a bullet in late November, when parliamentarian Frantisek Gaulieder, after announcing his resignation from the ruling coalition's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, was stripped of his parliamentary mandate through antidemocratic means that are unheard of anywhere else in Europe. His removal has been protested by the European Union and the United States at OSCE meetings in Vienna, but, so far, to no avail. Even more outrageously, there was a bomb attack against Mr. Gaulieder's home, while he and his family were present. This is a tactic that reminds me of the Communists, fascists, and other similarly bloody and ruthless groups. The 1995 kidnaping of President Kovac's son is not only still unsolved, but the manner in which this matter has been investigated has fueled speculation that the government's own security forces were directly involved in this crime. The murder last year of Robert Remias, who may have had key evidence in this case, and the ineffectual investigation of that case has deepened these suspicions. Adding to this disturbing pattern, questions are already being raised about the official investigation of the December bomb attack on Frantisek Gaulieder's home: Mr. Gauliedier has reported that some of his testimony regarding the attack is missing from his police file, that the first investigator was removed after only 3 days on the case, and that the Slovak Minister of Interior has, shockingly, suggested that Mr. Gaulieder may have planted the bomb himself, the same `he-did-it-himself' story that no one believes regarding the kidnaping of Mr. Kovac, Jr. I am now informed that this investigation, like the Kovac and Remias cases, has been `closed for lack of evidence.' For a country supposedly seriously committed through its OSCE obligations to the establishment of a `rule of law' state, this is a damagingly poor performance. In addition to these acts of violence, it has been reported that the President, the President's son, and members of the Constitutional Court have been subjected to death threats. In fact, in early December the Association of Slovak Judges characterized the anonymous, threatening letters addressed to Milan Cic, the Chair of the Slovak Constitutional Court, as an attack against the court as a whole and a means of political intimidation. It has also been reported that on February 24 an opposition political figure in Banska Bystrica, Miroslav Toman, was attacked by four assailants. We see a country where politically motivated violence is on the increase, where public confidence in the government's intent to provide security for all Slovaks has plummeted, and where acts of violence and threats of violence have brought into question both the rule of law and the very foundations of democracy. The ruling coalition has continued to pursue an openly hostile agenda toward a free and independent media and free speech in general. During the course of the past year, two newspapers, Slovenska Republika and Naroda Obroda, have seen a total of 21 editors quit over alleged political interference with their work. Defamation suits launched by public officials appear to be a common vehicle for harassing one's political opponents. Most recently, on November 19, the government barred four journalists from attending a regular press conference after the weekly cabinet meeting because the journalists were believed to be unsympathetic to the government. Although this decision was ultimately rescinded after a public outcry, including a protest from the journalists' union, it was further evidence of the government's relentless efforts to curb any reporting it doesn't like. In fact, in one of the more shocking episodes of the battle for free speech in Slovakia, it has been reported that Vladimir Meciar, the Prime Minister of the country and, not insignificantly, a former boxer, warned journalist Dusan Valko just a few weeks ago that `I will punch you so that your own mother will not recognize you.' So much for Mr. Meciar's tolerance for other points of view and nonviolence. The Slovak Government continues to pursue a minorities policy that would be laughable if it were not so wrong and harmful. This policy has included everything from banning the playing of non-Slovak national anthems last year to the more recent decision to bar the issuance of report cards in the Hungarian language, reversing long-standing practices. Such petty gestures are beneath the dignity of the Slovak people, whose heritage has survived more than a thousand years of foreign, and often markedly repressive, rule. The Slovak language and culture, now protected in an independent Slovakia, are not so weak that they can only flourish at the expense of others. More seriously, it should be noted that past repressive crackdowns on minorities, for example, in Cluj, Romania, and in Kosovo, Serbia, began by whittling away at the minority language opportunities that had traditionally been respected by the majority community. Accordingly, these seemingly small restrictions on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia may very well be the harbinger of more repressive tactics ahead. With this in mind, the failure of the Slovak parliament to adopt a comprehensive minority language law, and the recommendation of the Ministry of Culture that such a law is not even necessary, defy common sense. Current laws on minority-language use in Slovakia do not provide adequate or satisfactory guidance regarding the use of Hungarian for official purposes, as the recent report-card flap shows. Much harm can be done until a minority language law is passed based on a genuine accommodation between the majority and minority communities. Finally, recent reductions in government-provided cultural subsidies have had a disproportionately negative effect on the Hungarian community. The Slovak Government's defense, that all ethnic groups have been equally disadvantaged by these cut-backs, is unpersuasive in light of the Culture Minister Hudec's stated intent to `revive' Slovak culture in ethnically mixed areas and to make cultural subsidies reflect that goal. While Hungarians suffer from a more direct form of government intolerance, other ethnic groups suffer more indirectly. Put another way, it is not so much government action which threatens Romani communities in Slovakia, it is government inaction. According to the most recent State Department report on Slovakia, skinhead violence against Roma is a serious and growing problem; three Roma were murdered as a result of hate crimes last year, and others have been severely injured. Some Roma leaders, in response to their government's inability or unwillingness to protect them, have called for the formation of self-defense units. Obviously, the Slovak Government is just not doing enough to address the deadly threats they face. Moreover, the repugnant anti-Roma statements that have repeatedly been made by Jan Slota, a member of the ruling coalition, have fostered this climate of hatred. The fact that the Czech Republic, Germany, and other European countries also confront skinhead movements in no way relieves Slovakia of its responsibility to combat racism, just as Slovakia's skinhead problem does not relieve the other countries of their responsibilities. It is time and past time for Prime Minister Meciar to use his moral authority and political leadership to set Slovakia on the right course. He must make clear, once and for all, that Jan Slota, who also called the Hungarian minority `barbarian Asiatic hordes', is not his spokesman, and that the Slovak National Party's unreconstructed fascists do not represent the majority of the people of Slovakia. Mr. President, the leadership of the Helsinki Commission, including my co-chairman, Representative Christopher H. Smith, and ranking members Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Steny Hoyer, have raised our concern about developments in Slovakia with Slovak officials on a number of occasions. Unfortunately, all we hear from the Slovak leadership is one excuse after another, and all we see is a search for one scapegoat after another: it's the Hungarians, it's the Czechs, it's the Ukrainian mafia, it's the hostile international community seeking to destroy Slovakia's good name, it's a public relations problem abroad, not real problems back home: in short, there is always somebody else to blame besides the people that are, in fact, running the country. I don't mean to suggest that there have been no positive developments in Slovakia over the past 4 years. In fact, I have been especially heartened by the emergence of a genuine civil society that is increasingly willing to express its views on a broad range of issues. But positive initiatives by the Government have been too few and too far between. I make this statement today in the hope that the leadership in Bratislava will start to make real reforms, like their colleagues in Romania, and begin to restore the promising future that the people of Slovakia deserve. Their present policies are leading down a path toward international isolation, increasing criticism, and economic deprivation for their people. One Belarus is enough.
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)Thursday, February 20, 1997
This briefing focused on the topics of European security and NATO enlargement, specifically in terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Elements of the treaty that remained especially important, including the goal of avoiding destabilizing concentrations of forces in Europe and the goal of creating greater transparency and promoting information exchange among governments in Europe, were discussed. Witnesses testifying at this briefing spoke to the need for amendments and changes to the CFE, but maintained the relevance of the treaty to international security. Different strategies for making these changes related to Russian pressure and NATO involvement were presented.
U.S. Statements on the Human Dimension, 1996 OSCE Vienna Review Conference and Lisbon SummitFriday, November 01, 1996
This compendium of statements illustrates the U.S. perspective that one of the key and distinguishing features of the OSCE is the interlocking framework of critical, politically binding commitments which provide a common set of principles to which all participating States can aspire. The OSCE draws its real strength and practical flexibility from participating states' commitments to the values of the original Helsinki Act, rather than from a legalized, treaty-based institutional structure. A fundamental strength of the OSCE is the review process, which provides a regular opportunity to assess a participating states' efforts to further the realization of the Helsinki Accords within its own borders, and in its relations with other OSCE states. The OSCE is increasingly a pillar of European security. By facilitating honest implementation review the OSCE can strengthen security links based on common values.
Ex Post Facto Problems of the Czech Citizenship LawSunday, September 01, 1996
When the Czechoslovak Federal Republic dissolved on January 1, 1993, the newly independent Czech Republic adopted a citizenship law that provided citizenship to only some of the former Czechoslovak citizens then resident in the Czech Republic. An undetermined number of people, including long-term residents and even some people born in the Czech Republic, have been left stateless or with an unclear legal status. Almost all of these people belong to the Czech Republic's largest minority, Roma (Gypsies). As a consequence, this law has been heavily criticized at meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the law presents numerous and serious questions regarding its conformity with international standards, such as those relating to recognition before the law (the status of orphans), equal protection before the law (different requirements for citizenship established for different classes of former Czechoslovak citizens), the right to a fair hearing (lack of adequate hearing procedures and opportunities for appeal), and actual or arbitrary discrimination (original intent of the law). Non-governmental organizations in the Czech Republic and abroad have heavily criticized the law both as drafted and as applied. This memorandum examines one discrete aspect of the current Czech citizenship law: its conformity with the Czech Republic's international obligation to refrain from increasing criminal penalties after the crime in question was committed.
Hungary's Relations with her NeighborsFriday, August 02, 1996
Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of my colleagues the joint declaration adopted in Budapest on July 5 by representatives of the Hungarian Government and by representatives of Hungarian communities abroad- the so-called Hungarian-Hungarian summit declaration. The status of the various and sizable Hungarian minority communities in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia are of considerable interest to many in Congress. How governments treat their minority communities is often a significant barometer of how they will treat their citizens as a whole, and a strong indicator of the progress of democratization in countries in transition. In fact, I remain concerned about the minority situation in each of these countries, and, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, have raised such concerns on a number of occasions. Many hoped the Hungarian-Hungarian summit document would provide some useful insight into the concrete concerns of Hungarian minorities. Unfortunately, the summit document adopted in Budapest does not address the kind of specific and concrete issues that are usually raised with the Commission, such as minority language schooling or electoral districting. Instead, the declaration stands as a broad and somewhat ambiguous endorsement of `autonomy' and `self-government.' Those terms, guaranteed to alarm those already afraid of alleged Hungarian irredentism, were unfortunately left undefined, fostering the perception in some quarters that the declaration represents only a thinly veiled effort by Budapest to extend its influence beyond current Hungarian borders and, implicitly, to turn back the clock to the days when Hungarians were united in a single country. I appreciate the Hungarian Embassy's willingness to clarify for the Commission the underlying intent of his declaration. In particular, the Embassy asserted that the word `autonomy' was in no way intended to signal `territorial autonomy.' I also believe the declaration's positive emphasis on the importance of the accession of all Hungary's neighbors into NATO and the European Union should not be overlooked and, indeed, is especially important in light of the recent congressional debate on NATO expansion. Nevertheless, I believe that the declaration, through the use of wording that is ambiguous at best and, at worst, predictably inflammatory, stands in contradiction to Hungary's stated goal of pursuing `good neighbor' policies. Surprisingly, Hungary implies that its goal of gaining admission to NATO and other European organizations should be dependent on `the fundamental interests of Hungarian national communities abroad'--a message that suggests a qualified interest in accession to NATO. Finally, I must note that concerns about this declaration were only heightened by the statement of the Hungarian representative to the OSCE in Vienna, Ambassador Martin Krasznai. In defending the use of the word `autonomy,' Ambassador Krasznai presented the Basques, Catalans, and South-Tyroleans as positive examples of Europe's experience with autonomous movements. The irony of these particular references was probably not lost on the representatives of Italy or Spain--especially in the wake of the numerous terrorist bombings attributed to Basque separatists last month. Mr. Speaker, while a rare opportunity for discussion about real minority concerns may have been missed, I also see the Hungarian-Hungarian summit declaration as an aberration from the current government's usually constructive approach. I will continue to follow the situation of minority communities in central Europe and the inseparable issue of the progress of democratization in general. As I do so, I hope that Hungarian representatives will join with the Commission in seeking to promote democracy for all the citizens of all the countries of the OSCE.
Violence in SlovakiaMonday, May 20, 1996
Mr. Speaker, I am alarmed by recent violence in Slovakia that may be part of a larger pattern of politically motivated violence. During the weekend of May 4-5, a device that may have been a hand-grenade exploded in front of the home of Bela Bugar. Mr. Bugar is not only a member of the Hungarian minority's opposition coalition, he is also, according to opinion polls, its most popular member. Shortly before that incident, Robert Remias, a former policeman who has been questioned in connection with the kidnaping of President Michal Kovac's son last year, died when his propane-fueled BMW exploded. Although it is not yet certain who is responsible for these acts, it is clear that violence coincides with politics in Slovakia at a suspiciously high rate. I also recall, for example, that Frantisek Miklosko, the opposition leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, was assaulted by unknown attackers near his home last August; Peter Toth, a journalist investigating the Kovac case, has also been assaulted; last April, a bomb went off in the car of Arpad Matejka, a member of the Prime Minister's party. The Helsinki Commission, which I chair, is no stranger to Slovakia. We were a close observer of developments there well before the breakup of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1992 and have issued two major reports on that country. Since last summer, I have been joined twice by Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the Commissions' cochairman, and the Commission's ranking minority members, Representative Steny H. Hoyer and Senator Frank Lautenberg, in sending letters to Slovak Ambassador Lichardus regarding continuing challenges to the democratization process in his country. Although the Commission has raised a number of serious concerns in these letters, we have, remained generally optimistic about developments in Slovakia. Last week, for example, I hosted a conference in New Jersey on business opportunities in Central Europe, where I discussed some of the positive economic changes in Slovakia that are creating new opportunities for Slovak society as a whole. I appreciate the willingness of the Slovak Parliament to consider the views of a number of international interlocutors regarding draft legislation and note the active and constructive role of the President and the Constitutional Court in guiding the passage of legislation consistent with democratic values and human rights norms. I commend Prime Minister Meciar for his decision last week to seek, in his words, a wider democratic discussion of the draft law on the protection of the Republic. Most of all, I have been greatly heartened by the increasing involvement of Slovak citizens in all areas of public life. The message sent by the most recent developments in Slovakia, therefore, is all the more discouraging. And that message is dangerous: take on a high political profile, and you are possibly a more visible--and more likely--target of violence. I welcome the May 9 statement of the Government of Slovakia condemning acts of violence and promising a thorough investigation of these matters. I believe it is particularly important that the death of Robert Remias be examined in an open and transparent manner, in a manner that makes information available to all those concerned with this case, and in a manner that will foster credibility in its results. Mr. Speaker, the Helsinki Commission will continue to follow closely developments in this case, and I expect to report further to this body as information becomes available.
Summary of the OSCE Rule of Law SeminarFriday, December 01, 1995
From November 28 to December 1, 1995, the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) convened a seminar on the rule of law. The meeting was organized by the Warsaw-based OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Thirty-eight of the 53 fully participating States attended, along with representatives from two Non-Participating Mediterranean States, six international organizations, and 25 non-governmental organizations. Over the course of two days, a number of emerging democracies described the constitutions and other legislative provisions that had been adopted in their countries to provide for the rule of law, at least on paper. Western participants, for their part, generally spoke of the specific and concrete challenges faced in their countries in actually implementing safeguards for the rule of law. In general, the participation of East-Central European and former Soviet countries—most of which attended this meeting—was more active than at the 1991 Oslo meeting, and Western participants, for their part, avoided the West-West bickering that marred the earlier seminar. At the end of the meeting, the rapporteurs produced summaries of the discussions.
Religious Liberty: The State Church and Minority FaithsTuesday, November 28, 1995
Samuel G. Wise, Director for International Policy at the US Helsinki Commission, presented the second briefing in a series focusing on religious liberty in the participating states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This particular discussion was intended to evaluate the relationship between state churches or traditional religious and freedom of religion for minority faiths in the OSCE region through an analysis of the effects of certain historical legacies on individual states. Witnesses testifying at the briefing – including Father Kishkovsky, Ecumenical Officer of the Orthodox Church in America; Father George Papaioannou, Pastor of St. George Greek Orthodox Church; Gerard Powers, Foreign Policy Advisor for the U.S. Catholic Conference; Lauren Homer, Founder of Law and Liberty Trust; and Lee Boothby, Vice President of the Council on Religious Freedom – focused on the issue of minority and majority in society as it relates to religion and the potential for this issue to result in conflict. The historical origins of these tensions, especially in Eastern Europe, were particularly emphasized.
Religious Liberty in the OSCE: Present and FutureWednesday, September 27, 1995
Speaking on behalf of Congressman Christopher H. Smith and Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, chairman and co-chairman of the Helsinki Committee, the Committee's Director for International Policy, Samuel G. Wise, addressed the improvements made by the countries of the OSCE in religious liberty since the demise of communism. Observed deficits in this particular subject were also evaluated, including acts of OSCE governments perpetrating religious intolerance and discrimination against people of faith by passing laws favoring certain religions, turning a blind eye to harassment, and establishing bureaucratic roadblocks to prevent religious minorities from practicing their faith. Each panelist – including Dr. Paul Marshall, Senior Fellow of Political Theory for the Institute for Christian Studies; Dr. Khalid Duran, Senior Fellow for the Institute for International Studies; and Micah Naftalin, National Director for the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews – spoke to the overall factors affecting religious freedom in the OSCE, including: respect for other freedoms such as freedom of speech and religion, ethno-cultural tensions, and the relevance of old prejudices. These ideas were presented in the context of moving towards a more comprehensive respect for religious freedom among OSCE member states in the future.
Report on the U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation Visit to Hungary, Yugoslavia, and AlbaniaMonday, March 04, 1991
The main purpose of the Commission's visit to Budapest was to participate in the Seminar on Parliamentary Responsibility for Economic Development being co-sponsored by the Helsinki Commission, the Hungarian Parliament, the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity, and the Library of Congress. Additionally, members of the delegation discussed Hungary's current political and economic situation with members of the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), leaders of the Gypsy community, and U.S. business representatives.
Elections in the Czech and Slovak Federal RepublicFriday, June 08, 1990
This report is based on the findings of a staff delegation of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic from 6-11 June 1990. The staff met with representatives of several political parties and movements, as well as of the Electoral Commission. It also observed the voting and some aspects of the counting of ballots. The Commission wishes to thank the National Democratic and National Republican Institutes for International Affairs for allowing the staff delegation to be included in the activities of their international election observer mission to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
Reform and Human Rights in Eastern EuropeThursday, December 01, 1988
During the course of the last several years, tremendous political changes have occurred in Eastern Europe. On the plus side of the ledger, the United States normalized relations with Poland, symbolized by the reinstatement of Poland's Most-Favored-Nation trad ing status (MFN) in 1987, following a series of prisoner amnesties and political improvements peaking in 1986. In Hungary, progress has included the introduction of a new passport law, undoubtedly the most liberal in Eastern Europe to date, permitting passport is suance according to roughly the same standards as in the West. In the German Democratic Republic, record numbers of people have been permitted to travel and to emigrate. On the negative side of the ledger, to mention only the most striking case of deterioration, United States relations with Romania have chilled because of that country's progressively poorer human rights performance. This led Romania to renounce its MFN privileges rather than face what promised to be a highly critical assessment before the U.S. Congress in 1988. In spite of worldwide condemnation of its policies, Romania has forged ahead with plans to destroy up to half of its approximately 13,000 villages. All this is painted onto domestic political and economic canvases which can seem alternately diverse and yet uniform, capable of metamorphosis and yet stagnant. In spite of the notable changes, there are few discernible area-wide trends in this geographic region united by its postwar fate. It is no wonder, then, that East European analysts have been left scratching their heads, trying to make sense out of all that is happening, or -- in some cases -- not happening. One of the traditional questions posed by these analysts involves the degree of influence events in the Soviet Union have on developments in Eastern Europe. The latest angle in this sophisticated guesswork has become the question of what role Mikhail Gorbachev performs in Eastern Europe's own passion play. Since World War II, Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea has been the victim of push-me, pull-you politics emanating from Moscow: now racing to catchup with de-Stalinization, now being punished for taking de-Stalinization too far. Today's Eastern Europe seems to continue to walk a poorly defined path between being reactive to events in the Soviet Union, and proactively leading the way to parts unknown. Understanding the changes taking place in the region -- and the opportunities for the West which have arisen as a result of them -- may be more critical now than at any time since the end of World War II. Consequently, the Helsinki Commission has followed developments in Eastern Europe more closely during the past Congress than ever before. Extensive hearings have been held on virtually every aspect of the Helsinki Accords as they apply to Eastern Europe, drawing on a wide range of experts on East European affairs, including renowned scholars, high-ranking government officials, representatives from nongovernmental organizations, and East Europeans speaking from their firsthand experiences. In addition, the Commission has led congressional delegations to all six East European countries. These unprecedented trips provided Helsinki Commissioners and other Members of Congress with the opportunity to engage government officials in a dialogue on all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, and to exchange views regarding specific areas of bilateral and multilateral concern. Just as important were delegation meetings with a wide range of private citizens, representing independent and unofficial thinking among the political, religious, and cultural communities. Commission staff delegations to Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have performed important follow-up activities. The report that follows is based on the information garnered by the Commission's numerous hearings, delegations, and reports. It is an attempt to take that information one step further and, like The Gorbachev Record which precedes it, present a sober, factual analysis of trends in the countries of Eastern Europe. It is hoped that, as a result, we will better understand where and in what ways positive change is taking place in Eastern Europe, and where compliance with the Helsinki Final Act cries for improvement.
Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE - Phase III and IVFriday, January 01, 1988
The main activity of the Vienna Meeting throughout Phases III and IV was the presentation and negotiation of proposals for inclu sion in the concluding document of the meeting. The number (more than 160), complexity and controversial nature of many of these proposals led to the extension of the Vienna Meeting well beyond its target closing date of July 31. These factors, along with other elements such as continuing major shortcomings in the implementa tion of existing commitments, are largely responsible for the continuation of the Vienna Meeting into 1988. The slow pace of progress already evident in Phase II continued through the next phase. Each side defended its own proposals but showed little disposition to begin the process of compromise which could lead to the conclusion of the meeting. The main procedural development during this phase was the appointment of coordinators from the neutral and non-aligned states to guide the work of the drafting groups. This development provided greater order and structure for the proceedings but did little to advance the drafting work or to induce compromises. Other major developments during this phase were the introduction of the long-awaited Western proposal on military security and the tabling of a comprehensive compromise proposed in Basket III by two neutral delegations, Austria and Switzerland. Both proposals were put forth at the very end of the phase and thus did not have much impact until the next phase. The Western (NATO) proposal on military security questions was designed as a response to the Eastern proposal which envisioned two main objectives: another round of negotiations on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) to build upon the successful Stockholm meeting and the initiation of negotiations on conventional disarmament, both within the same CSCE forum. The Western response to this proposal was delayed primarily because of United States and French differences over the connection between the conventional arms negotiations and the CSCE process, the French arguing that the negotiations should be an integral part of the process and the U.S. insisting that they be independent. The issue was resolved by agreement that the negotiations would be "within the framework of the CSCE," but should remain autonomous.
Mr. Speaker, `Dogs have more freedom than us; at least they are not afraid to go outside.' Mr. Speaker, this is the conclusion of a young Romani father in Slovakia who recounted his experience with growing skinhead violence in his country. His story is, regrettably, just one of the many documented in a January 1997 report prepared by the European Roma Rights Center [ERRC] entitled `Time of the Skinheads: Denial and Exclusion of Roma in Slovakia.' This study describes a grim pattern of violent assaults against Roma perpetrated by skinhead extremists; it also suggests that local police forces have been, at best, unwilling to fulfill their obligation to protect their citizens and, at worst, have themselves actually engaged in violence against Roma.
Descriptions of a 1995 organized attack on the entire Romani community in the town of Jarovnice--something that reads like a pogrom from a bygone era--were especially chilling. Since Slovakia became an independent state in 1993, a great deal of international attention has, rightly, focused on the status of the Hungarian minority in that country, a community that makes up approximately 10 percent of the population. Slovakia also has another large minority population which is less well known abroad. While the exact number of Roma in Slovakia is contested, it is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands. These people, the survivors of Nazi efforts to eradicate the Roma altogether, now face increasing violent attacks against their homes, their villages, and their lives.
The problems of Roma in post-Communist European countries are many, and often defy easy answers. But at least three of the problems described in `Time of the Skinheads' do have obvious solutions. First, the Slovak Government has failed to demonstrate any serious effort to acknowledge and address the widespread problem of violent skinhead attacks on Roma. On the contrary, some public officials, members of the ruling coalition, have repeatedly made crude racist remarks about the Roma. As long as such remarks stand uncontested or unchallenged by Prime Minister Meciar, skinheads will believe that they can attack Roma with impunity. Clearly, local police officials take their cues from the top. Accordingly, any improvement in the situation of Roma in Slovakia must begin with the leadership of that country stating that racism and bigotry will not be tolerated.
Second, the ERRC report described a pattern of excessive use of force by the police against Roma. When the victims seek to bring a complaint against the police, the charges are, in effect, reversed and the Rom is charged with assaulting the police. Significantly, the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture released a report on April 3, which also documented a problem of police brutality in Slovakia. That report, like the report of the ERRC, noted that the failure to ensure that those charged with a criminal offense have adequate legal representation has significantly contributed to this miscarriage of justice. One of the purposes of providing such representation is to guarantee a fair trial, consistent with the due process of law, and to ensure that those accused of crimes do not have confessions extracted from them by force. The failure to provide the accused with defense counsel violates one of the most important provisions of the international human rights system: the right to an attorney, a right articulated in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as paragraph 5.16 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document. I hope the Slovak Government will take immediate measures to redress this problem.
Finally, the ERRC report on Slovakia indicates that Slovak localities continue to use a system of tightly controlled residency permits to restrict the freedom of movement of Roma. Not only does this practice offend the nondiscrimination provisions of the Helsinki process, this system also harkens back to the rigid controls of the Communist days. If people are not permitted to move where jobs are, how can a free market system flourish?
Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this pattern of violence against Roma is not unique to Slovakia. The ERRC, which was founded to defend the human rights of Roma, has also issued major reports on Austria and Romania. In addition, its most recent newsletter reported on problems Roma face in several other European countries. Clearly, there is much more that many governments in Central Europe can and should do to address these problems. I realize that Slovakia is in the midst of grappling with a very broad range of fundamental questions regarding its development and future. The basic human rights of Roma should be a part of that agenda. I see no better time. Will Slovakia enter the 21st century as a country which seeks to unite its citizens in achieving common goals, or will it lag behind with those countries which have permitted nationalism and racism to divide their people and weaken the very state they worked so hard to create?


text:
Download Hacking My Town: Friends House for Android for free ]
Version: 7.00.03
- MOD - Free Shopping
- Genre: Educational games
Offered ByGoogle Commerce Ltd
Android RequirementsAndroid 4.4 +
- Google Play:Go over
Plot "My Town: Friends House"
Friends are always good! And visiting them is even better! A game project that educates an audience of 3+ helps the user to explore the best friend's house, learn the correct behavior at dinner in the company of his parents, get to know the room of a friend or girlfriend, and also spend the whole night away and take care of his pet. The player gets at his disposal a lot of rooms and a large set of characters. The game works great with other My Town apps. Its plot is open, allowing you to create your own stories. Friends, moms and dads can always take part in the fun.
Download CHEATS on My Town: Friends House
Минимальная длина комментария - 50 знаков. комментарии модерируются


text:
In most cases, cardiac rehabilitation will include fitness instruction, emotional support, and teaching about how to make lifestyle changes that can lower your risk of heart disease, such as eating a heart-healthy diet, keeping a healthy weight, and stopping smoking.
What are the 3 phases of cardiac rehab?
In this post, we'll go through the four stages of cardiac rehabilitation – commonly known as the acute, subacute, outpatient, and maintenance phases – and how they differ from one another.
How long do patients stay in cardiac rehab?
Cardiac rehabilitation programs are typically 3 months in length, although they may run anywhere from 2 to 8 months in length. Cardiovascular rehabilitation is something you should discuss with your doctor.
What is monitored during cardiac rehab?
If you are participating in a supervised cardiac rehab program, your blood pressure (BP) will be monitored in addition to your heart rate (HR) and respiratory effort (RPE). It is possible that you will want to be conscious of your blood pressure during activity that you undertake on your own.
How many sessions is cardiac rehab?
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an outpatient or home-based cardiac rehab program typically consists of 36 sessions spread over a period of around three months. It is possible, however, to finish the program in as little as 2 months or as long as 8 months.
Can you do cardiac rehab at home?
Your cardiac rehabilitation (rehab) program may include an exercise regimen that you may complete at your leisure at home. You may want to begin this regimen as soon as you return home from the hospital. The home program is a component of, or phase of, your cardiac rehabilitation treatment.
What is best exercise for heart patient?
Exercise that is aerobic in nature How much time: Ideally, at least 30 minutes each day, five days a week is sufficient. Exercises such as brisk walking, jogging, swimming, cycling, tennis, and jumping rope are examples. When doctors prescribe at least 150 minutes of moderate activity each week, they are referring to high-intensity aerobic exercise that causes the heart to pound faster.
Is Cardiac Rehab worth?
Cardiovascular rehabilitation leads to a healthy lifestyle as a consequence of weight reduction, greater muscular tone and strength, lower blood pressure, decreased insulin resistance, and improved lipids. Quitting smoking, reducing stress, and protecting against osteoporosis are all benefits of the program.
Is Cardiac Rehab helpful?
Cardiac rehabilitation has a number of advantages. Using it can help you enhance your capacity to carry out everyday tasks while also lowering your chance of developing heart disease. It can also improve your perspective and mental stability while also increasing your ability to manage your condition.
Is Cardiac Rehab safe?
Risks are quite rare. Due to the fact that cardiac rehab is medically supervised, the dangers associated with exercise and heart-healthy lifestyle modifications are minimal. There is no need to be afraid that exercising may induce another heart attack. Physical activity is safer in a rehabilitation facility than it is at home.
Is Cardiac Rehab difficult?
Despite the fact that it may be tough to begin a cardiac rehabilitation program when you are not feeling well, it will be beneficial in the long term. As you return to an active lifestyle, cardiac rehabilitation can help you overcome your fears and anxieties so that you have more drive and energy to pursue the activities you like.
What is 75 of my max heart rate?
If you are exercising, you should try to keep your heart rate between 50 and 75 percent of your maximum heart rate, depending on your fitness level. If you want to know what your goal heart rate should be, multiply your maximum heart rate by 0.50. This will provide you with the low end of the range number. Then multiply your maximal heart rate by 0.75 to get your average heart rate.
Is cardiac rehab necessary after stent?
Despite the fact that cardiac rehabilitation following stent implantation is necessary for the vast majority of patients, it is woefully underutilized. In this case, there are a number of obstacles to overcome. These include accessibility, cost, education, and referrals. The absence of involvement in rehabilitation is associated with lower health outcomes and increased rates of readmission to the hospital.
What is the average cost of cardiac rehabilitation?
[3] For cardiac patients, the cost-effectiveness of cardiorespiratory rehabilitation (CR) when compared to standard care has been estimated to cost between USD$2000 and $28,000 per life-year gained, or to cost between USD$700 and $16,000 per quality adjusted life year (QALY) gained if HRQL is improved [3].
How soon after open heart surgery do you start cardiac rehab?
Patients who have undergone minimally invasive heart surgery can begin rehabilitation as soon as one to two weeks after the procedure, according to the American Heart Association.
What are the 5 risk factors of heart disease?
Important Risk Factors
- Hypertension is a condition in which the blood pressure is elevated (Hypertension). High blood pressure raises your chances of developing heart disease, having a heart attack, or having a stroke. High levels of cholesterol in the blood. High blood cholesterol levels are one of the most significant risk factors for heart disease. Other risk factors include diabetes, obesity, and overweight, smoking, physical inactivity, gender, and hereditary factors.


text:
- 1. If you're using Windows 10 on a laptop, you can disable Secure Boot in the Windows 10 settings.
- 2. To do this, open Settings and click on System.
- 3. Under Boot, click on Secure Boot and then uncheck the box next to "Turn on Secure Boot."
- 4. You can also disable Secure Boot from the command line by typing "bcdedit /set {current} disablepassword" into the command prompt.
How to disable Secure Boot on an Acer laptop
How do I disable secure boot on my Acer laptop?
To disable secure boot on your Acer laptop, you'll need to access the BIOS settings. Follow these steps:
Press the "Del" key to enter the BIOS setup screen.
Select "Secure Boot" from the list of settings on the left side of the screen.
Disable secure boot by selecting "Disable" from the menu that appears.
How do I disable secure boot on my laptop?
To disable secure boot on your laptop, you'll need to enter your password and then press "F10" or "F11". This will boot into the BIOS (the system settings). From here, you'll need to find the Secure Boot section and disable it.
How do I remove secure boot?
Secure Boot is a requirement for Windows 8 and newer systems in order to protect against booting malware. It can be disabled from the BIOS or from Windows by disabling Secure Boot in the settings. Once disabled, the computer will boot into Windows as normal.
How do I enable UEFI on my Acer?
To enable UEFI on your Acer, you'll need to go into the BIOS and change the boot order. First, turn off your computer and remove the battery if it's still plugged in. Next, press and hold the Delete key while powering on your computer. This will take you to the boot menu. Select the option for UEFI from the list of options. This will take you into the UEFI interface where you can change your boot order.
How do I enable secure boot on my Acer laptop?
To enable secure boot on an Acer laptop:
1) Boot into Windows 10.
2) Click the Start button and select Settings.
3) Click Update and Security.
4) Under "Other security settings," click "Secure Boot."
5) Under "Secure Boot Mode," select "Enabled."
6) Click OK in all windows.
What happen if we disable secure boot?
It is important to note that when we disable secure boot, it does not mean that our computer will be completely unsecured. Secure boot is a security measure that is used to protect our personal information and data. This security measure is implemented by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip.
What is the boot key for Acer?
The boot key is a special key that is used to access the boot menu on many Acer computers. To access the boot menu on an Acer computer, press and hold the Windows key and the F10 key at the same time. This will bring up the boot menu.
How do I disable secure boot on my Acer Aspire Nitro 5?
Step 1: Go to Acer's website and search for "secure boot."
Step 2: Hit the "Acer Secure Boot" link.
Step 3: You'll be greeted with a new window that asks for your password.
Step 4: Enter your password and click "OK."
Step 5: You should now see a new menu option called "Acer Secure Boot.
What is secure boot mode?
Secure Boot mode is a security feature that has been implemented in Microsoft Windows. It allows only signed code to run on the system, which makes it more difficult for malware to attack and infect your computer.
How do I disable Windows boot Manager?
Windows boot manager is a feature that allows you to choose which operating system to boot when you start your computer. To disable it, you can either delete the bootmgr file, or disable it in your registry.
How do I disable secure boot on Acer Aspire es 15?
To disable secure boot on your Acer Aspire es 15, you can follow these steps:
Press the Windows key and type "cmd" in the search bar.
Click on the window that pops up and type "bcdedit" without quotes.
Find the following line in the window and type "set current timezone to {timezone}
Find the following line and type "delete".
What is UEFI and legacy?
UEFI is a newer mode of BIOS that was designed to replace the traditional BIOS. Legacy systems use BIOS, while UEFI systems use a more secure and modern mode of BIOS.
How do I change my Acer laptop boot mode?
To change your Acer laptop boot mode, you will need to first open the "Start" menu and select "Control Panel". From there, you will need to select "Hardware and Sound" and then "System". Finally, under "System," you will be able to select "Boot Options.
How do I enable secure boot?
To enable secure boot on a PC, you need to go to the BIOS and change the boot order. Then, you need to set the computer to boot from the hard drive and not from an optical drive. If your PC has a UEFI BIOS, you need to disable Fast Boot mode.
Why do I have to disable Secure Boot?
The answer to this question is not straightforward. Generally, Secure Boot is used to ensure that only authorized firmware is loaded onto a computer, thereby preventing unauthorized devices from being used. However, there are a few cases where disabling Secure Boot may be necessary. For example, if you are installing a new operating system on a computer that already has an older version of Windows installed, you may need to disable Secure Boot in order to install the new operating system.


text:
The COVID-19 pandemic has directly changed people's habits to switch to online systems, including financial transactions. The most common are the use of internet banking and payments using digital wallets. The purpose of this study is to quantitatively analyze the use of internet banking and digital wallets in financial transactions based on Theory Of Planned Behavior (TPB). The method used is primary data (quantitative) by questionnaire as many as 62 people who use internet banking. This research was taken for 1 month, namely February 2021 (during COVID-19). The dependent variable used is Financial Transaction, while the other independent variables use 3 variables, namely Attitude, Norm and Behavior Control. The results of this study provide information that only attitude and norm have an effect on the financial effect. This provides evidence that the use of financial transactions via the internet is often done during the COVID-19 pandemic. This provides a new paradigm that financial transactions have begun to switch to using non-cash payments.
Andreou, P. C., & Philip, D. (2018). Financial knowledge among university students and implications for personal debt and fraudulent investments. Cyprus Economic Policy Review, 12, 3e23.
Andreou, P. C. (2020). Financial literacy and its influence on internet banking behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2020.12.001
Arif, I., Aslam, W., & Hwang, Y. (2020). Technology in Society Barriers in adoption of internet banking : A structural equation modeling - Neural network approach. Technology in Society, 61 (November2019),101231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101231
Lusardi, A., & Mitchell, O. S. (2011). Financial literacy around the world: An overview. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 10(4), 497e508
M. Xue, L.M. Hitt, P.-y. Chen. (2011). Determinants and outcomes of internet banking adoption, Management Science 57(2).291-307 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1187
Rahi, S., Abd, M., & Hafaz, A. (2019). Technology in Society Integration of unified theory of acceptance and use of technology in internet banking adoption setting : Evidence from Pakistan. Technology in Society, 58(March), 101120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.03.003
Sharma, R., Singh, G., & Sharma, S. (2020). International Journal of Information Management Modelling internet banking adoption in Fiji : A developing country perspective. International Journal of Information Management, 53(June 2019), 102116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2020.102116
State Bank of Pakistan. (2013). 94.4% bank's branches offer Real-Time Online Banking services in Pakistan: SBP [Online]. Available: http://www.sbp.org.pk/press/2013/PSR-30-May-2013.pdf, 2013, May.
Copyright (c) 2022 Hurian Kamela, Ryan Saputra Alam, Andrianto Prasetya Nugroho
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.


text:
- Discover CSUB
- |
- Academics
- |
- Admissions & Aid
- |
- Student Life
- ASI (Student Government)
- Antelope Valley Campus
- Bookstore
- Campus Dining
- Campus Programming
- Career Education and Community Engagement (CECE)
- Children's Center
- Counseling Center
- Graduate Student Center
- Health Center
- Housing and Residence Life
- Services for Students with Disabilities
- Student Financial Services
- Student Organizations
- Student Recreation Center
- Student Rights and Responsibilities
- Student Union
- Vice President for Student Affairs
- Wellness
- |
- Athletics
- |
- News & Information
Ceremony Parking Information
2019 Fall Graduate Hooding and Undergraduate Ceremony
Wednesday, December 11, 2019, 7:00 p.m.
Mechanics Bank Arena (Formerly Rabobank Arena)
Parking is available in the arena parking structure. To park in the parking structure, the fee is $10 per vehicle.
Street parking is also available. Read posted parking signs on the street before parking.
2020 Spring Graduate Hooding Ceremony
Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 6:30 p.m.
CSUB Main Soccer Field
Parking is available in Lots H and I
Campus and Parking Map
2020 Spring Undergraduate Ceremony
Friday, May 22, 2020, 7:30 a.m.
CSUB Main Soccer Field
Parking is available in all lots on campus.
Parking shuttle buses will be available for guests to be transported from the farthest parts of the campus to the venue.
Related Links
Interactive Map
For a more detailed, please click interactive map of CSUB.
Commencement Office
Dina Ebeling, Associate Director
For questions, please view our Frequently Asked Questions.