Boeing Resisted Pilots' Calls for Aggressive Steps on 737 Max - <AUTHOR> https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/business/boeing-737-max-ethiopian-plane-crash.html <comment><USER2> What people are forgetting is that Boeing did it all to head off competition from the E190 and Bombardier C-Series, both of which are smaller planes than the 737 but are bigger in terms of passenger comfort while being smaller in terms of noise and global warming impact.

Boeing discounted the 737 MAX by more than 70% to force Bombardier to sell the C-Series below cost, which forced Bombardier to sell a controlling share to Airbus for $0.

I rode in a E175 and was blown away by the passenger experience; the 2nd generation E-Jets are much better and the A220 is better still. Boeing hopes that you don't ride in one and realize you don't have to settle for a 737.

(Not like I trust Airbus with the A220, since they've got the same motivation to string the A320 along that Boeing has to string along the 737)

<comment><USER3> I've flown in many an E190/195 and almost as many E170/175 that I can specifically recall. The small size of the cabin is a large negative for many people. Carry on bags don't fit near as well; the galley is small so food service is weak; for people afraid of flying, the living room experience in a 787 or A380 is far superior. I didn't find cabin noise levels to be especially pleasant (nor unpleasant) in the small Embraers, but they're amazingly nice in the 787 and even a step better on the upper deck on the 380.

I fly small piston aircraft for a lot of our travel, so even an A319 or MD90 is top luxury in some sense.

I don't think people generally feel like they're "settling" in a 737. I just got off a 737-800 BOS-ATL in fact. I do feel like I'm settling when I strap on an E170/175 on a short haul flight. I put them as clearly superior to Saab 340s and Dash-8 aircraft, but that's about it. It makes taking the train (Amtrak!) seem worthy of consideration for BOS-PHL type trips.

<comment><USER4> I just flew in a KLM E190 "CityHopper" and the seating was significantly more spacious than recent 737ng experiences. Seat layout allows for large carry ons under the seats. No problem. 2x2 rows means football players don't get stuck in a middle seat. I also noticed the E190 noise level was lower than 737.

<comment><USER5> I took one once and I was blown away by how smooth it felt in flight.

Airbus are nervous, jiggly and constantly jittering along as the avionics happily acknowledges the plane is within envelope. Boeing planes feel more damped and they don't remind me of my flight stress as often.

But the Embraer?! I flew one over the English Channel, windy and all that; and yet, it sailed along gently.

<comment><USER6> Hmm...I fly frequently (every month) on either Boeing or Airbus planes and but for the seat pocket card I'd be hard pressed to identify one from the other.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment> tuna-piano "You've got to understand that our commitment to safety is as great as yours," Mr. Sinnett [Boeing Exec] said in the meeting. "The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like this, and the even worse thing would be another one."

But yet, even after the second crash Boeing still insisted they continue to fly the plane. It's like they pre-determined their decision and any evidence or additional crashes be damned.

I don't want to have too much hindsight though - if the AA pilots union really didn't want to fly the plane, presumably the union could have chosen not to fly the plane (I think it's in most pilots contracts?). In fact, even after Ethiopian crash, American pilots continued to fly the plane. Though part of this may have been because they didn't have the full amount of information Boeing did.

<comment><USER7> It's just words. Actions speak louder than words. Their actions fly in the face of all the nice sounding things they say, and report after report fly in the face of all of Boeing's denials and claims of safety.

Boeing has gone into liability defensive mode at the expense of the lives of passengers, the safety of air travel, and America's credibility in aerospace engineering.

Boeing is either going to face a major reckoning that they may not survive or maybe we'll have more deaths from accidents due to their negligent behavior.

I'm basing all this on the many reports about what is going on around the 737 MAX aircraft published in the WSJ and the New York Times. It hasn't been pretty.

I don't think that plane should ever fly again as engineered. It seems to require software to address problems with the large engine and the plane's form that other jets do not have. If a software patch can make the aircraft safe, then a bug can make it unsafe. Does the FAA validate all the aircraft software patches Boeing issues?

<comment><USER4> Other airliners w/ large turbofans have a pitch-up under climb/thrust characteristics. (like B777) We don't know if 737 MAX's pitch-up stall handling characteristics are really bad -or- just different from older 737's. MCAS was put in place to allow the MAX to be type certified w/ other 737's so 737 pilots could fly the 737 MAX and vice versa. (Airline pilots can only hold 1 type certification at a time.)

<comment><USER8> > MCAS was put in place to allow the MAX to be type certified w/ other 737's

But the expected behavior which MCAS was to provide was not something invented only for "other 737's." Whichever plane would behave as the MAX behaves without MCAS turned on would also be rejected from certification.

Only Boeing being silent about MCAS is the effect of the goal of "avoiding re- certification."

> We don't know

I can't agree to that. Based on the above, I think it is obvious that we do know: 737 MAX without any MCAS-like help is dangerous to fly according to the security expectations which weren't specially invented for 737 MAX.

<comment><USER9> > But the expected behavior which MCAS was to provide was not something > invented only for "other 737's." Whichever plane would behave as the MAX > behaves without MCAS turned on would also be rejected from certification.

No, it would have been a perfectly certifiable plane with a particular set of handling characteristics (including 777-like pitch-up). It just wouldn't be a 737, and would require its own type certificate. No-one's suggesting that large turbofan aircraft with pitch-up behaviour are inherently unsafe _when flown by pilots appropriately trained and certified for them_ \- otherwise the 777 would be grounded.

<comment><USER8> > No-one's suggesting that large turbofan aircraft with pitch-up behaviour are > inherently unsafe

It is as long it keeps 737 MAX body and engines and doesn't have something like MCAS I.e. Inherently unsafe under conditions under which MCAS was supposed to turn on when properly functioning.

The certification requirements are the result of the clear safety goals not something invented "just so."

<comment><USER10> MCAS was a type certificate hack.

The poster you're responding to is right; there isn't anything wrong with the behavior given the right training.

It's just that the investment in that training, and extra certification hoops to jump through would have made WhateveroModelNumberus MAX a non-starter.

It had to be a 737 to work at all.

<comment><USER8> > there isn't anything wrong with the behavior given the right training.

The behaviour without MCAS on 737 MAX is that minimal movements of pilot's controls effectively activate what would be considered "amplification" of nose up movement, resulting in an uncontrollable plane and sure crash.

It's definitely not something that pilots or passengers should be exposed to: being punished for approaching more dangerous position by plane forcing a deadly outcome.

Training pilots to not to move even minimally the controls in the "wrong" direction is maybe technically possible but in practice still totally wrong: It's comparable to what Boeing told everybody before Ethiopian crash, and their attempts to blame the pilots. In reality, the pilots had almost no chance to rescue themselves and the plane.

In engineering the "positive feedback loops" (amplification of control inputs) are bad the "negative feedback loops" (correction of the input) are good.

The functioning MCAS provides a correction. The plane without MCAS amplification. Badly functioning MCAS also amplification and crash. That's why the wrong behavior was regulated, and that's why it had to be fulfilled for the certification. It's that easy.

To convince me that 737 MAX without the "properly functioning MCAS" isn't inherently dangerous under higher angles of attack you'd have to provide some explicit proofs.

<comment><USER10> 727 had about the same issue. Interactions with high lift devices would cause major problems on approach to stall.

The FAA certified it anyway. The U.K. gave it conditional certification contingent on the addition of a stick-pusher to be able to operate in U.K. airspace. See the Royal Aeronautics Society D.P. Davies Interview, specifically the 727 one.

There was quite a bit of controversy amongst test pilots at even granting the certification, seeing it as setting a precedent that would lead to a slippery slope that would culminate in less and less airworthy designs.

Nevertheless, the certification authorities accepted the argument that as long as instabilities could be countered by technological means, it would be acceptable.

Let me clarify though, that without MCAS, a responsible pilot would definitely be constrained to a much thinner envelope, but within that thinner envelope, the plane can fly just fine.

The deployment of flaps, also takes the plane out of a regime where MCAS is a factor.

So both legal, and practical precedent for it exists. Given additional training of course.

<comment><USER8> > The U.K. gave it conditional certification contingent on the addition of a > stick-pusher to be able to operate in U.K. airspace.

Boeing 727 was clearly from another times: "As of July 2018, a total of 44 Boeing 727s were in commercial service" "Many airlines replaced their 727s with either the 737-800 or the Airbus A320."

> both legal, and practical precedent for it exists.

Does it? The devil is in the details. Speaking as an engineer, both the measurements of the ranges in which the changes happen and the characteristics of the responses to controls still matter. I wouldn't be surprised that it's still 737 MAX that would be "a precedent" with worse characteristics when the stall is possible (and without proper MCAS-like help) than those measured in 727.

It's the conditions under which the problems occur and the response diagrams that the regulators are supposed to verify, not the binary "has or hasn't" a problem near the stall. I'm quite sure that the technology at the time of 727 introduction was already more than capable of producing the relevant diagrams, so they can be compared. Thanks for specifying your arguments in the answer.

<comment><USER10> No problem! I'm as eager to get to the bottom of things as anyone, so I'm trying to be a careful steward of as much context as I can to keep discussions productive, and to rephrase in as many different ways as possible to increase visibility and reasonability to anyone who can help contribute more context.

>It's the conditions under which the problems occur and the response diagrams that the regulators are supposed to verify, not the binary "has or hasn't" a problem near the

Ah, I hadn't run into this tidbit before! Can you elaborate on it? I'd love to get some more detailed information if only to facilitate my own deep diving. I've been repeating the 727 simimilarity, and if there's any footwork I can do to make that more accurate, I'd be thrilled to run with it.

I do know Boeing was generally considered notorious amongst test pilots for knowing exactly how their designs would fly, so I can't imagine that those diagrams can't be found somewhere.

<comment><USER8> > Can you elaborate on it? I'd love to get some more detailed information if > only to facilitate my own deep diving.

To appreciate non-binariness of the problem, just try to find the pictures of different flight envelopes under different flight conditions for different planes and compare them. The wrongness in claiming that every plane can be qualified with just "has x" or "hasn't" is then more than obvious.

Then imagine that you'd actually need the _response_ diagrams -- some valid measurement of how the plane _reacts_ to the controls. That is the actual point of problem: exactly how the curves look like, where are which limits between "fine" and "deadly" and how dangerous is which kind of movement or non-movement of which control.

Then consider that Boeing even after the first crash claimed that "everything's fine" in their "additional instructions" which were followed by the Ethiopian air pilots but that then the plane responses were such that the pilots were practically helpless: the plane "didn't listen." That's what's happening with the positive feedbacks, and that is what "nose up" behavior is -- but the answer is not "yes-no" but where and how much in every point.

The helplessness (or not) of the pilots (i.e. how much of their force produces how much of the outcome under which conditions) is also something that can be plainly measured and drawn.

I don't have the corresponding (complex) pictures of Boeing 737 MAX flying without the MCAS. And I don't think they are available at the moment. But that _is the point_. Who are those who claim that _they know it 's safe_ and what is the basis of their claim? We have already plain demonstration that Boeing openly lied with their "everything's fine" claims -- I can't imagine that nobody inside of a company that is supposed to sell the planes orders of which measure hundreds of billions of dollars has such pictures.

But who can say simple "it's safe" when to be able to really claim it somebody has to evaluate these complex aspects demonstrated by the diagrams and not just construct a simple "yes-or-no-is-it-kinda-same-as-this-other-thing" question?

Reducing that whole topic to such kind of argument "well 727 was bad too" is obviously misleading. The way I still see it is: had it been it actually safe to fly it without a functioning MCAS, there would be no "regulatory requirement" to put it there at all. The "requirement" was an actual "it's not safe without it." But the way that "requirement" looked like was also not "yes no" but "see this diagrams -- the plane should approximately behave so and not the opposite of that." And the opposite is the characteristic of the positive feedback loops. MCAS was there to polish one resulting from the design driven by the marketing goal, not by physics.

Imagine when you would move the steering wheel to make a slight turn and when the car would "listen to you" under e.g. 30 mph but respond in turning you much out of the road when the speed is higher. "Well you should be trained not to try to turn the wheel when over 35 mph" "Really?" "Yes you see that other old car also responded kinda like this one, yes that old one couldn't have killed you so easily, yes, this one will, but don't worry that's actually the same, trust me, because I'm the one making and selling you this new car." "..." That's not how the sameness is compared.

<comment><USER10> I get where you are coming from. And understand it isn't binary. I was hoping you knew what what the name of the various diagrams you asserted were being evaluated were.

I understand there are different levels of problematic behavoor, because something that causes a 3 degree uncommanded pitch over say 10 seconds is a sight less severe than one that does the same over 3 seconds.

I'm still not seeing anything that's significantly changing my mental model of this problem. Physically, legally and pragmatically speaking.

-The plane remains statically stable within the majority of the flight envelope.

-Dynamic stability still isn't quite there, but can be handled with more conservative maneuvering.

-Critical information was deemphasized in the certification process, or changed after the fact

-the promised deliverable did not achieve it's stated goals without excessive "compliance engineering"

The plane is absolutely dangerous to an uninformed pilot; but aerodynamically, within a constrained flight envelope, it's fine. I don't personally feel it should be airworthy, as I agree with many test pilot's from back in the 60's. It just encourages the use of less airworthy designs with less problematic behavior, because a computer can smooth out the curve, and yet as a programmer myself,I believe a passenger plane should not be reliant on that level of hack necessarily.

As it is, I'm not even highly confident that if there were something wrong with the software update, that the FAA would even catch it in it's current incarnation.

But without language naming the graphs you're talking about, or need to see to be convinced of safety, a FOIA would honestly be fruitless.

Thanks for the contributing though. I'll see if I can find the paperwork.

<comment><USER8> If you consider FOIA then it could be, for example:

\- of the logs of the measurements of the test flights flown on the 737 MAX prototypes with the new engines but without the MCAS, if the test flights are flown to establish the flight envelope, especially of the correlation to the pilot's input and the plane's response.

\- of the calculations or of the physical models of the said response to the pilots input, on the plane without the MCAS. Such parameters and models are indeed used e.g. in the flight simulators.

\- Note that even if there were planed deliveries of hundreds of billions (!) worth of 737 MAX planes, up to recently only four (!) flight simulators for 737 MAX were delivered. I don't know if it's possible to even fly them without assuming MCAS "always working perfectly."

I'm not directly in that field to be able to give you a "local" jargon though. My view is a result of just reading those newspaper articles which provided enough engineering details (and a few forums) and I do remember seeing some complex enough related graphs for which I''m sure they couldn't be invented by a journalist, but surely not a "definitive plainly obvious proof". But there is indeed a lot still kept hidden from the public, and I'm sure there are more technical details that are significantly worse than we are ready to imagine.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER11> Damning article for Boeing execs... just one quote:

"We don't want to rush and do a crappy job of fixing the right things and we also don't want to fix the wrong things," Mr. Sinnett said, later adding, "For flight-critical software, I don't think you want us to rush, rush it faster."

Well Mr. Sinnett, that's exactly what you did in the development of the 737 Max.

<comment><USER12> He's certainly making an air tight case for keeping those planes on the ground.

</comment></comment><comment><USER13> Hard to think of a better case study on the perils of regulatory capture than Boeing.

<comment><USER4> Amazing how Boeing was restructured from an engineering & production organization into a political influence machine. Production was spread (and outsourced) from Seattle out to key influential states and HQ moved to Chicago.

<comment><USER2> Not just US influence but international influence.

In the 777 and 787 eras, Boeing decentralized production all over the world, and it's hard to say that Airbus is really a European company because they've done the same.

Back in the day so many countries had to have a fourth- or fifth-rate car industry, and to head that off, the Boeing-Airbus duopoly distributed production all over the place so politicians in most countries could point to some part in a Boeing or Airbus airliner that was made in their country to discourage the development of an indigenous industry.

<comment><USER14> Which is why the safety cards in US airline cabins cleverly state "Country of final manufacture: ___"; another subtle win for Boeing.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER10> Actually, that statement,

>"For flight-critical software, I don't think you want us to rush, rush it faster."

may come back to haunt them, given it doesn't line up with the paperwork they filed, or with anything about the way they tried to get the plane certified. The fact he said that before the investigation completed implies they knew how critical MCAS was.

Something tells me "that was just talk!", will not go over well.

EDIT: deparaphrased quote.

<comment><USER15> Important point, I think. They also gave MCAS an innocuous name: "Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System" Sound better than 'pitch-up stall prevention system' (my vote is for 'death plummet prevention system') or something that implies that if the system is not in place, you die. It seems there was intent to mislead from the get-go. I'd love to see their internal documents describing the naming of this subsystem because it's got to be highly political.

<comment><USER16> It's not even that. It's solely to maintain the 737 type certification to avoid a need for retraining. The pitch up tendency isn't inherently unsafe but it does change how pilots need to fly in certain portions of the flight envelope. Normally this is just something they're trained on but to avoid that we got this bodge of a system in MCAS.

<comment><USER15> Well, this is true only if you believe Boeing's talking points. We actually don't know how bad the pitch effect is. Perhaps a small pilot error would result in an unrecoverable stall. Considering Boeing modified the MCAS's authority over what was originally stated to the FAA (malfunctions aside, which gave it unlimited authority), why should we trust them?

What is the absolute probability that no MCAS + pilot doing what would be normal on any other aircraft would lead to a crash? Remember, pilots go from plane to plane, potentially of various types. If a particular plane you don't fly frequently behaves very differently in a critical situation, that's a bad thing. You need the muscle memory. If they only flew the MAX 100% of the time, probably not a big deal.

Imagine twice a year you drive a someone else's car. During normal operation, nothing out of the ordinary. However, if you apply more than 25% brake pressure while turning left between 5-10 degrees, the steering input suddenly goes to 60 degrees, requiring you to quickly counter steer. Now, imagine that there's a software mitigation to prevent this over-steer. Now imagine, with little warning, that software system is disabled, and you've never driven the car without that system active.

It's lunacy.

<comment><USER16> > Remember, pilots go from plane to plane, potentially of various types. If a > particular plane you don't fly frequently behaves very differently in a > critical situation, that's a bad thing. You need the muscle memory. If they > only flew the MAX 100% of the time, probably not a big deal.

That's what type certifications exist for and it's actually pretty rare for pilots to switch between planes. In their career with a particular airline they're going to be flying one type family of planes (eg: A319, A320, and A321 all count as the same plane from a certification standpoint) day in and day out, it's quite expensive to get certified on a second plane.

As for your car example that's the exact thing MCAS was a bodge for it was to make the MAX8 fly enough like the rest of the 737 family to require minimal retraining. It was a bad bodge that should have been classified as a safety critical system (meaning 3+ AoA etc).

Also highly relevant is it's not very clear how bad the pitch up effect is from reporting it could vary anywhere between a slight problem that would only really put the type rating in danger to a critical safety flaw.

[https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/24073/how- frequ...](https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/24073/how-frequently- are-airline-pilots-switching-between-aircraft-types-e-g-airbus)

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER17> How many FAA officials used to work at Boeing (or related lobbying firms) or vice versa?

<comment><USER18> Boeing was allowed to act as the FAA's contractor in certifying the plane.

<comment><USER19> Reminds me of when Tennessee Valley Authority let contractors certify the dams for its coal plans, which they failed terribly at, leading to a dam breech that spread toxic material all over the valley and watershed outside the Kingston Fossil plant. I covered the protests back in 2009:

[https://fightthefuture.org/videos/tva- coal/](https://fightthefuture.org/videos/tva-coal/)

<comment><USER20> Let's hear it for "market forces" and unfettered capitalism, youd think we would've learned in 2008.

<comment><USER21> The market for political influence is working pretty well, no reason to use scare quotes.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER22> So is Mr. Sinnett still working for Boeing? I don't see how the managers can ride this one out.

<comment><USER23> Boeing appears to already be lawyering up their execs while throwing engineers under the bus. It's going to be all about denying everything now.

<comment><USER24> Yes, it was probably another vast multi-decade inter-company conspiracy entirely orchestrated & executed in secret by THIS lone, junior engineer, hired last January. Amazing how systemic this kind of problem is.

<comment><USER25> Except, the "lone engineer" VW blamed it on was the head of the diesel engine department, and by now even the former CEO is facing jailtime.

I doubt Boeings management will get any punishment whatsoever.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER26> So when will travelers have the option to filter the aircraft manufacturer/type in flight booking systems?

<comment><USER27> I assume you mean one that's contractually binding on the airline?

<comment><USER16> Not contractually obligated (sometimes it seems they're barely obligated to actually fly the flight you've paid for) but airlines pretty much always fly the same plane on the same flight number day in and day out.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER28> The CEO of Boeing should go to prison.

<comment><USER29> For what?

<comment><USER30> As a start, for keeping details from pilots even after the first crash. For example, after the first crash, Boeing did not disclose that MCAS keeps repeating at 5 second intervals. Surely this was relevant information for pilots in life and death situations. But perhaps it would have required Boeing acknowledging the need for additional training, and corporate greed got the better of their judgement.

<comment> village-idiot Continuing to lie about the AoA disagree light being disabled is also a major issue.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER31> Boeing apparently has no idea how to handle a crisis.

<comment><USER32> I think Boeing accurately reflects the arrogant world view of its main client.

<comment><USER33> This is a great comment!

Of course a company can only be a subset of the values of the world it exists in.

<comment><USER34> If this is not irony then I have to disagree, any agent with a free will have responsibility

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER35> Just waiting for the other shoe to drop and for all of these revelations to mean something. Hope it does eventually.

</comment><comment><USER36> When comparing with the Monsanto/Bayer Roundup case, there is a more direct link between what the company has done (or not done) and the death of people. American People died in the second crash, right ? They have a clean shot for suing and getting a billion punitive damage, haven't they ?

<comment><USER37> See, Monsanto would not have had a problem if Bayer had not acquired it...

</comment></comment><comment><USER38> I wonder what circles of hell is Mr. Sinnett destined to?

</comment><comment><USER39> now reporters have audio from that meeting: [https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/us/boeing-737-max-audio- meeti...](https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/15/us/boeing-737-max-audio-meeting-with- pilots/index.html)

</comment><comment><USER40> "You've got to understand that our commitment to safety is as great as yours," Mr. Sinnett said in the meeting.

Which is a blatant lie considering they opted to DLC bunch of saftety features.

<comment><USER41> _Which is a blatant lie considering they opted to DLC bunch of saftety features._

If you're referring to the AOA indication — they didn't though. Boeing sold the MAX to the FAA and the airlines as being equipped with an "AoA disagree" annunciator on every single one. It turns out that the annunciator didn't work unless you also purchased the AoA gauges (it's unclear to me whether or not there are gauges on the primary flight display or if they're just part of the heads-up display). That little glitch was considered too minor by Boeing to notify the FAA or the airlines.

<comment><USER42> So _effectively_ it did turn it into a DLC, making GP's post 100% correct.

I am past caring for or trusting their lame excuses at this point.

<comment><USER43> It's really worse, since the aircraft was advertised as having the critical safety feature but in reality it required the DLC. So pilots could well have assumed there would be a warning.

<comment> village-idiot Southwest actually called them out on this, and called Boeing a bunch of liars (through corporate speak).

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER19> I know it's unlikely cause, America, but I'd like to see some of these executives tried for criminal negligence. They'll most likely just face civil suits and make settlements with passengers/pilots families ... which honestly isn't enough. Executives need to know fucking up this bad can lean to prison time.

<comment><USER44> Serious question: how would you go about determining who is at fault in such a situation?

<comment><USER45> Very difficult, just as it would be in any large organization. Facilitation of plausible deniability is a principle design requirement for company structure.

Worse, because of the corporate shield, any malefactors get to keep their ill- gotten gains. (Wells Fargo's execs, even after clawbacks, wound up tens of millions of dollars ahead.) There's no serious deterrent -- the system encourages wrongdoing at the individual level, the perpetuation of entities where wrongdoing occurs, and the creation of new entities where wrongdoing will commence.

Prediction: everyone at Boeing will come in for a safe landing after a bit of turbulence.

<comment><USER46> Not sure. Every single design change goes through well documented review processes in Aerospace. The bigger the change the higher the up the hierarchy it goes. The definitely is a paper trail here. _If_ someone is willing to investigate.

Agree with rest, organized deniability is pretty much how large orgs are set up.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER47> I'm beginning to wonder if HN is an unwilling part of a disinformation campaign an on 737max? It seems every day now we have a speculative article posted like this.

<comment><USER48> Please don't break the site guidelines by making insinuations about astroturfing without evidence. If you're worried, you can email us and we'll look at the data. People reach for this image to explain why they're seeing a bunch of posts they disagree with or dislike—but the overwhelming majority of the time, it's simply that the topic is divisive, with lots of users on opposing sides.

[https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html](https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html)

<comment><USER47> I'm a bit surprised by this reaction actually. I know it's in HN favor to keep the comment section academic; so my apologies if my comment came off construed as conspiracy theory. Given that early 2017 a heavily discussed topic was fake news and intentional manipulation of social media, this did not seem out of the realm of possibility for me, hence my original comment.

<comment><USER48> Agreed, the germs of the topic are still very much airborne, and that's a big part of it. I think we just have to keep repeating this every time it comes up (sigh). Totally clear that your intention was sincere.</comment></comment></comment></comment>


Fast Iterations: How Napoleon Managed the French Army - <AUTHOR> http://managingmetrics.com/how-napoleon-managed-the-french-army

<comment><USER2> This article sounds really good at a high level, but it misses an important point.

Prior to the invention of the radio, lower level commanders _always_ had to use their initiative when commanding their troops, because there was no reliable way to quickly communicate with their commanders during a battle.

It's disappointing this was missed, because it's an important point: Control needs to be proportional to communication.

Also:

 _They also were taught to live off the land by hunting and foraging. This decoupled the soldiers from the slow supply caravans and allowed them to remain independent for long periods of time._

The author probably should have pointed out that this tactic led to his armies in the Iberian peninsular being bled by attacks form the local population sick of having the crops stolen by "foraging" soldiers. It also led to the Russian disaster - the Russians left nothing for the French armies to forage, and so when winter came they ~all died.

<comment> hacker-gene > Control needs to be proportional to communication.

First time I've heard of this, and I'm pretty sure there's good insight here somewhere (I don't think I've heard it mentioned anywhere), would be great if you can expand on it.

<comment><USER2> Thanks. I just made it up.. but I don't think it's anything complicated.

Control should only be exerted over things where you have sufficient knowledge. In a rapidly changing environment - be it business or battle - knowledge can only come via communication.

Strong centralized control can only work well in environments where communication is strong too. Otherwise decisions must be made with less knowledge than other parts of the organisation closer to the action the decision affects.

<comment><USER3> > Thanks. I just made it up.. but I don't think it's anything complicated.

It's a nice phrase and concept. If you could fluff it up a few hundred pages, you could get a business book of your own out of it...

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER4> Military analogies and examples are almost universally terrible when applied to software development (and business in general). That blog post cherry picks a few anecdotes from Napoleon's history and ignores his failure to learn from his mistakes. As his famed opponent Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) said after defeating Napoleon the final time: "They came on in the same old way and we defeated them in the same old way." [https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Column_%28for...](https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Column_%28formation%29#Napoleonic_Wars)

Business is not war.

<comment><USER5> "As his famed opponent Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) said after defeating Napoleon the final time: "They came on in the same old way and we defeated them in the same old way.""

Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then, Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day.

Remembering Napoleon for Waterloo rather than Austerlitz, Ulm and Jena would be like remembering Hannibal for Zama. The fact that his name has become synonymous with his unremarkable defeat on that day, and that Wellington, a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, is somehow looked upon with favor in this country (America), even more so than his adversary who was an ally of America, who doubled the size of our country with the Louisiana Purchase and who actually planned on settling here after his second abdication, is a testament to the lasting power of the British anti- Bonapartist propaganda industry. More books were written about Napoleon in the 19th century than about any other man, living or dead, and most English languages books on him were written by Brits, and most of those books vilified him as the Corsican Ogre, the Great Usurper and so on. Were it not for this cottage industry that sprang up during the Napoleonic Era and lingered long after, most Americans would probably still have a favorable view of Napoleon as they did during his lifetime.

<comment><USER2> _Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then, Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day._

That's true, but Wellington defeated French armies numerous times. Indeed, I think this is why the quote is famous - instead of Napoleon being some magical fairy dust that made the French army invulnerable, Wellington was making the point that he'd defeated them before and the actual fighting at Waterloo unfolded much like it had in all of the other battles Wellington fought (eg, in the Peninsular campaign).

It also ignore just how close the battle was - indeed, most commentators think it is likely the French would have won if Napoleon had attacked Wellington earlier in the morning, instead of parading his army in an attempt to intimidate the British. (The argument is that he could have beaten the British before the Prussians arrived instead of having to split his forces). True or not, it does seem likely this was a mistake by Napoleon.

Wellington was _a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat_ , but in many ways he was a better _manager_ of his army than Napoleon was. For example, he always made sure his armies were supplied with food without having to steal from the local population. It was Wellington's logistical innovations in India that allowed the British to subdue the sub-continent - despite French attempts to stop them.

<comment><USER6> Allow me to point out that anti-democratic in the context of the times (and especially Wellington) really means pro-monarchy. In other words, not for the oppression of the people that anti-democracy perhaps implies to the modern reader, but instead that monarchy is a better, more beneficial system for the people.

<comment><USER2> This is true.

But prior to his European campaigns, Wellington served as _Chief Secretary for Ireland_ and in that position was responsible for policies that would be considered very oppressive these days.

There is some evidence that he didn't agree with at least some of these policies (in particular I believe he tried to moderate the treatment on Irish tenants by English landholders).

But yeah.. attitudes really were different then, and you can't just interpret things the same way.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER7> Interesting... he became the most renowned military commander in European history by relinquishing his command to his subordinates. In effect, he pioneered not micromanaging.

Of course, there's more to it than just saying "do what you think is best" and calling it a day. Napoleon still needed to make high-level strategic decisions, he needed ensure his subordinates' individual initiative was in line with those strategic objectives (even harder if the officers are French aristocrats), and as usual he needed to completely re-invent logistics for his army to be able to take advantage of their flexibility (see also: Kanban). In a very real sense, he wasn't just a great general but invented an entirely new way of waging war.

</comment><comment><USER8> Napoleon was innovative, but only covering his career to 1805 sort of ignores the final punchline. Over the next ten years he was repeatedly defeated by a coalition that could field larger armies, and slowly but surely stole (or improved on) all of his innovations. Thus demonstrating the "innovator's dilemma."

<comment><USER2> That's not true.

Napoleon repeatedly defeated larger coalitions.

Battle of Austerlitz (1805): defeated the combined armies of the Austrian and Russian empire, which led to the collapse of the Third Coalition (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Coalition>)

Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806): defeated the Prussians, which led to the collapse of the Fourth Coalition (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fourth_Coalition>)

Battle of Wagram (1809): defeated the Austrian army, which collapsed the Fifth Coalition (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fifth_Coalition>)

In conclusion, it wasn't larger coalitions improving on Napoleon's tactics that beat him. It was firstly the Russian winter, and secondly the superbly trained and professional British army (which used very _different_ tactics)which first defeated his Marshals in the Peninsular campaign and then joined with the Prussians to beat him at Waterloo.

<comment><USER9> I like how whoever gets defeated in Russia always blames it on bad weather.

<comment><USER2> Except for the Mongols [1][2].

[1] I guess they didn't get defeated, and the "bad Russian weather" was much better than the Mongolian weather they were used to

[2] And to some extent, the Rus tribe which founded Russia. Being Vikings, they probably found the "bad Russian weather" quite reasonable, too.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER10> Napoleon practiced what is now known as Maneuver Warfare. John Boyd - the guy who originated maneuver warfare formally studied spent his life learning this stuff. Patterns of conflict was a study of 2500 years of conflict and includes Napoleons campaigns.

The current startup culture of fast iteration is a very weak version of what Boyd produced. I'd advise anyone starting or running a business to read up on the subject Boyds' work will tell you what you can and cannot achieve and how to go about doing it.

[http://radio- weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/02/08/oodaAndB...](http://radio- weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/02/08/oodaAndBusinesschesterRichardsOnBoyd.html)

<comment><USER11> "Crew resource management" (there's a good Wikipedia article on it) is another interesting application of Boyd's ideas. In a nutshell, it's the training that cockpit crews use to make decisions in quickly-changing environments like emergencies. It has the advantage of lots and lots of testing, which not all Boyd's ideas do.

</comment></comment><comment><USER12> Fairly interesting, but a bit surprised that he missed one of the most surprising elements of Napolean's innovations: canned food. Modern war is largely a question of logistics, and canned goods (over foraging) gave them the ability to keep food edible longer over greater distance. Of course, not even canned food could give them victory over the russian winter.

</comment><comment><USER13> This is only peripherally related. But since we are on the topic of Napoleon...

Charles Joseph Minard created and published a flow map of "Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign of 1812"[1]. This graphic is way ahead of it's time. It provides so much information in such a concise and clear form that it's hard to imagine that it was published in 1869.

Also see more information on Tufte's website[2][3]. That is how I originally found out about it.

[1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Joseph_Minard> and [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Minard.pn...](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Minard.png)

[2] <http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard>

[3] <http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard-obit>

</comment><comment><USER14> Utter and complete crock. Armies had always requisitioned food. Hunting could never supply a substantial part of an army's needs. Napoleon drew in part from lessons learned by the French while assisting the Americans during the American Revolution. Etc. etc. etc.

But as business publications go, it's above average.

</comment><comment><USER15> Didn't the Roman general Gaius Marius also introduced the idea of backpack? His soldiers were called Marius' Mules.

</comment><comment><USER16> Also shows the problem of first followers in action.

All of Europe got smacked around for a while by this great disrupter, but eventually, they learned from Napoleon, found some weaknesses, and then broke him in the two key battles ending the Napoleonic Wars. He couldn't maintain his 'first mover' advantage.

<comment><USER17> I would have to think some of his defeat was because France was just depleted. It had undergone what was probably the most violent couple decades in history to that point, starting with the revolution, and during his second run, there wasn't much room for error.

</comment></comment><comment><USER18> There are only two posts on that blog, and they're both great. I hope he keeps it up.</comment>


Ask HN: on H4 visa for 5 years did nothing. now starting up - <AUTHOR>

I am on H4 visa for 5 years and I practically did nothing. Not because I did not wanted to but because I had the responsibility to take care of my children. Now I have an idea and I want to build up on the idea but I don't even know people here forget getting intro to angel. Should I even dare to go ahead with my idea ? If yes, How can I build my network from scratch ? I live in Mid-south. <comment><USER2> I would say move to San Francisco, but you've got kids. Stay where you are and just start networking your balls off, I would start with any free tech related events you can find. You'll probably get a good idea pretty quickly whether or not your idea is worth pursuing simply by getting out there and talking about it.</comment>


A Glass Box of a House in Germany That 'Thinks' for Itself - <AUTHOR> http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/greathomesanddestinations/a-glass-box-of-a-house-in-germany-that-thinks-for-itself.html <comment><USER2> I hope all of the things which are automatically actuated via automation systems and overridden by portable devices (smartphones, etc.) have actual manual overrides (physical handles on doors, windows, blinds, shutters, etc) for when you need manual overrides (ie, there is a fire. I need to get out, in, frantically can't find phone)

</comment><comment><USER3> > "As might be expected, there is little need for anything as outdated as a > door handle or a light switch — everything is at the tap of an iPad or a > smartphone, which can set room and water temperature, switch on the > lighting, open and close the windows and even control the refrigerator."

Ugh, no not at all. I'd rather instinctively reach a light-switch than reach for my tablet, click the power-button, wait 0.4 seconds for it to turn on, enter my pincode, wait 0.5 seconds before it's usable, open the control app, which takes 3-10 seconds to then navigate to the proper option and tap it.... For the same result.

</comment><comment><USER4> I enjoyed the use of the term 'minicomputer', being old enough to remember minicomputer actually meaning something somewhat larger than the size of a modern day internet router :)

</comment><comment><USER5> "Mostly it is the work of engineers and contractors who (...) have no education in aesthetics."

I consider that to be, often enough, a positive thing.

<comment><USER2> Yes, that's true. Overemphasis on aesthetics above functionality tends to result in buildings with quirky problems (the recently new mit buildings) and can stick out like an eyesore once the avant guarde aesthetic falls by the wayside, but I think here they have a point in that many times contractors and other builders go for mass production and so don't often optimize for recyclability or energy usage, etc.

</comment></comment><comment><USER6> I wonder what the cost would be in bulk. Also how secure the house is against intruders with such light materials.</comment>


YC Will Now Fund Nonprofits Too - <AUTHOR> http://ycombinator.com/np.html <comment><USER2> It's interesting to compare the differences between the two applications-

For Profit - [https://gist.github.com/e1ven/6467215](https://gist.github.com/e1ven/6467215)

Non Profit- [https://gist.github.com/e1ven/6467309](https://gist.github.com/e1ven/6467309)

Overall, it seems like they've replaced 'company' with 'organization', and dropped a number of questions relating to making money.

Interestingly, many of the questions have been dropped without replacement, even when I would imagine the answer would be very interesting to YC!

For instance, 'Who are your competitors' has been dropped entirely. Nonprofit companies can certainly compete with one another.. But they also often compete with for-profit companies.

Take for example Wikipedia - They're a 501(c)(3) but they've certainly competed with Encyclopedia Britannica, Grolier, Encarta, etc. It might be helpful to keep the questions, but to ask them in a modified way. For instance, "Who is this going to disrupt?"

Similarly they dropped "How do or will you make money?", without replacing it with "How do you plan to you raise money?"

"How will you get users", and "Was any of your code written by someone who is not one of your founders?" were also dropped.

They also haven't (yet) added questions relating to non-profits, such as "Why do you think you will be able to get a 501c(3) classification?"

It's a really interesting idea, and it'll be interesting to see where they grow with it.

It really reminds me of the first few years of YC where they were making it up as they went along, before they started the current cycle of continuous improvements through validated learning.

Watsi was the MVP, now they're ready for Beta ;)

<comment><AUTHOR> We don't know yet what will turn out to be the most important questions for nonprofits, so we just kept the subset of questions that seemed to apply to any project whether for profit or not.

<comment><USER3> _We don 't know yet what will turn out to be the most important questions for nonprofits_

Evergreen funding source/s is (arguably) _the_ definition of success, for any organization, profit or otherwhise, at least empirically. Competition for scarce resources is thus a key part of the game.

The CEO of MOMA (non-profit) has a salary approaching $2MM/yr. This is rationally viewed as a sales comission ($2mm/ on $XXmm in fundraising prowess) by the trustees. There is no other measure of 'productivity' at that order of magnitude for a "non-profit" organization (10x the statuatory salary of POTUS). Similarly, at _non-profit_ universities. Both in the administration and elsewhere (multi-million dollar salaries for NCAA D1 sports linked with television contracts). Comparably, also the Clinton Foundation, per this recent note from the NY Times:

 _Worried that the foundation's operating revenues depend too heavily on Mr. Clinton's nonstop fund-raising, the three Clintons are embarking on a drive to raise an endowment of as much as $250 million, with events already scheduled in the Hamptons and London._

<comment><USER4> You accurately describe the trends, but I'm not sure those are positive trends. _If_ these CEOs of nonprofits were indeed purely sales agents receiving commissions, fine, it's a rational ROI to employ them in a role like Vice President of Donor Relations.

But they happen to also be the CEO, formally in charge of the whole operation, and further tend to set the tone for that operation. Then you have the fundraising tail wagging the mission dog. As a result, some nonprofits (and universities) start to look more like weird corporations that exist to perpetuate themselves and their top staff, with some kind of mumbo jumbo relating to public service being an official goal but nowhere near the top of the priority list. An organization that exists primarily to perpetuate itself and pay its staff well is perfectly fine, but then it doesn't really have any business claiming to be a charity...

<comment><USER3> Its worth taking a look at samples of the data.

Education: [http://www.dartblog.com/images/CHE%20Salaries%20Ivies%20Comp...](http://www.dartblog.com/images/CHE%20Salaries%20Ivies%20Comp1.jpg)

ART/culture: [http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/26/arts/salaries....](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/26/arts/salaries.html)

Sports/NCAA: [http://www.philsteele.com/blogs/2012/Mar12/DBMar15.html](http://www.philsteele.com/blogs/2012/Mar12/DBMar15.html)

Charities/Misc: [http://www.charitywatch.org/hottopics/Top25.html](http://www.charitywatch.org/hottopics/Top25.html)

______

sample: Robert J. Mazzuca, Past Chief Scout Executive Boy Scouts of America - N.O. $987,412

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER5> I am very excited for this initiative. However, I think there is a mismatch between venture-funding models and non-profit funding models.

Venture capital economics is premised on founders accepting low initial salaries based on the hope for long-term big payoffs. Which makes it OK for seed funding to be very small (on the order of tens of thousands).

However, non-profits have no hope for long-term big pay offs and therefore have no financial incentive to seek small amounts of seed funding.

In other words, it is sensible for a for-profit startup founder to accept zero salary (or close to it). However, it is nonsensical for a non-profit startup founder to accept close-to-zero salary.

I believe the YC non-profit initiative could still be beneficial to non- profits for the sake of mentorship, networking, etc. But I don't think many non-profit founders will drop their day-job salaries to launch YC non-profit startups.

Edit: s/sensical/sensible/g

<comment><USER6> It seems like you're implying that these non-profit founders put a lot of weight in salary as a consideration to whether or not they pursue their vision. That's something I'd disagree with (though admittedly my opinion off is based off the folks behind Watsi).

The non-profit startups that are going to fit YC are going to be the ones that aren't in dire need of a market salary, who don't need the potential of a huge cash windfall to keep on grinding.

The sacrifices here will be made in the pursuit of 'success' (however you define that), and the pursuit of watching your organization be large enough to make a difference (these are also primary motivators of for-profit startups in my experience).

<comment><USER7> Did you just take 200 words to say "Only wealthy individuals who don't need money can do this?"

Also in tech, its almost impossible to sell workers on the idea of a options- based windfall in favor of lower pay -- let alone the vague promise of 'success'.

<comment><USER8> You don't have to be wealthy (of course, that helps). Sometimes, people are willing to forsake money to start a non-profit.

[http://www.coca- colascholarsfoundation.org/quest/relentlessl...](http://www.coca- colascholarsfoundation.org/quest/relentlessly-striving-to-give-everyone-a- fair-chance/#.UiouX2RgZvY)

Samasource's founder was sleeping at a friend's couch for a while, while being a SAT tutor.

Note: I'm an ex-Samasource employee

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER9> So proud of YC for doing this. There are so many lessons the nonprofit world can learn from the world of startups. If YC can help great causes scale faster, the world will be better for it.

<comment><USER10> In fact, I'm sure there are many things both worlds can learn from each other. More diversity within the groups will be a good thing by itself, even if just for the for-profit's sake.

That said I'm also excited about it being non-profits particularly - this way YC can help solve problems in which there's no money to be made.

</comment></comment><comment><USER11> This is a great move for YC. They've never been about making ludicrous amounts of money which is one reason they've been able to be so successful. I loved that they funded Watsi and agree wholeheartedly that non-profits can benefit from YC/startup advice in general.

As a side note, I think that we've as a culture have been approaching non- profits entirely wrong [0]. Instead of letting them build structure to actually maximise the help they can give, we require them to be stripped-down organizations so their metrics can show they're giving as much money away as possible. This is why we've seen such a surge in for-profit-but-that's-not- the-main-point companies like Tom's Shoes lately. It's simply the best way to do the most good.

[0] [http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_pallotta_the_way_we_think_about...](http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_pallotta_the_way_we_think_about_charity_is_dead_wrong.html)

<comment><USER12> With _donor funded_ nonprofits the "product" is _fulfilling the donors ' wish to see money spent on X_, so the litmus test for spending the money for donor- funded organizations should be _if donors knew we were spending on this, would they change their mind about the donation_. Rational, reasonable people won't mind some of their donation being spent soliciting further donations, but they will mind _nearly all_ the money being spent on fundraising activity, to the point where it's essentially a marketing matrix giving little more than an "image rights" fee to the good causes.

Profit making companies like Tom's Shoes that see philanthropy as a core brand value, are a different matter. There's room for more of them irrespective of how the charitable sector organizes itself.

<comment><USER13> > With donor funded nonprofits the "product" is fulfilling the donors' wish to > see money spent on X

I disagree. With donor funded nonprofits, the product can be to fulfill the donors wish to see their money _achieving_ outcome X, not seeing their money _spent on_ outcome X (it can also be as you present; different donors have different motives.)

I don't think that necessary challenges your conclusions, but I think it is an important distinction.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER14> I really love the concept of an early stage investor formalizing their commitment to improving the world by explicitly creating room for non-profits. Now all we need is a later stage fund to structurally commit follow on investment to these non-profit start-ups. YC deserves big props for this and for not just chasing the buck, if not with all their investments at least with these the mission really is to change the world and for the better at that.

Watsi was an experiment waiting to be repeated, looking forward to see which non-profits will make it through here.

<comment><USER15> The Shuttleworth Foundation does this. They provide fellowships that are the size of an angel or seed round. Primarily for non-profit projects but they do for-profit as well (in my case).

An amazing group/experience is a big understatement.

[http://shuttleworthfoundation.org/](http://shuttleworthfoundation.org/)

Disclaimer: I'm a 2nd year fellow.

<comment><USER14> Maybe you could drop them a hint about partnering with YC for this? That would be something to watch.

<comment><USER15> I've chatted with Chase from Watsi. I'd love to get something more fomalized...

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER16> YC is really demonstrating thought leadership here.

It would be super exciting if we started to see overlap between Y Combinator and the effective altruism movement ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism)), which is people who are trying to make the world a better place in the most effective way.

(I do for-profit startups but am also involved in the EA movement. Please contact me if this is interesting to you.)

</comment><comment><USER17> I'd love to apply to this, but most people around me are off having stable jobs, wives, mortgages, children and other such craziness. Is there much hope for accepting a solo founder with a non-profit idea?

<comment><AUTHOR> We'll probably treat single founders the same as we usually do. We don't automatically reject single founders, but we have a higher threshold for them.

</comment></comment><comment><USER18> Hey pg, the date on the apply page ([https://news.ycombinator.com/apply](https://news.ycombinator.com/apply)) is still from the summer term. Cheers.

<comment><AUTHOR> Oops, fixed.

</comment></comment><comment><USER19> They need to ask:

1\. At what percentage will your entity spend on administration costs?

2\. Will you agree to keep it to less than 10%, if we give you funds?"

3\. Flat out ask the future non-profit, "How much money do you feel you will need to run the non-profit. Would you agree to take only what the standard cost of living in the county you reside--if it succeeds?"

4\. Will your BOD contain any family, friends, or relatives?

5.(Sorry if I sound callous; I live in a county where starting a non-profit is a career move. Some of the salaries are mind boggling.)

6\. (Note to any future non-profit. I applaud your efforts if they are honest. Just a reminder--if you ever close down the 501(c)3 you can't keep any assets --not even a paper clip. Nothing belongs to you. )

<comment><USER20> Though it is tempting to try to capture the entirety of the "efficiency" of a non-profit with a single number, it isn't really helpful.

In particular, it turns out that "administration" doesn't scale linearly. A 4 person nonprofit still needs their ED to spend ~50% of time fundraising; there's likely >15% of your salary right there.

Information from folks that have done this for a while: [http://philanthropy.com/article/3-Major-Charity-Groups- Ask/1...](http://philanthropy.com/article/3-Major-Charity-Groups-Ask/139881/)

Data, if you want: [http://nonprofitquarterly.org/management/22239-new-study- low...](http://nonprofitquarterly.org/management/22239-new-study-low- nonprofit-overhead-does-not-greater-efficiency.html)

<comment><USER13> > Though it is tempting to try to capture the entirety of the "efficiency" of > a non-profit with a single number, it isn't really helpful.

Even when it would be, "ratio of total spending to administration spending" probably is almost never the right single number.

<comment><USER19> Yes--there's no real number on administration costs. Maybe that's the problem? Just keep giving--we're complicated! I guess I keep giving to the nonprofits that sound good? The one's that advertise on T.V.?

Any nonprofit founder, should be able to answer a few questions; "How much do you, the founder expect in salary-- present and future. If we decide to fund your initial nonprofit, would you agree to work for these amounts?

If you want to make a large salary--start a for-profit business. There's nothing wrong with wanting to make a good living, but don't hide behind a nonprofit entity.

Oh yea, Obama is hip the nonprofit dance, but hasn't done anything. A few years ago, he wanted to separate legitimate nonprofits from just money making businesses. As far as I know, nothing has been done?

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER21> This is a wonderful initiative.

I'm someone who's generally very skeptical about the VC ways of doing things (difficult to really describe my feelings here, let's just say some just seem a bit too unapologetically mercenary in my eyes), so this move really sets apart YC from all the other startup-incubators/VCs.

Watsi is fantastic in every way I can think of. I hope more people are encouraged to create nonprofit companies to solve some real problems (read: non-first-world-problems) in a true hackerly fashion.

</comment><comment><USER22> As someone working for a nonprofit this makes me very happy. The world of a starting non-profit is surprisingly similar to that of a startup. :)

</comment><comment><USER23> The only true difference between a for-profit and a non-profit is the tax status.

Cosmic level blessings on Paul Graham for doing this. Badly needed. The entire sector needs catalytic infusions of entrepreneurial energy and expertise.

Only 150 non-profits have grown past $10M in revenue since 1970. North Korea has better business acumen. Love to see efforts like this.

Thank you Y Combinator!

<comment><USER24> Hmm, $10M/year seems a bit off. This ([http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/how_nonprofits_get_r...](http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/how_nonprofits_get_really_big)) says the figure is $50M/year in revenue.

<comment><USER23> Thanks for the correction on that.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER25> Does anyone know what the financial motivation of YC to do this is? Is it to diversify the types of companies they invest in? As much as I love to think that venture capitalists give money to nonprofits out of the goodness of their hearts...

<comment><USER26> because they like to help nonprofits out of the goodness of their hearts, but sometimes what a nonprofit needs is not just money, but infrastructure and connections - and here the ycombinator folks have the opportunity to provide access to those less tangible resources using an organization that doesn't have to be built from scratch.

<comment><USER25> When I said "like to help nonprofits out of the goodness of their hearts" I was being sarcastic. I'm skeptical that this is just a charitable action. I was wondering if anyone has any ideas how this might benefit them financially.

I don't want to seem like I think this can only have bad intentions, but finance people and investors aren't typically known to be charitable.

<comment><USER27> > I don't want to seem like I think this can only have bad intentions, but > finance people and investors aren't typically known to be charitable.

That's incredibly false.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER28> Really awesome to see this.

pg - Can you explain your reasoning on a charitable donation to the "startup"? It seems that if these .orgs are successful one great way to literally pay it forward is into a separate fund that could grow more .org's.

Program-related investments ([http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non- Profits/Private-Foundatio...](http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non- Profits/Private-Foundations/Program-Related-Investments)) from a ycombinator.org would seem to fulfill both investments in .orgs and investments in for-profits with a mission.

<comment><USER29> Although there's no financial incentive for YC here, the financial cost for the few non-profits they decide to fund is nominal as well.

YC has the money to fund many more companies than they do. But not the bandwidth.

Y Combinator is not selling their capital, they're selling their time, expertise, and network. A separate fund would defeat that purpose.

</comment></comment><comment><USER30> Aaaaaand now we'll start to see a lot of accelerators throwing non-profits in with their other companies, because YC did.

I don't think that--in the vast majority of cases--this will be particularly helpful.

<comment><USER31> To be fair, most companies accelerators invest in never turn a profit, so they're already living the dream.

</comment></comment><comment><USER32> hi pg, Any update on when you will update your 'startup ideas we'd like to fund'?

[http://ycombinator.com/ideas.html](http://ycombinator.com/ideas.html)

<comment><USER33> That would be a good idea for an android app. I thorough list of hundreds or thousands of ideas we'd like to fund. Aspiring startups can go through the list, select which ones they like, max of 5, and submit an application to YC right then and there. I wonder if PG's thought of doing that.

edit: what's with the downvotes? that's puzzling

<comment><USER34> Maybe this is oversimplifying things, but I think a startup/prospective founder for which the current YC application is too time-consuming/difficult is probably not an ideal one; the application process is a filtering mechanism, after all.

<comment><USER33> There might be a lot of capable founders, such as older people with a lot of experience in other industries, who are filtered out by that. You might be a 50 year old guy who doesn't get computers but are a killer sales guy, making it easier to select an idea and proceed might be a good bet for YC. Maybe even match up that killer sales guy with a young programmer type.

<comment><USER35> If YC is in the business of matching cofounders, I am unaware of it.

Without that, you're still suggesting that they fund a team that is so uninspired that they can't spend a little time on the application. YC does not have unlimited resources with which to filter applicants, so increasing the number of applicants and decreasing their average quality (an argument that this wouldn't happen would be interesting if you have one) seems like a lose- lose situation.

<comment><USER33> PG has stated multiple times that they key to success is being relentlessly resourceful and pivoting. There are a lot of people with that mindset, most of whom are not Stanford/MIT graduates. Encouraging more applicants from a wider selection pool might increase the quality of YC batches.

PG is always innovating, I'm sure the current process he's created is not the global maximum. He might be interested in matching founders, giving initial ideas, codifying more of his process into apps - anything that might increase ROI he will try as a rational businessman.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER36> According to Eric Ries, "a startup is a human institution designed to create a new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty". "Institution" is broad enough to include nonprofits, which are explicitly mentioned in the Lean Startup book. After all, they do face similar challenges to those that companies face, as they also try to discover new sources of value and to grow... Looking forward to seeing the future YC nonprofits!

</comment><comment><USER37> Great idea! I'd love to see more data-centric nonprofits. The recent This American Life episode "I was just trying to help" discusses this with GiveDirectly. GiveDirectly points out that many many nonprofits are soliciting donations based on anecdotes and are reluctant to produce more data on their impact. I can only imagine that YC-selected nonprofits (and NGOs? Could this go global?) will be more data centric than the rest. Good luck!

</comment><comment><USER38> I've been helping a family friend bootstrap her nonprofit, and let me say that it is darn near the _purest_ form of bootstrapping to start a nonprofit. Not only did she have no income to start, but she has no expectations of personal financial gain. She bootstrapped for pure love of her cause.

Funnily enough, in her struggle to get her nonprofit off the ground, I got my idea for my "startup". Bravo to YC for taking an unorthodox step here.

</comment><comment><USER39> Great idea. Non-profits frequently run into two challenges: financing and scaling. This helps on both fronts. Providing initial seed capital, mentorship on growth and an audience of rich people (many of whom have committed to giving part of their legacy towards non-profits) will increasing the likelihood of their success. If YC takes on 5 non-profits and even 1 scales, this will be a venture worth doing.

</comment><comment><USER40> Nonprofits are notoriously non-technical; run by people who just aren't able to use tech to advance their cause. So I think this makes sense.

</comment><comment><USER41> I am interested to see how this turns out. The amount of money a person donates each year is roughly fixed. Each non-profit is competing for a splice of that donation. So in some ways having multiple non-profits in the same batch is like funding multiple companies which are direct competitors with each other.

</comment><comment><USER42> Great idea. Think it's a phenomenal idea to apply some of the same mechanisms for building high growth engines to the charitable space. It's a space that needs that type of growth.

</comment><comment><USER43> This is a game-changing equalizer for non-profits! Thanks YC.

</comment><comment><USER44> This is awesome and encouraging. I hope it sets a trend.

</comment><comment><USER45> this is absolutely awesome to hear and can not wait to see how things progress. a truly great initiative!

</comment><comment><USER46> can you apply to both the categories..?

<comment><AUTHOR> Not with the same HN account, but if you have two founders you could submit separate applications under each account.

</comment></comment><comment><USER47> Awesome.

</comment><comment><USER48> Interesting move by YC as a way of paying less taxes and helping nonprofits at the same time!

<comment><USER16> Um. "Paying less taxes" is unlikely to be a motivator here, because you still end up with more money if you don't give it away at all :)

<comment><USER48> I'm not sure I understand your argument. I never said that the motivator was ending up with more money.

But yes, they will pay less taxes.

So, if their tax rate is 35%, every donated dollar costs them only 65 cents.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER49> That's a really undeveloped idea of "nonprofits" — "rich people" and "charities."

<comment><USER50> You could turn that comment into something constructive by proposing some particular kinds of nonprofits you think we should fund but might not have thought of.

<comment><USER51> You could contact people like these (and many others), and beg them to advise you, or recommend advisors:

* [http://www.zcommunications.org/zcontacts.htm](http://www.zcommunications.org/zcontacts.htm)

* email@example.com

* [http://www.iww.org/contact](http://www.iww.org/contact)

Have you considered looking at groups who've really "disrupted markets" (in the most literal sense, like sex slave and child labor markets, even markets in general); break unjust things, and are _real_ risk-takers who risked poverty/jail/beatings? You know, serious hackers.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER19> They need to ask:

1\. At what percentage will your entity spend on administration costs?

2\. Will you agree to keep it to less than 10%, if we give you funds?"

3\. Flat out ask the future non-profit, "How much money do you feel</comment>


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