French homeland intelligence threatens a sysop into deleting a Wikipedia Article - <AUTHOR> http://blog.wikimedia.fr/dcri-threat-a-sysop-to-delete-a-wikipedia-article-5493 <comment><USER4> Wikimedia France just published an article (in English) with more details: [http://blog.wikimedia.fr/dcri-threat-a-sysop-to-delete-a- wik...](http://blog.wikimedia.fr/dcri-threat-a-sysop-to-delete-a-wikipedia- article-5493)

What's distressing about this is that they found a French Wikipedia sysop who they could identify in real life and "summoned" him to their offices (I presume from the language it was a summons he couldn't refuse). Then forced him to delete it there and then, despite no prior connection to the article, or else be detained.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of them wanting to delete the article, or whether it had super-secret information, there is only really one response to what they did; What. The. Fuck.

The precedent they are setting is something like "if you are involved in a website where someone else does something we consider problematic, you could be in trouble. If we feel like it".

<comment><USER5> It's a 'do the ends justify the means' issue. I'm kind of shocked that the above the fold comments here no one seems to take into account that France is engaged in conflict. As a result, if you have an easy to access well written article, which is exactly what wikis espouse to be that has detailed relevant as deemed by the french gov't military information, It is their decision to determine what was once public to be classified information. As much as I am for supporting rights of individuals and keeping systems in balance, I'm not so much for the establishment of principle to prove a point and set a precedent (which is not how the french law system works by the way) so much as I am for the utilitarian exercising of power when lives are on the line. How selfish must one be to cling to a few pages on principle when others could die for it.

"The precedent they are setting is something like "if you are involved in a website where someone else does something we consider problematic, you could be in trouble. If we feel like it".

The other way goes that: 'If I have time sensitive information due to the changing landscape of warfare, I could get soldiers and civilians killed if I feel like it'

I sadly would trust the gov't on this decision than an individual.

<comment><USER4> Well, I'm not really advancing an opinion as to whether the article is a problem or not. But looked at it, it is a fairly mundane description of a radio station right in the heart of France. I struggle to see how any interpretation of the content could be a direct threat to soldier or civilian lives... so your rhetoric there doesn't sit comfortably.

I for one think that the following, "ends justifies the means", approach is not acceptable; "Trust us, we're the government and though it looks innocuous it is threatening lives right now. So we will take any measures to remove it". If it is that much of a risk I feel they should be able to convince _someone_ of that fact without divulging the exact problem.

Through all of this the intelligence agency have apparently failed to communicate this sort of urgency, in private, to either a trained lawyer or the sysop in question. Indeed, the legal team quite clearly suggest they made no effort to convince them of such an urgency.

In either case, had they done so, then both would have been able to explain how to quietly remove the article without this sort of Streisand effect...

All of which still does not excuse the fact that they threatened a private citizen with terrorism charges.

> I sadly would trust the gov't on this decision than an individual.

I feel that what is often forgotten about govt. is that they are _made up of individuals_. What you are actually arguing here is that of the several individuals involved, some of them presumably have more information (i.e. secret govt. information) than the others.

<comment><USER5> Well apparently it was a military installation, not just a radio station, and even if it was in the heart of France that doesn't negate the risk as we know targets, civilian and military have been hit on a nation's home soil before. As others have said yeah, the problem of explaining why some of the information is sensitive is a catch-22. After all, I wouldn't be surprised if a media outlet decided to publish that information as well 'This is the sensitive information that required us to remove the content'. The precedent for that has already been set a la wikileaks. And yes, the gov't is made up of individuals and this particular gov't happens to be a republic so I agree, my assumption is that those in the intelligence community within the elected gov't have more knowledge than either the foundation or the sysop as to whether this information is benign or not. I'll stick with that assumption, of course who knows, it could all be a conspiracy =).

<comment><USER4> Yes, a military radio station. They are far from uncommon, and certainly have super secret things happening in them. But their existence and location? Not really a first class secret, nor one exclusively revealed by Wikipedia. :)

<comment><USER6> As you can see, the French Gov't took great pains to disguise this one. Were it not for some traitorous Wikipedia editor, then casual passers-by may have never suspected that it was anything other than a dairy farm, (perhaps owned by an eccentric architect). The terrorists are probably already en-route. Any minute now, we can expect free peoples of the world to fall under the iron hands of our enemies. Despite the heroic efforts of the DCRI.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pier...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pierre- sur-Haute)

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER7> A couple of points:

\- The laws on official secrets typically (and uncontroversially IMO) forbid any unauthorized handling or distribution of classified material. This is not a US-pandering post-9-11 knee-jerk thing, it goes back _at least_ to WWII, and probably much longer.

\- Many facts are classified, even though they don't appear significant. Sometimes they indeed aren't, sometimes the motivation is that a multitude of such facts collectively suggest something which is significant.

\- Telling an uncleared person what is classified amounts to giving that person even more classified material that they're not allowed to have. Obviously, so is saying that there's classified material on the page at all, but arguably less so.

\- There are some items on the Wikipedia page in question that have "citation needed", ie. they are not immediately obviously sourced from publicly accessible material. Chances are that the problematic material is among those facts.

<comment><USER8> > \- Telling an uncleared person what is classified amounts to giving that > person even more classified material that they're not allowed to have. > Obviously, so is saying that there's classified material on the page at all, > but arguably less so.

What recourse does a person have then? If the information is publicly posted, it hardly seems more of a security risk to tell _one_ person what to remove than have the 'secrets' published for the entire world to see.

Additionally, how can a company such as Wikipedia possibly comply without any specific information? I.e. - how can they _prevent_ the re-posting of said information if they have _no idea_ what that information is?

<comment><USER9> > if they have no idea what that information is?

Reminds me of this case in 2007 in China. A newspaper ad "Paying tribute to the strong(-willed) mothers of June 4 victims" slipped through the censorship, because the young clerk had no idea that June 4 is a reference to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the talking of which is not allowed. Because she had never heard of the Tiananmen Square protests, because censorship had been so effective.

[http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/06/us-china- tiananmen...](http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/06/us-china-tiananmen- advertisement-idUSHKG14616220070606)

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER10> Suddenly I cannot think of a single thing QUITE so intoxicatingly interesting as what the French might be up to with this radio station on Pierre sur Haute!

Surely it must be just sinfully rich with secret sauce, mystery, and espionage! If only there were thousands of like-minded, curious individuals with the wherewithal to investigate and help bring these wonderful mysteries to light...

<comment><USER11> If only... The article states it's one of four military radio relays along the North-South axis in France, and that launch orders for nuclear weapons could pass through it if used. As such it'd probably be one of the primary targets for anyone who'd like to attack France.

That kind of position probably makes some intelligence officials feel incredibly important if they can find an excuse to demand even relatively trivial information about it deleted.

<comment><USER12> It's pointless either way. If the intention was to keep the relay station secret, there's no use trying to put worms in back in the can once the information is public. They should relocate it and try better at not spilling the beans next time.

<comment><USER13> Bit hard to hide a 30 m heavy concrete tower in a country as densely populated as mainland France, especially from people actively looking for it.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER14> Seems the article is still here : [http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Station_hertzienne_militaire_de...](http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Station_hertzienne_militaire_de_Pierre_sur_Haute) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pierr...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pierre- sur-Haute)

<comment><USER15> It was restored 22 hours after deletion.

5 avril 2013 à 09:16 Inisheer (discuter | contributions) a restauré la page Station hertzienne militaire de Pierre sur Haute (30 versions restaurées : suppression précipitée)

4 avril 2013 à 11:02 Remi Mathis (discuter | contributions) a supprimé la page Station hertzienne militaire de Pierre sur Haute (Article qui contient des informations classifiées, qui contrevient à l'article 413-11 du code pénal)

</comment></comment><comment><USER16> The french intelligence agency has done many mistakes in the past. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_the_Rainbow_Warrior> is seen as one of the most counter productive operations done my military agencies to date

<comment><USER17> Mistake? Are you saying they meant to give the boat a new coat of paint, and accidentally blew it up instead, killing a bystander in the process?

<comment><USER16> Mistake as in stupid decision.

<comment><USER17> It wasn't merely stupid, it was evil. They blew up a civilian vessel and killed a man.

<comment><USER18> I wouldn't go so far as to call it evil - death happened due a miscalculation, it was not intentional. I think intent matters if we call something evil.

<comment><USER19> Not enough. If something can predictably end in disaster and horrible things and someone does it anyway, that person is just as evil as if they had planned it from the beginning.

If someone throws rocks at oncoming cars, you can't claim innocence because "I didn't mean to kill a family in a car crash!" If you invade an oil-rich Middle Eastern country and cause half a million excess deaths, it's just as bad as if you personally murdered each and every one of them.

<comment><USER6> No, we don't say that drunks are evil when they get drunk and then drive their car over someone. We do still throw them in prison though.

<comment><USER17> We? You might not, but I certainly do.

<comment><USER18> Let me explain the problem here.

What you are doing is diluting the 'evil brand'. If you call a drunk driver evil, you have nothing left for the likes of Hitler and Pol Pot. What are they then - double evil?

<comment><USER17> It's a spectrum. It's possible to be 'slightly evil' or 'very evil', or - <USER2> the case of Hitler or Pol Pot - 'one of the most evil humans who ever lived'.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER20> I suspect we're about to see the Streisand effect in action.

<comment><USER21> Apparently the original article is quite of international significance. Can we get an English version thereof?

<comment><USER22> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pierr...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pierre- sur-Haute)

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER23> Not defending the idiotic actions of the DCRI here, but try looking at it from a non-American perspective.

American organizations appear to bend over backward to be of service to American intelligence interests around the world, but tend to act arrogantly if approached by local authorities over local matters, to the extend of openly violating the law of the country they're operating in.

For all we know (I'm neither a lawyer nor French), French law requires the whole publication to be taken down immediately pending further procedure. In that case it's not surprise that something designated a matter of national security gets escalated fast.

Wikipedia's blunt refusal has probably pissed the French of more than the actual content of the article.

<comment><USER24> >>American organizations appear to bend over backward to be of service to American intelligence interests around the world, but tend to act arrogantly if approached by local authorities over local matters, to the extend of openly violating the law of the country they're operating in.

Why is it that this makes what the French authorities did OK? Your argument boils down to "He did it so I should be able to do it too?" What kind of screw up logic is that. Seriously, W.T.F. We are not talking about kids here.

<comment><USER11> Where does he say this makes it ok?

It makes it easier to _understand_ why they picked this approach. It is possible to try to understand someones motivations without supporting them.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER25> Fellow living in France here.

For those who want to learn more, the radio station built at this site is part of a Tropospheric Scatter Communication Network (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tropospheric_scatter>) named Ace High and which is used by NATO for military and civilian communications.

You can see it here on a map with other TSCN networks <http://rammstein.dfmk.hu/~s200/tropo.html#ace>

</comment><comment><USER26> Wikipedia is full classified information, the same way as Jane's and Aviation Week is full of classified information. Intelligence agencies read this stuff and try to sift disinformation from genuine leaks. Counter-intelligence agencies try to act cool and make the enemy suspect the information is inaccurate.

</comment><comment><USER27> The article has been updated to reflect the current controversy. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pier...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_radio_station_of_Pierre- sur-Haute)

Perhaps this is the sensitive portion? _The most important part of the site is the underground part, used for transmissions dispatch: at a speed of 2 Mb/s, communications from the towers are analysed, then redirected to be transmitted as appropriate._

</comment><comment><USER28> I think this is a really revealing story. Not revealing as in what the French Government were worried about specifically but as in the changing of the world.

Firstly the grey world of interesting classified information - it has long been the domain of Janes' Ships and similar publications - who themselves had been "trusted" not to go too far, and only occassionally (as in the reveal of the Stealth bomber as an airfix kit in the late '80s) does it come to mass public attention.

This resulted in a grey world where secrets were not actually secret - <USER3> private.

Secondly - the loss of privacy. We worry about it for individuals - but it is happening to governments too, and faster. And they, like us, have not accpeted the new reality - there is _no_ privacy. Facebook can determine if you are having an affair, are gay or ill. Combined tracking of sites and queries can reveal almost anything about ourselves and our medical conditions. Concerned your employer might know you are rethinking your sexuality? Don't Google "gay bars". Don't friend anyone. Remove the battery from the iPhone before going out for the night.

The same goes for governments - if it is not a secret, it is open. And it is not a secret because you say so - its a secret because no-one knows.

Thirdly this leads to a simple choice - decide on the things you are going to keep secret. And keep them secret with all the resources of the State. This clearly does not work in the "I say that is secret and you will now forget it" approach taken here. It works in the not F$%king telling anyone sense.

Fourthly - Most things will be open - its not feasible to hide a 100ft tower in the middle of the French countryside. You cannot keep a plane secret. You cannot keep a prison secret. In fact there is not much in an open andinquisitive society you _can_ keep secret.

What does this leave? I am not too sure. Secret rendition flights are monitored by plane-spotting enthusiasts and soon will just be a google- satellite search away.

I think it will be a better world - less secrecy usually means better function, but there is a really big threat - the tempting way to keep things secret is to keep _everything_ secret. Shut down the open, democratic society. Shut down _inquisitiveness_. Piece by piece.

And we do need to fight that at each and every turn because until governments get it - this is their default, tempting solution. Fighting terrorists? Lets torture some. Nuclear strike warning network under threat? Put wikipedia under French control.

My only suggestion is as follows: define National Security. Something like a reasonable belief that this things will threaten to destroy 2% of GDP or 1000+ deaths of citizens. Embarrassment to Politicans? Loss of a couple of agents? Not likely. So when someone quotes National Security, people listen. And if you quote it for a wikipedia article - woe betide you.

If we do it right we shall slowly find that like online security, you get it right by actually being secure.

Lesson here - security by secrecy, is no security at all.

<comment><USER29> > And we do need to fight that at each and every turn because until > governments get it

I read an interesting article somewhat related to this:

[http://krypt3ia.wordpress.com/2013/03/22/digital-natives- dig...](http://krypt3ia.wordpress.com/2013/03/22/digital-natives-digital- immigrants-exo-nationals-and-the-digital-lord-of-the-flies/)

It uses Anonymous and Wikileaks as examples (which you may or may not disagree with), but I'm linking it for the general discussion about a sort of digital generation gap, how the "governing class" of people hasn't caught up with this digital era quite yet.

<comment><USER28> To be fair, its not just the governing class - I don't think anyone really gets it - the almost total loss of privacy for any digital "native" is stunning.

This is a little mental exercise for me so bear with me please. Imagine that all the digital footprints I leave are available through nice open APIs and easily accessible (its not, it wont be but...)

Then I _know_ that these are collected without any malicious or surveillance intent:

1\. Physical location - iPhone collects this every 5 mins by default. Thats almost everything you need right there. I also log into different wifi hotspots, duck in and out of cells. You can infer an _enourmous_ amount about me by knowing where I am, and even more by knowing who is there with me. My sex life, my business deals.

2\. Interests - google searches for itchy skin rashes, my debit and "loyalty" cards with costa coffee and the supermarkets who know what itch cream I just bought. Do i have a cat - I buy cat food at Tescos so its a good guess. One of my two cats just died, which is very sad, but Tesco will know soon as my purchases halve and stay that low. When I buy puppy food Tesco can sell me pet insurance.

3\. Networks - who I email (gmail knows all), who I phone (skype, cell provider), Facebook, linkedin, and most insidiously this cross-website-cookie business that is coming up (there is a name for it but basically how ad networks know to show me ads on different sites). If my iphone and one of my contacts iphones meet up, am I preparing to leave my employer? Would you want to know who is in the same location as Google's HR people if you were Zuckerberg?

4\. Real world monitoring - CCTV is too poor to convict bank robbers most of the time, but Stanford did a study where a good camera could identify faces and match them to Facebook photos 1 in 3 times. You know the bit in CSI:NY where they search for the baddie and two dzoen photos flash by and suddenly they have an address. Thats real. Just not in neon blue lights with good looking lab assistants.

5\. travelcards and train tickets, Uber taxi cab bookings from my mistresses flat to my wife's house. (NB I dont actually have a mistress but you get the point. <\- you see the paranoia is getting to me, just in case my wife reads HN :-)

I could go on, but really, all this is starting to fall into place - I could happily do an Research MSc on pulling these sources together...

Anyway - privacy, gone.

And that leaves us with two circles in our Venn diagram of life. Anything that can be found out by someone somewhere in the world , and if there is anything left over it is a secret.

Oh and I think my Phd would be on inference of privatives - that is being able to spot the "black holes" in a persons digital footprints that tell you something they want to keep secret is going on.

Really, if the Intelligence Services lived up to their names, this is the stuff they should be eating up. (And those vast NSA computer farms....oh yes, of course :-)

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER30> Here is the cached version of the article [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:hnvaMcj...](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:hnvaMcjr4nEJ:fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Station_hertzienne_militaire_de_Pierre_sur_Haute+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=br)

<comment><USER31> And here is a link to the automatic translation: [http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js...](http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=de&ie=UTF-8&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwebcache.googleusercontent.com%2Fsearch%3Fq%3Dcache%3AhnvaMcjr4nEJ%3Afr.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FStation_hertzienne_militaire_de_Pierre_sur_Haute%2B%26cd%3D2%26hl%3Den%26ct%3Dclnk%26gl%3Dbr)

<comment><USER32> Seems rather anodyne and doesn't seem to have much (or anything) that could be considered sensitive the fact that a state has installations like say RAF chicksands or the Lincolnshire poacher numbers station - both of which have Wikipedia articles.

Sounds like some french civil servant overracted - though unfortunately the French do have a nasty poujadist anti American strain that can come out at times.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER33> I see Ms. Streisand works for French Intelligence now. I hope this gets a South Park episode, too.

</comment><comment><USER34> Here's a link to a pastebin of the original article dated July 20, 2012 before it was deleted. Also includes a link to the video that started the controversy: <http://pastebin.com/vYGkSzyA>

</comment><comment><USER35> For some reason the submitted story links to the original insertion of that notice, but it's been updated a lot since then (including a translation into French and an ensuing discussion): [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikip%C3%A9dia:Bulletin_des_ad...](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikip%C3%A9dia:Bulletin_des_administrateurs/2013/Semaine_14#Wikimedia_Foundation_elaborates_on_recent_demand_by_French_governmental_agency_to_remove_Wikipedia_content%2E)

</comment><comment><USER36> EDIT: If, like it randomly happens to me, the link takes you in the middle of a french discussion, you just need to scroll all the way down to get a much more explicative message from the WMF about the chain of events.

I always have a hard time navigating wp discussion pages. Here is what looks like a more informative post that the one linked in the title of this HN post. EDIT: disregard that comment about the title as it might be a navigation problem on my side.

> First, my apologies for speaking in English in response to this thread, but > I fear my French would not be adequate to convey what I would like to. If > someone who is fluent in English and French would be so kind as to translate > my message so that everyone on this thread can understand it, I would very > much appreciate that. The Wikimedia Foundation's legal team was contacted by > Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur in early March regarding the > French language Wikipedia article entitled "La station hertzienne militaire > de Pierre sur Haute". The Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur > requested that we delete the article in its entirety under the claim that it > contained classified military information. I responded to Direction Centrale > du Renseignement Intérieur, requesting more detailed information because it > was not apparent what classified information the article could possibly > contain from a plain reading of the article. The Direction Centrale du > Renseignement Intérieur repeatedly failed to provide any further information > and simply continued to make a general takedown demand, despite my > explanation that we could not remove the information without more > information from them. Eventually, I had no choice but to refuse their > request until they are willing to provide me with more information so that I > can properly evaluate their claim under legal standards. The community > remains free, of course, to retain or remove the article as it sees fit. But > at this point, we do not see a demonstrated reason to remove it on legal > grounds. --Michelle Paulson, Legal Counsel (WMF)

And this is "Remi"'s first post about the whole thing (rough translation and report):

> Bonjour,

> je vous informe que l'article Station hertzienne militaire de Pierre sur > Haute vient d'être supprimé par mes soins. Cet article contrevenait à > l'article 413-11 du code pénal français (compromission du secret de la > Défense nationale). La police française m'a convoqué en tant > qu'administrateur, suite au refus de la Wikimedia Foundation de supprimer > cet article en l'état des éléments fournis.

> La remise en ligne engagera la responsabilité pénale de l'administrateur qui > aura effectué cette action.

Remi M. (d · c). À Paris, ce 4 avril 2013 à 11:11 (CEST)

In a nutshell:

\- He deleted an article about a military radio station (Pierre sur Haute) ;

\- he states that that article violates article 413-411 of the french penal code (violation of state defense secret) ;

\- french police asks him to come to their office for a little chat (can't recall the english legalese for this) following wikimedia foundation refusal to delete the article. Him=a wikipedia administrator.

\- he finally states that any admin who restores the article would face legal and penal consequences.

I understand from this first post that it is implied he deleted the article after the whole wikimedia refusal to delete the article but don't quote me on that and check for the exact chronology of events yourself when it surfaces.

There is also now a debate about the role of wikipedia admin on articles and their rights to delete or endorse responsabilities (I haven't read everything yet, take my rough report and translation with a grain of salt).

<comment><USER37> The debate is also fueled by the fact that "Rémi" is not simply "a" wikipedia admin but the president of Wikimedia France: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9mi_Mathis> ; which drives people to ask for him to resign.

<comment><USER38> > to ask for him to resign

Actually, they ask for him to resign _as a wikipedia administrator_ as long as he remains the president of wikimedia France (not the other way round).

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER39> So why not put the article back up? if its already public knowledge? and Just lock it to teach them a lesson?

</comment><comment><USER40> I grew up in France, this isn't unexpected or unusual for the government to do. But it is a perfect example of why administrative rights (the ability to delete/censor an article) should reside in a country that has complete freedom of the press, America.

<comment><USER41> hahaha :)

</comment></comment><comment><USER42> What's next? How easy would it be for French officials to decide that something that's critical of the president or the ruling party may be a threat to state security and censor the internet accordingly?

</comment><comment><USER43> One simple suggestion to prevent this from happening in the future : require each deletion to be approved by another Wikipedia representative in a DIFFERENT COUNTRY.

</comment><comment><USER44> Not to reach for the big "let's invent a new policy" stick, however does wikia have guidelines for those contributing articles where there is obvious life- and-limb danger to subjects, and by-proxy contributors? Also, don't contributors have some basic moral duty to not reveal things (0days, troop movements, etc.) that puts others in immanent danger?

</comment><comment><USER45> Ideas are not property. Government secrets == thoughtcrime.

The "intelligence" agency doesn't even understand how Wikipedia works! Scary.

</comment><comment><USER46> Liberté, égalité, farterai....ahh nevermind

<comment><USER28> I can best translate that as waxing?

Could you explain - I must have missed the presumably French idiom

<comment><USER47> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libert%C3%A9,_%C3%A9galit%C3%A9...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libert%C3%A9,_%C3%A9galit%C3%A9,_fraternit%C3%A9)

<comment><USER28> Yeah I know that, obviously.

But why Liberty, Equality, Waxing?

<comment><USER48> I think OP was trying to write "fraternité", and the fact that his misspelling became an actual word is a mere coincidence.

<comment><USER28> Yeah, I was just hoping there was some trend in French schools to mess with the sacred cows and I had not heard of it :-)

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER49> Here's an article about the site with interesting photos... it's in French but use Google Translate to get the gist.

[http://j28ro.blogspot.com/2012/09/la-station-hertzienne- mili...](http://j28ro.blogspot.com/2012/09/la-station-hertzienne-militaire- de.html#more)

</comment><comment><USER50> What I would do as a real intelligence agency is start inserting fake information into the article.

<comment><USER51> And then relocate the tower, then have the article deleted on the basis that the tower doesn't exist.

<comment><USER13> Why? Keep it, all the better to confuse competing intelligence agencies.

<comment><USER51> Theres a lot of ways you could do it. Keeping it is one option, removing it is another, without knowing more about the function of the tower it's hard to make a determination either way.

(That is, it could be more advantageous to make it seem like a hoax, or it could be better to leave the "hoax" up with faulty information.)

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER52> I dunno, you've gotta watch out for Wikipedia.

I know a guy who had a rare car, of which there were twelve in the world. One day some people came and tried to steal his car and the cops told him to get the photo taken down because this would encourage future attempts.

</comment><comment><USER53> What is it with this moronic word "homeland"? This was the DCRI, an internal security organization. "Homeland" is a fascist-style euphemism which the Americans have become conditioned into using.

</comment><comment><USER54> Funny how the overreaction mostly comes from foreigners or people involved with Wikimedia activities.

It may have been handled abruptly (if it were properly handled, there wouldn't be any significant article about the event anywhere), but the DCRI is perfectly within its rights and was right to have the info taken down. No, information isn't free or benign. The right info in the right hands can be destructive, and I'm glad there are people watching out so that our national soil remains more or less safe. Knowing about very sensitive compounds _isn't_ a right nor a liberty.

Furthermore, it's not for the Wikimedia Fondation to assess the sensitivity of information, they merely provide efficient ways of spreading it and should stick to that.

</comment><comment><USER55> Simply deleting the article doesn't erase it from the internet. If the content is really that important people who want it badly enough can still find it in archives and old database dumps.

<comment><USER56> Wikipedia deletes only hide the article from non-admins (well there is a real delete too but the agency did not appear to know that). There is one click restore if you are an admin.

<comment><USER57> They do have "oversight", which deletes from administrator view too. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Oversight>

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER58> And initiate the Streisand effect; I'm now digging around to find the article to read what sensitive information is hidden from me.

</comment><comment><USER59> Was the article later restored by Wikipedia? It doesn't make any sense that it would have been _permanently_ deleted.

</comment><comment><USER60> While I agree the situation underlines a real problem, I don't think it lies where people think. If you read the text, you will realise that, even if they are really clumsy, the issue here is not so much the DCRI than French law itself.

Let's look closely at what is happening : 1 - The DCRI aks the Wikimedia Fundation to delete an article from Wikipedia because it's infringing article 413-11 of the French penal code. 2 - The Wikimedia Fundation refuses arguing the order should state which piece of information in the article is classified. 3 - As the Wikimedia Fundation is an american organisation, the DCRI turns itself towards its French arm, the French Wikimedia and its representative. 4 - Under pressure, the president complies and removes the article pointing that people putting it back will be breaking the law.

Well, actually, he is probably right. While I understand why the Wikimedia Fundation took a stand and refused to remove the article, as silly as it seems, the fact remains : In France, putting classified information online is illegal even you don't know they are classified.

Let's look at the article 413-11 : [http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessioni...](http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=FB03D025759E0DF0811DDCFEC51257B5.tpdjo17v_1?idArticle=LEGIARTI000020933031&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20130406&categorieLien=id)

First, this article is aimed at everyone not mentioned in article 413-10. Article 413-10 lists the sanction for people which are legitimately depositary of a state secret. Thus, article 413-11 concerned anyone knowing a state secret without being mandated.

Now, there is three points in the article. The first one says that the mere fact of knowing classified information without being mandated is illegal (yes, even by accident). The second one that destroying, stealing or copying such information is illegal (yes, it's unnecessary considering that to do that you have already committed 1). The third (unnecessary too) states that sharing this information with the public is illegal too.

So yes, if the Wikipedia article contains classified information, Wikimedia France already broke the law and its legal representative is liable and yes it's laughable.

But now, the best part. Do you know why there is so unnecessary part in this law ? Because it was changed in 2009 ! Previously, article 1 only criminalised illegally acquiring classified information, not knowledge of it. But, you nailed it, transforming unknowing citizen into criminals was obviously a necessity to protect us against terrorists and the amendment was passed in a state of general indifference despite some warning from the press (for once).

So, if you want to blame someone, blame the French parliament and the French people. It's entirely our own fault (you can also do some lobbying if you happen to be French, the new government might hear you but I doubt it).

<comment><USER61> It's worth pointing out that "if the Wikipedia article contains classified information, Wikimedia France already broke the law" seems to be a misunderstanding. From the article on the Wikimédia France blog currently linked by the OP (I understand it pointed to a discussion on Wikipedia earlier, but has been edited): "Wikimédia France is a charity which supports the Wikimedia projects in France. Wikimedia does not host nor edit Wikipedia: if some members are also Wikipedia contributors, the charity never intervenes in Wikipedia. It is independent from Wikimedia Foundation." From Wikipedia: "Wikimédia France brings together users and participants in Wikimedia projects. It is recognized by the Wikimedia Foundation as a chapter; however it is a legally and financially independent entity, obeying different rules and a separate leadership. It is led by a Board of Trustees elected by the association members. Wikimédia France doesn't host any Wikimedia Foundation project and doesn't have any right to edit them." [<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikim%C3%A9dia_France>]

<comment><USER60> Thank you, I missed that (I'm an idiot, it explains why the DCRI went after Wikimedia and not Wikimedia France at first). Wikimedia seems to think the law is with them. I'm not entirely sure but contrary to their layers, I'm not a specialist. What I wanted to convey is how silly the law is and how it makes Wikipedia French administrators easy targets .

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER62> I find the fact that an intelligence agency does not understand Wikipedia scarier than the actual bullying. These are people allowed to circumvent the law in order to protect the country. People who do counter-espionage and counter-terrorism it what amounts to a police state. If they can't figure out this, how are they dealing with the serious stuff?

<comment><USER63> I disagree. They just found the most simple way how to delete that article.

<comment><USER62> It did not work. The article was quickly reinstated by another user and the whole thing backfired.

<comment><USER64> Haven't read through it all yet, but presumably he's just been "recruited" to make it work. They've probably go some dirt on him. That's probably not even the material they care about, at least in the long term.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER65> Somebody, somewhere in France should go on strike.</comment>


Combining the power of R and D3.js - <AUTHOR> http://blog.ae.be/combining-the-power-of-r-and-d3-js/?hn

<comment><USER2> The culmination of such an approach is realized in the Beaker Notebook ([http://www.beakernotebook.com](http://www.beakernotebook.com)). You can not only switch between languages, but the environment allows you to share datasets between Groovy, Python, JS, Julia, Ruby etc ..

It's a work in progress, but something to watch out for, imho

<comment><USER3> Well this is what iPython is morphing into. iPython is going kernel agnostic and you can actually use dozens of languages already. Juypter is the new name.

</comment></comment><comment><USER4> Since the post linked to my ggplot2 tutorial, I should probably mention that I'm really not a fan of interactive charts/D3 for _static_ content, because a) loading the data can dramatically increase the loading time of the webpage and b) interactive charts _will_ break on mobile devices, so you need to invest time to QA that.

Rstudio now offers HTMLWidgets which allow for interactive chart generation natively, which is interesting: [http://blog.rstudio.org/2014/12/18/htmlwidgets-javascript- da...](http://blog.rstudio.org/2014/12/18/htmlwidgets-javascript-data- visualization-for-r/)

</comment><comment><USER5> Somewhat close in spirit to what seems like a never-ending side project I have: [https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/7702253/AlthingiJS-1.mov](https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/7702253/AlthingiJS-1.mov) Here I show Javascript and APL, but the plan is to eventually include at the very least also R. But so far I'm still rewriting what I have until I'm happy with it, so it's taking ages.

<comment><USER6> That's cool, but... code or it didn't happen. Are you running an APL interpreter client-side or shuttling the code and data back to the server? If it's the latter, are you sandboxing in some way the arbitrary code being executed?

<comment><USER5> Yes, that's the thing. At the current point it is usable (barely) as an APL/javascript REPL, but there are several corners that are very rough, not counting unhandled data structures and such. Every time I have some spare time with some clear mind I work a little on it, so it's not stalled, but has been going for quite a few months already without much improvement.

As for your question, data goes back to the "server" (there's go code interacting with the APL interpreter and sanitising inputs and outputs, converting to JSON, etc) but this is expected to be used as a local service (using a port not listening to the outside world), so no, no arbitrary code execution failsafes (if I were to deploy it in some real, server-ed way I'd isolate interpreters via sessions in the go 'middle' layer).

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER7> This is why I prefer using clojure + incanter.

You get interactive freechart dialogues (and much more).

Library: [https://github.com/incanter/incanter](https://github.com/incanter/incanter)

A few (impressive) slides: [http://incanter.org/docs/data-sorcery- new.pdf](http://incanter.org/docs/data-sorcery-new.pdf)

</comment><comment><USER6> R is a very powerful tool, but I fail to see how it's adding value in this case. It seems like the author is advocating just using R to clean up the data and put it in JSON. The same can be done (without overhead for context switching and server-client architecture) in JS itself. Tools like Crossfilter [0] can be seamlessly integrated with D3.

[0]: [https://square.github.io/crossfilter/](https://square.github.io/crossfilter/)

<comment><USER3> This is the way I would want my work flow:

1) Use R clean the data

2) Use R to turn the raw data into analytically data

3) Use R to do exploratory charting etc

[Most project stop here]

4) Final Product: RMarkdown (For static reports), Shiny (Interactive variable charts), or now D3 if I want to have interactive charts. My interactive charts would be very few.

I wouldn't want to do the first three steps with javascript.

</comment></comment><comment><USER8> There is a seemingly dead github repo called "R2D3" by hadley wickham. Wonder what came of that project?

[https://github.com/hadley/r2d3](https://github.com/hadley/r2d3)

</comment><comment><USER9> I wonder how this will compare to ggvis when it becomes more advanced. Also, I recommend looking intk Shiny for interactivity.

<comment><USER3> I have been using ggvis for a little while. It is very flexible in terms of changing variables for exploratory use. (My favorite personal use). I haven't done much with Shiny yet but I think D3 is more in lines with RStudio's html widgets. [http://rmarkdown.rstudio.com/developer_html_widgets.html](http://rmarkdown.rstudio.com/developer_html_widgets.html)

</comment></comment><comment><USER10> A better approach IMO:

[http://htmlwidgets.org](http://htmlwidgets.org)</comment>


Antirez (Redis creator): don't believe this is just a flu - <AUTHOR> https://twitter.com/antirez/status/1237359829884243968 <comment><USER2> I find it strange that even on HN we seem to fall into the trap of holding up people's opinions who ostensibly know nothing special about the subject. This guy is an engineer not a public health expert, why are we holding his thoughts and advice in particular esteem?

<comment><USER3> Because he's on the ground in one of the hardest hit areas, and has no (that I can see) incentive to lie. The media, where he is getting his info from, also has no (that I can see) incentive to overstate the situation. Sometimes you have to consider anecdotal evidence - sometimes there is no other option in a crisis like this.

<comment><USER2> That is a good point, I am still skeptical that he should be handing out advice though. I would also disagree that the media has no incentive to overstate the situation. The Italian PM has specifically asked them to tone down their reporting as it was causing panic.

<comment><USER3> > The Italian PM has specifically asked them to tone down their reporting as > it was causing panic.

That doesn't mean they are being untruthful, though.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER4> The rate at which this has spread in Italy is a two sided coin in my opinion.

It means the "found" cases are grossly under representative, and probably deaths is a more meaningful statistic. But on the upside it also means the virus is probably not as lethal as the 3% figure, as it has passed through many people uncounted.

<comment><USER5> > But on the upside it also means the virus is probably not as lethal as the > 3% figure, as it has passed through many people uncounted.

Lethality appears to be a function of the availability of health care.

> This is what you can conclude: countries that are prepared will see a > fatality rate of ~0.5% (South Korea) to 0.9% (rest of China); countries that > are overwhelmed will have a fatality rate between ~3%-5%.

[https://medium.com/@tomaspueyo/coronavirus-act-today-or- peop...](https://medium.com/@tomaspueyo/coronavirus-act-today-or-people-will- die-f4d3d9cd99ca)

</comment></comment><comment><USER6> I read yesterday that the US infection rate is tracking that of Italy. If so, we should all take note of his comments regarding isolation and culture.

<comment><USER3> Sorry to say this, but the US is going to be even worse than Italy. You have not been testing nearly enough people.

<comment><USER7> Additionally, the US health care system is worse, people are not or under- insured (so they have an incentive to avoid seeking care), and leading US politicians are acting like it isn't really happening.

<comment><USER3> I'm usually pretty libertarian and I think private healthcare can work. But right now it really, really can't. Massive issues are down the road, and not very far down the road (14 days).

<comment><USER8> And if private healthcare can't work during a crisis, then what use is it?

A large public system cannot be conjured out of thin air to met each crisis.

We will see the large well funded social medical systems, with their "inefficient" over capacity, over-perform the operating on thin margins private systems.

I'm terrified here in the US.

(FWIW - give me 90% socialized medicine with room on the margins for private clinics, like the vast majority of the 1st world)

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER2> Does anyone know where he is getting the number from? It is quite a striking statistic, I would love to read more.

<comment><AUTHOR> It's in the thread: "Yes, it was reported yesterday by the authorities in the Italian television, the director of one of the major hospitals also reported a few severe cases with people under 30 otherwise totally healthy."

<comment><USER9> Citation needed.

"The authorities ..." Which one? If it's an official statement there should be better sources available.

"the director of one hospital ..." Which one?

<comment><USER7> What is it with so many people being so dismissive of such reports? You think he's just lying, that he just wants to mislead us, or what?

<comment><USER2> There is so much misinformation out there about this situation, I think skepticism of any report is not an unreasonable position. The Italian media has been criticised for drumming up panic.

<comment><USER7> The health system is completely overloaded and unable to deal with this (1). And that's in a health system that was rated as one of the best in the world (2).

(1) Article in German, shared by Germany's top virologist (1b), the guy who literally developed the test for the corona virus [https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/panorama/aus-dem- co...](https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/panorama/aus-dem-coronavirus- krisengebiet-tsunami-der-uns-ueberwaeltigt-hat-der-verzweifelte-bericht-eines- italienischen-arztes/25629010.html)

(1b) [https://twitter.com/c_drosten/status/1237650201323737088](https://twitter.com/c_drosten/status/1237650201323737088)

(2) many sources, but see e.g. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Health_Organization_rank...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Health_Organization_ranking_of_health_systems_in_2000)

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER10> Not trying to be negative, but this seems to me as a appeal to non-authority bias, specially the way the title is written.

For the fun of it, let's reverse it:

Adhanom (OMS General Manager): Redis is way better than memcached</comment>


Easily Deploy Any Web Application to AWS, DO, etc. With Docker and Nanobox - <AUTHOR> https://nanobox.io/app-deployment-tool/ <comment><USER2> If something like this could solve the problem of having to deal with redundancy and scaling every time you deploy a growing app, that would be worth using for those purposes alone.

Nanobox deploys also require using it as a dev environment, but that's not so bad.

Regarding setting up dev environments, from AlternativeTo.net: [http://alternativeto.net/software/nanobox/reviews/](http://alternativeto.net/software/nanobox/reviews/) \---- "On a fresh laptop, our latest dev was up and running with Nanobox - repos cloned, DB imported, local running - in 7 minutes flat. Unheard of."

</comment><comment><USER3> Core Nanobox team member here. A brief history of how Nanobox came about. We are a small team of developers who were doing a lot of medium to large-ish web applications and found ourselves having to do the same, tedious tasks over and over when deploying apps to production servers. So we built Nanobox to automate the process, save us time, and preserve our sanity.

</comment><comment><USER4> Docker deployment certainly can be tricky.

Regarding automation for app deployment, isn't there a point where you've automated the process too much and removed some of the intelligent decision making that requires a human?

<comment><USER3> It's definitely a tricky balance. Ultimately there's best practices to follow, and there's no need to manually implement best practices in every project if you can automate it. The balance is between time-saved vs absolute control.

Nanobox tries to strike the balance between saving time and giving devs ways to hook into and control the dev-to-production lifecycle.</comment></comment>


Ask HN: Which segment of the ERP market is easier to attack? - <AUTHOR>

Suppose I am creating an ERP 2.0 startup, or another one where the data is coming to/from an ERP system. At the start I have two choices:
1. Target only clients with simple schema (simple CSV files or even manual entry) and modest budget.
2. Target only clients with complex schema and large budgets (bunch of data sources).
The former is more like a product business which later grows to provide customizations, the latter is more like a consultancy shop which later begets a product from common functionality.
Which approach has been more successful historically? Any pointers at all are greatly appreciated. If you're in Seattle, I'm buying beer! :) <comment><USER2> I don't see how you can possibly target the second group of clients with a startup. Organizations in the second category will by-and-large have the following properties:

A) Already have an ERP implementation of some sort. It may be awful, and difficult to manage, but it's there and most likely interfaces some important, or even mission-critical systems in the company. It's much easier to sell to an organization that is transitioning from ad-hoc/manual ERP to a systematic approach than it will be to convince to replace SAP with your new stuff.

B) Be relatively risk-averse. Larger organizations just have more to lose from a failed implementation. In a SMB, ERP often replaces manual process which can be reverted to or extended in case of a failed implementation. At a larger organization, you'll have mission critical processes interfacing with the ERP system meaning that there's very much an "if it's not broken..." attitude.

C) Classic high-touch, expensive enterprise sales cycles. While there are startups which have managed this, it's definitely the harder nut to crack than the more high-volume, but shorter, sales cycle that you'll find in the SMB market.

<comment><AUTHOR> The startup I consider joining is not building an ERP system itself, but rather something that will need to get the data from an ERP system. So I am trying to get a sense of the field before I sign up, not even really knowing which question to ask...

My concern is that if the ERP schemas turn out to be sufficiently diverse in practice, the startup might end with high per-user implementation cost, effectively turning into a consultancy.

<comment><USER2> That's a very valid concern, even for smaller ERP implementations, I expect that it will be the case that there will be quite a bit of diversity in the schemas. It will certainly be true for larger ERP implementations.</comment></comment></comment>