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http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/ The Interpreter 2015-03-31T06:16:56+00:00 Daily analysis of international events with a focus on Asia. Published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Lowy Institute BlogEngine.Net Syndication Generator http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/opml.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd Lowy Institute Daily analysis of international events with a focus on Asia. Published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy. en-AU The Interpreter 0.000000 0.000000 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/The-coming-nuclearisation-of-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx The coming nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean 2015-03-31T06:16:00+00:00 David Brewster
While the world focuses on the dangers that a nuclear-armed Iran could present in the Middle East, a potentially more dangerous and unstable nuclear proliferation is occurring in the Indian Ocean.

In the coming years India, Pakistan, and perhaps China will likely deploy a significant number of nuclear weapons at sea in the Indian Ocean. This could further destabilise already unstable nuclear relationships, creating a real risk of a sea-based exchange of nuclear weapons.

Observers have long seen India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry as the most unstable in the world, and South Asia as the most likely location of nuclear conflict. This is not just academic speculation. Foreign diplomats have been evacuated from Islamabad on several occasions from fears of an impending nuclear exchange with India.

India has a 'no first use' (NFU) nuclear-weapons policy of sorts, although it is increasingly subject to caveats and exceptions. But Islamabad refuses to adopt an NFU policy and indeed has announced a long list of actions that it claims would justify a nuclear response against India. Pakistan is also busy miniaturising its nuclear weapons for tactical use, thus reducing the threshold for Pakistani nuclear action.

Importantly, Pakistan sees its nuclear arsenal not only as a deterrent but also as an enabler, providing an umbrella under which it can sponsor sub-conventional attacks against India. In the face of terrorist attacks such as those in Mumbai in 2008, Delhi has found its options constrained by concerns about a possible Pakistani nuclear response. But few are confident that India's restraint can be maintained in the face of another serious cross-border attack that is proved to have been sponsored by Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan are now in the process of moving their nuclear weapons capabilities into the maritime realm.

India is the furthest down this track, having launched its first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant in 2009 (expected to be commissioned this year); it is also in the process of building two more so-called SSBNs. Further, India is developing nuclear-tipped Dhanush short range ballistic missiles for deployment on offshore patrol vessels. India has leased a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine and has plans to construct up to six more SSNs (unlike SSBNs, SSNs are not armed with nuclear ballistic missiles). Pakistan is following India's lead, having recently established a Naval Strategic Force Command Headquarters with the declared intention of developing a sea-based deterrent. This may involve nuclear-armed conventional submarines supplied by China, rather than SSBNs.

Some nuclear weapons states have created a nuclear 'triad' in order to have an assured second strike capability. While such an assured capability can help stabilise a nuclear relationship, according to a recent Carnegie report, taking the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic into the maritime realm may in fact create greater instability.

One issue is an ambiguous mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities at sea, including the deployment of nuclear missiles on Pakistani conventional submarines and on Indian missile boats. Uncertainty over whether a platform is carrying nuclear weapons creates a risk of an inadvertent but highly escalatory attack on an opponent's nuclear capability. Another concern is that maritime nuclear capabilities could lower Pakistan's already low nuclear threshold. Islamabad may be tempted to conduct a demonstration nuclear attack at sea, believing it will not be escalated on land. A further problem is Pakistan's reported propensity to delegate nuclear authority to field commanders, which could create considerable risks if submarine communications are interrupted.

China is also a major player in the nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean. China's role in creating a nuclear-armed Pakistan is a big factor in the distrust that characterises the India-China security relationship. In the 1980s, China supplied Pakistan with weapon plans along with fissile material, and facilitated the supply of missile technology. Any further moves by China to develop Pakistan's maritime nuclear capability will only cement India's threat perceptions about China.

The India-China nuclear relationship is itself relatively unstable and is now also moving into the Indian Ocean. This is because India's land-based nuclear deterrent currently suffers from considerable geographical and technological disadvantages compared with China. China is able to deploy its nuclear missiles in sparsely populated territory close to India's border, providing it with nuclear missile coverage of the entire subcontinent. In comparison, India fields much shorter range missiles that can barely reach major population centres in eastern China.

This gives India good reason to establish an assured second strike capability on SSBNs that could potentially be forward deployed into the western Pacific. Alternatively, India may deploy its SSBNs in a well-protected 'bastion' in the Bay of Bengal, although this may require further development of Indian missile technology.

There have been increasing detections of Chinese SSNs in the Indian Ocean in recent years, including the deployment of a Chinese SSN to the western Indian Ocean between last December and February, nominally as part of its anti-piracy deployment. According to Indian sources, these deployments are part of hydrographic 'profiling' of the region and will likely increase in frequency. But Beijing has less reason to deploy its SSBNs in the Indian Ocean; instead, they will likely be primarily deployed in the western Pacific, targeted at the US. This could create its own risks: the detection of an unusual transit of a Chinese SSBN into the Indian Ocean or an Indian SSBN into the Pacific could be seen as an escalation at times of tension.

The US also has a potentially significant role in facilitating nuclear stability in the Indian Ocean. In the 1980s, Washington helped construct India's only facility for communications with submerged nuclear submarines and the US might again support India's maritime nuclear capabilities. It might even be in Washington's interests to help Pakistan. The establishment of reliable communications links with Pakistan's nuclear-armed submarines could, for example, be critical in stabilising the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic.

Despite concerns about superpower competition in the Indian Ocean during the latter half of the Cold War, there was relatively little nuclear competition in that theatre. The three-party nuclear rivalry we will soon see in the Indian Ocean is likely to be more unstable, and potentially far more dangerous.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user UK Ministry of Defence.
 2015-03-31T06:16:00+00:00 David Brewster In the coming years India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, will likely deploy a significant number of nuclear weapons at sea in the Indian Ocean. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b268a95c-e919-4b68-b1b9-7a35238a6504 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b268a95c-e919-4b68-b1b9-7a35238a6504 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/The-coming-nuclearisation-of-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b268a95c-e919-4b68-b1b9-7a35238a6504 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Chinas-reserve-currency-ambition.aspx China's reserve-currency ambition 2015-03-31T03:35:00+00:00 Julian Snelder
In mid-2009, with American finance reeling from the Lehman Brothers collapse, the nation's Treasury Secretary addressed his prestigious alma mater Peking University. 'How safe are China's investments in US Government debt?', challenged one student. 'Very safe', the Secretary answered to derisive laughter.

At the time, cynicism was understandable. But many Chinese experts still doubt the security of Beijing's official reserve holdings, which have been growing ever larger. These same people fret about the dollar's dominance and they reasonably wonder why the world can't be more multipolar, with several reserve currency alternatives.

A recent issue of the journal Red Flag Manuscript features a paper complaining that the US 'reaps profits without sowing' and lists no less than ten 'harvests' from the US dollar's reserve-currency status: seigniorage, 'inflation tax', foreign investment income, underwriting and transaction fees, unfair trade gains, currency manipulation, derivative and commodities profits, and IP royalties. The paper says that over 500 years, Portugal, Spain, Holland, England and then the US have successively exploited 'state hegemony' which has 'gradually developed from traditional territorial conquest to modern financial colonisation.'

A book recently launched at Renmin University, Sanctions and Global Asymmetric Power, makes a more direct warning that Western monetary power 'kills without a shot.' This concern is not unjustified, given that American pundits discuss 'weaponised finance' and how Russia and China are 'circumventing' the dollar system.

Such critiques are quintessentially Marxist-Leninist. But Beijing's real problem is not that America's imperialism (to use Marx's term) is unfair or immoral, but that China doesn't also enjoy such spoils. Beijing's perspective is straightforward: China wants what America has got. It is unhappy with its relative position rather than with its own vulnerability.

Take Red Flag's first point, seigniorage, a reward for all currency issuers. It is most easily understood as the interest rate not paid on cash. The banknote in your wallet is a 'zero coupon perpetual' instrument: it pays no interest and can only be redeemed in kind. The Federal Reserve gets a free ride on all those bills it has issued. But then, so does every central bank. And the biggest of all money issuers by far is China, which fleeces its citizens of several percent of GDP in foregone interest annually. The 'exorbitant privilege' of the People's Bank of China's seigniorage is wholly at the expense of the Chinese people.

But what stings Beijing most is that America extracts its seigniorage from anyone holding greenbacks, including Chinese.

How the US dollar became so dominant is splendidly depicted in Adam Tooze's book The Deluge. A hundred years ago, the British Empire was stumbling towards insolvency. The Deluge explains how a reluctant, isolationist Wilsonian America shrugged off the mantle of global leadership, leaving behind a vindictive Versailles peace, a rampant Soviet Union, a bereaved China in chaos, and a predatory Japan. Bad things ensued. World War I had 'bequeathed an unprecedented problem of economic and political order, but no historical model of world hegemony with which to address it.' Only 30 years later, at Bretton Woods, did Washington acknowledge and self-interestedly embrace its financial pre-eminence, possibly for fear of any alternatives. America didn't initially seek the crown but got it by default when all other contenders lay shattered.

The British themselves recognised their shaky hold (then on the gold-pound). A Foreign Office memo in 1928 <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=QmV_AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=Great+Britain+is+faced%E2%80%A6+with+a+phenomenon+for+which+there+is+no+parallel+in+our+modern+history+--+a+state+twenty-five+times+as+large,+five+times+as+wealthy&source=bl&ots=80DElTCV-8&sig=7NjbTjQt4VxypjknhNhr2gU5-vA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=0oQYVZL5NYm58gXC0YBg&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Great%20Britain%20is%20faced%E2%80%A6%20with%20a%20phenomenon%20for%20which%20there%20is%20no%20parallel%20in%20our%20modern%20history%20--%20a%20state%20twenty-five%20times%20as%20large%2C%20five%20times%20as%20wealthy&f=false" target="_blank">described the challenge starkly:

Great Britain is faced...with a phenomenon for which there is no parallel in our modern history -- a state twenty-five times as large, five times as wealthy, three times as populous, twice as ambitious, almost invulnerable, and at least our equal in prosperity, vital energy, technical equipment, and industrial science. This state has risen... at a time when Britain is still staggering from the effects of the superhuman effort made during the war, is loaded with a great burden of debt, and is crippled by the evil of unemployment.

Is there a senior adviser cautioning the American president with a similar assessment today? Possibly within several decades, but not yet. For the British, their zenith was already upon them. Chinese experts, too, know the history of hegemonic transition. Some have called for 'the management of America's decline.' Others are more circumspect, well aware of the burden of reserve issuers. As the late Ronald McKinnon has said, dissatisfaction with the dollar is widespread, including in the US itself.

No doubt there is potential demand for new reserve currencies in the world, and the establishment of a international renminbi – with a free capital account – would be welcome. De-pegging the renminbi from the dollar would afford Beijing greater monetary independence in the long term. Recently capital outflows have accelerated, and Beijing is selling dollars in order to hold its currency relatively firm.

After years of sterilising inflows, the Chinese now have an historic opportunity to escape their dollar dependence and attain the reserve status they crave. Even Peking University students, the future elite of the nation, know US T-bonds are unsafe. So keeping the Chinese currency strong and stable is easy: just sell them.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Sharon Drummond.

 2015-03-31T03:35:00+00:00 Julian Snelder Beijing's perspective is straightforward: China wants what America's got. It is unhappy with its relative position rather than with its own vulnerability. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b20b2183-5b05-40c7-968e-b134a01623c5 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b20b2183-5b05-40c7-968e-b134a01623c5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Chinas-reserve-currency-ambition.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b20b2183-5b05-40c7-968e-b134a01623c5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Is-The-Great-Moderation-over.aspx Is the Great Moderation over? 2015-03-31T02:45:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans
In what appeared to be a case of spectacularly bad timing, the Bank of England held a conference in September 2007 on 'sources of macroeconomic stability'.

You see, from the early 1980s the business cycle in developed economies had become much less volatile. A term had been coined for this stability: the 'Great Moderation'.

However, that picture, from all appearances, came crashing down during the financial crisis. Imagine what the senior Bank of England officials thought, listening to conference participants, only to be dragged from proceedings to authorise liquidity facilities for Northern Rock in an attempt to stem the first bank run in the UK since 1866!

With the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC), the Great Moderation was declared dead. It looked like volatility was back. The official website commemorating the Federal Reserve's centenary says the Great Moderation ran from 1982 to 2007. Phil Lowe, the Reserve Bank of Australia's Deputy Governor, said in a 2013 speech, 'Recall that prior to the crisis, there was the Great Moderation' (emphasis added).

But to paraphrase Mark Twain, I think reports of the Great Moderation's death have been greatly exaggerated.

Check out the graph below. It shows rolling five-year standard deviations of GDP growth for Australia, the US and the UK. Basically, at any point on the graph, the level of the line shows the standard deviation of growth for the previous five years. The decline in volatility during the 1980s is plain to see. So is the spike up in the US and the UK in 2008, although volatility did not reach the level of the 1970s. Australia sailed through the crisis relatively smoothly, so volatility stayed low.

A funny thing has happened though. Now that 2008 and early 2009 has fallen out of the window of the rolling standard deviation, volatility is back down to the pre-GFC levels. While the level of growth may be somewhat disappointing, it has been stable.

I don't think the Great Moderation left us. The key question is: what drove the Great Moderation in the first place? In a paper published in 2008, Steve Davis and James Kahn looked at the numbers and concluded:

Our explanation for the aggregate volatility decline stresses improved supply-chain management, particularly in the durable goods sector, and, less important, a shift in production and employment from goods to services.

If they are right, there is no reason to suspect the Great Moderation has disappeared. Their arguments are buttressed by delving into the disaggregated data from the national accounts. They also note that, in fact, the Great Moderation appears just to be the continuation of a longer term trend. The decline of business cycle volatility in the US had dated back to at least World War II. The apparent abrupt nature of the fall in volatility in the 1980s is the result of an unusual spike in volatility in the 1970s.

What should we make of the GFC in this context?

It was a large shock, so large shocks can still happen. But another takeaway is that the consequences of such shocks are perhaps not as dire as they once were. Some think the shock that hit the global economy in 2008 was as big as the shock that caused the Great Depression, but improved policy – through monetary easing and other liquidity provision to the banks – staved off 20% unemployment in the US. If this interpretation is correct, it provides another reason – improved policy – for why volatility will be lower than it had been in the past.

There is a further wrinkle to this story. In the same speech mentioned above, Phil Lowe suggested that now that the Great Moderation was over, the rebound in volatility would be something that would hold back investment.

Given the evidence from the graph above and from Davis and Kahn, I'm inclined to disagree.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Brookings Institution.
 2015-03-31T02:45:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans I don't think the Great Moderation left us. The key question is: what drove the Great Moderation in the first place? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=22733733-07d2-4877-a683-286c3f356af9 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=22733733-07d2-4877-a683-286c3f356af9 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Is-The-Great-Moderation-over.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=22733733-07d2-4877-a683-286c3f356af9 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Development-and-air-conditioning-(part-3).aspx Development and air conditioning (part 3) 2015-03-31T02:11:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
Here is part 1 and part 2 in this series.

My thanks to Stephen Fallon for alerting me to the documentary series now getting a run on the ABC, How We Got to Now, which addresses the link between air conditioning and development:

[youtube:m4c4TqKfQcI]

Marginal Revolution has more links on this topic too.
 2015-03-31T02:11:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen Does air conditioning make development possible? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=8917f4ef-f026-41de-bdba-8698fb8726ea 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=8917f4ef-f026-41de-bdba-8698fb8726ea http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Development-and-air-conditioning-(part-3).aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=8917f4ef-f026-41de-bdba-8698fb8726ea http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Saudi-Arabias-coalition-of-the-autocrats.aspx Saudi Arabia's coalition of the autocrats 2015-03-30T23:30:00+00:00 Rodger Shanahan
Coalitions sound great at first blush. Groups of like-minded states tackling an issue of regional or international importance. And in the Middle East there is no shortage of such issues. But, just as with any wedding or birthday gift, one should not be distracted by the shiny wrapping. We should pay attention to what's inside the box. The so-called 'coalition of the willing' that invaded Iraq, for example, was certainly willing, but it only contained four countries.

Which brings us to the issue of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. The Saudis have put together a coalition they say is designed to reinstate the legitimate government under President Hadi, whose continued existence in internal exile in Aden was coming under threat from a coalition of Zaydi Houthi fighters and troops loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh (the Saudis and pretty well every other Sunni Arab country would have you believe that Iran is a member of this coalition too, but the evidence is pretty thin).

Washington has said that it is providing unspecified support to the Saudi-led coalition, which sounds fair enough given Riyadh has, until now at least, enjoyed a special relationship with the US. But once we have a look at the rest of the Saudi-led coalition, some concerns start to appear.

To begin with, the Sudanese government is listed as one of the contributors to the coalition, even though its leader remains indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide. The thought of someone indicted for genocide helping to restore someone else's 'legitimate government' while being assisted by the US is richly ironic, even by the Middle East's high standards.

Then there is the contribution by Bahrain, whose discrimination against its own Shi'a majority population has been documented by the US State Department and led to the military intervention in the island kingdom by Saudi and Emirati forces.

Furthermore, one could argue that, in the time-honoured tradition of 'As ye sow, so shall ye reap', Saudi Arabia's predilection for seeking to spread its intolerant Wahhabist brand of Islam led to the Zaydi revivalist movement we refer to as the Houthis. Rather than being seen as agents of Tehran, as some commentators would have us believe, the Houthis could more accurately be described as a creation of Riyadh (or at least Saudi actions decades ago).

Yep, coalitions sure sound impressive, but they often disappoint on closer inspection.

Photo by Flickr user Khaled AlQubeli.
 2015-03-30T23:30:00+00:00 Rodger Shanahan When we have a look at the members of the Saudi-led coalition, some concerns start to appear. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=3ba28173-22d5-4b24-a84d-2e3b33aef536 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=3ba28173-22d5-4b24-a84d-2e3b33aef536 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Saudi-Arabias-coalition-of-the-autocrats.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=3ba28173-22d5-4b24-a84d-2e3b33aef536 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/One-belt-one-road-Chinas-community-of-common-destiny.aspx One belt, one road? China's community of common destiny 2015-03-30T22:54:00+00:00 Philippa Brant
More details emerged over the weekend about two Chinese big-ticket initiatives, 'One Belt, One Road' and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Speaking at the Boao Forum for Asia, President Xi Jinping outlined his vision for the region in a keynote address titled 'Towards a Community of Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia'.

The Boao Forum, held annually since 2001 in Hainan, has moved from being primarily a business and finance gathering to being regarded as a platform for Chinese leaders to make significant foreign policy announcements. It was attended by leaders from more than 15 countries including Indonesia's President Jokowi, Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena and Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven. Australia sent its Governor-General and Finance Minister. The Opposition Leader Bill Shorten was also there.

In his speech, Xi Jinping outlined four principles that underlay his vision. To build a community of common destiny, he said:

we need to make sure that all countries respect one another and treat each other as equals.

we need to seek win-win cooperation and common development.

we need to pursue common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.

we need to ensure inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations.

The rhetoric is familiar and it is easy to be dismissive. However, this vision espoused by the Chinese President is an attempt to assuage fears among China's neighbours about its growing power and influence. China is not winning hearts and minds through its bilateral efforts, so is now framing its engagement as a shared regional vision.

It explicitly connects the futures of China's neighbours with China's own future. In doing so, Xi Jinping is trying to convince other countries that their own peace and prosperity will best be secured by becoming even more intertwined with China.

The much promoted 'Belt and Road Initiative' is the hallmark of this vision. There are obviously domestic economic imperatives for the Belt and Road, but it is also being framed as an example of China's regional leadership. Chinese leaders speak of the Initiative as being a 'public good China provides to the world' and the effort of a 'big country' to shoulder 'greater responsibilities'. This is an attempt to demonstrate that China's intentions are benign and should be welcomed.

The Chinese Government knows that its own successful development is linked to the economic growth of others, and that it cannot achieve its 'great national rejuvenation' without peace, stability and growth in its neighbourhood. But countries are becoming wary of being too dependent on China. And China's bilateral efforts in places like Sri Lanka and Myanmar are hitting roadblocks. So instead President Xi is trying to reframe China's inroads as part of a regional vision shared by all.

Coinciding with Xi Jinping's Boao speech, the Chinese Government released its 'action plan' for the Belt and Road Initiative. The plan was jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, indicating it is both a domestic and foreign policy initiative.

Light on details, it purports to be 'open', 'harmonious' and 'inclusive'. It covers road, sea and air transportation, energy infrastructure, and optical cables, removing trade barriers, improving customs clearance processes, cooperation in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, trade facilitation, free trade zones, e-commerce, and renewable energies, to name but a few! For those who want to know more, Xinhua has a dedicated website with links to all the statements, policies, news and activities.

It appears to be an all-encompassing initiative that basically anything can fit under. Indeed, we will see projects that are already underway being rebranded as part of the 'one belt one road'. And existing financing pledges for development projects will also be subsumed and re-announced.

The Belt and Road Initiative will be financed through a range of mechanisms. The AIIB, the BRICS New Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund, as well as China-ASEAN Interbank Association and SCO Interbank Association have all been explicitly mentioned. The Chinese Government increasingly speaks of the Belt and Road and AIIB together, linking them to its vision of a common (Asian) destiny.

In a clear case of the US shooting itself in the foot, the AIIB now looks like it is becoming a global institution. With the UK joining up, others did not want to be left out. Russia, Australia, Denmark, Brazil and the Netherlands are the latest to signal intentions to join. In addition to jumping on the bandwagon, there has been recognition that commercial and development cooperation interests will be affected by the AIIB and so it is better to be involved to try and influence the bank's investment decisions from the beginning.

But in signing onto the AIIB, countries have implicitly agreed to support China's regional vision. The challenge will be to make sure that infrastructure investments really are 'win-win'.

Alongside the policies and investments, China wants to embark on a publicity campaign to gain public support for the initiative. So expect to see cultural exchanges, sporting events and 'maritime silk road tourism cruises', being promoted under the banner of the One Belt One Road initiative.

The initiative is clearly a priority for Xi Jinping. The Central Government has established a special 'leading group' under the National Development and Reform Commission to oversee implementation of the initiative. We should expect to see and hear a lot more about it. China's neighbours will certainly embrace the new economic development opportunities, but time will tell whether they are convinced of China's intentions and persuaded by the 'common destiny' idea.

Photo courtesy of the Boao Forum.
 2015-03-30T22:54:00+00:00 Philippa Brant China is not winning hearts and minds through its bilateral efforts, so is now framing its engagement as a shared regional vision. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=01462565-9888-48cc-ab7f-e4abc1c69d4b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=01462565-9888-48cc-ab7f-e4abc1c69d4b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/One-belt-one-road-Chinas-community-of-common-destiny.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=01462565-9888-48cc-ab7f-e4abc1c69d4b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Southeast-Asia-links-Prayuths-jokes-Myanmars-startup-culture-LKY-funeral-and-more.aspx Southeast Asia links: Myanmar's startup culture, Prayuth's 'jokes', LKY funeral and more 2015-03-30T21:58:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan

A wonderful collection of bizare gaffes from Thailand's junta leader, General Prayuth. This week he wryly joked that he could 'just execute' journalists that don't 'report the truth'. Australian journalist Alan Morison is among those currently fighting charges of criminal defamation.

In Myanmar, KIA General Gun Maw said 'signing the ceasefire does not mean achieving peace'.

After last week's comments about China's nine-dash line, Jokowi this week clarified Indonesia's position, emphasising that it remains neutral in the South China Sea dispute.

The Economist looked at how, almost a year on, Thailand's reforms are faring; there's also a series of infographics on the Thailand's volatile politics. This week, Thailand brought in the death penalty for human trafficking.

A Philippines Senate Committee Report on the botched police operation that left 44 police dead (police report here) indicated that the US had a role in the operation. Gregory Poling wrote on the impact the failed raid may have on the US. Meanwhile, Malaysia says it is prepared for an influx of refugees if the peace process in the south breaks down.

Vietnam ramped up defence spending by 113% between 2004 and 2013. Murray Hiebert and Phuong Nguyen examine the increase.

A Justice Trust report accuses Myanmar's hardliners of being the 'hidden hand' behind the 2014 Mandalay riots.

The BBC examines Myanmar's one hundred languages in this podcast, while The Economist looks at Myanmar's burgeoning startup culture.

The week was dominated by coverage of Lee Kuan Yew's death. There was a steady stream of obituaries (including this excellent piece by Milton Osborne) and some LKY contrarianism (h/t Sam). The Straits Times reported on the tens of thousands that joined the three-hour queue to pay their final respects to him in Singapore. This is what it looked like (hyperlapsed):

[youtube:2Y2OFEcL0xQ]
 2015-03-30T21:58:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan Prayuth's 'jokes', Myanmar's startup culture, LKY's funeral, and more in this week's links to the best Southeast Asia reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=decc2071-b0e5-48d4-9daa-49e835ce88d0 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=decc2071-b0e5-48d4-9daa-49e835ce88d0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/Southeast-Asia-links-Prayuths-jokes-Myanmars-startup-culture-LKY-funeral-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=decc2071-b0e5-48d4-9daa-49e835ce88d0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Why-Australia-should-have-joined-the-AIIB-last-November.aspx Why Australia took so long to join the AIIB 2015-03-30T05:07:00+00:00 Susan Harris-Rimmer
Australia cares about infrastructure investment in Asia. So why didn't we join the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) last November when we would have received the most political benefit? And why are we still asking the wrong questions about the AIIB?

The Abbott Government made infrastructure investment a headline for the G20 Summit in Brisbane. A legacy outcome of the Summit was the establishment of a Global Infrastructure Hub in Sydney with a four-year mandate. Australia is now part of the troika for the upcoming G20 summits in Turkey and China, and it is clear infrastructure investment is a priority for all three nations, in particular for financing the New Silk Road.

So why on earth did we take so long to join the AIIB? There are three plausible reasons.

First, many of our closest allies and comparators have joined already, so we could shuffle in behind and avoid US censure. India and Singapore, then the UK and New Zealand, now France, Germany and Italy have all announced plans to join the AIIB. A 'safety in numbers' approach, then, which is disappointing in terms of Australian leadership.

Second, there were some legitimate concerns about bank governance.

Among infrastructure experts, bankers, economists, business groups, foreign policy experts and governance advisers, there is barely a word of dissent about the low risk and general reward of being involved in the AIIB at a strategic level. No Australian seems unduly concerned about China taking a stronger leadership role in economic governance. It is simply expected of the globe's second-largest economy.

Nevertheless, the US was asking the right questions about safeguards and governance, even if for the wrong reasons. Infrastructure investment for macroeconomic growth does not automatically benefit people living in extreme poverty, as they can be affected by displacement, environmental damage or by being forced to pay more for basic services. But those attuned to human rights and social protection concerns in China felt that early accession might give more opportunity to push for the same level of environmental and social safeguards as have been hard-won in the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, but which need to go further. We do need to ask about AIIB plans for transparency, human rights standards, alleviation of extreme poverty, and climate change mitigation and adaptation in project selection and design.

Heaven knows, it is not that existing multilateral development banks have been so perfect in their interventions in our region all these decades. They have improved because they were forced to change by civil society actors. And the governance of those banks has not represented the reality of shifting power for about a decade. The US and Japan have only themselves to blame for that.

China should take the safeguards concerns on board, improve them where possible. In the AIIB, China's global governance reputation will be on the line, and at the same moment China assumes the G20 presidency with the world watching.

Third, Australia put enormous diplomatic effort into its G20 year, and with the Infrastructure Hub in Sydney such an important legacy, we needed time to examine the synergies with the AIIB.

Asian Development Bank estimates suggest Asia will need $8 trillion in national infrastructure and $290 billion in regional infrastructure through 2020 to sustain the region's growth trajectory. The AIIB in not a sufficient response to that deficit, but it is a response, and a creative one. In AIIB's case, the consensus seems to be that the initial target is around $100 billion of new capital. The test is how that capital will be employed. Most development experts agree there is an underinvestment in pro-poor infrastructure globally. The International Energy Agency also estimated that adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change over the next 40 years out to 2050 will require around US$45 trillion or around US$1 trillion a year. Will the AIIB invest in pro-poor, green infrastructure?

For the first time, China is not joining a global institution, it is creating one. The issue is not to stop China taking a leadership role in global economic governance. The issue is to do everything possible to make sure China benefits the rest of the world in its new role.

A longer version of this article appeared in Mandarin in the Global Times, People's Daily on 21 March 2015.

Photo by Flickr user Jason Tabarias.
 2015-03-30T05:07:00+00:00 Susan Harris-Rimmer Australia cares about infrastructure investment in Asia. So why didn't we join the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) last November when we would have received the most political benefit? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=fc0f201a-a9a2-4dab-8b5e-63ab29273eef 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=fc0f201a-a9a2-4dab-8b5e-63ab29273eef http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Why-Australia-should-have-joined-the-AIIB-last-November.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=fc0f201a-a9a2-4dab-8b5e-63ab29273eef http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Yemen-crisis-domestic-affair-foreign-meddling.aspx Yemen crisis: A domestic affair made worse by foreign meddling 2015-03-30T03:14:00+00:00 Sarah Phillips
Short of a full-blown ground invasion, the Saudi-led (and US-UK-supported) aerial bombardment of Yemen – Operation Decisive Storm – was probably the most dangerous of the available international responses to the Yemeni political crisis. That a ground invasion apparently remains on the table is either an indication of how misunderstood the drivers of the crisis are, or of a cynical willingness by neighbouring states to drag Yemeni civilians through another round of struggle for reasons of domestic legitimacy and regional dominance. Or both.

Civilian casualties from the bombings are already mounting, but the consequences will spread beyond this sad tally. Yemen imports around 90% of its wheat and all of its rice. With its runways bombed and airports closed, Yemen's already food-insecure population is in a dire humanitarian predicament.

At its heart, the Yemeni crisis is a continuation of a domestic power struggle that has been underway for more than a decade over the rightful successor/s to President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the basis for their legitimacy. From a Yemeni perspective, the sectarian and regional geopolitical aspects to the crisis have been a sideshow to the local politics at play. However, Operation Decisive Storm risks unleashing a hell still (only just, and very imperfectly) contained by domestic power balances.

The military campaign is ostensibly to force the return to power of a weak and isolated president, Abdo Rabo Mansour Hadi, after he fled the country following a slow-motion coup by the northern rebel group, Ansar Allah.

Better known as the Houthis (after the family that has led the movement since 2002) the group has ties to Iran, though the duration and strategic depth of their association is a matter of conjecture. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have overstated the level of coordination between Iran and the Houthis to their domestic audiences. For example, members of the Iranian elite have touted Sana'a as the fourth Arab capital to join the Iranian revolution, while both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni president have framed Operation Decisive Storm as saving Yemen from Iranian hegemony, calling the Houthis 'puppets of Iran'.

In reality, Iran's ability to drive events in Yemen through the Houthis is limited; hard evidence of Tehran's capacity to issue orders is scant.

That dearth of evidence is underlined by Saudi Arabia's willingness to assign geopolitical significance to symbolic or commercial ties, such as the new commercial flight route between Sana'a and Tehran.

The Houthis' success in Yemen is almost entirely a product of local political factors, military capacity, and support. The Houthis steadily gained influence by articulating widespread anger over the failures of Hadi's government, such as when it cut fuel subsidies in August 2014. The following month, Houthi militias overran the capital Sana'a with the acquiescence of factions of the military loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was ousted in 2012 but was granted immunity from prosecution (of whom more in a moment).

Tensions continued to build between the Houthis and President Hadi over an appropriate power sharing arrangement, and in January the Houthis surrounded the presidential palace and placed the president and other senior government figures under house arrest. In an apparent attempt to call the rebels' bluff, President Hadi and his cabinet resigned, leaving the Houthis militarily dominant but politically overstretched and increasingly unpopular. Hadi fled to the southern city of Aden, declaring it to be Yemen's new capital, and withdrew his resignation. On 25 March the Houthis, again drawing on parts of the military still loyal to Saleh, captured the al-'Anad air base just north of Aden and took Hadi's defence minister hostage. Hadi subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia from where he now praises the Kingdom's willingness to conduct air strikes in support of his leadership.

This snapshot of Yemen's political alliances makes some sense if one follows the fairly linear 'Saudi v Iran' script that permeates regional politics at the moment, but then it deviates and ties this logic in knots.

Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his family have been informally affiliated with the Houthis since Saleh's removal from office following the 2011 protests. But prior to that, his regime fought six brutal wars against them between 2004-2010. For now, Saleh and the Houthis share a common enemy in President Hadi, although even that may have been put up for sale by Saleh over the weekend. Saudi Arabia has come and gone with the Houthis as well, invading northern Yemen to fight them briefly in 2009-2010, only to apparently investigate a closer collaboration with them last year against Yemen's Islah Party, elements of which are affiliated with Saudi Arabia's other bête noire, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, both the Houthis and Saudi Arabia are declared enemies of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Former president Saleh, on the other hand, repeatedly released its members from prison and had his military abandon their posts and relinquish territory to them in an apparent attempt to illustrate just how chaotic Yemen could become if protests against his rule continued.

Despite the international tone to recent events, Yemen's predicament is very much a product of domestic political tensions and failures, the threads of which have been woven through the country's rivalries, palace intrigues, and humanitarian calamities for over a decade. Each of Yemen's contenders to power have sought political advantage by attaching their cause to wider regional preoccupations, whether sectarian rivalry, the war on terrorism, the rise of Iran, or a fear of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Saudi Arabia's Yemen intervention is part of the broader regional trend of narrowly-based regimes shoring up their domestic legitimacy through external posturing – the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), the Saudi invasion of Bahrain (2011), Iran's support of Hezbollah and Hamas, regional support for/against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and, of course, more recently the civil war Syria and Iraq. The list goes on.

The notion that outsiders now need to 'pick a side' between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen is extremely dangerous. The Houthis may well have imploded as they tried to govern the country, and been forced back into negotiations. But we will never know, so great is the desire for outsiders to be seen to be doing something. Anything.

Photo by Flickr user RA.AZ.
 2015-03-30T03:14:00+00:00 Sarah Phillips Civilian casualties from the bombings are already mounting, but the consequences will spread beyond this sad tally. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=67f52e0d-e667-4251-8633-9e57402a3d77 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=67f52e0d-e667-4251-8633-9e57402a3d77 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Yemen-crisis-domestic-affair-foreign-meddling.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=67f52e0d-e667-4251-8633-9e57402a3d77 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Development-and-air-conditioning-(part-2).aspx Development and air conditioning (part 2) 2015-03-30T00:49:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen

Last week I was one of many who highlighted an old Lee Kuan Yew quote in which he argued that Singapore's development had a lot to do with air conditioning, because it made 'development possible in the tropics. Without air conditioning you can work only in the cool early-morning hours or at dusk.'

Paul Krugman also noticed the quote, and blogged on it for the NY Times, with evidence from the American south backing up LKY's claim about the link between air conditioning and development in warm climates. Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution pushes back gently at Krugman's argument, citing this paper which argues that Krugman's argument may be backwards: as consumers have become wealthier, it argues, they have placed a higher premium on 'nice weather', so they move to warmer climates and buy air conditioners. There's also this post, which argues that air conditioning may have been an important early factor in the development of America's south, but not so much lately.

Lastly, my thanks to Elliot Brennan, who points out that there was an entire book written on LKY's theory about air conditioning and Singaporean development.

(PS. On the broad subject of unexpected reasons for major social trends, check out some recent articles on the link between lead exposure and crime.)

Photo by Flickr user Choo Yut Shing.
 2015-03-30T00:49:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen A follow-up to last week's post on Lee Kuan Yew's claim that air conditioning made Singapore's development possible. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=76c07912-fd39-44ad-9c9e-76cfd2790b81 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=76c07912-fd39-44ad-9c9e-76cfd2790b81 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Development-and-air-conditioning-(part-2).aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=76c07912-fd39-44ad-9c9e-76cfd2790b81 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Aid-and-development-links-Bill-Gates-Uber-and-the-UN-Middle-East-water-Australian-aid-and-more.aspx Aid and development links: Bill Gates, Uber and the UN, Middle East water and more 2015-03-29T23:45:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan

Why is Australian aid funding so frequently in the cross-hairs? Kylie Bourne on why we need to talk about aid.

Bled dry: an ICRC report on how war in the Middle East is bringing the region's water supplies to breaking point.

Bill Gates reviews the world's response to Ebola and what might be the next global epidemic.

New report from the OECD on the world's 50 most vulnerable countries.

UN backs out of deal with Uber due to concerns over female driver protection.

Roads are a key aspect of the development agenda, but at what environmental cost?

The Economist reviews the four big meetings to occur in 2015 that will decide global governance outcomes.

Startling graph below from CARE Australia: Australian foreign aid as a percentage of national income.

 2015-03-29T23:45:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan Links to this week's best aid and development reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=c083ec3f-1d96-4c89-85bd-aa4845fc738a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=c083ec3f-1d96-4c89-85bd-aa4845fc738a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Aid-and-development-links-Bill-Gates-Uber-and-the-UN-Middle-East-water-Australian-aid-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=c083ec3f-1d96-4c89-85bd-aa4845fc738a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Are-Chinas-shadow-banks-going-to-bring-the-economy-down.aspx Are China's shadow banks going to bring the economy down? 2015-03-29T23:15:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville
There has been much fretting about China's growth over the past five years. One special focus for hand-wringing has been the Chinese financial system and its non-banking component – the shadow banking system – in particular.

Financial growth in China has certainly been rapid since 2007, a classic warning of impending trouble. In the decade before 2007, credit grew only a little faster than GDP, reaching 187% of GDP, which is about normal for an emerging economy.

Then China applied a huge stimulus in 2009 in response to the global financial crisis, mainly in the form of easing the constraints on credit expansion. As a result, China sailed through the crisis with double-digit growth. But by 2014 the credit to GDP ratio had risen to 282%, a bit more than Australia or the US and much more than is normal in emerging economies. The shadow banking component led the expansion, growing at 37% annually since 2007.

This issue received special attention in the recent McKinsey Global Institute report on global debt. The Fung Institute in Hong Kong has also recently produced a couple of excellent papers on the topic.

The shadow banking sector is harder to delineate than the core banking system because its precise size is confused by fuzzy definitions, double counting of some institutions and under-reporting of others. Based on Chinese central bank data, the Fung Institute puts shadow banking assets a little over 50% of GDP, or less than one-third the size of bank credit. McKinsey estimates that the sector is a bit larger.

This is much smaller than the American shadow banking sector, and the Chinese institutions are much less complex.

In China, as in most countries, the expansion of shadow banking is the result of controls and distortions on the core banking sector which prevent banks from meeting the needs of savers and borrowers. They take their unsatisfied financing requirements to the informal financial sector, which expands to meet these needs. Depositors left the banking system because government controls made the interest return unattractive for savers. Borrowers went to the shadow banking systems because banks would not give them loans, or offered only unattractive short-term funding.

With this in mind, the rapid expansion of the shadow banking system should be seen as a phase in the ongoing development of China's finances. There are benefits as well as dangers.

The answer is not to shut it down, but to develop the benefits and minimise the dangers. In the pre-2007 world, much of China's enormous savings ended up funding the expansion of state-owned enterprises, with this investment (or over-investment) becoming less and less efficient over time. Private sector enterprise (the dynamic element in the economy) was starved of funds, receiving only 20% of bank credit.

The growth of the shadow banking sector is the transitional means for correcting this – imperfect, but a step towards a better financial system.

An efficient financial system provides finance across the full range of risks, offering safety for risk-averse depositors while also offering high-risk funding for the most dynamic entrepreneurs. The shadow banking sector's proclivity for excess and mindlessly low credit standards (also demonstrated in America and Europe in the period leading up to the 2008 crisis) needs to be reined in while at the same time retaining the dynamism and flexibility. Finding the right balance for the less-regulated non-bank institutions is a challenge for financial policy-makers everywhere, not just China.

So is this a worry?

China's central government has the resources and administrative capacity to prevent a serious macro-economic financial crisis. The central government starts with modest debt levels – 27% of GDP. Even if it had to absorb the losses envisaged in McKinsey's most extreme disaster scenario, this would take official debt up to around 75% of GDP – less than in most advanced economies. Many borrowers also have substantial deposits to offset against their liabilities. While there are substantial credit risks in the housing industry (property developers and builders), most homeowners have little or no debt.

China's huge foreign reserves are not available in any substantive way for domestic financial problems. But these reserves (and the current-account surplus) ensure that China cannot be affected by the flight of foreign money that made the 1997-98 Asian crisis so disastrous.

All that said, it is quite possible, even likely, that there will be numerous bankruptcies (a property crash would be serious, as McKinsey estimates that housing-related credit accounts for 40-45% of lending). The central government would have to bail out some local governments (it has already begun taking over small amounts of their debt). As well, the links between shadow banking and the mainstream banks would precipitate balance sheet strains for the banking system.

Financial history tells us that countries which undergo financial deregulation always experience a crisis, to a greater or lesser degree. In China, the deregulation is taking place in a carefully staged fashion. But policy-makers can make mistakes. Markets can lose confidence and growth can be knocked off trend. China's low official debt, substantial government ownership of banks and enterprises, and enormous foreign reserves don't give it immunity from financial troubles, but they do mean that when things go wrong, they can be fixed with less disruption and quicker bounce-back. A Chinese 'Lehman moment' still seems unlikely.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Sharon Hahn Darlin.
 2015-03-29T23:15:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville Financial history tells us that countries which undergo financial deregulation always experience a crisis, to a greater or lesser degree. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=1a1a5adf-9cca-4827-8a5f-f035df6185af 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=1a1a5adf-9cca-4827-8a5f-f035df6185af http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/Are-Chinas-shadow-banks-going-to-bring-the-economy-down.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=1a1a5adf-9cca-4827-8a5f-f035df6185af http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/The-more-things-change.aspx The more things change... 2015-03-29T21:40:00+00:00 Milton Osborne

Two events over the past week leave an observer to conclude that change will only come slowly in Cambodia so long as Hun Sen is prime minister. The first relates to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ECCC), the second to Michelle Obama's visit.

On 5 March I recorded in The Interpreter that Judge Mark Harmon, one of the international judges at the ECCC, had charged two former Khmer Rouge figures with crimes against humanity. My post noted that, for these charges to progress to indictment, it was necessary for judge Harmon's decision to be endorsed by his Cambodian counterpart on the tribunal, judge You Bunleng.

During the past week judge Harmon has charged another former Khmer Rouge figure, former Central Zone deputy secretary Ao An, better known as Ta An, and again judge You Bunleng has so far not joined with Harmon to move to indictment.

The Cambodian Government, and particularly Hun Sen, has made clear its opposition to the ECCC continuing to work towards indicting additional defendants, so it is not surprising that judge You Bunleng has not acted to support judge Harmon. What is not clear is what happens now. So far judge You Bunleng is reported as saying that he will 'continue the discussion' with his counterpart. That discussion could go on for some time.

Meanwhile, in a speech that will not be welcomed by Washington, Prime Minister Hun Sen has chosen to express a critical judgment on Michelle Obama's visit to Cambodia, reported in The Interpreter on 23 March. According to the Phnom Penh Post, Hun Sen argued that the US should pay for scholarships for the ten students the First Lady met in Siem Reap. Hun Sen accused the first lady of making false promises about paying for the scholarships, a claim denied by the US Embassy:

Her [Obama's] mission is very good, but I suggest the United States should help completely and not play like this,' he said. 'It is just playing around  it is not good. What if she chose 300 students? It would be death. I don't have that money to give.

Although the tone of Hun Sen's speech is not really surprising in the light of his sometimes critical view of the US, his readiness to make these observations so soon after the Michelle Obama visit is puzzling to the extent that it undermines any sense that the visit might have involved a rapprochement between the two countries.

Photo by US Embassy, Phnom Penh.
 2015-03-29T21:40:00+00:00 Milton Osborne Change will only come slowly in Cambodia so long as Hun Sen is prime minister. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=2fc53bc2-4c5f-4027-a03d-14c80b50ec52 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=2fc53bc2-4c5f-4027-a03d-14c80b50ec52 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/30/The-more-things-change.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=2fc53bc2-4c5f-4027-a03d-14c80b50ec52 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/28/Weekend-catch-up-Fraser-and-LKY-war-with-Iran-Australian-defence-strategic-thinking-tax-white-paper-and-more.aspx Weekend catch-up: Fraser and LKY, war with Iran, Australian defence, tax white paper and more 2015-03-27T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
 Bringing together the best Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week.

Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew both passed away this week. James Curran reflected on Malcolm Fraser's principled foreign policy legacy:

It is too often forgotten that Fraser was one of the first on his side of politics to welcome the advent of a new, multi-racial Commonwealth in the 1950s and 60s. Not for him the morbid recital of Kiplingesque odes as the sun set on the British Empire. In 1961 he supported the expulsion of South Africa in order to make the Commonwealth a 'stronger moral force'. That put him directly at odds with Menzies' position, which was to refuse comment on the internal affairs of another Commonwealth country.

Elliot Brennan offered his take on the LKY's legacy in Singapore and the region:

Lee was a man of strong convictions. His pragmatism was arrived at through empirical study and driven by expert consultations, earning him the accolade of being a 'one-man intelligence agency'. He was of course not alone in the building of his big ideas. Sinnathamby Rajarathnam and Goh Keng Swee were just two who played a pivotal role in the creation of Singapore, as Lee would himself attest. (He was known for publicly deriding the idea of statesmanship, once saying that 'anyone who thinks they're a statesman should see a psychiatrist'.)

Dina Esfandiary responded to a recent op-ed in The Washington Post which argued that war with Iran over its nuclear program, rather than negotiations, is the better option. Dina doesn't think so:

Instead, military action will play beautifully into the hands of the Iranian Government. It will give them a legitimate excuse to forgo its non-proliferation commitments and go hell for leather on the nuclear program. It will encourage Tehran to drive the program underground and cease all transparency. Muravchick argues that if Iran currently has hidden facilities, they'll be hidden from an agreement too. Perhaps, but the aim of an agreement is to ensure that Iran submits to the most stringent inspection regime devised to date. Surely that's a step up from nothing, which is what we would be left with if force is used.

Are there contradictions in Australia's foreign fighter laws? Lauren Williams pointed some out:

But just as the US-led alliance is providing arms and training to the Iraqi armed forces, so the Iraqi Army is partnering with the Peshmerga. And in turn, the Peshmerga is teaming up with the YPG. This reporter has witnessed YPG-Peshmerga cooperation in northern Syria, and it is safe to say that arms directed to the Iraqi Army will end up in YPG hands. They may even end up in the hands of Matthew Gardiner as he battles ISIS.

Alan Dupont and Hugh White continued their debate over the future of the ADF and strategic policy. First, Alan Dupont:

Yes, I do cast my net wider than Hugh in thinking about the variables that should shape the future ADF. That's because the ADF is required by governments to do much more than defend Australian territory against a particular kind of military attack coming from a specific location or direction. Future governments will expect a richer suite of military options from the ADF than ever before, including an enhanced capacity to deploy and sustain significant forces at considerable distance from Australian shores in defence of our interests, not just our territory. So our strategic reach must be longer, and our capacity for autonomous operations – what we used to call self-reliance – correspondingly greater. All the more so in a post-American world.

And Hugh's response:

More importantly, the fact that governments use the ADF for purposes other than that for which it was designed does not mean it has been designed for the wrong purposes. It often makes sense to use something for a purpose for which one would not buy it.

There is a separate question, of course, about whether the strategic objectives that have been laid down as force structure determinants in recent white papers are the right ones for Australia over coming decades. I do not think they are, because they assume that Australia's strategic risks will remain much the same in the next few decades as they have been in the last few. What objectives we should adopt instead is a question for another time.

Former army major-general Jim Molan thought Hugh White's comments on strategic thinking in the ADF to The Saturday Paper were generalisations:

But I don't dismiss these fine people just because they have no idea about military operations and therefore stay at the vague level of clever strategic posturing. Still, if professors are permitted to be arrogant in their generalisations, then permit me to at least be blunt in my reply: no one should be permitted to give strategic advice involving the military unless they have at least a familiarity with military operations and tactics. The uniform currently or once worn is irrelevant. I know civilians who can and have done it, but not many. The greatest gift of anyone who calls themselves a strategist must be the ability to align policy, strategy and its implementation.

Again, Hugh White responded:

My primary point to Sophie was simply that serving in the ADF, perhaps at quite a junior level, does not in itself guarantee that a parliamentarian will have special expertise in the defence and strategic policy decisions discussed and made at the political level.

But the broader point remains true too: the ADF as an institution does not generally (with some notable exceptions) excel at the strategic-level tasks of advising governments about when and how they should use force to achieve policy objectives, and about what capabilities Australia needs.

Mike Callaghan on globalisation and the future of the Australian tax system:

The breakdown of the production process across many countries and the increasing importance of services and intangibles in international trade makes it easier for firms to shift profits to zero or low tax jurisdictions. Combating corporate 'base erosion and profit shifting' is a G20 and OECD priority. But the resilience of the corporate tax base is particularly important for Australia given its high reliance on corporate tax. From 1983 to 2011, the OECD average corporate tax rate as a percent of total revenue remained around 8.5%. But Australia's corporate tax revenue rose from 9% of total revenue to 20% over the same period.

The Shambaugh debate rages on. Nadege Rolland wonders if the Chinese Communist Party will be adaptable:

Is the Party able to acknowledge these problems for what they are, and not through ideological lenses? And most importantly, how will the ruling elite respond? Will they choose the path of reforms, and if so, will the regime be able to live with a growing contradiction between the need for good governance and the intrinsic limitations of a Leninist system? Will they revert to all-out repression and control? The Arab Spring showed us that growing tensions between the socio-economic situation and its political (mis-)management can produce unexpected outcomes. Despite its resilience so far, China may not be immune from such shocks.

Catriona Croft-Cusworth reported on an attempted terrorist attack in Indonesia that used chlorine gas:

A small explosion in a Jakarta shopping centre late last month has Indonesian authorities concerned that local radicals may be adopting tactics from ISIS. The explosion in ITC Depok, a tech shopping centre in the Greater Jakarta area, came from a poorly made device consisting of batteries, paint tins and wires inside a cardboard box. The homemade bomb, left unattended in a men's bathroom, appeared not to have detonated properly, and no-one was hurt. But what has alarmed police and anti-terror forces is that the device contained a substance known to be used by ISIS: chlorine gas.

What have we learned about migrant smuggling? Marie McAuliffe looks back on the publication of the book Illicit:

Firstly, there remain significant gaps in our understanding of migrant smuggling. Patchy data indicate that some smuggling routes are closely monitored while others are not; some smuggling routes have been effectively shut down while others appear to be flourishing. Improved data collection and targeted research is enhancing our understanding of smuggling but we still don't know the true scale and nature of many smuggling networks. We have a limited understanding of how inter-connected smuggling is with other forms of illicit activity; we may not yet appreciate the level of danger and insecurity experienced by those being smuggled.

Robert E Kelly reviewed the film American Sniper:

...All the unpleasant controversies are pleasantly avoided: no mention of pre-war intelligence failures; no hint of the mismanagement and incompetence of the occupation; no discussion of Abu Ghraib or America's heavy-handed search tactics, especially in the early days; no examination of Iraqi nationalism or suggestion that resistance to US occupation had any legitimacy whatsoever. It's all straight-up American hero stuff to balm neocons' frayed sense of American exceptionalism.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Choo Yut Shing.
 2015-03-27T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Bringing together the best Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=585f518a-beca-4c45-859b-4c9acb3734eb 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=585f518a-beca-4c45-859b-4c9acb3734eb http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/28/Weekend-catch-up-Fraser-and-LKY-war-with-Iran-Australian-defence-strategic-thinking-tax-white-paper-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=585f518a-beca-4c45-859b-4c9acb3734eb http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/China-politics-of-smog.aspx China and the politics of smog 2015-03-27T02:28:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen

This piece by Chinese academic Wu Quiang on the domestic and international politics of China's smog problem is compelling.

A few vignettes, the first of which goes to a topic I have touched on previously, which is that the chances of a meaningful international emissions deal in Paris at the end of this year are somewhat higher than many think, because Washington and Beijing seem to be on similar terms:

President Obama and President Xi Jinping reached a deal in which China promised to reduce carbon emission by 20% by 2030. The deal was almost the sole instance of progress the Obama administration has made in the US-China relation at a time when the relationship is becoming more difficult. During the Clinton administration, the Most Favored Nation Trade Status was the issue that bound the relationship. During the Bush administration, the bond was war on terrorism. Now that these bonds have gone, the emission promise is becoming the new bond that keeps the two countries in a cooperative relationship in which they clash often but not break up. The deal is also one of the few gestures China makes to the United States and to the world that it is a responsible power and that it recognizes the international rules.

Then there are internal factors, such as the increasing influence of the Ministry of Environmental Protection:

It is also possible that the MEP will be given law enforcement authority for the first time, for example, the authority of forced inspection, search, sequestration, fines, recall and closure. We shouldn't be surprised if in the future the MEP establishes its own environmental police force and environmental procureratorate, similar to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in the United States, that merges the existing forest police force and fisheries regulatory body to form a new environmental law enforcement power. After all, the power redistribution and institutional reconstruction these changes bring is in line with the increasing trend of power concentration since Xi Jinping took power. It can also be put under the banner of "comprehensively deepening reform," providing Chinese leaders with concrete evidence to show to the world that China is taking measures to reduce emission.

And finally, there's an internal security angle to China's smog problem that I had never considered:

As face masks people wear everyday render surveillance cameras meaningless, the security organs are said to be very uneasy, fearing that the situation can spin out of control and lead to a smog revolution.

(H/t Marginal Revolution.)

CORRECTION (30/3): The excerpt I quote above reads 'President Obama and President Xi Jinping reached a deal in which China promised to reduce carbon emission by 20% by 2030.' In fact, the commitments President Xi made in the joint announcement with Obama are (1) to peak China's CO2 emissions 'around 2030', with the intention of peaking earlier; and (2) to raise the non-fossil fuel share of its primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030. (Thanks Fergus.)

Photo by Flickr user Nicolo Lazzati.
 2015-03-27T02:28:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen This piece by Chinese academic Wu Quiang on the domestic and international politics of China's smog problem is compelling. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ce9ce5be-7992-4d40-b9e8-088e3e10cc61 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ce9ce5be-7992-4d40-b9e8-088e3e10cc61 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/China-politics-of-smog.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ce9ce5be-7992-4d40-b9e8-088e3e10cc61 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/The-shallow-pool-of-strategic-expertise-in-Defence.aspx The shallow pool of strategic expertise in Defence 2015-03-27T01:00:00+00:00 Hugh White

Jim Molan is dismayed by my suggestion that strategic-level policy is not the ADF's strong suit. The offending line — in an article by Sophie Morris in last week's Saturday Paper — accurately reflects my remarks to her. Jim's robust response peppers a rather larger target, however.

Among other things, he attributes to me the view that Defence civilians are much better at strategy than their uniformed colleagues. So to be clear, I do not believe that civilians are any better at providing strategic policy advice than military officers. On the contrary, had I been asked, I would have said that the depth and breadth of strategic policy expertise among civilians in the Defence Department is just as inadequate as it is among their military colleagues. This is a major problem for our defence policy which, to be fair, I believe the senior leadership of the organisation understands.

My primary point to Sophie was simply that serving in the ADF, perhaps at quite a junior level, does not in itself guarantee that a parliamentarian will have special expertise in the defence and strategic policy decisions discussed and made at the political level.

But the broader point remains true too: the ADF as an institution does not generally (with some notable exceptions) excel at the strategic-level tasks of advising governments about when and how they should use force to achieve policy objectives, and about what capabilities Australia needs.

I would offer as evidence the flawed advice that led to Australia's costly strategic failure in Afghanistan (and yes, I have no doubt that it was a failure), and the advice to acquire the amphibious assault ships (pictured), which I believe are now becoming widely recognised as the white elephants they are. I think the ADF's strategic-level advisers, along with their civilian counterparts, must take some share of the responsibility for these decisions, if indeed they spoke in favour of them or failed to speak to robustly against them.

Photo by Flickr user Crouchy69.
 2015-03-27T01:00:00+00:00 Hugh White The depth and breadth of strategic policy expertise among civilians in the Defence Department is just as inadequate as it is among their military colleagues. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=d0051efc-8ab7-4b86-af94-eadfacb4fe93 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=d0051efc-8ab7-4b86-af94-eadfacb4fe93 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/The-shallow-pool-of-strategic-expertise-in-Defence.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=d0051efc-8ab7-4b86-af94-eadfacb4fe93 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Data-retention-scheme-has-majority-support-from-Australians.aspx Data retention scheme has majority support from Australians 2015-03-27T00:00:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan
 New Lowy Institute polling released today shows that the Australian Government's data retention ('metadata') laws, which passed the parliament last night, have the support of a clear majority of Australians.

When asked whether 'legislation which will require Australian telecommunications companies to retain data about communications such as phone calls, emails and internet usage, but not their content' is justified, 63% of the adult population say it is 'justified as part of the effort to combat terrorism and protect national security'. Only one-third (33%) say it 'goes too far in violating citizens' privacy and is therefore not justified.'

Younger Australians (18-29) are more likely to say the legislation is not justified (47%), but this age group is divided about the policy, with 50% saying it is justified.

'Australians appear to accept some infringements on their privacy in the interests of fighting terrorism and protecting national security,' said Lowy Institute Executive Director Dr Michael Fullilove today. 'This result is consistent with 2013 Lowy Institute polling which found that most Australians believed the government had struck about the right balance between protecting the rights of citizens and fighting terrorism.'

This result is drawn from the forthcoming 2015 Lowy Institute Poll, the full version of which will be released in June 2015. The Lowy Institute Poll is based on a nationally representative telephone survey of 1200 Australian adults between 20 February and 8 March 2015. The Poll's error margin is approximately +/- 2.8%. For more information see Lowy Institute press release.
 2015-03-27T00:00:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan 63% of the adult population say new data retention laws are 'justified as part of the effort to combat terrorism and protect national security'. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ecda0c70-b046-4724-9044-1b19f939b6fd 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ecda0c70-b046-4724-9044-1b19f939b6fd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Data-retention-scheme-has-majority-support-from-Australians.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ecda0c70-b046-4724-9044-1b19f939b6fd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Cyclone-Pam-A-photo-essay-from-a-volunteer.aspx Cyclone Pam: A photo essay from a volunteer 2015-03-26T23:43:00+00:00 guest blogger – blank
By Eva Westfield, who was an Australian volunteer based in Port Vila.

Consistently rated the most dangerous countries in the world in terms of disaster risk, Vanuatu is no stranger to the destruction caused by natural hazards.

Talk of Cyclone Pam hitting Vanuatu started about a week before it descended upon us on 13 March. Still, many were convinced that the cyclone would not hit Port Vila directly until it became clear, just two days before, that it would be one of the biggest storms to ever hit the Pacific.

Those who had sturdy housing were able to see out the storm in their own boarded-up homes. Others had to bunker down with friends, leaving their homes at the mercy of the storm. Villagers packed sandbags onto their corrugated iron roofs. Many prayed, believing that God would ensure the cyclone missed Vanuatu altogether.

As night fell, the winds picked up and it was clear that Pam had arrived. Winds would reach over 300km per hour in some parts of Vanuatu.

Over the course of the night, the cyclone was ruthless as it ripped from the ground enormous banyan trees, bowled over towering coconut palms and lifted solid roofing from houses. Endless rain flooded homes and entire villages.

Despite all of the preparation for the cyclone, nothing prepares you for the shock of the aftermath. By morning, fallen tree trunks had blocked every road, rolled shipping containers and beached yachts littered every part of Port Vila. Bridges between villages were totally washed away, with no way of crossing the overflowing rivers. While telephone communication in Port Vila was re-established by the afternoon, the rest of Vanuatu was silent for days to come.

Though it is considered a developing country, the people of Vanuatu are extremely fortunate for the rich vegetation that envelops the archipelago, allowing them to live off the land sustainably. Seeing the almost total destruction of banana, coconut and cocoa plantations was the most confronting sight of all.

Desperation was soon followed by disorder. Shops and resorts were looted, leading to a 6pm curfew. ATMs ran out of money and fuel became scarce. However, the response of the people who had experienced the wrath of Pam – villagers, expatriates, tourists – was united and overwhelmingly positive. And with a relatively low death toll of 11 people, hopes were high for a full recovery.

Within hours, local people immediately began replanting their crops and rebuilding their homes. Locals on the island of Efate who own chainsaws took to the single road that connects villages with Port Vila and started to cut back the fallen tree trunks that had blocked the way.

Foreign aid has been pouring in from all over the world to support Vanuatu's recovery, including from Australia, France, the US and the EU. Australia has donated over $10 million in relief funding as well as $5 million to support locally-based NGOs. Over 2000 Australian military and aid personnel have also been deployed to support the effort.

Locals, expatriates and tourists were lining up to volunteer with major NGOs that were preparing water, food and medical supplies to be delivered to those worst affected. Vanuatu's National Disaster Management Organisation coordinated the aid effort to ensure that those most in need would not miss out.

At Port Vila Central Hospital, dozens of Australian and international volunteers have donated blood and helped local staff to restore the old wards and attend to the overwhelming influx of people.

Shops and restaurants in town began to re-open after just a couple of days.

But while Vanuatu 'island life' seems to be back on its way to normalcy, the country faces some serious issues as a result of Cyclone Pam. Those living in more remote villages and islands waited for over a week to receive fresh water, food, medical assistance and shelter from aid vessels. These people will be relying on aid for weeks and perhaps months until their crops grow back and their rain tanks refill.

Without local fruit and vegetables, many villages have lost their permanent food sources and their primary source of income, and soon the cost of feeding a family will be unaffordable. Tourism, an industry that Vanuatu's economy relies heavily upon, has come to a halt.

Dozens of fishing boats across Vanuatu that once provided a key part of the island diet were washed away or damaged beyond repair. Some living on more remote islands such as Tongariki and Boninga no longer have any fishing boats at all, and will have to rely on alternative sources of food until they source other boats.

While the initial response from Australia and the international community has been encouraging, the road to a full recovery for Vanuatu will be a long one, requiring a sustained joint effort and the political will of the Vanuatu and supporting governments to re-build this beautiful country.
 2015-03-26T23:43:00+00:00 guest blogger – blank Despite all of the preparation for the cyclone, nothing prepares you for the shock of the aftermath. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=645ecfbd-07e4-4e49-af31-d098124caaab 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=645ecfbd-07e4-4e49-af31-d098124caaab http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Cyclone-Pam-A-photo-essay-from-a-volunteer.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=645ecfbd-07e4-4e49-af31-d098124caaab http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Is-China-competitive-enough.aspx Is China competitive enough? 2015-03-26T22:52:00+00:00 Julian Snelder
Lei Jun reckons he has what customers really need. Xiaomi's flamboyant chairman has declared his ambition to overtake Apple at the top of the smartphone industry within ten years, by which time he expects 'Chinese companies to lead the world.' Whether he will succeed is, obviously, up in the air. For that matter, by then Apple may no longer be the benchmark, nor smartphones a sexy category. But his basic point must be right: China will wield a large number of globally competitive companies within a decade.

Two academics, economist Ricardo Hausmann and statistician Cesar Hidalgo, performed a famous and extraordinarily detailed data crunch, 'The Building Blocks of Economic Complexity', comparing the current and potential national incomes (GDP) of the world's economies, and their trade patterns. Their findings were intuitively sensible:

Economies that export many types of products are more likely to be sophisticated; products exported only by sophisticated economies are more likely to be complex. Sophistication and wealth do not always go hand in hand. China and India are more complex than their incomes would suggest; When economies are relatively sophisticated but relatively poor, they often have the potential for quick growth, as we have seen in China and India.

Economic complexity is a measure of both 'non-ubiquity' (or exclusivity), and diversity (or breadth). Wealthy exporters like Japan and Germany make a broad spread of hard-to-copy technologies. They 'go wide and deep', so to say. By contrast, countries heavily reliant on undifferentiated commodity products tend to struggle to grow incomes.

As Mark Buchanan at Bloomberg has highlighted, other academics applying powerful Big Data techniques have shown limitations to the Hausmann-Hidalgo framework as a predictor of income for lower-complexity nations (where, say, resource endowments or governance could be disproportionately influential). But it remains a useful guide for the countries that matter most, those with an 'ability to produce a wide range of products, as well as specialized things – think iPhones and rocket boosters – that few other nations can match.' Specifically, Buchanan is referring to India and China. 'The two have been building capabilities in a wide range of new products and skills, and have thus graduated into the group of countries for which complexity does predict growth.'

Still, there are a couple of wrinkles to using export classifications alone as a measure for complexity; on such a scale, Uganda (say) looks more advanced than soybean superpower America. China exports a lot of advanced goods (40% by some measures) but its own contribution is significantly lower, Apple's iPhone being the familiar example. Merchandise exports also ignore services (eg. IPR, branding, health care, consulting, financial and legal advisory) which are specialised, with high-entry barriers, and are therefore lucrative.

Chinese economists fully understand this. Zhang Monan has warned about the misleading signal of final exports. It is not enough simply to send abroad assembled 'high-tech' products and services if the most critical technologies and skills are already embedded in the components by others. In the recently concluded National People's Congress, Premier Li Keqiang delivered a workpaper re-prioritising domestic mastery of key capabilities – robots, high-end marine vessels, new-energy vehicles, high end medical devices, biologic pharmaceuticals, gas turbine aero-engines, integrated circuits, and advanced internet – within a decade.

Zhang lists her worries in a domestic opinion piece: China is 'big' but not efficient, innovation is still weak, the usual 'latecomer advantage' may not apply to its 'catch-up', the nation is losing talent to others, and the 'window of opportunity is closing rapidly.' This last argument is curious, made in an era of globalisation when the horizons for cross-border collaboration seem to be expanding. Yet Zhang sees other countries spurred (especially since 2009) to stimulate indigenous innovation programs, partly in response to China's ambitions. Beijing has long complained about Western technology export restrictions, and now it is playing rough itself: 'We just did what the Americans have already done; you can choose to leave, we have substitutes' seems to summarise the new line. Perhaps Zhang senses danger in such mercantilist industrial policy.

Xiaomi's chairman hopes to build a world-class Chinese enterprise. The question is not whether there will be such companies; it's whether there will be enough. China has only one path to getting rich: to have a very deep and very wide economy. I have noted before that China's rise to high complexity status must be disruptive. Trade isn't a zero-sum game; there can be more winners than losers. But there are losers, and they look like Detroit. The perpetual race for national power is, at its root, an economic contest. Rich, complex economies have many companies providing things that customers need, and can afford. From a developmental perspective, nothing else matters.

Photo by Flickr user David.
 2015-03-26T22:52:00+00:00 Julian Snelder Xiaomi's chairman hopes to build a world-class Chinese enterprise. The question is not whether there will be such companies; it's whether there will be enough. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=24b69533-1373-4a4c-9023-c4eb65e11a95 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=24b69533-1373-4a4c-9023-c4eb65e11a95 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Is-China-competitive-enough.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=24b69533-1373-4a4c-9023-c4eb65e11a95 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Digital-Asia-links-Robot-diplomacy-Tibetan-malware-social-media-in-Vietnam-and-more.aspx Digital Asia links: Robot diplomacy, Tibetan malware, social media in Vietnam and more 2015-03-26T21:34:00+00:00 Danielle Cave
The Asia Pacific is the most dynamic digital landscape in the world, home to the fastest adopters of new technologies and the largest concentration of mobile and social media users. An escalation in online activism, changing cyber dynamics, developments in digital diplomacy and the exploitation of big data are shaping the region's engagement with the world.

India's Supreme Court has struck down a law that made it illegal to spread 'offensive messages' on electronic devices. The presiding judge said the law, which had resulted in arrests over Facebook posts, had a 'chilling' effect on free speech.

University of Toronto's Citizen Lab has found that hundreds of members of the Tibetan community are being targeted by email-based malware attacks that are using the anniversary of the 10 March 1959 Tibetan Uprising as a disguise to infect individuals and organisations.

A fantastic report on Vietnam's social media landscape highlights internet censorship and outlines how social media is challenging the country's state-controlled broadcast and print media.

Indonesian neuroscientists have a developed a mobile app to help reduce the risk of accidents by using a brainwave sensor device to evaluate driver performance. The app pulls together vehicle data and real-time environmental data (traffic, weather), which is then meshed with information collected from the driver (stress levels, alertness) to make a call on whether you should drive.

Japan is reaping the benefits of an Asian-driven demand for robots (Taiwanese company Foxconn uses 20 million robots in its production of the iPhone 6 alone). India wants in, and is eyeing off opportunities for its tech industry (particularly programmers) to better collaborate with Japanese manufacturers.

And while Japan regularly capitalises on its robotics expertise via well rehearsed 'robot diplomacy', it's unlikely Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel will be buying a personal robot anytime soon:

[youtube:Chx9peMTZS0]
 2015-03-26T21:34:00+00:00 Danielle Cave Links to this week's best Digital Asia reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=58c18777-36a3-4435-9df3-b89cef1e72ad 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=58c18777-36a3-4435-9df3-b89cef1e72ad http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/27/Digital-Asia-links-Robot-diplomacy-Tibetan-malware-social-media-in-Vietnam-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=58c18777-36a3-4435-9df3-b89cef1e72ad http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Just-how-absurd-is-the-Middle-East-at-the-moment.aspx Just how absurd is the Middle East at the moment? 2015-03-26T07:09:00+00:00 Anthony Bubalo
Even for long-time watchers of the Middle East like myself, the region's enmities and alliances have become very difficult to keep track of.

This has just been taken to a mind-bogglingly new level by Saudi Arabia's decision to launch a military campaign in Yemen against the Houthi movement.

Last September the Houthis, backed by Yemen's deposed president, Ali Abdullah Saleh (whom the Houthis fought against in 2009), stormed the Yemeni capital Sana'a. Since then they have captured large parts of the country, forcing President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to flee to the southern city of Aden.

The Houthis are Zaidi Shia, and are seen as closely aligned with Iran, which is a key reason why the Saudis, backed by other Gulf allies and seemingly by the US, have now intervened. But the Houthis are also fighting al Qaeda elements and Islamic State supporters in Yemen.

So in Iraq and Syria, the US, backed by Saudi Arabia (at least nominally), is fighting against al Qaeda and Islamic State, and both groups are also being fought by Iran. But in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, backed by the US, is fighting against the Houthis, who are supported by Iran but who are fighting al Qaeda and Islamic State.

Confused? So am I.
 2015-03-26T07:09:00+00:00 Anthony Bubalo With the fall of Yemen, it's getting complicated. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=329f88e8-2bdc-4608-8265-1658be04922f 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=329f88e8-2bdc-4608-8265-1658be04922f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Just-how-absurd-is-the-Middle-East-at-the-moment.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=329f88e8-2bdc-4608-8265-1658be04922f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/The-Liberal-Partys-conflicted-relationship-with-the-UN.aspx The Liberal Party's conflicted relationship with the UN 2015-03-26T06:33:00+00:00 Peter Nadin

In a speech to the National Press Club yesterday, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said she is 'scoping the opportunities for our next term on the United Nations Security Council.'

Australia performed well during its 2013-2014 term on the Security Council, and the time has come for a decision to be made about the next term. It would be a welcome change if a bid were to be launched under a Liberal government.

It is a commonly held perception that the Labor Party is friendlier to the UN than the Liberal Party. Australians themselves are largely supportive of the UN: 63% hold a favourable view of the organisation. Labor stalwart Dr HV Evatt was the great agitator on behalf of medium and small nations at the founding conference in San Francisco, 1945. He later served as the fourth president of the General Assembly.

The Liberal Party, on the other hand, is seen as being more conflicted over the UN. The Howard Government worked ably with the UN on Timor, while it later rode roughshod over the rules-based order when it joined with allies the UK and the US to invade Iraq.

In 2000, Alexander Downer famously derided the UN, saying that, 'if a United Nations committee wants to play domestic politics here in Australia, then it will end up with a bloody nose.' He was later appointed UN Special Envoy to Cyprus.

But there is a healthy pro-UN camp within the Liberal Party. Dr Russell Trood founded the UN Parliamentary Group while serving as a Liberal senator. The group is now co-chaired by Melissa Parke MP (Labor) and Senator Chris Buck (Liberal). Trood is now chairman of the UN Association of Australia, succeeding the former Liberal senator Robert Hill (former defence minister and former Australian permanent representative to the UN).

Other voices in the party tap into the anti-UN sentiment, which runs deep on the hard right (ie. the 28% of Australians that hold an unfavourable view of the UN). But this sentiment is born mostly of ignorance of the UN system and its limitations. But it is not as suspicious a minority as that in the US, where the positively unhinged 'black helicopter' conspiracy theorists continue to irrationally oppose the Arms Trade Treaty and Agenda 21 (a non-binding pact on sustainable development) for fear that the UN will one day take over the world.

A couple of weeks ago, Prime Minister Abbott suggested that Australians were 'sick of being lectured by the UN.' In opposition, the Liberals also opposed the bid for a seat on the Security Council, citing issues of cost and timing.

In keeping with the Liberal Party's contradictory approach to the UN, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop actually took advantage of the seat, and performed admirably on numerous occasions (on MH17 and during the presidencies of 2013 and 2014). During her speech yesterday, Bishop espoused the virtues of Australia's term on the Council: 'I believe we exceeded expectations of the impact that we could have as a non-permanent member.' By all accounts, the P-3 (France, US, UK) enjoyed Australia's company on the Council, while the Russians found us a worthy adversary.

Bishop also took the opportunity to focus more broadly on the question of how Australia would look to build a post-Council legacy. She signaled Australia's intention to support 'efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of both United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding.' This support is timely. Jose Ramos-Horta's High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations delivers its report in the middle of the year and Obama hosts his summit on peacekeeping at UN HQ in September.

Bishop also made mention of the need to 'ensure women are more deeply engaged' in the UN's efforts towards peace. This flags ongoing Australian support for the women, peace and security agenda enshrined in resolution 1325.

This year is a big year for the UN, which is celebrating its 70th Anniversary, and the options for meaningful engagement are plentiful.

On the immediate horizon will be the Palestinian Question (as it is known at the UN). Although Bishop made no mention of it in her speech, the recent Israeli election result could prompt a showdown at the UN some time this year. With the Obama White House signalling a potential change its stance at the UN, it remains to be seen whether Australia too will alter its policy. The UK and France are also likely to push for the recommencement of final status negotiations.

The Millennium Development Goals are up for renewal. The new post-2015 development agenda promises to be more inclusive and far reaching.

The UN's humanitarian architecture is also under immense strain brought on by a record number of IDPs and refugees (57.5 million), a result of the numerous crises afflicting the Middle East, North and Central Africa. US$ 16.4 billion will be required this year alone.

Despite the UN's growing needs, Australia's brand of niche diplomacy is likely to get more of a workout than its cheque book (or the boots of ADF personnel).

Photo courtesy of the Foreign Minister.
 2015-03-26T06:33:00+00:00 Peter Nadin It is a commonly held perception that the Labor Party is friendlier to the UN than the Liberal Party. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=2b373257-acd0-4ff3-a4cd-0a24d4926e2d 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=2b373257-acd0-4ff3-a4cd-0a24d4926e2d http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/The-Liberal-Partys-conflicted-relationship-with-the-UN.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=2b373257-acd0-4ff3-a4cd-0a24d4926e2d http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Illicit-A-decade-on-and-what-have-we-learned.aspx 'Illicit': A decade on and what have we learned? 2015-03-26T03:57:00+00:00 Marie McAuliffe
Just over a decade ago Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, hit bookshops around the world. Written by the then editor of Foreign Policy and former Venezuelan Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Moises Naim, Illicit outlined how the 'black' economy risked undermining the regulated economy, reshaping politics to the detriment of societies and destroying lives around the world.

Illicit received widespread praise for its thoroughness and accessibility. Some reviewers, however, suggested that Naim had overstated the impact illicit actors were having on states' abilities to regulate the movement of goods and people. Other reviewers commended him for persuasively arguing that illicit trade patterns threaten 'the very fabric of society' itself.

Ten years on from Illicit, what has changed? Have responses been effective or is the threat Naim outlined still present?

Naim's book covered illicit industries ranging from small-arms trading to illegal drugs to money laundering, but this column focuses on one area: migrant smuggling. Back in 2005, Naim argued that smuggling and its more sinister manifestation, human trafficking, were both growing illicit trades. He cited UN estimates that the combined business in smuggling and trafficking was worth US$7-10 billion annually.

Today, there is little doubt that migrant smuggling continues to pose many challenges, including for migrants risking death and exploitation during their journeys, and for states seeking to manage their borders. The patchy data available on smuggling indicate the number of people being smuggled around the world appears to be increasing overall, albeit unevenly geographically. It also seems that an increasing number of illicit actors are making considerable profits from that exploitation. Some estimate that up to US$1 billion was paid to smugglers along the Mediterranean Sea route alone in 2014.

The latest EU data show that 2014 saw a massive increase in illegal cross-border detections, most notably by sea across the Mediterranean, with almost 100,000 people being smuggled by sea between July and October alone. The use of cargo ships to smuggle on a larger scale in the Mediterranean, such as the recent Ezadeen ghost ship abandoned at sea by its crew, is an ominous sign that migrant smugglers are reaching a new scale of operational capacity.

African-based analysts have found that while the true scale of regional smuggling and irregular movement is difficult to quantify, the smuggling route to Europe via Libya continues to grow. They have also highlighted that in Libya migrant smuggling is directly linked to the smuggling of drugs and weapons, placing asylum seekers and refugees in the hands of criminal gangs.

US Border Patrol data stretching back several decades shows a big drop in illegal migrant apprehensions across the Southwest border with Mexico from the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, however last year saw smugglers fill a soft market with extremely vulnerable migrants from Central America. The number of unaccompanied minors and families with minors who were apprehended in FY 2013–14 almost tripled to around 135,000, undoubtedly sending a collective chill through the spines of policy makers, international organisations and migrants' rights groups worldwide.

Closer to home, some of the largest migrant smuggling routes are thought to be in Southeast Asia, particularly between Indonesia and Malaysia. Analysts estimate the illegal migrant population in Malaysia to be around 2.2 million, with more than half from Indonesia.

Smuggling of asylum seekers to Australia is now in abeyance, at a time when factors enabling smuggling — modern transportation and communication networks; the growing prevalence of opportunistic unregulated actors — have perhaps never been greater. The current policy and operational framework in Australia has halted maritime migrant smuggling, but it is fragile in the face of such global forces, and it has come at a substantial cost.

Ten years on from Illicit and it's difficult to say whether the 'very fabric of society' has been irreparably harmed, though some communities in some societies have experienced just that. What is clear is that few inroads have been made in eradicating human smuggling globally in a substantive and sustainable way. There are at least three main reasons.

Firstly, there remain significant gaps in our understanding of migrant smuggling. Patchy data indicate that some smuggling routes are closely monitored while others are not; some smuggling routes have been effectively shut down while others appear to be flourishing. Improved data collection and targeted research is enhancing our understanding of smuggling but we still don't know the true scale and nature of many smuggling networks. We have a limited understanding of how inter-connected smuggling is with other forms of illicit activity; we may not yet appreciate the level of danger and insecurity experienced by those being smuggled.

Secondly, it is clear that while migrant smuggling is big business and multiple factors underpin the phenomenon (including poverty and relative deprivation), we are now in the midst of the largest episode of human displacement due to war, conflict and persecution seen for two decades. This has a direct effect on smuggling. EU data show that Syrians currently make up the majority of those intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea. Greater support of countries hosting refugees, realising the end of conflict in places such as Syria, and expanding durable solutions to displacement are all high global priorities.

Finally, a transnational problem requires transnational solutions involving multiple sectors and stakeholders that complement national initiatives. Policies, practices and operational responses that can account for international smuggling patterns, industry-specific labour needs and better industry regulation, international monetary flows, migrants' rights and motivations, as well as transnational linkages, have a greater chance of reducing migrant smuggling, securing borders and enhancing protection. There remains much work to be done.
 2015-03-26T03:57:00+00:00 Marie McAuliffe Moises Naim's "Illicit" outlined how the 'black' economy risked undermining the regulated economy, reshaping politics to the detriment of societies and destroying lives around the world. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=4cf21dee-d9f1-40d9-b11f-67e84cbf64ca 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=4cf21dee-d9f1-40d9-b11f-67e84cbf64ca http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Illicit-A-decade-on-and-what-have-we-learned.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=4cf21dee-d9f1-40d9-b11f-67e84cbf64ca http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Irregular-warfare-and-the-ADF.aspx Irregular warfare and the ADF 2015-03-26T01:30:00+00:00 Hugh White
Alan Dupont concludes his thoughtful response to my comments on his Lowy Analysis paper, Full-Spectrum Defence: Re-thinking the Fundamentals of Australian Defence Strategy, by posing some good questions.

First, he asks, should we see irregular warfare as the dominant form of future conflict, both between and within states? The answer depends on what we mean by 'dominant'. Do we mean 'most common' or 'most serious'? Irregular warfare is likely to be the most common form of conflict in future, as it always has been in the past. What I suppose we must call 'regular warfare' – large-scale conflict between the armed forces of states – has always been much rarer, and I expect this will remain true too.

But regular warfare is more serious than irregular warfare, at least for a country like Australia. If we were Yemen or the Congo or (for much of its history) Indonesia, then irregular warfare would pose a more serious threat than regular warfare, and it would make perfect sense to design our armed forces primarily for that kind of conflict.

But we face no credible or even conceivable risk of internal insurrection, and no risk of insurrections spilling onto our territory from elsewhere on anything but the smallest scale, a scale for which police are more relevant than armed forces. And the risk of state-sponsored irregular warfare against Australia by a neighbouring state was tested at length by the 'low-level contingency' concept which was so central to our defence policy in the 1980s. I think Alan would agree with me that the closer one looked at that concept, the more improbable it seemed.

Of course the risk of Australia being involved in a regular conflict is pretty low too. But I would argue that changes in the regional strategic order mean it is not as low over coming decades as it has been since the early 1970s, and that this risk is much more serious for Australia than risks of irregular warfare. And that is why I think it should predominate in our force planning.

Second, Alan asks whether the 'force structure determinants' used in previous White Papers 'have any redeeming value'. By 'force structure determinants' Alan means the core strategic objectives which the Government decides the ADF should be built to achieve, and which therefore determine what kinds of forces we need and how much money we should spend.

I think setting these strategic objectives for the ADF does have value. Indeed I think deciding what we want our armed forces to be able to do is absolutely essential to making sensible decisions about what capabilities we need. In his paper, Alan says they are no use because governments sometimes ignore them in choosing capabilities, and often use the ADF for tasks different from the ones they identify as force structure determinants.

He is quite right about both of these, but that does not mean the idea of setting core objectives has no value. Governments do sometimes violate their own policy principles (the Howard Government did when it ordered the C-17s that Alan mentions), but the fault here might lie with government decisions rather than the principles they sometimes ignore.

More importantly, the fact that governments use the ADF for purposes other than that for which it was designed does not mean it has been designed for the wrong purposes. It often makes sense to use something for a purpose for which one would not buy it.

There is a separate question, of course, about whether the strategic objectives that have been laid down as force structure determinants in recent white papers are the right ones for Australia over coming decades. I do not think they are, because they assume that Australia's strategic risks will remain much the same in the next few decades as they have been in the last few. What objectives we should adopt instead is a question for another time.

Third, Alan asks whether I still think we should have a primarily maritime military strategy, and if so how space and cyber fit into it? The short answer to the first part is 'yes'. Most of the core strategic objectives I would set for the ADF can be achieved most cost-effectively by maritime operations, and I would focus most of our capability there.

What about cyber and space? Let's clear up a muddle here: when we talk about cyber and space as new domains of warfare, are we talking about the impact of cyber- and space-based actions on the systems that support and enable the conduct of conventional military operations in the other three domains, or are we talking about the impact of such operations on society more broadly, to achieve a direct strategic effect?

If it is the former, then clearly we need to develop our maritime forces to operate in a contested cyber and space environment, based on a sober assessment of the risks involved. This might be hard technically, but it poses no conceptual challenges to policy.

If it is the latter, the issue is much less clear. Cyber attack on national information systems is a serious potential threat, but armed force is little or no use in responding to it, so it need not shape our defence planning. Space-based attack directly on civilian populations or systems? Unless we mean such familiar problems as ballistic missiles, I'm not sure what we are talking about here. Denial of satellite services, perhaps? Whatever it is, I doubt that armed forces are going to be the answer.

Photo by Flickr user DVIDSHUB.
 2015-03-26T01:30:00+00:00 Hugh White If we were Yemen or the Congo or (for much of its history) Indonesia, then irregular warfare would pose a more serious threat than regular warfare, and it would make perfect sense to design our armed forces primarily for that kind of conflict. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=e9615dd1-5393-472c-8547-a41b517269c6 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=e9615dd1-5393-472c-8547-a41b517269c6 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Irregular-warfare-and-the-ADF.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=e9615dd1-5393-472c-8547-a41b517269c6 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Indo-Pacific-links-US-strategy-in-South-China-Sea-AIIB-strategic-debate-in-India-submarines-and-more.aspx Indo-Pacific links: US strategy in South China Sea, AIIB, India's strategic debate and more 2015-03-26T00:19:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
The Indo-Pacific is a strategic system encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, reflecting the expanding interests and reach of China and India as well as the enduring role of the US. The Lowy Institute's International Security program presents a weekly selection of links illuminating the changing security picture in this increasingly connected super-region.

US Senators who head the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter expressing concern over China's expanding land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. The disputes in the East China Sea also need some crisis management attention.

Has the US-UK split over the whether to join the Chinese-backed AIIB exposed significant divisions over the question of how to accommodate a rising China?

Sam Roggeveen was in India last week and has written on his impressions of the country's strategic debate.

The Indian Navy has raised alarm with the government over China's deployment of a nuclear attack submarine to the Indian Ocean late last year.

China now operates more attack submarines than the US. But the US Navy is confident that it retains a qualitative advantage.

It seems China has invited Japan to its World War II commemorations in September. Also, Japan's largest warship since the war, a helicopter destroyer, has entered service.

The Japanese Self Defense Force intercepted more Russian Tu-95 bombers off Japan's coast this week.

 2015-03-26T00:19:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Links to the best reading on the Indo-Pacific this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=10981691-203e-45b4-97d3-ca056638b2a6 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=10981691-203e-45b4-97d3-ca056638b2a6 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/Indo-Pacific-links-US-strategy-in-South-China-Sea-AIIB-strategic-debate-in-India-submarines-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=10981691-203e-45b4-97d3-ca056638b2a6 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/War-with-Iran-is-the-worst-option.aspx War with Iran is the worst option 2015-03-26T00:07:00+00:00 Dina Esfandiary
Throughout the P5+1 negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, we've been treated to constant commentary on why a nuclear agreement with Iran is a terrible idea.

But none have been as ridiculous as this from Joshua Muravchick. According to him, war with Iran is a better way to prevent it from going nuclear. He couldn't be farther from the truth.

The best way to assess the success of a policy is to examine what it's trying to achieve. What would be the goal of a military campaign against Iran? Presumably, to stop Iran getting a nuclear weapon. But military action doesn't guarantee the destruction of Iran's nuclear program. In fact, it makes a nuclear Iran more likely.

Those who endorse strikes against Iran advocate for an air campaign targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. But Iran's nuclear program is no Al-Kibar or Osirak. Iran's nuclear program is far more extensive and spread out than those targeted in the past by the US and Israel. What's more, it bears reminding that some facilities are impenetrable, or at the very least, very difficult to penetrate because they are too far underground. Iranian facilities are also well protected and Iranian air defences are solid.

Total destruction of the program is, to put it mildly, highly unlikely.

If everything hasn't been destroyed, then it can be rebuilt. What then? Can the US or Israel commit to 'mowing the lawn'; striking Iranian facilities every few years? Iran would likely rebuild its facilities further underground and hidden from all. Each successive attack would need more firepower and better intelligence. Not an easy commitment to make.

Now let's assume that all of these obstacles are overcome. Let's assume that a military operation against Iran destroys all of its (known) nuclear facilities. What of the information, data and skills that remain? Knowledge can't be bombed away.

Instead, military action will play beautifully into the hands of the Iranian Government. It will give them a legitimate excuse to forgo its non-proliferation commitments and go hell for leather on the nuclear program. It will encourage Tehran to drive the program underground and cease all transparency. Muravchick argues that if Iran currently has hidden facilities, they'll be hidden from an agreement too. Perhaps, but the aim of an agreement is to ensure that Iran submits to the most stringent inspection regime devised to date. Surely that's a step up from nothing, which is what we would be left with if force is used.

Military action will also give the Iranian Government more ammunition for its anti-American rhetoric. The Islamic Republic thrives off external enemies. What better way to galvanise support for Iran's leaders than to be the victim of airstrikes? That would turn even the most moderate Iranian against the West. And let's not forget the international community; even US allies are unlikely to back military action if there is no obvious Iranian-caused tripwire.

Finally, military action will spark retaliation. Sure, Iran may be deterred from anything too drastic. But the use of force has been on the table for 20+ years, and it hasn't deterred Iran from using its proxies and pursuing its interests. Iran may refrain from closing the Straits of Hormuz, for example, but that's only because it stands to lose the most from closing it.

It's not just that, as Muravchick acknowledges, there 'are risks' to military action, it simply won't work. In fact, it is bad policy because it clearly results in the opposite end-state from the stated goal of stopping a nuclear Iran.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user US Department of State.
 2015-03-26T00:07:00+00:00 Dina Esfandiary Military action doesn't guarantee the destruction of Iran's nuclear programme. In fact, it makes a nuclear Iran more likely. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=dccea01b-8a9b-4009-8ef2-791ea3dd50f2 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=dccea01b-8a9b-4009-8ef2-791ea3dd50f2 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/War-with-Iran-is-the-worst-option.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=dccea01b-8a9b-4009-8ef2-791ea3dd50f2 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/The-truth-about-development-banks.aspx The truth about development banks 2015-03-25T21:49:00+00:00 Julian Snelder
First, let's get past the histrionics over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Beijing undoubtedly has scored a symbolic diplomatic win over Washington, whose stance increasingly looks churlish. The Chinese have prevailed in what may become an epic saga of skirmishes over the outmoded Bretton Woods system.

They were always going ahead with their overseas investment efforts, with or without Washington's support. It is understandable that other countries should now reconsider 'getting inside the tent' when the AIIB initiative has gained so much momentum. Many American experts recognised early that opposing AIIB was a strategic error, especially when Congress had blocked attempts to reform the IMF. Their Chinese counterparts now supposedly gloat over Washington's 'petulant and cynical' sulking.

Look more closely at this situation and it gets even stickier. Development banks are unwieldy politically driven bureaucracies that submit even the most honourable objectives to a soul crushing ritual of arbitrary decision-making, petty infighting, endless red tape, shelved reports and, frequently, corruption. I should know; I worked as adviser to a major multilateral lending agency some years ago in the Indian energy sector. Well-paid delegates would arrive from everywhere on lavish travel budgets, bearing no apparent relevance to a given project, which after two years would run full circle, ending where it had started. Apparently this wasn't an unusual experience, either then or now. Lou Jiwei, China's finance minister, rightly queries why international standards should be his aspiration: 'I don't acknowledge best practice. Who is the best?'

Although influence and power are what's at stake, the battle over the AIIB is technically about governance. In theory, making this Chinese-led institution a multilateral one should improve transparency and objectivity.

A major gripe about existing institutions is that they bestow veto rights upon incumbent hegemons (the US and Japan, notably) who hold under 20% of the equity capital. China intends to own 49% of AIIB. Its offer to surrender the veto is an empty gesture; practically Beijing's will could only be blocked if every other shareholder opposed it. And when it comes to building infrastructure, Beijing thinks best practice is Chinese practice: brusque, efficient, decisive. 'Bureaucratic procedures and tedious methods' such as public consultation or EIAs are spurned. As Lou says, 'we need to consider (developing countries') needs and sometimes the West puts forwards some rules that we don't think are optimal.'

Another complaint about today's development institutions is that they prioritise the preferences of the sponsor. Examining the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) disbursements against a range of geopolitical criteria, Christopher Kilby showed that 'both Japan and the US have systematic influence over the distribution of ADB funds.' Two other academics, Edward Lincoln and Karen Mingst, have even documented American (!) complaints about Japan's outsized role in the ADB. China may exert similar influence in favour of its pet projects, its allies and its own contractors, just as the Japanese did. According to one estimate, locals in Vietnam got only 3% of the money doled out by ADB there during the last fifty years.

Development banks underwrite risks that a huge and capable global private sector is not coordinated or motivated to take on. That means making non-commercial lending as commercial as possible, so politics inevitably is involved. No doubt China earnestly wishes to improve its neighbours' transport linkages, for example, and that is a win-win outcome. But when AIIB's tenders come in for the bullet-train line through Cambodia or Kyrgyzstan, we can be sure which country will oversee, manage, supply and construct the railway.

Roughly 30 countries have signed on, but it is telling that recent Western joiners, such as Australia and Britain, have overtly emphasised their commercial interests. These countries think they see a giant money pot. Their wishes are forlorn. Concessionary lending makes poor business, and Chinese contractors and suppliers can easily undercut foreign companies.

Still, the AIIB is good news. There is no shortage of need in the world, and different institutions can complement each other. Just as the World Bank targets poverty and public health, the AIIB is aimed at regional infrastructure building, where the ADB reckons there is a US$800 billion annual shortfall. This happens to play to China's industrial strengths and it is encouraging that, at least, the AIIB is inviting others for the ride. Alternative Chinese initiatives are far more parochial, like the colossally unaccountable China Development Bank or the mercantilist Silk Road Fund.

In fact a chastening experience in Sri Lanka or Venezuela might lead Beijing to better appreciate the advantages of good governance. Because for all the yelping about the 'riven west' choosing between 'accommodation or appeasement', there is a serious practical issue of rules here. Put simply, does the world trust China to do the right thing? If Beijing builds a parallel geo-financial order, will others have a voice? How fair will it be? In this regard, the AIIB has been challenged to match other multilateral agencies. It should aim higher.

Photo by Flickr user The Climate Group.
 2015-03-25T21:49:00+00:00 Julian Snelder Western joiners, such as Australia and Britain, have overtly emphasised their commercial interests. These countries think they see a giant money pot. Their wishes are forlorn. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=5a230e74-fccb-4e48-8d0f-1218a3ba7804 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=5a230e74-fccb-4e48-8d0f-1218a3ba7804 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/26/The-truth-about-development-banks.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=5a230e74-fccb-4e48-8d0f-1218a3ba7804 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Awkward-contradictions-in-Australian-foreign-fighter-laws.aspx Awkward contradictions in Australian foreign-fighter laws 2015-03-25T07:15:00+00:00 Lauren Williams
One of the stranger stories to come out of Syria lately was the case of Northern Territory Labor Party president Matthew Gardiner's disappearance to Syria to fight against ISIS. Mr Gardiner upped and left his wife and family to join the ranks of the Kurdish YPG. Only two weeks later, another Australian, Ashley Johnston, became the first foreigner reportedly killed fighting ISIS, also with YPG.

The Syria conflict has made for some awkward alliances and strange bedfellows. But these two cases present a particularly complicated legal predicament in the realm of Australian counter-terror law.

Peshmerga forces in action against ISIS. (Flickr/Times Asi.)

YPG is considered the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (YPD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), a Kurdish socialist guerrilla army behind an insurgency against Turkey, a conflict that has killed over 40,000 in the last three decades. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU, US, and Australia. It is the only non-Islamic organisation on the terror list in Australia.

Kurdish factionalism is a complex beast. There is little love lost between the outlawed PKK, based in the Qandil Mountain area of northern Kurdish Iraq and the Eastern Turkish border, and the Peshmerga, the legitimate armed forces of the Kurdish Regional Government which governs semi-autonomous Kurdish Iraq. However, the emergence of ISIS has seen interests converge. Kurdish factions, rivalrous Shiite factions, the Iraqi army and even some Sunni tribes have united in the battle against the militants.

With coalition air cover to help them, the battle-hardened YPG has emerged as the key partner for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS in the Syrian city of Kobani, on the central northern border with Turkey. PKK, YPG and Peshmerga forces battled ISIS for months to win back the city in early February.

Australia is of course a partner in the US-led alliance against ISIS. The coalition is arming and training the Iraqi Army, and providing air cover to local partners in Iraq and Syria. The Royal Australian Air Force joined the US-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq in October, and in March the Government announced an additional 300 troops will join the nearly 200 already assisting Iraqi security forces and the 400 Air Force personnel conducting air strikes against ISIS in northern Iraq.

But just as the US-led alliance is providing arms and training to the Iraqi armed forces, so the Iraqi Army is partnering with the Peshmerga. And in turn, the Peshmerga is teaming up with the YPG. This reporter has witnessed YPG-Peshmerga cooperation in northern Syria, and it is safe to say that arms directed to the Iraqi Army will end up in YPG hands. They may even end up in the hands of Matthew Gardiner as he battles ISIS.

Yet under Australian law it is a criminal offence to fight with any side in a foreign conflict. It is also an offence to be a member of any terrorist organisation. A new foreign fighters bill passed in October last year makes it an offence to travel to certain conflict zones other than for legitimate purposes.

The Australian Federal Police is reportedly investigating Mr Gardiner and he could face prosecution on return to Australia. Attorney General George Brandis says that 'participation by Australians in the Syrian civil war is against Australian law, irrespective of which side they are fighting on...Those who contemplate travelling are putting themselves in mortal danger. Those who are already there should leave the conflict zone immediately...there are safer, legal ways of helping the people affected by these conflicts than travelling overseas to fight'.

So far, there have not been any prosecutions of Australians involved in fighting with the PKK, the YPG or the Kurdish Peshmerga. Nor have there been any prosecutions of Australians for terrorism offences relating to the PKK.

One way to get around this awkward contradiction would be to de-list the PKK as a terrorist organisation. The PKK was first listed under a Criminal Code regulation in 2005 and was last re‑listed on 18 August 2012. The 2012 listing expires on 18 August and will be reviewed again before that date.

There several good arguments for removing the PKK from the list. One is that could pave the way for direct cooperation between the YPD and the US against ISIS. It could also give the peace process between the Kurds and Turkey extra steam. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, agreed from his prison cell in May 2013 to a pact ending hostilities and withdrawing fighters from Turkish soil, paving the way for a full settlement. The PKK was originally listed by the US as a terrorist organisation in 1997 at Turkey's urging and at the peak of hostilities. But now, as he approaches a general election in June, a final settlement of the Kurdish question will also prove critical for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

But that doesn't solve the problem of what do about Australians providing support to the PKK or traveling to Turkey, Iraq and Syria to fight on 'our side', and afterwards potentially coming home. It appears the only solution to that quandary is to ignore it, at least selectively, and hope no other high profile Australians fighting against ISIS make the press.
 2015-03-25T07:15:00+00:00 Lauren Williams The Syria conflict has made for some strange bedfellows. But two recent cases present a particularly complicated legal predicament in the realm of Australian counter-terror law. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9bd8265c-e48c-467f-acd7-3f2d36795379 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9bd8265c-e48c-467f-acd7-3f2d36795379 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Awkward-contradictions-in-Australian-foreign-fighter-laws.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9bd8265c-e48c-467f-acd7-3f2d36795379 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Australia-and-climate-change-negotiations-at-the-table-or-on-the-menu-13.aspx Australia and climate change negotiations: At the table, or on the menu? 2015-03-25T04:38:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan

In a new Lowy Institute Analysis paper released today, Howard Bamsey and Kath Rowley argue that a failure to pay high-level attention to international climate change negotiations raises several risks to the national interest. Australia and Climate Change Negotiations: At the Table, or on the Menu? argues that climate change negotiations are changing the global economy in ways that matter to Australia. Strong, constructive engagement in those negotiations by Australia would serve climate, economic and other national goals.

'As one of the world's biggest fossil fuel producers and exporters, Australia has an important stake in when and how the world pursues emissions reductions,' say Bamsey and Rowley.

Climate change negotiations will create new norms, standards, rules and laws. These developments create challenges and opportunities for Australian businesses and individuals. Bamsey and Rowley argue that ministerial leadership, a strong negotiating team, and active support for preparations for the Paris conference in December would return much needed momentum to Australia's negotiating effort.

Read or download the Analysis from the Lowy Institute website.

Photo by Flickr user The Danish Wind Industry.
 2015-03-25T04:38:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan A new Lowy Institute Analysis paper argues that a failure to pay high-level attention to international climate change negotiations raises risks to the national interest. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=c2d5c044-e216-4bca-af51-85e56a8d8d14 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=c2d5c044-e216-4bca-af51-85e56a8d8d14 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Australia-and-climate-change-negotiations-at-the-table-or-on-the-menu-13.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=c2d5c044-e216-4bca-af51-85e56a8d8d14 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Quick-comment-Milton-Osborne-on-Lee-Kuan-Yew.aspx Quick comment: Milton Osborne on Lee Kuan Yew 2015-03-25T04:06:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
Yesterday afternoon I sat down with Lowy Institute's Non-Resident Fellow and distinguished historian of Southeast Asia Milton Osborne to talk about the legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

We discussed Singapore's beginnings as part of the Malaysian Federation, its reputation abroad in the 70s and 80s, and Lee Kuan Yew's signature achievement of keeping Singapore corruption-free. You will also hear me reference Milton's opinion piece in the Financial Review, which you can read here, where he talks about Singapore resembling, in the early days, a 'tropical slum'. As you will hear, Milton spent time in Singapore in the early 60s, and that description is no exaggeration.

 2015-03-25T04:06:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen Distinguished historian of Southeast Asia Milton Osborne talks about the legacy of Lee Kuan Yew. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=39a5daee-4281-43cc-8946-1a291bbb5579 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=39a5daee-4281-43cc-8946-1a291bbb5579 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Quick-comment-Milton-Osborne-on-Lee-Kuan-Yew.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=39a5daee-4281-43cc-8946-1a291bbb5579 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Australia-needs-a-modern-and-globalised-tax-system.aspx Australia needs a modern and globalised tax system 2015-03-25T03:26:00+00:00 Mike Callaghan
The Abbott Government will shortly release a discussion paper on the Australian tax system. It will be the first step towards the much anticipated tax white paper. International factors should figure prominently in the white paper — specifically, how to ensure that Australia has a resilient tax system given the challenges of globalisation.

Treasury Secretary John Fraser recently said our tax system looks 'remarkably like it did back in the 1950s – but our economy looks very different'. How true.

Among the most significant changes are the internationalisation of the Australian economy, and the influence of technology. Australian exports and imports as a share of GDP have increased from 30% in the early 1960s to around 45% now. But this figure does not do full justice to the extent to which Australian business and consumers operate across national borders and participate in the global economy.

The integration of economies and a global rather than a national approach to doing business is challenging our tax system.

For example, the underlying principle of corporate tax is that firms pay tax where economic activity takes place. This was fine when goods were entirely produced in Australia. However it is not so clear when inputs – both goods and services, such as R&D, advertising, marketing and intellectual property rights – are sourced from many countries. Increasingly, this involves companies operating production across many national borders. When there are such intra-company operations it can be difficult to determine the value-add and tax liability in each jurisdiction. Companies can readily manipulate prices in intra-firm operations.

The Government has countered with transfer pricing rules which seek to apply an arm's length principle to value related party trading. But this is increasingly difficult when intangibles, such as unique intellectual property rights, are a major part of the production process. As a guide to the rising importance of intangibles, in 1978 the asset distribution of S&P 500 companies was 95% tangible assets, 5% intangible. In 2010, the breakdown was 20% tangible and 80% intangible.

The breakdown of the production process across many countries and the increasing importance of services and intangibles in international trade makes it easier for firms to shift profits to zero or low tax jurisdictions. Combating corporate 'base erosion and profit shifting' is a G20 and OECD priority. But the resilience of the corporate tax base is particularly important for Australia given its high reliance on corporate tax. From 1983 to 2011, the OECD average corporate tax rate as a percent of total revenue remained around 8.5%. But Australia's corporate tax revenue rose from 9% of total revenue to 20% over the same period.

Another aspect where international developments will loom large is the competitiveness of the Australian corporate tax rate.

Australia's corporate tax rate is 30% compared with an average 23.5% in the Asia Pacific and an OECD average of 25%. The UK has recently cut its rate to 21%. If the international community is successful in combating base erosion and profit shifting, and taxes are actually paid where economic activity takes place, then economic activity (investment) will increasingly shift to countries with low corporate tax rates. The 2009 Henry Report on the tax system recommended that Australia's corporate tax rate be lowered in order to ensure that Australia remains an attractive place for investment.

The breakdown of national borders is also impacting the resilience of the GST. Online shopping has grown rapidly, with 75% of Australians who shop online making purchases from overseas sites. The total value of overseas online purchases falling below the threshold of $1000 when GST is to be applied was more than $7 billion in 2012-13. Australian retailers have argued that the low-value threshold should be lowered, although both the Productivity Commission and the Board of Tax concluded that the cost of collecting GST on overseas purchases below the threshold is prohibitive.

The challenges from online purchases from overseas are likely to grow. While Australia's online purchases have grown significantly, they still lag the US and UK markets.

In addition, it is one thing to impose GST on goods purchased from overseas; the GST is paid when the goods are released from customs. It is not so easy to impose GST on services and intangibles that are purchased overseas and delivered via the internet. This challenge is also likely to increase. For example, the spread of 3D printers could increasingly see patent rights purchased overseas and delivered via the internet , with the goods 'printed' in Australia.

The global integration of the Australian economy and the spread of technology will not stop. More likely it will accelerate. As such, they must figure prominently in the tax white paper if Australia is to have a modern tax system for the 21st century.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Tony Abbott.
 2015-03-25T03:26:00+00:00 Mike Callaghan The integration of economies and a 'global' rather than a 'national' approach to doing business is challenging tax systems. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a7963c21-1aa3-406d-8b56-b694f8c59525 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a7963c21-1aa3-406d-8b56-b694f8c59525 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Australia-needs-a-modern-and-globalised-tax-system.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a7963c21-1aa3-406d-8b56-b694f8c59525 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/American-Sniper-and-the-craving-for-validation-of-the-Iraq-War.aspx 'American Sniper' and the craving for validation of the Iraq War 2015-03-25T00:20:00+00:00 Robert E Kelly
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American Sniper has emerged as a major hit. It is the best-grossing film of 2014, perhaps even the highest grossing war movie ever. Serious reviews suggest it may be the greatest American war movie of all time. It rates a solid 72% from Rotten Tomatoes. But as the hype dies down, we can better see it in the wider context of other war films. It is actually quite conventional and shows the viewer little that we have not seen before.

But American Sniper is the Iraq War movie that war supporters have been pining for. To use Walter Russell Mead's famous categories of US opinion regarding foreign policy, this is a 'Jacksonian' portrait of the war: US soldiers doing the right thing, bringing a tough, righteous violence on those who deserve it. Consider how conventional the film's portrait actually is according to its two most celebrated aspects:

1. The protagonist suffers personally from the impact of combat exposure

This seems to be the film's strongest selling point, and it is indeed clear that in real life, sniper Chris Kyle (the film's protagonist) and his family found the experience harrowing. But this is hardly an insight, cinematic or otherwise, anymore.

'Soldier's heart' (the old term for what we now call post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD) is so well-known to Western publics at this point that it should act as a break on the use of military force. In film, PTSD is a trope going all the way back to All Quiet on the Western Front. It has been said that any good war film must inevitably be an anti-war film, and showing the brutalising effects of combat, for however noble the cause, has been a constant theme. No serious American director, no matter how patriotic, has made a war movie as ridiculous as John Wayne's Sands of Iwo Jima or Green Berets since then.

Nor, curiously, does the film actually show Kyle suffering all that much compared to others (Stop-Loss deals with this issue more directly). He even says to his post-rotation psychiatrist that he is prepared to stand before God and account for every bullet he fired, an astonishing statement suggesting Kyle was little afflicted by the confusion and guilt common to PTSD sufferers. In fact, the film even flirts with portraying Kyle as more comfortable in combat than at home, an issue raised long ago by Ernest Juenger and toyed with again in The Hurt Locker.

Showing an American soldier enjoying combat, as Platoon and Casualties of War did, would have been truly cinematically disruptive, as America would prefer to see its soldiers as reluctant warriors. And in the end, Eastwood sticks with this morally conventional and less controversial portrait.

2. The combat sequences are ultra-realistic

Surely, but this too is not new. Many Global War on Terror (GWoT) films have gritty, brutal combat sequences that are difficult to watch, with choreography and production supervised by combat veterans, ex-special operators, and so on. Generation Kill, by far the best visual Iraq War portrait so far, was based on book by an embedded journalist and supervised by members of the platoon. Similarly, Lone Survivor was based on the direct experience of a US SEAL in Afghanistan, and in filming Zero Dark Thirty, Kathryn Bigelow was notoriously rumoured to have gained unique access from the White House.

And this is just in the past few years. Vietnam veterans praised Platoon and Full Metal Jacket in their time, and the infamous drill sergeant of Full Metal Jacket was in fact played by a real drill sergeant. Saving Private Ryan, Band of Brothers, and The Pacific all received similar accolades from World War II veterans.

Beyond these two conventional elements, the film has no exceptional selling points. The acting, production values, direction, and so on are fine; Eastwood is clearly talented. But this is not a genre-defining masterpiece like Apocalypse Now or Saving Private Ryan. So what accounts for its huge popularity? I suggest the deep craving of Americans, not just conservatives, to finally see a portrait of this horribly mistaken war that fits our self-image.

Probably the best evidence of this is Fox News' relentless coverage (read: lionisation) of the film over the last three months. This is very much the movie about Iraq that Iraq War supporters have wanted to see for years. Most GWoT films to date have been ambiguous or downers, and while Americans will in time make critical films about Iraq, just as we have about Vietnam, it is likely too soon after 9/11 right now for films like Stop-Loss or Rendition.

So for the 'Jacksonian' set, Eastwood at last lifts the political gloom and gives them what they want. Eastwood has an established reputation of both conservative politics and tough-guy masculinity. Chris Kyle, both in life and the film, clearly believed in the mission and the war. The film shows 9/11 and then shortly cuts to the Iraq War, suggesting a link. That Saddam Hussein was not involved is unmentioned. The villain wears all black, and Kyle kills him in a dramatic slow-mo shot worthy of Call of Duty. Kyle calls the Iraqis 'savages.' All the unpleasant controversies are pleasantly avoided: no mention of pre-war intelligence failures; no hint of the mismanagement and incompetence of the occupation; no discussion of Abu Ghraib or America's heavy-handed search tactics, especially in the early days; no examination of Iraqi nationalism or suggestion that resistance to US occupation had any legitimacy whatsoever. It's all straight-up American hero stuff to balm neocons' frayed sense of American exceptionalism.

One day, with some distance from the war, the searching, honest Apocalypse Now of GWoT films will come. But it is likely too soon. In the interim, try Generation Kill.
 2015-03-25T00:20:00+00:00 Robert E Kelly American Sniper is the Iraq War movie that war supporters have been pining for. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=00865ccb-a8b3-435c-a4b3-7dada725012f 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=00865ccb-a8b3-435c-a4b3-7dada725012f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/American-Sniper-and-the-craving-for-validation-of-the-Iraq-War.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=00865ccb-a8b3-435c-a4b3-7dada725012f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Pacific-Island-links-Cyclone-Pam-relief-effort-World-TB-Day-Aus-PNG-research-collaborations-and-more.aspx Pacific Island links: Cyclone Pam, World TB Day, Aus-PNG research and more 2015-03-24T23:42:00+00:00 Anna Kirk

The latest reports on the impact of Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu have the death toll at 11 with 166 000 people affected on 22 islands. Food and water shortages are still of great concern.

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop visited Vanuatu over the weekend and pledged Australia's long-term support for the recovery effort.

In Kiribati it has become clear that the damage to outer islands hit by the cyclone is much worse than initially thought.

A research team from the University of Technology Sydney elaborates on the strengths and weaknesses of Vanuatu's disaster preparedness plans.

These before and after shots from Vanuatu show just how drastically the natural landscape has changed in parts of the country.

On the Aus-PNG Network, Michelle Redman-MacLaren explains how collaborations between Australian and Papua New Guinean researchers have strengthened HIV research capacity in PNG.

March 24 was World TB Day. Tuberculosis is a growing crisis in PNG, where journalist Jo Chandler contracted a multi-drug resistant form. Here she reflects on her experience of the disease compared to what she witnessed in PNG.

Medecins Sans Frontieres has been using new technologies to track tuberculosis in remote areas of PNG.

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 2015-03-24T23:42:00+00:00 Anna Kirk Links to this week's best ereading on the Pacific Islands region. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=1a1a18f8-6828-4433-aea3-1e99f8abed5e 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=1a1a18f8-6828-4433-aea3-1e99f8abed5e http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Pacific-Island-links-Cyclone-Pam-relief-effort-World-TB-Day-Aus-PNG-research-collaborations-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=1a1a18f8-6828-4433-aea3-1e99f8abed5e http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Yes-military-personnel-can-think-strategically.aspx Yes, military personnel can think strategically 2015-03-24T21:28:00+00:00 Jim Molan

An article in last weekend's The Saturday Paper on the supposed affinity between ex-military personnel and the Coalition Government lists the ex-military now serving in parliament and those (me) wanting to serve in parliament, and quotes Professor Hugh White at his patronising best:

...at one level, it is good to have former military people in the parliament, and any increase in their representation reflects the rise in prominence of the ADF since deployment to East Timor in 1999. However, he adds that it would be wrong to assume former ADF personnel necessarily possess the strategic abilities needed for setting sound defence policy. 'The ADF is not a strategic organisation. It is very much focused at the tactical level,' he says. 'One of the risks is that military personnel are given more deference than they deserve.'

This is an unworthy generalisation. Perhaps Hugh has watched too many re-run documentaries about the Cuban missile crisis. JFK said: 'The first advice I am going to give my successor is to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn'. So no one denies that, based on this example, some generals at some time may not have possessed the strategic abilities to give sound defence advice. But then again JFK, a civilian president, initiated US involvement in Vietnam.

I thought governments set defence policy, not generals.

I am aware that the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence give advice on such matters. I am not aware that there has recently been a massive split between a CDF and a secretary over such advice, though Hugh could know something I don't. To make Hugh's statement true, the advice given by a CDF to the government on defence policy would have to have been inadequate, and a non-military person, probably the Secretary, stepped in to correct the advice because he, as a civilian, possessed the strategic abilities needed for sound defence policy. And then of course, the government would have to have accepted the Secretary's advice over the CDF's because, much as Hugh and many others don't like it, the government of the day defines what is sound defence policy, just as Papal infallibility is assisted by the Pope defining infallibility.

I suspect something else is going on here: those who argue that current or retired military personnel lack the strategic abilities needed for setting sound defence policy simply don't agree with the advice those people are offering.

I would have let Hugh's remarks pass except that I noticed this thread of articles. A civilian analyst is arguing with several retired and serving officers about the future of the army and how it should be structured and equipped. The analyst does not agree with current defence policy as laid down by a conservative Coalition government, in which the Government wants the option to deploy land forces outside a narrowly defined region. Because this does not align with the personal view of the analyst, he decries the policy and the capabilities that enable it.

Even Professor White falls for this one. He characterises the procurement of a capability to enable the army to actually achieve what the Government wants as 'a big waste of money and a big strategic mistake' because he does not agree with the Government's defence policy.

The approach such people take is that when their preferred defence policy is not adopted by government, they advocate only those capabilities that match their defence policy. This is generally a civilian trait as the military know that once a military policy has been decided on, it is they who have to make it work. Continued argument is a luxury.

But I don't dismiss these fine people just because they have no idea about military operations and therefore stay at the vague level of clever strategic posturing. Still, if professors are permitted to be arrogant in their generalisations, then permit me to at least be blunt in my reply: no one should be permitted to give strategic advice involving the military unless they have at least a familiarity with military operations and tactics. The uniform currently or once worn is irrelevant. I know civilians who can and have done it, but not many. The greatest gift of anyone who calls themselves a strategist must be the ability to align policy, strategy and its implementation.

Because I am ex-military, I have worked at the highest levels of government, taking policy through strategy to successful implementation, and I strongly object to Hugh's generalised views of myself and my military colleagues.

Leave the strategy for the bright civilians and the implementation through operations and tactics to the simple soldiers? What a recipe for a disaster. The most prominent recent example I can think of is US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's ignorant rejection of military advice on the number of troops needed to occupy Iraq in 2003, and President Obama's rejection of military advice on the importance of leaving behind in Iraq a residual force of US troops in 2011.

I wonder if these failures of policy and strategy by the non-military balance out the Cuban missile crisis?

Photo by Flickr user Len Matthews.
 2015-03-24T21:28:00+00:00 Jim Molan If professors are permitted to be arrogant in their generalisations, then permit me to at least be blunt in my reply http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=7e147cb2-0500-4687-9ed1-eff18f1f55c1 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=7e147cb2-0500-4687-9ed1-eff18f1f55c1 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/25/Yes-military-personnel-can-think-strategically.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=7e147cb2-0500-4687-9ed1-eff18f1f55c1 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/How-much-similarity-between-the-Khmer-Rouge-and-ISIS.aspx Are the Khmer Rouge and ISIS similar? 2015-03-24T06:16:00+00:00 Milton Osborne
Elliot Brennan's comparison between the Khmer Rouge and ISIS raises a number of questions.

No one is more aware than I of the terrible cost of Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. It was a period that devastated a country I knew well, and which led to the death, as Elliot rightly notes, of at least 1.7 million people, including several of my close friends.

But there are several reasons for offering a more nuanced view of what occurred under the Pol Pot regime than Elliot suggests, and reasons for wondering whether the Cambodian experience has all that much to tell us about what is happening in the Middle East. There are also some factual points that need adjustment.

The fact that the US bombing campaign had a terrible cost is beyond dispute. However, the revelations that bombing began in 1964 under President Johnson, before Nixon's authorisation of Operation Menu, which lasted from 1969 to 1973, needs to be put against the fact that little of this bombing, however damaging it may have been, was in populated areas. During the more than six months I traveled around Cambodia in 1966 (including in the northeast of the country), there was simply no general awareness that bombing was taking place.

There is another problem in relation to the bombing. While it is quite clear that the Khmer Rouge made the bombing a successful basis for propaganda and recruitment, we simply cannot say with any certainty just how much this contributed to its recruitment campaigns. Interviews with former Khmer Rouge cadres can only tell part of the story. For the record, I have acknowledged the importance of the bombing for recruitment in my book Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy.

More to the point, and on an issue of fact, the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk was not the result of the American bombing campaign, as Elliot suggests. The coup was mounted by men of the Cambodian right who had been Sihanouk's close associates. It is not correct to link the bombing and the March 1970 coup. The best account of the coup is provided by David Chandler in his book The Tragedy of Cambodian History, where he describes the anti-Vietnamese feeling and resentment of Sihanouk's consort's family as prime factors in his overthrow.

As to the extent to which the bombing explains later Khmer Rouge actions, I think this is far from clear.

Philip Short's excellent biography of Pol Pot presents a picture of a man and his close associates who were ready to transform Cambodia well before the US bombing took place. As for the phrase 'Year Zero', now so routinely associated with the Khmer Rouge, David Chandler, whose judgment I accept, maintains that this was never used by them. The term was originally associated, it is suggested, with Lenin. But it seems to have gained currency in relation to Cambodia because of its use as a book title by Francois Ponchaud, Cambodge Année Zéro.

What were the Khmer leaders' views of Cambodia's past?

As Elliot notes, Pol Pot referred to Cambodia's Angkorian past as a symbol of what the nation he now ruled over could achieve. So it is not all that surprising that the physical symbols of the past were not destroyed by the Khmer Rouge regime. While looting on a major scale took place in the Angkor region after the Khmer Rouge was defeated in 1979, there is no evidence of the Khmer Rouge setting out to damage the Angkor temples while it was in power. Indeed, the one serious instance of damage at Angkor Wat appears to have been the result of a missile launched by Lon Nol forces.

The priceless treasures in Phnom Penh's National Museum remained untouched while Pol Pot was in power. And despite claims made in some editions of the Lonely Planet Guide to Cambodia that the Silver Pagoda was looted, my own judgment is that the collection of Buddha images that can be seen there today is very much the same as could be seen before 1975. The one notable loss from the royal palace in the 1975-79 period was the royal regalia. The sacred sword, known as the Preah Khan or 'Lightening of Indra', has never been recovered.

Action against genocidal groups is indeed a necessity. But one cannot readily equate one genocidal group with another. The lack of a religious element in the Cambodian genocide (or 'auto-genocide', to use Jean Lacouture's term) is surely vitally important given the central role religion plays in the beliefs of ISIS.

In short, one genocide may have some similarity with another, but it is just as important to give due weight to the differences between them.

Photo courtesy of Wikipedia Commons.
 2015-03-24T06:16:00+00:00 Milton Osborne Action against genocidal groups is indeed a necessity. But one cannot readily equate one genocidal group with another. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9ba3fe65-2921-4220-b720-ffa25b0f8403 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9ba3fe65-2921-4220-b720-ffa25b0f8403 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/How-much-similarity-between-the-Khmer-Rouge-and-ISIS.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9ba3fe65-2921-4220-b720-ffa25b0f8403 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/UK-budget-expansionary-austerity.aspx UK budget: A test for 'expansionary austerity' 2015-03-24T03:14:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville
The 2008 global financial crisis provided a rare test-bed for macroeconomics — an opportunity to sort out some old controversies. One issue dominated the debate during the recovery phase: with national budgets and official debt pushed up by the crisis, should budget austerity be imposed as a matter of priority to reduce debt levels?

In this debate, the UK was seen as the clearest test-case — described by one observer as a 'laboratory rat.' The latest UK budget provides an opportunity to evaluate the test, and ask whether it is relevant here in Australia.

Some of the deficit and debt growth in the crisis-affected countries came from the need to bail out collapsing financial sectors. But the larger and more persistent factor was the sudden and sharp fall in GDP, followed by a lacklustre recovery.

In 2009, in the immediate aftermath of the shock, global policy-makers were unanimous in agreeing that automatic stabilisers (the budget components which automatically respond to soften the effects of the cycle, such as higher unemployment benefits and lower tax takings) should be allowed to take budgets into larger deficit. The G20 gave its seal of approval. So far so good.

Then, around the end of 2009, the Greek debt crisis arrived.

Policy incompetence in a country smaller than the state of Victoria set off a market panic in the European periphery that focused global policy attention on official debt levels everywhere. Fears of Greek insolvency were translated into global insolvency concerns. The three most influential global financial institutions – the IMF, OECD and Bank for International Settlements – all strongly urged budget austerity focused on getting government debt down.

Some academics argued that if debt tipped over a critical trigger level (just a bit higher than where many countries found themselves), economic growth and recovery would collapse. Others revived an arcane view that budget austerity would actually be expansionary, with austerity boosting confidence so effectively that private sector expansion would outweigh the budget contraction. Economist-blogger Paul Krugman dubbed this the 'confidence fairy' effect.

Indisputably, the European periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) was in such deep trouble that severe budget austerity was necessary, no matter how painful. But everyone joined in. Abruptly and universally, budgetary policy switched from supportive to contractionary.

The UK was the prime test-case for this new wisdom.

The newly-installed chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, endorsed the 'expansionary austerity' mantra. Certainly, the budget deficit was alarmingly high, temporarily inflated by the cost of bailing out the UK's bloated global banks. Undoubtedly, there was fat in the budget which would, at some stage, have to be trimmed. The critical question, however, was the pace of budgetary reform. Was it better to go 'cold turkey' (including raising the VAT — the equivalent of our GST — and cancelling infrastructure projects), or support the recovery while committing to make structural reforms in more favourable times?

We can now judge this experiment. The taut austerity was maintained for 2010 and 2011, in which time the UK economy stagnated in the trough of the cycle. A good recovery started in 2013, but it was only at the end of 2014 that UK GDP returned to where it had been in 2007, before the crisis. The current budget has set off a strident argument over whether living standards have in fact returned to pre-crisis levels.

This belated recovery has been taken by some (not least the Chancellor) as a vindication of austerity. But what about the seven years of lost potential output? Even with the strong recovery, GDP is 16% below the medium-term growth trend. Unemployment is down, but productivity (the source of rising living standards) has stagnated. Was this the best that could be done?

More damaging for the 'expansionary austerity' theory, the UK had already departed from its planned path of budget austerity by 2012, pushing back the target for budget balance. The latest budget pushes it back even further; three or four years later than originally planned. The structural budget balance has hardly changed in the past two years.

The recovery should be linked to this easing of fiscal austerity, rather than be seen as a vindication of the initial harshness. Nevertheless, the Chancellor's hair-shirt rhetoric remains unchanged even in the current budget. To do otherwise would raise the question of whether the initial pain was really necessary after all.

Budget austerity has also seriously distorted monetary policy.

The initial hope for UK growth was that fiscal austerity could be balanced by abnormally accommodative monetary policy – near-zero interest rates and huge quantitative easing. But monetary policy is a weaker instrument than fiscal policy, and couldn't offset the budget contraction. The long period of low interest rates has eroded pension incomes and given misleading price signals to investment. Quantitative easing has distorted bank balance sheets, weighing them down with unwanted excess liquidity. Macro policy has been seriously out of balance. Yet in international discussions, some hold up the UK experience as an enviable model. Even here in Australia the new Treasury Secretary, John Fraser, called the UK austerity policy a 'clear success'.

The UK experience seems to confirm some old lessons: when you tighten the budget, the economy slows; the 'confidence fairy' is still imaginary; and there is no painless schedule for structural budget reform.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Number 10.
 2015-03-24T03:14:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville This belated recovery has been taken by some (not least, the Chancellor) as vindication of austerity. But what about the seven years of lost potential output? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=e11566f4-3f8e-457d-9236-9e583c1d0aad 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=e11566f4-3f8e-457d-9236-9e583c1d0aad http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/UK-budget-expansionary-austerity.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=e11566f4-3f8e-457d-9236-9e583c1d0aad http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Shambaughs-coming-chinese-crack-up.aspx Shambaugh and the coming Chinese crack-up 2015-03-24T00:28:00+00:00 Nadège Rolland
David Shambaugh's opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal proclaiming that the 'endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun' has mostly stirred scepticism and criticism from the community of China watchers. Some have questioned the author's personal motivations; others have criticised his arguments or dismissed his conclusions. Judging from the insulting personal attacks on Shambaugh from two major English-language Chinese media outlets, his essay also touched a raw nerve in China.

Shambaugh is not an obscure commentator on China's politics, but a sound, respected expert and a perspicacious analyst of China's domestic and international developments. His book China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, completed in 2007, did a groundbreaking job in showing how the Party was evolving and adapting to 'legitimize, reinstitutionalize and save itself'. Shambaugh's recent op-ed is not about a 'volte face' or 'flip-flopping'. Rather, it reflects a growing concern about China's overall direction because of the challenges the world's second-biggest economy is facing, and the way the Party appears to be responding to them.

Roderick MacFarquhar, another highly respected scholar, raised similar concerns in an interview with the New York Times' Sinosphere blog last January. MacFarquhar mentioned the erosion of ideology and the anti-corruption campaign as being major risks for the Chinese regime. There is, he said, a 'danger for the party collapsing as it did in Russia, or danger of a leadership coalition against Xi Jinping'.

It takes a certain audacity to toy with the idea of a coming Chinese crack-up, knowing perfectly well that collapsist or doom-laden prophecies can easily be brushed away as being sensationalist or even irrational. But when it comes from seasoned China watchers such as Shambaugh and MacFarquhar, one would be wise to listen carefully.

China observers too often assume that China's rise is going to be linear, and that its ascendency is irrevocable. Shaking the foundations of this conventional wisdom is not a bad thing. To the contrary, it gives us an opportunity to think out of the box and to take a closer look at the weaknesses and vulnerabilities the Asian giant is facing. Which, incidentally, is just what the Chinese authorities are doing. The 2015 version of the Chinese Communist Party bears little resemblance to the 1949, 1966, 1978, 1989 or even 2007 versions. Over the years, Chinese elites have constantly taken their country's pulse, observing the environment and drawing conclusions for new directions to be followed.

The nature and essence of the Party dictate its first and most crucial objective: to stay in power. With this objective comes a profound sense of insecurity and vulnerability.

It is now well known that huge amounts of Chinese time, brainpower and resources have been devoted to the study of the Soviet collapse and to thinking about options for China's one-party state to avoid the same fate as its Soviet counterpart. For years after the Tiananmen massacre, the 'social contract' between the ruling party and the Chinese population has consisted of the delivery of economic growth in exchange for unquestioning acceptance of the Party's authority. As China's experiences what Secretary General Xi Jinping calls the 'new normal' (ie. slower growth and a faltering economy), there are growing questions about the Party's ability to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of Chinese citizens. Examples of rifts within the Party (the Bo Xilai case and the current anti-corruption campaign are only the most recent) add to the general feeling of an emerging political crisis.

China does face daunting challenges. A corrupted state capitalism, dreadful pollution and environmental damage, high income inequalities and growing social disparities, and rising social discontent are among the issues with which the Party must struggle.

Is the Party able to acknowledge these problems for what they are, and not through ideological lenses? And most importantly, how will the ruling elite respond? Will they choose the path of reforms, and if so, will the regime be able to live with a growing contradiction between the need for good governance and the intrinsic limitations of a Leninist system? Will they revert to all-out repression and control? The Arab Spring showed us that growing tensions between the socio-economic situation and its political (mis-)management can produce unexpected outcomes. Despite its resilience so far, China may not be immune from such shocks.

Even if Chinese and Westerners both acknowledge that weaknesses and vulnerabilities exist, their remedies will probably not coincide. Whenever Westerners talk about 'political vulnerabilities' or 'regime crackup', the Chinese will hear 'colour revolutions' and 'hostile forces' trying to bring a 'regime change' in Beijing. Where Westerners see salvation only in democracy, the Chinese leadership will answer that legitimacy doesn't grow out of a ballot box.

Despite Western hopes that China will eventually join the club of liberal democracies, there is growing evidence that the West will have to live with a China that constantly reinvents itself in ways that we do not necessarily like, and with consequences that few among us would like to even think about. For this reason, pondering the improbable, as Shambaugh did, remains an essential contribution to the China debate.

Photo by Flickr user Malthri.
 2015-03-24T00:28:00+00:00 Nadège Rolland It takes a certain audacity to toy with the idea of a coming Chinese crack-up, knowing perfectly well that such prophecies can be brushed away as being sensationalist or even irrational. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9febf12b-8bfc-4c5b-b182-a9fbd2393c2a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9febf12b-8bfc-4c5b-b182-a9fbd2393c2a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Shambaughs-coming-chinese-crack-up.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9febf12b-8bfc-4c5b-b182-a9fbd2393c2a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Development-and-air-conditioning.aspx Development and air conditioning 2015-03-23T23:32:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
With Lee Kuan Yew having just passed away, an old quote of his has resurfaced:

Question: Anything else besides multicultural tolerance that enabled Singapore's success?

Answer: Air conditioning. Air conditioning was a most important invention for us, perhaps one of the signal inventions of history. It changed the nature of civilization by making development possible in the tropics. Without air conditioning you can work only in the cool early-morning hours or at dusk. The first thing I did upon becoming prime minister was to install air conditioners in buildings where the civil service worked. This was key to public efficiency.

Any economists or development experts out there who would like to evaluate this claim? Please email me on email@example.com.

(H/t Vox.)
 2015-03-23T23:32:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen Lee Kuan Yew: 'Air conditioning was a most important invention for us, perhaps one of the signal inventions of history.' http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a2eb6c24-9fd3-47ae-9df8-6e50345fdac4 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a2eb6c24-9fd3-47ae-9df8-6e50345fdac4 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Development-and-air-conditioning.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a2eb6c24-9fd3-47ae-9df8-6e50345fdac4 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Southeast-Asia-Australia-Vietnam-Malaysias-hudud-Jokowi-on-South-China-Sea-white-cards.aspx Southeast Asia links: Malaysia's hudud, Jokowi on SCS, Myanmar's umbrellas, LKY and more 2015-03-23T22:28:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan

During the visit of the Vietnamese PM to Australia last week, the two countries agreed to an enhanced comprehensive partnership. The Government's view of proceedings here, the WSJ's take on the visit and, most comprehensively, Carl Thayer's look here.

New Zealand and Vietnam also strengthened ties.

In a worrying sign of appeasement, Malaysia's ruling party joined with the opposition to pass hudud law in the opposition-held Kelantan.

Jokowi said that Beijing's claims in the South China Sea have no legal base. Meanwhile, Japan and Indonesia agreed to strengthen defence ties.

An interesting round up of satellite imagery of the Spratly Islands.

Myanmar welcomed the Solar Impulse 2 plane in what was a highly symbolic visit in a country where the majority of citizens still don't have access to electricity. The landing was attended by President Thein Sein and Army Chief Min Aung Hlaing.

Social media was abuzz this week with the shoddy photoshopping of an umbrella over a deputy minister in Myanmar.

Why ASEAN isn't pressuring Myanmar to reform, Nikolay Anguelov explains in Foreign Affairs. Also in Foreign Affairs (a special addition on ISIS), Joseph Chinyong Liow looked at ISIS's spread through Southeast Asia.

Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition party expelled 20,000 temporary citizenship holders from its ranks ahead of the government's request for the controversial 'white cards' return.

Michael Vatikiotis argued that the US must support peace more forcefully in the Philippines.

The region's newspapers have been full of praise for Lee Kuan Yew, who died on Monday. Singapore's Prime Minister's Office released this tribute to the man who built an impossible nation:

[youtube:R3AC66_6U0M]

 2015-03-23T22:28:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan Links to this week's best Southeast Asia reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=e7389b6f-3aa1-4d6d-8a2d-ad68a332d164 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=e7389b6f-3aa1-4d6d-8a2d-ad68a332d164 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Southeast-Asia-Australia-Vietnam-Malaysias-hudud-Jokowi-on-South-China-Sea-white-cards.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=e7389b6f-3aa1-4d6d-8a2d-ad68a332d164 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Tokyos-unsettled-spring.aspx AIIB, World War II, and more: Tokyo's unsettled spring 2015-03-23T21:34:00+00:00 Christopher Pokarier
Last Friday the Abe Government shifted publicly towards a more favourable position on foundation membership of China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

This follows dramatic developments during the week as Germany, France and Italy followed the UK's sudden lead in committing to the AIIB, with more favourable reassessments under way in Australia and South Korea too. Cascading interest in joining is in response to Beijing's insistence that founding membership of the AIIB be finalised this month. The UK's decision came in for criticism from the US.

Japan has shared American concerns that the AIIB plan is aimed at enhancing Chinese influence in the region, and that it will be at cross-purposes with the IMF, World Bank, and most notably, the Asian Development Bank. The latter has long been significantly influenced and supported financially by Tokyo and by custom has been headed by a Japanese. Current Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda, principal architect of the massive quantitative-easing component of 'Abenomics', served as ADB president for eight years prior to heading up the BoJ. Kuroda has spoken publicly of the ADB's long-established know how and that it should continue to be used.

In a sitting of the Diet's budget committee, an opposition lawmaker quizzed Prime Minister Abe on whether Japan was in danger of being left out as other nations lined up to join the AIIB. Abe said his Government would consider membership if it could be assured of transparency in the AIIB's governance. Abe, perhaps a little disingenuously in light of concerns about China's motivations in proposing the AIIB, stated that it might present an opportunity to integrate China, now the second largest economy in the world, into a cooperative rules-based international order.

Finance Minister Taro Aso also left the door open to membership, saying that Japan wanted assurances on standards of governance and financial sustainability. In particular, he said the board of directors should have direct oversight of loan decisions. He said Japan had not yet received replies to the questions it has posed. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga struck a more cautious note, reflecting divisions of opinion and general wariness within the Government and bureaucracy on whether Japan would have influence within the AIIB while lending legitimacy to it through membership.

Japanese policymakers remain sensitive to arguments about the primacy of existing international institutions after Japan's proposal for a new regional fund in the wake of the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis was stymied by Washington as needlessly impinging on the IMF's brief.

Some Japanese media commentary suggested rising private sector concern that business opportunities in regional infrastructure provision, long a national competitive strength, might be lost if Japan stayed out of the AIIB. Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey is speaking openly of how the Abbott Government wants Australian businesses to get work from the AIIB. The race for such opportunity puts both Washington and Tokyo in an an awkward position in relation to the AIIB.

The AIIB issue has arisen at a time of quiet in China-Japan relations following the meeting between Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014. But the approaching 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II, and Abe's ongoing deliberations about developing an official statement, means this quiet period comes with a clear end-date. There is considerable foreboding in Tokyo about Beijing's expected demeanour come August and beyond.

In other news from last Friday, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party reached formal agreement with its small coalition partner Komeito on the terms and timetable for introducing legislation to permit greater involvement by the Self Defence Forces (SDF) in collective security arrangements. As anticipated, the pacifistic Buddhist Sokka Gakkai-affiliated Komeito received undertakings on the limited conditions under which the SDF might deploy force.

Friday also marked the twentieth anniversary of the Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks, carried out by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo. A memorial service was held at the Kasumigaseki subway station at the heart of the national bureaucratic district, which had been targeted by Aum in what is now depicted in Japan as the world's first chemical weapon terrorist attack. The Aum sarin attacks highlighted how Japan's post-war decentralised policing structure hampered investigation. Subsequent reforms were tentative.

In sum, Friday brought multiple reminders that post-war Japan has not been a 'normal' country in terms of its state capacities to police, defend, or even gather intelligence at home and abroad, as well as to involve itself in international aid and development. The Japanese take institution-building seriously, as they feel so heavily the constraints of them at home.

Also on Friday, school holidays started for many; the academic calendar is calibrated to start and finish with the brief fragile beauty of the cherry blossoms. Springtime in Japan is deeply culturally associated with the permanence of impermanence. Thoughts turn to what is constant, and what is to be memorialised. It is a time of anticipation, of new starts in school and work. Yet the weather is typically unsettled and spring defies use as a metaphor for unambiguously positive change.
 2015-03-23T21:34:00+00:00 Christopher Pokarier http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=1edd42fd-22d5-4d4f-a84a-4a8a5dc11199 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=1edd42fd-22d5-4d4f-a84a-4a8a5dc11199 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/24/Tokyos-unsettled-spring.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=1edd42fd-22d5-4d4f-a84a-4a8a5dc11199 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Malcolm-Fraser-A-man-of-foreign-policy-principle.aspx Malcolm Fraser: A man of foreign policy principle 2015-03-23T05:40:00+00:00 James Curran
Much of the commentary surrounding the sad and unexpected passing of Malcolm Fraser has rightly focused on his record in opposing continued white majority rule in the former Rhodesia and his implacable opposition to apartheid in South Africa.

Fraser's record on these issues, as Bob Hawke commented in recent days, was 'absolutely impeccable'. And his decision to welcome thousands of Indo-Chinese refugees in the wake of the fall of Saigon can be fairly judged as the moment when 'White Australia' was buried once and for all.

But few have stopped to consider the underlying patterns which gave shape to Fraser's global outlook and his ideas about Australia's place in the world.

It is too often forgotten that Fraser was one of the first on his side of politics to welcome the advent of a new, multi-racial Commonwealth in the 1950s and 60s. Not for him the morbid recital of Kiplingesque odes as the sun set on the British Empire. In 1961 he supported the expulsion of South Africa in order to make the Commonwealth a 'stronger moral force'. That put him directly at odds with Menzies' position, which was to refuse comment on the internal affairs of another Commonwealth country.

Even Britain's first application to join the EEC from 1961-63, which provoked widespread panic among his parliamentary colleagues, was greeted by Fraser as an event that would give a new impetus to the inevitable weakening of Australia's traditional ties with Britain.

The other dimension to the Fraser worldview, of course, was his hard-headed realism. Throughout his formal political career he consistently warned of the 'lessons of Munich'. If necessary, military force was required to prevent a repetition of the aggressive nationalism of the 1930s which had catapulted the world into war.

These ideas had not been plucked out of the air for political expediency. They defined him. And they had emerged from his sustained effort to try and make sense of the post-war world.

As a student at Oxford in the late 1940s Fraser had read and been seized by Arnold Toynbee's Study of History. In his 12-volume work, Toynbee had developed the theme of 'challenge and response', which held that challenges presented to communities by various external forces demanded a particular response. That response dictated the success or failure of a society, a thesis many quickly applied to the threat posed by Soviet communism to the West's way of life.

Fraser applied this Toynbean view of history to many of his speeches on foreign affairs at the height of the Cold War. Like Menzies, he demanded that in an increasingly unstable Southeast Asian environment, Australia needed 'great and powerful' friends to shield itself from the 'downwards thrust' of Asian communism. 'Our survival', he said in 1964, 'depends on the United States'. Fraser was one of the more articulate defenders of Australia's role in Vietnam. Aggressors, he said, understood only force or the threat of force. There was always a sense of 'clear and present danger' in Fraser's foreign policy rhetoric.

But as prime minister, Fraser was distinctly more anti-Soviet than anti-communist. Indeed in his first major foreign policy statement he proposed a new realism for dealing with threats to the regional balance of power. 'In our relations with other countries', he said, 'the ideology of regimes is not irrelevant but it cannot be the guiding principle of our policy'. It was a significant shift in Fraser's worldview.

That shift was seen most clearly during his visit to China in 1976. That his first overseas trip as PM was to Beijing and Tokyo showed his awareness that the departure of Australia's 'great and powerful friends' from the region imposed a new urgency on the need to learn to live with its Asian neighbours. When Fraser was asked by journalists to explain why he had chosen to visit these capitals first, instead of the customary pilgrimage to London and Washington, his response was simple, yet striking: 'The world changes'. The idea, he added, of 'taking you back to simplistic pasts, a relationship with Britain or a relationship with America that was almost the end result in foreign policy', was no longer possible. Things were now 'much more complex, more difficult'.

Nevertheless it is true that Fraser, who had denounced Whitlam's ground-breaking visit to Beijing in 1971 as a 'disgrace', saw the new relationship with China in terms of classic realpolitik. China was a potential ally to keep Soviet ambitions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans at bay.

To this end Fraser proposed the formation of a quadrilateral alliance between China, Australia, the US and Japan to contain Soviet ambitions. Fraser's idea bore no fruit, but it was the mark of a new era. What had happened to the Australian perception of China as the source of all insurgencies and disturbance in the region? Moreover, The proposal was made without first consulting Washington. Before 1972, no Australian government would have ventured on such a course without first clearing it with the British or the Americans.

Fraser, much like Whitlam before him, maintained a policy of greater self-reliance within the American alliance. He stressed that the 'interests of the United States and the interests of Australia are not necessarily identical'. To the National Press Club in Washington in 1976 he dismissed the idea of uncritical obeisance, denying that 'concurrence and common action means subordination to the larger nation'. As Fraser put it during a speech in 1982, the alliance was a 'full blooded relationship...between equals'.

A strident critic of détente, Fraser cast it as a policy of weakness, a throwback to the Munich policy of appeasement. It was clear he had little time for Jimmy Carter. Only with the inauguration of Reagan in 1981 did Fraser believe that the free world had a leader who embodied the 'remobilisation of will in the United States'. The two leaders developed a relationship of mutual respect.

It was perhaps not surprising, then, that in one of their final telephone conversations before Fraser's loss to Bob Hawke in March 1983, Reagan told the Australian leader that he would 'say a prayer' for him. Fraser had cancelled a proposed visit to Washington on account of the campaign, but Reagan had broken with protocol by telling Fraser that that he looked forward to seeing him after an election victory. Of course, it was not to be, and even Reagan's advisers realised that their boss had gone beyond the usual caution in speaking to a foreign leader facing re-election. Nevertheless, one of them added, 'if Prime Minister Fraser wins, we are way ahead because he will realise the President took the risk based upon his personal regard for the man. If Hawke wins, the chances of the conversation becoming public are not high, thus we could still deal with the new prime minister'.

Fraser's views on the Third World were also linked to his concern about the spread of Soviet strategic influence. He accepted the substance of Owen Harries' landmark report into Australia's relations with the Third World: policy was to rest upon a combination of Western sensitivity to 'any significant gains made by the Soviet Union in the Third World', a consideration of 'direct political and economic self-interest and the more 'altruistic, humanitarian dimensions'.

Fraser's fear of Soviet infiltration climaxed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. There was a sense of personal vindication when he pointed out that his long-held view of Soviet expansionism, 'often stated when it was an unpopular view' and 'expressed many times over many years', had been 'proved tragically right'. However, given the extent to which he had committed himself emotionally and intellectually to the fight, being 'proved right' gave him little comfort. In fact, as he solemnly added, 'that gives me no great pleasure at all'. He advocated a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, even telling those athletes who decided to go that their medals would be 'devalued medals', much like those that had been won at the Berlin games in 1936.

Later in life Fraser did come to change his views on some of these questions, most notably the US alliance. Those shifts are well documented. But Paul Hasluck's appraisal of Fraser might remain a fitting epitaph for the former prime minister: 'He at least is a man who believes in something and who works at his beliefs'.

Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.
 2015-03-23T05:40:00+00:00 James Curran Fraser's ideas were not plucked out of the air for political expediency. They defined him. And they had emerged from his sustained effort to try and make sense of the post-war world. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=d2fe80a7-de75-4417-b50f-e2e79af57f38 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=d2fe80a7-de75-4417-b50f-e2e79af57f38 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Malcolm-Fraser-A-man-of-foreign-policy-principle.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=d2fe80a7-de75-4417-b50f-e2e79af57f38 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Chlorine-bomb-reveals-Indonesias-ISIS-worries.aspx Chlorine bomb reveals Indonesia's ISIS worries 2015-03-23T05:01:00+00:00 Catriona Croft-Cusworth
[youtube:MsZhf2OnMKQ]

A small explosion in a Jakarta shopping centre late last month has Indonesian authorities concerned that local radicals may be adopting tactics from ISIS. The explosion in ITC Depok, a tech shopping centre in the Greater Jakarta area, came from a poorly made device consisting of batteries, paint tins and wires inside a cardboard box. The homemade bomb, left unattended in a men's bathroom, appeared not to have detonated properly, and no-one was hurt. But what has alarmed police and anti-terror forces is that the device contained a substance known to be used by ISIS: chlorine gas.

Indonesia's National Police, like terrorism expert Sidney Jones, see the use of chlorine gas in the failed attack as a warning that ISIS influence could pose a threat to Indonesia's security, especially with the possible return of ISIS supporters from the Middle East. Police say 514 Indonesian ISIS supporters are known to have left for Syria and Iraq, though this number could be outdated, since it has remained the cited figure since the end of last year. Other reports show a growing number of Indonesians attempting to join ISIS.

Indonesian media this month have been focused on the disappearance of 16 Indonesian nationals who joined a tour group to Turkey in January. Three families — including men, women, children and infants — separated from their tour group at the Istanbul airport, saying they wanted to stay with family members in Turkey for a few days before rejoining the tour. They kept in contact with the tour guide for two days before disappearing. Earlier this month, Turkish authorities detained 16 people believed to be Indonesian nationals (several did not carry passports) as they attempted to cross the Syrian border. Strangely enough, Turkish and Indonesian authorities have confirmed that these were not the same 16 who went missing in Istanbul. The group also consisted of families, including children.

Assuming that the arrested Indonesians were attempting to cross into Syria to join ISIS, the fact that they were traveling with their families lends weight to the theory advanced by Princeton University Professor of Near Eastern Studies Bernard Haykel in an interview with The Interpreter's Sam Roggeveen last week. Professor Haykel argued that those leaving their home countries to join ISIS see it as a permanent relocation, which is why they tend to bring their families along. In contrast to al Qaeda supporters, it would appear that ISIS supporters have no intention of returning to their home country as trained terrorists.

Also unlike al Qaeda, the struggle of ISIS has been described as a 'war within Islam' between extremist Sunnis and moderate Muslims of various creeds. It's no wonder this ideology has found little support among Indonesia's majority-moderate Muslim population. Though the number of ISIS supporters is growing, it remains a fraction of the total population of 250 million, even smaller than the fraction of the Australian population joining the foreign ranks of ISIS. Public notices rejecting ISIS have been displayed in Jakarta neighbourhoods since last year. The central government has officially denounced the group, as has ASEAN.

The question now being asked in Indonesian media is whether those found to have joined ISIS should have their Indonesian citizenship revoked. The Republic of Indonesia has a long history of rejecting groups that want to establish an Islamic state in its territory, a struggle that predates the country's independence. Supporters of ISIS are viewed in a similar way to separatists that threaten the unity of the state, a position that is not tolerated.

Nonetheless, the use of chlorine gas in Depok and the arrival of Indonesian citizens on the Syrian border show that the ISIS ideology remains a cause for concern in relation to Indonesia's security.
 2015-03-23T05:01:00+00:00 Catriona Croft-Cusworth The use of chlorine gas in the failed attack is a warning that ISIS influence could pose a threat to Indonesia's security. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=79960053-d85b-4157-bd8d-6907ef59230b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=79960053-d85b-4157-bd8d-6907ef59230b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Chlorine-bomb-reveals-Indonesias-ISIS-worries.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=79960053-d85b-4157-bd8d-6907ef59230b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Chinas-ruling-party-is-not-afraid-of-the-middle-class.aspx China's ruling party is not afraid of the middle class 2015-03-23T02:38:00+00:00 Julian Snelder
Xi Jinping's new governing vision, the Four Comprehensives, has been unveiled: to build a moderately prosperous society, deepen reform, rule by law, and enforce party discipline (all done 'comprehensively'). With its clunky name and unsurprising agenda, this new 'political theory' has been relentlessly paraded by mainstream media. More intriguing is the focus given by editors, reflecting Xi's deeper message: the middle class loves the Chinese Communist Party and will never confront it. The urban elite, a 'vital rational voice', is 'critical to maintaining social stability.' Building a middle class society 'would only support the legitimacy of the Chinese ruling party.'

Who is China's 'middle class'? Understanding this is a question with deep political significance, for example with respect to housing. It is also a priority for marketeers, eagerly following the habits and attitudes of China's consumer economy. So it's useful to look at some findings from surveys of wealth, income and spending. Like many societies, China is a pyramid. The top 1% are truly rich, as I will discuss briefly here. It's the next 10-20% who most accurately can be depicted as China's middle class.

China's list of billionaires is not just growing meteorically, from a handful a decade ago to over 350 last year, it also is highly dynamic, with new names appearing seemingly from nowhere. An active IPO market helps. Whereas western countries tend to be fairly static in their billionaire rankings, China has demonstrated impressive wealth mobility as its first generation of self-made entrepreneurs matures. Historically, such people would keep a low profile in China, aware of 'the curse of Forbes'. Nowadays, because many companies are public, their net worth is fairly transparent. They even have high political profiles.

By contrast, the middle-class is anonymous. Property is their main source of wealth. According to a survey by researchers at China's Southwestern University of Finance, the top 1% of Chinese families hold $1.6 million in assets, but even the average urban family's net worth is $368,000, mostly in housing and usually unencumbered by mortgages. Properties often are owned through relatives or disguised holding companies and a national policy of rates taxes is still some way off, so wealthy middle-class households can own dozens of apartments without attracting attention. The obscurity is deliberate; it facilitates tax avoidance and an understandable desire to keep a low profile. Public credit records are only now being established.

Based on income measures, various surveys reveal that China's middle is already substantial. McKinsey estimates that two-thirds of all urban households (which may have more than one earner) are already in this category, up from just 4% in 2000. 'By 2022 more than 75 percent of China's urban households will earn $9,000 to $34,000 a year...in average PPP terms, between Brazil and Italy.' Other forecasters, like BCG, Monitor and Merrill Lynch, also estimate that 'mass affluent class' (MAC) households – those with at least US$10,000 in disposable income – will rise from 150 million to 400 million in the next ten years. That would encompass a majority of China's population, and certainly most urbanites. Still, these numbers are just projections, and probably sketchy ones at that. Most Chinese urban households wouldn't see themselves as affluent: 'the country has changed so fast that few feel secure with their status.'

But there is one reliable indicator of the financial position of households: consumption. Wealth or income not disclosed officially can be revealed by how it is spent. Detailed surveys of spending, based on interviews with retailers, car dealers and property agents for example, give us a better idea of who is spending how much. The assembled montage outlines the pyramid. Below the top 1% is an urban middle class of 150 million workers (20% of the total workforce), plus their dependents, totaling one-quarter of China's population but accounting for 40% of total consumer expenditures. Of these 150 million 'white collar' workers, it is thought that 70 million are either government personnel or managers who are on (or near) the payroll of state-owned companies.

That number is significant. The Communist Party's own membership is 85 million. So even allowing for a significant presence of rural cadres, 'the base' of the Party must nestle in the comfortable urban homes and jobs of the modern official Chinese nation. Their daily concerns are a world apart from their rural counterparts. Their children enjoy studying abroad but blithely return more committed to the status quo. Whether or not the Party's legitimacy rests on economic growth, its members certainly have skin in the game.

As China slows into the murk, Premier Li emphasises a higher purpose: 'to strengthen the bonds of attachment and affection of all Chinese, whether at home or overseas, to the fatherland.' Appeals to nationalism aren't inconsistent with other authoritarian, state-capitalist countries. Comparisons with Russia may be provocative, since China has a far more vibrant private economy. But a recent article on Putin's Russia states that 'more than 40% of the new middle class works for the state, and therefore they are not independent people. The regime's social base, in other words, is itself.'

Photo by Flickr user Khalid Albalh.
 2015-03-23T02:38:00+00:00 Julian Snelder The base of the Party nestles in the comfortable urban homes and jobs of the modern official Chinese nation. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=2a66aa4c-2e7c-440b-8d3b-2ac1bbebd2bd 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=2a66aa4c-2e7c-440b-8d3b-2ac1bbebd2bd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Chinas-ruling-party-is-not-afraid-of-the-middle-class.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=2a66aa4c-2e7c-440b-8d3b-2ac1bbebd2bd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Another-US-First-Lady-visits-Cambodia.aspx Another US First Lady visits Cambodia 2015-03-23T00:47:00+00:00 Milton Osborne

Over the past couple of weeks Phnom Penh has been abuzz with discussion of the visit to Cambodia by Michelle Obama (now completed), with comparisons being drawn with the visit in 1967 of Jacqueline Kennedy. The coverage in the Phnom Penh Post is reflective of the interest shown in the lead-up to the visit, and of the comparisons drawn with Kennedy (disclosure: I am quoted on a number of points in the Post's article).

With the visit announced as long ago as November, it is difficult to judge the extent to which Hun Sen's government will benefit from having the First Lady make such a visit or, conversely, the degree to which Michelle Obama's visit has significance for the the Obama Administration's 'pivot to Asia'. The fact that Michelle Obama has placed great emphasis on the education of young women during her visit has been seen by some commentators as a less-than-coded criticism of the Hun Sen Government's failings more generally, particularly with her reference to education of women making it possible for their participation 'in the political life of their country', which allows them to 'hold their leaders accountable'.

While there could scarcely be a greater contrast between the circumstances in which Jacqueline Kennedy visited and the visit just made by Michelle Obama, there is one underlying similarity: the sense that both the US and Cambodia are concerned not to let their differences overshadow the desirability of a finding a middle path accommodation that suits both their interests. That said, there is no reason to think Hun Sen will change his government's view that China is and will remain Cambodia's most important foreign friend.

Image courtesy of @FLOTUS.
 2015-03-23T00:47:00+00:00 Milton Osborne Phnom Penh has been abuzz with discussion of the visit to Cambodia by Michelle Obama. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=76f5047b-1ed0-4825-ac5e-0aa60aba3efe 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=76f5047b-1ed0-4825-ac5e-0aa60aba3efe http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Another-US-First-Lady-visits-Cambodia.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=76f5047b-1ed0-4825-ac5e-0aa60aba3efe http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Why-Australia-needs-full-spectrum-defence.aspx Why Australia needs full-spectrum defence 2015-03-22T23:57:00+00:00 Alan Dupont
Given he was the principal author of the 2000 Defence White Paper, it is reassuring to know that Hugh White agrees with me that Australian strategic policy needs a rethink, even if he is not persuaded by all of my prescriptions. So, in the spirit of a full and frank debate about what needs to be done, let me respond to Hugh's observations and counterpoints to my Lowy Analysis paper, Full-Spectrum Defence: Re-thinking the Fundamentals of Australian Defence Strategy.

To begin with, I agree the ADF should be structured to respond to threats from other countries' armed forces. Defending against such threats must be a primary mission, and I have not argued otherwise. But the military threats we confront today are more diverse and interlocked than ever before. They are increasingly playing out over five domains (land, sea, air, space and cyber) rather than just land, sea and air. And the growing military prowess and information-warfare capabilities of non-state actors warrants greater consideration in our strategy and force structure calculations.

Consider Russia's involvement in Ukraine as an example of what future armed conflict between states might look like: there was no declaration of war and no readily identifiable Russian force streaming into eastern Ukraine with pennants flying. Instead, Moscow opted for plausible deniability, using a mix of irregular and conventional forces supported by an effective information-warfare campaign, including cyber attacks, to achieve its initial political and military objectives.

Our strategic planners need to think through the implications for the ADF. I look forward to seeing their conclusions in the forthcoming white paper.

Yes, I do cast my net wider than Hugh in thinking about the variables that should shape the future ADF. That's because the ADF is required by governments to do much more than defend Australian territory against a particular kind of military attack coming from a specific location or direction. Future governments will expect a richer suite of military options from the ADF than ever before, including an enhanced capacity to deploy and sustain significant forces at considerable distance from Australian shores in defence of our interests, not just our territory. So our strategic reach must be longer, and our capacity for autonomous operations – what we used to call self-reliance – correspondingly greater. All the more so in a post-American world.

Which leads me to Hugh's point about the Middle East.

As strategists, we can both have our views about the wisdom or desirability of particular deployments, or whether military force is the appropriate response to a particular problem. But the reality is that Australian governments of all political persuasions have consistently committed the ADF to military operations well beyond our immediate neighbourhood, and not just to the Middle East.

I have no doubt this will continue to be the case. It is therefore incumbent on defence planners to make the ADF as agile and deployable as possible within budgetary constraints so that our defence force can confidently operate wherever it is deployed with the necessary protection, firepower and C4ISR. And that includes the Middle East.

It is sometimes argued that designing a versatile force reduces our capacity to defend Australia, or that a force optimised for such a task can do everything else pretty well. I don't buy either proposition. A far better approach is to identify the core tasks required of the ADF and design an optimal defence force to meet all of them. That is why the new amphibious ships — so versatile and useable in virtually all the ADF's core tasks — are so useful.

Perhaps I have not been as clear as I should in my writing about future threats because I am in furious agreement with Hugh that the future does not always resemble the past. But my take is a little different. In allowing for a different strategic future, one ought not to assume that the past, particularly the recent past, has no relevance. Defence planners should ask what, in the recent past, is likely to continue and what may change. My answer to the first part of the question is that messy, hybrid irregular conflicts like Ukraine, Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria are going to continue and that the form of warfare they represent has direct implications for the ADF.

As to what may change, without pretending to be an oracle, my money would be on the real possibility of future interstate conflict in the western Pacific, further dangerous mutations of transnational terrorism, the growing importance of the cyber and outer space domains, and the automation of weapons platforms and systems driven by breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and robotics.

As a former defence intelligence analyst, I am the last person to denigrate the value of horizon scanning or, as we used to call it, 'peering into the future'. My concern is about using speculative long term assessments about the future strategic environment to justify force structure and planning decisions that lock us into systems we have to live with for 30 to 50 years when technological change is continuing to accelerate. Hence my argument about shortening the timeframes for acquisition decisions and moving towards acquiring capabilities that are more flexible, disposable, usable and upgradeable.

Ah yes, but what about the money? I suspect we could use several megabytes of blogging space talking about money, but let me be brief.

I made a deliberate choice not to talk about money in this Lowy Analysis, and not just because of space limitations. There is virtue in having a first-principles discussion about strategy unencumbered by budgetary considerations, since this encourages clear thinking about the appropriate objectives of strategic policy and ADF priorities.

Two points about money. The first is that defence planners seldom, if ever, have certainty about future government outlays. So they do what any sensible person would do and make reasonable assumptions about likely future spending based on past experience, current commitments and the forward estimates.

But no matter how big or small the actual budget, every budgetary process involves trade-offs between competing priorities. In this sense, defence is no different from any business or other government department. What is important, however, is the efficacy of the process for allocating resources. My argument is that the current process is flawed because resource decisions are far too often arbitrary and/or distorted by bureaucratic or political interference rather than being the result of a considered strategic risk-assessment process.

My other observation is that defence planners should not try to artificially situate their military appreciations and force structure options by trying to second guess how much money the government of the day is likely to allocate to defence.

Most government ministers I have talked to over the years maintain that what they want from the Defence Department is costed force-structure options so that they can make informed decisions about the appropriate level of funding. To quote one senior minister, 'Defence needs to tell us what it wants and why. It is the government's task to decide what is justifiable and affordable.'

Finally, if Hugh feels so inclined, it would be helpful to hear whether he sees irregular warfare as the dominant form of future conflict, both between and within states, and whether our force structure determinants have any redeeming value as strategic planning constructs? And if he still believes our defence strategy should be a maritime strategy, how does he see a three-domain construct (land, sea and air) encapsulating the five-domain warfare of the future?

Photo courtesy of the <a href="http://images.defence.gov.au/fotoweb/Grid.fwx?SF_GROUP3_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP12_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP13_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP14_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP15_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP16_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP17_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP18_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP19_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP20_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP21_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP22_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP23_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP24_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP25_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP26_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP27_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP28_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP29_BOOLEAN=and&archiveId=&SF_GROUP4_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP4_FIELD=FQYFT&SF_FIELD4_GROUP=4&SF_FIELD4=BMP+or+FPIX+or+JPEG+or+PNTG+or+8BIM+or+PNG+or+QDGX+or+PICT+or+QTIF+or+SGI+or+TPIC+or+TIFF+or+NEF+or+PCDI&SF_GROUP1_BOOLEAN=and&SF_FIELD1_GROUP=1&SF_FIELD1_MATCHTYPE=exact&SF_FIELD1=cyber&SF_GROUP1_FIELD=&SF_FIELD2_GROUP=2&SF_GROUP2_BOOLEAN=and&SF_FIELD2_MATCHTYPE=exact&SF_FIELD2=&SF_GROUP2_FIELD=&SF_GROUP35_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP35_FIELD=IPTC015&SF_FIELD35_GROUP=35&SF_FIELD35=&SF_GROUP36_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP36_FIELD=IPTC020&SF_FIELD36_GROUP=36&SF_FIELD36=&SF_GROUP37_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP37_FIELD=IPTC025&SF_FIELD37_GROUP=37&SF_FIELD37=&SF_GROUP30_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP30_FIELD=IPTC080&SF_FIELD30_GROUP=30&SF_FIELD30=&SF_GROUP31_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP31_FIELD=IPTC110&SF_FIELD31_GROUP=31&SF_FIELD31=&SF_GROUP32_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP32_FIELD=IPTC115&SF_FIELD32_GROUP=32&SF_FIELD32=&SF_GROUP33_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP33_FIELD=IPTC101&SF_FIELD33_GROUP=33&SF_FIELD33=&SF_GROUP34_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP34_FIELD=IPTC090&SF_FIELD34_GROUP=34&SF_FIELD34=&SF_GROUP5_BOOLEAN=and&SF_FIELD5_GROUP=5&SF_GROUP5_FIELD=FQYFD&SF_FIELD5=&SF_FIELD5_TO=&SF_GROUP6_BOOLEAN=and&SF_FIELD6_GROUP=6&SF_GROUP6_FIELD=FQYFS&SF_FIELD6=&SF_FIELD6_TO=&SF_GROUP7_BOOLEAN=and&SF_FIELD7_GROUP=7&SF_GROUP7_FIELD=FQYIR&SF_FIELD7=&SF_FIELD7_TO=&SF_GROUP8_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP8_FIELD=FQYIC&SF_FIELD8_GROUP=8&SF_FIELD8=&SF_GROUP9_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP9_FIELD=FQYFM&SF_FIELD9_GROUP=9&SF_FIELD9=&SF_GROUP10_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP10_FIELD=&SF_FIELD10_GROUP=10&SF_FIELD10=&SF_GROUP11_BOOLEAN=and&SF_GROUP11_FIELD=FQYOL&SF_FIELD11_GROUP=11&SF_FIELD11=#Preview68" target="_blank">Defence Department.
 2015-03-22T23:57:00+00:00 Alan Dupont The military threats we confront today are more diverse and interlocked than ever before. They are increasingly playing out over five domains (land, sea, air, space and cyber) rather than just land, sea and air. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=5a23af1f-6d19-4f66-af1e-0c958cdeef5f 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=5a23af1f-6d19-4f66-af1e-0c958cdeef5f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Why-Australia-needs-full-spectrum-defence.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=5a23af1f-6d19-4f66-af1e-0c958cdeef5f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Aid-and-Dev-Links-Geo-coding-coaxing-the-dragon-aid-workers-mental-illness-and-more.aspx Aid & development links: Geo-coding, coaxing the dragon, aid workers and more 2015-03-22T23:07:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan

Germany announces record boost to aid budget to €7.4 billion, though still far from the 0.7% target.

Apart from making pretty visualisations on maps, what can geo-coding, add to aid delivery?

Does America's diplomatic failure on the Asian Infrastructure Bank symbolise US decline?

Coaxing the dragon: why China should join the aid debate in Africa.

A crisis of anxiety : a NY Times op-ed on high rates of mental illness among aid workers.

Great overview on aid commitments to Cylone Pam from Lowy Institute staff, including a piece on how to rebuild paradise.

UN Social 500: index of social media influencers working for the UN.

 ICYMI: Great documentary from SBS Dateline on Australian aid worker Jo Dunlop's work in Ebola-ravaged Sierra Leone.

 2015-03-22T23:07:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan Links to this week's best aid and development reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a5dcc11c-ffd4-4768-88e9-9199f38d1f93 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a5dcc11c-ffd4-4768-88e9-9199f38d1f93 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Aid-and-Dev-Links-Geo-coding-coaxing-the-dragon-aid-workers-mental-illness-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a5dcc11c-ffd4-4768-88e9-9199f38d1f93 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Obituary-Lee-Kuan-Yew.aspx Lee Kuan Yew (1923-2015) 2015-03-22T21:51:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan

Lee Kuan Yew in May 2007. (REUTERS/Toru Hanai.)

'The mark of a great leader is to take his society from where it is to where it has never been'. So said Henry Kissinger about Singapore's founder and master-builder, Lee Kuan Yew, in 2010. Kissinger went on to say that 'There is no better strategic thinker in the world today'.

Kissinger's sentiments have been echoed the world over. Lee, one of Asia's great architects, was a remarkable statesman and a much revered thinker on politics, society and state-building.

Rising to become Singapore's first prime minister at the age of 35 in 1959, Lee was all too aware of his island-state's fragility. Resource poor and under threat from communist forces, he sought a union with the Malaysian Federation. But Malaysia's ethno-centric nation-building was at odds with Lee's vision of a meritocratic, secular state and in 1965 Singapore found itself exiled from the Federation.

A fierce pragmatist who narrowly avoided execution under Japanese occupation, Lee set about building the impossible nation. His Singapore would become, by the end of the 20th century, a key financial and trade hub of Asia and a centre of innovation and big ideas.

During Lee's prime ministership, lasting from 1959 to 1990, he ran the island-state more like a multinational corporation than a state. Indeed, there were few models in the 20th century or Cold War for the viability (let alone survival) of a city-state. Through his lifetime (both as PM as well as in his advisory roles as senior minister from 1990 to 2004 and minister mentor from 2004 to 2011) he saw GDP per capital rise from $400 to $40,000, constructed an unlikely stability and weeded out corruption in Singapore. Today, Singapore is unique in a region prone to developmental teething problems.

Lee was a man of strong convictions. His pragmatism was arrived at through empirical study and driven by expert consultations, earning him the accolade of being a 'one-man intelligence agency'. He was of course not alone in the building of his big ideas. Sinnathamby Rajarathnam and Goh Keng Swee were just two who played a pivotal role in the creation of Singapore, as Lee would himself attest. (He was known for publicly deriding the idea of statesmanship, once saying that 'anyone who thinks they're a statesman should see a psychiatrist'.)

Under Japanese occupation in 1942-45, Lee worked as a translator for occupying forces, narrowly escaping execution when upon being asked to board a truck for relocation, sensed something amiss and excused himself to return home to collect a change of clean clothes. He stayed there for two days before returning to work, thus avoiding the massacre of Sook Ching. As he would later say about his escape, it was 'a lottery'. After reading law at the University of Cambridge where he obtained a 'Double Starred' honours, he returned to Singapore to work as lawyer before entering politics in 1954. He was elected the first prime minister of Singapore in 1959 after the island was granted self-government from Britain.

Lee's vision for Singapore was of development in phases, and in this sentiment rests the essence of the strongest criticism of Lee, who demanded strong rule (often rule by law rather than rule of law) throughout his tenure. In 1980, on the campaign trial, he declared: 'Whoever governs Singapore must have that iron in him'. He led an illiberal democracy that has often been derided for curbing civil liberties and upholding severe penalties (including death) against offenders. He saw little place for the media in his Singapore, noting that 'One value that does not fit Singapore is the theory that the press is the fourth estate'.

His irreverence toward media was derived from pragmatism:

I ignore polling as a method of government...I think that shows a certain weakness of mind, an inability to chart a course whichever way the wind blows, whichever way the media encourages the people to go, you follow. You're not a leader.

His straight-speaking, strong will and foresight in dealing with the big picture rather than what we would today term 'inbox issues' earned him the admiration of leaders and reformers the world over.

When asked of the great men he had met, he responded:

I would say the greatest was Deng Xiaoping. At his age, to admit that he was wrong, that all these ideas, Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, they are just not working and have to be abandoned, you need a great man to do that...

Lee was a visionary of equal merit, and Deng would thrust on him (and him alone) the mantle of 'mentor'. China's reformer wasn't the only one who sought Lee's counsel. Lee was the only individual who has been called to give counsel to every US president since Nixon.

In a 2011 interview, when asked how he judged his life's achievements, he responded:

Has the life I've lived been worthwhile? Have I made the world around me and those dependent on my decisions...[have I] given them a better life? I give myself a B+. That's enough.

Singaporeans both lament the restrictions on liberties under his tenure (which remain in place today) and celebrate the progress and achievement made possible through him. Standing firmly upon his belief in pragmatism, he has long expressed his concerns: 'What I fear is complacency. When things always become better, people tend to want more for less work.'

As Singapore marks its 50th anniversary of independence this year, time will tell if complacency can corrode the bastion of strength that Lee has constructed. But for today, this man's life achievements as the father of a nation and the adviser to a generation of statesmen should be revered and remembered. Asia is poorer without him.

Photo by REUTERS/Tom Hanai.
 2015-03-22T21:51:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan A fierce pragmatist who narrowly avoided execution under Japanese occupation, Lee went about building the impossible nation. His Singapore would become, by the end of the 20th century, a key financial and trade hub of Asia and a centre of innovation and big ideas. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=30ed7c39-efdc-4fbb-a972-80382484cd40 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=30ed7c39-efdc-4fbb-a972-80382484cd40 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/23/Obituary-Lee-Kuan-Yew.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=30ed7c39-efdc-4fbb-a972-80382484cd40 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/21/Weekend-catch-up-Bibi-idealogues-Australia-and-the-AIIB-India-Cyclone-Pam-and-Vanuatu-and-more.aspx Weekend catch-up: Bibi, idealogues, Australia and the AIIB, India, Cyclone Pam and more 2015-03-20T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
Bringing together the best longer Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week.

Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was re-elected to a fourth term on Tuesday, if he can form a coalition government in the coming weeks. Anthony Bubalo wrote on the election victory and the comments made by Bibi in the lead-up to election day:

There is no doubt that a little panic had crept into the Bibi camp.

A week before the poll he declared that there would be no Palestinian state under his watch, because any territory ceded would quickly fall to Islamic extremists. On election day he warned, via Facebook, that Israeli Arabs were being bussed to the polls by left wing NGOs, imploring his supporters to save his nationalist government.

But it also seems that panic worked.

Rodger Shanahan took aim at the ideologues in Iran and the US who are against the ongoing nuclear negotiations:

There is a deep thread of exceptionalism that runs through both American and Iranian notions of self. The problem with conservative ideologues from both countries that harbour this notion of exceptionalism is that they rarely understand that it isn't a view shared by anyone outside their respective countries. Without a modicum of self-awareness, such mindsets can lead to foreign policy adventurism as they both believe in their divinely-ordained right to lead. And, while the embarrassing letter has been seen for what it is, it reveals a way of thinking that reminds us that not all dangerous ideologues reside in the Middle East.

This week, after the UK signaled that it would become a founding member of the China-sponsored Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, news broke that Australia was revisiting its position. It now seems almost certain that Australia will in fact join. Malcolm Jorgensen wrote on what the bank means for the rules-based global order:

For the US to maximise its leverage through a rules-based order it must accept the evolution of global finance to encompass the reality of growing Chinese power. Importantly, China continues to engage with existing global financial institutions even as it fosters parallel alternatives. The 2015 US National Security Strategy recognised the need to reform the World Bank and IMF to 'make them more effective and representative.' No such reforms have been forthcoming however, with the US Congress refusing to relinquish power that was crystallised in a previous era.

Stephen Grenville also wrote on the bank and the rise of regional economic institutions:

The region already has the ADB. Does it need the AIIB, the BRICS New Development Bank and the Chinese New Silk Road initiative? Probably not. But Japan continues to monopolise control of the ADB (where Japan and the US each have voting rights well over twice as large as China's and the president is always a Japanese). The US dominates the Washington institutions, with the American Congress preventing even modest governance reformsat the IMF.

Given this ossified and unwelcoming environment, China's search for alternatives is inevitable.

One of Australia's former allies in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province, Matiullah Khan, was killed this week in a suicide bombing in Kandahar. Susanne Schmeidl, who met and interviewed Matiullah during her time in Afghanistan, reflected on the strongman's death:

And that was the ultimate problem with how the West fought in Afghanistan. Why fight in a war you cannot win militarily, especially if you leave before it is over? Why fight the war if it means that in the end you need to align with men of questionable reputations? When the Australians left Uruzgan, the job was not done. With a stretched Afghan National Army, it was for the Afghan National Police, and hence Matiullah, to continue the fight.

The Interpreter also published a series of articles on India this week. First, Crispin Rovere responded to a debate between Hugh White and Shashank Joshi on India's strategic role in the Indo-Pacific, and its growing partnership with the US:

As for India and the US, I find it astonishing that after more than 50 years of being repeatedly burned, some Americans still have not learned their lesson (though many have), and continue insisting that China and India are 'natural competitors'. This is false. China and India are historical competitors, but such competition is not necessarily 'natural' and certainly nothing like the strategic competition that exists between China and the US. After all, any Chinese expansion in the Western Pacific will be at America's expense. It is hard to argue that India's expansion into the Indian Ocean is being actively resisted by China.

Sam Roggeveen, who was in India throughout the week, wrote on a speech he attended by the new head of India's foreign service, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar:

In fact, the speech struck me as setting a more pro-American posture than I was used to hearing in my short time here. Yes, he focused a lot on shortcoming and challenges, but all in the service, it seemed to me, of wanting to move the relationship forward — the problems he identified were framed as ones to be overcome, not as reasons to limit ambitions. I have had the sense, during this visit, that it's the Americans who urgently want to elevate the relationship even more than has already occurred, and that the Indians are reluctant to match this enthusiasm. Jaishankar seemed to turn this on its head.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi concluded a tour through the Indian Ocean region, and David Brewster argued that the trip was strategically significant:

As nascent and aspirational as India's initiatives in the Indian Ocean may be, they represent important steps in giving substance to its claims to be a 'net security provider' to the region. A grouping with the island states may represent the beginnings of a new multilateral alignment in the Indian Ocean, with India at the centre. For India it would represent an important psychological step beyond its traditional adherence to nonalignment, which could have much broader implications.

Vanuatu suffered a devastating cylone earlier this week, displacing up to 70% of the population. Anna Kirk on the long-term implications:

Following a visit to Tanna, one of the most badly damaged islands, Prime Minister Natuman said that even though it was the Government's job to serve the people, they will need to survive on their own. The Government will provide some relief, he said, but in the long term they must become self-sufficient. This has always been the reality for the majority of ni-Vanuatu. There are few government services on outer islands and communities have always been self-sufficient. But the devastation wrought by Cyclone Pam means this is no longer an option. It will take years for Vanuatu to recover.

Tom Switzer had a popular profile piece on former US National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft:

Why is this case? Why should we recognise Scowcroft as the most distinguished US foreign policy figure of modern times?

Well, for one thing, he was widely regarded as a calm, sober, judicious, loyal, non-partisan and highly intelligent strategist. A master of the day-to-day process of coordinating Washington's bureaucracies and an honest broker in high-level deliberations, he was scrupulous about presenting different arguments to be widely debated among policymakers. Scowcroft was also something of a rare exception in a town like Washington: he lacked the insatiable drive toward power and celebrity.

Will the Chine Communist Party collapse? Kerry Brown:

Finally there is the biggest question, and one that hovers over much of Shambaugh's article. Beyond shrill nationalism, what precisely does the Chinese Communist Party offer as a belief system and national vision to its people and the world in the 21st century? We know what it doesn't want; some of these things are spelt out in documents like the No. 9 edict Shambaugh refers to from 2013. But beyond national rejuvenation and addressing historic resentments, what is the great China vision which the country and the world can buy into in the coming decades?

Vanessa Newby on religion and the public sphere in the Middle East:

If you look broadly across the Muslim world, you will notice that governments tightly control religious space because of the potential threat religion poses to existing political power structures. Extreme piety in Western converts is viewed with great suspicion by governments in the Middle East, not just in the West. This means it is not easy to emigrate to a Muslim state as a Western convert without running the risk of attracting unwanted attention from the local security services, even in places such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. Equally, those born Muslim in Western states may not always feel comfortable displaying their religion openly for fear of arousing suspicion or censure.

I am concerned the space for piety without violence is shrinking in this battle of ideas about what is good Islam (preferably as secular as possible?) and bad Islam (indicated by the wearing of the Niqab and a pious lifestyle?).

Finally, Leon Berkelmans revisted Thomas Piketty's Capital:

In addition, Piketty's paper contains a valuable reminder that his book also discusses labour income inequality. I've had people say to me in the past something like, 'Of course, Piketty is all wrong because inequality over the last few decades has been driven by inequality of labour income.' These people obviously have not read the book. The title of Chapter 9 is 'Inequality of Labor Income'.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Speaker John Boehner.
 2015-03-20T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Bringing together the best longer Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=2f2238ff-ca65-4e6f-874d-42f19b79a584 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=2f2238ff-ca65-4e6f-874d-42f19b79a584 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/21/Weekend-catch-up-Bibi-idealogues-Australia-and-the-AIIB-India-Cyclone-Pam-and-Vanuatu-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=2f2238ff-ca65-4e6f-874d-42f19b79a584 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Malcolm-Frasers-foreign-policy-wisdom.aspx Malcolm Fraser's foreign policy wisdom 2015-03-20T08:10:00+00:00 Tom Switzer
Many Liberals and conservatives have looked on sadly over the past three decades at the career of Malcolm Fraser. Like British prime minister Ted Heath, Fraser started off as a man of the Right but ended up as anything but.

But some political questions transcend party, and in the post-Cold War era, ideological divisions on foreign policy all too often foster simplistic divisions and create artificial alliances. So when Fraser warned of the dangers of isolating Putin's Russia, or intervening (again) in Iraq, or being obedient to America, he always deserved a respectful audience.

Malcolm Fraser with the author.

On Ukraine, Fraser believed that the West's policy of NATO expansion and pulling Ukraine away from Russia's strategic orbit had precipitated the crisis. He recognised that although the Western alliance was a magnificent achievement in containing Soviet power, it was moribund in the post-Cold War era.

According to Fraser, NATO expansion was bound to cause trouble. Among other things, it would violate Churchill's wise principle of 'In Victory, magnanimity', and in the process upset the strategic sensibilities of a nuclear power. So when Russia intervened in the Crimean peninsula a year ago in direct response to the West's role in toppling a pro-Russian government in Kiev, Fraser was hardly surprised. Far from reviving the Soviet empire, he said, Putin's move was a defensive attempt to protect legitimate security interests.

'We should always give our adversary an avenue of escape,' Fraser told me a few months ago. In the context of Russia, this meant making Ukraine a buffer state and giving Moscow some strategic space in what it had deemed its sphere of influence long before Stalin and Lenin even appeared on the scene. Moreover, he would point out with good reason, what's good for the goose is good for the gander. Imagine Washington's response if another great power expanded a military alliance into the Caribbean or toppled pro-American governments in Latin America.

On Iraq, Fraser was a strong opponent of both the invasion, 12 years ago yesterday, as well as the recent US-led coalition to fight Islamic State jihadists. What drove him was a sense of history.

He understood American outrage over both the September 11 terrorist attacks and the recent Islamic State videos of carefully choreographed beheadings of Western hostages. But in toppling Saddam Hussein's regime and in fighting Sunni jihadists, Fraser warned, the US-led coalition was bound to make a bad situation worse. Fraser would stress that because Iraq was an artificial state and ethnically fractured society created out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, it would be virtually impossible for Western powers to create a viable state in the post-Saddam era. And he was quick to warn about the unintended consequences of both missions, such as a strengthened Iranian presence in Shia Iraq and a further marginalised Sunni minority that would not just tolerate but even support Sunni terrorists. Far from 'draining the swamp' of jihadists, he argued, we would replenish them.

On the US alliance, although Fraser was a strong supporter of Washington during the Cold War, he believed that the circumstances of the post-Cold War era justified a more nuanced and independent Australian foreign policy stance. I think Fraser overstated his case that Australia, under prime ministers Howard, Gillard, Rudd and Abbott, had become an American lickspittle. America, he feared, had become a revolutionary unilateral power, bent on transforming the world in its image rather than dealing with the world as it is. Fraser argued that in an inherently unequal relationship, there was a risk of Australia becoming so enmeshed in US strategy that it would lose its autonomy. Thus, the alliance was less relevant to Australia, and America a less appropriate ally on which Canberra should rely as it has in the Cold War. The trouble is that Fraser's call for an 'independent foreign policy' was essentially another way of saying the alliance should be abandoned. That makes no strategic sense, as Bates Gill and I pointed out in Foreign Affairs recently.

Still, Fraser was right to point out that an unconditionally loyal ally such as Australia should not expect reciprocal loyalty from a great power if it was inconvenient. And he was right to call for Canberra to engage with China, even if that meant, for instance, that Australia's inclusion in the China-led infrastructure bank would aggravate Washington. There was also something to be said for his concern that the so-called Obama pivot to Asia could push an insecure China into an anti-foreign posture that has often characterised that nation since its defeat in the Opium Wars in the mid-19th century.

During the past 18 months, Fraser and I would frequently exchange thoughts on the aforementioned issues. He once gave me some wise advice that any foreign policy practitioner should bear in mind: when dealing with an adversary, real or imagined, it is wise to try to understand any contentious issues from their perspective and to put contemporary events into a broader historical context. In relations with Russia and China today, perhaps even Iran, it is sound counsel.

That wisdom perhaps explains why Malcolm Fraser was so respected by global figures of stature such as Helmut Schmidt (chancellor of West Germany, 1974-82), Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore's founding prime minister), Henry Kissinger (US secretary of state, 1973-77) and of course the late Nelson Mandela.

RIP, old friend.
 2015-03-20T08:10:00+00:00 Tom Switzer Fraser was respected by global figures of stature such as Helmut Schmidt, Lee Kuan Yew, Henry Kissinger and of course the late Nelson Mandela. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a5d2535f-9f07-4551-a65e-ac9f214d2b41 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a5d2535f-9f07-4551-a65e-ac9f214d2b41 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Malcolm-Frasers-foreign-policy-wisdom.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a5d2535f-9f07-4551-a65e-ac9f214d2b41 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/The-unofficial-king-of-Uruzgan.aspx The unofficial king of Uruzgan 2015-03-20T02:17:00+00:00 Susanne Schmeidl
Matiullah Khan, the police chief of Uruzgan and once a strong ally of US and Australian special forces in the Afghan province, was killed yesterday in Kabul.

It is unclear if it was a targeted suicide killing or simply a lucky 'shot in the dark'. At this point reports from Kabul are conflicting, though the Taliban did eventually claim responsibility. It was well known that the Taliban was out to get him, and Matiullah knew his fight against the Taliban was not only about defending his country and home, but also a personal struggle to stay alive.

I wrote in 2011 that Matiullah had finally reached his goal to become the chief of police of Uruzgan province that year, a position he had being trying to get for some time. Before he became chief of police, Matiullah had been watching from the sidelines and running a private militia protecting the Kandahar-Uruzgan road. That road was one of his major income sources; international militaries in particular (US, Dutch, Australian) paid handsomely to get their supplies safely into Uruzgan. This arrangement along the Kandahar-Uruzgan road was infamously profiled by the US Congressional Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.

Matiullah is just one of many casualties of Afghanistan's war. Does his death matter?

It does, and the aftershocks might yet follow. He was, after all, Uruzgan's 'unofficial king' and with the departure of the Australian and US military, effectively the most powerful person in the province.

Matiullah called Uruzgan 'his house', a house he aimed to keep in order – meaning above all, that he would hold the front against the Taliban. He never really tried for the post of provincial governor, arguing he was not qualified (at least that's what he told me). But of course never wanted a strong governor above him, and he wanted other commanders to play to his tune.

That is after all what strongmen do – they rule in their own way. The greater conflict against the Taliban aside, Matiullah did maintain a stability of sorts in Uruzgan, and without him neither the Dutch (who shunned him), the Americans nor Australians would have come as far as they did in the province. He was their man, and he was especially close to US and Australian special forces.

I still remember on one of my interviews with Matiullah. He proudly showed me photos of him and various US and Australian commandos. He reached into the pockets of his Kamiz and pulled out two handfuls of coins given to him by US and Australian special forces in appreciation of his services. I almost felt sorry for him at this moment. The coins were his proof that he was liked and that he was useful, something the Dutch had denied him. At that moment he seemed like a young boy, trying to please, wanting to be accepted and respected.

I wondered why he bothered. This was his country, his province — why did he need the acceptance of foreigners?

But this was the name of game at this point. You needed the support and acceptance of powers who had the resources and access to make 'kings'. In order to rule when you did not come from a landed elite background (which Matiullah did not), you needed money to buy your constituency and patronage network. Matiullah did this skillfully.

He also showed that he could fight and defeat the Taliban. He was one of the early allies of Hamid Karzai and helped wrangle Uruzgan from the Taliban in 2001. Though controversial and hated by many that did not belong to his Popalzai tribe, he was seen as the man that could protect Uruzgan from the Taliban, especially after international forces withdrew.

But now he is gone. Knowing Matiullah, I think he rather would have died in battle defending himself and staring into the eyes of his enemies. He was a fighter and he was proud. To die far away from his 'house' in Kabul is not the end he likely anticipated.

The deaths of men like Matiullah always have repercussions because they leave a vacuum. And in conflict and war, such vacuums are often filled with turmoil and instability. Who is now going to rise to the task of defending Uruzgan? It may be up to individual tribal leaders again, but many of them are weakened. The province is too marginal to matter for most. If more of it is overrun by the Taliban then much of what the West, and specifically Australia, tried to do only lasted a short time. One thing is for sure: things will get messy in Uruzgan now. That's happens when 'kings' die and there is no clear leadership transition in place.

And that was the ultimate problem with how the West fought in Afghanistan. Why fight in a war you cannot win militarily, especially if you leave before it is over? Why fight the war if it means that in the end you need to align with men of questionable reputations? When the Australians left Uruzgan, the job was not done. With a stretched Afghan National Army, it was for the Afghan National Police, and hence Matiullah, to continue the fight.

When I heard of Matiullah's death, I did not only feel sad for the man who wanted to be king, but also for the province which now is very likely to slip further into instability and conflict. I know he was a strongman and did many horrible things, but I also know he cared for his province and had desperately tried to redeem himself by supporting the education of young men, giving money to widows and others in need. On my last visit to his office, when we discussed security and the battle against the Taliban, I noticed a large container of Tums antacids on his desk. Even strongmen get heartburn.

Maybe his death, and what might follow, could be lesson in how we approach war and counter-terrorism. Is collaborating with strongmen the ultimate and even best answer? Or does it delay the challenge we should have faced all along: finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in Afghanistan?

Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Image Library.
 2015-03-20T02:17:00+00:00 Susanne Schmeidl Matiullah is just one of many casualties of Afghanistan's war. Does his death matter? It does, and the aftershocks might yet follow. He was, after all, Uruzgan's 'unofficial king'. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=45119441-e115-4f64-afbc-28714c9d181a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=45119441-e115-4f64-afbc-28714c9d181a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/The-unofficial-king-of-Uruzgan.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=45119441-e115-4f64-afbc-28714c9d181a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Digital-Asia-links-Cyclone-Pam-Indonesian-broadband-Weibo-censorship-and-more.aspx Digital Asia links: Cyclone Pam, Indonesian broadband, Weibo censorship and more 2015-03-20T01:48:00+00:00 Danielle Cave

How Indonesian President Jokowi intends to make fast and accessible broadband internet his legacy.

Vanuatu's popular Facebook groups are busy as residents share information and coordinate responses to Cyclone Pam. At the request of the Red Cross, the Humanitarian Open Street Map Team is using crowdsourcing to map Vanuatu's pre and post disaster imagery. A Ushahidi map has also been created to log and fulfill ICT equipment needs.

Chinese micro blogging site Weibo is censoring discussion about five women's rights activists who remain confined without charge after they were detained on International Women's Day (8 March) for planning a small protest against sexual harassment.

This article claims Bangladesh may have the technology and expertise to deal with cyber terrorism but it lacks political will, leadership and coordination, which is hampering law enforcement efforts to tackle the growing problem.

The cyber security risks faced by Taiwan — allegedly the most hacked place on earth — as it adapts to the 'Internet of Everything'. (And what is the Internet of Everything?)

The Singapore Navy is crowdsourcing names for eight new warships. The PR campaign-style competition, which runs until 29 March, is looking for 'strong' names; there are cash prizes for the winners.

[youtube:YInf8yoi6PE]
 2015-03-20T01:48:00+00:00 Danielle Cave Links to this week's best reading on digital Asia. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=bb7bb742-888e-4657-bcdb-31f4d875eb0e 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=bb7bb742-888e-4657-bcdb-31f4d875eb0e http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Digital-Asia-links-Cyclone-Pam-Indonesian-broadband-Weibo-censorship-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=bb7bb742-888e-4657-bcdb-31f4d875eb0e http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Malcolm-Fraser-and-the-Lowy-Institute.aspx Malcolm Fraser and the Lowy Institute 2015-03-20T01:19:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
With the passing of Malcolm Fraser, herewith some highlights of his recent appearances and interactions with the Lowy Institute. More coverage to come of Mr Fraser's legacy for Australian foreign policy.

In July last year, Fraser appeared with Lowy Institute Executive Director to talk about his book Dangerous Allies. I also interviewed Mr Fraser by phone about his book:

[youtube:ga21QoahOyU]

Fraser had a longstanding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and in 2009 he delivered the annual John Gee lecture, sponsored by the Lowy Institute and the Australian National University:

We have perhaps the best opportunity ever to abolish nuclear weapons. The current crises in disarmament, non-proliferation, the rule of law and risks of use of nuclear weapons have spawned a widespread realisation that nuclear business as usual is in fact an inexorable slide towards nuclear anarchy and eventual disaster, and that nuclear weapons undermine the security of all.

Fraser also spoke at the Lowy Institute in 2010 to mark the launch of his memoirs. You can listen to the speech here, and I recorded an interview with him after his speech.

Fraser's memoir also led to an exchange on The Interpreter with Margaret Simons, who co-authored the book. I questioned an anecdote in the book relating to Fraser's role in convincing the Reagan Administration to back the Thatcher Government in the lead-up to the Falklands War, and Simons responded in detail.

Fraser was an Interpreter reader, and he wrote to us in response to a piece highlighting the tough anti-China comments of a senior US Navy intelligence official.
 2015-03-20T01:19:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen Some highlights of his recent appearances and interactions with the Lowy Institute. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ecf9df73-088f-4506-a894-2ebd3f4b2ab3 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ecf9df73-088f-4506-a894-2ebd3f4b2ab3 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Malcolm-Fraser-and-the-Lowy-Institute.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ecf9df73-088f-4506-a894-2ebd3f4b2ab3 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Rebuilding-paradise-in-Vanuatu.aspx Rebuilding paradise in Vanuatu 2015-03-20T00:09:00+00:00 Anna Kirk
Cyclone Pam has been one of the worst natural disasters the Pacific has ever seen, and the small island nation of Vanuatu was hardest hit. The immediate disaster relief effort is crucial but it is important to realise that the devastating impact of this disaster will be felt in Vanuatu for years to come.

The death toll stands at 11 but communication has not yet been re-established with many of the outer islands, so the true scale of the disaster is still unknown. However, it is likely that up to 70% of the country's population has been displaced. The geographic nature of Vanuatu makes it especially difficult to coordinate the response to natural disasters. Vanuatu is an archipelago of approximately 83 islands, of which 65 are inhabited and only accessible by air or sea. It is common for communications to be lost during storms.

Although Vanuatu is used to natural disasters this one was so huge it has attracted international attention, with the unintended consequence that aid agencies and media outlets are making early and unhelpful predictions in their wish to report information.

For example, earlier in the week UNICEF was reporting that every school in the country had been damaged. It is now clear that islands in the north-east of the archipelago, like Malakula and Santo, suffered little or even no damage. These kinds of blanket assertions so soon after the disaster are a hindrance for relief efforts, which need to focus on accurately assessing the extent of damage and coordinating the response from that point.

Vanuatu Prime Minister Joe Natuman has been critical of the influx of NGOs into his country in the wake of Cyclone Pam. At present there are more than 100 NGOs in the country. The Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) has been working closely with the governments of Australia, New Zealand and France, and key NGOs like the Red Cross and Oxfam International, to coordinate the initial disaster response. The presence of so many other NGOs puts pressure on the country's heavily compromised resources and has the potential to confuse the relief effort.

The key challenge the country now faces is a food and water shortage. 80% of ni-Vanuatu rely on subsistence agriculture for food. This is true of the outer islands but also for many communities around the capital, Port Vila, where gardens are an important source of nutrition. The Vanuatu Ministry of Agriculture released a statement saying that the staple crops of fruit trees, leafy greens and root vegetables have been irreparably damaged. The majority of processed food stocks were also destroyed. It is likely that the affected communities will run out of food in less than a week.

The Vanuatu NDMO has a plan in place to deal with this situation through the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster, and is stressing the importance of all efforts being coordinated through this organisation. This situation needs to be urgently addressed in the coming weeks but it should be acknowledged that any government would struggle to cope with a natural disaster of this scale. The Vanuatu Government will require long-term assistance from the international community to ensure food security for its people.

Following a visit to Tanna, one of the most badly damaged islands, Prime Minister Natuman said that even though it was the Government's job to serve the people, they will need to survive on their own. The Government will provide some relief, he said, but in the long term they must become self-sufficient. This has always been the reality for the majority of ni-Vanuatu. There are few government services on outer islands and communities have always been self-sufficient. But the devastation wrought by Cyclone Pam means this is no longer an option. It will take years for Vanuatu to recover.

Having said that, the word that has been most used to describe ni-Vanuatu people in the wake of Cyclone Pam is 'resilient'. And it's true they are an extraordinarily resilient people. Their famous strength has been evident, with people immediately going into action to clean up debris and take the first steps on the road to recovery. Oxfam International's Country Manager for Vanuatu told Radio Australia's Pacific Beat that he had never seen such incredible motivation to put things right.

Vanuatu President Baldwin Lonsdale was, ironically, at the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Japan when the cyclone struck. He gave an emotional interview saying that all the development progress they had made has now been wiped out and that Vanuatu will have to start again.

Australians can make it easier for Vanuatu by continuing to contribute to the vital tourism sector, which makes up 40% of the economy. Even though some facilities in Port Vila may take time to recover, other destinations in Vanuatu, such as the island of Santo, were not hit by the cyclone and are open for business.

President Lonsdale described his country as a paradise on earth. I have lived in Vanuatu and I agree, as would many who have visited the country. The ni-Vanuatu people are incredibly generous, warm and strong, and they will recover. But they are going to need continued support. Red Cross and the ABC are holding a Tropical Cyclone Pam Appeal Day today, Friday 20 March. ABC Radio is hosting a one-hour special with Jon Faine from 11.00am on ABC Local Radio, midday EDST on Newsradio and 2405 UT on Radio Australia.

Photo by Flickr user Jordi Bernabau Farrus.
 2015-03-20T00:09:00+00:00 Anna Kirk The presence of so many NGOs puts pressure on the country's heavily compromised resources and has the potential to confuse the relief effort. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ca2d5232-ed43-433c-a28e-9ea082908707 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ca2d5232-ed43-433c-a28e-9ea082908707 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Rebuilding-paradise-in-Vanuatu.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ca2d5232-ed43-433c-a28e-9ea082908707 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Shambaugh-china-disaster.aspx Shambaugh's China disaster scenario examined 2015-03-19T22:26:00+00:00 Kerry Brown
'Always predict disaster', a shrewd academic economist told me some years ago. 'If it happens, you are proved right. And if it doesn't, then catastrophe was avoided by people heeding your wise and timely advice!' Dystopia is, as least for those foreseeing it, a win-win game.

18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, November 2012

David Shambaugh is a seasoned China expert, and even he admits in his recent essay for the Wall Street Journal that predictions of demise in China have often been made. He refers to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, which caused many to lose faith in the system, saying it would ignominiously collapse as other communist countries did that year and the next. The pessimists were proven wrong. From 1992, China entered a second phase of economic liberalisation, though only under firm unified political control.

Shambaugh knows that the Chinese Communist Party looked long and hard at the reasons behind the collapse of the USSR. He wrote a book about it in 2008. His view then was that the Party could adapt and transform. Evidently he has changed his mind.

The five reasons he gives for China's imminent political revolution have been exhaustively discussed over the years.

His first refers to capital flight, with officials or members of the elite trying to set themselves up inside and outside China. But this started in the 1980s, almost from the moment some Chinese started to get wealthy. And the political elite were always up to it. Deng Xiaoping's son studied in the US. Hu Jintao's daughter lived there for a while. Non-convertibility of the Chinese currency means movement of their assets is more 'visible' as it goes out of China. Unlike the nomadic super elites elsewhere who can hide the shifts of their capital and assets around the globe easily, Chinese can't. But this doesn't portend impending Armageddon because of a collapse of confidence in the political system. It just means people in China are richer and more of them can do these things now.

Shambaugh is probably right in saying that Xi Jinping and his hardline war on corruption has made some enemies. But in fact, Xi is using this campaign to edge China towards pragmatic structural changes along the same lines Shambaugh indicates would create better governance in China. He is making officials more accountable and, for all the fear it has created in the administration, the campaign has been popular on the street.

Among the property owning, investment seeking middle class of urban China who will be the warriors that create the country's service-orientated future, the anti-corruption campaign is welcome. For them, the language of stronger property rights and more financial stability in banks and investment vehicles, at least as it is laid out in the Fourth Plenum held last year, is appealing. These are the people Xi and his colleagues have to keep on side, not fat cats in the Party creaming off vast illicit profits for their networks in the state enterprise system.

Shambaugh is probably right in saying that the game being played out in China now is one of high stakes. It could go horribly wrong. Christopher Coker from LSE delivered a similar warning against complacency in a book on scenarios for conflict between China and the US. 'The best way to avoid war,' he says, 'is to prepare for it.'

Similarly, the best way for China to avoid regime collapse is to prepare for it. The government seems to be permanently in crisis mode. The ugly crackdown on dissidents and activists (including five female ones earlier this month on International Women's Day), as Shambaughrightly says, shows a lack of political imagination. It is almost as if the government is picking on the same old list of easy victims and soft targets. Bashing up dissidents and activists should be stopped. They are the wrong targets.

But Xi, to his credit, has also struck against one of the most unpleasant members of the old elite generation, Zhou Yongkang. This was not an arbitrary strike. There was political logic to it. So far, for all its sprawling, messy character, the anti-corruption campaign does make sense.

Finally there is the biggest question, and one that hovers over much of Shambaugh's article. Beyond shrill nationalism, what precisely does the Chinese Communist Party offer as a belief system and national vision to its people and the world in the 21st century? We know what it doesn't want; some of these things are spelt out in documents like the No. 9 edict Shambaugh refers to from 2013. But beyond national rejuvenation and addressing historic resentments, what is the great China vision which the country and the world can buy into in the coming decades?

If the Party can capture the emotional life and convictions of the Chinese people, then anything is possible. But its message at the moment is one where idealism is mixed with fear and coercion. There needs to be an historic reset, something like a renegotiation of the social contract between the Chinese people and their government. I am not as pessimistic as Shambaugh about the outcomes of this, but I do agree something needs to be done.

The fundamental problem is that this intensely internal issue will have immense implications for the stability and prosperity of the world – and yet the best that foreigners are likely to manage is a bystander seat.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Remko Tanis.
 2015-03-19T22:26:00+00:00 Kerry Brown Beyond shrill nationalism, what precisely does the Chinese Communist Party offer as a belief system and national vision to its people and the world in the 21st Century? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9ffd9a31-fe38-402f-b168-7f9fed05f5a2 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9ffd9a31-fe38-402f-b168-7f9fed05f5a2 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/20/Shambaugh-china-disaster.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9ffd9a31-fe38-402f-b168-7f9fed05f5a2 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Scowcroft-at-90-A-tribute-to-a-wise-man.aspx Scowcroft at 90: A tribute to a wise man 2015-03-19T03:50:00+00:00 Tom Switzer

Scowcroft (C) with President Bush (L) and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu in 1989. (Wikipedia.)

Today marks the 90th birthday of America's leading foreign-policy strategist of the last 40 years. No, not Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as national security advisers to presidents Richard Nixon (1969-75) and Jimmy Carter (1977-81) respectively. I am referring to Brent Scowcroft, who served in the same position for presidents Gerald Ford (1975-77) and George HW Bush (1989-93).

Mine is hardly an isolated view. A new biography, Bartholomew Sparrow's The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security, reaches the same conclusion. Most of the American reviewers of the book agree (see, for instance, Jacob Heilbrunn in the March-April issue of The National Interest) National security advisers to both Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Barack Obama have praised Scowcroft as a role model.

Why is this case? Why should we recognise Scowcroft as the most distinguished US foreign policy figure of modern times?

Well, for one thing, he was widely regarded as a calm, sober, judicious, loyal, non-partisan and highly intelligent strategist. A master of the day-to-day process of coordinating Washington's bureaucracies and an honest broker in high-level deliberations, he was scrupulous about presenting different arguments to be widely debated among policymakers. Scowcroft was also something of a rare exception in a town like Washington: he lacked the insatiable drive toward power and celebrity.

For another thing, there's his record in the Bush Sr Administration. Let me provide three examples: Russia, China and Iraq.

Russia

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet communism, Scowcroft rejected triumphalism in favour of caution. Far from maximising American advantage, he was focused on managing the collapse of an empire lest it unleash the kind of instability, chaos and bloodshed usually associated with the fall of empires. That is why Scowcroft helped negotiate the end of the Cold War to the advantage of both the Soviets and the Americans. It is also why he did not push for NATO expansion in the 1990s, lest it upset the strategic sensibilities of a nuclear great power.

China

Following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Bush secretly dispatched Scowcroft to Beijing to maintain official contact with a Chinese leadership slipping into dangerous isolation. At the time, Bush and Scowcroft were accused of 'kowtowing' before the communists. In reality, as Democrat China hand Michel Oksenberg remarked at the time, 'it was an act of courageous statesmanship.' While Democrats and many Republicans appeared willing to risk isolating China's government and to court its animosity, Scowcroft was salvaging a constructive relationship with the most populous nation on earth. In the process, he prevented a situation that could have easily become worse: a more oppressive China at home and a troublesome China abroad.

Iraq

After Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Scowcoft took the lead in organising the US-led multinational response. According to The Economist, the Gulf War was 'Mr Scowcroft's finest hour.' He was, to be sure, criticised for not intervening when the Iraqi tyrant began slaughtering Shia and Kurds after the US-led liberation of Kuwait. But the goal, as Bush and Scowcroft always made clear, was never to take out Saddam or democratise Iraq; it was about restoring order and stability to that part of the world.

Like most realists, Scowcroft believed that although containment – sanctions, naval blockades, no-fly-zones – may have lacked the political sex appeal of 'liberation', at least it would avoid the unintended consequences of a liberated Iraq. Look at Iraq today and you can see what he meant: high costs in blood and treasure, a Shia ascendancy along with strengthened Iranian power and influence in Iraq, and marginalised Sunni Iraqis who turned to an insurgency that has morphed into a plethora of jihadist groups.

That is why, in the post-9/11 era, Scowcroft emerged as the leading critic of the Bush Jr doctrine of preventive war and democracy promotion. In a famous Wall Street Journal op-ed in August 2002 titled Don't Attack Saddam, Scowcroft warned of the dire consequences of an invasion of Iraq. Toppling the Sunni regime, he argued, would 'swell the ranks of the terrorists' and 'might destabilise Arab regimes in the region.'

Scowcroft didn't make these criticisms lightly. After all, he was President Bush Sr's best friend and he mentored Bush Jr's national security adviser Condi Rice. He copped criticism for speaking out against the war, but his warnings were prescient.

Which brings me to what distinguishes Scowcroft from other leading US foreign policy figures in the modern era: his realism (Kissinger is also widely seen as a realist, but almost all American realists opposed the wars in Vietnam and Iraq; Kissinger did not). According to foreign policy realists, and contrary to the liberal interventionists on the Left as well as the neo-conservative crusaders on the Right, America is not a 'new Israel' but one nation among others and should be guided by national strategic and economic interests, pursued with a pragmatic calculation of commitments and resources. Its goal should not be to impose its democratic ideals on other nations but to secure peace and stability through maintaining a balance of power among potential adversaries. Not for realists any noble, grand causes to transform the world in a democratic image.

It is fair to say that realism has provided a sound alternative to the excesses of American idealism, whether it was over-extension in Vietnam or aggressive unilateralism and democracy promotion in Iraq. But realism, with its antecedents in 19th century balance-of-power politics, is hardly perfect (what strategy is, in a messy world?). During the Cold War, realists downplayed the inherently evil nature of communism; in the 1980s Scowcroft dismissed Ronald Reagan's worldview as simplistic, wincing in 1987 when the Gipper called on Mikhail Gorbachev to 'tear down' the Berlin Wall. Even Sparrow, in his otherwise sympathetic biography, says Scowcroft and the Bush team were 'unable to offer Americans a vision of a transformed world.'

Still, realism in the hands of Scowcroft and his Bush Administration colleagues James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger and Colin Powell was an important corrective to the fog within which Wilsonian idealism and a Pax Americana has shrouded US public discourse since the end of the Cold War.

Scowcroft's 90th birthday today also marks the 12th anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq. We are still living with the consequences of what the historian Tony Judt called 'the worst foreign policy error in American history.' But Washington policy makers could do worse than heed Scowcroft's counsel about the importance of allies, the danger of hubris, illusions of omnipotence and the wisdom of limits, restraint and modesty in a world that does not conform to American expectations.
 2015-03-19T03:50:00+00:00 Tom Switzer Today marks the 90th birthday of America's leading foreign-policy strategist of the last 40 years. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=3ead1848-b66a-44d3-99b5-5256d9f1a000 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=3ead1848-b66a-44d3-99b5-5256d9f1a000 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Scowcroft-at-90-A-tribute-to-a-wise-man.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=3ead1848-b66a-44d3-99b5-5256d9f1a000 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Indo-Pacific-security-links-South-China-Sea-construction-AIIB-Japan-and-France-linguistic-divides-and-more.aspx Indo-Pacific security links: South China Sea construction, AIIB, Japan and France, linguistic divides and more 2015-03-19T01:19:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
The Indo-Pacific is a strategic system encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, reflecting the expanding interests and reach of China and India as well as the enduring role of the US. The Lowy Institute's International Security program presents a weekly selection of links illuminating the changing security picture in this increasingly connected super-region.

Victor Robert Lee has a new satellite image analysis of China's construction in the Spratly island group in the South China Sea.

Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times is arguing that US pressure on its allies to not join the Chinese-sponsored AIIB has made America look 'isolated and petulant' in the region.

Japan and France have signed an arms transfer agreement that will include technological exchanges on unmanned underwater vehicles for surveillance and sea-mine removal.

Also, later this month the foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea will hold their first trilateral meeting since 2012.

In May, Kim Jong Un will attend World War Two victory celebrations in Moscow, his first foreign trip since taking power three years ago. China is also considering holding its own World War Two commemorative parade. But instead of Tiananmen Square, the site for the parade being considered is Marco Polo bridge, which is often associated with the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Fascinatingly, the linguistic divide between North and South Korea is growing, to the extent that even 'language experts from the two countries can have trouble understanding each other.'

The Economist has a piece on the growing border conflict between China and Myanmar, and how it could affect the latter's upcoming election.

David Brewster wrote an excellent round-up of the strategic outcomes of Prime Minister Modi's recent trip to Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Seychelles. Interestingly, while in Sri Lanka, Modi was also the first Indian prime minister to visit the predominantly Tamil sections of the country's northeast.

 2015-03-19T01:19:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Links to the best reading on Indo-Pacific security this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=c418ca1c-637e-421b-9b9b-577cbbb7bd1f 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=c418ca1c-637e-421b-9b9b-577cbbb7bd1f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Indo-Pacific-security-links-South-China-Sea-construction-AIIB-Japan-and-France-linguistic-divides-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=c418ca1c-637e-421b-9b9b-577cbbb7bd1f http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Piketty-responds-to-his-critics.aspx Piketty responds to his critics 2015-03-18T23:48:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans
The Journal of Economic Perspectives is a terrific journal. Its first issue was released in 1987 and at that time the founding editor, Joseph Stiglitz, wrote: 'The Journal of Economic Perspectives will try to fill a gap between the general interest press and existing academic economics journals.'

It has succeeded. It's a great vehicle for the educated public to keep in touch with what academic economists are doing. And it's free. The most recent issue came out a few weeks ago, and includes a symposium on wealth and inequality. Contributors include Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Charles Jones, Wojciech Kopczuk, and of course, Thomas Piketty.

I'd like to focus on Piketty's contribution, although clearly the other pieces are self-recommending. (There is also an article on the marginal cost controversy, a must read for all economists, and also a paper on how economists should pull their heads in which got a lot of attention a few months ago as a working paper).

Piketty's book is long at 700 pages. After ploughing through, some people who have read every single word may be somewhat confused about his point. That's why the contribution in the Journal of Economic Perspectives is so valuable. For a start, here are some lines from the introduction:

When a lengthy book is widely discussed in academic circles and the popular media, it is probably inevitable that the arguments of the book will be simplified in the telling and retelling. In the case of my book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), a common simplification of the main theme is that because the rate of return on capital r exceeds the growth rate of the economy g, the inequality of wealth is destined to increase indefinitely over time. In my view, the magnitude of the gap between r and g is indeed one of the important forces that can explain historical magnitudes and variations in wealth inequality. However, I do not view r > g as the only or even the primary tool for considering changes in income and wealth in the 20th century, or for forecasting the path of income and wealth inequality in the 21st century.

When you next read commentary on Piketty, ask yourself if its portrayal is consistent with that quote.

In addition, Piketty's paper contains a valuable reminder that his book also discusses labour income inequality. I've had people say to me in the past something like, 'Of course, Piketty is all wrong because inequality over the last few decades has been driven by inequality of labour income.' These people obviously have not read the book. The title of Chapter 9 is 'Inequality of Labor Income'. But it is also covered elsewhere in the book. In Chapter 8, probably the most important part of the book, he says:

Let me now return to the cause of rising inequality in the United States. The increase was largely the result of an unprecedented increase in wage inequality…

We can debate what he means by 'largely', but he clearly does not ignore the issue. Another reason this paper is so interesting is that Piketty reflects on what he may have done differently. In particular he has this to say:

As I look back at my discussion of future policy proposals in the book, I may have devoted too much attention to progressive capital taxation and too little attention to a number of institutional evolutions that could prove equally important, such as the development of alternative forms of property arrangements and participatory governance.

For me, Piketty's most important contribution in his book is the extraordinary collation of data, while discussing an underappreciated force in the long-run development of an economy (namely r-g). Take for example the following two graphs:

What force could have driven the capital to income ratio of Europe to 7-to-1 in the 19th Century, while the US has never come close to this level?

It seems to me that some sort of explanation must include r-g. And I note that many of the critiques offered of Piketty cannot explain the 7-to-1 ratio. For example, many note that Piketty's forecasts of exploding capital to income ratios will not come to pass because depreciation will erode the wealth. Perhaps. But why didn't this erosion happen in the 1800s? I'd like to hear more about that. Maybe the historic importance of agricultural land as a part of a nation's capital partially accounts for the lack of erosion, but by 1910 agricultural land was already a relatively small part of the capital stock.

I'll close with another quote from Piketty's article. In discussing Acemoglu and Robinson's critique of his work, Piketty says:

It seems to me that we disagree less intensively than what they appear to believe, and that the well-known academic tendency to maximize product differentiation might be at work here.

I suspect that this point is applicable to more than just Acemoglu and Robinson.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
 2015-03-18T23:48:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans Piketty's recent paper contains a valuable reminder that his book also discusses labour income inequality. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=f6c336e3-7ed8-40c9-9d05-c8f59ad0174a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=f6c336e3-7ed8-40c9-9d05-c8f59ad0174a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Piketty-responds-to-his-critics.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=f6c336e3-7ed8-40c9-9d05-c8f59ad0174a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Israeli-election-nobody-likes-Bibi-but-everyone-votes-for-him.aspx Israel's election: Nobody likes Bibi, but everyone votes for him 2015-03-18T22:08:00+00:00 Anthony Bubalo
When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for early elections last December there was a schizophrenic character to a lot of the analysis. Most observers thought Bibi would probably win again; but there were also predictions that perhaps Bibi had started to run out of political puff.

Closer to the election there were polls warning Bibi might lose; it is fair to say there were many people in Israel and internationally hoping he might. Even in Likud strongholds that once sang 'Bibi, King of Israel', there seemed to be a waning enthusiasm for the Prime Minister, driven by difficult economic circumstances and a growing weariness with the scandals that always seemed to hover around Bibi and his wife Sara.

In fact, a senior member of Bibi's own party reputedly offered this hopeful piece of analysis ahead of the election to an Israeli newspaper (unattributed of course):

If we win, that would be excellent...But even if we lose, it will be a healthy and good process for the Likud. Netanyahu will go home, and a whole generation of potential leaders will finally be able to contend for the leadership and transform Likud from a party that scratches 20 seats to a true ruling party.

And yet, despite exit polls predicting an almost dead heat between Bibi and his Zionist Union rival Yitzhak Herzog (27-26 seats), Bibi's Likud party won 30 seats to Zionist Union's 24, a big win by Israeli standards. (This also suggests, incidentally, that either there is something wrong with Israeli exit polls or some Israelis did not want to admit that they voted for Bibi.)

There is no doubt that a little panic had crept into the Bibi camp.

A week before the poll he declared that there would be no Palestinian state under his watch, because any territory ceded would quickly fall to Islamic extremists. On election day he warned, via Facebook, that Israeli Arabs were being bussed to the polls by left wing NGOs, imploring his supporters to save his nationalist government.

But it also seems that panic worked.

Bibi's emergency campaign to shore up his right-wing base won Likud seats, largely at the expense of other right-wing parties, particularly Naftali Bennet's Habayit Hayehudi (Jewish Home). He now enters the usually febrile period of post-election coalition formation in a strong position. There will, of course, be the usual courtships and tantrums, both real and affected. But people who complained bitterly about Bibi while they were in government with him will happily take their (ministerial) seats again.

The real question is how ideologically narrow the new government will be. Israel's President Reuven Rivlin, whose role it is to invite one of the party leaders to form a government, has called for a government of national unity built around Likud and Zionist Union. But Bibi could also form a more ideologically coherent government of just right-wing and ultra-orthodox parties (Haartez has a great interactive that allows you to explore the options and build your own ruling coalition.)

The former seems unlikely at this stage. In particular, Labor members of Zionist Union will be urging Herzog to stay out. Bibi could also bring in the Centrist Yesh Atid (There is an Alternative) at the expense of the ultra-orthodox parties, but this would mean a kiss and make-up with its leader Yair Lapid, whose spat with Bibi helped prompt the early election.

Yet if a narrow government might be more preferable to Bibi and more politically possible, it will also make Israel's government less palatable internationally. This matters insofar as the new government will be trying to convince the world not to strike a nuclear deal with Iran, and to deflect growing efforts by the Palestinians to condemn Israel in the UN and take it to the International Court of Justice.

Experience has taught me to never rule anything out in Israeli politics. A bit like Bibi's election victory, things that seem unlikely one week, somehow turn out to be inevitable the next.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user IsraeliInUSA.
 2015-03-18T22:08:00+00:00 Anthony Bubalo The real question is how ideologically narrow the new government will be. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=3746f66d-ddf0-4c4e-aa0c-83d3b241fff7 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=3746f66d-ddf0-4c4e-aa0c-83d3b241fff7 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/19/Israeli-election-nobody-likes-Bibi-but-everyone-votes-for-him.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=3746f66d-ddf0-4c4e-aa0c-83d3b241fff7 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/In-Malaysia-government-demonstrates-that-it-remains-in-control.aspx In Malaysia, government demonstrates that it remains in control 2015-03-18T05:27:00+00:00 John Funston
Malaysian Prime Minister Dato' Sri Najib Tun Razak, founder of the Global Movement of Moderates, has been widely praised by international leaders (including President Obama and Prime Minister Abbott) for his commitment to democracy and moderate Islam.

Yet between 2013 and 2014, according to Amnesty International, 44 people in Malaysia were investigated or charged for sedition. Another dozen or so have been investigated this year, the latest being the daughter of jailed opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim.

What is behind this crackdown?

Najib's reputation as a reformer owes much to changes he announced in mid-September 2011 that appeared to be moving Malaysia in a more democratic direction. Reforms included ending a decades' long state of emergency, amending several repressive laws, and repealing the notorious Internal Security Act that allowed indefinite detention without trial. In July 2012 he also promised to end the 1948 Sedition Act, a catch-all law covering any action perceived to bring the government, the Malay Rulers or Islam into disrepute.

The new laws, passed in mid-2012, were in fact not as democratic as promised. But when the government performed poorly in the 2013 general election – losing the popular vote though still winning 60% of parliamentary seats – the reforms were partly blamed.

The government responded by using the Sedition Act against pro-opposition groups to demonstrate that it remained in control. An orchestrated groundswell by United Malays National Organisation-linked (UMNO) pressure groups also followed, calling for the Sedition Act to be maintained to protect Malays, the Rulers and Islam.

At the UMNO general assembly last November Najib obliged, promising that the Act would be retained and in fact strengthened – even outlawing advocating secession for the states of Sabah or Sarawak.

Two further reasons for using the Sedition Act have arisen in recent months.

First, former prime minister Mahathir has fallen out with his erstwhile protégé, declaring his opposition to reforms such as abolishing the Internal Security Act, and demanding Najib resign. Since Mahathir still retains strong support in UMNO, Najib has had to demonstrate he is just as able as the former prime minister in cracking down on the opposition.

Second, the government wants to limit all opposition to the recent conviction and 5-year jail sentence of Anwar Ibrahim for sodomy. Most Malaysians seem unconvinced of Anwar's guilt. In an attempt to address this, the prosecutor (an UMNO lawyer appointed for the trial) has even gone on a roadshow giving graphic details of the alleged crime. Now sedition investigations have been launched against those who have criticised the court decision.

The most recent investigation is against Anwar's daughter Nurul Izzah. An MP in her own right, she delivered a speech in parliament – in fact prepared by Anwar – that was critical of the sodomy conviction. Parliamentary speeches are privileged in Malaysia, and although there is an exception for sedition, this is confined to questioning citizenship, the special position of the Malays, and the Malay rulers, and does not extend to the judiciary.

The jailing of Anwar was already a considerable setback for Malaysia's international reputation. The investigation of Nurul Izzah for a parliamentary speech – along with the intimidation and unnecessary act of detaining her overnight – has done nothing to help.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Firdaus Latif.
 2015-03-18T05:27:00+00:00 John Funston When the Malaysian government performed poorly in the 2013 general election, recent progressive reforms were partly blamed http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=56b324ae-ce02-47d9-94d1-780fed8e9edf 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=56b324ae-ce02-47d9-94d1-780fed8e9edf http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/In-Malaysia-government-demonstrates-that-it-remains-in-control.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=56b324ae-ce02-47d9-94d1-780fed8e9edf http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Post-cyclone-aid-to-Vanuatu.aspx Post-cyclone aid to Vanuatu 2015-03-18T03:51:00+00:00 guest blogger – blank
By Jenny Hayward-Jones, Director of the Lowy Institute's Melanesia Program and Philippa Brant, Research Associate

A woman weaves a straw mat as another burns decomposed foliage in Tanna, Vanuatu, 17 March 2015 (Reuters/Edgar Su)

The full extent of the devastation wrought by Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu and to a lesser degree Tuvalu, Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, is not yet known. But images of the damage in Vanuatu have been heartbreaking. Vanuatu's Government is understandably overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster and has reached out for international help.

Australia, New Zealand and France quickly mobilised military assets under the FRANZ Arrangement to undertake reconnaissance of the cyclone damage and coordinate the delivery of immediate relief assistance.

Australia is Vanuatu's largest bilateral aid donor, with the annual program currently worth AUD$60.4 million. Australia also has significant capacity to respond to disasters in the Pacific Islands region. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced two early packages of assistance, detailed here and here, including $5 million for NGOs/UN agencies, humanitarian supplies and crisis and disaster response teams. Importantly, an Australian Medical Assistance Team and an Urban Search and Rescue Team are being deployed to focus on immediate support for Port Vila Central Hospital and other medical and infrastructure needs. A much larger package of assistance from Australia will almost certainly be allocated when Vanuatu's Government is able to make a full assessment of its needs.

Other international partners have also been quick to offer assistance. New Zealand announced financial support of NZ$2.5 million for Vanuatu and the other nations affected by Cyclone Pam. It is also using military assets to assist with reconnaissance and, like Australia, sending health and logistics personnel.

France has provided significant logistical and technical assistance, which will likely expand in the coming weeks. The UK is also assisting with logistical efforts and has made up to £2 million available for relief. The EU has committed €1 million.

Indian Prime Minister Modi tweeted his sympathy for the people of Vanuatu and promised that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs would provide immediate financial assistance.

The Chinese Government has promised to 'extend disaster relief assistance to the government of Vanuatu' and has thus far offered emergency humanitarian assistance of US$100,000 through the Red Cross Society of China. China is usually slow off the mark (in part due to rigid decision-making processes) and is likely to provide further assistance. China has been looking for ways to improve its foreign disaster assistance response and this would be a good opportunity for it to coordinate with other development partners.

Vanuatu's Melanesian neighbours have also shown strong support, with PNG's Prime Minister Peter O'Neill announcing a package of 5 million kina (AUD$2.4m) for the Vanuatu and 1 million kina (AUD$482,000) for Tuvalu. PNG will also send an assessment team to assist with recovery efforts. Fiji is sending a relief team and emergency supplies.

The Red Cross, a number of international NGOs, and UN agencies with a presence in Vanuatu are also involved in the immediate relief effort.

The people of Vanuatu are famously resilient.

Up to 85% of the population of 267,000 live a subsistence lifestyle across the archipelago of 83 islands. Coping with regular natural disasters are a part of life for the ni-Vanuatu people. The Vanuatu Government has estimated that up to 70% of households may have been displaced. We've already seen images of people cleaning up and helping each other. People are sleeping in evacuation centres where they can, but working during the days to clean up and repair their houses and villages. Fortunately for people living in rural areas, their dependence on traditional materials in house-building makes reconstruction a little easier and less costly. Rebuilding the hundreds of schools and critical infrastructure will be a much more difficult task. Providing emergency food supplies is critical, but long-term options are also needed for rural people whose food gardens have been destroyed.

Given China's increased engagement in the Pacific, the region will be looking closely at its response. It has provided substantial support for Vanuatu's infrastructure development since 2006 (73% of its aid has been in the transport sector) and could take a prominent role in reconstruction efforts. A responsible act would be to suspend current loan negotiations and offer assistance as grants and other in-kind aid.

Vanuatu will need to be consulting with international partners in the coming weeks – not only about urgent humanitarian assistance but also about ensuring support is available for long-term reconstruction and for restoring the food security of the ni-Vanuatu people.
 2015-03-18T03:51:00+00:00 guest blogger – blank Given China's increased engagement in the Pacific, the region will be looking closely at its response. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=1eb85737-cc77-4950-a857-44f5b7065119 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=1eb85737-cc77-4950-a857-44f5b7065119 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Post-cyclone-aid-to-Vanuatu.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=1eb85737-cc77-4950-a857-44f5b7065119 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Pacific-Island-links-Cyclone-Pam-special.aspx Pacific Island links: Cyclone Pam special 2015-03-18T01:30:00+00:00 Anna Kirk

Tropical Cyclone Pam devastated parts of the Pacific over the weekend. Vanuatu was hardest hit by the category 5 storm, one of the biggest the region has ever experienced. The death toll currently stands at 11 in Vanuatu, but this is expected to rise as contact is re-established with the outer islands.

Current reports state that up to 70 % of the population could be displaced.

There are grave fears for those in the southern islands that endured the eye of the storm. The first reports coming out of Tanna are that the people are in urgent need of assistance.

Jenny Hayward-Jones writes about the devastation and displacement of communities in Vanuatu, and the challenges facing recovery efforts.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is releasing regular and detailed reports updating the situation.

Australia is increasing its support for Vanuatu as the scale of the disaster is becoming clearer.

Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati were also badly impacted by the cyclone and now face food and water shortages. Tuvalu's prime minister reported that up to 45% of the population has been displaced.

Andrew Freeman looks at whether climate change played a part in the severity of Cyclone Pam.

This is a good opportunity to revisit this analysis from Brookings on the role of regional organisations in building the disaster risk management capacity of Pacific Island countries.

If you would like to donate to Cyclone Pam relief efforts here is a list of registered charities.

Vanuatu's President, Baldwin Lonsdale, gave an emotional interview on the situation in his country, saying that Vanuatu must now start again after the destruction of all their development progress:

[youtube:UotNdSh3SuI]
 2015-03-18T01:30:00+00:00 Anna Kirk A links special on the emergency situation in Vanuatu and other Pacific Island countries in the wake of Cyclone Pam. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=3b0f59ad-7faa-420d-93f4-7e9fb6cbf805 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=3b0f59ad-7faa-420d-93f4-7e9fb6cbf805 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Pacific-Island-links-Cyclone-Pam-special.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=3b0f59ad-7faa-420d-93f4-7e9fb6cbf805 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Ideologues-threaten-to-sink-Iranian-nuclear-negotiations.aspx Ideologues threaten to sink Iranian nuclear negotiations 2015-03-18T00:23:00+00:00 Rodger Shanahan
The problem with ideologues is that while they are ready to criticise others for their rigidly held viewpoints, they are rarely ready to recognise that they are equally rigid and intolerant.

Senator Tom Cotton, speaking at the 2013 Conservative Political Action Conference in National Harbor, Maryland.

Nowhere is that on better display than in the recent controversy surrounding the nuclear negotiations with Iran. It must have been a long time since a deliberately provocative, and downright rude, open letter to the Iranian Supreme Leader was penned, and even longer since such a letter was supported with the signatures of 47 US Senators.

Now I understand that junior senators like Senator Tom Cotton want to make a political name for themselves, have always had President Obama in their sights, and see issues such as this as a way to do it. But if 50 members of the Iranian Majlis had sent a similarly worded letter to the US President, what do you think the reaction of the US public, let alone the conservative faction in American politics, would have been?

What the letter did reveal though, is the sort of hubris that only committed ideologues can demonstrate. The sort of hubris that precipitated the White House's 2003 decision to invade Iraq as a precursor to a 'flowering of democracy' among countries and cultures and within a region that few (if any) of the key decision-makers had any idea about. The sort of hubris that also depicts the nuclear negotiations as a bilateral negotiation between Washington and Tehran. Greg Sheridan writing in The Australian said that the letter told '...the Iranian leadership...not to set too much store by any deal it gets from President Barack Obama on nuclear weapons.'

Unfortunately, as the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif pointed out, the negotiations involve the P5+1 with an agreement that may eventually be backed by a UN Security Council resolution. So the US Senators' open letter should have also been addressed to the British prime minister, the Russian, Chinese and French presidents, the German chancellor and the secretary-general of the UN. Because, by Senator Cotton's logic, he also put all of these leaders on notice that none of them should expect Washington to keep its word on any future agreement. In Senator Cotton's world, the P5+1 should move over and make room for the one.

Now if it was only these people exhibiting such breathtaking and public audacity then we could simply see them as petty local politicians trying to hit a pinpoint target using a shotgun. The problem is their actions are not as random as we think and, like all good ideologues (particularly ex-army officers like the good senator), they encourage supporting attacks.

Thus a few days later The Washington Post ran a somewhat poorly written, but provocatively titled op-ed, 'War with Iran is probably our best option'. I like provocative, but I like accurate even better. So when the neocon author breathlessly claims that 'Iran aims to carry its Islamic revolution across the Middle East and beyond', he ignores the fact that Iran's revolution was Shi'a-specific, and has limited appeal even among the broader Shi'a community (which itself only represents at most 20% of the global Muslim population).

That's the problem with people who over-hype Iran's regional and even at times global ambitions. Tehran faces three significant hurdles in expanding its influence even at the regional level: it has the wrong religion, is the wrong ethnicity, and speaks the wrong language. To expand its influence, Iran creates proxies and courts allies in the time-honoured tradition of countries who seek to expand their influence but have limited means by which to do it.

There is a deep thread of exceptionalism that runs through both American and Iranian notions of self. The problem with conservative ideologues from both countries that harbour this notion of exceptionalism is that they rarely understand that it isn't a view shared by anyone outside their respective countries. Without a modicum of self-awareness, such mindsets can lead to foreign policy adventurism as they both believe in their divinely-ordained right to lead. And, while the embarrassing letter has been seen for what it is, it reveals a way of thinking that reminds us that not all dangerous ideologues reside in the Middle East.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Gage Skidmore.
 2015-03-18T00:23:00+00:00 Rodger Shanahan If it was only these people exhibiting such breathtaking and public audacity then we could simply see them as petty local politicians trying to hit a pinpoint target using a shotgun. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=5f5b8b95-6cbd-436e-b9bc-f620dd810395 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=5f5b8b95-6cbd-436e-b9bc-f620dd810395 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Ideologues-threaten-to-sink-Iranian-nuclear-negotiations.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=5f5b8b95-6cbd-436e-b9bc-f620dd810395 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Do-we-need-full-spectrum-defence.aspx Do we need 'full-spectrum defence'? 2015-03-17T21:48:00+00:00 Hugh White
The first thing to say about Alan Dupont's recent paper is that he is absolutely correct about the dire condition of Australian strategic policy.

As he suggests, we lack a coherent answer to the most basic question of all: 'What do we want our armed forces to be able to do?' Until that question is answered, there is no way we can make sensible choices about the kinds of armed forces we need, nor about how much we should spend on them.

Moreover, Alan is right about many of the reasons why our strategic policy is so bad. However, I'm not completely sold on all of his suggestions about how to do things better. Here are a few points that I think deserve fuller debate.

What is armed force good for?

Clearly we cannot decide what we want our armed forces to be able to do until we have decided what kinds of things armed forces can usefully do. Alan casts the net pretty wide. He identifies a broad range of security threats which he thinks our forces should be designed to deal with, and criticises the idea that we should focus narrowly on building them to respond to threats from other countries' armed forces.

I'm not so sure.

For example, Alan clearly believes that stabilisation operations in the Middle East are an important role for our forces and should influence our force development decisions. This presupposes that not just our interests in the Middle East are important enough to us to warrant giving them such a central place in our national security policy, but that military operations are a cost-effective way of promoting those interests. The experience of the past decade does not support that view.

To take the most obvious case, it seems likely that a serious analysis of our experience in Afghanistan would conclude that sustained military operations there failed to achieve our strategic objectives, not because of any faults in the conduct of the operation itself, but because the aims we set ourselves could not be achieved with military means. Those are lessons we need to learn.

What kinds of threats will we face in the future?

Alan's ideas about the kind of threats that Australia's forces should be designed to address, reflect a judgement that our future threat environment will look much like the one we see have seen in recent decades. That means he emphasises lower-level contingencies and coalition operations over higher-level conventional conflicts and independent operations.

But the future does not always resemble the past, so it is important to test this judgement.

Alan rightly observes that the strategic order in Asia is changing as power shifts to China, and that America's role in Asia will change too, and he criticises our defence policymakers for not thinking carefully enough about what this will mean. But he himself, perhaps, underestimates just how big the implications of these changes might be – especially if we look out a few decades.

Alan deprecates any attempt to think this far ahead, but one wonders how decisions about capabilities that will not even enter service for 20 years can be made without doing so. This is not the place to explore what kinds of risks we might face in the very different Asia of the Asian Century: suffice to say here that it would be unwise to base our strategic policy on the assumption that they will look much like those of the past 30 years.

That is the context in which issues like the geographic focus on our defence posture and the place of maritime operations in our defence planning come into focus. The more the future resembles the recent past, the more sense there is in Alan's arguments for a wider geographic and operational focus. The more we contemplate our security needs in a very different and more contested Asia, the more questionable Alan's arguments become.

How much to spend?

Alan's paper doesn't focus much on money. That is a pity, because money is of course central to any serious discussion about strategic policy. One gets the impression that Alan thinks we should be spending a good deal more on defence than we are, but even with a much bigger budget there would be hard choices to be made between competing priorities.

Alan mentions lots of things he thinks the ADF should be able to do, but doesn't give any basis for setting priorities between them. That leaves the hard work of building a coherent strategic policy still to be done.

Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Image Library.
 2015-03-17T21:48:00+00:00 Hugh White Clearly we cannot decide what we want our armed forces to be able to do until we have decided what kinds of things armed forces can usefully do. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=541ae752-daef-48f3-a4aa-e9d137aba81b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=541ae752-daef-48f3-a4aa-e9d137aba81b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/18/Do-we-need-full-spectrum-defence.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=541ae752-daef-48f3-a4aa-e9d137aba81b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Quick-comment-Rory-Medcalf-on-Australias-security-challenges.aspx Quick comment: Rory Medcalf on Australia's security challenges 2015-03-17T06:37:00+00:00 John Gooding
This week's Quick Comment podcast is with the new head of ANU's National Security College and Lowy Institute Nonresident Fellow, Professor Rory Medcalf, who last night delivered a speech in which he argued that Australia needs to rethink how it approaches and considers national security and defence. The interviewer is Lowy Institute Research Director Anthony Bubalo.

Professor Medcalf outlines what new security risks Australia faces, and why he believes this security rethink is necessary. Anthony also asks Rory which nations he thinks are key strategic partners for Australia in the region:

 2015-03-17T06:37:00+00:00 John Gooding Quick comment: Rory Medcalf rounds out a recent speech he delivered at ANU's National Security College. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=d3493e35-4cc7-44a6-92a1-2aea79a45e08 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=d3493e35-4cc7-44a6-92a1-2aea79a45e08 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Quick-comment-Rory-Medcalf-on-Australias-security-challenges.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=d3493e35-4cc7-44a6-92a1-2aea79a45e08 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Vice-News-interviews-Obama.aspx Vice News interviews President Obama 2015-03-17T04:30:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
[youtube:2a01Rg2g2Z8]

President Obama continued his string of 'new media' appearances (the other one was with Vox last month) this week, giving a wide-ranging interview for Vice News. Shane Smith, the somewhat controversial CEO of Vice, interviewed the president on ISIS, Iranian nuclear negotiations and climate change. He said this on the battle against ISIS:

I'm worried about how, even if ISIL is defeated, the underlying problem of disaffected Sunnis around the world — but particularly in some of these areas including Libya, including Yemen — where a young man who's growing up has no education, has no prospects for the future, is looking around and the one way he can get validation, power, respect is if he's a fighter. 'And this looks like the toughest gang around, so let me affiliate with them, and now you're giving me a religious rationale for doing this.' That's a problem we're going to have, generally. And we can't keep thinking about counter terrorism and security as entirely separate from diplomacy, development, education.

Check out the full interview above.
 2015-03-17T04:30:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Vice News interviews President Obama http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a84d6ae2-8174-4c20-909b-d897582888d8 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a84d6ae2-8174-4c20-909b-d897582888d8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Vice-News-interviews-Obama.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a84d6ae2-8174-4c20-909b-d897582888d8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Modi-builds-Indias-sphere-of-influence-in-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx Modi builds India's sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean 2015-03-17T03:24:00+00:00 David Brewster
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has just completed a ground-breaking tour of the Indian Ocean, aiming to consolidate India's leading role among the island states and counter China's growing presence in the region.

Modi is now breaking some long-standing taboos in Indian foreign policy.

Enhanced security cooperation was very much at the forefront of Modi's visits last week to Seychelles and Mauritius. India has long acted as a security provider to these islands, including fending off feared coups on several occasions. The relationship is bolstered by their large Indian ethnic populations (some 70% of Mauritians are of Indian origin and there is a substantial Indian community in Seychelles). For decades, India has been the major contributor of military equipment and training to both countries.

The head of Mauritius' navy and the Mauritian national security advisor are Indian officers, while the Seychelles maritime security advisor is also an Indian naval officer. Modi used last week's visits to promise additional Indian surveillance aircraft to Seychelles as well as handing over an Indian-built patrol vessel to Mauritius.

Modi's visit to Sri Lanka – the first Indian prime ministerial visit for almost 30 years – focused on rebuilding the political links between the two countries that have often been frayed and irritated by the Tamil issue. Modi pledged India's commitment to the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka, but also pressed Colombo to implement its promises of devolving power to the Tamil community. In doing so, Modi managed to avoid the antagonism that has previously surrounded the issue, raising hopes that India might play a constructive role in helping to facilitate lasting national reconciliation.

But Modi's visit to the region also had considerable strategic significance.

India is now in the process of building a maritime security grouping among the Indian Ocean island states as part of its aspirations to be a 'net security provider' to the region.

For several years, India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have been parties to a trilateral arrangement involving training and capacity building of maritime forces, regular joint exercises and meetings of national security advisors. Last year, Delhi proposed that this arrangement should be expanded to include Mauritius and Seychelles, and potentially even other states. The proposal was blocked by Sri Lanka's former President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was concerned about the dilution of India's contributions to Sri Lanka (particularly in defence training). Rajapaksa was also unhappy with Mauritius, which had boycotted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo in November 2013.

This policy may have now changed under Sri Lanka's new President, Maithripala Sirisena, who has pledged to 'correct' Sri Lanka's perceived tilt towards Beijing.

An expansion of the trilateral maritime security arrangement to include Mauritius and Seychelles is now on the cards. The initial focus of the 'IO-5' will be on capacity building, training and information sharing, and perhaps joint exercises. Delhi is also focused on building a cooperative system of 'maritime domain awareness' for tracking and identifying ships and aircraft throughout the western and central Indian Ocean. Delhi has already installed coastal radar systems in the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius, which all feed information back through the Indian Navy's National Command Control Communication Intelligence network.

India also plans to build military facilities on the islands. Modi's visit to Mauritius included an announcement that India will upgrade airfield and port facilities at North Agalega Island, located some 1000km northeast of Madagascar, for use by the Indian military. This has long been discussed, but never acted upon. Using Agalega as a staging point will substantially help India's maritime reconnaissance efforts throughout the western Indian Ocean.

Just as interesting is India's agreement with Seychelles to develop 'infrastructure' on the uninhabited Assumption Island near the northern end of the Mozambique Channel. Along with the Suez Canal, the Channel is the main route for shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Control over this and other so-called Indian Ocean 'choke points' has long been a key objective of the Indian Navy. The deals giving the Indian military access to these facilities will represent a major departure from Indian policy that has long derided 'foreign military bases' in the region. (Interestingly in the 1960s the US also planned to build a base on an island near Assumption before it settled on Diego Garcia.)

The immediate explanation for these moves is India's growing strategic competition with China.

Delhi is seeking to preempt China's perceived attempts to build its own strategic relationships in the region. China has longstanding security relationships with Pakistan and several other Indian Ocean countries. Some highly unusual port visits by a Chinese submarine to Colombo last year prompted significant concerns in Delhi that Sri Lanka may be moving to align itself with Beijing and provide access to the Chinese military. In recent months there have also been curious reports emanating from Namibia that the Chinese navy may have sought access arrangements to a port being upgraded by China at Walvis Bay. Denials by the Namibian Government were not entirely convincing. Whether true or not, such arrangements would be extremely valuable to China in helping to secure its huge energy imports from West Africa.

As nascent and aspirational as India's initiatives in the Indian Ocean may be, they represent important steps in giving substance to its claims to be a 'net security provider' to the region. A grouping with the island states may represent the beginnings of a new multilateral alignment in the Indian Ocean, with India at the centre. For India it would represent an important psychological step beyond its traditional adherence to nonalignment, which could have much broader implications.

India's moves also reflect an instinctive view among many in Delhi that if the Indian Ocean is not actually India's Ocean, then in an ideal world it ought to be.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user President Sri Lanka.
 2015-03-17T03:24:00+00:00 David Brewster Delhi is seeking to preempt China's perceived attempts to build its own strategic relationships in the region. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=4b8caf7c-b013-4719-8745-43f73a18aa06 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=4b8caf7c-b013-4719-8745-43f73a18aa06 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Modi-builds-Indias-sphere-of-influence-in-the-Indian-Ocean.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=4b8caf7c-b013-4719-8745-43f73a18aa06 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/China-and-the-AIIB-Towards-a-new-rules-based-order.aspx China and the AIIB: Towards a new rules-based order? 2015-03-17T01:00:00+00:00 Malcolm Jorgensen
Australia's likely decision to become a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) marks the loosening of America's 70 year command over global governance.

US Secretary of State John Kerry and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim at the African Growth and Opportunity Act Ministerial meeting, 4 August 2014

It remains uncertain whether the Chinese-led AIIB initiative will complement or compete with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) to meet Asia's capital investment needs. What is clear, however, is China's willingness to challenge America's long-established strategy of institutionalising power in a rules-based order.

America's stated concerns with the AIIB are that it replicates existing global financial institutions, but lacks their transparency and accountability standards. Pressuring key allies to reject the AIIB has failed, with the British Government announcing its intention to be the 'first major Western country' to join and influence the bank's design and development. The US has accused the UK of 'constant accommodation' of China over a range of issues and 'virtually no consultation with the US' in this case. Australia nevertheless looks set to follow the UK decision as it moves towards signing a free trade deal later this year.

American disquiet stems from more fundamental concerns than AIIB governance, and goes to the heart of its future regional and international engagement.

A defining feature of American global strategy since 1945 has been building the architecture of global governance, including the Bretton Woods financial institutions, to facilitate its own international power. An example is the World Bank, which continues to weight the US vote heaviest at 16.42%, while China's vote is weighted third at only 4.91%. Such disparities are replicated in the Asian Development Bank and IMF.

China resents the rigidity in global financial institutions for distorting its growing economic significance, which has now become a basis for challenging the legitimacy of the American-led international order. A recurrent theme of US regional policy is to strengthen a 'rules-based order' and enforce Chinese compliance with it. The case of the AIIB shows that China now seeks to define this order for itself, with the battle for influence in Asia increasingly fought through rules and institutions.

The AIIB choice encapsulates the dilemma facing the US-Australian alliance as a new Sino-US equilibrium is contested in coming years and decades.

In a recent Lowy Institute Analysis. Alan Dupont identified Australian defence strategy in equivalent terms, but warned that: 'Maintaining and propagating a rules-based liberal, democratic order will be far more difficult in a world where Pax Americana is fraying at the edges.' There could be no clearer demonstration than America's closest allies supporting a key element of a Sino-regional financial order at the expense of US leadership.

A US tactic for influencing international institutions has been to remain outside their formal constraints to increase its ability to develop them in line with US interests – what former US State Department legal advisor Harold Koh described as a 'flying buttress mentality.' A US official criticised the UK decision to sign up too readily on the basis that 'large economies can have more influence by staying on the outside and trying to shape the standards it adopts.'

This approach presumes that other countries will recognise US support as indispensible – whether as a member, or through its external backing. The case of the AIIB reveals however that the perception of US power in Asia has receded such that its consent is no longer necessary to the success of a major regional institution. Choosing to conspicuously obstruct the AIIB has served only to accentuate the weakness of America's status as arbiter of regional order.

For the US to maximise its leverage through a rules-based order it must accept the evolution of global finance to encompass the reality of growing Chinese power. Importantly, China continues to engage with existing global financial institutions even as it fosters parallel alternatives. The 2015 US National Security Strategy recognised the need to reform the World Bank and IMF to 'make them more effective and representative.' No such reforms have been forthcoming however, with the US Congress refusing to relinquish power that was crystallised in a previous era.

American failure to reform global architecture cannot be repackaged as an obligation on Australia to uphold obsolete rules, and thereby risk financial and political isolation in its own region. The 'switch' in Australian Government policy probably owes more to the fraught nature of the choice than any supposed improvement in the Chinese proposal.

The lesson is that there are limits to prolonging US power through international law and institutions. If Washington fails to adapt it will ultimately be China demanding fidelity to its rules-based order.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user U.S Department of State.
 2015-03-17T01:00:00+00:00 Malcolm Jorgensen What is clear, however, is China's willingness to challenge America's long-established strategy of institutionalising power in a rules-based order. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=435820c0-a7e1-4d99-8392-6a7a1c05f3da 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=435820c0-a7e1-4d99-8392-6a7a1c05f3da http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/China-and-the-AIIB-Towards-a-new-rules-based-order.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=435820c0-a7e1-4d99-8392-6a7a1c05f3da http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Southeast-Asia-Links-Bangkok-bomb-plots-Russia-in-Vietnam-Myanmars-slide-ASEANs-big-year.aspx Southeast Asia links: Bangkok bomb plots, Russia in Vietnam, Myanmar's slide, ASEAN's big year and more 2015-03-16T23:50:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan

The Thai junta is trying to downplay a report that attacks are planned this week on over 100 targets in the capital.

Carl Thayer has explained how Russia may be the spoiler in US-Vietnam relations.

Anwar Ibrahim's jailing could hurt both the Malaysian prime minister and the opposition, says RSIS' Yang Razali Kassim

Peter Chalk looked at the difficulties and processes of bringing the ASEAN Community to life in a new report for ASPI. The Economist looked at why the Community will struggle to implement meaningful integration.

Beijing's non-interference policy was tested this week as airstrikes by the Myanmar Air Force hit locations inside the Chinese border. Naypyidaw blamed the rebels (who don't have aircraft).

The head of the Thai junta, Prayuth Chan-ocha, complained about the US stance toward his coup-installed government:

The East and the West are different. I ask you to tell the US that its one-size-fits-all shirt does not suit everyone. There must be different sizes...

The 'power of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Vietnam has increased dramatically' says ISEAS' Le Hong Hiep.

A heavy handed crackdown on student protests in Myanmar last week highlighted the slow progress made in reform:

[youtube:CDwuLNRYYWQ]
 2015-03-16T23:50:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan Links to the best reading on Southeast Asia this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=7d510e94-d128-4ca3-ade6-2bd3f64f5252 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=7d510e94-d128-4ca3-ade6-2bd3f64f5252 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Southeast-Asia-Links-Bangkok-bomb-plots-Russia-in-Vietnam-Myanmars-slide-ASEANs-big-year.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=7d510e94-d128-4ca3-ade6-2bd3f64f5252 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/The-shrinking-space-for-piety-without-violence.aspx The shrinking space for piety without violence 2015-03-16T22:27:00+00:00 Vanessa Newby
The deliberate recruitment of women by ISIS certainly brings a new twist to radicalism. It is something that al Qaeda never quite got the hang of. It is worrisome, because it reveals the long-term ambitions of the group – to create a new generation of radicalised men and women.

Why is it working in some cases? As I noted previously, the acquisition of territory is key to recruitment for ISIS. This is because there is somewhere to go that embodies the romantic ideal of the Caliphate, where Muslims can be Muslims and their piety is rewarded by the state. Why do some people feel the need to live their lives completely in the service of God? What does this look like to Muslims?

In Syria, prior to the war, I spent several months studying Arabic at Abu Noor, a madrasah in Damascus. It afforded me insight into the lives of the truly pious and an understanding of what it means for some Muslims to live the dream of a devout life. My observation of the women of Abu Noor is that most of them were simply Sunni Muslims who wished to make God the focus of their life.

Like all religious spaces in the Middle East, the school was regularly audited by the government, but was nonetheless allowed to exist up until the war began.

The Arabic school was part of the mosque and was divided by gender. Most of the women I met were there because they felt they could not live out their religion as fully as they would have liked in their home countries. They hailed from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Balkans and parts of Africa. They came to learn Arabic in order to be able to read the Quran in its original language.

They stayed for years. Not just because Arabic is wretchedly hard to learn, but because they could be devoutly Muslim there.

They could cover freely – which they believed the Quran instructed them to do. Simply being covered was not an option for the girls from the 'Stans'.

I met a qualified medical doctor from Uzbekistan who came because she was unable to practice as a doctor in hijab. I got to know one particularly devout girl from Kyrgyzstan, whose ability to learn and retain tracts of the Quran for our recitation classes was astonishing. She told me she came from a secular family who didn't cover and who mocked her for her religious devotion. I met Turkish girls who were unable to study at university because they banned hijabs on campus (a policy that has now been revoked in Turkey). I met an entire Chinese family from Yunnan who sought to escape the control that exists in China over their ability to learn about their religion. I met a devout Japanese woman who had converted as a result of travelling around the Maghreb for months and meeting many Muslims. I met a fully covered (Niqab) highly educated Singaporean woman, who believed she needed her religion to be the focal point of her life.

The women spent their mornings learning Arabic, and their afternoons engaged in classes of their choice, on tafsir (interpretation), tajweed (recitation), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), or private prayer and Quran study. The girls' boarding area, which I was invited to view, was inside the mosque/school which comprised the campus. It was clean and very simple and it was here I met girls from Africa whom I had never seen in class, who told me they had been there for seven years.

There was no doubt at Abu Noor that radicalism existed (it has been noted before by Ed Hussein), but I was never exposed to it directly (at the time it was more noticeable in the male quarter). The women I met never spoke to me about violence or even politics. At this time, they just seemed happy to have a place to learn about their religion.

I don't believe the school was producing extremists; the school had other interests. I noticed after I had been at the school for a couple of months that some of the most talented Arabic language students were leaving the classes. I spoke to one and she told me she had been invited to join an advanced class called Taheeleh (meaning rehabilitation). After asking a few more questions it occurred to me that these classes were most likely teaching the girls how to proselytise about Islam in the broader world. But I do not believe the school taught any kind of radical ideology. Rather, students were taught to preach a conservative or pious form of Islam which does not correspond in any way to the teachings of ISIS.

I often wonder what many of these women are doing now. I know the Syrian Government cracked down hard on the area and closed the school during the early stages of the conflict. My great fear is that this kind of repression may well have driven some of the girls towards ISIS or similar groups.

If you look broadly across the Muslim world, you will notice that governments tightly control religious space because of the potential threat religion poses to existing political power structures. Extreme piety in Western converts is viewed with great suspicion by governments in the Middle East, not just in the West. This means it is not easy to emigrate to a Muslim state as a Western convert without running the risk of attracting unwanted attention from the local security services, even in places such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. Equally, those born Muslim in Western states may not always feel comfortable displaying their religion openly for fear of arousing suspicion or censure.

I am concerned the space for piety without violence is shrinking in this battle of ideas about what is good Islam (preferably as secular as possible?) and bad Islam (indicated by the wearing of the Niqab and a pious lifestyle?).

Recognition of the difference between extremism and piety in Islam is essential for the effective and responsible use of security services to monitor extremism. More research is urgently needed to understand this issue, in order to prevent a dangerous dichotomy from developing.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Glenn Halog.
 2015-03-16T22:27:00+00:00 Vanessa Newby Broadly across the Muslim world, you will notice that governments tightly control religious space because of the potential threat it poses to existing political power structures. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b6dca479-3a95-4cc6-a4d7-15d56db7525c 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b6dca479-3a95-4cc6-a4d7-15d56db7525c http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/The-shrinking-space-for-piety-without-violence.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b6dca479-3a95-4cc6-a4d7-15d56db7525c http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Jaishankar-india-leading-power.aspx Jaishankar: India becoming a leading power 2015-03-16T16:20:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
Crispin Rovere wrote on The Interpreter yesterday that India sees itself 'as an emerging great power.' Those words carried extra resonance for me here in New Delhi, where I am attending an India-US 1.5 track conference arranged by the Atlantic Council and the Vivekananda International Foundation.

India has long nursed such ambitions, but it is unusual for any senior foreign policy figure, let alone the head of India's foreign ministry, to voice it in a public setting. Yet that is exactly what happened here today. The new Secretary of India's Ministry of External Affairs, S Jaishankar, made his first public address in that role at the India-US 2015 conference. He gave a memorable address that closed with the claim that India is transitioning from being a balancing power to being a leading power.

India's ambitions are rarely stated so bluntly.

Jaishankar was equally frank about the US presence in the region, which he said contributed a valuable element of uncertainty: 'My sense is that, from an Indian perspective today, for us the fact that the US is both a source of supply and a military partner helps to create enough uncertainties that could actually strengthen security in Indo-Pacific region'. This was overwhelmingly read by those in the room as suggesting that America's presence complicates China's calculations. It's quite rare for a senior figure like Jaishankar to talk in such nakedly Macchiavellian terms.

In fact, the entire speech was bluntly realist and unsentimental. There was little talk of democracy or shared values with the US, and Jaishankar talked candidly about the many problems in the relationship. This media report reflects Jaishankar's critical tone.

But I heard something else too.

In fact, the speech struck me as setting a more pro-American posture than I was used to hearing in my short time here. Yes, he focused a lot on shortcoming and challenges, but all in the service, it seemed to me, of wanting to move the relationship forward — the problems he identified were framed as ones to be overcome, not as reasons to limit ambitions. I have had the sense, during this visit, that it's the Americans who urgently want to elevate the relationship even more than has already occurred, and that the Indians are reluctant to match this enthusiasm. Jaishankar seemed to turn this on its head. He spoke of the recent Modi-Obama Joint Strategic Vision statement, which defined shared interests in the Asia Pacific. He said the symbolic significance of Obama's presence for the Indian Republic Day celebrations 'could not be overstated'. Even his criticisms of the American posture in the Indian Ocean were couched in terms of encouraging the US to do more. He said at one point America's trumpet must sound in a more certain way in the region.

Mind you, Jaishankar also seemed to signal that closer relations would not come on any terms. He dampened expectations of reforms to India's foreign investment rules, arguing that there was little need to do more so long as India's domestic economy improved. And yet he encouraged the US defence sector to share more with Indian partners, because it was in US interests to see the emergence of a 'serious Indian defence industry' (ouch, take that, Hindustan Aeronautics).

So times are really changing in the India-US relationship. A veteran India observer pointed out to me today that events such as this one used to be dominated by discussions about Pakistan. The subtext in Jaishankar's remarks, and comfortably the most discussed topic of the day, was the rise of China.
 2015-03-16T16:20:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen India has long nursed such ambitions, but it is unusual for any senior foreign policy figure, let alone the head of India's foreign ministry, to voice it in a public setting. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=bde54740-b25d-4458-a922-d92414b82a4d 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=bde54740-b25d-4458-a922-d92414b82a4d http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/17/Jaishankar-india-leading-power.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=bde54740-b25d-4458-a922-d92414b82a4d http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/Aid-and-Dev-Links-Virtual-currencies-Syria-Hans-Rosling-and-more.aspx Aid & development links: Virtual currencies, Syria, Hans Rosling and more 2015-03-16T05:30:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan

Are digital currencies a plus for poor countries? A podcast from The Guardian discusses how the rise of virtual currencies are helping people embrace e-commerce without the need for centralised banking structures.

Four years into the Syrian conflict, hundreds of local and diaspora groups are successfully negotiating access and delivering aid to civilians in areas that international agencies are struggling to reach, says a new report from ODI.

A new essay from LSE anthropologist Jason Hikel on the death of international development.

These 12 journalists covering aid and development are ones to watch.

An interesting poll on how much of their budget Americans think is going towards foreign aid.

Watch this Hans Rosling presentation to the Clinton Global Initiative University on preconceived notions regarding population growth and international development:

[youtube:kh7nfnUIAvA]
 2015-03-16T05:30:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan Links to the best reading on aid and development this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=fafd9150-86b2-4b48-a631-af22581bab66 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=fafd9150-86b2-4b48-a631-af22581bab66 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/Aid-and-Dev-Links-Virtual-currencies-Syria-Hans-Rosling-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=fafd9150-86b2-4b48-a631-af22581bab66 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/India-is-no-ally-of-the-US.aspx India is no ally of the US 2015-03-16T04:05:00+00:00 Crispin Rovere
In the continuing debate between Hugh White and Shaskank Joshi regarding US-India strategic cooperation, I would associate myself closely with the views of White and what he sees as the eventual limits of the relationship.

But I would take it one step further. In the long-term, an anti-US coalition consisting of China, Russia and India cannot be discounted.

India presently fears China's growing power. Accordingly, India hedges by deepening relations with the US and status quo middle powers such as Australia. However, India does not perceive itself as a status quo power, but as an emerging great power. As India's confidence grows it will be acting in its own interests, not those of the collective West.

Of course there are clear areas of strategic tension in the bilateral China-India relationship. These include unresolved border disputes, China's patronage of Pakistan and China's growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region. But these issues are being managed between the parties and may well be resolved, probably in that order, over the next 10 to 20 years.

It is very hard to see a similar outcome between China and the US.

Last September, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi said they would 'seek an early settlement to the boundary question,' with both countries subsequently appointing new envoys to help manage the dispute. Despite a recent setback, negotiations continue, and there is no reason to believe they will not ultimately succeed. After all, China has settled its land border with 12 of the 14 countries on its periphery, sitting in stark contrast with increasing Chinese maritime assertiveness in the East and South China seas.

As for Pakistan, India's view of China's patronage is complicated. India holds grievances over such issues as China's support for Pakistan's nuclear program, yet it is dangerous for India if Pakistan feels overly threatened. Making Pakistan feel secure is extremely challenging, especially as India's power grows. Thus a transparent Chinese role in Pakistani affairs is in India's long-term interest – transparency that will depend highly on India improving bilateral relations with China.

Finally, China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean is another major concern for India; an expansion due mainly to China's dependency on energy imports from the Middle East. The long-term trajectory of this issue depends on a combination of China reducing its reliance on sea-borne oil imports, and on the improving strength and assertiveness of India. As China has no maritime claims in the Indian Ocean, maritime tension will likely be a consequence of fissures in the broader relationship, not a cause.

As for India and the US, I find it astonishing that after more than 50 years of being repeatedly burned, some Americans still have not learned their lesson (though many have), and continue insisting that China and India are 'natural competitors'. This is false. China and India are historical competitors, but such competition is not necessarily 'natural' and certainly nothing like the strategic competition that exists between China and the US. After all, any Chinese expansion in the Western Pacific will be at America's expense. It is hard to argue that India's expansion into the Indian Ocean is being actively resisted by China.

India is not a pro-Western democratic bulwark, and never will be.

India has one true strategic partner – Russia. That relationship is deep, multifaceted and as old as ANZUS. Modi calls Russia 'a pillar of strength' and India's 'most important defence partner.' Russia has supplied a significant portion of India's military hardware, is supplying most of India's nuclear reactors, and continues to play a significant role in India's military-industrial complex, including submarine and ballistic missile programs. Likewise, Russia's relationship with China is 'the best it's been in 450 years.'

Once you remove the immediate barnacles in the China-India relationship, an interesting coalescence of interests emerge between China, India and Russia.

All three countries have a strong preference for a multipolar world order and the dilution of American hegemony. All three countries consider the principle of state sovereignty to be the pre-eminent norm of international relations, have a mercantile bent to their economic policies and already cooperate on many of these issues through the BRICS grouping.

There are certainly significant pitfalls and risks in the China-India relationship. But should those be navigated successfully, the US may well find itself with a worse relationship with India, Russia and China than the three have with each other. This is because strategic tension between India and China is finite, while their shared interests are broad and enduring.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Mat McDermott.
 2015-03-16T04:05:00+00:00 Crispin Rovere As India's confidence grows it will be acting in its own interests, not those of the collective West. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=c9c9b8d1-6c58-4835-8f87-493a09965ff0 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=c9c9b8d1-6c58-4835-8f87-493a09965ff0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/India-is-no-ally-of-the-US.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=c9c9b8d1-6c58-4835-8f87-493a09965ff0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/A-European-Army.aspx A European army? 2015-03-16T02:24:00+00:00 Daniel Woker
Can 28 national armies be pooled to form a 'European army', as recently proposed by European Union President Jean-Claude Juncker? The short answer is no, but maybe in the future.

Juncker's European call-to-arms is by no means unprecedented. In voicing the eternal dilemma between national interests and the need for Europe, with its particular geography and history, to transcend the state, Juncker is a very typical European. As with many Europeans, he straddles both sides.

As prime minister of Luxembourg, Juncker saw nothing wrong in crafting a 'beggar thy neighbor' tax policy for multinational companies who were only marginally active in his tiny fiefdom. As EU President and a candidate of the European People's Party which won EU parliamentary elections in May, Juncker correctly perceives the most glaring shortcoming in EU-building today: scattered hard power capabilities that are having a negative effect on the projection of European soft power as well. In his new book, Is Europe failing? (not yet translated into English), the former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer dwells in detail on this crucial point.

The barriers to remedy this hard power dilemma of the EU are threefold.

First, there is NATO. Some of the most important EU members are NATO members as well. However, those who are not NATO members have a technical and political compatibility with the alliance, should Europe be attacked. The most likely scenario is the continued existence of NATO, alongside whatever security policy structures the EU will eventually build, with a certain division of tasks 'in area' (EU) and 'out of area' (NATO). Indeed, that is already something of a reality: some EU members had troops in a NATO framework in Afghanistan and in an ad hoc European context in Africa.

The most important point regarding NATO, however, is the changing attitude of the US towards European defence. Only 10 years ago, non-NATO supranational defence structures in Europe were anathema to the Pentagon. Now it is the opposite. Washington would be delighted if Europe shared more of the ever-increasing burden of propping up 'our' world order.

The second barrier is the degradation of national defense budgets, particularly in Western Europe. Even the United Kingdom is employing very creative bookkeeping this budgetary year, to come up with the 2% of GDP reaffirmed by all member states at last year's NATO summit in Wales.

Third, defence and security cut very close to the central tenets of national sovereignty. Once you integrate your national defence into a larger grid of both decision-making and equipment procurement, you cede an important part of national independence. There must be considerable incentives to do this, and to explain such a fundamental decision to your own democratic base.

Yet that is probably what we will begin to see in Europe now, if only under the threat of new front lines drawn by an increasingly hostile Russia, and led by a unpredictable strongman with an impressive record of broken treaties and promises in the name of 'national glory.'

In the parlance of traditional international relations teaching, the EU is still mired in the large grey area between being a supranational organisation and a 'US of Europe,' and will likely remain there for the foreseeable future. However, as an international institution sui generis, the EU will find a way – because it has to – to increase European defence capabilities.

But the first steps towards an integrated EU military are being taken, and they might be the hardest of all: the pooling of defence industry potential.

The EU is littered with partly, or often entirely, state-owned defence companies, which are generally regarded as having long and proud traditions. This makes them less dependent on commercial pressures to merge, but also more susceptible to political will. Thus, state-owned defence corporations are a pretty reliable bellwether as to the resolve of European governments for serious integration.

Closely following an eventual integration of production would be the next step: the allotment of specialisations. To put it bluntly, not every country needs its own air force, nor heavily-armored infantry units. Aside from a Democratic Union about which I have written before, a Defence Union would be another indicator of the progress (or not) of the European project.

If that were to happen, Europe may well have, on top of its famous telephone number, a common fire horn and a respective brigade, too.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Rock Cohen.
 2015-03-16T02:24:00+00:00 Daniel Woker But the first steps towards an integrated EU military are being taken, and they might be the hardest of all: the pooling of defence industry potential. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9622da71-5316-4229-9826-e5eccadc2a67 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9622da71-5316-4229-9826-e5eccadc2a67 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/A-European-Army.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9622da71-5316-4229-9826-e5eccadc2a67 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/The-Asian-Infrastructure-Investment-Bank-and-the-rise-of-regionalism.aspx The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the rise of regionalism 2015-03-15T23:12:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville
Should Australia join the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? As often happens in international affairs, the answer is not found in the technical pros and cons of the proposal, but in the politics.

America seems to have strongly encouraged its close Asian friends (Japan, South Korea and Australia) not to join, concerned about China's growing influence in Asia. But now that the United Kingdom has decided to become a founding member, the pressure is on the hold-outs to sign up.

There is no doubt that Asia needs much more infrastructure; that China has a lot of experience at building it; and that China has massive savings to help fund it. There is no doubt, too, that there would be some overlap with the World Bank and, perhaps more obviously, with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The AIIB does raise some questions. Would some competition between rival funding institutions be helpful? Would this new channel add to the resources going into infrastructure, or just re-channel the same funds? Is Australia more effective in improving AIIB governance by joining in from the start or by playing hard-to-get?

To start, the AIIB is just one more example of devolution away from the centralised global economic institutions created at Bretton Woods in 1944 and towards a more regional framework. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 1966 was an early example. The devolution process in Asia was given a huge boost by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. Many policy-makers in the region still hold the view that the IMF failed to understand the crisis, and from then on, they realised they should work to build regional institutions.

Japan's attempt to create an Asian Monetary Fund in 1998 was vetoed by America (China also resisted). Since then, the Chiang Mai Initiative has encroached on IMF territory, although it has yet to demonstrate operational capacity. Regional groupings such as ASEAN have become stronger, and regional networks have established close personal relations between officials across a wide range of disciplines and levels. For the most part, these regional institutions have been slow developers (it's hard to see the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateral (CMIM) becoming an effective rival to the IMF), but much of the interaction is now at a regional level.

There is a powerful case for subsidiarity – pushing responsibility down to the lowest level practicable. Differences between the globe's regions are substantial, so regional knowledge and region-specific policies matter. Countries are also more likely to come to the assistance of neighbours. The Washington-based institutions have become top-heavy, weighed down by the need to placate universal representation. Rules imposed in response to specific problems are often applied globally.

The region already has the ADB. Does it need the AIIB, the BRICS New Development Bank and the Chinese New Silk Road initiative? Probably not. But Japan continues to monopolise control of the ADB (where Japan and the US each have voting rights well over twice as large as China's and the president is always a Japanese). The US dominates the Washington institutions, with the American Congress preventing even modest governance reforms at the IMF.

Given this ossified and unwelcoming environment, China's search for alternatives is inevitable.

Rather than lobbying its allies to oppose the Chinese initiative, the Obama Administration might remind Congress of the cost of its recalcitrance. As for Australia, the answer on the AIIB is now obvious. New Zealand has decided to join. Will they, once again, get ahead of us in regional ties?

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Asian Development Bank.
 2015-03-15T23:12:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville Differences between the globe's regions are substantial, so regional knowledge and region-specific policies matter. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b1f8bb7d-7fda-407e-a1a6-c0c8b3d1c4df 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b1f8bb7d-7fda-407e-a1a6-c0c8b3d1c4df http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/The-Asian-Infrastructure-Investment-Bank-and-the-rise-of-regionalism.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b1f8bb7d-7fda-407e-a1a6-c0c8b3d1c4df http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/15/Quick-comment-Bernard-Haykel-on-the-threat-of-returning-ISIS-fighters.aspx Quick comment: Bernard Haykel on the threat of returning ISIS fighters 2015-03-15T03:51:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
Here in Delhi I've been attending some sessions of the 2015 India Today Conclave, a wide ranging conference on all manner of subjects relating to Indian politics and society, and India's place in the world.

There was a fascinating panel discussion yesterday on the threat of ISIS, featuring two men who survived long periods of captivity by extremist groups in in the Middle East. If you watch the early parts of the video, you will see a convener who is perhaps a little too eager for the two men to recount the lurid details of their experience; they respond with extraordinary dignity and wisdom.

Also on the panel was Princeton University Professor of Near Eastern Studies Bernard Haykel, who made an argument about the threat of so-called returning foreign fighters that I have never heard in Australia. The discussion about these fighters is dominated by the fear that they will be a threat to Australia when they return home, but Haykel makes the blunt and arresting argument that those who go to Syria and Iraq to fight for ISIS don't want to come back. They burn their bridges with their home country when they leave, and even burn their passports. They are leaving to fight and to die, not to return as trained terrorists.

But Haykel goes further: he says it is a mistake to even prevent those who want to fight for ISIS from leaving, because when their ambitions are frustrated, they become a 'lone wolf' threat at home.

I sat down with Professor Haykel in a busy hotel lobby after his panel session to discuss his argument:

 2015-03-15T03:51:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen Professor Haykel made an argument about the threat of so-called returning foreign fighters that I have never heard in Australia. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=8f4cb707-5f8d-4047-b8ad-7df8c7f0a2bc 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=8f4cb707-5f8d-4047-b8ad-7df8c7f0a2bc http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/15/Quick-comment-Bernard-Haykel-on-the-threat-of-returning-ISIS-fighters.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=8f4cb707-5f8d-4047-b8ad-7df8c7f0a2bc http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/14/Observations-of-India.aspx Observations of India 2015-03-14T06:28:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen

I'm four days into a whirlwind tour, my first ever visit to India, having touched down in Chennai, Mumbai and now Delhi.

I've been a bit reluctant to record my observations so far. I'm delighted to report that The Interpreter clearly has a sizeable and loyal readership among the Indian foreign and strategic policy community, but when you meet such people face to face, you suddenly become acutely aware of how little you know about this country and how condescending they would find it to read the judgments of a man who has spent a bit less than a hundred hours here flitting between offices, conference rooms, hotels and airports.

So just a few stray observations, then, which will inevitably be superficial but hopefully don't stray into cliche:

If you're a media junkie, this is your country

Western observers of the media industry are now thoroughly familiar with the story of long-term decline in their own countries, but that's not happening in India. Of course, there is a massive shift here from print to online, but India boasts some of the world's biggest and most successful newspapers; in fact, the entire industry is booming. I'm told this is especially true among non-English newspapers, which are some of the most profitable. There is a well established newspaper-buying habit even among the poor.

But even if this country is one of the last bastions for 'dead tree' journalism, the journalists and editors I have talked to tell me that there is very much an 'online first' mentality. Rather than Twitter, which is popular among Australian journalists, reporters here prefer to use WhatsApp for breaking news. And whereas Australian journalists will set up their own Twitter accounts to post breaking stories and thereby build a personal brand, Indian journalists use WhatsApp accounts under their employer's name. All their posts are edited before being published.

There's also a rich selection of high-end news magazines in India which I had not been aware of. Open, for instance, is just six years old and is doing well in a competitive market. For more high-brow reading, take a look at The Caravan.

As for TV, you may have heard about the boom in 24 hour news channels in this country. Five minutes of channel flicking in my hotel room confirmed all the stories I had read about their raucous and tabloid-y nature. But I heard from one well-placed source that these channels get very low ratings and tend to be supported by subsidies of various kinds.

Indian infrastructure is actually pretty good, considering

True, there is little of the Chinese-style breakneck development of roads and railways. And yes, road congestion is horrific. But in recent years New Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai have begun building modern light rail systems and highway networks. It's also important to put India's shortcomings into context. Consider what the country is up against. How could any nation, let a lone one at India's stage of development, keep up with this pace of urbanisation without suffering from congestion (I was told that around 1200 families move to Mumbai every day)? It's also worth mentioning that the major airports I have visited are efficient and easy to navigate, and the local airlines offer first-rate service with modern fleets.

Of course, infrastructure is not just about transport. India faces massive challenges in providing clean water and sanitation in its cities. I visited the Observer Research Foundation in Mumbai, which has made a big effort to expose the 'toilet torture' in India's slums. Here's a trailer for a documentary produced by ORF:

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Indians might not be as cricket mad as I thought

I really couldn't have timed this trip any better. I'm a cricket lover and in any conversation with an Indian, the World Cup is the ultimate ice-breaker. It helps that both India and Australia are playing well, though I tell Indians that, whatever happens from here, Australia has in a sense already lost the tournament. As we all know, the Golden Rule in Australian sport is that anything is permissible as long as we beat New Zealand. So even if we lift the trophy now, the gloss has slightly gone off it.

But although there is clearly deep interest in the tournament here, and I see lots of World Cup-related advertising as well as matches constantly being replayed on TV, there's no sense on the street of the cricket fanaticism I was expecting. And cricket stays confined to the back pages of the paper; it doesn't creep to the front as it would on big occasions back home.

As I write, India is struggling to overcome a feisty Zimbabwe in its last pool game. It will be interesting to read the national mood should the men in blue lose.

Photo by Flickr user Eddie O.
 2015-03-14T06:28:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen A few stray observations, which will inevitably be superficial but hopefully don't stray into cliche. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=5072f890-f85c-4a7b-82af-d62f4117a424 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=5072f890-f85c-4a7b-82af-d62f4117a424 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/14/Observations-of-India.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=5072f890-f85c-4a7b-82af-d62f4117a424 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/14/Weekend-catch-up-Internet-in-Asia-womens-rights-death-penalty-in-Indonesia-India-US-EU-reform-and-more.aspx Weekend catch-up: Documentaries in Asia, women's rights, death penalty in Indonesia, India-US, EU reform and more 2015-03-13T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
Bringing together the best longer Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week.

Over the last couple weeks, two documentaries, one in India (India's Daughter) and the other in China (Under the Dome), have stirred debate about climate change, sexual assault and censorship in Asia. But, as Danielle Cave argued this week, the format of the debate, and the way the documentaries have been distributed, has shown how the internet and digital platforms are fundamentally changing politics in Asia.

Historically, politics has been the domain of the elite, with only a chosen few given access to decision-making. Information flows were also predominantly unidirectional and trapped within rigid hierarchies. But the internet has decimated the geographical and economic nature of how power is distributed and decisions were made. Under the Dome and India's Daughter are both incredibly compelling documentaries, but the online reaction they have stimulated is even more powerful. And this is a timely reminder for Australia that the internet's ability to provide the world's 3 billion web users with unprecedented access to information is a global game changer.

The Australian Director of Human Rights Watch, Elaine Pearson, wrote on the status of women's rights in Asia:

Twenty years ago, women activists gathered in Beijing for a historic conference to develop an agenda for women's empowerment – the 'Beijing Platform for Action.' Women across the Asia-Pacific region have made great strides in those two decades, achieving greater gender equality in employment, education and politics, progress in addressing domestic violence and a new treaty extending protections to domestic workers. Yet they still face multiple challenges of discrimination and violence.

The region's women are standing up for their rights in larger numbers than ever before, yet they they struggle against backward-thinking governments, religious authorities and extremist groups. They need support from governments such as Australia's to speak out when their rights are under threat.

Catriona Croft-Cusworth explored the groups in Indonesia that are speaking out against the death penalty:

The National Commission on Human Rights has shown its independence by criticising the president's decision to pursue executions. Commissioner Sandrayati Moniaga has commented that the right to life cannot be reduced under any circumstances. She has further questioned the impact of executing foreign drug smugglers on disrupting drug distribution networks, as well as the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent for drug-related crimes.

Other popular figures who have spoken out against the death penalty include senior actor Roy Marten, novelistLaksmi Pamuntjak and Alissa Wahid, an activist and daughter of former president Abdurrahman Wahid. Meanwhile, social media campaigns have struggled to find a popular support base, including among Indonesian youth.

Continuing a debate over the potential consequences of the growing US-India strategic partnership, Shashank Joshi thinks that India would provide limited support to the US in any future conflict between America and China:

China's heft works both ways: it dissuades middle powers from exposing themselves to a US-China fight, but if that fight is consequential enough – and in Hugh's framework, it would be – then it also means that they have a stake in supporting the US, a status quo power, against what would be a dramatic shift in the perceived Asian balance of power.

Hugh White responded:

I agree with Shashank that very important issues for India would be at stake in a US-China clash. But deciding to support America against China would be much harder than joining the coalition against Iraq. In every way China is both a much more valuable partner and a much more dangerous adversary. The key question for India, and for America's other friends in Asia, is what would have to be at stake for them to make that decision?

So it boils down to this: would India go to war with China to help America preserve the current order based on US primacy? If the answer is no, then I don't think the new warmth between America and India matters much to the future of Asia, and America's position in Asia is rather weaker than most people assume.

Daniel Woker on the future of European Union reform:

The EU is many things, a Democratic Union it is not. Yet it will have to go down this institutional path too, as the European future will be determined in the last instance by its citizens. Now of course there is already a European Parliament with limited yet increasing clout. But former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently made an interesting proposal. He sees a democratic way forward by having EU affairs discussed and decided by a specially designated part of national parliaments.

Australia is set to send more troops to Iraq to assist in training Iraqi security forces. Jim Molan argued that now that we are there, we need to execute the mission properly:

I am prepared to acknowledge that the invasion of Iraq may not have been a strategically brilliant move. But it occurred and the occupation followed. After 11 years and 100,000-plus lives lost in Iraq, I wonder: if we had concluded the war in a shorter period, or even concluded it more effectively, would ISIS even have arisen? As I said here, there is nothing more stupid than getting yourself into the wrong war and then bungling it. Our current tepid response runs the risk of seeing Iranian control and influence from the northern Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean shore.

Elliot Brennan wrote a very interesting piece drawing out the similarities between the Khmer Rouge and ISIS:

Anti-progress movements (whether religious or ideologically driven) are nothing revolutionary. The very nature of progress gives birth to counter-movements – the Luddites, for example, destroyed machinery during the 19th Century Industrial Revolution. These groups thrive in periods of change, such as the incredible social and technological upheaval that has marked this new century.

Stephen Grenville wrote on the IMF extending another loan to Ukraine:

In all of this, the Fund has to preserve some semblance of its principles: that it only lends where it has good prospects of being repaid, and that it doesn't lend new money to bail out old creditors. It does this by rose-tinted optimism about how things will work out. In the process, its reputation for professional economic advice gets chipped away. And in order to preserve some modicum of its traditional function, the Fund imposes a standard reform agenda on Kiev that may well be inappropriate for a country with its back to the wall.

South Korean President Park Guen-Hyes administration is drifting, argued Robert E Kelly:

With a coalition like this, it would have been amazing had Park pushed through modernising changes. She has occasionally tried to make the right noises. For example, she has called on Korea to become a 'creative economy', in recognition that the industrial chaebol represent a manufacturing past increasingly out of step with an information economy future. But unsurprisingly, she has sought to stimulate this the old-fashioned way – with state-led monies for approved firms. This is hardly the way to create Silicon Valley in Korea; no one ever created a cool new gadget with a government bureaucrat looking over their shoulder.

Mike Callaghan says that we are living through an economic experiment with negative interest rates:

…In a prolonged period of low interest rates, both investors and lenders may not adequately take into account the inherent risk of the investment, and both will be caught out when rates eventually head north.

We are living through an economic experiment, and this alone imposes significant uncertainty as to the outlook for the global economy. If history is our guide to the future, then we are flying blind.

Is SOE reform the next step in President Xi Jinping's economic plan? And what does that mean for China's economy? Julian Snelder took a look:

Overlooking this reality, central planners are reaching back to their Soviet roots in seeking the unicorn of 'efficient monopolism.' They like the outcomes of capitalism, but they are still grasping for state-centric relevance. They arejealous of multinational companies and the dominant positions they hold globally. They admire the unexpected dominance of local private companies in new sectors like the internet. And they know that SOEs don't play well together and gorge on capital to over-build. In some cases, like steel, SOEs have openly defied orders to consolidate. The planners are frustrated that truly private actors are actually more coordinated. These bureaucrats, determined to cure the self-harm of overcapacity, are reaching for their shotguns to reverse years of competitive separation.

Finally, Shaivalini Parmar on human rights abuses on Laos:

Disappearances remain a very serious concern. It has been more than two years since Lao police were last seen detaining prominent civil society leader Sombath Somphone - and the government has come no closer to providing answers about his case.

Somphone, a highly respected community development practitioner who was awarded the prestigious 2005 Magsaysay Award, was stopped and taken away from a police checkpoint on a busy thoroughfare in Vientiane in 2012. The entire incident was caught on security camera film, a copy of which was provided to his family by local police officers. Those officers have now been transferred to posts unknown. Senior government and parliamentary officials have repeatedly denied official involvement in Sombath's disappearance, and some are now spinning absurd theories of Thai mafia involvement.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Dr EG.
 2015-03-13T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Links to the best reading on The Interpreter this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=f31f7230-4877-4713-919a-b888a66ec109 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=f31f7230-4877-4713-919a-b888a66ec109 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/14/Weekend-catch-up-Internet-in-Asia-womens-rights-death-penalty-in-Indonesia-India-US-EU-reform-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=f31f7230-4877-4713-919a-b888a66ec109 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Would-India-go-to-war-with-China-to-help-America.aspx Would India go to war with China to help America? 2015-03-13T04:30:00+00:00 Hugh White
In his latest contribution to our debate, Shashank Joshi raised some excellent points against my sceptical view of the emerging India-US strategic partnership. But I'm still unpersuaded.

To explain why, it helps to step back and clarify the question we are debating here. It is not whether strategic relations between Delhi and Washington have grown closer in recent years, because clearly they have. It is what these closer relations mean for the geo-political contest between America and China.

India's position is clearly important to this contest. Many Americans, and many of America's friends in Asia, have long believed that India's growing wealth and power will be vital in helping America counterbalance China's growing strategic weight, and resist China's challenge to US regional leadership.

Indeed, the belief many people have that India will play this role is central to their confidence that America can and will preserve the status quo against China's challenge. It is therefore important to decide whether the progress we have seen in US-India relations justifies that confidence.

I have argued that in a geopolitical contest of the kind we see unfolding between America and China today, India's relations with America will only make a difference to the extent that India is seen to be willing to support America in a US-China conflict.

That is because who wins the contest between the American and Chinese visions of Asia's future order ultimately depends on which is seen to be more willing to fight for their vision. Each power wants the other to believe that it will go to war to impose its vision, and hopes that, if all else fails, this will persuade the other to back off.

This way of describing what is happening will surprise those who think that this kind of old-fashioned power politics disappeared after 1989, but it seems to me the only way to understand events in Asia today. In fact power politics never went away; people simply started to think that America was the only power that was indulging in it. It has been taken for granted that America will fight to support its vision of regional order, but that no one would be willing to oppose them. Now China is proving that false. We can no longer assume that China is any more determined to change the current order than America is to preserve it.

That is why India's role in this contest depends on how far it appears willing and able to materially support the US in a conflict with China. In a game played for these stakes, nothing less counts for much.

As I read him, Shashank makes two key points about this question.

One is that, while India might not be willing to send combat forces to fight alongside America's in a coalition against China, it would provide other, non-combat support such as basing and refuelling facilities. That sounds like what the diplomats call 'all support short of actual help'. It would do very little either practically or symbolically to bolster America's position against China, and certainly much less than American boosters of the relationship expect.

His second key point is that perhaps India would be willing to provide America with more substantial support if it saw really fundamental issues of regional order at stake in a US-China conflict. He cites the example of the wide support given to America in opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by countries who saw basic questions of international order being tested there.

I agree with Shashank that very important issues for India would be at stake in a US-China clash. But deciding to support America against China would be much harder than joining the coalition against Iraq. In every way China is both a much more valuable partner and a much more dangerous adversary. The key question for India, and for America's other friends in Asia, is what would have to be at stake for them to make that decision?

So it boils down to this: would India go to war with China to help America preserve the current order based on US primacy? If the answer is no, then I don't think the new warmth between America and India matters much to the future of Asia, and America's position in Asia is rather weaker than most people assume.

Photo courtesy of White House/Lawrence Jackson.
 2015-03-13T04:30:00+00:00 Hugh White The contest between the American and Chinese visions of Asia's future order depends ultimately on which is seen to be more willing to fight for their vision. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=f4706c0e-b69c-479f-92a3-6cb64cc07d6c 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=f4706c0e-b69c-479f-92a3-6cb64cc07d6c http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Would-India-go-to-war-with-China-to-help-America.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=f4706c0e-b69c-479f-92a3-6cb64cc07d6c http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Australia-Laos-rights-dialogue.aspx Australia-Laos rights dialogue: More than just rhetoric needed 2015-03-13T03:28:00+00:00 Shaivalini Parmar
For many Australians, Laos is a scenic, off-the-beaten path, holiday destination for adventurous travellers.

Relatively few know that it's also a repressive one-party state with a long record of restricting basic rights, and imprisoning or forcibly disappearing critics or citizens who dare to form groups or hold protests without government permission.

Last week, Australia had a chance to throw light on Laos' darker side when on 5 March, Canberra hosted officials from Vientiane for the fourth bilateral human rights dialogue. The dialogue, held in Australia for the first time, is part of Canberra's assistance to the Lao Government, intended to improve its human rights record. However, given the intensifying crackdown on fundamental rights, the Lao Government's commitment to reform appears dubious at best.

To ensure that this dialogue doesn't become an exercise in empty rhetoric, the Australian Government should work with its Lao counterparts to set concrete measurable benchmarks for reform, and publicly commit to them.

This past January, Laos' rights record was under scrutiny by the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva during the country's second Universal Periodic Review. Australia notably raised key concerns on forced disappearances and the systematic and escalating crackdown on freedom of expression and association.

Disappearances remain a very serious concern. It has been more than two years since Lao police were last seen detaining prominent civil society leader Sombath Somphone - and the government has come no closer to providing answers about his case.

Somphone, a highly respected community development practitioner who was awarded the prestigious 2005 Magsaysay Award, was stopped and taken away from a police checkpoint on a busy thoroughfare in Vientiane in 2012. The entire incident was caught on security camera film, a copy of which was provided to his family by local police officers. Those officers have now been transferred to posts unknown. Senior government and parliamentary officials have repeatedly denied official involvement in Sombath's disappearance, and some are now spinning absurd theories of Thai mafia involvement.

At the same time, police investigators have refused all technical assistance in the investigation, including from Australia. Following up on its statement at the Universal Periodic Review, Australia should demand answers and accountability in Sombath's case.

In Laos, government intimidation to silence critics is standard practice and self-censorship is widespread. The wall of silence that has descended in Vientiane about the Sombath's case is emblematic of that self-censorship sparked by fear. It is suspected that Sombath's dedication and involvement in supporting and empowering communities and civil society led to his ultimate disappearance. The already limited space for civil society is shrinking further. In the past year, the Lao Government has been making a concerted effort towards restricting the activities of both local and international non-governmental organisations. Newly formed guidelines controlling the activity of nonprofit associations have set onerous restrictions on international funding, alongside other limitations on notification, permissions and the types of acceptable activities that both local and international groups can engage in. An existing decree on associations forbids organisations from 'abusing the rights of freedom' or 'engaging in activities that run contrary to national interest,' both expressions that are vaguely worded and easily manipulated to serve the interests of government authorities.

Taking it one step further, in September, the Lao Government promulgated an internet decree to further solidify state control over online speech.

The language of the decree is vague and broad, and can be used to prohibit speech on a wide variety of political, economic and social topics. For instance, the decree forbids spreading 'false information' about the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party. The decree sets outs that it is impermissible to send information that could be seen as 'divid[ing] solidarity' among ethnic groups and between Laos and other countries. Another provision effectively criminalises disseminating information that 'distorts truth or tarnishes the dignity and rights of individuals, sectors, institutions and organisations.'

For far too long, Laos has been treated as an afterthought by the international community when it looks at Southeast Asia. But this year and next, it's not going to be possible to continue to look the other way on Laos's poor human rights record.

In 2016, Laos will be the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and many regional and national leaders will meet several times in Vientiane. Somewhat incredibly, Laos has also indicated its plan to run that year for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council – a seat for which they are woefully unqualified at this time.

It's time for Australian leaders to find their voices and call on Laos to stop its crackdown on civil society groups and account for Sombath Somphone's disappearance. Last week's dialogue, and those in the future, are an opportunity for Australia to help put Laos on the right track.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Prachatai.
 2015-03-13T03:28:00+00:00 Shaivalini Parmar In Laos, government intimidation to silence critics is standard practice and self-censorship is widespread. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=138cf364-5c82-4857-bc8c-950b3506f8bd 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=138cf364-5c82-4857-bc8c-950b3506f8bd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Australia-Laos-rights-dialogue.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=138cf364-5c82-4857-bc8c-950b3506f8bd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Park-Guen-Hyes-presidency-is-adrift.aspx Park Geun-Hye's presidency is adrift 2015-03-13T01:55:00+00:00 Robert E Kelly
Park Geun-Hye has been president of South Korea for just over two years, with almost three still go, and the emerging consensus here (I'm writing from South Korea) is that her presidency is already adrift.

It is not a catastrophe – she is not the George W. Bush of Korea – but it is flailing, opaque, and unfocused. Her administration's endless staffing controversies and scandals have become emblematic. In January, after less than two years on the job, her approval rating had fallen below 30% – an astonishing collapse so early in a presidency.

Park's curious inactivity, due to both the paralysis of scandal, and her own apparent unwillingness or inability to push major change, is becoming increasingly obvious. Unless Park takes some bold steps soon, her presidency is likely to go down as a caretaker one. She is becoming a bland, centre-right defender of the status quo, guarding extant structures that may have served Korea well in the past but most agree need reform today.

Much of Park's trouble stems from the obvious contrast between how she ran for president, and how she has governed. Her predecessor was an unpopular neoliberal conservative. In order to win, her campaign broke with that, running towards the social democratic centre. It claimed that a Park presidency would make the economy fairer (wealth inequality has become a large issue in Korea lately), expand welfare state support, especially for the elderly, and discipline Korea's largest corporations (the chaebol), who often act above the law (well-illustrated in the recent hubris of the so-called 'nut rage' chaebol scion). All of this was captured in the trendy phrase of Korean politics in 2012, 'economic democratisation'.

But Park's domestic coalition has little interest in liberalising, social democratic change, and Park herself is very much a product of the conservative-industrial deep state of Korea. In one of the first posts I wrote for The Interpreter, I argued that she was unlikely to shake-up Korea because she comes from the very domestic coalition that benefits from the status quo.

Her father was an earlier dictator of Korea (Park Chung-Hee), strongly associated with both rapid growth and authoritarian politics. His policies helped create the chaebol (as rough Korean analogues to Japan's earlier zaibatsu). Park the daughter has, unsurprisingly, not wandered far from this script. She has cracked down on the media and a left-wing party, and in her inauguration she promised another 'miracle on the Han.' (The Han River bisects Seoul, and the expression 'miracle on the Han' is a self-congratulatory Korean coinage for the country's rapid modernisation under her father.) But instead of desperately-needed reform of, say, education, child-care, trade policy, or corporate governance, she has offered more of the old technocratic-developmentalist recipe of her father, as if it is still 1975: five-year plans, government investment, more fetishising of the trade surplus, soft loans for the chaebol, and so on.

But this is precisely what Park's coalition wants.

The chaebol have traditionally been closest to Korea's conservatives and their central political objective for decades has been to fend off serious anti-trust action. And Park was always a curious (read: unlikely) figure to take on these elephants of old Korea which her father helped create. Besides big industry, her other large block of support is the elderly. The strongest correlation of voting for Park in 2012 was age. To elderly Koreans, the miracle on the Han and the chaebol are symbols of the glory days. For such voters, the concerns of modern liberalism – such as specious media prosecutions for defamation, or the constitutional destruction of an elected political party – are less pressing, or perhaps just par for the course for a generation who remember Park Chung-Hee. Whereas young Koreans are deeply ambivalent about Park Chung-Hee because of the dictatorship, older Koreans are less so.

With a coalition like this, it would have been amazing had Park pushed through modernising changes. She has occasionally tried to make the right noises. For example, she has called on Korea to become a 'creative economy', in recognition that the industrial chaebol represent a manufacturing past increasingly out of step with an information economy future. But unsurprisingly, she has sought to stimulate this the old-fashioned way – with state-led monies for approved firms. This is hardly the way to create Silicon Valley in Korea; no one ever created a cool new gadget with a government bureaucrat looking over their shoulder.

And the list goes on: Park promised to expand the geriatric welfare state without raising taxes, which, not surprisingly, has proven impossible. Economic democratisation (reducing inequality, reining in the chaebol) is no longer even talked about in the press. Despite being the first female president, Park has done nothing to fix Korea's crashing birth rate. Yet again unwilling to challenge Korean industry, she has not pushed for at-work daycare or maternity leave laws. After the Sewol ferry sank, Park proposed tepid reforms of the corporate mismanagement that led to the ferry being routinely overloaded and a threat to passengers. When criticised for the weak response, Park retreated into the opaque silence that has often characterised her administration.

Because her presidency will only last three more years, Park need not push much. She can coast, and should North Korea act out, her numbers will likely improve. Korea's structural rigidities (rapid ageing, education conformity, ballooning consumer debt, and so on) will likely not boil over on her watch. But it is a shame to see all these serious problems kicked down the road to the next president.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Republic of Korea.
 2015-03-13T01:55:00+00:00 Robert E Kelly Much of Park's trouble stems from the obvious contrast between how she ran for president, and how she has governed. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b55cc17f-c05a-4b08-bc4a-3cd056e69663 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b55cc17f-c05a-4b08-bc4a-3cd056e69663 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Park-Guen-Hyes-presidency-is-adrift.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b55cc17f-c05a-4b08-bc4a-3cd056e69663 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Digital-Asia-links-Mobiles-in-Myanmar-Twitter-in-China-PNG-telecommunications-USBs-and-more.aspx Digital Asia links: Mobiles in Myanmar, Twitter in China, PNG telecommunications, USBs and more 2015-03-13T00:10:00+00:00 Danielle Cave
The Asia Pacific is the most dynamic digital landscape in the world, home to the fastest adopters of new technologies and the largest concentration of mobile and social media users. An escalation in online activism, changing cyber dynamics, developments in digital diplomacy and the exploitation of big data are shaping the region's engagement with the world.

Myanmar's mobile subscriptions grew 87% last year (until September), pushing penetration to 20% of the population. This blog post discusses what such rapid mobile adoption may mean for the country and this article outlines what companies are doing to increase digital literacy and mobile access for women.

Even though it is banned in China, Twitter is opening an office in Hong Kong to help Chinese companies market their products overseas. Many Chinese brands are turning to Western social media channels to build their global image, including the state-owned Xinhua news agency which has re-branded itself 'New China' across Facebook, Twitter and Youtube.

I look at internet citizenry in Asia in this Interpreter post and, specifically, why it is important to think about the powerful online reactions to recent viral documentaries in China (Under the Dome) and India (India's Daughter).

This short report from the ANU's Bell School analyses Papua New Guinea's mobile and ICT market. With a focus on the dominance of Irish telecommunications company Digicel, the author calls for more effective regulation to safeguard against potential market abuse.

How USBs and camera memory cards are being used to smuggle data into North Korea, including South Korean movies, American TV series (Scandal is the current favourite) and Wikipedia-like information summaries.

A great editorial from the New York Times on what tech companies are doing to make the internet available to more people (less than half the world's population are online) but why bridging the digital divide is not progressing fast enough (thanks Brendan).

The attempts of China's internet giants to depict International Woman's Day with online doodles (as Google did) resulted in an online backlash in China for their sexist nature. This one was from Chinese search engine Baidu:

 2015-03-13T00:10:00+00:00 Danielle Cave Links to the best reading on digital developments in Asia this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9580baaa-2388-41bb-a1e3-13fdeb64f273 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9580baaa-2388-41bb-a1e3-13fdeb64f273 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Digital-Asia-links-Mobiles-in-Myanmar-Twitter-in-China-PNG-telecommunications-USBs-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9580baaa-2388-41bb-a1e3-13fdeb64f273 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Australia-unable-to-clearly-define-its-defence-strategy-new-Lowy-Institute-research-from-Prof-Alan-Dupont.aspx Australia unable to clearly define its defence strategy 2015-03-12T23:03:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan
In a new Lowy Institute Analysis launched today, Nonresident Fellow Professor Alan Dupont argues that successive Australian governments have failed to clearly define the nation's defence strategy.

Full Spectrum Defence: Re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian defence strategy argues that Australia needs a defence strategy that counters threats across multiple domains, is based on more diverse regional defence relationships and is underpinned by better risk assessments and defence acquisition processes.

'Australia's inability to clearly and succinctly define its defence strategy is a perennial failing. Recent defence white papers are part of the problem: they have lacked coherence, their messaging has been poor, and many of their underlying assumptions and planning practices are questionable,' Dupont said.

Key points of the Analysis include:

Australia's current defence strategy suffers from six major defects.

The forthcoming Defence White Paper is an opportunity for the Government to produce a clear statement of Australia's defence and military strategies and their principal objectives.

Australia needs an ADF that is more versatile, can counter threats across all domains, including space and cyber space, has more diverse defence relationships, and has better processes for risk management, defence acquisition and mobilisation.

The Analysis is already being widely reported in The Australian and Sydney Morning Herald. It is available on the Lowy Institute website. Stay tuned to The Interpreter for comments from some of Australia's leading defence and national security analysts.

Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Image Library.
 2015-03-12T23:03:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan In a new Lowy Analysis, Alan Dupont argues that successive Australian governments have failed to clearly define the nation's defence strategy. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=efbd6ca1-9525-49f1-8ce5-778fefadeab8 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=efbd6ca1-9525-49f1-8ce5-778fefadeab8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Australia-unable-to-clearly-define-its-defence-strategy-new-Lowy-Institute-research-from-Prof-Alan-Dupont.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=efbd6ca1-9525-49f1-8ce5-778fefadeab8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Indo-Pacific-security-links-Nuclear-weapons-Merkel-in-Japan-security-cooperation-in-South-China-Sea-and-more.aspx Indo-Pacific security links: Nuclear weapons, Merkel in Japan, security cooperation in South China Sea and more 2015-03-12T06:10:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
The Indo-Pacific is a strategic system encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, reflecting the expanding interests and reach of China and India as well as the enduring role of the US. The Lowy Institute's International Security program presents a weekly selection of links illuminating the changing security picture in this increasingly connected super-region.

The Economist made nuclear weapons a cover story this week. It is well worth reading in regards to the growing role nuclear weapons are playing in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Also, as if on cue, Pakistan successfully tested an updated and longer-ranged version of its Shaheen ballistic missile.

Chancellor Angela Merkel, on a state visit to Japan earlier this week, spoke on 'the spirit of reconciliation' and offered lessons from Germany's past as a way to calm tensions in Northeast Asia.

Two retired Japanese admirals are arguing that industrial cooperation between Japan and Australia on submarine technology and construction would 'provide strategic and operational flexibility to the US rebalancing policy.'

Japan is also increasing its security cooperation with others in the region. In the next several months, Japan will hold its first naval exercise with the Philippines and Japanese military doctors are advising Vietnamese submariners on how to cope with decompression sickness. This will most likely assist Vietnam in operating its six new Russian-built Kilo-class submarines.

Are air-intercept missions over the East China Sea wearing out Japan's fighter pilots?

On Tuesday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi began an Indian Ocean tour in an effort to bolster India's strategic presence in Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius. Meanwhile, Syed Fazl-e-Haider is arguing that Gwadar port in Pakistan will be critical for China's energy security across the Indo-Pacific.

China has commenced construction of its first indigenous aircraft carrier.

Are the Chinese economy's strengths now turning into weaknesses?

 2015-03-12T06:10:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Links to the best reading on the Indo-Pacific this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=0835ed66-18bc-46da-92a6-fb889806cc5d 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=0835ed66-18bc-46da-92a6-fb889806cc5d http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Indo-Pacific-security-links-Nuclear-weapons-Merkel-in-Japan-security-cooperation-in-South-China-Sea-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=0835ed66-18bc-46da-92a6-fb889806cc5d http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/The-Khmer-Rouge-and-ISIS.aspx The worrying parallels between the Khmer Rouge and ISIS 2015-03-12T04:26:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan
In an excellent exploratory piece by Graeme Woods in The Atlantic this month, he notes in passing the similarities between ISIS and the Khmer Rouge. It's a worthy comparison – further highlighted by ISIS' destruction of antiquities as reported last week – and something that merits a deeper look.

In the 1960s and 70s, communism was arguably the Western world's equivalent to today's global battle with Islamic jihad. Its scourge and spread in the midst of the Cold War kept US and European policymakers awake at night. One of the groups that emerged under the broad guise of communism was the Khmer Rouge.

A regressive and genocidal regime, the Khmer Rouge seized upon the anger of Cambodians following a brutal US bombing campaign. That campaign, from 1965 to 1973, flew 230,516 sorties and dropped 2,756,941 tons of ordnance on Cambodia (more than the Allies dropped during the entirety of World War Two). The bombing campaign, of which over 10% was on indiscriminate sites, was aimed at destroying mobile Viet Cong bases in eastern Cambodia. The environment of anger that the campaign fermented gave way to a coup d'état in 1970, followed by the Khmer Rouge seizing power in April 1975.

As a 2006 paper by Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan noted, 'despite many differences, a critical similarity links the war in Iraq with the Cambodian conflict: an increasing reliance on air power to battle a heterogeneous volatile insurgency.' Just as in the case of Cambodia, that heterogeneity in Syria and Iraq has given way to a calcified homogenous and territorially-bound group.

In one of their first acts, the Khmer Rouge emptied Phnom Penh and forced the capital's residents on a long and deadly march into the countryside to work rice fields. Torture and execution were central to their brutal grip on power. As Kiernan explains, Cambodians 'quickly learnt that any display of knowledge or skill, if "contaminated" by foreign influence, was folly.'

At the forefront of the Khmer Rouge's ranks were thousands of indoctrinated youth who were to usher in 'Year Zero'. At the base of the Khmer Rouge's genocidal regime was a mix of ideological agrarian socialist utopianism and a desire to reinstate the glory years of the 12th Century Khmer Empire. Pol Pot, a self-proclaimed leader, found an opportune moment in the Cold War, playing the great powers and capitalising on public discontent, to build his ranks then seize and maintain power. His genocidal reign was short but destructive.

There's much similarity to be gleaned from Pol Pot's genocidal regime that parallels with ISIS today.

Aside from obvious similarities that will be noted from the above, both groups subscribe to the destruction of a collective memory in place of a favoured revisionist other. In effect, both are anti-progress. Reminiscent of the Khmer Rouge's 'Year Zero' concept is the recent footage of ISIS destroying ancient artefacts in Mosul and Nimrud (despite having profited greatly from the smuggling of other antiquities).

Anti-progress movements (whether religious or ideologically driven) are nothing revolutionary. The very nature of progress gives birth to counter-movements – the Luddites, for example, destroyed machinery during the 19th Century Industrial Revolution. These groups thrive in periods of change, such as the incredible social and technological upheaval that has marked this new century.

Anyone who has walked Cambodia's Killing Fields or S-21 prison should need little reminding of the urgency for action against genocidal groups. In the three years, eight months and 20 days of the Khmer Rouge's power, an estimated 1.7 million people died. That number, among the most conservative of estimates, equated to 21% of the population. The long tail of that civil war lasted until 1998. Yet unlike Pol Pot's Cambodia which financially ran itself into the ground, ISIS has riches and resources far beyond.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user lecercle.
 2015-03-12T04:26:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan Both groups subscribe to the destruction of a collective memory in place of a favoured revisionist other. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=83399158-ee14-4ce4-aea4-caf705fa1827 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=83399158-ee14-4ce4-aea4-caf705fa1827 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/The-Khmer-Rouge-and-ISIS.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=83399158-ee14-4ce4-aea4-caf705fa1827 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Tough-road-for-Asias-women-activists.aspx Tough road for Asia's women activists 2015-03-12T02:00:00+00:00 Elaine Pearson

On 3 March, Australia's Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said, 'We must use the celebration of International Women's Day to highlight the plight of women still fighting for freedom and equality, for when that is achieved it will be for the betterment of us all.'

That fight is ongoing in the Asia-Pacific region. While women around the world celebrated International Women's Day on 8 March, in China, state security forces took into custody at least 10 women activists in three cities - five remain detained. Their crime? Organising a nationwide campaign to distribute stickers and leaflets protesting sexual harassment on public transport. As incongruous as it sounds, during the week China's National People's Congress meets in Beijing, the authorities' tolerance for any perceived criticism or dissent is zero.

But China is not alone in jailing women who speak out. When I visited Cambodia last November, I attended the trial of seven women activists arrested only the day before, who had protested the city's inaction when their neighborhood in Phnom Penh flooded. The trial was a farce. After barely two hours, the court convicted the women for blocking traffic and sentenced each to a year in jail.

Last July, women's rights activists in Chin State protested against sexual violence by Burmese military authorities in Burma, and were charged with staging unauthorised public protests. And Burmese women who have campaigned against discriminatory marriage laws have faced threats and intimidation.

Twenty years ago, women activists gathered in Beijing for a historic conference to develop an agenda for women's empowerment – the 'Beijing Platform for Action.' Women across the Asia-Pacific region have made great strides in those two decades, achieving greater gender equality in employment, education and politics, progress in addressing domestic violence and a new treaty extending protections to domestic workers. Yet they still face multiple challenges of discrimination and violence.

The region's women are standing up for their rights in larger numbers than ever before, yet they they struggle against backward-thinking governments, religious authorities and extremist groups. They need support from governments such as Australia's to speak out when their rights are under threat.

It's in Australia's best interests to ensure that women's voices are heard and not silenced. Bishop should follow-up on her International Women's Day pledge by turning her general appeal into specific calls for action: pressing for the release of women activists detained in Burma, Cambodia and China would be a good place to start.

*Elaine Pearson will a panelist at tonight's Women in Foreign Policy event at the Lowy Institute. The event is sold out, but a podcast will be made available.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Dying Regime.
 2015-03-12T02:00:00+00:00 Elaine Pearson The fight for gender equality is ongoing in the Asia-Pacific region. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9d57fb22-e595-440e-99e6-8b5059b6a8b9 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9d57fb22-e595-440e-99e6-8b5059b6a8b9 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Tough-road-for-Asias-women-activists.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9d57fb22-e595-440e-99e6-8b5059b6a8b9 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Boko-Haram-The-later-years.aspx Boko Haram: The later years 2015-03-12T00:43:00+00:00 Hans Brun
Since 2010, Boko Haram has acquired increasingly sophisticated weaponry, grown its ranks, and expanded its capacity to attack a variety of targets, primarily in northeastern Nigeria.

Boko Haram´s links to international networks, including al-Qaeda, became known to the Nigerian public in March 2014 through local media. A Nigerian newspaper claimed Boko Haram had been able to establish several training camps in neighbouring Cameroon and that the movement had maintained extensive links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb for several years. It had also receiving advanced training, including in the manufacture and deployment of improvised explosive devices (IED).

This training has enabled the movement to introduce new types of terror attacks in Nigeria, using IEDs beyond their traditional role as roadside bombs.

One of the first known suicide attacks in Nigeria occurred on 16 June 2011, when a suicide bomber attacked law enforcement personnel in Nigeria´s capital, Abuja. At least three people were killed, including the suicide bomber who appeared to be from Sudan or Somalia, which indirectly confirmed Boko Haram´s links to al-Qaeda and other jihadi terror groups.

Boko Haram also introduced the use of vehicle-borne suicide bombers the same year. On 26 August, a suicide car attack was carried out against the UN headquarters in Abuja, killing at least 18 people. It was also at this time that Boko Haram began to target villages, churches, schools and universities. The movement also launched a campaign of kidnappings in the region, abducting women, girls and boys on a number of occasions.

On 13 July 2014, Boko Haram´s leader, Abubakar Shekau, officially stated the movements support for the efforts of the Islamic State (IS), after IS declared a Caliphate on territory belonging to Iraq and Syria. Also during that summer, it became obvious that Boko Haram was changing its tactics once again. The Nigerian security forces were unable to effectively deal with Boko Haram, and the movement started to hold on to territory that it seized.

During this time, the group published a video in which Abubakar Shekau gave a speech in a mix of Hausa and Arabic. According to the initial translations, it was widely believed that he declared the creation of a Caliphate, however, this translation later proved to be incorrect. Nevertheless, what he actually said, according to some translations and interpretations was, 'Thanks be to God who gave victory to our brothers in Gwoza and made it a state among the Islamic states.' He also stated that Boko Haram did not recognise Nigeria as a nation-state since the Muslim community (Ummah) cannot be divided by the borders, a classic jihadi argument.

Abubakar Shekau also rejected democracy in his speech, stating that the existence of democracy in Nigeria and neighbouring countries is one of the key reasons behind Boko Haram´s use of violence. According to Shekau, the movement will continue to use violence until democracy is rejected in the region and replaced by a correct interpretation and implementation of Sharia. The rejection of democracy draws upon another jihadi argument, that democracy is based upon man-made laws and thus opposes, by definition, the laws and the will of God. According to Shekau, democracy is actually worse than 'sodomy, adultery, and paganism.'

The situation in northern Nigeria grew significantly worse towards the end of 2014.

Nigerian security forces appeared to be demoralised. There were problems with soldiers deserting and several cases of self-mutilation. It also appeared as if security forces avoided confronting Boko Haram, even when reliable intelligence of its whereabouts was available. Boko Haram skillfully exploited the situation and increased the number of attacks against remote villages. As a result, more than 200,000 refugees searched for safety in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Boko Haram was also able to attack targets in neighbouring countries, such as Cameroon. Nigerian security forces had no choice but to start cooperating with military units from Niger, Chad and Cameroon, and allowed them to conduct military operations against Boko Haram on Nigerian territory. Despite this, Boko Haram has been able to maintain its momentum, and the deteriorating security situation has led to the postponement of a national election from 14 February to 28 March.

Boko Haram has released a number of propaganda videos over the years, but these have been of amateur quality. Recently, however, Boko Haram´s material has become increasingly sophisticated in terms of technical quality and editing. The movement also launched a Twitter account on 18 January 2015. It is highly probable that Boko Haram has started to receive various types of technical support from Islamic State regarding production and content.

The existence of a strong link between Boko Haram and Islamic State has been indicated by other factors as well. Islamic State announced in November 2014 that it had forged a number of alliances with jihadist groups in Northern Africa and the Middle East. On 7 March 2015, it became known that Boko Haram also pledged allegiance to Islamic State. The movements leadership published a message on its Twitter account, stating that Boko Haram will be loyal to Islamic State and its leadership, and that the movement 'will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity, in hardship and ease, and to endure being discriminated against and not to dispute about rule with those in power, except in case of evident infidelity.'

Photo courtesy of Flickr user United Nations Photo.
 2015-03-12T00:43:00+00:00 Hans Brun Boko Haram has been able to maintain its momentum due to increasingly sophisticated weaponry, growing ranks and a large geographic reach. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a5153d7e-964a-4d2f-9eda-f18e106fb9e9 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a5153d7e-964a-4d2f-9eda-f18e106fb9e9 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Boko-Haram-The-later-years.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a5153d7e-964a-4d2f-9eda-f18e106fb9e9 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Indonesians-against-the-death-penalty.aspx Indonesians against the death penalty 2015-03-11T21:30:00+00:00 Catriona Croft-Cusworth
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As we learned from a recent Lowy Institute poll, 62% of Australians oppose the use of the death penalty in the case of Bali Nine members Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran in Indonesia. But what do Indonesians think about the case?

While I have yet to find a similar survey of Indonesian public opinion, voices backing the death penalty are far louder than those rejecting it in mainstream and social media. The way that the issue is framed in the media – as a fitting punishment for a crime that indirectly leads to the deaths of others – leaves little room for dissenting voices.

Most reports and commentary focus on Indonesia's 'drug crisis' and the lives lost by drug abuse, using this as a justification for capital punishment. Others focus on sovereignty, taking issue with Australia's perceived attempts to intervene in Indonesia's legal system. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Council of Ulama has issued a fatwa lending moral approval to the use of the death penalty for individuals heavily involved in the drug trade.

However, there are some vocal critics of the death penalty in Indonesia, especially among human rights groups that supported the election of President Jokowi last year.

These critics frame their objection to the death penalty in the language of human rights, arguing that execution is a violation of the basic human right to life. They have expressed disappointment in Jokowi's abandonment of his promise to uphold principles of human rights by ordering the executions in his first few months as president.

A coalition of non-governmental organisations against the death penalty has issued a statement urging President Jokowi to reconsider the upcoming round of executions. The head of one of the NGOs in the coalition, Hendardi from the Setara Institute, has commented to local media that pushing for the death penalty should not be an option for Jokowi, given his stated commitment to upholding human rights. Hendardi has further accused Jokowi of making a show of strength by carrying out the executions in order to cover the weakness of his government's performance so far in law enforcement, particularly in relation to the ongoing conflict between the Corruption Eradication Commission and the National Police.

Andreas Harsono, a researcher with Human Rights Watch, has condemned the decision to execute foreigners who have long been on death row, calling it an easier option for Jokowi than dealing with corruption and law reform, which would do more to stop the drug trade in Indonesia. He has also pointed to Jokowi's weak control in the parliament, and within his own party, as possible reasons for the president to attempt to show his strength in another way.

The National Commission on Human Rights has shown its independence by criticising the president's decision to pursue executions. Commissioner Sandrayati Moniaga has commented that the right to life cannot be reduced under any circumstances. She has further questioned the impact of executing foreign drug smugglers on disrupting drug distribution networks, as well as the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent for drug-related crimes.

Other popular figures who have spoken out against the death penalty include senior actor Roy Marten, novelist Laksmi Pamuntjak and Alissa Wahid, an activist and daughter of former president Abdurrahman Wahid. Meanwhile, social media campaigns have struggled to find a popular support base, including among Indonesian youth (see video above).

In an email interview, Haris Azhar from the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence said it is difficult for anyone to voice criticism against the death penalty in Indonesian media because it means going against popular opinion. 'We are labelled as friends of drug dealers,' he said. 'We can make a voice but the media sometimes make use of the human rights group to improve their hits in dotcoms and [are] bullied by the commentators.'

Until public opinion changes, he said, international pressure will be the main vehicle for abolition of the death penalty in Indonesia.
 2015-03-11T21:30:00+00:00 Catriona Croft-Cusworth There are some vocal critics of the death penalty, especially among human rights groups that supported the election of President Jokowi last year. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=7b07fe32-97a8-4cb5-a14d-5869acca4549 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=7b07fe32-97a8-4cb5-a14d-5869acca4549 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/12/Indonesians-against-the-death-penalty.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=7b07fe32-97a8-4cb5-a14d-5869acca4549 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Australia-needs-to-start-thinking-globally-about-national-security.aspx Australia needs to start thinking globally about national security 2015-03-11T08:48:00+00:00 Peter Layton
ISIS and submarines are the two big fashionable defence and national security concerns at the moment. When combined, they make it evident that there is need for a considerable rethink about how Australia approaches defence and security.

Today we seem stuck around notions of fighting an sea-air battle somewhere north of Australia, perhaps with a dash of land action informed by our recent counter insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It's time to move on.

Firstly, the latest National Security Statement, focusing on the threat from ISIS (and future groups that may learn from it), sharply highlights that our defence and national security is now simultaneously both domestic and global. To counter the domestic threat of future Lindt Cafe scenarios or worse, new internal security laws have been proposed and domestic security steadily tightened. Globally, multilateral support has been sought from allies and at the UN to impede ISIS's access to foreign fighters and finance, and an expeditionary force dispatched to fight the group in Iraq.

To successfully counter such groups we need to wage defence in depth, fighting 'joined up' wars at home and abroad, just as ISIS does now.

Moreover, this is not just a military conflict. Success requires the astutely coordinated use of all of our instruments of national power: public diplomacy, cyberwar, policing, strategic communications, financial sanctions and more. A non-state actor such as ISIS may not pose as large-scale threat as a hostile state actor, but the threat it does pose is complex.

Secondly, the ongoing submarine chaos suggests that the post-Cold War, narrowly technocratic, approach to major defence purchases has reached an end of its usefulness.

On one level, the new submarines are seen as necessary to hedge against China, our major trading partner whose continued success is crucial to Australia being able to fund the new submarines ourselves. On another level, the acquisition process means that the long-term economic and financial importance to the nation of the $50 billion-plus whole-of-life cost for the submarines is consciously disregarded. Both aspects are at play as Japan, France and Germany struggle to be our build‑partners for their own, very specific, reasons.

Completely missing from the submarine debate so far has been a good understanding of Foreign Minister Julie Bishop's formulation: 'economics is power and power is economics'. To be safe and secure the nation needs more than just military hardware. The debate at times is troublingly one-dimensional.

What is to be done? Firstly, our thinking needs to become much broader and take a whole-of-nation perspective, not simply that of a single Federal Government department or agency. A good start would be to abandon the present Defence White Paper and instead craft a 'Strategic Defence and Security White Paper' that looks across all of government, not just a single entity. Such a white paper could for the first time take a national perspective that factors in all our instruments of national power, and also include important economic and financial aspects.

Secondly, take on board that the world and Australia are now globalised. Australia is no longer insulated from the outside world by our remoteness; our enemies can now inspire 'lone wolf' attacks through global communications, not to mention our increasing vulnerability from cyber attacks. Moreover, our defence forces are also now highly dependent on global supply chains in order to operate – think petroleum for a starter.

Today, to successfully defend Australia and it's interests we need to start taking a global view, not a rigidly local or even regional one. A stable global order is now a prerequisite for our defence forces to keep functioning. We need to think much more deeply about how to contribute to global order when our defence and security on many levels relies so profoundly on it. A favourable global order is no longer a nice-to-have matter of interest as previous Defence White Paper's have argued. It is arguably today's first order defence and security task.

Thirdly, we need to overcome our cultural cringe that tells us we are too small to influence international order. We are a top 20 nation with the world's 12th largest economy and a sizeable defence budget to match. And in any event, we have no choice in the matter. Global thinking is needed in today's world to keep us safe and secure and we need to embrace it. We must consider national defence and security from a wider viewpoint anchored in the world as it now is, not as it once was.

Photo courtesy of the Australian Defence Image Library.
 2015-03-11T08:48:00+00:00 Peter Layton Today, to successfully defend Australia and it's interests we need to start taking a global view, not a rigidly local or even regional one. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=4d35a2a9-0a51-4a69-9e63-71fef92365ba 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=4d35a2a9-0a51-4a69-9e63-71fef92365ba http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Australia-needs-to-start-thinking-globally-about-national-security.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=4d35a2a9-0a51-4a69-9e63-71fef92365ba http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Under-the-Dome-and-Indias-Daughter-Two-documentaries-stir-debate-on-censorship-in-Asia.aspx Under the Dome and India's Daughter: Documentaries stir powerful online reaction in Asia 2015-03-11T00:55:00+00:00 Danielle Cave
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Conflict has broken out across Asia. Militaries aren't involved and there are unlikely to be human casualties, but this conflict is already re-shaping our most important partners in Asia.

Last week, under very different circumstances, two documentaries went viral online and now the Chinese and Indian Governments are scrambling to contain public opinion and save face by mopping up the final traces of these films on the Internet.

Under the Dome, a Chinese TED-talk style documentary self-financed and produced by well-known investigative journalist Chai Jing, was launched 28 February via the website of the state-owned People's Daily. The fact that the documentary began its online life at the People's Daily implies some level of government buy-in. And on 1 March the Minister for Environmental Protection, Chen Jining, added to this perception when he said that Chai was to be admired for encouraging citizens to be concerned about the environment.

300 million-plus views later, however, we now know that this support was conditional.

About 72 hours after its online release the censors commenced 'cease and desist' efforts. Empowered by instructions from the News Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department (which explained in frank terms that Under the Dome had become too distracting in the lead up to China's annual Communist Party meetings), social media discussions were censored, website comment threads were disabled, news organisations stopped reporting the story and the documentary itself disappeared from China's major video sharing sites.

In contrast, India's Daughter, a documentary about the brutal 2012 gang rape and murder of medical student Jyoti Singh in New Delhi, has travelled the reverse path to censorship.

A UK-India co-production, the BBC documentary was set to be shown on Indian TV station NDTV on 8 March, International Women's Day, but was banned before its release after police secured a last-minute court injunction. India's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has couched the censorship in terms of women's public safety, arguing that excerpts of an interview with one of the convicted rapists 'appear to encourage and incite violence against women'. In protest, NDTV halted programming during the one-hour planned screening slot.

Globally, the documentary was screened in select countries and remained accessible across video-sharing sites including YouTube and Vimeo for most of last week. But on 9 March it largely disappeared from the internet when Google agreed to comply with the Indian Government's requests to block access to the film, and later the BBC's own requests, which cited copyright infringement.

In banning India's Daughter, the Indian Government set alight a monstrous debate that has grown to include topics ranging from gender inequality and education to poverty. Spoof videos about rape have gone viral, blog posts and social media discussions are multiplying and growing into a national debate. India's TV stations have taken up the topic of the film's ban with vigour, and emotional interviews with Jyoti's parents have been aired. India's politicians responded immediately to the public outcry and are falling over one another to argue for or against India's Daughter.

In a rare display of symbiosis, a number of journalists in India have also leveraged the popularity of Under the Dome to re-ignite debate about India's poor air pollution. And without a hint of irony, China's Global Times published an opinion piece on the banning of India's Daughter, analysing India's 'imbalanced and inadequate social development' and encouraging its neighbour 'to face up its domestic headaches.'

This week-long cyber tug of war won't end soon for China or India because the internet can't actually be censored in the way some states would want.

To start with, China's and India's sizeable diasporas, both loosely estimated at approximately 40 million, are scattered across the world and are largely free to watch, discuss and share whatever content they can get their hands on. As are both countries' rapidly growing numbers of outbound tourists.

While China has worked hard this year to fortify and expand its Great Firewall, netizens remain one step ahead of censors because they lead the discussion that the state then scrambles to suppress. China's internet users exist within a constantly shifting and shrinking framework set by the state, but the Chinese Government can't always predict where the next flare-up will occur, giving netizens some room to manoeuvre. The Chinese Government also knows it must ensure that using the internet remains attractive to its citizens, and that includes leaving space for people to congregate and discuss issues online.

If China's version of the internet starts losing mass appeal, then 620 million frustrated people will be looking for other ways to channel their opinion. And this is the Communist Party's worst nightmare.

Under the Dome's viral popularity has already had an impact. The price of solar stocks surged 32%, with analysts directly attributing the jump to Jing's documentary. Small anti-smog protests have broken out in Shaanxi province. A 24-hour environmental complaints hotline that Jing spruiks in her documentary has reported a 610% surge in calls.

On 6 March – a week after the film's release – President Xi Jinping promised that polluters would be punished, no exceptions, 'with an iron hand.'

Historically, politics has been the domain of the elite, with only a chosen few given access to decision-making. Information flows were also predominantly unidirectional and trapped within rigid hierarchies. But the internet has decimated the geographical and economic nature of how power is distributed and decisions were made. Under the Dome and India's Daughter are both incredibly compelling documentaries, but the online reaction they have stimulated is even more powerful. And this is a timely reminder for Australia that the internet's ability to provide the world's 3 billion web users with unprecedented access to information is a global game changer.

Australia should be seeking to understand and influence the internet's ability to unite and mobilise populations, because this internet citizenry is accelerating political and social change in Asia.
 2015-03-11T00:55:00+00:00 Danielle Cave Under the Dome and India's Daughter are both incredibly compelling documentaries, but the online reaction they have stimulated is even more powerful. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=c8f460bc-e35f-4e4c-a67d-a1b22bd9fb36 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=c8f460bc-e35f-4e4c-a67d-a1b22bd9fb36 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Under-the-Dome-and-Indias-Daughter-Two-documentaries-stir-debate-on-censorship-in-Asia.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=c8f460bc-e35f-4e4c-a67d-a1b22bd9fb36 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Giganto-capitalism-China-takes-another-wrong-turn.aspx Giganto-capitalism: China takes another wrong turn 2015-03-10T23:35:00+00:00 Julian Snelder
15 years ago, Beijing made an important strategic decision about its sprawling aviation manufacturing monopoly, AVIC.

Dissatisfied with AVIC's slothfulness, and keen to promote competition, the state's planners split the company in half, creating two firms. Unimaginatively named AVIC-1 and AVIC-2, these entities continued to stumble, and in 2008 a decision was made to put them back together again. Today, the AVIC monopoly reigns once more, still ungainly and inefficient (although Beijing did make the sensible move to hive off the commercial airliner business into COMAC, where AVIC's influence has been diluted).

The AVIC restructurings didn't go well, in either direction. Is the experience about to be repeated in other strategic industries?

People close to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) have let it be known that the centrally-owned portfolio of 112 SOEs – the backbone of China's state-capitalist economy – may be pared back to 30-50 companies through consolidation. China's two major locomotive manufacturers, CNR and CSR (the original SOE was split into North and South respectively), have been ordered to merge again, reportedly out of cabinet-level frustration that the two were over-competing against each other in overseas markets.

The re-marriage appears to have been under compulsion; no details have been forthcoming since the announcement on 30 December 2014, and CNR and CSR are notorious for their mutual hostility. Their managers are unenthusiastic about merging with the enemy. This is a shotgun wedding. As with AVIC, the process will be ugly.

Recently there have been reports that Beijing may recombine its three national oil companies. The reports have been greeted with disbelief by analysts, and denial by the companies themselves. Some investors, admittedly, would welcome the return of monopolistic profits. The logic of merging PetroChina (strong in onshore oil and gas), Sinopec (downstream refining and marketing) and CNOOC (offshore oil) supposedly is to create a mega-integrated petroleum firm, rather like the old CNPC but better equipped to compete overseas, i.e., 'we want our own ExxonMobil.'

If the SOE consolidation story is true, we might also see the re-melding of China Telecom and China Unicom back into something resembling their predecessor, the old fixed-line monopoly carrier. Years of painful separation would be undone. And so it would go, back to the future, for all of China's strategic industries (shipbuilding and shipping have also been mentioned) in the name of economic reform.

Tellingly, the explanation given by NDRC sources is that re-monopolisation will reduce overlap and replication: 'they're increasingly fighting among each other. That has led to lots of waste and inefficiency.' But 'each soldier fighting his own war' is exactly what happens in competitive markets.

Overlooking this reality, central planners are reaching back to their Soviet roots in seeking the unicorn of 'efficient monopolism.' They like the outcomes of capitalism, but they are still grasping for state-centric relevance. They are jealous of multinational companies and the dominant positions they hold globally. They admire the unexpected dominance of local private companies in new sectors like the internet. And they know that SOEs don't play well together and gorge on capital to over-build. In some cases, like steel, SOEs have openly defied orders to consolidate. The planners are frustrated that truly private actors are actually more coordinated. These bureaucrats, determined to cure the self-harm of overcapacity, are reaching for their shotguns to reverse years of competitive separation.

This is a mistake. Putting two or three mediocre businesses together seldom makes a good one.

Unless there are savage cuts to management ranks, the only result will be higher prices for consumers and thus a deadweight loss for the economy as a whole. If the market is to play a 'decisive role', as the administration has promised, competition, not consolidation, is the way to weed out inefficient capacity. If the Government is truly worried about overeager rivalry overseas, there are organisational alternatives (like joint ventures) to ensure cooperation.

Beijing acts vigorously against foreign monopolists, but it appears to take a contrary attitude to its own cartels.

Re-monopolisation, if it occurs, would be the third major enterprise reform measure that Xi Jinping's team has proposed. The first reform is the attempt to separate financially the Party's governance and executive management, aided by a brutal anti-graft campaign. This is popular and necessary, but it will be exceptionally difficult to unbind the incestuous links between the state's pure 'guardians' and the profit-seeking 'merchants'. Moreover it will be hard to attract talent when the message is 'you'll get nothing and like it', as one analyst puts it. The second reform is the promotion of 'mixed ownership', apparently based on Xi's own observations in Zhejiang. He admires the 'minben' businesses of the province which interweave private and government money. Geely Automobile might be a successful example, but there are other sectors like solar and shipbuilding where state support of entrepreneurs has created an industrial mess.

Even allowing for China's commercial exceptionalism, these two initial reforms will be challenging. They may even be contradictory: attracting private capital into sectors undergoing unpredictable corruption purges will be tough. This third step, cajoling SOEs to form giant national conglomerates, while still expecting private capital to play a decisive role in industry, is another dead-end.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user 2 dogs.
 2015-03-10T23:35:00+00:00 Julian Snelder Shotgun weddings of state giants to recreate monopolies will not advance SOE reform. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=6b42ac62-cc8b-43d2-b4d3-b7b93a74b13b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=6b42ac62-cc8b-43d2-b4d3-b7b93a74b13b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Giganto-capitalism-China-takes-another-wrong-turn.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=6b42ac62-cc8b-43d2-b4d3-b7b93a74b13b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Pacific-Island-links-New-Zealand-spying-New-Caledonia-elections-Pacific-climate-change-and-more.aspx Pacific Island links: New Zealand spying, New Caledonia elections, Pacific climate change and more 2015-03-10T22:16:00+00:00 guest blogger – blank
 By Sally Andrews, an intern in the Lowy Institute's Melanesia program.

In response to reports that New Zealand has been spying on its Pacific Island neighbours, some analysts suggest that such intelligence may hold unexpected benefits for those countries.

Pacific Island nations have developed a climate change action plan. Although doubts remain about state capacity to implement the recommendations.

A French court decision that stipulates only persons enrolled since 1998 can vote in New Caledonia's provincial elections has enraged anti-independence lobbyists.

183 refugees have been arrested after last week's protests in Nauru.

Australia is upgrading the vessels used in the Pacific Patrol Boat Program. The Program, which assists nations in policing their exclusive economic zones, will now extend to Timor Leste.

Bougainville's autonomous government has granted new powers to the traditional Councils of Elders in order to combat lawlessness in the region.

A great piece from Genevieve Nelson, CEO of the Kokoda Track Foundation, about why there is no need for an International Men's Day in PNG.

In this interview, Tok Piksa talks to PNG's Dame Meg Taylor about her journey to becoming the first female Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum:

[youtube:9jDJkIVwhpo]
 2015-03-10T22:16:00+00:00 guest blogger – blank Links to the best reading on the Pacific Islands this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=605376bd-016c-4db1-850b-e15135eb3efb 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=605376bd-016c-4db1-850b-e15135eb3efb http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/11/Pacific-Island-links-New-Zealand-spying-New-Caledonia-elections-Pacific-climate-change-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=605376bd-016c-4db1-850b-e15135eb3efb http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-consequences-of-the-strengthening-US-India-parternship-still-uncertain.aspx The consequences of the strengthening US-India partnership are still uncertain 2015-03-10T03:20:00+00:00 Shashank Joshi
Over the past month, Hugh White and I have exchanged opposing views on the meaning of the US-India relationship on The Interpreter.

Hugh first argued that President Barack Obama's January trip to New Delhi failed, 'because India is not willing to make the preservation of US primacy its principal strategic aim in Asia.' I replied that this was an unfairly high bar to set in terms of judging India's role in the pivot. Hugh then clarified:

India's new alignment with the US will only make a real difference if it is credibly willing to support America militarily against China if and when US primacy is at stake. Diffuse and politically acceptable diplomatic support won't cut it at a time like this. So the test of the US-India alignment is simple: does anyone think India would send forces to help America defend Japan's claim to the Senkakus, or the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea, or Taiwan? If not, how does India's support help America deter China from challenging US primacy in these flashpoints? And if it doesn't do that, what use is it to Obama?

In his book The China Choice, Hugh fleshes this out with three arguments. First, 'as India emerges as a great power in its own right...its aim will be to maximise its own power, not support America's.' Second, 'the stronger India becomes, the less it will need America to help balance China.' And third, 'the stronger China is relative to India, the more cautious Delhi will be about sacrificing its interest in a good relationship with Beijing.'

Against this, we might raise five issues:*

First, what if Indian power is a function not just of internal factors – economic growth and defence spending – but also its partnership with the US? India is getting stronger, true, but the gap with China will be large for decades to come. The US has been willing to sell India a huge and growing volume of high-end arms, including platforms that directly augment India's capabilities vis-à-vis China, and transfer to it technology that is normally the purview of close American allies. Supporting America, and consolidating these valuable transfers, is therefore one way for India to enhance its position as a great power.

Second, should we judge partnerships primarily in terms of one country's willingness to wage war alongside another? Countries can provide significant military support without directly entering a conflict. New Delhi allowed US aircraft carrying arms to refuel at its airports during the First Gulf War despite its overt opposition to the campaign. India also offered the use of its military facilities immediately after 9/11, strongly considered sending troops to Iraq, and may sign a Logistics Support Agreement that would permit, inter alia, the refuelling of one another's aircraft and warships. And this is with the relationship at a nascent stage.

Consider, also, that China has consistently let down Pakistan in each and every one of its wars, even as the country was dismembered; yet this bilateral relationship, too, is considered a significant one for both parties. Hugh might legitimately retort that the smaller party (Pakistan) was never called upon to defend the regional position of its larger patron (China), and so the analogy is imperfect. But Beijing certainly felt that its cultivation of Pakistan had a potential, if modest and unknowable, deterrent effect on India had a crisis broken out.

Third, to develop this point further, if China did go to war against Japan, the Philippines or Taiwan, it is obviously true that India would not send its warships straight in. But the US-India relationship could still make an important mark on any such conflict. India could allow use of its facilities and provide enablers, as described above. India's acquiescence or support would make a distant blockade of China much easier. This does not necessarily 'deter' China, as Hugh requires, but it may well affect Beijing's calculus at the margin. That seems like a good investment for Washington.

Fourth, much depends on the origins and nature of any US-China confrontation. Hugh frames such a conflict as a Chinese challenge for US primacy, which India has little reason to uphold. But when Iraq challenged US primacy by invading Kuwait, a large coalition, including states that could have chosen to free ride on American efforts and others that would have had good reason not to alienate Saddam, came together.

Why did they do so? Firstly because they saw that benefits might accrue from being seen as valuable partners; secondly because the success and consequent emboldening of a regional hegemon would threaten them in the future; and thirdly, perhaps also because they had some commitment to, and interest in, basic norms of international conduct, such as preservation of the territorial status quo.

It is not hard to see how each of these three dynamics could characterise a future Asian conflict. China's heft works both ways: it dissuades middle powers from exposing themselves to a US-China fight, but if that fight is consequential enough – and in Hugh's framework, it would be – then it also means that they have a stake in supporting the US, a status quo power, against what would be a dramatic shift in the perceived Asian balance of power.

For India, the severity of the Sino-Indian border dispute gives this real force: were China to succeed in, say, invading and occupying the Senkakus, India would be profoundly concerned about the implications for its own disputed territory; both in terms of what such a development might reveal about China's risk-acceptance, and the precedents it might set in terms of maritime and territorial revision. And political scientists can shout until they're blue in the face that 'credibility' and 'reputation' are misunderstood concepts, but this isn't necessarily how Indian leaders will think under such circumstances.

Fifth, Hugh argues that 'India has a wide range of interests at stake in its relationship with China, and India cannot afford to subordinate those interests to the concerns of America or Japan, or Australia.' The first part is undoubtedly true, but the second is less clear. India might well bandwagon in some areas, becoming gradually more interoperable with the US, and balance in others, continuing to work at odds with Washington on, say, trade or climate change. Up to a point, we can indeed disaggregate these different economic/diplomatic and security/military elements. West Germany's Ostpolitik, for instance, never fundamentally compromised its position in NATO. I have a feeling that some of this depends on how we define 'primacy', and the types of actions that destroy (rather than challenge) it.

India is very far from thinking seriously about its potential role in American wars with China; but then we are still far from violent Chinese challenges to US primacy. The point is to note how far India has come, and how quickly things are changing.

*I am grateful to Dhruva Jaishankar for sharpening my thinking on several of these issues, though he is not responsible for the arguments here.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user The White House.
 2015-03-10T03:20:00+00:00 Shashank Joshi What if Indian power is a function not just of internal factors – economic growth and defence spending – but also its partnership with the US? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=8afc32d7-4e7b-4d5b-aaf7-70be8806b131 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=8afc32d7-4e7b-4d5b-aaf7-70be8806b131 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-consequences-of-the-strengthening-US-India-parternship-still-uncertain.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=8afc32d7-4e7b-4d5b-aaf7-70be8806b131 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/Southeast-Asia-Links-Kokang-and-China-Vietnam-on-the-SCS-Yangon-protests-Jokowi-questions-Dhammakaya-and-more.aspx Southeast Asia Links: Kokang and China, Vietnam on the SCS, Yangon protests, Jokowi questions, Dhammakaya and more 2015-03-10T01:40:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan

The SCMP has reported that Beijing is reprimanding a General who aided Myanmar's Kokang in 2009. If correct, that would be a strong message to any possible (and likely rogue) PLA support for the Kokang armed group.

Jokowi: Modern man of the people or divine clown?, asks Hamish McDonald.

Vietnam's former border chief said in an interview this week that China's construction activity in the South China Sea is for offensive purposes. Vietnam later in the week demanded that China stop 'illegitimate' construction in the Troung Sa (Spratly Islands).

Women in Southeast Asia are 38% less likely to own a mobile phone than men (h/t @DaniellesCave).

Francis Wade wrote on recent public protests in Yangon and the Myanmar police's right (under the Code of Criminal Procedure) to 'raise a male civilian force in order to break up the gathering and assist with arrests'. And Cogit's Phuong Nguyen looked at why this should be a concern for the US.

As the world marked the anniversary of the MH370 disappearance, new speculation emerged this week as a preliminary report noted that a shipment containing lithium batteries was loaded on the flight.

Malayisan Prime Minister Najib is in hot water over national investment fund 1 Malaysia Development Berhad.

Two Malaysians are believed to have been identified in an ISIS beheading video.

Carl Thayer gave an excellent round up of how the US is upping the ante in Southeast Asia in this month's (paid) issue of The Diplomat.

Michelle Obama will be in Cambodia this month, the first visit to the country by a US first lady.

Thailand's Buddhist infighting threatens martial law, leading Prayuth Chan-ocha to ban any march by Buddhist monks.

And this fascinating photo series of Buddhists gathered at Thailand's Wat Dhammakaya this week to observe Makha Bucha.

 2015-03-10T01:40:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan Links to the best reading on Southeast Asia this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a82411cf-96e7-4c71-a3bb-b5acc89a11f3 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a82411cf-96e7-4c71-a3bb-b5acc89a11f3 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/Southeast-Asia-Links-Kokang-and-China-Vietnam-on-the-SCS-Yangon-protests-Jokowi-questions-Dhammakaya-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a82411cf-96e7-4c71-a3bb-b5acc89a11f3 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/Negative-interest-rates-We-are-flying-blind.aspx Negative interest rates: We are flying blind 2015-03-10T00:21:00+00:00 Mike Callaghan
We live in strange economic times. Depositors in Denmark are paying interest to their banks and borrowers are being paid when they take out a loan. The basic principles of finance have been turned on their head.

One commentator has noted that 'something economists thought was impossible is happening in Europe'. Interest rates on government bonds in Denmark, Switzerland and Germany – along with some corporate bonds like Nestlé – are negative. We are not talking about negative real interest rates, namely the nominal rate adjusted for inflation, but the nominal rate itself. Investors are lending money to governments knowing that they will not be fully repaid.

It may be six years since the global financial crisis, but its legacy continues to take us into uncharted waters. As the Reserve Bank of Australia's Deputy Governor, Phil Lowe, recently observed: 'The global monetary environment is quite extraordinary'. Mohamed El- Erian has noted that there are few analytical models, and even fewer historical examples, to help us understand the broader implications of all this, particularly for a global financial system based on the assumption of positive nominal interest rates.

An indication of the peculiarity of this ultra-low interest rate environment was provided in a recent speech by Andie Haldane from the Bank of England, when he presented the following chart showing interest rates over the past 3000 years:

A chart plotting interest rates over 3000 years should receive an award for the 'most ambitious economic chart of the year'. Nevertheless, it highlights that interest rates, both long and short-term, are the lowest they have ever been – with the emphasis on 'ever'.

When interest rates get into negative territory, why are investors prepared to pay governments to look after their money?

One answer may be that given the dire outlook for the European economy, and a lack of confidence in other opportunities, investors are willing to tolerate negative yields on relatively safe bonds. Mohamed El-Erian suggests that with the European Central Bank just starting its quantitative easing program (where it prints money to buy government bonds), investors believe they may be able to make capital gains if the prices of the bonds keep going up in response to the bond buying program.

The central banks in Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark have set negative rates because they are actively trying to discourage capital inflows. This is an effort to prevent their exchange rates from rising when the euro falls following the ECB's quantitative easing.

Some hedge funds are warning that Australian savers and investors may not escape the world of negative interest rates. This was a topic at a recent superannuation forum in Australia, with Danny Yong from hedge fund Dyman Asia Capita noting that 'sitting tight and doing nothing is not an option when deposit rates are negative'

In the absence of historical precedent, no one can predict the full implications of negative interest rates. For some time the BIS and the IMF have warned about the dangers of an extended period of ultra-low interest rates. These dangers include investors increasingly moving into riskier investments in search of yield and asset price bubbles.

The ultra-low interest rates are also a challenge for banks and providers of long-term insurance products. Some banks are charging for deposits: in short, they want depositors to take their money elsewhere. The National Australia Bank has warned that if interest rates become too negative, depositors will pull their cash from the banks and either place it under a mattress, in a safe deposit box or invest in riskier assets like shares. If enough people do this, the bank warns, there could be a run on bank deposits which could create a crisis.

The insurance industry, pension funds and money market funds all depend on positive yields to operate. Wolfgang Munchau points out that life insurance companies sell products and annuities with guaranteed returns. They invest the money they receive from policyholders in government or corporate bonds. For this model to work, it requires positive interest rates from safe investments.

Then there are the adjustments that are required when interest rates eventually rise. In a prolonged period of low interest rates, both investors and lenders may not adequately take into account the inherent risk of the investment, and both will be caught out when rates eventually head north.

We are living through an economic experiment, and this alone imposes significant uncertainty as to the outlook for the global economy. If history is our guide to the future, then we are flying blind.

However if there is one thing that is certain, it is the limited policy flexibility available to respond to the next crisis. This should make us all concerned.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user ECB.
 2015-03-10T00:21:00+00:00 Mike Callaghan It may be six years since the global financial crisis, but its legacy continues to take us into uncharted waters. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=49aa6965-a02d-42d2-9c63-b1e99b015f78 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=49aa6965-a02d-42d2-9c63-b1e99b015f78 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/Negative-interest-rates-We-are-flying-blind.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=49aa6965-a02d-42d2-9c63-b1e99b015f78 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-Interpreter-is-looking-for-female-contributors.aspx The Interpreter is looking for more female contributors 2015-03-09T23:02:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
To mark International Women's Day in 2015, the Lowy Institute is hosting a special 'Women in Foreign Policy' panel on Thursday. An all-female panel (journalist Lauren Williams, Elaine Pearson from Human Rights Watch, Jenny Hayward-Jones from the Lowy Institute and the ABC's Geraldine Doogue) will discuss the challenges faced by women in Melanesia, Asia Pacific and the Middle East, as well as their personal experiences pursuing careers that research, report and advocate gender issues in foreign policy. The event is fully subscribed, I'm afraid, but a video and podcast will be available soon after.

From the perspective of The Interpreter, this seems an apt moment to renew our effort to increase the number of female contributors to the site. I say 'renew' because over the last few years we have reached out individually to women in international relations and encouraged them to write for the site. On this occasion, we want to do it publicly too, because although our efforts thus far have produced improvement, we'd like to do more.

So to all the women reading The Interpreter who are involved in international policy and have something to say, please pitch me your ideas at email@example.com.

If you're a regular reader, you will know that The Interpreter covers all manner of topics within the broad rubric of 'international policy', so you may want to write on diplomacy, economics, strategic issues, foreign aid, or a particular country or region. Then again, you may think The Interpreter has neglected a particular topic. If so, just make your case in an email. We generally post articles of no more than 800 words. A piece can be built around a news 'hook', it can have a strong point of view that engages with something you have read here or elsewhere, or it can even take a first-person perspective on a international-policy issue you have witnessed. Other than looking around the site to get a sense of our style and 'voice', that's really the only guidance I would offer. We're open to your ideas.

One further thing: you might have noticed that, these days, The Interpreter has a number of regulars contributing from around the Asia Pacific. If you're a woman based somewhere in the region and you think you have that special combination of skills to be a regular Interpreter correspondent — deep expertise in your chosen country and what I would call a 'journalistic sensibility' — then I would love also to hear from you.
 2015-03-09T23:02:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen This is an apt moment to renew our effort to increase the number of female contributors to The Interpreter. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b6aba27b-ef91-4dd9-aa9d-910ed0726855 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b6aba27b-ef91-4dd9-aa9d-910ed0726855 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-Interpreter-is-looking-for-female-contributors.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b6aba27b-ef91-4dd9-aa9d-910ed0726855 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/The-G20-can-help-women-enter-the-global-economy.aspx The G20 can help women enter the global economy 2015-03-09T05:55:00+00:00 Hannah Wurf
International Women's Day was celebrated yesterday, and there is cause for optimism with regards to progress in women's rights and important commitments undertaken to reduce gender inequality.

Many international organisations came out in strong support of the day, including UN Women and the IMF. In Australia, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced a partnership with the World Bank to reduce gender inequality in South East Asia through private sector partnerships to encourage women entrepreneurs, build women's business skills and improve workplace policies.

Another international grouping that is taking on the issue of female labour participation is the G20. The G20 is primarily concerned with the stability and growth of the global economy and it is no secret that increasing women's participation in global labour markets is key to global economic growth. Increasing labour market participation also has important flow-on effects that improve the lives of women.

But where does the G20 stand on female labour participation? It appears to be an issue of growing relevance.

At last year's Brisbane Summit, the G20 committed to reduce the gap between male and female labour participation by 25% by 2025. It is claimed that this will bring 100 million women into the labour force – a big promise. To achieve this, employment plans for G20 countries need to promote female participation.

Getting more women into the formal labour market is not an easy task. Even where women are entering the workforce, the quality of work and informal working arrangements are cause for concern. The International Labour Organisation has provided guidance on how to better incorporate gender considerations into employment policies, and the IMF has recently focused on removing legal restrictions that affect the economic standing of women.

However, there is still no coherent plan with timeframes to ensure the G20 can deliver the collective commitment by 2025. At the G20 Working Group meeting last month in Antalya the commitment was reinforced, but the implementation remains vague. The T20 group of think tanks urged the G20 to adopt 'milestones, timeframes, and country goals'.

Only half of the world's women of eligible working age are estimated to be in the global labour market (versus 76.6% of the male population). I have graphed the most recent estimates of female and male labour participation in the G20 countries from 2013 (see above), and included the world average for women as an indicative guide. Of course these are only estimates, and it is notoriously difficult to calculate the participation of women in the labour market because of the way it is measured. You can play around with the World Bank-ILO data here.

The G20 countries have varying degrees of female labour participation. The legacy of communism means China and Russia have more women in the labour market than the world average, with 64% in China and 57% in Russia. Australia also ranks well, with female labour participation just under 59%. Turkey, this year's G20 host, overtook India in 2011, but female labour participation still remains under 30%. Gender inequality in India and Saudi Arabia is particularly acute, resulting in very low female labour participation. Perhaps more surprising is that the EU average is only on par with the world average.

The G20 has also canvassed involving women's groups as part of its formal consultation with the international community, including a stand-alone 'W20' comprised of women's groups to exist alongside civil society, business, think tank, labour, and youth engagement groups. However, rather than an additional G20-based forum, gender issues should feed directly into the G20's agenda. For example, when the G20 summit last year deemed Ebola a global health risk, it overlooked the fact that women are disproportionally affected by the virus because of their roles as carers for the sick.

By considering the gender implications of global issues, the G20 can play an important role in drawing attention to discrepancies.
 2015-03-09T05:55:00+00:00 Hannah Wurf But where does the G20 stand on female labour participation? It appears to be an issue of growing relevance. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=c7f10981-b420-4d6c-bab9-07cd57579afd 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=c7f10981-b420-4d6c-bab9-07cd57579afd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/The-G20-can-help-women-enter-the-global-economy.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=c7f10981-b420-4d6c-bab9-07cd57579afd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Aid-development-links-International-Womens-Day1.aspx Aid & development links: International Women's Day edition 2015-03-09T04:39:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan
A special 'International Women's Day' themed edition of Aid & Development Links.

Australia used International Women's Day to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and launched a new publication, Empowering Women: Australia's support for gender equality and the empowerment of women. The report showcases the extraordinary stories of some of the many women who have been supported by Australia's diplomatic, economic and foreign aid programs around the world.

UNDP's first female Administrator, Helen Clark, called for increased female participation in modern development challenges such as climate change, peace and security, and crisis response.

The US State Department celebrated International Women's Day with their annual International Women of Courage Award.

Women's Rights: how far have we come? The Guardian has an analysis on achievements in gender equality since the 1995 Beijing Declaration. Also this good infographic from UN Women.

Foreign Policy Interrupted amplifies female voices in all areas of foreign policy. Be sure to sign up for their Friday email of female authored foreign policy analysis.

India clearly has a long way to go when it comes to the status of women, as demonstrated by this chilling BBC interview with one of the men convicted for the infamous 2012 Delhi bus rape. Indian authorities tried to ban the BBC's film, India's Daughter.

The Lowy Institute will be holding an International Women's Day themed all-women panel event on Thursday evening. It's sold out, but look out for the podcast Friday. It should be a great discussion on the challenges facing women globally, with human rights campaigner Elaine Pearson, journalist Lauren Williams and Melanesia expert Jenny Hayward-Jones. Moderated by ABC's Geraldine Doogue.

Australia's Ambassador for Women and Girls, Natasha Stott Despoja has released a message commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Beijing World Conference on Women:

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 2015-03-09T04:39:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan A special aid and development links on International Women's Day. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=0d65eabe-8464-4e4e-950e-8bc5a0e01b56 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=0d65eabe-8464-4e4e-950e-8bc5a0e01b56 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Aid-development-links-International-Womens-Day1.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=0d65eabe-8464-4e4e-950e-8bc5a0e01b56 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Ukraine-IMF-sent-in-where-others-fear-to-tread.aspx Ukraine: IMF sent in where others fear to tread 2015-03-09T03:40:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville
This week the IMF Executive Board will consider a proposal to provide Ukraine with a US$17.5 billion Extended Fund Facility. The IMF Managing Director explains that this program 'can succeed'. But it has to be said that the chances are low, given current geopolitical circumstances and Kiev's recent economic performance.

IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde delivering a statement on a financial stand-by arrangement for Ukraine, 30 April 2014.

Why, then, is the Facility almost certain to be approved by the Executive Board?

The short answer is that no one has offered a viable alternative. Is the geopolitical clash for Europe's borders going to be lost because Kiev can't fund its budget? Will the battle be lost for want of a nail? The economic problems of Ukraine have been shoved over to the IMF to sort out as best it can.

In April last year, the IMF provided Ukraine with a US$17 billion Stand-by Arrangement, around US$4 billion of which has already been disbursed. The current IMF proposal is that this should morph into an Extended Loan Facility (ie. a four-year loan rather than short-term support), which would form part of a bigger assistance program including contributions from other multilateral agencies, bilateral government lenders and debt relief from creditors. All this is envisaged to add up to a package of around US$40 billion – not yet agreed, but confidently expected.

The geopolitical environment gets a mention in the Lagarde statement ('And yet, while this is a comprehensive and strong program, it is also subject to high risks. The main risk, of course, relates to geopolitical developments that may affect market and investor confidence') but only to say that everyone hopes it will all work out for the best. Yet anyone watching the evening news might conclude that the war is not going well and has no prospect of early settlement.

Meanwhile, back on Ukraine's home front, the economic outlook is parlous. GDP fell nearly 10% last year. Budget austerity has brought the 2014 deficit down to 4% of GDP on IMF calculations, but if the cost of bailing out the domestic banks and state enterprises is counted, the figure would be 13.5% last year and nearly 9% this year. Getting the budget into surplus won't be popular. The price of gas and heating oil has been raised but is still only around half the world-market price, with more consumer pain ahead with plans to bring it up to market parity by 2016.

Public servants are being asked to trim their pensions (currently absorbing 16% of GDP) and work longer. The current account deficit is 5% of GDP and foreign exchange reserves are minimal. Inflation is running at nearly 30%. The newly flexible exchange rate, which fell 45% after the fixed rate was abandoned last year, has lost a further half of its value this year and has fluctuated wildly. Bank depositors are shifting into foreign currency when they can do so. Foreign creditors are asking for repayment, with the largest, Russia, unlikely to cooperate with debt relief. Kiev was forced by the EU to make a US$3.1 billion disputed arrears payment to Gazprom late last year so that Gazprom would not cut gas deliveries to the EU.

But what else can the Fund do other than 'whistle in the dark', hoping that things might get better while continuing to provide money to keep Kiev operational? Who else would offer to step in if the Fund wasn't ready to do the job?

All this is the political reality of international agencies' governance. The Fund is wheeled out by the major members to stop-gap whatever economic shortfall occurs, especially if the problem country is 'strategic'. The amount involved here is smaller than that for Greece in 2010 (where the Fund was dudded for US$30 billion), but is a much larger proportion of the overall support package. With no agreed procedures for sovereign debt rescheduling (thanks to Wall St's self-interested reluctance to change the messy status quo), the Fund's money will defer indefinitely the reality that creditors should be bearing the main burden of the external shortfall.

In all of this, the Fund has to preserve some semblance of its principles: that it only lends where it has good prospects of being repaid, and that it doesn't lend new money to bail out old creditors. It does this by rose-tinted optimism about how things will work out. In the process, its reputation for professional economic advice gets chipped away. And in order to preserve some modicum of its traditional function, the Fund imposes a standard reform agenda on Kiev that may well be inappropriate for a country with its back to the wall.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user International Monetary Fund.
 2015-03-09T03:40:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville Is the geopolitical clash for Europe's borders going to be lost because Kiev can't fund its budget? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=e5ad3070-828c-4e3d-8094-42e1bfc7975b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=e5ad3070-828c-4e3d-8094-42e1bfc7975b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Ukraine-IMF-sent-in-where-others-fear-to-tread.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=e5ad3070-828c-4e3d-8094-42e1bfc7975b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Applying-right-lessons-to-Iraq.aspx Applying the right lessons to Iraq 2015-03-09T01:23:00+00:00 Jim Molan
The Australian Government's announcement that 300 additional troops will be sent to Iraq to help train the Iraqi Army has brought forth the usual public commentators, myself included. My view is that all those who see ISIS as evil should be prepared to commit military and other resources to oppose it.

Why should we help? Firstly, it is as much a moral obligation to assist the Iraqi Government to regain sovereignty over areas currently held by ISIS as it was to provide humanitarian assistance on Mount Sinjar. Moreover, given ISIS links to terrorism and recruiting, it is in Australia's interests to contribute to its defeat. However, although our assistance to Iraq might be underdone at the moment, it should not at this stage include ground combat units, and definitely not of the previous magnitude as during the Iraq War. However, this should never be ruled out.

Over the last week, in media commentary and speeches, I have stressed that the distinct difference between this conflict and previous wars in Iraq is that, this time, the West is more directly in strategic competition with Iran. And at the moment, as the old saying goes, Iran is playing three-dimensional chess while the West plays checkers. Iran's speed and effectiveness in supporting the Iraqis on the battlefield, and its willingness to mentor Iraqis in battle, may mean Iran will win the peace no matter who wins the war.

Tom Switzer, here and here, says Tony Abbott has 'learnt nothing and forgotten nothing since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.' Tom reminds us that we have tried to train the Iraqi military before, and claims that we failed because the Iraqi Army broke before the ISIS onslaught in mid-2014. Tom also tells us that our involvement is exactly what ISIS wants in order to increase its recruitment and the radicalisation of our young. In other words, we are repeating old errors and falling into a trap.

The learning of lessons from conflict really is the central issue here, so let me offer a view of recent events to contrast with Tom's.

It is 11 years since the invasion and nine years since my involvement ended, perhaps too soon for formal analysis. But the Middle East does not wait, and what you learn will always depend on where you stand. For instance, had then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listened in 2002-03 to military advice on the troop levels needed for an effective occupation, we might have achieved in two years what it took eight years and two troop surges to achieve.

By 2011, when the final Coalition troops left, US and Iraqi forces had achieved a relatively high level of stability and the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq. Tom should note that, at the time, a common line being argued was that al Qaeda had baited a trap for the US in Iraq. If that was a trap, it only ended up trapping al Qaeda in Iraq.

Before it left, the US had produced an Iraqi military that was adequate to the task of containing the remaining threat, but the Army was never given the chance to mature. The first Maliki Government, while the US was present and had influence, showed promise of governing across sectarian lines. Maliki allowed the Iraqi Army to be developed and led with some degree of military logic and success. However, the second Maliki Government, especially after the US left in 2011, proved disastrous for the Army and for Iraq.

What happened after 2011 to create the situation we now face?

First, the Arab Spring led us into the depths of the Syrian civil war, which in turn helped produced ISIS. It is drawing a very long bow to blame that on the US invasion of Iraq. An equally valid argument could be that if the US had not invaded Iraq, today it would look much more like Syria.

Second, President Obama did not insist on leaving behind a residual force, contrary to all military advice and for which he was roundly criticised, even by Hillary Clinton. Had there been a residual US force, ISIS may not have invaded. And even if it did, the Iraqi Army probably would not have folded. It is interesting that President Obama has now agreed to leave such a residual force in Afghanistan, and his Administration is even hinting at extending it.

Third, the second Maliki Government proved to be sectarian, corrupt and incompetent. Maliki replaced Army commanders with sectarian cronies who stole the pay of the military in Mosul, made soldiers buy their ammunition, failed to fund Army training and equipment and destroyed soldiers' morale and trust. No wonder the Army failed against ISIS (the soldiers told us that the Maliki-installed commanders led the rout).

I agree with Tom that lessons are there to be learned, but let's learn the right ones.

Prime Minister Abadi must regain the trust of his people and his military, and we are seeing some positive signs of that playing out in Tikrit, in the attitude of some Sunnis, and in the composition of the Army. Of course, the role of the Shia militias is deeply worrying, but Iraq has never been neat.

I suspect we do not yet have the mix of support to the Iraqis right, and I urge a calm reading of these most sensible views by a soldier who should know.

ISIS can be defeated militarily in Iraq, given what we are doing at the moment and what we could do if necessary. And once Iraqi sovereignty is re-established, who knows what might be possible for the Syrian people. But a solution to the Syria problem is far past the bounds of feasible planning until we have achieved the operational aim of restoring Iraqi sovereignty.

I am prepared to acknowledge that the invasion of Iraq may not have been a strategically brilliant move. But it occurred and the occupation followed. After 11 years and 100,000-plus lives lost in Iraq, I wonder: if we had concluded the war in a shorter period, or even concluded it more effectively, would ISIS even have arisen? As I said here, there is nothing more stupid than getting yourself into the wrong war and then bungling it. Our current tepid response runs the risk of seeing Iranian control and influence from the northern Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean shore.

Photo courtesy of the Australian Defence Image Library.
 2015-03-09T01:23:00+00:00 Jim Molan ISIS can be defeated militarily in Iraq, given what we are doing at the moment and what we could do if necessary. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=7b9569d3-5d97-4064-aca7-c39754906dbd 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=7b9569d3-5d97-4064-aca7-c39754906dbd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Applying-right-lessons-to-Iraq.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=7b9569d3-5d97-4064-aca7-c39754906dbd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Will-a-female-led-world-be-more-peaceful.aspx Will a female-led world be more peaceful? 2015-03-09T00:08:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
Writing in the Wall St Journal yesterday to mark International Women's Day, Dr Melvin Konner answers this question firmly in the affirmative:

There are not yet enough women heads of state to study them systematically, but there are enough in other governing roles. In a 2006 study, political scientist Lynne Weikart and her colleagues surveyed 120 mayors—65 women and 55 men—in comparable cities of over 30,000. Women mayors were far more likely to alter the budget process and seek broad participation.

Perhaps it is time for us to consider returning to the hunter-gatherer rules that prevailed for 90% of human history: women and men working at their jobs, sharing, talking, listening and tending children. Men didn't strongly dominate because they couldn't; women's voices were always there, speaking truth to male power every night around the fire. There was violence, and it was mainly male, but it was mostly random, accident more than ideology.

Women won't make a perfect world, but it will be less flawed than the one that men have made and ruled these thousands of years. My grandson, I think, will be happy in the new world. It will be better for him because women will contribute so much more to running it.

In 2014, the Lowy Institute polled Australians on this question, and the response was more equivocal:

 2015-03-09T00:08:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen According to recent research, the answer is 'yes'. But when polled, Australians are not so sure. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=08c1002a-7506-488f-819c-82f662442557 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=08c1002a-7506-488f-819c-82f662442557 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Will-a-female-led-world-be-more-peaceful.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=08c1002a-7506-488f-819c-82f662442557 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Europe-Greece-not-biggest-problem.aspx Europe: Greece is not the biggest problem 2015-03-08T22:14:00+00:00 Daniel Woker
No news is good news. The Greek debt crisis and even the euro have momentarily disappeared from the headlines. Europe and the euro will survive and will do even better than that, much as this displeases the Murdoch media, conservative think tanks and pundits all over the world, including in Europe itself.

More interesting is the effect of the present multiple crises on the institutional set-up of the EU. During the euro crisis it has become evident that that the European Central Bank serves as the main technical pillar of the common currency. This is fine but cannot last indefinitely. A Banking Union with a common regulator, and at least core parts of a fiscal union, will have to follow.

Joschka Fischer. (Flickr/Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung.)

Indeed a European banking union is already underway, if slowly and, as in all European structure building, with a fair amount of national bickering. Now that even the largest British bank is shrinking its investment banking arm, the case for the City to make a stand against Brexit and eventually for the UK to adopt the euro and thus become part of the world's second currency block becomes ever more evident.

The main challenge for the EU at present is in foreign affairs, and on top of the problem list figures Putin. The radical change from limited partnership to full containment of a Russia that is aggressive (Ukraine), criminal (assassination of Boris Nemtsov) and yet enfeebled is not easy. This is illustrated by Britains's energy confrontation with the Russian tycoon Mikhail Fridman. The decision to block an important foreign investment cannot have come easy for a government dedicated to giving market forces free rein whenever possible.

Yet the decision is as right as it was inevitable. The energy dependence of some eastern and north-eastern EU members from increasingly erratic decisions by the Kremlin is untenable. Institutionally this will mean an Energy Union, which is another project that has already started and includes the express aim of reducing the influence of Russian-generated energy in Europe.

A close second on Europe's foreign problem list are the bloody confrontations on its southern (Africa) and south-eastern (Middle East) peripheries. The two immediate problems are (1) the massive influx of refugees, and (2) Islamic war tourism by frustrated young Muslims. Both the number of refugee arrivals and the probability of Islamic terrorism have shot up over the last two years in all European countries, regardless of their institutional links to the EU.

Herein lies the biggest challenge of all for the future development of the European Union. As we all know, nationalist and xenophobic parties, mainly from the right fringe, have ridden the twin topics of immigration and violent Islam, both supposedly caused by 'Europe', to more or less political centre-stage in a number of countries. Should any of these parties come to wield real power in an EU member country, especially a key country such as France, the Union could, for the first time since it started in the 1950s, be in real existential trouble.

The EU is many things, a Democratic Union it is not. Yet it will have to go down this institutional path too, as the European future will be determined in the last instance by its citizens. Now of course there is already a European Parliament with limited yet increasing clout. But former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently made an interesting proposal. He sees a democratic way forward by having EU affairs discussed and decided by a specially designated part of national parliaments.

Fischer's book is first and foremost a 'crie de coeur' by a convinced European. One might or might not agree with his sense of urgency as to the political crisis in European countries. But it is difficult to find fault with his conclusion that only a Democratic Union can carry Europe forward in a truly sustainable way.
 2015-03-08T22:14:00+00:00 Daniel Woker The EU's multiple crises raise questions about its institutional set-up. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b52ab1ce-56d8-4653-892c-7fb44396a7d4 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b52ab1ce-56d8-4653-892c-7fb44396a7d4 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/09/Europe-Greece-not-biggest-problem.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b52ab1ce-56d8-4653-892c-7fb44396a7d4 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/07/Weekend-catch-up-Islam-and-ISIS-Bibi-in-DC-Nemtsov-drones-Indias-budget-and-more.aspx Weekend catch-up: Islam and ISIS, Bibi in DC, Nemtsov, drones, India's budget and more 2015-03-06T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
Bringing together the best Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week.

How is the Islamic world responding to the threat of ISIS? Two pieces addressed this question on The Interpreter this week. The first is from Lauren Williams who wrote on the Lebanese Sunni political party, Future Movement, and how similar groups throughout the Middle East may represent the moderate voices needed to counteract the extremist rhetoric of ISIS:

It's fair to say that the majority of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims don't subscribe to ISIS and al-Nusra's radical doctrines; the presence of radical groups has even united the rival factions to set aside their domestic disputes in the face of a common enemy, and a national dialogue between the March 8 and March 14 camps has made progress.

But at a time when Sunni identity is increasingly linked to an existential battle against their Shiite adversaries, secularism rings hollow, especially when backed up by poverty and neglect. The Future Movement and the Sunni leadership need to tap into and reverse Sunni grievance, and provide a moderate religious counter-narrative in response to the more successful recruitment campaigns of ISIS and al-Nusra. It must regain the trust and respect of Sunni Lebanon and restore it's position as the champion of Sunni Islam. It can do this by promoting its moderate Islamic credentials while offering economic and financial support to its main constituents in northern Lebanon.

Vanessa Newby also wrote a very good piece on how the Arab world views ISIS:

My sense is that most Middle Easterners recognise that ISIS does not reflect genuine Islamic values and believe the group is just opportunistically seeking power. A survey of the region in 2014 found ISIS received almost no support in Arab states. Interestingly, Sunni support for ISIS is described as high by some Western and Israeli commentators.

However, 'almost no support' is not the same as 'zero support', and in Egypt and Jordan, active support for ISIS has emerged. It is fair to assume that in these cases socio-economic factors are partly to blame, something President Obama referred to in his speech at a recent anti-extremism summit. The summit received minimal attention from Middle East media owing to the local belief that US policy in the region is the root cause of extremism there, and because states at the coalface of extremism, such as Lebanon, did not attend. Local politics also play a role. In Egypt, support for ISIS is in part a response to the Government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave his highly anticipated and divisive speech on the Iran nuclear negotiations in Washington on Tuesday. Anthony Bubalo had this take on Bibi:

In effect, therefore, Bibi argued that America should just walk away.

But then what? He didn't argue the case for imposing more sanctions on Iran, perhaps because he understands that sanctions have not prevented Iran from developing its nuclear program to date. And while increased sanctions over the last year have helped bring Iran to the negotiating table they are unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term, given their reliance on Russian and Chinese cooperation.

Nor did he say anything about military action, perhaps in the knowledge that even among many Republican allies there is little appetite for dragging America into another costly war in the Middle East.

Prominent Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was murdered in central Moscow last weekend. He had been investigating Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine before his death. Matthew Sussex wrote on Russia's fractured liberal opposition:

Nemtsov knew he might be killed. He had spoken of the possibility as recently as a fortnight ago. Yet his death is more than just a sign that liberals are once again potential execution targets. It will be a vital test of opposition to Putin's rule inside Russia. Nemtsov's murder has already caused popular outrage, as evidenced by this morning's march in Moscow. If it sparks widespread civil disobedience, it will be a sign that Putin's seemingly immovable spot at the apex of Russian politics is vulnerable. But if the liberal intelligentsia accept it meekly and with only token protests, it will demonstrate the direct opposite: that there is still no realistic alternative to the government in the Kremlin.

Rodger Shanahan deconstructs a story in The Australian about Prime Minister Tony Abbott:

According to the story, the PM raised an operational planning idea in his office and then sought the advice of Australia's 'leading military planners'. Not the normal way of doing things, for sure, but plausible. By the time I got to the second paragraph, however, my 'sloppy journalism' warning light began flashing. And when I noticed that the article failed to define who 'Australia's leading military planners' were, the light stopped flashing and just stayed on.

New Zealand is planning to send soldiers to assist in training efforts in Iraq. But Robert Ayson says the deployment decision actually reflects a divided political leadership:

But on one issue Prime Minister Key seems firm. New Zealand's forces will be in Iraq for only two years and then they will come out. As this exit date comes before the next general election in New Zealand, in theory at least National is not committing any future government to continue the mission it has started. But at that point the trans-Tasman partners may be in different positions. In one interview Mr Key said he expected 'Australia will stay longer, so they'll either backfill with more people of their own or maybe they'll find another training partner or whatever.'

It looks more likely that Australia will acquire armed drones from the US. Ben FitzGerald argues that, alongside making sure that the Australian Government develops the right regulations and norms to govern their use, Australia also needs to make sure that other nations in the region use them in line with the global rules-based order:

The greatest risk to Australian interests is not that other nations will acquire drones and use them against us (if it were, buying drones of our own would not be a remedy). The more likely risk is that some nations will use them in ways that undermine the rules-based international order that Australia subscribes to, or will increase regional instability through risky use (such as China flying a drone toward the Senkaku islands in September 2013). These incidents are likely to increase in frequency as nations acquire drones and seek to push the boundaries of international norms or re-establish them in their favour.

Julian Snelder on how China's infrastructure handled the annual holiday migration of China's increasingly mobile middle class:

Today there are 154 million cars on China's roads, up tenfold in 15 years. Not surprisingly, the explosive growth in the car population and the new-found joys of driving home resulted in horrendous traffic jams during chunyun, made more treacherous by snowstorms and an alarming accident rate. Chinese drivers are stoic and complaints are seldom aired. Even the not-so-open road offers mobility and freedom to workers that was unattainable just a few years ago. The misery of the last train home is fading, and the true liberation of China's workers is drawing nearer: when they don't all have to go on vacation at the same time.

What was in the first budget of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's new government in India? Leon Berkelmans took a look at subsidies:

The new Indian Government brought down its first full-year budget last weekend. It has been keenly anticipated. Business Standard claimed: 'The market is expecting the Union Budget to be path-breaking, similar to the one in 1991, which led to the liberalisation of the Indian economy.'

As it was, the budget did not live up to that billing, but such expectations were unrealistic. The 1991 budget is legendary, formulated in a time of crisis. But with growth in India now reported to be 7.5%, there is no such acute urgency pervading the corridors of power. The budget, nonetheless, was received well. The Financial Times said that the package 'moves things in the right direction'.

Andrew Carr previewed a new book he has just published, Winning the Peace: Australia's Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific:

Australians sometimes wonder if their nation has a grand strategy. I think it did. It was called 'Engagement' and it has now come to an end.

Beginning in the 1950s and 60s and re-doubled in the 1980s and 90s, Australia's leaders began a historic turn of their nation from West to East. For many this is believed to be a still-distant goal. After all, most of us don't speak an Asian language, too many don't realise Bali is in Indonesia, and our foreign policy keeps looking toward the Middle East and singing sweet notes about the Anglosphere.

Yet on the terms the Engagers actually sought, the policy has been thoroughly achieved.

Cautious about culture and history, their terms of success were focused on gaining economic and political access as a basis for influence and security. Today, Australia's top six export markets and five of our top six import markets are in the Asia Pacific, with the US the only Anglosphere nation to feature prominently in both lists. Politically we have guaranteed ourselves a seat at the table of all of the region's major forums. We have created and reformed institutions, and helped shape the region's values and norms on such key issues as trade, non-proliferation and irregular migration. We no longer fear economic or political isolation as we once did. This is our region and we are no longer the odd man out or even the odd man in, but thoroughly at home.

Stephen Grenville asks if the TPP will be a good deal for Australia:

If the peer-pressure dynamic of plurilateral agreements often fosters progress, this can also work to our disadvantage if our interests have been overridden. Just as we had no choice (for political reasons) but to sign off on the Australia-US FTA, not signing up to the TPP if it is finalised would be an admission of failure at the political level. We'll sign on, even to a disadvantageous treaty.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Montecruz Foto.
 2015-03-06T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Bringing together the best Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=254f428f-a172-4c1d-8f9a-338016d81081 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=254f428f-a172-4c1d-8f9a-338016d81081 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/07/Weekend-catch-up-Islam-and-ISIS-Bibi-in-DC-Nemtsov-drones-Indias-budget-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=254f428f-a172-4c1d-8f9a-338016d81081 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/Boko-Haram-The-early-years.aspx Boko Haram: The early years 2015-03-06T02:00:00+00:00 Hans Brun
Violence and uprisings fueled by religious beliefs and ethnic-divides are nothing new in Nigeria.

A bombing by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, 2014. (Flickr/Global Panorama.)

Movements such as Boko Haram and Ansaru have precedents that go back to at least the start of the 19th century in Nigeria, and violent uprisings were rather common even during the 1980s and 1990s.

The recent situation has been compounded by the Nigerian Government's failure to stamp out corruption and distribute the profits from its oil industry in a manner that could have countered violent extremism. Poverty, especially in northern Nigeria where Boko Haram primarily operates, is a major problem.

It is difficult to establish an accurate account of Boko Haram's history and development. It has been argued by a number of scholars that the movement has been active since the mid-1990s under several different names, including Al Sunna Wal'Jamma, Muhajirun, the Nigerian Taliban, the Yusufiyaa Islamic Movement and Ahlusunna wal' Jamma Hijra.

But from 2002 onwards, the movement started to call itself Jamaátu Ahlus Sunnah Liddà Awati Wal Jihad, which translates to 'People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad.' The group's more widely used name, Boko Haram, is a composite term consisting of the regional Hausa language's word boko (book) and the Arabic word haram (sinful, ungodly, or forbidden). It literally means 'book is forbidden,' but it can be more deeply interpreted to mean Western education and civilization are sinful or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden and rejected.

Boko Haram appears to have received initial financial support primarily from Nigerian politicians and businessmen who supported the cause for a variety of reasons. However, from 2007 onward, the group started to receive funding from al Qaeda; several members of the group were arrested and accused of receiving funds from al Qaeda, in one case up to US$300,000.

Boko Haram started to launch attacks against the Nigerian Government at the end of December 2003, when the movement destroyed a police station and a number of government buildings in northern Nigeria. During the attacks its members hoisted the flag used by the Taliban and various groups within the global jihadist movement.

Boko Haram continued to stage attacks against police stations in the region throughout 2004, most likely in an attempt to acquire weapons. The violence continued throughout 2005, when Boko Haram attacked a number of Christian villages, looted shops and kidnapped several local businessmen and forced them to convert to Islam. In response, Nigerian security forces launched Operation Sawdust in the northeast of the country. Authorities succeeded in arresting Boko Haram's leader at the time, Mohammed Yusuf, but he was later granted bail and allowed to return to Maiduguri.

On 26 July 2009, Nigerian security forces raided one of Boko Haram's compounds in Bauchi state, arresting nine of its members. Ingredients and equipment for the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and weapons were confiscated. Two hours later, Boko Haram launched several reprisal attacks, primarily against police stations. The Nigerian police eventually gained control of the situation but at least 700 people were killed, including many members of Boko Haram as well as civilians. During the fighting, Boko Haram's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, died (or was murdered) allegedly in police custody, together with one of Boko Haram's key financial sponsors at the time, Alhaji Buji Foi.

As a consequence, the group's remaining leadership were forced to regroup and go underground.

Abukarar Shekau, who would eventually become leader, and other senior members hid away in countries such as Niger, Cameroon and Benin. Mamman Nur, another leading member who was originally from Chad, sought refuge in Somalia, where he and other members received training in camps run by al-Shabaab. A number of others spent time in training camps in Mali and Mauritania that were under the control of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After the confrontation with the security forces in 2009, Boko Haram allegedly received not only training from AQIM but also a significant amount of money.

At this time, the movement only had access to primitive weapons such as bows and arrows, various types of farming equipment, homemade firearms, petrol bombs and simple IEDs. In order to arm itself, Boko Haram launched a series of attacks against patrolling police officers and police stations in the Borno and Yobe states in August 2010. Later that year, the movement started to target and kill Muslim clerics in the region who were perceived as a threat, thus degrading the capabilities and willingness of Nigerian civil society to openly oppose it. Later on, the movement started to target churches and schools in the region.

In recent years, the movement has increased the scope of its attacks by targeting entire villages, often at night. The attacking forces usually arrive on technicals and motorbikes in company-sized units. The targeted village is looted and more or less destroyed together with its inhabitants. Survivors are also often tracked down and killed.

Boko Haram's access to weapons has grown over the years. Some of the weapons were looted or even bought from corrupt Nigerian officers and soldiers. It is also highly likely that the movement has received weapons, including more sophisticated weapon systems such as man-portable air-defense systems, from looted Libyan weapons and ammunition dumps through its contacts with AQIM. It also appears to have good access to technicals, motorbikes and even an unknown number of armoured personnel carriers of various types.

During 2014, Boko Haram started to try to hold on to seized territory and staged raids over the Nigerian border, primarily into Cameroon. It became obvious that Nigerian security forces were unable to deal with the group. As consequence, military units from Chad, Niger and Cameroon have started to fight Boko Haram in Nigerian territory in cooperation with the Nigerian military.

The movement claims to have more than 40,000 members in Nigeria and dispersed throughout Africa in countries such as Niger, Chad, Mauritania and even Somalia. According to US intelligence officials, Boko Haram is estimated to have between 4000 and 6000 hardcore fighters. The movement also appears to have access to a large number of child soldiers, whom it usually recruits by force and often uses in mass attacks as cannon fodder.

As of February 2015, approximately 15,000 people have been killed by Boko Haram.
 2015-03-06T02:00:00+00:00 Hans Brun Boko Haram appears to have received initial financial support primarily from Nigerian politicians and businessmen. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ab76096a-861e-45e6-9c19-b65c13228fc5 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ab76096a-861e-45e6-9c19-b65c13228fc5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/Boko-Haram-The-early-years.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ab76096a-861e-45e6-9c19-b65c13228fc5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/Movie-trailer-No-Escape.aspx Movie trailer: No Escape 2015-03-05T23:19:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
This reminds me a bit of the trailer for The Impossible, with a white Western family placed in peril in an exotic Southeast Asian location.

I really hope No Escape offers more than the trailer suggests, because this looks like a movie that will play into a lot of unattractive prejudices about the strange and alien Far East — note that little cutaway of a fish being butchered on the street; we're not in Kansas any more! The father is presented as naively wanting to embrace a foreign culture, but it's his less trusting daughter who turns out to be right. Only America (or in this case, the US Embassy) is safe!

[youtube:VFpK71yBv1s]

(H/t Slashfilm.)
 2015-03-05T23:19:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen I really hope the film offers more than the trailer suggests, because this looks like a movie that will play into a lot of unattractive prejudices about the strange and alien Far East. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=f4efce2f-0f04-4073-9587-209134d35ed1 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=f4efce2f-0f04-4073-9587-209134d35ed1 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/Movie-trailer-No-Escape.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=f4efce2f-0f04-4073-9587-209134d35ed1 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/Digital-Asia-links-Under-the-Dome-phones-and-gender-FireChat-and-more.aspx Digital Asia links: Under the Dome, phones and gender, FireChat and more 2015-03-05T22:45:00+00:00 Danielle Cave
The Asia Pacific is the most dynamic digital landscape in the world, home to the fastest adopters of new technologies and the largest concentration of mobile and social media users. An escalation in online activism, changing cyber dynamics, developments in digital diplomacy and the exploitation of big data are shaping the region's engagement with the world.

A new report investigating the gender disparities in mobile phone ownership in developing countries has found the largest gaps are in Southeast Asia, where women are 38% less likely to own a mobile phone than men.

President Obama has criticised China's plans for new restrictions on US tech companies, urging Beijing to change the policy if it wants to do business (h/t @BrendanTN_). China has dismissed the criticism and called for the US to 'treat this in a calm, objective and correct manner'.

The US is also putting up a fight in Indonesia against new rules requiring smartphone and tablet companies to produce 40% of their content locally from 1 January 2017. The US believes the 'made in Indonesia' rule will hamper the efforts of its tech companies, such as Apple, to capitalise on Indonesia's growing smartphone market.

Few 'mobile for development' programs reach Cambodia's poorest because they are unavailable in Khmer and aren't accessible to illiterate users. Local NGOs and the Government are getting around this with a free open-source platform that uses voice rather than text.

This blog post questions the hype around the FireChat mobile messenger app. Operable without phone reception or an internet connection, FireChat generated headlines last year during Hong Kong's 'Umbrella Revolution' (and before that during Taiwan's 'Sunflower Movement').

Why did a documentary about China's air pollution go viral in China this week? 'Under the Dome', self-financed by a former state TV journalist, has generated tens of thousands of comments on WeChat and been viewed more than 200 million times. It is now being censored but it is available here with English subtitles:

[youtube:T6X2uwlQGQM]
 2015-03-05T22:45:00+00:00 Danielle Cave Links to this week'-s best reading on Asian digital trends. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=64a57c07-a3cc-458d-a1a9-27dc3658cf5b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=64a57c07-a3cc-458d-a1a9-27dc3658cf5b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/Digital-Asia-links-Under-the-Dome-phones-and-gender-FireChat-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=64a57c07-a3cc-458d-a1a9-27dc3658cf5b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/How-does-the-Arab-world-view-ISIS.aspx How does the Arab world view ISIS? 2015-03-05T21:50:00+00:00 Vanessa Newby
Syrian friends here in Lebanon often tell me that some Syrian refugees have chosen to leave Lebanon and return to parts of Syria that are under ISIS control. These anecdotes usually emerge as part of a larger conversation about why ISIS still receives support in some Arab countries, albeit often tacit and inactive.

When I ask why these refugees return, the response is always the same: 'They simply don't believe that the media reports of the atrocities taking place are actually true'.

Perhaps the death of Jordanian pilot Moath al Kasasbeh changed that. In Lebanon, often a barometer for regional issues, there was a palpable sense of shock on the street among all sects that a Sunni had been killed by ISIS in such an unholy way. A recent article on the Palestinian response to the slaying of the Jordanian pilot appears to confirm that prior to his death, some were wavering about the true nature of ISIS. But it seems the way in which he died (denounced by Islamic scholars), and the fact he was a Sunni Arab, touched people around the region in a way that the deaths of foreign journalists and aid workers perhaps did not.

But even prior to the incident, in conversation I eavesdropped on during shared taxi rides, the phrase ma fi din, ma fi shi (no religion, nothing) comes up when drivers and passengers speak about 'Daesh'. In bars and cafes the locals joke with me: 'It's alright for you, you're Christian, ISIS just want to drive you from the region. I'm Shi'a — they want to kill all of us!' In fact, I have never had a conversation with anyone in Lebanon that didn't involve expressly denouncing the group, whether with Palestinians, Lebanese Christians, Druze, Shi'a and Sunnis. Even Salafis in Lebanon do not appear to agree with ISIS.

However, there are pockets of sympathy for ISIS in Lebanon, often attributed to political and economic factors.

Weak leadership has led to the feeling that Sunnis are under-represented at the political level (as compared to the Shia). This is combined with dire economic conditions in Sunni areas of northern Lebanon and parts of the Beqaa Valley. Sunni leaders in Lebanon are perceived by the people there as not doing enough to ameliorate their poverty.

But what about other parts of the Middle East?

In Syria itself there is good reason for people to remain in areas under ISIS control, caught as they are between a rock and a hard place: regime attacks or ISIS authority. Formally, Muslim and Arab institutions such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the leading Sunni clerical institution Al Azhar have repeatedly put out statements denouncing ISIS. Less formal responses come in the form of memes mocking ISIS which have emerged online all across the region.

My sense is that most Middle Easterners recognise that ISIS does not reflect genuine Islamic values and believe the group is just opportunistically seeking power. A survey of the region in 2014 found ISIS received almost no support in Arab states. Interestingly, Sunni support for ISIS is described as high by some Western and Israeli commentators.

However, 'almost no support' is not the same as 'zero support', and in Egypt and Jordan, active support for ISIS has emerged. It is fair to assume that in these cases socio-economic factors are partly to blame, something President Obama referred to in his speech at a recent anti-extremism summit. The summit received minimal attention from Middle East media owing to the local belief that US policy in the region is the root cause of extremism there, and because states at the coalface of extremism, such as Lebanon, did not attend. Local politics also play a role. In Egypt, support for ISIS is in part a response to the Government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups.

There is also the lure of the Caliphate itself. The fact that ISIS has managed to capture territory is crucial, because in theory it means there is an actual place where Muslims are governed under the banner of their religion, which is a powerful symbol even to those who utterly reject ISIS's methods. There may also be a sense among devout Muslims who were on the fence about the group that, as practicing Sunnis, they themselves had nothing to fear from ISIS.

Resistance to the West is another powerful force in the Middle East. Perhaps some people could not help but approve of the fact that the West is finally being challenged. The Charlie Hebdo attack, which brought the magazine's editorial content to the attention of many Muslims for the first time, may well have demonstrated to them that the West has never had any good intentions towards Islam anyway.

Other than shock and awe, it is hard to know what ISIS was thinking when it killed the Jordanian pilot, because it has alienated ordinary people who might have had latent sympathies towards it, and erased doubts on the street about the truly indiscriminate viciousness of ISIS.

When considering their strategy towards ISIS, the most significant point for the US and other countries to consider is that low support for this group should not be conflated with levels of regional support for other Islamic groups such as Hamas, Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood. Keeping the war on ISIS separate from these other more established groups is essential.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Hossam el-Hamalawy.
 2015-03-05T21:50:00+00:00 Vanessa Newby Most Middle Easterners recognise that ISIS does not reflect genuine Islamic values and believe they are simply opportunists seeking power. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=d104140e-ad71-47dd-a0e9-22f1d049fcc7 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=d104140e-ad71-47dd-a0e9-22f1d049fcc7 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/How-does-the-Arab-world-view-ISIS.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=d104140e-ad71-47dd-a0e9-22f1d049fcc7 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Lone-wolf-attack-wont-disrupt-US-Korea-relationship.aspx Lone wolf attack won't disrupt US-Korea ties 2015-03-05T07:42:00+00:00 Robert E Kelly
Around 7:40 am (KST), the US ambassador to South Korea, Mark Lippert, was attacked at a breakfast event on Korean unification. His attacker, Kim Ki Jong, slashed Lippert's face and wrist. Lippert was taken to a hospital for surgery.

Kim is a member of two nationalist groups – one regarding national unification, the other concerning Dokdo. The attack, Kim said, was a protest against the current South Korea-US military exercise Key Resolve. Not surprisingly, the attack has dominated the South Korea news all day. A few quick points are in order:

Kim does not represent anything like majority opinion in South Korea on the alliance with the US

Anti-Americanism in Korea is an issue, but not a large one. It tends to come in waves and is often the result of elite political manipulation.

The largest recent outburst was in 2007-08 over US beef imports. A rumour spread in South Korea that US beef was contaminated with mad cow disease, and this catalysed a groundswell of opposition, with candlelight vigils in the streets against a US-Korean free-trade deal. But it was also widely noted that Korean left-wing parties emphasised the American connection to help their political opposition to both a conservative president they disliked (Lee Myung-Bak) and a trade deal their voters opposed.

Similarly, when Roh Moo-Hyun ran for president (2002), he explicitly ran against the US, and that helped him get elected. He did not actually move to expel US forces from Korea. Since Roh, Korea has elected two pro-American conservatives in a row. In fact, part of Kim's anger may be how unresponsive the Korean political system actually is to popular anti-Americanism.

South Korean left-wing parties do not endorse direct action against US personnel in the Korea

Koreans of all parties are very nationalistic, but the South Korean right, which one would assume to be more so, is actually not. The South Korean right supports a tough line against the North and supports American ties, which means it is often labelled 'internationalist.' It is the left that is more traditionally nationalistic: sympathetic to unconditional unification and blaming the Americans (and Japanese) for national division.

These topsy-turvy political categories generate a lot of political confusion, but it is important to note that Korea's democratic left does not endorse violent action against Americans. Recently, a radical-left pro-Northern party was broken up by the Government in part over the issue of violence against the 'occupation.'

North Korea almost certainly had nothing to do with it

North Korea would be foolish to attack such a high-profile American target. North Korea, for all its bellicose rhetoric, does not want war. It would lose. But more importantly for the Pyongyang gangster elite that runs the country, they would lose all their illicit privileges. Not only that, they would likely be hunted down by angry North Koreans, as happened to Gaddafi and Ceausescu, or be pulled before post-unification courts. And South Korea has still has the death penalty, likely for this very contingency.

The South Korea-US alliance has weathered ups and downs for decades. If Kim is the lone wolf he seems to be, the only real fall-out will likely be greater security for US officials in Korea. That will make it harder for regular South Koreans to meet them, and that is a shame.
 2015-03-05T07:42:00+00:00 Robert E Kelly If Kim is the lone wolf he seems to be, the only real fall-out will likely be greater security for US officials in Korea. That will make it harder for regular South Koreans to meet them, and that is a shame. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=33602a81-905c-4dfa-8ed1-95fbfba63409 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=33602a81-905c-4dfa-8ed1-95fbfba63409 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Lone-wolf-attack-wont-disrupt-US-Korea-relationship.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=33602a81-905c-4dfa-8ed1-95fbfba63409 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Indo-Pacific-security-links-Chinas-military-spending-Xi-Jinping-RCEP-P-8-and-submarines.aspx Indo-Pacific security links: China's military spending, Xi Jinping, RCEP, P-8 and more 2015-03-05T04:31:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
The Indo-Pacific is a strategic system encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, reflecting the expanding interests and reach of China and India as well as the enduring role of the US. The Lowy Institute's International Security program presents a weekly selection of links illuminating the changing security picture in this increasingly connected super-region.

A few links from China this week. First, China has announced its military spending will increase by 10% this year, even with the economy expanding just 7.4% in 2014.

A PLA general has said that Hong Kong's Occupy protests were an 'orchestrated Hong Kong version of a colour revolution', in what is seen as a warning to pro-independence Taiwanese.

What is shaping Xi Jinping's presidency? Historical trauma.

Why is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership of Asia and the Pacific of particular importance to India?

Some interesting details have emerged from US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's secret trip to North Korea. Earlier this week, North Korea fired some short-range missiles off its coast to protest annual US-South Korean military drills.

The US has started to fly the new P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft over the South China Sea from a base in the Philippines and is planning on shifting more Aegis-equipped destroyers to the Pacific.

Submarines in the Indo-Pacific: after push-back from the new government in Sri Lanka over whether it would allow China to continue docking its submarines in Colombo, China has defended its actions.

 2015-03-05T04:31:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone The best reading on security in the Indo-Pacific this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=066db51d-b7ed-4416-8353-85df3ba51ae8 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=066db51d-b7ed-4416-8353-85df3ba51ae8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Indo-Pacific-security-links-Chinas-military-spending-Xi-Jinping-RCEP-P-8-and-submarines.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=066db51d-b7ed-4416-8353-85df3ba51ae8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Indias-budget-Will-subsidies-fall-as-predicted.aspx India's budget: Will subsidies fall as predicted? 2015-03-05T03:32:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans

The new Indian Government brought down its first full-year budget last weekend. It has been keenly anticipated. Business Standard claimed: 'The market is expecting the Union Budget to be path-breaking, similar to the one in 1991, which led to the liberalisation of the Indian economy.'

As it was, the budget did not live up to that billing, but such expectations were unrealistic. The 1991 budget is legendary, formulated in a time of crisis. But with growth in India now reported to be 7.5%, there is no such acute urgency pervading the corridors of power. The budget, nonetheless, was received well. The Financial Times said that the package 'moves things in the right direction'.

One of the main measures in the budget, perhaps the main measure, is a relaxation of the previously planned fiscal consolidation to allow for more infrastructure spending. A drop in the subsidy bill is also projected, which will help pay for new roads, rail and power stations.

It certainly appears that India needs better infrastructure. Power outages left 650 million people without electricity for days in 2012. According to McKinsey, infrastructure bottlenecks take 2% off GDP annually. These and other ailments are discussed thoroughly by the Council on Foreign Relations here.

So the boost to infrastructure sounds good, provided the Government can overcome governance issues associated with such projects (again, see CFR). However, we need to be cautious.

Below is a graph of central Government spending on subsidies (food, fuel and fertiliser) and capital (which includes infrastructure). There is a reasonably clear negative correlation between subsidies and capital spending. As the subsidy burden increased on the back of high commodity prices, it crowded out capital spending, which is relatively easy to defer.

The dashed lines indicate what is forecast in the budget. It looks like capital expenditure will increase, although interestingly it will still be well below 2010 levels as a percentage of GDP. Correspondingly, subsidies will fall.

But we have seen this prediction before.

Below is a graph of the subsidy bill, with the dashed lines showing what was predicted in each budget. The Ministry of Finance has consistently predicted substantial falls in the subsidy bill that do not come to pass. If this happens again, there is the danger that capital spending will be trimmed...again. The fall in commodity prices makes me optimistic that the projected falls are realistic this time around, but the graph shows an absolutely dire forecasting record.

Discussion around budgeted revenues suggest that revenue numbers, for the first time in a while, look reasonable. This was even trumpeted in the official budget documents, which noted the 'Realistic figures shown...without showing exaggerated revenue projections.' Let's hope the subsidy projections are equally realistic.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user lecercle.
 2015-03-05T03:32:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans The Ministry of Finance has consistently predicted substantial falls in the subsidy bill that do not come to pass. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=6a13377e-1add-4152-8a2e-7eb8599a2a7a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=6a13377e-1add-4152-8a2e-7eb8599a2a7a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Indias-budget-Will-subsidies-fall-as-predicted.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=6a13377e-1add-4152-8a2e-7eb8599a2a7a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Engagement-is-over.aspx Engagement is over 2015-03-05T01:05:00+00:00 Andrew Carr

Australians sometimes wonder if their nation has a grand strategy. I think it did. It was called 'Engagement' and it has now come to an end.

Beginning in the 1950s and 60s and re-doubled in the 1980s and 90s, Australia's leaders began a historic turn of their nation from West to East. For many this is believed to be a still-distant goal. After all, most of us don't speak an Asian language, too many don't realise Bali is in Indonesia, and our foreign policy keeps looking toward the Middle East and singing sweet notes about the Anglosphere.

Yet on the terms the Engagers actually sought, the policy has been thoroughly achieved.

Cautious about culture and history, their terms of success were focused on gaining economic and political access as a basis for influence and security. Today, Australia's top six export markets and five of our top six import markets are in the Asia Pacific, with the US the only Anglosphere nation to feature prominently in both lists. Politically we have guaranteed ourselves a seat at the table of all of the region's major forums. We have created and reformed institutions, and helped shape the region's values and norms on such key issues as trade, non-proliferation and irregular migration. We no longer fear economic or political isolation as we once did. This is our region and we are no longer the odd man out or even the odd man in, but thoroughly at home.

This is the story I set out to tell in my new book Winning the Peace: Australia's campaign to change the Asia-Pacific, launched last night by Paul Kelly.

However, once I had the mass of notes and chapter drafts before me, I realised that what Australia needs is not a collective effort to praise engagement but to bury it.

As many have noticed over the last ten or so years, many of our key relationships and key initiatives don't seem to have blossomed as they did in the past. However, I don't accept the usual explanations, such as a lack of 'creativity', 'maturity' or that we can pin the blame on certain individuals or political parties.

Instead, I think the problem is that we still think of our country as an outsider looking to engage, rather than being in a fully enmeshed position, which we actually are. The 'engagement' posture suited us during the courtship, but I believe it's now hurting us in the marriage.

As a self-proclaimed 'middle power' we felt free to let our attention wander between global and local concerns. We saw our relationships as exclusively bilateral concerns and not part of the region's networks and hubs. And we didn't mind being seen as an outsider as long as it gave us the freedom to lob diplomatic hand grenades every once in a while.

The costs of holding onto this 'outsider looking in' engagement-era thinking are starting to mount.

Kevin Rudd was high priest of the need to return to a 'pure' engagement vision. But his voluminous activity earned little respect and his signature policies, such as the Asia-Pacific Community, fell embarrassingly flat. The Gillard Government likewise sought to spruik the need to engage with the Asian Century, but its own thinking looked outdated when it announced a major new US presence in Darwin without even informing the neighbours. Finally, the Abbott Government seems continually surprised that Indonesia doesn't want to keep doing us favours (such as ignoring spying, accepting boats or giving mercy to drug smugglers) and can't quite understand why getting closer to our old friend Japan is leaving many so nervous.

These governments are victims of the success of their predecessors. Their failure is one of adaptation, a result of their desire to cling onto engagement-era thinking.

I don't have an overarching new concept or slogan to sell you at this point. Maybe we shouldn't even think in terms of slogans. But we do need a new intellectual framework that helps us think about what Australia wants from its region and what role it will play within it.

The starting point is to throw away the idea of being an outsider looking in, and begin afresh from our real position as part of Southeast Asia. That probably means more constraints, but it also promises more security and prosperity.

Before that debate can begin, however, we need to accept that the old beloved project of engagement is over. Despite the controversy, this truly was a bipartisan and national effort of re-orientation, of a form and success that few nations have ever attempted. No wonder we have trouble letting it go.
Until we do, however, Australian foreign policy will be far less effective and influential than it ought to be, and our nation will be weaker and poorer for it.
 2015-03-05T01:05:00+00:00 Andrew Carr What Australia needs is not a collective effort to praise engagement but to bury it. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=bf6c1c1e-c989-4132-9c09-6a8794241d78 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=bf6c1c1e-c989-4132-9c09-6a8794241d78 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Engagement-is-over.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=bf6c1c1e-c989-4132-9c09-6a8794241d78 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Khmer-Rouge-Tribunal-Two-more-charged-but-not-indicted.aspx Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Two more charged, but not indicted 2015-03-05T00:09:00+00:00 Milton Osborne

Contrary to media reports of two more 'indictments' of former Khmer Rouge figures by the Cambodian-UN Khmer Rouge Tribunal, what has actually happened is that Meas Muth (the former Khmer Rouge navy commander) and Im Chaem (a former regional detention centre director) have been charged in absentia with crimes against humanity by one of the tribunal's international judges, Mark Harmon.

Judge Harmon has a long record of association with international tribunals and with law enforcement in the US. He joined the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2012.

In taking this action, Judge Harmon is acting in accordance with the tribunal's procedures, which permit a judge to charge individuals without having the agreement of a fellow Cambodian judge — this is why the term 'charged' is correct, rather than 'indicted'. For an indictment to be entered, additional approval is required. And according to the Phnom Penh Post report cited above, Harmon's Cambodian counterpart, Judge You Bunleng, considers the cases against Meas Muth and Im Chaem (listed in court documents as Cases 003 and 004) as already closed.

It appears Prime Minister Hun Sen had at least an inkling that Judge Harmon was about to act, since he delivered a familiar warning against further cases being heard at the ECCC last week. He claimed that if further cases went before the tribunal there was a risk of war breaking out.

So, not for the first time, Hun Sen has shown his deep displeasure at the role played by international elements within the ECCC. For Judge You to now go ahead and endorse his international colleague's decision against the Prime Minister's wishes seems unlikely. If, contrary to all expectations, he were to do so, it would be a striking example of Hun Sen's power being on the wane.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
 2015-03-05T00:09:00+00:00 Milton Osborne An international judge has charged, not indicted, two more former members of the Khmer Rouge. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=d802aafd-ba62-413f-bc01-b377fc3f36c2 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=d802aafd-ba62-413f-bc01-b377fc3f36c2 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/Khmer-Rouge-Tribunal-Two-more-charged-but-not-indicted.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=d802aafd-ba62-413f-bc01-b377fc3f36c2 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/How-should-we-respond-to-ISIS-in-Southeast-Asia.aspx How Southeast Asia is responding to ISIS 2015-03-04T22:39:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan
In November last year, at the general assembly of the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in Malaysia, a video was shown. It was the first minute of footage showing a beheading carried out by ISIS.

The screening was a volte-face from a few months earlier, when Prime Minister Najib had implored his UMNO to be brave like ISIS fighters had been in combating the Iraqi army, no doubt influenced by the foiling of an ISIS-inspired plot to target nightclubs and a Carlsberg brewery in Malaysia.

The ruling UMNO is trying to balance Malaysia's fragile social make-up. Malaysia, like states everywhere, now fears the impact of ISIS.

The horrors of ISIS have reverberated across Southeast Asia. Buddhist extremists in Myanmar are using the barbarism of the group to justify its Islamaphobia, as are some Thais in that country's long running conflict against Muslim insurgents in the south. But the biggest impact, and where concern is understandably deepest, is in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, where jihadi groups have long had a foothold. Some of these groups have declared bai'at (allegiance) to ISIS, including Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor and Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid in Indonesia (causing a split in the latter group, explained here and here).

ISIS, through its slick media outfit, has made strong overtures to Southeast Asians to join its ranks. This was perhaps most evident in the full back-page photo of Southeast Asians in Issue 4 of the group's glossy Dabiq Magazine. In any other magazine this would be prime real-estate for advertising. In ISIS's magazine, it was a call to arms.

The number of Indonesians going to fight in Syria and Iraq has already surpassed that which went to Afghanistan between 1985-1994, says expert Sidney Jones. The experience these fighters gained during that period was brought home to Indonesia, in effect producing an 'Afghanistan alumni'. The fear now is of a returning 'ISIS alumni'. Estimates vary but in December 2014 the country's National Counter Terror Agency chief said that 514 Indonesians had traveled to Iraq and Syria (he did not specify how many had joined ISIS). In Malaysia the number of known ISIS recruits is approximately 40 and in the Philippines about 200. (By comparison, in February Australia reported that 110 citizens had traveled to join ISIS, of whom 20 have been killed).

Another often overlooked concern arises from the number of Southeast Asian migrant workers already living in the Middle East. The Philippines alone had an estimated 2.5 million citizens working in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE as of 2012. These Southeast Asians could become both recruits or targets for ISIS.

Unsurprisingly, Southeast Asian states have spent plenty of time brainstorming and implementing new measures to curb recruitment.

As terrorism expert Greg Barton noted recently, 'we have the hard side of counter-terrorism right...where we are dropping the ball (or not picking it up) is in case managing individuals'. This appears to be increasingly true in Southeast Asian states, with a few exceptions.

Gaps in enforcement are being patched up. Malaysia will introduce a new security bill in March. Najib controversially repealed the Internal Security Act in 2011. The new Prevention of Terrorism Bill will likely cover much of what was repealed in the ISA.

Increased regional cooperation in counter-terrorism has been boosted through stronger information sharing on suspect Southeast Asian citizens traveling through the region. In attempts to fly under the radar, Malaysian recruits had been traveling to Indonesia before heading to Syria, and coming home the same way. Others passed through or come from Brunei and the Philippines. China is worried that its citizens are also using such travel routes to Syria; Kuala Lumpur said 300 Chinese militants had used Malaysia as a transit point to join ISIS. So border control is being enhanced, proof of which came in December 2014 when at least a dozen Indonesians bound for Syria were stopped by Malaysian border police.

Indonesian security services have kept a close watch on its known jihadi groups. As a September 2014 report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict noted, Indonesia has 'reacted more forcefully to the appearance of IS than to any other extremist movement in memory and so has the mainstream Muslim community'. Indonesia is also moving to invalidate passports of those attempting to join ISIS and those already fighting. Crucially, work still needs to be done in Indonesian prisons, which remain a key recruiting and funding ground. But as a January IPAC report notes, the building of anti-ISIS groups in prisons is making some headway.

Some jihadi groups in Indonesia have been given space to speak out against the Caliphate. While this is a dangerous game that may give undue credibility to these jihadi groups, Southeast Asian states have a decent track record of tackling them. It is perhaps a case of better-the-devil-you-know, or necessary appeasement to stymie local jihadi groups from pledging bai'at.

De-radicalisation programs have also gained renewed support. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have long employed such programs, with mixed results. Recidivism rates vary. Some results suggest that recidivism is lower than in the normal offender populations in Europe or the US (~40%); other results suggest the opposite. These programs are still being modified to meet the new ideological challenge of ISIS. As such, the study of de-radicalisation continues to expand. In January, Singapore announced a study abroad program for students to immerse themselves in a 'summer of study' in de-radicalisation. At the East Asia Summit last year, Singapore's PM proposed a symposium on de-radicalisation to share best practice among experts. That symposium will take place in Singapore in April.

There is no panacea to the ISIS threat. As one expert on de-radicalisation put it to me during a trip to Indonesia in February, every individual recruit needs a different dose of the 'medicine'. We don't know the perfect dose, and we are still figuring out the medicine. That epidemiological work is being studied across Southeast Asia.
 2015-03-04T22:39:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan The horrors of ISIS have reverberated across Southeast Asia. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=21a58ed6-94c4-4cdb-9ed7-158c58b541a5 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=21a58ed6-94c4-4cdb-9ed7-158c58b541a5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/How-should-we-respond-to-ISIS-in-Southeast-Asia.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=21a58ed6-94c4-4cdb-9ed7-158c58b541a5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/The-destructive-power-of-nuclear-weapons.aspx The destructive power of nuclear weapons 2015-03-04T21:09:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
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My generation doesn't think much about nuclear weapons, disarmament and the consequences of nuclear-weapons use. Some certainly do, but generally, the cause of nuclear disarmament is being carried on by an older generation.

I think that's a problem. Nuclear weapons seems like an old issue, from a previous generation and time. Plus, we have our own causes and as the argument often goes, 'no one is ever going to use one anyways, right?' This never convinces me, for a variety of reasons, but I also think we just haven't lived in a time when geopolitical tensions were such that two nuclear armed powers were close to war (except perhaps India and Pakistan in 1999, and the growing nuclear dimension of the tensions between Russia and the West today).

There is also the fact that the immediate and full effect of a military-grade nuclear weapon hasn't really been represented in pop culture since the end of the Cold War. For example, films since 9/11 have only depicted explosions from small nuclear weapons, usually orchestrated by terrorists like in the film The Sum of All Fears, but also in The Dark Knight Rises and to a lesser extent The Peacemaker. The point is that younger generations have never really been exposed, even fictionally, to the dangers of nuclear war. Some films do deal with this, like Crimson Tide (great film, but nuclear war is averted, yet again) and Independence Day (the nuclear explosion is not depicted, and it fails to stop the aliens, except later in space with the help of Jeff Goldblum).

In short, my generation has never had its version of The Day After.

That's why an article by Lynn Eden, Ted Postal and Steven Starr, recently published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (h/t The Browser), grabbed my attention. The article is adapted from Lynn Eden's 2004 book Whole World on Fire, which essentially argues that US military planners have consistently underestimated the destructive effects of nuclear weapons by only calculating their blast damage, and not the additional damage caused by fire and firestorms.

It is worth quoting Eden describing the results of an 800 kiloton nuclear warhead detonating over Manhattan, which she does to terrifying effect. First, the temperature of the detonation itself:

 Within a few tenths of millionths of a second after detonation, the center of the warhead would reach a temperature of roughly 200 million degrees Fahrenheit (about 100 million degrees Celsius), or about four to five times the temperature at the center of the sun...

...After one second, the fireball would be roughly a mile in diameter. It would have cooled from its initial temperature of many millions of degrees to about 16,000 degrees Fahrenheit, roughly 4,000 degrees hotter than the surface of the sun.

 Eden then describes the destruction the heat would cause downtown:

At the Empire State Building, Grand Central Station, the Chrysler Building, and St. Patrick's Cathedral, about one half to three quarters of a mile from ground zero, light from the fireball would melt asphalt in the streets, burn paint off walls, and melt metal surfaces within a half second of the detonation...

...Those who tried to escape through the streets would have been incinerated by the hurricane-force winds filled with firebrands and flames. Even those able to find shelter in the lower-level sub-basements of massive buildings would likely suffocate from fire-generated gases or be cooked alive as their shelters heated to oven-like conditions.

And then the fires that would engulf the city and the surrounding suburbs:

On a clear day with average weather conditions, the enormous heat and light from the fireball would almost instantly ignite fires over a total area of about 100 square miles...

...As the massive winds drove flames into areas where fires had not yet fully developed,the fires set by the detonation would begin to merge. Within tens of minutes of the detonation, fires from near and far would join to form a single, gigantic fire. The energy released by this mass fire would be 15 to 50 times greater than the energy produced by the nuclear detonation...

 ...These superheated ground winds of more than hurricane force would further intensify the fire. At the edge of the fire zone, the winds would be powerful enough to uproot trees three feet in diameter and suck people from outside the fire into it.

The destructive power of nuclear weapons is imaginable, real and frightening. Even though recent set-backs have slowed down the momentum for nuclear disarmament, it's critical that it at least remains a visible part of the global agenda.
 2015-03-04T21:09:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Did US military planners underestimate the effects of nuclear weapons by only calculating their blast damage, and not the damage also caused by fire and firestorms? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=f88db36d-71a4-4ea2-8595-c08be2ce3339 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=f88db36d-71a4-4ea2-8595-c08be2ce3339 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/The-destructive-power-of-nuclear-weapons.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=f88db36d-71a4-4ea2-8595-c08be2ce3339 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Quick-comment-Philippa-Brant-on-Chinas-aid-to-the-Pacific.aspx Quick comment: Philippa Brant on China's aid to the Pacific 2015-03-04T01:54:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
This week's Quick Comment interview is with the Lowy Institute's Dr Philippa Brant, who is behind the Lowy Institute's latest (and very popular) infographic on Chinese aid to the Pacific. Philippa discusses how she put the data together (China doesn't have a comprehensive accounting of its own aid program in the Pacific Islands region) and her three major findings. I also ask Philippa if she has heard any feedback from China:

 2015-03-04T01:54:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen This week's Quick Comment interview is with the Lowy Institute's Dr Philippa Brant, who is behind the Lowy Institute's latest (and very popular) infographic on Chinese aid to the Pacific. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=4dc1b96e-83b8-462a-b70d-39f93dd98cca 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=4dc1b96e-83b8-462a-b70d-39f93dd98cca http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Quick-comment-Philippa-Brant-on-Chinas-aid-to-the-Pacific.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=4dc1b96e-83b8-462a-b70d-39f93dd98cca http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Pacific-Island-links-Chinese-aid-in-the-Pacific-impact-of-the-Melanesian-Spearhead-Group-Bainimarama-critical-of-Australia-and-more.aspx Pacific Island links: Chinese aid in the Pacific, Melanesian Spearhead Group, Bainimarama and more 2015-03-04T00:32:00+00:00 Anna Kirk

Philippa Brant has released an interactive map of Chinese aid in the Pacific. The figures show the extent of China's growing influence in the region, where it is likely to become the third biggest donor in the near future.

Kaliopate Tavola looks at how the Melanesian Spearhead Group could drive greater Pacific regionalism.

Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama was critical of Australia's refugee resettlement process in a speech at the UN Human Rights Council.

Philip Alpers analyses the success of disarmament programs in the Pacific.

Matthew Allen explains the deepening standoff at the Goldridge mine in Solomon Islands, where water tailings are dangerously close to breaching the spillway.

Following a meeting with Indonesia's Foreign Minister, PNG Prime Minister Peter O'Neill has expressed his support for West Papua's application for membership of the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

Hundreds of refugees on Nauru have protested against their poor living conditions on the island.

 2015-03-04T00:32:00+00:00 Anna Kirk Links to this week's best reading about the Pacific Islands region. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=f72e6902-8e90-48d6-97bd-3ee36c610223 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=f72e6902-8e90-48d6-97bd-3ee36c610223 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Pacific-Island-links-Chinese-aid-in-the-Pacific-impact-of-the-Melanesian-Spearhead-Group-Bainimarama-critical-of-Australia-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=f72e6902-8e90-48d6-97bd-3ee36c610223 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Bibi-goes-to-Washington1.aspx Bibi goes to Washington 2015-03-03T23:43:00+00:00 Anthony Bubalo
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For most of my professional life I have been addicted to Middle Eastern politics. In recent years, however, I have started to kick the habit, so I had not planned to get up at 3am Sydney time to watch Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu deliver his much anticipated and controversial address to the US Congress.

And yet it seems I retain some of the involuntary reflexes of a long-time political junkie. I woke abruptly at 3am and carried myself off to the television. I'm glad I did. Because while 'Bibi' has built his political career on his words rather than his actions (just like President Obama, ironically), you only get the full nuance when you watch him live.

The world was first introduced to Bibi during the 1991 Gulf War when, as Israel's deputy foreign minister, he became a familiar face on CNN, including most famously during one interview, wearing a gas mask. Bibi repeatedly warned of the dangers Israel faced from Iraq's Scud missiles, a number of which did strike Israel during that war.

It was a tense moment in US-Israel relations. The Israeli government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir wanted to take military action against Iraq's Scud missile. The Bush Administration, however, wanted desperately to keep Israel out of the war to ensure that the Arab coalition it had carefully assembled against Saddam did not fall apart.

The Administration succeeded, but the Israeli Government's pressure meant that the US military placed a high priority on hunting Scuds in Iraq's western desert. Bibi was very much the public face of that pressure, using the skills he would become famous for: his deep understanding of the media and public relations; his strong command of the English language and his great facility for dramatic gestures.

Bibi's TV appearances also propelled him politically in Israel, which caused great tension between him and his nominal boss, then Israel Foreign Minister David Levy, who did not speak English and had the charisma of a prickly pear.

Almost 25 years later, many of those same elements were at play in another moment of tension in US-Israel relations, this time over Iran.

Bibi believes the Obama Administration is about to sign a deal with Iran over its nuclear program that will imperil Israel. His address to Congress at the invitation of House Speaker, Republican John Boehner, and in the face of opposition from the Obama Administration, was a typically dramatic gesture. Yet, as numerous Israeli critics pointed out, it also risked undermining bipartisan support for the US-Israel relationship by alienating Democrats, some 50 of whom reportedly refused to attend the speech. And many saw the speech as a stunt aimed at shoring up political support for Bibi in Israel's elections in two weeks' time.

Against so rich a background the speech turned out to be a bit of an anti-climax.

It was all the things we have come to expect from a Bibi speech: dramatic, eloquent, at times compelling, at others condescending, and not a little bit cynical. And there were strong points to Bibi's argument. Two stand out in particular.

The first reflects deep Israeli (and indeed Arab) fears about an agreement. That is, not only won't it stop an Iranian nuclear bomb, but it will entrench Iran's regional ascendancy by ending its economic and political isolation. Indeed the fear among Iran's adversaries is that the Obama Administration is contemplating allying with Iran in the Middle East on issues of common interest.

A significant part of Bibi's speech was devoted to the theme of 'be careful who you get in bed with'. He singled out America and Iran's shared interest in the defeat of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. 'Don't be fooled', he argued. Iran and Islamic State are no different; they were simply competing for the crown of militant Islam. I don't believe the Obama Administration is blind to the realities of the Iranian regime and its regional ambitions. Nevertheless, Bibi's evocative reminders about the nature of the regime, and the amount of American blood on its hands, will be difficult for the Administration to rebut publicly.

Bibi's second strong point was to point to a flaw in the nature of the agreement, a flaw which worries even some supporters of a nuclear deal with Iran: its sunset clause. Because no deal would ever be able to totally eliminate Iran's nuclear program, the deal instead seeks to place limits on Iran's ability to produce fissile material. Any deal would, however, be time-limited. According to media reports, the US was seeking a 20-year lifespan for the deal, the Iranians want 10, with a compromise most likely to emerge at 15.

Bibi dwelt effectively on the real fear that Iran will just wait out the term of any agreement, pocketing the ending of sanctions along the way, and then build nuclear weapons once it is freer to do so. The truth is that even after the end of any deal, Iran will remain subject to NPT restrictions. But this is always going to seem weaker and much less reassuring to those that fear Iran is wriggling its way out of sanctions by exploiting the short-term horizons of Western political leaders.

The strength of both these points was, however, undermined by the speech's greatest weakness: Bibi's inability to offer an alternative. He was detailed in his exposition of the Iranian regime's perfidy over the years and the flaws of any diplomatic agreement with Tehran. But the detail disappeared when it came to explaining the alternative.

America, he argued, should simply walk away from any deal that didn't eliminate Iran's nuclear infrastructure. This precondition cuts little ice with anyone except the most partisan of critics of the deal. There is no way the Iranians would agree to negotiate on that basis. As President Obama correctly noted in an interview with Reuters this week, 'there's no expert on Iran or nuclear proliferation around the world that seriously thinks that Iran is going to respond to additional sanctions by eliminating its nuclear program.' Even military action would not achieve that outcome, other than temporarily. Netanyahu also said America should walk away from any deal which fails to end Iran's aggressive regional behaviour. That's an important issue, but impossible to tie into an already complex nuclear negotiation.

In effect, therefore, Bibi argued that America should just walk away.

But then what? He didn't argue the case for imposing more sanctions on Iran, perhaps because he understands that sanctions have not prevented Iran from developing its nuclear program to date. And while increased sanctions over the last year have helped bring Iran to the negotiating table they are unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term, given their reliance on Russian and Chinese cooperation.

Nor did he say anything about military action, perhaps in the knowledge that even among many Republican allies there is little appetite for dragging America into another costly war in the Middle East.

Indeed, under both of these scenarios (more sanctions or military action), the sunset that so worries Bibi and others in any diplomatic deal gets a whole lot closer than 10 or 15 years. Even under intense sanctions, Iran will still develop its nuclear program and probably even accelerate it, as it has done in the past. And as even Israeli military experts have conceded, military action might slow Iran's program by only 2 or 3 years.

I do not think Bibi's speech will scuttle the negotiations with Iran (although that may still happen of its own accord), nor will it irreparably damage US-Israel relations. Where Bibi has done real damage is to the willingness of the Obama Administration to listen to Israeli concerns about an agreement.

These are real and justified concerns, which need to be built into any agreement if it is to bring much needed stability to the region. But because Bibi has made it personal and political, he has made it easier for the Administration to dismiss Israeli complaints about a deal on the grounds that Bibi simply opposes any realistic deal, no matter how good. Moreover, poking your finger in the eye of an American president in the less politically-encumbered final years of his presidency does not seem very smart.

To put it another way, Bibi's speech won't scuttle the deal because Bibi has made it all about Bibi. But for the same reason, the speech won't do deep damage to Israel's alliance with America. One day Bibi will be gone; the US-Israeli relationship will remain.
 2015-03-03T23:43:00+00:00 Anthony Bubalo It was all the things we have come to expect from a Bibi speech: dramatic, eloquent, at times compelling, at others condescending, and not a little bit cynical. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=b7576d6d-a6c6-4c60-b774-088dc9935a88 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=b7576d6d-a6c6-4c60-b774-088dc9935a88 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Bibi-goes-to-Washington1.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=b7576d6d-a6c6-4c60-b774-088dc9935a88 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Lebanon-Future-Movement-moderate-sunni-alternative.aspx Can Lebanon's Future Movement provide a moderate Sunni alternative? 2015-03-03T22:21:00+00:00 Lauren Williams
At a forum held at the Parliament of New South Wales last Tuesday evening, the General Secretary of Lebanon's Future Movement party, Ahmad Hariri, forcefully condemned terrorism in the name of Islam. Flanked by pictures of two former Lebanese prime ministers, the slain Rafik Hariri and his son Saad, the leader of Lebanon's largest Sunni political party called for a secular and unified Lebanon and for the need to prevent alienation and radicalisation of Sunni communities.

A March 14 Alliance rally in Lebanon, 2011.

These noble calls were met with nods of approval at the Sydney forum, hosted by the NSW branch of the Future Movement, but may be falling on deaf ears among the Future Movement's Sunni constituents at home. The uncomfortable truth is that the Future Movement itself has largely failed its responsibility to prevent alienation of young Sunnis in Lebanon.

Hariri listed the forces of instability in the Middle East in order as: the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli occupation of Palestine; Iran's expanding sphere of influence; and ethnic extremism and terror in the name of Islam. On the third point, Hariri spoke of the inability to combat ISIS through purely military means and the need to prevent 'alienation' of Sunni communities more broadly. Critically, he spoke of the role of the Future Movement as a force of moderation in the promotion of a 'secular' and 'unified Lebanon'.

Lebanon, with it's combustible sectarian mix and confessional system of government, is in a precarious position vis-a-vis the Syrian civil war. The involvement of militias from Lebanon — in the form of Shiite Hezbollah fighters backed by Iran on behalf of the Syrian Government, and Sunni Islamists aligned with Syrian rebel forces opposed to the Syrian Government's rule — has aggravated Lebanon's own precarious Sunni-Shia divide.

The expansion of a regional proxy war played out in the Lebanese arena is a real threat.

The Lebanese Armed Forces are an important symbol of unity in a country politically split between Iranian-backed Hezbollah and its March 8 Alliance (which includes a number of Christian parties), and the Saudi-backed predominantly Sunni Future Movement and its broader March 14 coalition.

Recently the Army has stepped up its operations (and the amount of aid it receives from Western sponsors) against ISIS and other radical Islamists groups. But it faces a growing backlash from within Lebanon itself, where many Sunni Muslims, particularly in northern Lebanon, are hostile towards the Armed Forces. Largely opposed to Assad, Lebanon's Sunni are resentful of the apparent impunity with which Hezbollah has been allowed to conduct operations against their brethren in Syria. That hostility is manifested in attacks against the Lebanese military, kidnappings and a growing number of Sunni Lebanese joining radical groups. Sunni Muslims in northern Tripoli have expressed the belief that the Army is targeting Sunnis and colluding with their enemy, Hezbollah. In Lebanon's predominantly Sunni northern Tripoli, high unemployment, poor living conditions and lower standards of education have further fueled grievances.

The Future Movement and the March 14 coalition spearheaded the Cedar Revolution in 2005 that saw a broad spectrum of Lebanese society come together in the name of unity and state sovereignty following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Ahmad Hariri's uncle). The Revolution forced Syria to withdraw from Lebanon after a 29-year occupation. Five members of Hezbollah have been indicted over the assassination by an international tribunal in The Hague.

But more recently the Future Movement has consistently failed to champion the economic and political interests of the Sunni community. The current president of the party, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, doesn't even live in Lebanon and splits his time between France and Saudi Arabia as the head of the business empire he inherited from his father. He made his first visit to Lebanon in four years in August 2014.

The situation has created a leadership vacuum in the Sunni community, allowing space for more radical leaders to expand their influence and tap into broader Sunni discontent.

It's fair to say that the majority of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims don't subscribe to ISIS and al-Nusra's radical doctrines; the presence of radical groups has even united the rival factions to set aside their domestic disputes in the face of a common enemy, and a national dialogue between the March 8 and March 14 camps has made progress.

But at a time when Sunni identity is increasingly linked to an existential battle against their Shiite adversaries, secularism rings hollow, especially when backed up by poverty and neglect. The Future Movement and the Sunni leadership need to tap into and reverse Sunni grievance, and provide a moderate religious counter-narrative in response to the more successful recruitment campaigns of ISIS and al-Nusra. It must regain the trust and respect of Sunni Lebanon and restore it's position as the champion of Sunni Islam. It can do this by promoting its moderate Islamic credentials while offering economic and financial support to its main constituents in northern Lebanon.

Shouting the language of moderation goes only so far; Sunni Muslims must be given a reason to listen, political representation and political agency to prove they are united against terror.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Gehad Hadidi.
 2015-03-03T22:21:00+00:00 Lauren Williams Lebanon, with it's combustible sectarian mix and confessional system of government, is in a precarious position vis-a-vis the Syrian civil war. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ecb0b125-b7b5-47fc-b219-8d4bae740f2a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ecb0b125-b7b5-47fc-b219-8d4bae740f2a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/04/Lebanon-Future-Movement-moderate-sunni-alternative.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ecb0b125-b7b5-47fc-b219-8d4bae740f2a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Chinas-middle-class-increasingly-heading-overseas-for-Chunyun.aspx China's transport infrastructure shows vast improvement during Chunyun 2015-03-03T04:07:00+00:00 Julian Snelder
Chunyun, the annual spring festival holiday in China, is often described as the world's largest human migration. Over one billion trips are made in a 10-day period. The family reunion over the lunar new year is the local equivalent of Christmas and Thanksgiving combined, and for the many families separated by rural-urban migration it is proportionately stressful.

A major cause of tension is the horrendous logistical requirement of getting folks safely home on time. No mode of transport looms so large in the public imagination as the long-distance trains and hard sleeper carriages, often stuffed to standing room only, hauling migrant workers and their ubiquitous polythene bundles back to their home villages. The railway reservation system alone, with its petty rules, fake tickets and touts, is a nightmare. The unhappy lot of migrant workers at this time is heart-wrenchingly captured in Fan Lixin's 2011 reality docudrama, Last Train Home.

But things are improving. China Railway Corporation reported mid-festival that passenger rail volumes were running 21% higher than a year ago. Normally such a spike might cause chaos, most notoriously memorialised by the desperate 200,000-strong crowd at the gates of Guangzhou station in 2008.

This year things went (relatively) smoothly. Vast national investment in high-speed rail, whatever its economics, is performing an impressive role in relieving China's 'golden week' seasonal festival surges. While many migrant workers can't afford the new bullet trains, others can, and the upward displacement eases network congestion on the slower ones. High-speed rail at such times is a blessing.

But it is other means of transport, namely wings and wheels, that best reveal China's changing consumption patterns.

Just as new fast trains free up capacity on old slow ones, they are also stealing traffic from domestic air travel. Last week's chunyun saw international passenger departures exceed internal ones for the first time. International departure halls at major airports were frantic (expect to hear stories of bad behaviour). China's middle class citizens, seeking to escape the festival's crush at home, instead find themselves part of an exodus of their compatriots abroad.

Chinese traffic in some Korean and Japanese attractions was up by 50%. Japan received half a million Chinese tourists during the festival. It is said, not in jest, that Mandarin was spoken more than Japanese in some retail streets of Tokyo. Attracted by a cheap yen and the joys of high-quality consumer products (including luxury toilet seats, oddly), Chinese customers have set aside their patriotic distaste and are embracing Japan once more.

This is bad news for Hong Kong and Macau.

While these destinations are still more important for Chinese tourism, they are going backwards. Hong Kong registered its first fall in mainland visitors in more than two decades, a worrying reflection of mainland attitudes, probably fueled by ongoing scuffles between Tuen Mun locals, activists and cross-border traders. Jewelry stores saw sales fall by as much as 30%. Retailers in Hong Kong are asking whether the allure of the city has peaked.

Macau's gross gaming revenue fell a whopping 50% as VIP junkets go into hibernation during China's anti-graft campaign. Visit numbers to Macau are still strong and hotel occupancy was 100%; in fact there is talk of limiting visas again to ease congestion. But the mix of business continues to shift down from high-rollers to 'premium mass' customers who spend less but still want to be pampered with 5-star hotels and spas. What retailers and brand-owners see is an expanding franchise of affluent globalised white-collar clients with clear, independent views on how and where they spend their time and money.

And nothing has emancipated the Chinese from the tyranny of chunyun more than the automobile. On the lunar new's year eve alone, 74 million passenger trips were made on China's highways, eight times the number of rail passengers, according to the Transport Ministry (although that number will include non-festival journeys). Hitching a ride in a crammed car home with co-workers is preferable to the train system for most. Some colleagues boast about road trips of 1000km or more.

Today there are 154 million cars on China's roads, up tenfold in 15 years. Not surprisingly, the explosive growth in the car population and the new-found joys of driving home resulted in horrendous traffic jams during chunyun, made more treacherous by snowstorms and an alarming accident rate. Chinese drivers are stoic and complaints are seldom aired. Even the not-so-open road offers mobility and freedom to workers that was unattainable just a few years ago. The misery of the last train home is fading, and the true liberation of China's workers is drawing nearer: when they don't all have to go on vacation at the same time.

Photo by Flickr user Junyu Wang.
 2015-03-03T04:07:00+00:00 Julian Snelder Vast national investment in high-speed rail, whatever its economics, is performing an impressive role in relieving China's seasonal festival surges. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=d16a9898-2ca2-43b6-beb7-3b0435c28bf1 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=d16a9898-2ca2-43b6-beb7-3b0435c28bf1 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Chinas-middle-class-increasingly-heading-overseas-for-Chunyun.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=d16a9898-2ca2-43b6-beb7-3b0435c28bf1 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Trans-Pacific-Partnership-good-deal-for-australia.aspx Will the Trans-Pacific Partnership be a good deal for Australia? 2015-03-03T02:16:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is close to the make-or-break stage. It will either get US Congressional blessing soon or lose momentum and slip from the agenda. So it is surprising how little public debate there is in Australia about its important ramifications. For an excellent exception, see Peter Martin.

Trans-Pacific Partnership discussions on the margins of the APEC Leader meetings in Bali, Indonesia, 2013

How did Australia go from being a leading exponent of multilateral trade to being ready to sign a preferential trade arrangement universally acknowledged to be inferior to the WTO's multilateral model?

The short answer is that the global trading environment has shifted. The WTO is in stasis. The only path forward seems to be either multilateral agreements with very limited subject coverage (like the Bali agreement), or 'coalitions of the willing' – agreements between a smaller number of countries who are often regional partners. And then there are bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) such as the ones Australia has recently signed with China and with Japan. These contradict the multilateral spirit of the WTO. Exporters are happy to get access to a new market, but FTAs may divert imports from the cheapest foreign supplier by giving preference to the FTA partner. Certainly the plethora of bilateral FTAs is a sub-optimal outcome.

An alternative method could be multi-member plurilateral agreements that would bundle up the relevant FTAs and enforce consistency in their conditions. With more members, there is less trade diversion. The ASEAN-based Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an example.

But the TPP represents a different model again, one which aims to impose a set of consistent rules (especially 'behind the border' rules) on the participants.

Arrangements like the TPP can have a particular negotiating dynamic which helps overcome some of the deficiencies of bilateral FTAs. Sensitivity over issues such as agriculture and services could succumb to majority peer pressure. The 'noodle-bowl' of divergent rules-of-origin might be made uniform. The narrow trade focus of the bilateral agreements might be broadened to include 'behind the border' issues, as envisaged in the TPP.

Some progress is better than just lamenting the failure of the WTO, and these arrangements won't prevent greater multilateralisation later. It's possible to envisage the TPP and RCEP merging to form the APEC-based Free-Trade Area of Asia and the Pacific (FTAAP). That would overcome one problem with the current negotiations: the biggest trading nations – America and China – don't share a common agreement. If the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership goes ahead between the US and Europe, there may even be a parallel arrangement with similar rules.

Thus it's easy to understand how Australia has moved over time from being one of the most energetic players in the GATT/WTO framework to actively seeking bilateral FTAs and participating in both the RCEP and TPP negotiations. To stay faithful to the multilateral ideals would have seen us lose competitive advantage (for example, to New Zealand with its hugely successful FTA with China). There are political considerations too: RCEP serves Australia's regional objectives, and the TPP supports our relationship with America.

That said, the wide-ranging rule-making aspect of the TPP raises some issues. Are all these rules in our interests? One of the few things economists agree on is that multilateral trade openness gives advantages to all participating countries. The TPP's rules, on the other hand, may advantage one country over another.

Who writes the TPP rules? You might think that the rules of the lofty 'platinum-standard' TPP would be hammered out by a group of high-minded technocrats, with the world's collective interests as their priority.

Unfortunately, this is not so.

Proposals on intellectual property, for example, reflect the vested interest of pharmaceutical manufacturers who want longer patent protection. Hollywood (famous for engineering the Mickey Mouse Protection Act giving Walt Disney products a century of royalties) will undoubtedly influence the outcome. Our main hope is that there will be some counter-balancing vested interests (perhaps in Silicon Valley). There may even be some salvation in the voice of public advocacy, arguing for shorter protection to allow cheaper generic drugs to reach the US market more quickly, though vested interests are usually better funded than public advocates.

Bilateral horse-trading has also found its way into the TPP process. Japan was a late joiner in the negotiations, but politics in both Japan and the US strongly support Japan's entry (joining would strengthen Prime Minister Abe's 'third arrow' – structural change). These side deals, however, make the net balance of advantages harder to assess.

One element that was initially resisted by Australia was an investor-state dispute settlement chapter. Our opposition to this sort of sovereignty-overriding measure was strengthened by Philip Morris' attempt to resist Australia's world-leading anti-smoking measures, though our attitude has apparently softened. Given the issues ahead on climate change and the environment, we may well want to introduce laws which foreign investors will see as disadvantaging their Australian enterprises (restrictions on the use of brown coal might be an example). An investor-state dispute settlement mechanism could make it harder for Australia to introduce such measures.

If the peer-pressure dynamic of plurilateral agreements often fosters progress, this can also work to our disadvantage if our interests have been overridden. Just as we had no choice (for political reasons) but to sign off on the Australia-US FTA, not signing up to the TPP if it is finalised would be an admission of failure at the political level. We'll sign on, even to a disadvantageous treaty.

While there are good reasons for conducting these negotiations behind closed doors, the general principles of our approach shouldn't be secret. What issues do we feel strongly about? What do we have to give away and what will we win in return? We need more colour than can be found here. With an agreement possibly imminent, we need a public discussion to let the broader community judge whether this looks like a good deal. Time for a detailed speech from Trade Minister Andrew Robb.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user US Department of State.
 2015-03-03T02:16:00+00:00 Stephen Grenville How did Australia go from being a leading exponent of multilateral trade to being ready to sign a preferential trade arrangement like the TPP? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=991a7f45-8c5c-40bf-ba77-7fe84ad8477b 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=991a7f45-8c5c-40bf-ba77-7fe84ad8477b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Trans-Pacific-Partnership-good-deal-for-australia.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=991a7f45-8c5c-40bf-ba77-7fe84ad8477b http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Southeast-Asia-Links-Valentines-resistance-ASEAN-peacekeepers-Myanmar-federalism-and-more.aspx Southeast Asia links: Valentine's resistance, ASEAN peacekeepers, Myanmar federalism and more 2015-03-02T23:45:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan

Thailand's junta has moved to indict 269 former MPs. Meanwhile, on Valentine's Day, a new resistance movement emerged.

David Steinberg explores how Myanmar is grappling with federalism.

Norshahril Saat from ISEAS looks at the historic underpinnings of the state and the Ulama (Islamic religious scholars), and its impact on policy-making in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Gwenael Njoto-Feillard on the prospects and problems for Jokowi's new 'religious harmony' draft law.

Amnesty International's lengthy human rights list for Jokowi (full report here).

In the wake of deadly bombings in Thailand's restive south, motorbike helmets have been banned.

In a key initiative for its ASEAN chairmanship this year, Malaysia's defense minister last month said his country wants to establish an ASEAN peacekeeping force.

Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia have announced the trial of a new flight tracking system – the notable omission from the trial is Singapore.

Following the deportation of a prominent environmental activist and subsequent protests, Cambodia has postponed the development of a controversial dam project. The Stimson Centre took a look at the Laos' dams.

An excellent podcast on the life work of Lee Kuan Yew by the Brookings Institution, as part of the launch of a new book about the founding father of Singapore.

An outbreak of avian influenza (H5N1) in Myanmar will test the response of the country's health authorities.

The ISIS Study Group released a Philippines Jihad update with some excellent insights on the Marwan operation that went horribly wrong last month, resulting in the death of 44 police officers.

Bernt Berger elaborates on his Interpreter post  to look at China's Myanmar policy: dilemma or strategic ambiguity?

How to import a Lamborghini at the Thai-Myanmar border (h/t @Thailander):

 2015-03-02T23:45:00+00:00 Elliot Brennan Links to this week's best Southeast Asia reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=8cc4cfcc-88e1-4d11-bef6-af1ba9f21d11 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=8cc4cfcc-88e1-4d11-bef6-af1ba9f21d11 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Southeast-Asia-Links-Valentines-resistance-ASEAN-peacekeepers-Myanmar-federalism-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=8cc4cfcc-88e1-4d11-bef6-af1ba9f21d11 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Applying-Australian-values-to-drone-warfare.aspx Applying Australian values to drone warfare 2015-03-02T21:47:00+00:00 Ben FitzGerald
Last week was a big one for drones in Australia. A US Global Hawk made its first ever landing on a non-military airstrip at the Avalon Airshow and the Department of Defence said it wants to reestablish an agreement to influence the future development of the naval version of the Global Hawk, the Triton, of which Australia intends to purchase seven. Most notably, the Royal Australian Air Force has stated its intention to purchase eight Reapers, the armed drone that is controversially used by the US for targeted strikes. The RAAF already had personnel undergoing training stateside only days after the formal change of policy that made the purchase possible.

A US Global Hawk drone at the Avalon Air Show. (Flickr/The Canon.)

These are positive developments for Australian security but the reporting around these decisions and events doesn't really explain why.

Mentioning drones usually conjures images of recent operations in the Middle East and South Asia. But the biggest use of drones for Australia would actually be patrolling our northern approaches, something that can be done more persistently and cost effectively using uncrewed systems. The purchase of the Triton provides the beginnings of such a capability, but more importantly it will create the institutional building blocks to allow for weaponised platforms and for implementation of future capabilities like uncrewed underwater vehicles.

Acquiring drones will enhance Australian capability in meaningful ways but this may not actually be the most important consequence of becoming a leader in the use of military drones. Drones are proliferating rapidly, especially in our region. Numbers vary but some estimates state that 85 countries possess drones of some variety for military purposes. There are few opportunities to reduce this rate of proliferation. The US does not hold a monopoly on the technology and cannot control its growth. In fact, Israel is the largest exporter of military drones, China and Iran have shown a willingness to export their drones, and many other nations are developing indigenous capabilities or draw on widely available commercial technologies. Australia must consider and respond to the military use of drones by others.

Given that we cannot prevent the proliferation of drones it is important that Australia helps influence how they are used regionally and internationally.

The greatest risk to Australian interests is not that other nations will acquire drones and use them against us (if it were, buying drones of our own would not be a remedy). The more likely risk is that some nations will use them in ways that undermine the rules-based international order that Australia subscribes to, or will increase regional instability through risky use (such as China flying a drone toward the Senkaku islands in September 2013). These incidents are likely to increase in frequency as nations acquire drones and seek to push the boundaries of international norms or re-establish them in their favour.

To have a credible voice in developing appropriate norms and policies for drone use on the world stage, Australia must establish itself as a leading operator of drone capability, including armed variants. The announcements from last week put Australia on that path. To be sure, capability acquisition alone will not achieve that objective. Related efforts will be required by the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to establish Australia's drone use policies and foreign policy positions.

Establishing appropriate policies in line with the law and Australian values will also go a long way to addressing concerns that the Australian public may have about the acquisition of drones. These concerns were mentioned by a number of senior leaders last week but were primarily articulated in terms of civilian casualties. Air Marshal Geoff Brown said 'The collateral damage issues around UAVs are absolutely no different to manned aeroplanes,' and that 'I certainly don't see any difference from dropping a bomb from a Reaper or an F-18.'

Concerns about civilian casualties should always be in the minds of national security leaders but this is not the key issue that makes drones controversial. Rather the issue is the current US use of drones for targeted counter-terrorism strikes outside war zones by non-military intelligence organisations. An Australian policy proscribing the use of drones in this manner would help mitigate concerns about the technology and would make a useful contribution to normalising the use of drones internationally.

Australia's geostrategic circumstances, population size, technical sophistication and wealth all point logically to the use of uncrewed systems, especially in the air and maritime domains. Rather than shy away from drones based on some contentious current policies, Australia should continue down its emerging path to best equip our military, contribute to regional security from capability and policy perspectives and to ensure that Australian values are represented in the international use of a technology that will play an ever increasing role in warfare.
 2015-03-02T21:47:00+00:00 Ben FitzGerald The purchase of Triton creates the institutional building blocks to allow for weaponised platforms and for implementation of future capabilities like uncrewed underwater vehicles. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=ec673e82-ade9-4cd4-9841-629f07089812 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=ec673e82-ade9-4cd4-9841-629f07089812 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/03/Applying-Australian-values-to-drone-warfare.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=ec673e82-ade9-4cd4-9841-629f07089812 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Two-House-of-Cards-videos.aspx House of Cards: Is the original still the best? 2015-03-02T06:30:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen
We've all known that annoying dinner party guest who excels at cultural one-upmanship. If someone mentions a movie, they will say it's not a patch on the novel. If you mention that you just returned from Bangkok, they'll tell you it was better in 2006 when they spent a month there during the coup. Let's call it the 'Das Rumpolschk' school of conversation.

So it's become cool over the last few years to profess a preference for the original British House of Cards series to Kevin Spacey's popular remake, now in its third season. Having watched the first two seasons, I still think the American remake is superior, but Christopher Orr's article on why the British are better at satire makes a pretty solid argument against the new version and particularly Spacey's lead character, Frank Underwood:

Underwood has no meaningful ideology or purpose beyond the acquisition of power. Like his predecessor, he occasionally dabbles in homicide, but he poses no evident threat to the body politic itself. Two seasons in, he has not yet sought to start a war or turn back the clock on civil rights or otherwise realign the course of the nation. He's a pro-Establishment centrist—essentially a southern-fried version of Steny Hoyer, the current Democratic whip. What's so scary about a guy like that?

But whatever you think of House of Cards v2, it is producing some good satire of its own:

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 2015-03-02T06:30:00+00:00 Sam Roggeveen It's become cool over the last few years to profess a preference for the original British House of Cards series to Kevin Spacey's popular remake. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=8b10a677-7cf8-4f8f-af94-06a16f0fb4d8 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=8b10a677-7cf8-4f8f-af94-06a16f0fb4d8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Two-House-of-Cards-videos.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=8b10a677-7cf8-4f8f-af94-06a16f0fb4d8 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Who-or-what-is-a-leading-military-planner.aspx Who or what is a 'leading military planner'? 2015-03-02T05:08:00+00:00 Rodger Shanahan
During my Army career I was a military planner. I worked on lots of plans. Most were never executed, but others were. Some were standing plans that were annually revised, while others were worked up at the behest of someone higher up the operational chain. I got to know the ADF planning process pretty well and became someone that could be described as a 'military planner'.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott with Chief of Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Binskin inspecting damage in Queensland in the wake of Typhoon Marcia.

In the ADF, you could say the Chief of the Defence Force is formally the 'leading military planner', given he is the one who provides military advice to the Government and 'owns' Joint Operations Command. In practical terms though, the Chief of Joint Operations has carriage of developing operational plans, so he is really the ADF's leading military planner.

Service chiefs would have input into the plans as they are developed, but they aren't planners in their own right. They have a 'raise, train and sustain' responsibility, but not a operational military planning function.

So when The Australian penned this exclusive expose of Prime Minister Tony Abbott's plan to invade Iraq, I was intrigued.

According to the story, the PM raised an operational planning idea in his office and then sought the advice of Australia's 'leading military planners'. Not the normal way of doing things, for sure, but plausible. By the time I got to the second paragraph, however, my 'sloppy journalism' warning light began flashing. And when I noticed that the article failed to define who 'Australia's leading military planners' were, the light stopped flashing and just stayed on.

Then the Chief of Defence Force weighed in to say the matter had never been raised with him formally or informally, and the vultures began to circle over the entrails of The Australian's sensational but poorly researched exclusive.

I assumed that a correction would ensue and that the journalist would have been advised by a military planner of the dictum that one should 'never reinforce failure'. So when The Australian clarified the situation this weekend I was somewhat surprised to find more imprecision and hype.

The previously reported 'unilateral invasion of Iraq' that was discussed with 'leading military planners' was now a dinner party discussion where the PM expressed frustration at the slow pace of deployment of ADF elements into Iraq (damn that Iraqi sovereignty issue) and perhaps asked aloud why we couldn't just take Mosul quickly. The main guest was the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, who The Australian breathlessly claimed was 'the Pentagon's senior official overseeing the US-led war against Islamic State in Iraq'.

Even though the term 'overseeing' is left undefined, I'm pretty sure that the senior Pentagon official overseeing the war would be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force provides air force capabilities to the CENTCOM commander (based in Florida), who actually oversees the operational conduct of the war. The US Navy, Army and Marine commanders do the same for their service branches.

But never mind, one shouldn't let inconvenient facts get in the way of a good story. Rather, my attention was focused on the fact that the people objecting to the PM's proposal had in the space of a week gone from 'Australia's leading military planners' to 'others at the table'. Perhaps the confusion over who Australia's leading military planners are could be put to bed if the list of those attending the dinner was published by the newspaper.

After reading both stories all I know is that if, during my time in the Army, I briefed an operational plan to a real 'leading military planner' that was equally poorly staffed and thought through, I would have been told in no uncertain terms where I had failed to meet expectations.

To use a military planning term, it would appear that in writing about the military planning process the journalist in question has, either wittingly or unwittingly, been part of someone's anti-Abbott 'shaping and influencing' operation.

Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Image Library.
 2015-03-02T05:08:00+00:00 Rodger Shanahan The Australian's exclusive on PM Tony Abbott's plan to invade Iraq unilaterally is full of inaccuracies. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=2a8cf83d-ac2e-4ad4-963a-46c8dd73ad96 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=2a8cf83d-ac2e-4ad4-963a-46c8dd73ad96 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Who-or-what-is-a-leading-military-planner.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=2a8cf83d-ac2e-4ad4-963a-46c8dd73ad96 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Aid-and-development-links-Chinese-aid-in-the-Pacific-ICC-Ebola-remittances-and-more.aspx Aid and development links: Chinese aid in the Pacific, ICC, Ebola, remittances and more 2015-03-02T02:50:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan

Curious about how much Chinese aid in spent in the Pacific? Check out Mapping Chinese Aid in the Pacific, by Dr Philippa Brant. It's the first comprehensive survey of Chinese-funded aid projects in the Pacific Islands region, presented as an interactive map.

Aid data has the potential to radically alter the way development is delivered, but will donors recognise the benefits of investing in it? 'How to Fund a Data Revolution', by Claire Melamed (ODI) and Grant Cameron (World Bank).

Only when Ebola was framed as a security problem did it prompt global action.

Real World Development Indicators: suggests helpful indicators such as 'Probability that Prime Minister/President seeks medical treatment in their own country'. (Thanks Sam.)

The International Criminal Court is in crisis, and it always has been.

The value of remittances: Westpac will shut down accounts that use money transfer organisations to send money abroad. Will this affect Australians' ability to provide direct cash injections to friends and family in developing countries?

Why a 'social progress index' is a better benchmark than GDP. Interesting TED talk from social progress expert Michael Green:

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 2015-03-02T02:50:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan Links to this week's best aid and development reading. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=37a92a72-98cb-44ee-b6cb-97a3c04b9ef5 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=37a92a72-98cb-44ee-b6cb-97a3c04b9ef5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Aid-and-development-links-Chinese-aid-in-the-Pacific-ICC-Ebola-remittances-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=37a92a72-98cb-44ee-b6cb-97a3c04b9ef5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Divided-and-confused-New-Zealands-Iraq-deployment.aspx Divided and confused: New Zealand's Iraq deployment 2015-03-02T00:31:00+00:00 Robert Ayson
Australia's embattled prime minister got less, and more, than he bargained for during his quick visit to New Zealand over the weekend. Australia may have lost the World Cup cricket fixture to a rising New Zealand team, but Tony Abbott got a rare vote of confidence in his leadership style from his Kiwi counterpart John Key. Yet on the most urgent subject for trans-Tasman consultation — the response to ISIS — Mr Abbott and his colleagues may well be thinking that New Zealand's political leaders are collectively divided and individually confused.

The division is over whether New Zealand should send what the Key Government advertises as a training deployment to Iraq. The announcement of this decision, reported in these pages by Anna Powles, had been preceded by months of a painfully slow warm up act by a Government clearly uncomfortable about being seen to make any sort of direct contribution to combat. In prematurely ruling out a special forces role early on, the Government robbed itself of a contribution that might have been its most valuable. Mr Key's explanation of that limit – that this is Iraq's war to fight, and not New Zealand's – is an unconvincing balancing act born largely of domestic political calculations.

Abbott also had an audience with the leader of New Zealand's main opposition Labour Party (spelled with a 'u'; ie. correctly). The newly installed Andrew Little will certainly have grabbed the attention of many of his supporters by indicating that he told the Australian leader that the RAAF's air strikes against ISIL were a good idea. Here at least there seems to be some common ground with the National Party leadership. But the Labour leadership is opposed to the training mission, arguing that it is too small to make a difference and that New Zealand had no business propping up Iraq's armed forces, which have a track record of corruption and ineffectiveness.

Quite how Little reconciles these positions is an interesting question. Labour has shown little if any interest in investigating what New Zealand might do to support the anti-ISIS military coalition in combat missions. Little would be even more reluctant than Key to advocate a special forces role. This leaves Labour open to the charge, which Key is bound to hammer home, that it supports the aims of the coalition but is in no mood for New Zealand to make any sort of military contribution to it.

As I noted in a panel discussion held in New Zealand's parliament last week, there are also tensions in the Key Government's approach. Understandably, there appears to be a good deal of cynicism in New Zealand that a training mission can and will remain precisely that. Indeed the Government's language on what its forces will and will not do, and how they are comprised, leaves it with a fair amount of wiggle room.

But on one issue Prime Minister Key seems firm. New Zealand's forces will be in Iraq for only two years and then they will come out. As this exit date comes before the next general election in New Zealand, in theory at least National is not committing any future government to continue the mission it has started. But at that point the trans-Tasman partners may be in different positions. In one interview Mr Key said he expected 'Australia will stay longer, so they'll either backfill with more people of their own or maybe they'll find another training partner or whatever.'

This must make interesting reading for planners in Canberra who need to find extra Australian forces to ensure that the New Zealanders have a larger training mission in Iraq to contribute to. The joint statement from the Auckland visit  politely refers to this situation by noting that Mr Abbott's 'discussion with Prime Minister Key had informed Australia's consideration of what further assistance it would provide Iraq.' Perhaps a tenth New Zealand wicket at Eden Park would have been a more satisfying present.

Photo by REUTERS/David White.
 2015-03-02T00:31:00+00:00 Robert Ayson New Zealand's political leaders are collectively divided and individually confused. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9dea0cf7-8f5a-4974-8896-22c18b40a4fb 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9dea0cf7-8f5a-4974-8896-22c18b40a4fb http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Divided-and-confused-New-Zealands-Iraq-deployment.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9dea0cf7-8f5a-4974-8896-22c18b40a4fb http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Chinese-Aid-Interactive.aspx A new tool to examine Chinese aid in the Pacific 2015-03-01T23:43:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan
Mapping Chinese aid in the Pacific, an interactive map launched by the Lowy Institute today, is the first comprehensive survey of Chinese-funded aid projects in the Pacific Islands region.

Lowy Institute Research Associate Dr Philippa Brant drew on over 500 sources including budgets, tender documents, government statements as well as interviews and site visits to create this map. It is the first time this data has been systemically collected, verified, analysed and mapped for Chinese aid projects from 2006 onwards. Users can search via country, year and sector, as well as compare Chinese aid with other aid donors in the region.

Key findings include:

Since 2006, China has provided US$1.4 billion in foreign aid to Pacific Island countries.

China is on track to overtake Japan as the third largest donor in the region. But at a regional level, Australia is and will remain the most significant external actor.

In some countries however, Chinese aid amounts are rivaling that of traditional partners.

Jump in by pressing 'Explore Now' button, or visit the full-screen version on the Lowy Institute website. And note that the interactive can be embedded on other websites too. Just click the 'Share' button to copy the code:

 2015-03-01T23:43:00+00:00 Stephanie Dunstan Lowy Institute Research Associate Dr Philippa Brant drew on over 500 sources including budgets, tender documents, government statements as well as interviews and site visits to create this first-of-its-kind map. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=9f630192-5724-4c88-88ae-f7eeb04ca814 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=9f630192-5724-4c88-88ae-f7eeb04ca814 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Chinese-Aid-Interactive.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=9f630192-5724-4c88-88ae-f7eeb04ca814 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Who-killed-Boris-Nemtsov-and-why.aspx Who killed Boris Nemtsov, and why? 2015-03-01T21:42:00+00:00 Matthew Sussex
The gangland-style killing of Boris Nemtsov on Saturday marked the worrying return of political assassination to Russia's internal power games. While Russia has remained one of the most dangerous places to be a government opponent or outspoken journalist, murders of opposition members have actually tapered off in recent years.

Nemtsov was shot four times as he walked on a bridge across the Moskva river, only metres from the Kremlin walls, and just one day before he was due to lead a protest rally against Vladimir Putin.

Muscovites march to commemorate Boris Nemtsov. (REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov.)

For Kremlin critics, the most likely culprits will be those close to Putin's inner circle, most of whom have backgrounds in the FSB. There is a fairly lengthy set of precedents for such an assumption. In 1998 Galina Staravoitova, the human rights campaigner and democratic politician, was gunned down outside her apartment in St Petersburg. The assassination's organisers were officially found in 2013, yet questions remain about the alleged role of organised crime gangs, rival politicians and the Russian security services in ordering the hit.

Sergey Yushenkov was shot dead outside his apartment in 2003. He had been investigating charges that the FSB was behind the pair of apartment bombings in Moscow during 1999 that were subsequently blamed on the Chechens.

Paul Klebnikov, the editor of Russia's Forbes magazine, was shot and killed in 2004 while working on a story about Kremlin corruption and embezzlement during the reconstruction of Chechnya.

In 2006, the anti-Putin journalist Anna Politkovskaya was shot dead at her home. And a month later, the Russian defector Alexander Litivinenko was sensationally poisoned with polonium in London. His death came after he had written a book alleging that the Kremlin was behind the bomb plots of 1999, which were subsequently used as justifications for war in Chechnya.

According to this prominent view, members of the siloviki – politicians and officials originally from the security services – have methodically been doing away with anyone who might challenge their privileged positions. This includes meddling in the affairs of other countries. A case in point was the poisoning of the anti-Russian Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko with dioxin in 2004, which left him badly disfigured. And before his death Nemtsov was compiling a report which his supporters claim showed direct proof of Russian involvement in the conflict in Ukraine.

A second possibility accepts that the siloviki are responsible, but with the added caveat that they acted with Putin's blessing. In other words, Putin is directly complicit in Nemtsov's killing, and potentially in past murders too.

Why would Putin want to kill Nemtsov? For one thing, it would be a pre-emptive strike on any domestic unrest, sending a message to his opponents after he had just reluctantly reined in pro-Russian rebels at the Minsk 2 peace talks. Hence Putin's calculations would be driven by the need to show strength, to terrorise dissenters, and avoid the perception of weakness among Russia's sizeable far right.

But one wonders whether this can be true. After all, it runs counter to Putin's domestic interests. What could be gained from eliminating a marginalised critic, without even a seat in parliament, and stirring up internal unrest? Perhaps he could blame it on Ukrainian spies as a pretext for invasion? Yet he has accomplished more or less what he wants in the Ukraine. In truth, the optics of Nemtsov's killing, his body lying in the street with St Basil's as backdrop, are bad for Putin. The episode will automatically draw support away from the Kremlin, and a crackdown in the aftermath will only make that worse.

There is a third possibility: that fellow liberals, perhaps with links to Ukrainian nationalists, killed Nemtsov. In the lead-up to the last presidential election, Putin himself had issued a warning that anti-Kremlin figures could be murdered by their own kind. That would foment a crisis which could then be blamed on the government. If a Ukrainian fifth column was involved, the rationale would be that killing Nemtsov would spark a wider war with Ukraine, and thereby hasten Kiev's entry into NATO.

That sounds pretty fantastical, but we should not be too quick to rush to judgment. After all, there is now significant evidence that Ukrainian nationalists played a role in the violence unleashed at Kiev's Euromaidan, and that it was not just the security services to blame for violence. Hence it is possible (albeit unlikely) that Nemtsov was deliberately made a martyr.

On the face of it, though, it seems most likely that someone with government connections was ultimately responsible. The hit was well planned, the scene was a highly symbolic backdrop, and the target was an individual who had long been a thorn in the side of government officials. If so, it is unlikely Nemtsov's murder will be solved any time soon, since the culprit(s) would have been careful to distance themselves from the actual triggermen.

By the same token it is far too simplistic to blame 'the FSB'. Kremlin politics are extremely complex and virtually impossible to reliably track. There are four to seven competing factions, some of which overlap. All of them involve members who swap sides. Some are frequently tagged 'hardliners', like the groups controlled by Igor Sechin and Nikolai Patrushev. Others, like Sergei and Viktor Ivanov, are sometimes branded more moderate. But they are far from a united cabal, and Putin regularly moves individuals up and down to keep them on their toes. Any one of these groups, or their supporters, could have been involved, which makes getting to the bottom of the case even harder. Or it could have been none of them: some other highly plausible potential culprits include organised criminals and Russian ultranationalists. Each had a reason to kill Nemtsov, whether driven by the profit motive or by a hatred of liberal ideology.

Nemtsov knew he might be killed. He had spoken of the possibility as recently as a fortnight ago. Yet his death is more than just a sign that liberals are once again potential execution targets. It will be a vital test of opposition to Putin's rule inside Russia. Nemtsov's murder has already caused popular outrage, as evidenced by this morning's march in Moscow. If it sparks widespread civil disobedience, it will be a sign that Putin's seemingly immovable spot at the apex of Russian politics is vulnerable. But if the liberal intelligentsia accept it meekly and with only token protests, it will demonstrate the direct opposite: that there is still no realistic alternative to the government in the Kremlin.
 2015-03-01T21:42:00+00:00 Matthew Sussex For Putin, what could be gained from eliminating a marginalised critic, without even a seat in parliament, and stirring up internal unrest? http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=41c2345c-913b-488d-bdbb-d6ad45f0106a 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=41c2345c-913b-488d-bdbb-d6ad45f0106a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/02/Who-killed-Boris-Nemtsov-and-why.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=41c2345c-913b-488d-bdbb-d6ad45f0106a http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/28/Weekend-catch-up-National-Security-Statement-aid-to-Indonesia-QE-Australia-Japan-and-more.aspx Weekend catch-up: National Security Statement, aid to Indonesia, QE, Australia-Japan and more 2015-02-27T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone
Bringing together the best longer Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week.

On Monday, Prime Minister Tony Abbott gave the National Security Statement, which addressed the threat of radical Islamic terrorism and how the Government has chosen to respond. Sam Roggeveen gave a first take on the implications:

'In Australia and elsewhere, the threat of terrorism has become a terrible fact of life that government must do all in its power to counter', said Abbott. Just like when an airline tells you that 'safety is our number one priority', this is one of those reassuring statements which doesn't actually withstand much scrutiny. If airlines made safety their top priority, their planes would never leave the ground. And if governments did all in their power to stop terrorism, we'd be living in a police state with a dying economy. As Abbott acknowledges later ('We will never sacrifice our freedoms in order to defend them'), the fight against terrorism is, like all public policy, a trade-off. We can't have perfect security, just as we can't have perfect freedom. We would have a much saner public discourse on terrorism if our leaders acknowledged this simple fact from time to time.

Next, Rodger Shanahan wrote on the Government's plan to strip the citizenship of dual citizens found to be traveling to the Middle East to join jihadist groups:

The civil libertarian argument, however, fails to address what I would argue is a more serious issue: the potential eradication of targeting constraints for Australian intelligence agencies and military forces in dealing with Australian citizens engaged in terrorist activities overseas. The possession of Australian citizenship rightly imposes limitations on how much information Australia's spy agencies can collect, and perhaps more importantly who they can share it with. There have already been legislative amendments to strengthen the intelligence-collection powers of these agencies, but dealing with non-citizens gives them much greater flexibility in sharing information.

So, rather than dual citizens simply becoming someone else's problem or able to undertake violent actions elsewhere, such a move may actually free up Australian authorities to address the problem by sharing information on foreign fighters or terrorists who were formerly Australian citizens.

Preparations in Indonesia for the execution of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran continue. On the back of comments made by Prime Minister Tony Abbott regarding Australia's aid to Indonesia during the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, a campaign has started in Indonesia to collect coins to repay Australia. Catriona Croft-Cusworth on the politics around aid:

But while Indonesia is wealthy, it is also deeply unequal. If Indonesians were to repay the $1 billion to Australia in coins, all 250 million of the population would have to donate about $4 each, or about 40 one-thousand Rupiah coins. For roughly 50% of the population, that would be the equivalent of missing out on a morning coffee. For the other 50%, it would mean giving up two days of living costs. This is not to say Indonesia could not afford to repay the money — it easily could (especially with the vice president involved). My point is that while the country overall is no charity case, for the recipients of aid Australia's assistance is no small change.

This week Julian Snelder wrote on the economic dangers associated with debt build-up in China:

For now, total debt continues to outpace nominal GDP growth by 6-7% annually, meaning that debt/GDP keeps piling up. There is an insouciant view, expressed once to me by a Japanese central banker when discussing quadrillions of yen of public borrowing, that debt is 'just a bunch of zeroes.' It doesn't matter, since it's 'owed to ourselves.' But Japan's experience actually informs otherwise. And Goldman's historical database suggests that a growth hiccup of at least 2-4 percentage points would normally ensue. The days of 7-point-something growth may be over soon.

Stephen Grenville responded to an argument that International Economy Program Director Leon Berkelmans made last week. Was quantiative easing the best tool to stimulate economic growth post-2008?:

Fiscal policy gives a more direct and powerful stimulus at the trough of the cycle without depreciating the exchange rate, while monetary policy is feeble in these circumstances. The extreme monetary settings (near-zero policy interest rates and huge excess central bank liquidity), while giving an abnormal boost to international competitiveness, distorted the longer-term price signals for both investors and savers.

QE was a desperate effort to compensate for recovery-sapping fiscal austerity, which was itself a product of political failings and serious macro policy misjudgments. QE might have been an admirable second-best policy, but it was still 'beggar-thy-neighbour'.

And Leon responded:

I agree that QE (where the Federal Reserve purchased long term government bonds along with securities backed by mortgages) was second-best policy, but for different reasons. I think negative interest rates would have been better. But I strongly disagree that QE was 'beggar-thy-neighbour'.

In fact I think QE was quite effective.

My thinking on the topic has been strongly influenced by a paper released by some of my old colleagues at the Federal Reserve. In the paper they evaluate the effects of quantitative easing and the forward guidance provided by the Fed (forward guidance is when the Fed signals it will keep interest rates at zero). The authors of the paper estimate that these policies subtract 1.25 percentage points from the unemployment rate and add 0.5 of a percentage point to inflation. That's quite impressive!

Murray McLean addressed Australia-Japan relations in light of the controversy over the future Australian submarine project:

Australia will also keenly pursue its national interests, and if that means a decision to purchase Japanese submarines then this should not, as some commentators argue, risk affecting our relations with China. Australia's national interests dictate that we place a high priority not only on our relations with Japan but also with the US, China, India, Indonesia, and other key Asian countries. Management of these relationships is not a zero-sum game. Each can be developed on its own merits and in ways that maximise Australia's national interests without making one contingent upon the other.

The G20 might be losing its way, says Tristram Sainsbury:

The first discussions by finance ministers under the Turkish presidency, held in early February in Istanbul, were underwhelming. Despite statements from Canadian Finance Minister Joe Olivier that global growth needs akickstart and from Christine Lagarde that this year has the potential to be a special one for collective action, the Istanbul meetings were most notable for a lack of consensus. Even after a marathon communique drafting session that lasted more than 24 hours, countries could not agree on how to spur growth and were reluctant to commit to the Turkish hosts' plans for binding investment targets.

Another big announcement on Monday was Foreign Minister Julie Bishop's plan to travel to Iran in April. This is a smart move, argues Dina Esfandiary:

First, no senior Australian official has set foot in Iran in over a decade. In fact, no senior Western official other than Catherine Ashton, the lead negotiator for the EU, has been to Iran in that time. Secondly, Iran is not a foreign policy priority for Canberra. The little communication that has existed between Canberra and Tehran focused on addressing concerns about 'boat people'. The only other way Iran figured on Canberra's radar is because of Tehran's importance to the US, Australia's most important ally.

There is a scattering of reports that ISIS is attempting to make in-roads in Afghanistan. Susanne Schmeidl thinks the country has bigger problems:

Afghanistan is in enough trouble already, and for what it's worth it has had an 'Islamic state' for much longer than Syria or Iraq. After all, the Taliban officially goes by name Islamic Emirate, and has thus long laid claim to the 'Islamic state' brand. The fact that ISIS called itself the 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham' might actually be a nod of acknowledgment from one quasi-state to another that such an ambition is already established in Afghanistan.

Though much has been made of the similarities between ISIS and the Taliban, such as their focus on conquering territory, maintaining an army and governing structure (all trademarks of states), they are not the same.

Mike Callaghan weighed into the Greek debt debate:

Greece needs a more flexible program than the one imposed by the EU/ECB/IMF that has resulted in a 30% decline in the size of the economy and mounting poverty. It also needs a program that recognises that Greece's debt levels are not sustainable.

But for this to happen there needs to be a major change in approach by the EU. This may be the biggest stumbling block in resolving the Greek crisis.

Paul Barker on what lower energy prices will mean for the one-track PNG economy:

Low oil and gas prices provide a sobering but potentially valuable reminder of the need to avoid the pitfalls of the 1990s. The PNG Government needs to avoid squandering funds on low priority activities and one-off events, establish and operationalise the long-delayed sovereign wealth fund, revitalise the anti-corruption and accountability effort, and focus policies on establishing favourable conditions for economically and environmentally sustainable activities, particularly in agriculture. It also needs to focus spending on the needs of all Papua New Guineans and not just selected parts of the community, especially by encouraging young men and women to participate actively in the economy.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Tony Abbott.
 2015-02-27T21:00:00+00:00 Brendan Thomas-Noone Bringing together the best Interpreter articles you were too busy to read this week. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=34c58881-ebcb-40ea-a619-23107d8e2ca5 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=34c58881-ebcb-40ea-a619-23107d8e2ca5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/28/Weekend-catch-up-National-Security-Statement-aid-to-Indonesia-QE-Australia-Japan-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=34c58881-ebcb-40ea-a619-23107d8e2ca5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/Quantitative-easing-was-not-a-beggar-thy-neighbour-policy.aspx Quantitative easing was not a 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policy 2015-02-27T04:35:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans
It seems my colleague Stephen Grenville is somewhat sceptical of quantitative easing (QE). He says 'QE might have been an admirable second-best policy, but it was still "beggar-thy-neighbour".'

I agree that QE (where the Federal Reserve purchased long term government bonds along with securities backed by mortgages) was second-best policy, but for different reasons. I think negative interest rates would have been better. But I strongly disagree that QE was 'beggar-thy-neighbour'.

In fact I think QE was quite effective.

My thinking on the topic has been strongly influenced by a paper released by some of my old colleagues at the Federal Reserve. In the paper they evaluate the effects of quantitative easing and the forward guidance provided by the Fed (forward guidance is when the Fed signals it will keep interest rates at zero). The authors of the paper estimate that these policies subtract 1.25 percentage points from the unemployment rate and add 0.5 of a percentage point to inflation. That's quite impressive!

These estimates come from a large macro-econometric model of the economy called FRB/US. I worked closely with the model when I was at the Fed. The way the authors have estimated the effects of forward guidance is by changing the interest rate expectations of the private sector, keeping them lower than otherwise, which is expansionary. The effects of QE are modeled as pushing down the long term Treasury bond interest rate, which in the model positively affects stock market valuations and pushes down the corporate bond yield and the cost of borrowing for households. And yes, it also lowers the exchange rate, but it is only one channel of many that QE operates through.

It is important to emphasise that the strength of the relative channels of monetary policy are based on estimated relationships from past experience. These things are not just made up.

Now, the authors do not break out how much work is done by the exchange rate, but it beggars belief to think that the exchange rate response would account for much of that 1.25 percentage point decrease in unemployment in a relatively closed economy like the US (trade as a percentage of GDP is around 30%, which is low). Most of the work is being done by other channels, such as easier borrowing conditions for households and firms. QE and forward guidance is not beggar-thy-neighbour because most of the effect does not work through the exchange rate. QE likely has positive spillovers, as the IMF found. Quiet, sceptics!

Should we be cynical about the apparently large effects of QE?

I say 'no'. Sure, the effects are uncertain, and there should be largish confidence bands associated with these guesses. The model is not perfect after all, but I certainly think it is informative. These models are, in fact, invaluable for policy making. Without them, we would have no idea about the effects of many policy changes (economists call these policy changes 'multipliers').

Moreover, I'm confident that the guesses represent the best guesses of the authors. There would have been no political interference here to get answers that would make the Fed look good. Indeed, there are some messages in here that imply QE was not implemented optimally. For example, they state that the Federal Reserve's actions 'apparently provided only a small boost to the real economy during the recession and the initial recovery period'. Rather they find that the largest effect is happening this year, and next, well after the worst of the recession has passed.

When I worked at the Fed, there was never any trace of interference in the independent research of the staff – if there had been it would have been fiercely and stridently resisted. No, the large effects were not found in order to make QE look good. Rather, the large effects in these and other calculations likely convinced people in the Fed to apply QE with the force they did.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user International Monetary Fund.
 2015-02-27T04:35:00+00:00 Leon Berkelmans QE and forward guidance is not beggar-thy-neighbour because most of the effect does not work through the exchange rate. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=5580984d-0813-48f9-a700-b09be9e586b7 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=5580984d-0813-48f9-a700-b09be9e586b7 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/Quantitative-easing-was-not-a-beggar-thy-neighbour-policy.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=5580984d-0813-48f9-a700-b09be9e586b7 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/false-dawn-China-Philippines-relations.aspx A false dawn in China-Philippines relations? 2015-02-27T00:56:00+00:00 Richard Javad Heydarian
The late-2014 'icebreaker' meeting between Philippine President Benigno Aquino and Chinese President Xi Jinping raised hopes for a de-escalation in bilateral tensions amid the ongoing territorial standoff in the South China Sea.

Benigno Aquino with Xi Jinping at APEC 2014 in Beijing. (REUTERS/Kim Kyung Hoon.)

Ecstatic about the possibility of a revival in Philippine-China relations, Aquino went so far as claiming a 'meeting of minds' with Xi during their short exchanges on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing. It marked the first face-to-face talk between the two heads of state.

Since then, Filipino officials have expressed their optimism over a follow-up meeting between the two leaders in the near future, paving the way for a institutionalised high-level dialogue. A top-level Filipino diplomat recently confirmed to me that Xi and his foreign minister, Wang Yi, are expected to make an unprecedented visit to the Philippines for the 2015 APEC summit. There are, however, growing indications that the newly-generated sense of optimism has been premature, if not totally unfounded.

To begin with, the Aquino-Xi meeting was not a pre-arranged formal dialogue; not even similar to those held between Xi and his Japanese and Vietnamese counterparts on the sidelines of APEC. While Vietnam and Japan have engaged in concerted efforts to establish crisis-management mechanisms with China, the Philippines is yet to negotiate a hotline with its northern neighbour.

The ongoing legal standoff at The Hague, with the Arbitral Tribunal awaiting Manila's additional legal arguments against China, continues to embitter bilateral relations. Favouring bilateral dialogue and consultation, China has fervently opposed the Philippines' request for compulsory arbitration in the South China Sea, dismissing the Aquino Administration's legal maneuver as provocative and counterproductive.

Reflecting Manila's deep-seated mistrust towards Beijing, Filipino officials recently made a decision to effectively evict 18 Chinese experts employed by the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP). The Chinese technicians, who have been involved in operating, maintaining and expanding the Philippines' electricity grid, have been working on behalf of the State Grid Corporation of China, which has a 40% stake in the NGCP. Filipino officials have (indirectly) cited national security considerations to explain Manila's refusal to renew the visas of the Chinese nationals.

Earlier this year, Manila and Beijing once again exchanged bitter accusations when Chinese Coast Guard forces allegedly rammed three Filipino fishing boats navigating close to the Scarborough Shoal. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei tried to deflect criticism by accusing the Filipino fishermen of aggressive maneuvers while indirectly placing the blame on the Philippine Government by urging it to 'enhance supervision and allocation of its own fishermen to prevent such an incident from happening again.'

The Philippines has also been alarmed by the latest satellite imagery which indicates expanding Chinese construction activities on islands in the South China Sea. The Fiery Cross Reef, for instance, having been artificially expanded to over 11 times its original size, now hosts approximately 200 Chinese troops. Defence officials in the Philippines estimate China has completed almost 50% of its reclamation project on the contested feature, which could soon host its own airstrip as a prelude to a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea. China has also ramped up its exploration of hydrocarbon and fisheries resources in the area. While boasting the discovery of the Lingshui 17-2 gas field, located about 150km south of Hainan province, Chinese officials have also reportedly finished a comprehensive survey of fisheries resources in the contested areas.

Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario urged his ASEAN counterparts to show greater resolve and unity amid China's purported aim to 'establish full control' over the South China Sea. The topic was at the heart of his discussions with his Southeast Asian counterparts during the Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM) in January. Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman tried to reassure his Filipino counterpart by stating that the other participants in the FMM 'shared the concern raised by some foreign ministers on land reclamation in the South China Sea.'

Singapore is slated to assume the role of the country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations in August 2015. There is some hope that there will be a more proactive push by ASEAN on negotiating a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea. Singaporean Foreign Minister K Shanmugan has expressed Singapore's 'common goal to try and do as much as we can to try to get to a proper document on (the) CoC.' During the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Plus, held in Kuala Lumpur, the ASEAN leadership actually pushed for placing the CoC issue on the agenda of the following meeting to be held in November.

But it is far from clear whether ASEAN will find the resolve and unity to push China back to negotiating the CoC. What is increasingly clear is that Manila and Beijing have a long way to go before improving their troubled relations.
 2015-02-27T00:56:00+00:00 Richard Javad Heydarian There are growing indications that the newly-generated sense of optimism has been premature, if not totally unfounded. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=a796a1a3-786e-4921-80ee-8722f232c86e 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=a796a1a3-786e-4921-80ee-8722f232c86e http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/false-dawn-China-Philippines-relations.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=a796a1a3-786e-4921-80ee-8722f232c86e http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/Greece-has-compromised-so-too-must-Europe.aspx Greece has compromised, so too must Europe 2015-02-26T23:34:00+00:00 Mike Callaghan
The recently approved extension of the EU/ECB/IMF bailout program kicks the Greece debt problem four months down the road. Where to from there? Unless there is a major change in approach by both Greece and the EU, it will not be long before we are again fretting over Greece exiting the euro and the future of the euro itself.

Stephen Grenville says 'Greek politicians have to learn to break election promises', specifically promises that the austerity bail-out program would be rejected. Wolfgang Munchau says 'Athens must stand firm against the Eurozone's failed policies', particularly the requirement to run a primary budget surplus of 3% while the country faces massive unemployment.

Both are right.

Rejecting the bail-out program would see a collapse in the Greek economy. So Greek politicians have, as Stephen recommended, broken their promises, achieving an extension to the program and agreeing to implement a series of reforms by June. While there remain doubts the Greek Government will deliver, the next hurdle is to negotiate a program to replace the one that expires in June. Here Munchau is right: Greece should stand firm in seeking changes.

Greece needs a more flexible program than the one imposed by the EU/ECB/IMF that has resulted in a 30% decline in the size of the economy and mounting poverty. It also needs a program that recognises that Greece's debt levels are not sustainable.

But for this to happen there needs to be a major change in approach by the EU. This may be the biggest stumbling block in resolving the Greek crisis.

Much of the focus has been on what Greece needs to do, with headlines such as 'Greece now has a chance to change'. More attention should be placed on the need for the EU/ECB/IMF to change, and particularly to compromise on what they want from Greece. However, the politics in Europe are not compatible with the idea of compromise when it comes to Greece.

Greece has got a rough deal throughout the crisis. While it is responsible for the debt-loaded mess it is in, it was forced into a draconian and flawed bailout program in 2010. This was acknowledged in an IMF self-assessment. The Fund said the program was based on excessively optimistic assumptions, a gross underestimation of the impact of the austerity measures, and was inconsistent with the IMF's rules that a country gaining exceptional access to resources should have a high probability that its public debt will become sustainable.

The IMF was pressured into approving the program by the EC because of the fear of contagion. If Greece's debts were seen to be unsustainable, so might those of Portugal, Spain and Italy.

But there was also strong resentment towards Greece, particularly in Germany. The view was that Greece manipulated its statistics to get into the euro and the Greeks didn't pay their taxes, retired too early and worked too little. There was no sympathy towards Greece. Imposing tough conditions was necessary to obtain domestic support in Germany for a bail-out. That view remains today, evidenced by German business groups urging MPs to take a tough line on any extension.

Throughout the recent wrangling over the program, the EU was determined there be no weakening in the conditions and that Greece repay all its debts. As was the case with the initial bail-out program, this view was influenced by what was happening elsewhere in Europe rather than what is best for Greece.

The hard line taken by some EU ministers reflected the rise of anti-austerity parties in their own countries. The Spanish finance minister was particularly tough with Greece. This is not surprising because Spain's anti-austerity party, Podemus, leads the opinion polls in the run-up to the election. If Syriza was seen to be successful, this would increase support for Podemus. Anti-euro parties are on the rise in France and Italy too.

Another factor behind the EU's intransigence is the view that the risk of contagion is now much lower. Europe now has a firewall in the form of the European Stability Mechanism to support countries facing financial pressure. However, UK Chancellor George Osborne has warned that a Greek exit could be very damaging for Europe and the world. A messy Greek exit would indeed be a major shock to a fragile Europe.

The political fallout may be the most destabilising factor. Greece would default on its debts held by the ECB and EU (the IMF would likely be exempt). This would crystalise in the minds of European (particularly German) taxpayers how much has been lost in attempting to bail out Greece. This may well impact on the willingness to provide financial assistance to other countries and the commitment to the euro itself.

So the stakes are high for all parties to negotiate a successful bail-out program for Greece. The concern is that frustration and resentment towards Greece may continue to prevent Europe from making the necessary compromises.

Photo by Flickr user Glorgos.
 2015-02-26T23:34:00+00:00 Mike Callaghan Greece needs a more flexible program than the one imposed by the EU/ECB/IMF that has resulted in a 30% decline in the size of the economy and mounting poverty. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=683e465c-665e-4473-b854-34bf93f27ead 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=683e465c-665e-4473-b854-34bf93f27ead http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/Greece-has-compromised-so-too-must-Europe.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=683e465c-665e-4473-b854-34bf93f27ead http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/Digital-Asia-links-Mao-Xinyu-Facebook-in-Tibet-Vietnams-tech-boom-and-more.aspx Digital Asia links: Mao Xinyu, Facebook in Tibet, Vietnam's tech boom and more 2015-02-26T21:45:00+00:00 Danielle Cave
The Asia Pacific is the most dynamic digital landscape in the world, home to the fastest adopters of new technology and the largest concentration of mobile and social media users. An escalation in online activism, changing cyber dynamics, developments in digital diplomacy and the exploitation of big data are shaping the region's engagement with the world.

China has dropped some of the world's largest tech companies, including Apple and Cisco, from its approved state purchases list in a move that has been linked to both Western cyber surveillance and domestic protectionism.

Fergus Hanson has proposed that the Government instigate a regional ICT response to discredit Islamic State messages in Southeast Asia and Australia. One of his recommendations — an interdisciplinary lab bringing together technologists, communications experts, tech firms and public servants — might be realised via the Government's newly announced body intended to monitor social media and disrupt terrorist propaganda.

Vietnam's regulatory approach to the internet is increasingly out of step with its booming technology sector.

The spokesperson for Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang party has used Foreign Policy magazine to urge his own party to turn its fortunes around by changing the way it uses the internet, shifting from thinking about it as simply a communications tool to using it to mobilise support and encourage public participation in policy development.

Can Tibetans trust Facebook? Prominent Tibetan author Tsering Woeser doesn't think so.

Based on 2013's Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines, findings have been published showing how state-of-the-art social media processing methods can be used to assist humanitarian organisations during a crisis. More than 2 million tweets were analysed and geo-located as a part of the project.

After the People's Liberation Army announced strict guidelines for body weight, including that meeting the guidelines will be a promotion consideration, Chinese netizens turned on Mao Xinyu, the often-mocked and overweight grandson of Mao Zedong, who in 2010 become the youngest Major General in the PLA.

 2015-02-26T21:45:00+00:00 Danielle Cave Links to this week's best reading on the most dynamic digital landscape in the world. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/pingback.axd http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?id=aedf1d5d-57c8-419c-b208-b5cbcd532aa5 0 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/trackback.axd?id=aedf1d5d-57c8-419c-b208-b5cbcd532aa5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/27/Digital-Asia-links-Mao-Xinyu-Facebook-in-Tibet-Vietnams-tech-boom-and-more.aspx#disqus_thread http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/syndication.axd?post=aedf1d5d-57c8-419c-b208-b5cbcd532aa5 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/26/ISIS-least-of-Afghanistans-problems.aspx ISIS is the least of Afghanistan's problems 2015-02-26T06:17:00+00:00 Susanne Schmeidl
The growing geographic spread of ISIS has lately been part of the news chatter in tabloids and respected papers alike.

We know ISIS has tried to spread its propaganda to Pakistan and Afghanistan since late 2014 and proclaimed its leadership of that region in early January, with members of the Pakistani Taliban claiming loyalty to the group. One of ISIS's Afghan commanders who was in a recruitment video aimed at the region was killed at the end of January, and another was allegedly arrested by the Afghan Taliban.

However, police in Afghanistan's Ghazni province, where ISIS was reported to be fighting, recently denied the group had a presence there.

Nevertheless, many Afghan Government officials, Afghan analysts with links to Government, and some civil society activists I spoke to last year are set on making the case that ISIS is operating in Afghanistan. Their counterparts across the border in Pakistan seem to be less concerned, even if the link between the Pakistani Taliban and ISIS is ostensibly stronger.

Others however, remain sceptical, and the Taliban website has been suspiciously silent on the matter. Australia's Foreign Minister has been cautious about acknowledging an ISIS presence in Afghanistan (possibly because there is about as much evidence for its presence in Australia, considering the Sydney siege and two individuals arrested before they could strike), though the Australian Government continues to warn that ISIS may expand its operations to Afghanistan in the future.

The question is, why should we even bother looking for ISIS in Afghanistan?

Afghanistan is in enough trouble already, and for what it's worth it has had an 'Islamic state' for much longer than Syria or Iraq. After all, the Taliban officially goes by name Islamic Emirate, and has thus long laid claim to the 'Islamic state' brand. The fact that ISIS called itself the 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham' might actually be a nod of acknowledgment from one quasi-state to another that such an ambition is already established in Afghanistan.

Though much has been made of the similarities between ISIS and the Taliban, such as their focus on conquering territory, maintaining an army and governing structure (all trademarks of states), they are not the same.

The Afghan Taliban still draws the majority of its recruits from within Afghanistan's Pashtun tribal structure, though it is known to also collaborate with many other ethnic and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There have been suggestions of Arabic trainers and mentors in Afghanistan, but generally Afghans have not liked them. Sunni Muslims have long been a majority in Afghanistan (no underdog status as in Iraq) and any sectarian problems have been predominantly of an ethnic nature, involving the Shia Hazara minority group.

Rather than looking for ISIS, I worry more about Afghanistan's other problems, which provide ample space to breed more extremist and criminal groups, and should be addressed both by the Afghan Government and the international community.

The Afghan Taliban is losing command and control, and its self-financing structure has seen it morph more into a criminal group than an insurgency. A recent UN report argued that the Taliban was acting more like a 'godfather' than a 'government in waiting', something Gretchen Peterson argued in 2009 when she compared the Taliban to the Sopranos minus the chianti. The Taliban leadership has long denied fragmentation and emphasized its unwavering command and control. On the ground however, the story is different, and many Afghans resent the fact that some fighters no longer practice as their leadership preaches.

There is a lesson here for counter-terrorism as an answer to the problem of ISIS. Much of what the Taliban has become today can be linked to the 'kill and capture' policy of the US military, which not only alienated the local population but also eliminated a lot of older, mid-level commanders with allegiances to the old Taliban leadership and belief system. Forced to continuously refill their ranks, the Taliban fighters and commanders have become younger, many with a rather basic understanding of Islam and Taliban rules (such as the laheya).

Thus, the very counter-terrorism policy designed to defeat the Taliban – which recently was quietly reinstated – has made the group into the different beast we are now dealing with; one that is far less likely to be reconciled into the Afghan Government. This should cause us to pause and consider if similar counter-terrorism approaches elsewhere might not also backfire.

Another way to understand the appeal of groups such as the Taliban, or ISIS, is to recognise what I would call the enabling environment that breeds extremism.

In addition to rising poverty and unemployment in Afghanistan, high dowry prices have forced young men to delay marriage and seek work abroad, or even engage in crime or jihad to afford a wife. This creates frustration, so much so that the Taliban has tried to lower dowry prices in areas they control. ISIS's response to the same problem has been somewhat more 'creative'. Either young women are encouraged to volunteer to marry fighters or ISIS sanctions their rape, enslavement and forced marriage. The importance of this 'sexual conquest' or 'primitive gratification' in ISIS's strategy, and the attraction for many young men struggling to find their place in more modern societies, has been little analysed in trying to understand the group's universal appeal.&