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International Negotiation 7: 261–285, 2002. 261 © 2002 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands. New Research Directions Over the years, International Negotiation has published several articles concerning conflict resolution and negotiation efforts in Cyprus. Louise Diamond (Vol. 2, no. 3, 1997) described lessons learned from conflict resol- ution training in Cyprus. Benjamin Broome (Vol. 2, no. 3, 1997) recounted his experiences facilitating problem-solving workshops with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu (Vol. 6, no. 3, 2001) examined a failed attempt at third party intervention in Cyprus. The following article by Birol Yesilada and Ahmet Sozen offers a game theoretic analysis of the current negotiation context concerning the Cyprus dispute. Negotiating a Resolution to the Cyprus Problem: Is Potential European Union Membership a Blessing or a Curse? BIROL A. YESILADA1∗ & AHMET SOZEN2† 1 Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, USA (E-mail: email@example.com); 2 Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir, Istanbul, Turkey Abstract. This article provides a game theoretic analysis of how the candidacy of Cyprus for European Union (EU) membership presents an important challenge for both the Union's eastern enlargement plans and current international efforts aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. The conclusions indicate that the Cypriot conflict has entered a very delicate period in its protracted and troublesome history characterized by a deadlock game. Strong domestic and international factors have created the conditions for each side to follow a non-cooperative strategy aimed at unilateral victory rather than a compromise. In this regard, the EU's promise to the Greek Cypriots of membership in the Union, regardless of the settlement of the Cyprus problem, serves as a side payment that enforces non-cooperative strategy. Likewise, Turkey's overwhelming military superiority in the region and its unconditional support for the Turkish Cypriots strengthens the Turkish side's rigid position in the Cyprus negotiations. Under these circumstances, it is argued that an influential third party like the United States is needed to coordinate the efforts of the UN and EU to move the two parties away form a deadlock game. This effort requires a package approach to the issues surrounding the Cyprus problem, the island's membership in the EU, and EU-Turkey relations. Keywords: bargaining, Cyprus, European Union, EU enlargement, game theory, Greece, Greek Cypriot, international conflict, negotiation, Turkey, Turkish Cypriot ∗ Birol Yesilada is professor of political science and international studies in the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. He is also holder of the endowed chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the 262 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN Introduction The present candidacy of Cyprus for European Union (EU) membership presents an important challenge for both the Union's eastern enlargement plans and current international efforts aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. It can be argued that if the Greek and Turkish communities agree to join the EU, the Cyprus problem could be resolved peacefully within the frame- work of EU legislation. Yet the opposite could be argued as well. As some in the Turkish Cypriot community point out, joint membership in the EU could result in domination of the Turkish Cypriots by the more numerous and richer Greek Cypriots and, thus, further destabilize the relationship between the two sides on the island. In this article, we attempt to shed light on the current impasse in Cyprus with a focus on future EU membership and the implications of accession on the two communities. The main issues dividing the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish Cypriots are: (i) the future political system; (ii) guarantorship; (iii) freedom; (iv) the military status of Cyprus; (v) displaced persons; (vi) Turkish settlers; (vii) territorial adjustment; and (viii) EU membership. Among these (ii), (iii), and (viii) have direct relevance to EU-Cyprus relations. European Union-Cyprus Relations Cyprus has always maintained close relations with the EU economically, socially, and politically. A recent EU report states that its relationship with Cyprus is based on a 1973 Association Agreement as well as a new Acces- sion Partnership (Council Decision No 248/2000) and relations are supported financially by a Council Regulation regarding the implementation of pre- accession operations (Council Regulation No. 555/2000). But the two parties had an earlier encounter when Cyprus applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1962. That decision came about with consent from both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives, as required by the constitution of Cyprus. However, when the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish Cypriot townships in December 1963, a civil war University of Michigan in 1984. Yesilada is the co-author of The Emerging European Union (Longman 2002, second edition), author of "Turkey's Candidacy to Join the European Union," The Middle East Journal (Winter 2002), and has published numerous edited books and articles on EU affairs, Turkish politics and economic development. † Ahmet Sozen is assistant professor and acting chair of international relations at the University of Bahcesehir in Istanbul. He is also director of the Istanbul Strategic Research Center. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Missouri-Columbia in 1999. Sozen is a recipient of the Rotary Club's Paul Harris Conflict Resolution Fellowship in 1997. NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 263 began. Cyprus's aspiration of becoming an EEC member came to an abrupt halt. Despite the internal political divisions on the island, Cyprus and the EU (EC at that time) signed an Association Agreement in 1973 that provided for the establishment of a customs union. Even though the Turkish Cypriots did not participate in this decision, the EC indicated that "rules governing trade between the Contracting Parties may not give rise to any discrimina- tion between the Member States, or between nationals or companies of these states, nor nationals or companies of Cyprus" (Commission of the EC 1972: 3). The Association Agreement, therefore, prohibited discrimination against the Turkish or Greek Cypriots by their EC trading partners. It also called for the elimination of all tariffs and quotas within five years. Following the end of the five-year period, the agreement was renewed annually until 1987, when the two sides signed a customs union (CU) agreement. This agreement outlined two phases of economic measures to be implemented by Cyprus prior to its entrance to the EEC (EEC 1987). During the customs union nego- tiations, the Turkish Cypriots, citing Article 5 of the Association Agreement, asked to participate. They only succeeded in obtaining informal meetings with the EC officials because the EU recognized only the Greek Cypriot administration as the official government of Cyprus. Preparation of the Cypriot economy for accession was governed by finan- cial protocols that contained provisions for extensive financial aid. The first protocol, signed on July 15, 1977, targeted projects that would benefit both communities. Accordingly, all ventures that were proposed were required to have a bi-communal component. The total amount of aid necessary was 30 million Ecus, which was distributed over the subsequent five years. The Greek Cypriot side received 24 million Ecus and the Turkish Cypriot side obtained 6 million Ecus. The projects that received funds were: (1) the Vassilikos-Pendaskinos irrigation project; (2) an electric power station project in Dhekelia; and (3) the Nicosia sewage project. Only the last project included investment on the Turkish Cypriot side. The second financial protocol (1984– 1988) provided 44 million Ecus in aid. Not a single Turkish Cypriot proposal received favorable review by the EC officials; they lacked the "communality" component required by the Community. The third financial protocol, signed in January 1989, provided Cyprus with another 62 million Ecus in aid and again, covered only projects on the Greek Cypriot side of the island (EC Council Decision 1989: 1). As bilateral EU-Cyprus relations improved, Greek Cypriots decided to apply for EU membership on July 4, 1990. The European Commission issued a favorable opinion on June 30, 1993, and the Council of Ministers endorsed its recommendation that October. In issuing its decision, the Council indi- 264 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN cated that the EC expected progress on the Island's political problem while the parties continued working to meet those conditions necessary for acces- sion. In other words, while the Commission expressed positive sentiments regarding Cyprus' membership, it also indicated concern over the ongoing dispute between the Greeks and Turks. Simply stated, resolution of this problem prior to accession would benefit all parties. At the December 1997 Luxembourg summit, the European Council took the steps necessary to set the enlargement process in motion. It decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in the spring of 1998 with Cyprus and other select countries to negotiate conditions for their entry into the Union. In addition, the Luxembourg European Council stated that (European Council 1997): the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations that must continue with a view to creating a bi-communal, bi-zonal federa- tion. In this context, the European Council requested that the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating delegation be acted upon. Unfortunately, accession talks between Cyprus and the Union did not pro- gress as hoped. On March 12, 1998, President Glafkos Clerides attended the European Conference in London and presented a timetable outlining the Cypriot strategy for accession talks. The proposal included an invitation to the Turkish Cypriots to participate in the Cyprus negotiating team. The Turkish Cypriots rejected this invitation on the grounds that the Greek Cypriot government did not represent all of Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriot side had been excluded from prior EU-Cyprus relations. They also raised legal objections based on the Republic's constitution. First, the Constitution requires that both communities support the decision to apply for EU membership and the Turkish Cypriots were clearly excluded in this process. Second, the Treaty of Guarantee proscribes relations that would unite Cyprus with another country. Article I (2) of this treaty states that "[Cyprus] is not to participate in whole, or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatso- ever" (Republic of Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee, 16 August, 1960). Article I (12) further elaborates on economic and political union by prohibiting "all activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, union with any other state." Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were able to object to Cyprus's NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 265 membership in the EU or at the very least challenge it in the International Court of Justice. However, the Cypriot government and EU rejected this as a real problem. The Greek Cypriots' application for EU membership complic- ated efforts aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem because the Turkish side perceived this development as "an attempt by the Greeks and their EU allies to pressure them into a corner."1 The Cyprus Problem and Bicommunal Negotiations Over the years, intercommunal talks have taken a third-party approach under the auspices of the UN and orchestrated predominantly by the US and the UK. During talks between 1967–1974, the Greek Cypriots maintained that the 1960 constitutional order was unworkable and, therefore, the future polit- ical system had to be one of a unitary state with minority rights given to the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish side strongly rejected this position: it denied their political equality as a founding member of the Republic of Cyprus, and depicted the Turkish Cypriots as the minority on the island – a position that petrified them. In response, the Turkish Cypriots called for a return to the 1960 constitutional order. When this fell on deaf ears, they proposed a federal system as the new regime. In each case, the Greek Cypriots rejected their proposals. The Greek Cypriot bargaining position was quite simple; they cornered the Turkish Cypriots into small enclaves where they were at the mercy of the Greek Cypriot military (UK House of Commons 1987: xii). This caused Turkish Cypriots to flee the island in record numbers. Ultimately, if the Greek Cypriots maintained their hard-line position, the majority of Turkish Cypriots might leave. This situation lasted until July 1974, when Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus following an Athens-led coup against the Makarios govern- ment. At the time, Turkey was concerned about the safety of the Turkish Cypriots given the fact that ultranationalist Greek Cypriots had taken over the government. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 353 calling for Guarantor powers to enter into negotiations to restore peace. Two confer- ences were held in Geneva in 1974, the second including representatives from both communities. The talks were fruitless and resulted in the Turkish Cypriots declaring their "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in February 1975. The Turkish Cypriot justification of this decision was rather peculiar. They insisted that their action was aimed at persuading the Greek Cypriots to follow suit and subsequently enter into negotiation over a future federal system.2 266 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN Intercommunal talks resumed in the summer of 1975 under UN Secretary- General Kurt Waldheim. Three rounds of talks in Vienna failed to result in any breakthrough with the exception of an agreement by both sides to create two ethnically pure regions on the island: the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish Cypriot north. In 1977, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas suggested direct talks with Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios to review previous negotiations. At the same time, the US administration launched a new initiative to bring the two sides together. The two leaders met in February and agreed on the "Four Guidelines" for future negotiations: 1. an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic, 2. the territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability and productivity and land ownership, 3. questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters are open to discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties which arise for the Turkish community, and 4. the powers and the functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bicommunal character of the state.3 The success of their agreement was frustrated when the Greek side proposed that the Turkish Cypriots control no more than 20 percent of the land on the Island. It was not until May 1979 that the two sides agreed to meet again, under the auspices of the UN. Denktas and Makarios's successor, Spyros Kyprianou, reaffirmed the Four Guidelines and signed the "Ten- Point Agreement" that included the following main points (Tamkoç 1988: 111–113): 1. priority should be given to the resettlement of Varosha [suburb of Famagusta and a tourist Mecca] by the Greek Cypriot refugees, 2. avoid any action prejudicial to the intercommunal talks, 3. the demilitarization of Cyprus, and 4. the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonalignment of the Republic be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other state and against any form of partition or secession. A year later, the UN Secretary-General proposed an Interim Agreement that was accepted by both communities as a basis for further negotiations. However, from that point, no intercommunal talks took place until 1984 due mainly to Kyprianou's intransigence. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot side declared their independent state, calling it the Turkish Republic of Northern NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 267 Cyprus ("TRNC"). They claimed that this would bring the Greek Cypriot side to the negotiation table. In 1984, the new Secretary-General of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, initiated a more comprehensive approach to the Cyprus problem and aban- doned the mini-packages of the past. Cuellar wrote a "Draft Framework Agreement" which underwent various modifications by 1986 following prox- imity talks with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. The agreement called for a bizonal, bicommunal federal republic with a bicameral chamber (with a 70 Greek Cypriot – 30 Turkish Cypriot representation in the lower house and a 50–50 representation in the upper house), presidential political system with a Greek president and a Turkish vice president, a cabinet of 7 Greek and 3 Turkish ministers, and a constitutional court composed of one Greek, one Turkish, and one non-Cypriot voting member. (Tamkoç 1988: 123–124). The Turkish Cypriots showed interest in these points. However, Kypri- anou informed the Secretary-General that before he would sign on to these ideas he needed agreements on: (1) the withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers; (2) effective international guarantees; and (3) application of the three freedoms (movement, settlement, and the right to property). It is also note- worthy that before Kyprianou's rejection, the Greek government in Athens ruled the Secretary-General's proposals unacceptable. In 1988, George Vassiliou, a self-made millionaire businessman, became President of Cyprus and began a campaign to solve the Cyprus problem.4 However, he spoke of the problem as if it began in 1974 with the Turkish intervention; he failed to acknowledge that problems on the island existed before then. Meanwhile, Denktas added to the tension by introducing a new concept into the pictures: "sovereignty association." Comparable to the French-Canadian view of sovereignty, this idea was inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolutions and the 1977 and 1979 summit agreements. According to the resolutions and agreements, separate "sovereignty" for each community was impermissible. While the UN criticized Denktas for this new obstacle, the Secretary- General produced the famous "Set of Ideas" as food for thought. This was a 100-point document that expanded on the issues addressed in the previous "Draft Framework." It envisioned bringing the two leaders together at an international summit if they showed interest. However they did not show much enthusiasm for the proposal. The UN Security Council attempted to induce negotiations and improve the pre-negotiation environment by passing an important resolution, No. 649, in which the two communities were treated as equals. The resolution did not make references to "the Government of Cyprus" or "the Turkish Cypriot community." Rather, it talked about the two communities and "the leaders 268 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN of the communities" (UNSC 1990). In view of these developments, the two leaders met with the Secretary-General in New York in October 1992 but failed to come to an agreement. Denktas raised concerns over separate sover- eignties and each community's right to self-determination. Vassiliou, on the other hand, suggested that these ideas could be improved in the future. The Secretary-General failed to make any progress and blamed Denktas' discussion of "separate sovereignties" for the ensuing impasse. The irony of these talks was that Vassiliou's lukewarm endorsement of the "Set of Ideas" cost him the subsequent presidential elections in the south.5 His successor, Glafkos Clerides, adamantly opposed the Ideas as being insensitive to the Greek Cypriot cause. Faced with such deadlock, the Secretary-General stated in his report to the Security Council that (UNSG 1992: para. 63): It appears from the joint meeting that there is a deep crisis of confid- ence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails. There can be no doubt but that the prospects for progress would be greatly enhanced if a number of confidence building measures were adopted by each side. It was clear to the Secretary-General that future negotiations were impossible without some kind of pre-negotiation confidence building efforts. It was not until November 24, 1992, that the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proposed 15 wide-ranging confidence building measures that showed great promise in bringing the two sides towards an agreement (UNSG 1993). The proposal covered potential cooperation in areas of water supply, energy, education, cultural activities, transportation and commerce, health, the environment, and continuous political dialogue. Despite the leaders' mixed initial reactions, the Secretary-General indi- cated that the two leaders were leaning towards a compromise that would have moved them away from years of status quo position. Yet, the Secretary- General did not seize the moment and push the two leaders hard enough to sign an understanding for cooperation. Instead, he let them return to Cyprus and "sleep on it." The result was disastrous. Clerides asserted a tough position by showing some interest in these ideas while, at the same time, pursuing hard-line policies with Greece. He increasingly emphasized the Hellenic character of Cyprus in his public speeches, called for demilitarization of the Mesaoria Plain, and asked for military cooperation with Greece, which resulted in the signing of a joint defense agreement between the two coun- tries. Denktas, on the other hand, called for a lifting of economic sanctions against the "TRNC" as a precondition for accepting the confidence building measures.6 As the UN attempted to persuade the two sides to come to the negotiation table, the European Court of Justice issued a decision effectively NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 269 banning "TRNC" exports to the UK markets (ECJ 1994).7 While the Greek Cypriots hailed this decision, the Turkish Cypriots viewed it as a stab in the back and rejected any idea of talks with the other side. The next contact between the two community leaders took place nearly four years later, in 1997. The new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, tried to bring a new dynamic to negotiationsand convinced Clerides and Denktas to meet face-to-face in New York. That August, the two leaders came together for another round of talks in Geneva. Shortly thereafter, in 1998, the US administration appointed Richard Holbrooke, with Thomas Miller as his assistant, as the new American mediator in the Cyprus talks. Their task was to help resolve the Cyprus problem within the parameters of the UN. Neither effort proved successful. Unfortunately, these talks took place at a time when the EU decided to open accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the whole island and excluded Turkey from the list of candidates at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. Further complications arose when the Greek Cypriots decided to sign a "Joint Defense Doctrine" with Greece, to establish a military air base in Paphos, and to purchase Russian S-300 missiles. In response to these developments, the Turkish Cypriots signed a wide-ranging declaration with Turkey that called for cooperation in foreign affairs, defense, and economic development. This joint declaration was designed to establish a "partial integration" between Turkey and the "TRNC". From that point forward, the Turkish Cypriot side argued that if the "intercommunal negotiations" continued, they should be conducted on the basis of "two states" with confederation as the only viable solution for the Cyprus problem. The next round of negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots occurred in the form of proximity talks under the auspices of the UN in 2000. These talks followed the EU's decision to grant candidacy status to Turkey at the Helsinki summit of the European Council in December 1999. Despite international pressures to move forward toward direct talks, the Turkish side announced in November 2000 that it would no longer attend talks as long as the "TRNC" was not recognized as a separate state and the EU continued its accession talks with the Greek Cypriots. The lack of progress has continued. Clerides and Denktas have been meeting on a weekly basis (with periodic recesses) in an attempt to prepare the ground for a comprehensive settlement. At the time of writing no real breakthrough has occurred. What is truly tragic about the current impasse is that EU membership holds a real promise for resolving Greek and Turkish Cypriot differences, at least in the long run. Yet, the current candidacy of Cyprus seems to have caused more obstacles than assistance for third-party resolution of the crisis. 270 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN Game Theoretic Analysis of the Current Impasse The following game theoretic evaluation of the 1990s bargaining process provides important background to the current impasse in Cyprus and yields insight into changing strategies and tactics of the two sides that have resulted in the present deadlock game. The game theoretic model conceives of the Cyprus conflict as a sustained series of events and opportunities in bargaining where the disputants are confronted with choices of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. The Cyprus conflict is a dynamic non-cooperative game with incomplete infor- mation. The analysis draws from earlier works presented by the authors (Yesilada and Hewitt 1998; Sozen and Yesilada 2001) and is rooted in Azar's conceptualization of the protracted conflict (1985).8 The reader is advised to refer to endnotes on game theory in order to keep track of the strategies of the parties and games that result thereof. In game theory, the advantage of the prisoners' dilemma game over dead- lock or other strategies is found in binding agreements and side payments through which a skillful mediator can bring about a compromise (C,c) outcome especially when the game is repeated n-times and if the Folk Theorem conditions hold.9 It is at this point that the role of the third-party mediator becomes crucial (e.g., the US or the EU that can offer a side payment to induce cooperation).10 Stages of Conflict, 1992–1998 The last decade of the 1990s is chosen as the reference point for our analysis for three important reasons. First, the 15-point confidence building measures represented a major breakthrough in the Cyprus problem and held out the prospect for resolving the crisis. Second, the subsequent misperceptions and strategy choices of the two adversaries turned the problem into a more rigid environment. And third, the emergence of the EU side payments for the Greek Cypriots in the form of accession talks coupled with the ECJ decisions on TRNC exports and Turkey's solid support for Denktas' bargaining position further eroded relations between the two communities. Boutros-Ghali Confidence-Building Proposal, 1992: A Chicken Game We begin our explanation of the enduring conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the confidence-building measures of Boutros-Ghali. At this point in the conflict, the preference structure for the players can best be represented by a Chicken strategy where each party's preference ordering NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 271 was T>R>S>P (T = temptation to win unilaterally; R = reward for mutual compromise; P = punishment against mutual defection; and S = sucker). In a Chicken game, the players prefer all other outcomes over the punishment outcome, so one might have expected acceptance (at least by one of the actors) in order to shift the outcome away from mutual punishment. Sustained non-cooperative behavior during 1976–1990 had created a setting where the actors were prepared to make a move from status quo (mutual defection with payoff [P,P]) which was seen as increasingly undesirable. The Greek side wanted to unite Cyprus and to see Turkish troops leave. The status quo had become a psychologically unbearable situation. For the Turkish Cypriots, the status quo meant continued economic hardship, an uncertain future, and growing international isolation. Boutros-Ghali's proposal was an oppor- tunity for the disputants to make mutual concessions and shift behavior from defection to cooperation. In addition, the timing of the confidence-building measures coincided with an increase in the U.S. administration's multi-track diplomacy aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. Yet, in the process of considering the Secretary General's proposal, a set of events unfolded which permitted the actors to readjust their valuation of the status quo. First, the Secretary General failed to place a high cost to further iterations of the game. In other words, the discount rate for future expected payoffs was not significantly lower than the expected present payoff. The costs of iterated defection were not high enough to induce cooperation. Second, the Secretary General allowed the two leaders to return to Cyprus before signing the confidence building measures. As explained earlier, once in Cyprus, the two leaders took steps that led to the rejection of the confidence-building measures. Thus, due in part to this evolution of circumstances, the incentives available to the adversaries for cooperation or defection changed. The new circumstances represented a Prisoners' Dilemma game with an increase in the value of mutual defection and concomitant decline in the value of the (S) payoff, transforming actors' preferences to T>R>P>S. The Situation Until the Luxembourg Summit of the EU By treating this phase of the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as a Prisoners' Dilemma, we explicitly assume the disputants can achieve Pareto improvements through cooperation. In particular, Pareto improvements are possible only when both sides make concessions (e.g., play cooperation). The iterated PD has been analyzed by a number of scholars, so we simply restate the conditions necessary to sustain cooperative behavior and refer the reader to more detailed discussions of this topic (Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987; Morrow 1994; Gates and Humes 1997). Under certain conditions, Tit- for-Tat strategies will produce long-term cooperation in an iterated PD. As 272 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN such, our description of this phase of the conflict presumes that opportunities for cooperation could be available to the adversaries, especially if the actors maintained a sufficiently high valuation for future cooperative relations. In a Tit-for-Tat strategy, a player begins the iterated game by choosing C (cooperation). Thereafter, the player's choice depends on the choice of the opponent in the previous round. If the opponent chose D (defection) in the opening round, then the player chooses D in the second round. When both players adopt Tit-for-Tat strategies in the iterated PD, long-term cooperation can be sustained provided that the players do not discount the value of future payoffs too heavily against the short-term gains derived from defection. If the discount rate on future payoffs is substantial, a player may be tempted to switch from a Tit-for-Tat strategy to one that called for continued defection when the short-term gains from defection offset the losses from failed cooper- ation. Let us denote δi as the discount factor on future payoffs for the players, where i ∈.{g,t} and 0<δ<1. It can be shown that a Tit-for-Tat strategy is an equilibrium strategy when (Taylor 1987: 64–69): T−R δI ≥ T−P The condition suggests the importance of strategies to be adopted by third-parties that could be useful in facilitating cooperative behavior in the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This condition defines a threshold that must be exceeded by the actors' discount factor to sustain cooperative behavior via Tit-for-Tat strategies. If the actors' discount factor falls below this threshold, the discounted value of future cooperative payoffs are valued less than the value of defecting from Tit-for-Tat and achieving the temptation to defect (T) in the short term and then the punishment outcome (P,P) for the indeterminate future. With this in mind, note that some of the parameters of the condition are potentially manipulable by a third party. That is, to the extent that a third-party can punish the disputants for non- cooperative behavior and reward them for cooperative behavior, the value of the condition can be modified. It can be seen from this condition that increases in the value of R, such that the difference between T and R declines, will serve to reduce the overall value of the condition. That is, additional inducements for cooperation will serve to ease the conditions necessary for cooperative behavior. In a similar manner, if the value of the punishment outcome can be worsened by an additional cost imposed for non-cooperative behavior, the overall value of the condition will decline. In short, even when the ordinal ranking of the payoffs is retained such that the game remains a PD, modifications to the payoffs such that the differences between R and P are increased will lead to an increased likelihood for sustained cooperative behavior. NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 273 Despite such a reality, the third-party intervention in Cyprus took a turn for the worse with the emergence of the EU factor. Just when the UN and the U.S. were formulating various initiatives to bring the two sides back to the bargaining table within the framework of the Confidence-Building measures, the decision of the ECJ on TRNC exports to the UK and the decision of the European Council to include Cyprus among the first group of countries for the next membership expansion (in complete disregard of the Cyprus Treaties of 1960 and the Constitution of the island republic) worked against the conditions outlined above. In this non-cooperative game, the EU factor became an incentive for the Greek Cypriots to defect (choose D) in the hope that the Turkish side would eventually cave in if Turkey was ever to join the list of potential members of the EU. However, the outcome was far more disastrous than anyone had expected in Washington, London, or Brussels. The Turkish side broke off all contact with the Greek Cypriots and began a process of economic integration with Turkey (a Tit-for-Tat strategy in the direction of non-cooperative behavior). At this point, the Turkish Cypriot position reflected a bully strategy of T>P>R>S whereas the Greek Cypriots maintained a prisoner's dilemma strategy T>R>P>S. The result was a dead- lock game that continued with no hope for a breakthrough until the decision of the parties to restart face-to-face negotiations in December 1999. In summary, the nature of the Cyprus game progressively worsened during the 1990s as it moved from a Chicken to a Deadlock game. The Current Phase of the Problem In this section, major players' preferences on eight main issues that comprise the Cyprus problem are presented. Unlike other studies on Cyprus that consider the two sides as separate actors represented by Clerides and Denktas (or whomever happens to be the top level political representative of each community), we present positions of all the major political parties and interest groups on both sides of Cyprus, as well as in Greece and Turkey. Our information is based on field research and surveys of interest-group representatives, supplemented by analysis of declared positions of the relevant officials. The initial data were collected during 1997–1998 and updated periodically in June 1999, June 2000, and throughout 2001.11 The Cypriot participants interviewed were: Greek Cypriots Church Clerides (President of the Cyprus Republic) EOKA/EOKA-B (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) AKEL (Progressive party former Communists – Demetris Christofias) 274 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN DIKO (Right wing – Tassos Papadopoulos and previously Spiros Kyprianou) DISY (Right wing – Ioannis Matsis) KISOS (formerly EDEK Socialists – Vassos Lyssarides) EDI (formerly KED or United Democrats or Free Democrats – George Vassiliou) Turkish Cypriots Denktas (President of the "TRNC") TMT (Turkish Resistance Movement) CTP (Republican Turkish Party, reformed party, former Communists – M. Ali Talat) DP (Democratic Party, moderate right, Salih Cosar for Serdar Denktas) TKP (Communal Liberation Party, Social Democratic, Mustafa Akinci) UBP (National Unity Party, moderate right, Dervis Eroglu) MAP (Nationalist Justice Party, ultra right wing, Zorlu Tore) The parties were asked to specify their preferences on the following issues: 1. The future political system of Cyprus – (unitary state, consociational unitary state, strong federation, federation, confederation, two inde- pendent states). 2. Guarantorship of Cyprus's independence and protection of its two ethnic peoples – (US guarantorship, NATO, UN, and the 1960 Agreement). 3. Three freedoms (movement of people, settlement, and property owner- ship) – (none, freedom of movement, UN set of ideas, movement and settlement, and full freedoms). 4. Territorial adjustment – (80–20 percent based on the 1960 population ratio of the two communities, 75–25 percent, 71–29 percent, and present status quo). 5. The future of displaced individuals – (All displaced persons have the right to return to their properties; most displaced persons have the right to return to their properties; the issue should be negotiated between the two sides; few displaced persons have the right to return to their properties; and no displaced persons have the right to return to their properties). 6. The future status of the Turkish settlers/immigrants – (All Turkish settlers/immigrants leave Cyprus; most Turkish settlers/immigrants leave Cyprus; the issue should be negotiated between the two sides; most Turkish settlers/immigrants stay in Cyprus; and all Turkish settlers/ immigrants stay in Cyprus). 7. Status of military buildup in Cyprus – (Complete de-militarization with only a small police force carrying light arms; partial reduction, small NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 275 Table 1. Positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on eight key issues∗ ISSUE Position of Greek Position of Turkish Cypriots and Greece Cypriots and Turkey Future Political System Strong Federation that Confederation between two requires minimal changes states of the 1960 system Guarantorship Multinational The 1960 Arrangement Three Freedoms Absolute Restricted Territorial Adjustment Based on the 70–30 Greek 29+% for the Turkish Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot Cypriot State population ratio Displaced Persons Right to return Highly restricted on right to return Future of the Turkish Must return to Turkey No forced return to Turkey mainland settlers Military Status of Cyprus Demilitarized Reduced military forces for both states EU Membership Cyprus joins the EU with or Settlement of the Cyprus without Turkish Cypriots problem prior to membership in the EU ∗ Raw data for the information in these tables is available from the authors by sending an e-mail to email@example.com. unified army; two sides reduce their armed forces but maintain separate armies; and escalated arms race). 8. EU membership – (Greek Cypriots in EU, Turkish Cypriots integrated with Turkey; Greek Cypriots in EU, Turkish Cypriots in EU if Turkey is in EU; United Cyprus in EU with explicit political equality; and United Cyprus in EU with no explicit political equality). Table 1 provides a summary of the positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the eight issues. The data in this table clearly confirms the growing polarization of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as Greece and Turkey, on all issues that are salient to the Cyprus problem. Based on this information, a simple game theoretic analysis of the current impasse in Cyprus negotiations was conducted. The subsequent payoff matrix for the current positions of the two sides is presented in Figure 1. Based on our interviews, it can be stated that the preference ordering of the two parties is: Turkish Cypriots : T>P>R>S Greek Cypriots : T>P>R>S 276 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN Figure 1. Strategic matrix of the current Cyprus impasse. The result is a deadlock game – a noncooperative, conflictual game. It is far more dangerous than if the two sides were locked in a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game of T>R>P>S. Unless the game is returned to a Prisoners' Dilemma, the likelihood of achieving a compromise via sequential bargaining is very slim. In a PD game, one can use the tit-for-tat strategy to attain the best outcome possible (as in the works of Anatol Rapoport). A third party mediator can bring about a cooperative game with binding threats and with a loss function attached to the payoffs (e.g., the works of Robert Axelrod and John Nash). The current deadlock game is a result of both sides receiving side- payments that unfortunately allow them to pursue a self-interested strategy of standing firm. Unless the side payment is aimed at promoting cooperation NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 277 and compromise, there is little chance of moving the parties away from a deadlock game with all of its inherent dangers. The side payments the two sides received that made their positions rigid are quite serious. Why is the Cyprus bargaining situation in such a critical deadlock impasse? To understand this we need to consider each party's decision calculus: Turkish Cypriots. The changes that took place since the Luxembourg summit decreased the Turkish Cypriots' evaluation for cooperation with respect to continued defection. Since EU membership was no longer expected as a reward for Turkish cooperation, the value of making concessions to the Greek Cypriots declined after December 1997. For a brief time following the Helsinki summit when Turkey attained candidacy status, there seemed to be some hope of bringing the two Cypriots sides to the negotiation table. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership refused to enter into direct talks and opted for proximity talks under the Secretary General's good offices. Yet, these talks failed to produce any tangible result. Under these circumstances Deadlock-type preferences (bully strategy) are a better characterization of Turkish Cypriot preferences to (T>P>R>S). For the hardliners in the TRNC and Ankara, it is no longer clear that the mutual cooperation outcome (R,R) is a Pareto improvement. For their part, the Turkish Cypriots led by Denktas can afford a deadlock strategy given Turkey's military superiority and the upper hand the hawks presently have in Ankara. In a Tit-for-Tat move, Ankara began matching EU-Cyprus moves with similar moves with the "TRNC". Given Turkey's military superiority and willingness to defend them against outside threats, the Turkish Cypriots assume that the Greeks will ultimately compromise. Greek Cypriots. Until the EU stated its position for Cyprus' accession in 2004, the Greek Cypriots were less rigid on their bargaining position than the Turkish Cypriots and followed a Prisoner's Dilemma (T>R>P>S) strategy. They had, after all, changed their position on the political system from a unitary state to a federal alternative. However, with the EU accession secured, the Greek side has become far less willing to meet the Turkish Cypriots in a compromise today. This revised position of the Greek Cypriots is best presented by a deadlock preference (T>P>R>S) of a bully strategy. In addition to these immediate challenges, there are larger issues that link the Cyprus problem to domestic political forces in Greece and Turkey and these parties' respective priorities over expansion of EU member- ship, regional foreign policy miscalculations (especially over US interests), and reforms (in Turkey). Accession of the Greek part of Cyprus to the 278 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN EU prior to a settlement would risk a serious crisis on the island, strain EU-Turkey relations (membership and security), cause a setback in Greek- Turkish rapprochement and destabilize the region, and potentially derail any hope for a NATO-ESDI (European Security Defense Identity) agreement. Here we see frightening scenarios being contemplated by influential policy advisors on both sides. For example, Greek nationalists believe that they can manipulate the EU to position the entire Union against the Turks in matters pertaining to Greek-Turkish problems. They still view the world in terms of the days immediately following the end of the Cold War and refuse to recognize that the West's security interests and policies toward Afghanistan and Iraq are indexed to Turkey's position on these matters. Moreover, the new geopolitics of the greater Eastern Mediterranean/Black Sea/Caucuses/Central Asia/Northern Middle East magnify Turkey's importance for the Atlantic Alliance. Turkish hardliners, on the other hand, view the world in terms of a post- Cold War international system and assume that the US would be satisfied in keeping this country in its sphere of influence, accepting a Greek/Cyprus alliance with the EU. They believe that the US and EU are engaged in a bitter power struggle and that they will be more than happy to take separate shares of the Eastern Mediterranean. In this environment, the anti-reformist political forces in Turkey plan to use Cyprus as their scapegoat to cause a rift in EU-Turkey relations. Conclusion and Prospects The analysis in this study demonstrates that the Cyprus conflict has entered a very delicate period in its protracted and troublesome history. There are strong domestic and international factors that create conditions for each side to follow a non-cooperative strategy aimed at unilateral victory. The resulting deadlock game carries with it a serious danger of distancing Turkey from the EU that, in turn, could weaken the position of democratic reformers in this country. It is against this background that the current negotiations are being held. The challenge for international mediators is to move the two parties away from deadlock and engage them in an iterated bargaining within a Prisoners' Dilemma framework (as the worst acceptable game option). In this regard, mediators could benefit from combining game theoretic analysis with multi-track diplomacy. Under these conditions, the ability of international mediators to move the two sides away from deadlock strategy and engage them in a Prisoners' Dilemma game will not be easy. As noted above, certain conditions must be present to promote a mutual cooperation (C,c) strategy that provides NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 279 mutual reward (R,R) . First, the mediation process can benefit from the "Contingency Model of Third-Party Intervention" (Keashly and Fisher 1996). The model combines prenegotiation and negotiation phases of mediation based on a rationale that assumes both an objective and subjective mix of views. The model has four stages: destruction; segregation; polarization; and discussion. Each stage has a series of third-party intervention sequences aimed at reducing tensions and improving communication between the parties. The final outcome is a negotiated settlement of differences (Keashly and Fisher 1996: 245). The Cyprus problem is currently in the discussion stage. Furthermore, a highly influential mediator must get involved in the negotiation/bargaining process. At present, the only such mediator that has substantial influence over Greece and Turkey, and therefore on the Cypriot parties as well, is the United States. While the US might not have placed such high priority to resolving the Cyprus issue before, the current impasse and its implications demand imme- diate American diplomatic intervention. This American intervention should be on multiple fronts involving the two Cypriot communities, Greece, Turkey, the UN, and the EU. Moreover, it must involve several issues simultaneously. The Secretary General can provide his good offices to set the stage for US participation. The US, in turn, should consider solving the Cyprus problem as a "high priority issue" on its own agenda and invite the leaders of the two sides to meet in the US in a summit retreat like the Dayton Agreement project. Several points must be satisfied before this is acceptable to the parties. First, the US must do all it can to promote deepening of good relations between Greece and Turkey. It can facilitate regional economic integration, social interaction, and political cooperation in the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. Everyone should consider the Franco-German example of the early days of the European Economic Community/EU and remember the dream of Jean Monnet of integrating the economies of these two countries to such an extent that war between them would not only be unthinkable but economically impossible. Second, the US must discourage Turkey from annexing the TRNC if the Greek side joins the EU before the Cyprus problem is settled. A restrained Turkish reaction would make it easier for Washington to mend fences between the two sides and minimize the damage caused to transatlantic relations. Third, the US must take over the mediation role in the Cyprus negotiations and bring all concerned parties together for a summit meeting in Camp David or at a similar place. In this regard, assurances on the political equality of the two Cypriot communities must be emphasized. The UN Secretary Generals repeatedly made it clear that the relationship between the Greek Cypriots 280 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN and Turkish Cypriots is not one of majority-minority relations but between political equals. Somewhere during the last year, this point has become vague in the minds of the two parties and it needs to be readdressed if for no other reason than to set aside the fear of the Turkish Cypriots of being placed under a future Greek majority government. Fourth, the renewed bargaining process needs to be a cooperative game with binding threats (see John Harsanyi and James Marrow) so that the two sides know the consequences of derailing the negotiation process. In the sequential bargaining that follows, there should be an effective loss function attached to the expected utility each side desires to obtain. This loss function guarantees the sides' adherence to the rules of bargaining and prevents them from dragging out the talks. This scenario follows Ariel Rubinstein's model and is quite effective. The side payments that the mediator brings to the table must be real and positive to induce compromise. Certainly, the various possible target zones presented in Figure 1 (box C,c) allow ample room for negotiated compromises on a number of crucial points. For example, Turkey can get a clear timetable from the EU for membership; in other words, starting the accession talks as the Cyprus issue is settled. Similarly, if Greece receives assurances from the EU-NATO similar to the one Turkey received in the Ankara Agreement on the ESDI, they will be more inclined to pressure their kin on the island to reach a compromise. Issues specific to a US summit can focus on attaining the following compromises: 1. At present, the two leaders are talking past each other. Moreover, their statements signal a worsening of the positions held earlier by each side. Clerides talks about fine-tuning the existing constitutional order that is less than a partnership of two federal states. Denktas, on the other hand, insists on two sovereign states coming together in a partnership. However, not everyone on either side of the island agrees with these positions. A middle ground can be formulated where two Cypriot federal states are announced simultaneously while abolishing the 1960 constitutional order. This would be a new partnership based on political equality – an equality that existed under the 1960 agreements. 2. The new federal state can have a president and a vice president. The Greeks and Turks can alternate in holding each post for a five-year term. This compromise solution can create a vice presidency without veto power. The senate and lower house of the federal legislature can have checks and balances on the executive branch (see below). 3. There can be a federal legislature, preferably bicameral. The lower house can be based on population ratio and revised as each states' populations change. The senate can be formulated based on equal representation. NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 281 4. There can be a federal supreme court with equal representation of the judges appointed by the president and the senate. 5. Each state can have its own government with a governor, state legislature, and local administrations. 6. EU law can apply for the freedoms of movement, settlement, and prop- erty rights, but population ratios must be maintained to guarantee a majority for Turks and Greeks in their respective states. This is crucial for the initial phase of state building since there is very little trust between the two communities. Initial return of refugees to their former homes can be kept to a minimum to prevent disturbances between the two sides. 7. Territorial adjustment can be approximately 29 percent for the Turkish state and 71 percent for the Greek state. 8. Federal trade zones can be established to facilitate joint economic activities between the two business communities. 9. Property rights can be addressed with appropriate compensation to those who left their possessions in the other state. 10. As for foreign policy, the senate can ratify the agreements signed by the president. International treaties (e.g., EU treaties) can be ratified by each state legislature as well. 11. Cyprus and Greece can agree to support, and not block, Turkey's membership in the EU. 12. The new federal republic of Cyprus cannot have an army of its own. 13. NGOs of the two communities can work together and interaction between them can start immediately. 14. Security and defense of Cyprus can be guaranteed by a EU-Turkey agree- ment. A joint ESDI-NATO presence on the island (commanded by the US) that includes a Turkish contingent could serve as a good vehicle for promoting collaboration that meets more than one objective: Security for the Turkish Cypriots, security for the Greek Cypriots, collaboration between the EU and NATO, and a model for the future ESDI-NATO partnership. 15. Simultaneous signing of the Cyprus agreements (federal republic, two separate federal states, security agreements, etc.) can be coupled with the EU starting accession talks with Turkey. This will place Turkey at the same level with all the other candidate countries that are required to meet the Copenhagen criteria for membership. Turkey is the only candidate that has been told to meet the criteria prior to the start of the accession talks. 282 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN Finally, a Truth and Reconciliation Committee can be established to examine each side's grievances and propose "just" resolutions, similar to the one in South Africa. Finger pointing by each side must come to an end and each side must be willing to accept their part in the Cyprus problem. Notes 1. From statements made by Rauf Denktas, president of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Only Turkey recognizes the TRNC. The United Nations refuses to accept its legitimacy. 2. From interviews with President Rauf R. Denktas of the "TRNC" in Nicosia Cyprus, July 1994. 3. Ibid. 4. Vassiliou discussed his proposals for the intercommunal negotiations in the parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on January 31, 1990 and also during his visit to the United States in 1990 when he spoke to the National Press Club. 5. Vassiliou was successful in getting the international community to identify Denktas as the reason for deadlock in negotiations (e.g., the Commonwealth and the Non-aligned movement). Also he successfully rearmed the Greek Cypriot National Guard. When asked about his views on these matters in an interview with Hasan Ali Biçak, Vassiliou joked about his actions and blamed Denktas for the failure of the "Set of Ideas." He never accepted the fact that he also opposed the "Set of Ideas." 6. Denktas did not believe that Clerides or the other Greek Cypriot leaders accepted the confidence building measures. Hasan Ali Biçak confirmed this later when he interviewed the representatives of the Greek Cypriot political parties during March 9–11, 1994. All of the representatives, except that of ADISOK (having a potential voter support base of 3 percent in the Greek Cypriot community), voiced their opposition to the measures. Thus, despite Clerides' public statement that he would accept the confidence building measures if Denktas went along, the initiative was a well-calculated plan to put Denktas in an awkward position. Denktas, knowing the Greek Cypriot leader's position , would oppose the measures and Clerides would look to the rest of the world as the sincere player. 7. For the effects of this decision on TRNC exports see, Birol A. Yesilada and Hasan Ali Biçak, "The European Court of Justice Decision on Trade with Northern Cyprus: Implic- ations for the Cyprus Conflict," paper presented at the 1995 Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, in Chicago, IL, August 31–September 3, 1995. 8. As Azar states, "protracted conflicts are hostile interactions that extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination . . . Protracted conflicts, that is to say, are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point in time, they are processes (emphasis added)." For a detailed discussion, see Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts Ten Propositions," International Interactions 12, 1(1985), 59–70, and Birol Yesilada and Joseph Hewitt, "Conflict, Negotiation, and Third-Party Intervention In Cyprus." For conceptual understanding, it is helpful to consider the basic terminology used in a game theoretic analysis. The following figure and terminology can assist in operationalizing the Cyprus conflict: NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 283 Turkish Cypriots c d C (R,R) (S,T) Greek Cypriots D (T,S) (P,P) where strategies C, for cooperation or compromise, and D, for defections or standing firm with one's own position. The payoffs are, T, for temptation to win unilaterally: R, for reward for mutual compromise; P, for punishment against mutual defec- tion; and S, for sucker. It is commonly assumed that R>(S+T)/2. When the preference ordering of the game becomes T>R>P>S for both parties, the game is called a Prisoners Dilemma game (where both sides choose D as their dominant strategies). If the preference ordering of both parties becomes T>P>R>S it is called a deadlock game (where, again, D is the dominant strategy for each player). A variant of these games is the Chicken game where the preference ordering of the parties is T>R>S>P. In a prisoners' dilemma game, the (D,d) or (P,P) cell represents a Nash equilibrium which is Pareto inferior to the (C,c) or (R,R) option. Here, individual rationality drives players to defect and win unilaterally even when cooperation can be a viable option (see James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 263). These variants can be viewed in the following game theoretic matrices: DEADLOCK c d c d C R,R S,T C 2,2 1,4 D T,S P,P∗ D 4,1 3,3∗ ∗ Dominant strategy equilibrium. PRISONERS DILEMMA c d c d C R,R S,T C 3,3 1,4 D T,S P,P∗∗ D 4,1 2,2∗∗ ∗ Nash equilibrium. CHICKEN GAME c d c d C R,R S,T C 2,2 2,4 D T,S P,P D 4,2 1,1 284 BIROL A. YESILADA AND AHMET SOZEN 9. For a detailed discussion of how this is possible, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod and Doug Dion, "The Further Evolution of Cooperation," Science 242 (1988): 1385–1390; Scott Gates and Brian D. Humes, Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997; ch. 4; James Morrow, Game Theory, pp. 263–268; Michael Nicholson, Formal Theories in Interna- tional Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 30–35; and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 88–106. 10. However, as Scott Gates and David Humes warn, contrary to the argument of many polit- ical scientists, mutual cooperation is just one of many possible equilibrium points in an infinitely repeated game, for details see Ibid., pp. 94–95. 11. We are grateful to the Rotary International Foundation for providing Ahmet Sozen a Paul Harris Ambassadorial Fellowship in 1997 that enabled him to complete the first phase of the surveys in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. References Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Axelrod, R. and Dion, D. (1988) "The further evolution of cooperation," Science 242: 1385– 1390. Azar, E.E. (1985) "Protracted international conflicts ten propositions," International Interac- tions 12(1), 59–70. Azar, E.E., Jureidini, P. and McLaurin, R. (1978) "Protracted social conflict: Theory and practice in the Middle East," Journal of Palestine Studies VIII(29): 41–60. Commission of the European Communities (1972) Agreement Establishing an Association Between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Economic Community. SEC (72) 4552, Brussels. Council Decision (EC) No. 248/2000 of 20 March 2000 on the principles, priorities, inter- mediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Cyprus, which entered into force on 1 April 2000. Council Regulation (EC) No. 555/2000 of 13 March 2000 on the implementation of operations in the framework of the pre-accession strategy for the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Malta, which entered into force on 19 March 2000. European Council Presidency Conclusions, "Luxembourg summit," http://europa.eu.int/ council/off/conclu/dec97.htm European Communities. Council Decision (1989) Protocol on Financial and Technical Cooperation Between the EC and the Republic of Cyprus. Article 2. European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court. Case C-432/92, 5 July 1994. European Economic Community. Protocol for the Implementation of the Second Stage of the Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus. Brussels. Gates, S. and Humes, B. (1997) Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Harsanyi, J.C. (1989) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University. NEGOTIATING A RESOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 285 Harsanyi, J.C. and Selten, R. (1972) "A generalized Nash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete information," Management Science 18(5) part II: 80–106. Keashly, L. and Fisher, R.J. (1996) "A contingency perspective on conflict interventions: Theoretical and practical considerations," in J. Bercovitch, editor, Resolving International Conflicts. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, pp. 235–261. Mayhew, A. (1996) "Going beyond the Europe agreements: The European Union's strategy for accession," in F. Franzmeyer and C. Weise, editors, Polen und die Osterweiterung der Europeischen Union. Berlin: Sonderhefte des DIW No. 158, pp. 13–37. Morrow, J. (1994) Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rasmusen E. (1989) Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Redmond, J. and Rosenthal, G., editors (1998) The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. Republic of Cyprus. 16 August 1960. The Treaty of Guarantee. http://www.cypnet.com/ ncyprus/cyproblem/ganati.html and http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/treaty.html Rubinstein, A. (1982) "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model," Econometrica 50: 97–109. Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. Snyder, G.H. and Diesing, P. (1977) Conflict Among Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tamkoç, M. (1988) The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self- Determination. London: K. Rüstem & Brother. Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1977) Guidelines of Denktas-Makarios Summit Meeting. Nicosia: Enformasyon Dairesi Yayinlari. United Kingdom, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee (1987), "Cyprus," Third report. Session 1986–1987. London. United Nations Secretary-General, Report on Cyprus. (November 19, 1992). United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus. S/26026. July 1, 1993. von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Yesilada, B.A. and Biçak, H.A. (1995) "The European Court of Justice decision on trade with Northern Cyprus: Implications for the Cyprus conflict," paper presented at the 1995 Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, in Chicago, Illinois. Yesilada, B. and Hewitt, J. (1998) "Conflict, negotiation, and third-party intervention in Cyprus: A game theoretic analysis," paper presented at the 1998 Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois. April 23–28 at the Palmer House. Yesilada, B. and Hewitt, J. (1989) "Social progress and political development in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," Cyprus Review 1(2) (Fall): 90–113.
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This is a great place for families (as evidenced by the many children in the pools!). The suites are very large (we had a two-bedroom/two bath), with decent hang out space for when the family wants to be together. (Or has to be inside because of childrens' bedtime.) Nice verandas and an adequate kitchen with mini-fridge, microwave and sink -... More
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"Not happy"
I'll start by saying that I love the Reacher books and have read a couple of them more than once. This one is terrible. Dick Hill is superb, as usual but Lee Child is not. This one is so full of endless description of everything except action that I found myself dozing off more than once. I figured out the "mystery" way before Reacher did and I hate when that happens. I'm sure that die hard fans like myself will discount this review and buy it anyway and I'm not trying to discourage you from doing that. I'm just saying that much of what I love about the series (action) is not present in this one. Don't even get me started on the ending...
I can see the point of some of the negative reviews posted here. There was some superfluous detail and the end was slightly contrived. I suppose I'm a little jaded, maybe a lot jaded. It's all about the journey in this one. I very much enjoyed the twists and turns of the story. Coben even made me a little teary eyed at times. I didn't figure this one out until the end and that, to me, is the definition of a good mystery. Great narrator as well. It was recommended to me by one of my students and I intend to thank him next week.
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Premier League - Bale considers foreign move
Mon, 04 Apr 10:05:00 2011
Tottenham winger Gareth Bale has not ruled out one day plying his trade in another country if a "great opportunity" was presented to him.
Bale has been catapulted into the limelight following some impressive performances with Spurs this season, not least his stunning Champions League hat-trick against Internazionale at the San Siro in October.
Subsequently a host of big-name clubs have been linked with a move for the Welshman, including the likes of Inter and Spanish giants Barcelona and Real Madrid.
But the 21-year-old recently committed himself to Spurs by penning a new four-and-a-half year contract.
However, that does not mean Bale is not willing to try his hand at playing abroad further down the line.
The former Southampton player telling Spanish daily AS: "You never know, but I'm not afraid to leave the country.
"If a great opportunity arises you need to seriously consider it. I left home at 15.
"If I leave the Premier League, I'll learn another language, I'll know other people, another country, I will grow as a person.
"There aren't more British players abroad because the league is very strong, but now yours (the Spanish league) has got Cristiano (Ronaldo), (Lionel) Messi..."
PA Sport


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|Reviews for Time can change so much
| horsesrules chapter 12 . 3/21/2012
write more please
| janjan2009 chapter 12 . 2/1/2012
uh oh...Jasper's gonna be diappointed...
| Legolas' Girl 31 chapter 12 . 1/29/2012
Great chapter, I liked it. I can't wait to read more.
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 12 . 1/28/2012
Loved it! Can't wait to see what will happen next!
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 11 . 1/28/2012
Loved it!
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 10 . 1/28/2012
Loved it!
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 9 . 1/28/2012
Loved it!
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 8 . 1/28/2012
Loved it!
| the captains wife chapter 12 . 1/27/2012
I hope Jasper doesn't freak out! Bella did the right thing!
| TwilightAddict71484 chapter 12 . 1/27/2012
i don't see what the problem is..she just proved she could be around blood spill...the girl was hit in the head! post again soon.
| LuvinTwilight143 chapter 12 . 1/27/2012
I think Bella and Jasper should move back to there place I know Rose is only trying to helo but Bella would never hurt her own children and Jasper and Bella need to be a family with the twins on there own for a little bit.
I don't think its bad that Bella killed that guy she can be the same as Peter and Charlotte were and just kill the nad guys and if people have a problem with it them who cares it her life and her choice
great chapter loved it
| SavageGraceX chapter 12 . 1/27/2012
Nobody better bitch at her for saving that girl - especially Rosabitch. e_e And I don't buy Rosalie's claim that she's only trying to protect the babies - she clearly playing mommy and that isn't right! And if Jasper is agreeing with it... that's just wrong of him e_e I still vote for them to move to their own place, far enough away from the Cullens that they can only come for short visits e_e
| PaulaB87 chapter 11 . 1/1/2012
awesome so lookig forward to next chapter
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 7 . 11/30/2011
Loved it!
| HeavenlyAngel34 chapter 6 . 11/29/2011
Loved it!


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Our special coverage of the closest race for years
Meet Malaysia's first female mixed martial artist
03 Aug 2012 23:48 GMT | Europe, France, Spain
A Spanish judge has jailed one of three suspected al-Qaeda members arrested for allegedly planning an attack in Europe, postponing a decision on the other two until Sunday.
The judge on Friday jailed a Turk accused of being an al-Qaeda operative for "possession of explosive substances and devices with terrorist aims", but did not agree with prosecutors that the man belonged to a terrorist group, the source said.
Two Chechen suspects also accused of belonging to al-Qaeda are currently being held for questioning while police continue their investigation.
The Turkish man's lawyer said his client, who denied all charges against him, is an engineer for a multinational company who has lived in Gibraltar for seven years and has legal residence in Britain.After the men's arrest on Wednesday, Interior Minister Jorge Fernandez Diaz said investigators had a "clear indication" that the men had been planning an attack in Spain or elsewhere in Europe.He called the suspects "extremely dangerous people", including one who was "a very important operative in al-Qaeda's international structure".
Two of the suspects were travelling in a bus towards France when they were arrested in a layby at Valdepenas by a police special operations group, according Spain's El Pais newspaper.
The Turkish man was reportedly arrested in a flat near La Linea de la Concepion, in the southern province of Andalucia, where police also discovered explosives allegedly being stored by the group.
In attacks on the capital, Madrid's, train system eight years ago, 191 people died and 1,800 were wounded.
Source: Agencies
Trio face questioning by judge on Friday over allegations they were planning attacks in Spain and elsewhere in Europe.
Europe, Spain
Nigerians are flooding home for Saturday's vote, but fears of violence grow amid the too-close-to-call election.
Nigeria Decides, Nigeria, Africa
More than 800 people were killed and 65,000 displaced in religion-based election violence in 2011 in the central city.
Nigeria Decides, Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan
More than 100 people were gunned down in Maidan Square a year ago, but investigations have failed to bring prosecutions.
Human Rights, Politics, War & Conflict
Religious practice involves ceremonial dancing, singing and body piercing - which are not allowed in mainstream Islam.
Religion, Europe, Albania
Saudi-led forces bomb military bases controlled by the rebels as civilian death toll reportedly rises to 39.
War & Conflict, Middle East, Yemen, Houthis, Iran
At least seven people killed and hostages held at hotel popular with government officials in Mogadishu.
War & Conflict, Africa, Somalia, Al-Shabab
It is a source of sustenance but also of tension and new political realities are now increasing uncertainty.
Egypt, Sudan, Middle East
A media post-mortem into the UK's surveillance report. Plus, why five years on in Argentina the media looks so familiar.
Media, Edward Snowden, Security
The untold story of how the Lebanese community overcame the odds and found their place in multicultural Australia.
Asia Pacific, Australia, Lebanon
How to keep a telenovela profitable and demanding sponsors happy while inspiring the production team to stay passionate.
Arts & Culture, Mexico, Latin America


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Arizona Coyotes
Phoenix Coyotes announce long-term extension for GM Don Maloney
The Phoenix Coyotes and general manager Don Maloney agreed to terms on a long-term contract extension on Friday afternoon.
The details of the contract were not disclosed by the team.
The Coyotes have enjoyed great success under Maloney's guidance. In six seasons with the club, the 'Yotes have amassed a record of 230-172-56, and have clinched three playoff berths.
"I am grateful to continue working for this franchise," Maloney said in a statement following the announcement. "We have a strong core of talented people, both on and off the ice, who are committed to building a championship team and a first class organization. I would like to thank NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman and Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly for their tremendous support these past few years."
Maloney became the GM of the Coyotes on May 29, 2007 and is the seventh general manager in franchise history.
Most Popular
Coyotes Audio
- Dave Tippett- Coyotes head coachDave Tippett says neither team was trying to lose last night in Buffalo.
- Jeremy White- WGR 550 Morning Show HostJeremy White describes the atmosphere in Buffalo when the Yotes came to town.
- Jeremy White- WGR 550 Morning Show HostJeremy White says the Sabres have been planning on losing all along.
- Bickley BlastThe Coyotes have a must-lose hockey game tonight.
- Shane Doan, Coyotes captainShane Doan says he and his teammates would never tank a game.


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CityBBQ Flyer
Anthony Thomas Candy Bar Fundraiser
*Begins NOW!!!
(If these times do not work for you, give me a call or text, I would be happy to make other
Call or text Trina Wemlinger 614-561-8632
What is AmazonSmile?
AmazonSmile is a website operated by Amazon that lets customers enjoy the same wide selection of products, low prices, and convenient shopping features as on Amazon.com. The difference is that when customers shop on AmazonSmile (smile.amazon.com), the AmazonSmile Foundation will donate 0.5% of the price of eligible purchases to the charitable organizations selected by customers.
How does AmazonSmile work?
When first visiting AmazonSmile, customers are prompted to select a charitable organization from almost one million eligible organizations. In order to browse or shop at AmazonSmile, customers must first select a charitable organization. For eligible purchases at AmazonSmile, the AmazonSmile Foundation will donate 0.5% of the purchase price to the customer's selected charitable organization.
By using your Kroger Plus card when you check-out, booster members (and their family and friends) can earn funds for the Grove City High School Band programs.
Register or re-register your Kroger Plus Cards online at Kroger's secure website, www.kroqercommunityrewards.com.
In order for the Grove City High School Band Boosters to receive funds, you will need our group's Kroger Community Rewards organization number which is 81540.
See the Kroger Cards tab below the Fundraisers tab for more detail.http://gchsbands.org/index.php/fundraisers/kroger-cards
What is Scrip?
The Band Boosters sell gift cards through the Great Lakes Scrip Center (GLSC). Gift cards are available for over 500 retailers including department stores, restaurants, grocery stores, home improvement stores, theatres, electronic stores, gas stations, hotels, airlines and online stores.
Getting Started
To start ordering Scrip you need to register at www.shopwithscrip.com.
Eighty percent (80%) of your Scrip earnings will go into your family account while the remaining twenty percent (20%) will go into the Band's general fund. A packing slip will be included with your gift cards showing how much your family earned with the order.
See the Scrip tab below the Fundraisers tab for more detail.
Please contact Angel Wenger (Fundraiser Chair) at 614-397-8972 if you have any questions or concerns


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Ryrie NAS Study Bible Soft Touch Burgundy, Red Letter, Indexed
- Version▼▲
- Audience▼▲
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- Color▼▲
- Helps & Features▼▲
- Language▼▲
- References▼▲
- Text Color▼▲
- Text Layout▼▲
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Product Description
"The Bible is the greatest of all books; to study it is the noblest of all pursuits; to understand it the highest of all goals."- Dr. Charles C. Ryrie
Regardless of how many Bibles you may already have, a study Bible is a must if you intend to deepen your understanding of God, His character, His methods, and His commands.
The Ryrie NASB Study Bible (1995 New American Standard Lockman Foundation translation) is purposely designed to keep the focus on God's Word, the 10,000 explanatory notes are written to enhance, not comment on Scripture.
Whether you are a new believer or a mature Christian, Dr. Ryrie includes helpful articles to further your knowledge of the Bible.
- Helpful articles by Dr. Ryrie's to further your knowledge of the Bible
- Wider margins allow you to add your thoughts, notes, and insights
- In-text supporting maps, charts, timelines, and diagrams
- 16 full-color maps
- 8-page historical timeline
- Thorough topical index
- Comprehensive concordance
- Words of Jesus in red
- Free WORDsearch™ software download valued at over $400
- Presentation page
- 9-point text
- 9.50" x 7.00" x 1.50"
Product Information
|Format: Imitation Leather
Number of Pages: 1880
Vendor: Moody Publishers
Publication Date: 2012
Dimensions: 9.25 X 6.69 (inches)
Availability: In Stock
Text Layout: Wide Margin
Text Color: Red Letter
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Ryrie NAS Study Bible Hardback, Red Letter, IndexedCharles C. RyrieMoody Publishers / 2012 / Hardcover$36.99 Retail:5 Stars Out Of 5 2 Reviews
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Ryrie NAS Study Bible Genuine Leather Black, Red LetterCharles C. RyrieMoody Publishers / 2012 / Genuine Leather$56.99 Retail:4 Stars Out Of 5 41 Reviews
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Ryrie NAS Study Bible Genuine Leather Burgundy, Red Letter, IndexedCharles C. RyrieMoody Publishers / 2012 / Genuine Leather$62.99 Retail:4 Stars Out Of 5 41 Reviews
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Ryrie NAS Study Bible Soft Touch Black, Red LetterCharles C. RyrieMoody Publishers / 2012 / Imitation Leather$44.99 Retail:4 Stars Out Of 5 41 Reviews
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Publisher's Description
"The Bible is the greatest of all books; to study it is the noblest of all pursuits; to understand it, the highest of all goals."-Dr. Charles C. Ryrie
Charles Ryrie's life work has been to help people know and understand the Bible-a pursuit that has encompassed church ministry, college professorships, and, most notably, holding the Systematic Theology Chair and being Dean of Doctoral Studies at Dallas Theological Seminary. The Ryrie Study Bible reflects this lifetime of biblical scholarship in a single, powerful work.
Since its initial publication in 1978, The Ryrie Study Bible has sold more than 2.6 million copies, giving countless Bible readers a firmer grasp on "the greatest of books." Available in multiple translations and containing more than 10,000 of Dr. Ryrie's explanatory notes, The Ryrie Study Bible is a single source for all Bible study needs.
Included are detailed sections for broad biblical comprehension:
¿ A Synopsis of Bible Doctrine
¿ The Inspiration of the Bible
¿ Understanding the Bible
¿ How We Got Our Bible
¿ The Meaning and Blessings of Salvation
¿ Archeology and the Bible
¿ A Brief Survey of Church History
Additional features:
¿ In-text graphics, including maps, charts, timelines, and diagrams
¿ Book outlines in easy-to-read format
¿ Extensive cross references
¿ Expanded topical index
¿ Comprehensive concordance
¿ Detailed introduction to each book
¿ Introduction to the Old and New Testaments and the Gospels
¿ All-new 16 full-color maps
¿ 8-page historical timeline
¿ Daily Bible reading plan
¿ Thinner: 20% fewer pages than older versions
¿ Wide margins for better note taking
Author Bio
Product Reviews
Priscilla E White3 Stars Out Of 5Rurie NAS Study BibleJanuary 30, 2015Priscilla E WhiteQuality: 3Value: 3Meets Expectations: 5This review was written for Ryrie NAS Study Bible Bonded Leather Black, Red Letter, Indexed.The paper was too thin and the numbers were too small. Didn't like the red lettering.
susan4 Stars Out Of 5nice BibleJanuary 11, 2015susanQuality: 5Value: 5Meets Expectations: 4This review was written for Ryrie NAS Study Bible Genuine Leather Burgundy, Red Letter.ordered burgundy but looks more like dusty brown color.
Henry4 Stars Out Of 5Ryrie NAS Study BibleDecember 12, 2014HenryQuality: 4Value: 4Meets Expectations: 4This review was written for Ryrie NAS Study Bible Genuine Leather Burgundy, Red Letter.The quality is pretty good. I like the different font sizes and layout of the text. Overall is it a nice looking Bible.
There are two things I would like to see improved on. First and foremost, a better quality and thicker paper would be a tremendous improvement. I am willing to pay more for the Bible if Ryrie could use better paper.
Secondly, the verse numbers need to be larger in size. It is hard to find them when you need to find a verse.
LJM5 Stars Out Of 5Ryrie Study BibleDecember 2, 2014LJMThis review was written for Ryrie NAS Study Bible Hardback, Red Letter.I'm rather surprised at some of the reviews I've read; 'Shallow' is the word that comes to mind. I thought that the point of 'The Word' was just that...reading the word...no matter what the outside wrapping is, it's what is inside that matters! I bought the hard back with red wording & finger index. Let me say that I am well pleased with this bible! To those that seem to think that they need a "leather look" to their bibles and then are not happy with their purchase...maybe you should just go with the hardback & order a bible cover that suits your taste. That's what I did. But please remember, it is the word of God that you are purchasing that matters, not the cover. After all...the early church didn't even have the written word, it was spoken. Corrie Ten Boom had just a few scriptures written on scraps of paper while she languished in a Nazi concentration camp....so lets be thankful for the whole written word of God copies that we have shall we? God Bless.
Half pint5 Stars Out Of 5Ryrie NAS Study BibleOctober 3, 2014Half pintQuality: 5Value: 5Meets Expectations: 5This review was written for Ryrie NAS Study Bible Hardback, Red Letter.It is a good study Bible.
Ask Christianbook
Q: What's the difference in the 2010 Ryrie Study Bible NASB (WW475855) and the new 2012 edition (WW484640)? Is the 2012 edition just a smaller overall size with smaller font size and fewer pages?
In addition to smaller size and font, and fewer pages, the 2012 edition has center column references instead of marginal references. It also features a paragraph text style rather than the older verse-over-verse or left-hand justified text format.
Ask Christianbook
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Re: Authorized Users and Credit Scoring?
devon22ou wrote:
To piggy back off my most recent question about putting an authorized user on accounts to help their credit score, would it be more legit and less "cheating" if I put that person on a credit card that we both pay 50/50 on?
I personally wouldn't see it as cheating. Just pay 100% of the bill yourself and have the other person pay you directly. Also accept any responsibility if they charge too much. I've seen some posts in here where the CC holder refused to pay a bill their friend or relative ran up without their consent. IMO, I'd never do it. I'd tell them to get their own CCs and get a secured CC if needed.
(5,321 Views)


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Cop featured on "Boston's Finest" commits suicide
Patrick Rogers, an 8-year veteran of the Boston PD killed himself - shocking his department and docudrama cast-mates
By PoliceOne Staff
DORCHESTER, Mass. — The season two premiere of the reality show "Boston's Finest", which details the work and personal lives of the Boston Police Department, was abruptly put on hold when word got out that one of the cast members and a Boston cop had apparently committed suicide.
Patrick Rogers, an 8-year veteran of the department and a native of Dorchester, took his own life, though it is unclear how.
Rogers was featured in several episodes of the first season of the docudrama, which is produced by Dorchester native Donnie Wahlberg, according to the Boston Herald.
"I am so deeply saddened tonight. My thoughts and prayers go out to a fallen brother of The Boston Police Dept.," Wahlberg tweeted Tuesday night.
The second season, which focuses on the officers who responded to the Boston Marathon bombings, was set to debut Tuesday night at the Revere Hotel in Dorchester, where Mayor Tom Menino and interim police Commissioner William Evans were expected at attend, according to the Metro.
The screening was canceled immediately after producers received news of Rogers' death.
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Cop featured on "Boston's Finest" commits suicide
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Nonresidential building activity heated in Southwest County
Those developments range from The Commons, a 550,000-square-foot retail center on about 55 acres along Winchester Road where Clinton Keith Road is expected to be punched through. Developers are targeting the spring of 2006 for that opening, Vollbrecht said.
There is also an estimated 450,000-square-foot retail center, dubbed The Orchard at Stone Creek, planned at the northwest corner of Clinton Keith Road and Interstate 215 near Vista Murrieta High School. As well as the Home Center along Los Alamos Road at Interstate 215.
The 230,000-square-foot center will host a variety of furniture-related outfits, such as Arizona Leather, Thomasville Gallery, Plummers Furniture and Wicks Furniture. Borre Winckel, executive director of the Riverside County Chapter of the Building Industry Association, said developers of these projects are doing what comes naturally.
"They are chasing the rooftops," Winckel said.
Contact staff writer Wyatt Haupt at (951) 676-4315, Ext.2615, or firstname.lastname@example.com .


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Audi Repair in Delray Beach
We found 35 Audi service shops and mechanics in Delray Beach.
3 are RepairPal Certified.
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502 N.E. 3rd St(561) 430-2931
Boynton Beach, FL 33435Map & directions
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German Auto World Services, Inc
2165 W Atlantic Ave(561) 285-3663
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Two Tone Gold Wedding Band TT-555
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Moreland School District
4711 Campbell Avenue
San Jose, CA 95130-1790
Phone: (408) 874-2900
Fax: (408) 374-8827
Welcome to the Moreland School District
Registration Now Open for the 2015-2016 School Year
Registration for the 2015-2016 school year is now open. Open Enrollment has also started, and will continue through March 31st. All enrollment and new student registration is handled at the Moreland School District Enrollment Center.
For more information, please visit our Enrollment page.
Theresa Molinelli Wins Gouldin Foundation Award
Payne Elementary Principal Theresa Molinelli (left),
with Assistant Principal Katie Berg
Theresa Molinelli, Principal of Payne Elementary School, has been named as a 2015 winner of the Goldin Foundation for Excellence in Education Award.
An innovative leader and champion of students, Theresa is being recognized for her exemplary approach that has led to educational excellence for all Payne students. Since joining Payne in 2009, Theresa has worked with her staff to implement authentic teacher collaboration, systematic data analysis, research-based instructional practices, and strategic interventions, reaching toward a goal of educational excellence.
Under Theresa's leadership and through her innovation, Payne's Academic Performance Index (API) climbed 84 points to 902 and Payne was selected as a 2014 California Distinguished School. Theresa's leadership, dedication, and knowledge of education have created a culture of teachers who work to meet the individual needs of each child, and a culture of students who are academically exceeding expectations.
Moreland Summer Camp
Moreland Summer Camp is an action-packed day camp that includes a variety of hands-on learning opportunities surrounding engaging and exciting themes. Our fun-filled themes include:
Animation Nation
American Heroes
Amazingly Awesome Animals
Campers Can Cook!
Run! Jump! Play!
The camp includes weekly field trips, swimming, and spirit days, and is open to all Moreland School District students. For more information, please visit here: Moreland Summer Camp.
Latimer Expands to Offer Middle School
Moreland School District announced that Latimer Elementary School will expand to offer middle school, beginning next school year. Starting by offering 6th grade in the 2015/2016 school year, Latimer will be a full Transitional Kindergarten – 8th grade school by the year 2017/2018. Additional information is available here.
Parcel Tax Exemption for Seniors
On May 5, 2009, voters approved a special Parcel Tax assessment for $95.00 per parcel for eight years. Parcel Tax funds allow Moreland School District to attract and retain qualified teachers, maintain high-quality science, reading and math programs, including classroom technology and learning materials, keep class size small and keep school libraries open and accessible to students. The tax is assessed against each parcel of taxable land within MSD boundaries.
Exemptions from the $95.00 Parcel Tax are available to Senior Citizens (65 years or older) who own and occupy, as a principal residence, a parcel and apply to the District for exemption.
In addition, we have available Supplemental Security Income Exemption (owner/occupants receiving supplemental security income for a disability) and a Contiguous Parcel Tax Exemption. Applications are due beginning March 1, 2015 until June 15, 2015. Please pass this information along to the seniors in your neighborhood.
To file for exemption from the parcel tax, seniors must apply in person and bring the following items with them.
• Proof of birth (driver's license, birth certificate, medi-cal card, or passport)
• Proof of residence (current utility bill, DMV identification card)
• Proof of ownership (property tax bill, tax bill w/homeowner's exemption)
Seniors who applied last year for the exemption will be mailed a renewal form on or around March 1, 2015 for this year. They need to sign, date and mail their form to the District Office, 4711 Campbell Ave. SJ, CA 95130, Attention: Debbi Lyon, Business Services. For questions, please call (408) 874-2921.
Come Work with Kids
We're looking for substitute teachers who are passionate about helping students develop a love of learning and want to work in a supportive community of educators. Does this sound like you? If so, please apply to join our team on EdJoin.org.
Qualified substitutes must hold a current California teaching credential or 30-day sub permit and pass a pre-employment fingerprint check.
Please click on the following links to get information on specific services or programs:
The Moreland School District, a caring learning partnership of students, parents, staff, and community will empower all students through innovative and exemplary educational practices, with the knowledge, skills and critical thinking abilities to become contributing and responsible members of a global society.
Read the Superintendent's Latest Message
Quick Links:
Local Control Accountability Plan (LCAP)
Common Core State Standards
Wei Yu Charter School Appeal Update
Moreland Seeking individuals in serving on Bond Oversight and Parcel Tax Committees:
Application for Committee