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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough
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Chapter 1
SCHOPENHAUER famously called the mind-body problem a "Weltknoten," or "world-knot," and he was surely right. The problem, however, is not really a single problem; it is a cluster of connected problems about the relationship between mind and matter. What these problems are depends on a broader framework of philosophical and scientific assumptions and presumptions within which the questions are posed and possible answers formulated. For the contemporary physicalist, there are two problems that truly make the mind-body problem a Weltknoten, an intractable and perhaps ultimately insoluble puzzle. They concern mental causation and consciousness. The problem of mental causation is to answer this question: How can the mind exert its causal powers in a world that is fundamentally physical? The problem of consciousness is to answer the following question: How can there be such a thing as consciousness in a physical world, a world consisting ultimately of nothing but bits of matter distributed over space-time behaving in accordance with physical law? As it turns out, the two problems are interconnected--the two knots are intertwined, and this makes it all the more difficult to unsnarl either of them.
Devising an account of mental causation has been, for the past three decades, one of the main preoccupations of philosophers of mind who are committed to physicalism in one form or another. The problem of course is not new: as every student of western philosophy knows, Descartes, who arguably invented the mind-body problem, was forcefully confronted by his contemporaries on this issue.1 But this does not mean that Descartes's problem is our problem. His problem, as his contemporaries saw it, was to show how his all-too-commonsensical thesis of mind-body interaction was tenable within an ontology of two radically diverse substances, minds and bodies. In his replies, Descartes hemmed and hawed, but in the end was unable to produce an effective response. (In a later chapter we will discuss in some detail the difficulties that mental causation presents to the substance dualist.) It is noteworthy that many of Descartes's peers chose to abandon mental causation rather than the dualism of two substances. Malebranche's occasionalism denies outright that mental causation ever takes place, and Spinoza's double-aspect theory seems to leave no room for genuine causal transactions between mind and matter. Leibniz is well known for having denied causal relations between individual substances altogether, arguing that an illusion of causality arises out of preestablished harmony among the monads. In retrospect, it is more than a little amazing to realize that Descartes was an exception rather than the rule, among the great Rationalists of his day, in defending mental causation as an integral element of his view of the mind. Perhaps most philosophers of this time were perfectly comfortable with the idea that God is the sole causal agent in the entire world, and, with God monopolizing the world's causal power, the epiphenomenalism of human minds just was not something to worry about. In any case, it is interesting to note that mental causation is regarded with much greater seriousness by us today than it apparently was by most philosophers in Descartes' time.
In any case, substance dualism is not the source of our current worries about mental causation; substantival minds are no longer a live option for most of us. What is new and surprising about the current problem of mental causation is the fact that it has arisen out of the very heart of physicalism. This means that giving up the Cartesian conception of minds as immaterial substances in favor of a materialist ontology does not make the problem go away. On the contrary, our basic physicalist commitments, as I will argue, can be seen as the source of our current difficulties.
Let us first review some of the reasons for wanting to save mental causation--why it is important to us that mental causation is real. First and foremost, the possibility of human agency, and hence our moral practice, evidently requires that our mental states have causal effects in the physical world. In voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways, thereby causing the objects around us to be rearranged. That is how we manage to navigate around the objects in our surroundings, find food and shelter, build bridges and cities, and destroy the rain forests. Second, the possibility of human knowledge presupposes the reality of mental causation: perception, our sole window on the world, requires the causation of perceptual experiences and beliefs by objects and events around us. Reasoning, by which we acquire new knowledge and belief from the existing fund of what we already know or believe, involves the causation of new belief by old belief. Memory is a causal process involving experiences, physical storage of the information contained therein, and its retrieval. If you take away perception, memory, and reasoning, you pretty much take away all of human knowledge. Even more broadly, there seem to be compelling reasons for thinking that our capacity to think about and refer to things and phenomena of the world--that is, our capacity for intentionality and speech--depends on our being, or having been, in appropriate cognitive relations with things outside us, and that these cognitive relations essentially involve causal relations. To move on, it seems plain that the possibility of psychology as a science capable of generating law-based explanations of human behavior depends on the reality of mental causation: mental phenomena must be capable of functioning as indispensable links in causal chains leading to physical behavior, like movements of the limbs and vibrations of the vocal cord. A science that invokes mental phenomena in its explanations is presumptively committed to their causal efficacy; if a phenomenon is to have an explanatory role, its presence or absence must make a difference--a causal difference. Determinism threatens human agency and skepticism puts human knowledge in peril. The stakes are higher with mental causation, for this problem threatens to take away both agency and cognition.
Let us now briefly turn to consciousness, an aspect of mentality that was oddly absent from both philosophy and scientific psychology for much of the century that has just passed. As everyone knows, consciousness has returned as a major problematic in both philosophy and science, and the last two decades has seen a phenomenal growth and proliferation of research programs and publications on consciousness, not to mention symposia and conferences all over the world.
For most of us, there is no need to belabor the centrality of consciousness to our conception of ourselves as creatures with minds. But I want to point to the ambivalent, almost paradoxical, attitude that philosophers have displayed toward consciousness. As just noted, consciousness had been virtually banished from the philosophical and scientific scene for much of the last century, and consciousness-bashing still goes on in some quarters, with some reputable philosophers arguing that phenomenal consciousness, or "qualia," is a fiction of bad philosophy.2 And there are philosophers and psychologists who, while they recognize phenomenal consciousness as something real, do not believe that a complete science of human behavior, including cognitive psychology and neuroscience, has a place for consciousness, or that there is a need to invoke consciousness in an explanatory/predictive theory of cognition and behavior. Although consciousness research is thriving, much of cognitive science seems still in the grip of what may be called methodological epiphenomenalism.
Contrast this lowly status of consciousness in science and metaphysics with its lofty standing in moral philosophy and value theory. When philosophers discuss the nature of the intrinsic good, or what is worthy of our desire and volition for its own sake, the most prominently mentioned candidates are things like pleasure, absence of pain, enjoyment, and happiness--states that are either states of conscious experience or states that presuppose a capacity for conscious experience. Our attitude toward sentient creatures, with a capacity for pain and pleasure, is crucially different in moral terms from our attitude toward insentient objects. To most of us, a fulfilling life, a life worth living, is one that is rich and full in qualitative consciousness. We would regard a life as impoverished and not fully satisfying if it never included experiences of things like the smell of the sea in a cool morning breeze, the lambent play of sunlight on brilliant autumn foliage, the fragrance of a field of lavender in bloom, and the vibrant, layered soundscape projected by a string quartet. Conversely, a life filled with intense chronic pains, paralyzing fears and anxieties, an unremitting sense of despair and hopelessness, or a constant monotone depression would strike us as terrible and intolerable, and perhaps not even worth living. In his speech accepting the Nobel Prize in 1904, Ivan Pavlov, whose experiments on animal behavior conditioning probably gave a critical impetus to the behaviorist movement, had this to say: "In point of fact, only one thing in life is of actual interest for us--our psychical experience."3 It is an ironic fact that the felt qualities of conscious experience, perhaps the only things that ultimately matter to us, are often relegated in the rest of philosophy to the status of "secondary qualities," in the shadowy zone between the real and the unreal, or even jettisoned outright as artifacts of confused minds.
What then is the philosophical problem of consciousness? In The Principles of Psychology, published in 1890, William James wrote:
According to the assumptions of this book, thoughts accompany the brain's workings, and those thoughts are cognitive of realities. The whole relation is one which we can only write down empirically, confessing that no glimmer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this is the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort the consciousness and of what sort the knowledge may be. Sensations, aware of mere qualities, involve the mystery as much as thoughts, aware of complex systems, involve it.4
In this passage, James is recognizing, first of all, that thoughts and sensations, that is, various modes of mentality and consciousness, arise out of neural processes in the brain. But we can only make a list of, or "write down empirically" as he says, the observed de facto correlations that connect thoughts and sensations to types of neural processes. Making a running list of psychoneural correlations does not come anywhere near gaining an explanatory insight into why there are such correlations; according to James, "no glimmer of explanation" is "yet in sight" as to why these particular correlations hold, or why indeed the brain should give rise to thoughts and consciousness at all.
Why does pain arise when the C-fibers are activated (according to philosophers' fictional neurophysiology), and not under another neural condition? Why doesn't the sensation of itch or tickle arise from C-fiber activation? Why should any conscious experience arise when C-fibers fire? Why should there be something like consciousness in a world that is ultimately nothing but bits of matter scattered over spacetime regions? These questions are precisely the explanatory/ predictive challenges posed by the classic emergentists, like Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, and C. D. Broad--challenges that they despaired of meeting.
These, then, are the problems of mental causation and consciousness. Each of them poses a fundamental challenge to the physicalist worldview. How can the mind exercise its causal powers in a causally closed physical world? Why is there, and how can there be, such a thing as the mind, or consciousness, in a physical world? We will see that these two problems, mental causation and consciousness, are intertwined, and that, in a sense, they make each other insoluble.
I now want to set out in some detail how the problem of mental causation arises within a physicalist setting.
Mind-body supervenience can usefully be thought of as defining minimal physicalism--that is, it is a shared minimum commitment of all positions that are properly called physicalist, though it may not be all that physicalism requires. As is well known, there are many different ways of formulating a super-venience thesis.5 For present purposes we will not need an elaborate statement of exactly what mind-body supervenience amounts to. It will suffice to understand it as the claim that what happens in our mental life is wholly dependent on, and determined by, what happens with our bodily processes. In this sense, mind-body supervenience is a commitment of all forms of reductionist physicalism (or type physicalism), such as the classic Smart-Feigl mind-brain identity thesis.6 Moreover, it is also a commitment of functionalism about mentality, arguably still the orthodoxy on the mind-body problem. Functionalism views mental properties as defined in terms of their causal roles in behavioral and physical contexts, and it is evidently committed to the thesis that systems that are alike in intrinsic physical properties must be alike in respect of their mental or psychological character. The reason is simple: we expect identically constituted physical systems to be causally indistinguishable in all physical and behavioral contexts. It is noteworthy that emergentism, too, appears to be committed to supervenience: If two systems are wholly alike physically, we should expect the same mental properties to emerge, or fail to emerge, in each; physically indiscernible systems cannot differ in respect of their emergent properties. Supervenience of emergents in this sense was explicitly noted and endorsed by C. D. Broad.7
Mind-body supervenience has been embraced by some philosophers as an attractive option because it has seemed to them a possible way of protecting the autonomy of the mental domain without lapsing back into antiphysicalist dualism. Just as normative/moral properties are thought to supervene on descriptive/nonmoral properties without being reducible to them, the psychological character of a creature may supervene on and yet remain distinct and autonomous from its physical nature. In many ways, this is an appealing picture: while acknowledging the primacy and priority of the physical domain, it highlights the distinctiveness of creatures with mentality--creatures with consciousness, purposiveness, and rationality. It reaffirms our commonsense belief in our own specialness as beings endowed with intelligent and creative capacities of the kind unseen in the rest of nature. Further, this view provides the burgeoning science of psychology and cognition with a philosophical rationale as an autonomous science in its own right: it investigates these irreducible psychological properties, functions, and capacities, discovering laws and regularities governing them and generating law-based explanations and predictions. It is a science with its own proper domain untouched by other sciences, especially those at the lower levels, like biology, chemistry, and physics.
This seductive picture, however, turns out to be a piece of wishful thinking, when we consider the problem of mental causation--how it is possible, on such a picture, for mentality to have causal powers, powers to influence the course of natural events. Several principles, all of which seem unexceptionable, especially for the physicalist, conspire to make trouble for mental causation. The first of these is the principle that the physical world constitutes a causally closed domain. For our purposes we may state it as follows:
The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t.
There is also an explanatory analogue of this principle (but we will make no explicit use of it here): If a physical event has a causal explanation (in terms of an event occurring at t), it has a physical causal explanation (in terms of a physical event at t).8 According to this principle, physics is causally and explanatorily self-sufficient: there is no need to go outside the physical domain to find a cause, or a causal explanation, of a physical event. It is plain that physical causal closure is entirely consistent with mind-body dualism and does not beg the question against dualism as such; it does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is. As far as physical causal closure goes, there may well be entities and events outside the physical domain, and causal relations might hold between these nonphysical items. There could even be sciences that investigate these nonphysical things and events. Physical causal closure, therefore, does not rule out mind-body dualism--in fact, not even substance dualism; for all it cares, there might be immaterial souls outside the spacetime physical world. If there were such things, the only constraint that the closure principle lays down is that they not causally meddle with physical events--that is, there can be no causal influences injected into the physical domain from outside. Descartes's interactionist dualism, therefore, is precluded by physical causal closure; however, Leibniz's doctrine of preestablished harmony and mind-body parallelism, like Spinoza's double-aspect theory,9 are perfectly consistent with it. Notice that neither the mental nor the biological domain is causally closed; there are mental and biological events whose causes are not themselves mental or biological events. A trauma to the head can cause the loss of consciousness and exposure to intense radiation can cause cells to mutate.
Moreover, physical causal closure does not by itself exclude nonphysical causes, or causal explanations, of physical events. As we will see, however, such causes and explanations could be ruled out when an exclusion principle like the following is adopted:
Principle of causal exclusion. If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination).
There is also a companion principle regarding causal explanation, that is, the principle of explanatory exclusion, but we will not need it for present purposes. Note that the exclusion principle as stated is a general metaphysical principle and does not refer specifically to mental or physical causes; in particular, it does not favor physical causes over mental causes. It is entirely neutral as between the mental and the physical. For our purposes, it will be convenient to have on hand a generalized version of the exclusion principle.
Principle of determinative/generative exclusion. If the occurrence of an event e, or an instantiation of a property P is determined/ generated by an event c--causally or otherwise--then e's occurrence is not determined/generated by any event wholly distinct from or independent of c--unless this is a genuine case of overdetermination.10
The second principle broadens causation, or causal determination, to generation/determination simpliciter, whether causal or of another kind. The intuitive idea is the idea of an event or state, or a property instantiation, owing its existence to another event or state--or, to put another way, the idea that one thing is generated out of, or derives its existence from, another. What I have in mind is very close to the fundamental notion of causation, or determination, that I believe Elizabeth Anscombe was after in her Causality and Determination.11 Causation as generation, or effective production and determination, is in many ways a stronger relation than mere counterfactual dependence,12 and it is causation in this sense that is fundamentally involved in the problem of mental causation. Another way in which a state, or property instance, is generated is supervenience; the aesthetic properties of a work of art are generated in the sense I have in mind by its physical properties. So are moral properties of acts and persons generated by their nonmoral, descriptive properties. It is the relation that sanctions the assertion that something has a certain property because, or in virtue of the fact that, it has certain other properties that generate it. I have argued elsewhere for the causal/ explanatory exclusion principle;13 I believe that the fundamental rationale for the broader principle is essentially the same, and that anyone who finds the former plausible should find the latter equally plausible.
It is quick and easy to see how these principles create troubles for mental causation for anyone who accepts mind-body supervenience--that is, for anyone who is a minimal physicalist. I have called the line of considerations to be presented below "the supervenience argument"; in the literature, it is also known as "the exclusion argument." (For usage uniformity, it is best to think of the supervenience argument as a special form of the exclusion argument, and take the latter as a generic form of argument with the conclusion that mental cause is always excluded by physical cause.) Briefly, the argument goes like this.14 Suppose that an instantiation of mental property M causes another mental property, M*, to instantiate. (We take property instantiations as events; instantiations of a mental property are mental events, and similarly for physical properties and physical events.) This is perfectly consistent with physical causal closure. But mind-body supervenience says that this instantiation of mental property M* occurs in virtue of the fact that one of the physical properties on which M* supervenes is instantiated at that time; call this physical base property P*. This means that given that P* is instantiated on this occasion, M* must of necessity be instantiated on this occasion. That is, the M*-instance is wholly dependent on, and is generated by, the P*-instance. At this point, the exclusion principle kicks in: Is the occurrence of the M*-instance due to its supposed cause, the M-instance, or its supervenience base event, P*-instance? It must be one or the other, but which one? Given that its physical supervenience base P* is instantiated on this occasion, M* must be instantiated as well on this occasion, regardless of what might have preceded this M*-instance. In what sense, then, can the M-instance be said to be a "cause," or a generative source, of the M*-instance?
I believe that the only acceptable way of reconciling the two causal/generative claims and achieving a consistent picture of the situation is this: the M-instance caused the M*-instance by causing the P*-instance. More generally, the following principle seems highly plausible: In order to cause a supervenient property to be instantiated, you must cause one of its base properties to be instantiated. In order to alter the aesthetic properties of a work of art, you must alter the physical properties on which the aesthetic properties supervene; in order to do something about your headache you must causally intervene in the brain state on which the headache, supervenes. There is no other way; this is what makes the idea of telepathy (for example, a thought of mine directly causing a thought in you) not credible if not incoherent--unless of course one could telepathically influence another person's brain processes. (In fact, for present purposes, this principle concerning the causation of supervenient properties, which I believe is independently plausible, can replace the principle of determinative/ generative exclusion, which some might find too broad.)
So M causes M* to instantiate by causing P* to instantiate, from which it trivially follows that the M-instance causes a P*-instance. But this is a case of mental-to-physical causation. Turning our attention now to the supposed mental cause M, we see that, by mind-body supervenience, M must have its own physical supervenience base; call it P. When we consider the total picture, there seems every reason to consider P to be a cause of P*. If we think of causation in terms of sufficiency, P is clearly sufficient for P*, since it is sufficient for M and M is sufficient for P*. If we think of causation in terms of counterfactuals, we may assume that if P had not been there, the supervening M wouldn't have been there either, and that since M is what brought about P*, P* wouldn't be there either. So at this point we have the following two causal claims: M causes P*, and P causes P*.
Now, given psychophysical property dualism espoused by the nonreductive physicalist, M and P are distinct properties. This means that P* has two causes each sufficient for it and occurring at the same time (a supervenient property and its base properties are always instantiated at the same time). At this point the causal exclusion principle applies: either M or P must be disqualified as P*'s cause. A moment's reflection shows that it is M that must be disqualified. The reason is that if P is disqualified, the causal closure principle kicks in again, saying that since a physical event, P*, has a cause (namely M), it must have a physical cause (occurring at the same time as M)--the disqualified P will do--and we are back in the same situation, a situation in which we again have to choose between a physical and a mental cause. Unless mental cause M is jettisoned in favor of P we would be off to an infinite regress--or be forever treading water in the same place.
The final picture that has emerged is this: P is a cause of P*, with M and M* supervening respectively on P and P*. There is a single underlying causal process in this picture, and this process connects two physical properties, P and P*. The correlations between M and M* and between M and P* are by no means accidental or coincidental; they are lawful and counterfactual-sustaining regularities arising out of M's and M*'s supervenience on the causally linked P and P*. These observed correlations give us an impression of causation; however, that is only an appearance, and there is no more causation here than between two successive shadows cast by a moving car, or two successive symptoms of a developing pathology. This is a simple and elegant picture, metaphysically speaking, but it will prompt howls of protest from those who think that it has given away something very special and precious, namely the causal efficacy of our minds. Thus is born the problem of mental causation.
The problem of mental causation. Causal efficacy of mental properties is inconsistent with the joint acceptance of the following four claims: (i) physical causal closure, (ii) causal exclusion, (iii) mind-body supervenience, and (iv) mental/physical property dualism--the view that mental properties are irreducible to physical properties.
Physical causal closure and mind-body supervenience are, or should be, among the shared commitments of all physicalists. The exclusion principles are general metaphysical constraints, and I don't see how they can be successfully challenged. This leaves mind-body property dualism as the only negotiable item. But to negotiate it away is to embrace reductionism. This will cause a chill in those physicalists who want to eat the cake and have it too--that is, those who want both the irreducibility and causal efficacy of the mental. I believe that the question no longer is whether or not those of us who want to protect mental causation find mind-body reductionism palatable. What has become increasingly clear after three decades of debate is that if we want robust mental causation, we had better be prepared to take reductionism seriously, whether we like it or not. But even if you are ready for reductionism, it doesn't necessarily mean that you can have it. For reductionism may not be true. This is the point to which we now turn.
Before reduction and reductionism can be usefully discussed, we need to be tolerably clear about the model of reduction appropriate to the issues on hand. I believe much of the philosophical debate during the past few decades concerning the reducibility of the mental has turned out to be a futile exercise because it was predicated on the wrong model of reduction. This is the derivational model of intertheoretic reduction developed by Ernest Nagel in the 1950s and '60s. As is widely known, the heart of Nagel reduction is bridge laws, the empirical lawlike principles that are supposed to connect the properties of the domain to be reduced with the properties of the base domain. Specifically, the requirement, as standardly understood, is that each property up for reduction be connected by a bridge law with a nomologically coextensive property in the base domain. Most of the influential antireductionist arguments--notably, Davidson's anomalist argument and the Putnam-Fodor multiple realization argument15--have focused on showing that the bridge law requirement cannot be met for mental properties in relation to physical/biological properties.
All this is by now a familiar story, and there is no need here to rehearse the arguments, counterarguments, and so forth. But the philosophical emptiness of Nagel reduction is quickly seen when we notice that a Nagel reduction of the mental to the physical is consistent with, and even in some cases entailed by, many all-out dualisms, such as the double-aspect theory, the doctrine of preestablished harmony, epiphenomenalism, and even emergentism. The reason of course is that these dualisms are consistent with the mind-body bridge law requirement; in fact, some of them, like the double-aspect theory, entail the satisfaction of this requirement. This objection can be circumvented by strengthening the bridge laws into identities--that is, by requiring the bridging principles connecting the reducing and reduced theories to take the form of an identity ("pain 3 C-fiber activation") rather than a biconditional law ("pain occurs to an organism at a time just in case its C-fibers are activated at that time")--that is, by moving from bridge-law reduction to identity reduction.16 It has recently been suggested that an identity reduction of consciousness is just what is needed to close the much-discussed "explanatory gap" between the brain and conscious experience. We will look at the feasibility of identity reduction for consciousness in later chapters (chapters 4 and 5). The main problem with this proposal, as we will see, concerns the availability of mind-body identities for reductive purposes. I will argue that the principal arguments advanced for psychoneural identities, namely that they serve certain essential explanatory purposes, do not work, and that there is no visible reason to think that such identities are true or that we will ever be entitled to them.
What then is required to reduce a mental property, say pain? I believe that what has to be done is, first, to functionalize pain (or, more precisely, the property of being in pain): namely, to show that being in pain is definable as being in a state (or instantiating a property) that is caused by certain inputs (i.e., tissue damage, trauma) and that in turn causes certain behavioral and other outputs (i.e., characteristic pain behaviors, a sense of distress, a desire to be rid of it). More generally, instantiating a mental property M, upon M's functionalization, will turn out to be being in some state or other that is typically caused by a certain specified set of stimulus conditions and that in turn typically causes a certain specified set of outputs. Next, once a mental property has been functionalized, we can look for its "realizers"--that is, states or properties that satisfy the causal specification defining that mental property. Thus, for pain, we look for an internal state in an organism that is caused to instantiate by tissue damage and trauma and whose instantiation in turn causes characteristic pain behaviors (and possibly outputs of other kinds). In the case of humans and perhaps mammals in general, the state turns out to be, let us say, electrical activity in a certain cortical zone--call it Q. That is, neural state Q is the realizer of pain for humans and mammals. Conventional wisdom has it that pain and other mental states have multiple diverse realizers across different species and structures, and perhaps even among members of the same species (or even in the same individual over time). This means that this second step of finding realizers of a mental property is likely to be an ongoing affair with no clear end. Obviously, we are not going to find, nor would we necessarily be interested in identifying, all actual and possible realizers of pain for all actual and possible pain-capable organisms and systems. Functional reduction, as I call it, can focus on the reduction of a mental property, or a group of them, for a specific population--that is, neural research on pain will aim at local reductions, not a one-shot global reduction (as suggested by the Nagel bridge-law model). We may be interested in finding the neural basis of human pain, or canine pain, or Martian pain. We may be interested in identifying the neural basis of your pain now or my pain yesterday. Neural bases may differ for different instances of pain, but individual pains must nonetheless reduce to their respective neural/ physical realizers. Unlike in the case of Nagelian bridge-law reduction, the multiple realizability of pain is no barrier to local reduction by functionalization. Suppose that pain has physical realizers, P1, P2, . . . Then, any given instance of pain is an instance of either P1 or of P2 or . . . If you are in pain in virtue of being in state Pk, there is nothing more, or less, to your being in pain than your being in state Pk. This particular pain is the very same state as this instance of Pk. Each pain instance is a P1-instance, or P2-instance, or . . . ; that is, all pain instances reduce to the instances of its realizers.17
If pain can be functionalized in this sense, its instances will have the causal powers of pain's realizers. Thus, if a given instance of pain occurs in virtue of the instantiation of physical realizer Pk, that pain instance has the causal powers of this instance of Pk. This will solve the problem of the causal efficacy of pains--that is, provided that pain can be functionalized. It is important to see that this result cannot be achieved by simply assuming that Pk is a neural correlate, or substrate, of pain. It might be that pain and Pk correlate with each other because they are both the effects of a common cause; if such is the case there obviously is no reason for thinking that a given occurrence of pain and the corresponding instance of Pk have the same causal powers, or that they are one and the same event. Pain and its realizers are much more intimately related: to be in pain is to be in a state meeting causal specification C--that is, to be in pain is to instantiate one of its realizers--and if you are in pain in virtue of instantiating pain-realizer Pk, there is no pain event over and above this instantiation of Pk.
So if pain is functionalized, the problem of mental causation has a simple solution for all pain instances. But what of the causal efficacy of pain itself? What should we say about the causal powers of pain as a mental kind? The answer is that as a kind pain will be causally heterogeneous, as heterogeneous as the heterogeneity of its diverse realizers. Pain, as a kind, will lack the kind of causal/nomological unity we expect of true natural kinds, kinds in terms of which scientific theorizing is conducted. This is what we must expect given that pain is a functional property with multiple diverse physical realizers. If the term "multiple" in "multiple realizations" means anything, it must mean causal/nomological multiplicity; if two realizers of pain are not causally or nomologically diverse, there is no reason to count them as two, not one. On this reductive account, pain will not be causally impotent or epiphenomenal; it is only that pain is causally heterogeneous.
The key question then is this: Is pain functionally reducible? Are mental properties in general functionalizable and hence functionally reducible? Or are they "emergent" and irreducible? I believe that there is reason to think that intentional/ cognitive properties are functionalizable. However, I am with those who believe that phenomenal properties of consciousness are not functional properties. To argue for this view of phenomenal properties, or qualia, we do not need anything as esoteric and controversial as the "zombie" hypothesis much discussed recently18--that is, the claim that zombies, creatures that are indiscernible from us physically and behaviorally but who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible. All we need is something considerably more modest, namely the metaphysical possibility of qualia inversion. Perhaps the problem is still open, but I believe there are substantial and weighty reasons, and a sufficiently broad consensus among the philosophers who work in this area,19 to believe that qualia are functionally irreducible.
Moreover, it is easily seen that if qualia are functionally reducible, the problem posed by James and others about consciousness can be solved. Suppose that pain has been functionalized and its realizer identified for humans. Consider a functional characterization of pain like this: To be in pain is to be in a state that is caused by tissue damage and that in turn causes winces and groans. And assume that the venerable C-fiber stimulation is the neural realizer of pain in humans. Consider now the question: Why is Jones in pain at t? Can we derive the statement "Jones is in pain at t" from information exclusively about Jones's physical/behavioral properties (along with other strictly physical/behavioral information)? Given the functional reduction, the answer is yes, as is shown by the following deduction:
Jones's C-fibers are stimulated at t.
Notice that the third line, a functional definition of pain, does not represent empirical/factual information about pain; if anything, it gives us information about the concept pain, or the meaning of "pain." Formally, definitions do not count as premises of a proof; they come free. Notice, moreover, that the displayed derivation could also serve as a prediction of Jones's pain from physical/behavioral information alone. And we could easily convert it into an explanation of why (in humans) pain correlates with C-fiber stimulation, not with another neural state.20 This derivation would, therefore, answer William James's question why sensations "accompany the brain's workings," a question for which he saw "no glimmer of an explanation." Functional reduction of pain and other sensations would deliver the explanation James was seeking. The only problem is that sensations, or qualia, resist functional reduction, and, as James says, there still is no glimmer of an explanation. But we have made some progress: we now know what is needed to achieve such an explanation.
As earlier noted, there are those who think that functional reduction is not the only way to solve the problem of consciousness; they argue that although pain and other qualia may not be functionally reducible, they are reducible in another way, through their identification with physical/neural properties, and that this will enable us to close the gap between consciousness and the brain and thereby provide us with an answer to James's question. We will see in later chapters why this new mind-brain identity reduction is not an option for us. As we will argue,21 if functional reduction doesn't work for qualia, nothing will.
Let us take stock of where we are: the problem of mental causation is solvable for a given class of mental properties if and only if these properties are functionally reducible with physical/biological properties as their realizers. But phenomenal mental properties are not functionally definable and hence functionally irreducible. Hence, the problem of mental causation is not solvable for phenomenal mental properties.
But, as we also saw, the problem of consciousness, or "the mystery of consciousness," is solvable if consciousness is functionally reducible--and I will argue that it is solvable only if consciousness is functionally reducible. So the functional irreducibility of consciousness entails the unsolvability of both the problem of consciousness and the problem of mental causation--at least as the latter problem concerns consciousness. It is thus that the two problems, that of mental causation and that of consciousness, turn out to share an interlocking fate. What stands in the way of solving the problem of mental causation is consciousness. And what stands in the way of solving the problem of consciousness is the impossibility of interpreting or defining it in terms of its causal relations to physical/biological properties. They are indeed Weltknoten, problems that have eluded our best philosophical efforts. They seem deeply entrenched in the way we conceptualize the world and ourselves, and seem to arise from some of the fundamental assumptions we hold about each.
Does this mean that there is some hidden flaw somewhere in our system of concepts and assumptions, and that we need to alter, in some basic way, our conceptual framework to rid ourselves of these problems? Of course, if our scheme of concepts were radically altered, the problems would be altered as well; perhaps, the new scheme would not even permit these, or equivalent, problems to be formulated. Some philosophers would be willing to take this as a sufficient ground for urging us to abandon our present system of concepts in favor of a cleansed and tidier one, claiming that the conundrum of mental causation and consciousness is reason enough for jettisoning our shared scheme of intentional and phenomenal idioms, with its alleged built-in "Cartesian" errors and confusions. There are others who blame our penchant for thinking in terms of robust productive causality for the vexing problem of mental causation. Blaming our system of concepts, or our language, for philosophical difficulties is a familiar philosophical strategy of long standing. To me, this often turns out to be an ostrich strategy--trying to avoid problems by ignoring them. To motivate the discarding of a framework, we need independent reasons--we should be able to show it to be deficient, incomplete, or flawed in some fundamental way, independently of the fact that it generates puzzles and problems that we are unable to deal with. Why should we suppose that all problems are solvable--and solvable by us? ( Just because we find difficult, perhaps insoluble, moral problems and puzzles, should we cast aside moral concepts and moral discourse?) It may well be that our mind-body problem, or something close to it, arises within any scheme that is rich enough to do justice to the world as we experience it. It may well be that the problem is an inexorable consequence of the tension between the objective world of physical existence and the subjective world of experience, and that the distinction between the objective and the subjective is unavoidable for reflective cognizers and agents of the kind that we are.22
To conclude, then, the mind-body problem, for us, the would-be physicalists, has come down to two problems, mental causation and consciousness, and these together represent the most profound challenge to physicalism. If physicalism is to survive as a worldview for us, it must show just where we belong in the physical world, and this means that it must give an account of our status as conscious creatures with powers to affect our surroundings in virtue of our consciousness and mentality. The arguments that have been presented here already suggest that physicalism will not be able to survive intact and in its entirety. We will try to determine how much of it can survive, and we will see, I hope, that what does survive is good enough for us.
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text:
B.S., Business Administration, Creighton University, 1991
With more than a dozen years in marketing professional services, Mike plays a key role in the strategic direction of the firm. As chief marketing officer, he oversees the firm's business development and marketing initiatives by working directly with attorneys drafting and preparing proposals, new business pitches, presentations, strategic marketing communications, sponsorships and cobranding opportunities.
Mike's experience includes business development positions at two of the largest global accounting firms and corporate development responsibilities for a publicly held technology firm.
Professional Affiliations
- Legal Marketing Association
- Association for Corporate Growth
- Financial Executives Networking Group

subset: commoncrawl


text:
In addition to running screens and reading 10-Qs and 10-Ks, one of my regular activities involves tracking the filings of activist investors. While many of the larger activists, like Carl Icahn, make headlines on a regular basis, a lot of smaller activists have had a great deal of success finding cheap stocks and forcing corporate change to unlock value. I use them as a source of ideas and I am always delighted when an activist takes a position in one of my stocks. It's often a catalyst for rapid improvement of the stock price. Such is the case now as activists have been stalking a few of the stocks I have written about and own.
The biggest story has been CommonWealth REIT (CWH). The Related Companies, a large real estate investment firm, and Corvex Management, an activist firm headed by a Carl Icahn protégé, have teamed up to force out the board and unlock the value of the shares. There is a lot of value here as book value is $26 per share and the appraisals of net asset value place the value of the company near $40 per share. It has been a nasty fight as the external management company controls the board and enjoys an enormous stream of fees from the relationship.
Corvex and Related made an offer for $27 per share that was rejected by management. CommonWealth then went forward with a 34.5-million-share offering at prices well below book value that the activists tried to stop. Shortly after that, Perry Corp., another activist hedge fund, announced that it owned more than 5% of the company and was supporting Corvex. Corvex/Related made another offer to acquire the company at $24.50 per share and that was also rejected.
In the latest round of the fight, the activists have said that the results of their consent solicitation show that they have 70% of shareholder votes in favor of removing the entire current board. CBRE Group (CBG), a large real estate management firm, has agreed to manage the properties in the interim until a new board is elected, and a co-founder of Archon Capital has agreed to serve as interim CEO until a new one is elected. CommonWealth has rejected the removal of the board and says the consent solicitation is not in line with the bylaws. This is heading to arbitration July 18 but odds favor the dissidents. Two leading corporate governance watchdogs, ISS and Glass Lewis, support the effort and suggest management be removed.
The best outcome for shareholders is a replacement of the board and existing management without a full takeover. A new board with an eye on maximizing return could easily realize $34 to $40 a share from the existing asset base. Cutting management fees could also lead to higher dividends for us. I am not going to complain if we get a full buyout around $30 per share as I own the stock around $19, all in costs after several purchases over the past few years, and I have gotten around half the money back in dividends over time.
Earlier this month activist Joseph Stilwell announced that he was looking to gain a board seat at Malvern Bancorp (MLVF) and push for dividends and share buybacks to increase the value of the stock. Stilwell has a long history with Malvern; he sued last year and only dropped the suit when Malvern announced a second step conversion in January. Sitwell and his funds own 9.9% of the outstanding shares. PL Capital, another well-known and successful bank-stock activist investor, also has an active stake of 9.8% of the bank. The stock is cheap, trading at 78% of book value, and flush with cash after the second step offering earlier this year. The stock should be owned by every investor hoping to take advantage of the trade of the decade. The presence of two strong activists could lead to positive results sooner than hoped.
Seeing an activist take a stake in one of my existing holdings is like getting a Christmas present in July. It might not have been expected, but it is not unwelcome either. Both of these stocks have enormous upside potential from current levels, and the odds of recognizing that value sooner rather than later are rising.


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Equine Management Major
PE 130 (1) Horseback Riding I
Provide the basic principles of horseback riding as well as instruction in the care of the equipment and the animal. Fee. (Majors/Minors Only)
PE 131 (1) Horseback Riding II
Review the basic fundamentals from beginning horseback riding and to introduce new skills including riding at the trot and canter. Prerequisite: Beginning Horseback Riding. Fee. (Majors/Minors Only)
EQM 200 (3) Horsemanship Ministry
Training of dedicated Christians to conduct safe, efficient, and effective horsemanship programs as a tool of Christian Ministry. Designed to equip each equine student with the necessary tools to successfully manage, train, and teach in a variety of equestrian ministry settings. Fee
EQM 202 (3) Stable Management
Basic principles of establishing a business plan, creating a safe and satisfying environment, applying practical and economic horse keeping techniques and maximizing your efforts for a successful operation. Fee.
EQM 206 (3) Equine Health and First Aid—Comprehensive course to explain routine but essential health care, basic first aid, and how to identify urgent medical conditions. Fee.
EQM 208 (3) Introduction to Therapeutic Riding
Progressive instruction for building a skill foundation in therapeutic riding instruction. North American Riding for the Handicapped Association. Certification and Standards including the use of therapy horses, tack and other equipment. Fee.
EQM 245 (3) Riding Instructor Certification
Students complete a 40 hour certification clinic. Teaching and equitation skills in ring and trail riding. Fee.
EQM 251 (3) Horse Training
Establishing horse training goals and programs. Positive and progressive approach to horsemanship including handling, ground lessons, and obedience under saddle. Fee.
EQM 310 (3) Farm and Ranch Management
Resource Management of land, water, and facilities involved in equine programs. The primary goals will be to train equine managers, and to develop a focus on natural resource systems with the overall aim to increase efficient farm or ranch management. Fee.
EQM 320 (3) Equine Administration
Study of equestrian business, equestrian organizations, breed associations, facility and event management operations, conventions and programs. Fee.
EQM 391 (1-3) Independent Study
A directed and supervised investigation of a selected problem/topics in the area of Equine Management. Available to senior EQM majors or minors. A student may take up to six (6) hours of independent studies.
EQM 435 (6) Equine Field Experience
A directed field experience at Asbury College or at another location with departmental approval. Students are responsible for total care of the horses including feeding, as well as maintaining stables and facilities including programming for one semester. 240 hours. Contract.
HED 231 (3) Injury Care and Safety
Science of prevention, evaluation, management and rehabilitation of athletic injuries. Emphasis is placed on developing an understanding of the mechanisms of injury and on acquiring practical training room skills. Includes American Red Cross Community CPR and First Aid certifications. Requires a field component.
Also 6 hours from
EQM 393 (1-3) Seminar
The study of various issues/topics in the field of equine management. Topics will be determined and announced for each semester a seminar is offered.
COM 230 (3) Intro to Leadership
BM 211 (3) Principles Management


text:
为了使您在Abcam官网的浏览体验更顺畅,请使用最新版本的浏览器比如 Google Chrome
A region within synthetic peptide: AGCGAGTCQV IVTTPMEMLK IQLQDAGRIA AQRKILAAQG QLSAQGGAQP, corresponding to N terminal amino acids 109-158 of Human SLC25A22
Our Abpromise guarantee covers the use of ab60332 in the following tested applications.
The application notes include recommended starting dilutions; optimal dilutions/concentrations should be determined by the end user.
|Use a concentration of 1.25 µg/ml. Detects a band of approximately 36 kDa (predicted molecular weight: 36 kDa). Good results were obtained when blocked with 5% non-fat dry milk in 0.05% PBS-T.
|Use a concentration of 4 - 8 µg/ml.
|Use at an assay dependent concentration.
ELISA titre using peptide based assay: 1:312500.
Immunohistochemistry (Formalin/PFA-fixed paraffin-embedded sections) analysis of human muscle tissue labelling SLC25A22 with ab60332 at 4-8µg/ml. Arrows indicate positively stained skeletal muscle cells. Magnification: 400X.
ab60332 has not yet been referenced specifically in any publications.
Please note: All products are "FOR RESEARCH USE ONLY AND ARE NOT INTENDED FOR DIAGNOSTIC OR THERAPEUTIC USE"


text:
It may not rival the FIFA World Cup, but there's nothing bigger than the Dr Pepper Dallas Cup when it comes to international youth soccer tournaments in the United States.
Now in its 35th year, the recently concluded youth tournament crowned winning teams from throughout the world who competed in eight age classifications. Other big winners at the event were eight U.S.-based community organizations who each received donations of $5,000 in sports gear on behalf of the winning teams.
The donations were made by Let's Play, a community partnership led by Dr Pepper Snapple Group to get kids and families active nationwide. The $40,000 total contribution is part of the $1 million in sports gear Dr Pepper Snapple Group will donate this year through its Let's Play partnership with Good Sports, a national non-profit organization that provides sports equipment to disadvantaged youth programs across the country.
"The Dr Pepper Dallas Cup is truly a celebration of soccer and the passion people of all ages have for the sport," said Vicki Draughn, vp of corporate affairs for Dr Pepper Snapple Group. "In a year when soccer will capture the hearts and minds of sports fans across the U.S. and around the world, we are thrilled to help provide more kids the opportunity to get active through participating in the 'Beautiful Game.'"


text:
About The Campaign
The automotive enthusiast hobby continues to come under the scrutiny of local, state, and federal officials. However, this November's elections will prove that automotive enthusiasts have the horsepower to stop the madness.
If you are concerned about scrappage laws, emission controls, titling and registration concerns, equipment violations, non-operation laws and other efforts to demonize car enthusiasts, you need to sign up here at CARINITIATIVE.com to be informed of who is supporting the car hobby and who are the threats against it.


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Photo: Matt Lambert
Issue 1 (December 2009)
UC Davis Occupations: Narrative of Events
Two Anonymous Protesters
The series of occupations that began on November 19th on the UC Davis campus was as shocking as it was unprecedented. Not least among the reasons was that it erupted from a leaderless undergraduate population which was considered until that morning, by many within activist circles, as a-political, largely apathetic, and practically un-organizable. The massive and spontaneous disruptions that started with a march the morning of November 19th and continued through the night of the 24th of November, resulted in three occupations, 52 arrests, and the mobilization of hundreds of students, faculty, and workers from UC Davis and beyond.
In these five November days, UC Davis catapulted itself onto the world stage of anti-privatization protests and student occupations. While the Regents met in UCLA, and thousands there, at UC Berkeley, and at UC Santa Cruz honored a system-wide strike, only one department at Davis (Chicano Studies) even closed. No events, rallies or pickets were planned. And still, on November 19th, the campus exploded in protest: by 9 pm, more students had been arrested at UC Davis than on all other UC campuses combined.
Here below, accounts by two occupiers:
Mrak Occupation
X: Although the place and time for a rally on the 19th had been set, nothing had been planned, and it was still unclear to us if even 5 people would show up.
When we arrived at Mrak at 10am, there were at least 35-55 people, already gathering and talking. We all decided to start marching. After going to several buildings we went back to Mrak. In Mrak nothing was set in stone, no one knew what was going to happen, and there were no leaders, only instigators—those who wanted to speak up did so. That was the beauty of it. Our first intention was to find our Chancellor to speak her.
The Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs appeared and suggested we choose some "student representatives" to have a discussion with her but this was an odd idea to us; we needed to represent ourselves as a whole. We demanded that she speak to all of us, that if she had a meeting it would be with all of us. This concept, of solidarity, and of all us speaking together for ourselves and one another, is what lead to the large number of arrests. Nothing swayed us but this concept of togetherness. We had to reclaim our space, our voice, our ability. We re-claimed our administrative building as that space of representation, because we should be our own administration.
This is why we began talking about the idea that we shouldn't think in terms of those willing to get arrested but in terms of no one being arrested at all; that we were participating in our own constitutional rights and we were peaceful. If one of us was to be arrested it was all of our responsibility. When the cops came in on us we locked arms and we kept chanting. Once they began their arresting we knew what we had to do, which was stay together. Then they kicked the bongo player out and it was clear things were ending: they invaded us, they closed the doors that we had tried to keep open.
Z: When I got to Mrak about 2pm on Thursday there were already about 60 students sitting-in. I went to get banners and find students/professors holding classes outdoors to invite them to come. When I got back around 4, the administration had already begun to try to talk the students out—there were a few cops positioned on the staircase, where we hung a "Ruck the Fegents" banner. Around 5pm, an administrator tried to talk the students out of the building from half way up the stair case. This move was shut down by Davis faculty and students, who, recognizing the power-play going on, intervened and stopped the patronizing attempt to control the protesters by repositioning us all as speakers on the same staircase. At this point, the students decided to stay; the Mrak staff had already been escorted out and riot cops called in.
I left Mrak to try to get an outside crowd—a number of us went to the Student Union study space, KDVS, and outside of Freeborn Hall where a huge crowd was gathered waiting for tickets for a USOC event. We announced the sit-in and asked students to come witness, keeps riot cops away, and give outside support. By about 7pm, crowd outside Mrak had grown to about 200; news crews were everywhere, and cops had been called in from seven counties. Riot police showed up and divided the crowd outside—they plowed through the students and hit a number of us as they filed in toward the door to make an aisle—about that time they arrested an undergraduate from the crowd outside for assaulting an officer. They pinned her to a car, then brought her into the paddy-wagon.
Over the next two hours the crowd outside grew: the ASUCD brought their meeting to Mrak and tried to hold it inside—deterred by the officers, they generated a unanimous vote of 'no confidence' to UC President Mark Yudof; arrests from inside began, and 51 students and one UCD professor were led into the paddy-wagon. At this point a helicopter and police dog had been present for a while. Flood lights were set up, and press was everywhere. By 9pm the arrests were complete. As the last student was hauled into the wagon, the crowd outside sat down in solidarity with the arrested. The arrestees shook the wagon with stomping to show their support.
We followed our friends to the county jail, where we waited outside all night for them to be processed. At first, students were processed five at a time, from midnight on, about once an hour, until 4am, when the processing stopped. We knew the one student arrested for assaulting an officer was being held in solitary confinement. About 20 of us stayed all night outside, and were let in the waiting room only at 7am. At 9am the processing began again. News of a rally at UC Davis beginning at 11am Friday had been broadcast on CNN the night before. Around 11am the last 3 were processed, including the student arrested for assaulting an officer, who was held in a cell alone all night. Around 9am, when I called the Davis Police Department to find out if they were following the case, the Chief of Police claimed all the students were awaiting bail: at Mrak the administrators who approved the arrests had no idea where the students were—apparently they went home to bed and never bothered to inquire.
Around 11:15 the next morning, I returned to UC Davis with two of the last graduate students processed and released from jail. There was a driving rain coming down and high winds. As the three of us rounded the corner where their cars had been parked the day before, we spotted, not far in the distance, a rally of 200+ marching across campus through the pouring rain.
I went home and fell asleep for the first time since Tuesday night. At 2pm, I got a text message from X, which I could barely distinguish from a dream. It read: "Dutton Hall is Ours!"
Dutton Hall Occupation
By 2pm Friday—just hours after the last students and faculty left the Yolo County Detention Center—200 students, faculty and staff had marched into Dutton Hall, home of Financial Aid and Student Judicial Affairs, and staged a second sit-in. Near 4pm, we were making posters, dancing, and discussing how much longer to stay. And by 5:30, riot police pulled up around back of the building. The crowd filled up the front lobby and spilled outside where students were drumming and keeping doors open by moving from inside to out. As we talked through whether or not to stay, we began getting texts from our friends at Berkeley engaged in violent confrontations with riot police. It seemed clear by the immediate presence of riot cops at Dutton that the administration was taking our actions as an escalation—not as a discrete disruption, but as part of a UC-wide escalation of actions. Comrades arrested the previous night, now at Berkeley supporting the occupiers at Wheeler, texted us about beatings at Berkeley and police violence against the crowd: one of our friends, a UCB grad student, had been beaten, and another was undergoing surgery after having her hand crushed against a barricade by a cop's baton. We reported the violence going on to the group, and decided, after holding the doors open dancing for another hour, to leave and march. We had held Dutton open 2 1/2 hours past closing.
On Monday at 7pm, 300+ students, faculty, and community members from UC Davis, Sac State, Napa, Sonoma, Sac City College, and numerous high-schools crowded into a UCD auditorium—standing room only—for the first General Assembly. The crowd reported on occupations currently taking place throughout the state, the country, and the world. The Assembly continued for two hours—roughly in the way Assemblies do—and at 9pm there was a 'Know Your Rights' training for students who thought they might be arrested in the protests. About 70 percent of the crowd got up and went to the training—a sure sign of a desire, at Davis and surrounding schools, for continued action.
Back To Mrak: or Mrak II
On Tuesday, November 23rd, Davis students returned to the sight of the arrests for a "Back to Mrak" study-in planned from 2pm-5pm. At 3pm, in Mrak, the crowd dwarfed the one amassed the previous Tuesday. The entry-way was full of students, and more continued to pile in and fill the staircases. Outdoors, professors were holding classes on the steps and lawn, and near 5pm, when we were expected to leave, more students were arriving with pizzas, vegetarian food, and instruments. Nearly all of the 52 arrested on Tuesday were back, but there were plenty of new undergraduates, students, staff, union workers and community members. Drumming and chants began, and protesters hugged each other, danced and sang.
As the sit-in turned to occupation, the administrators still present adopted the roles of either "concerned grandmotherly type" or "bound-by-the-rulebook good guy who just wants what's best for everyone," in alternating attempts to bargain us out of the building. They proposed we elect student representatives who would meet in private with them over the group's concerns and demands. But the occupiers wouldn't be talked down to, and insisted the administration speak with us as a group, and from the same floor, opposed to the staircase, where last week they had staged their royalty-on-the-balcony appearances. We held the space together for hours, as Vice Chancellor Janet Gong and Davis Police Chief Annette Spicuzza appeared, spoke, and withdrew for consultation repeatedly. In an act of bad faith that the administration would repeat later at Berkeley's Wheeler Hall "Live Week" arrests, they proposed to "negotiate" with protesters, and hid the fact that riot cops, already acting on orders to arrest students, were filing into the basement and locking down doors to hallways and bathrooms. During the interim between the start of "negotiations" and what they imagined would be the cops' announcement that the building was locked, Vice Chancellor Gong and Police Chief Spiccuza offered a number of banal but revealing justifications for refusing to let students stay in the building without arrest--among these:
-It's five o'clock and the building needs to close;
-This is a public building until 5pm, and then it becomes private;
-There are certain rules and regulations we have to uphold;
-I'm just doing my job: my job is to protect this building, your job is to be the consumer of our educational product.
These excuses tellingly linked the performance of their power to the maintenance of private property, and disclosed the looming anxiety around occupation: its ability to reveal the supposed public (whether education, self-expression, space or buildings) as entirely private--controlled, policed, and meant to be reserved, for the privileged, the rich, the few.
While the administration continued its mind-numbing, circular attempts at "negotiation," students walked away and secured Mrak's main doors open with bike locks. We overturned trash cans and wedged them in doorjambs, then sat ourselves in the open doorways, making it impossible for the cops to lock the building down. And this was the night's most resonant lesson: that it could not be negotiations that stopped the administration from isolating, controlling, or arresting us. Our power was not in talking, but in walking away from conversation—which was never actual conversation anyway, but a diversionary tactic—and in using our bodies to occupy and open space up for ourselves.
Mrak II ended not with a police lock-down, then, but with a written agreement, by the Vice Chancellor, to attend to a list of student demands generated in the hours that followed. The set of demands was recognized, even then, by protesters, as woefully focused on treating the needless violence already endured in the previous week's arrests. The demands included: an investigation into the charge of "assault" on an officer by a Davis undergraduate (no investigation was yet underway, and the chief of police had only "heard about it" from videos of the incident on TV); administrative encouragement of the DA to drop charges in all 52 Mrak arrests; freedom from punishment by student judicial affairs for students arrested; and reconsideration of the closing of a campus housing co-operative. At 11pm, the occupiers settled on a written agreement produced by the Vice Provost to address their demands, and as a group, peacefully ceded the building.


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State police at the Frackville barracks are investigating an assault/harassment incident that happened at 2 a.m. Nov. 24 in West Mahanoy Township.
Police said Joseph McTiernan, 26, of Frackville, has been cited for harassment as a result of the incident.
Police said the incident happened at Oak and line streets in the township when McTiernan punched Joshua R. hoffman, 26, of Brooklyn, N.Y., in the face after the victim had left Jimmy O's Sports Bar. The victim also twisted his ankle during the altercation.


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Man convicted of shooting Ithaca police officer charged with assaulting corrections officer
Wed, 01 May 2013 14:39:20 GMT —
The Ithaca man partially convicted of shooting an Ithaca Police Officer is now accused of assaulting a corrections officer while in jail awaiting sentencing.
Jamel Booker, 23, is charged with assault after an altercation inside of the Tompkins County Jail, in which a corrections officer was injured.
Sheriff's deputies say it happened last Tuesday, April 23. The extent of the injuries are unknown at this time.
Deputies say Booker was locked up, awaiting his June 28 sentencing for shooting Ithaca Police Officer Anthony Augustine last October during a chase. Booker was pulled over for driving a vehicle that had been reported stolen. The police veteran was shot in the chest.
A Tompkins County jury returned a mixed verdict in that trial, convicting Booker on seven of the eight counts he was charged with in regards to the incident. He was convicted of assault on a police officer, assault, criminal possession of stolen property, criminal possession of a weapon, criminal use of a firearm, and tampering with physical evidence.
The, however, jury could not come to a unanimous decision on the most serious charge - attempted murder. While prosecutors said Booker intended to kill Augustine, Booker's attorney maintains he had no plan to kill the officer, and was trying to get away.
Booker was arraigned in the Town of Lansing Court for assaulting the corrections officer last week. He was sent back to the Tompkins County Jail on $10,000 cash bail.


text:
Steelers getting cheers in Ohio
Published: August 7th, 2010 | Tags: 2010 Hall of Fame, Ben Roethlisberger, Dick LeBeau, Hines Ward, Mike Tomlin, Pittsburgh Steelers, Troy Polamalu
CANTON, OHIO — There was no mistaking when the Steelers made their way into Fawcett Stadium on Saturday night. There was a considerable pop from the far corner of the stadium, and fans flocked to the end zone next to the stage where the Steelers started filing in.
The team is here to represent defensive coordinator Dick LeBeau, who is being inducted.
Try to figure out which photos were taken by a professional, and which were done with a camera phone.
— Adam Rank
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Hail Mary!
Sally Feldman on making your children worship you
Martha Gellhorn journalist extraordinaire, tough war correspondent, lover of Ernest Hemingway didn't spend much time at home. When her son complained that she was never around to greet him after school with fresh-baked biscuits like all the other moms, she said: "Tough, son. That's the way it is."
But for every Martha, there are hundreds of thousands of Marys. Let's face it, the Madonna has a lot to answer for. She may not be the icon of choice for 21st century equality seekers, but as a mother she's a tough act to follow. Pure, unsullied, devoted, sacrificing it's still the ideal we're lumbered with the minute that pregnancy test reads positive. And when we don't live up to it, the punishments can be, well, crucifying.
You don't have to be a Catholic to recognise that all the dominant images of motherhood have their roots in religion. Even free-thinking Marthas are weighed down by all those centuries of Mary. So how does the humanist mother go about producing reasonably well-balanced, well-educated, moral human beings, protected from irrelevant and oppressive myths?
Anyone who was brought up in a religious household will be troubled by this question. We recognise the value of belonging to a culture: the age-old rituals, the candles, the specialness. Of course you can always borrow the trappings from more devout family and friends, without the accompanying faith requirements. But that rather defeats the point. Because what is missing is certainty.
That's the danger of humanism. Certainty is replaced by doubt. Absolute authority gives way to anything goes. And this is where the unease comes in. Children brought up in devout families tend to be better disciplined, nicer to their parents, more hard-working, ambitious and successful. There is a sneaking suspicion lurking deep in the soul of even the most ardent atheist that once you relax that iron authority, you've started to lose the parenting game. Our children no longer have to honour their father and their mother. Now it's okay to question us and from there it's a slippery road to despising, scorning, using the place as a hotel and eventually writing Mommie Dearest about us or selling their story to the Sun.
It's a bit like the royal family letting in commoners. The mystique disappears and suddenly the whole fabric of autocratic domination disintegrates. In believing families, the rules are the rules, reinforced by endless holy days, extra Islam or Hebrew classes or Sunday school. You're much more likely to work hard and do what you're told if your moral viewpoint is framed by the burning agonies of evil-doers wrought by the wrath of bearded old men.
One solution for the humanist mother is to do nothing at all, thereby liberating her children from outmoded notions of the parent as authority figure. I've got friends who are so hopelessly hippy in their lifestyle that their children in despair have turned the other cheek and become the grown-ups. One is working as a human rights lawyer in the Middle East. Another is running a think tank. They plan to be extremely strict with their children should they be foolish enough to have them.
So benign neglect can be a very good policy if it works. It means you can be lazy and hope for the best. Sadly, it doesn't always work and your children may well join the Salvation Army or the Tory Party just to spite you. They are quite likely to see right through you and your feckless ways, like Saffy in Absolutely Fabulous withering Edina and Patsy with her magnificently polished disdain.
Another ruse is to be less a mother and more a friend. This, too, has its limitations. Motherhood does not really allow for equality. Your job is to relinquish your attractiveness, your sexuality and your allure, to pass on the candle to the next lot. You'd better go with this or you could end up eternally waiting for the mirror to declare you are the most beautiful of all. Listen the mirror lies. How can you be supportive, nurturing and loving if you are competing with your own children? They may not thank you for offering them a fun companion when what they really need is a mother.
A modern version of the mum as friend is the even more dangerous mum as business partner. Think Sigourney Weaver and Jennifer Love Hewitt in Heartbreakers the sexy mum and daughter duo exploiting pint-sized men with gross-sized fortunes. The danger here is co-dependence the mother descending into neediness which in turn prevents the child from developing at all. The successful mother, remember, is the mother who knows when to let go. That shared dotcom enterprise is often just another way of never really moving out. And it can be unhealthy in so many ways.
Shudder, for example, at the memory of the Kaplins one a superannuated lapdancer, the other a self-styled spiritual guru pontificating from her pyramid. Is this what you want? Really?
It's what the ultimate juggling mother, Cherie Blair, thought she wanted. As if the Catholic stuff wasn't enough, she turned to their cocktail of crystals, spiritual healing and, no doubt, a touch of astrology to help her negotiate her inner Martha and Mary. But she made a big mistake when, at the height of Cheriegate, she sobbed: "I'm no superwoman."
Wrong, Cherie. Wrong. Superwoman is exactly what a mother should be, with or without religion. But if you want to instil some values into your children without God and without making yourself ridiculous what you have to do is follow your instincts. Allow yourself to be adored. Be the mother from hell. Be the all-knowing, absolute font of authority and wisdom. Hey you don't need God. You can be God. How? Just become a Jewish mother. That's how.
Let's not forget that Mary herself was a Jewish mother in fact, she was the Jewish mother incarnate. She believed her baby was a golden prince, more perfect than any other baby ever and the son of god already. He even had an ology: the ology. The Madonna was the original model for Sophie Tucker's Yiddishe Momma: teacher, protector, worshipper . . and nourisher.
You don't need to be Jewish to be a Jewish mother. Just follow these few simple rules of engagement. Let's begin with the food. Wicked stepmothers starve their children. Real mothers nurture and feed. You must supply chicken soup on tap and strudel by the ton. Don't worry if you're a lousy cook, or if that secret gefilte fish recipe comes courtesy of Marks and Spencer. What matters is the portions. Pile on helpings as large as Australia. That way they'll never need to go to Australia. Practise phrases like, "I made it for you specially," and, "just a little more won't hurt." Offer two desserts. Whichever they choose, immediately snap: "You didn't like the other one?"
Next fear. Be inspired by the most formidable mother in the whole of literature, Sophie Portnoy. "She was so deeply imbedded in my consciousness that for the first year of school I seem to have believed that each of my teachers was my mother in disguise." Did she do it with God? I don't think so. She used terror. Her definition of an acorn? "A pellet you should never shoot at anyone. Not even in jest." Gourmet cuisine? "There are plenty of good things to eat in the world, Alex, without eating a thing like a lobster and running the risk of having paralyzed hands for the rest of your life." So your kids might grow up a little cautious but, hey, is that so bad?
I used to think that the good humanist mother should avoid causing guilt in her children. Now I realise it just depends on the kind of guilt. Instead of giving them grief about eating ham or forgetting to do the rosary, encourage your children to feel guilty about you. When did they last phone? Have they practised piano? Are they living up to your magnificently grandiose expectations?
Your daughter gets 90 percent on her maths test. Your response? "So what happened to the other ten?" Your actor son phones excitedly to tell you he's got the part he just auditioned for. He's going to play the husband. Don't gush, just shrug: "You couldn't get a speaking part?"
Let them feel guilty about the right things, like letting you down. Otherwise how can you sport the other side of motherhood pride? "Help, help my son the doctor is drowning." What mother doesn't deep down long to be in a position to scream out her children's professional achievements to a jealous world?
There's nothing wrong with being ambitious for your children. If you want them to be successful, driven, marginally neurotic but ultimately satisfied then make them adore you. Be the centre of their universe. Don't use God. Replace him.
And if you think I'm advocating an unhealthy dependency here don't worry. Remember the wise words of Jewish mothers everywhere. "Oedipus, shmoedipus who cares, so long as he loves his mother."


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Mociun Stacked white diamond ring with pavé white diamonds
- $1680.00$1179.00
Mociun Stacked white diamond ring with pavé white diamonds
- $1680.00$1179.00
Stacked reverse-set white diamond (0.12 ct) on 14k yellow gold band with white diamond micropavé. Looks beautiful worn alone or in a stack. Size 6.5. • • • After successfully operating her own clothing line, Caitlin Mociun turned to jewelry. She is inspired by the simple design principles of the Bauhaus school, creating a trademark result: simple, unexpected elegance. Sustainability is important to Mociun. All pieces are made in New York by jewelers that she works with closely. When sourcing new diamonds and gemstones, Mociun works closely with suppliers so that she knows exactly where they come from. Her work has been featured in the New York Times and Vogue, among others. Handmade in NYC.
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RECIPES: Recipe Details
That's Italian
This is a burger I've made for 20 years, it's definately an adult burger, children seem to snicker at the fresh spices and cheeses. This is a burger you can easily get addicted to.
95% beef roma tomatoes,
salt, pepper,
2 chopped fresh cloves of garlic,
6 sweet basil leaves,
freshly grated assiagio cheese,
1 slice provolone,
italian roll or italian bread
and freshly torn parsley.
Two 95% beef patties, one a little larger than the other, on top of the smaller patty place a thick slices of roma tomatoes, salt, pepper, chopped fresh clove of garlic, 4 sweet basil leaves, sprinkle with assiagio cheese and place a slice of provolone. Place the larger beef patty on top, seal sides and grill, cook until beef is 160 degrees. Use italian roll or bread, top it with: freshly chopped tomato, basil, garlic and parsley.


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This answer will explain how to remove cached content which is appearing on Google. This relates to sites which have already been verified in a Google Webmaster Tools account.
When content is updated on a website, Google's index will not be updated until the site is next crawled. In the meantime the original content may still appear in search results. To have any old information removed, you will need to place a request with Google to remove the cached version of the page. To do this please follow the instructions below.
Log into your Google Webmaster Tools account.
Select your site.
On the left hand menu select Optimization and then Remove URLs.
Click New Removal Request.
Type the URL of the page you wish to be removed, and click Continue. Please note that the URL is case sensitive.
Select Remove Cached Version of This Page.
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text: Comments on Captain America Never Safe For Work 2017-07-07T18:13:23Z http://comics212.net/?feed=atom&p=85 WordPress By: Blog@Newsarama » Anyone have an extra copy of Captain America #25? Blog@Newsarama » Anyone have an extra copy of Captain America #25? http://blog.newsarama.com/2007/03/09/anyone-have-an-extra-copy-of-captain-america-25/ http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-573 2007-03-09T14:55:09Z 2007-03-09T14:55:09Z […] Many retailers limited purchases of the issue to one per customer, while others instituted sign-up lists. Even Toronto's The Beguiling, which had "plenty of copies" on Wednesday, ended up restricting purchases on Thursday and then selling out before closing. […] ]]> By: Captain N Captain N http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-566 2007-03-08T20:23:28Z 2007-03-08T20:23:28Z "…the comic book world – still reeling from Superman's death…" That made me ell oh ell. ]]> By: Blog@Newsarama » Those who forget history … something, something Blog@Newsarama » Those who forget history … something, something http://blog.newsarama.com/2007/03/08/those-who-forget-history-something-something/ http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-565 2007-03-08T18:33:39Z 2007-03-08T18:33:39Z […] While some retailers, like Chris Butcher of Toronto's The Beguiling, say they have plenty of copies of Captain America #25, customers elsewhere may find their comic shops coming up short. Captain America #25 variant(Blanket warning: For those wishing to avoid spoilers, follow any of these links at your own peril.) […] ]]> By: Ed Mathews Ed Mathews http://www.popimage.com http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-562 2007-03-08T05:20:59Z 2007-03-08T05:20:59Z Now I must hunt down those issues and remix them with Mark Millar scripts… ]]> By: Hugh Hugh http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-561 2007-03-08T03:00:09Z 2007-03-08T03:00:09Z Further research shows that there was indeed a Captain Canada, and I guess he appeared mostly on Yes Album Covers? ]]> By: Hugh Hugh http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-560 2007-03-08T02:56:37Z 2007-03-08T02:56:37Z Please, it's Captain Canuck. ]]> By: Ed Mathews Ed Mathews http://www.popimage.com http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-559 2007-03-08T02:48:34Z 2007-03-08T02:48:34Z That's because Captain Canada is probably doing ok. I mean, this is really a formality, isn't it? Mark Millar has been killing Captain America off one line of script at a time for a while now… ]]> By: Mike Mike http://comics212.net/2007/03/07/captain-america/#comment-558 2007-03-08T01:11:59Z 2007-03-08T01:11:59Z Yah, but this is Marvel… Won't he just come back to life just in-time to save the world/universe from the soon to be discovered chaotic event/bad guy??? ]]>


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I had a TT, BA, lipo on inner/outer/lower back. The over all experience was just like my C-section. The only bruising was the lipo areas and the pain was really the lipo areas not the stomach.
I would deffinitly do it again and I am only 6 weeks PO. I did it because I always looked pregnant no matter what I wore or eat or how hard I worked out. Bad enough, that people would ask me fairly regularly if I was prego or when was I do. Beside the fact I was constantly un-happy with my look.
I know I have a large scar, but it is worth the trade off.


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34 New England Ridge Rd
Phone: 304-863-6300
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We regularly have special offers for you! Come take a look.
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We are your neighborhood grocery store! At JAMES COUNTRY STORE you will always be greated by a warm welcome and friendly smile! We take the time to get to know our customers and their favorite items to buy.
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The quickest and easiest way to lower OE Springer forks by 1 1/2". Comes with two chrome compression springs, spring spacers and bushings included. Proudly made in the U.S.A. The Burly Springer Disassembly Tool is also available separately to make the job a little easier.
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The Judge is the original Contrast Cut wheel, the one that started it all. The great thing about the judge is it still looks as good today as it did when it was first introduced and continues to be one of Roland's personal favorites. It has just enough hot rod and race inspiration to make it look good on anything.
Roland's Garage is an online window into the creative soul of RSD, where customers can buy ultra-premium goods and one of kind exclusive items that are a result of our diverse crew and inspirations.
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Tag Archives: Lecture Notes
Lecture notes on PDE
The semester is over, and this Spring I really enjoyed teaching the course on partial differential equations. All the lecture notes can be found at the course web page, or, in one file, at ResearchGate. Advertisements
Posted in Career, Math 483: PDE, Teaching, Uncategorized Tagged Lecture Notes, Math 483: PDE, teaching Leave a comment
Lecture Notes
I put together in one file the lecture notes I have written for my courses, here they are: Undergraduate ODE Graduate ODE I Dynamical Systems and Models in Biology Mathematics of Networks (Unfinished)


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PART FINDER FRIDAY – 2mm 10 pin socket header (for XBee). This part finder friday is for 2mm pitch pin socket header! Whew its a long name but basically its the things you use to connect to small modules like XBees. This is a common part we get asked about in the forums, since they're somewhat delicate and also not incredibly common compared to the 0.1″ variety. You can get them from a few distributors including us!
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