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For the Supreme Court, New Term Means Renewed Attacks on Civil Rights Legislation
by Julianne Hing on October 13 2014, 7:00AM
Brace yourself.
Topics: Politics, Voting Rights Act
For the Supreme Court, New Term Means Renewed Attacks on Civil Rights Legislation
by Julianne Hing on October 13 2014, 7:00AM
Brace yourself.
Topics: Politics, Voting Rights Act
Only Property Owners Should Vote Says Fla. Congressman
by Brentin Mock on May 21 2014, 4:30PM
Fla. Rep. Yoho doesn't stop with the nonsense, this time: voting.
Topics: Voting Rights, Politics, Politics
Two Republican Leaders Give Up on Voter ID
by Brentin Mock on May 12 2014, 1:45PM
Sen. Rand Paul and Pa. Gov. Tom Corbett throw in the towel on voter ID
Topics: Politics
Meet the Preacher Behind "Moral Mondays" in NC
by Carla Murphy on April 16 2014, 10:01AM
Rev William Barber is inspiring a lot of people
Kentucky Debates Easing Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
by Carla Murphy on February 21 2014, 10:33AM
Advocates anticipate victory.
Why I'd Rather Hear Eric Holder Deliver the State of the Union Tonight
by Brentin Mock on January 28 2014, 1:46PM
What issue has Obama been addressing inadequately that Holder has confronted more forcefully?
Topics: Voting Rights, /NOW, Politics, State of the Union, Voting Rights Act
Oprah to Produce Ava DuVernay's Voting Rights Film 'Selma'
by Jamilah King on January 23 2014, 12:35PM
DuVernay took over directing duties from Lee Daniels, who faced numerous challenges in financing the project.
Topics: Arts & Culture, /NOW
Florida's Upcoming Race-Tested Special Election
by Brentin Mock on January 22 2014, 7:00AM
The March 11 Florida race for an empty congressional seat will be a sign of the political and racial temperatures in the state.
Topics: Voting Rights, Politics
The Voting Rights Act Fix is In
by Brentin Mock on January 16 2014, 2:50PM
Civil rights group are giving the bill some side-eye for failing to recognize voter ID laws.
Debo Adegbile Faces Senate For Justice Department Civil Rights Post
by Brentin Mock on January 8 2014, 9:38AM
Civil rights attorney Debo Adegbile goes up against Senate conservatives today who may grill him about representing Mumia Abu Jamal
Topics: Voting Rights, /NOW, Politics
DC's Non-Citizens Could Get Right To Vote
by Carla Murphy on December 9 2013, 2:53PM
The bill, if passed, will affect up to 50,000 District of Columbia residents.
Topics: Immigration, /NOW
Yelp! Joins ALEC Amidst Ongoing Criticism
by Von Diaz on September 27 2013, 1:11PM
At least 50 corporations and nonprofits have severed ties with American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), but Yelp! is just getting on board.
Congress May Fix the Voting Rights Act This Year. Here's Why
by Brentin Mock on September 13 2013, 7:00AM
Wanna bet that Congress restores key functions of the Voting Rights Act before New Years?
Topics: Voting Rights, Politics
Parting Words From Resigning NAACP President Ben Jealous
by Brentin Mock on September 9 2013, 11:28AM
NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund also loses civil rights pillar in attorney Debo Adebile, who is now counsel for the U.S. Senate judiciary committee.
Topics: Voting Rights, History, /NOW, Politics
What Would It Take To Pass a Voting Rights Amendment? [INFOGRAPHIC]
by Erin Zipper, Brentin Mock on August 28 2013, 7:00AM
Mapping out a constitutional solution to the Supreme Court's devastating ruling this summer.
Topics: Voting Rights, Politics, Voting Rights Act
Rep. John Lewis Debuts His New Graphic Novel at Comic-Con
by Brentin Mock on July 22 2013, 1:01PM
Rep. John Lewis was himself inspired by a comic book based on civil rights in the 1960s. Now he's produced his own.
Topics: /NOW
Five Decisions to Watch From the Supreme Court
by Aura Bogado on June 20 2013, 11:36AM
The high court's decisions will affect the future of affirmative action, voting rights, tribal sovereignty, and marriage equality.
Two Ways Arizona's Proof of Citizenship Law Might Get Reinstated
by Brentin Mock on June 18 2013, 1:01PM
Justice Scalia and Senators Cruz and Vitter are creating paths for Arizona to revive the proof of citizenship requirement.
Topics: Voting Rights, /NOW, Politics
US Supreme Court Strikes Down Proof of Citizenship Voting Law
by Brentin Mock on June 17 2013, 10:35AM
Proof of citizenship law in Arizona, which burdened Latino and Native American voters, has been struck by high court.
Topics: Voting Rights, /NOW, Politics
U.S. Reports to U.N. on Ending Racial Bias, With No Plan of Its Own
by Brentin Mock on June 14 2013, 3:02PM
U.S. says it can do more to address racial injustice. Civil rights group agree.
Topics: Immigration, /NOW


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Foreword: Pantaloon does not live in Frankfurt (*)
The state of confusion into which the EU and, in particular, the EMU (the 17-state monetary zone) has fallen is the confirmation that the crisis of the world capitalist system has not been overcome at all, but is ongoing and is spreading from the economic plane to the political one, violently attacking those institutions that less correspond to the needs of financial Capital. In this respect, the crisis of the EMU is a political crisis, revealing the inadequacy of Europe, a mosaic of independent nations, to manage the contradictions in an area distinguished by divisions and inbalances, where on one hand you have the fragile links of Community agreements and on the other, a growing economic and financial integration, driven by the banking systems of the imperialist poles France and, above all, Germany, which is taking place, without being able, now and in the future, – at least in the ways wished by the petit-bourgeois pro-Europe ideology – to lead to a political integration of the entire EU area, or, at least, of the restricted area of the Euro.
The explosion of contradictions we are witnessing – which once again gives us the satisfaction of seeing the basic principles of revolutionary marxism confirmed – will make the EMU fall into pieces, too, if that sort of supergovernment (composed of the French-German axis, the ECB, the IMF and the European commission) which has formed to face the emergency does not succeed in fixing the two main flaws: the crisis of the banking system and the crisis of national debts. Even in this case, the crisis can be delayed but not solved: firstly because the global crisis of overproduction – which obviously interests the old continent, too – cannot be solved by the intervention of central banks, the "last resort" guarantors that feed the system with unlimited liquidity (as confirmed by the failure of the two "quantitative easings" by the Fed) – at most, only the short-term effects of the crisis can be attenuated; secondly – and this is the specific nature of the European case – because Europe lacks, and will continue to lack, its Pantaloon, its "last resort" guarantor, a central bank having the power to offer guarantees for the whole sovereign debt of the area. The assignment of unlimited powers to the ECB, thus making it the true and lawful central Community bank, guarantor of sovereign debts, would be the only solution capable of saving the Euro area from the international financial speculation; but this would certainly mean a real shift toward a higher level of integration: it would be a prelude to political integration. Faced with this prospect, Germany opposes an unconditional nein. Europe is destined to remain a plurinational entity, within which the stronger nations, the continental imperialist poles, dictate rules and conditions.
Banking crisis and crises of the sovereign debt: ungrateful banks, foolish States
Generally speaking, the crisis that is affecting the sovereign debts of the countries of the EMU and which has spread from the outskirts of the Union to highly important States such as Spain and Italy, eventually affecting France itself, is a result of the great financial crisis of 2007 and of the recession from which the capitalist system has never got out. The long period of "easy money" and expansionist monetary policies put into practice by the FED in a global context of complete market deregulation, had boosted the proliferation of financial products and generated an enormous mass of derivatives devoid of any link with real economy, of purely fictitious capital which, as the first problems of the accumulation mechanism resurfaced, started to lose its apparent value. Consequently, at the origins of the European sovereign debts crisis is the banking system debt, due to financial assets having lost any market and being shouldered, for a large quota, by the States, with a consequent increase in the need to finance sovereign debts and in the yield of government bonds issued by those countries that are considered to be less "solid" from the point of view of their balance of payments and economic structure.
Countries like Greece or Portugal, which are today accused of being responsible for running up an excessive debt, are in fact paying the consequences of the financial penetration they have been experiencing for years by the banking systems of those countries that now profess to be virtuous, that is to say the imperialist poles of the continent. In the years preceding the crisis, German and French banks were the most engaged in sustaining the growth of the so-called PIGS, providing credit for speculation in the real estate and in the financial market of those economies that are now accused of having piled up excessive debts. But if that credit provided for speculation is now at risk of being largely wiped out by the difficulties that those countries are finding in repaying their debts (which have, in the meantime, taken the form of State bonds), it is thanks to these same outlying squanderers that the highly virtuous banks have been able for years to record abundant profits on their balance sheets.
The governments' response to the crisis has been directed to the saving of the financial system, weighed down by illiquid derivatives. The salvage operation has implied the growth of the debt of the States, that had to take on enormous amounts of bonds with no market, accepted as "collateral" in exchange for liquidity. The FED continued its expansionist policy through two successive "quantitative easings", with the objective of helping American banks to finance the recovery of the so-called "real" economy. The action taken by the ECB, whilst not being of the same "non-conventional" nature as that of the FED, has provided an equally massive support for the European inter-banking, by directly financing the banks, which were no more lending a penny one another, in exchange for stocks of dubious value. The hardliners of the Bundesbank school, who are now rapping the knuckles of the outlying countries and criticizing the support the ECB is giving to sovereign debts, kept conveniently quiet on those occasions, considering that it was – and it still is – the German banks themselves that have the greatest load of junk bonds and the greatest need for liquidity. The effect of salvage operations on both sides of the Atlantic, in a context of chronic overproduction, of excess global production capacity, has been to fuel a new season of speculation, as if the financial and real-estate bubbles had never exploded. American and European banks have intensified, rather than diminished, their activity of hunting profits in high-risk financial operations, continuing at the same time to load their balances with State bonds, considered to be "safer" than most of the private bonds in circulation.
Since 2008, we have observed the transfer of a large part of the private debt to its public counterpart. The private debt of industrialized countries has dropped by 1 000 billion dollars, whilst the public debt has risen by 8 000 billion dollars (Crédit Suisse data). The growth of State debts – that in advanced economies already exceeded, on average, the 100% of GNP – is thus a phenomenon that results from the financial crisis, inspired by the classical logic of privatizing profits and socializing losses. From September 2008 to December 2010 in the EU, post-crisis State allocations for the financial sector amounted to 4 285 billion euros, of which 1 240 have already been used.
National financial systems that have made most use of State financing to EU banks (in billions of euros),
The table shows that nearly a half of the total amount has been used by British and German banks. 620 billion, half of the total, went to the 10 largest banks. The allocated figure is enormous, equal to 36% of the EU's GNP and to 10% of total bank assets; this huge expenditure of public money has been made to close potential balance gaps of a system that over the past decade had financed itself by one third through the real economy and by two thirds through finance itself – which means that at least two thirds of bank assets are made up of fictitious capital (1).
After being saved by government interventions directed to purchase bonds and monetize the debt, banks have further re-financed themselves with short-term loans of public money at near-zero interest rates, and have used this money to buy long-term government bonds, mostly issued in order to finance the banks themselves. This way, banks can keep on making profits thanks to the interest rate differential between short-term public loans and long-term government bonds, the latter being the most hardly hit by the recent speculative attacks assets; thus banks use the income from the public debt to recover the losses experienced as a consequence of the crisis, since they cannot rely on financing themselves from the real economy, which – with the sole exception, to date, of Germany and its satellites – is in a phase of chronic stagnation.
"Speculation" here does not appear as the parodistic "greedy and unscrupulous businessmen", but as the need of the financial system to make profits using the opportunities offered by the situation, which are, at present, limited mostly to moving around worthless securities inside the system itself. The unchallenged dominion of international financial capital which, through the so-called "markets", expresses absolute judgements on national governments and economies, is actually (dialectically) a display of the extreme fragility of the system as its dynamics are detatched from the crucial, but feeble at this point, production of surplus value. Today more than ever, Capital needs the State to survive its historical crisis. The financial system can do no more than put itself in the hands of the State, in order to seek protection from bankruptcy, and in the hands of the public debt in order to guarantee profitability to its investments. In turn, States are asked to reduce their balance deficit in order to finance the cost of the debt, which is increasing also because of the props provided for the shaky bank balances. The fact that the price of reducing the deficit is obtained almost exclusively by reducing incomes from salaried workers, pensions and expenditures for the so-called "social" services is the umpteenth demonstration that the capitalist system is now a parasitic organism that is more able to drain the riches of society than to generate them.
Bank investments in sovereign debts do not, however, represent a haven safer than speculative finance. The enormous amount of public bonds in the hands of the banks also represents a totally fictitious value – as Marx demonstrates. This apparent value is placed at risk by the movement of capital that the banks themselves are mainly responsible for. The rush to sell off risky bonds and purchase those considered to be "safe" (American, German, Swiss…) represents the attempt to safeguard fictitious capital from the threat of depreciation, which is part of its very nature. When the bonds of a sovereign debt are the object of massive sales, the percentage of reduction in their value corresponds to the percentage of increase in their yield. The possibility, anything but theoretical, of a default in the public debts of one or more States depends ultimately on the fact that the issues of these bonds, which have no intrinsic value, are based on the future tax income, which is, in turn, bound up with economic trends, the production of social surplus value. Nevertheless, in the banks' accounting, the nominal value of bonds appears as a real value and its reduction is a source of losses. Considering that a large proportion of the 350 billion Euros Greek debt is in the hands of French and German banks, the decision of the European Community to intervene in order to guarantee the country's solvency was taken mainly on the behalf of those same banking systems. The 12 largest German banks are exposed for the amount of 68 billion euros in government bonds of the PIIGS, a much higher amount than the other European countries considered to be "weaker" and, despite the fact that in the last three years they have increased their equity, the figure at risk still represents over twice the amount of their capital guarantees (2).
However, the critical situation of banks is certainly not limited to the sovereign debts in their possession, which in the end amounts to only a small percentage of their exposure. The large northern banks, particularly French and German ones, are overflowing with junk bonds. In the banking systems of Europe all this more or less worthless paper amounts to 337 billion euros. The Deutsche Bank possesses over 46 billions in junk bonds, the Bnp Paribas almost 33. The crash of the French-Belgian giant Dexia has nothing to do with sovereign bonds but with the fact that 1/3 of its total assets were illiquid. Behind the so-called "crisis of sovereign debts" and the crisis of the EMU lurks a financial whirpool that risks sparking off a systemic crisis.
Über alles!
In their position as the main creditors, France and Germany have taken over the management of the sovereign debt crisis of the PIGS, with the aim of creating the right conditions for saving their own banks. Today, a sort of "supergovernment" seems to have formed, bringing the representatives of these two national governments together with the ECB, the IMF and the European commission: but, in fact, it is the German point of view that systematically prevails in every important issue, demonstrating that one of the most significant aspects of this crisis is the reaffirmation of Germany as the leading economic and political power on the continent. The preconditions for this supremacy, in comparison with which the equal role of France is only formal, formed themselves beginning with the German reunification.
Following the financial crisis of 2008, Germany suddenly abandoned the role of the moving spirit of the integration process culminating in the Treaty of Maastricht. Then, as now, the German government refused the proposal of a joint European guarantee for the rescue of the financial systems, obtaining that every single State had to guarantee for its own banks. It was the demonstration that the German "pro-Europe spirit" that had led to Maastricht obeyed to the strictly national interest of making the European partners (first and foremost France) and the USA accept the undigestible fact of German reunification, the implications and prospects of which were far wider in importance than that of a treaty signed by sovereign States (3).
For two decades the historical significance of German reunification was overshadowed by the renewed progresses towards European intergration and by the adoption of the Euro, to which far more importance was assigned than it really has. Germany had to demonstrate a "European" vocation that showed continuity with the post-war political situation, in which the European Union was merely a building block of the Atlantic alliance, without any perspective of strategic independence because genetically incapable of achieving a unified political synthesis of the different national interests.
Whilst the economic giant EU paid the price of its political dwarfism, Germany was successfully engaged in the integration of the East, the considerable cost of which, however, yielded its fruits in terms of labor productivity in the East and of convergence of the two economies. (4)
In parallel to the process of reunification, Germany dealt with large scale restructuring of its production system – already marked out by a high concentration of capital in large industrial-financial groups – , resulting in a further increase in the average organic composition of capital and in labour productivity. Many German companies reduced their costs by progressively moving segments of their production processes to Eastern Europe; while major reforms of the labour market reduced unemployment benefits, increased the percentage of fixed-term contracts and reduced the weight of national contracts compared to the more flexible company contracts. While the German proletariat paid the price of an increase in unemployment and salary restrictions, there was a corresponding strengthening of the Country's production system, more competitive exports and the confirmation of the role played by the German productive apparatus as the engine of the continent.
In same the years when the PIGS were fed by its banks, Germany recorded high growth rates in production and exports that confirmed it as the "engine of growth" in Europe, though in a climate of uncertain recovery. Thus the gap with other European states increased, turning into high trade surplus, that was for 2/3 due to trade exchange with the other Eurozone countries (5). In the years from 1995 to 2006, German growth, fuelled by industrial export, was far more moderate than that of countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, who recorded large increases in GNP [(between 2.5% and 3.6%), but at the same time had a markedly negative trade deficit (with an average of 12,9% and 5% of GNP over the period) and a sharp increase in the cost of labour (yearly average: +4.5%, + 3%, + 2.8%) (P.Reichlin, cit.). This situation went on even after the 2008 crisis; in 2010, a year in which Germany had a foreign surplus of 5.1%, the PIGS recorded a large foreign deficit (in relation to GNP: Italy 4.2%, Spain 4.5%, Portugal 9.8%, Greece 11.8%). Capitals started to abandon the latter countries, accentuating deficits in their balance of payments, which have been financed by the ECB over the past three years by issuing money for over 100 billion euros a year (6).
In the EMU zone, the single currency allows the higher productivity of German economy to turn immediately into competitivity in terms of prices, without the obstacle of competitive devaluations, which can be carried out only by countries with their own currency. Euro has represented a benefit for countries that took advantage of the force of the single currency to finance an economic growth founded on real estate and financial speculation at low interest rates; but now that they have to guarantee the payment of debts they are suffering the strength of the German giant without being able to counter with their own monetary policy. From this point of view, Euro has amplified German supremacy on the European continent, as well as being an excellent monetary vehicle for placing German goods on markets outside the EMU at more favorable prices than those expressed in the old Deutschmarks. After the introduction of the EMU in 1998, for a decade the differentials between the yield rates on national bonds of the different countries remained low or non-existent; but after the financial crisis and the bank rescue operations carried out by the States, the trend in the yield rates of sovereign debts has started to reflect the state of high or low difficulty of the single national economies. Basically, what occurred on the bond market was a "race to quality", that's to say to safer yields, by all the investors, which amplified the gap among the yield of high risk bonds and those of countries considered to be more solid or "virtuous".
The Eurozone in the midst of a political crisis: commissary States and States under commissarial administration
The European crisis has, under many aspects, taken on a political form. First of all, we can see the (probably definitive) decline of the petit-bourgeois idea that the political integration of the continent can occur through the pacific and progressive economic integration, culminating in the creation of a community of nations united under a single federal flag. In practice, what we are witnessing is the full affirmation of national interests in a context of inter-communitarian relations where the big fish dictates its conditions to the small one. The result of as many as 14 emergency summits in 20 months has been the constitution of a sort of directorate - centered on the French-German axis, the ECB management and the EU commission -, in which the political decisions are clearly taken by the two leading nations, with the clear prevalence of Germany. This aspect already goes beyond the old communitarian structure, firstly because decisions do not pass through EU institutions and secondly because the inner core of EMU is depriving the EU countries outside the Euro area of authority over crucial decisions, first and foremost the United Kingdom. We are glimpsing a preview of the possible split between EMU and non-EMU countries, which is not, however, the only possibile future split inside Europe.
The most evident fact emerging from all the summits preceding the one held at the end of October 2011 has been the reluctance of Germany to agree on rescuing countries involved in a debt crisis. In fact, as economic contribution to bailout operations given by individual countries is proprotional to their economic weight, the greatest burden would be on Germany, with a considerable transfer of resources towards the Southern European countries. Germany, like France, is interested in saving its own banks and in ensuring monetary stability, not in being involved, beyond a certain limit, in the problems of others. The apparent indecision of the German government in the management of the sovereign debt crisis is actually the fruit of a precise strategy aiming to keep the States in crisis on the tightrope, in order to force them to pursue economic recovery policies, an attitude that has risked to worsen the crisis, but also an indication of the fact that German capitalism is also taking into account the possibility of giving up the EMU (7), despite the enormous cost that the move would have for exports and for the banking system.
In fact, the result of the summit held at the end of October does not substantially change the prospects outlined by the previous ones. The declaration of intent to save the single currency was followed by solutions that do not represent a qualitative step forward when compared to the previously decided emergency measures. Another 100 billion in aid were assigned to Greece, banks will have to accept a loss of the 50% of the nominal value of the Greek bonds they hold and, in order to strengthen their financial position, they will have to proceed to recapitalize; the "state rescue fund" had its resources increased from 450 to around 1000-1400 billion euros due to a "lever effect" (intepret: "getting into debt"); a financial tool (the Special Purpose Vehicle) was set up: it is supposed to attract foreign sovereign funds in support of the European public debts. In fact, in order to recapitalize, banks will be allowed to resort to state aid if needed and, in the last resort, to the "state rescue fund" itself, whose real resources remain the same as before (440 billion, 140 of which already used for Portugal, Greece and Ireland), and rise only thanks to a financial trick. Finally, the prospects of interventions by foreign states in support of the fund don't lie within the European power of decision (8).
In the end, the highly praised resolution of the summit held at the end of october has given birth to a new mouse. The problem of the financial structure of EMU, which lies in the nature of the ECB, was not tackled: in the Eurozone the ECB has the prerogative of supplying liquidity, but is not allowed to "monetize" sovereign debt, as well as being bound by statute, modelled on that of the Bundesbank, to the basic principle of safeguarding the value of money to contrast the risks of inflation. In this respect, the ECB has already stepped beyond its mandate by issuing several billion euros in order to save Greece, Portugal and Ireland, but cannot bleed itself white any further in buying up Italian and Spanish (or even French) State bonds in order to halt their falling trends, as the order of magnitude of the expenditure would soar to several hundreds billion euros, making it inconceivable to absorb percentages of debt as high as those of Greece and Ireland.
More in general, the contradiction of the ECB lies in the fact of its being the central bank of an aggregate of independent States, with conditions and interests that diverge, especially in a period of crisis; its own claimed "independence" from the pressure of individual governments prevents it from carrying out massive interventions like those of the Fed (quantitative easing), making it at the same time a tool in the hands of the strongest States. The interventions of ECB in the crisis fully reflect the politicy of Germany of saving the Euro while refusing stable solutions, so that to keep the States in difficulty under the pressure of financial markets, forcing them to adopt restrictive economic policies. From the point of view of financial markets, the ECB embodies the political weakness of Europe: it is a central bank that cannot guarantee unlimited liquidity in situations of sovereign crises.
In fact, the ECB is not involved in the rescuing salvage operations, even indirectly - as it was proposed by France, with the idea of turning the "State rescue fund" into a bank which, as such, could have been financed by the ECB. Germany opposes solutions implying the full assumption of European sovereign debts by the ECB, just as it has always opposed the issuing of community bonds (Eurobonds) to finance the sovereign debt of individual countries, whose risk premium would be an average of the yields of national sovereign bonds, thus increasing the cost of financing the German debt. To each its own State bonds, to each its own banks! The real "solutions" have never been taken into consideration by Germany, nor will they be in the future, and this ensures a permanent economic instability in the Eurozone and the risk of its deflagration.
During the summit, the reformulation of treaties was discussed: however, this should not be seen as a turning point towards a greater integration, but as the reinforcement of the present power relations based upon the French-German predominance. The purpose of the new treaties will be to "impose economic policies on the EU member States" (9): in other words, to implement rules on sanctions against peripheral countries that do not respect the "stability agreement". It is the pure and simple ratification of present political and economic relations within the EMU, which assign the role of the decision-maker to the French-German axis, imposing to the other countries limitations on their sovereignty. We are not, therefore, witnessing a process which is obliging Germany and France, under the pressure of emergency, to advance along the path of the political integration of the EMU zone: on the contrary, we are observing the political reinforcement of the two main imperialist poles of the area (France and, above all, Germany) in their relationships with the peripheral countries – Italy included –, a reinforcement that ratifies the economic integration carried out in the preceding decade through the financial penetration of the banking systems of these two countries in the Eurozone. According to the decisions taken in the latest European summit, the programme for acquiring sovereign funds by the "State rescue fund" is subordinate to a plan of reforms drawn up in Brussels, which has to be approved by a few Parliaments, first of all the Bundestag. It will be a plenary session of the German Members of Parliament that will decide about the pensions of Italians, Spaniards, Greeks etc..
Beyond the Euro: Eurasia
The other split that is looming, apart from that between the States inside and outside the EMU, is the one marked by the North/South demarcation line. For Germany, Euro is good as long as it represents an advantage: but from the very moment its survival implied limitations to the country's own national sovereignty, it would go on without it. During the course of the crisis, impatience towards the Mediterranean States of Europe has grown amongst the countries that come under Germany's direct economic and political influence. Finland has managed to wring from Greece a bilateral agreement that defends its credits; Holland has brutally suggested to establish a communitarian commission with the power of inflicting sanctions up to expulsion of countries that do not respect the stability agreement. The nationalist ferment in central Europe is particularly evident in the authoritarian drift of Hungary, where the new constitution, which is supposed to be modelled on pro-European principles, has confirmed the Florin as the national currency, putting further away the possibility of joining the EMU in the future.
The idea that Germany has no alternative but to save the Euro and thus to assume the burden of financially supporting the peripheral nations takes into account exclusively economic remarks, not considering any historical prospect alternative to the continuity of the EMU. In Germany, a clash has been going on for some time now between a trend in favour of saving the single currency and one turned toward other prospects, as the foundation of a northern economic area with a strong currency and a Mediterranean area with a devalued Euro. The material basis of the different views within the German bourgeoisie lies on the fact that the old economic and geopolitical balances are being shaken by the advance of the crisis.
Should the crisis lead to the breakup of the EMU, a smaller monetary zone might take its place, corresponding more to the area already economically integrated which gravitates around the Rhine axis and the countries of the central European area extending from Finland to Slovenia. The establishment of an economically strong and homogeneous monetary zone would provide the conditions for the recovery of the German financial system after the general crisis that would follow the failure of the Euro: it would then be possible to relaunch the financial penetration to the East, which had, in the past few years, allowed the high growth rates of the economies of the Baltic States and of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries, now threatened precisely by the banks' exposure to PIIGS debt (10). The continuation of the financial penetration the East, towards the ex "Soviet" countries, is a vital policy for German imperialism, revived by the vacuum of power that followed the collapse of USSR and thwarted by the US political and military initiatives. Recovery and reinforcement of a process of economic integration of the area between the Russian borders and the Rhine would affect the area of the old Central Europe (Mitteleuropa); which is not just an economic area, as the EU and the EMU, but has its own historical tradition and cultural identity, thus being potentially more homogeneous on the political level. This does not mean, of course, that we are foreseeing the "renaissance" of the old Central Europe, which is now something that only exists in history books, but we are observing a series of conditions that will encourage the integration of the States in that area under the sphere of influence of the German capital, in relations of subordination that could be more or less marked.
Starting from the Republic of Moldova in 2009, it was precisely in Eastern Europe that the Chinese financial and commercial penetration began, by purchasing State bonds and winning contracts to build infrastructures (11). China's force of gravity is moving the barycentre of the European and the world's (geo)politic towards East, inevitably acting as a pole of attraction. China is today setting itself up as a direct competitor in an area of traditional German influence. The "trend to the East" is part of the history of Germany, of the Prussian tradition and of the "national Bolshevism" which appeared between the two world wars, and necessarily pushes Germany towards the prospect of an integration between the immense natural resources of Russia and the highly advanced German industry, which still has the vital need of those resources (12). Relations between Germany and Russia were never interrupted, not even during the Cold War (Ostpolitik), particularly as far as gas pipelines were concerned. Over the past decade, relations have been strengthened with the prospect of an alliance on energy production, whose significance is not only economic, but implies the reinforcement of bonds between Russia and Western Europe. This policy, culminating in 2003 with the joint opposition of Germany and Russia, together with France, to the war in Iraq, faced a strong hostility on part of the countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact and of the USA. The most significant result of this political guideline was the creation of the North Stream gas pipeline that, since 2011, bypasses the Eastern European countries by running across the Baltic directly to Germany.
These and other aspects (including the fact that since 2007 German investments in Russia have been higher than Chinese ones, a proof of the competition between the two powers in that area) confirm the reinforcement of a traditional bond, to the extent that "Berlin might even become, globally speaking, a strategic partner of Russia for issues not strictly linked to the area of Europe" (13). Poland itself, that in 1920 opposed both the movement of the proletarian revolution toward the west and the popular-bourgeois perspective of the "national Bolsheviks" and has always seen Ostpolitik and Russian power as threats to its own interests and its own national integrity, is today increasingly involved in the German economic area and is setting itself up as a "bridge" to Russia, with which a process of reapproaching is taking place (14).
Today the Euro and the EMU act as an economic restraint to the trend towards the East of German imperialism, which otherwise would be naturally turned in that direction. However, its exit from the Community cage and from the single currency would imply enormous costs in terms of competitiveness of German exports and banks, and, above all, would imply risks of global instability. It is the threat of a systemic world crisis generated by the collapse of Euro that is at the basis of the very strong pressures made on the German government by the USA and China in order to make it finally decide to stabilize the situation through adequate measures. Yet, Germany is doing little more than making declarations of loyalty to the Euro. The deadlock in which Europe finds itself has originated from the contrasting forces Germany is subjected to: on the one hand the onslaught of the financial crisis requires the problematic rescue of the Euro, which would impose a greater political integration, something that no national component of the EU tends towards spontaneously; on the other hand Eastern Europe offers a possible relaunch of 'Ostpolitik' from a geopolitical viewpoint and in the direction of Russia and China.
These prospects might well encourage Germany to support the dramatic separation between the destiny of the rich Northern Europe from that of the ragged South, and thus to assume the economic and political costs of this move. It would be a truly historical turning point, open to all sorts of solutions, not excluding the military one, if the new German policy were to short-circuit its relations with the traditional Atlantic adversaries (with or without France) or if social tensions found an outlet in nationalist and separatist outbursts on a continental stage insisting on national identities, despite half a century of communitarian rhetoric.
Perspectives: if it doesn't blow, it will
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe confirms the subordination of governments to the interests of the international financial capital which, in turn, develops on a national basis around dominant imperialist poles. In the context of Europe, the latter can be identified first and foremost with German and French imperialisms, which affirm their own interests in the whole area through communitarian institutions. The rescue of Greece actually means the rescue of French and German banks, which otherwise would have been condemned to far higher losses by market mechanisms. In this difficult situation, the Community system and the single currency have once again proved to be functional to the interests of the imperialisms dominating the area. This aspect weighs in favour of the conservation of the Community: in this phase, Community ties represent an advanced form of the domination of Capital on a continental scale, able, within certain limits, to intervene in the contradiction between the international nature of Capital and its national dimension, and to become even more functional to the capitalist need than the direct domination of the State at a national level – a sort of working prototype of a "world government" (15).
However, this model only works as long as the crisis remains below a certain threshold, beyond which nationalism once again becomes the identity factor that opposes the claims of supranational organizations, identified as instruments in the hands of the stronger nations, or as long as the proletariat fails to hold up its head and take action to proceed once more along its independent path.
The crisis accentuates nationalism but also creates the conditions for the resumption of class struggle, both in countries that are the object of rescuing and in "saver" countries. Cohabitation in the Community implies costs that are proportional to the economic weight of the States and thus are borne mostly by the strongest nations through heavier taxation and sacrifices. It seems that the cost of saving the PIGS for Germany would be over 400 billion Euros, rising to over 500 if Italy were included. To give an idea of the scale of this, the Italian so-called "blood and tears" financial manoeuvre of 2011 amounts to 50 billion. It is thus understandable that in Germany there is extremely strong resistance to the idea of rescuing countries in crisis, both amongst the half classes, finding themselves in growing economic difficulties, and in the working class, that has already been bled white. In addition, the costs of salvage operations have a direct effect on the proletariat of the "rescued" States in terms of wages and service cuts, unemployment, etc.. According to some calculations, the costs of a split with the EMU would be far higher for Germany (up to 1200 billion) (16): however, the evaluation of pros and cons cannot be limited to an accounting record, but has to include the political prospects of an imperialist pole that, in a context of global crisis due to worsen and of changings in international power balances among imperialist spheres of influence, is obliged to seek internal and external cohesion – something that doesn't lie in an assembly of nations more or less bound by shared rules, but basically divided. The crisis itself deepens divisions and stirs up nationalist and anti-European trends; but at the same time aggregates, around the imperialist poles, areas that share their destiny for economic, geographical and historical reasons.
The dynamic of the crisis is fuelled by the explosive contradictions of capitalist economy, that cause also deep-seated shifts in old structures and balances of power. Events put the "German question" as the barycentre of what is happening in Europe, creating the preconditions for redefining its role in the continent and, as a consequence, the role of all the other national players. Germany is the centre of gravity of an integrated area including Northern Italy (the so-called "Padania"), the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and, in the East, the countries of Central Europe. In this context, through the various phases of the crisis, Germany will be forced to take again its role as a continental power, having a strategy of its own and being supported by a proportionate military force and a horizon of political and military alliances that make it free from its subordinate position within the Atlantic Alliance and from the limits imposed by its being part of the European Union. For the moment, initiatives and declarations of German politicians are far from suggesting this outcome, which however can already be glimpsed in the strong nationalist connotation of the policy the government has undertaken in managing the crisis.
In order to save the Euro in a stable way, Germany should agree to structurally bind its own destiny to that of the peripheral countries in crisis, thus tying its fortune to that of the EU, that represents a model of integration subordinate to the USA for a defect at source. In this sense, saving the EMU is in contradiction with the strategic needs of a country forced by the crisis to become again a fully-fledged imperialist power – a difficult goal, only possible outside the communitarian context. If the German government, amongst the many options that are considered and then abandoned, contemplates also the reformulation of Community treaties – a long-term prospect that would leave the basic issues unsolved – this is not in order to reinforce the level of integration within the Community, but just to make even stricter the conditions that impose to States a restrictive tax regime, or, in other words, to increase the power of Germany to condition national policies in the Community area. If this were achieved, Mediterranean Europe would be even more dependent than it already is on the economic diktats of France and Germany, with destabilizing effects on the political and social plan.
The alternative is between a split of the EMU, that would spark a global financial crisis caused by the interconnections within the banking system, and a situation of chronic instability, because a European order based on German domination would be undermined by strong national tensions. Just as a "world government" is impossible, an "international government" on a continental scale, in a context of independent nations, would not be able to impose the will of the dominant power without adequate coercive instruments of political and military nature, once again displaying an imperialist power in its classical role within its own sphere of influence.
The European crisis is the manifestation on a continental scale of the global crisis that has matured with the development of the production forces and the financialization of the economy. The presence of multinational companies, the shifting of production seeking for the best conditions for the extraction of surplus value, the segmentation of production processes on different territories, the freedom of movement of capitals, would now require a world government capable of facing contradictions no longer manageable on a national scale. But since this world government is impossible in a capitalist regime, which would not exist without its national organization and its bourgeoisies, the contradiction between the now global dimension of capitalist economy and the national character of its composition takes, during the crises, the form of a tendency of whole areas to aggregate around the leading imperialist poles. If these aggregations are based on economic ties and consolidate them, they must succeed in expressing an adequate political and military strength, that is not part of the history and prospects of the European Union. Germany is thus called upon to pass beyond its present nature of "geo-economic" power (17), prospering in a context of international relations in which western Europe has positioned itself as a subject standing outside the scenarios of conflict. What is now happening in terms of economic relations will have repercussions first and foremost on the relationships within the Community. The French-German axis, which has taken on the responsibility for solving the crisis, has its material basis in the now strong integration of the respective industrial-financial systems, but is seeing cracks appearing in its solidity as divergent interests and views about how to solve the crisis are coming out: while France is more inclined to make use of Community resources, for Germany each country should put its own budget in order by using its own resources. France cannot give up an independent role nor agree to be subordinate to German power: but as the evolution of the international imperialist context limits the autonomous action of medium-sized powers, it is improbable that we shall once again witness a Europe divided along the course of the Rhine (18). In any case, the crisis imposes to both France and Germany to recover and develop a geo-political perspective aiming to strengthen their influence on a strategic area, whilst waiting for the maturation of conditions for taking a firm stand within imperialist alliances.
In this phase, Italy, the third economic power of the continent, is unable to exercise any influence on the decisions regarding it, nor to propose itself as an imperialist pole with an independent policy. Its government – just as any "alternative" executive would do in its place – is hastening to fulfil the conditions imposed by France and Germany, giving up whole chunks of sovereignty in order to remain anchored to the Sacred Euro. But this subordinate position corresponds to a central role in the crisis: the main contradictions meet here, here are being risked the perspectives of the EMU (and, even though it seems absurd to say so, of the world). The situation of instability that is taking shape in the Eurozone can do nothing but worsen the tensions that reproduce the continental division on a national scale, unless the present Italian "vaudeville" government makes room to a government of national unity capable of restoring at least a role as a co-star among the imperialist powers to the capitalist "Italietta" [i. e., "small Italy"], thus also saving her sacred borders. [Be it noted that this article was written before the fall of the Berlusconi government. Present-day Monti government – the so-called "technical government", made up of professors and managers, and not of career politicians – is precisely pursuing this course of action].
The "attack on the Euro" uncovers all the weaknesses, both those due to the degeneration of the national bourgeois ruling classes and those due to the Community structure, in an international context where what counts is the organized strength of Capital around solid political centres. From the ashes of the present European currency and the precarious Community institutions a new, far more solid and cohesive continental aggregation, this time founded on the German power, could arise: in any case, this process, which has a real potential, would encounter considerable resistance both in Europe itself and, above all, in the USA, which would use every available mean to keep Germany, and with Germany the whole continent, bound to their own interests. The relegation of Germany to a subordinate role in the imperialistic arena would favour the creation of the conditions for the critical fault line, from which the enormous potential energy flowing beneath the surface of capitalist society will discharge itself, to pass once again through Germany (and Italy). The unification of the continent would then be entrusted to the only historical force able to achieve it: the revolutionary proletariat.
(*) - In the Italian commedia dell'arte, Pantaloon is the character of the avaricious merchant who is, eventually, always forced to pay.
1 - A. Cerretelli, "La UE delle banche pigliatutto", il Sole 24ore, 22.10.2011.
2 - B. Romano, "Ora le banche si scoprono vulnerabili", Il Sole 24ore, 26.08.2011.
3 - At the time when Europe and Germany were divided between the two blocks, both the USA and the USSR feared the reunification of Germany. As we wrote in 1960: "The American President told the Russian President in Camp David that he fears German unification. The former denied saying this. But the truth is: they told one another in a relaxed tone that neither wished to see Germany united and that they were afraid of it." ("Vae victis, Germania", Il programma comunista, n.11/1960). When the crisis of the Soviet block began, France and England were so alarmed by the prospect of an imminent German reunification, that the two governments would have preferred Russian tanks in the GDR rather than the fall of the wall, which the propaganda of the "free world" had always pointed to as a "symbol of oppression".
4 - "The cost of labour per unit of product in the regions of former East Germany has fallen progressively since the beginning of the '90s, to the extent that it is now almost 50% lower than in the West […] German unification has been a costly process for the West Germans and is still incomplete. But the convergence is proceeding. Between '98 and 2008 the gap between East and West fell by 8 points in terms of productivity of work and by 4 points in terms of pro-capita GNP" (P. Reichlin, "Spazziamo via il ghiaccio della UE con più competitività e un mercato del lavoro più fluido", il Sole 24 ore, 4.12.2010).
5 - M. De Cecco, "A che serve spezzare le reni alla Grecia", Affari e finanza, 22.3.201.
6 - Hans Werner Sinn, "Una tragedia greca", Lavoce.info, 11.8.2011.
7 - "The speculation that has exploded on the financial markets is an attack on the European currency. Motivated, of course, by the specific weaknesses of individual countries and for Italy by the obvious ineptitude of the Government, but basically moved by the perception, well supported by the facts, that Germany is calling into question the very survival of the Euro. It is not so much a question of contagion between weak economies, but it is a virus coming from the strongest government and to which even the French state bonds market is not immune, despite the axis linking French government to Germany in the running of Europe
"It is an illusion to think we can find a way to get out of troubles by having Greece, the country where the problems began, leave the monetary Union. This would be the beginning of the end for the Euro, a rapid end, because once the first country had left, the markets would wonder if it were not better for other countries, starting with Italy, to leave, too, and would behave accordingly, exerting an unbearable speculative pressure. In that case, we shall witness again the story of the 1992 EMS crisis." (G.Nardozzi, "Quel virus che arriva dalla Germania", Lavoce.info, 12.8.2011).
8 - The ESFS fund had just been increased to 440 billion after passing through the laborious and complicated examinations by all the parliaments of the EMU zone; Merkel herself could not have decided to increase the fund without once again going through the Bundestag.
9- A.Cerretelli, "Per salvare l'Euro si rischia di distruggere l'Unione", Il Sole 24ore, 29.10.2011.
10 - M. Cavallitto, "Crisi europea, adesso rischia l'Europa dell'Est", Il fatto quotidiano, 18.5.2011.
11 - R. Bongiorno, "Offensiva partita dall'Est Europa", Il Sole 24ore, 24.9.2011.
12- This is a perspective that recalls that of the German "national Bolsheviks" in the years between the two wars and is still today a reality for "revolutionary" groups and movements, present both in Russia and in western Europe, which hope to move beyond hoping to overcome nationalism in the name of a Eurasian continental union with an anti-mondial and anti-American function. Their openly imperialist and fascist vision of a continental block from Vladivostock to the Atlantic, allied with China and intermediary powers such as Iran, nonetheless appears to be less of a pipe dream than the petit-bourgeois idea of the pacific political integration of Europe under the Community flag. Compared to the latter, it has at least a reactionary grandeur of its own. Chinese ambitions in Eastern Europe are another reason for Germany to renew her efforts in the area, abandoning the sterile policy of integration of South-Western Europe.
13 - I. Rubanov, "La santa alleanza dell'energia", Limes, 4/2011.
14 - B. Kerski, "Berlino-Varsavia, il secondo motore d'Europa?", Limes, 4/2011.
15- In an article in Asia News of 10.13.2010, the content is reported of a speech by Bernanke, held in the same period in Rhode Island and published on the Fed's website, which was totally ignored by the international press. The speech forecasts an imminent global financial disaster and is focused on the presence of a systemic crisis in the old capitalist countries due to unsustainable State balances of payments. Money for pensions and healthcare is lacking, the public debt is about to esplode, taxes cannot be raised without penalizing an economy that is already suffering, etc. The conclusion reached is that democratic régimes are not able to provide the urgent solutions required by the crisis, with particular regard to the taxation measures and economic manoeuvers needed. In this respect, Benanke proves to appreciate the mechanisms in force in the EU that oblige individual States to respect certain budgetary constrictions: "To support his thesis, Bernanke quotes many events happened in America over the past few decades. Of particular interest, however, is his reference to the European Union (very similar in this respect to a 'Soviet' Union). On the basis of the constituent treaties of the EU, these 'tax rules' are already introduced in the 'national' parliaments but now, says Bernanke, admiringly, European leaders are working to make these measures even more 'coercive'. The reference is to Europe's 'New Stability Pact' approved (in practice) in June 2010, that is to say only few months ago, following the crisis of Greece and of the other so-called PIGS. The Governor of the FED is thus well informed and knows that in Europe State balances are no longer in the hands of parliaments or of national governments, but of a central European 'Soviet' – a word that in Russian means council, a counselling body – a non-elected organism. This counselling body in fact determines the decisions on public spending regarding over three hundred million Europeans. We should do the same in America, says Greenspan's successor." (Maurizio d'Orlando, "Bernanke: Il disastro finanziario globale è imminente", Asia News, 13.10.2010).
16 - W. Riolfi, "Berlino salvi Atene: la Merkel risparmierà fino a 1.200 miliardi", Il Sole 24 ore, 20.7.2011.
17 - Hans Kundnani, "La Germania come potenza geoeconomica", Limes, 4/2011.
18 - A key for interpreting the possible scenarios can be obtained by looking at the opposite attitude assumed by France and Germany on the occasion of intervention in Libya. France was on the front line in promoting and implementing the military attack, while Germany remained completely out of the question. This can be interpreted as a symptom of the German tendency to turn towards the East and as a signal of the French tendency to pursue a more active and aggressive policy in the traditional southern direction, towards the Mediterranean area and Northern and Western Africa. It is however true that the French military initiaitve, agreed upon together with the United Kingdom, can be interpreted as a response to the request made by the USA for a greater military involvement in the Mediterranean area by the European allies, and thus as a reinforcement of NATO bonds. It demonstrates that times for taking a definitive stand within imperialistic alliances are not mature yet.
International Communist Party
("Il programma comunista", n°6, novembre-dicembre 2011)

subset: commoncrawl


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text:
No they do not elaborate because they know they will get caught in technical lies.
the claim he made was impossible given the circumstances of the known history of these programs.
Your claim of taking dark side pictures and sending them before crashing is impossible, if it was on the dark side and died on the dark side, nothing would transmit.
With every thing I proved impossible, you simply spun it to another level. First it was Lunar orbiter, next it probably was Ranger, Third if it couldn't the Ranger, they probably had Russian picutures, and when all that failed, you started to say written history was a lie.
Maybe it is you who are blinded, maybe it is you who has no ability to be objective?
Maybe its you who is the die hard believer, that if this doesn;t sell it, we will just change the story to sell it.
Where is the other E-2 Second Class airman? Where are your hard questions for Mr. Wolf, to test his credibility? Where is anyone else that the first Bladdermouth would have shown these picutures to? He had to have a CRIPTO CLEARANCE too, why would he show these pictures to someone he does not know from Adam?
You go ahead and contact him, thats your idea. Tell about this thread, see if he will defend himself and answer all these questions on this thread. Good Idea, you set it up!


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The Indian Army in Mespotamia - forgotten prisoners, forgotten army, forgotten war, 4 March 2015
Now the financial crisis is (arguably) over, how effective do you, as a corporate lawyer, believe the UK regulators were?, 3 March 2015
International Trade and Climate Change Mitigation, 25 February 2015
What Does Hong Kong Law Say About Democracy?, 11 February 2015
Immigration Detention Lancaster Conference, 22 & 23 January 2015
Work in progress seminar series - Professor David Campbell, 'Sense in Coase's Critique of Pigou', 14 January 2015
State Capitalism and International Economic Law, 11 December 2014
An Ethical Defence of the Liverpool Care Pathway, 4 December 2014
Legality of Lunar and Martian Real Estates: Science Fiction or Reality?, 3 December 2014
CILHR Speaker Series: 'Legality of Lunar and Martian Real Estates: Science Fiction or Reality?' Dr Saskia Vermeylen Dec 3rd BNSR 2 @ 12pm, 3 December 2014
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Fundamental Rights and Private Law, 18 November 2014
Care Leavers, Looked After Children and the Criminal Justice System, 12 November 2014
Universal Jurisdiction and the Struggle Against Impunity in Spain and Latin America, 6 November 2014
Symposium on the Rule of Law, 31 October 2014
Wish You Were Here (the Whitehall Edition): Graduate Opportunities with the Civil Service, 30 October 2014
Law in Search of a Strategy: Justifying the Use of Force against ISIS, 22 October 2014
'Objecting to conscience: Section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 and the policing of professional boundaries', 16 October 2014
Researching Trafficking : a Lancaster research day, 3 July 2014
Centre for Crime, Law and Justice Launch Event, 30 June - 1st July 2014
Conference on 21st Century Borders: Territorial Conflict and Dispute Resolution, 13 June 2014
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Gender and Violence Research Day 2014, 3 June 2014
50th Anniversary Seminar: Reforming International Corporate Taxation and Some Reminiscences, 28 May 2014
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Public Lecture - Security by Remote Control: Automation and Autonomy in Robot Weapons Systems, 22 May 2014
CILHR Speaker Series: "International Environmental Law 1902-1972: Environmentalism, Empire, and the Civilising Mission" Dr. Mario Prost, Keel University, 20 May 2014
CILHR Speaker Series: "Beyond 'Hearing' Children: Best Interest Decisions and International Law" Dr. Aoife Daly, Uni of Essex, 6 May 2014
Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator on Human Trafficking, 27 March 2014
Objecting to Conscience: Reconsidering section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967, 26 March 2014
Untying Genetic Ties in the Regulation of Artificial Reproductive Technologies, 19 March 2014
Making better humans: thinking about human enhancement - what could and should we do?, 12 March - 14 March 2014
Justifying assent to research: Why we need children's assent to research, 12 March 2014
How Commercial Lawyers 'add value', 12 March 2014
Holocaust Memories, 11 March 2014
Rapid Response Seminar on the Crisis in the Crimea, 6 March 2014
Freedom from Torture is not a Right: Understanding Torture from the Perspective of Prohibition and Perpetrator, 5 March 2014
The Iredell Lecture in Law and History 2014, on Historicising Criminal Responsibility, 28 February 2014
The International Framework of Fisheries and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, 26 February 2014
"The International Framework of Fisheries and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations", 26 February 2014
The UN's Internet Governance Forum: The Future of the Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet, 19 February 2014
The shortcomings of a law-and-economics analysis of intellectual property law, 12 February 2014
Digital Defusing: Cyber Peacekeeping in a Pre-War State?, 5 February 2014
Law School Work in Progress Series, 5 February 2014
Modern Law Review Seminar - Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation: Offences, Offenders and Victims, 16 December 2013
'Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation: Offences, Offenders and Victims, 16 December 2013
Apples of the Golan, 4 December 2013
'Research misconduct and Professional Regulation: an analysis of the General Medical Council adjudication, 1990-2012', 27 November 2013
Criminal Omissions: Assessing the Limits of the Military Profession in International Law, 27 November 2013
Talk by Lord Justice Ryder, 27 November 2013
David Sugarman Seminar Series: Seminar 1 - Gender, Race, Class and Diversity: A Study of Lawyers and Judges in England and Wales, 21 November 2013
You, your discipline and the Higher Education Academy, 20 November 2013
'Dogs and Monsters: Issues of moral status in the fiction of Dean Koontz', 13 November 2013
The changing role & reform of the European Court of Human Rights, 13 November 2013
The changing role and reform of the European Court of Human Rights, 13 November 2013
Political Genocide: Between Moral Realism and Legal Positivism, 30 October 2013
'Advice and Obligation: Are Child Health Guidelines Optional?', 16 October 2013
Roundtable discussion on Syria, 16 October 2013
Transforming wrong(s) into right(s): The power of 'proper medical treatment', 12 September 2013
Do we need to jail CEOs and corporate executives when they commit white collar crimes?, 12 September 2013
Law - WIP (Catherine Easton and Ben Mayfield), 19 June 2013
Law - Work in Progress - Kopela and MacCulloch, 12 June 2013
CANCELLED - Law - Work in Progress - Kibble, 5 June 2013
'Adolescent-to-parent abuse: A discussion', 30 May 2013
Is there anything special about international human rights law?, 16 May 2013
Professor Alan Buchanan (Duke University) 'Human rights: taking international legalization seriously', 15 May 2013
LAW - WIP (Gearoid O'Cuinn), 8 May 2013
Law - Work in Progress - Rieder, 1 May 2013
Formalism and the Sources of International Law, 24 April 2013
Security, Conflict and Justice Pathway: Risky Research in Security and Conflict Situations, 21 March 2013
One Mum too few: Maternal Status in Host Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements, 20 March 2013
Law - Work in Progress - Summers and Webb, 20 March 2013
Sociology, Security Lancaster & UNESCO Chair Seminar with Liz Kelly on Sexual Violence, 19 March 2013
Dalia Gavriely-Nuri, 'The normalization of war in Israeli discourse 1967-2008', 14 March 2013
Jackson Maogoto, University of Manchester, "Smokeless War: Cyber Warfare and the Conundrum of Virtual Battlefields and Weapons - the Legal Twilight relating to Force, Worms and Viruses"., 13 March 2013
Right-Wing Populism, 8 March 2013
Religious Interest Groups in Irish Bioethics Debates, 6 March 2013
Sharifah Sekalala, University of Warwick,, 6 March 2013
Workshop 'International human rights law and boundaries', 28 February 2013
Foregrounding Economic and Social Rights within Transitional Justice, 27 February 2013
Walter Manoschek, 'If that's so then I'm a Murderer': Film and Discussion, 21 February 2013
CANCELLED - Is this the way to do it'. British soldiers investigating and prosecuting war crimes in Occupied Germany 1945, 20 February 2013
Seminar on Hate Crime - 1 February 2013, 1 February 2013
Best Interests and the sanctity of life after W v M and Others, 16 January 2013
Silences and Perspectives, 11 December 2012
Bioethical Controversy, Ethical Compromise and the Criminal Law, 5 December 2012
'The Interplay of Islam and the West in the Context of Womb Transplantation Technology'., 28 November 2012
Bonfire of the Quangos: Lighting A Fire Under HFEA and HTA, 28 November 2012
Annual Conference of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Academic Network - UK and Ireland (ESRAN-UKI), 30 November 2012
Mandatory or Meritorious? Establishing the Legal Duties of Researchers, 7 November 2012
History, Memory, Biography, and Fiction, 7 November 2012
Iredell Lecture in History and Law:Britain, Empires, and the Re-Writing of Written Constitutions, 30 October 2012
The Taxation of Wealth: Should Inheritance Tax be Abolished?", 17 October 2012
Sixth Form Conference, 4 July 2012
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Law : Work in Progress Seminar (Austen-Baker and Mauthe), 13 June 2012
Public Lecture: A Collision of Law and Politics: the Pinochet Case, 1998-2000., 9 May 2012
Public Lecture: "A.W.B. Simpson in Context: The Life of Brian", 22 May 2012
Guernica 75: Memories of the International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War, 28 April 2012
CeMoRe Seminar with Amalia Cabezas - Stuck between desire and making beds: Housekeeping staff in Havana's hotels., 24 April 2012
What to do with frozen embryos?, 7 March 2012
After Cancun: Impossibility of Carbon Trading, 29 February 2012
Sociology and CGWS Seminar with Sirma Bilge, 28 February 2012
Regulating Experts: Agency Regulation of Emerging Biotechnologies, 22 February 2012
Victims as Idealized Citizens; Transition, Mobilisation and the Contested Past in Northern Ireland (Dynamics of Memories Research Seminar), 16 February 2012
Contesting/Contested Memories: The Holocaust in the Twenty-First Century, 9-11 February 2012
Charles Clarke - Does Prison Work?, 7 February 2012
Property in Human Biomaterials: Separating Persons and Things?, 7 December 2011
International Law Group, 30 November 2011
'Property in Human Biomaterials: Separating Persons and Things?', 30 November 2011
Public Health, Law and Ethics: From 'Coherence' Problems to Policy Proposals', 23 November 2011
International Law Group, 16 November 2011
International Law and the Death Penalty, 14 November 2011
Politically Proper? Connections Between Medicine, Bioethics and the Criminal Law, 9 November 2011
Burglary and the Englishman's Castle, 3 November 2011
Human Rights Forum, 3 November 2011
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Cyber Security Conference 2011, 19 September 2011
Using the Discourse Historical Approach to Analyse German National and anti-Semitic Discourse (1871-1924), 23 June 2011
Law, Politics, and the State: a Strategic-Relational Approach to Law, 1 June 2011
Reform and the future of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 May 2011
More makeovers than a 90s Boy Band: The ongoing transformation of RIPA encryption provisions, 11 May 2011
Complexity and Autopoietic Theory - What Relation? A Public Law Perspective, 16 March 2011
The Relational Business Charter, 11 March 2011
Scottish Criminals cannot apply - another look at Bywater v The Crown (1781), 2 March 2011
Workshop on Public health, equity and interventions, March 2011
Sam Edwards, The Good War and the Cold War: American War Memory in Europe, 1945-2005, 9 February 2011
CANCELLED - Dead Cats and Chaos: RIPA and the disclosure of encryption keys, 19 January 2011
Politics as Legal Action - Lawyers as Political Actors, 8 December 2010
'CANCELLED - Public Reason', Judicial Deference, and the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief under the Human Rights Act - What is Going On, 1 December 2010
The Law Lords, Amnesty International and the Pinochet Case: What Happened and Why?, 25 November 2010
Agata Fijalkowski, 'From Old Times to New Europe', DoM Seminar, 3 November 2010
Escaping the mirror principle: towards a municipal law of human rights, 20 October 2010
Workshop 'Forced Migration: Challenges and Prospects in the Current Global Context', 20 October 2010
Legal Education and Scholarship - Past, Present and Future: A Workshop in Honour of William Twining, 20 October 2010
'Testimony and the Law' (Lancaster, September 2010):, 24 September 2010
Insecure Times, Emergency Measures - Workshop, 22 July 2010
Photography: Medium and Method, 15 June 2010
Introducing complexity to constitutionalism, 15 March 2010
Female Genital Mutilation, 12 March 2010
Prosecuting Genocide: Thirty Years On: the Cambodian Experience, 9 March 2010
Right to development and poverty eradication; Legal, practical problems in a critical perspective, 3 March 2010
Individual reproductive autonomy in Malaysia: Why couple should be allowed to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to select the sex of their child., 16 February 2010
Latina Women Writers: The Powerful Tools of Imagination, Words and Memory - DELC Research Seminar, 15 February 2010
Law & Politics: Terrorism as a Challenge for Constitutional Law: The German Case, 15 February 2010
Terrorism and the Constitution: The German Case, 15 February 2010
Recent Developments in the Russian Legal System, 10 February 2010
Implementability: A methodology to further human rights' realisation, 26 January 2010
Legitimation of Taxation through the realisation of Human Rights - a Kenyan case study, 11 January 2010
"It's not me, it's you" - Law's Performance Anxiety over Gender Identity in cohabitation', 2 December 2009
Public law and the value of conceptual analysis, 18 November 2009
Multilateral Development Bank Accountability Mechanisms: Developments and Challenges, 4 November 2009
Workshop on Children and Health Care Ethics, November 2009
International Business Law and the Business of Law, 19 September 2009
States' Extraterritorial Obligations Related to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 September 2009
Raluca Grosescu, 'Conversion of Communist Elites in Romania in the post-1989 period' and Adelina Tintariu, 'Lustration Laws: Romanian Approaches', 18 June 2009
'Theorizing the professions: technology, education and regulation', 16 June 2009
Iredell Lecture 2009: "Was there white slavery in the seventeenth- century Caribbean?", 4 June 2009
Memory and Justice, 15 May 2009
'The new all singing, all dancing Ombudsman: a true alternative to the courts?', 13 May 2009
'Do International Criminal Tribunals Deliver Justice in Divided Societies? Examining the Assumptions behind the ICTY in Croatia, 6 May 2009
The Practice of International Organisations in Suspending States for Breaches of Democracy, 6 May 2009
The Kosovo Precedent One Year On, 28 March 2009
Participation in International Human Rights Law: A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 18 March 2009
Exploring Health Care Law's Recognition of Autonomy and Rights, 16 March 2009
Close Guantanamo Bay and End Illegal Detention, 10 March 2009
Centre for Law & Society in association with the Human Rights forum- Sir Geoffrey Bindman, 23 February 2009
Basque Independence and the Spanish Constitutional Court., 12 February 2009
Holocaust Memorial Day, Lancaster, 29 January 2009
Professions and Professionalism in the 21st Century: Meanings, Challenges and Prospects, 6 January 2009
2Choice and Use of Weapons in Non-International Armed Conflicts", 26 November 2008
Calling out the Troops; Britain and Australia Compared- Dr Michael Head, University of Western Sydney, 19 November 2008
Enhancing the Conservation of Shallow Water Coral Reefs under the World Heritage Convention, 12 November 2008
Conference: The Pinochet Case and its Consequences Ten Years On, 11 November 2008
From Human Rights to the Primacy of the Political, 7 November-8 November 2008
Into the Abyss: Iraqi refugees in Jordan, 28 October 2008
Kosovo and Kadi: Turning Points for the EU?, 22 October 2008
Indigenous peoples' rights in the aftermath of the Declaration: (Intellectual) Property and Self-Determination, 23 September 2008
Implementing The Human Right To Development As A Vehicle For Poverty Eradication, 19 June 2008
Anarchism an other art of life, 28 May 2008
Ending the Nightmare: A Different Vision of Human Rights - please note change of venue, 15 May 2008
EU Digital Copyright Law - CANCELLED, 14 May 2008
Seminar on relational contract theory (Revised Macneil seminar), 30 April 2008
Credit & Debt Conference, 17 April 2008
CANCELLED: Corporate Governance after Enron, 31 March 2008
The Democratic Legitimacy of Global Governance, 19 March 2008
Iredell Lecture: Truth and Justice in the Wake of Dictatorship and Armed conflict, 13 March 2008
Law School - Work in Progress - 'Crime and Security in Romania', 12 March 2008
Inaugural Lecture to celebrate the Honorary appointment of Professor Reiner Schulze, 11 March 2008
The Law: Like God, Like Sex, 5 March 2008
Personal Injury Lawyering and Doing Justice, 25 February 2008
Philip C. Jessup International Moot Court Competition, 23 February 2008
Complicity or impunity: States' responsibility for the human rights effect of their foreign policy, 19 February 2008
Access to Justice and Human Rights, 18 February 2008
Lancaster University Law Society Students Moot, 5 February 2008
Intersectionality: Traumatic Impressions, 30 January 2008
Law School - Work in Progress, 16 January 2008
The challenges faced by the Internationised Criminal Tribunal for Cambodia., 13 December 2007
Law - Lunchtime Discussion, 12 December 2007
Legalization and World Politics, 5 December 2007
Law - Postgraduate Disscussion Group, 28 November 2007
US Army Muslim Chaplain James Yee, 28 November 2007
An uneasy partnership: International Human Rights Law and State Responsibility, 21 November 2007
Law (Postgraduate) Teatime Discussion Group, 7 November 2007
Legal Services in North West England: The Changing Landscape, 27 September 2007
The Role of NGOs in Governance, 21 September 2007
Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Involvement of Children in Health Care Research, 20 and 21 September 2007
Law, Religion, Culture: An Interdisciplinary Symposium, 14 September 2007
Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Involvement of Children in Health Care Research, September 2007
Human Rights in Contemporary US Foreign and Security Policy: Consistencies and Inconsistencies, 15 May 2007
In Internet's Way, 21 March 2007
Human Rights Forum Lunchtime Discussion : A Critique of the Power to Levy and Disburse Tax, 19 March 2007
Western ambivalence on International Human Rights Standards - Law School Seminar, 27 February 2007
Human Rights Forum Lunchtime Discussion - 'Environmental Human Rights: Conceptual Foundations', 13 February 2007
European Patent Law - Law School Seminar, 6 February 2007
The Launch of the Human Rights Forum and International Human Rights Obligations Network, 18 January 2007
Personal Bankruptcy - Law Workshop, 27 November 2006
Alcohol-related Disorder and the Nature of the Problem of Social Cost - Law School Seminar, 22 November 2006
Saddam Hussein and the Death Penalty, 22 November 2006
The War on Terrorism and Human Rights - New Venue, 15 November 2006
Regulating intimacy: Do we need a new family law? Law School Seminar, 25 October 2006
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Lawyering and the Legal Profession in Late Modernity, 21 September 2006
Professions in the Knowledge Based Economy, 1 September 2006
Capital Punishment and Eastern Europe, 27 June 2006
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Montenegro and Kosovo: Two New States in the Balkans? (Human Rights Forum Group), 30 May 2006
Class Actions - the US experience (Law School Seminar), 12 May 2006
The "dishonest" Cartelist: the role of dishonesty within the Cartel Offence (Law School), 9 May 2006
Prosecuting Pinochet: The Challenges & Obstacles to the Pursuit of Justice in Chile, 2 May 2006
Future of Consumer Law, 25 April 2006
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Framed Embroidered Monogram
No longer available
We hand embroider the monogram of your choice on a linen mat, then frame it with richly lacquered alder wood. We like this as a gift idea because it has both personalized and homespun appeal.
10" square, 1" thick
Made of alder wood with a black painted finish.
Linen mat.
Glass front.


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Most Recent Articles In Department Stores
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It's 8 p.m. on a recent Monday night, and Victoria Beckham isn't out on the town with her soccer-player-slash-underwear-model husband, nor ensconced in the comforts of their Beverly Hills estate with their four children. Instead, Beckham is on designer duty in Las Vegas, spending a couple of hours with 50 or so customers at Neiman Marcus before hopping on a midnight flight to Los Angeles, where she will repeat her performance at another Neiman's the next day, and then again the day after that in Dallas.
While Neiman Marcus is Beckham's largest U.S. account (it was also her first, along with Bergdorf Goodman, when she launched for spring 2009), the designer has yet to make a store appearance there until now. Long overdue, Neiman Marcus was itching to get Beckham in front of a few select groups of loyal clients — all chosen because they had already bought Victoria Beckham pieces or demonstrated interest in doing so. These appearances were low-key, private affairs where she was able to personally present her brand's spring collection.
RELATED STORY: Victoria Beckham RTW Spring 2013 >>
"Neiman Marcus is obviously a very important partnership in America," said Zach Duane, chief executive officer of London-based Victoria Beckham. "It wasn't about a particular product launch. It was more about Neiman's. They have a customer that they were keen on getting close to the brand. We have a really good business with them."
Speaking of Beckham's business, Duane told WWD last year that the brand would exceed $12 million in annual sales in 2011. "The business is profitable, which I think for a young fashion brand is challenging in itself, and we are growing fast," he said. "If you compare 2012 to 2011, we are up 150 percent."
The job of a designer sometimes seems as much politician as creative director. Face time, handshakes and hugs are important, especially to a still-young brand. Beckham — who has racked up air miles this year with appearances at Holt Renfrew in Vancouver, Joyce in Beijing, Lane Crawford in Hong Kong, Brown Thomas in Dublin and Harvey Nichols in London — realizes that. "I want to get to as many territories and stores as I can, not only to meet my customer, but to also support my retailer," she said. "I have a really great relationship with all of my retail partners. I think it's really important. I also want feedback from women. I want to know what women want."
Certainly, the private appearances go far in establishing long-term relationships with stores and customers, but their short-term impact is measured in immediate sales. While neither Neiman Marcus nor Duane would divulge the exact sales generated as a result of said appearances, Duane asserted that typically 60 to 70 percent of sales of the Victoria Beckham brand have been generated during the designer's in-store appearances and in the days prior to or following them. "I would imagine they will do very, very well with this [spring] season as a result of these events," Duane said of Neiman Marcus. (Upon later follow-up, the company would only confirm a "strong response" from customers at the Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Dallas events.)
In all three cities, Beckham spoke a few words into a microphone, thanking the guests for taking time out of their busy schedules to view the collection, and then the shows started — models walking in 23 ready-to-wear looks in Vegas, six in L.A., 16 in Dallas. Afterward, the models in Las Vegas came back out, this time wandering the space in Victoria Victoria Beckham pieces, while in L.A. and Dallas, samples of the secondary line hung on racks for customers to view and try on. In several instances, Beckham gamely walked around and chatted with guests.
Many of the Las Vegas clients, whose ages ranged from their early 20s to 60s and were mostly the wives of local bigwigs, were not shy about showing off their shapely bodies in Beckham's slim silhouettes — several of which were paired with handbags by Dolce & Gabbana, Hermès and Chanel. In L.A., the guests, predominantly professionals in their 20s, cast a wider fashion net. Beckham looks were, obviously, a popular choice for the occasion while Tibi and Alice + Olivia were represented, too; Alexander McQueen, The Row and Alice + Olivia were among the guests' favorite brands. In Dallas, the crowd, made up primarily of socialites in their 40s with a number of professionals in the mix, was polished, bejeweled and, like Beckham, in stilettos.
The mood at the daytime L.A. event was light and, as an added bonus, guests included Beckham's husband David, their son Brooklyn and daughter Harper. While some clients swooned over the diapered baby, they appeared more interested in Beckham's dresses than David, who calmly chased Harper through the partitioned area on the second floor where the event was held. "This is what I'm about," said Beckham, as her daughter rolled over and over on a sofa bench. "I always love it when I'm lucky enough to take my children to work with me. I'm a working mom."


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Schedule TBA
©2015 Belle-Clair Speedway All rights reserved
Belleville, IL (April 8th, 2011) Mother Nature smiled on Belle-Clair Speedway with a beautiful warm day and the fans responded with a huge turnout to watch the fast and furious action on the tight one-fifth mile dirt oval. The fans wouldn't leave disappointed as all five divisions provided spectacular, heart stopping side-by-side racing along with two and three car battles for the win in all the divisions.
Randy Korte of Highland, Illinois recorded his first win since he was sidelined for a year and half with back problems in the UMP DIRTcar Late Model division. In what may of been one of the most exciting late model feature events ever at Belle-Clair Speedway, Korte would only lead the final five of the thirty lap Amp Energy 30 feature event. Aaron Kleine and Mark Voigt started on the front row and the two raced side-by-side until they reached lap traffic on lap eight. Kleine, using the low side, would get through the lapped cars while Voigt had some trouble with lapped cars on the high side. Michael Kloos would move past Voigt into the second spot a lap later and then Voigt would suffer mechanical problems and pull on the infield. Kloos would slip by Kleine on lap eleven only to have the caution come out and give Kleine the lead back. On the restart, Kleine would prove to be tough as he used the low side to hold Kloos off. With Korte now running third, Kloos and Korte both went to the high side to work on Kleine for the lead. Kloos and Korte would clear Kleine for the lead and Kloos would go back to the low side while Korte challenged him by using the high side. The two ripped through lapped traffic passing the lapped cars high and low and going three and four wide. Korte would bang the outside walls down the straight-aways as he finally got through the lapped traffic ahead of Kloos. A late race caution would put Kloos right on Korte's rear bumper with four laps to go, but Korte would prove to be to strong and hang on for the win. Kloos would finish second with Kleine third. D.J. Cygan would bring home the fourth spot while Mike Hammerle rounded out the top five.
The UMP DIRTcar Modified action would prove to be just as exciting as Bobby Bittle, Tim Hancock and Dean Hoffman put on a spectacular battle for the lead. Bittle jumped out to the early lead with Hancock and Hoffman right on his trail. Bittle started off on the high side holding off Hancock as they raced around the top. As Hoffman showed his nose on the low side, Bittle went to the bottom to protect that line. A few laps later, Hancock would move up on the outside of Bittle for the lead. This caused Bittle to move back to the high side to try and hold off Hancock. That would allow Hoffman to use the low side to move past both of them and into the lead. Just a couple of laps later, disaster would strike for Bittle and Hancock. Bittle's throttle would stick going down the front stretch causing him to slam into the turn one wall with the right side of his car. Hancock would have no where to go and would run into the back of Bittle's car. The two cars would be hung up, but once the tow trucks got them separated, Hancock was able to restart and was given the second spot back on the restart. Bittle's night would end with the incident. On the restart, Hoffman continued to use the low while Hancock used the big cushion up on the high side. However, Hancock's night would come to an end just a few laps later as a big puff of smoke came from under the hood along with a trail of oil and water on the track. On the final restart, Hoffman would pull away for the win. Aaron Kleine would take the second spot with Paul Reinneck claiming third. Zeb Moake would finish fourth with Jeremy Thoele completing the top five.
John Schrand got front in the UMP DIRTcar/AARA Sportsman main event and held on for dear life as Ryan Gegg and Mark Schaefer battled him for the lead. Gegg would apply the early pressure but it would be Schaefer challenging Schrand in the closing laps. Gegg and Schaefer would have quiet the battle themselves for the second spot. The two banged fenders lap after lap as they raced side by side. Schaefer would finally clear Gegg for the second spot with four laps remaining and moved right in on the rear bumper of Schrand to battle for the lead. Schrand would hold tough on the low side and keep the hard charging Schaefer at bay to earn the win. Schaefer would get second with Gegg third. Jim Clark would finish fourth while Denny Tribout took fifth.
Jeff Buss would claim his first career feature win in the UMP DIRTcar/AARA Pure Stock division. Another three-car battle for the top spot would take place for most all of the twelve lap main event. Buss along with Jake Hewitt and Randy Dietzel fought lap after lap for the top spot. Buss would hold them off to get the win while Hewitt crossed the line in second and Dietzel third. Brian Bunfill would get fourth while Ron Weidler finished fifth.
Trevor Isaak, Jordan Suhre and Ryan Emig also had a great three car battle for the top spot in the UMP DIRTcar/AARA Pro 4 Stock division. The three locked into the battle for the entire twelve lap main event with Isaak coming out on top. Suhre would get second and Emig third. Dave Racer made a late race push to get to fourth while James Southers completed the top five.
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Krest wrote:*looks at a sneak peek of the next page*
Looks like Forrest...
* puts on sunglasses*
...just got Gumped.
ArMoFgEdDoN wrote:Need confermation on the production on the ppgd Video game,pleas
kidwakanda wrote:...(face palm) is it wrong I think he's right ',:(
And where's the deus ex machina?
actually theres a flash game called PPGD battle in Megaville. i play it sometimes. http://www.newgrounds.com/portal/view/301661ArMoFgEdDoN wrote:Need confermation on the production on the ppgd Video game,pleas
Xi-1 wrote:Hmm. Spider-Man was clocked at 200 mph a few times, and that's webslinging. He can do the 25 in 3 and a third minutes. Too bad he's not around to take anybody out of the blast radius, assuming that's what it is.
Alex Mercer wrote:Hey guys my wifi stopped working this past week so that's why I'm posting so late.
So who's the guy running for his life? Is he the men in black guy from awhile back?
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