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The Podcasters
So, who are we? Are we just some hacks who discuss things that we have picked up in local newspapers in the week, well actually no! All of the panellists are experienced non-league volunteers who are involved in the game week in – week out at club and league level. The differing backgrounds and roles of all panellists and podcasters gives the Counties Podcast a unique and relevant perspective, which we hopes come through on our recordings. Here is the lowdown on the regular crew……
One of the founders of Counties Podcast, Martin is an experienced football man and is involved in a number of projects in both League and Club capacity. Often the level head of the podcast team and an almost ever-present, he always has a fairly solid opinion and an ability to see things from a step back.
A former Runcorn FC player, Secretary and go-to man, he was involved in the club almost to its end. He is currently a Committee member at Runcorn Town FC and also serves as an Officer at the North West Counties League with the role of Results Co-Ordinator and IT Specialist.
Zach, the third and final founder of the podcast is one of the more regular hosts, interviewers and thinkers of the panel. Always keeping a deep and somewhat cosmopolitan perspective on the issues of the week, he always asks the questions that the listeners are thinking as they listen.
Currently one of the highly successful media team at Atherton Collieries FC as well as a Committee Member at the club, Zach combines these high profile roles with studying Theatre at University at York. An active political activist and Socialist he is also a thespian and aspiring producer and writer, currently working on a production for the 2017 Edinburgh Fringe Festival.
Gary joined the team as a regular at around 20 episodes in and tends to keep a balanced approach, often leading to fence sitting gags from his fellow panellists. Every now and again though he does come off it and can be quite vociferous on certain subjects, giving an honest appraisal on discussion points.
An experienced football man, Gary has been on the board of Stranraer FC in Scotland (Family connections) but since hanging up his kilt has been involved in local non-league football for over a decade between Steps 1-6. League Development Officer & back at Remyca, he still has a regular gig writing a number of articles freelance for various publications around the country.
Martin is a non league veteran having been on the scene for a number of years following Runcorn Town for ages before switching allegiances to City of Liverpool when the club set up on his doorstep. He had a brief period on the board there, combining that role with the post of programme editor but took a step-back mid-season 16-17 to just follow as a fan.
Martin joined the podcast team from episode 111 in May 2017 and his deadpan Scouse wit combined with local insight has been a great addition to the CP team.
Like Martin Stewart, Lucy joined the Podcast at episode 111 and immediately struck a chord with listeners. Her knowledge of the Hallmark Security League belies her young years having operated as a physio for a number of high profile teams such as Maine Road, Ashton Town and Litherland Remyca.
"Gibbo" joined the team as a permanent member at around episode 80 and is a well known and iconic figure around non-league, this despite his relatively young years. Joe is a fan of football first and foremost and often debates on the podcast with a fans terrace perspective, keeping it real as members of the youth community say.
Joe is another member of the Atherton Collieries media team as well as being a Committee Member and Shareholder at the Club. A well respected Groundhopper as well as blogger and football writer, Gibbo is currently studying at University in York.
Podcast Associate and co-founder-
ROB McKAY
Another Co-Founder of the Counties Podcast, Rob manages a number of roles in local grassroots football and is an experienced footballing man across a number of Genres. He never holds back and always calls things as he sees them on the podcast, yet always brings in some fascinating points and stats from around the North West Counties League.
Currently Club Secretary at West Didsbury & Chorlton FC in the Premier Division of the Hallmark Security League, he is also Secretary of the Greater Manchester Women's Football League. An experienced and accredited sports Blogger, Rob is a regular reporter and feature writer at Read WSL as well as writing freelance for American Football Blogs.


text: Dulcibella, also called Dowsabel, in English poetry, an idealized sweetheart, based on the Latin word dulcis ("sweet"). Dulcibella, like Dulcinea, represents beauty, inspiration, and virtuous love. The name was used in medieval literature and appeared with some frequency in the 16th century, but it was obsolete by the 18th century.

subset: commoncrawl


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A few months back I shared my horrid experience with that vile and unholy concoction that mankind has labeled as Fruitcake, in that post I also shared an image from the 1984 Sear Wishbook, a collection of clocks.
Just a couple of days ago while visiting a wonderful local record shop called Block Street Records, I spied sitting on a television what appeared to be a vintage Star Wars talking alarm clock. The forty-five dollar price tag gave me pause, not because I thought it was too expensive as it was in excellent condition but…you know…we all have bills to pay. Now it just happens that my Father was with me while we checked out the store and he went back the next day and bought it for me, a very nice surprise to find when I returned from the arcade to be sure.
It works quite well and I've made sure to place it in my curio cabinet so it can be protected from accidental falls while trying to shut off the alarm. While C-3PO is rather rude with his translation of R2-D2's cheery beeps, "You have to get up right away, don't be so polite, this young rebel is going to be late."…at least the duo aren't as violent as the Star Trek Alarm Clock!
[Via] David Simkins
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July 22, 2010
It's colourful, chaotic and the culinary capital of Asia. Hong Kong offers the fanatical foodie a bewildering choice of cuisines.
Following on from her previous post on Hong Kong's food culture, Chantal Martineau gets to the heart of the former colony's dining scene.
"Hong Kong is said to have more restaurants per capita than any other place in the world, serving up just about every kind of Chinese regional dish as well as a huge variety of international cuisine. Delving into the city's night markets, food courts, fine dining establishments, dim sum joints and noodle shops will help you to grasp just what Hong Kong is about.
"Hole-in-the-wall noodle shops abound, but one that has grown rather famous is Mak's Noodles on Wellington Street in the Central part of the city. Its name in Chinese translates literally as "Mak's Stingy Noodles", referring to the notoriously small portions which are said to keep the noodles from going soggy. Now in its third generation, this family business serves a traditional wonton noodle soup using a dried fish and pork-based stock. What the restaurant lacks in decorative flair, it more than makes up for in each savoury bowlful.
"There are endless opportunities throughout Hong Kong to graze on street food. To take just one example, once night falls the bustling market of Temple Street in Kowloon transforms from a treasure trove of cheap gadgets and designer knockoffs into an open-air food court. The food stalls sell everything from the street food classic of fried tofu to full seafood meals."
"While you could almost certainly eat street food for every meal and still be satisfied, you would be remiss not to head indoors at some point to sample what some of the city's innovative chefs are doing.
"One of the most provocative among these is Alvin Leung, a purple-haired, tattooed, cigar-smoking wunderkind who owns the molecular gastronomy hot spot Bo Innovation. The self-taught chef turns out novel takes on Asian dishes, such as Chinese sausage and rice re-imagined as sausage ice cream with a rice crisp topping. The Michelin-starred restaurant has been compared to Spain's El Bulli and New York's wd~50.
"As in many financial centres around the world, some of the best restaurants in the city can be found in hotels, including the lauded Lung King Heen which has a magnificent view from its perch atop the Four Seasons. But if you want to show solidarity with the locals who were outraged that this Western-accented restaurant was the first and only to earn three Michelin stars in 2009, head instead to Golden Valley at the Emperor Hotel for authentically fiery Sichuan, like chicken in peanut-chilli sauce or a super spicy hot pot."
"No trip to Hong Kong is complete without dim sum. Unlike boring old brunch, this noonish meal offers the opportunity to taste a multitude of different flavours and textures in one sitting.
"For really authentic dim sum, head to Luk Yu Tea House in Central Hong Kong. The wood panelled restaurant, dating from the 1930s, feels frozen in time with dishes that haven't changed much since its inception. All the dim sum staples are there, such as har gau (shrimp dumplings), but there are also more challenging options such as dumplings stuffed with pig liver or almond and pig lung soup."
"With so much to see and taste in Hong Kong, a side trip might seem excessive, but the hour-long ferry from Hong Kong Airport to Macau is just too quick and easy a ride to pass up. Returned to China by Portugal in 1999, the island is still very much a fusion of the two cultures.
"Macanese cuisine also includes influences from nearly every place the Portuguese had colonised, from Mozambique to Brazil. Take African Chicken, the national dish. The bird is marinated in chilies, onions, and garlic, then smothered in a lemony, buttery coconut sauce, and grilled to crispy perfection."
"If you're just looking to nibble, head to Food Street in the Taipa district for a colourful array of snacks on sticks. Nearby, at Café Tai Lei Loi Kei, you might notice a queue stretching around the block. It's for chu pa bao, a take on the Portuguese pork chop sandwich, bifana, made with a sweet, crunchy-topped bo lo bao (pineapple bun)."
For more information on Hong Kong, check out our recommendations for first time visitors and outer island experiences.
Virgin Atlantic operate daily flights to Hong Kong from London Heathrow, and check out the many ways that Virgin Holidays can help you combine Hong Kong with other destinations in the Far East.


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I've got a busy day ahead of me,1. I am dropping of measurements to the glass company to cut mirrors for my future craft project, a mirrored desk. I was obsessed with finding "just the right one" .. Thanks to my friend Ashley I think I have it.. Can't wait to get the project underway.. I of course will post photos..
2. breakfast/lunch with good friend Amy Z
3. Off with the BF to Dick Howser Stadium to watch the FSU Baseball team, play in the Super Regional games.... more on the games below
MIAMI (43-18) at FLORIDA (45-15)
HOW THEY GOT HERE: Miami won Coral Gables Regional: beat Dartmouth 12-8, beat Texas A&M 14-1, lost to Texas A&M 11-7, beat Texas A&M 10-3. Florida won Gainesville Regional: beat Bethune-Cookman 7-3, beat Oregon State 10-2, beat Florida Atlantic 15-0.
TOURNAMENT APPEARANCES (LAST): Miami, 39th (2009). Florida, 26th (2009).
SUPER REGIONALS APPEARANCES (LAST): Miami, 10th (2008), 14-8. Florida, fourth (2009), 2-4.
4. Pedicure with good friend, Brett
5. restful evening in reading one of my new books!!


text:
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text:
27 March 2017
The Digital Landscape of Native AdvertisingTwitter Looks to Correct Brand 'Misconceptions' With Marketing Campaign
CIOReview - 24 Mar 2017 12:23
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The history of native advertising is older and more storied than you might expect even if you're already familiar with it. The reason why is related to how it works: native advertising is advertising...
TheStreet.com - 27 Mar 2017 10:14
How to Use Social Media for Your Lead Generation Marketing
Business 2 Community - 27 Mar 2017 14:12
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One of the most overlooked parts of a B2B marketing campaign is social media. Everyone likes to talk about it because it's fun, and because it looks simple and easy. Because of that, social media doesn't look like something where a business in a B2B...
Should your PR firm know SEO? Absolutely!
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Getting top rankings on Google and the other search engines is the prime marketing objective for hotels in today's digital world. Insight into the logic of Google's madness is a must for your PR...
3 Companies Bringing Content Marketing Back to Life
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Companies just need to take advantage of trends in content marketing and determine how to make content work for them -- and their audiences -- again. Take a minute to think about marketing in 2014...
Kroger Veteran Joins CMI Orchards as Vice President of Marketing
GroceryHeadquarters.com - 27 Mar 2017 13:33
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MLB Goes With Player-Focused Marketing Effort
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Fifth Third Bancorp has a new leader for its marketing team. Matthew Jauchius has been named...
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Plastics News - 27 Mar 2017 12:37
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Updated 3/27/2017 Email Print Plastics News Report Cranberry Township, Pa. — Conair Group has named Sam Rajkovich as vice president of sales and marketing for the maker of auxiliary...
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Path To Purchase Institute - 27 Mar 2017 11:08
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Walgreens launched its Balance Rewards loyalty program for two purposes: to build customer knowledge and differentially engage customers. Some of that engagement comes through the rewards points and...


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Decoding The Importance of PIQ at the SSB
The Interview is a process by which the Interviewing officer gets to know about the person he is Interviewing. The SSB Interview is more or less a personal meeting between the Interviewing officer and the candidate in which the I.O. gets to know about the inherent qualities of a candidate, how well versed is the candidate with himself and the surroundings.
At the Service Selection Board the Interview is conducted in a structured way to evaluate the try potential of the candidate or to see what all inherent OLQ's he posses within a specific time frame.
In this methodology, a preplanned questions are put forward by the Interviewing officer so as to obtain answer from the candidates, which help him assist and asses the true PERSONALITY TRAITS or which we usually term as OLQ's or Officer like qualities.
The PIQ (Personal Information Questionnaire) consists of basic information about the candidate about his name place of residence, educational qualification with percentage for each year along with his family details which would include his parents name salary occupation and also about ones participation in sports and other extra curricular activities etc. A candidate is required to fill up two copies of the same after clearing the Screening Test(which consists Of PPDT and Intelligence Test). The PIQ is the first impression a candidates gets to create on the I.O. And the Psychologist. A form should never be filled up in a hurry, also one should try avoid cutting and over writing. One should make sure he writes the complete P.I.Q. form with the best of his availability. Therefor make sure you fill the form properly and to best of your knowledge without concealing any facts.
The P.I.Q. is the basic background information of the candidate. The P.I.Q. however does not dal with the candidates ability to adapt, his contribution towards life and work, whether he has social qualities to get along with his/her colleagues or friends, what are the problem areas, social activities and leadership potential etc. The interviewing Officer would make a set of questions before hand to evaluate these factual aspects in a candidate and bring it out of the candidate.
Hence a candidate must give proper information about his experiences and his/her participation in all the activities mentioned by him in the PIQ during his/her Interview.
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<< Back to Rentals | Email this Page
Village Green invites you to live life on your own terms. Our community has several home, community, and location advantages. Our spacious studio, one and two bedroom floor plans were designed to provide the quality and comfort for a premier lifestyle.
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We invite you to contact us at email@example.com for a personal tour of our community, stop by our office to see what features your new home has to offer. We look forward to welcoming you to your new home!
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text:
- Open Access
Remittances, savings and return migration under uncertainty
- Matthieu Delpierre1, 2 and
- Bertrand Verheyden1Email author
© Delpierre and Verheyden; licensee Springer. 2014
- Received: 31 March 2014
- Accepted: 27 August 2014
- Published: 29 November 2014
Recent empirical evidence links migrant remittances, savings and return migration, and stresses the inaccuracy of return migration plans. This paper presents a model of endogenous remittances, savings and return decisions under uncertainty. In our framework, migrants make remittance and saving decisions at an early stage of migration, when their long term economic performance in the host country is still uncertain. Over time, information about professional prospects is acquired, and conditionally on past decisions, migrants adjust their return plans. We show that when migrants expect large gains from migration and face relatively low wage risks in the host country, they tend to remit less, save more and are less likely to return migrate. These results are in line with recent empirical evidence and provide a rationale for the support by relatives in the sending country of low-skill, illegal migration.
JEL codes D13; D80; JE
- Remittances
- Savings
- Risk
- Return migration
Over the last decade, migrant remittances have become a key element of many developing economies. In 2012, remittances represented a quarter of the GDP's of countries such as Moldova, Lesotho and Nepal, and reaching even half of Tajikistan's GDP.1 Remittances are also important because their growth is both faster and more stable than official aid. For instance, the average annual growth rate of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa has amounted to 13.9% over the 1995–2010 period.2 These transfers help recipients in countries of origin to cope with adverse shocks, and foster investments in various domains, such as education, productive assets and innovative technologies, but also in financial development, housing and social capital.3
In the face of such a major phenomenon benefiting recipient countries, economists have analyzed migrants' behavior, and in particular their motivations to send remittances. Migrant altruism towards the family left behind is among the most widely acknowledged motives for remittances. Practically all other motives can be related to the existence of some implicit contract between the migrant and the recipient. Such contracts involve mutual insurance and various forms of investments made by migrants in the country of origin, in human, physical, financial and social capital.
Although this literature is relatively vast, the analysis of the motives for remittances has until recently overlooked important elements of the migrant's decision process. While the link between remittances and return migration plans has recently been observed, theoretical analysis of the motives for remittances under endogenous return migration is scarce. More importantly, empirical studies show strong discrepancies between planned and actual duration of stay in the host country, due to uncertainty about their professional prospects and about their capacity to assimilate in the host country. Yet, theoretical analyses assume perfect foresight by migrants. Finally, a proper analysis of migrants' remittance behavior should include alternative strategies of transferring resources to the future, such as savings, whereas theoretical and empirical studies generally analyze either remittances or savings, but not both. Addressing the following questions may therefore improve our understanding of migrants' remittance and return migration strategies. Are migrants more or less likely to remit or to save under uncertainty? How do prior beliefs in terms of expected gains and risks from migration affect migrants' remittance-saving portfolio? How do these decisions interact with labor market performance in the host country?
In this paper, we present a model of endogenous remittances, savings and return decisions under uncertainty. Remittances foster investments in the host country, and these investments also benefit the migrant.4 In our setting, migrants make remittance and saving decisions at an early stage of migration, when both labor market performance and return options are uncertain. Over time, when information about professional prospects is acquired, and conditionally on past savings and remittances, migrants choose to become either a permanent migrant or a return migrant by comparing the consumption levels they would obtain in each location. It must be noted that this setting is in line with long-term international migration rather than circular migration.5
Savings and remittances are two technologies to transfer resources to the future, but they differ in some important aspects. When migrants consider whether to stay in the host country or return, they view savings as completely mobile, in the sense that these may be withdrawn and used in either location. In contrast, remittances lead to investments which have location-specific returns. Indeed, a migrant eventually opting for a permanent stay in the host country will only enjoy part (if any) of the remittance investment. For instance, investments in physical capital (e.g. houses, small businesses, inheritance,…) will incur transaction costs to be repatriated in the host country. Other types of investments in the origin country, for example in social capital (prestige, social status) are simply immobile and illiquid and therefore sunk. These considerations have strong implications in terms of return plans under uncertainty. For instance, we show that migrants who tend to remit large amounts in the early stages of migration have, ceteris paribus, a higher probability of return. Also, ex-ante, returns to remittances are random since they depend on the uncertain final location. In other words, unlike savings, remittances affect the distribution of future consumption through (i) their different returns in each location and (ii) their impact on return migration.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an original framework to analyze migrants' behavior. It allows us to relate profiles of migrants based on their beliefs in terms of economic performance to various patterns of remittance-saving portfolios. More specifically, we show that migrants forming high expectations about the benefits of migration tend to remit less to save more.6 Also migrants whose labor market outcomes are relatively risky in the host country tend to remit more. Combining these prospect and risk characteristics, the model predicts that low-skill, illegal migrants are likely remit, whereas highly-educated and documented migrants are less likely to remit. Intermediate remitters are for instance legal migrants with low levels of education, and student migrants, whose returns from migration are potentially high but risky. Also, the model reproduces a series of recent stylized facts, linked to the determinants of remittance behavior, to the relationship between remittances and return intentions, and to the economic performance of returnees.
First, all empirical analyses of remittance behavior highlight the existence of a large share of non-remitting migrants. Bettin et al. ([2012]) develop an econometric model which distinguishes various reasons for not remitting, either due to credit constrains, or due to the mere non-willingness to remit. Our framework captures these different possibilities, and explains why some unconstrained migrants may prefer not to remit. Since remittances increase the likelihood of return migration ex ante, and remittances have a higher return in the country of origin, returns to remittances are potentially convex. This convexity is a source of corner solution in remittances. Also, migrants who ex ante have high expectations about their economic outcomes in the host country are less likely to return. Because of this, they are also more likely to bear transaction costs to repatriate returns to remittances, which limits the attractiveness of such a form of investment. An additional reason for not remitting is related to the location of risks in host and origin countries. Migrants facing relatively low risk in the host country have no incentives to remit, as remitting affects the probability of return, and as a result increases the exposure to risks from the origin country. Conversely, this result is consistent with the observation that migrants facing high uncertainty in the host country are more likely to remit (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006]; Sinning [2011]).
The arguments on the impacts of expected gains and risks from migration provide a rationale for the important flows of illegal migration and their support by family members in developing countries. Indeed, our results imply that it is in the interest of migrants with low/risky prospects to remit. Therefore, relatives financing the migration of this type of agents are likely to receive transfers, independently of any pressure mechanisms.7 These results are strongly related in our model to the positive effect of past remittances on the likelihood of return. Dustmann and Mestres ([2010]) prove the existence of this "feedback effect" in their thorough analysis of the impact of return plans on remittances. They show that failing to take it into account leads to biased estimates of that impact.
Finally, the empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the economic performance of return migrants. Our model provides rationales for this phenomenon, and may explain cases of negative selection of return migrants. For instance, Coulon and Piracha ([2005]) and Campos-Vazquez and Lara ([2012]) show that the average counterfactual wages of return migrants had they never migrated are lower than the average wages of stayers, despite the existence of a migration premium derived from the human capital accumulated in the host country. In our model, there is first a potential negative selection at the first stage of migration since, as explained above, migrants who have relatively low and risky benefits from migration are the most likely to remit, and therefore are likely to receive support. Second, because of transaction costs, the more migrants remit, the more they are ready to concede low wages in the origin country. Furthermore, the low prospect, high risk migrants are the most likely to remit and are therefore the most susceptible to return and earn low wages.
In line with the explained empirical evidence, this model allows us to identify two distinct types of investment motives for remittances.8 First, when the expected returns to remittances are larger than the returns to savings, we say that remittances are sent with a "pure investment motive". Second, when the migrant's risk structure across locations is such that remittances reduce the total variance of future consumption, remittances may be sent with a "precautionary investment motive". Illegal migrants are particularly subject to this second motive.
The paper is organized as follows. A review of the recent literature is provided in Section 2. The general setting is introduced in Section 3. The case of risk neutral migrants is presented in Section 4, while the case of risk averse migrants is analyzed in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide an extension of the model allowing for differences in purchasing power between the host country and the origin country. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
Review of the literature
This paper links three fields of the migration literature: the study of (i) the motives for remittances, (ii) return migration plans, and (iii) the role of uncertainty at the early stages of migration.
First, the literature analyzing the motives for remittances has been initiated by Lucas and Stark ([1985]). Recent surveys of this question are provided by Rapoport and Docquier ([2006]), Carling ([2008]) and Stark ([2009]). Remittances are generally motivated by altruism towards the left behind and/or by the existence of an implicit contract between the migrant and the recipient. This implicit contract can take various forms. Remittances may be part of a mutual insurance arrangement. Indeed, migration allows families to diversify their income sources (Stark and Levhari [1982]) and remittances can be considered as insurance transfers to the family left behind (Choi and Yang [2007]; de la Briere et al. [2002]; Gubert [2002]). Remittances may also be seen as the repayment by the migrant of an implicit loan which made the initial migration possible (Poirine [1997]). As previously mentioned, remittances also foster investments in education (Edwards and Ureta [2003]; Yang [2008], [2009]; Calero et al. [2009] and Alcaraz et al. [2012]), productive assets (Adams [1998]) and innovative production technologies (Mendola [2008]), but also in financial development (Aggarwal et al. [2011]), housing (Adams Jr and Cuecuecha [2010]; Osili [2004]), social capital (Gallego and Mendola [2013]; Maggard [2004]) and family prestige (Auriol and Demonsant [2012]).
Whether altruism is involved or not in the migrant's decision making process, these investments generally benefit both remittance recipients and migrants themselves, either in terms of physical or social capital. For instance, remittances maintain membership rights in home communities (Osili [2007]) and generate the gratitude from recipients (Stark and Falk [1998]). Remittances may also be sent to migrants' extended family and friends in order to ensure the provision of services, such as the maintenance of migrants' patrimony, cattle and crops (Cox [1987]). Finally, migrants may invest in their future inheritance by sending money to their parents and improve their position against their siblings (the so-called strategic bequest motive, observed by Hoddinott ([1994]), Schrieder and Knerr ([2000]) and de la Briere et al. ([2002])).
Second, return migration is an important phenomenon. For instance, about 40% of migrants leave the host country after 5 to 7 years of migration (Bijwaard [2010]) for the Netherlands, Dustmann and Weiss ([2007]) for the UK). Return migration has first been explained by location-specific preferences (Djajic and Milbourne [1988]; Hill [1987]). More recent contributions relate return migration to long term strategies (Borjas and Bratsberg [1996]), motivated either by "lifecycle" or "target earnings" considerations. Migrants caring about lifecycle consumption determine the length of their stay abroad by trading off higher (utility) costs of staying abroad, including differences in purchasing powers, for higher earnings in the host country (Djajic and Milbourne [1988]; Dustmann [1997], [2003]; Stark et al. [1997]). An increase in wages may lead "lifecycle migrants" to stay longer in the host country. In contrast, migrants wishing to invest in their country of origin need to accumulate sufficient "target earnings" before returning (Djajic [2010]; Mesnard [2004]). These savings often translate into entrepreneurial activities, which require liquidities and are more profitable if migrants acquired specific skills and human capital in the host country (Dustmann and Kirchkamp [2002]; Dustmann et al. [2011]). Compared to lifecycle consumption, "target earnings" considerations provide opposite predictions: higher wages in the host country allow migrants to reach the required level of savings faster, allowing them to shorten their stay in the host country. Yang ([2006]) uses exchange rate shocks to empirically test both theories and finds a larger support for the lifecycle theory.
As regards remittances, recent empirical evidence highlights the positive link between return intentions and remittances (Dustmann and Mestres [2010]; William et al. [2011]; Sinning [2011]) and between return intentions and asset holdings by migrants in the origin country (Dustmann and Mestres [2011]). Yet to the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to take into account this relation, and in particular the feedback effect of remittances on return plans (Dustmann and Mestres [2010]).
Third, with regard to uncertainty, most theories analyzing migration duration assume that duration is decided at the beginning of the migration process, under perfect foresight. There is however strong evidence that migrants form erroneous expectations about available opportunities in the host country (Borjas and Bratsberg [1996]) and about the length of their stay, for instance in case of illegal migration and/or of poor economic performance (Tunali [2000]). van Baalen and Müller ([2008]) follow a sample of migrants from Southern Europe and Turkey over 21 years using the German Socioeconomic Panel. While a mere 2.7% declared their intention to stay more than 20 years in 1984, 39% were still in Germany in 2004. These inaccurate expectations cannot only be attributed to the initial phase of migration, as for each additional year in the host country, about 70% of immigrants revise upward the duration of their stay. At the same time, about 26% of migrants who initially declared their plan to stay permanently in Germany had left by 2004. Labour market trajectories affect return migration, as shown by Kirdar ([2009]) and Bijwaard ([2014]) who both find that migrant unemployment has a positive impact on return. In addition to return decisions, recent empirical studies show that uncertainties about income and legal status also positively affect saving and/or remittance behavior (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006]; Piracha and Zhu [2012]; Sinning [2011]). Yet, few theoretical works incorporate uncertainty. Galor and Stark ([1991]) assume that return itself is random and exogenous and show that the return probability induces migrants to save more than native-born individuals. Dustmann ([1997]) presents a model of savings and optimal duration under uncertainty. However, these decisions are jointly made ex ante.
Our paper contributes to the three mentioned fields in the following ways. Among the motives for remittances, we focus on the investment motive in various forms, including social capital (membership rights, gratitude, status). Interestingly, a self-interested behavior involving investments of this kind mimics the predictions of the altruism motive (Stark and Falk [1998]), since both altruistic and self-interested migrants benefit more from helping poorer recipients. Regarding the comparison between lifecycle and target earnings theories of return migration, our framework is more in line with lifecycle considerations, since high wages in the host country lower the likelihood of return migration. It is also worth noting that unlike many theoretical analyses previously cited, our model does not require differences in purchasing power or in preferences for consumption between host and home countries in order to motivate return migration.9 Instead, return migration is motivated here by the fact that for some migrants, remittances may have a higher return than savings, or may decrease future risks. Because of the feedback effect, remittances increase the willingness to return. In other words, return migration in our framework is driven by the comparison between savings and remittances and by the feedback effect. The results obtained in this case are qualitatively equivalent to the main setting. Finally, while the few studies which account for uncertainty preclude any revision of return migration plans when information about the migration outcome is revealed, our setting allows migrants to choose their final location after the revelation of information. This feature is one of the main driving forces of our results.
The model
Savings, which are placed on a bank account in the host country, produce τ s at the beginning of period 2. Remittances are invested in the country of origin in some form of (physical, financial, social) capital.10 This investment produces a return R l (r) for the migrant in period 2, which depends on the migrant's location decision l∈{h,o}.11R l (r) is location-specific because if migrants choose to stay in the host country, migrants only partially benefit from investments made in the country of origin. The loss incurred in case of permanent migration is either due to transaction costs borne to liquidate the asset (e.g. a house, a small business,...), or simply because some specific types of assets, like social capital, are immobile, illiquid and therefore sunk. As a result, R o (r)≥R h (r). Also, let us define D R (r)≡R o (r)−R h (r) as the difference in returns to remittances between temporary and permanent migration, or transaction costs, which increase with the value of the investment: .12
Note that contrary to remittances and wages, savings are perfectly mobile, since they can be withdrawn and spent in any location.
Summing up, this setting highlights the trade-off between higher expected wages in the host country and higher returns to remittances in the origin country in a context of uncertainty. In the first period, the migrant decides on savings and remittances (s,r). In the second period, wages in both locations (w o , w h ) are observed by the migrant, who chooses a location l∈{h,o}. Solving backwards, we start by analyzing the second period's problem, namely the location choice, and derive its consequences on the (ex ante) likelihood of return migration in period 1 and on saving and remittance decisions.
3.1 Optimal location choice
The migrant chooses the location in which the consumption level is the highest, so that ex-post, period-2 consumption c2= max{c o ,c h }. In this simple setting, this choice boils down to comparing the difference in returns to remittances between origin and host countries, D R (r)≡R o (r)−R h (r), to the difference in wages between host and origin countries, D w ≡w h −w o .13 At this stage, note that D R (r) is certain and depends on a past endogenous variable, whereas D w is a random variate.
Lemma 1.
In period 2, the migrant returns to the origin country if D w <D R .
Having determined the optimal location condition, we can now start the analysis of the migrant's problem in period 1. In this period, wages, and consequently the wage gap D w , are treated as random variables. Return migration is therefore uncertain, and depends on the distribution of D w . Let f(D w ) denote the marginal density of D w , where , where ι(w h ,w o ,D w )=1 if w h −w o =D w and ι=0 otherwise. The cumulative density function of D w is noted F(D w ).
Lemma 2.
where with probability F(D R ) the migrant returns to the country of origin and enjoys E(g(c o )|D w ≤D R ), where c o depends on the realization of w o . With probability (1−F(D R )), the migrant stays in the host country and enjoys E(g(c h )|D w >D R ). While the concavity of u(·) captures the migrant's taste for consumption smoothing, the concavity of g(·) captures the degree of risk aversion. Section 4 and 5 are based on two particular cases of Kreps-Porteus preferences. Section 4 covers the case of risk-neutral migrants having a taste for consumption smoothing, which corresponds to a linear g(·) function and a concave u(·) function. This case allows us to introduce the "pure investment motive" for remittances, which appears when the expected return to remittances dominates that of savings. In Section 5, we introduce risk aversion by posing that u(·) and g(·) are identical. This second case, which corresponds to expected utility, puts forward the "precautionary motive" for remittances: depending on the distribution of wage risks across locations, remittances may decrease the variance of future consumption.
Risk neutral migrant and the pure investment motive
Let us first analyze the properties of the remittance technology in the way it affects the expectation of future consumption. Based on these properties, we will study in a second subsection the optimal remittances decision of risk-neutral migrants.
4.1 The impact of remittances on expected consumption
In this subsection, we will analyze the impact of remittances on (i) the expected consumption in each location, and (ii) the total expectation of consumption, taking into account optimal location decisions.
This decomposition allows us to assess the impact of remittances on the expected consumption in each location separately, taking into account the endogeneity of the location decision. Such an exercise brings two interesting findings. First, it allows us to provide an explanation to the poor performance of some return migrants.18 Second, it shows that remittances, although they are more productive in case of return migration, increase the conditional expectation of consumption of migrants settling in the host country.
Proposition 1.
- 1.remittances decrease the expected wage E(w o |D w ≤D R ), but have an ambiguous impact on the expected consumption in the country of origin:
- 2.remittances have a positive impact on the expected wage and consumption in the host country:
where and .
See Appendix 7. □
Remittances have an ambiguous impact on E(c o |D w ≤D R ) because, ceteris paribus, migrants who remit more are ready to concede lower wages in the origin country. Indeed, as r increases, so does D R , so that the condition to return (D w ≤D R ) is easier to satisfy. In other words, return migration is compatible with higher values of D w , that is, lower (higher) values of w o (w h ). This result provides a rationale for poor economic outcomes of return migrants: the more migrants remit, the more likely they will return, and the lower the wages they are ready to accept in case of return. Conversely, remittances have a positive impact on E(w h |D w >D R ): migrants who remit are less likely to stay, which implies that they will do so only for sufficiently large wages in the host country.
E[w] is the expected wage, based on the distributions of wages in each location conditional on the wage gap D w . Similarly, E[R] is the total expectation of return to remittances, which also depends on ex-post location decisions. In order to show the impact of remittances on E[c2], let us first analyze their impacts on E[w] and E[R] separately. The next Lemma shows that migrants who decide to remit anticipate lower expected wages, but higher expected benefits from remittances.
Lemma 3.
The first part of the lemma, which states that remittances have a negative impact on expected wages, is explained by the following intuition. Remitting increases the likelihood of return migration by . The global distribution of wages is unaffected by this change, except at the margin where migrants are indifferent between returning and staying, i.e. when D w =D R . When switching from staying to returning, they renege on w h to earn a wage w o instead. Therefore, they suffer a loss D w at this marginal point, which is precisely equal to D R .
The second part of the lemma highlights two positive effects of r on E[R]. The first effect stems from the fact that, as for E[w], remittances increase the likelihood of return migration at the margin. At this margin, migrants enjoy a return R o (r) instead of R h (r): they benefit from a marginal increase equal to D R . The second and most obvious term accounts for the marginal returns to remittances in each location, and . Weighting these two marginal returns by their respective probabilities leads to E[R′(r)].
Proposition 2.
This possible variety in the "technology" of returns to remittances gives rise to the following questions: (i) which migrant characteristics are likely to lead to high/low or concave/convex returns to remittances, and (ii) how does this affect the migrant's optimal remittances behavior? We address the first question in the next subsection, looking at the impact of migrants' beliefs about their wage prospects.
4.2 How migrant characteristics affect the impact of r on E[c2]
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of migrants' and recipients' characteristics on the shape of returns to remittances, both through and . While we provide here analytical results and their interpretation, the interested reader can find graphical representations of these results based on calibrations of the model in Appendix 7.
First, we show that the higher the migrants' anticipations about their labor market performance in the host country, the lower their expected marginal returns to remittances. In order to show this, let us consider that some migrants have higher wage prospects from migration than others following the concept of first order stochastic dominance. A migrant with high (low) wage prospects faces a cumulative distribution of the wage gap between host and origin countries noted (). The distribution of the wage gap for migrants with high prospects first-order stochastically dominates that of migrant with low wage prospects: for all D w . In other words, for any given D w , the higher the migrant's wage prospects, the lower F(D w ). Note that first order stochastic dominance implies that migrants with higher prospects have a higher expected wage gap: .
Lemma 4.
For all r, the higher the migrant's wage prospects, the lower .
One can rewrite as , which clearly increases with F(D R (r)). For a given level of D R , a migrant with higher migration prospects faces a lower expected marginal return to remittances. See Appendix 7 for a graphical illustration. □
Let us now discuss how recipient characteristics affect . We have seen that is the sum of two terms, and E[R′′(r)]. While the first is always positive, the second term may also be positive, depending on the way recipients in the origin country use remittances. Indeed, E[R′′(r)] is more likely to be positive in poor receiving households than in rich ones. Intuitively, poor families are likely to first allocate remittances to their basic needs. The more the migrant remits, the higher recipients' capacity to switch to more productive investments, which also benefits the migrant. Marginal returns to remittances are therefore negligible for low levels of remittances, and become attractive as recipient households have improved their living conditions. As a result, migrants originating from poor households are more likely to face convex returns to remittances. This reasoning has been illustrated by Adams ([1998]), which shows that households with a migrant member have a higher marginal propensity to invest.
In the next section, we analyze migrants' optimal saving and remittance decisions, taking into account the potential heterogeneity in the remittance technology across migrants.
4.3 Optimal savings and remittances under risk neutrality
where c1 and E[c2] are defined in (1) and (8), and both r and s need to satisfy non-negativity constraints. While remittances can obviously not be negative, borrowing is precluded by the migrant's lack of credibility to repay a loan in case of return migration. As mentioned in Proposition 2, returns to remittances may either be concave, or convex. Let us analyze these two cases separately.
Proposition 3.
Under risk neutrality, if , then three types of remittance-saving portfolios are possible: (0,s∗), (r∗,s∗) and (r∗,0), where:
under "high" migration prospects (large E[D w ]): (0,s∗) such that ,
under "intermediate" migration prospects: (r∗,s∗) such that ,
under "low" migration prospects (small E[D w ]): (r∗,0) such that .
It must be noted that the solutions described here are valid if and only if . Intuitively, for the arbitrage condition, E[R′(r)]=τ, to hold at equilibrium, remittances should have a decreasing expected marginal return. Indeed, remittances below the interior solution should have a higher marginal return than savings, while remittances beyond the interior solution should have a lower return than savings. If, as mentioned in the previous section, remittances have an increasing marginal return, this reasoning does not hold, and a corner solution will prevail. As shown in the next proposition, the case of convex returns to remittances is incompatible with an interior solution in both s and r.
Proposition 4.
If , then the optimal remittance/saving portfolio of the migrant is never diversified. Two remittance-savings portfolios are possible, (0,s∗) and (r∗,0), where:
under "high" migration prospects: (0,s∗) with U(0,s∗)>U(r∗,0) and s∗ such that ,
under "low" migration prospects: (r∗,0) with U(r∗,0)>U(0,s∗), and r∗ such that .
See Appendix 7. □
The main insight of this case is that the optimal remittance/saving portfolio of the migrant is never diversified when returns to remittances are convex. Which of the two assets is chosen depends again on return prospects. If prospects are high (low), marginal returns to remittances are low and the migrant saves (remits).
Let us now analyze the risk implications of remittances.
Risk averse migrants and the precautionary investment motive
Let us describe intuitively the two terms composing the variance of c2. The first term, E[V a r(c2|D w )], which is decomposed in (19), represents the average variance over the two locations. More precisely, it is the weighted sum of consumption variances by location, where weights are the probabilities of choosing these respective locations. The second term, V a r[E(c2|D w )], which is decomposed in (20), represents the consumption variance which is due to differences in expected consumption across locations. This second term can be interpreted as the risk imposed by the uncertainty about the future location itself.
In the next subsection, we assess the impact of remittances on the aggregate risk faced by the migrant.
5.1 The impact of remittances on consumption variance
In this section, we will provide a rationale, based on risk considerations, to the fact that migrants facing relatively more risks in the host country, such as illegal migrants, are more likely to remit than others. Indeed, the initial distribution of uncertainty is an important determinant of the migrant's ability to use remittances as a precautionary investment. More precisely, we show that if the wage uncertainty is mostly located in the host country labor market, remittances have the property of reducing future consumption variance. This argument also provides a rationale for the fact that in developing countries, families provide support for illegal/risky migration. Indeed, it is in the own interest of migrants facing high risk in the host country to send remittances, so that families are likely to receive a return on investment independently of pressure mechanisms, such as migrant networks. This section also allows us to show that the location choice (temporary versus permanent migration) is per se a risk-coping mechanism, used ex post. Remittances, sent ex ante, improve the effectiveness of this ex-post risk-coping device.
The impact of remittances on aggregate risk is highlighted in the following Lemma. The economic intuition follows in the subsequent propositions.
Lemma 5.
See Appendix 7. □
Lemma 5 describes the effect of remittances on the variance of the migrant's future consumption. The sign of this effect depends on two terms. First, remittances are likely to decrease V a r(c2) if the expected consumption is lower in the origin country than in the host country (E(c o |D w ≤D R )<E(c h |D w >D R )). Note that these expectations are conditional on the wage gap, and that the distribution of wages across the two locations is in fact a crucial determinant of the sign of this first term. Second, remittances are likely to decrease V a r(c2) if, at the margin where the migrant is indifferent between staying and returning (i.e. for D w =D R ), the variance of wages in the origin country is lower than the variance of wages in the host country.
In order to provide more insights from this general formula and to highlight the role played by the distribution of wage risks across locations, we need to add more structure on the distribution of wages. To this end, we will assume that wages are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution, with means E[w o ]=μ o and E[w h ]=μ h and variances and . We assume without loss of generality that wages are independently distributed across locations, so that c o v(w o ,w h )=0.21 The reason why we assume a bivariate normal distribution is that this distribution has appealing properties allowing analytical solutions and providing intuitive results. One implication of normality is that the migrant's income variance is minimized for E(c o |D w ≤D R )=E(c h |D w >D R ). This is intuitive since, at this point, uncertainty related to the location itself vanishes, given that ex ante the consumption levels are equal in both locations. It has to be noted, however, that if this level is optimal from an insurance perspective (precautionary motive), remittances are also potentially sent to increase the migrant's expected income (pure investment motive). This combination of motives is explored in the section devoted to the migrant's optimization problem.
5.2 How migrant characteristics affect the impact of r on V a r(c2)
Clearly, migrants differ in terms of θ h . For instance, illegal migrants are more likely to face risk in the host country, in which case θ h is close to one. On the other hand, well established and integrated migrants should face very little risk in the host country, while uncertainty in case of return is higher.
Proposition 5.
See Appendix 7. □
Proposition 5 indicates that remittances decrease the aggregate income risk faced by the migrant if her initial risk is mainly located in the host country (large θ h ). Intuitively, increasing remittances makes return migration more likely, which reduces the exposure to the relatively large risk in the host country. An important implication of Proposition 5 is that is itself a function of the level of remittances. The next proposition states that the impact of remittances on risk is non-monotonic.
Proposition 6.
is increasing in r. Therefore, V a r(c2) is potentially non-monotonic in r, being decreasing for low r, and increasing for large r.
See Appendix 7. □
This proposition states that low levels of remittances may decrease aggregate risk, as in this case is low and is likely to be smaller than θ h . Large levels of remittances may on the other hand be risk-increasing, as is then high and will eventually be larger than θ h .
It must be noted at this stage that the impact of remittances on aggregate risk is largely driven by the fact that our framework accounts for the location choice. More precisely, it can be argued that in this setting, the genuine self insurance device is the migrant's ability to choose her location after information about wages is revealed. Indeed, for any initial geographical distribution of risks, the migrant is protected against low wages by the ability to select the best outcome among both locations. In other words, the migrant is capable of mitigating a negative shock in one location by moving to the other location. Moreover, as we show in the following example, this instrument is most powerful if risk is evenly distributed among locations. Example 1 provides the intuition behind propositions 5 and 6, namely that remittances are risk-reducing if risk is mainly located in the host economy and that transferring too much risk towards the origin country might, at the end, increase the aggregate risk faced by the migrant. In order to illustrate these points, we use a simplified framework where the only decision variable is location.
Example 1.
- 1.
The capacity to choose the best location always improves the expected consumption: the expected consumption conditional on optimal location, E(ω), is larger than the unconditional expected consumption w.
- 2.
The consumption variance conditional on optimal location, V a r(ω) is minimized when the initial income risk is identical in both locations, i.e. for θ h =1/2.
See Appendix 7. □
As this simplified example illustrates, on the one hand, the location choice allows the migrant to increase expected consumption. On the other hand, it shows that aggregate risk depends on the initial risk composition. More precisely, the more the distribution of wage risks across locations is even ex ante, the lower the variance of consumption conditional on optimal location. If risk is mainly located in the host economy, remittances can be used to improve the balance of risks across locations, so that aggregate risk is reduced. This mechanism provides an explanation to the empirical evidence according to which migrants facing higher risks in the host country are more likely to remit (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006]). On the contrary, as stated in Proposition 6, remittances may increase aggregate risk if the origin country is relatively riskier.
5.3 Optimal savings and remittances under risk aversion
where , as described in Proposition 2, and where the impact on the variance is given by equation (21). We are now able to formally take into account both precautionary and pure investment motives. Under risk neutrality, we have shown that returns to remittances are potentially convex, as discussed after equation (12). In the risk averse case, we need to also take into account the effect of remittances on consumption variance in order to define the concavity or convexity of total returns to remittances. Note that another source of migrant heterogeneity, namely risk aversion η, amplifies this result: the larger η, the larger the impact of r on V a r(c2).
Definition 1.
Whether returns to remittances are convex or concave matters for the optimal migrant portfolio. Indeed, as in the section with risk neutrality, we know that the migrant's objective may admit an interior maximum in both s and r only if total returns to remittances are concave. Although convex total returns to remittances are still possible for risk averse migrants, this possibility is less likely than in the case of risk neutral migrants. The fact that concavity is more relevant under risk aversion than under risk neutrality is due to the impact of remittances on the variance of consumption. By Proposition 6, we know that . This effect, whose magnitude increases with the degree of absolute risk aversion η, increases the likelihood of concave returns to remittances. As a result, it is likely that risk averse migrants choose strictly positive levels of both savings and remittances. However, one should keep in mind that, even if returns to remittances are concave, the non-negativity constraint on savings may, under some conditions, be binding. As in Proposition 3, this will be the case if the return to savings is low compared to the returns to remittances, which, in the risk averse case, combine potential benefits in terms of both expectation and variance of consumption. For instance, because remittances are risk-reducing for illegal migrants, these migrants are more likely to have no savings, other things being equal.
Proposition 7.
- 1.
If , then depending on migration prospects and host-country relative risk θ h , three types of remittance-saving portfolios are possible:
"high" and "safe" migration prospects (large E[D w ], low θ h ): (0,s∗) such that ,
"intermediate" migration prospects: (r∗,s∗) such that ,
"low" and "risky" migration prospects (low E[D w ], large θ h ): (r∗,0) such that .
- 2.
If , then the optimal remittance/saving portfolio is never diversified:
"high" and "safe" migration prospects: (0,s∗) with U(0,s∗)>U(r∗,0) and s∗ such that ,
"low" and "risky" migration prospects: (r∗,0) with U(r∗,0)>U(0,s∗) and r∗ such that .
The last section provides a taxonomy of the motives for remittances, based on the analysis conducted above.
5.4 Remittances as pure and/or precautionary investment?
This equation is represented in Figure 5 by the straight line with positive slope . All points below this line are such that , in which cases it is not in the migrant's interest to remit. For this reason, r∗ is at a corner in the grey area in the lower right corner of the graph.
In the upper left part of the figure, remittances are attractive because . If , the investment motive is irrelevant since savings provide a better return. However, the fact that is due to the fact that remittances are risk-reducing at the margin. Therefore, remittances are spent on a precautionary motive in this case, which is represented by the yellow triangle. The opposite case is captured by the orange triangle, in which only the investment motive is relevant, since whereas remittances increase risk: . Finally, the white square represents the area where both motives are met since remittances have a higher average return than savings and decrease the aggregate risk.
Extension: differences in purchasing power across locations
The expression in highlights the fact that since returns to savings also become location-specific through differences in prices, their return is, just like wages and remittances, also random ex ante. The next proposition describes the properties of returns to remittances and savings when purchasing powers differ across locations.
Proposition 8.
The remittance and saving technologies with different purchasing powers
See Appendix 7. □
One can see that, as in the basic model, returns to savings τ must be compared to a weighted sum of and , where the weights not only depend on the probability of return migration, but also on relative prices. If prices are equal, one obtains the same condition as before.
Second, while returns to remittances may be convex as in the basic setting, returns to savings are now always convex. This is due to the fact that, while the unadjusted (for differences in purchasing power) return to savings is linear, increasing savings creates an incentive to return and enjoy a higher purchasing power. The more the migrant saves, the more he/she increases this incentive as the likelihood of return migration keeps increasing. Making use of the concept of wage prospects from migration, one can conclude that migrants with lower wage prospects (higher F(D w ) for any given D w ) face higher returns to both remittances and savings.
Let us now determine the migrant's portfolio efficiency frontier. This frontier determines, for a given amount x invested in period 1, the optimal mix of savings and remittances (r,s) (i.e. such that r+s=x) which maximizes E[c2|r,s]. This question is not trivial, given that as we have just seen, the two technologies are complementary , but savings (and also potentially remittances) have convex returns individually.
Lemma 6.
See Appendix 7. □
In the basic setting, it has been shown in Proposition 2 that the migrant's problem admitted a corner solution if returns to remittances were convex: . In the setting with different purchasing powers across locations, this condition is more complex for two reasons. First, it also involves returns to savings, which are here convex . While this term was equal to zero in the basic setting since returns to savings were certain and linear, its presence here reinforces the case for corner solutions. Second, the condition also involves the complementarity between both technologies . This complementarity clearly goes in favor of an interior solution, whereas in the basic setting, both technologies didn't interact.
When all these terms are combined, they simplify to an expression which is very similar and qualitatively equivalent to the basic setting. Indeed, Proposition 4 shows (under identical prices between locations) that returns to remittances are convex if the concavity in expected returns to remittances does not counterbalance the increase in marginal returns to remittances induced by the feedback effect . Interestingly, in this more complex setting, the condition under which corner solutions prevail is identical, with the exception that the source of convexity induced by the feedback effect must also incorporate the gap in returns to savings: . The reason thereof is fairly intuitive. Indeed, in the basic setting, an additional monetary unit invested in remittances (and removed from savings so that the amount invested remains constant since s=x−r) used to increase the gap in consumption in favor of the origin country by . The fact that savings decreased by one unit did not affect the gap across locations (c o −c h ) since this unit of savings would have brought τ in period 2 independently of the location choice. When prices differ however, this is no longer the case: savings also create a gap in consumption. Reducing savings at the margin now decreases the gap across locations by . The net effect of substituting one unit from remittances for savings on the gap between c o and c h is therefore .
One might therefore be tempted to conclude that the introduction of differences in purchasing power limits the scope for corner solutions, since the source of convexity is now mitigated by the fact that savings reduce the consumption gap across locations through . It is worth reminding, however, that the introduction of prices also amplifies by the same effect (lower prices in the origin country reinforce the benefits of remittances in case of return). Summing up, one can conclude that the condition under which corner solutions prevails is qualitatively equivalent to the basic setting.
We have established in the previous lemma the condition under which, for a given amount x invested, the efficient portfolio is diversified or not. As in the main setting, let us now describe in more detail the way the composition of this efficient portfolio evolves with migration prospects. Again, we will distinguish two cases. We will refer to the "concave case" as the case where , which potentially leads to interior solutions in r and s, and to the convex case when this expression is positive, leading systematically to corner solutions.
Let us now analyze the optimal portfolio composition for these different types of migrants. Proposition 9 shows that this composition follows exactly the same pattern as in the basic setting, both in the concave and convex cases.
Proposition 9.
- 1.
In the concave case,
migrants with "high" prospects only save: (0,s∗),
migrants with "intermediate" both save and remit: (r∗,s∗) such that ,
migrants with "low" prospects only remit: (r∗,0).
- 2.
In the convex case,
migrants with "high" prospects only save: (0,s∗)
migrants with "low" and "intermediate" prospects only remit: (r∗,0).
See Appendix 7. □
Therefore, we can conclude the following.
Proposition 10.
The impact of remittances and savings on risk with different purchasing powers
See Appendix 7. □
As we have seen above, the condition under which is larger than is very weak. It indeed suffices (but is not even necessary) that is larger than τ. We can therefore conclude that risk averse migrants facing high wage uncertainty in the host country tend to remit rather than save for a precautionary motive, confirming the result stated in the main setting.
In this paper, we present a theory of migrants' decisions on their remittance-saving portfolio under uncertainty about labor market performance in the host country and endogenous return migration. Stylized facts show that migrants have poor information about their professional prospects at the time of arrival in the host country. In our model, beliefs about such prospects affect migrants' remittance and saving decisions at the early stage of migration, and will in turn shape the likelihood of return migration in the future. The model provides insights about the role played by such migrant characteristics on portfolio decisions. Two key results are obtained.
First, the higher the migration prospects (i.e. expected wage gain from migration), the lower the incentive to remit and the higher the incentive to save. This result stems from the fact that ceteris paribus, migrants with high migration prospects are less likely to return to their origin country. As a result, migrants anticipate that they will only partly enjoy the benefits of the investments financed by their remittances in the country of origin (housing, businesses, social capital,...). Therefore, they tend to remit less and to favor savings ex ante. Second, migrants who face a relatively large wage risk in the host country are more likely to remit: remitting allows them to balance future risks across locations as it increases the likelihood of return migration.
Combining these prospect and risk characteristics, the model predicts that low-skill, illegal migrants are likely to remit, whereas highly-educated and documented migrants are less likely to remit. Intermediate remitters are for instance legal migrants with low levels of education, and student migrants, whose returns from migration are potentially high but risky.
These results provide insights to explain the massive flows of low-skill, illegal migrants towards more developed countries. Indeed, it is in the own interest of such migrants to send remittances, independently of pressure mechanisms, such as migrant networks, or altruistic behavior. Therefore, relatives of these migrants anticipate that they are likely to receive remittances if they invest in them by fostering migration, even if their supervision mechanisms are limited.
The model also reproduces other stylized facts. For instance, the diversification of migrants' portfolios depends on the remittance technology, and more precisely on whether returns to remittances are concave or convex. When remittances have convex returns, migrants either save or remit, but do not invest in both assets. This result contributes to explanation of the large share of non-remitting migrants. Also, the model can explain potential cases of negative selection of return migrants.
While the basic version of the model assumes for expositional simplicity that prices are the same in both locations, an extension of the model allows for differences in purchasing power between host and origin countries. This introduction substantially complicates the analysis but leads to the same qualitative results, the only remarkable difference being that savings also affect return migration since they allow to enjoy a higher consumption in case of return migration. However, this difference also applies to remittances, so that portfolio decisions of migrants follow the same pattern as in the basic setting, based on wage prospects and risk location.
1 Source: Worldbank, Migration and Development Brief #21, 2013.
2 Source: Migration and remittances factbook (2011), World Bank.
3 See the literature review below.
4 The notion of investment in this paper must be interpreted in a very broad sense, encompassing various forms of capital, including physical, financial, human and social capital.
5 The case of non-EU workers residing in the European Union is a good example of this type of migration.
6 This result is in line with the numerous empirical papers observing that more educated migrants are less likely to remit.
7 Illegal migrants also generally rely more on transnational networks, since such networks improve migrants' economic prospects and provide them with informal insurance. The counterpart of these networks is that they exert a pressure to remit, which provides an additional reason why origin countries support risky migration.
8 In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible, the altruism motive is not presented in this model. The inclusion of this motive, even though it would clearly provide an additional incentive to remit, would not qualitatively affect our main results, which describe the effects of remittances on return plans and on the expectation and the variance of the migrant's consumption. Furthermore, as discussed in the review of the literature, the altruism motive is difficult to distinguish from a motive of investment in social capital in the origin country (Stark and Falk [1998])
9 Still, we add an extension of the model allowing for differences in purchasing power for the sake of generality.
10 While remittances need not always have an explicit investment purpose, they generally benefit the migrant by maintaining his/her membership rights, and by improving his/her social status in the community. In this case, they can therefore also be considered as a form of investment.
11 We do not impose specific assumptions on the shape of R l (r) and keep it general. It is likely however that this shape is affected by the relationship between the sender and the recipient of remittances, and we discuss this point in Section 4.2.
12 This is obvious in the case of investments in social capital where R o (r)=0. Then, . For other types of investments, this only implies that the larger the investment, the larger the cost to liquidate the asset, for instance in the case of proportional costs. A more complex framework involving a recipient in an agency relationship also leads to (not presented here but available upon request).
13 This basic version, which neglects differences in purchasing powers and country preferences, already allows us to reproduce many stylized facts about remittances and return migration plans. The impact of such differences will be discussed further.
14 See the introductory section.
15 For example, assuming risk neutrality under standard expected utility would impose the utility function to be linear. In this case, the migrant has no taste for consumption smoothing either, so that at equilibrium, consumption is always at a corner in one of the two periods.
16 The models of Kreps and Porteus ([1978]) and Selden ([1978]) are equivalent but we use the formulation of Kreps and Porteus which is more intuitive. See Chapter 20 of Gollier ([2004]) for an introduction to non-expected utility.
17 Note that by definition, .
18 As mentioned in the introduction, there is mixed evidence about the economic success of returnees. Despite the existence of a migration premium derived from the human capital accumulated in the host country, some analyses, such as Coulon and Piracha ([2005]) and Campos-Vazquez and Lara ([2012]), find a negative selection of return migrants: had they never migrated, the counterfactual wages of return migrants are lower than non-migrants.
19 The zero probability of return migration in the absence of remittances requires the absence of a common support between the distributions of w o and w h . This example is based on this assumption for simplicity of exposition, but none of our results rely on it.
20 The migrant therefore modifies his/her consumption path over time, conceding a lower consumption level in period 1 in order to enjoy a higher expected consumption level in period 2.
21 While wages for a given individual are independently distributed across locations, this assumption is compatible with the fact that the distribution parameters between the two locations are correlated accross individuals. For instance, highly educated agents probably face high expected wage in both locations, while low-educated migrants are likely to face low expected wages in both origin and host countries.
22 Indeed, if and only if .
23To see this, note that under normality, we have that and .
and are available upon request.26The fact that F1 is smaller than F2 is true for the concave and convex cases, except in the extreme subcase where and . Then, F1 would be larger than F2.27One could simplify the exposition further by assuming that R o (0)=R h (0)=D R (0)=0, in which case this gap would be simply D s (x).
where the denomitor is positive in the concave case, and the numerator is developed below.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Appendix 2: Illustrating the remittance technology
Comparative statics
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
The latter condition might be fulfilled even if . Indeed, the more the migrant remits, the more his/her consumption path is distorted at the expense of first period utility. This cost is convex, while the benefit in terms of second period consumption is concave. The second case occurs if, due to liquidity constraints, the migrant is unable to spend enough remittances so as to raise their return to the level of the return to savings, τ. Then, remittances are at a corner and the migrant saves instead.
Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 5
Based this expression, one can write the effect of r on V a r[c2] as the sum of three effects.24
We first split the resolution of these three effects in two separate subsections, and then gather them in third subsection.
The derivatives of Σ o and Σ h with respect to r
The derivative of Σ oh with respect to r
The derivative of Σ o +Σ h +Σ oh with respect to r
After tedious calculations, we end up with equation (21).25
Appendix 5: Proof of proposition 5
First, let us show that the normality assumption helps obtain analytical results to our problem. Indeed, to assess the distribution of the difference of two random variables, such as D w =w h −w o , is generally a very demanding task which makes use of concepts of cross-correlation of distributions and complex conjugate of density functions. Such a distribution does not have an analytical expression in virtually all types of distribution functions, except the normal distribution. In other words, assuming a normal distribution is the unique case which provides an analytical solution to the problem of the determination of D w 's distribution. In this case, D w , which is a linear combination of two normal random variables, is also normally distributed, with parameters E[D w ]=μ h −μ o and .


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Sponsor Moe Maestas Responds to Veto of House Bill 175 Restricting Solitary Confinement
DATE: April 5, 2017
Contact: Daniel Marzec
Phone: 505-363-8372
Statement Regarding the Veto of House Bill 175 Restricting the Use of Isolated Confinement
Santa Fe, N.M. –
"The governor's veto of this compromise legislation will mean that New Mexican taxpayers will continue to pay millions of dollars in settlements for over utilizing an outdated and inhumane jail management tool," said bill sponsor Antonio "Moe" Maestas (D-Albuquerque).
"HB 175 was the result of the hard work of many stakeholders, including county jail officials and criminal justice experts. I look forward to continuing to work with jail and prison officials to change the culture in our state's correctional facilities and end solitary confinement in New Mexico for mentally ill, pregnant and juvenile inmates."


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21 Mar 2014
Almaty International Airport JSC celebrates the Nauryz holiday!
Today, March 21, 2014, Almaty International Airport JSC has celebrated a national holiday Nauryz in the S.Seifullin park.
The Nauryz holiday is one of the oldest holidays in the world. This holiday is a symbol of spring renewal, harmony, fertility, and friendship. This is a festival of joy and love. Nauryz means 'birth of spring'.
It is believed that the celebration of the Nauryz will bring wealth and success for the whole year. If the Nauryz comes to the clean house of a good host, diseases, failures, and adversities will pass him by.
These beliefs explain the abundance of festive rituals and customs in the park. Celebration of the Nauryz was accompanied by all-around merriments, concerts, and sports.


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The release of SECRET WARS #1 is just around the corner! But before fans everywhere sink their teeth into the biggest comic event of the year, Marvel is proud to present your first look at the Secret Wars Battleboard! A brand-new promo item available at participating comic shops and retailers, the Battleboard will be released in conjunction with the highly anticipated SECRET WARS #1.
A premium, foldout map printed on laminated cardstock, the Battleboard is your guide to the new patchwork planet of Secret Wars. From the untamed wilds the North to the festering wastes in the South – explore every corner of this strange new realm with this oversized, 13.25 x 20.375 map! The Battleboard also features cover images for every exciting Secret Wars title launching throughout May and June!
In addition to the Secret Wars Battleboard, qualifying retailers will have access to exclusive launch party items including lithographs, special variant covers and more! Retailers are encouraged to inquire with your Diamond representative and check upcoming Marvel Mailers for more information.
Written by JONATHAN HICKMAN (FEB150650)
Art by ESAD RIBIC
Cover by ALEX ROSS
Variant Cover by ESAD RIBIC (FEB150656)
Variant Cover by AMANDA CONNOR (FEB150655)
Variant Cover by Jim Cheung (FEB150651)
Party Variant by CHIP ZDARSKY (FEB150663)
Connecting Variant by SIMONE BIANCHI (FEB150653)
Classic Variant by BUTCH GUICE (FEB150652)
Young Variant by SKOTTIE YOUNG (FEB150657)
Action Figure Variant by JOHN TYLER CHRISTOPHER (FEB150654)
Blank Variant Also Available (FEB150658)
FOC – 03/09/15, On-Sale – 05/06/15
Let us know your thoughts below, @NerdFollowing on Twitter or on Facebook


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Type 2 Diabetes Trial: 46% Achieve Diabetes Remission Within 1 Year
After one year, 46% of the Type 2 Diabetic individuals in the intervention group recovered and maintained control over blood glucose concentrations.
Periods of Fasting Protects Against Obesity and Diabetes, Nurture Health
Can fasting for a specific period of time each day help prevent obesity, diabetes and other health conditions? Researchers detail their findings from a recent study.
Discovery Details How Obesity Causes Disease – and 2 Ways to Stop It
New research from the University of Virginia School of Medicine explains why obesity causes harmful inflammation that can lead to diabetes, clogged...
Spouses Share Risk of Developing Type 2 Diabetes
A new study found a connection between the BMI of one spouse and the other spouse's risk of developing type 2 diabetes.
Obamacare Improved Heart Health of Americans, Especially Men
Under Obamacare, also known as the Affordable Care Act, Americans have more preventive care for heart health - which in turn has lead to overall better cardiovascular health, timely diabetes screening and reduced risk of heart disease.
Drinks Sweetened with Sugar Raise Risk of Diabetes, Hypertension and More
Researchers have found a link between soda, juice consumption and health problems, like diabetes and metabolic syndrome, due to sugar.
Chocolate May Help Prevent or Delay Type 2 Diabetes, Says BYU Study
Chocolate may help prevent and treat diabetes according to a new BYU study, but there's a catch.
1 in 4 People Hospitalized in Germany has Diabetes
The prevalence of diabetes in hospitals was studied by German researchers who determined that 1 in 4 patients hospitalized was a diabetic.
Implant Invented to Lower Blood Sugar Levels and Weight
A spongy implant into fat tissue reduced weight gain and blood-sugar levels with no adverse affects - a development that can benefit people with diabetes or prediabetes.
Most Primary Physicians Can't Identify All Prediabetes Risk Factors
Study findings may be a wake-up call for primary care providers, the majority of which could not identify all 11 risk factors that qualify patients for prediabetes screening.
Chronic Disease in Men Linked to Chemicals in These Plastics
Chemicals found in everyday plastics materials are linked to cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes and high blood pressure in men, according to researchers.
Diabetes and Prediabetes Prevalence Soaring in China
Details of a large survey of Chinese adults, published by JAMA, shows that the estimated overall prevalence of diabetes and prediabetes is soaring and that China now has the world's largest diabetes epidemic.
Online Tool Predicts Heart Disease, Diabetes Risk Better
Online risk calculator, also being called an internet crystal ball, proves to be more accurate than method traditionally used by doctors in predicting heart...
Insulin Resistance Speeds Up Cognitive Decline, Dimentia
Researchers report that executive function and memory are particularly vulnerable to the effects of insulin resistance, which may increase the risk of dimentia later...
Repurposed Drug Cuts Type 2 Diabetes Risk by 80-Percent in Pre-diabetics
A recently published study details how a commonly prescribed diabetes drug lowered the risk of developing diabetes in at-risk people and those with pre-diabetes. The...
Easy Way to Cut Disease Risk: Assess Physical Activity
A new study looked at the benefits when clinicians counsel patients on their physical activity - and how routine assessments lower the risk of...


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Eddie launched his first store as a tennis supply shop, but since tennis was a seasonal sport, he would spend the rest of the year hunting, fishing, and enjoying the great northwest outdoors. Because of his love for all outdoor sportsmanship, it was an easy decision to expand his store into what became known as "Eddie Bauer's Sport Shop." Eighty years later, the company launched this novelty line under the name "Sport Shop" as a nod to those humble beginnings.
Ashley Arhart, Peter Beveridge
This holiday campaign took the heritage look and polished it up a bit with the use of a blind emboss, die cuts, spot UV, metallic ink, and a lenticular gift card. The direct mail portion of the campaign was extremely successful, far exceeding the expected response rate.
Ashley Arhart, Peter Beveridge


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Broad Member Involvement
Disaster Relief
Andy Muller is CCBA Disaster Relief Coordinator. If you would like more information from Andy click HERE. The following is a message from Andy:
Disaster Relief Video Click this like to watch or download
Illinois Disaster Relief Training Schedule
Central - April 8-9, 2016 - Western Oaks Baptist Church
5345 Old Jacksonville Rd
Springfield IL 62711-6067
North - April 22-23, 2016 - Streator Baptist Camp
South - October 14-15,2016 - Lake Sallateeska Baptist Camp
Cost: New Trainees: $30.00
(including background check, DR shirt and cap, and credentials.)
Renewals: $10.00
(background check)
Andy Muller, Coordinator
Capital City Baptist Association
Phone (217) 415-9868
E-mail email@example.com
Capital City Baptist Association has 108 trainees; some people are trained in more than one area.
IBSA Disaster Relief click HERE.
NAMB Disaster Relief click HERE.
Kincaid Mud Out January 4 - February 19, 2016 VIDEO


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Tucked away next to the Lake Elmo Park Reserve are the Farms of Lake Elmo, with homes ranging from $500,000 to $1+ million. This neighborhood features a variety of architecture, walking paths, and seclusion. Children attend ISD No. 834, Stillwater School District.
www.lakeelmo.org - Your source for city news and information.


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- "…the worst thing to happen to Canada since Justin Bieber…"
- New look! New posts! New everything!
- What a terrible time this is!
- Are video games art?
- Watch "Man of Steel – Official Nokia Exclusive Trailer [HD]" on YouTube
- Will The Purge live up to the suspenseful thrills it promises in the trailers?
- Archie live-action movie coming soon??


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Process Deism is a combination of Process Theism and Deism.
Process theism typically refers to a family of theological ideas originating in, inspired by, or in agreement with the metaphysical orientation of the English philosopher-mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and the American philosopher-ornithologist Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). For both Whitehead and Hartshorne, it is an essential attribute of God to be fully involved in and affected by temporal processes. This idea contrasts neatly with traditional forms of theism that hold God to be in all respects non-temporal (eternal), unchanging (immutable,) and unaffected by the world (impassible). Process theism does not deny that God is in some respects eternal, immutable, and impassible, but it contradicts the classical view by insisting that God is in some respects temporal, mutable, and passible. The views of Whitehead and Hartshorne should also be distinguished from those that affirm that the divine being, by an act of self-limitation, opens itself to influence from the world. Some neo-Thomists hold this view and a group of Evangelical Christian philosophers, calling themselves "open theists," promote similar ideas. These forms of theism were influenced by process theism, but they deny its claim that God is essentially in a give-and-take relationship with the world. Moreover, process theism is a genuinely philosophical theology in the sense that it is not grounded in claims of special insight or revealed truth but in philosophical reflection. Specifically, process theism is a product of theorizing that takes the categories of becoming, change, and time as foundational for metaphysics. The metaphysical underpinning of process theism is often called process philosophy, a label suggested by the title of Whitehead's magnum opus, Process and Reality. In order to bring out this philosophy's emphasis on relatedness, many scholars follow Bernard Loomer in calling it process-relational philosophy. Whitehead's preferred expression for his metaphysical viewpoint is "the philosophy of organism."
Here are some of the key characteristics of the beliefs regarding Process Deism.
1. "God" is the source of all being
2. all existence is understood as a process
3. emphasis is on "becoming" not "being"
4. "God" is alive and changing
5. "God" acts as a divine persuasive force
6. "God" is interactive
7. the whole cosmos is the "body" of "God"
8. "God" is continually co-creating new possibilities
9. "God" is omnipresent
10. "God" is not omnipotent
11. "God" is not omniscient
12. "God's" power is cooperative
13. we can co-create a more just, loving, enjoyable world
14. the universe is a continual process of evolution
15. evolution moves towards increased complexity
16. the world is filled with creativity, emergence, and novelty
17. the world is an interconnected changing web
18. this life is meant to be enjoyed
19. life is hope filled
20. life is positive and optimistic
For more information on Process Deism check out www.PanenDeism.com or telic21.org...


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Founded in 2008 by Dr. Luga Podesta our staff of physician, nurses, medical assistants and radiological technicians pride themselves on their ability to deliver exemplary care to our patients, while minimizing potential time lost from work or play.
Dr. Podesta will evaluate and treat each patient as if they were members of his family, providing each patient with the necessary time to understand their injury and how it should effectively be treated. Dr. Podesta with over 20 years of experience evaluating and treating musculoskeletal and orthopedic injuries will always take a conservative non-surgical approach to treatment when appropriate. Dr. Podesta's expertise lies in the treatment of athletic and musculoskeletal injuries of the shoulder, elbow, knee and spine, utilitizing the sports medicine model to aggressively diagnose and treat all patients with orthopedic musculoskeletal injuries.


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We'll Ease Every Breath You Take
The pulmonary care unit at Hutchinson Regional Medical Center (HRMC) focuses on caring for patients with complex respiratory issues. We measure your pulmonary function and provide breathing treatments to help you breathe easier. We specialize in treating individuals afflicted with:
- Asthma
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- Pneumonia
If testing determines that you need additional respiratory assistance after leaving the hospital we'll guide you in the right direction. We work closely with Health-E-Quip, a local medical equipment company, to set up home oxygen, CPAP and BIPAP equipment. A Health-E-Quip representative will provide one-on-one instruction to help you use the equipment properly.
HRMC also offers Pulmonary Rehab as an outpatient basis. Pulmonary Rehab is designed to help people with chronic pulmonary problems improve their quality of life through exercise, education, counseling, and support for patients and their families. Our AACVPR certified program uses a specialized staff of registered nurses, respiratory therapist, exercise physiologist, dieticians, occupational therapists, and pharmacists to reduce morbidity, mortality and disability from pulmonary disease. We slowly increase patient's exercise tolerance and strength over the course of the program. Education is given on how and when to use your medications to maximize their effectiveness. Also our staff members will teach patients energy saving and breathing techniques, so they can spend more time doing the things they love to do.