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1 A DISNEYLAND DILEMMA: TWO-PART TARIFFS FOR A MICKEY MOUSE MONOPOLY * WALTER Y. OI I. Two-part tariffs and a discriminating monopoly, 78. II. Determination of a uniform two-part tarif!, 81. III. Applications of two-part tariffs, 88. Appendix: Mathematical derivation of a uniform two-part tariff, 93. A two-part tariff is one in which the consumer must pay a lump sum fee for the right to buy a product. Examples of two-part tariffs are found in the rental of computers and copying machines, country club fees, and the rate structures of some public utilities. The Disneyland economy offers a stylized model of this type of pricing policy. If you were the owner of Disneyland, should you charge high lump sum admission fees and give the rides away, or should you let people into the amusement park for nothing and stick them with high monopolistic prices for the rides? Received theories of monopoly pricing shed little light on this question. The standard model that appears in almost every text assumes that the monopolist sets a single price for his product. The third-degree price discrimination model due to A. C. Pigou still presumes that a single price prevails in each segregated market.^ Pricing policies that involve tying arrangements (like those examined by M. L. Burstein- and W. S. Bowman, Jr.^) and the multi-part tariffs of Pigou's first- and seconddegree discrimination models come closer to the goal of maximizing the ill-gotten gains of monopoly power. The intricate pricing schemes reported in the antitrust literature are testimony to the fact that the imagination of a greedy entrepreneur outstrips the analytic ability of the economist. A discriminating two-part tariff is equivalent to Pigou's perfect first-degree price discrimination structure, which globally maximizes monopoly profits by extracting all consumer surpluses. This result * I would like to thank my colleagues J. Ferguson, D. F. Gordon, and R, Jackson for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The comments by the referee for this journal provided a very cogent review and pointed out two serious errors. Financial assistance from the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business is gratefully acknowledged. 1. A. C. Pigou, The Economics oj Welfare (London: MacMillan and Co., 1960). See especially Ch. 17, pp M. L. Burstein, "The Economics of Tie-in Sales," Review oj Economics and Statistics, Vol. 42 (Feb. 1960), pp W. S. Bowman, Jr., "Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,' Yale Law Journal, Vol. 67 (Nov. 1957), pp
2 78 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS was derived by A. Gabor *, Burstein,-^ and others. A truly discriminatory two-part tariff is difficult to implement and would probably be illegal. The determination of a nondiscriminatory two-part tariff is presented in Section II. The analysis there implies that in an exceptional case it behooves the monopolist to set price below marginal cost. Finally, attention is directed in Section III to some examples of two-part tariffs and the relationship of this pricing policy to quantity discounts. I. TWO-PART TARIFFS AND A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLY In the standard textbook model, a monopoly sets price so that marginal cost is equated to marginal revenue. At this price, consumers still enjoy consumer surpluses that are not captured by the firm. Alternative pricing policies, if legal, can always raise monopoly profits above that realized by adopting a single-price tariff. Suppose that our monopoly is Disneyland, whose product is an amusement park ride. Consumers are assumed to derive no utility from going to the park itself, and all utility derives from consuming a flow of rides X per unit time period. In our model, Disneyland establishes a two-part tariff wherein the consumer must pay a lump sum admission fee of T dollars for the right to buy rides at a price P per ride. A two-part tariff thus introduces a discontinuity in the consumer's budget equation: (1) XP-\-Y = M-T [if X>0] Y = M [if X = 0] where M is income measured in units of the numeraire, good Y, whose price is set equal to one. The consumer maximizes utility, U=U{X, Y,), subject to this budget constraint. In equilibrium, the consumer who patronizes Disneyland equates the marginal rate of substitution to the price P which forms the variable argument of the two-part tariff: (2-a) l=p. A consumer who refuses to pay the admission fee T must specialize his consumption to good Y, thereby attaining a utility index U(,= U{X, Y,) U{0, M,). This specialization would be optimal if his utility function satisfied the inequality 4. A. Gabor, "A Note on Block Tariffs," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 23 (1955), pp. 32-^1. 5. Op. cit.
3 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 79 (2-b) ^<P [when X = 0, Y = M,]. The admission fee is simply a purchase privilege tax that extracts part of the consumer surplus from rides, thereby transferring incomes from consumers to Disneyland. Under a two-part tariff, the consumer's demand for rides depends on the price per ride P, income M, and the lump sum admission tax T: (3) X = DiP, M~T,). Only the difference (M T) enters the demand equation because equal increments in income M and the lump sum tax T have no effect on the budget constraint, equation (1). Hence, we have dx dx If there is only one consumer, or if all consumers have identical utility functions and incomes, one could easily determine an optimal two-part tariff for the monopoly. Total profits are given by (5) x^xp-hr-c(x) where C{X) is the total cost function. Differentiation with respect to T yields where c' is the marginal eost of producing an additional ride. It can be shown that if K is a normal good, a rise in T will increase profits.^ There is, however, a limit to the size of the lump Bum tax. An increase in T forces the consumer to move to lower indifference curves as the monopolist extracts more of his consumer surplus. At some critical tax T*, the consumer would be better off to withdraw from the monopolist's market and specialize his purchases to good Y. The critical tax 7** is simply the consumer surplus enjoyed by the consumer; it can be determined from a constant utility demand curve, X = ^(P) where utility is held constant at Uo= U{0, M,). The lower the price per ride P, the larger is the consumer surplus. Hence, the 6 From the budget constraint, equation (1), we have fdx\ (dy\ dy _ (dx\ WW^' dm Substitution of this expression into equation (6) yields ^dy Y ) dt "dm^dm T u-. A rising or constant marginal cost curve implie-s that c'so. In this event, y is a normal good meaning C(iy/dM)>0. then dirldt will also be positive,
4 80 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS maximum lump sum tax T* that can be charged by Disneyland while retaining the patronage of the consumer is the larger, the lower is the price P: (7) T*=]^{P)dP ^=-^{P) = -X. p ar In the case of identical consumers, it behooves Disneyland to set T at its maximum value T*, which in turn depends on P.'' Hence, profits TT can be reduced to a function of only one variable, namely the price per ride P. Differentiating x with respect to P, we get (8-a) i!^ dp The change in the optimal lump sum admission tax T* due to a change in P is obtained from equation (7). Hence, in equilibrium, the price P satisfies the necessary condition (8-b) (P-c')(^)=O, or P = c'. ^dp ^ Tn equilibrium, the price per ride P (the variable component of a two-part tariff) is equated to marginal cost. The lump sum tax T* (the fixed component) is then determined by taking the area under the constant utility demand curve ^pip) above the price P. In a market of many consumers with different incomes and tastes, a discriminating monopoly could establish an ideal tariff wherein the price per ride P is equated to marginal cost and is the same for all consumers. However, each consumer would be charged a different lump sum admission tax that exhausts his entire consumer surplus.^ Customers who derive larger surpluses from consuming amusement park rides are thus charged higher purchase privilege taxes. The same global maximum of monopoly profits could have also been achieved by using a Pigovian model of firstdegree price discrimination, but a discriminatory two-part tariff 7. The maximum revenue, fl-xp-j-t*, that can be extracted from the consnmer increa.«e.s as P is lowered. This obvious result shows that the "all or none" demand cnrve defined by M. Friedman {Price Theory: A Provisional Text, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965, p. 15) is relatively elastic over its entire range because consumer surplus is a monotonically increasing function of the amount consumed. 8. Let xi = ^pi{p) be the constant utility demand cur\'e of the jth consumer where utility is constant at f7d. the index corresponding to a consumption bundlo containing no ricies X. Summation of these constant utility demand curves yields the pertinent market demand curve whose intersection with the marginal coat curve establishes the optimum price per ride P. Having thus fixed P, the optimum lump sum tax Tj* for the ;th coasumer is calculated from equation (7).
5 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 81 provides a simpler scheme for achieving the same end.^ Although it is discriminatory, this two-part tariff yields Pareto optimality in the sense that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption (Ux/Uy) is equated to that in production ic'/l) where the marginal cost of good Y is assumed equal to one. Admission taxes are nothing more than lump sum transfers of incomes that necessarily put consumers on lower indifference curves. K. J. Arrow has pointed out that there is a unique Pareto optimum for each distribution of income.^ However, there is nothing in economic theory that allows us unambiguously to compare one Pareto optimum to another.^ II. DETERMINATION OF A UNIFORM TWO-PART TARIFF The best of all possible worlds for Disneyland would be a discriminating two-part tariff where the price per ride is equated to marginal cost, and each consumer pays a different lump sum tax. The antitrust division would surely take a dim view of this ideal pricing policy and would, in all likelihood, insist upon uniform treatment of all consumers. If Disneyland were legally compelled to charge the same lump sum admission tax T and price per ride P to all customers, how should it proceed to determine an optimum, uniform two-part tariff? ^ Suppose that there are two consumers whose demands for rides are described by the curves ipi and ip^ in Figure I. If the income elasticity is zero, i^i and ijj2 are constant utility demand curves.* If 9. The theorem that monopoly profits are truly maximized when the monopolist can extract all consumer surpluses was derived earlier by Gabor, op. cit., P. E. Watts, "Block Tariffs: A Comment," Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 23 (1955), pp , and Burstein, o-p. cit. IQ Pigou's language, first-degree price di.scrimination occurs when a different price is charged for each additional unit demanded by a consumer. The monopolist thus strives to climb down a constant utility demand curve. Implementation of firstdegree price discrimination entails the establishment of a complete pricequantity schedule for each consumer. It is evident from the preceding analysis that the same appropriation of consumer surplus could be achieved with a two-part tariff. This equivalence was also derived by Gabor. 1. K. J. Arrow, "Uncertsinty and the Welfare Implications of Medical Care," Am,erican Economic Review, Vol. 53 (Dec. 1963), pp This point deserves further amplification. For any given income distribution A, there is a unique Pareto optimum in which all marginal rates of substitution in consumption are equated to those in production. If, however, another income distribution B applied, there is a corresponding unique, and possibly different, Pareto optimum. Economic theory has very little to say about which income distribution. A or B. is to be preferred. Arrow applied this principle to his analysis of the economics of medical care. 3. Watts recognized the practical problem of quoting a uniform tarift to all con.sumers, but does not offer a solution. 4. A zero income elasticity means that the demand curve in the (X, P,) plane is invariant to changes in income M or lump sum tax T. J. R. Hicks has
6 82 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS FIGURE I price is equated to marginal cost (here assumed constant at C per ride), the surplus enjoyed by the first consumer is equal to the area of the triangle (ABC), while that of the second individual is (A'B^C). In order to keep both consumers in the market, the lump sum admission tax T cannot exceed the smaller of the two consumer surpluses. No profits are realized from the sale of rides because price is equated to the constant marginal cost C, and all profits derive from admissions: TT = TTl + 7r2 = 2 [ABC). Profits can, however, be increased by raising price above marginal cost. A rise in P must be accompanied by a fall in T in order to retain the custom of the small consumer. At price P, the first consumer demands Xi* PD rides and is willing to pay an admission tax of no more than (ADP). Although the monopolist now obtains some profits from rides, the reduction in the lump sum tax from {ABC) to {ADP) results in a net loss of profits from the small consumer: shown that in this case the consumer surplus is equal to the area under the demand curve and above the price line {Value and Capital, London: Tht* Clarendon Press, 1961).
7 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 83 Although the second consumer benefits from a lower lump sum tax, he must pay a higher price for rides. The change in profits from sales to the second consumer is thus given by A7r2 = x2*-7r2= [ {ADP) -f {PD'E'O ] - [ABC] = -\-{DD'E'B). Given that the same two-part tariff must be quoted to both consumers, a rise in P accompanied by a fall in T would increase monopoly profits if the area of the quadrangle {DD'E'B) exceeded that of the triangle (DBE). Indeed, the optimum priee P in this special case of two consumers would maximize the difference in the areas of the quadrangle and triangle. Before generalizing the model to a market of many consumers, attention is directed to a curious counterexample in which it behooves the monopolist to set price below marginal cost. It is possible to concoct utility functions with the usual convexity properties that would generate the demand curves of Figure II. Income effects are again assumed equal to zero. If price is equated to marginal cost, the uniform lump sum tax cannot exceed the smaller of the two surpluses, which in Figure II is equal to {ABC). All profits again derive from the tax T= {ABC) from each of the two consumers. Suppose now that price is set below marginal cost, as shown in Figure II. At this price, the first consumer is prepared to pay a tax of (ADP) for the right to buy Xi*=PD rides. The sale of rides at a price below marginal cost leads to a loss, given by the rectangle (CEDP), but part of the loss is offset by a higher lump sum tax. As a result of a lower price P and higher tax T, the net change in profits from the first consumer is given by A7ri=-;ri*-7ri= [ {ADP) - {CEDP}]- [ABC] = -{BED). By lowering P, the monopolist can raise the lump sum tax to both consumers. If {A'D'P) is greater than (ADP), the second consumer still enjoys some consumer surplus and remains in the market. The increment in the tax {CBDP) is, however, larger than the loss in selling PD' rides to the second consumer at a price below marginal cost. More precisely, the net increment in profits from the second consumer is A-n-2 = 7r2*-7r2 = [ {ADP) - {CE'D'P) ] - [ABC] ^ -t- {E'BDD'). The combined profits at the lower price will be greater if the area {E'BDD') is greater than {BED). In this exceptional ease, the
8 84 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS first consumer has a smaller consumer surplus even though he demands more rides over the relevant range of prices. The rationale for this exceptional case rests on the fact that the lump sum admission tax can only be raised by lowering the price to retain the custom of the first consumer. Pricing below marginal cost entails a loss in the sale of rides, but this loss is more than offset by the higher admission taxes that could be exacted in this exceptional case. The establishment of an optimum and uniform tariff in a market of many consumers is complicated by the added problem of determining the number of consumers. It may happen in the twoconsumers case that total profits are maximized by forcing the small consumer out of the market. In this event, the solution reverts to that of Section I: namely, set price equal to marginal cost and extract the entire surplus of the remaining large consumer via a lump sum tax. The monopolist's task of arriving at an optimum
9 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 85 tariff in a market of many consumers can be divided into two steps. In the first step, one can imagine that the monopolist tries to arrive at a constrained optimum tariff (consisting of a price per ride P and a lump sum tax T) that maximizes profits subject to the constraint that all A'' consumers remain in the market. For any price P, the monopolist could raise the lump sum tax to equal the smallest of the A^ consumer surpluses; this procedure would not only increase profits but would also insure that all N consumers remain in the market. Since all N consumers must be kept in the market in this first step, the tax T must be adjusted whenever the price P is varied. The total profits given by equation (9) can thus be reduced to a function of only one parameter, the price per ride P: (9) 7riN)=XP-\-NT-CiX) where X is the market demand for rides, T=Ti* is the smallest of the A" consumer surpluses, and CiX) is the total cost function. The optimum price for a market of A^ consumers is then obtained by setting dir/dp equal to zero: where 8-i = Xi/X is the market share demanded by the smallest consumer, and E is the "total" elasticity of demand for rides; details of the mathematical derivation are contained in the Appendix. The price P will exceed marginal cost c' if (1-A^Si) >0, meaning that the smallest consumer demands less than 1/A^ of the total market demand. If (1-A'si) <0, the optimum price is below marginal cost; this is precisely the situation in the exceptional case of Figure II. Moreover, the equilibrium price P could occur in an inelastic part of the demand curve since only the term in brackets need be positive. If the monopolist raises the lump sum tax, the smallest consumer (and possibly others with consumer surpluses only slightly above T^Ti*) would elect to do without the monopolist's product. Having thus decided to contract the number of consumers, the monopolist proceeds to determine a new uniform tariff having a higlier lump sum tax and, in most instances, a lower price per ride.^ One can thus derive a uniform tariff that maximizes profits for any number of consumers n. To ascertain if the expulsion of some con- 5, The lump sum tax is raised to force out individuals with small consumer surpluses. The price P is then revised to satisfy equation (10) for a market with fewer consumers. If (l-a'si)>0, as it usually will be, it generally pays the monopolist to lower P when there are fewer consumers in the market.
10 86 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS sumers is desirable, we need only examine the behavior of constrained monopoly profits, win), as n is varied. In the second step, total profits 7r(7i) is decomposed into profits from lump sum admission taxes, ira-nt, and profits from the sale of rides, 7ra= {P c)x, where marginal cost is assumed to be constant. A rise in T reduces the number of consumers n who purchase the monopolist's product, and the change in VA depends on the responsiveness of n to variations in T. The elasticity of the number of consumers with respect to the lump sum tax is ultimately determined by the distribution of consumer surpluses. Plausible assumptions about that distribution would generate a WA function like the one depicted in Figure III/ A monopolist can obviously limit the size of his market by controlling the magnitude of the tax T. With fewer consumers, it pays to lower the priee per ride P in order to capture the larger surpluses of those consumers who continue to buy his product. Consequently, profits from sales, Tra= {P c)x, are likely to fall as the size of the market is contracted since both the profit margin (P c) and the market demand for rides X are likely to decline. In the limit, when only one customer is retained in the market, price is equated to marginal cost, and all profits derive from the lump sum tax. Hence, the vs function is a monotonically increasing function of the number of consumers n as shown in Figure III. The optimum and uniform two-part tariff that globally maximizes profits is attained when dw{n) _dtra, _^_n (Li.) ; -r I - U. dn dn an That optimum is achieved by restricting the market to n' consumers, as shown in Figure III. Recall that at each point on the WA and TTg curves, the uniform tariff (P, T,) is chosen to maximize profits 6. Strictly speaking, VB includes both the direct profits from selling rides and indirect profits deriving from higher lump sum taxes due t-o lower prices for rides as the number of consumers is contracted. This point is amplified in, the Appendix. 7. Differentiation of VA = nt with respect to n yields dji dn Let j{t) denote the frequency density of the number of consumers who enjoy a surplus of T dollars. The number of consumers n who remain in the market is the integral of j{t) to the quoted lump sum tax T. Hence. {dt/dn) = -l/j{t). If f{t) is a unimodal density function, TTA will usually attain a single maximum like the curve shown in Figure III. If, however, f{t) is bimodal, it is possible {though unlikely) that TTA could have two or more local maxima. A clue to the possible shape of the f{t) function is provided by the frequency distribution of sales because X) would tend to be positively correlated with the size of the consumer surplus.
11 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 87 FlQUBB III for a market of precisely n consumers. The optimum number of consumers n' is obtained in the downward sloping portion of the TTA curve where a rise in T would raise profits from admissions even though some consumers would be forced out of the market. The implementation of a uniform two-part tariff requires considerably more information. The price elasticity of demand e is the only information needed by a monopoly that adopts the singleprice tariff of the textbook model in which marginal revenue is equated to marginal cost. A two-part tariff is a feasible alternative provided that there are impediments to the resale of the product. The monopolist could proceed on a trial and error basis by initially establishing a feasible two-part tariff. The lump sum tax could be raised to see if it drives some consumers out of the market. He could then iterate on the price P to determine if profits are higher or lower. In the final equilibrium, the price per ride exceeds marginal cost but would be lower than the price implied by a textbook, singleprice model. However, those customers who purchase the monopolist's product and who pay the lump sum purchase privilege tax would spend a larger fraction of their budget, {XP-\-T)/M, on the good. The requirement that a uniform tariff must be quoted to all consumers clearly reduces monopoly profits below the level attain-
12 88 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS able under a discriminating two-part tariff. The welfare implications of a uniform tariff are evident from the two-consumer case of Figure I. The individual with the smallest consumer surplus is fully exploited; he derives no consumer surplus because he is forced to an indifference curve corresponding to a bundle containing none of good X. The other consumer would, however, prefer the uniform tariff to the discriminating tariff that appropriates the consumer surplus via the lump sum tax. In all but the exceptional case of Figure II, price P will exceed marginal cost. Consequently, the size of the consumer surplus that is conceptually amenable to appropriation is smaller than the lump sum tax T,-* in the tariff of Section I where price was equated to marginal cost. HI. APPLICATIONS OF TWO-PAET TARIFFS A two-part tariff wherein the monopolist exacts a lump sum tax for the right to buy his product can surely increase profits. Yet, this type of pricing policy is rarely observed. That apparent oversight on the part of greedy monopolists can partially be explained by an inability to prevent resale. If transaction costs were low, one customer could pay the lump sum tax and purchase large quantities for resale to other consumers. Resale is precluded in our Disneyland example, where the consumer himself must be physically present to consume the product.^ In other instances, high transaction eosts or freight expenses may provide the requisite impediments preventing resale. I suspect that the latter type of barrier permits firms in the computer and copying machine industries to establish and enforce two-part tariffs. The pricing policy adopted by IBM ean be interpreted as a two-part tariff. The lessee is obliged to pay a lump sum monthly rental of T dollars for the right to buy machine time. If each lessee 8. This is just another way of saying that the transaction cost of reselling an amusement park ride is prohibitively high. Most service industries meet this requirement. Night clubs, golf courses, barbers, and bowling alleys can easily prevent resale of tlieir products. Indeed, our theory suggests that a private country club should adopt a two-part tariff consisting of annual membership dues T plus additional prices P per round of golf or per drink. Moreover, the optimum uniform tariff derived in this paper implies that the price per round of golf should be lower at a private club than at a public course of comparable quality even though the total outlay (XP+T) is higher for a member of a private country club. It is also of interest to note that the annual lump sum tax at the University of Rochester faculty club is higher for a full professor than for an assistant professor, who has less income and presumably derives less consumer surplus from the goods vended at the club. Differential lump sum membership dues are, indeed, rational for a profitmaximizing monopoly.
13 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 89 could be charged a different rental, IBM could behave like the discriminating monopoly of Section I. The price per hour of machine time P would be equated to marginal cost, and all surpluses could be captured by a discriminatory structure of rental charges. If IBM were compelled to quote a uniform tariff, the price per machine hour would exceed marginal cost, but the discrepancy between price and marfrinal cost would be smaller than that under the single-price tariff of the textbook model.^ The IBM price structure introduces an additional twist to a two-part tariff. Every lessee who pays the lump sum rental is entitled to demand up to X* hours of machine time at no additional charge. If, however, more than X* hours are demanded, there is a price k per additional hour. The large customers are thus saddled by a volume surcharge. To analyze the rationale for this pricing policy, it is again convenient to deal with two consumers and to neglect income effects. The demand curves of the two consumers are presented in Figure IV. At a zero price for machine time, the first customer, i/-!, is prepared to pay up to Ti*^OAB for the right to use IBM equipment. He does not demand his allotment of X* hours, but whatever he demands results in a loss from sales so long as there is a positive marginal cost c for machine use. If the monthly rental is set to capture the entire surplus of the small consumer given the zero price, T = Ti* {OAB), the profits from this customer are given hy The second customer demands more than X* hours; his precise demand depends on the surcharge rate k. If the surcharge rate were as high as X*H, he would be content to pay the monthly rental, T= {OAB), and demand his allotment of X* hours. At a surcharge rate k, he would demand A'o hours of machine time and his total outlay for IBM equipment would be {OAB)-\-k{X2-X*). Although the first A'* hours entail a loss (given a positive marginal cost), the last (A'2 X*} hours contribute to IBM's profits. Hence, profit from the second customer is seen to be ^2= (OAB) ~ {OCD'X*)-\-iD'E'F'G'). A volume surcharge can thus be interpreted as a device for recapturing part of the larger surplus enjoyed by the second customer. 9. The ratio of marginal cost to price, c'/p, is frequently used as a measure of monopoly power. Under a discriminatory two-part tariff, c'/p is equal to unity, implying the complete absence of monopoly power. Yet, in this case, monopoly profits are at an absolute maximum since the monopolist appropriates all consumer surpluses. In short, the ratio of marginal cost to price is not a very good measure of monopoly power.
14 90 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS A : A k Xg B X X2 FIGURE IV This pricing policy is an optimum only under very special conditions that include (a) the marginal cost of machine time is zero/ (b) the spike X* at which the surcharge rate becomes effective is precisely equal to the maximum demand by the small customer, (c) there is virtually no resale of computer time,^ and (d) the surcharge rate k is determined in a manner analogous to a single price monopoly tariff.3 In a market of many consumers, the analytic task 1. It is argued that a volume surchage is required to pay for the higher maintenance costs resulting from more intensive machine use. The initial allotment X* corresponded to approximately one shift per week. Maintenance is, however, only a small part of the cost of high-speed computers. If depreciation is mainly a function of use rather than calendar lime, the capital cost can properly be allocated to machine hours. On the other hand, if obsolescence is dominant (as it appears to be in the light of rapid technical change), the capital cost would be unrelated to use, and the assumption of zero marginal cost may not be far from the mark, at least for computers. 2. Recent reductions in telephone rates have reduced transaction costs, thereby encouraging more resale via time-sharing arrangements. 3. In the example of Figure IV, only the second customer demands additional machine time. In determining an optimum surcharge rate k, the de-
15 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 91 of fixing three parameters {a lump sum rental T, the spike X*, and the surcharge rate k) becomes extremely complicated. However, the principle that a volume surcharge recaptures part of the larger surpluses is still retained.* Pricing policies that involve volume discounts can be analyzed in the context of two-part tariffs. Public utilities, for example, often quote tariffs that embody marginal price discounts. The consumer pays a price Pi for demands up to X* units and a lower follow-on price P2 for demands in excess of X* units.^ This type of tariff produces a kink in the consumer's budget constraint: (12-a) XPi+F-M [if 0<X<X*], (12-b) X*Pi-\-iX-X*)P2 + Y = M [if X>X*]. For those consumers who have sufficiently large demands to obtain the lower follow-on price, a marginal price discount is equivalent to a two-part tariff. Equation (12-b) can be written (12-c) XP2-\-Y = M-T [where T-X^iPi-Ps},]. In a sense, the public utility charges a lump sum purchase privilege tax of T = X*iPi-P2) for the right to buy Z at a price of Pa. This type of quantity discount is thus seen to be a way of appropriating part of the consumer surpluses of large customers, thereby raising monopoly profits.^ Indeed, a marginal price discount may be prefmand curve ^2 is translated so that X* is taken as the origin. Tlie marginal revenue of the truncated demand curve to the right of X* can be constructed and is depicted by the dashed line in Figure IV. The intersection of this constructed marginal revenue with marginal cost then determines the optimum surcharge rate k. 4. According to an alternative hypothesis, the lump sum rental T is a charge for the amortization of the capital cost, while the surcharge reflects the marginal cost of machine tiine beyond X* hours. The latter hypotliesis suggests that the IBM pricing policy may simply be a competitive price structure. A careful study of the marginal cost of rnachine time together with the profits of the lessor would enable us to distinguish between the discrimination theory developed in this paper and the amortization argument set forth in this note. 5. In practice, marginal price discount schedules may identify several blocks with their accompanying prices. The essential features of the analy.sis can, however, be derived in the simplest case involving a single spike at A'* units. 6. To the best of my knowledge, J. M. Buchanan was the first to recognize the point that quantity discounts arc devices for appropriating part of the consumer surplus (" The Theory of Monopolistic Quantity Discounts." Review of Economic Studies, Vol, 20 (1953), pp ). This is surely correct, but it has received little attention in the antitrust literature. Tlie equivalence of a two-part tariff and a schedule of marginal prices was demonstrated by Gabor (071. cit.). One can interpret a two-part tarife as a high price T for the first unit and a lower marginal price P for ad<litional units. It should be noticed that the corner of the first block does not have to lie insiile of the constant money income demand curve, as was erroneously argued by K. K. Boulding ieconomic Analysis, New York: Harper and Bros., 1948, p. 543). This is clear if one recalls that the lump sum tax T can be interpreted as the
16 92 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS erable to a two-part tariff because it enables the monopolist to retain the custom of those consumers with small demands, {X < X*). A second type of volume discount is described by a schedule of average prices. In this case, the consumer still pays a price Pi for the first block of X* units. If, however, he demands more than X* per unit time period, a lower price P2 applies to all units including the first block of X* units. The budget constraint exhibits a discontinuity at X = X*, and the consumer who demands enough to get the lower price P2 is rewarded by getting an implicit rebate of X*(Pi-P2) dollars.'^ In a sense, the firm fails to capture part of the consumer surplus that it could have appropriated by adopting a marginal price discount. It is difficult to explain why some firms have adopted average price discounts with their implicit rebates to large customers, but a detailed analysis of the question is beyond the scope of the present paper. In summary, the standard monopoly model assumes that the firm establishes a single price that equates marginal revenue to marginal cost. Alternative and more complicated pricing strategies can always increase monopoly profits. Buchanan and Gabor examined the rationale for quantity discounts and block tariffs, while Bowman and Burstein showed that tying arrangements raise profits by appropriating part of the consumer surplus. Those studies fail, however, to come to grips with the actual implementation of these pricing policies and the nature of the equilibrium that would prevail under different pricing policies.^ In this paper, I have directed price for afirstblock of one unit, and T can surely exceed the demand price for precisely one unit of X. r > -a c 7. Advertising rates, wholesale price schedules, and freight tariffs often involve average price discounts. An interesting implication of price structures with average price discounts is that one should never observe demands (sales) in the interval, 5X*<X<X*, where S^P^/Pi is the relative price discount. The customer's outlays are XP, forx<x*, and XP, for X>X*. Since he can always buy the minimum quantity X* to get the lower price, he should never buy an amount such that XP^^X*P, or X>dX*. where 5 = P./Pu The consumer who would have demanded an amount in the interval, 5X*<X<A''*, would thus be induced to increase his demand to X* in order to obtam the lower price. Consequently, the firm would produce a concentration of demands at or slightly above the spike X*, and it is this concentration of sales that offers the most plausible explanation for average price discounts. 8. Little attention has been devoted to the problem of implementing the pricing policies. In the Burstein model, the monopoly must determine which goods are to be tied to the monopolized tying good as well as the prices of tying and tied goods. Buchanan ("Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comrnent," this Journal, Vol. SO (Aug. 1966), pp ) and Gabor ("Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Further Comment," this Journal, Vol. 80 (Aug. 1966), pp ) demonstrated Ihat if a public utility adopts rnarginal price discount schedules (as many actually do) one cannot determine a unique Pareto optimum capacity in the peak load pricing problem. Given the equivalence of two-part tariffs and marginal price discounts, it is conceptually
17 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 93 attention to a class of pricing policies described by two-part tariffs. A discriminatoi'y two-part tariff, in which price is equated to marginal cost and all consumer surpluses are appropriated by lump sum taxes, is the best of all pricing strategies for a profit-maximizing monopoly. It', however, a uniform tariff must be quoted to all customers, the analysis of Section II outlines how a firm would proceed to determine tlie parameters of an optimum and uniform two-part tariff. Aside from income redistribution effects, a uniform two-part tariff is preferable to a single monopoly price since the former leads to a smaller discrepancy between marginal rates of substitution in consumption and production. Finally, the analysis of two-part tariffs provides an illuminating interpretation of the rationale for the IBM pricing policy and for volume discounts. APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION OF A UNIFORM TWO-PART TARIFF The task of determining an optimum and uniform two-part tariff in a market of many consumers can be separated into two steps. First, an optimum tariff is determined subject to the constraint that the monopoly retains the patronage of N consumers. It is then possible to derive the constrained monopoly profits corresponding to the optimum tariff for A'" consumers where A'" can be varied. The second step then examines how the constrained monopoly profits behave as one varies the number of consumers who are retained in the market. Suppose initially that the monopoly establishes a feasible tariff (consisting of a price P and lump sum tax T) that insures that all A'' consumers remain in the market for his product. The profits from this feasible tariff are given by (A.l) \ X= 5 xa. Let i/'j(p) describe the constant utility demand curve of the ;th consumer where the utility index is constant for a consumption bundle including none of good X. The surplus realized by the jth consumer, Tj*, is a function of the price P: (A.2) Tj*^ /^;(P)dP. F For any price P, profits can be increased by setting the lump sum tax T equal to the smallest of the N consumer surpluses that is assigned to the first consumer; that is, T=Ti*. The demand for rides by the smallest consumer is thus determined by his constant utility depossible to determine a uniform two-part tariff that would maximize the difference between social benefits and eosts by solving for the three parameters of a two-part tariff, a price P, a lump sum tax T, and an optimum number of consumers.
18 94 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS mand, Xi^^AP). Since the remaining N-l consumers still enjoy some consumer surplus, their demands for rides depend on the price P and net incomes (Mj T): (A.3) Xj = DAP, M,-T,) [i = 2, 3,..., ivj. In this first step, it is assumed that all N consumers must be kept in the market. Consequently, the tax T must be adjusted whenever the price F is varied in order to keep the smallest consumer in the market. The requisite adjustment is given by equation (7) as {dt/df) = -Xi. In this manner, total profits, equation (A.I.), can be reduced to a function of only one parameter, the price per ride P. Setting (dtt/dp) equal to zero, we get the equilibrium condition for an optimum price P given a market of N consumers: (A.4) C' = F[I + [^^)\ where E is the "total" price elasticity of the market demand for rides; where si = a:i/x is the smallest consumer's share of the market demand, kj = XjP/M} represents the budget share devoted to variable outlays for rides, and iij is the income elasticity of demand_ for rides.** The optimum price per ride is thus set to satisfy equation (A.4); by substituting this optimum price in equation (A.2) for the smallest consumer (; = 1), we get the optimum lump sum tax r = 2'i*. 9 In differentiating profits ir with respect to P, it must be remembered that tlie market demand JC ia a function of P and T via equation (A.3). Hence, dt dx\( dt Recall that (.dt/dp) = -x, and that idxi/dt)=-{dx,/dm,). {dx\( dt\ " { dxi\ dx ^ ( dx, \ Thus, we get Collecting terms, we obtain The "total" price elasticity of the market demand E is defined as follows: The "total" price elasticity thus incorporates the mduced change in demand for rides resulting from the requisite adjustment in T when P is varied. If we substitute, we get Setting drt/dp equal to zero thus yields equation (A.4). In the expression for the "total" price ela.sticity, the terni e represents the price elasticity unadjusted for the induced effect of changes in T. More precisely,
19 DISNEYLAND DILEMMA 96 This procedure could conceptually be repeated for any number of consumers, n, thereby obtaining an optimum tariff and constrained maximum monopoly profits irin) for a market of n consumers. Up to now, we have shown how a monopolist can determine an optimum tariff {P, T,) which yields a constrained maximum profit win) when precisely N consumers are retained in the market. Attention is next directed to the behavior of 7r(A'') as the number of consumers A'' is varied. A rise in T would force the smallest consumer out of the market since T=Ti* appropriated the smallest of the A^ consumer surpluses. Having thus decided to ignore the smallest consumer, the rnonopolist establishes a new price (P+AP), which would maximize profits for a market of N 1 consumers. The equilibrium condition {A.4) is thus revised to (A.6) e where c is marginal cost, S2 is the market share demanded by the second smallest consumer, and E' is the "total" price elasticity after excluding the smallest consumer. The new lump sum tax, it-\-at), is again set to exhaust the smallest of the remaining surpluses, here assigned to individual 2: (A.7) / P +A The second integral on the right is the adjustment in the lump sum tax due to a change in the price per ride and can be approximated by -X2AF; consult equation (A.2) above. If the value of the first integral is denoted by dt, equation (A.7) can be written (A.8) AT = dt-x2ap. If marginal cost is constant, the constrained maximum profits for markets of A'' and A''! consumers can be written {A.9a) (A.9b) wbere AX ia the change in the market demand for rides. The change in profits from excluding the smallest consumer {accompanied by the establishment of a new optimum, uniform tariff) can conveniently be separated into changes in profits from admissions dva and profits from sale of rides dws: (A.lOa) dn = where (A.lOb) dwa (A.lOc) dns=-[{p-c)ax-\-{x~(n-l)x2)ap-\-axap]. Notice that the revision in the lump sum tax due to a change in the price per ride has been included with the change in profits from sales. The monopolist limits the number of consumers A^ by raising the admission tax, thereby inducing some consumer to do without his product. In the discrete case of equation (A.lOh), exclusion of the smallest consumer would raise profits from admissions if
20 96 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS T If A^ is large, one can appeal to a continuous approximation; differentiation of 7rA = NT with respect to A^ yields where ^=^1^;! For a fixed marginal price per ride F, the number of consumers N is inversely related to the size of the lump sum tax T. Profits from admissions xj would fall as N is increased (by rcducmg T) if -l <«< 0, and would rise if 7,<-l. The value of TJ depends on the distribution of consumer surpluses T*j. Plausible assumptions about that distribution would generate a TTA function like that depicted in Figure III.^ When individuals with small consumer surpluses are forced out of the market, it behooves the monopoly to establish a new optimum price (P+AP) that satisfies equation (A.6) given the smaller number of consumers. In general, the optimum price will be lowered as the size of the market is contracted.- Profits from the sale of rides TTS will typically fall as the number nf consumers is reduced; i.e., dtr.s/dn>0. In the limit, when only one consumer is retained in the market, price would be equated to marginal cost, and profits from sales is a minimum. The global maximum, subject to the contraint that the same two-part tariff is quoted to all customers, is thus attained when d7r = dira-\-dtrs = 0, and this will occur at the point n' shown in Figure III.^ UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER 1. The shape of the WA function is determined by the frequency density function of consumer surpluses. In an earlier draft (available upon request from the author), I have developed this relationship. I show there that if the frequency density is a rectangular distribution, the ITA function is a parabola. Although local maxima for the TTA function are possible, they are unlikely. 2. Tlie qualification "in general" is necessitated because different configurations of individual demands could produce situations in which elimination of some consumers would prompt the monopolist to raise P. An example of such a situation is provided by the exceptional case of Figure IT, in which the individual with the smaller con.sumer surplus demands more rides. If the market, share demanded by the smallest consumer is less than 1/N (i.e.. the demand for rides by the smallest consumer x,<x/n), profits would be maximized by lowering the price P when the smallest consumer is excluded. The mathematical proof of this is contained in the earlier draft of this paper. 3. The anonymous referee's comments on the earlier draft of this paper correctly pointed out that there may not be a unique maximum because the ordering of individuals by the size of consumer surpluses is not invariant to the prire per ride. In the example of Figure II, it is possible that the two demand curves inter.'^ect twice. I believe, however, that these are pathological cases (including the example of Figure II), and as such should not be viewed as plausible counterexamples.
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text:
Book and Media Reviews Section Editor: John L. Zeller, MD, PhD, Contributing Editor.
Disease has influenced the course of human history as much as any force or phenomenon—war, famine, greed, religion, and weather.
Maybe more. Plagues in particular have hammered individuals and cultures throughout history. In the superb Twelve Diseases That Changed Our World, 10 of the featured maladies are caused by microbes: smallpox, bubonic plague, cholera, tuberculosis, syphilis,
influenza, malaria, yellow fever, AIDS, and the Irish potato blight.
Hemophilia and porphyria are the only noninfectious illnesses to make the list.
Miksanek T. Twelve Diseases That Changed Our World. JAMA. 2007;298(24):2914-2920. doi:10.1001/jama.298.24.2919
© 2017

subset: commoncrawl


text:
New Lyon Tall Drinks Cabinet
Ideal for entertaining, the Lyon Grey tall drinks cabinet is made from wood and comes in a light grey finish. There is room to store bottles of wine or other drinks in the lower part of the cabinet, and glasses can be hung at the top. You can also use the three shelves to prepare your drinks or to place items upon. The cabinet has a traditional look and feel.
- Collection: New Lyon Furniture
- Height: 180 cm
- Width: 70 cm
- Depth: 38 cm
- Colour: grey
- Material: wood
- Weight: 32.2kg


text:
We are inordinately grateful to Ryan MacDonald, who created the trailer for Ryan Ridge's and Mel Bosworth's Camouflage Country, which releases tomorrow!
Camouflage Country: Book Trailer from Ryan MacDonald on Vimeo.
We are inordinately grateful to Ryan MacDonald, who created the trailer for Ryan Ridge's and Mel Bosworth's Camouflage Country, which releases tomorrow!
Camouflage Country: Book Trailer from Ryan MacDonald on Vimeo.
Ahead of its pre-release next Tuesday, November 24th, we thought we'd stay true to the freewheelin' spirit of Camouflage Country and have a little fun–and also give you the chance to win signed copies!
Here's how it works:
Below you will find four groups of sentences drawn directly from the book. Because the collection was a true collaboration between Ryan Ridge & Mel Bosworth, it's tricky to determine where one author ends and the other begins. Which is exactly what Queen's Ferry is asking you to do: tell us who wrote the sentences that follow–two groups belong to Ryan, two to Mel–by emailing email@example.com; the first 4 correct responders (1 per group) will each receive a signed copy.
1) At the time I believed in love and I reckon I still do.
2) And farther off still, I can nearly hear the low rumble of something bigger than you on your loudest day.
3) We had fantastic mohawks and the world by the balls.
4) Through the dust that kicked up all around, my eyes kept returning to the horses tethered nearby, their long faces blank and beautiful as catwalk amnesiacs.
5) There we were in our minds, skin naked and pink, teeth-tearing our favorite concert tees and slam-dancing with mechanics, each of us happier and each of us the wiser for it.
6) And when the day finally comes, the reunion signal will be easy because I practice it all the time inside the saddest boxcar: knees to chest, hug forever.
7) The groove wrapped the room like a second skin and my Memphis blood took us all home.
8) Later, pensive and buzzed beside the crackle of our campfire, I took a cool swallow of Michelob Ultra, fired a snot rocket into the darkness, and told my father he'd make a damn fine mother.
9) We rolled up our lives like sleeping bags and headed toward brighter colors and louder music.
10) Outside, the world was thick with a fog that took me in like a birthday party, all cheers and backslaps and frosting stabbed with fire.
1) Everyone was a star and nothing is real.
2) I went to bed early because it was never too late.
3) Outside the rain fell like empires.
4) We are actors, dammit, children who never ceased believing.
5) Through the giant bagel marquee I watched the sunset burst from the center and thought how everything good comes from the center.
6) The cork played the room like a pinball machine.
7) Another man dousing himself in kerosene as his wife bursts into laughter from the flames.
8) My manifesto was getting lots of likes on Facebook and my Twitter followers had shot to triple digits in the few hours since I'd issued my ultimate ultimatum.
9) Martyrs happen all the time, but a modern saint is about as rare as a one-armed gymnast.
10) I didn't believe in monsters until my sister brought one home.
1) Now the blue moon lit our skin like butane.
2) With the exception of stating that there was no digital Satan, the producers were super tightlipped about how the Virgin birth scene was accomplished.
3) Such was my beginning, long before my funding for Antarctica, long before those strippers grazed my sagging skin with their chests, breasts, and hearts.
4) We were high as Balsa-wood flyers.
5) What I got instead was a spectacular view of galaxies' slow-motion salsa dancing and I guess I can think of worse ways to spend a few lifetimes.
6) I hoped you'd answer but all I got was the pounding sound of everything that was ever wrong.
7) The way I saw it we were like our American Adventure cabin coupon: innocent until proven unredeemable and I'd never felt more born.
8) The moon pushed beneath the horizon and rang like the close of the second round of a fight scheduled for fifteen.
9) The answer was obvious but no one would admit it: it was time to put our guns down and go home, collect our sashes from pot-bellied oaks, and press our own pot bellies into American dinner tables.
10) I turned my attention back to the darkening field, to the uninspired music, and to whatever patriotic dishonesty came next.
1) And I jumped out the window as the room became flames.
2) He'd constructed a sensory deprivation tank out of old washing machine parts and a children's pool.
3) We married beneath a waterfall, honeymooned at the end of a rainbow.
4) I went to the store and picked up a forty of Olde English, a box of menthols, and a Shake Weight.
5) It was raining animals and we sweated nude in the glass-walled parlor of my attorney's home in the hills.
6) Whoa, whoa, whoa.
7) The moon looked like a dark disc with light leaking from it.
8) We wanted to sleep in our own beds, and for once, we wanted to wake up in a world that didn't seem shot.
9) He had eyes like shiny new shovels and when no one was looking I suspected he dug deep into the pharmacy stash.
10) I was a man without a plan––hungover and already half-drunk––and just stupid enough to think everything was going to be all right.
Come one, come all!
Here it is: the final book of 2015 (Dec. 22), ready for its close-up. A truly collaborative compilation, Camouflage Country brings together authors Ryan Ridge & Mel Bosworth and the illustrations of Jacob Heustis in a collection of microfictions/prose poems described by Kathleen Rooney (O, Democracy!) as "a pinball machine of a book, full of bounce and light and crazy ricochets: sentences start, you don't know where they'll end up, and this dynamic unpredictability is what gives this collection its life and its victory."
Camouflage Country will stand as Queen's Ferry Press' final release of 2015.
Plano, TX—February 27, 2015 Queen's Ferry Press, an independent publisher providing a venue for fine literary fiction, announced it will publish a co-authored collection by Ryan Ridge and Mel Bosworth.
"QFP releases are always the perfect mixture of perfect mixtures: work that's both evocative and innovative, beautiful and strange," said Ridge. "To be a part of this party is a privilege and an honor. Let's dance!"
"I am thrilled!" said Bosworth. "I couldn't be more pleased and excited to be working with Queen's Ferry Press. Yes!"
To get an idea of the collection, Camouflage Country, picture Horatio Alger's greatest nightmares transcribed by the brothers Grimm. Imagine Hemingway's In Our Time except in our time. See: 'The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave' scream past on a bumper sticker affixed to the back of an F-16. Camouflage Country is one hundred forty-five afterburner blasts of postmodern Americana further fueled by fifty illustrations by the artist Jacob Heustis. Excerpts have appeared in The Santa Monica Review, Hobart, Sleeping Fish, Passages North, McSweeney's Small Chair, Tin House, Big Lucks, and elsewhere.
Camouflage Country will release in December, 2015.
About the Authors:
Ryan Ridge is the author of the story collection Hunters & Gamblers, the poetry collection Ox, as well as the chapbooks Hey, it's America and 22nd Century Man. His latest book, American Homes, is out from the University of Michigan Press as part of their new 21st Century Prose series. Past work in PANK, DIAGRAM, Flaunt Magazine, Salt Hill, The Los Angeles Review, The Mississippi Review, Fanzine, and elsewhere. A former editor-in-chief of Faultline, he now edits Juked alongside his wife, Ashley Farmer. He is currently a visiting professor of creative writing at the University of Louisville.
Mel Bosworth is the author of the novel Freight and the poetry chapbook Every Laundromat in the World. His work has appeared in Hayden's Ferry Review, Per Contra, New World Writing, and Melville House, among others. Mel's book reviews have appeared in HTMLGIANT, The Lit Pub, and American Book Review. He is the series editor for the Wigleaf Top 50 (2015) and the creator & curator of the Small Press Book Review. Mel lives, breathes, writes, and works in Western Massachusetts.
About the Artist:
Jacob Heustis is a native of Louisville, Kentucky, where he lives and works. In 2004, he had his first solo exhibition at Swanson Reed Contemporary and has shown in numerous group exhibitions and solo shows since. He has also designed album covers for the indie bands Wax Fang, Silver Tongues, and Whistle Peak, among others. His work is held by several public and private collections.
Founded in 2011 as an independent publisher, Queen's Ferry Press specializes in literary fiction. The press currently releases 6–12 titles a year, many from debut authors, and is the publisher of Shadows of Men, the 2013 recipient of the TIL Steven Turner Award for Best Work of First Fiction. For book updates please contact Kevin Wehmueller, Marketing & Publicity of Queen's Ferry Press, or visit www.queensferrypress.com.
Media Contact: Kevin Wehmueller, Marketing & Publicity


text: About Starwood Capital GroupStarwood Capital Group is a private, U.S.-based investment firm with a core focus on global real estate. Since the group's inception in 1991, the firm has raised nearly $16 billion of equity capital and, through its various funds, has invested $13 billion representing nearly $35 billion in assets. Starwood Capital Group currently has over $21 billion of assets under management. Starwood Capital Group maintains offices in Greenwich, Atlanta, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles and Chicago, and affiliated offices in London, Luxembourg, Paris, Mumbai and Sao Paulo. Starwood Capital Group has invested in nearly every class of real estate on a global basis, including office, retail, residential, senior housing, golf, hotels, resorts and industrial assets. Starwood Capital Group and its affiliates have successfully executed an investment strategy that includes building enterprises around core real estate portfolios in both the private and public markets. Additional information about Starwood Capital can be found at www.starwoodcapital.com. About the The Witkoff Group The Witkoff Group is a fully integrated real estate investment firm that owns a diverse portfolio of real estate in select U. S. markets. The company specializes in identifying and acquiring undervalued properties in key central business district locations as well as assets with strong repositioning potential in newly emerging markets. These strategies have guided the company's acquisition and management activities. Investor Relations: Phone: 203-422-7788Email: firstname.lastname@example.com Media Contact: Jason Chudoba, ICR on behalf of Starwood Property TrustPhone: 646-277-1249Email: email@example.com


text:
Battery-operated Flameless Outdoor Candles
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Battery-operated Flameless Outdoor Candles with Remote, Set of Two is rated out of 5 by 186.
Rated 5 out of 5 by QualityShopper from Excellent Purchase This candle is AWESOME!!! In fact, I'm ordering more. I highly recommend this product and the program feature is so great!
Date published: 2011-11-02
Rated 5 out of 5 by Sunshine2 from Bought more! Need I say more? I liked the battery-operated sets enough to buy two more!
Date published: 2011-10-08
Rated 5 out of 5 by Gamecock1 from Battery powered candles Love them! They were perfect for my deck & gazebo lanterns-no mess &easy on/off! control!
Date published: 2011-09-26
Rated 5 out of 5 by Bruzer from Ideal Patio Accent For years I have fought the battle of having beautiful candles outdoors that melt away as the temperature rises. And who is going to bring them inside every day in the summer! Even other battery operated candles are made with a wax exterior - so they melt too. These candles perform great and look great. And, I love that you can put them on the remote. Now as the sun goes down, the yard comes alive with accent lighting. Thanks!
Date published: 2011-09-14
Rated 5 out of 5 by Autismmommy from Flameless candela I purchased this candle set for our front gate lanterns because our patio gets quite hot and the wax candles kept melting. We ended up using these during the power failure we had during the hurricane! They were safe and bright and saved the day. We hope to use them outside eventually, but this is an unexpected use for flameless candels. And they are beautiful when lit. I think Halloween will be another use as well.
Date published: 2011-09-08
Rated 5 out of 5 by Alex from Fabulous these are amazing. Purchased the starter kit with remote(gotta have that) and a couple more candles. I live in Southern CA so regular candles outside in my lanterns or anywhere melted from the heat. These turn on with the remote. (sometimes u have to point the remote directly at each candle). They flicker like real candles but unlike real candles BUT BETTER- the whole candle glows- not just the top wick. These are worth every penny and don't melt and are water resistant as well! 5 stars
Date published: 2011-09-07
Rated 5 out of 5 by Tamra from Great product I love these candles. Our lanterns are outside and we get strong sunlight from the early afternoon until sunset. Other wax covered candles would melt. These not only don't melt but are easy to use and look great and very realistic in our lanterns. And for the price...they are a great buy!
Date published: 2011-09-07
Rated 5 out of 5 by Kahalacruiser from A Wonderful Glow I own about 45 flameless candles for inside and needed for outside. Took a chance and ordered yours and just love them. Beautifully made, on timers and remote and made by Candle Impressions. I own Candle Impressions and they are a very good name in flameless candles. Doesn't get much better. Quality, in fact I ordered 2 more sets.
Date published: 2011-09-07
Rated 5 out of 5 by WCWWWW from Easy - to - operate candles! Remote controlled candles are the best idea. I can scatter them around the pool and patio, and quickly operate them from the comfort of our deck chair. No need to walk around and "light" each one. This gives me more time to concentrate on opening a good bottle of wine to enjoy with family and friends.
Date published: 2011-09-06
Rated 5 out of 5 by Zelda from Very Satisfied with Purchase I wanted candles that (a) could be used outside, (b) would not melt in the sun, (c) looked realistic, and (d) were safe. These candles more than met my espectations. The timers and remote control are nice features and work well.
Date published: 2011-09-06
Rated 5 out of 5 by Eileen from Candles COOL!
Date published: 2011-08-27
Rated 5 out of 5 by Nancefc from Great Items! Beautiful outdoor candles! The remote is great and makes it easy to turn them on and off. They look beautiful at night and are safe and smokeless!
Date published: 2011-08-19
Rated 5 out of 5 by Valday46 from The BEST solved my problems with candles melting from the sun or heat also gave out as gifts they all love them too, and ordered more
Date published: 2011-08-17
Rated 5 out of 5 by Timpannie from Outdoor candles Our candles were, are wonderful....they put out much more light than I thought they would, BUT when we ordered three times as many for son's wedding anniversary,....as we loaded the batteries....we noticed the remote didn't work. We sure hope it worked for them. We're waiting to hear.
Date published: 2011-08-16
Rated 5 out of 5 by Yoise from Beautiful Glow!! I love these candles!! They give a warm romantic glow. I purchased one set with a remote included and one single candle. With the touch of a button (remote), I can turn them all on from inside my home directing the remote toward them. I have one on a table outside under a terrace and two inside a floor lantern next to a saltwater pool. They look so real, you cannot tell they are flameless. I highly recommend them, beats melted wax from hot Florida weather. I'll keep buying these over and over if I have too. I've had them for 3 months now and still working.
Date published: 2011-08-09
Rated 5 out of 5 by Linda67 from Battery operated candles with remote We love the look of these candles. The fact that they are remote controlled is a nice touch. We've order extra sets for friends and family that's how popular they are.
Date published: 2011-08-08
Rated 5 out of 5 by Oaklen from Very nice candles I love these candles. I have a variety of solar candle but love the "glow" of these. Very real looking without the worry of flames.
Date published: 2011-08-06
Rated 5 out of 5 by SoCalGal from Great Purchase I purchased the set (2 candles and the remote) about a month ago, put them outside, and have not touched them since. I love the way they look and I really love that I can have that flickering candle glow on my patio every evening without having to light then extinguish real candles. I live in a high fire danger area so not having any kind of open flame is a real plus. Some people have commented on the white color but I think it looks fine. Mine are both in some sort of lantern/candle holder so during the daytime, the white contrasts nicely against the dark metal. At night, they glow an orange-yellow and flicker. I'm curious to see how long a set of battery lasts - I think even lasting a month is great considering they come on every night for 5 hours. I would definitely recommend these candles for those who like to entertain - one less thing to worry about to "set the mood" when you have guests over for the evening.
Date published: 2011-08-03
Rated 5 out of 5 by Rosannadana from Love them! At night they look great when they flicker!!!!!!
Date published: 2011-08-02
Rated 5 out of 5 by Vicky5150 from Great transaction Every aspect of the purchase was easy, from the online purchase to receiving the wonderful candles in less than a week. This was my first purchase with Frontgate and I look forward to many more.
Date published: 2011-07-21
Rated 5 out of 5 by TexasJim from They're......Great. Great style, Great price, Great service and Great Site.
Date published: 2011-07-20
Rated 5 out of 5 by DrTony from fabulous candles Beautiful candles that are safe, weather resistant, and with handy remote and timer. Perfect!
Date published: 2011-07-20
Rated 5 out of 5 by lindab from Flameless Outdoor Candles These are great. They claim they won't melt & they have not! They look beautiful sitting in my lanterns. I had purchased different flame-less candles from another retailer and they could not be outside in the heat. Would recommend that one purchase the remote if they are in lanterns or less readily accessible.
Date published: 2011-07-14
Rated 5 out of 5 by jenropaul from Flameless Candles Bought these for indoor candle holders and they are perfect. Also, ordered the remote and love it!
Date published: 2011-07-13
Rated 5 out of 5 by Anonymous from remote control candles are the best We really enjoy the candles. We'd but at least 10 more if you had smaller ones such as 2.5 inches by 3 inches.
Date published: 2011-07-13
Rated 5 out of 5 by MellowYellow from love these battery candles... we were very pleased with our candles. we have them on the patio and they re perfect by the pool. we live in a very hot climate and wax candles melt outdoors. these are just the thing.
Date published: 2011-07-13
Rated 5 out of 5 by Grammie3 from Stands up great outdoors These candles really are wonderful to use in large groups. One remote. Our grandkids love them!
Date published: 2011-07-12
Rated 5 out of 5 by leemh from Love it! Love the remote control candles!! I put them inside my morrocan lanterns on my deck and because the remote control has a "timer" option available ... each night the candles light the lanterns without having to touch a button! Awesome!
Date published: 2011-07-02
Rated 5 out of 5 by BonVivant from Ingenious These candles are absolutely fantastic. I have several different sizes in different outdoor lanterns and hurricanes. No more melted wax outdoors. Th e timers are an added plus.
Date published: 2011-07-02
Rated 5 out of 5 by ThomasM1126 from Worth every penny These candles are truley wonderful! We leave them outside all the time and they don't fill up with water when it rains. We were also happy to find ones made of plastic and not wax, it gets hot in the sun.
Date published: 2011-06-29
Will they melt under extreme sun/heat?
I live in the northeast and have not had a problem.
Date published: 2017-06-10
May I leave candles outside in rainy weather?
So, the mini holes on top of the candle will let water in. Will this moisture hurt my candle operation?
No it should not
Date published: 2017-06-10
I did not realize I had to have a remote control for these candles that I purchased and received today. Where do I get the remote control itself?
I got the remote from Frontgate, check online
Date published: 2017-06-09
Timer on the remote
I bought these candles (I LOVE them) and have lost the directions to the remote. I've tried using the timer buttons but the candles don't turn off automatically. What am I doing wrong? Thanks
the candle must be turned on with the button underneath the candle before the remote can be used to set the timer. Though I did have one candle after over 5 years that the timer stopped functioning
Date published: 2017-05-20
Do I need a remote for each candle?
I didn't buy any remotes because it said that the candles had timers (most of my electric candles have timers as an option on the switch). What I didn't realize is that the timer only works if you have the remote.
One remote will work with all of the outdoor candles
Date published: 2017-06-09
Product:44436-Battery-operated Flameless Outdoor Candles


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Built out ground floor space. Private offices, boardroom, kitchen. Can be divided down to 1,000 - 2,000 SF. Contiguous to 28,400 SF with 7,262 SF of basement space. Additional Rent excludes janitorial.
Located on North Queen St. & Atomic Ave. Well maintained and newly renovated building. Landlord may provide allowance to qualified tenants. Fibre Optic cabling into building.