text:
Russian Federation
Newly Independent States
Back Issues
Volume XII
No.1 (27 January 2006)
Volume XI
No.4 (08 December 2005)
No.3 (17 November 2005)
No.2 (03 November 2005)
No.1 (20 October 2005)
Volume X
No.9 (11 August 2005)
No.8 (26 July 2005)
No.7 (8 June 2005)
No.6 (25 April 2005)
No.5 (6 April 2005)
No.4 (25 March 2005)
No.3 (4 March 2005)
No.2 (11 February 2005)
No.1 (31 January 2005)
Volume IX
No.19 (9 December 2004)
No.18 (10 November 2004)
No.17 (28 October 2004)
No.16 (15 October 2004)
No.15 (29 September 2004)
No.14 (15 September 2004)
No.13 (18 August 2004)
No.12 (4 August 2004)
No.11 (15 July 2004)
No.10 (23 June 2004)
No.9 (12 June 2004)
No.8 (12 May 2004)
No.7 (28 April 2004)
No.6 (8 April 2004)
No.5 (26 March 2004)
No.4 (5 March 2004)
No.3 (19 February 2004)
No.2 (06 February 2004)
No.1 (23 January 2004)
Volume VIII
No.20 (11 December 2003)
No.19 (20 November 2003)
No.18 (7 November 2003)
No.17 (24 October 2003)
No.16 (10 October 2003)
No.15 (25 September 2003)
No.14 (12 September 2003)
No.13 (22 August 2003)
No.12 (10 August 2003)
No.11 (10 July 2003)
No.10 (18 June 2003)
No.9 (28 May 2003)
No.8 (7 May 2003)
No.7 (23 April 2003)
No.6 (9 April 2003)
No.5 (26 March 2003)
No.4 (5 March 2003)
No.3 (19 February 2003)
No.2 (5 February 2003)
No.1 (22 January 2003)
Volume VII
No. 20 ( 18 December
No. 19 ( 4 December
No. 18 (20 November
No. 17 (30 October 2002)
No. 16 (16 October 2002)
No. 15 (25 September
No. 14 (11 September
No. 13 (21 August 2002)
No. 12 (24 July 2002)
No. 11 (10 July 2002)
No. 10 (12 June 2002)
No. 9 (22 May 2002)
No. 8 (1 May 2002)
No. 7 (17 April 2002)
No. 6 (3 April 2002)
No. 5 (13 March 2002)
No. 4 (27 February 2002)
No. 3 (13 February 2002)
No. 2 (30 January 2002)
No. 1 (16 January 2002)
Volume VI
No. 20 (12 December
No. 19 (28 November
No. 18 (7 November 2001)
No. 17 (24 October 2001)
No. 16 (10 October 2001)
No. 15 (26 September
No. 14 (12 September
No. 13 (21 August 2001)
No. 12 (1 August 2001)
No. 11 (10 July 2001)
No. 10 (13 June 2001)
No. 9 (23 May 2001)
No. 8 (2 May 2001)
No. 7 (18 April 2001)
No. 6 (4 April 2001)
No. 5 (21 March 2001)
No. 4 (28 February 2001)
No. 3 (14 February 2001)
No. 2 (31 January 2001)
No. 1 (17 January 2001)
Volume V
No. 19 (13 December 2000)
No. 18 (29 November
No. 17 (11 November
No. 16 (25 October 2000)
No. 15 (11 October 2000)
No. 14 (27 September
No. 13 (13 September
No. 12 (23 August 2000)
No. 11 (2 August 2000)
No. 10 (12 July 2000)
No. 9 (21 June 2000)
No. 8 (16 May 2000)
No. 7 (24 April 2000)
No. 6 (4 April 2000)
No. 5 (21 March 2000)
No. 4 (29 February 2000)
No. 3 (15 February 2000)
No. 2 (1 February 2000)
No. 1 (18 January 2000)
Volume IV
No. 20 (20 December
No. 19 (6 December 1999)
No. 18 (15 November
No. 17 (1 November 1999)
No. 16 (18 October1999)
No. 15 (27 September
No. 14 (13 September
No. 13 (31 August 1999)
No. 12 (4 August 1999)
No. 11 (14 July 1999)
No. 10 (23 June 1999)
No. 9 (2 June 1999)
No. 8 (10 May 1999)
No. 7 (5 April 1999)
No. 6 (5 April 1999)
No. 5 (22 March 1999)
No. 4 (1 March 1999)
No. 3 (15 February 1999)
No. 2 (1 February 1999)
No. 1 (13 January 1999)
Volume III
No. 18 (9 December 1998)
No. 17 (16 November
No. 16 (4 November 1998)
No. 15 (21 October 1998)
No. 14 (7 October 1998)
No. 13 (16 September
No. 12 (2 September
No. 11 (3 August 1998)
No. 10 (16 July 1998)
No. 9 (18 June 1998)
No. 8 (28 May 1998)
No. 7 (7 May 1998)
No. 6 (23 April 1998)
No. 5 (26 March 1998)
No. 4 (5 March 1998)
No. 3 (19 February 1998)
No. 2 (5 February 1998)
No. 1 (22 January 1998)
Volume II
No. 22 (4 December 1997)
No. 21 (20 November 1997)
No. 20 (6 November 1997)
No. 19 (23 October 1997)
No. 18 (10 October 1997)
No. 17 (25 Sep 1997)
No. 16 (9 Sep 1997)
No. 15 (20 Aug 1997)
No. 14 (6 Aug 1997)
No. 13 (23 July 1997)
No. 12 (9 July 1997)
No. 11 (18 June 1997)
No. 10 (4 June 1997)
No. 9 (21 May 1997)
No. 8 (7 May 1997)
No. 7 (23 April 1997)
No. 6 (9 April 1997)
No. 5 (26 March 1997)
No. 4 (5 March 1997)
No. 3 (19 February 1997)
No. 2 (5 February 1997)
No. 1 (22 January 1997)
Volume I
No. 4 (18 December
No. 3 (4 December 1996)
No. 2 (20 November
No. 1 (6 November 1996)
Putin's victory
While the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has yet to release the final
figures, it is generally accepted that Vladimir Putin has won Russia's presidency
in the first round of voting, with nearly 53% of the vote. While some analysts
have raised questions of voting fraud (see, for example, Pavel Felgenhauer
on the results from Chechnya and Ingushetia in THE MOSCOW TIMES, 30 Mar
00), the sense of inevitability that has surrounded Putin's presidential
quest since Yel'tsin's resignation has served to mute the criticism.
Putin, who, with the possible exception of his jet fighter flight into Chechnya,
waged a remarkably low-key campaign, was similarly modest in his post-election
comments. He urged people not to expect "miracles" from his presidency
and, with a nod to the Communist voters, he promised to consult with the
Duma on important issues. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 27 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
He further suggested that members of different parties could join his new
government, as long as they shared his views. He later clarified these remarks
and distanced himself from the idea of forming a coalition government.
A month's wait
Putin's inauguration, which constitutionally must be held within 30 days
of the CEC's publication of the final election results, is set for early
May, at which time Putin plans to unveil his new government and administration.
With the election finally secured, speculation over Putin's next moves is
running rampant through the media. Putin himself has highlighted economic
policy, urging the speedy completion of his policy team's draft economic
program and pinpointing tax reform and collection as central issues.
While the composition of the government will not change until after the
inauguration, Putin held a "cabinet session" with a few select
ministers and advisers on 30 March. Included in the meeting were First Deputy
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, Deputy Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin,
Government Apparat Chief Dmitri Kozak, and State Property Committee Deputy
Minister German Gref. While the full government held its regular meeting
the same day, the above group is now considered the new cabinet. (KOMMERSANT
DAILY, 31 Mar 00; Russian Press Digest, via lexis-nexis)
Putin has also selected a working group to "co-ordinate the law-making
activities of the Administration and the Government." (SEGODNYA, 31
Mar 00; Russian Press Digest, via lexis-nexis) This group includes Kremlin
Chief of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin, as well as Kasyanov, Kudrin and Gref.
The results of their work may prove quite revealing of the nature of Putin's
presidency. Their work is twofold: They are both to sort out relations among
the three branches of government and to delineate tasks between the Kremlin
and the government. Given the current composition of the Duma, it is likely
that this team's specific goal will be to set up consultative and coordinative
lines of communication in order to eliminate needless conflicts.
Cleaning up the overlap and dualities between the Kremlin and government
apparats may be the more daunting task. After years of working with an only
sporadically engaged president, the Kremlin has, at times, become bloated
due to attempts to control directly as many aspects of policy as possible.
At other times, stronger hands in the government have asserted authority
without Kremlin consultation. Putin's declared desire to create a "strong
state" suggests that he will move to strengthen Kremlin oversight of
government functions. If he chooses to take a page from Chubais' playbook,
that would indicate streamlining the Kremlin apparat with preference in
staffing to loyalists and trusted friends. The same would be necessary in
the government apparatus. Putin will enjoy an advantage in this which Chubais,
in 1996, could not employ, in that Putin selects the prime minister. He
will need to choose someone who will not interfere when Putin staffs the
government's apparat with his own men. With tight control of the administrative
end of both the Kremlin and government work, Putin is more likely to be
able to prevent the issuance of "sweetheart deal" decrees to oligarchs
and perhaps curb some of the rampant corruption. If that is really his plan.
On favorites
While it is clear through some of his choices thus far that Putin has named
a few close advisers already, it is yet unclear how close they will be to
him next month. In the case of German Gref, for example, he appears to have
become part of Putin's inner circle. As head of the Strategic Research Center,
he claims to be composing a program for Russia's long-term development for
the president. He has certainly become very high-profile lately. There are,
however, other policy groups formulating programs for the president, and
there is no guarantee that Putin will follow anyone's proposal. Gref himself
has said of his work at the center, "we have a patron (Putin) and we
are just trying to figure out what this patron wants." (THE MOSCOW
TIMES, 2 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
Gref also seems to leave a less than stellar impression on observers. After
attending a conference presentation given by Gref, Pavel Felgenhauer described
his remarks as "irrationally unspecific." (Of course, there are
times the same could be said of the new president.) Boris Berezovsky, when
prompted by an interviewer to comment on Gref, described him as a "weak
person," who "doesn't understand basic issues." (THE MOSCOW
TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
Berezovsky's interview managed to muddy the waters on presidential favorites
by, among other things, suggesting that Putin's remarks about fighting the
oligarchs were just a typical politician choosing the right words "for
the voters." While on the one hand dismissing the separation of the
oligarchs from power as something that "will never happen," Berezovsky
did hint darkly that Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-MOST group may be headed
for trouble. MOST group's media holdings include part of NTV, which has
been operating comparatively freer from state control than Russia's other
outlets (and that's faint praise). It has also been supportive of Moscow
Mayor Luzhkov and Former Prime Minister Primakov, a stance Berezovsky clearly
deemed foolish. Not that MOST would cease to exist after the election, "but
there will be some redistribution of property, they have debts, some big
ones..." (Ellipses in original.) (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
Is Yavlinsky covered?
Both the Federal Security Services and the Ministry for Internal Affairs
claimed oversight of electoral coverage in order to crack down on dirty
campaign tricks. In the days leading up to the election, ORT TV ran reports
claiming Yavlinsky's campaign was funded by foreign money, that some of
his supporters (specifically Gusinsky) were Israeli citizens, and ran a
seemingly staged press conference of a gay rights group declaring its support
for Yavlinsky. Shame on Berezovsky's ORT for running the reports and shame
on any citizens who may have been swayed by them. Do these tactics, or any
of the other media attacks on Yavlinsky, rise to the level of dirty tricks?
Is the FSB or the MVD investigating?
by Susan J. Cavan
Welcome to the club
Why should the Russians take democracy seriously when no Western leader
does? In their rush to congratulate Vladimir Putin on winning the Russian
elections, presidents and prime ministers decided not to wait for an assessment
of the polls' fairness, despite the narrowness of the margin and credible
warnings of voter fraud. (INTERFAX, 1317 GMT, 24 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0324,
via World News Connection) Apparently all believed, for example, that Putin's
large majority in Chechnya reflected the true sentiments of the population
he had bombed. Luckily their consciences were untroubled by international
observers, who once again cheerfully attested to the Russians' ability to
open polling stations and count slips of paper. Yes, the OSCE admitted,
there had been some bias in major media outlets before the poll, but it
had not affected the outcome. (INTERFAX, 1115 GMT, 27 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0327,
via World News Connection) Not even by three percent -- the margin of Putin's
American officials greeted Putin's victory with a familiar "wait-and-see"
tone, implying either that seven months of brutality in Chechnya was not
much to see, or that it was not the kind of thing that concerned them. European
leaders added their dear hope that the man who launched the Chechen war
would somehow be the best person to end it, but had apparently used up their
annual allotment of outrage just after the Austrian vote. "Where,"
asked one French commentator, "is the Europe that mobilized against
Milosevic and Haider in the name of human rights? Can it, should it continue
to cajole and finance a Russia that turns its back on it more each day?"
(LE MONDE, 19 Mar 00; FBIS-WEU-2000-0321, via World News Connection)
Consolidating society: strength through peace
On 24 March, shortly before his election, Putin led his cabinet to sign
off on a new foreign policy doctrine that seemed to be the work of a man
for whom one might well overlook some electoral niceties. The new foreign
policy would be marked by its "realism," Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov said. "Our policy is based on succession, predictability and
mutually beneficial pragmatism. Russia will remain an important stabilizing
factor of international relations." (ITAR-TASS, 28 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
The few details that emerged hinted at a document formed in the image of
Putin's life experience. Discipline matters: Foreign policy will be led
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with less freelancing from the military
and trade delegations. Economics matter: Russian foreign policy will promote
Russia's economic interests vigorously against barriers such as Western
anti-dumping laws and restrictions such as political demands attached to
Western loans. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via World
News Connection)
Most importantly -- Russia matters. The doctrine appears finally to put
to rest the common notion that Putin has two contradictory natures, the
democrat of the St. Petersburg reforms and the tough nationalist of loyal
KGB service. Putin seems to want Russia's embassies, intelligence agencies,
defense attaches -- even its cultural ministries -- to help consolidate
domestic life around re-invigorating the country so that it can stand taller
in the world.
To introduce the rigors of competition to the market at home, Putin the
Saint Petersburg reformer will promote Russia's integration in the international
economy. To gain new prosperity and strength for Russia, Putin the former
spy and apparatchik will put every state agency to work. Speaking with reporters
after the 24 March meeting, Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov said
that the "views and interests" of the Russian power departments,
including the Foreign Intelligence Service, "found reflection"
in the new doctrine. Participants at the meeting, he said, believed the
doctrine "must take into account not only the national security interests
but also Russia's national interests, including in the economic field."
(ITAR-TASS, 24 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
Call it "velvet mobilization." Putin appears to be putting Russia
on a war footing without threatening any war. Such a Russia, however, will
confound the determinists who imagine that economic "reform" leads
straight to good behavior abroad. Even before the new self-strengthening
campaign was underway, Putin promised that "Russia will be more attentively,
judiciously and insistently standing up for the interests of its citizens
-- both those who reside in Russia and those who have opted to settle down
in the CIS countries, the Baltic States or the distant abroad." (BALTIC
NEWS SERVICE, 24 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Putin's vision may be "realistic"
and peaceful for now, but the Russian state he imagines is a powerful force
for defending the interests of an ethnic nation scattered far afield and
supposedly downtrodden -- not, history suggests, a recipe for perpetual
Speaking with one voice
The complexities of Kosovo show why Russia feels the need to consolidate
its international affairs back under the foreign ministry's control. Several
elements of Russian political life, such as the Duma's committee on foreign
affairs and the international department of the military -- lean to extreme
support for Yugoslavia and deep paranoia about NATO's intentions. In greeting
the first anniversary of NATO's campaign in Kosovo, the foreign ministry
showed a far more subtle touch -- one more likely to promote Russia's standing
as the Kosovo operation collapses.
Perhaps in recognition of his abilities, Ivanov appears to have been given
complete authority over all relations dealing with Kosovo -- even military
relations with NATO. Ivanov chaired a committee preparing the resumption
of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (ITAR-TASS, 1209 GMT, 17 Mar
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0317, via World News Connection) on March 17, and seems
to be in complete control of all decisions governing Russian involvement
with the alliance's peacekeeping forces. Russia, Ivanov has said, will be
closely involved in deterring a new outbreak of violence between the Yugoslav
military and the NATO alliance, and would not, despite rumors, withdraw
its 3,600 troops from KFOR. Ivanov refused, however, to commit Russian police
forces to UN patrols.
More in sorrow than in anger, Ivanov has used the obvious failures of the
Kosovo mission to diminish the West's authority, regardless of its military
prowess, in handling matters of ethnic conflict. Kosovo has proven the perfect
foil to Western complaints about Chechnya. This may explain why, despite
a constant drumbeat of criticism from international organizations such as
the UNHCR and the European Union, Russia has been spared the wrath of elected
officials, such as Britain's Tony Blair and America's Bill Clinton, who
are publicly identified with the Kosovo operation.
But watching quietly as the West fails in Kosovo also promotes Russia's
long-term goals. For a Russia newly committed to the fate of its compatriots
aboard, Kosovo is providing a cautionary tale of the sorrows of intervention
in another country's interethnic affairs. It is a tale Ivanov is more than
pleased to tell.
by Chandler Rosenberger
* * * * *
'New realism' in Russian foreign policy, but no real policy change
The Russian Security Council may have approved the draft of a new foreign
policy doctrine on 24 March, but there is little to suggest that major foreign
policy change is in the works. According to Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov, the "newness to Russia's foreign political concept is, primarily,
its realism." (ITAR-TASS, 28 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Despite Ivanov's
vague terms, apparently there is at least one area that might receive greater
emphasis in the new doctrine: promotion of Russian economic interests abroad.
In fact, Ivanov himself hinted that the foreign ministry in particular should
play a larger role in promoting Russia's economic interests. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE,
27 Mar 00)
Russia's foreign policy vagueness has prompted some uneasiness in Asian
countries, which have been carefully observing Russia's foreign policy direction
under President-elect Vladimir Putin. Despite reassurances by top Russian
officials, Japanese newspapers elicited a chorus of requests for the Russian
president to clarify his foreign policy. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 27 Mar 00;
via lexis-nexis) For Japan, which has been trying to arrange another Russo-Japanese
summit since Yel'tsin canceled last Fall's meeting, a change in Russia's
foreign policy on certain key issues like the peace treaty could be of domestic
political advantage. Thus far, however, Putin appears only willing to rely
on Japan for economic advice and assistance. The economic realm is the one
area in which Putin has kept up relations with Japan since his appointment,
sending various Russian economic officials to Tokyo. So far, this seems
to have worked; concurrent with last week's visit by Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Emissary to the G-7 Alexander Livshits, the
Japanese government released another $100 million tranche of its $1.6 billion
loan. As long as much-coveted economic cooperation is not hindered, Putin
will continue to show no interest in changing Russia's stance on the issues
that the Japanese would really like to see resolved, such as the Kurile
Islands. Indeed, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, although
Russia is conducting ongoing negotiations on the peace treaty issue, "Moscow
won't relinquish its principle of territorial integrity in drafting [it]."
(INTERFAX, 1036 GMT, 23 Mar 00; FBIS-EAS-2000-0323, via World News Connection)
Hence, Russia will take all it can get without giving up its strategic interests
in the region.
Beyond Japan, with which relations have been strained for some time, Russia
even has issued reassurances to China, with which it has been vigorously
increasing political and economic ties. However, this time Defense Minister
Sergeev did the reassuring, telling his Chinese counterpart Chi Haotian
that there would be no major changes in Moscow's relations with China. (AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, 30 Mar 00; via RussiaToday.com) For China, the possibility
of a Russian rapprochement with the West that would eclipse the growing
Russo-Chinese "strategic cooperative partnership" is the main
concern. But, Russia's new emphasis on expanding economic interests suggests
that even if Putin builds a more cordial relationship with the West, China
will still be an important avenue for economic expansion.
by Sarah K. Miller
A tale of two oligarchs: the one with power (for now)...
In Russian politics, two weeks is an eternity. Prior to the presidential
election, Putin stated that one of his first initiatives in office would
be to start limiting the political influence of the oligarchs. The press
ministry's 29 February announcement that the broadcast license of Boris
Berezovsky's ORT network would not be renewed and would be put up for tender
in May seemed ominous. So did an implied reference to Berezovsky by Rossiyskaya
gazeta in a 2 March article on "black" propaganda as practiced
in both the election and the Russian corporate world. (See THE NIS OBSERVED,
21 Mar 00)
But Berezovsky did not seem the least perturbed by this posturing. On 25
March, editors from Vedomosti, the Russian-language sister paper of the
Moscow Times, printed an exclusive interview with the oligarch. When he
was asked if he believed that Putin would try to force him and the other
oligarchs from power, Berezovsky answered that Putin was being "very
pragmatic, just like a regular politician." He went on to intimate
that, although Putin had said that the oligarchs' influence should be reduced,
the whole claim was merely "campaign promises." "This is
normal, it's absolutely right," noted Berezovsky. "Only, it will
never happen. But his words are right. For the voters." (MOSCOW TIMES,
25 Mar 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com)
Berezovsky seems convinced that Putin's threat against the oligarchs is
all bluster. Why? There are a few possibilities. One is that, just prior
to the election, it became clear that Putin would not win as clear a mandate
from the people of Russia as he might have hoped. The fact that he only
won a little more than 52% of the vote, as well as the strong showing by
Gennady Zyuganov, demonstrates that he has not yet consolidated power, and
that he lacks the political strength to excise the "cancerous"
Another is that Putin may have no intention of fully attacking the oligarchs,
or at least not all of them. Putin's claim to fame is the popular Chechen
adventure, but as that conflict descends into guerrilla warfare and Russian
casualties rise, to stay in power he may need the backing of Berezovsky
and the other "first-tier" oligarchs. In this situation, Putin
would be allowed to make it appear that he was fighting the oligarchs little
by little. He would probably take small actions, such as placing ORT's license
up for tender, for his own public relations image. But, he might not mobilize
directly against them. No doubt, one of Berezovsky's many holdings could
buy back the ORT license, and he would thus take no damage. It would be
a symbolic, yet fake, war on the oligarchs.
The most likely possibility is a synthesis of the other two. Putin is a
man who seems to consider himself loyal to only a handful of persons. The
recently deceased former mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, was one
of them. Sobchak had been one of Putin's professors at Leningrad State University,
and later brought Putin into politics when, as chairman of the city council,
he hired the former KGB officer as an aide. Sobchak lost his 1996 re-election
attempt amidst a series of corruption investigations, but shortly after
Putin became prime minister in 1999, all charges against his mentor were
dropped. (MOSCOW TIMES, 21 Feb 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) By his own
admission, Berezovsky lacks that kind of personal relationship with Putin.
Putin's intelligence background also suggests that he knows a thing or two
about covert warfare, political or otherwise. Comments made by Berezovsky
in the interview as to how Putin made a name for himself in early 1999 in
the Yel'tsin administration suggest these skills. "At that time there
was a real conflict between him and Primakov, who had convinced Yel'tsin
to fire Putin from his FSB post. Back then, the presidential administration
simply saw him as someone who wouldn't go anywhere, but would just hold
on tight to his own position," stated Berezovsky. (MOSCOW TIMES, 25
Mar 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com) Needless to say, Putin was never fired,
but Primakov lost his job only months later. What is remarkable is how long
the two apparently have been feuding, and the extremely rapid rise of Putin
contrasted with the equally rapid fall of Primakov.
What seems likely, then, is that Putin will make every effort to consolidate
power while stringing along the oligarchs. He will make them think that
he needs them, and will take the "token actions" against them
that they expect. He will be patient. But the moment that he sees an opening
and feels that he has the power, Berezovsky and those like him will be put
under a crippling attack. "Some particularly well-known oligarchs will
have to be dealt with in a special way," said unnamed Kremlin sources
to Interfax on 28 March. (INTERFAX, 1535 GMT, 28 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0328,
via World News Connection) Is that a former FSB director's "special
way"? Sounds intriguing.
Putin seems to know how to play the "sleeping dog" well, if Berezovsky's
comments are any indication. How long we will have to wait to see if this
is true is another story entirely, but the political seasons in Moscow change
a lot more often than the weather.
...And the one on the verge of losing it
What is certain is that Putin will be able to claim that he excised one
oligarch in the near future. Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-MOST empire is under
assault from virtually all directions. In his interview, Berezovsky grimly
predicted that after Putin is elected, "MOST will be around. But there
will be some redistribution of its property, they have debts, some big ones..."
(MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Mar 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com)
NTV is MOST's flagship holding. MOST has also invested in Novaya gazeta
in the past, and MOST Bank handles Obshchaya gazeta's accounts. (RFE/RL:
RUSSIAN MEDIA EMPIRES V REPORT; via http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia5/most.html)
These three outlets have been among the most critical in recent times of
the Putin administration and the Chechen war. On top of that, Novaya gazeta
has been investigating, among other things, the Ryazan "terrorist bomb
drill," Putin's possible ties to corruption, and the sources of Yel'tsin's
1996 and Putin's 2000 campaign funds.
Little wonder then that that the FSB allegedly tried to coerce an NTV personality
to act as a mole within the network. Or that Novaya gazeta's internal computer
server was hacked on 15 March and two issues' layouts were destroyed. (See
THE NIS OBSERVED, 21 Mar 00) In addition to the computer hack, according
to Novaya gazeta's deputy editor Yuri Shchekochikhin, the paper's offices
had been burglarized and a computer with the list of advertisers had been
stolen the previous week. He claimed that, since then, a number of advertisers
had voided their contracts with the paper. This was in addition to the four
tax audits conducted on the paper in the last two years alone. (FINANCIAL
TIMES, World News-Europe, 17 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
NTV has had rough times this year in its own right. The natural gas monopoly
Gazprom had owned roughly 30% of NTV's stock since 1996, and in late 1999
announced that it was attempting to buy up another 13% or so of NTV's shares.
Yet, until recently, the giant remained quiet with regards to its views
on NTV's editorial policies. On 15 February, however, Gazprom chairman Rem
Vyakhirev stung NTV with a sharp rebuke for its coverage of Chechnya. "As
the head of Gazprom and as a citizen," he said, "I do not consider
the position of NTV leadership on the Chechnya problem entirely correct."
He went on to suggest that highlighting "negative aspects" of
the government's war against the "bandits" was "simply inappropriate."
These "negative aspects" include reports on federal troop and
civilian casualties, as well as the refugee crisis. They gave Gazprom pause
to review its media investments within the framework of the company's interests,
"which obviously cannot contradict the interests of the state,"
said Vyakhirev. (MOSCOW TIMES, 15 Feb 00; via www.themoscowtimes.com)
The pressure this implicitly placed on NTV to "get with the Kremlin's
program or else" should not be underestimated. Consider how last Fall,
as NTV gave air to opponents of the Unity bloc in the Duma elections, the
state-run Vneshekonombank called in the $42.2 million NTV owed. Then, on
17 February of this year, the Supreme Arbitration Court decided to uphold
the antimonopoly ministry's intention to force NTV to pay dues retroactively
for the use of state broadcasting assets. Yel'tsin had decreed in 1998 that
the network was vital to democracy in Russia, and thus it should have the
same broadcast facility-use discounts as state-run ORT and RTR. But in the
spring of 1999, the ministry charged that NTV had been paying those rates
since 1996 in violation of "fair competition laws." With the court
decision, NTV could be forced to pay millions in back dues, and at any time
Putin can revoke the Yel'tsin decree, which currently saves NTV $13 million
annually. (MOSCOW TIMES, 19 Feb 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) Gusinsky could
not afford to keep NTV running much longer should Gazprom threaten to sell
off its shares, the retroactive debt be called in, and the special decree
be revoked.
Recently, ORT opened up a full barrage against NTV and Gusinsky just before
the presidential election to boot. Gusinsky and NTV backed YABLOKO candidate
Grigory Yavlinsky in the campaign. So, in addition to its "relentlessly
positive" coverage of Putin, on the evening of 23 March ORT painted
Yavlinsky as "the candidate of gays and foreigners," while it
played upon lingering anti-Semitic attitudes in society by calling "NTV
as a channel dangerous in that it was run by a Jew, Gusinsky." (MOSCOW
TIMES, 30 Mar 00; www.themoscowtimes.ru) Its reports suggested that Gusinsky
was directly bankrolling Yavlinsky, as were other prominent Russian and
Israeli Jewish businessmen. Shots of Gusinsky at a banquet with Hasidic
Jews were shown. (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 25 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
It is clear that Gusinsky and MOST are in the Kremlin's crosshairs, and
they know it. Rather than openly contesting these turns of events, NTV's
general director and co-owner, Yevgeny Kiselev, cited Putin's backing of
free speech on the Itogi news program on 12 February, and begged him to
treat state and private networks equally. (MOSCOW TIMES, 19 Feb 00; via
www.moscowtimes.ru) Putin has the upper hand with regards to Gusinsky and
MOST, and NTV continues to broadcast at the president-elect's pleasure.
It is unlikely that MOST will change its coverage to pacify the Kremlin.
So, when Putin has had enough, the other shoe will drop and that will be
it for Gusinsky. His holdings will be divided up, but he will likely be
allowed to leave the country should he so desire. It is only a matter of
The Chechens get TV!
And lastly, on a lighter note, Putin's spokesman on Chechnya, Sergei Yastrzhembsky,
was proud to announce on 22 March that persons in the region's mountainous
areas can now receive RTR, thanks to a new transmitter in Gudermes. (ITAR-TASS,
1706 GMT, 22 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0322, via World News Connection ) Don't
you wonder how lucky they must feel?
by Jonathan Solomon
Putin discusses independence of the country's courts
In a meeting with Vyacheslav Lebedev, chairman of the Supreme Court of the
Federation, Putin said that the court system should be financed exclusively
from federal sources. He voiced concern that the independence of the nation's
courts could possibly be compromised if judges, clerks and administrative
staff had to rely on regions and municipalities for their livelihoods. (ITAR-TASS,
1310 GMT, 16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via World News Connection)
Putin is correct in his concern over the independence of the Russian court
system, but the problem lies closer to home. The threat to judicial independence
comes from the executive branch's routine flouting of court rulings, manipulation
of judicial appointments, and other machinations which leave the legitimacy
of the whole constitutional arrangement open to question. Of course judges
need to be paid, but so do soldiers, teachers, and other public servants.
The re-centralization of authority and control is no panacea, even in the
face of perceived chaos and the expansion of regional power. Putin forgets
why the regions were forced almost overnight to pick up the tab for the
federal employees stationed on their respective territories -- Moscow ceased
to do so. A better approach to ensuring judicial independence is vigorous
enforcement of the country's laws, something the federal prosecutor's office
has been prevented from doing since the day it launched an investigation
into possible kickback arrangements between the Yel'tsin "Family"
and a Swiss construction firm a year ago. Until the law is respected, it
does not matter much who writes the checks for the judges' salaries.
Vladivostok Duma by-election invalidated
Vladivostok electoral politics is probably the most rough-and-tumble in
the federation today. It was not until December 1999 that the city finally
passed a charter thereby bringing it into accordance with every other city
in the country. But the struggle continues. The regional election commission
has recently invalidated the apparent electoral victory of former Vladivostok
Mayor Viktor Cherepkov, who received a plurality of the vote with 27 percent.
The reason for the commission's decision is its claim that the Primory district
court had ruled two days before the 26 March elections that the registration
of another candidate, Orysya Bondarenko, had been improperly revoked. This,
so argued the commission, invalidated the electoral results and Cherepkov's
victory. The relevant documents have been submitted to the Central Election
Commission in Moscow for a final decision; whatever the outcome, no doubt
there will be an appeal. (ITAR-TASS, 0635 GMT, 30 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0330,
via World News Connection)
Putin speaks to Union of Russian Cities
At the 21 March meeting in Novosibirsk, Putin spoke to the Union of Russian
Cities of the need to coordinate the actions of municipal authorities to
benefit the entire population. He also spoke disapprovingly of the municipal
authorities' tendency to ignore or pass local laws contrary to federal law.
Most tellingly, however, was Putin's oblique reference to the often strained
relations between the regions' governors and mayors. Putin seemed to suggest
a federal/municipal alliance to limit the power of the governors. (ROSSIYSKAYA
GAZETA, 21 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0324, via World News Connection)
This speech was given only a week before the presidential elections, so
it is hard to know how much of the speech was about policy and how much
about election season promises. The answer will come in the actions of the
new Putin administration.
by Michael DeMar Thurman
Russian information warfare, Soviet style
Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin called for an increased emphasis
on information science in the military-industrial sector on 21 March at
an all-Russia conference of defense and agrarian workers. Putin stated Russia
has been lagging behind other countries in this field since the Cold War,
and that lagging behind in the information field might result in backwardness
in "everything else." (ITAR-TASS, 1242 GMT, 21 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0321,
via World News Connection) Putin's concerns are justified since the information
age will have a profound impact in economics, politics, society, and particularly
military affairs.
Russia's latest national security concept, published 14 January, lists Russian
information resources as a national interest. Specifics include the development
of modern telecommunications, protection of the state's information resources
from unsanctioned access, and the problems of Russia's weakened potential
in this field and dependence upon foreign technology, which undermine Russia's
ability to defend itself. In addition to worries about NATO expansion, the
document notes, Russia is also very concerned about the desire of a number
of countries to dominate the global information sphere and expel Russia
from the external and internal information market. (NEZAVISIMOYE VOENNOYE
OBOZRENIYE, 14 Jan 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Russia's draft military
doctrine also addresses information warfare, listing it as an external and
internal threat to the government, economy, and military. The document even
acknowledges that information warfare will constitute a basic general feature
of modern war. Specific Russian applications of information warfare are
"information preparation (information blockade, expansion, aggression)
and the confusion of public opinion of certain states and of the world community
as a whole." (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Oct 99; via lexis-nexis)
Military analysts at the US Foreign Military Studies Office have researched
Russian views on information-based warfare extensively. For Russia, information
warfare is conducted in peacetime and wartime. This is a significant departure
from the US view which currently confines information warfare to periods
of crisis or conflict. One reason for this departure is the fact that the
Russian state, economy, and society are in transition resulting from institutional
and philosophical instability; therefore, Russian citizens are vulnerable
to unscrupulous promises of economic and social prosperity. Traditional
Russian military thinking has also developed differently from the West due
to geographical considerations, varied military threats, and an emphasis
placed on the study of military affairs as a science. In wartime, information
warfare refers to the attainment of superiority in the use of information
protection and suppression systems, to include command and control, electronic
warfare, and reconnaissance. (CALL PUBLICATION No. 98-21; Foreign Military
Studies Office)
The Soviet Union was very adept at peacetime information warfare, specifically
the practice of information manipulation and perception management. This
practice rose in prominence during the war in Chechnya, where Russia imposed
strict news media controls on their "anti-terrorist operation."
(NIS OBSERVED, 29 Feb and 21 Mar 00) Journalists arriving in the Northern
Caucasus had to seek accreditation from the press center of the armed forces,
technically an illegal requirement since neither a state of war nor emergency
had been declared. The military was given the right to brand journalists
as either "desirable" or "undesirable," depending on
if their work supported the government's official position. Government-controlled
television and radio stations graphically highlighted alleged Chechen atrocities,
repeated the military's understated casualty rates, and squashed efforts
by independent news media to provide objective coverage. The refugees' plight
and destruction of "liberated" Grozny due to Russia's scorched
earth tactics were relegated to the back pages. (PERSPECTIVE, March-April
2000) As a result, Russian public support for the war remained solid. Military
personnel fighting the Chechens believed they were patriots, and any Russian
who protested the operation was considered a traitor. Although Russia waged
a successful information operations campaign on the homefront, information
warfare on the battlefield was less successful.
Russia's backwardness in intelligence gathering and dissemination contributed
to the Russian army's inability to counter the Chechen's hit-and-run tactics.
Early in the war, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, who has responsibility for
Russia's satellites, boasted the satellite fleet was operating in the interest
of the federal troops. Independent analysts disputed this claim, stating
the troops could not make use of the one optical intelligence satellite
which was believed to fly over Chechnya once per day. Although the data
were useful in identifying Chechen vehicles, the data was out of date when
it arrived in the troops hands. Federal troops did not have the capability
to download satellite data instantly, therefore, the mobile Chechen targets
had plenty of time to move to a new location. The military only used the
data to destroy fixed targets such as bridges and buildings, alienating
the local population which Russian forces were sent to "liberate."
(DEFENSE NEWS, 13 Dec 99) In this aspect of information warfare -- the ability
to move data rapidly from sensor to shooter within an agile enemy's decision
cycle -- the Russian military was deficient.
Despite their present deficiencies in the information sphere, Russian thinkers
and strategists have devoted considerable energy to information warfare,
and it is apparent they clearly understand its utility in conflict. The
problem is, can Russia's generals reorganize their armed forces to take
full advantage of the information age and counter future adversaries employing
guerrilla tactics? Despite two bloody battles for Grozny, Russian generals
are still wed to a clumsy command structure leading large troop and armored
formations into battle. These battles include massive air and artillery
bombardments using battle plans approved by superiors well in advance. This
doctrine prevents the Russian army from seizing the initiative and more
efficiently attacking the Chechens at their weakest moments. A smaller,
better trained, more professional army is required to counter guerrilla
warfare. (PERSPECTIVE, March-April 00) Russian generals still dream of major
conflicts between nation-states (such as World War II and Desert Storm)
which are becoming less common. In the near future, Russia's more probable
scenarios will involve stopping ethnic conflict in border regions where
adversaries are likely to employ guerrilla tactics.
The onset of the information age marginalizes the utility of large conscript
armies and formations of tanks, aircraft, and ships. Capabilities of individual
platforms are becoming less relevant. It is increasingly more important
to "network" military platforms together and increase the forces'
combat power, enabling them to strike an adversary quickly at his weakest
point versus battling toe to toe. In the near future, Russia may watch the
West's trial and error with first generation information age technology.
Forced by necessity, a gradual change in culture and organization of the
Russian military may enable Moscow to seize other advantages of information
warfare in the future.
by LCDR James Duke
Sergeev is retained ... at least for the time being
Despite much speculation over the "almost certain" replacement
of Defense Minister Marshal Igor D. Sergeev, President-elect Vladimir Putin
has once again shown his elusive personality and announced his intention
to keep Sergeev in his current position. Following on the heels of the presidential
election, Putin announced on 28 March that he was extending Sergeev's term
as defense minister for another year. (INTERFAX, 1201 GMT, 28 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0328,
via World News Connection) This latest term is Sergeev's third as defense
minister. He was appointed in 1997 and served two previous one-year terms
under former President Boris Yel'tsin. Sergeev will be 62 on 20 April.
The Sergeev announcement was Putin's first major personnel declaration following
presidential elections, and came as something of a surprise. Many in and
outside Russia believed that Putin would move quickly to replace Sergeev.
The two most likely candidates for the defense minister position had been
the present chairman of the Duma's defense committee, General Andrei Nikolaev,
and the current chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin. (THE
NIS OBSERVED, 15 Feb 00) Sergeev has been seen as a passive defense chief
at a time when the need for aggressive leadership is clear both in terms
of much-needed military reform and the present war in Chechnya.
Issues of military reform and the success of Russian forces in Chechnya
are high-profile issues for Putin. Much of his success to date has been
tied to the "success" of military operations in Chechnya and his
open courting of the armed forces. This courting in turn hinges heavily
on his ability to move forward on long-standing cries for extensive Russian
military reforms. For these reasons, Putin's justification for keeping Sergeev
on the payroll is not clear. It became even murkier with the 28 March announcement
by Putin's press secretary, Aleksei Gromov, that Putin actually made his
decision "some time ago" to extend Sergeev's term as defense minister.
(INTERFAX, 1201 GMT, 28 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0328, via World News Connection)
-- apparently while rumors of Sergeev's replacement were at their height.
So why did Putin keep Sergeev on? One guess is that Putin's decision is
a calculated move to give the Russian public the impression that he is satisfied
with the present operations in Chechnya, that everything is going according
to plan. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 Mar 00) This may persuade the general public.
Putin's announcement also rewards Marshal Sergeev for his solid support
and maintains the defense status quo, throwing water on any potential power
plays and instability within the defense ministry based on anticipated leadership
changes. Keeping the armed forces pacified is critical to Putin as he places
more of his focus on resurrecting the Russian economy and other domestic
If this is, in fact, Putin's game plan, then he is playing a very volatile
game that could very easily blow up in his face. It is clear from media
coverage that the war in Chechnya is bogged down. There is no clear ending
to the conflict, no "glorious Russian victory" any time in the
near future. There are only back-and-forth reports of Russian advances,
followed by reports of Russian withdrawals and setbacks. Add to these items
growing Russian casualties and the overall impact eventually will be to
crack what has been overwhelming Russian public support for Putin, especially
in the absence of any positive actions on the economic front.
Very few analysts believe Sergeev will serve his full term. More likely,
Putin's retention of Sergeev is a prevarication: pacifying the public and
the military while putting difficult and costly reform issues on the back
burner. This, coupled with regular pronouncements of support for the military
and hints at change, will keep the military on the hook. It also holds Sergeev
in place as a possible scapegoat for future failures regarding military
reform and Chechnya while Putin, playing to the larger public audience,
tackles more pressing plans for the economy and other domestic issues.
In the meantime ... the military votes
Not surprisingly, the military voted heavily in the recent presidential
elections. Ninety-seven percent of Russia's 1.2 million troops went to the
ballot boxes, or in the case of Chechnya, the ballot box went to them.
- 83% of servicemen in Kamchatka voted
- 78% of servicemen in Sakhalin voted
- 84% of servicemen in the Kuriles voted
- 91% of servicemen in the Pacific Fleet voted
- 98% of servicemen in Chechnya voted
According to Major General Nikolai Burbyga, director of the defense ministry's
education department, voting was overwhelming for Vladimir Putin... no real
- 81% of servicemen deployed to Chechnya voted for Putin
- 80% of servicemen outside of Russia voted for Putin
-- 87.3% of peacekeepers assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina voted for Putin
-- 86% of sailors assigned to the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol voted for
The remaining small percentage of military votes was divided between other
presidential candidates: Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Gennady
(INTERFAX, 1000 GMT, 27 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0327, ITAR-TASS, 0929 GMT,
26 Mar 00, and INTERFAX, 1843 GMT, 26 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0326, via World
News Connection)
In Chechnya, polling stations and mobile ballot boxes were established at
sites of deployed military units. According to Lt Gen Vladimir Kozhemyakin,
"The ballot boxes (were) brought directly to areas of military missions,
such as block posts, guard units, and other places where military personnel
cannot go to polling stations. Further, in cases where ballot boxes could
not be transported by air, then they were delivered by ground transport
vehicles accompanied by a military convoy. (ITAR-TASS, 0857 GMT, 24 Mar
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0324, via World News Connection). And if anyone should
worry that that this aggressive program to get out the military vote could
have been tainted, armed forces representative Kozhemyakin assured all that
there were no violations in the organization of the polls and absolute compliance
with voting laws and regulations.
by Jill Skelton
Russia, streamlined GUUAM maintain security differences
At the mid-March meeting of eight CIS defense ministers in Moscow, Russia
showed that it is not going to abandon its designs to dominate "counter-terrorism"
plans for the CIS. In an apparent attempt to clear up some of the questions
that last month's CIS heads of state meeting raised about FSB units possibly
being stationed on CIS soil, the Russian government sent its FSB director,
Nikolai Patrushev, to join the defense ministers. Although Patrushev clarified
the mission of the Antiterrorism Center, which will "gather and analyze
information on international terrorism," he made no reference to the
Antiterrorism Program that might include participation by FSB special units.
Instead, the FSB director only stressed that the center will not have "strong-arm
functions." (ITAR-TASS, 1058 GMT, 16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via
World News Connection)
Over the past year, Russia has continually used "antiterrorism"
rhetoric to reassert its dominance in the CIS, especially among those nations
that it considers its closer partners. In a recent interview, Russian Security
Council Head Sergei Ivanov specifically singled out Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan as Russia's CIS "allies" when he noted
that "the CIS is no longer a unified field." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA,
16 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0316, via World News Connection) Interestingly,
Ivanov left out Uzbekistan, which is officially a GUUAM member but has participated
in various joint defense exercises with Russia since last year. Only two
weeks later, Uzbekistan decided to pull its battalion out of the Southern
Peace Shield-2000 exercises in Tajikistan, opting to conduct its portion
of the exercise inside Uzbekistan. (ITAR-TASS, 0656 GMT, 29 Mar 00; via
lexis-nexis) However, it doesn't appear that Uzbekistan will be joining
three of its fellow GUUAM members in forming a Georgia-Azerbaijan-Ukraine
peacekeeping unit, either. Although the unit is still in the planning stages,
the "GAU" presidents plan to have their peacekeepers receive authorization
from the UN or OSCE and remain apart from the Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping
forces. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 20 Mar 00) In this streamlined forum,
GAU has maintained its opposition to the so-called "Russia-6"
or Collective Security Treaty members, despite the optimistic words GAU
officials had for Putin's leadership at the January heads of state summit
in Moscow. For now, the CIS remains split on issues of CIS security, as
Russia seeks dominance among its "allies" and GAU desperately
looks westward.
by Sarah K. Miller
Constitution? What constitution?
The Ukrainian Constitutional Court has apparently decided that it will now
be known as the "We'll just fudge it a little and maybe nobody will
notice because we really don't want to make the tough choices" court.
On 29 March, the court ruled that Kuchma's proposed All-Ukraine referendum
can go forward with two revisions. On 16 April, voters will be asked whether
they approve Kuchma's initiatives to (1) eliminate parliamentary immunity,
(2) cut the number of parliamentary deputies from 450 to 300, (3) make the
unicameral legislature a bicameral model, and (4) allow the president to
disband parliament if it fails to form a majority within one month or does
not pass a budget within three months of its submission by the executive
The court did rule, however, that two of Kuchma's proposed questions were
unconstitutional. It will not allow Kuchma to ask voters whether they have
confidence in parliament, and give him the power to disband the body in
the event of a no-confidence vote. It will also not allow a question on
whether a new constitution should be approved through direct referendum
instead of by the parliament.
Even with these questions disallowed, however, the referendum is constitutionally
questionable. This fact appears to have been lost on many of Kuchma's critics
and most of his supporters, who seem happy just to have had the most troublesome
questions rejected. The European Union released a statement that read, in
part, "This decision is a positive development, which provides encouraging
evidence of the effective functioning of Ukrainian democratic institutions."
(REUTERS, 0852 GMT, 4 Apr 00; via America Online) Ukrainian Parliamentary
Deputy Serhiy Holovaty, who is also a former justice minister, said, "With
this decision the Constitutional Court has practically defeated the intentions
of those who wanted to effect an anti-constitutional coup in Ukraine."
(REUTERS, 0902 GMT, 29 Mar 00; via America Online)
"Practically" is the operative word. The Constitution of Ukraine
contains some interesting tidbits that seem to have gone unnoticed by many
in the country. This burdensome document notes the following:
"The constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine consists
of 450 National Deputies of Ukraine who are elected for a four-year term
on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot."
(Article 76)
"National Deputies of Ukraine are guaranteed parliamentary immunity."
(Article 80)
The questions approved by the Constitutional Court, therefore, amount to
amending the constitution. So, according to this document, how are amendments
supposed to be adopted?
"A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine
may be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine
or by no fewer National Deputies of Ukraine than one-third of the constitutional
composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine." (Article 154)
"A draft law on introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine,
... previously adopted by the majority of the constitutional composition
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to be adopted if, at the next
regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, no less than two-thirds
... have voted in favor thereof." (Article 155)
There is no mention in "Chapter XIII: Introducing Amendments to the
Constitution of Ukraine" of amendment by referendum. And yet, the Constitutional
Court, by a vote of 15 to 3 with one abstention, found these questions constitutional
and -- most importantly -- binding. "Government bodies will be obliged
to take [those results] into account and adopt the appropriate measures
about those questions addressed in the referendum." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE,
31 Mar 00)
Perhaps the politically appointed judges (six by the president, six by the
Congress of Judges and six by the parliament) recognized that the power
structure of the country has become lopsided in favor of the president,
and acted accordingly. Or perhaps these judges, who cannot be reappointed,
simply did not want to make the difficult decision to pronounce the entire
referendum unconstitutional.
Ukrainian political analyst Mykhailo Pohrebinsky suggests, however, that
the court will once again be called upon to examine the situation if the
referendum questions are passed. "What is required now is for the Constitutional
Court to consider a new case -- what to do if parliament doesn't implement
the people's will?" (REUTERS, 3 Apr 00; via America Online) In fact,
according to the constitution, that body is in no way required to do so.
For this reason, on 4 April, the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly
(PACE) warned Ukraine that it could be suspended if Kuchma moves forward
with his poll before the parliament passes a new law of referenda. Although
the PACE suspension would probably be more symbolic than meaningful, as
one of the few predominantly Western organizations that have accepted Ukraine,
it would be a difficult blow to the country's West-oriented foreign policy.
This fact does not seem to concern Kuchma, who vowed to continue with the
In January, when Kuchma first suggested that he would hold a referendum,
this writer asked, "Does Kuchma want to be king?" and suggested
that the only way these questions would be approved by the Constitutional
Court would be if Ukraine planned to "follow Russia's lead and contort
the constitution to fit the whims of the presidential administration."
(THE NIS OBSERVED, 17 Jan 00) This week, we discovered that the Constitutional
Court has learned well from Russia, as Kuchma began planning his coronation.
Meanwhile, in the council's parliamentary assembly ...
The new constitutional tangle with the Council of Europe comes just as Ukraine
had finally eliminated a major disagreement with that body by outlawing
the death penalty. It also comes as representatives of ethnic Russian organizations
in Ukraine are appealing to the council to look into what they call Ukraine's
"Russophobia." In a statement to the council's parliamentary assembly,
The Ukrainian Slavic Party wrote, "The Ukrainian language policy is
based on Russophobia, as is manifested by the fact that the Russian language
is almost not taught to junior classes, ... and even in senior classes it
is taught in miserly doses." (INTERFAX, 22 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis)
There is undoubtedly a reason that the Slavic Party statement uses vague
terms like "almost not taught" and "miserly doses."
The exact figures would simply not support the argument. According to government
data, 34 percent of primary and secondary students were taught in the Russian
language during the 1998-1999 year. Twenty-five percent of preschoolers
were taught in Russian, and 34 percent of students in higher education were
taught in Russian. While this is down considerably from 1991, when approximately
50 percent of all students were taught in Russian, the figures more adequately
represent the current language breakdown of the country. The Russian language
school figures, incidentally, remain above 98 percent in Crimea, 87 percent
in Luhansk Oblast' and 90 percent in Donetsk Oblast', in spite of the existence
of significant numbers of Ukrainian speakers in these areas. (THE UKRAINIAN
WEEKLY, 5 Mar 00; via Arel's The Ukraine List #76) That's quite an interesting
understanding of the term "miserly."
How not to make friends and influence enemies
Following the Freedom March II on 15 March, Belarusian authorities tried
valiantly to intimidate protesters into not amassing for the opposition's
next scheduled protest on 25 March. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and
the rest of his administration seemed to believe that, by outlawing the
protest and threatening opposition members with arrest, they could limit
the demonstration's effect internationally. They failed miserably.
Unlike Freedom March I and II, the 25 March commemoration of the 1918 declaration
of the Belarus Republic garnered significant Western attention -- thanks
to Lukashenka's tactics.
According to Belapan, between 5,000 and 7,000 people attempted to gather
at the designated rally point, ignoring the threats from authorities that
they would be arrested. Belapan noted, "Yakub Kolas Square ... was
cordoned off by rows of helmeted police. The underground railroad exits
leading to the square were also blocked. Two police armored personnel carriers
could be seen on the square." The report continued, "Police groups
waded into crowds with truncheons and grabbed people, pushing them into
police vehicles. More than two hundred people were detained, including cameramen
and reporters of the Russian television networks RTR, NTV and ORT, as well
as Christopher Panico, counselor of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group
in Belarus." (BELAPAN, 0230 GMT, 25 Mar 00)
Reaction from outside Belarus was swift in appearing. Vladimir Putin reportedly
intervened immediately in order to facilitate the release of at least one
dozen Russian reporters. The OSCE responded sharply to the arrest of its
representative, who had diplomatic status. And the United States and European
Union called the Belarus tactics "brutal." US Department of State
Spokesman James Foley said, "The authorities deployed police with dogs,
riot troops and armored personnel carriers ... to arrest 300 to 500 Belarusian
citizens, reportedly beating many of them." According to Foley, Polish
MP Mariusz Kaminski and 35 journalists from Russia, Belarus and Poland were
among those arrested. For the first time, Foley also signaled that the US
had given up all hopes of using dialogue to solve the crisis in Belarus.
"The Lukashenka regime's suppression of this demonstration makes clear
its disinterest in dialogue," he said. (REUTERS, 1950 GMT, 27 Mar 00)
This is a significant departure from several previous statements. There
are also unconfirmed reports from Charter-97 that the US is considering
the introduction of some type of economic sanction.
Lukashenka, meanwhile, underwent a major shift in opinion as international
reaction began to pour in. On 25 March, while on an official visit to the
United Arab Emirates, he wholeheartedly supported the police actions, suggesting
that such things are necessary to "maintain law and order." He
said, "Any disorders have to be stopped and we will do that."
(ITAR-TASS, 2016 GMT, 25 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0325, via World News Connection)
Just days later, however, Lukashenka apparently found his humanity, criticizing
police for "serious mistakes." He said, "It is as if law
enforcement bodies deliberately make serious mistakes in their jobs at exactly
the moment when the head of the state has left the country." (REUTERS,
1351 GMT, 31 Mar 00; via America Online) How unfortunate that Lukashenka
was not in the country to take care of the situation. And how convenient.
According to Interior Minister Yuri Sivakov, before Lukashenka left Minsk,
he told Sivakov to ensure order. "We fulfilled this task," Sivakov
said. (REUTERS, 1950 GMT, 27 Mar 00; via America Online) Sivakov is apparently
also fulfilling another task -- scapegoat.
Meanwhile, opposition members have vowed to continue their protests. For
the first time, thanks to Lukashenka, they will do it with the strong support
of the West.
by Tammy Lynch
Can sanctions reinstate peace talks?
President Putin's response to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (PACE) sanctions on Russia shows that he can be persuaded to compromise.
Amid all the anti-Western bluster about a new iron curtain and Western support
of "terrorism," there was a concession announced the day after
the vote: Direct presidential rule will not be imposed on Chechnya. (ITAR-TASS,
7 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis)
On 6 April Russian representatives were still defending the plan to introduce
direct rule for several years by reference to Soviet legislation. (AFP,
6 Apr 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Putin had backed this idea very forcefully
over the last month, but on the day after the PACE vote he suddenly decided
to abandon it. While this decision can in no way satisfy PACE demands for
a cease-fire, peace talks, and a war crimes inquiry, it does mean that those
goals are attainable -- if member governments find the political will to
continue along this course.
In the last days of March, revelations that clandestine negotiations with
the Maskhadov government have been ongoing since January were followed by
calls for a political solution to the conflict. The PACE vote builds on
those developments, bolsters domestic peace advocates and creates greater
internal and external pressure for a negotiated settlement.
On 6 April a two-thirds majority of the PACE voted to suspend Russia's
voting privileges and called on the ministers of the member states to initiate
proceedings to suspend Russia's membership in the Council of Europe unless
Russia immediately makes "substantial, accelerating and demonstrable
progress" towards eradicating human rights abuses and calling a cease-fire
in Chechnya. The assembly also directed member nations to bring war crimes
charges against Russia in the European Court for Human Rights. (REUTERS,
6 Apr 00; via Johnson's Russia List) Council of Europe foreign ministers
are scheduled discuss the possibility of suspending Russia from the body
on 10 April.
The PACE vote comes amidst mounting pressure to pursue renewed negotiations
with the Chechens. On 4 April, the speaker of the Federation Council, Yegor
Stroev, called for a policy of negotiations and an end to the Chechen war,
saying, "Either we continue to play hide-and-seek with society or we
undertake steps to end the war and begin to resolve the problem peacefully."
(ITAR-TASS, 4 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis) The US ambassador, James Collins,
echoed that call on the following day, saying that the war must end in a
political solution. (INTERFAX, 5 Apr 00; via Johnson's Russia List)
According to recent revelations, peace talks have been underway for months
even as presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky continued to set unrealistic
conditions for the start of such talks, including the elimination of Chechen
armed forces and the surrender of Chechen field commanders. But even Yastrzhembsky
has commented that perhaps Maskhadov, who has been charged with leading
an insurrection, can be given amnesty. (ITAR-TASS, 30 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
According to Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev and North Ossetian President
Alexander Dzasokhov, the two have been serving as intermediaries since January.
Informal groups, including North Caucasian leaders and federal government
representatives, have been meeting to discuss possible avenues for negotiations.
A written proposal was passed through intermediaries to the Chechen authorities
in early March, but no response has been forthcoming. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA,
31 Mar 00)
According to Aushev, the proposals were "quite logical and reasonable
.. (and) could have provided a basis for negotiations. (...) Maskhadov and
his cabinet members should accept these proposals. They had better forget
any ambitions, now that the fate of the whole people is at stake."
(VESTI, 29 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
It's possible these proposals were scuttled by Putin's intention to institute
direct rule over Chechnya, first broached at roughly the same time as Aushev
transferred the proposals to Maskhadov. Aushev has commented that the institution
of direct presidential rule would be unconstitutional and counterproductive.
He pointed out that the federal government already has a high-ranking official
serving as representative in Chechnya, Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Koshman.
In practical terms, a change in the formalities of federal governance over
Chechnya would have no bearing on the course of the war, characterized recently
by mounting guerrilla raids against Russian positions. (INTERFAX, 30 Mar
00; via lexis-nexis) In an earlier interview he explained that the federal
government has resisted proposals of instituting direct presidential rule
over the Prigorodnyi krai district, (a conflict zone between the Ossets
and the Ingush) precisely on the grounds that this measure lacks constitutional
basis. (INTERFAX, 16 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
The sum of Aushev's statements represents a fairly coherent program: Peace
negotiations must be held between Maskhadov's and Putin's representatives,
the Chechen side must respond to the last set of proposals, and the final
status of Chechnya should be determined by popular referendum. (VREMYA MN,
3 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
The details of the proposals forwarded to the Chechens have not been revealed.
However, the lack of response and Aushev's recommendation to "forget
any ambitions" suggest that the terms were probably fairly harsh.
The international community would do well to build on the PACE vote by reminding
Russia of its obligations under previous agreements that remain woefully
unfulfilled, but should constitute the foundation for any future negotiations.
1) According to the peace treaty of 12 May 1997, Russian and Chechnya agreed
"to stop the centuries old confrontation" and "build further
relations in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of
international law" and "cooperate on the basis of certain specific
agreements." (The Treaty of Peace and the Principles of Relations between
the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, OFFICIAL KREMLIN
INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROADCAST, 13 May 97; via lexis-nexis)
2) The Khasavyurt treaty specifies that "The agreement on the fundamentals
of relations between Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic being determined
in accordance with generally recognized norms of international law shall
be reached prior to December 31, 2001." (IZVESTIA, 3 Sep 97; via ISCIP
3) At the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul (and many times since),
Russia agreed to provide access to Chechnya to humanitarian workers and
inspectors, that the mandate of the OSCE mediation mission for Chechnya
remains in force, and that its participation would benefit the political
regulation of the conflict.
by Miriam Lanskoy
Authoritarianism, political repression real winners in Kyrgyz elections?
Kyrgyzstan, once widely considered to be the most democratic Central Asian
state, particularly by Western analysts, appears to be catching up quickly
with the most authoritarian and politically repressive Central Asian state,
The 12 March runoff elections for 68 parliamentary seats were even more
heavily criticized by the OSCE and the Kyrgyz opposition (RFE/RL NEWSLINE,
23 Mar 00) than the first round of parliamentary elections had been. Mark
Stevens, the chairman of the OSCE observer mission, told journalists that
the Kyrgyz elections had failed to meet his organization's standards. Local
election officials' interference in the polling process, as well as the
fact that the Central Election Commission (CEC) permitted several candidates
to stand for election in the first round but then barred them from participating
in the second round, drew sharp criticism from OSCE observers. (KABAR NEWS
AGENCY, 1700 GMT, 13 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis)
Feliks Kulov, chairman of the Ar-Namys (Honor or Dignity) Party and one
of the few prominent opposition candidates who was not kept off the ballot
in the second round of elections, reported that in his voting district (Talas
Oblast' in northwestern Kyrgyzstan) a number of votes were collected before
the polls were officially open, blank ballots were sold, and his party's
election observers were denied access to the voting stations. He also charged
election officials with bribing and even threatening voters in order to
persuade them to cast their ballots for the government-backed candidate,
Alymbai Sultanov. (Sultanov won by approximately 16%.) (INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY,
14 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis, and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Mar 00)
By 15 March thousands of dissatisfied voters were protesting outside government
buildings in Bishkek, Kara Bura (in Talas Oblast'), and Balykchy (in Issyk-Kul
Oblast') as well as in Osh and Jalalabad Oblast's. The protesters accused
the government of falsifying the voting outcomes in all of these regions
and called for new elections to be held. (KYRGYZ TELEVISION FIRST CHANNEL,
1530 GMT, 15 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis,
and RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Mar 00) A bloc of five opposition parties (including
Ar-Namys, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, and Daniyar Usenov's El
Bei Bechara Party) released an official statement and list of demands to
the Kyrgyz government on 20 March. They called on President Akaev's administration
to annul the results of the elections in Talas Oblast', on the grounds that
they were falsified; to punish all those officials responsible for perpetrating
the election fraud; to review the courts' decisions to uphold the ban on
numerous opposition candidates' participation in the elections; to release
a number of opposition activists promptly from detention; and to stop harassing
independent media agencies. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 20 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
On 22 March, perhaps in an attempt to dampen the protesters' enthusiasm,
law enforcement officials arrested Feliks Kulov in the Bishkek clinic where
he was receiving treatment for high blood pressure and chest pains and charged
him with the misappropriation of funds and the abuse of power during his
short stint as national security minister in 1997-1998. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN
NEWS, 22 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Although the earlier arrests of Mr. Kulov's
campaign manager and other well-known members of Ar-Namys had done little
to intimidate the demonstrators, government officials may have reasoned
that the detention of Mr. Kulov himself would bring the protests to an end.
However, the opposition leader's supporters responded to his detention by
continuing their protests both in Bishkek and in Kara Bura and by issuing
a second list of demands to the Kyrgyz government, calling for Mr. Kulov's
immediate release from prison and urging all of the country's political
parties and organizations to join together in resisting the government's
heavy-handed actions. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 31 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
Mr. Kulov himself has gone on hunger strike in order to protest his arrest
and detention. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 31 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis)
Kyrgyz authorities did succeed in ending the opposition demonstrations in
Kara-Bura, but only after police chased the protesters out of the town's
main square using truncheons. 120 of the demonstrators were taken into custody
and bused to the local internal affairs ministry headquarters. Following
the demonstration's forcible dispersal by the police, internal affairs ministry
troops were stationed in the town, presumably in order to prevent any further
opposition gatherings. (VECHERNIY BISHKEK, 23 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central
Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis)
While the arrest of Mr. Kulov and numerous other opposition figures has
not prompted his supporters to abandon their cause, what it has achieved
is to make the Ar-Namys Party's chairman ineligible to run in Kyrgyzstan's
next presidential elections. Under present Kyrgyz election law, anyone who
has been charged with a crime is not permitted to run in presidential or
parliamentary elections. As a result, President Akaev is not likely to face
any serious opposition in his bid for reelection next December. Unless the
Kyrgyz opposition is able to win the vociferous support of both international
organizations and Western governments, President Akaev's administration
will have little incentive to change the country's currently highly irregular
election laws or to pursue any further political reforms. In fact, the Kyrgyz
government seems to be well on its way to duplicating the type of harsh
repression practiced by neighboring Uzbekistan.
Tajik opposition grudgingly accepts flawed elections
Despite numerous complaints of election fraud from nearly all of the opposition
parties during Tajikistan's recent parliamentary elections, both regional
and national party leaders have proclaimed their acceptance of the voting
results, in order to preserve the peace process.
Leading members of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, the Democratic Party
of Tajikistan (DPT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),
and the Socialist Party reported numerous incidents of interference by local
election officials in the polling process, as well as irregular voting procedures.
On the eve of runoff elections in 12 voting districts, the Central Election
and Registration Commission (CERC) suddenly invalidated a popular Communist
candidate's registration, barring him from participating in the second round
of voting. In two other districts where Communist candidates seemed likely
to win in runoff elections, the CERC simply annulled the results of the
first voting round, citing widespread election violations. (VOICE OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 0330 GMT, 12 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia
Unit, via lexis-nexis) DPT and IRPT officials complained that their candidates
often faced an undue number of campaign and registration restrictions and
that their election observers were frequently not given access to the polling
stations. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 0100 GMT, 10 Mar 00 and
1600 GMT, 27 Feb 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis)
However, spokesmen for both of these opposition parties publicly declared
their recognition of the election's validity and their acceptance of its
The chairmen of the Leninobod branch of the DPT released a statement following
the first round of parliamentary elections in which the party expressed
its point of view quite bluntly: "We officially recognize the holding
of elections to the Assembly of Representatives and local councils for the
sake of the unity of society, of cooperation in the cause of ensuring political
stability and the consolidation of democratic achievements." Although
the party chairmen acknowledged that there had been irregularities in the
election process, they went on to say that establishing a lasting peace
in Tajikistan was of greater importance than the election outcome and their
own party's interests. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 0100 GMT,
10 Mar 00; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, via lexis-nexis)
Although the Leninobod DPT chairmen's words are eloquent and their sentiments
admirable, one must question how realistic their views of Tajikistan's situation
are. In a country which for decades has been wracked by profound social
and political cleavages, it was particularly important that these elections
provide a more or less level playing field for the various regional factions
to win representation in the national government, a goal which they have
craved since before the civil war. Indeed, it was their lack of representation
in republic-level politics which led to the outbreak of war in 1992. Unfortunately,
Tajikistan's recent parliamentary elections did not provide the opportunities
that they were originally slated to, a fact which nearly everyone seems
to recognize. How much hope can we then realistically hold that the same
dissatisfaction with the status quo which resulted in five years of civil
war will not eventually bring about a similar chain of violence?
President proves that playing nicely with others brings few rewards
Although neither the Turkmen nor the Azerbaijani media were willing to publish
many details, on 9 March President Niyazov's press service revealed that
the two countries' governments had come to an agreement on how to divide
the Trans-Caspian pipeline's capacity, once its construction has been completed.
Instead of the two sides sharing the pipeline equally (Azerbaijan's original
goal), it seems that Baku has accepted the Turkmen president's terms and
agreed to a 5 billion cubic meter quota. This leaves Turkmenistan with more
than 75% of the pipeline's capacity. (TURAN, 1655 GMT, 10 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0311,
via World News Connection) This could be considered a substantial triumph
for the Turkmen president's "get-tough" policy, if the pipeline
were actually close to being completed. However, just two weeks after having
achieved this victory, President Niyazov himself acknowledged that there
is little hope that the pipeline's construction will even begin in the near
future. According to the present timetable, work is to start in early 2001
and conclude two years later, but the Turkmen leader told Shell representatives
that unless the project receives more international support, it will not
be carried out at all. (INTERFAX, 1426 GMT, 22 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0322,
via World News Connection)
President Niyazov's obstinacy and blunt words compelled the Azerbaijani
government to meet his terms, despite pressure from the US and Turkey for
him to soften his stance. Will he be able to achieve similar results with
the international oil tycoons? Prior to his success in the pipeline quota
deal with Azerbaijan, one might have said no, but perhaps President Niyazov's
negotiation methods (or lack thereof) are exactly what is necessary in this
by Monika Shepherd


text:
Welcome to the CICRA blog - blog.cicra.gg
Here we will publish news and views related to CICRA's work in Guernsey and Jersey. Posts will be moderated before publication. Click the RSS button to be notified of blog updates.
Visit blog.cicra.gg
The Channel Islands Competition and Regulatory Authorities or 'CICRA' is the name given to the Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority and the Guernsey Competition and Regulatory Authority (formerly the Office of Utility Regulation).
The JCRA was established under the Competition Regulatory Authority (Jersey) Law, 2001, and the GCRA was established under the Guernsey Competition and Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2012.
In Jersey, the telecoms, ports and postal sectors are regulated by the JCRA, which is also responsible for administering and enforcing the Competition (Jersey) Law 2005.
In Guernsey the telecoms, postal and electricity sectors are regulated by the GCRA, which is also responsible administering and enforcing The Competition (Guernsey) Ordinance, 2012.
By working together, sharing resources and expertise between the islands, CICRA's aim is to ensure that consumers receive the best value, choice and access to high quality services, in addition to promoting competition and consumers' interests.
CICRA's 2017 Work Programme can be found here and its Strategic Aims which incorporates its prioritisation principles can be found here.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
"He's a free agent," general manager Brian Cashman said. "He can do what he wants."
Clemens, who won his 300th game and recorded his 4,000th strikeout last season, always said 2003 was going to be his last season. But he left the door open a crack, which turned out to be Andy Pettitte's decision to sign with Houston as a free agent.
Pettitte, and several other Astros, lobbied Clemens, who has decided to accept the Astros' one-year, $4 million contract offer.
Clemens' agent, Randy Hendricks, said at the baseball winter meetings in New Orleans in mid-December that his client would make a decision by the middle of January. That decision has now been reached, and the Astros have two-fifths of the Yankees' 2003 rotation.
It will be interesting to see how much the Yankees miss the presence of Pettitte and Clemens. While Javier Vazquez and Kevin Brown are quality arms -- when they're healthy -- the mystique of the Yankees was augmented by the postseason brilliance of Pettitte and Clemens.
--The Yankees hired Rick Down, whom they fired as hitting instructor after the season, as a coordinator of minor league instruction. Down was replaced by as hitting coach by Don Mattingly.
--Infielder Erick Almonte cleared waivers and was assigned to Triple-A Columbus.
--Catcher Michel Hernandez was claimed on waivers by the Boston Red Sox.
QUOTE TO NOTE: "I play 20 years, work my tail off -- they're not going to tell me what hat I'm wearing. I promise you that. There might be a vacant seat there. I'll take my mother and we'll go to Palm Springs and invite all y'all and we'll have our own celebration." -- Roger Clemens on being told the Hall of Fame will determine what he wears when he is inducted. Clemens has insisted he will wear a Yankee cap, but the Hall says the deciding factor is where the player made his mark, and that would be Boston.


text:
"Come on down to Honey Grove,
where the bees are buzzin and the flowers are growin.
Come on down to Honey Grove,
don't you know everybody's goin.
Come on down to Honey Grove,
and why don't you stay for a while?
There's alotta nice things on Honey Grove,
they're gonna make you smile…"
And now, hear those words sung with just the right amount of lilt and twang by a man in a well-worn-straw-hat, and faded denim trousers held up by suspenders. Add to this a little banjo and an old-time fiddle, throw in a guitar, a washboard and a stand-up base and you've got yourself the Honey Grove theme song. Yes, this is the one I imagine, the song that plays through my mind while I push wheel-barrows of compost around the property and clean chicken coops. So far, there is only one guitar in my band and it belongs to me, I have yet to find the man in the straw hat, the banjo player and the fiddler, but I'll get there. These things are easy to come by in our neck of the woods. Mark could do nicely as the man in the straw hat, but he would have to lose his British accent, otherwise, I fear it might sound more like an English Ballad, and between you and I, that just would not do. On another note, our musical friends are arriving from various islands this weekend with their banjo's and guitars in tow, so perhaps my Honey Grove song will come to life yet. That is my hope anyway, that under the stars around the campfire, my song will be born.
But anyway….
Come on down to Honey Grove, where the bees are buzzin.
And the flowers are growin.
Come on down to Honey Grove, don't you know, everybody's goin.
Come on down to Honey Grove, and why don't you stay for a while?
There's alotta nice things on Honey Grove, they're gonna make you smile…"
Although, these days, that line should be "there are alotta nice peas on Honey Grove."
Yes, we are picking peas and shelling peas and eating peas and freezing peas.
I have recently discovered the wonder of listening to pod-casts, on my i-pod, while picking pea-pods. I am having a full education over here, learning all matter of interesting things from ancient Egyptian astrology to Greek mythology to unsolvable (or rather Un-provable) mathematical mysteries. I will have all kinds of interesting new facts so share next time you stay up all night with me, sipping mead around the campfire. eh eh. But, you'll have to "Come on down to Honey Grove for that.
Otherwise, I spent this week wheeling wheel-barrows filled to the brim with 10 year old bark mulch (which I acquired from an old riding- ring in the over grown woods on our property) up to the veg plot to create this sparkling new path. It divides our garden into four lovely quadrants for ease of use, and of course, crop rotation.
And looking upon it from another angle.
I am rather pleased with it, which is a relief, because after you wheel barrow 54 loads of bark mulch up the driveway ( yes I counted), you want to be pleased with the result. You really do. And speaking of being pleased, Mark is also feeling very pleased with his brick oven progress, which is proving to be an absolute feat of engineering. I cannot even begin to comprehend how he is doing it. Seeing him doing the calculations alone, is like watching someone do advanced algebra. Tomorrow, he is having a big work party to take things to the next level as he pours the next concrete pad, which the fire bricks will sit on.
And, while we work, everything just keeps growing.
But, all the working never stops us from putting our noses in roses. We have no choice but to succumb to their perfume. They seduce us whenever we attempt to walk past, clutching our agendas. Yes, you will find me bent over roses, breathing deeply, several times a day. The below rose is called Elle, and she belongs to a romantic novel, or olden fairytale, or the elegant garden of an 18th century stately home… or maybe, maybe she belongs to Honey Grove. Truth be told, I think we belong to her. Her smell is utterly transporting, nothing else exists when you spend time in her company.
So, "Come on down to Honey Grove, where the bees are buzzin and the flowers are growin, come on down to Honey Grove, don't you know everybody's goin, come on down to Honey Grove and why don't you stay for awhile. There are alotta nice things on Honey Grove, they're gonna make you smile.."
In Gratitude,
Nao, Mark, Gus and All at Honey Grove.


text:
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Mix (12+): orders of 12+ items
Availability: In stock.
Our Classico Negroni is an aged negroni made from a traditional blend of gin, vermouth and Italian Bitters. The result is a superbly smooth classic negroni drink, the perfect Aperitivo. The Classico Negroni is bottled at sipping strength and can be served straight from the bottle. We recommend cooling the aperitif in the freezer for 2 hours before serving, then pour and enjoy.
Tasting Notes: Complex bitter and sweet notes with a hint of fruit, citrus and botanicals.
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text:
Washington, February 23 (ANI): Ben Stiller showed his funny side one more time by taking a dig at Joaquin Phoenix at the recent Oscars ceremony.
The actor appeared to present the Best Cinematography trophy, alongside Natalie Portman, with a thick beard and sunglasses while chewing on gum.
Taking the joke forward, Portman said "this is ridiculous" and chastised the comic for chewing gum onstage.
Phoenix added, "OK, I'll take it out," and laid it on the podium.
"I want to retire from being the funny guy," Us magazine quoted Stiller as saying.
Portman responded: "You look like you work at a Hasidic meth lab!" (ANI)


text:
Welcome Home by Shaun Groves MP3
Lyrics: Welcome Home, Shaun Groves Take, me, make me All You want me to be That's all I'm asking, all I'm asking Welcome to this heart of mine I've buried ...
Twilight by Shaun Groves MP3
Like the sky before the dawn, While the night is holding on. Sun and moon together in the gray. So my soul is shared by two, the worst of me, the best of You.
After the Music Fades by Shaun Groves + Lyrics MP3
Song: After the Music Fades Artist: Shaun Groves Album: Invitation to Eavesdrop I was so surprised no one did a Lyrics video for this song! It's such a nice song ...
Shaun Groves Welcome Home MP3
Shaun Groves performed at Cup O Joy. See more info about Cup O Joy at www.cupojoy.com or Shaun Groves at www.shaungroves.com.
Shaun Groves - Should I tell them MP3
Should I Tell Them? by Shaun Groves.
Abba Father (Shaun Groves) MP3
Verse of the Day Thursday July 7 2011 "Your kingdom come. Your will be done On earth as it is in heaven." Matthew 6:10.
Bless The Lord by Shaun Groves MP3
Just As I Am (Shaun Groves & Micah Watson) MP3
Shaun Groves and Micah Watson singing Just As I Am from the album Third World Symphony. http://thirdworldsymphony.com Recorded by Missouri Baptist ...
Here I Am- Shaun Groves MP3
Shaun Groves performs "Here I Am" at New City Cafe in Knoxville, Tennessee. I have arranged his song to be a softhearted lyrical bible study of Isaiah Chaper 6 ...
Shaun Groves-Should I Tell Them w/lyrics MP3
Walking with you is not without hazards Trippings this traveler's curse Price paid for falling is more than my stumble In a world that is watching and waiting for ...
Abba Father - Shaun Groves MP3
Very powerful song; I love it. Enjoy! :) Credits to Shaun Groves.
Shaun Groves - After the Music Fades (live) MP3
Music video.
Shaun Groves - Just as I am MP3
This song is so new that I couldn't find a video of it. :) Interested in seeing Shaun's new album, Third World Symphony?
"Damage Done" by Shaun Groves MP3
Last night I viewed the film "The Descendants." One of the themes of the movie is forgiveness, which is a topic that doesn't get enough press. Thinking about ...
FREE NEW MUSIC FROM SHAUN GROVES AT: http://shaungroves.com/freemusic Shaun Groves performing Welcome Home live on Live From Studio B. For ...
Shaun Groves - Should I tell them? MP3
Shaun Groves Live at the Cup O Joy.
Shaun Groves - After the music fades MP3
Song: After the music fades Artist: Shaun Groves Album:Invitation to Eavesdrop Year: 2001.
Shaun Groves ' Flea Market Montgomery MP3
Shaun Groves performance of another beautiful rendition of Sammy Steven's "Flea Market Montgomery" in Royal Palm Beach Florida.
Shaun Groves - Satellite MP3
I looked up the word "satellite" in a thesaurus and I was surprised to find that DISCIPLE meant the same thing. I found that really interesting. In Matthew 28:18-20, ...
Shaun Groves - Your Renown MP3
There is no other god I would rather follow than the Lord Jesus Christ. He is famous among the heavens and here on Earth. He is the ONLY ONE that can save ...
Shaun Groves- Jesus MP3
Shaun Groves' Alternate Guitar Tuning MP3
Shaun Groves teaches the alternate tuning that's fooled tens of people into thinking he's talented. http://www.ShaunGroves.com http://www.Compassion.com ...
Abba Father- Shaun Groves (cover) MP3
Here are the lyrics! Abba Father My Defender You are Holy And I surrender For in my weakness You protect me When my heart strays You Correct me I cry Abba ...
Shaun Groves- All Is Grace MP3
Shaun Groves' new song All Is Grace found on the cd "Third World Symphony." Shaun received inspiration for the song from the way Ann Voskamp signed her ...
Shaun Groves Twilight EPK MP3
EPK for "Twilight" by Shaun Groves. http://www.ShaunGroves.com http://www.Compassion.com http://www.CompassionBloggers.com.
Shaun Groves - Welcome Home MP3
Shaun Groves from Invitation to Eavesdrop.


text:
Now in Version 2.0, Network Magic is a godsend for those befuddled with home networking configuration.
Linksys continues its standard of excellent products with the WRT54GX, a wellrounded, speedy router with SRX (Speed and Range eXpansion) based on Airgo Networks' MIMO chipset. The WRT54GX excels with smooth setup and impressive performance and security tools.
Read the full review: Linksys Wireless-G WRT54GX


text:
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Jenny Bornholdt
Jennifer Mary Bornholdt (born 1 November 1960) is a New Zealand poet and anthologist.
Born in Lower Hutt, Bornholdt received a bachelor's degree in English Literature and a Diploma in Journalism. She studied poetry with Bill Manhire at Victoria University of Wellington in 1984.
She is co-editor of My Heart Goes Swimming: New Zealand Love Poems and the Oxford Anthology of New Zealand Poetry in English, which won the Montana New Zealand Book Award for Poetry for Poetry in 1997. In addition, Bornholdt won the 2002 Meridian Energy Katherine Mansfield Memorial Fellowship, was a recipient of one of the 2003 Arts Foundation of New Zealand Laureate Awards, and was named the fifth Te Mata Estate New Zealand Poet Laureate in 2005. Her poems were selected for the Best New Zealand Poems series in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005.
Her poetry[edit]
Bornholdt's poetry has been published in a number of volumes:
- 1988: This Big Face
- 1989: Moving House
- 1991: Waiting Shelter
- 1995: How We Met
- 1997: Miss New Zealand: Selected Poems
- 2000: These Days
- 2003: Summer
- Co-editor, with Gregory O'Brien, My Heart Goes Swimming: New Zealand Love Poems, Random House New Zealand (2000) ISBN 0-908877-81-1, ISBN 978-0-908877-81-2
- Co-editor Oxford Anthology of New Zealand Poetry in English
External links[edit]
|Cultural offices
|Preceded by
Brian Turner
|New Zealand Poet Laureate
|Succeeded by
Michele Leggott


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