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Intelligence/Agents/Multimedia Research Group
Department of Electronics and Computer Science
University of Southampton
Highfield, Southampton
Three of the books under review are about consciousness, one is about meaning, and one is about language, but the topics are inter-related, as we shall see. The reader may find it surprising to learn that it has lately become fashionable in cognitive science to call the problem of consciousness the "hard problem," and the problems of meaning and language (and brain function and behavior) the "easy problems." Everything is relative. The "easy problems" may be easier than the "hard one," but that certainly does not make them any easier than most other scientific problems.
What is the hard problem, then? It's as old as the human mind, it's probably lurking behind our ideas about religion and the immateriality and immortality of the soul, and it has been pondered since the advent of philosophy, where it is usually called the "mind-body" problem. Unfortunately, the word "mind" is ambiguous here, and "body" a misnomer. Some philosophers think it's more useful to call it the "mental-physical" problem instead, but even that doesn't quite do the trick.
The problem itself arises when we try to relate one sort of "thing" (mental things) to another sort of thing (physical things). We know that physical things are not just "bodies": They are matter and energy, the stuff that physicists (and chemists and biologists and engineers) study and explain to us with their familiar functional, cause-and-effect explanations (e.g. transfer of momentum from one billiard ball to another, chemical reactions, liver function). And we know exactly what mental "things" are, too: They are what is going on in our heads when we are awake: thoughts, experiences, feelings.
The problem is: How do we put those two kinds of things together: Are they both the same kind of thing? Are thoughts/experiences/feelings just matter/energy, somehow? If so, How? (I pause to let the reader test whether, mirabile dictu, he can provide a satisfactory answer to this hard question where everyone else so far has failed. . . .)
The trouble with this easy solution to the hard problem is that it has some uneasy consequences: It is at odds with the conservation of mass and energy, causal laws of physics that have an awful lot of evidence supporting them, all over the universe. To regard the mental as a telekinetic force, we have to be ready to believe that some rather remarkable things are going on on our small planet: Things move because they are willed to move, not just because of the usual transfer of energy. And what is the source of this telekinetic force? That's anyone's guess, but it can't be just our brains, because our brains, like our hearts and our livers, are just that ordinary stuff, matter/energy, structure/function. (The telekineticists reason that if our brains were the cause of all our motions after all -- in other words, if telekinesis really didn't happen -- then it could never be true that we move because we feel like it; it would just feel-like that was how and why we were moving.)
I will not pursue the telekinetic option any further (it is often called "dualism"), because, in exchange for "solving" the hard problem, it seems to raise even harder problems, pitting itself against all the rest of science. Suffice it to say that none of the authors of the books under review would endorse telekinetic dualism. They are all committed to explanations that stay within the natural bounds of matter and energy, structure and function--bounds set by current theory and evidence in physics, biology and engineering. Yet let us admit that telekinesis certainly feels like the right explanation for our minds, and what they do, and how. It's just that it's an explanation that unfortunately does not fit with the scientific explanation of everything else--and hence would itself stand in need of a good deal more hard scientific explanation in its own right.
Three of the books under review try to take on the hard problem directly. Antonio Damasio does it using brain anatomy and physiology; Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi use computational modeling of brain function. Colin McGinn, in contrast, does not try to solve the hard problem at all, but with an excuse: he argues that, although the problem does have a solution, the human brain is incapable of finding it (and would not understand it if it did). The other two books, by Michael Tomasello and by Jerry Fodor, do not venture to take on the hard problem at all. Fodor thinks it would be futile but (unlike McGinn) does not say why (he spends his time instead trying to show why we may not even be able to solve some of the easy problems!). And Tomasello does not even mention consciousness. Damasio, however, as well as Edelman and Tononi, strive not to beg the question.
There are basically two ways to beg the question. One way is to change the subject, swap an easy problem for the hard one (but keep calling it the hard one anyway), and then solve that easy problem instead. The second way is simply to provide an easy solution, but interpret it as if it had solved the hard problem. Damasio does the first and Edelman and Tononi do the second.
At the outset, it looks as if Damasio will not beg the question--as if he is not merely going to explain intelligence or language or brain function or behavior. All of those could be explained in principle even if there were no hard problem at all: For if we had the very same intellectual and linguistic capacities we have, but we were not conscious (no mental states, no thoughts, experiences, feelings), then there would still be the "easy" problem of explaining those capacities in terms of brain function. But that would just amount to ordinary ("easy") science. Let us call that kind of explanation a structural-functional explanation (functional explanation for short). Functional explanations are perfectly compatible with the matter-energy explanations given by physics, biology and engineering.
What makes the hard problem hard is that giving functional explanations for bodily capacities is not all there is to it: We are not just zombies with certain intellectual and linguistic skills. We are conscious, that is, we do have mental states: thoughts, experiences, feelings. Let's call what it is that makes mental states mental "feelings,"for short. If we were nonfeeling zombies, there would be no hard problem. What makes the hard problem hard is precisely the mysterious difficulty of explaining feelings functionally. So the "mind-body" problem is actually the "feeling-function" problem.
Why is it so difficult (if not impossible) to explain feelings in terms of function? Because a functional explanation is always a cause-effect explanation, showing how and why something works the way it does. A functional explanation is fine for ordinary, nonfeeling matter-energy[[: the stuff investigated by physics, biology and engineering]]. But every time we try to explain a feeling functionally, it turns out that the function alone can do the cause-effect job just fine (thank you very much!), and the feeling just falls by the wayside, unexplained.
For example, a functional explanation of pain might go something like this: Pain is a signal indicating that tissue has been injured. It is useful for an organism's survival and reproduction to minimize tissue injury, to learn and remember to avoid what has caused injury in the past, to avoid contact between a currently injured body part and other objects while the part is still damaged, and so forth. The sensorimotor and neural machinery for accomplishing all this, including the computational mechanism that would do the learning, the remembering, the selective attending and so forth, could all be described, tested, confirmed and fully understood. The only part that would remain unexplained is why pain feels like something: The functional explanation accounts for the functional facts, but the feeling is left out. And so it goes: every time you try to give a functional explanation of feeling, the feeling itself turns out to be functionally superfluous (unless you happen to be a telekinetic dualist!).
In short, we know that we are not feelingless zombies. The hard problem is explaining how and why we are not. And because how's and why's are purely functional matters, that would seem to leave only two possibilities: (1) ("epiphenomenalism") that feelings are not functional but merely "decorative," piggy-backing (for some inexplicable, because nonfunctional, reason) on certain functions; or (2) (dualism) that feelings are telekinetic. The hard problem is finding an explanation for feelings that is neither (1) nor (2). My own view is that this is simply impossible. How do our authors fare with this?
Maybe we are indeed feelingless zombies when we are in the grip of an epileptic automatism, maybe we are not. (It is hard to know for sure without being the epileptic undergoing the automatism; and even if you were, you wouldn't be able to speak at the time, and afterwards you wouldn't be able to recall! So, without telepathic powers, no neurologist could ever know for sure whether or not a patient was in a zombie state: That is called the "other-minds problem," the flip side of the mind-body problem.)
Damasio's functional anatomy of feeling states certainly tells us a good deal about what their brain and behavioral correlates are: When this part of the brain is active, you feel this and you can do that; when you lose this part of the brain, you can no longer feel this or do that. This is of great interest to the clinician trying to do diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. It is also useful to the victims of brain injury, the families of such patients and to everyone interested in how their own brain works. In some cases, for instance, in the brain anatomy of the so-called sense of self, Damasio's findings may help theorists design functional models that actually have the capacities that go with having a sense of self. But those are all "easy" problems. Do Damasio's findings shed any light on the hard problem of how and why we feel at all?
Alas, they do not, and I think I can pinpoint where the question gets begged: Damasio is intent on providing a bottom-up explanation of feelings, from the most primitive feeling-state of akinetic mutism to the highest-order feeling-states of a philosopher like Descartes when he is reflecting on the nature of mind. But explaining the variations along such a hierarchy is the easy part; the hard part is explaining how and why any of it is felt at all. The critical transition, in other words, is between nonfeeling and feeling, and that is the transition Damasio completely overlooks.
Instead, Damasio rests his hierarchy of feeling-states on a highly nonstandard (and, I think, in the end, incoherent) notion of emotion. On the face of it, "emotion" is just a synonym for a certain kind of feeling. (Other kinds of feelings include sensations, such as seeing something blue or hearing something loud; hybrid emotion-sensations, such as feeling pain; desire states, such as wanting something; psychomotor states, such as willing an action; and complex feeling-thinking states, such as believing, doubting or understanding.) But Damasio uses emotion in an equivocal way, in an attempt to bridge the unbridgeable gap between nonfeeling and feeling. His bottom-level emotions (readers should confirm this for themselves) are either just motions--in other words movement tendencies and their underlying brain activities, in which case they are no kind of feeling at all, and leave us as clueless as before about how to bridge the gap--or, worse, they are "unfelt feelings," which is a contradiction in terms. Either way, it is only by invoking this blurred notion of emotion that Damasio gives the (illusory) impression of having made some sort of successful transition from the unfelt to the felt.
Descartes (whom some people wrongly blame for the idea of dualism) was the subject of an earlier book of Damasio's, titled Descartes' Error. In that book Damasio argued that Descartes had made the mistake of trying to separate what in the brain is inseparable: the psychic (mind) and the somatic (body). In the workings of the brain, Damasio pointed out, there is no such duality of function. That is correct; but let us not forget that all of the brain, both structure and function, is "somatic," and that's precisely Damasio's error with motions and emotions in The Feeling of What Happens. For the functional part of emotion, the somatic part, is indeed, as Damasio maintains, just motion! But the felt (psychic) part is something else: something 100 percent correlated with brain structure and function, to be sure--but, again, correlation isn't explanation. Correlations need a causal explanation, and the only candidate explanation, namely telekinetic dualism, is a nonstarter. Hard luck.
But then Edelman and Tononi go ahead and beg the hard, "feeling" question anyway. They describe some very interesting functional networks -- "distributed, re-entrant" ones -- which, they hypothesize, have some powerful functional capacities (some already demonstrated experimentally, many of them not yet). They also describe how such networks are brain-like in many ways. This is all important and exciting, but it is still all just functional. The nagging question still remains: How and why do the feelings come in (other than as the usual mysterious, unexplicated correlations)? Without an answer to that question, Edelman and Tononi's discussion is just an exercise in hermeneutics: the functional mechanism that correlates with feeling is interpreted as actually being the feeling itself, and hence as functionally explaining the feeling; whereas in reality it merely explains the functions that are mysteriously correlated with the feeling, nothing more.
Edelman and Tononi's network model is largely a mechanism for learning categories. A mechanism with all the functional capacities the authors attribute to their model will be an important contribution to cognitive science if it can indeed be shown to have all those capacities. But that is not what Edelman and Tononi are out to show here. In A Universe of Consciousness they simply try to persuade the reader that the functions of their network are somehow an explanation of feeling. The locus of Edelman and Tononi's question-begging can again be pin-pointed: An essential function of their model is discrimination, and their treatment of discrimination is equivocal in exactly the same way Damasio's treatment of motions/emotions is.
To discriminate is to be able to tell things apart. Psychophysicists speak about the JND, or just-noticeable-difference--the smallest sensory difference that people can feel. Feel? But of course psychophysics, being an ordinary functional science like all the others, really only deals with the smallest sensory difference people can detect and respond to. That could just as well apply to an optical transducer. The fact that it also happens to feel-like something when one detects those differences is another matter, and Edelman and Tononi's model comes no closer to explaining the how and why of that than an optical transducer does.
[[Two other points are worth making in passing about Edelman and Tononi: (1) They cast some of their argument in terms of another fashionable problem, the so-called binding problem: How does the brain manage to "bind" all the simultaneous sensations that it receives while perceiving an object into one unitary percept of that object? But would there be a binding problem at all if there were nothing it felt-like to perceive an object--if our brains just went about doing all their functional business of moving, categorizing, discriminating without feeling anything while doing it? Might the binding problem be just another variant of the (hard) question of how and why we are not zombies? (2) I personally did not glean much insight from Edelman and Tononi's paraphilosophical koan, "Being Precedes Describing."]]
But why should the feeling-function problem be one of them? To turn McGinn's suggestion into anything more than an arbitrary conjecture, one would have to answer a how-and-why question every bit as hard as the hard problem itself, namely, how and why is the brain unable to solve the hard problem? To this reader, McGinn's answers unfortunately read like Just-So stories, leaving us no less mystified than we were before being informed that our mystification was innate. That's about as unhelpful as informing us that the brain does cause feelings somehow (but not explaining how or why).
For surely the latter is true: The brain does somehow cause feelings; no nondualist doubts that. The hard part is explaining how and why. Now McGinn's position is interesting in the sense that he is declaring, positively (but nondemonstratively) that there is an answer, but it just happens to be one that we are not equipped to grasp. By way of evidence, he cites other kinds of things that our brains are not equipped to grasp: We cannot know, for instance, what it feels like to be a bat (with its extra sonar sense), any more than someone born blind can know what it feels like to see. But that's cheating! It amounts to saying that a certain feeling is simply missing from the human repertoire, and that certain feeling is: what it feels like to know the solution to the feeling-function problem!
At the very least, to give this speculation some substance, McGinn would have to offer some hint of what the solution to the hard problem might look like, as well as how and why it could be the solution, even though it did not feel like the solution. For, on the face of it, all we are asking for here is a functional how-and-why explanation of something. Such explanations tend to be objective ones, which do not depend on how they "feel" to you, any more than the truth of a mathematical proof (as Descartes also noted famously) depends on whether or not it feels true to you. If there is indeed a functional explanation of feeling, it ought to be possible to at least state it (and test it, functionally), even if, because of our brain limitations, such a statement and test would not be sufficient to dispel from our minds the attendant mystery about the hard problem .
But perhaps McGinn means something even stronger than this: not just that we lack the sense to see that something is a solution to the hard problem even when it is staring us in the face, but that we even lack the means to state that solution. But that would be very odd, because it would be a limit not just on the nature of our brains, but on the expressive power of language and mathematics (both of which, though rooted in our brains, have universal, brain-independent powers, too): I may not be able to feel what it is like to be a bat, but surely I should be able to state all the functional facts about it (in fact, that's exactly how we understand the bat's sonar sense, and there is absolutely no mystery there, just a feeling that we know perfectly well that we humans happen to lack!).
No, I don't think McGinn's conjecture helps us with the hard question at all: If the question is, "how and why do we feel?", then his reply that we are not equipped to know simply raises another question, just as hard: How and why not?
Before leaving the hard problem and moving on to the two books that address easier problems, I will venture an answer: It is not because we have the wrong brains. It's because of the nature of functional explanation, the nature of feeling, and possibly also the nature of causality. The only alternative to telekinesis (in which feelings would have an independent causal power of their own) is that feelings do not have an independent causal power of their own (epiphenomenalism). They just are. (We know they exist; that's not in dispute.) Moreover, they pose no problem to the rest of science if they are simply side-effects of matter and energy, structure and function, not causes in their own right.
Make no mistake: We are no less mystified by my own conclusion that the "function" of feelings is merely decorative, but at least epiphenomenalism moots any further how-and-why questions. And it implies that the reason the hard problem is insoluble is that (1) telekinesis itself is false and (2) feeling is immune to (nontelekinetic) functional explanation (hence it is inexplicable). [[But we are still left with the sense of mystery about how and why this should be so--a mystery that could perhaps only be dispelled if we did have an extra sense, a telepathic sense, of the way matter-energy-structure-function causes and constitutes feeling.]] [[Such a hypothetical sense, however, would be just as self-contradictory, hence impossible, as a functional explanation of feeling, because of the essentially first-person nature of feeling: The only feelings you can feel are your own. ("I feel your pain" is just a metaphor.) So any "telepathic" sense I had of how nonfeeling causes or constitutes feeling could only be an illusion. I can feel only what I feel, not how I (or anyone else) feel(s).]]
To answer that question Tomasello studies the behavioral, social, conceptual and communicative capacities of (1) apes and (2) children before and after the age at which they acquire language. His comparative studies implicate a few critical capacities: the capacity to imitate others; the capacity to "mind-read" (to sense what others are seeing, wanting or thinking); and the capacity to monitor and coordinate joint attention with others: to sense that both of you are looking at or thinking about the same thing, and to sense that the other one senses that too. (Damasio's mechanisms for the sense of self would come in very handy here). No nonhuman species has that set of capacities in full, and not even the human child does until the age when language usually begins. So Tomasello concludes that those are the capacities that make up the functional basis of language.
These findings are very important, and, as Tomasello shows, the capacities he has isolated form a basis for human culture. But do they explain language? (There still remains the separate question of grammatical capacity--another easy problem--but let us leave that aside, as a functionally autonomous module, until we get to Fodor's book.) Has Tomasello really pinpointed the functional basis for language (apart from grammar), here? I would like to suggest that he has not. For human language is, among other things, the capacity to express any proposition with a string of symbols--"The cat is on the mat," "Feeling cannot be explained functionally," "2 + 2 = 4"--plus the capacity to understand symbol strings as expressing propositions.
But if you look closely at the capacities Tomasello has singled out (and even if you design a functional model that implements those capacities), you will find that you have a mechanism that is capable of producing and sharing social pantomime. Such a mechanism could act out present and future scenes, draw people's attention to this or that, share all the kinds of data that can be shared through this kind of joint activity--but this does not provide a clue about how to get from pantomime to propositions. Even acting out the cat's being on the mat is simply that: a pantomime of the cat being on the mat, in much the way that the cat's actually being on the mat is a pantomime of itself.
In short, entities with Tomasello's functional capacities remain in the analog world of events, and copies and re-enactments of those events. Such capacities may well be necessary preconditions for language. But there is no language proper until we make the transition from this analog world of social imitation to the arbitrary, symbolic world of propositions. Perhaps Tomasello's functional resources need to be augmented with Edelman and Tononi's: If their category-learning network has the power they say it has, it should be able to learn to detect and identify cats and mats and "on-ness." So far that would just name them. But if it can also string those names into propositions that describe events and can be construed as either true or false, then we may indeed be closer to the functional substrate for language capacity.
Now this view of Chomsky's is highly controversial, but it has a great deal of evidence supporting it: It does look as if UG isn't and cannot be learned by the language-learning child (as Chomsky has long been pointing out, the trial-and-error possibilities are far too large, and the child's actual learning time and experience far too small); for similar reasons, it is hard to imagine how UG could have evolved in the usual way (but that conclusion is perhaps not as firmly based on evidence as the fact that UG cannot be learned in childhood).
Fodor, impressed by the innateness of one function of the mind, UG, generalizes to other functions that go far beyond the evidence for UG: Fodor thinks that most categories ("cat," "mat," "object," "number" and so forth) are innate and unlearned too, just as UG is. All we learn is what names to call them; their meanings are already innately in our heads, like place-holders merely waiting for labels. If this is true, it is bad news for Edelman and Tononi's category-learning networks, because it leaves them precious little to do: Most of the category structure of the world would somehow have to be built into them in advance.
But is there any reason to believe Fodor's assertion is true? Is there any evidence that there are not examples enough, and time, for children (and adults) to learn all the kinds of things there are in the concrete and abstract world by trial and error, guided by feedback indicating when they get it right and wrong? I think there is no such evidence. But then why does Fodor believe that what is true of grammar might be true of meaning too?
I think the answer is related to yet another ("easy") problem, the symbol-grounding problem: Symbols alone do not mean anything. Ignorant of Chinese, you would look in vain for the meaning of any Chinese word in a Chinese-Chinese dictionary: It's all in there, and yet it isn't! You look up a definition, and it's just more meaningless symbols, even though, for a Chinese speaker who does not know the meaning of that particular word but does know the meaning of the words used to define it, it's enough to convey the new meaning.
This example illustrates both the power and the limitation of language: In principle, you can find out anything and everything from strings of words expressing propositions, but you can't start from scratch: Some of the words have to be "grounded" in something other than just more (meaningless) words. How are those basic words to be grounded? Edelman and Tononi's networks, linked to the world through analog sensors and effectors, sound like a good start, although one would be well-advised to build in the functions Damasio describes for internal sensorimotor maps and the self, as well as the functions Tomasello describes for social communication.
Such a system would then ground some of its symbols directly, in the capacity to detect, discriminate, categorize and manipulate the things the symbols stand for in the outside world. Other symbols could then be grounded indirectly, through propositions that define them in terms of already grounded symbols.
Fodor thinks that kind of mechanism is a nonstarter, for pretty much the same reason that the "associationism" of seventeenth-century philosophers was a nonstarter: Thought and meaning arise not merely through the association of "ideas." Thought has structure over and above mere association in time and space. (So Fodor would not believe in the Edelman and Tononi network module of such a hybrid symbol-grounding system.) Symbols and computation can perhaps capture some of the structure of thought, but Fodor, although he is a functionalist and a computationalist (computation is his "language of thought"), doubts that computation can do the whole job. His doubts are based in part on worries about "holism" (the view that symbols are local things, but meanings are not) and in part on "abduction" (how can a symbol system find the best theory to explain any set of data unless the answers are all already built into it in advance?) So Fodor would not believe in the computational component of such a hybrid symbol-grounding system either.
(It should be added that Fodor seems to have little more faith in the explanatory usefulness of "modules"--despite the fact that he himself was responsible for popularizing the notion--than he does in nets or symbols [or brain function, for that matter, or evolution]. We can define modules, in a theory-neutral way, as functionally independent components of a system, components whose design can be understood and modeled on their own, in isolation from the rest of the system. Perhaps because Fodor's own notion of modularity was inspired by UG [which was originally considered by Chomsky to be a functionally independent component of our language mechanism], the definition of "module" has been saddled with so many additional arbitrary stipulations--they must be innate, they must not interact, they must not be influenced by what a person knows--that the word really has lost all its usefulness.)
Are there grounds for all this skepticism on Fodor's part about the only explanatory resources that cognitive science has at its disposal? It is certainly true that cognitive science has not even come close to solving any of its "easy" problems, such as explaining the functional basis of language or meaning or any other lifesize piece of human intellectual capacity or brain function. But it's also hard to know how fast cognitive science ought to be explaining the mind, based on scientific track records elsewhere. Tononi and Edelman have to be given the time to demonstrate whether or not their nets can do what associationism could not. Their nets are, after all, operating on sensorimotor and symbolic inputs, not "ideas" (whatever those are).
And if symbols have their limitations, they also have their powers. No one can say in advance what hybrid systems can or cannot accomplish if their symbols are grounded in the sensorimotor world via category-learning networks. Changing the definition of just one word in a dictionary already propagates "holistically" to every other definition in the dictionary in which that word figures. Change the sensorimotor grounding and the holistic effects could be even more dramatic.
So there's no a priori reason to doubt that the "easy" problems can be solved using cognitive science's current functional tools. If, however, what you want to know is how and why it feels like something to be a system that has and exercises all those remarkable functional capacities, then I am afraid you will be disappointed. That is one unsolved mystery we will all just have to learn to live with.
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Chomsky, N. (1959) A Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior.
Language 35(1): 26-58
http:// cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/11/48/
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[Reprinted in Hungarian Translation as "A
Szimbolum-Lehorgonyzas Problemaja." Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle XLVIII-XLIX (32-33) 5-6: 365-383.]
Harnad, S. (1996) The Origin of Words: A Psychophysical Hypothesis In
Velichkovsky B & Rumbaugh, D. (Eds.)
Communicating Meaning: Evolution and Development of Language. NJ: Erlbaum: pp 27-44.
Harnad, S. (2000) Correlation Versus Causality: How/Why the Mind/Body Problem Is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7(4): 54-61. http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html
Harnad, S. (2000) Minds, Machines, and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9(4): 425-445. (special issue on "Alan Turing and Artificial Intelligence") http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.turing.html
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C. & Ratner, H. H. (1993) Cultural learning. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 16:495-552.


text:
The Secretary of the Interior shall take all the necessary measures for the completion of the surveys in the several surveying districts, at the earliest periods compatible with the purposes contemplated by law; and whenever the surveys and records of any such district are completed, the Secretary of the Interior or such officer as he may designate shall deliver over to the secretary of state of the respective States, including such surveys, or to such other officer as may be authorized to receive them, all the field notes, maps, records, and other papers appertaining to land titles within the same.
43 U.S. Code § 54. Completion of surveys; delivery to States
The original text of R.S. § 2218 provided for completion of surveys "in the several surveying-districts for which surveyors general have been, or may be, appointed" and also provided that "the surveyor general thereof shall be required to deliver over" all papers appertaining to land titles within the district, "and the office of surveyor general in every such district shall thereafter cease and be discontinued." The references to the surveyors general were omitted in view of act Mar. 3, 1925 (classified to section 51 of this title) abolishing office of surveyor general and transferring its activities to the Field Surveying Service, under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supervisor of Surveys. See, also, Transfer of Functions note below.
R.S. § 2207, formerly cited as a credit to this section, which provided for appointment of surveyors general, was superseded by act Mar. 3, 1925 (classified to section 51 of this title) and repealed by act Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 202, § 1, 47 Stat. 1429.
Act June 5, 1924, appropriated funds for use in making the surveys in twelve districts.
Act May 25, 1906, ch. 2554, 34 Stat. 199, provided for a survey, pursuant to R.S. § 2218, of unsurveyed lands in Louisiana, and was omitted.
Provisions of act Oct. 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 525, which provided for transfer to State officials of field notes, maps, records and other papers appertaining to land surveys in Nebraska and Iowa, were omitted.
All records, etc., belonging to office of recorder of land titles for Missouri were delivered to State upon discontinuance of office, by provisions of act June 6, 1874, ch. 223, § 3, and act July 31, 1876, ch. 246.
R.S. § 2218 derived from acts June 12, 1840, ch. 36, § 1, 5 Stat. 384; July 31, 1876, ch. 246, 19 Stat. 121.
For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of Department of the Interior, with certain exceptions, to Secretary of the Interior, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1950, §§ 1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1262, set out under section 1451 of this title.
"Secretary of the Interior or such officer as he may designate" substituted for "Supervisor of Surveys" on authority of section 403 of Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1946. See note set out under section 1 of this title.

subset: commoncrawl


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HGTV's First Time Home Buyer's Hour Key Driver for Primetime Lineup
Knoxville, Tenn. [For Immediate Release--November 5, 2009] As Congress considers a vote to extend tax credits for first-time home buyers, first-time home buyers continue to vote for HGTV. The network's "First-Time Home Buyers' Hour," which airs Monday-Friday from 8-9 p.m. ET/PT, is breaking ratings records, posting a 33 percent ratings increase among P18-49 and gaining at least 25 percent among all key demographics during October 2009. Since the programming block featuring My First Place and Property Virgins began airing in May, ratings have increased among all key demographics.
During the week of October 26, the First-Time Home Buyers' Hour delivered a 1.07 HH Rtg/0.45 P25-54 Rtg, delivering its best performance season-to-date among P25-54. All key demographics saw healthy growth as compared to the previous week, with P25-54 increasing by 22 percent and P18-49 increasing by 17 percent week-to-week. The hour continues to post solid gains, with all key demographics growing by more than 35 percent year-over-year.
"My First Place and Property Virgins are both produced in a fresh, authentic style that lets the viewer become a fly on the wall and accompany these first-time home buyers on their journey," says Jim Samples, president, HGTV. "The First-Time Home Buyers' Hour is a perfect anchor to HGTV's primetime, bringing younger viewers to our air and then inviting them to stay."
HGTV also has seen tremendous success with the one-hour special, My First Place: Lessons Learned. Premiering on Wednesday, September 16 at 8 p.m., it ranked as one of the top 10 rated specials on the network in 2009-to-date among key demos of P25-54 and P18-49.
"In this evolving housing market, HGTV will continue to offer first-time home buyers the relevant information and insights they need to prepare for the real estate plunge," said Samples.
About HGTV
HGTV, America's leader in home and lifestyle programming, is distributed to more than 98 million U.S. households and is one of cable's top-rated networks. HGTV's website, HGTV.com, is the nation's leading online home-and-garden destination that attracts an average of 4 million unique visitors per month. Headquartered in Knoxville, Tenn., with offices in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Nashville, New York and San Francisco, HGTV is wholly owned by Scripps Networks.
Scripps Networks is owned by Scripps Networks Interactive (NYSE:SNI), the leading developer of lifestyle-oriented content for television and the Internet. The company's media portfolio includes: Lifestyle Media, with popular lifestyle television brands HGTV, Food Network, DIY Network and country music network Great American Country (GAC); and Interactive Services, including leading online search and comparison shopping services, Shopzilla and uSwitch.


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|October 23, 2000
|October 21, 2000
|mole day
|Don't kill your invisible husband to see what he looks like or you'll sob your heart out. But don't worry about the millions of invisible men coming to attack your village because they won't kill you if you don't know how to fight them.
|October 22, 2001
|NON-VIOLENCE! NON-VIOLENCE! NON-VIOLENCE! Non-violence makes you strong! Strength crushes enemies! NON-VIOLENCE!
|"He" is actually a buxom blonde bisexual sorority girl. The net is like that.
|Dream Log: October 22, 2000
|November 12, 1999
|What I'm trying to say is that I may have unconsciously plagiarized this
|Dream Log: October 23, 2000
|Found Poem
|Forms of poetry
|Editor Log: October 2000
|October 22, 1999
|I miss you
|I was Christian for a day
|October 21, 2001
|April 6, 2001
|Editor Log: October 22, 2000


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When I was in school, I was able remember almost everything including english vocab, poems, theoretical material, facts & figures even the arabic poems i did not know the meaning of by the time. This ability of mine definitely helped me secure positions whenever I used it in my educational career. I call it "ability" because I was never trained on how to remember all sorts of stuff and recall it successfully, it was there by birth or by nature. I believe almost all kids do possess this ability, it is only that they do not utilize (subconsciously) it at that time because of a number of reasons like not taking that much interest in studies or feeling uncomfortable at school, etc.
As the science of mind tells, kids have "strong observation" which results in perfect storing of stuff in their minds but with the passage of the time, "strong observation" fades away gradually. This simply means that we can still remember at any age unless we are able to maintain the "strong observation". The way to maintain the "strong observation" is by keeping your mind in some sort of practice like riddles, mental math calculations, etc.
Another reason why I was able to remember it all and recall it was that I subconsciously used the mnemonics ! When I was in university, I used the mnemonics again but this time consciously and it helped me secure position. In fact, mnemonics come in extremely handy when you need to remember foreign vocab, facts as well as figures, this is especially really useful for lawyers as well as medical students who have to come across a lot of Latin words, etc.
Here I share with you a very handy trick that you can use to remember headings of an essay, your daily errands if any, topics of the speech/debate, or any other relevant or sequential piece of information.
So here it is:
I want to show you now that you can start immediately to remember as you've never remembered before. I don't believe anyone with an untrained memory can possibly remember twenty unassociated items, in sequence, after hearing or seeing them only once. Even though you don't believe it either, you will accomplish just that if you read following some paragraphs.
Here are the twenty items you will be able to remember.
carpet, paper, bottle, bed, fish, chair, window, telephone, cigarette, nail, typewriter, shoe, microphone, pen, television, plate, doughnut, car, coffee pot, brick.
Can you recall the twenty items in order now?
The link method of memory is based on the combination of mental images. The images must be as ridiculous as possible. Let's learn by doing. I shall explain no more about the method rather let's try it out by creating twenty ridiculous images for these items.
The first thing you have to do is get a picture of the first item, "carpet", in your mind. Don't see the word carpet but see a carpet, any carpet, perhaps own from your home. In order to remember the objects we are going to associate them with things you already know. Here the other items.
To remember the second item, "paper", you must associate or link it with paper. The association must be as ridiculous as possible. For example you might picture a carpet in your home made out of paper. See yourself walking on it and hear the paper crinkle underfoot. Alternatively you could picture yourself writing on a piece of carpet. Either of these will do. A piece of paper lying on a carpet, though, is not ridiculous enough and you will not remember it. You must see this ridiculous picture in you mind. Close your eyes for a fraction of a second, as soon as you have seen the picture you can move on. Do not see the words.
So now the thing you already know or remember is "paper", the next step then is to link paper to the next item, "bottle". You can stop thinking about carpet entirely know. Make an entirely new ridiculous link between bottle and paper. You might see yourself reading an enormous bottle or writing on a gigantic bottle instead of paper. You could see a bottle pouring paper not liquid. Pick whichever seems most ridiculous to you and see it in your mind's eye. You must see the picture. Don't think long about which picture, the first idea is usually the best one.
We have linked carpet to paper, and then paper to bottle. We now come to the next item, which is "bed". Make a ridiculous association between bottle and bed. A bottle lying on bed would be too logical. So picture yourself yourself sleeping in a large bottle instead of a bed, or perhaps taking a drink from a bed instead of a bottle. See either of these pictures and then stop thinking of it.
You realize that we are linking one object to the next of course. The next item is fish. See a giant fish sleeping in your bed or a bed made out of a giant fish. See the picture you think is most ridiculous.
Now "fish" and "chair". See a gigantic fish sitting on a chair. Or you are catching chairs instead of fish while fishing.
Chair and window – see yourself sitting on a pane of glass, which is painful, instead of a chair or see yourself throwing chairs through a closed window. See the picture and move on.
Window and Telephone – see yourself answering the phone, but when you put it to your ear, it's not a phone you're holding but a window. Or, you might see your window as a large telephone dial. See the one you think is most ridiculous and move on.
Telephone and Cigarette – you're smoking a telephone instead of a cigarette; or you're holding a large cigarette to your ear and talking to it instead of a phone. Alternatively you might see yourself picking up the phone and cigarettes flying out of the ear-piece.
Cigarette and nail – you're smoking a nail; or hammering a lit cigarette into the wall instead of a nail.
Nail and Typewriter – you're hammering a gigantic nail through your typewriter, or all the keys are nails, pricking your fingers as you type.
Typewriter and shoe – see yourself wearing typewriters instead of shoes or see a large shoe with keys on that you're typing on.
Shoe and microphone – you're wearing microphones instead of shoes or you're broadcasting into a large shoe.
Microphone and pen – you're writing with a microphone or you're talking into a giant pen.
Pen and TV – see a million pens gushing out of the TV or there's a screen in an enormous pen you're watching TV on it.
TV and plate – picture your TV as one of your kitchen plates or see yourself eating out of the TV instead of a plate, or you're watching a TV show on your plate as you eat.
Plate and doughnut – see yourself biting into a doughnut, but it cracks in your mouth because it's a plate. Or, picture being served dinner in a doughnut instead of on a plate.
Doughnut and car – you might see a large doughnut driving a car or you are driving a doughnut instead of a car.
Car and coffee pot – a large coffee pot is driving a car or you're driving a coffee pot instead of a car. Alternatively picture a car on your sideboard with coffee percolating in it.
Coffee pot and brick – see yourself pouring coffee from a brick or see bricks pouring out of the spout of the coffee pot.
That's it. If you have actually "seen" these mental pictures in your mind's eye then you will have no trouble remembering the twenty items in sequence, from "carpet" to "brick".
Of course it takes much longer to explain this than to do it – each picture
Now starting with carpet go through the list without the help of the book.
Unbelievable? Yes but it works as you can see. Try making your own list and memorizing them in the same way.
Of course we are brought up to think logically and I am asking you to think illogically which may be a problem at first, however after just a little practice you will have no problem at all in creating ridiculous pictures. Until then here are some simple rules to help……
1. Picture items out of proportion. In other words too large. This is why I used the word "gigantic" often above – to get you to imagine the items out of proportion.
2. Picture you items in action whenever possible. Unfortunately it is the violent and embarrassing things we all remember rather than the pleasant ones. Anyone who has been in an accident or been acutely embarrassed doesn't need memory training to recall it so try to get violent action into you images.
3. Exaggerate the amount of items. For example above I talked about "millions" of cigarettes flying out of the telephone. If you had also seen them lit and burning your face you would have had action and exaggeration.
4. Substitute your items. This is the one I use most often. It is simply picturing one item instead of another i.e. smoking a nail instead of a cigarette.
That's it. The link method boils down to this:
associate the first item with the second, the second to the third, the third to the fourth and so on.
Make your association as ridiculous and/or as illogical as possible and most important SEE the pictures in your mind's eye.
You can now try out the technique on friends or with shopping lists. If you have trouble recalling the first item then associate with the friend testing your skills, if you have trouble recalling other items then the link was not illogical enough.
What you have memorized will be easily retrievable for hours or days. Also you will be able to recall the list backwards with no extra effort.
Looking for your feedback on how did you find this method of memorizing! 🙂


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Software Package for 78K4 [SP78K4]
The SP78K4 software package is a single package of software products made up of 78K4 microcontroller development tools.
Product Components
- Assembler package (RA78K4)
- compiler package (CC78K4)
- Integrated debugger (ID78K4-NS)
- System simulator (SM78K4)
- Device files (DF)
Target Devices
|78K Family
|UPD78491x UPD78403x UPD78404x UPD78405x UPD78421xA UPD78422x UPD78492x UPD78493xA UPD78497xA
Information supporting development tools
|My Renesas
|Create a My Renesas account to use our tool download services,receive e-newsletter/update notifications, and take advantage of our other services.
|Information for studying and learning about microcontrollers and microprocessors.
|Frequently asked questions and useful hints for development.
|A forum and community site to share technical information, questions and opinions with others who use Renesas MCU's.
|Tool News
|Tool release information and other important information.
|Operating Environment
|Information on system requirements and operating environment for the latest version of tools.
|Info on Discontinued Products
|A list of Renesas software and tools that have been discontinued and are no longer being offered for new projects.


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Just some random pictures of our Halloween decor! I tend to change it up every year and keep it interesting! We did the rope spiderweb for the first time thanks to Martha Stewart! Directions are in her Halloween issue this year.
You might also notice the small white card behind the mum. We've been Boo'ed! It's a fun neighborhood tradition. Details are here on my neighbor/friend, Amanda's blog. http://www.myheartsdesireblog.com/2011/10/boo-your-neighbors.html
When we moved to Florida in July 2011, we would jog around our neighborhood and I saw this fiber optic cat on a neighbor's front porch! I KNEW I had to have one! I didn't steal theirs but found this one at Eckerd Drug! (Do they still have those stores?) It's 11 years old and still works like a charm!!
There are also tombstones, pumpkins and a toothy rat which spent the first part of it's life with us as the mascot of John's lab at UGA. (I will spare you the picture....)
Last year I got this Halloween tree and the boys absolutely love it! I spent quite a bit of time last Sunday hanging our ornaments in the perfect spot only to have the boys rearrange it every afternoon after school! But that is what makes it fun---it's totally kid decorated!!
We had some new additions this year to the tree. While we were in Santa Fe over spring break, I bought several Day of the Dead skeletons to add to the mix. I got them at the coolest store in the world called the Jackalope! (http://www.jackalope.com/). Uh-oh, didn't know they have an online store.......
And every time I walk by this dude, the boys have positioned his arms and legs in different ways---but he's always waving (Guess he's friendly)!!!


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I never get fed up of shooting in forests- every few weeks, I get an entirely new backdrop to interact with and new plants and creatures to look for- especially when I'm shooting outside of the UK.
Last time I visited the Netherlands, I found wild boar, red squirrels, nuthatches (I think) and deer. I also discovered Dutch pancakes. Not a creature, I know, but still seriously amazing. 😉
I got these pictures from Frits aka Studio3nl a little while ago but didn't have the chance to post them up! So here you go- it was a beautiful day, if a little muddy. Though we tried hard to be discreet, we did nearly cause a man to fall off his bicycle, which made me nearly fall off the tree stump I was posing on!! Utterly hilarious- it was a multi-quadruple-take, as he kept swinging back off his seat just to check I wasn't a figment of his imagination, LOL!!
Wish me luck- I'm about to head South (hopefully ahead of the snow) for some outdoor nudes… though hopefully my "Narnia coat" will get another outing too… 😉
Got to dash!


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Now showing items 1-1 of 1
The Irish Sea in Prehistory
(Journal of Irish Archaeology, 1992)
The role of the Irish Sea in the study of past contacts between Ireland and Britain is reviewed. Analysis of a selection of distribution maps relating to the period c. 4000 B.C. to c. 500 B.C. suggests the possibility of ...


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Energy Policy
CFA's Cooper says fuel efficiency standards will provide immediate benefits to consumers
Are consumers willing to pay a higher cost for more fuel-efficient vehicles? During today's OnPoint, Mark Cooper, head researcher at the Consumer Federation of America, discusses his organization's research on the consumer impacts of the Obama administration's fuel economy standards. He also responds to the National Automobile Dealers Association's call to slow the rollout of these standards.


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Under general supervision and following established policies and procedures, performs diagnostic radiological exams utilizing appropriate imaging equipment. Verifies patient identity and reviews patient's medical record for appropriateness of exam or procedure. Interviews patient to obtain, verify or update medical history and assesses risk factors such as medications, pregnancy and/or psychological indicators. Explains procedure to patient, including side effects of pharmaceuticals administered, risks, benefits, alternatives and follow-up. Sets up equipment and acquires appropriate images as per script. Reviews images, makes initial observations, documents exceptions from established protocols and communicates data to radiologist. Recognizes and responds to medical emergencies as appropriate. Provides physician-prescribed post care instructions to patients. Participates in process improvement activities within radiology practice including but not limited to quality of care, patient flow, reject-repeat analysis and patient satisfaction. Provides imaging education to residents, student technologists and new employees. GENERAL DUTIES: 1. Maintains licensure/certification/registration in both modality and subspecialty as applicable as well as health care provider BLS. 2. Adheres to the mission, vision, values and Code of Business Conduct as established by the DMC and its associate facilities. 3. Complies with approved policies, procedures, guidelines and standards as established by the DMC and its associated facilities. 4. Demonstrates an understanding of and a commitment to customer service values of respect, courtesy, ownership, privacy, professionalism and responsiveness. 5. Completes mandatory education and training as defined by the DMC and the specific employer-facility. 6. Maintains a safe working environment through compliance with established policies and procedures and timely reporting of safety variances. SPECIFIC JOB DUTIES: 1.Ensures equipment is wiped down between patients and exam room is clean and properly stocked with linen and supplies. 2. Adheres to department exam protocols. 3.Ensures STAT requests are relayed to the radiologist in a timely manner. 4.Uses universal precautions at all times. 5. Attends staff meetings/reviews e-mails daily for updates communication. 6.Maintains competency in all assigned areas including fluoroscopic, general diagnostic, orthopedic, and operating room procedures. Must also maintain competency in IV starts where directed by the department.
. Registered by the American Registry of Radiologic Technologist (ARRT) in Radiography (R) or registry eligible and must obtain (RT) ARRT within 6 months of hire.
2. Required to have or successfully complete American Heart Association (AHA) Basic Life Support � Healthcare Provider (BLS) training by end of orientation period. #LI-LB3
Employment practices will not be influenced or affected by an applicant�s or employee�s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age, disability, genetic information, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, veteran status or any other legally protected status. Tenet will make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities unless doing so would result in an undue hardship.


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If you've not received it yet, don't worry – it's speeding its way through the air, headed to your Nook with delicious promises of apps, games and a web browser amongst other little gifts.
Wi-Fi is improved along with the new features, so you'll be able to surf the net on hotspots that require a log-in via the web browser – which is also new. It beggars belief as to why Nook owners would still walk into Barnes & Noble store, but if you connect to their hotspot you'll be able to read an ebook for free, for an hour – with newspapers and mags coming along later for 20 minutes' use each day. Could be a nice activity while slurping down a coffee in their in-store cafe.
An updated design for the home screen arranges apps nicely by the sounds of it, and speed – which has always been an issue with the Nook – is improved, with faster page turns and a general zippiness all 'round.
Connect the Nook to your computer to push through the update manually, or if you'd prefer downloading it over Wi-Fi, it should arrive sometime in the next few days. [Nook via Electronista]


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Edmunds Says
The 2011 Ford Expedition is a lot more civilized than its truck-based roots might imply, making it a fine choice for those who need a vehicle with large passenger, cargo and towing capacities.
What's New
For 2011, the Ford Expedition gains a new entry-level XL model and loses the long-running Eddie Bauer edition. The available rear-seat video system gets dual headrest-mounted screens, and models equipped with the hands-free Sync system get a complimentary three-year subscription to the new Traffic, Directions and Information service.Read more
Rides and handles better than you'd expect; high towing capacity; roomy third-row seat; flexible interior with easy-to-fold rear seats.
The one-two punch of soaring gas prices and social stigma has convinced an awful lot of folks who jumped on the SUV bandwagon during the past decade that they don't really need to be driving a big honkin' truck after all. But for the holdouts or those people who truly need lots of towing and hauling capacity, there's the 2011 Ford Expedition.
Actually there are two versions of Ford's flagship sport-utility vehicle: the regular Expedition and the long-wheelbase Expedition EL. Both come with the big V8 engine, hefty towing capacity and supersized eight-passenger interior that buyers expect in a full-size SUV. The biggest difference between the two is the EL version's significantly larger cargo hold.
Among its more civilized strengths, the Expedition counts supple ride quality, relatively confident handling and comfortable seating in all three rows. The ride and handling are no doubt largely attributable to the independent rear suspension -- a rarity in the large-SUV segment. Also notable is how easy it is to stow and raise the third-row seats. In competitors like the 2011 Chevrolet Tahoe, this operation is downright back-breaking.
Of course, there are some downsides, the most significant of which is the modestly powered V8. The 2011 Toyota Sequoia, in comparison, can pack considerably more punch, while the Chevrolet Tahoe boasts a more comfortable ride. Even so, the 2011 Ford Expedition is a well-rounded vehicle with enough good qualities that it deserves consideration from buyers who really do need the capability that only a full-size SUV can deliver.
Body Styles, Trim Levels, and Options
The 2011 Ford Expedition is a full-size, body-on-frame SUV that's offered in four trim levels: base XL, midrange XLT, upscale Limited and top-of-the-line King Ranch edition. Buyers can also opt for the extended-wheelbase Expedition EL, which adds 15 inches of overall length.
The new entry-level XL model comes standard with seating for five (or eight in the third-row-equipped EL), 17-inch alloy wheels (18-inch on the EL), automatic headlights, foglights, a roof rack, running boards, air-conditioning (with rear controls), cloth upholstery, a power driver seat, a leather-wrapped steering wheel, auto-dimming rearview mirror, cruise control, full power accessories and a six-speaker CD stereo with an auxiliary audio jack and rear audio controls. Upgrading to the XLT adds 18-inch alloy wheels and a third-row seat to regular-wheelbase versions, plus a reverse-sensing system, power-adjustable pedals, power rear quarter windows, the voice-operated Sync system and an upgraded stereo with satellite radio and steering-wheel-mounted controls.
The Limited trim level goes a few steps further with 20-inch polished alloy wheels, power-folding mirrors, a power liftgate, a back-up camera (with its display built into the rearview mirror), rain-sensing wipers, dual-zone automatic temperature control, perforated leather seats (heated and ventilated up front, heated in the second row), a wood-and-leather-trimmed steering wheel, a power-folding third-row seat, a 110-volt household style power outlet and a standard heavy-duty towing package. Finally, there's the King Ranch edition, which is similar to the Limited, but sports special two-tone paint, 20-inch painted alloy wheels, upgraded "Chaparral" leather upholstery and wood trim.
Many of the niceties found on upper trim levels can also be had as options on the less expensive models. Other major add-ons, depending on trim level, include 20-inch alloy wheels, a load-leveling rear air suspension, a manually folding third-row seat for the regular-wheelbase XL (which increases seating capacity to eight), second-row captain's chairs (which reduce the maximum passenger count to seven), a sunroof and a new rear-seat video entertainment system that features two headrest-mounted screens. A touchscreen navigation system, available on all but the XL trim level, includes the Sirius Travel Link service, which provides information on traffic, weather, sports, movie listings and local fuel prices.
Powertrains and Performance
All Expeditions are powered by a 5.4-liter V8 that produces 310 horsepower and 365 pound-feet of torque. A standard six-speed automatic transmission channels power to the rear wheels by default, but buyers can opt for a four-wheel-drive layout with a dual-range transfer case for optimal low-speed off-roading. The last Expedition we tested (it produced 10 hp less than the current model) accelerated from zero to 60 mph in 8.9 seconds, a below-average time for this segment. Properly equipped, the Expedition has a maximum tow rating of 9,200 pounds.
Fuel economy is about average for a full-size SUV, with the EPA estimating 14 mpg city/20 mpg highway and 16 mpg in combined driving for a 2WD Expedition. EPA estimates for 4WD versions drop to 12/17/14 mpg.
The Ford Expedition comes standard with antilock disc brakes with brake assist, a rollover-sensing stability control system, front-seat side airbags and full-length side curtain airbags. Ford's programmable MyKey system, which allows parents to specify speed limits and stereo volumes for their teenage drivers, is also standard. All models are also equipped with Trailer Sway Control, which uses the existing stability control sensors to detect trailer sway, then applies precise braking and throttle adjustments to assist in bringing both the vehicle and the trailer under control.
In government crash testing, the Ford Expedition received a five-star rating (the best possible) for frontal and side-impact protection for driver and passengers.
Interior Design and Special Features
A large part of the 2011 Ford Expedition's appeal has to do with its passenger cabin, which can be fitted with a variety of seating options to comfortably accommodate five, seven or eight passengers. The standard second-row bench seat features reclining seatbacks and is split 40/20/40, which allows the center portion to slide forward to put young children within easy reach. Second-row bucket seats are an option on all but the entry-level XL models.
Also notable is the third-row seat, which can be folded down by a simple release mechanism or by pressing the power-folding button that's standard on upper trim levels. By contrast, you must physically remove the Tahoe's heavy third row. Both Expedition body styles offer generous cargo room behind that third row, including an ample 18.6 cubic feet in regular-wheelbase models and a whopping 42.6 cubic feet in the EL version. Drop both the second- and third-row seats down and you have a cargo hold that's downright cavernous, with 108 cubic feet of cargo capacity in the standard model and just over 130 cubic feet in the extended-wheelbase EL.
The Expedition's interior design is generally attractive, though some people might find the dash's array of buttons confusing. Some low-quality interior materials also disappoint, particularly when you've paid the extra money for a premium trim level like the top-of-the-line King Ranch edition. Of all the Expedition's available bells and whistles, the voice-operated Sync system -- which, among other services, allows you to control your cell phone and MP3 player without removing your hands from the steering wheel -- is a standout.
Driving Impressions
There's no denying that the 2011 Ford Expedition -- all 17-plus feet and more than 5,500 pounds of it -- is one heck of a big truck. Oddly enough, though, it doesn't really feel like it from behind the steering wheel. Much of the credit goes to the fully independent rear suspension, which is a rarity in a full-size SUV. The ride quality is good overall, though some competitors feel a bit smoother on the highway. Relatively precise and responsive steering also makes the Expedition more nimble than you'd expect.
The 5.4-liter V8 under the hood is sufficient for everyday driving, but performance suffers when you've packed up the Expedition with full load of passengers and cargo and/or towing a trailer. The six-speed automatic transmission is smooth and produces quick shifts, but it has some trouble finding the right gear in certain situations.
2004 Chevrolet Tahoe LT 4WD
Stock# 8660
2008 Honda CR-V EX-L 4WD
Stock# 8497
2006 Hyundai Tucson 4WD
Stock# 8766
2009 Chevrolet HHR LT w/1LT
Stock# 8768


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Fashion's Night Out, designed to boost economy, goes on hiatus
Fashion's Night Out, the star-studded initiative launched at the height of the recession to help generate more sales, is going on hiatus this year.
Since starting in 2009, the annual effort brought out the glitterati in heaps as thousands of retailers and designers hosted celebrities and models at parties, showcases and special shopping events.
By 2012, the affair had spread to 500 cities across the country – including Los Angeles – and 30 cities worldwide. Last year's festivities attracted singer/designer Victoria Beckham, stylist Rachel Zoe, actress Jennifer Hudson and more.
New York City, the original host, partnered with American Vogue, the Council of Fashion Designers of America and NYC & Co. to "celebrate fashion, restore consumer confidence and boost the industry's economy," according to the collective.
But in 2013, the celebration of shopping will go dark in the U.S. to "enable retailers to channel their resources toward strategies more in keeping with their current priorities," according to the FNO website.
Some retailers and designers – especially those simultaneously consumed with their Fashion Week collections – resented FNO for sucking away valuable resources, according to WWD, which first reported the news.
Come September, the extravaganza will live on in 19 other countries, including China, Russia, India and several European nations.
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Macy's targets Millennials, Saks blames Sandy in Q4 earnings
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Baltimore Ravens cheerleader Courtney Lenz won't be joining her team at this year's Super Bowl. Why? Because she's too fat.
According to the 23-year-old veteran cheerleader, she was benched during the regular season after she gained 2 pounds – something she believes weighed on her chances of making it to the Big Game.
"I received an email on Sunday saying I need to turn in my uniform. I can't say I didn't expect it…" she told ABC News.
"I'm just devastated by the whole situation. This was very unexpected… I didn't even think there would be a chance of me not going with being a five-year veteran."
A Facebook page supporting Lenz titled, "Help Us Get Courtney to the Superbowl," was created shortly after the brunette's story became public. The page reads:
"Courtney announced she was retiring during the last home game at the end of the season which didn't go well with the director. She was told she didn't put in as many appearance hours this season as she did the past 4 yrs (sic) while in college. This season she earned her B.S. degree and got a full time job… Bad call. They also stated she struggled with weight on occasion & she had been benched for 2 lb weight gain during a game earlier in the fall, which is a absurd, unhealthy and a complete inaccurate measurement of a woman's 'appearance' and size!
Courtney is beautiful & this organization that is supposedly out there to promote self esteem and healthy body image to millions of young girls and women nationwide has done a big injustice to Courtney & we are outraged! She deserves to be out on the field with her teammates, her family."
The National Football League released the following statement regarding the issue:
"As set by the NFL, we are permitted to bring 32 cheerleaders to the Super Bowl. Our selection process was based upon three criteria: seniority, performance ability and personal conduct throughout the season. As much as we would like to take the whole team, we are unable to do so, due to parameters set by the NFL."
Lenz is 5-feet 3-inches and weighs a reported 124 pounds.


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Small leather Pegaso bag with patent finish, embellished by a buckle depicting the iconic winged horse, emblem of the Maison. Perfect for shoulder wear or as a cross-body.
Product Details
• 18 x 14 x 3.5 cm
• Exterior: 100% calfskin
• Finish: 100% kidskin
• Lining: 66% cotton, 34% polyester
• Adjustable shoulder strap (length: 55 cm)
• Rear pocket
• Appliqué inside pocket
• Metal accessories with gunmetal colour finish
• Fastening with magnet with painted resin Pegaso
• Lining in fabric with ETRO logo
• Made in Italy
Sku: 202P1N34423270700
We offer Express shipping, with delivery within 1-4 business days (possibly longer for shipments to islands and remote locations).
The times for returns has also been extended until to 45 days. The returns process is user-friendly with no additional charges and without any risk of goods getting lost.For further information please see our Return Management section.
€ 925,00


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In the latest Barron's cover story, Jack Hough warns of the long-term risks of rising U.S. public debt. While noting that there's little chance of hitting debt-related turbulence anytime soon and that interest rates on U.S. Treasuries remain low, Hough says that complacency is a threat and that politicians have done little to avert a potential market upheaval:
If the party that has long branded itself as fiscally conservative—and showed off a debt clock during the 2012 Republican National Convention, in a call to action—now has little interest in containing deficits during good times, the result could be a costly backlash during the next bust.
Former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin is among those quoted by Hough warning about the dangers of U.S. fiscal policy: "I don't think bonds adequately reflect what at some point in the future, with high probability, will be trouble in bond markets and with interest rates, due to our fiscal situation," he says.
There are no easy fixes, Hough writes, but Rubin highlights the importance of slowing Medicare cost growth: "If you can reduce cost growth in Medicare and Medicaid, even without cutting entitlements, you're halfway there," Rubin says.
Boosting federal revenues is the other key, Hough says, noting that back in the late 1990s, when Washington produced budget surpluses, annual tax receipts approached 20 percent of GDP. "Over the next several years, that figure is expected to bottom at 16.4% before beginning to rebound—if certain tax cuts expire," Hough writes.
Subscribe to Barron's to read the full story and an accompanying interview with economist Stephanie Kelton, a leading proponent of a school of macroeconomics called modern monetary theory, who has a very different way of thinking about the deficit: "So can the deficit be too big? Of course! But can it be too small? Yes. And that's something you rarely hear people say. Or complain about it."


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Advanced controls and preset modes are easy to use
Good value-for-money for a convergence device
10x zoom lens and dedicated camera controls
Good battery life, Decent web browsing
Good picture quality
Supports 4G, MicroSD card support, Clean user interface
Inconsistent performance, Unimaginative design
Low price, 4G connectivity, microSD card slot, runs Android 4.2
Large screen makes gaming and watching videos very comfortable
4G and microSD support, Large, bright screen
UI navigation is pretty smooth
Crisp or clear as many other smartphones
Thin and light for a mid-range device
High-contrast AMOLED screen, Smooth user interface
Has almost all the features of its last flagship Galaxy S III
Jelly Bean out of the box
Comfortable five-row keyboard, NFC
Compact to hold and carry around
Comfortable, roomy hardware keyboard
Decent choice -- the keyboard and business features
Compact and affordable
Very good call quality, World phone, Long battery life
Smooth performance, Verizon's strong LTE
Generic design, Low-res display, No standout features
Elegant and compact design
Scaled down design, Android Jelly Bean
Android 4.1 with Samsung TouchWiz UI
Great build and nice design
Stellar call quality
Rugged and can keep out the elements
Fast processor and LTE data speeds.
Good lens for a durability-focused handset
4G LTE capability & a zippy dual-core processor
Super-fluid performance
State-of-the-art everything
Excellent battery life
Terrific battery life and a generous feature set for a lower-tier phone
Affordable price, Solid performance
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covering over 29,474 products.
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Diva Drawer Chest
Diva Drawer Chest
Product Description
Don't forget to check your delivery type and print off your Delivery Checklist & Delivery Guide
- Features: Mirrored, Quick Ship
- Chest Measurements: 56 Height/Inches, 40 Width/Inches
- Weight (lb.): 165 Lb
- Base Material: 100% Wood
- Care: Wipe Clean
- Country of Origin: Imported
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