Git Integration - <AUTHOR> http://blog.atom.io/2014/03/13/git-integration.html

<comment><USER2> The same type of gutter integration can also be had in Vim and Sublime Text:

[https://github.com/airblade/vim-gitgutter](https://github.com/airblade/vim- gitgutter)

[https://github.com/jisaacks/GitGutter](https://github.com/jisaacks/GitGutter)

<comment><USER3> Emacs supports it for many different vcs' [http://elpa.gnu.org/packages/diff- hl.html](http://elpa.gnu.org/packages/diff-hl.html)

And magit is the best git integration I've seen so far: [http://magit.github.io/](http://magit.github.io/)

<comment><USER4> Sometimes I wonder how I used git before magit.

<comment><USER5> I'm recent to the party. I've discovered magit-blame-mode; any other goodies I might be missing out on?

<comment><USER6> Magit can do most common actions with one or 2 strokes, like `cc` for commit, `ca` for amend etc. Push, pull fetch etc work like a breeze and wont lock up emacs till its complete.

Sometimes I forget the keys, then I either enable menu bar mode to quickly look it up or switch to eshell for a while

<comment><USER4> Yeah, once I'm in magit-status, I type "g" for update, "fa" for fetch all, and if I need to commit, "S" to add all changes, C-u S to add all unstaged files, and using "n" and "p" to move through the list, I use "4" and "2" to toggle between showing/hiding changes per file (sometimes "3" if I want to see only part of a file's changes). When Im' done, I do "c" to type a commit message, and "cc" to commit. Often I need to fix a commit message typo, so "c" and "ca" lets me amend. Then I just type "PP" to push my changes! If I need to force- push because of an amended commit that I pushed 2 seconds ago, I'll do "P-fP". And interactive rebasing is really easy too, with "E". But yeah I've already gone on too long here.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER7> Adobe Brackets, an actual free open-source editor, along with Brackets-Git ([https://github.com/zaggino/brackets- git](https://github.com/zaggino/brackets-git)) does much of the same.

<comment><USER8> I really enjoy Brackets, but it is mainly targeting HTML, CSS and JavaScript. Atom seems to be more of a general editor.

</comment></comment><comment><USER9> This is sweet but totally expected as almost all the big text editors have it. Well done!

If you're coming from RubyMine and are used to the colors it uses for git integration, I've created an Atom UI package that ports RubyMine into Atom!

[https://atom.io/packages/atom-darcula](https://atom.io/packages/atom-darcula)

</comment><comment><USER10> If only there was a build for something other than OSX, so I could actually try it out...

<comment><USER11> Yeah (although I actually have OSX), that'd be nice.

Related to this, today I just discovered Brackets[1]. It also has some nice git features, like highlighting changed lines. Like Atom, it's written in HTML5. Unlike Atom, it's available on all platforms...because that's a really cool thing about HTML5.

[1] [http://brackets.io/](http://brackets.io/)

<comment><USER12> Downloaded Brackets today, as I am really excited for the live web view. However, the live web view either showed wonky formatting or crashed. However, if I open the same index.html doc in Chrome, everything is fine. They say Bracket is updated every 2.5 weeks, so I hope the issue doesn't last too long.

<comment><USER10> I just downloaded brackets, but it won't let me use Firefox, it forces me to use Chrome, so no Brackets for me.

<comment><USER13> I got rid of Chrome months ago over NSA spying stuff. Not only does this not work in Firefox, but it won't work in Qupzilla (which is WebKit). I'll wait for a new version with better browser support.

<comment><USER10> hmmm, I had never heard of QupZilla, I am going to check it out.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER14> Article lost me at the first phrase:

'Have you ever used Atom...'

Thanks for asking but no I haven't because I'm still waiting for a $%#$#%ing invitation!

<comment><USER15> I would be happy to provide one if you give me your email!

<comment><USER16> Just dropped ya a note, if you're in Japan that is. I assume this means existing users can offer new users invites, though I could be mistaken. :-)

Edit: Ah I see, each new user also gets 3 invites after downloading it themselves: [http://discuss.atom.io/t/had-an-invitation-but-cannot- access...](http://discuss.atom.io/t/had-an-invitation-but-cannot-access-my- download-link-anymore/674/3)

<comment><USER17> Mind sending one my way? Really wanna check it out.

<comment><USER16> Sorry, I'm already out. They seem to limit how many invites you get so you ultimately can't invite to get more invites ;-)

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER18> I know they're touting it as a feature, but it seems like a bit of a red flag that git integration is "built in." What if I don't like some behavior of the built-in plugin? Can I install a different one? Is there some reason it needs to be bundled? Is the plugin architecture not far-enough along that other VCS's can't be supported?

<comment><USER19> It is a plugin, just happens to be one of the bundled ones that's installed by default to provide a nice out-of-box experience. You can still disable it and install your own VCS plugin. One of the great things about Atom is that absolutely everything is a configurable plugin.

</comment></comment><comment><USER20> I really like the way a lot of the plugins are accompanied by gifs. Excellent way to see what the plugin does immediately.

</comment><comment><USER21> By the way, if you're a developer who wants to try Atom, go ahead and ask someone on the HN invite tree:

[https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7376063](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7376063)

Keep in mind that Atom is currently OSX only.

<comment><USER22> I'd love to post in there, however HN doesn't seem to offer any private means of communication and I don't want to post my e-mail address in public if I can prevent it.

<comment><USER23> Then send me an email, my address is in my profile. I have two invites left.

<comment><USER23> I'm afraid I'm all out of invites now, for the rest of you HN folks.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER24> I'm currently liking, not yet loving, Atom at work on a big Drupal site and building my first Angular project. I've wasted 3 days at home trying to get comfy with it in a Rails project. I don't think there's anything that compares to vim-rails in terms of intuitiveness, so I'll stick with vim for that.

If I could just get a note for note port of the Twilight theme for not-gui vim, I don't think I'd ever look back.

</comment><comment><USER25> Does anyone know what they are using to record the screen and save it as a .gif?

<comment><USER26> Not sure what they use, but I use: [http://www.cockos.com/licecap/](http://www.cockos.com/licecap/)

</comment></comment><comment><USER27> It would be fitting to have an equivalent of Fugitive's :Gbrowse to see a file on github and :Gblame to see the blame inline. Never understood why would your editor should be aware of git until I used that.

<comment><USER2> Yes! Gblame is fantastic. Xcode also has some pretty good git blame, git log, and version comparison support directly in the editor. I find that kind of thing fantastically useful for understanding why a section of code is the way it is.

</comment></comment><comment><USER28> I was looking to see if Atom allows me to git add / git commit from the editor yesterday and I haven't found a way. That'd be good integration.

</comment><comment><USER29> can we stop with the atom posts, please.

atom has built-in support for git? wait, no way!

</comment><comment><USER30> This looks terrific and is absolutely what someone like me needs. I'm excited to see where the development of this editor would go next. It's like a breath of fresh air.</comment>


Ask HN: Is There a "Glassdoor" for Engineering? - <AUTHOR> I'm wondering if there's a service that gives me an unbiased / anonymous perspective of what it's like to be an engineer at a company.
There's Glassdoor, but that's mostly about culture and a general sense of the vibe and career trajectory at the company.
Technical blog posts published by companies are definitely interesting and provide a glimpse of what interesting things one might work on, but they also have the hidden agenda of wanting to attract talent, so of course they're only going to shine a positive light on the company.
I want to know specifically how an engineer feels about company "x". And how engaging the work is, and what technical management is like at company "x".
Does this exist? <comment><USER2> Maybe what you're looking for is [https://www.teamblind.com](https://www.teamblind.com) ?</comment>


How to easily receive notifications about GitHub commits in Google Talk - <AUTHOR>

I have not found a quick way to notify my mates about commits on GitHub over Google Talk we all use. I asked about it on StackOverflow and they didn't have an answer. That's why I decided to create an tiny webapp based on Google App Engine to do that job. You can use it without registration and installation, just look through README to understand how it works and how you can use it. The job is in progress, but the basic functionality is there now, so you can receive notifications about commits. Source code is available from http://www.github.com/skible/gitport. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me over email: firstname.lastname@example.com. Thanks! <comment><USER2> I've never used it, but does the Jabber service hook not work with Google Talk?

<comment><AUTHOR> I don't think it does the job. I tried it before. I filled in my Google Talk ID and clicked Test Hook. Nothing happened. May be there are some settings I could change to make it work?

<comment><USER2> Ugh. Probably something having to do with this:

[https://github.com/github/github- services/blob/master/servic...](https://github.com/github/github- services/blob/master/services/jabber.rb)

        raise GitHub::ServiceConfigurationError, "jabber hook temporarily disabled"

<comment><AUTHOR> I suppose my app can potentially be more flexible. First thing coming to my mind is that you can insert as many Post-Receive URLs as needed so you can notify not only yourself but your mates too who want to stay in touch. Actually, it solves our problem easily and quite well now.</comment></comment></comment></comment>


Ask HN: What format is this?  - <AUTHOR>

{D1531,1000,1501|} {C|} {U2;0130|} {D1531,1000,1501|} {AX;+000,+000,+00|} {AY;+05,0|} {PC000;0922,0555,15,15,H,11,B|} {RC00;<FE/>LABELTITLE</FE>|} {PC001;0865,0555,15,15,H,11,B|} {RC01;<FE/>VOLTAGE</FE>|} {PC002;0796,0040, <comment><USER2> That looks like commands sent to a Century Eagle label printer. It appears to say:

{D1531,1000,1501|} Set label pitch to 153.1mm, width 100.0mm, height 150.1mm.

{C|} Clear the image buffer

{U2;0130|} Reverse feed by 13.0mm

{D1531,1000,1501|} Set label pitch to 153.1mm, width 100.0mm, height 150.1mm.

{AX;+000,+000,+00|} Adjust label position and so on...

I'm assuming that this was interpreted by something that changed { to ESC, | to LF and } to NIL.

<comment><AUTHOR> I wish HN allowed giving something more tangible than just +1

<comment><USER2> Pay it forward by helping someone else.

<comment><USER2> For completeness I turned this into a little blog-lesson about searching the web.

<http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1347388>

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER3> [http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2790475/ini-file- reverse-...](http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2790475/ini-file-reverse- engineering)

<comment><AUTHOR> That was posted by me to find no satisfying answers.</comment></comment>


Wayfair employees plan walkout in response to company furnishing border camps - <AUTHOR> https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/25/wayfair-employees-protest-apparent-sale-of-childrens-beds-to-detention-camp.html <comment><USER2> I do want these people in border camps to sleep on beds and have furniture to use. I hate it when I see floors full of sleeping bags. Why do the Wayfair employees hate these poor refugees so intently?

<comment><USER3> Leftists live for hatred and violence. They don't actually care about these children one way or another. They've probably never thought for a single moment about them at all.

They have a public figure top virtue signal over, and npcs are going to npc.

<comment><USER4> Using HN for political and ideological battle will get you banned here, regardless of your politics or ideology. We want thoughtful, curious discussion. The two sets are disjoint, so please do the latter or don't post.

[https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html](https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html)</comment></comment></comment>


Einstein's Philosophy of Science (2014) - <AUTHOR> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einstein-philscience/ <comment><USER2> This is a very interesting article. It turns out that Einstein was a very serious philosopher of science, in dialogue with leading philosophers of science of his day such as Schlitz and Reichenbach.

It seems to me that his overall philosophy of science is a version of pragmatism.

</comment><comment><USER3> > Robert Thornton, a young African-American philosopher of science

How is his ethnic background possibly relevant?

<comment><USER4> The entire bit about Robert Thornton seems unnecessary, they can't even keep his name consistent. Though a German citizen writing a letter to an African- American in 1944 probably does say a fair amount about his philosophy of science, if you include the letter at all it seems worth mentioning.

<comment><USER5> It's strange to call Albert Einstein a "German citizen" in _1944_, since by 1943 all German Jews had been murdered or exiled.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein)

> In 1901, after being stateless for more than five years, Einstein acquired > Swiss citizenship, which he kept for the rest of his life.

> He settled in the United States, becoming an American citizen in 1940

<comment><USER4> Yes, that was the point. And being an American citizen tells you more about his philosophy, as most American physicists would not have been allowed to write such a letter in 1944.</comment></comment></comment></comment>


Why "Airbnb for event venues" websites all die/ venue marketplaces' fatal flaws - <AUTHOR> https://www.dropbox.com/s/vu0wnfrdbka2hrl/Speakeasy%20post%20mortem.pdf?dl=0

<comment><AUTHOR> Background: this is a deck I made to explain to our investors why we killed Speakeasy, our event venue marketplace product. Now that our most recent product was acquired (Gymsurfing -> ClassPass) I am cleaning out our old assets and found this deck to share with HN

<comment><USER2> Just a warning, dropbox blocks access to often requested files. And HN has a tendency to create a lot of requests... So be prepared to provide a mirror

</comment></comment><comment><USER3> What sort of things did you guys try to convince people not cut you out? It seems that the marketplace needs very compelling value-add (aside from discovery) in order to get people to not cut it out after discovery. Trying to be the marketplace for existing venues seems quite challenging as most have already figured out their their infrastructure (payment processing, customer support, insurance, reporting, etc).</comment>


Ethiopian Max Crash Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots - <AUTHOR> https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots <comment><USER2> "WASHINGTON—A simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.

Details of the session, shared with Aviation Week, were flown voluntarily as part of routine, recurrent training. Its purpose: practice recovering from a scenario in which the aircraft was out of trim and wanting to descend while flying at a high rate of speed. This is what the ET302 crew faced when it toggled cutout switches to de-power the MAX's automatic stabilizer trim motor, disabling the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) that was erroneously trimming the horizontal stabilizer nose-down.

In such a scenario, once the trim motor is de-powered, the pilots must use the hand-operated manual trim wheels to adjust the stabilizers. But they also must keep the aircraft from descending by pulling back on the control columns to deflect the elevator portions of the stabilizer upward. Aerodynamic forces from the nose-up elevator deflection make the entire stabilizer more difficult to move, and higher airspeed exacerbates the issue.

The U.S. crew tested this by setting up a 737-Next Generation simulator at 10,000 ft., 250 kt. and 2 deg. nose up stabilizer trim. This is slightly higher altitude but otherwise similar to what the ET302 crew faced as it de- powered the trim motors 3 min. into the 6 min. flight, and about 1 min. after the first uncommanded MCAS input. Leading up to the scenario, the Ethiopian crew used column-mounted manual electric trim to counter some of the MCAS inputs, but did not get the aircraft back to level trim, as the 737 manual instructs before de-powering the stabilizer trim motor. The crew also did not reduce their unusually high speed.

What the U.S. crew found was eye-opening. Keeping the aircraft level required significant aft-column pressure by the captain, and aerodynamic forces prevented the first officer from moving the trim wheel a full turn. They resorted to a little-known procedure to regain control.

The crew repeatedly executed a three-step process known as the roller coaster. First, let the aircraft's nose drop, removing elevator nose-down force. Second, crank the trim wheel, inputting nose-up stabilizer, as the aircraft descends. Third, pull back on the yokes to raise the nose and slow the descent. The excessive descent rates during the first two steps meant the crew got as low as 2,000 ft. during the recovery.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Transport preliminary report on the Mar. 10 ET302 accident suggests the crew attempted to use manual trim after de-powering the stabilizer motors, but determined it "was not working," the report said. A constant trust setting at 94% N1 meant ET302's airspeed increased to the 737 MAX's maximum (Vmo), 340 kt., soon after the stabilizer trim motors were cut off, and did not drop below that level for the remainder of the flight. The pilots, struggling to keep the aircraft from descending, also maintained steady to strong aft control-column inputs from the time MCAS first fired through the end of the flight.

The U.S. crew's session and a video posted recently by YouTube's Mentour Pilot that shows a similar scenario inside a simulator suggest that the resulting forces on ET302's stabilizer would have made it nearly impossible to move by hand.

Neither the current 737 flight manual nor any MCAS-related guidance issued by Boeing in the wake of the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), when MCAS first came to light for most pilots, discuss the roller-coaster procedure for recovering from severe out-of-trim conditions. The 737 manual explains that "effort required to manually rotate the stabilizer trim wheels may be higher under certain flight conditions," but does not provide details.

The pilot who shared the scenario said he learned the roller coaster procedure from excerpts of a 737-200 manual posted in an online pilot forum in the wake of the MAX accidents. It is not taught at his airline.

Boeing's assumption was that erroneous stabilizer nose-down inputs by MCAS, such as those experienced by both the JT610 and ET302 crews, would be diagnosed as runaway stabilizer. The checklist to counter runaway stabilizer includes using the cutout switches to de-power the stabilizer trim motor. The ET302 crew followed this, but not until the aircraft was severely out of trim following the MCAS inputs triggered by faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) data that told the system the aircraft's nose was too high.

Unable to move the stabilizer manually, the ET302 crew moved the cutout switches to power the stabilizer trim motors—something the runaway stabilizer checklist states should not be done. While this enabled their column-mounted electric trim input switches, it also re-activated MCAS, which again received the faulty AOA data and trimmed the stabilizer nose down, leading to a fatal dive.

The simulator session underscored the importance of reacting quickly to uncommanded stabilizer movements and avoiding a severe out-of-trim condition, one of the pilots involved said. "I don't think the situation would be survivable at 350 kt. and below 5,000 ft," this pilot noted.

The ET302 crew climbed through 5,000 ft. shortly after de-powering the trim motors, and got to about 8,000 ft.—the same amount of altitude the U.S. crew used up during the roller-coaster maneuvers—before the final dive. A second pilot not involved in the session but who reviewed the scenario's details said it highlighted several training opportunities.

"This is the sort of simulator experience airline crews need to gain an understanding of how runaway trim can make the aircraft very difficult to control, and how important it is to rehearse use of manual trim inputs," this pilot said.

While Boeing's runaway stabilizer checklist does not specify it, the second pilot recommended a maximum thrust of 75% N1 and a 4 deg. nose-up pitch to keep airspeed under control.

Boeing is developing modifications to MCAS, as well as additional training. Simulator sessions are expected to be integrated into recurrent training, and may be required by some regulators, and opted for by some airlines, before pilots are cleared to fly MAXs again. The MAX fleet has been grounded since mid-March, a direct result of the two accidents."

</comment><comment><USER3> I made the prediction a month ago and I'll make it again. MCAS won't ever fly again.

I think the plane will fly without MCAS with a new type rating, and where pilots specifically train on the stick feel during a power on stall.

They needed the 737 with new engines to fly like the old 737 in order to maintain the type rating and avoid training. Now that they obviously have lost that and require substantial training, I don't see any reason to keep the system.

Some people think the plane is unflyable / inherently unstable without MCAS. I've only flown about 15 hours in my life, and a Cessna at that so I'm not qualified to offer an expert opinion.

But my intuition is that if that were true, if MCAS was not just a bandaid to maintain a type rating, but rather a safety critical system essential for flightworthiness, it would never have shipped in its current form in the first place. Or rather, the 737 MAX would not have been viable to begin with.

If it is the case that 737 MAX is not actually airworthy without a functioning MCAS then Boeing has fucked up an order of magnitude worse than even they appear to have at this point.

<comment><USER4> MCAS is not there because of maintaining pilot type rating.

The plane's airworthiness certificate depends on certain behavior while approaching stall and the new larger and more forward engines on the MAX changed the behavior of the machine in such way that would make it very difficult for the crew to bring the nose down at high angles of attack and high thrust.

The engines on the MAX are forward of the CoG, so they are pushing the nose up as you add thrust - exactly what you _do not_ want when approach a stall. MCAS has been added to help with this - to help the crew push the nose down in such situation by using the stabilizer trim.

The older NG doesn't have this issue because the engines are both smaller and more to the back, so the pitch-up moment is smaller, even though it is still present. This is an inherent issue with underslung engines, all planes with engines mounted under and ahead of the CoG have this issue.

>If it is the case that 737 MAX is not actually airworthy without a functioning MCAS then Boeing has fucked up an order of magnitude worse than even they appear to have at this point.

That's BS. By that logic no Airbus or any fly-by-wire plane could ever be certified - they actually require the computer augmentations to fly. Even the 737 NG has a similar trim system that automatically trims the plane depending on speed, angle of attack and what not.

<comment><USER5> _The engines on the MAX are forward of the CoG, so they are pushing the nose up as you add thrust - exactly what you do not want when approach a stall. MCAS has been added to help with this - to help the crew push the nose down in such situation by using the stabilizer trim._

The forward-backward position of the engines have nothing to do with their resultand pitch torque. What matters is that they are _below_ the CG.

The engines being forward matters because it shifts the center of pressure forward, giving an inherent pitch-up tendency that becomes more pronounced at high angles of attack.

And like you say, all planes with underslung engines have this issue to some degree. Maybe the issue with the MAX is severe enough to cause certification problems but the stall recovery procedures for the NG apparently already call for reducing pitch angle before going to full power or you may not be able to get it down.

<comment><USER6> The fore/aft position has a lot to do with the AofA-dependent effect, as it results from the approximately cylindrical engine nacelles producing some lift when their axis is at a positive angle of attack (fuselages have a similar effect [1].) On airplanes with rear-mounted engines, this effect on their nacelles increases the longitudinal stability [2].

The high/low position matters for the power-dependent effect, and furthermore, what matters in steady-state is the pitch moment created by misalignment of thrust and drag (when accelerating, the moment around the CofG also matters.) A modest tendency to pitch down when the power is reduced is preferable to the opposite.

The issue MCAS was supposed to solve was due to the AofA-dependent effect. That's why it has AofA as an input, and not any measurement or proxy for thrust.

[1] [https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/30/bjorns-corner-pitch- stabil...](https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/30/bjorns-corner-pitch-stability- part-2/)

[2] [https://leehamnews.com/2018/12/07/bjorns-corner-pitch- stabil...](https://leehamnews.com/2018/12/07/bjorns-corner-pitch-stability- part-3/)

<comment><USER5> Isn't that exactly what I said? Edit: not quite, good point about center of drag in steady state conditions.

<comment><USER6> "The forward-backward position of the engines have nothing to do with their resultand pitch torque. What matters is that they are below the CG.

"The engines being forward matters because..."

Janoc repeated a mistake that has been made several times, attributing the problematic pitch-up to the thrust of low-slung engines, and also made some mistakes about how that effect works. I am sure you did not intend it, but by combining corrections to both the former and the latter, and not differentiating between the two, you ended up with something quite confusing, so I felt some clarification would help. The key points are that the engines do produce lift at high AofA, and it is this, not thrust, that creates the problem MCAS was intended to fix.

<comment><USER5> _The key points are that the engines do produce lift at high AofA, and it is this, not thrust, that creates the problem MCAS was intended to fix._

Is that really true? I agree that the pitch-up torque from engine thrust does not vary based on AoA, but the elevator deflection needed to counteract said torque definitely depends on airspeed and hence on AoA. Even if there was no aerodynamic effect of the engines at all, the pilot would be required to trim nose-down as airspeed goes down relative to an airplane with centerline thrust.

If the thrust gets high enough, at some point this pitch torque would overwhelm the natural tendency of the airplane to pitch down as airspeed goes down and result in negative longitudinal stability.

My impression is that MCAS was intended to counteract the decreasing stick force with decreasing airspeed. Both effects, offcenter thrust and aerodynamics, combine to produce the same effect.

<comment><USER6> First you said I was repeating what you said, now you are saying the opposite?

Various good sources [1],[2] state that the issue is lift, not thrust. The article I linked to from my earlier post shows that this lift is not unique to 737 Maxes, and that it contributes to the stability of the DC-9, on account of being behind the CofG on that airplane.

The LEAP-1B engines of the Max variants are not significantly more powerful than those on NGs (they are more efficient and somewhat quieter.) As the whole problem arises from the fact that they cannot be mounted lower, it seems unlikely that an increased thrust moment is what is making the Max handling unacceptable.

> If the thrust gets high enough, at some point this pitch torque would > overwhelm the natural tendency of the airplane to pitch down as airspeed > goes down and result in negative longitudinal stability.

There seems to be some confusion here over what longitudinal static stability is: it a matter of the rate of change of pitching moment with respect to AofA (take a look at the links in my first post for data from real airliners, where a negative slope indicates stability.) Thrust is not a function of AofA, and consequently is not factor in the relationship that gives longitudinal stability of ordinary airplanes - and, as I said before, neither thrust nor any proxy for it is an input to MCAS (while AofA is.)

[1] [http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm](http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm)

[2] [https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim- for...](https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for- the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/)

<comment><USER5> Sorry for making unclear references. My question was referring to "it is [lift], not thrust, that creates the problem MCAS was intended to fix", which I never addressed before.

The article you linked has some nice cross-sectional illustrations that makes clear that the thrust line of the MAX engine actually is _higher_ than on the NG. I hadn't realized this but it makes sense given their larger diameter and needed ground clearance. That would indicate that the thrust dependent pitch up is likely smaller on the MAX than the NG so, if the MAX behaves worse, it stands to reason that the aerodynamic effect must dominate.

I guess the issue is that lift overall is just so much larger that a small shift in the center of lift has a large effect on pitch moment?

As for your comment about longitudinal stability, I agree that the pitch moment due to thrust is independent of AoA and hence can't change the shape of the pitch moment curve. I gotta think about this some more.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER7> I am not very concerned with this particular problem anymore since it will get a satisfactory solution due to its publicity.

What I am worried about and think should get more focus is other potential issues and corners that has been cut by the Boeing management. I have note read a single thing that Boeing has handled well in this massive disaster. This lack of judgement, short term profit seeking & cover up mentality is what media should spend more time on. It feels to me that they used up a lot of their trust capital to be allowed to perform any type of self-certification

<comment><USER8> That is also expected in our Capitalistic system. Greed, profit, and share- holder value is often more important then the end-user.

Boeing is not the only company that subscribes to that religion.

<comment><USER9> Rushing to execute a contract in order to meet economic goals is unfortunately also a failure of nominally-socialist systems: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOT_Polish_Airlines_Flight_505...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOT_Polish_Airlines_Flight_5055#Cause)

As are arbitrary cost-cutting goals: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOT_Polish_Airlines_Flight_7#C...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOT_Polish_Airlines_Flight_7#Causes_of_disaster)

(I only know about these specific disasters due to reading about the Il-62 because it looks cool)

<comment><USER10> More to the point, rushing execution in order to meet economic promises, and arbitrary cost-cutting, are symptoms of _large_ systems. Capitalist, socialist, same diff, when it comes to the behavior of bureaucracies.

<comment><USER11> I don't even know about that. Isn't rushing execution a defining characteristic of small start up culture?

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER12> > The U.S. crew tested this by setting up a 737-Next Generation simulator at > 10,000 ft., 250 kt. and 2 deg. nose up stabilizer trim. This is slightly > higher altitude but otherwise similar to what the ET302 crew faced as it de- > powered the trim motors 3 min. into the 6 min. flight, and about 1 min. > after the first uncommanded MCAS input

That's not slightly higher, that's a lot higher. The graphs in the preliminary report [0] note that the flight _starts_ at around 7,500 ft. since Addis Ababa Bole International Airport is 7,625 ft. above sea level [1]. Their radar altitude "about 1 min. after the first uncommanded MCAS input" was ~1,000 ft. The highest they got above ground was around 6,500 ft. around 5 mins 30 seconds into the flight.

> The excessive descent rates during the first two steps meant the crew got as > low as 2,000 ft. during the recovery.

If you assume they meant they were 10,000 ft. _above sea level_ in the first quote, then this quote means they'd be 5,625 ft. under ground at their lowest point.

[0] [http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+...](http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C%28ET- AVJ%29.pdf)

[1] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addis_Ababa_Bole_International...](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addis_Ababa_Bole_International_Airport)

edit: oops, refs.

<comment><USER13> So if you run into this problem at 7,500' above ground level you might just be okay.

This is why having the ability to disable MCAS without disabling electric assisted trim is so important and such a big factor in this accident. Additionally its raised another possible accident scenario:

The runaway trim cutouts were put in place after electric trim in case the switch (or some other aspect of the electric trim) got stuck in an on position that would cause the trim to go to full deflection one direction or the other, hence runaway trim. And hence if you notice this happening you cutout the power to the electric trim completely.

But now we know you can't manually trim the aircraft above certain speeds with some trim levels. Should there be an expectation you can? What if runaway trim happens and ran to full deflection before a pilot cut it out. That would be equivalent to the same conditions experienced in this accident - the pilots now needing to manually trim but being unable to.

So on top of needing separate cutouts for the MCAS and electric trim, should the manual trim not be investigated for installing some higher ratio gearing/pulleys to enable over coming the forces experienced here?

<comment><USER14> There is the manual trim as a backup, but it's mechanical advantage is inadequate when the trim is too far out.

<comment><USER13> Right, which is why I'm saying that means there's been a failure scenario that existed even _prior to MCAS_. This is how they have demo'd the problem in some flight simulators for this. The electric trim can without MCAS erroneously drive the trim into this situation before being cut out. This is why the cutout switches were put in place decades ago. If this happens in some situations it could leaving the plane in a position where the trim couldn't be manually adjusted due to forces. We now know this situation also exists. Is it so rare, or resolvable in other ways, so it shouldn't be addressed? Or does there also need to be a fix for the manual trim by adjusting the gear/pulley ratio such that the pilot could overcome these forces?

<comment><USER14> What I read and makes sense the way to adjust the manual trim if the force on the stabilizer is too high is to push the nose down to unload it and crank on the wheel. Probably when this was needed the pilots killed the electric trim long before it got too far out.

So I agree the manual trim has always been kinda scketch.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER15> Is anyone concerned that even in the face of re-training, that two aircraft could find themselves in this position within the first year of operations?

Let's say you were on one of these aircraft and the pilots were able to recover. How terrifying would that be? This is the designed behavior?

</comment><comment><USER16> Besides retraining, it seems that there must be upper-body strength tests that 737 MAX pilots will have to pass to ensure that they will be able to manually trim the stabilizer.

Are such tests part of flight crew physicals?

<comment><USER17> Poe's law 'n all that -- are you serious? I mean, yes, I've seen the video, but presumably it won't be safe to require pilots to execute the manual trim, yeah? IMO either the design is unsafe and must change or there exists a way to safely fly without ever needing manual trim.

<comment><USER16> I'm serious. If the final backup system is to revert to mechanical cranks, pulleys, and cables to move the horizontal stabilizer, then the pilots have to be able to exert sufficient torque and power on the control wheels to do so.

</comment></comment></comment><comment><USER18> The 777 and 787 are full fly by wire. The control system has all the sensor inputs, all the actuator outputs, and a model of how the aircraft is supposed to behave. If the aircraft isn't doing what's expected, the flight control system will fault and drop to a dumber control mode, giving the pilot more control rather than driving control surfaces to their limits trying to correct the wrong problem. Those systems are managing trim, like MCAS, plus a lot more.[1]

MCAS is dumb. It has few inputs and one output. It has no overall model of aircraft behavior. It just detects a bad angle of attack and cranks the trim to bring the nose down.

The 777 is supposed to handle like a 737. The cockpit controls are reasonably similar, although different enough that transition training is required. Unfortunately, there's no "small 777", a gap in Boeing's product line the 737 Max was supposed to fill. (Or small 757, 767, or 787 variants. How did they go half a century without a new sub-200 seat aircraft?)

[1] [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/analysis-boeing-777-fly-by- wi...](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/analysis-boeing-777-fly-by-wire-system- jaime-beneyto-g%C3%B3mez-de-barreda)

</comment><comment><USER19> Link to the forum post explaining how to execute the yo-yo manoeuvre, mentioned in the article. What is interesting was one pilot mentioned that the yo-yo procedure dates all the way back to the 707 for a runaway trim. The 737 was derived from the 707 and 727. The 707 was the first Jet Airliner.

Edited for links : referance to 737-200 Manuel [https://www.pprune.org/tech- log/619326-boeing-advice-aerodyn...](https://www.pprune.org/tech- log/619326-boeing-advice-aerodynamically-relieving-airloads-using-manual- stabilizer-trim.html#post10414805)

[https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/619326-boeing-advice- aerodyn...](https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/619326-boeing-advice- aerodynamically-relieving-airloads-using-manual-stabilizer-trim.html)

<comment><USER20> The 707 is interesting as the UK air Registration Board refused to certify it in its original form. It had insufficient rudder authority in the case of certain engine-out scenarios because Boeing hadn't implemented full rudder boost, and the pilots therefore couldn't overcome yaw. That had killed two crews in training. In order to save the big BOAC order Boeing had to fit full boost and a tail strake, which they quietly adopted for all subsequent 707s

Then there was the 727 that had four fatal crashes within six months of entering service, which was put down to inadequate training. But it was later found that the high fatality rate was because Boeing had routed fuel lines along the belly, which severed in a hard landing and caused immediate fires. And they severed easily because bizarrely they were aluminium, in order to bring the weight within target...

</comment></comment><comment><USER21> You can watch the simulation in this video by 60 Minutes Australia:

[https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=QytfYyHmxtc](https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=QytfYyHmxtc)

<comment><USER22> do you mean this? [https://youtu.be/aoNOVlxJmow?t=11m59s](https://youtu.be/aoNOVlxJmow?t=11m59s)

</comment></comment><comment><USER23> This focus on MCAS only is tantamount to a red-herring because there are many more changes to the 737 NG and MAX that the FAA allowed with little or no oversight. The absurdly-crude Ducommun critical structural parts debacle gained almost no media attention in 2010, and several people have died due to fuselages breaking-up in runway overruns and hard landings where previous and similar aircraft maintained fuselage integrity. 737 NG, MAX, 787 and all other Boeing aircraft developed in the past 25 years need to be seriously reexamined for safety risks and deficiencies.

</comment><comment><USER24> Kind of sad that they don't report AGL or AMSL along with the elevations here. How is anyone supposed to make sense of this reporting?

</comment><comment><USER25> TLDR;

1: multi billion dollar U.S. aviation company that employs thousands of employees statewide screws up

2: the aviation company offers to send consultants to "help" investigate the cause of the crash, and not falsify or change the narrative of the story in of the African operated flight whatsoever

3: the reputable Airlines that used their plane, decided to do their own untampered investigation and found the aviation company at fault

4: leaks get out via a few ethical employees at the aviation company that the plane was not tested properly and was rushed to market to compete with a rival European aviation company

5: CEO semi apologizes and the company has nightmare of pr

</comment><comment><USER26> One thing I don't understand is how the pilots can override the operation of the electric trim system by holding the manual trim wheels and yet the electric trim appears to be able to overcome airloads on the jackscrew that the pilots can't.

In light aircraft the design of autopilot servos normally includes a clutch so that the pilot can override the servos. But that limits the force that the servo can apply.

I guess it could have some kind of torsion sensing system which cuts the power to the trim motor but I've been unable to find this detailed anywhere.

<comment><USER4> Well, the "Stabilizer wheel - grasp and hold" item of the procedure doesn't necessarily mean the crew will be able to override it. That's the last ditch option on the checklist, when everything else has failed, even turning the motors off (there could be e.g. a short circuit powering the motor).

There is no clutch on the 737, AFAIK, because the forces are such that it wouldn't work.

Here is a good video by an actual 737 captain explaining how the runaway stab trim procedure works and what you have to do. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xixM_cwSLcQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xixM_cwSLcQ)

And this simulator video shows both how the 737 horizontal stabilizer is controlled and what kind of forces are on the trim wheel and control column when severely out of trim:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoNOVlxJmow](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoNOVlxJmow)

Should give you an idea what were the Ethiopian pilots facing when unable to use the electric trim, plane trimmed nose heavy by MCAS and at high speed ...

</comment></comment><comment><USER23> Mentour Pilot's channel:

[https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwpHKudUkP5tNgmMdexB3ow](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwpHKudUkP5tNgmMdexB3ow)

</comment><comment><USER27> How do these simulators work? What is the underlying model that gives sim users assurance that the simulated behaviour corresponds to real world aerodynamics and eg engine behaviour?

<comment><USER28> There are several levels of "Full Flight Simulators" [1] defined by the FAA: "There are currently four levels of full flight simulator, levels A - D, level D being the highest standard and being eligible for zero flight time (ZFT) training of civil pilots when converting from one airliner type to another."

The requirements and process for testing simulators for certification is documented as well [2]. Its not clear from the article exactly what simulator they were using though.

[1] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Full_flight_simulator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Full_flight_simulator)

[2] [https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/nsp/media/14CFR60_Sear...](https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/nsp/media/14CFR60_Searchable_Version.pdf)

</comment></comment><comment><USER29> What does this mean for Boeing's responsibility? Is there a case that they were negligent for this plane and partially responsible for the crash?

<comment><USER11> This is all largely irrelevant until the actual accident reports are finished.

Yes, it's possible that Boeing will be partially (or even fully, although I doubt it) responsible.

</comment></comment><comment><USER30> This is slightly off topic, but I read write ups like this and wonder how flight simulators like this work. Do they have to program in the details of the accident, or is it just a standard Max 737 simulator?

<comment><USER31> In flight simulators, every aspect of the environment is able to be controlled by the user. Programming in the details of the accident involves setting up the same conditions as were present during the accident including altitude, airspeed, etc. Then the user/instructor would activate specific malfunctions that will cause the plane to behave like it did during the accident. Now the pilot is, for all intents and purposes, flying the same plane in the same conditions that the pilots were during the accident.

</comment></comment><comment><USER32> Would a possible recovery method be to roll the plane somewhat so that when the nose is forced down, it doesn't take the plane directly toward the ground?

<comment><USER33> You'd need to turn it all the way over, which is likely to upset the passengers.

<comment><USER5> Well, I'm sure they'd prefer being upset over being dead... although the likelihood of successfully rolling over and flying a negative-g recovery in a transport airplane seem dubious at best. Transport category airplanes are only certified to -1G so an inverted pullout would definitely exceed those limits.

<comment><USER34> See Boeing 707 barrel roll by Tex JohnSton.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER35> Article is behind a paywall unfortunately. Any help? :)

<comment><USER36> Found a forum thread about it from some aviation enthusiasts [1]. Some choice excerpts they made:

'A simulator session flown by a U.S.-based Boeing 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the Flight 302 accident sequence suggests that the crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.'

'What the U.S. crew found -. Keeping the aircraft level required significant aft-column pressure by the captain, and aerodynamic forces prevented the first officer from moving the trim wheel a full turn. They resorted to a little- known procedure to regain control.' (YoYo Roller Coaster)

The excessive descent rates during the first two steps meant the crew got as low as 2,000 ft. during the recovery.

...

'The simulator session underscored the importance of reacting quickly to uncommanded stabilizer movements and avoiding a severe out-of-trim condition, one of the pilots involved said. "I don't think the situation would be survivable at 350 kt. and below 5,000 ft," this pilot noted.'

"This is the sort of simulator experience airline crews need to gain an understanding of how runaway trim can make the aircraft very difficult to control, and how important it is to rehearse use of manual trim inputs,"

[1] [https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/621478-ethiopian-max- cra...](https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/621478-ethiopian-max-crash- simulator-scenario-stuns-pilots.html)

<comment><USER37> Can someone shed light on what the "little-known procedure" is they're referring to?

<comment><USER12> It's a "roller coaster" procedure where the plane is pitched down to lessen aerodynamic forces on the stabiliser, allowing the trim wheels to be manually turned, then pitched up to regain altitude. The process is repeated as necessary until the trim wheels can be manually moved without it.

<comment><USER38> Interesting, it seems similar to how large sailboats need to head into or down wind when attempting to trim sails in some conditions? (to reduce pressure on the sails to allow trimming to be doable by hand)

<comment><USER39> Yeah, with the important difference that in sailing you lose speed (and heel) when heading into the wind, whereas a plane will go even faster towards the ground... Scary!

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER40> > and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim > recovery procedures.

So we're back to blaming the pilots?

<comment><USER41> That's pretty much the opposite, right? That the pilots would need to know an extreme emergency procedure. In other words you'd need a Sully level pilot to survive (and unsurvivable below a certain speed and height). If you ask me that's a damning indictment when a flawed autopilot results in a state like that.

<comment><USER42> Except Sully actually screwed up and put the passengers life in danger by trying to land on water and rather than returning to the airport. [https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ntsb-sully-could-have-made- it-b...](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ntsb-sully-could-have-made-it-back-to- laguardia/)

<comment><USER43> This was disproven. And is a major plot point in the movie about Flight 1549 (Sully).

From Wikipedia:

> The NTSB used flight simulators to test the possibility that the flight > could have returned safely to LaGuardia or diverted to Teterboro; only seven > of the thirteen simulated returns to La Guardia succeeded, and only one of > the two to Teterboro.

> Furthermore, the NTSB report called these simulations unrealistic: "The > immediate turn made by the pilots during the simulations did not reflect or > account for real-world considerations, such as the time delay required to > recognize the bird strike and decide on a course of action." A further > simulation, in which a 35-second delay was inserted to allow for those, > crashed.</comment></comment></comment></comment>


Please Review our startup – Venux.com - <AUTHOR>

Hey guys,
We are looking for some feedback on our website and products. Do you understand the message based on the information on the website? Would you want to download the products when first viewing the site?
If you have downloaded our products, what is your initial impression? <comment><USER2> The landing page is nicely designed with clear flow for the user to grasp the product (wordy at times).

_[http://venux.com/products/connect/download](http://venux.com/products/connect/download) (only displays the Windows Icon which gave me the initial thought it was PC only until i noticed the compatibility statement)

_Even though the site is inviting i don't trust the information i will store using the service. This may come with brand awareness.

*About Us page- I would like to learn more about the teams background

Good luck on the adventure.

<comment><AUTHOR> Thank you for the feedback.

Would it make more sense to you if on the download page, we added icons for Mac and Linux without download buttons with text like "coming soon" or "unavailable"?

<comment><USER2> I feel any indicator that shows the product is coming soon will relay the message to users to follow-up (ie email notification when mac/linux is release).

<comment><AUTHOR> Thanks again for your suggestion.

</comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><USER3> The web site seems very solid to me. The design is good, clean, very professional.

Your message isn't nearly as clear. I understand you encrypt data and somehow make sharing, or keeping, my data more secure. But I don't see to what end. I don't get a clear sense of what MY problem is and then how you are solving it.

So let's say I like to video chat online with my college bound son using Google Hangouts. I am also security and privacy conscious. How do I go from downloading your software to having a chat with my son? By the way, there is not a chance in hell I am going to download your software, hand you my account information, and get my son to do the same thing BEFORE you describe to me how the software works and what benefit I am getting. Give me a simple "walk through" of what you want me to do and why this is going to make my life better and maybe I will. Something like:

Google Hangouts are insecure -> government officials/naughty hacker people watch you while you chat on Google Hangouts -> You love privacy and want security -> Downloading Venux is easy -> connect with Venux to Google hangouts makes hangsouts secure! -> Venux secures you and blocks out government officials/naughty hackers!

You also make some sensational claims about your security. Mathematically impossible? How do I know? Have you been peer reviewed? Have you been audited? Can I look at how you implement the algorithms? Or should I just hand you my credit card and believe? I am not trying to sound difficult, I just want you to think about how you talk about your product.

There is a TON of data on your front page and frankly I get lost in all of it and it doesn't really tell me anything I want to know in order to decide if I want to actually download your software. It would take me a while to critique the entire experience. I would suggest simplifying the entire page and giving me a simple path to realizing I have a problem and then showing me that you are the solution.

Edit: One other thing I guess I would like to point out is you could, and probably should, niche this thing. For example, look at Tarsnap[0]. The website design won't win awards. They aren't attempting to market to every person in the world who could use an online backup. I believe it takes a high level of technical prowess to use their product. Yet, they have a very very profitable niche. I am not comparing your product to theirs (though I guess they both have a security component). What I am saying is pretty web site designs don't sell products. Finding the right customer and then making sure that customer knows about you sells products.

[0] [http://www.tarsnap.com/](http://www.tarsnap.com/)

<comment><AUTHOR> Hello trcollinson,

First of all, thank you very much for thoughtful input as well as your suggestions, we are considering much of what you have said.

"The web site seems very solid to me. The design is good, clean, very professional." Thank you very much!

"Your message isn't nearly as clear. I understand you encrypt data and somehow make sharing, or keeping, my data more secure. But I don't see to what end. I don't get a clear sense of what MY problem is and then how you are solving it." We will improve the message on our website based on your other suggestions. Once again, thank you!

"So let's say I like to video chat online with my college bound son using Google Hangouts. I am also security and privacy conscious. How do I go from downloading your software to having a chat with my son?" It's very simple actually, download, install and register. The entire process takes less than a minute and required only once.

"By the way, there is not a chance in hell I am going to download your software, hand you my account information, and get my son to do the same thing" That's the thing. You DON'T provide us with anything. Communication features such as chat/video/audio calls are free. As for providing us with any information, in order to use our software you only need to provide username and the password which is not submitted anywhere nor stored in any databases. Your credentials (username + password combination) is transcoded (one-way hash functions involved) and your profile created/accessed based on this transcoded information. Your credentials also calculate 8 (digits/numbers) PIN that you can provide to your son (or get his PIN) and by using this PIN (which is unique to your credentials only) you can become friends/contacts with anyone.

"BEFORE you describe to me how the software works" Well, not sure how deep you wish to go into implementation, but the high-level architecture is; Network: Venux forms Peer-to-Peer decentralized overlay network on top of the Internet. The network topology is similar to Gnutella, Freenet and other p2p networks which are formed on supernode/leaf (although in our network it is called router/peer) nodes. Venux "Routers" are elected automatically among Venux "peers" based on multiple criteria. Their job is to route synchronization information, coordinate "peers" for NAT (Network Address Translation) traversal, sometimes route audio/video calls via RTP (Real-Time Protocol) tunnels when peers are behind strict firewalls. Audio/video calls are transmitted using SRTP (Secure Real-time Transport Protocol)

Storage: All information within Venux Network is stored by peers in small (3kb to 40kb) .PGP files. They are all looking likes this;

85C6 A2C6 7E93 3911 7952 2171 0656 85F8 8C08 A0D5 5F35 62A4 807A 4862 0F52 87DF F154 E2EF.pgp 889B 61EA BB94 7B77 5E02 3179 DDF6 3A0E 8669 29A0 0A1A 23D5 3EB4 8DEE 2408 04E3.pgp These files maybe your profile, avatar of one of your contacts, etc. Venux uses PGP for validation purposes as well as for anonymity by the use of PGP ascii-armor.

Profile: UniversalID (or UID) is a JSON object that stores contacts public keys, login credentials to remote services such as DropBox and so on. UID is always in sync (at least it tries to be) with all of its copies that are stored locally (and any other computer/device you use to login into Venux) as well as within your contacts.

"and what benefit I am getting. Give me a simple "walk through" of what you want me to do and why this is going to make my life better and maybe I will. Something like: Google Hangouts are insecure -> government officials/naughty hacker people watch you while you chat on Google Hangouts -> You love privacy and want security -> Downloading Venux is easy -> connect with Venux to Google hangouts makes hangouts secure! -> Venux secures you and blocks out government officials/naughty hackers!" The overall benefit is simple. You have a single profile (you may have many profiles if you wish, they are all free) that allows you to login from anywhere on the planet, access your encrypted/raw data from various services, communicate with your contacts, access your remote computers/devices, share your files from work computers with any of your contacts from home, all of it without worrying about privacy and anonymity.

"You also make some sensational claims about your security. Mathematically impossible? How do I know?" Pretty much all modern strong cryptographic algorithms are mathematically impossible to break. Assuming you don't have a key, the only option you have is a brute-force attack which has nothing to do with mathematics. Given the synergy effect of our implementation (where algorithm to encrypt the data is chosen based on user credentials), even brute-force attack is pretty useless. Given another point where all .PGP files all look alike without any outside references, you don't really know either if you're attacking the profile or somebody's avatar. The biggest issue in any security system is a key management, not cryptography, which in Venux is pretty much automatic.

"Have you been peer reviewed?" Many of the algorithms we use are peer- reviewed.

"Have you been audited?" Most system components are audited since they have been used in other security products. As for Venux, no, we haven't been audited but hope to do that soon.

"Can I look at how you implement the algorithms?" You will have a chance to review entire code base once we'll go open-source.

"Or should I just hand you my credit card and believe?" We don't need your credit card if you are not satisfied with our product(s).

"I am not trying to sound difficult, I just want you to think about how you talk about your product." Yes, thank you very much, your input is very valuable to us!

"There is a TON of data on your front page and frankly I get lost in all of it and it doesn't really tell me anything I want to know in order to decide if I want to actually download your software. It would take me a while to critique the entire experience. I would suggest simplifying the entire page and giving me a simple path to realizing I have a problem and then showing me that you are the solution. Edit: One other thing I guess I would like to point out is you could, and probably should, niche this thing. For example, look at Tarsnap[0]. The website design won't win awards. They aren't attempting to market to every person in the world who could use an online backup. I believe it takes a high level of technical prowess to use their product. Yet, they have a very very profitable niche. I am not comparing your product to theirs (though I guess they both have a security component). What I am saying is pretty web site designs don't sell products. Finding the right customer and then making sure that customer knows about you sells products."

We are working to improve that as we speak :)

</comment></comment><comment><USER4> You need to give a very, very specific use case right off the bat.

Security, computing, privacy. Simplify everything. Be in control of your data. Communicate freely. Mathematically impossible to break.

What are you talking about? So much text, and you don't even provide one actual direct strike example use among all of that buzzwording.

Pick your top one or two use cases, be specific, and sell yourself for that immediately near the top of the intro on the homepage. Right now it comes across as so vague as to not mean anything specific. Products are about solving narrow, specific problems; the wider you cast the net the harder it's going to be to get the traction you want.

<comment><AUTHOR> Thank you for your feedback. This is useful information to us.</comment></comment>


Snapchat Minis - <AUTHOR> https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/20/snap-turns-on-minis-bite-sized-third-party-apps-in-snapchat/ <comment><AUTHOR> seems the era, of superapps is now here, in the states. will be interesting, to see if Apple decides to fight with snapchat. also amazing they're html5 based. web always wins</comment>


Court Rebukes DOJ, Says Hacking Required to Be Prosecuted as Hacker - <AUTHOR> http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/04/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ <comment><USER2> Between this and the SOPA/PIPA/etc. pushes, you can tell the US Government _WANTS SO BADLY_ to dictate the boundaries of the free Internet. It brings up the old bit, "you can tell you're free because this is what freedom looks like."

<comment><USER3> No they don't. The world does not break down a conviently dramatic good-guy bad-guy narrative. It's much more boring.

What the DoJ wants is an easy, flexible statutory framework that will let them shortcut prosecutions in cases like this, where you have a clear bad-actor for whom non-CFAA cases would be complicated and expensive to pursue. Remember, the guy who evaded CFAA prosecution in this article isn't a hero. (Read the whole article for the [strictly white collar] criminality he's accused of, but fair warning: it's boring white collar stuff).

 _That doesn't make the DoJ right_. It probably shouldn't be super easy for them to make complex cases simply by citation to computer terms of service. But it also doesn't _automatically_ signal the intention of every single government entity to take over the "free Internet".

An extremely excellent study of the issues at play in defining "abuse" and "unauthorized access":

<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=399740>

Strongly recommend reading the whole thing. It covers a giant swath of almost any computer-based legal drama likely to hit HN.

<comment><USER4> _What the DoJ wants is an easy, flexible statutory framework that will let them shortcut prosecutions in cases like this, where you have a clear bad- actor for whom non-CFAA cases would be complicated and expensive to pursue._

This fails to reassure me.

<comment><USER3> Fails to reassure you of what? I can't help feeling like you stopped reading at that sentence.

<comment><USER4> You say it's not good vs evil, and that the government's goal isn't to cripple the Internet, but "just" to bypass due process so they can easily convict people they "know" are guilty. If anything I find your scenario even worse; it's approaching the cartoon villains in Atlas Shrugged ("there's no way to rule innocent men").

<comment><USER3> I'm going to play this "Not Arguing Law With People Who Are Especially Conversant With Ayn Rand" card I had conveniently saved for just such an occasion.

</comment></comment></comment></comment></comment></comment><comment><AUTHOR> Prior relevant reporting: [http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/anti- hacking-law-to...](http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/anti-hacking-law- too-broad/?utm_source=Contextly&utm_medium=RelatedLinks&utm_campaign=Previous)

</comment><comment><USER5> Technology created the Internet and, as such, technology is really the only thing to make it safe from "hacking".

Laws are abstract concepts easily broken: especially by those who write them. Laws have never assured security (and that goes for things beyond just the internet).</comment>