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Seiad Valley to Etna Summit (56.2 PCT miles)
Seiad Valley has a reputation as a hiker friendly town, but that wasn't our experience. We think they could use a lesson from Trout Lake. From the cars that whizzed by us on Hwy 96 without slowing or moving over while we walked along the 6" shoulder in the sweltering heat, to the no less than 6 signs around the cafe/store advising what hikers couldn't do, our first impression was negative. The store was a dark, dank, and nearly empty room with a dour woman behind the counter who groused about our packages and refused to sell us quarters. The bright spot was the cafe, where we were warmly welcomed and treated well even though we didn't order much. The tiny RV Park is apparently run by a guy named Bruce, a large guy who wears small tank tops (per our server in the cafe) who takes advantage of hikers by charging $15 to camp, hang out on his lawn, and/or shower or use the coin-op laundry there. After being warned about this by our server, I walked over with my towel to inquire about the cost for just a shower (the sign out front says "PCT Hikers Welcome!" & "Public Showers & Laundry"). The office was empty with a note on the door saying "if my grey Expedition is here, I'm around somewhere." No grey Expedition, and nobody matching the description of Bruce. I wandered a bit and found a coin-op laundry, and an adjacent bathroom with what appeared to be a quarter-operated shower. A big sign on the door said in all caps that showers and laundry were for paying guests only, but I had a few quarters with me.... It turns out that the quarter-taking machine wasn't connected, the water was hot, and there were slivers of soap on the sill. It was the grossest shower stall I've seen on our hike so far, but a shower is a shower. Afterwards I hurried back over to the picnic tables outside the cafe to let Macro know the scene, and he walked over to have a similarly quick but free shower before Bruce showed up. Oh, and the woman at the post office was pretty friendly. But the only area in town to sit down and sort resupply goods (unless you paid to sit on the lawn at the RV park) was a pair of picnic tables and a dirt lot adjacent to a dumpster and outdoor restroom. There was a bit of shade, but in the sweltering heat you can imagine how that area smelled. We had every intention of leaving town by early afternoon but were paralyzed by the 100+ degree heat and caught up in conversation with the other hikers milling about. By the time we loaded up our packs with a full 6-day resupply and maximum water it was already 3pm.
We knew we would have to continue along Hwy 96 another mile to cross the Klamath River, but hadn't realized that after that was another 5+ mile road walk before the PCT became a trail again. The highway was blazing hot in the direct sun, and we again received no courtesy from passing cars. We turned up Grider Creek Road for the rest of our drudgery, thankful for little patches of shade and that we weren't staying in Seiad Valley for the night. There were only a handful of cars on this road and for the first few miles it follows along the wide and slow Klamath River. An osprey went by and a bald eagle soared overhead, and we saw tons of Canada geese along the shore. If it hadn't been for the road-walk and the heat, it would have been quite scenic. Our initial goal was to get 8-10 miles out of town before camping, but we discovered on the map that there were camping options at 6.4 and 14 miles, but nothing in between. The earlier spot was a USFS campground at the end of the road-walk, allegedly closed though we figured PCT hikers were probably still sleeping there given the paucity of alternate options. The steep and highly vegetated terrain made it unlikely that we would find a flat spot not already indicated as a campsite on our maps. We decided that given the heat, the weight of our packs, and our late start we should just plan for the campground and be happy that we were out of Seiad Valley and (nearly) on the trail. The road turned away from the Klamath and was only intermittently paved as it climbed gently, passing several rural properties with plentiful "Keep Out" and "No Trespassing" signs posted. With less than 2 miles left to hike, we were passed by a Subaru that slowed, then stopped. The driver rolled down a window to ask if we were southbounding, then offered us a ride to the campground. As tempting as it was, our journey is to _hike_ the PCT, not hitch rides along it. So we thanked her but declined, and walked the final bit along the road. At least our final impression was that of a friendly resident.
Grider Creek Campground was filled with signs stating the area was closed due to salvage logging operations in the area from a recent fire. The outhouse was unlocked, though, and we weren't the only ones there. NOBOs King Arthur (from Adelaide), Rainbow (German but living in Barcelona), and an Asian dude whose name we didn't catch all camped there that night along with us and two other SOBOs. We'd met Neemor for the first time at the picnic tables in Seiad earlier today, though we had heard of him from other hikers. The soft-spoken Georgian started 9 days after us and is obviously moving fast, with a UL setup that looks like a daypack. He thru-hiked the AT last year and only just decided to hike the PCT this June, when his family stayed in Old Station on an RV camping trip and he saw the trail passing nearby. When I asked if he was going to do the CDT next he demurred, saying he didn't really want to. And besides, he'd only have 4 months to work and save up for it after the PCT. The problem, he admitted, is that with long-distance hiking you have to either do one trail or all three. Once you complete two you pretty much have to go for the triple crown. He said he was thinking about not finishing the PCT, just to avoid the conundrum. Perhaps he'd quit at Lake Morena (20 miles from the Mexican border), at which we both laughed. But I'm guessing he'll be a triple crowner within a few years. The other SOBO at the campground was Mats (AKA Jorts), who we met as he flew past the morning we were headed to Timberline Lodge. He also started several days after us and we didn't expect to see him again, but it turns out that he took 5 days off in Ashland. We all hung around a picnic table and enjoyed easy conversation while we ate our respective dinners. It struck me how the NOBOs we run into now are the stragglers, who hike relatively short days and are unlikely to finish the trail this year. Our roles have reversed so now it is the SOBOs of the group who are getting up early, hiking late into the evening, and making long miles with a goal in mind while the NOBOs are the relative slackers. I wondered when we we see our very last NOBO, and how far these three would make it.
On Day 53 we in fact did wake up early and were the first out of the campground, hitting the trail by 6:15am just before sunrise. We had a steady 7000' climb in the first 15 miles, and given yesterday's heat wanted to get much of it behind us while it was still cool. We didn't have high expectations for the scenery but once again were happily surprised. The trail climbs along Grider Creek for the first 8 miles, crossing several times to alternate between the steep canyon walls. Despite the recent burn, there was plenty of regrowth in the understory and some trees were still alive. Madrones, firs, and small maples predominated at the low elevations and we kept a constant eye out for poison oak, which was unfortunatley prolific. Huge pieces of white granite bulged from the hillside and lined the path of the Grider, and gave us a little taste of what we might see in the Marble Mountains. The Grider was a larger creek than we've seen in a while, and in spots its clear waters formed deep green pools that tempted us to hop in for a swim. The faster-moving sections carved smooth curves into the granite, and tumbled the river rocks until they were perfectly rounded. All of this plus the natural air conditioning provided by the rushing water and deep shaded canyon made for an enjoyable morning. The sun didn't hit us until 10am, when we were already halfway through our climb. Neemor and Mats passed us a few miles in, and we suspect we won't see either of them again. After we left Grider Creek, we continued a climb through variable terrain, a mixture of dry exposed slopes and deep shaded forest with a smattering of humid fern and thimbleberry thickets and thankfully small stretches of recent burn. There wasn't much on-trail water, and the only camping options were the ends of abandoned dirt roads. However, a slight breeze and some decent shade made this long climb much more civilized than either of us had dreamed it might be. We popped out of forest at a dirt road near the Cold Spring trailhead and were briefly in a section of the huge burn that we could see on the hill from town. We had long views of ridges in every direction but it was hot, so thankfully we were soon out of the burn as we entered the Marble Mountain Wilderness.
We stopped for water and a long snack break at Buckhorn Spring near the top of our climb, a few miles into the wilderness. The water was just a trickle coming through a length of PVC pipe placed into the pool to facilitate collection, but it was sufficient for our purposes and we sat in the shade of a huge tree for a bit of rest and refreshment. The spring was in the middle of a wide buckwheat-filled slope, capped by interesting rock formations and with broad views below to several distant ridgelines. It would have made a great camping spot, but it was too early in the afternoon to stop for the night. There was a NOBO there having a "dirt nap" and listening to a podcast, who told us that he is impressed by the SOBOs he's meeting, as he has never has been able to consistently hike 20-mile days, and subsequently may not finish (for most thru-hikers, that would be a very short day). He was generally a bit odd, but did let us know that the creek in Marble Valley where we were planning to camp that night was running poorly. We left him there and continued our hike, generally along high ridges with hazy views of Mt. Shasta. These rugged mountains with rocky outcroppings and steep green or forested slopes made good eye-candy, though we were saddened by the wide swaths of dead trees on many hillsides (presumably from bark-beetle damage). We climbed to a dramatic rocky knoll with a handful of windswept trees contrasting against the red earth and the blue sky, and could have spent an hour there just looking at each tree from every angle. The heat kept us moving, and fortunately it wasn't long before we dropped onto the shady forested slope of the next ridge. The trail meandered around adjacent slopes for a bit. Up close, the green areas of these rugged mountains are covered in wildflowers, and at the higher elevations there were still some in bloom though others were showing signs of transition to fall. The trail generally makes a high traverse between slopes, somewhat reminiscent of northern WA. We passed small and shallow Paradise Lake, not that appealing but nevertheless surrounded by weekend campers and a few groups of hunters on this Saturday in late August.
In the late afternoon we got our first glimpses of Black Marble Mountain. Its upper knobs are black but the rest of the slopes are glistening white marble wherever there isn't green vegetation. As we neared this stunning peak, we started seeing white marble along the trail, in talus fields, and in broad shelves of rock containing intricate crevices that just invited exploration. The pale rock gleamed in the low-angle sunlight and it was difficult to make progress as we stopped to exclaim and explore at every corner. We passed a few sweet campsites set in a grove of hemlocks growing right from the marble shelves, but they appeared to be taken by hunters and besides, we needed water. We dropped down to the next creek, where we stopped to make dinner and fill up our reservoirs. Having lollygagged through the marble after a long day's climb, we ended up hiking the final 1.3 miles to our campsite in Marble Valley by headlamp. We saw 18 NOBOs on the trail today, but had the entire valley to ourselves for camping.
Day 54 started out hot. We climbed through a bit more white rock in Little Marble Valley, then worked our way up to some high ridges that were variably forested, sage-covered, open, or burned. We had more hazy views of Mt. Shasta and noticed what seemed to be new smoke behind some ridges to the north. Water was scarce on-trail today, and we hoped to make 30 miles which would put us at a lake 7 miles south of Etna Summit. The rocky terrain and frequent ups & downs slowed our progress, as did the spectacular views. In the late morning we made a long traverse towards a deep and clear blue-green lake sitting in a high shelf at the base of a craggy peak. We both agreed this was a place we'd love to return to and explore further, and spotted what looked to be a perfect campsite near its shore. We ultimately passed well above what turned out to be named Man Eater Lake, and crossed the nearby saddle to descend into a high alpine basin rivaling any we have seen in the Sierra. There were piles of granite talus, stands of western hemlock and white pine, wildflowers galore, steep rocky crags, a tumbling creek, and deep blue sky above. We decided to take our mid-day break early and lounged right on the granite rocks of the trail where it crossed the creek. We had seen only one section hiker and no thru-hikers today, and nobody came by in the 30+ minutes we hung out in the sun with our toes in the cold water. It was the perfect spot, and the perfect day. As we started back down the trail, we even found a large stand of huckleberry shrubs with big juicy ripe fruit. I love the Marble Mountains! It's hard to believe we've never been to this wilderness, since we have backpacked in the nearby Trinity Alps many times. After this first taste, I'm certain we will return.
The afternoon consisted of more high traversing. We passed a few small lakes that were really more like large ponds, then were in & out of forest on scenic but hot, exposed and rocky slopes for the rest of the day. Several knolls had bonsai-like ancient trees growing straight from the rock, while others were sage-covered with patches of blooming buckwheat and silvery lupine gone to seed. We realized that with the terrain, heat, and our penchance for enjoying our surroundings, 30 miles would mean at least a few hours of hiking by headlamp and didn't seem reasonable. Our remaining options were limited. The last two water sources before the road at Etna Summit were reported to be marginal at best, and even if we ate dinner at one then camped at the last known spot before the road we'd have hiked less than 20 miles. On the other hand, the first water source beyond the road was 6 miles in up a stiff climb, and the first campsite was a mile further. Suddenly, a night in town started to look pretty good. If we could catch a ride the 10 miles into Etna, we'd get a 25 mile day in, have water and a place to sleep for the night, and could get a fresh start on the other side of the road tomorrow morning. We passed our first two NOBOs of the day, who reported they'd been in Etna and it was a nice town, but a difficult hitch due to low traffic on the road. A few miles later we passed a third, who said he'd spent 3 days at the Motel Etna and highly recommended it. He confirmed there was little traffic on the road, but he had gotten a ride within half an hour. This was encouraging. Of course, he had left the road at 9:30am today and it had taken him 6+ hours to hike the 8.5 miles we had left, which was not encouraging. We checked the elevation profile and confirmed there was only ~1200' elevation gain and a similar drop, so it should not only take us about half as long to get there. These are definitely the stragglers of the bunch. As we continued on the trail, Macro pointed out that it was Sunday evening and we'd be hitting the road sometime after 6pm, so perhaps we should have a contingency in case we couldn't hitch a ride. The town is only 10 miles away, but the lake we were planning to camp at is only 7, so we are certainly not walking to town tonight. We passed one more NOBO in the late afternoon, making a grand total of just 4 for the day.
Our problem was solved when we crested the final saddle before making the final 3-mile descent to the road. We had a great (though hazy) view of Mt. Shasta, an increasingly large plume of smoke to the north, and cell service. I called the Motel Etna to see if they had space for the night, and asked what they thought the odds were of hitching a ride this time on a Sunday evening. After a bit of conferring on the other end, innkeeper Ryan asked what time we'd be at the road and said his girlfriend Sharon would come pick us up! We hustled down the trail to make our 6:30pm date, and within a few minutes of our arrival Sharon drove up. On the way back to town we learned that the billowing smoke is from a huge new fire near Happy Camp and just 5 miles north of Seiad, which is not yet at all contained and has caused many to be evacuated. We had good timing, and hope it can be controlled soon. As for Etna, it is a small town, though has a few restaurants and a small supermarket. We found the Motel Etna to be small but clean and extremely welcoming. In addition to picking us up from the trail there was a hiker box near the office, they had plastic trays for soaking feet in Epsom salts, and they even offered to do our laundry! We walked to Dotty's cafe, where we enjoyed delicious veggie burgers and a huge basket of sweet potato fries for dinner. The supermarket was our next stop to get ice cream (but of course), stuff for breakfast, and a few fresh items to supplement our trail food between here and Castella. We couldn't be more pleased with our unexpected town night, and glad it is in Etna rather than Seiad Valley. Tomorrow we're going to check out the bakery then head back to the trail, where we will be headed towards the Trinity Alps.


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subset: commoncrawl


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The Queen turned 91 this year! In honor of Elizabeth's birthday, here are fun facts about her—and her life!
RELATED: The Most Adorable Photos of the Royal Family, From Then Until Now
The Queen cannot be arrested because she is free from all prosecution. She and the royal family are also exempt from Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests.


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Signal Monitoring
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- DVB transport stream monitoring device
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- Available for the following modulation types: QPSK, 8PSK, QAM, OFDM
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kate spade new york Baby Girls Large Bow Headband Multi Glitter, One Size Currently only $14 on Amazon Looks like there is potential to get it to you by Christmas, but New Years for sure! Of course glitter is acceptable any time of year! This is the multi-color variation and should fit any little head…
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This is the excerpt for a featured content post.


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Wildomar Real Estate
Wildomar is a city (recently incorporated 2008) within the Temecula Valley in the southwestern Riverside County Region. It is bordered by Lake Elsinore to the North, Murrieta to the South and Orange County to the West. The current population is over 32,000 people. The city is much more rural then its neighbors and is often characterized as having homes with more "elbow room". Wildomar is perfect for residents who commute, but also like have ranches with horses and other animals.
Wildomar does not have its own school district and is a part of the Lake Elsinore Unified School District. Which is fitting as only 44% of all households having children under the age of 18 in the home.
When it comes to the Temecula Valley, Wildomar is definitely known for being a more affordable and over 70% of the residents of Wildomar are home owners. There is an increasing demand for Wildomar by buyers as more and more developers are buying land and creating beautiful new communities. The most utilized financing types by buyers in the area are FHA and Conventional, but this area also qualifies for USDA 100% financing!
Wildomar does not have any Condo's within city limits..
The average Single Family Home under 2000 sq. ft. sold for an average of $298,748 in 2015.
The average Single Family Home between 2000-4000 sq. ft. sold for an average of $359,961 in 2015.
Wildomar does not have a Luxury market and only 5 homes over 4000 sq. ft. sold all year.


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Artifact Details
TitleHP - 2640C (CRYILLIC) CRT terminal
Catalog Number102704286
TypeStill Image
PublisherHewlett-Packard Company (HP)
Identifying Numbers
|Other number
Dimensionsoverall: 8 in x 10 in
DescriptionBlack and White image of a HP 2640C (CYRILLIC) CRT Terminal.
Keyboard is shown close up wirth two hand on the keyboard. Above the keys are control switches and buttons.


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June 15, 2014
by Bruce Schneier
CTO, Co3 Systems, Inc.
A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.
For back issues, or to subscribe, visit <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.
You can read this issue on the web at <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-1406.html>. These same essays and news items appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog at <http://www.schneier.com/blog>, along with a lively and intelligent comment section. An RSS feed is available.
In this issue:
- Disclosing vs. Hoarding Vulnerabilities
- The NSA is Not Made of Magic
- GCHQ Intercept Sites in Oman
- News
- Chinese Hacking of the US
- The Human Side of Heartbleed
- TrueCrypt
- Schneier News
- Security and Human Behavior (SHB 2014)
- Seventh Movie-Plot Threat Contest Winner
Disclosing vs. Hoarding Vulnerabilities
There's a debate going on about whether the US government -- specifically, the NSA and United States Cyber Command -- should stockpile Internet vulnerabilities or disclose and fix them. It's a complicated problem, and one that starkly illustrates the difficulty of separating attack and defense in cyberspace.
A software vulnerability is a programming mistake that allows an adversary access into that system. Heartbleed is a recent example, but hundreds are discovered every year.
Unpublished vulnerabilities are called "zero-day" vulnerabilities, and they're very valuable because no one is protected. Someone with one of those can attack systems world-wide with impunity.
When someone discovers one, he can either use it for defense or for offense. Defense means alerting the vendor and getting it patched. Lots of vulnerabilities are discovered by the vendors themselves and patched without any fanfare. Others are discovered by researchers and hackers. A patch doesn't make the vulnerability go away, but most users protect themselves by patching their systems regularly.
Offense means using the vulnerability to attack others. This is the quintessential zero-day, because the vendor doesn't even know the vulnerability exists until it starts being used by criminals or hackers. Eventually the affected software's vendor finds out -- the timing depends on how extensively the vulnerability is used -- and issues a patch to close the vulnerability.
If an offensive military cyber unit discovers the vulnerability -- or a cyber-weapons arms manufacturer -- it keeps that vulnerability secret for use to deliver a cyber-weapon. If it is used stealthily, it might remain secret for a long time. If unused, it'll remain secret until someone else discovers it.
Discoverers can sell vulnerabilities. There's a rich market in zero-days for attack purposes -- both military/commercial and black markets. Some vendors offer bounties for vulnerabilities to incent defense, but the amounts are much lower.
The NSA can play either defense or offense. It can either alert the vendor and get a still-secret vulnerability fixed, or it can hold on to it and use it to eavesdrop on foreign computer systems. Both are important US policy goals, but the NSA has to choose which one to pursue. By fixing the vulnerability, it strengthens the security of the Internet against all attackers: other countries, criminals, hackers. By leaving the vulnerability open, it is better able to attack others on the Internet. But each use runs the risk of the target government learning of, and using for itself, the vulnerability -- or of the vulnerability becoming public and criminals starting to use it.
There is no way to simultaneously defend US networks while leaving foreign networks open to attack. Everyone uses the same software, so fixing us means fixing them, and leaving them vulnerable means leaving us vulnerable. As Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote, "every offensive weapon is a (potential) chink in our defense -- and vice versa."
To make matters even more difficult, there is an arms race going on in cyberspace. The Chinese, the Russians, and many other countries are finding vulnerabilities as well. If we leave a vulnerability unpatched, we run the risk of another country independently discovering it and using it in a cyber-weapon that we will be vulnerable to. But if we patch all the vulnerabilities we find, we won't have any cyber-weapons to use against other countries.
Many people have weighed in on this debate. The president's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, convened post-Snowden, concluded (recommendation 30), that vulnerabilities should only be hoarded in rare instances and for short times. Cory Doctorow calls it a public health problem. I have said similar things. Dan Geer recommends that the US government corner the vulnerabilities market and fix them all. Both the FBI and the intelligence agencies claim that this amounts to unilateral disarmament.
It seems like an impossible puzzle, but the answer hinges on how vulnerabilities are distributed in software.
If vulnerabilities are sparse, then it's obvious that every vulnerability we find and fix improves security. We render a vulnerability unusable, even if the Chinese government already knows about it. We make it impossible for criminals to find and use it. We improve the general security of our software, because we can find and fix most of the vulnerabilities.
If vulnerabilities are plentiful -- and this seems to be true -- the ones the US finds and the ones the Chinese find will largely be different. This means that patching the vulnerabilities we find won't make it appreciably harder for criminals to find the next one. We don't really improve general software security by disclosing and patching unknown vulnerabilities, because the percentage we find and fix is small compared to the total number that are out there.
But while vulnerabilities are plentiful, they're not uniformly distributed. There are easier-to-find ones, and harder-to-find ones. Tools that automatically find and fix entire classes of vulnerabilities, and coding practices that eliminate many easy-to-find ones, greatly improve software security. And when a person finds a vulnerability, it is likely that another person soon will, or recently has, found the same vulnerability. Heartbleed, for example, remained undiscovered for two years, and then two independent researchers discovered it within two days of each other. This is why it is important for the government to err on the side of disclosing and fixing.
The NSA, and by extension US Cyber Command, tries its best to play both ends of this game. Former NSA Director Michael Hayden talks about NOBUS, "nobody but us." The NSA has a classified process to determine what it should do about vulnerabilities, disclosing and closing most of the ones it finds, but holding back some -- we don't know how many -- vulnerabilities that "nobody but us" could find for attack purposes.
This approach seems to be the appropriate general framework, but the devil is in the details. Many of us in the security field don't know how to make NOBUS decisions, and the recent White House clarification posed more questions than it answered.
Who makes these decisions, and how? How often are they reviewed? Does this review process happen inside Department of Defense, or is it broader? Surely there needs to be a technical review of each vulnerability, but there should also be policy reviews regarding the sorts of vulnerabilities we are hoarding. Do we hold these vulnerabilities until someone else finds them, or only for a short period of time? How many do we stockpile? The US/Israeli cyberweapon Stuxnet used four zero-day vulnerabilities. Burning four on a single military operation implies that we are not hoarding a small number, but more like 100 or more.
There's one more interesting wrinkle. Cyber-weapons are a combination of a payload -- the damage the weapon does -- and a delivery mechanism: the vulnerability used to get the payload into the enemy network. Imagine that China knows about a vulnerability and is using it in a still-unfired cyber-weapon, and that the NSA learns about it through espionage. Should the NSA disclose and patch the vulnerability, or should it use it itself for attack? If it discloses, then China could find a replacement vulnerability that the NSA won't know about it. But if it doesn't, it's deliberately leaving the US vulnerable to cyber-attack. Maybe someday we can get to the point where we can patch vulnerabilities faster than the enemy can use them in an attack, but we're nowhere near that point today.
The implications of US policy can be felt on a variety of levels. The NSA's actions have resulted in a widespread mistrust of the security of US Internet products and services, greatly affecting American business. If we show that we're putting security ahead of surveillance, we can begin to restore that trust. And by making the decision process much more public than it is today, we can demonstrate both our trustworthiness and the value of open government.
An unpatched vulnerability puts everyone at risk, but not to the same degree. The US and other Western countries are highly vulnerable, because of our critical electronic infrastructure, intellectual property, and personal wealth. Countries like China and Russia are less vulnerable -- North Korea much less -- so they have considerably less incentive to see vulnerabilities fixed. Fixing vulnerabilities isn't disarmament; it's making our own countries much safer. We also regain the moral authority to negotiate any broad international reductions in cyber-weapons; and we can decide not to use them even if others do.
Regardless of our policy towards hoarding vulnerabilities, the most important thing we can do is patch vulnerabilities quickly once they are disclosed. And that's what companies are doing, even without any government involvement, because so many vulnerabilities are discovered by criminals.
We also need more research in automatically finding and fixing vulnerabilities, and in building secure and resilient software in the first place. Research over the last decade or so has resulted in software vendors being able to find and close entire classes of vulnerabilities. Although there are many cases of these security analysis tools not being used, all of our security is improved when they are. That alone is a good reason to continue disclosing vulnerability details, and something the NSA can do to vastly improve the security of the Internet worldwide. Here again, though, they would have to make the tools they have to automatically find vulnerabilities available for defense and not attack.
In today's cyberwar arms race, unpatched vulnerabilities and stockpiled cyber-weapons are inherently destabilizing, especially because they are only effective for a limited time. The world's militaries are investing more money in finding vulnerabilities than the commercial world is investing in fixing them. The vulnerabilities they discover affect the security of us all. No matter what cybercriminals do, no matter what other countries do, we in the US need to err on the side of security and fix almost all the vulnerabilities we find. But not all, yet.
This essay previously appeared on TheAtlantic.com.
Cyber-weapons arms manufacturers:
Selling exploits to military/corporations:
Selling exploits on the black market:
Jack Goldsmith's commentary:
President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies report:
Cory Doctorow:
My earlier writing:
Dan Geer:
White House commentary:
Joel Brenner:
Vulnerabilities are plentiful:
Richard Clarke and Peter Swire:
Michael Hayden:
Stuxnet used four zero-day vulnerabilities:
Me on the loss of trust:
Microsoft on finding and closing vulnerabilities:
Me on the cyberwar arms race:
The game theory of cyberwar:
The NSA is Not Made of Magic
I am regularly asked what is the most surprising thing about the Snowden NSA documents. It's this: the NSA is not made of magic. Its tools are no different from what we have in our world, it's just better-funded. X-KEYSCORE is Bro plus memory. FOXACID is Metasploit with a budget. QUANTUM is AirPwn with a seriously privileged position on the backbone. The NSA breaks crypto not with super-secret cryptanalysis, but by using standard hacking tricks such as exploiting weak implementations and default keys. Its TAO implants are straightforward enhancements of attack tools developed by researchers, academics, and hackers; you can buy a computer the size of a grain of rice, if you want to make your own such tools. The NSA's collection and analysis tools are basically what you'd expect if you thought about it for a while.
That, fundamentally, is surprising. If you gave a super-secret Internet exploitation organization $10 billion annually, you'd expect some magic. And my guess is that there is some, around the edges, that has not become public yet. But that we haven't seen any yet is cause for optimism.
TAO tricks:
TAO implants:
Tiny computer:
GCHQ Intercept Sites in Oman
Last June, the "Guardian" published a story about GCHQ tapping fiber-optic Internet cables around the globe, part of a program codenamed TEMPORA. One of the facts not reported in that story -- and supposedly the fact that the "Guardian" agreed to withhold in exchange for not being prosecuted by the UK authorities -- was the location of the access points in the Middle East.
On Tuesday, the "Register" disclosed that they are in Oman:
The secret British spy base is part of a programme codenamed "CIRCUIT" and also referred to as Overseas Processing Centre 1 (OPC-1). It is located at Seeb, on the northern coast of Oman, where it taps in to various undersea cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Seeb is one of a three site GCHQ network in Oman, at locations codenamed "TIMPANI", "GUITAR" and "CLARINET". TIMPANI, near the Strait of Hormuz, can monitor Iraqi communications. CLARINET, in the south of Oman, is strategically close to Yemen.
Access is provided through secret agreements with BT and Vodaphone:
British national telco BT, referred to within GCHQ and the American NSA under the ultra-classified codename "REMEDY", and Vodafone Cable (which owns the former Cable & Wireless company, aka "GERONTIC") are the two top earners of secret GCHQ payments running into tens of millions of pounds annually.
There's no source document associated with the story, but it does seem to be accurate. Glenn Greenwald comments:
"Snowden has no source relationship with Duncan (who is a great journalist), and never provided documents to him directly or indirectly, as Snowden has made clear," Greenwald said in an email. "I can engage in informed speculation about how Duncan got this document - it's certainly a document that several people in the Guardian UK possessed -- but how he got it is something only he can answer."
The reporter is staying mum on his source:
When Wired.co.uk asked Duncan Campbell -- the investigative journalist behind the "Register" article revealing the Oman location -- if he too had copies proving the allegations, he responded: "I won't answer that question -- given the conduct of the authorities."
"I was able to look at some of the material provided in Britain to the "Guardian" by Edward Snowden last year," Campbell, who is a forensic expert witness on communications data, tells us.
Guardian story:
Greenwald's comments:
Campbell's comments:
Campbell also published this on the NSA.
This article from "Communications of the ACM" outlines some of the security measures the NSA could, and should, have had in place to stop someone like Snowden. Mostly obvious stuff, although I'm not sure it would have been effective against such a skilled and tenacious leaker. What's missing is the one thing that would have worked: have fewer secrets.
This is a pretty horrible story of a small-city mayor abusing his authority -- warrants where there is no crime, police raids, incidental marijuana bust -- to identify and shut down a Twitter parody account. The ACLU is taking the case.
New IETF RFC: "RFC 7258: Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack" that designers must mitigate.
At Eurocrypt this year, researchers presented a paper that completely breaks the discrete log problem in any field with a small characteristic. It's nice work, and builds on a bunch of advances in this direction over the last several years. Despite headlines to the contrary, this does not have any cryptanalytic application -- unless they can generalize the result, which seems unlikely to me.
Interesting research paper on a bank card chip-and-PIN vulnerability.
New paper: "Your Secret Stingray's No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy," by Christopher Soghoian and Stephanie K. Pell.
Biologist Peter Watts makes some good points on the harms of surveillance. His basic point is that mammals consider it a threat, and that it makes us feel like prey.
This is interesting. People accept government surveillance out of fear: fear of the terrorists, fear of the criminals. If Watts is right, then there's a conflict of fears. Because terrorists and criminals -- kidnappers, child pornographers, drug dealers, whatever -- are more evocative than the nebulous fear of being stalked, it wins.
This, also by Peter Watts, is well worth reading.
Ross Anderson has an important new paper on the economics that drive government-on-population bulk surveillance. He talks about network effects, high fixed costs and low marginal costs, and high switching costs (lock-in).
Eben Moglen's essay on surveillance is well worth reading.
It's based on a series of talks he gave last fall.
SEC Consult has published an advisory warning people not to use a government eavesdropping product called Recording eXpress, sold by the Israeli company Nice Systems. Basically, attackers can completely compromise the system.
Security risks from smart toilets and smart televisions.
iOS 8 is randomizing MAC addresses. This seems like a good idea.
Feedly, Evernote, and Deezer are the victims of DDoS attacks, blackmail in the case of Feedly.
First-person experience of censorship in China.
"Erotica Written By Someone With An Appropriate Sense of Privacy"
Chinese Hacking of the US
Chinese hacking of American computer networks is old news. For years we've known about their attacks against U.S. government and corporate targets. We've seen detailed reports of how they hacked the "New York Times." Google has detected them going after Gmail accounts of dissidents. They've built sophisticated worldwide eavesdropping networks. These hacks target both military secrets and corporate intellectual property. They're perpetrated by a combination of state, state-sponsored and state-tolerated hackers. It's been going on for years.
On Monday, the Justice Department indicted five Chinese hackers in absentia, all associated with the Chinese military, for stealing corporate secrets from U.S. energy, metals and manufacturing companies. It's entirely for show; the odds that the Chinese are going to send these people to the U.S. to stand trial is zero. But it does move what had been mostly a technical security problem into the world of diplomacy and foreign policy. By doing this, the U.S. government is taking a very public stand and saying "enough."
The problem with that stand is that we've been doing much the same thing to China. Documents revealed by the whistleblower Edward Snowden show that the NSA has penetrated Chinese government and commercial networks, and is exfiltrating -- that's NSA talk for stealing -- an enormous amount of secret data. We've hacked the networking hardware of one of their own companies, Huawei. We've intercepted networking equipment being sent there and installed monitoring devices. We've been listening in on their private communications channels.
The only difference between the U.S. and China's actions is that the U.S. doesn't engage in direct industrial espionage. That is, we don't steal secrets from Chinese companies and pass them directly to U.S. competitors. But we do engage in economic espionage; we steal secrets from Chinese companies for an advantage in government trade negotiations, which directly benefits U.S. competitors. We might think this difference is important, but other countries are not as as impressed with our nuance.
Already the Chinese are retaliating against the U.S. actions with rhetoric of their own. I don't know the Chinese expression for 'pot calling the kettle black,' but it certainly fits in this case.
Again, none of this is new. The U.S. and the Chinese have been conducting electronic espionage on each other throughout the Cold War, and there's no reason to think it's going to change anytime soon. What's different now is the ease with which the two countries can do this safely and remotely, over the Internet, as well as the massive amount of information that can be stolen with a few computer commands.
On the Internet today, it is much easier to attack systems and break into them than it is to defend those systems against attack, so the advantage is to the attacker. This is true for a combination of reasons: the ability of an attacker to concentrate his attack, the nature of vulnerabilities in computer systems, poor software quality and the enormous complexity of computer systems.
The computer security industry is used to coping with criminal attacks. In general, such attacks are untargeted. Criminals might have broken into Target's network last year and stolen 40 million credit and debit card numbers, but they would have been happy with any retailer's large credit card database. If Target's security had been better than its competitors, the criminals would have gone elsewhere. In this way, security is relative.
The Chinese attacks are different. For whatever reason, the government hackers wanted certain information inside the networks of Alcoa World Alumina, Westinghouse Electric, Allegheny Technologies, U.S. Steel, United Steelworkers Union and SolarWorld. It wouldn't have mattered how those companies' security compared with other companies; all that mattered was whether it was better than the ability of the attackers.
This is a fundamentally different security model -- often called APT or Advanced Persistent Threat -- and one that is much more difficult to defend against.
In a sense, American corporations are collateral damage in this battle of espionage between the U.S. and China. Taking the battle from the technical sphere into the foreign policy sphere might be a good idea, but it will work only if we have some moral high ground from which to demand that others not spy on us. As long as we run the largest surveillance network in the world and hack computer networks in foreign countries, we're going to have trouble convincing others not to attempt the same on us.
This essay previously appeared on Time.com.
Chinese hacking:
New indictment:
NSA attacking Chinese networks:
NSA intercepting networking equipment:
Chinese on US economic espionage:
Chinese retaliation:
Complexity and security:
NSA offensive cyberattacks:
The Human Side of Heartbleed
The announcement on April 7 was alarming. A new Internet vulnerability called Heartbleed could allow hackers to steal your logins and passwords. It affected a piece of security software that is used on half a million websites worldwide. Fixing it would be hard: It would strain our security infrastructure and the patience of users everywhere.
It was a software insecurity, but the problem was entirely human.
Software has vulnerabilities because it's written by people, and people make mistakes -- thousands of mistakes. This particular mistake was made in 2011 by a German graduate student who was one of the unpaid volunteers working on a piece of software called OpenSSL. The update was approved by a British consultant.
In retrospect, the mistake should have been obvious, and it's amazing that no one caught it. But even though thousands of large companies around the world used this critical piece of software for free, no one took the time to review the code after its release.
The mistake was discovered around March 21, 2014, and was reported on April 1 by Neel Mehta of Google's security team, who quickly realized how potentially devastating it was. Two days later, in an odd coincidence, researchers at a security company called Codenomicon independently discovered it.
When a researcher discovers a major vulnerability in a widely used piece of software, he generally discloses it responsibly. Why? As soon as a vulnerability becomes public, criminals will start using it to hack systems, steal identities, and generally create mayhem, so we have to work together to fix the vulnerability quickly after it's announced.
The researchers alerted some of the larger companies quietly so that they could fix their systems before the public announcement. (Who to tell early is another very human problem: If you tell too few, you're not really helping, but if you tell too many, the secret could get out.) Then Codenomicon announced the vulnerability.
One of the biggest problems we face in the security community is how to communicate these sorts of vulnerabilities. The story is technical, and people often don't know how to react to the risk. In this case, the Codenomicon researchers did well. They created a public website explaining (in simple terms) the vulnerability and how to fix it, and they created a logo -- a red bleeding heart -- that every news outlet used for coverage of the story.
The first week of coverage varied widely, as some people panicked and others downplayed the threat. This wasn't surprising: There was a lot of uncertainty about the risk, and it wasn't immediately obvious how disastrous the vulnerability actually was.
The major Internet companies were quick to patch vulnerable systems. Individuals were less likely to update their passwords, but by and large, that was OK.
True to form, hackers started exploiting the vulnerability within minutes of the announcement. We assume that governments also exploited the vulnerability while they could. I'm sure the U.S. National Security Agency had advance warning.
By now, it's largely over. There are still lots of unpatched systems out there. (Many of them are embedded hardware systems that can't be patched.) The risk of attack is still there, but minimal. In the end, the actual damage was also minimal, although the expense of restoring security was great.
The question that remains is this: What should we expect in the future -- are there more Heartbleeds out there?
Yes. Yes there are. The software we use contains thousands of mistakes -- many of them security vulnerabilities. Lots of people are looking for these vulnerabilities: Researchers are looking for them. Criminals and hackers are looking for them. National intelligence agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and elsewhere are looking for them. The software vendors themselves are looking for them.
What happens when a vulnerability is found depends on who finds it. If the vendor finds it, it quietly fixes it. If a researcher finds it, he or she alerts the vendor and then reports it to the public. If a national intelligence agency finds the vulnerability, it either quietly uses it to spy on others or -- if we're lucky -- alerts the vendor. If criminals and hackers find it, they use it until a security company notices and alerts the vendor, and then it gets fixed -- usually within a month.
Heartbleed was unique because there was no single fix. The software had to be updated, and then websites had to regenerate their encryption keys and get new public-key certificates. After that, people had to update their passwords. This multi-stage process had to take place publicly, which is why the announcement happened the way it did.
Yes, it'll happen again. But most of the time, it'll be easier to deal with than this.
This essay previously appeared on The Mark News.
TrueCrypt -- the free hard-drive encryption program that a lot of us use -- shut down last month. There's a good summary of the story at ArsTechnica, and Slashdot, Hacker News, and Reddit all have long comment threads. See also Brian Krebs and Cory Doctorow.
Speculations include a massive hack of the TrueCrypt developers, some Lavabit-like forced shutdown, and an internal power struggle within TrueCrypt. I suppose we'll have to wait and see what develops. At this point, my guess is that the developers just got tired of maintaining the code and shut it down.
No word yet about someone else taking over the project.
Schneier News
I'm speaking at the IEEE 2014 Conference on Norbert Weiner in the 21st Century in Boston on 6/26.
I'm speaking at the 26th Annual FIRST Conference in Boston on 6/27.
I'm speaking at the 3rd Annual Batelle Cyber-Auto Challenge in Detroit on 7/15.
I'm speaking at the ISSA Chicago July 2014 Chapter Meeting in Rosemont, IL on 7/17.
On June 2, I had the honor of presenting Edward Snowden with a "Champion of Freedom" award at the EPIC dinner. Snowden couldn't be there in person -- his father and stepmother were there in his place -- but he recorded a message.
Recording of Snowden:
Two new news articles:
And one new audio:
Security and Human Behavior (SHB 2014)
Early this month, I helped organize SHB 2014: the Seventh Annual Interdisciplinary Workshop on Security and Human Behavior. This is a small invitational gathering of people studying various aspects of the human side of security. The fifty people in the room include psychologists, computer security researchers, sociologists, behavioral economists, philosophers, political scientists, lawyers, anthropologists, business school professors, neuroscientists, and a smattering of others. It's not just an interdisciplinary event; most of the people here are individually interdisciplinary.
I call these the most intellectually stimulating two days of my year. The goal is discussion amongst the group. We do that by putting everyone on panels, but only letting each person talk for 5-7 minutes The rest of the 90-minute panel is left for discussion.
The conference is organized by Alessandro Acquisti, Ross Anderson, and me. This year we were at Cambridge University, in the UK.
The conference website contains a schedule and a list of participants, which includes links to writings by each of them. Ross Anderson liveblogged the event.
Audio recordings:
Posts on previous SHBs.
Seventh Movie-Plot Threat Contest Winner
On April 1, I announced the Seventh Mostly Annual Movie-Plot Threat Contest:
The NSA has won, but how did it do it? How did it use its ability to conduct ubiquitous surveillance, its massive data centers, and its advanced data analytics capabilities to come out on top? Did it take over the world overtly, or is it just pulling the strings behind everyone's backs? Did it have to force companies to build surveillance into its products, or could it just piggy-back on market trends? How does it deal with liberal democracies and ruthless totalitarian dictatorships at the same time? Is it blackmailing Congress? How does the money flow? What's the story?
On May 15, I announced the five semifinalists. The votes are in, and the winner is Doubleplusunlol:
The NSA, GCHQ et al actually *don't* have the ability to conduct the mass surveillance that we now believe they do. Edward Snowden was in fact groomed, without his knowledge, to become a whistleblower, and the leaked documents were elaborately falsified by the NSA and GCHQ.
The encryption and security systems that 'private' companies are launching in the wake of theses 'revelations', however, are in fact being covertly funded by the NSA/GCHQ -- the aim being to encourage criminals and terrorists to use these systems, which the security agencies have built massive backdoors into.
The laws that Obama is now about to pass will in fact be the laws that the NSA will abide by -- and will entrench mass surveillance as a legitimate government tool before the NSA even has the capability to perform it. That the online populace believes that they are already being watched will become a self-fulfilling prophecy; the people have built their own panopticon, wherein the *belief* that the Government is omniscient is sufficient for the Government to control them.
"He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection." Michel Foucault, Surveilier Et Punir, 1975
For the record, Guy Macon was a close runner-up.
Congratulations, Doubleplusunlol. Contact me by e-mail, and I'll send you your fabulous prizes.
Since 1998, CRYPTO-GRAM has been a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise. You can subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address on the Web at <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. Back issues are also available at that URL.
Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM, in whole or in part, to colleagues and friends who will find it valuable. Permission is also granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM, as long as it is reprinted in its entirety.
CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a "security guru" by The Economist. He is the author of 12 books -- including "Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Survive" -- as well as hundreds of articles, essays, and academic papers. His influential newsletter "Crypto-Gram" and his blog "Schneier on Security" are read by over 250,000 people. He has testified before Congress, is a frequent guest on television and radio, has served on several government committees, and is regularly quoted in the press. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology Officer at Co3 Systems, Inc. See <http://www.schneier.com>.
Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of Co3 Systems, Inc.
Copyright (c) 2014 by Bruce Schneier.


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The Eisbach (German for "ice brook") is a small man-made river in Munich. It flows through the park Englischer Garten and is a tributary of the Isar river.
Munich is the capital of the German state of Bavaria and is Germany's third largest city, located on the River Isar north of the Bavarian Alps. Black and gold - the colors of the Holy Roman Empire - have been the city's official colors since the time of Louis IV, Holy Roman Emperor.


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By Mike Haaren – May 19, 2016
Some work from home jobs aren't available to California residents, reportedly for tax reasons. But not all, by any means. Here are hundreds of work from home openings that don't exclude California. We post more to our Daily Jobs page every day, so be sure to check it often!
Customer Service / Sales Agents – Working Solutions
At Home Advisors for Apple – Xerox is reportedly hiring hundreds of At Home Advisors for Apple. Per the job description, "This is a work from home position and we can consider candidates from across the US – you do not have to live in the city this is posted to be considered." For the listing, click here.
Social Media Content Writers – LoveToKnow
Gaming Support and Service Representatives – Sutherland CloudSource
Interpreters – LanguageLine Solutions
Online Ticket Agents – Working Solutions
Search Engine Evaluators – Leapforce
Software Developers – Clevertech
Transcriptionists – Rev.com
Medical Transcriptionists – SoftScript
Social Media Manager – Toptal


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Code PMxxxSPxx
MARCOTHERM PIASTRA DI MONTAGGIO SLK-ALU-Q is made of black coloured rigid polyurethane foam that is not subject to decay. The foam is reinforced with an immersed steel plate to ensure a tight fastening to the base.
MTH PIASTRA DI MONTAGGIO SLK-ALU-Q also has an aluminium plate for fastening external elements as well as a phenolic resin plate, which provides good dispersion of the surface weight. Includes with the product are EPS plugs for closing holes and fixing screws.
- Title Technical sheet
- Kind of file PDF
- Sizes 264.16 KB
- Download


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As paid social continues to evolve, so does the strategy for using it. This channel has become an integral part of the media plan for all of our clients, supporting objectives from awareness all the way to conversion. Platforms are responding to advertisers' more sophisticated use of the channel by offering new features and functionality that drive better performance.
To give marketers the insights they need to make the most of this versatile channel, iProspect today released the latest edition of the Quarterly Paid Social Trends Report. This quarter's report analyzes Q4 data from more than 210 brands advertising on Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, Twitter, and Snap, Inc. (all of which are managed by iProspect U.S., though spend is not confined to just U.S. markets).
Selected key insights from the Q4 2017 report include:
Download the full report for all the details about these trends and the corresponding brand opportunities.


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- "We brought Noxster on to design and develop our website. We have redesigned our website 2x now and they by far were the most creative bunch we have worked with. They went above and beyond their duty. We integrated brand new videos, cutting edge design, and they were a joy to work with. If you are looking for Online Marketing, Web Design, or SEO they are the best company in Los Angeles to work with." -Tim Toomey
○When considering SEO ratings and resources, make sure to check out case study samples. An established SEO Los Angeles business like Noxster will showcase samples of responsive web design via an online portfolio.
To learn more about Noxster's SEO Company, SEO ratings and resources as well as how to find the best SEO company to hire in Los Angeles, please call 888-507-4944 or visit our SEO Los Angeles website.