Abstract : The Colombian government has been unable to deal with its internal insurgency over the past forty years and as a result faces an increasingly violent situation today. This thesis seeks to understand how the interests of different elite actors have historically shaped the Colombian government's response to the insurgency, in an effort to break the stalemate that continues to undermine a unified elite response to their internal crisis, When faced with insurgency, governments have three options. They can develop a counterinsurgent policy to militarily defeat the guerrillas, they can negotiate a political resolution by conceding to some of the insurgents' demands, or they can choose the violent status quo. The thesis demonstrates that Colombia has chosen the violent status quo, walking a middle ground, between counterinsurgency and peace. It shows that Presidential efforts to negotiate peace have been undermined by opposition from the military and status-quo elites in Congress. Similarly, efforts at comprehensive counterinsurgency have been undermined by the executive's fear of military protagonism and congressional opposition to the social and economic reforms that are a necessary part of such efforts. The resulting lack of commitment to either peace or counterinsurgency has resulted in partial successes followed by resurgence of guerrilla activity.